Summa Theologica Plus Appendices Dom Central
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.
Second and Revised Edition, 1920.
PROLOGUE
Because the Master of Catholic Truth ought not only to
teach the proficient, but also to instruct beginners (accord-
ing to the Apostle: “As Unto Little Ones in Christ, I Gave
You Milk to Drink, Not Meat”—1 Cor. iii. 1, 2), we pur-
pose in this book to treat of whatever belongs to the Chris-
tian Religion, in such a way as may tend to the instruction of
beginners. We have considered that students in this Science
have not seldom been hampered by what they have found
written by other authors, partly on account of the multipli-
cation of useless questions, articles, and arguments; partly
also because those things that are needful for them to know
are not taught according to the order of the subject-matter,
but according as the plan of the book might require, or the
occasion of the argument offer; partly, too, because frequent
repetition brought weariness and confusion to the minds of
the readers.
Endeavoring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall
try, by God’s help, to set forth whatever is included in this
Sacred Science as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may
allow.
FIRST PART
FIRST PART, QUESTION 1
The Nature and Extent of Sacred Doctrine
(In Ten Articles)
To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavor to investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning this there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is necessary?
(2) Whether it is a science?
(3) Whether it is one or many?
(4) Whether it is speculative or practical?
(5) How it is compared with other sciences?
(6) Whether it is the same as wisdom?
(7) Whether God is its subject-matter?
(8) Whether it is a matter of argument?
(9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes?
(10) Whether the Sacred Scripture of this doctrine may be expounded in different senses?
Whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is required?
Ia q. 1 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that, besides philosophical sci-
actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salva-
ence, we have no need of any further knowledge. For man
tion of man that certain truths which exceed human reason
should not seek to know what is above reason: “Seek not
should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even
the things that are too high for thee” (Ecclus. 3:22). But
as regards those truths about God which human reason
whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philo-
could have discovered, it was necessary that man should
sophical science. Therefore any other knowledge besides
be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about
philosophical science is superfluous.
God such as reason could discover, would only be known
Objection 2. Further, knowledge can be concerned
by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture
only with being, for nothing can be known, save what
of many errors. Whereas man’s whole salvation, which is
is true; and all that is, is true. But everything that is, is
in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. There-
treated of in philosophical science—even God Himself;
fore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought
so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or
about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that
the divine science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi).
they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation.
Therefore, besides philosophical science, there is no need
It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical sci-
of any further knowledge.
ence built up by reason, there should be a sacred science
On the contrary, It is written (2 Tim. 3:16): “All
learned through revelation.
Scripture, inspired of God is profitable to teach, to re-
Reply to Objection 1. Although those things which
prove, to correct, to instruct in justice.” Now Scripture,
are beyond man’s knowledge may not be sought for by
inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which
man through his reason, nevertheless, once they are re-
has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful
vealed by God, they must be accepted by faith. Hence the
that besides philosophical science, there should be other
sacred text continues, “For many things are shown to thee
knowledge, i.e. inspired of God.
above the understanding of man” (Ecclus. 3:25). And in
I answer that, It was necessary for man’s salvation
this, the sacred science consists.
that there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides
Reply to Objection 2. Sciences are differentiated ac-
philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly,
cording to the various means through which knowledge is
indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that
obtained. For the astronomer and the physicist both may
surpasses the grasp of his reason: “The eye hath not seen,
prove the same conclusion: that the earth, for instance,
O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for
is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics (i.e.
them that wait for Thee” (Is. 66:4). But the end must first
abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of
be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and
matter itself. Hence there is no reason why those things
1
which may be learned from philosophical science, so far lation. Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs
as they can be known by natural reason, may not also be
in kind from that theology which is part of philosophy.
taught us by another science so far as they fall within reve-
Whether sacred doctrine is a science?
Ia q. 1 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that sacred doctrine is not a sci-
principles known by the light of a higher science: thus
ence. For every science proceeds from self-evident prin-
the science of perspective proceeds from principles estab-
ciples. But sacred doctrine proceeds from articles of faith
lished by geometry, and music from principles established
which are not self-evident, since their truth is not admit-
by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a science be-
ted by all: “For all men have not faith” (2 Thess. 3:2).
cause it proceeds from principles established by the light
Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.
of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the
Objection 2. Further, no science deals with individ-
blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority
ual facts. But this sacred science treats of individual facts,
the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred
such as the deeds of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and such
science is established on principles revealed by God.
like. Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.
Reply to Objection 1. The principles of any science
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) “to
are either in themselves self-evident, or reducible to the
this science alone belongs that whereby saving faith is be-
conclusions of a higher science; and such, as we have said,
gotten, nourished, protected and strengthened.” But this
are the principles of sacred doctrine.
can be said of no science except sacred doctrine. There-
Reply to Objection 2. Individual facts are treated of
fore sacred doctrine is a science.
in sacred doctrine, not because it is concerned with them
I answer that, Sacred doctrine is a science. We must
principally, but they are introduced rather both as exam-
bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences. There
ples to be followed in our lives (as in moral sciences) and
are some which proceed from a principle known by the
in order to establish the authority of those men through
natural light of intelligence, such as arithmetic and geom-
whom the divine revelation, on which this sacred scrip-
etry and the like. There are some which proceed from
ture or doctrine is based, has come down to us.
Whether sacred doctrine is one science?
Ia q. 1 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that sacred doctrine is not one
ity of the object of this science; and therefore is included
science; for according to the Philosopher (Poster. i) “that
under sacred doctrine as under one science.
science is one which treats only of one class of subjects.”
Reply to Objection 1. Sacred doctrine does not treat
But the creator and the creature, both of whom are treated
of God and creatures equally, but of God primarily, and of
of in sacred doctrine, cannot be grouped together under
creatures only so far as they are referable to God as their
one class of subjects. Therefore sacred doctrine is not one
beginning or end. Hence the unity of this science is not
science.
impaired.
Objection 2. Further, in sacred doctrine we treat of
Reply to Objection 2. Nothing prevents inferior fac-
angels, corporeal creatures and human morality. But these
ulties or habits from being differentiated by something
belong to separate philosophical sciences. Therefore sa-
which falls under a higher faculty or habit as well; because
cred doctrine cannot be one science.
the higher faculty or habit regards the object in its more
On the contrary, Holy Scripture speaks of it as one
universal formality, as the object of the “common sense”
science: “Wisdom gave him the knowledge [scientiam] of
is whatever affects the senses, including, therefore, what-
holy things” (Wis. 10:10).
ever is visible or audible. Hence the “common sense,”
I answer that, Sacred doctrine is one science. The
although one faculty, extends to all the objects of the five
unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object, not
senses. Similarly, objects which are the subject-matter of
indeed, in its material aspect, but as regards the precise
different philosophical sciences can yet be treated of by
formality under which it is an object. For example, man,
this one single sacred science under one aspect precisely
ass, stone agree in the one precise formality of being col-
so far as they can be included in revelation. So that in
ored; and color is the formal object of sight. Therefore,
this way, sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp of
because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely un-
the divine science which is one and simple, yet extends to
der the formality of being divinely revealed, whatever has
everything.
been divinely revealed possesses the one precise formal-
2
Whether sacred doctrine is a practical science?
Ia q. 1 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that sacred doctrine is a prac-
a speculative science.
tical science; for a practical science is that which ends in
I answer that, Sacred doctrine, being one, extends
action according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii). But sa-
to things which belong to different philosophical sci-
cred doctrine is ordained to action: “Be ye doers of the
ences because it considers in each the same formal aspect,
word, and not hearers only” (James 1:22). Therefore sa-
namely, so far as they can be known through divine reve-
cred doctrine is a practical science.
lation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences
Objection 2. Further, sacred doctrine is divided into
one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sa-
the Old and the New Law. But law implies a moral science
cred doctrine includes both; as God, by one and the same
which is a practical science. Therefore sacred doctrine is
science, knows both Himself and His works. Still, it is
a practical science.
speculative rather than practical because it is more con-
On the contrary, Every practical science is concerned
cerned with divine things than with human acts; though
with human operations; as moral science is concerned
it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is or-
with human acts, and architecture with buildings. But sa-
dained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which
cred doctrine is chiefly concerned with God, whose hand-
consists eternal bliss. This is a sufficient answer to the
iwork is especially man. Therefore it is not a practical but
Objections.
Whether sacred doctrine is nobler than other sciences?
Ia q. 1 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that sacred doctrine is not no-
reason’s grasp. Of the practical sciences, that one is no-
bler than other sciences; for the nobility of a science de-
bler which is ordained to a further purpose, as political
pends on the certitude it establishes. But other sciences,
science is nobler than military science; for the good of the
the principles of which cannot be doubted, seem to be
army is directed to the good of the State. But the purpose
more certain than sacred doctrine; for its principles—
of this science, in so far as it is practical, is eternal bliss; namely, articles of faith—can be doubted. Therefore other
to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every prac-
sciences seem to be nobler.
tical science are directed. Hence it is clear that from every
Objection 2. Further, it is the sign of a lower science
standpoint, it is nobler than other sciences.
to depend upon a higher; as music depends on arithmetic.
Reply to Objection 1. It may well happen that what
But sacred doctrine does in a sense depend upon philo-
is in itself the more certain may seem to us the less certain
sophical sciences; for Jerome observes, in his Epistle to
on account of the weakness of our intelligence, “which
Magnus, that “the ancient doctors so enriched their books
is dazzled by the clearest objects of nature; as the owl
with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers, that thou
is dazzled by the light of the sun” (Metaph. ii, lect. i).
knowest not what more to admire in them, their profane
Hence the fact that some happen to doubt about articles
erudition or their scriptural learning.” Therefore sacred
of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths, but
doctrine is inferior to other sciences.
to the weakness of human intelligence; yet the slenderest
On the contrary, Other sciences are called the hand-
knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is
maidens of this one: “Wisdom sent her maids to invite to
more desirable than the most certain knowledge obtained
the tower” (Prov. 9:3).
of lesser things, as is said in de Animalibus xi.
I answer that, Since this science is partly specula-
Reply to Objection 2. This science can in a sense
tive and partly practical, it transcends all others specula-
depend upon the philosophical sciences, not as though it
tive and practical. Now one speculative science is said
stood in need of them, but only in order to make its teach-
to be nobler than another, either by reason of its greater
ing clearer. For it accepts its principles not from other sci-
certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of its subject-
ences, but immediately from God, by revelation. There-
matter. In both these respects this science surpasses other
fore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon the
speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because
higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as
other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light
handmaidens: even so the master sciences make use of the
of human reason, which can err; whereas this derives its
sciences that supply their materials, as political of military
certitude from the light of divine knowledge, which can-
science. That it thus uses them is not due to its own de-
not be misled: in point of the higher worth of its subject-
fect or insufficiency, but to the defect of our intelligence,
matter because this science treats chiefly of those things
which is more easily led by what is known through natu-
which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while
ral reason (from which proceed the other sciences) to that
other sciences consider only those things which are within
which is above reason, such as are the teachings of this
3
science.
Whether this doctrine is the same as wisdom?
Ia q. 1 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that this doctrine is not the same can be known through creatures just as philosophers knew
as wisdom. For no doctrine which borrows its principles
Him—“That which is known of God is manifest in them”
is worthy of the name of wisdom; seeing that the wise
(Rom. 1:19)—but also as far as He is known to Himself
man directs, and is not directed (Metaph. i). But this doc-
alone and revealed to others. Hence sacred doctrine is es-
trine borrows its principles. Therefore this science is not
pecially called wisdom.
wisdom.
Reply to Objection 1. Sacred doctrine derives its
Objection 2. Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove
principles not from any human knowledge, but from the
the principles of other sciences. Hence it is called the
divine knowledge, through which, as through the highest
chief of sciences, as is clear in Ethic. vi. But this doctrine
wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order.
does not prove the principles of other sciences. Therefore
Reply to Objection 2. The principles of other sci-
it is not the same as wisdom.
ences either are evident and cannot be proved, or are
Objection 3. Further, this doctrine is acquired by
proved by natural reason through some other science. But
study, whereas wisdom is acquired by God’s inspiration;
the knowledge proper to this science comes through reve-
so that it is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit
lation and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no
(Is. 11:2). Therefore this doctrine is not the same as wis-
concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only
dom.
to judge of them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:6): “This is your
contrary to any truth of this science must be condemned as
wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations.”
false: “Destroying counsels and every height that exalteth
I answer that, This doctrine is wisdom above all hu-
itself against the knowledge of God” (2 Cor. 10:4,5).
man wisdom; not merely in any one order, but absolutely.
Reply to Objection 3. Since judgment appertains
For since it is the part of a wise man to arrange and to
to wisdom, the twofold manner of judging produces a
judge, and since lesser matters should be judged in the
twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one way by incli-
light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in any
nation, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly
one order who considers the highest principle in that or-
of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination to-
der: thus in the order of building, he who plans the form
wards it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is
of the house is called wise and architect, in opposition to
the measure and rule of human acts. In another way, by
the inferior laborers who trim the wood and make ready
knowledge, just as a man learned in moral science might
the stones: “As a wise architect, I have laid the founda-
be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had
tion” (1 Cor. 3:10). Again, in the order of all human
not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine things
life, the prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he di-
belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts
rects his acts to a fitting end: “Wisdom is prudence to a
of the Holy Ghost: “The spiritual man judgeth all things”
man” (Prov. 10: 23). Therefore he who considers ab-
(1 Cor. 2:15). And Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): “Hi-
solutely the highest cause of the whole universe, namely
erotheus is taught not by mere learning, but by experience
God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to
of divine things.” The second manner of judging belongs
be the knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (De
to this doctrine which is acquired by study, though its prin-
Trin. xii, 14). But sacred doctrine essentially treats of
ciples are obtained by revelation.
God viewed as the highest cause—not only so far as He
Whether God is the object of this science?
Ia q. 1 a. 7
Objection 1. It seems that God is not the object of
the object of the science. But in Holy Writ we reach
this science. For in every science, the nature of its object
conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning
is presupposed. But this science cannot presuppose the
many other things, such as creatures and human morality.
essence of God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, iv):
Therefore God is not the object of this science.
“It is impossible to define the essence of God.” Therefore
On the contrary, The object of the science is that of
God is not the object of this science.
which it principally treats. But in this science, the treat-
Objection 2.
Further, whatever conclusions are
ment is mainly about God; for it is called theology, as
reached in any science must be comprehended under
treating of God. Therefore God is the object of this sci-
4
ence.
ence, and not to the aspect under which it is treated, have
I answer that, God is the object of this science. The
asserted the object of this science to be something other
relation between a science and its object is the same as
than God—that is, either things and signs; or the works of
that between a habit or faculty and its object. Now prop-
salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members.
erly speaking, the object of a faculty or habit is the thing
Of all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so under the aspect of which all things are referred to that
far as they have reference to God.
faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to the fac-
Reply to Objection 1. Although we cannot know in
ulty of sight in that they are colored. Hence colored things
what consists the essence of God, nevertheless in this sci-
are the proper objects of sight. But in sacred science, all
ence we make use of His effects, either of nature or of
things are treated of under the aspect of God: either be-
grace, in place of a definition, in regard to whatever is
cause they are God Himself or because they refer to God
treated of in this science concerning God; even as in some
as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is
philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about
in very truth the object of this science. This is clear also
a cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a
from the principles of this science, namely, the articles
definition of the cause.
of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the prin-
Reply to Objection 2. Whatever other conclusions
ciples and of the whole science must be the same, since
are reached in this sacred science are comprehended un-
the whole science is contained virtually in its principles.
der God, not as parts or species or accidents but as in some
Some, however, looking to what is treated of in this sci-
way related to Him.
Whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument?
Ia q. 1 a. 8
Objection 1. It seems this doctrine is not a matter of
pute with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence
argument. For Ambrose says (De Fide 1): “Put arguments
Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above itself, can
aside where faith is sought.” But in this doctrine, faith es-
dispute with one who denies its principles only if the op-
pecially is sought: “But these things are written that you
ponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through
may believe” (Jn. 20:31). Therefore sacred doctrine is not
divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from
a matter of argument.
texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article
Objection 2. Further, if it is a matter of argument,
of faith, we can argue from another. If our opponent be-
the argument is either from authority or from reason. If it
lieves nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any
is from authority, it seems unbefitting its dignity, for the
means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but
proof from authority is the weakest form of proof. But if it
only of answering his objections—if he has any—against
is from reason, this is unbefitting its end, because, accord-
faith. Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the
ing to Gregory (Hom. 26), “faith has no merit in those
contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear
things of which human reason brings its own experience.”
that the arguments brought against faith cannot be demon-
Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.
strations, but are difficulties that can be answered.
On the contrary, The Scripture says that a bishop
Reply to Objection 1. Although arguments from hu-
should “embrace that faithful word which is according to
man reason cannot avail to prove what must be received
doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine
on faith, nevertheless, this doctrine argues from articles of
and to convince the gainsayers” (Titus 1:9).
faith to other truths.
I answer that, As other sciences do not argue in
Reply to Objection 2. This doctrine is especially
proof of their principles, but argue from their principles
based upon arguments from authority, inasmuch as its
to demonstrate other truths in these sciences: so this doc-
principles are obtained by revelation: thus we ought to
trine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are
believe on the authority of those to whom the revelation
the articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove
has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity
something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of
of this doctrine, for although the argument from authority
Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor.
based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument
15). However, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to the
from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest.
philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither
But sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not,
prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny
indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would
them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the high-
come to an end), but to make clear other things that are
est of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who
put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does
denies its principles, if only the opponent will make some
not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should
concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no dis-
minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to
5
charity. Hence the Apostle says: “Bringing into captivity faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and
every understanding unto the obedience of Christ” (2 Cor.
prophets who wrote the canonical books, and not on the
10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the author-
revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors.
ity of philosophers in those questions in which they were
Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): “Only
able to know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a
those books of Scripture which are called canonical have
saying of Aratus: “As some also of your own poets said:
I learned to hold in such honor as to believe their authors
For we are also His offspring” (Acts 17:28). Nevertheless,
have not erred in any way in writing them. But other au-
sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic
thors I so read as not to deem everything in their works
and probable arguments; but properly uses the authority
to be true, merely on account of their having so thought
of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof,
and written, whatever may have been their holiness and
and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that
learning.”
may properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our
Whether Holy Scripture should use metaphors?
Ia q. 1 a. 9
Objection 1. It seems that Holy Scripture should not
itual truths be expounded by means of figures taken from
use metaphors. For that which is proper to the lowest sci-
corporeal things, in order that thereby even the simple
ence seems not to befit this science, which holds the high-
who are unable by themselves to grasp intellectual things
est place of all. But to proceed by the aid of various simil-
may be able to understand it.
itudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least of all the
Reply to Objection 1. Poetry makes use of metaphors
sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science should
to produce a representation, for it is natural to man to be
make use of such similitudes.
pleased with representations. But sacred doctrine makes
Objection 2. Further, this doctrine seems to be in-
use of metaphors as both necessary and useful.
tended to make truth clear. Hence a reward is held out to
Reply to Objection 2. The ray of divine revelation
those who manifest it: “They that explain me shall have
is not extinguished by the sensible imagery wherewith
life everlasting” (Ecclus. 24:31). But by such similitudes
it is veiled, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i); and its
truth is obscured. Therefore, to put forward divine truths
truth so far remains that it does not allow the minds of
by likening them to corporeal things does not befit this
those to whom the revelation has been made, to rest in the
science.
metaphors, but raises them to the knowledge of truths; and
Objection 3. Further, the higher creatures are, the
through those to whom the revelation has been made oth-
nearer they approach to the divine likeness. If therefore
ers also may receive instruction in these matters. Hence
any creature be taken to represent God, this representa-
those things that are taught metaphorically in one part
tion ought chiefly to be taken from the higher creatures,
of Scripture, in other parts are taught more openly. The
and not from the lower; yet this is often found in Scrip-
very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the exercise of
tures.
thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of
On the contrary, It is written (Osee 12:10): “I have
the impious, according to the words “Give not that which
multiplied visions, and I have used similitudes by the min-
is holy to dogs” (Mat. 7:6).
istry of the prophets.” But to put forward anything by
Reply to Objection 3.
As Dionysius says, (Coel.
means of similitudes is to use metaphors. Therefore this
Hier. i) it is more fitting that divine truths should be ex-
sacred science may use metaphors.
pounded under the figure of less noble than of nobler bod-
I answer that, It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward
ies, and this for three reasons. Firstly, because thereby
divine and spiritual truths by means of comparisons with
men’s minds are the better preserved from error. For then
material things. For God provides for everything accord-
it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of
ing to the capacity of its nature. Now it is natural to man
divine truths, which might have been open to doubt had
to attain to intellectual truths through sensible objects, be-
they been expressed under the figure of nobler bodies,
cause all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in
especially for those who could think of nothing nobler
Holy Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the
than bodies. Secondly, because this is more befitting the
likeness of material things. This is what Dionysius says
knowledge of God that we have in this life. For what He is
(Coel. Hier. i): “We cannot be enlightened by the divine
not is clearer to us than what He is. Therefore similitudes
rays except they be hidden within the covering of many
drawn from things farthest away from God form within us
sacred veils.” It is also befitting Holy Writ, which is pro-
a truer estimate that God is above whatsoever we may say
posed to all without distinction of persons—“To the wise
or think of Him. Thirdly, because thereby divine truths
and to the unwise I am a debtor” (Rom. 1:14)—that spir-
are the better hidden from the unworthy.
6
Whether in Holy Scripture a word may have several senses?
Ia q. 1 a. 10
Objection 1. It seems that in Holy Writ a word can-
the moral sense. But so far as they signify what relates
not have several senses, historical or literal, allegorical,
to eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense. Since the
tropological or moral, and anagogical. For many differ-
literal sense is that which the author intends, and since the
ent senses in one text produce confusion and deception
author of Holy Writ is God, Who by one act comprehends
and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument,
all things by His intellect, it is not unfitting, as Augustine
but only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of
says (Confess. xii), if, even according to the literal sense,
propositions. But Holy Writ ought to be able to state the
one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.
truth without any fallacy. Therefore in it there cannot be
Reply to Objection 1.
The multiplicity of these
several senses to a word.
senses does not produce equivocation or any other kind
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De util. cred.
of multiplicity, seeing that these senses are not multiplied
iii) that “the Old Testament has a fourfold division as to
because one word signifies several things, but because the
history, etiology, analogy and allegory.” Now these four
things signified by the words can be themselves types of
seem altogether different from the four divisions men-
other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results,
tioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem
for all the senses are founded on one—the literal—from
fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according
which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from
to the four different senses mentioned above.
those intended in allegory, as Augustine says (Epis. 48).
Objection 3. Further, besides these senses, there is
Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture perishes on ac-
the parabolical, which is not one of these four.
count of this, since nothing necessary to faith is contained
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xx, 1): “Holy
under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put for-
Writ by the manner of its speech transcends every science,
ward by the Scripture in its literal sense.
because in one and the same sentence, while it describes
Reply to Objection 2. These three—history, etiol-
a fact, it reveals a mystery.”
ogy, analogy—are grouped under the literal sense. For
I answer that, The author of Holy Writ is God, in
it is called history, as Augustine expounds (Epis. 48),
whose power it is to signify His meaning, not by words
whenever anything is simply related; it is called etiology
only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves.
when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave the
So, whereas in every other science things are signified by
reason why Moses allowed the putting away of wives—
words, this science has the property, that the things sig-
namely, on account of the hardness of men’s hearts; it is
nified by the words have themselves also a signification.
called analogy whenever the truth of one text of Scripture
Therefore that first signification whereby words signify
is shown not to contradict the truth of another. Of these
things belongs to the first sense, the historical or literal.
four, allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses.
That signification whereby things signified by words have
Thus Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog.) includes
themselves also a signification is called the spiritual sense,
the anagogical under the allegorical sense, laying down
which is based on the literal, and presupposes it. Now this
three senses only—the historical, the allegorical, and the
spiritual sense has a threefold division. For as the Apostle
tropological.
says (Heb. 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law,
Reply to Objection 3. The parabolical sense is con-
and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) “the New Law itself is
tained in the literal, for by words things are signified prop-
a figure of future glory.” Again, in the New Law, what-
erly and figuratively. Nor is the figure itself, but that
ever our Head has done is a type of what we ought to do.
which is figured, the literal sense. When Scripture speaks
Therefore, so far as the things of the Old Law signify the
of God’s arm, the literal sense is not that God has such
things of the New Law, there is the allegorical sense; so far
a member, but only what is signified by this member,
as the things done in Christ, or so far as the things which
namely operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing
signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is
false can ever underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ.
7
FIRST PART, QUESTION 2
The Existence of God
(In Three Articles)
Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational creature’s advance towards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.
In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him.
Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is NOT the manner of His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations—namely, His knowledge, will, power.
Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the proposition “God exists” is self-evident?
(2) Whether it is demonstrable?
(3) Whether God exists?
Whether the existence of God is self-evident?
Ia q. 2 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that the existence of God is self-
stration. But the opposite of the proposition “God is” can
evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us
be mentally admitted: “The fool said in his heart, There
the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as
is no God” (Ps. 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is not
we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene
self-evident.
says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), “the knowledge of God is nat-
I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of
urally implanted in all.” Therefore the existence of God is
two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though
self-evident.
not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us.
Objection 2. Further, those things are said to be self-
A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is in-
evident which are known as soon as the terms are known,
cluded in the essence of the subject, as “Man is an an-
which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the
imal,” for animal is contained in the essence of man.
first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature
If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be
of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized
known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all;
that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as
as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstra-
the signification of the word “God” is understood, it is at
tion, the terms of which are common things that no one
once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified
is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and
that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived.
part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom
But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than
the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the
that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon
proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those
as the word “God” is understood it exists mentally, it also
who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject
follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition
of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says
“God exists” is self-evident.
(Hebdom., the title of which is: “Whether all that is, is
Objection 3. Further, the existence of truth is self-
good”), “that there are some mental concepts self-evident
evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants
only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not
that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then
in space.” Therefore I say that this proposition, “God ex-
the proposition “Truth does not exist” is true: and if there
ists,” of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth it-as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be
self: “I am the way, the truth, and the life” (Jn. 14:6)
hereafter shown (q. 3, a. 4). Now because we do not know
Therefore “God exists” is self-evident.
the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to
On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the op-
us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more
posite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph.
known to us, though less known in their nature—namely,
iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demon-
by effects.
8
Reply to Objection 1. To know that God exists in a some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that
general and confused way is implanted in us by nature,
everyone understands that by this word “God” is signi-
inasmuch as God is man’s beatitude. For man naturally
fied something than which nothing greater can be thought,
desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man
nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he under-
must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not
stands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only
to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that
that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actu-
someone is approaching is not the same as to know that
ally exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists
Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is ap-
something than which nothing greater can be thought; and
proaching; for many there are who imagine that man’s
this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God
perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and
does not exist.
others in pleasures, and others in something else.
Reply to Objection 3. The existence of truth in gen-
Reply to Objection 2. Perhaps not everyone who
eral is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is
hears this word “God” understands it to signify something
not self-evident to us.
than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that
Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?
Ia q. 2 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that the existence of God cannot
cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better
be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God ex-
known to us; because since every effect depends upon its
ists. But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because
cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence
a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas
the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to
faith is of the unseen (Heb. 11:1). Therefore it cannot be
us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which
demonstrated that God exists.
are known to us.
Objection 2. Further, the essence is the middle term
Reply to Objection 1. The existence of God and other
of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God’s
like truths about God, which can be known by natural rea-
essence consists, but solely in what it does not consist;
son, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the ar-
as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we
ticles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as
cannot demonstrate that God exists.
grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes some-
Objection 3. Further, if the existence of God were
thing that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing
demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But
to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as
His effects are not proportionate to Him, since He is infi-
a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of
nite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and
being scientifically known and demonstrated.
infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause
Reply to Objection 2. When the existence of a cause
cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to
is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place
it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demon-
of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause’s ex-
strated.
istence. This is especially the case in regard to God, be-
On the contrary, The Apostle says: “The invisible
cause, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is
things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the
necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the
things that are made” (Rom. 1:20). But this would not
word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence
be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated
follows on the question of its existence. Now the names
through the things that are made; for the first thing we
given to God are derived from His effects; consequently,
must know of anything is whether it exists.
in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects,
I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two
we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word
ways: One is through the cause, and is called “a priori,”
“God”.
and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The
Reply to Objection 3. From effects not proportion-
other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration
ate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be
“a posteriori”; this is to argue from what is prior relatively
obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause
only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its
can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate
cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the
the existence of God from His effects; though from them
cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper
we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.
9
Whether God exists?
Ia q. 2 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that God does not exist; because
indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the ef-
if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be al-
ficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself,
together destroyed. But the word “God” means that He is
which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not pos-
infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would
sible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes
be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world.
following in order, the first is the cause of the interme-
Therefore God does not exist.
diate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ulti-
Objection 2. Further, it is superfluous to suppose that
mate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or
what can be accounted for by a few principles has been
only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the
produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in
effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among effi-
the world can be accounted for by other principles, sup-
cient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermedi-
posing God did not exist. For all natural things can be re-
ate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on
duced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary
to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will things can be reduced to one principle which is human
there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient
reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose
causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is nec-
God’s existence.
essary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone
On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: “I
gives the name of God.
am Who am.” (Ex. 3:14)
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity,
I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in
and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible
five ways.
to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated,
The first and more manifest way is the argument from
and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be
motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the
and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to ex-
world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in mo-
ist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is
tion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in mo-
not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then
tion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is
at one time there could have been nothing in existence.
in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.
Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing
For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something
in existence, because that which does not exist only be-
from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced
gins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if
from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a
at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been
state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire,
impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus
makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot,
even now nothing would be in existence—which is ab-
and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possi-
surd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but
ble that the same thing should be at once in actuality and
there must exist something the existence of which is nec-
potentiality in the same respect, but only in different re-
essary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity
spects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be
caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on
potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold.
to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity
It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in
caused by another, as has been already proved in regard
the same way a thing should be both mover and moved,
to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the
i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in
existence of some being having of itself its own necessity,
motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which
and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in
it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also
others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.
must needs be put in motion by another, and that by an-
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found
other again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then
in things. Among beings there are some more and some
there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other
less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less”
mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inas-
are predicated of different things, according as they re-
much as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the
semble in their different ways something which is the
staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand.
maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it
Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in
more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there
motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be
is something which is truest, something best, something
God.
noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost
The second way is from the nature of the efficient
being; for those things that are greatest in truth are great-
cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order
est in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maxi-
of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it,
mum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire,
10
which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things.
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Enchirid-
Therefore there must also be something which is to all be-
ion xi): “Since God is the highest good, He would not
ings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other
allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipo-
perfection; and this we call God.
tence and goodness were such as to bring good even out
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the
of evil.” This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that
world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such
He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.
as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from
Reply to Objection 2. Since nature works for a deter-
their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so
minate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever
as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not for-
is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to
tuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now
its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must
whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end,
also be traced back to some higher cause other than hu-
unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowl-
man reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all
edge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark
things that are changeable and capable of defect must be
by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by
traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first prin-
whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this
ciple, as was shown in the body of the Article.
being we call God.
11
FIRST PART, QUESTION 3
Of the Simplicity of God
(In Eight Articles)
When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather how He is not.
Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named.
Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.
Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is a body?
(2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?
(3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject?
(4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?
(5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?
(6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?
(7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?
(8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?
Whether God is a body?
Ia q. 3 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that God is a body. For a body is
ened” (Ps. 33:6), and as a term “wherefrom”: “All they
that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture
that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth” (Jer.
attributes the three dimensions to God, for it is written:
17:13). Therefore God is a body.
“He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is
On the contrary, It is written in the Gospel of St. John deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure
(Jn. 4:24): “God is a spirit.”
of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea”
I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a
(Job 11:8,9). Therefore God is a body.
body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because
Objection 2. Further, everything that has figure is a
no body is in motion unless it be put in motion, as is evi-
body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems
dent from induction. Now it has been already proved (q. 2,
to have figure, for it is written: “Let us make man to our
a. 3), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved.
image and likeness” (Gn. 1:26). Now a figure is called
Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, be-
an image, according to the text: “Who being the bright-
cause the first being must of necessity be in act, and in
ness of His glory and the figure,” i.e. the image, “of His
no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing
substance” (Heb. 1:3). Therefore God is a body.
that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality
Objection 3. Further, whatever has corporeal parts is
is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely
a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God.
speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is
“Hast thou an arm like God?” (Job 40:4); and “The eyes
in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some
of the Lord are upon the just” (Ps. 33:16); and “The right
being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that
hand of the Lord hath wrought strength” (Ps. 117:16).
God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in
Therefore God is a body.
God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in
Objection 4. Further, posture belongs only to bodies.
potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible
But something which supposes posture is said of God in
to infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a
the Scriptures: “I saw the Lord sitting” (Is. 6:1), and “He
body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings.
standeth up to judge” (Is. 3:13). Therefore God is a body.
Now it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of
Objection 5. Further, only bodies or things corporeal
beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate;
can be a local term “wherefrom” or “whereto.” But in
and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inani-
the Scriptures God is spoken of as a local term “whereto,”
mate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely
according to the words, “Come ye to Him and be enlight-
as body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. There-
12
fore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our
“And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea”
body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence that
(Gn. 1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason
by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than
and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence
the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a
and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be
body.
according to the image of God.
Reply to Objection 1. As we have said above (q. 1,
Reply to Objection 3. Corporeal parts are attributed
a. 9), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things
to God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this
under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when
is owing to a certain parallel. For instance the act of the
it attributes to God the three dimensions under the com-
eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His
parison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quan-
power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; and so on with
tity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing
the other parts.
hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His ex-
Reply to Objection 4. Whatever pertains to posture,
celling power; by length, the duration of His existence;
also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He
by breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius
is spoken of as sitting, on account of His unchangeable-
(Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incom-
ness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His
prehensibility of His essence; by length, the procession of
power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.
His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading
Reply to Objection 5. We draw near to God by no
all things, inasmuch as all things lie under His protection.
corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the af-
Reply to Objection 2. Man is said to be after the im-
fections of our soul, and by the actions of that same soul
age of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that
do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to
whereby he excels other animals. Hence, when it is said,
withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the
“Let us make man to our image and likeness”, it is added,
metaphor of local motion.
Whether God is composed of matter and form?
Ia q. 3 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that God is composed of matter
and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is par-
and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of mat-
ticipated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now
ter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But
the first good and the best—viz. God—is not a partici-
Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in
pated good, because the essential good is prior to the par-
Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: “But My just
ticipated good. Hence it is impossible that God should
man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall
be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every
not please My soul.” Therefore God is composed of mat-
agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has
ter and form.
its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore
Objection 2. Further, anger, joy and the like are pas-
whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be pri-
sions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in
marily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent,
Scripture: “The Lord was exceeding angry with His peo-
since He is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His
ple” (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is composed of matter
essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.
and form.
Reply to Objection 1. A soul is attributed to God be-
Objection 3. Further, matter is the principle of in-
cause His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will
dividualization. But God seems to be individual, for He
anything, is due to our soul. Hence what is pleasing to His
cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He is composed
will is said to be pleasing to His soul.
of matter and form.
Reply to Objection 2. Anger and the like are at-
On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and
tributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus,
form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property
because to punish is properly the act of an angry man,
of matter. But God is not a body as proved in the preced-
God’s punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His
ing Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and
anger.
form.
Reply to Objection 3. Forms which can be received
I answer that, It is impossible that matter should ex-
in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in
ist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But
another as in a subject since it is the first underlying sub-
we have shown (q. 2, a. 3) that God is pure act, without
ject; although form of itself, unless something else pre-
any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should
vents it, can be received by many. But that form which
be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because ev-
cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is in-
erything composed of matter and form owes its perfection
dividualized precisely because it cannot be received in a
13
subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in God.
Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?
Ia q. 3 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that God is not the same as His
thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has
essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the
something more in it than has humanity. Consequently
substance or nature of God—i.e. the Godhead—is said to
humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but human-
be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as
ity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the
His essence or nature.
principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the
Objection 2. Further, the effect is assimilated to its
formal constituent in regard to the individualizing mat-
cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created
ter. On the other hand, in things not composed of matter
things the “suppositum” is not identical with its nature;
and form, in which individualization is not due to indi-
for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God
vidual matter—that is to say, to “this” matter—the very
is not the same as His Godhead.
forms being individualized of themselves—it is necessary
On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life itself, the forms themselves should be subsisting “supposita.”
and not only that He is a living thing: “I am the way, the
Therefore “suppositum” and nature in them are identified.
truth, and the life” (Jn. 14:6). Now the relation between
Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He
Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life
must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever
and a living thing. Therefore God is His very Godhead.
else is thus predicated of Him.
I answer that, God is the same as His essence or na-
Reply to Objection 1. We can speak of simple things
ture. To understand this, it must be noted that in things
only as though they were like the composite things from
composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must
which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in speaking
differ from the “suppositum,” because the essence or na-
of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence,
ture connotes only what is included in the definition of the
because with us only those things subsist which are com-
species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the
posite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity.
definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and
In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in
it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby
God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect
man is man. Now individual matter, with all the individ-
understands, but not that there is any composition in God.
ualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the
Reply to Objection 2. The effects of God do not imi-
species. For this particular flesh, these bones, this black-
tate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the
ness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition
imitation is here defective, precisely because what is sim-
of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the ac-
ple and one, can only be represented by divers things; con-
cidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are
sequently, composition is accidental to them, and there-
not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the
fore, in them “suppositum” is not the same as nature.
Whether essence and existence are the same in God?
Ia q. 3 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that essence and existence are
Therefore what subsists in God is His existence.
not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being
I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as
has nothing added to it. Now being to which no addi-
shown in the preceding article, but also His own exis-
tion is made is universal being which is predicated of all
tence. This may be shown in several ways. First, what-
things. Therefore it follows that God is being in general
ever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either
which can be predicated of everything. But this is false:
by the constituent principles of that essence (like a prop-
“For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and
erty that necessarily accompanies the species—as the fac-
wood” (Wis. 14:21). Therefore God’s existence is not His
ulty of laughing is proper to a man—and is caused by the
essence.
constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior
Objection 2. Further, we can know “whether” God
agent—as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if
exists as said above (q. 2, a. 2); but we cannot know
the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this exis-
“what” He is. Therefore God’s existence is not the same
tence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by
as His essence—that is, as His quiddity or nature.
its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing’s
On the contrary, Hilary says (Trin. vii): “In God ex-
existence to be caused by its essential constituent prin-
istence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth.”
ciples, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own
14
existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, Reply to Objection 1. A thing that has nothing added
whose existence differs from its essence, must have its ex-
to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes
istence caused by another. But this cannot be true of God;
any addition; thus, for example, it is of the essence of an
because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it
irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may under-
is impossible that in God His existence should differ from
stand a thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its
His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes ev-
essence does not require that anything should be added to
ery form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are
it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is
spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as ex-
not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but
isting. Therefore existence must be compared to essence,
neither is it to lack reason. And so the divine being has
if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality.
nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal
Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown
being has nothing added to it in the second sense.
above (a. 1), it follows that in Him essence does not differ
Reply to Objection 2. “To be” can mean either of
from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence.
two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may
Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not it-
mean the composition of a proposition effected by the
self fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has exis-
mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking “to be”
tence but is not existence, is a being by participation. But
in the first sense, we cannot understand God’s existence
God is His own essence, as shown above (a. 3) if, there-
nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know
fore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential,
that this proposition which we form about God when we
but participated being. He will not therefore be the first
say “God is,” is true; and this we know from His effects
being—which is absurd. Therefore God is His own exis-
(q. 2, a. 2).
tence, and not merely His own essence.
Whether God is contained in a genus?
Ia q. 3 a. 5
Objection 1.
It seems that God is contained in a
as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds
genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself.
good in other things. Hence since in God actuality is not
But this is especially true of God. Therefore God is in a
added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in
genus of substance.
any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence of
Objection 2. Further, nothing can be measured save
God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would
by something of its own genus; as length is measured by
be the genus “being”, because, since genus is predicated
length and numbers by number. But God is the measure
as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the
of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x).
Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot
Therefore God is in the genus of substance.
be a genus, for every genus has differences distinct from
On the contrary, In the mind, genus is prior to what
its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct
it contains. But nothing is prior to God either really or
from being; for non-being cannot be a difference. It fol-
mentally. Therefore God is not in any genus.
lows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all
I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways;
in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus
either absolutely and properly, as a species contained un-
which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ
der a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles and
in their existence. For the existence of man and of horse
privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to
is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus
the genus of quantity, as its principles; while blindness
in every member of a genus, existence and quiddity—i.e.
and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit.
essence—must differ. But in God they do not differ, as
But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot
shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain that
be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways.
God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this
First, because a species is constituted of genus and dif-
it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor
ference. Now that from which the difference constituting
can there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His
the species is derived, is always related to that from which
effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from
the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality.
genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration is
For animal is derived from sensitive nature, by concretion
a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to
as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive na-
it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle re-
ture. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from
ducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus;
intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an
as, a point is the principle of continuous quantity alone;
intellectual nature, and intelligence is compared to sense,
and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the prin-
15
ciple of all being. Therefore He is not contained in any in the genus of substance.
genus as its principle.
Reply to Objection 2.
This objection turns upon
Reply to Objection 1. The word substance signifies
proportionate measure which must be homogeneous with
not only what exists of itself—for existence cannot of it-
what is measured. Now, God is not a measure propor-
self be a genus, as shown in the body of the article; but, it
tionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all
also signifies an essence that has the property of existing
things, in the sense that everything has being only accord-
in this way—namely, of existing of itself; this existence,
ing as it resembles Him.
however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not
Whether in God there are any accidents?
Ia q. 3 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that there are accidents in God.
as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may
For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says
have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to ab-
(Phys. i). Therefore that which is an accident in one,
solute being: thus a heated substance can have something
cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that
extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless
heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because it is an
absolute heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly,
accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like,
because what is essential is prior to what is accidental.
which are accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore
Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in
in God there are accidents.
Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essen-
Objection 2. Further, in every genus there is a first
tial accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential
principle. But there are many “genera” of accidents. If,
accident of man), because such accidents are caused by
therefore, the primal members of these genera are not in
the constituent principles of the subject. Now there can be
God, there will be many primal beings other than God—
nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence
which is absurd.
it follows that there is no accident in God.
On the contrary, Every accident is in a subject. But
Reply to Objection 1. Virtue and wisdom are not
God cannot be a subject, for “no simple form can be a
predicated of God and of us univocally. Hence it does
subject”, as Boethius says (De Trin.). Therefore in God
not follow that there are accidents in God as there are in
there cannot be any accident.
us.
I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear there
Reply to Objection 2. Since substance is prior to its
can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is
accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the
compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality; for a
principles of the substance as to that which is prior; al-
subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But
though God is not first as if contained in the genus of sub-
there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown (q. 2,
stance; yet He is first in respect to all being, outside of
a. 3). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and
every genus.
Whether God is altogether simple?
Ia q. 3 a. 7
Objection 1. It seems that God is not altogether sim-
shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of
ple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus
this question. For there is neither composition of quan-
from the first being are all beings; and from the first good
titative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor com-
is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing
position of matter and form; nor does His nature differ
is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God altogether
from His “suppositum”; nor His essence from His exis-
simple.
tence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and
Objection 2. Further, whatever is best must be at-
difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is
tributed to God. But with us that which is composite
clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether sim-
is better than that which is simple; thus, chemical com-
ple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its
pounds are better than simple elements, and animals than
component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the
the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said
first being, as shown above (q. 2, a. 3). Thirdly, because
that God is altogether simple.
every composite has a cause, for things in themselves dif-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7):
ferent cannot unite unless something causes them to unite.
“God is truly and absolutely simple.”
But God is uncaused, as shown above (q. 2, a. 3), since
I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be
He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every
16
composite there must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in
does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates
the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so,
another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole.
since God is absolute form, or rather absolute being, He
Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of
can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument,
any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole
when he says (De Trin. vii): “God, Who is strength, is not
made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man,
made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light,
nor any of the parts of the foot, a foot. But in wholes
composed of things that are dim.”
made up of similar parts, although something which is
Reply to Objection 1. Whatever is from God imitates
predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as
Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of
a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), never-
the essence of a thing to be in some sort composite; be-
theless certain things are predicable of the whole which
cause at least its existence differs from its essence, as will
cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if
be shown hereafter, (q. 4, a. 3).
the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can
Reply to Objection 2. With us composite things are
be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is some-
better than simple things, because the perfections of cre-
thing which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said
ated goodness cannot be found in one simple thing, but
of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is
in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is
not it itself, as in a white object there is something which
found in one simple thing (q. 4, a. 1 and q. 6, a. 2).
Whether God enters into the composition of other things?
Ia q. 3 a. 8
Objection 1. It seems that God enters into the compo-
primary matter. Now all these contain manifest untruth;
sition of other things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv):
since it is not possible for God to enter into the compo-
“The being of all things is that which is above being—
sition of anything, either as a formal or a material princi-
the Godhead.” But the being of all things enters into the
ple. First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now
composition of everything. Therefore God enters into the
the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the
composition of other things.
form of the thing caused, but only specifically: for man
Objection 2. Further, God is a form; for Augustine
begets man. But primary matter can be neither numeri-
says (De Verb. Dom.,∗) that, “the word of God, which is
cally nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for
God, is an uncreated form.” But a form is part of a com-
the former is merely potential, while the latter is actual.
pound. Therefore God is part of some compound.
Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause,
Objection 3. Further, whatever things exist, in no way
to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that
differing from each other, are the same. But God and pri-
which enters into composition with anything does not act
mary matter exist, and in no way differ from each other.
primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts;
Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary mat-
for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and,
ter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does
fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a
God. Proof of the minor—whatever things differ, they dif-
compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound can
fer by some differences, and therefore must be composite.
be absolutely primal among beings—not even matter, nor
But God and primary matter are altogether simple. There-
form, though they are the primal parts of every compound.
fore they nowise differ from each other.
For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is abso-
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii):
lutely posterior to actuality, as is clear from the foregoing
“There can be no touching Him,” i.e. God, “nor any other
(q. 3, a. 1): while a form which is part of a compound is
union with Him by mingling part with part.”
a participated form; and as that which participates is pos-
Further, the first cause rules all things without com-
terior to that which is essential, so likewise is that which
mingling with them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).
is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire I answer that, On this point there have been three er-that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that God
rors. Some have affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is
is absolutely primal being (q. 2, a. 3).
clear from Augustine (De Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practi-
Reply to Objection 1. The Godhead is called the be-
cally the same as the opinion of those who assert that God
ing of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause, but
is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others have said
not as being their essence.
that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was
Reply to Objection 2. The Word is an exemplar form;
the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of
but not a form that is part of a compound.
David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was
Reply to Objection 3. Simple things do not differ by
∗ Serm. xxxviii
17
added differences—for this is the property of compounds.
x), “things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but
Thus man and horse differ by their differences, rational
things which are different differ by something.” There-
and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ
fore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not dif-
from each other by other differences. Hence, to be quite
fer, but are by their very being, diverse. Hence it does not
accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but follow they are the same.
diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.
18
FIRST PART, QUESTION 4
The Perfection of God
(In Three Articles)
Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God’s perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the divine goodness.
Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is perfect?
(2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the perfections of all things?
(3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?
Whether God is perfect?
Ia q. 4 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that perfection does not belong
call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its
to God. For we say a thing is perfect if it is completely
perfection.
made. But it does not befit God to be made. Therefore He
Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory says (Moral. v,
is not perfect.
26,29): “Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant
Objection 2. Further, God is the first beginning of
the high things of God.” For that which is not made is
things. But the beginnings of things seem to be imper-
improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created
fect, as seed is the beginning of animal and vegetable life.
things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they
Therefore God is imperfect.
are brought into actuality, this word “perfect” signifies
Objection 3. Further, as shown above (q. 3, a. 4),
whatever is not wanting in actuality, whether this be by
God’s essence is existence. But existence seems most im-
way of perfection or not.
perfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all mod-
Reply to Objection 2. The material principle which
ification. Therefore God is imperfect.
with us is found to be imperfect, cannot be absolutely
On the contrary, It is written: “Be you perfect as also
primal; but must be preceded by something perfect. For
your heavenly Father is perfect” (Mat. 5:48).
seed, though it be the principle of animal life reproduced
I answer that, As the Philosopher relates (Metaph.
through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from
xii), some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans
which is came. Because, previous to that which is poten-
and Leucippus, did not predicate “best” and “most per-
tial, must be that which is actual; since a potential being
fect” of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient
can only be reduced into act by some being already actual.
philosophers considered only a material principle; and a
Reply to Objection 3. Existence is the most perfect of
material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as
all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which
such is merely potential, the first material principle must
they are made actual; for nothing has actuality except so
be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is
far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all
the first principle, not material, but in the order of efficient things, even their forms. Therefore it is not compared to
cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as
other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as
such, is merely potential, an agent, as such, is in the state
the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the
of actuality. Hence, the first active principle must needs
existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is
be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is
considered a formal principle, and as something received;
perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we
and not as that which exists.
Whether the perfections of all things are in God?
Ia q. 4 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that the perfections of all things each thing is perfected by its specific difference. But the
are not in God. For God is simple, as shown above (q. 3,
differences by which “genera” are divided, and “species”
a. 7); whereas the perfections of things are many and di-
constituted, are opposed to each other. Therefore because
verse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in
opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that
God.
the perfections of all things are not in God.
Objection 2. Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now
Objection 3. Further, a living thing is more perfect
the perfections of things are opposed to each other, for
than what merely exists; and an intelligent thing than what
19
merely lives. Therefore life is more perfect than existence; were self-subsisting, nothing of the virtue of heat would
and knowledge than life. But the essence of God is exis-
be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being
tence itself. Therefore He has not the perfections of life,
itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting
and knowledge, and other similar perfections.
to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that
perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far
“God in His one existence prepossesses all things.”
as they have being after some fashion. It follows therefore
I answer that, All created perfections are in God.
that the perfection of no one thing is wanting to God. This
Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He
line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom.
lacks not (says the Commentator, Metaph. v) any excel-
v), when he says that, “God exists not in any single mode,
lence which may be found in any genus. This may be
but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely, with-
seen from two considerations. First, because whatever
out limitation, uniformly;” and afterwards he adds that,
perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effec-
“He is the very existence to subsisting things.”
tive cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal
Reply to Objection 1. Even as the sun (as Dionysius
agent—as when man reproduces man; or in a more emi-
remarks, (Div. Nom. v)), while remaining one and shin-
nent degree, if it is an equivocal agent—thus in the sun is
ing uniformly, contains within itself first and uniformly
the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun’s power.
the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse
Now it is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the ef-
qualities; “a fortiori” should all things in a kind of natural
ficient cause: and although to pre-exist in the potentiality
unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things
of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more imperfect way,
diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist
since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is
in God as one, without injury to His simplicity. This suf-
perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient cause is fices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more per-
Reply to Objection 3. The same Dionysius says (Div.
fect way. Since therefore God is the first effective cause
Nom. v) that, although existence is more perfect than
of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in
life, and life than wisdom, if they are considered as distin-
God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same
guished in idea; nevertheless, a living thing is more per-
line of argument by saying of God (Div. Nom. v): “It
fect than what merely exists, because living things also
is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as
exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although
the cause of all.” Secondly, from what has been already
therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, be-
proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent (q. 3,
cause that which participates in existence need not partic-
a. 4). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the
ipate in every mode of existence; nevertheless God’s exis-
whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot
tence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing
thing has not the whole perfection of heat, this is because
of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him who is
heat is not participated in its full perfection; but if this heat subsisting being itself.
Whether any creature can be like God?
Ia q. 4 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that no creature can be like
Objection 4. Further, among like things there is mu-
God. For it is written (Ps. 85:8): “There is none among
tual likeness; for like is like to like. If therefore any crea-
the gods like unto Thee, O Lord.” But of all creatures
ture is like God, God will be like some creature, which is
the most excellent are those which are called participation
against what is said by Isaias: “To whom have you likened
gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be
God?” (Is. 40:18).
like God.
On the contrary, It is written: “Let us make man to
Objection 2. Further, likeness implies comparison.
our image and likeness” (Gn. 1:26), and: “When He shall
But there can be no comparison between things in a dif-
appear we shall be like to Him” (1 Jn. 3:2).
ferent “genus.” Therefore neither can there be any like-
I answer that, Since likeness is based upon agreement
ness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness.
or communication in form, it varies according to the many
But no creature is in the same “genus” as God: since God
modes of communication in form. Some things are said to
is no “genus,” as shown above (q. 3, a. 5). Therefore no
be like, which communicate in the same form according
creature is like God.
to the same formality, and according to the same mode;
Objection 3. Further, we speak of those things as like
and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their
which agree in form. But nothing can agree with God in
likeness; as two things equally white are said to be alike in
form; for, save in God alone, essence and existence differ.
whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another
Therefore no creature can be like to God.
way, we speak of things as alike which communicate in
20
form according to the same formality, though not accord-ix), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it
ing to the same measure, but according to more or less,
does not mean to deny all likeness to Him. For, “the same
as something less white is said to be like another thing
things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as
more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way
they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly im-
some things are said to be alike which communicate in the
itable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short
same form, but not according to the same formality; as we
of their cause,” not merely in intensity and remission, as
see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent repro-
that which is less white falls short of that which is more
duces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts
white; but because they are not in agreement, specifically
according to the manner of its form, the effect must in
or generically.
some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the
Reply to Objection 2. God is not related to creatures
agent is contained in the same species as its effect, there
as though belonging to a different “genus,” but as tran-
will be a likeness in form between that which makes and
scending every “genus,” and as the principle of all “gen-
that which is made, according to the same formality of the
era.”
species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent
Reply to Objection 3. Likeness of creatures to God is
and its effect are not contained in the same species, there
not affirmed on account of agreement in form according
will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the
to the formality of the same genus or species, but solely
same species; as things generated by the sun’s heat may
according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being,
be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though
whereas other things are beings by participation.
they received the form of the sun in its specific likeness,
Reply to Objection 4. Although it may be admitted
but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent
that creatures are in some sort like God, it must nowise be
not contained in any “genus,” its effect will still more dis-
admitted that God is like creatures; because, as Dionysius
tantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to
says (Div. Nom. ix): “A mutual likeness may be found
participate in the likeness of the agent’s form according to
between things of the same order, but not between a cause
the same specific or generic formality, but only according
and that which is caused.” For, we say that a statue is like
to some sort of analogy; as existence is common to all. In
a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spo-
this way all created things, so far as they are beings, are
ken of as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a
like God as the first and universal principle of all being.
creature.
Reply to Objection 1. As Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
21
FIRST PART, QUESTION 5
Of Goodness in General
(In Six Articles)
We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the goodness of God.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?
(2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?
(3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?
(4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?
(5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?
(6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant?
Whether goodness differs really from being?
Ia q. 5 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that goodness differs really
being, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from
from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): “I perceive
that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each
that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing:
thing’s substantial being. Hence by its substantial being,
that they are is another.” Therefore goodness and being
everything is said to have being simply; but by any fur-
really differ.
ther actuality it is said to have being relatively. Thus to
Objection 2. Further, nothing can be its own form.
be white implies relative being, for to be white does not
“But that is called good which has the form of being”,
take a thing out of simply potential being; because only
according to the commentary on De Causis. Therefore
a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of
goodness differs really from being.
being. But goodness signifies perfection which is desir-
Objection 3. Further, goodness can be more or less.
able; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that
But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness
which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good;
differs really from being.
but that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some
i, 42) that, “inasmuch as we exist we are good.”
perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good sim-
I answer that, Goodness and being are really the
ply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in
same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the fol-
its primal (i.e. substantial) being a thing is said to be sim-
lowing argument. The essence of goodness consists in
ply, and to be good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philoso-but viewed in its complete actuality, a thing is said to be
pher says (Ethic. i): “Goodness is what all desire.” Now
relatively, and to be good simply. Hence the saying of
it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is
Boethius (De Hebrom.), “I perceive that in nature the fact
perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But every-
that things are good is one thing; that they are is another,”
thing is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear
is to be referred to a thing’s goodness simply, and having
that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence being simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a
that makes all things actual, as is clear from the forego-
thing simply exists; and regarded in its complete actual-
ing (q. 3, a. 4; q. 4, a. 1). Hence it is clear that goodness
ity, it is good simply—in such sort that even in its primal
and being are the same really. But goodness presents the
actuality, it is in some sort good, and even in its complete
aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.
actuality, it in some sort has being.
Reply to Objection 1. Although goodness and be-
Reply to Objection 2. Goodness is a form so far as
ing are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in
absolute goodness signifies complete actuality.
thought, they are not predicated of a thing absolutely in
Reply to Objection 3. Again, goodness is spoken of
the same way. Since being properly signifies that some-
as more or less according to a thing’s superadded actual-
thing actually is, and actuality properly correlates to po-
ity, for example, as to knowledge or virtue.
tentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have
22
Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?
Ia q. 5 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that goodness is prior in idea to
causality of which is first among causes, since an agent
being. For names are arranged according to the arrange-
does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter
ment of the things signified by the names. But Dionysius
is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of
(Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst the other
causes. Thus goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is
names of God, to His goodness rather than to His being.
the end to the form. Therefore among the names signify-
Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
ing the divine causality, goodness precedes being. Again,
Objection 2.
Further, that which is the more ex-
according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguish-
tensive is prior in idea.
But goodness is more exten-
ing primary matter from privation, said that matter was
sive than being, because, as Dionysius notes (Div. Nom.
non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than
v), “goodness extends to things both existing and non-
being; for primary matter participates in goodness as tend-
existing; whereas existence extends to existing things
ing to it, for all seek their like; but it does not participate alone.” Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.
in being, since it is presumed to be non-being. Therefore
Objection 3. Further, what is the more universal is
Dionysius says that “goodness extends to non-existence”
prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more universal
(Div. Nom. v).
than being, since goodness has the aspect of desirable;
Reply to Objection 2. The same solution is applied
whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said
to this objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends
of Judas: “It were better for him, if that man had not been
to existing and non-existing things, not so far as it can
born” (Mat. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior
be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them—
to being.
if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply
Objection 4. Further, not only is existence desirable,
those things which do not exist, but those which are po-
but life, knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus
tential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the
it seems that existence is a particular appetible, and good-
end, in which not only actual things find their completion,
ness a universal appetible. Therefore, absolutely, good-
but also towards which tend even those things which are
ness is prior in idea to being.
not actual, but merely potential. Now being implies the
On the contrary, It is said by Aristotle (De Causis)
habitude of a formal cause only, either inherent or exem-
that “the first of created things is being.”
plar; and its causality does not extend save to those things
I answer that, In idea being is prior to goodness. For
which are actual.
the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which
Reply to Objection 3. Non-being is desirable, not of
the mind conceives of the thing and intends by the word
itself, but only relatively—i.e. inasmuch as the removal
that stands for it. Therefore, that is prior in idea, which
of an evil, which can only be removed by non-being, is
is first conceived by the intellect. Now the first thing
desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desir-
conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is
able, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some be-
knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, be-
ing. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being
ing is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily
only relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of be-
intelligible; as sound is that which is primarily audible.
ing of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even
Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness.
non-being can be spoken of as relatively good.
Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius discusses the Divine
Reply to Objection 4. Life, wisdom, and the like, are
Names (Div. Nom. i, iii) as implying some causal relation
desirable only so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one
in God; for we name God, as he says, from creatures, as
of them some sort of being is desired. And thus nothing
a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the
can be desired except being; and consequently nothing is
aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the
good except being.
Whether every being is good?
Ia q. 5 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that not every being is good.
things are called evil. Therefore not every being is good.
For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear
Objection 3. Further, goodness implies desirability.
from a. 1. But whatever is added to being limits it; as sub-
Now primary matter does not imply desirability, but rather
stance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits
that which desires. Therefore primary matter does not
being. Therefore not every being is good.
contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every
Objection 2. Further, no evil is good: “Woe to you
being is good.
that call evil good and good evil” (Is. 5:20). But some
Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph.
23
iii) that “in mathematics goodness does not exist.” But ing. Thus a man is said to be evil, because he lacks some
mathematics are entities; otherwise there would be no sci-
virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the
ence of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good.
power to see well.
On the contrary, Every being that is not God is God’s
Reply to Objection 3. As primary matter has only
creature. Now every creature of God is good (1 Tim. 4:4):
potential being, so it is only potentially good. Although,
and God is the greatest good. Therefore every being is
according to the Platonists, primary matter may be said
good.
to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to
I answer that, Every being, as being, is good. For all
it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain extent in
being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect;
goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness.
since every act implies some sort of perfection; and per-
Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to
fection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from
desire.
a. 1. Hence it follows that every being as such is good.
Reply to Objection 4. Mathematical entities do not
Reply to Objection 1. Substance, quantity, quality,
subsist as realities; because they would be in some sort
and everything included in them, limit being by applying
good if they subsisted; but they have only logical exis-
it to some essence or nature. Now in this sense, good-
tence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and
ness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of
matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end, which
desirability and perfection, which is also proper to being,
itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repug-
whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does
nant that there should be in some logical entity neither
not limit being.
goodness nor form of goodness; since the idea of being is
Reply to Objection 2. No being can be spoken of
prior to the idea of goodness, as was said in the preceding
as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it lacks be-
article.
Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?
Ia q. 5 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that goodness has not the as-
that which is caused the converse ought to take place, so
pect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For,
that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being;
as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), “Goodness is praised
secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it
as beauty.” But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause.
is perfect in being, for a thing is perfect when it can repro-
Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause.
duce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly,
Objection 2. Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for
there follows the formality of goodness which is the basic
Dionysius says (Div.
Nom.
iv) that goodness is that
principle of its perfection.
whereby all things subsist, and are. But to be self-giving
Reply to Objection 1. Beauty and goodness in a thing
implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Therefore good-
are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the
ness has the aspect of an efficient cause.
same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness
Objection 3.
Further, Augustine says (De Doctr.
is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for good-
Christ. i, 31) that “we exist because God is good.” But we
ness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what
owe our existence to God as the efficient cause. Therefore
all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end
goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause.
(the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing).
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that
On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty;
“that is to be considered as the end and the good of other
for beautiful things are those which please when seen.
things, for the sake of which something is.” Therefore
Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses
goodness has the aspect of a final cause.
delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after
I answer that, Since goodness is that which all things
their own kind—because even sense is a sort of reason,
desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear
just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge
that goodness implies the aspect of an end. Nevertheless,
is by assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty
the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient
properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause.
cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see that what is
Reply to Objection 2. Goodness is described as self-
first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move.
first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the
Reply to Objection 3. He who has a will is said to be
heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in
good, so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will
causing, goodness and the end come first, both of which
that we employ whatever powers we may have. Hence a
move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent
man is said to be good, not by his good understanding; but
moving to the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in
by his good will. Now the will relates to the end as to its
24
proper object. Thus the saying, “we exist because God is good” has reference to the final cause.
Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?
Ia q. 5 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that the essence of goodness
perfect and good it must have a form, together with all
does not consist in mode, species and order. For good-
that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form
ness and being differ logically. But mode, species and
presupposes determination or commensuration of its prin-
order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is writ-
ciples, whether material or efficient, and this is signified
ten: “Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and num-
by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the
ber, and weight” (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can
mode. But the form itself is signified by the species; for
be reduced species, mode and order, as Augustine says
everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the
(Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): “Measure fixes the mode of every-
number is said to give the species, for definitions signify-
thing, number gives it its species, and weight gives it rest
ing species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher
and stability.” Therefore the essence of goodness does not
(Metaph. x); for as a unit added to, or taken from a num-
consist in mode, species and order.
ber, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken
Objection 2. Further, mode, species and order are
from a definition, changes its species. Further, upon the
themselves good. Therefore if the essence of goodness
form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action,
consists in mode, species and order, then every mode must
or something of the sort; for everything, in so far as it is
have its own mode, species and order. The same would be
in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance
the case with species and order in endless succession.
with its form; and this belongs to weight and order. Hence
Objection 3. Further, evil is the privation of mode,
the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection,
species and order. But evil is not the total absence of
consists also in mode, species and order.
goodness. Therefore the essence of goodness does not
Reply to Objection 1. These three only follow upon
consist in mode, species and order.
being, so far as it is perfect, and according to this perfec-
Objection 4.
Further, that wherein consists the
tion is it good.
essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we
Reply to Objection 2. Mode, species and order are
can speak of an evil mode, species and order. Therefore
said to be good, and to be beings, not as though they them-
the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species
selves were subsistences, but because it is through them
and order.
that other things are both beings and good. Hence they
Objection 5. Further, mode, species and order are
have no need of other things whereby they are good: for
caused by weight, number and measure, as appears from
they are spoken of as good, not as though formally con-
the quotation from Augustine. But not every good thing
stituted so by something else, but as formally constituting
has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says
others good: thus whiteness is not said to be a being as
(Hexam. i, 9): “It is of the nature of light not to have
though it were by anything else; but because, by it, some-
been created in number, weight and measure.” Therefore
thing else has accidental being, as an object that is white.
the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species
Reply to Objection 3. Every being is due to some
and order.
form. Hence, according to every being of a thing is its
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat.
Boni.
mode, species, order. Thus, a man has a mode, species
iii): “These three—mode, species and order—as common
and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on; ac-
good things, are in everything God has made; thus, where
cording to everything predicated of him. But evil deprives
these three abound the things are very good; where they
a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us
are less, the things are less good; where they do not exist
of that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every
at all, there can be nothing good.” But this would not be
mode, species and order, but only such as follow upon the
unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. There-
being of sight.
fore the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and
Reply to Objection 4. Augustine says (De Nat. Boni.
order.
xxiii), “Every mode, as mode, is good” (and the same can
I answer that, Everything is said to be good so far as
be said of species and order). “But an evil mode, species
it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown
and order are so called as being less than they ought to
above Aa. 1,3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it
be, or as not belonging to that which they ought to be-
lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But
long. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out
since everything is what it is by its form (and since the
of place and incongruous.”
form presupposes certain things, and from the form cer-
Reply to Objection 5. The nature of light is spoken of
tain things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be
as being without number, weight and measure, not abso-
25
lutely, but in comparison with corporeal things, because much as it is an active quality of the first body that causes
the power of light extends to all corporeal things; inas-
change, i.e. the heavens.
Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous∗, the useful and the pleasant?
Ia q. 5 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that goodness is not rightly
Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two
divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant.
ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g.
For goodness is divided by the ten predicaments, as the
a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in
Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the use-
the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that termi-
ful and the pleasant can be found under one predicament.
nates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means
Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.
by which something tends towards another, is called the
Objection 2. Further, every division is made by oppo-
useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely
sites. But these three do not seem to be opposites; for the
terminating the movement of the appetite, as a thing to-
virtuous is pleasing, and no wickedness is useful; whereas
wards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called
this ought to be the case if the division were made by op-
the virtuous; for the virtuous is that which is desired for its posites, for then the virtuous and the useful would be op-own sake; but that which terminates the movement of the
posed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore
appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is called
this division is incorrect.
the pleasant.
Objection 3. Further, where one thing is on account
Reply to Objection 1. Goodness, so far as it is iden-
of another, there is only one thing.
But the useful is
tical with being, is divided by the ten predicaments. But
not goodness, except so far as it is pleasing and virtu-
this division belongs to it according to its proper formal-
ous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against the
ity.
pleasant and the virtuous.
Reply to Objection 2. This division is not by oppo-
On the contrary, Ambrose makes use of this division
site things; but by opposite aspects. Now those things
of goodness (De Offic. i, 9)
are called pleasing which have no other formality under
I answer that, This division properly concerns hu-
which they are desirable except the pleasant, being some-
man goodness. But if we consider the nature of good-
times hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful
ness from a higher and more universal point of view, we
applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves,
shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as
but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the
such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and is
taking of bitter medicine; while the virtuous is predicated
a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose
of such as are desirable in themselves.
movement can be seen from a consideration of the move-
Reply to Objection 3. Goodness is not divided into
ment of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural
these three as something univocal to be predicated equally
body is terminated by the end absolutely; and relatively
of them all; but as something analogical to be predicated
by the means through which it comes to the end, where
of them according to priority and posteriority. Hence it
the movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of move-
is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of the pleasant;
ment, so far as it terminates any part of that movement.
and lastly of the useful.
∗ “Bonum honestum” is the virtuous good considered as fitting. (cf. IIa IIae, q. 141, a. 3; IIa IIae, q. 145) 26
FIRST PART, QUESTION 6
The Goodness of God
(In Four Articles)
We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether goodness belongs to God?
(2) Whether God is the supreme good?
(3) Whether He alone is essentially good?
(4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?
Whether God is good?
Ia q. 6 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that to be good does not belong
effective cause of all things, it is manifest that the aspect
to God. For goodness consists in mode, species and or-
of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence
der. But these do not seem to belong to God; since God is
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to God as to the
immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to
first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good “as by
be good does not belong to God.
Whom all things subsist.”
Objection 2. Further, the good is what all things de-
Reply to Objection 1. To have mode, species and or-
sire. But all things do not desire God, because all things
der belongs to the essence of caused good; but good is in
do not know Him; and nothing is desired unless it is
God as in its cause, and hence it belongs to Him to impose
known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.
mode, species and order on others; wherefore these three
On the contrary, It is written (Lam. 3:25): “The Lord
things are in God as in their cause.
is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh
Reply to Objection 2. All things, by desiring their
Him.”
own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the per-
I answer that, To be good belongs pre-eminently to
fections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine
God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness.
being; as appears from what is said above (q. 4 , a. 3). And
Now everything seeks after its own perfection; and the
so of those things which desire God, some know Him as
perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain like-
He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature;
ness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and
others know some participation of His goodness, and this
hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of
belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural
good. For the very thing which is desirable in it is the par-
desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends
ticipation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first
by a higher intelligence.
Whether God is the supreme good?
Ia q. 6 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that God is not the supreme
But things not in the same genus are not comparable;
good. For the supreme good adds something to good;
as, sweetness is not properly greater or less than a line.
otherwise it would belong to every good. But everything
Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other
which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing:
good things, as appears above (q. 3, a. 5; q. 4, a. 3) it
therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is
seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in re-
supremely simple; as was shown above (q. 3, a. 7). There-
lation to others.
fore God is not the supreme good.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that,
Objection 2. Further, “Good is what all desire,” as
the Trinity of the divine persons is “the supreme good,
the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is
discerned by purified minds.”
nothing but God, Who is the end of all things: therefore
I answer that, God is the supreme good simply, and
there is no other good but God. This appears also from
not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For
what is said (Lk. 18:19): “None is good but God alone.”
good is attributed to God, as was said in the preceding ar-
But we use the word supreme in comparison with others,
ticle, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him
as e.g. supreme heat is used in comparison with all other
as from the first cause. They do not, however, flow from
heats. Therefore God cannot be called the supreme good.
Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above (q. 4, a. 2);
Objection 3. Further, supreme implies comparison.
but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects
27
either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an effect in deficient in comparison with it.
the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivo-
Reply to Objection 2. When we say that good is what
cal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun
all desire, it is not to be understood that every kind of good
more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in
thing is desired by all; but that whatever is desired has the
God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, nature of good. And when it is said, “None is good but
it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore
God alone,” this is to be understood of essential goodness,
He is called the supreme good.
as will be explained in the next article.
Reply to Objection 1. The supreme good does not
Reply to Objection 3. Things not of the same genus
add to good any absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a
are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are
relation of God to creatures, is not a reality in God, but in
in different genera. Now we say that God is not in the
the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as, what is
same genus with other good things; not that He is any
knowable is so called with relation to knowledge, not that
other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the prin-
it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge depends
ciple of every genus; and thus He is compared to others
on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be compo-
by excess, and it is this kind of comparison the supreme
sition in the supreme good, but only that other things are
good implies.
Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?
Ia q. 6 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that to be essentially good does
in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third per-
not belong to God alone. For as “one” is convertible with
fection is to rest in its own place. This triple perfection
“being,” so is “good”; as we said above (q. 5, a. 1). But ev-
belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to
ery being is one essentially, as appears from the Philoso-
God only, in Whom alone essence is existence; in Whom
pher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essen-
there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others
tially.
accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be power-
Objection 2. Further, if good is what all things desire, ful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above
since being itself is desired by all, then the being of each
(q. 3, a. 6); and He is not directed to anything else as to
thing is its good. But everything is a being essentially;
an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence
therefore every being is good essentially.
it is manifest that God alone has every kind of perfection
Objection 3. Further, everything is good by its own
by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good
goodness. Therefore if there is anything which is not good
essentially.
essentially, it is necessary to say that its goodness is not its Reply to Objection 1. “One” does not include the
own essence. Therefore its goodness, since it is a being,
idea of perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs
must be good; and if it is good by some other goodness,
to everything according to its own essence.
Now the
the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore
essences of simple things are undivided both actually and
we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some good-
potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided
ness which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore
only actually; and therefore everything must be one es-
the first supposition holds good. Therefore everything is
sentially, but not good essentially, as was shown above.
good essentially.
Reply to Objection 2. Although everything is good in
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that
that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not very
“all things but God are good by participation.” Therefore
being; and therefore it does not follow that a creature is
they are not good essentially.
good essentially.
I answer that, God alone is good essentially. For ev-
Reply to Objection 3. The goodness of a creature is
erything is called good according to its perfection. Now
not its very essence, but something superadded; it is either
perfection of a thing is threefold: first, according to the
its existence, or some added perfection, or the order to its
constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any
end. Still, the goodness itself thus added is good, just as
accidents being added as necessary for its perfect opera-
it is being. But for this reason is it called being because
tion; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to some-
by it something has being, not because it itself has being
thing else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfec-
through something else: hence for this reason is it called
tion of fire consists in its existence, which it has through
good because by it something is good, and not because it
its own substantial form; its secondary perfection consists
itself has some other goodness whereby it is good.
28
Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?
Ia q. 6 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that all things are good by the
these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and
divine goodness. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), “This
by participation of these, everything was called “being”
and that are good; take away this and that, and see good
or “one”; and what was thus absolute being and absolute
itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God, good not
one, he said was the supreme good. And because good is
by any other good, but the good of every good.” But ev-
convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the
erything is good by its own good; therefore everything is
absolute good, from whom all things are called good by
good by that very good which is God.
way of participation.
Objection 2. Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.),
Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in
all things are called good, accordingly as they are directed
affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of
to God, and this is by reason of the divine goodness; there-
themselves—as Aristotle argues in many ways—still, it is
fore all things are good by the divine goodness.
absolutely true that there is first something which is essen-
On the contrary, All things are good, inasmuch as
tially being and essentially good, which we call God, as
they have being. But they are not called beings through
appears from what is shown above (q. 2, a. 3), and Aristo-
the divine being, but through their own being; therefore
tle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially
all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by their
such, and good, everything can be called good and a be-
own goodness.
ing, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain
I answer that, As regards relative things, we must
assimilation which is far removed and defective; as ap-
admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated
pears from the above (q. 4, a. 3).
“placed” from “place,” and “measured” from “measure.”
Everything is therefore called good from the divine
But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held
goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and fi-
the existence of separate ideas (q. 84, a. 4) of all things,
nal principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is
and that individuals were denominated by them as partic-
called good by reason of the similitude of the divine good-
ipating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates
ness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness,
is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now
whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there
just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which
is one goodness, and yet many goodnesses.
he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise
This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.
he laid down separate ideas of “being” and of “one,” and
29
FIRST PART, QUESTION 7
The Infinity of God
(In Four Articles)
After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity, and God’s existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.
Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is infinite?
(2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?
(3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?
(4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?
Whether God is infinite?
Ia q. 7 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that God is not infinite. For
a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made
everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says;
finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is
because it has parts and matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But
common to many; but when received in matter, the form
God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite.
is determined to this one particular thing. Now matter is
Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher
perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore
(Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there
infinite as attributed to matter, has the nature of something
is no quantity in God, for He is not a body, as was shown
imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other
above (q. 3, a. 1). Therefore it does not belong to Him to
hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but rather is con-
be infinite.
tracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the
Objection 3. Further, what is here in such a way as not
part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature
to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore
of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all
that which is a thing in such a way as not to be another
things, as appears from what is shown above (q. 4, a. 1,
thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this,
obj. 3). Since therefore the divine being is not a being re-
and not another; for He is not a stone or wood. Therefore
ceived in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as
God is not infinite in substance.
was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), it is clear that God Himself
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i,
is infinite and perfect.
4) that “God is infinite and eternal, and boundless.”
From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.
I answer that, All the ancient philosophers attribute
Reply to Objection 2. Quantity is terminated by its
infinitude to the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and
form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which
with reason; for they considered that things flow forth in-
consists in quantity terminated, is a kind of quantitative
finitely from the first principle. But because some erred
form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of mat-
concerning the nature of the first principle, as a conse-
ter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to God; as
quence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch
was said above, in this article.
as they asserted that matter was the first principle; con-
Reply to Objection 3. The fact that the being of God
sequently they attributed to the first principle a material
is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus
infinity to the effect that some infinite body was the first
called infinite, shows Him to be distinguished from all
principle of things.
other beings, and all others to be apart from Him. Even
We must consider therefore that a thing is called infi-
so, were there such a thing as a self-subsisting whiteness,
nite because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made
the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would
finite by form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is
make it distinct from every other whiteness existing in a
made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives
subject.
its form, is in potentiality to many forms; but on receiving
30
Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?
Ia q. 7 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that something else besides God
form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which
can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is
are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way infinite.
proportioned to its essence. Now if the essence of God
If, however, any created forms are not received into mat-
is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He
ter, but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with
can produce an infinite effect, since the extent of a power
angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such
is known by its effect.
kinds of forms are not terminated, nor contracted by any
Objection 2. Further, whatever has infinite power, has
matter. But because a created form thus subsisting has be-
an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has an in-
ing, and yet is not its own being, it follows that its being
finite power; for it apprehends the universal, which can
is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence
extend itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore
it cannot be absolutely infinite.
every created intellectual substance is infinite.
Reply to Objection 1. It is against the nature of a
Objection 3. Further, primary matter is something
made thing for its essence to be its existence; because sub-
other than God, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 8). But pri-
sisting being is not a created being; hence it is against the
mary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God
nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite. There-
can be infinite.
fore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot make
On the contrary, The infinite cannot have a begin-
a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two con-
ning, as said in Phys. iii. But everything outside God is
tradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He can-
from God as from its first principle. Therefore besides
not make anything to be absolutely infinite.
God nothing can be infinite.
Reply to Objection 2. The fact that the power of the
I answer that, Things other than God can be relatively
intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things, is be-
infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to in-
cause the intellect is a form not in matter, but either wholly
finite as applied to matter, it is manifest that everything
separated from matter, as is the angelic substance, or at
actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is
least an intellectual power, which is not the act of any or-
determined by form. But because matter, considered as
gan, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.
existing under some substantial form, remains in poten-
Reply to Objection 3. Primary matter does not ex-
tiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite
ist by itself in nature, since it is not actually being, but
can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite
potentially only; hence it is something concreated rather
according to its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, than created. Nevertheless, primary matter even as a po-inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of
tentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively, because
shapes. But if we speak of the infinite in reference to
its potentiality extends only to natural forms.
Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?
Ia q. 7 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that there can be something ac-
infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infi-
tually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics there is
nite.
no error, since “there is no lie in things abstract,” as the
Objection 4. Further, movement and time have quan-
Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics uses the in-
tity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which
finite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in his demon-
movement passes, as is said in Phys. iv. But it is not
strations says, “Let this line be infinite.” Therefore it is
against the nature of time and movement to be infinite,
not impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude.
since every determinate indivisible in time and circular
Objection 2. Further, what is not against the nature
movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore nei-
of anything, can agree with it. Now to be infinite is not
ther is it against the nature of magnitude to be infinite.
against the nature of magnitude; but rather both the finite
On the contrary, Every body has a surface. But ev-
and the infinite seem to be properties of quantity. There-
ery body which has a surface is finite; because surface is
fore it is not impossible for some magnitude to be infinite.
the term of a finite body. Therefore all bodies are finite.
Objection 3. Further, magnitude is infinitely divisi-
The same applies both to surface and to a line. Therefore
ble, for the continuous is defined that which is infinitely
nothing is infinite in magnitude.
divisible, as is clear from Phys. iii. But contraries are
I answer that, It is one thing to be infinite in essence, concerned about one and the same thing. Since therefore
and another to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that
addition is opposed to division, and increase opposed to
a body exists infinite in magnitude, as fire or air, yet
diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to
this could not be infinite in essence, because its essence
31
would be terminated in a species by its form, and con-place belonging to any other.
fined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from
The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we
these premises that no creature is infinite in essence, it still imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must
remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in
imagine it under some form, because nothing is actual ex-
magnitude.
cept by its form; hence, since the form of quantity as such
We must therefore observe that a body, which is a
is figure, such a body must have some figure, and so would
complete magnitude, can be considered in two ways;
be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.
mathematically, in respect to its quantity only; and nat-
Reply to Objection 1. A geometrician does not need
urally, as regards its matter and form.
to assume a line actually infinite, but takes some actually
Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be ac-
finite line, from which he subtracts whatever he finds nec-
tually infinite. For every natural body has some deter-
essary; which line he calls infinite.
mined substantial form. Since therefore the accidents fol-
Reply to Objection 2. Although the infinite is not
low upon the substantial form, it is necessary that deter-
against the nature of magnitude in general, still it is
minate accidents should follow upon a determinate form;
against the nature of any species of it; thus, for instance, it and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural
is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude,
body has a greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence
whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now what is not
it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite. The same
possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence
appears from movement; because every natural body has
there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species
some natural movement; whereas an infinite body could
of magnitude is infinite.
not have any natural movement; neither direct, because
Reply to Objection 3. The infinite in quantity, as was
nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it
shown above, belongs to matter. Now by division of the
is out of its place; and this could not happen to an infi-
whole we approach to matter, forasmuch as parts have the
nite body, for it would occupy every place, and thus every
aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole
place would be indifferently its own place. Neither could
which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the infinite is
it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion requires
not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.
that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a
Reply to Objection 4. Movement and time are whole,
place occupied by another part, and this could not hap-
not actually but successively; hence they have potentiality
pen as regards an infinite circular body: for if two lines
mixed with actuality. But magnitude is an actual whole;
be drawn from the centre, the farther they extend from
therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does
the centre, the farther they are from each other; therefore,
not agree with the totality of magnitude; yet it agrees with
if a body were infinite, the lines would be infinitely dis-
the totality of time and movement: for it is proper to mat-
tant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the
ter to be in potentiality.
Whether an infinite multitude can exist?
Ia q. 7 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that an actually infinite multi-
ject. Some, as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was
tude is possible. For it is not impossible for a potentiality
impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist ab-
to be made actual. But number can be multiplied to in-
solutely; but that an accidentally infinite multitude was
finity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude
not impossible. A multitude is said to be infinite abso-
actually to exist.
lutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that some-
Objection 2. Further, it is possible for any individual
thing may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would
of any species to be made actual. But the species of fig-
entail something dependent on an infinity for its existence;
ures are infinite. Therefore an infinite number of actual
and hence its generation could never come to be, because
figures is possible.
it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium.
Objection 3. Further, things not opposed to each other
A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its
do not obstruct each other. But supposing a multitude of
existence as such is not necessary, but accidental. This can
things to exist, there can still be many others not opposed
be shown, for example, in the work of a carpenter requir-
to them. Therefore it is not impossible for others also to
ing a certain absolute multitude; namely, art in the soul,
coexist with them, and so on to infinitude; therefore an
the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and supposing
actual infinite number of things is possible.
that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpenter-
On the contrary, It is written, “Thou hast ordered all
ing work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would
things in measure, and number, and weight” (Wis. 11:21).
depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude
I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this sub-
of hammers, inasmuch as one may be broken and another
32
used, is an accidental multitude; for it happens by accident tentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus
that many hammers are used, and it matters little whether
approach matter, as was shown in the preceding article, by
one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the
the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in
work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way they
the addition of multitude.
said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.
Reply to Objection 1. Every potentiality is made ac-
This, however, is impossible; since every kind of mul-
tual according to its mode of being; for instance, a day is
titude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the
reduced to act successively, and not all at once. Likewise
species of multitude are to be reckoned by the species of
the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively, and
numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every
not all at once; because every multitude can be succeeded
number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is im-
by another multitude to infinity.
possible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, ei-
Reply to Objection 2. Species of figures are infinite
ther absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature
by infinitude of number. Now there are various species
is created; and everything created is comprehended under
of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral and so on; and
some clear intention of the Creator; for no agent acts aim-
as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once re-
lessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended
duced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures.
in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an ac-
Reply to Objection 3. Although the supposition of
tually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a
some things does not preclude the supposition of others,
potentially infinite multitude is possible; because the in-
still the supposition of an infinite number is opposed to
crease of multitude follows upon the division of magni-
any single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible
tude; since the more a thing is divided, the greater number
for an actually infinite multitude to exist.
of things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found po-
33
FIRST PART, QUESTION 8
The Existence of God in Things
(In Four Articles)
Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere, and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is in all things?
(2) Whether God is everywhere?
(3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?
(4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?
Whether God is in all things?
Ia q. 8 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that God is not in all things.
preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun
For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is
as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long
above all, according to the Psalm (Ps. 112:4), “The Lord
as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according
is high above all nations,” etc. Therefore God is not in all
to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing
things.
and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is
Objection 2. Further, what is in anything is thereby
formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was
contained. Now God is not contained by things, but rather
shown above (q. 7, a. 1). Hence it must be that God is in
does He contain them. Therefore God is not in things but
all things, and innermostly.
things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog.
Reply to Objection 1. God is above all things by the
Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that “in Him things are, rather than
excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things
He is in any place.”
as the cause of the being of all things; as was shown above
Objection 3. Further, the more powerful an agent is,
in this article.
the more extended is its action. But God is the most pow-
Reply to Objection 2. Although corporeal things are
erful of all agents. Therefore His action can extend to
said to be in another as in that which contains them, never-
things which are far removed from Him; nor is it neces-
theless, spiritual things contain those things in which they
sary that He should be in all things.
are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in
Objection 4. Further, the demons are beings. But God
things containing them; nevertheless, by a certain simil-
is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship between
itude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in
light and darkness (2 Cor. 6:14). Therefore God is not in
God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.
all things.
Reply to Objection 3. No action of an agent, how-
On the contrary, A thing is wherever it operates.
ever powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through
But God operates in all things, according to Is. 26:12,
a medium. But it belongs to the great power of God that
“Lord. . . Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: ‘for’]
He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is dis-
us.” Therefore God is in all things.
tant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself. But
I answer that, God is in all things; not, indeed, as
things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness
part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent
to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the
is present to that upon which it works. For an agent must
excellence of His own nature.
be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch
Reply to Objection 4. In the demons there is their
it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii that the
nature which is from God, and also the deformity of sin
thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now
which is not from Him; therefore, it is not to be absolutely
since God is very being by His own essence, created be-
conceded that God is in the demons, except with the ad-
ing must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper
dition, “inasmuch as they are beings.” But in things not
effect of fire. Now God causes this effect in things not
deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God
only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are
is.
34
Whether God is everywhere?
Ia q. 8 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that God is not everywhere. For
is the term of the continuous; as a point in permanent
to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in
things, and as a moment in succession; and this kind of
every place does not belong to God, to Whom it does not
the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a
belong to be in place at all; for “incorporeal things,” as
determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place, or in
Boethius says (De Hebdom.), “are not in a place.” There-
many places; likewise the indivisible of action or move-
fore God is not everywhere.
ment, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in move-
Objection 2. Further, the relation of time to succes-
ment or action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another
sion is the same as the relation of place to permanence.
kind of the indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the
But one indivisible part of action or movement cannot ex-
continuous; and in this way incorporeal substances, like
ist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible
God, angel and soul, are called indivisible. Such a kind
part in the genus of permanent things be in every place.
of indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part
Now the divine being is not successive but permanent.
of it, but as touching it by its power; hence, according as
Therefore God is not in many places; and thus He is not
its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small
everywhere.
thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many
Objection 3. Further, what is wholly in any one place
places, and in a small or large place.
is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He
Reply to Objection 3. A whole is so called with ref-
is all there; for He has no parts. No part of Him then is
erence to its parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of
elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere.
the essence, as the form and the matter are called parts
On the contrary, It is written, “I fill heaven and
of the composite, while genus and difference are called
earth.” (Jer. 23:24).
parts of species. There is also part of quantity into which
I answer that, Since place is a thing, to be in place
any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any
can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of
place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that
other things—i.e. as one thing is said to be in another no
place, because the quantity of anything placed is com-
matter how; and thus the accidents of a place are in place;
mensurate to the quantity of the place; and hence there
or by a way proper to place; and thus things placed are in
is no totality of quantity without totality of place. But
a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in
totality of essence is not commensurate to the totality of
every place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He is in
place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole
all things giving them being, power and operation; so He
by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of
is in every place as giving it existence and locative power.
it. This appears also in accidental forms which have acci-
Again, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill
dental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each
place; and God fills every place; not, indeed, like a body,
part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence;
for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the
because according to the perfect idea of its species it is
co-presence of another body; whereas by God being in
found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its total-
a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed,
ity be considered according to quantity which it has acci-
by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill
dentally, then it is not whole in every part of the surface.
every place, He Himself fills every place.
On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality
Reply to Objection 1. Incorporeal things are in place
either of themselves or accidentally, except in reference
not by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by
to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is
contact of power.
whole in every part of the body, so is God whole in all
Reply to Objection 2. The indivisible is twofold. One
things and in each one.
Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?
Ia q. 8 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that the mode of God’s exis-
not to be absent from it. Now this is the meaning of God
tence in all things is not properly described by way of
being in things by His essence, that He is not absent from
essence, presence and power. For what is by essence in
anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by
anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in
essence and presence means the same thing. Therefore it
things; for He does not belong to the essence of anything.
is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His
Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by
essence, presence and power.
essence, presence and power.
Objection 3. Further, as God by His power is the
Objection 2. Further, to be present in anything means
principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His
35
knowledge and will. But it is not said that He is in things providence extended to these inferior bodies, and in the
by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present
person of these it is said, “He walketh about the poles of
by His power.
the heavens; and He doth not consider our things†” (Job
Objection 4. Further, as grace is a perfection added
22:14). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in
to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are
all things by His presence.
likewise added. Therefore if God is said to be in certain
Further, others said that, although all things are subject
persons in a special way by grace, it seems that accord-
to God’s providence, still all things are not immediately
ing to every perfection there ought to be a special mode of
created by God; but that He immediately created the first
God’s existence in things.
creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is
On the contrary, A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles
necessary to say that He is in all things by His essence.
(5) says that, “God by a common mode is in all things by
Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch
His presence, power and substance; still He is said to be
as all things are subject to His power; He is by His pres-
present more familiarly in some by grace”∗.
ence in all things, as all things are bare and open to His
I answer that, God is said to be in a thing in two ways; eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He
in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus
is present to all as the cause of their being.
He is in all things created by Him; in another way he is in
Reply to Objection 1. God is said to be in all things
things as the object of operation is in the operator; and
by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things them-
this is proper to the operations of the soul, according as
selves, as if He were of their essence; but by His own
the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing
essence; because His substance is present to all things as
desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is
the cause of their being.
especially in the rational creature which knows and loves
Reply to Objection 2. A thing can be said to be
Him actually or habitually. And because the rational crea-
present to another, when in its sight, though the thing may
ture possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown
be distant in substance, as was shown in this article; and
later (q. 12). He is said to be thus in the saints by grace.
therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by
But how He is in other things created by Him, may be
essence and by presence.
considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is
Reply to Objection 3. Knowledge and will require
said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, although he
that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and
is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by
the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence by knowl-
its presence in other things which are subject to its inspec-
edge and will things are more truly in God than God in
tion; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone,
things. But power is the principle of acting on another;
who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part
hence by power the agent is related and applied to an ex-
of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of sub-
ternal thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be
stance or essence in that place in which its substance may
present to another.
be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said that
Reply to Objection 4. No other perfection, except
spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the divine
grace, added to substance, renders God present in any-
power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject
thing as the object known and loved; therefore only grace
to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against
constitutes a special mode of God’s existence in things.
these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His
There is, however, another special mode of God’s exis-
power.
tence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own
But others, though they believed that all things were
place ( IIIa).
subject to the divine power, still did not allow that divine
Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?
Ia q. 8 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that to be everywhere does not
But the whole universe is constituted in number, as ap-
belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the
pears from the Book of Wisdom (Wis. 11:21). Therefore
Philosopher (Poster. i), is everywhere, and always; pri-
there is some number which is in the whole universe, and
mary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere.
is thus everywhere.
But neither of these is God, as appears from what is said
Objection 3. Further, the universe is a kind of “whole
above (q. 3). Therefore to be everywhere does not belong
perfect body” (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe
to God alone.
is everywhere, because there is no place outside it. There-
Objection 2. Further, number is in things numbered.
fore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
∗ The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)
† Vulg.:
‘He doth not consider. . . and He walketh,’ etc.
36
Objection 4. Further, if any body were infinite, no except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and
place would exist outside of it, and so it would be every-
absolutely belongs to God and is proper to Him: because
where. Therefore to be everywhere does not appear to
whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must
belong to God alone.
be in all of them, not as to a part of Him, but as to His very
Objection 5. Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De
self.
Trin. vi, 6), is “whole in the whole body, and whole in
Reply to Objection 1. The universal, and also pri-
every one of its parts.” Therefore if there was only one
mary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to
animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and
the same mode of existence.
thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
Reply to Objection 2. Number, since it is an accident,
Objection 6. Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137),
does not, of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither
“The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and
is the whole but only part of it in each of the things num-
is where it lives.” But the soul sees as it were everywhere:
bered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and
for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire
absolutely everywhere.
space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is
Reply to Objection 3. The whole body of the uni-
everywhere.
verse is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7):
not wholly in each place, but according to its parts; nor
“Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all
again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that
things, and everywhere, and always is, which assuredly
other places existed besides itself, it would not be in them.
belongs to the divinity alone?”
Reply to Objection 4. If an infinite body existed, it
I answer that, To be everywhere primarily and abso-
would be everywhere; but according to its parts.
lutely, is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primar-
Reply to Objection 5. Were there one animal only,
ily is said of that which in its whole self is everywhere;
its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but only
for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in
accidentally.
different places, it would not be primarily everywhere,
Reply to Objection 6. When it is said that the soul
forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part
sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one
does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white
sense the adverb “anywhere” determines the act of seeing
teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to
on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that
his teeth. But a thing is everywhere absolutely when it
while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens; and in the
does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that
same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow
is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of millet would
that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and
be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It
to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object.
belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely
In another sense it can be understood according as the ad-
when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this
verb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from
properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of
the seer; and thus it is true that where the soul feels and
places be supposed, even if an infinite number be sup-
sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of posed besides what already exist, it would be necessary
speaking; and thus it does not follow that it is everywhere.
that God should be in all of them; for nothing can exist
37
FIRST PART, QUESTION 9
The Immutability of God
(In Two Articles)
We next consider God’s immutability, and His eternity following on His immutability. On the immutability of God there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is altogether immutable?
(2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?
Whether God is altogether immutable?
Ia q. 9 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that God is not altogether im-
was not extended previously. Hence movement in no way
mutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mu-
belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as
table.
But, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit viii, 20),
it were, by the truth, decided that the first principle was
“The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor
immovable.
by place.” Therefore God is in some way mutable.
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine there speaks in a
Objection 2. Further, it is said of Wisdom, that “it
similar way to Plato, who said that the first mover moves
is more mobile than all things active [Vulg.‘mobilior’]”
Himself; calling every operation a movement, even as
(Wis. 7:24). But God is wisdom itself; therefore God is
the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are
movable.
called movements. Therefore because God understands
Objection 3. Further, to approach and to recede sig-
and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God
nify movement. But these are said of God in Scripture,
moves Himself, not, however, as movement and change
“Draw nigh to God and He will draw nigh to you” (James
belong to a thing existing in potentiality, as we now speak
4:8). Therefore God is mutable.
of change and movement.
On the contrary, It is written, “I am the Lord, and I
Reply to Objection 2. Wisdom is called mobile by
change not” (Malachi 3:6).
way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even
I answer that, From what precedes, it is shown that
to the outermost of things; for nothing can exist which
God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown
does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some
above that there is some first being, whom we call God;
kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal
and that this first being must be pure act, without the ad-
principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom
mixture of any potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely,
of the artist. And so in the same way, inasmuch as the
potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which
similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from
is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality.
the highest things, which participate more fully of its like-
Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in
ness, to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser
any way changeable. Secondly, because everything which
degree, there is said to be a kind of procession and move-
is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in
ment of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that
part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness, re-
the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light
mains the same as to substance; thus in everything which
touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i)
is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found.
expounds the matter, that every procession of the divine
But it has been shown above (q. 3, a. 7) that in God there
manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Fa-
is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is
ther of light.
manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, because ev-
Reply to Objection 3. These things are said of God
erything which is moved acquires something by its move-
in Scripture metaphorically. For as the sun is said to en-
ment, and attains to what it had not attained previously.
ter a house, or to go out, according as its rays reach the
But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all
house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from
the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire
us, when we receive the influx of His goodness, or decline
anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He
from Him.
38
Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?
Ia q. 9 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that to be immutable does not
dental being, supposing the subject to coexist with priva-
belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph.
tion of accident; as, for example, this subject “man” can
ii) that “matter is in everything which is moved.” But, ac-
exist with “not-whiteness” and can therefore be changed
cording to some, certain created substances, as angels and
from white to not-white. But supposing the accident to be
souls, have not matter. Therefore to be immutable does
such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject,
not belong to God alone.
then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with
Objection 2. Further, everything in motion moves to
the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as re-
some end. What therefore has already attained its ultimate
gards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot
end, is not in motion. But some creatures have already at-
be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not
tained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed in heaven.
consistent with privation of form, because the form per-
Therefore some creatures are immovable.
fects the whole potentiality of the matter; therefore these
Objection 3. Further, everything which is mutable is
bodies are not mutable as to substantial being, but only
variable. But forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Prin-
as to locality, because the subject is consistent with priva-
cip. i) that “form is essence consisting of the simple and
tion of this or that place. On the other hand incorporeal
invariable.” Therefore it does not belong to God alone to
substances, being subsistent forms which, although with
be immutable.
respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act, are
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i),
not consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as
“God alone is immutable; and whatever things He has
existence is consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts
made, being from nothing, are mutable.”
except it lose its form. Hence in the form itself there is no
I answer that, God alone is altogether immutable;
power to non-existence; and so these kinds of substances
whereas every creature is in some way mutable. Be it
are immutable and invariable as regards their existence.
known therefore that a mutable thing can be called so in
Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “intel-
two ways: by a power in itself; and by a power possessed
lectual created substances are pure from generation and
by another. For all creatures before they existed, were
from every variation, as also are incorporeal and imma-
possible, not by any created power, since no creature is
terial substances.” Still, there remains in them a twofold
eternal, but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God
mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end;
could produce them into existence. Thus, as the produc-
and in that way there is in them a mutability according to
tion of a thing into existence depends on the will of God,
choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii,
so likewise it depends on His will that things should be
3,4); the other as regards place, inasmuch as by their finite
preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than
power they attain to certain fresh places—which cannot
by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His
be said of God, who by His infinity fills all places, as was
action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing,
shown above (q. 8, a. 2).
as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). There-
Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change
fore as it was in the Creator’s power to produce them be-
either as regards substantial being as in the case of things
fore they existed in themselves, so likewise it is in the
corruptible; or as regards locality only, as in the case of
Creator’s power when they exist in themselves to bring
the celestial bodies; or as regards the order to their end,
them to nothing. In this way therefore, by the power of
and the application of their powers to divers objects, as in
another—namely, of God—they are mutable, inasmuch as
the case with the angels; and universally all creatures gen-
they are producible from nothing by Him, and are by Him
erally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose
reducible from existence to non-existence.
power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since
If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in
God is in none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him
itself, thus also in some manner every creature is muta-
alone to be altogether immutable.
ble. For every creature has a twofold power, active and
Reply to Objection 1. This objection proceeds from
passive; and I call that power passive which enables any-
mutability as regards substantial or accidental being; for
thing to attain its perfection either in being, or in attaining philosophers treated of such movement.
to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered
Reply to Objection 2. The good angels, besides their
according to its power for being, in that way all creatures
natural endowment of immutability of being, have also
are not mutable, but those only in which what is potential
immutability of election by divine power; nevertheless
in them is consistent with non-being. Hence, in the infe-
there remains in them mutability as regards place.
rior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial
Reply to Objection 3. Forms are called invariable,
being, inasmuch as their matter can exist with privation
forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation; but they
of their substantial form, and also as regards their acci-
are subject to variation because by them their subject is
39
variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they subject of being, but because through them something has
are; for they are not called beings as though they were the
being.
40
FIRST PART, QUESTION 10
The Eternity of God
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six points of inquiry: (1) What is eternity?
(2) Whether God is eternal?
(3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?
(4) Whether eternity differs from time?
(5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one eternity?
Whether this is a good definition of eternity, “The simultaneously-whole and perfect Ia q. 10 a. 1
possession of interminable life”?
Objection 1. It seems that the definition of eternity
fore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before
given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: “Eter-
and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of
nity is the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of
the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists
interminable life.” For the word “interminable” is a nega-
the idea of eternity.
tive one. But negation only belongs to what is defective,
Further, those things are said to be measured by time
and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the defi-
which have a beginning and an end in time, because in ev-
nition of eternity the word “interminable” ought not to be
erything which is moved there is a beginning, and there is
found.
an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no
Objection 2. Further, eternity signifies a certain kind
succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.
of duration. But duration regards existence rather than
Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, be-
life. Therefore the word “life” ought not to come into the
cause what is eternal is interminable—that is, has no be-
definition of eternity; but rather the word “existence.”
ginning nor end (that is, no term either way); secondly,
Objection 3. Further, a whole is what has parts. But
because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously
this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is
whole.
improperly said to be “whole.”
Reply to Objection 1. Simple things are usually de-
Objection 4. Many days cannot occur together, nor
fined by way of negation; as “a point is that which has no
can many times exist all at once. But in eternity, days
parts.” Yet this is not to be taken as if the negation be-
and times are in the plural, for it is said, “His going forth
longed to their essence, but because our intellect which
is from the beginning, from the days of eternity” (Micah
first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the
5:2); and also it is said, “According to the revelation of the
knowledge of simple things except by removing the op-
mystery hidden from eternity” (Rom. 16:25). Therefore
posite.
eternity is not omni-simultaneous.
Reply to Objection 2. What is truly eternal, is not
Objection 5. Further, the whole and the perfect are
only being, but also living; and life extends to operation,
the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is “whole,” it
which is not true of being. Now the protraction of du-
is superfluously described as “perfect.”
ration seems to belong to operation rather than to being;
Objection 6. Further, duration does not imply “pos-
hence time is the numbering of movement.
session.” But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore
Reply to Objection 3. Eternity is called whole, not
eternity is not possession.
because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing.
I answer that, As we attain to the knowledge of sim-
Reply to Objection 4. As God, although incorpo-
ple things by way of compound things, so must we reach
real, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal
to the knowledge of eternity by means of time, which is
names, so eternity though simultaneously whole, is called
nothing but the numbering of movement by “before” and
by names implying time and succession.
“after.” For since succession occurs in every movement,
Reply to Objection 5. Two things are to be consid-
and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon
ered in time: time itself, which is successive; and the
before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time,
“now” of time, which is imperfect. Hence the expres-
which is nothing else but the measure of before and after
sion “simultaneously-whole” is used to remove the idea of
in movement. Now in a thing bereft of movement, which
time, and the word “perfect” is used to exclude the “now”
is always the same, there is no before or after. As there-
of time.
41
Reply to Objection 6. Whatever is possessed, is held ity and permanence of eternity, we use the word “posses-firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutabil-
sion.”
Whether God is eternal?
Ia q. 10 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that God is not eternal. For
the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that
nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says
we apprehend the flow of the “now,” so the apprehension
(De Trin. iv) that, “The now that flows away makes time,
of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the “now”
the now that stands still makes eternity;” and Augustine
standing still. When Augustine says that “God is the au-
says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) “that God is the author
thor of eternity,” this is to be understood of participated
of eternity.” Therefore God is not eternal.
eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in
Objection 2. Further, what is before eternity, and af-
the same way as He communicates His immutability.
ter eternity, is not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle
Reply to Objection 2. From this appears the answer
says (De Causis), “God is before eternity and He is af-
to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eter-
ter eternity”: for it is written that “the Lord shall reign
nity, according as it is shared by immaterial substances.
for eternity, and beyond∗” (Ex. 15:18). Therefore to be
Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that “intelligence
eternal does not belong to God.
is equal to eternity.” In the words of Exodus, “The Lord
Objection 3. Further, eternity is a kind of measure.
shall reign for eternity, and beyond,” eternity stands for
But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does
age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the
not belong to Him to be eternal.
Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures
Objection 4. Further, in eternity, there is no present,
beyond every age, i.e. beyond every kind of duration. For
past or future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was
age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is
said in the preceding article. But words denoting present,
said in the book De Coelo i. Or to reign beyond eter-
past and future time are applied to God in Scripture.
nity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were
Therefore God is not eternal.
conceived to exist for ever, as the movement of the heav-
On the contrary, Athanasius says in his Creed: “The
ens according to some philosophers, then God would still
Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eter-
reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously
nal.”
whole.
I answer that, The idea of eternity follows immutabil-
Reply to Objection 3. Eternity is nothing else but
ity, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from
God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as if He
the preceding article. Hence, as God is supremely im-
were in any way measured; but the idea of measurement
mutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor
is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind
is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas,
alone.
no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own
Reply to Objection 4. Words denoting different times
being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as
are applied to God, because His eternity includes all
He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity.
times; not as if He Himself were altered through present,
Reply to Objection 1. The “now” that stands still, is
past and future.
said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As
Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?
Ia q. 10 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to God
But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all
alone to be eternal. For it is written that “those who in-
principles of demonstration and all demonstrative propo-
struct many to justice,” shall be “as stars unto perpetual
sitions. Therefore God is not the only eternal.
eternities†” (Dan. 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal,
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv)
there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone
that “God is the only one who has no beginning.” Now
is not the only eternal.
whatever has a beginning, is not eternal. Therefore God is
Objection 2. Further, it is written “Depart, ye cursed
the only one eternal.
into eternal [Douay: ‘everlasting’] fire” (Mat. 25:41).
I answer that, Eternity truly and properly so called is
Therefore God is not the only eternal.
in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability;
Objection 3. Further, every necessary thing is eternal.
as appears from the first article. But God alone is alto-
∗ Douay: ‘for ever and ever’
† Douay: ‘for all eternity’
42
gether immutable, as was shown above (q. 9, a. 1). Ac-may know Thee the only true God,” etc. (Jn. 17:3).
cordingly, however, as some receive immutability from
Reply to Objection 1. There are said to be many eter-
Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive im-
nities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the con-
mutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist;
templation of God.
in that sense it is said of the earth, “it standeth for ever”
Reply to Objection 2. The fire of hell is called eter-
(Eccles. 1:4). Again, some things are called eternal in
nal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the
Scripture because of the length of their duration, although
pains of the lost, according to the words “To extreme heat
they are in nature corruptible; thus (Ps. 75:5) the hills are
they will pass from snowy waters” (Job 24:19). Hence in
called “eternal” and we read “of the fruits of the eternal
hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according
hills.” (Dt. 33:15). Some again, share more fully than
to the text of the Psalm “Their time will be for ever” (Ps.
others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess
80:16).
unchangeableness either in being or further still in opera-
Reply to Objection 3. Necessary means a certain
tion; like the angels, and the blessed, who enjoy the Word,
mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher
because “as regards that vision of the Word, no changing
(Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore in this sense the
thoughts exist in the Saints,” as Augustine says (De Trin.
true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eter-
xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal
nal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; hence it does
life; according to that text, “This is eternal life, that they
not follow that anything beside God is eternal.
Whether eternity differs from time?
Ia q. 10 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that eternity does not differ
makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference
from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist to-
because, granted that time always was and always will be,
gether, unless one is part of the other; for instance two
according to the idea of those who think the movement
days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we
of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain
may say that a day or an hour are together, considering
a difference between eternity and time, as Boethius says
hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur to-
(De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is si-
gether, each of which imports a certain measure of du-
multaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for
ration. Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, foras-
eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time
much as eternity exceeds time, and includes it, it seems
is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the
that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing
aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things
from eternity.
measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is
Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher
some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured
(Phys. iv), the “now” of time remains the same in the
by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if
whole of time. But the nature of eternity seems to be that
the movement of the heavens lasted always, time would
it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time.
not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration,
Therefore eternity is the “now” of time. But the “now”
since the infinite is not measurable; but it would be the
of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore
measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning
eternity is not substantially different from time.
and end in time.
Objection 3. Further, as the measure of the first move-
Another reason for the same can be taken from these
ment is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys.
measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the be-
iv, it thus appears that the measure of the first being is
ginning as potentialities; because, granted also that time
that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the
always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the
first being—that is, of the divine being. Therefore eter-
beginning and the end, by considering its parts: thus we
nity is the measure of every being. But the being of things
speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year;
corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either
which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences
eternity or is a part of eternity.
follow upon the essential and primary differences, that
On the contrary, Eternity is simultaneously whole.
eternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.
But time has a “before” and an “after.” Therefore time
Reply to Objection 1. Such a reason would be a valid
and eternity are not the same thing.
one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure;
I answer that, It is manifest that time and eternity
but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those
are not the same. Some have founded this difference on
things of which the respective measures are time and eter-
the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor an end;
nity.
whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however,
Reply to Objection 2. The “now” of time is the same
43
as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but sure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure
it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as time corresponds to
of movement; and hence, according as any being recedes
movement, its “now” corresponds to what is movable; and
from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it re-
the thing movable has the same one subject in all time, but
cedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the
differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration
being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not
is movement. Likewise the flow of the “now” as alternat-
measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not
ing in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same ac-
only things actually changed, but also things changeable;
cording to both subject and aspect; and hence eternity is
hence it not only measures movement but it also measures
not the same as the “now” of time.
repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable,
Reply to Objection 3. As eternity is the proper mea-
but is not actually in motion.
The difference of aeviternity and time
Ia q. 10 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that aeviternity is the same as
veteration; and that aeviternity has “before” and “after”
time. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that
without innovation and veteration. This theory, however,
“God moves the spiritual through time.” But aeviternity is
involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if in-
said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore
novation and veteration be referred to the measure itself.
time is the same as aeviternity.
For since “before” and “after” of duration cannot exist
Objection 2. Further, it is essential to time to have
together, if aeviternity has “before” and “after,” it must
“before” and “after”; but it is essential to eternity to be
follow that with the receding of the first part of aevi-
simultaneously whole, as was shown above in the first ar-
ternity, the after part of aeviternity must newly appear;
ticle. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written (Ec-
and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it
clus. 1:1) that eternal “Wisdom is before age.” Therefore
does in time. And if they be referred to the things mea-
it is not simultaneously whole but has “before” and “af-
sured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a thing
ter”; and thus it is the same as time.
which exists in time grows old with time, because it has
Objection 3. Further, if there is no “before” and “af-
a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of
ter” in aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there a thing measured, there follows “before” and “after” in
is no difference between being, having been, or going to
the measure, as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact
be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not to
that an aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject
have been, it follows that it is impossible for them not to
to innovation, comes from its changelessness; and con-
be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them
sequently its measure does not contain “before” and “af-
to nothing.
ter.” We say then that since eternity is the measure of a
Objection 4. Further, since the duration of aeviternal
permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from per-
things is infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is manence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some
simultaneously whole, it follows that some creature is ac-
things recede from permanence of being, so that their be-
tually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore aeviternity
ing is subject to change, or consists in change; and these
does not differ from time.
things are measured by time, as are all movements, and
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol.
iii)
also the being of all things corruptible. But others recede
“Who commandest time to be separate from aeviternity.”
less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being
I answer that, Aeviternity differs from time, and from
neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change;
eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference
nevertheless they have change annexed to them either ac-
is explained by some to consist in the fact that eternity has
tually or potentially. This appears in the heavenly bod-
neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no
ies, the substantial being of which is unchangeable; and
end, and time both beginning and end. This difference,
yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness of
however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above,
place. The same applies to the angels, who have an un-
in the preceding article; because even if aeviternal things
changeable being as regards their nature with changeable-
had always been, and would always be, as some think, and
ness as regards choice; moreover they have changeable-
even if they might sometimes fail to be, which is possible
ness of intelligence, of affections and of places in their
to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would still
own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity
be distinguished from eternity, and from time.
which is a mean between eternity and time. But the be-
Others assign the difference between these three to
ing that is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is
consist in the fact that eternity has no “before” and “af-
it annexed to change. In this way time has “before” and
ter”; but that time has both, together with innovation and
“after”; aeviternity in itself has no “before” and “after,”
44
which can, however, be annexed to it; while eternity has that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a
neither “before” nor “after,” nor is it compatible with such
different sense according to the acceptation of our intel-
at all.
lect, which apprehends the angelic existence by compar-
Reply to Objection 1. Spiritual creatures as regards
ison with different parts of time. But when we say that
successive affections and intelligences are measured by
an angel is, or was, we suppose something, which being
time.
Hence also Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit.
viii,
supposed, its opposite is not subject to the divine power.
20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved
Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet suppose
by affections. But as regards their nature they are mea-
anything. Hence, since the existence and non-existence
sured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of
of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine
glory, they have a share of eternity.
power, God can make the existence of an angel not future;
Reply to Objection 2. Aeviternity is simultaneously
but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to
whole; yet it is not eternity, because “before” and “after”
have been, after he has been.
are compatible with it.
Reply to Objection 4. The duration of aeviternity is
Reply to Objection 3. In the very being of an angel
infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence,
considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and
there is no incongruity in saying that a creature is infinite,
future, but only as regards accidental change. Now to say
inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature.
Whether there is only one aeviternity?
Ia q. 10 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that there is not only one aevi-
because time is not a number abstracted from the thing
ternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras:
numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise
“Majesty and power of ages are with Thee, O Lord.”
it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are con-
Objection 2. Further, different genera have different
tinuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the
measures. But some aeviternal things belong to the corpo-
thing numbered. Now number as it exists in the thing
real genus, as the heavenly bodies; and others are spiritual
numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for
substances, as are the angels. Therefore there is not only
different things. Hence, others assert that the unity of eter-
one aeviternity.
nity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity Objection 3. Further, since aeviternity is a term of
of time. Thus all durations are one in that view, in the light
duration, where there is one aeviternity, there is also one
of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity
duration. But not all aeviternal things have one duration,
of things receiving duration from the influx of the first
for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case
principle. On the other hand others assign primary mat-
especially of human souls. Therefore there is not only one
ter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first subject
aeviternity.
of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of
Objection 4. Further, things not dependent on each
these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things
other do not seem to have one measure of duration; for
which are one in principle, or in subject, especially if dis-
there appears to be one time for all temporal things; since
tant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore
the first movement, measured by time, is in some way the
the true reason why time is one, is to be found in the one-
cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not de-
ness of the first movement by which, since it is most sim-
pend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of an-
ple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is
other angel. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the
On the contrary, Aeviternity is a more simple thing
thing measured, but also as accident is to subject; and thus
than time, and is nearer to eternity. But time is one only.
receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is
Therefore much more is aeviternity one only.
compared only as the measure is to the thing measured.
I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this sub-
Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by
ject. Some say there is only one aeviternity; others that
one separate measure many things can be measured.
there are many aeviternities. Which of these is true, may
This being established, we must observe that a twofold
be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can
opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some
rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of spiritual
said that all proceeded from God in a certain equality, as
things.
Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them,
Now some say that there is only one time for tempo-
as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual sub-
ral things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things
stances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order;
numbered; as time is a number, according to the Philoso-
and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so,
pher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason;
when he said that among spiritual substances there are the
45
first, the middle and the last; even in one order of angels.
say many aeviternities when we mean ages.
Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that
Reply to Objection 2. Although the heavenly bod-
there are many aeviternities as there are many aeviternal
ies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature,
things of first degree. But according to the second opin-
still they agree in having a changeless being, and are thus
ion, it would be necessary to say that there is one aevi-
measured by aeviternity.
ternity only; because since each thing is measured by the
Reply to Objection 3. All temporal things did not be-
most simple element of its genus, it must be that the ex-
gin together; nevertheless there is one time for all of them,
istence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the
by reason of the first measured by time; and thus all ae-
existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more
viternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first,
simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the
though all did not begin together.
second opinion is truer, as will be shown later (q. 47, a. 2);
Reply to Objection 4. For things to be measured by
we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity.
one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of
Reply to Objection 1. Aeviternity is sometimes taken
all, but that it be more simple than the rest.
for age, that is, a space of a thing’s duration; and thus we
46
FIRST PART, QUESTION 11
The Unity of God
(In Four Articles)
After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether “one” adds anything to “being”?
(2) Whether “one” and “many” are opposed to each other?
(3) Whether God is one?
(4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?
Whether “one” adds anything to “being”?
Ia q. 11 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that “one” adds something to
that “one” which is the principle of number, added a re-
“being.” For everything is in a determinate genus by addi-
ality to the substance of “being” (otherwise number made
tion to being, which penetrates all “genera.” But “one” is a
of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought that
determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which
the “one” convertible with “being” added a reality to the
is a species of quantity. Therefore “one” adds something
substance of beings; as “white” to “man.” This, however,
to “being.”
is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is “one” by its
Objection 2. Further, what divides a thing common
substance. For if a thing were “one” by anything else but
to all, is an addition to it. But “being” is divided by “one”
by its substance, since this again would be “one,” suppos-
and by “many.” Therefore “one” is an addition to “being.”
ing it were again “one” by another thing, we should be
Objection 3. Further, if “one” is not an addition to
driven on to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the former
“being,” “one” and “being” must have the same mean-
statement; therefore we must say that the “one” which is
ing. But it would be nugatory to call “being” by the name
convertible with “being,” does not add a reality to being;
of “being”; therefore it would be equally so to call being
but that the “one” which is the principle of number, does
“one.” Now this is false. Therefore “one” is an addition
add a reality to “being,” belonging to the genus of quan-
to “being.”
tity.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.):
Reply to Objection 2. There is nothing to prevent
“Nothing which exists is not in some way one,” which
a thing which in one way is divided, from being another
would be false if “one” were an addition to “being,” in the
way undivided; as what is divided in number, may be un-
sense of limiting it. Therefore “one” is not an addition to
divided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one
“being.”
way “one,” and in another way “many.” Still, if it is abso-
I answer that, “One” does not add any reality to “be-
lutely undivided, either because it is so according to what
ing”; but is only a negation of division; for “one” means
belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as regards
undivided “being.” This is the very reason why “one” is
what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may
the same as “being.” Now every being is either simple or
have many accidents; or because it is undivided actually,
compound. But what is simple is undivided, both actu-
and divided potentially, as what is “one” in the whole, and
ally and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not
is “many” in parts; in such a case a thing will be “one”
being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up
absolutely and “many” accidentally. On the other hand,
and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of any-
if it be undivided accidentally, and divided absolutely, as
thing consists in undivision; and hence it is that everything
if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in
guards its unity as it guards its being.
principle or cause, it will be “many” absolutely and “one”
Reply to Objection 1. Some, thinking that the “one”
accidentally; as what are “many” in number and “one” in
convertible with “being” is the same as the “one” which is
species or “one” in principle. Hence in that way, being
the principle of number, were divided into contrary opin-
is divided by “one” and by “many”; as it were by “one”
ions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the “one” convert-
absolutely and by “many” accidentally. For multitude it-
ible with “being” did not add any reality to “being,” but
self would not be contained under “being,” unless it were
signified the substance of “being” as undivided, thought
in some way contained under “one.” Thus Dionysius says
that the same applied to the “one” which is the princi-
(Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that “there is no kind of multitude
ple of number. And because number is composed of uni-
that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts,
ties, they thought that numbers were the substances of all
are one in their whole; and what are many in accidents,
things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering
are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one
47
in species; and what are many in species, are one in genus; gatory to say “being” is “one”; forasmuch as “one” adds
and what are many in processions, are one in principle.”
an idea to “being.”
Reply to Objection 3. It does not follow that it is nu-
Whether “one” and “many” are opposed to each other?
Ia q. 11 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that “one” and “many” are not
ing. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite;
mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is predicated of
forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is relative; for
its opposite. But every “multitude” is in a certain way
what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being abso-
“one,” as appears from the preceding article. Therefore
lutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being in the genus
“one” is not opposed to “multitude.”
of substance is non-being relatively as regards some acci-
Objection 2. Further, no opposite thing is constituted
dental being. In the same way, what is relatively good is
by its opposite. But “multitude” is constituted by “one.”
absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is absolutely
Therefore it is not opposed to “multitude.”
“one” is relatively “many,” and vice versa.
Objection 3. Further, “one” is opposed to “one.” But
Reply to Objection 2. A “whole” is twofold. In one
the idea of “few” is opposed to “many.” Therefore “one”
sense it is homogeneous, composed of like parts; in an-
is not opposed to “many.”
other sense it is heterogeneous, composed of dissimilar
Objection 4. Further, if “one” is opposed to “mul-
parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the whole is
titude,” it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided;
made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for
and is thus opposed to it as privation is to habit. But
instance, every part of water is water; and such is the con-
this appears to be incongruous; because it would follow
stitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In
that “one” comes after “multitude,” and is defined by it;
every heterogeneous whole, however, every part is want-
whereas, on the contrary, “multitude” is defined by “one.”
ing in the form belonging to the whole; as, for instance,
Hence there would be a vicious circle in the definition;
no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of a man a
which is inadmissible. Therefore “one” and “many” are
man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole. Therefore
not opposed.
inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the
On the contrary, Things which are opposed in idea,
latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of
are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of
not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude
“one” consists in indivisibility; and the idea of “multi-
so far as they are undivided, in which way they are op-
tude” contains division. Therefore “one” and “many” are
posed to multitude; but so far as they have being, as also
opposed to each other.
the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that
I answer that, “One” is opposed to “many,” but in
they are beings, not by the fact that they are not houses.
various ways. The “one” which is the principle of number
Reply to Objection 3. “Many” is taken in two ways:
is opposed to “multitude” which is number, as the mea-
absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to “one”; in
sure is to the thing measured. For “one” implies the idea
another way as importing some kind of excess, in which
of a primary measure; and number is “multitude” mea-
sense it is opposed to “few”; hence in the first sense two
sured by “one,” as is clear from Metaph. x. But the “one”
are many but not in the second sense.
which convertible with “being” is opposed to “multitude”
Reply to Objection 4. “One” is opposed to “many”
by way of privation; as the undivided is to the thing di-
privatively, inasmuch as the idea of “many” involves di-
vided.
vision. Hence division must be prior to unity, not abso-
Reply to Objection 1. No privation entirely takes
lutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension.
away the being of a thing, inasmuch as privation means
For we apprehend simple things by compound things; and
“negation in the subject,” according to the Philosopher
hence we define a point to be, “what has no part,” or “the
(Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes away
beginning of a line.” “Multitude” also, in idea, follows
some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality,
on “one”; because we do not understand divided things
the privation of being has its foundation in being; which is
to convey the idea of multitude except by the fact that we
not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of attribute unity to every part. Hence “one” is placed in the
whiteness and the like. And what applies to being applies
definition of “multitude”; but “multitude” is not placed in
also to one and to good, which are convertible with being,
the definition of “one.” But division comes to be under-
for the privation of good is founded in some good; like-
stood from the very negation of being: so what first comes
wise the removal of unity is founded in some one thing.
to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being,
Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and
and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly,
evil is some good thing, and non-being is some kind of be-
comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of multitude.
48
Whether God is one?
Ia q. 11 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that God is not one. For it is
is impossible for many gods to exist. Hence also the an-
written “For there be many gods and many lords” (1 Cor.
cient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when
8:5).
they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise that
Objection 2. Further, “One,” as the principle of num-
there was only one such principle.
ber, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity is not
Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For
predicated of God; likewise, neither can “one” which is
all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other
convertible with “being” be predicated of God, because it
since some serve others. But things that are diverse do
imports privation, and every privation is an imperfection,
not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered
which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one.
thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by
On the contrary, It is written “Hear, O Israel, the
one better than by many: because one is the “per se” cause
Lord our God is one Lord” (Dt. 6:4).
of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one,
I answer that, It can be shown from these three
inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore
sources that God is one. First from His simplicity. For
what is first is most perfect, and is so “per se” and not ac-
it is manifest that the reason why any singular thing is
cidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into
“this particular thing” is because it cannot be communi-
one order should be only one. And this one is God.
cated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can
Reply to Objection 1. Gods are called many by the
be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this
error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking as
particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore,
they did that the planets and other stars were gods, and
if Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this par-
also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle
ticular man, as there cannot be many Socrates, so there
adds: “Our God is one,” etc.
could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs
Reply to Objection 2. “One” which is the principle
to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was
of number is not predicated of God, but only of material
shown above (q. 3, a. 3). Therefore, in the very same way
things. For “one” the principle of number belongs to the
God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore
“genus” of mathematics, which are material in being, and
that many Gods should exist.
abstracted from matter only in idea. But “one” which is
Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His per-
convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does
fection. For it was shown above (q. 4, a. 2) that God
not depend on matter in its being. And although in God
comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being.
there is no privation, still, according to the mode of our
If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ
apprehension, He is known to us by way only of privation
from each other. Something therefore would belong to
and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind
one which did not belong to another. And if this were a
of privation should not be predicated of God; for instance,
privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect;
that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it
but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it
is said of God that He is one.
Whether God is supremely one?
Ia q. 11 a. 4
Objection 1.
It seems that God is not supremely
than any other being is “one.”
“one.” For “one” is so called from the privation of di-
On the contrary, Bernard says (De Consid.
v):
vision. But privation cannot be greater or less. Therefore
“Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trin-
God is not more “one” than other things which are called
ity holds the first place.”
“one.”
I answer that, Since “one” is an undivided being, if
Objection 2. Further, nothing seems to be more in-
anything is supremely “one” it must be supremely being,
divisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible;
and supremely undivided. Now both of these belong to
such as a point and unity. But a thing is said to be more
God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being
“one” according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not
is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined;
more “one” than unity is “one” and a point is “one.”
since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undeter-
Objection 3.
Further, what is essentially good is
mined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He
supremely good. Therefore what is essentially “one” is
is divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode
supremely “one.” But every being is essentially “one,” as
of division; since He is altogether simple, as was shown
the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being
above (q. 3, a. 7). Hence it is manifest that God is “one”
is supremely “one”; and therefore God is not “one” more
in the supreme degree.
49
Reply to Objection 1. Although privation considered as they have being only in some subject. Hence neither
in itself is not susceptive of more or less, still according as of them can be supremely “one.” For as a subject cannot
its opposite is subject to more or less, privation also can
be supremely “one,” because of the difference within it of
be considered itself in the light of more and less. There-
accident and subject, so neither can an accident.
fore according as a thing is more divided, or is divisible,
Reply to Objection 3. Although every being is “one”
either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more, or
by its substance, still every such substance is not equally
less, or supremely, “one.”
the cause of unity; for the substance of some things is
Reply to Objection 2. A point and unity which is the
compound and of others simple.
principle of number, are not supremely being, inasmuch
50
FIRST PART, QUESTION 12
How God Is Known by Us
(In Thirteen Articles)
As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
(2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image?
(3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?
(4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of God?
(5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?
(6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than another?
(7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?
(8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all things in it?
(9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?
(10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?
(11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of God?
(12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?
(13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason?
Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
Ia q. 12 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that no created intellect can see
able. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not
the essence of God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.)
be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the ex-
commenting on Jn. 1:18, “No man hath seen God at any
cess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for
time,” says: “Not prophets only, but neither angels nor
example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be
archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see
seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light.
what is increatable?” Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i),
Therefore some who considered this, held that no cre-
speaking of God: “Neither is there sense, nor image, nor
ated intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion,
opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him.”
however, is not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of
Objection 2. Further, everything infinite, as such, is
man consists in the use of his highest function, which is
unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above (q. 7,
the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that the cre-
a. 1). Therefore in Himself He is unknown.
ated intellect could never see God, it would either never
Objection 3. Further, the created intellect knows only
attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in some-
existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension
thing else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the
of the intellect is being. Now God is not something exist-
ultimate perfection of the rational creature is to be found
ing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says
in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is
(Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is not intelligible; but
perfect so far as it attains to its principle. Further the same above all intellect.
opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every
Objection 4. Further, there must be some proportion
man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which
between the knower and the known, since the known is
he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intel-
the perfection of the knower. But no proportion exists
lect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the
between the created intellect and God; for there is an in-
first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void.
finite distance between them. Therefore the created intel-
Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed
lect cannot see the essence of God.
see the essence of God.
On the contrary, It is written: “We shall see Him as
Reply to Objection 1.
Both of these authorities
He is” (1 Jn. 2:2).
speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius
I answer that, Since everything is knowable accord-
premises immediately before the words cited, “He is uni-
ing as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any ad-
versally to all incomprehensible,” etc. Chrysostom like-
mixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely know-
wise after the words quoted says: “He says this of the
51
most certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect tence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known
consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the
at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which
Son.”
means that He is not comprehended.
Reply to Objection 2. The infinity of matter not made
Reply to Objection 4. Proportion is twofold. In one
perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowl-
sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to an-
edge comes by the form; whereas the infinity of the form
other, according as double, treble and equal are species of
not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God
proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to
is Infinite in this way, and not in the first way: as appears
another is called proportion. And in this sense there can
from what was said above (q. 7, a. 1).
be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is
Reply to Objection 3. God is not said to be not ex-
related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potential-
isting as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists
ity to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be
above all that exists; inasmuch as He is His own exis-
proportioned to know God.
Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image?
Ia q. 12 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that the essence of God is seen
intellect power, and that He can be seen by the intellect.
through an image by the created intellect. For it is written:
And since the intellective power of the creature is not the
“We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to
essence of God, it follows that it is some kind of partici-
Him, and [Vulg.: ‘because’] we shall see Him as He is”
pated likeness of Him who is the first intellect. Hence also
(1 Jn. 3:2).
the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligi-
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v):
ble light, as it were, derived from the first light, whether
“When we know God, some likeness of God is made in
this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfec-
us.”
tion superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order
Objection 3. Further, the intellect in act is the ac-
to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the
tual intelligible; as sense in act is the actual sensible. But
part of the visual faculty, whereby the intellect is made
this comes about inasmuch as sense is informed with the
capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object seen,
likeness of the sensible object, and the intellect with the
which must necessarily be united to the seer, the essence
likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God is seen
of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First,
by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by
because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), “by the simili-
some similitude.
tudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that
way be known;” as by the likeness of a body the essence
when the Apostle says, “We see through a glass and in
of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less there-
an enigma∗,” “by the terms ‘glass’ and ‘enigma’ certain
fore can the essence of God be seen by any created like-
similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated
ness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is
to the vision of God.” But to see the essence of God is not
His own very existence, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4),
an enigmatic nor a speculative vision, but is, on the con-
which cannot be said of any created form; and so no cre-
trary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine essence is
ated form can be the similitude representing the essence
not seen through a similitude.
of God to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence
I answer that, Two things are required both for sen-
is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself super-eminently
sible and for intellectual vision—viz. power of sight, and
whatever can be signified or understood by the created in-
union of the thing seen with the sight. For vision is made
tellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any
actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the
created likeness; for every created form is determined ac-
seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that the thing seen
cording to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of be-
cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its like-
ing itself, or of some like thing. Hence to say that God is
ness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the
seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence
vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone
is not seen at all; which is false.
is not there. But if the principle of the visual power and
Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of
the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would nec-
God, there is required some similitude in the visual fac-
essarily follow that the seer would receive both the visual
ulty, namely, the light of glory strengthening the intellect
power and the form whereby it sees, from that one same
to see God, which is spoken of in the Ps. 35:10, “In Thy
thing.
light we shall see light.” The essence of God, however,
Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the
cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the
∗ Douay: ‘in a dark manner’
52
divine essence itself as it really is.
itself. Hence as other intelligible forms which are not their
Reply to Objection 1. That authority speaks of the
own existence are united to the intellect by means of some
similitude which is caused by participation of the light of
entity, whereby the intellect itself is informed, and made
glory.
in act; so the divine essence is united to the created intel-
Reply to Objection 2.
Augustine speaks of the
lect, as the object actually understood, making the intel-
knowledge of God here on earth.
lect in act by and of itself.
Reply to Objection 3. The divine essence is existence
Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?
Ia q. 12 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that the essence of God can be
with the eye of the flesh, but that man existing in the flesh
seen by the corporeal eye. For it is written (Job 19:26):
after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the words,
“In my flesh I shall see. . . God,” and (Job 42:5), “With the
“Now my eye seeth Thee,” are to be understood of the
hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth
mind’s eye, as the Apostle says: “May He give unto you
Thee.”
the spirit of wisdom. . . in the knowledge of Him, that the
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
eyes of your heart” may be “enlightened” (Eph. 1:17,18).
xxix, 29): “Those eyes” (namely the glorified) “will there-
Reply to Objection 2. Augustine speaks as one in-
fore have a greater power of sight, not so much to see
quiring, and conditionally. This appears from what he
more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of
says previously: “Therefore they will have an altogether
eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by
different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they shall see
these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to
that incorporeal nature;” and afterwards he explains this,
see even incorporeal things.” Now whoever can see incor-
saying: “It is very credible, that we shall so see the mun-
poreal things, can be raised up to see God. Therefore the
dane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to
glorified eye can see God.
see most clearly God everywhere present, governing all
Objection 3.
Further, God can be seen by man
corporeal things, not as we now see the invisible things
through a vision of the imagination. For it is written: “I
of God as understood by what is made; but as when we
saw the Lord sitting upon a throne,” etc. (Is. 6:1). But an
see men among whom we live, living and exercising the
imaginary vision originates from sense; for the imagina-
functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but
tion is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen
see it.” Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see
by a vision of sense.
God, as now our eyes see the life of another. But life is
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep.
not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visi-
cxlvii): “No one has ever seen God either in this life, as
ble, but as the indirect object of the sense; which indeed
He is, nor in the angelic life, as visible things are seen by
is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by
corporeal vision.”
some other cognitive power. But that the divine presence
I answer that, It is impossible for God to be seen by
is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and
the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the
through, corporeal things, happens from two causes—viz.
sensitive power. For every such kind of power is the act
from the perspicuity of the intellect, and from the reful-
of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later (q. 78). Now
gence of the divine glory infused into the body after its
act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence
renovation.
no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For
Reply to Objection 3. The essence of God is not
God is incorporeal, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 1). Hence
seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination
He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but
receives some form representing God according to some
only by the intellect.
mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture divine things
Reply to Objection 1. The words, “In my flesh I shall
are metaphorically described by means of sensible things.
see God my Saviour,” do not mean that God will be seen
Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence?
Ia q. 12 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that a created intellect can see
seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power un-
the Divine essence by its own natural power. For Diony-
derstands himself, it seems that by his own natural power
sius says (Div. Nom. iv): “An angel is a pure mirror, most
he understands the Divine essence.
clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty
Objection 2. Further, what is supremely visible, is
of God.” But if a reflection is seen, the original thing is
made less visible to us by reason of our defective cor-
53
poreal or intellectual sight. But the angelic intellect has sidering act of the intellect; hence it follows that through
no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely in-
the intellect we can understand these objects as universal;
telligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is
and this is beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic
supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand
intellect naturally knows natures that are not in matter; but
other intelligible things by his own natural power, much
this is beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the
more can he understand God.
state of its present life, united as it is to the body. It fol-
Objection 3. Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised
lows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural
up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its
to the divine intellect alone; and this is beyond the natu-
nature. Therefore if to see the essence of God is above the
ral power of any created intellect; for no creature is its
nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created
own existence, forasmuch as its existence is participated.
intellect can reach up to see the essence of God at all. But
Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of
this is false, as appears from what is said above (a. 1).
God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the cre-
Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect
ated intellect, as an object made intelligible to it.
to see the Divine essence.
Reply to Objection 1. This mode of knowing God
On the contrary, It is written: “The grace of God is
is natural to an angel—namely, to know Him by His own
life everlasting” (Rom. 6:23). But life everlasting con-
likeness refulgent in the angel himself. But to know God
sists in the vision of the Divine essence, according to the
by any created similitude is not to know the essence of
words: “This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the
God, as was shown above (a. 2). Hence it does not follow
only true God,” etc. (Jn. 17:3). Therefore to see the
that an angel can know the essence of God by his own
essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace,
power.
and not by nature.
Reply to Objection 2. The angelic intellect is not de-
I answer that, It is impossible for any created intel-
fective, if defect be taken to mean privation, as if it were
lect to see the essence of God by its own natural power.
without anything which it ought to have. But if the defect
For knowledge is regulated according as the thing known
be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is defec-
is in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower ac-
tive, when compared with God; forasmuch as it does not
cording to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge
possess the excellence which is in God.
of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If
Reply to Objection 3. The sense of sight, as being
therefore the mode of anything’s being exceeds the mode
altogether material, cannot be raised up to immateriality.
of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of the
But our intellect, or the angelic intellect, inasmuch as it is
object is above the nature of the knower. Now the mode
elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up
of being of things is manifold. For some things have be-
above its own nature to a higher level by grace. The proof
ing only in this one individual matter; as all bodies. But
is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it
others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all,
knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature
which, however, are not their own existence, but receive it;
except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect
and these are the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to
is able to consider abstractedly what it knows concretely.
God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent being.
Now although it knows things which have a form residing
Therefore what exists only in individual matter we know
in matter, still it resolves the composite into both of these
naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the
elements; and it considers the form separately by itself.
form of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cogni-
Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel, although it nat-
tive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which nat-
urally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to
urally knows things existing in individual matter; hence
separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that
sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind
the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another.
of cognitive power in the soul, called the intellect; and
Since therefore the created intellect is naturally capable
this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the
of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete be-
intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in in-
ing abstractedly, by way of a kind of resolution of parts;
dividual matter; not as they are in such individual matter,
it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting
but according as they are abstracted therefrom by the con-
substance, and separate subsisting existence.
54
Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of Ia q. 12 a. 5
God?
Objection 1. It seems that the created intellect does
sary that the power of understanding should be added by
not need any created light in order to see the essence of
divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers
God. For what is of itself lucid in sensible things does
is called the illumination of the intellect, as we also call
not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore
the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumi-
the same applies to intelligible things. Now God is intel-
nation. And this is the light spoken of in the Apocalypse
ligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any
(Apoc. 21:23): “The glory of God hath enlightened it”—
created light.
viz. the society of the blessed who see God. By this light
Objection 2.
Further, if God is seen through a
the blessed are made “deiform”—i.e. like to God, accord-
medium, He is not seen in His essence. But if seen by any
ing to the saying: “When He shall appear we shall be like
created light, He is seen through a medium. Therefore He
to Him, and [Vulg.: ‘because’] we shall see Him as He is”
is not seen in His essence.
(1 Jn. 2:2).
Objection 3. Further, what is created can be natural
Reply to Objection 1. The created light is necessary
to some creature. Therefore if the essence of God is seen
to see the essence of God, not in order to make the essence
through any created light, such a light can be made natu-
of God intelligible, which is of itself intelligible, but in orral to some other creature; and thus, that creature would
der to enable the intellect to understand in the same way
not need any other light to see God; which is impossible.
as a habit makes a power abler to act. Even so corporeal
Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should
light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as
require a superadded light in order to see the essence of
it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible
God.
of color.
On the contrary, It is written: “In Thy light we shall
Reply to Objection 2. This light is required to see the
see light” (Ps. 35:10).
divine essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen,
I answer that, Everything which is raised up to what
but as a perfection of the intellect, strengthening it to see
exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposi-
God. Therefore it may be said that this light is to be de-
tion above its nature; as, for example, if air is to receive
scribed not as a medium in which God is seen, but as one
the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition
by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take
for such a form. But when any created intellect sees the
away the immediate vision of God.
essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the in-
Reply to Objection 3. The disposition to the form of
telligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that
fire can be natural only to the subject of that form. Hence
some supernatural disposition should be added to the in-
the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the
tellect in order that it may be raised up to such a great and
creature has a divine nature; which is impossible. But by
sublime height. Now since the natural power of the cre-
this light the rational creature is made deiform, as is said
ated intellect does not avail to enable it to see the essence
in this article.
of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is neces-
Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another?
Ia q. 12 a. 6
Objection 1.
It seems that of those who see the
fectly than another can happen in two ways: either on the
essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than an-
part of the visible object, or on the part of the visual power
other. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:2): “We shall see Him as
of the seer. On the part of the object, it may so happen be-
He is.” But He is only in one way. Therefore He will be
cause the object is received more perfectly in the seer, that
seen by all in one way only; and therefore He will not be
is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude;
seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another.
but this does not apply to the present question, for God is
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri.
present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of simili-
Quaest. qu. xxxii): “One person cannot see one and
tude, but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees
the same thing more perfectly than another.” But all who
Him more perfectly than another, this happens according
see the essence of God, understand the Divine essence,
to the difference of the intellectual power; thus it follows
for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was
too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will
shown above (a. 3 ). Therefore of those who see the divine
see Him the more clearly; and this is incongruous; since
essence, one does not see more clearly than another.
equality with angels is promised to men as their beatitude.
Objection 3. Further, That anything be seen more per-
On the contrary, Eternal life consists in the vision of
55
God, according to Jn. 17:3: “This is eternal life, that they Reply to Objection 1. In the words,“We shall see
may know Thee the only true God,” etc. Therefore if all
Him as He is,” the conjunction “as” determines the mode
saw the essence of God equally in eternal life, all would
of vision on the part of the object seen, so that the mean-
be equal; the contrary to which is declared by the Apostle:
ing is, we shall see Him to be as He is, because we shall
“Star differs from star in glory” (1 Cor. 15:41).
see His existence, which is His essence. But it does not
I answer that, Of those who see the essence of God,
determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing;
one sees Him more perfectly than another. This, indeed,
as if the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be
does not take place as if one had a more perfect similitude
as perfect as is the perfect mode of God’s existence.
of God than another, since that vision will not spring from
Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For
any similitude; but it will take place because one intel-
when it is said that one intellect does not understand one
lect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than
and the same thing better than another, this would be true
another. The faculty of seeing God, however, does not be-
if referred to the mode of the thing understood, for who-
long to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by
ever understands it otherwise than it really is, does not
the light of glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind
truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of un-
of “deiformity,” as appears from what is said above, in the
derstanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect
preceding article.
than the understanding of another.
Hence the intellect which has more of the light of
Reply to Objection 3. The diversity of seeing will
glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have
not arise on the part of the object seen, for the same ob-
a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more
ject will be presented to all—viz. the essence of God;
charity; because where there is the greater charity, there
nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the ob-
is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes
ject seen by different similitudes; but it will arise on the
the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object de-
part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the
sired. Hence he who possesses the more charity, will see
natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.
God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified.
Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?
Ia q. 12 a. 7
Objection 1. It seems that those who see the divine
Great in counsel, and incomprehensible in thought” (Jer.
essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says (Phil.
32:18,19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.
3:12): “But I follow after, if I may by any means com-
I answer that, It is impossible for any created intel-
prehend [Douay: ‘apprehend’].” But the Apostle did not
lect to comprehend God; yet “for the mind to attain to God
follow in vain; for he said (1 Cor. 9:26): “I. . . so run, not
in some degree is great beatitude,” as Augustine says (De
as at an uncertainty.” Therefore he comprehended; and
Verb. Dim., Serm. xxxvii).
in the same way, others also, whom he invites to do the
In proof of this we must consider that what is compre-
same, saying: “So run that you may comprehend.”
hended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum,
which is known so far as it can be known. Thus, if any-
Ep. cxlvii): “That is comprehended which is so seen as a
thing which is capable of scientific demonstration is held
whole, that nothing of it is hidden from the seer.” But if
only by an opinion resting on a probably proof, it is not
God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and noth-
comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by sci-
ing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is simple.
entific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal
Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.
to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if
Objection 3. Further, if we say that He is seen as a
anyone accepts it as a probable opinion because wise men
“whole,” but not “wholly,” it may be contrarily urged that
or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend
“wholly” refers either to the mode of the seer, or to the
the thing itself, because he does not attain to that perfect
mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the essence of
mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable.
God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing seen is
But no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of
considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, like-
the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsi-
wise, he sees Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant,
cally capable. Which thus appears—Everything is know-
forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the
able according to its actuality. But God, whose being is
Divine essence. Therefore all who see the essence of God
infinite, as was shown above (q. 7) is infinitely knowable.
see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him.
Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the
On the contrary, It is written: “O most mighty,
created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less
great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name.
perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser
56
light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory But the blessed possess these three things in God; because
received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is
they see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as present,
clearly impossible for any created intellect to know God
having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him,
in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should
they enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment of desire.
comprehend God.
Reply to Objection 2. God is called incomprehen-
Reply to Objection 1. “Comprehension” is twofold:
sible not because anything of Him is not seen; but be-
in one sense it is taken strictly and properly, according
cause He is not seen as perfectly as He is capable of being
as something is included in the one comprehending; and
seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known
thus in no way is God comprehended either by intellect,
by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part
or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and can-
of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the
not be included in any finite being; so that no finite being
composition; but that it is not as perfectly known as it is
can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own in-
capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his defini-
finity. In this sense we now take comprehension. But in
tion of comprehension, says the whole is comprehended
another sense “comprehension” is taken more largely as
when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden
opposed to “non-attainment”; for he who attains to any-
from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely
one is said to comprehend him when he attains to him.
viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to
And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed,
be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge of
according to the words, “I held him, and I will not let him
it is attained.
go” (Cant 3:4); in this sense also are to be understood the
Reply to Objection 3. The word “wholly” denotes
words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehen-
a mode of the object; not that the whole object does not
sion. And in this way “comprehension” is one of the three
come under knowledge, but that the mode of the object is
prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as vision re-
not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he who
sponds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even
sees God’s essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely,
among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed,
and is infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode
forasmuch as things either appear sometimes afar off, or
does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely;
they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again,
thus, for instance, a person can have a probable opinion
do we always enjoy what we possess; either because we
that a proposition is demonstrable, although he himself
find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not
does not know it as demonstrated.
the ultimate end of our desire, so as to satisfy and quell it.
Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?
Ia q. 12 a. 8
Objection 1. It seems that those who see the essence
On the contrary, The angels see the essence of God;
of God see all things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog.
and yet do not know all things. For as Dionysius says
iv): “What do they not see, who see Him Who sees all
(Coel. Hier. vii), “the inferior angels are cleansed from
things?” But God sees all things. Therefore those who
ignorance by the superior angels.” Also they are ignorant
see God see all things.
of future contingent things, and of secret thoughts; for this
Objection 2. Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees
knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever
what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or possi-
sees the essence of God, does not know all things.
ble things shine forth in God as in a mirror; for He knows
I answer that, The created intellect, in seeing the di-
all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees God, sees
vine essence, does not see in it all that God does or can
all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.
do. For it is manifest that things are seen in God as they
Objection 3.
Further, whoever understands the
are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are
greater, can understand the least, as is said in De Anima
in the power of their cause. Therefore all things are seen
iii. But all that God does, or can do, are less than His
in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear
essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can under-
that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its
stand all that God does, or can do.
effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty under-
Objection 4. Further, the rational creature naturally
standing, as soon as one demonstrative principle is put be-
desires to know all things. Therefore if in seeing God it
fore him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions;
does not know all things, its natural desire will not rest
but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for he needs
satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy;
things to be explained to him separately. And so an in-
which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees God knows
tellect can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons
all things.
for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the
57
cause wholly. Now no created intellect can comprehend seen more or less perfectly.
God wholly, as shown above (a. 7). Therefore no created
Reply to Objection 4. The natural desire of the ratio-
intellect in seeing God can know all that God does or can
nal creature is to know everything that belongs to the per-
do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of
fection of the intellect, namely, the species and the genera
what God does or can do any intellect can know the more,
of things and their types, and these everyone who sees the
the more perfectly it sees God.
Divine essence will see in God. But to know other singu-
Reply to Objection 1. Gregory speaks as regards the
lars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the
object being sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself suf-
perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural de-
ficiently contains and shows forth all things; but it does
sire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to
not follow that whoever sees God knows all things, for he
know things that exist not as yet, but which God can call
does not perfectly comprehend Him.
into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the fount
Reply to Objection 2. It is not necessary that whoever
and principle of all being and of all truth, He would so fill
sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror, unless his
the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would
glance comprehends the mirror itself.
be desired, and the seer would be completely beatified.
Reply to Objection 3. Although it is more to see God
Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): “Unhappy the man
than to see all things else, still it is a greater thing to see who knoweth all these” (i.e. all creatures) “and knoweth
Him so that all things are known in Him, than to see Him
not Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he
in such a way that not all things, but the fewer or the more,
know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them
are known in Him. For it has been shown in this article
is not the happier for them, but for Thee alone.”
that the more things are known in God according as He is
Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any Ia q. 12 a. 9
similitude?
Objection 1. It seems that what is seen in God by
vine essence itself united to their intellect. For each thing
those who see the Divine essence, is seen by means of
is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows.
some similitude. For every kind of knowledge comes
Now this takes place in two ways. For as things which are
about by the knower being assimilated to the object
like one and the same thing are like to each other, the cog-
known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual
nitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object
intelligible, and the sense in act becomes the actual sen-
in two ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object
sible, inasmuch as it is informed by a similitude of the
itself, when it is directly informed by a similitude, and
object, as the eye by the similitude of color. Therefore
then the object is known in itself. In another way when
if the intellect of one who sees the Divine essence under-
informed by a similitude which resembles the object; and
stands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their
in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but
similitudes.
of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man
Objection 2. Further, what we have seen, we keep
in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his im-
in memory. But Paul, seeing the essence of God whilst
age. Hence to know things thus by their likeness in the
in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see the Divine essence,
one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their
as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34), remembered
own nature; whereas to know them by their similitudes
many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he
pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a
said: “I have heard secret words which it is not granted
difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence,
to man to utter” (2 Cor. 12:4). Therefore it must be said
according to the knowledge whereby things are known by
that certain similitudes of what he remembered, remained
those who see the essence of God, they are seen in God
in his mind; and in the same way, when he actually saw
Himself not by any other similitudes but by the Divine
the essence of God, he had certain similitudes or ideas of
essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God
what he actually saw in it.
Himself is seen.
On the contrary, A mirror and what is in it are seen
Reply to Objection 1. The created intellect of one
by means of one likeness. But all things are seen in God
who sees God is assimilated to what is seen in God, inas-
as in an intelligible mirror. Therefore if God Himself is
much as it is united to the Divine essence, in which the
not seen by any similitude but by His own essence, nei-
similitudes of all things pre-exist.
ther are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or
Reply to Objection 2. Some of the cognitive facul-
ideas.
ties form other images from those first conceived; thus the
I answer that, Those who see the divine essence see
imagination from the preconceived images of a mountain
what they see in God not by any likeness, but by the di-
and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain;
58
and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and is seen in the divine essence, which remained in Paul even
difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from
when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this
the similitude of an image we can form in our minds the
kind of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness
similitude of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any
thus conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are
other person who sees God, by the very vision of the di-
seen in God.
vine essence, can form in himself the similitudes of what
Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?
Ia q. 12 a. 10
Objection 1. It seems that those who see the essence
ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one
of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the same
body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence,
time. For according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii): “It
when many things can be understood by one idea, they
may happen that many things are known, but only one is
are understood at the same time; as the parts of a whole
understood.” But what is seen in God, is understood; for
are understood successively, and not all at the same time,
God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God
if each one is understood by its own idea; whereas if all
do not see all in Him at the same time.
are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
understood simultaneously. Now it was shown above that
viii, 22,23), “God moves the spiritual creature according
things seen in God, are not seen singly by their own simil-
to time”—i.e. by intelligence and affection. But the spir-
itude; but all are seen by the one essence of God. Hence
itual creature is the angel who sees God. Therefore those
they are seen simultaneously, and not successively.
who see God understand and are affected successively; for
Reply to Objection 1. We understand one thing only
time means succession.
when we understand by one idea; but many things under-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): “Our
stood by one idea are understood simultaneously, as in the
thoughts will not be unstable, going to and fro from one
idea of a man we understand “animal” and “rational”; and
thing to another; but we shall see all we know at one
in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof.
glance.”
Reply to Objection 2. As regards their natural knowl-
I answer that, What is seen in the Word is seen not
edge, whereby they know things by diverse ideas given
successively, but at the same time. In proof whereof, we
them, the angels do not know all things simultaneously,
ourselves cannot know many things all at once, forasmuch
and thus they are moved in the act of understanding ac-
as understand many things by means of many ideas. But
cording to time; but as regards what they see in God, they
our intellect cannot be actually informed by many diverse
see all at the same time.
Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?
Ia q. 12 a. 11
Objection 1. It seems that one can in this life see the
truth itself above our minds.” He also says (De Vera Relig.
Divine essence. For Jacob said: “I have seen God face to
xxx) that, “We judge of all things according to the divine
face” (Gn. 32:30). But to see Him face to face is to see
truth”; and (De Trin. xii) that, “it is the duty of reason to
His essence, as appears from the words: “We see now in a
judge of these corporeal things according to the incorpo-
glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face” (1 Cor.
real and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the
13:12).
mind could not be incommutable.” Therefore even in this
Objection 2. Further, the Lord said to Moses: “I speak
life we see God Himself.
to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and
Objection 4. Further, according to Augustine (Gen.
figures doth he see the Lord” (Num. 12:8); but this is to
ad lit. xii, 24, 25), those things that are in the soul by
see God in His essence. Therefore it is possible to see the
their essence are seen by intellectual vision. But intellec-
essence of God in this life.
tual vision is of intelligible things, not by similitudes, but
Objection 3. Further, that wherein we know all other
by their very essences, as he also says (Gen. ad lit. xiii,
things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known
24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His essence,
in itself to us. But even now we know all things in God;
it follows that He is seen by us in His essence.
for Augustine says (Confess. viii): “If we both see that
On the contrary, It is written, “Man shall not see Me,
what you say is true, and we both see that what I say
and live” (Ex. 32:20), and a gloss upon this says, “In this
is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee,
mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by
nor thou in me; but both of us in the very incommutable
the likeness itself of His own nature.”
59
I answer that, God cannot be seen in His essence by a though in an imaginary vision; as will later be explained (
mere human being, except he be separated from this mor-
IIa IIae, q. 174) in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We
tal life. The reason is because, as was said above (a. 4),
may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some ex-
the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of
alted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state.
the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life,
Reply to Objection 2. As God works miracles in cor-
has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows
poreal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above
only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by
the common order, raising the minds of some living in the
such a form. Now it is evident that the Divine essence
flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of
cannot be known through the nature of material things.
His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
For it was shown above (Aa. 2,9) that the knowledge of
26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul,
God by means of any created similitude is not the vision
the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully
of His essence. Hence it is impossible for the soul of man
in the question of rapture ( IIa IIae, q. 175).
in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in
Reply to Objection 3. All things are said to be seen
the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from corporeal
in God and all things are judged in Him, because by the
things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelli-
participation of His light, we know and judge all things;
gible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bod-
for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of
ily senses divine revelations and foresight of future events
the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and judge
are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, there-
of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun’s light. Hence
fore, that the soul in this mortal life should be raised up
Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), “The lessons of instruction
to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine
can only be seen as it were by their own sun,” namely
essence.
God. As therefore in order to see a sensible object, it is
Reply to Objection 1. According to Dionysius (Coel.
not necessary to see the substance of the sun, so in like
Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in
manner to see any intelligible object, it is not necessary to
the sense that certain figures are formed in the senses or
see the essence of God.
imagination, according to some similitude representing in
Reply to Objection 4. Intellectual vision is of the
part the divinity. So when Jacob says, “I have seen God
things which are in the soul by their essence, as intelli-
face to face,” this does not mean the Divine essence, but
gible things are in the intellect. And thus God is in the
some figure representing God. And this is to be referred to
souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by
some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak,
presence, essence and power.
Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?
Ia q. 12 a. 12
Objection 1. It seems that by natural reason we can-
can be led by sensible things. But our mind cannot be led
not know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol.
by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the
v) that “reason does not grasp simple form.” But God is a
sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God as
supremely simple form, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 7 ).
their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things
Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.
the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore
Objection 2. Further, the soul understands nothing by
can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects
natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we
and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so
cannot have an imagination of God, Who is incorporeal.
far as to know of God “whether He exists,” and to know
Therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge.
of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first
Objection 3. Further, the knowledge of natural reason
cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.
belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a
Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so
common nature. But the knowledge of God belongs only
far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ
to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): “The weak
from Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what
eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light
is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from
unless purified by the justice of faith.” Therefore God can-
Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because He
not be known by natural reason.
superexceeds them all.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:19), “That
Reply to Objection 1. Reason cannot reach up to
which is known of God,” namely, what can be known of
simple form, so as to know “what it is”; but it can know
God by natural reason, “is manifest in them.”
“whether it is.”
I answer that, Our natural knowledge begins from
Reply to Objection 2.
God is known by natural
sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it
knowledge through the images of His effects.
60
Reply to Objection 3. As the knowledge of God’s tracting what he had said before: “I do not approve what I
essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good; but the
said in prayer, ‘God who willest that only the pure should
knowledge of Him by natural reason can belong to both
know truth.’ For it can be answered that many who are not
good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i), re-
pure can know many truths,” i.e. by natural reason.
Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?
Ia q. 12 a. 13
Objection 1. It seems that by grace a higher knowl-
by the revelation of grace.
For the intellect’s natural
edge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For
light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light;
Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol. i) that whoever is the
and sometimes also the images in the human imagination
more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one
are divinely formed, so as to express divine things bet-
entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who nev-
ter than those do which we receive from sensible objects,
ertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge
as appears in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensi-
conferred by grace. But to be united to God while ig-
ble things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express
noring of Him “what He is,” comes about also by natural
some divine meaning; as in the Baptism, the Holy Ghost
reason. Therefore God is not more known to us by grace
was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Fa-
than by natural reason.
ther was heard, “This is My beloved Son” (Mat. 3:17).
Objection 2. Further, we can acquire the knowledge
Reply to Objection 1. Although by the revelation of
of divine things by natural reason only through the imag-
grace in this life we cannot know of God “what He is,” and
ination; and the same applies to the knowledge given by
thus are united to Him as to one unknown; still we know
grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that “it is impos-
Him more fully according as many and more excellent of
sible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as screened
His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we
round about by the many colored sacred veils.” Therefore
attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation,
we cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural
to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that
reason.
God is Three and One.
Objection 3. Further, our intellect adheres to God by
Reply to Objection 2. From the images either re-
grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be knowledge;
ceived from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed
for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Ev.) that “things not seen
in the imagination, we have so much the more excellent
are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge.” Therefore
intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light
there is not given to us a more excellent knowledge of God
is in man; and thus through the revelation given by the
by grace.
images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of
On the contrary, The Apostle says that “God hath re-
the divine light.
vealed to us His spirit,” what “none of the princes of this
Reply to Objection 3. Faith is a kind of knowledge,
world knew” (1 Cor. 2:10), namely, the philosophers, as
inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some
the gloss expounds.
knowable object. But this determination to one object
I answer that, We have a more perfect knowledge of
does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from
God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved
the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as faith
thus. The knowledge which we have by natural reason
falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which
contains two things: images derived from the sensible ob-
belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to
jects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to ab-
one object by the vision and understanding of first princi-
stract from them intelligible conceptions.
ples.
Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted
61
FIRST PART, QUESTION 13
The Names of God
(In Twelve Articles)
After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.
Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:
(1) Whether God can be named by us?
(2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially?
(3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically?
(4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?
(5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally?
(6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied first to God or to creatures?
(7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?
(8) Whether this name “God” is a name of nature, or of the operation?
(9) Whether this name “God” is a communicable name?
(10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God, by nature, by participation, and by opinion?
(11) Whether this name, “Who is,” is the supremely appropriate name of God?
(12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?
Whether a name can be given to God?
Ia q. 13 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that no name can be given to
cannot see the essence of God; but we know God from
God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that, “Of Him
creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence
there is neither name, nor can one be found of Him;” and
and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by
it is written: “What is His name, and what is the name of
us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies
His Son, if thou knowest?” (Prov. 30:4).
Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name
Objection 2. Further, every name is either abstract or
“man” expresses the essence of man in himself, since it
concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since
signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence;
He is simple, nor do abstract names belong to Him, foras-
for the idea expressed by the name is the definition.
much as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing.
Reply to Objection 1. The reason why God has no
Therefore no name can be said of God.
name, or is said to be above being named, is because His
Objection 3. Further, nouns are taken to signify sub-
essence is above all that we understand about God, and
stance with quality; verbs and participles signify sub-
signify in word.
stance with time; pronouns the same with demonstration
Reply to Objection 2. Because we know and name
or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for
God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify
He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; moreover, He
what belongs to material creatures, of which the knowl-
cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be de-
edge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind
scribed by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a
what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their
thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demon-
form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that
strative pronouns. Therefore God cannot in any way be
whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used by
named by us.
us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a con-
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 15:3): “The Lord
crete meaning as applicable to compound things; whereas
is a man of war, Almighty is His name.”
names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as
I answer that, Since according to the Philosopher
subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for instance,
(Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the
whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as
similitude of things, it is evident that words relate to the
God is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract
meaning of things signified through the medium of the in-
names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to
tellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give
signify His substance and perfection, although both these
a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now
kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, foras-
it was shown above (q. 12, Aa. 11,12) that in this life we
much as our intellect does not know Him in this life as He
62
is.
things, so we can understand and express simple eternity
Reply to Objection 3. To signify substance with qual-
only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has
ity is to signify the “suppositum” with a nature or deter-
a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But
mined form in which it subsists. Hence, as some things
demonstrative pronouns are applied to God as describing
are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His subsis-
what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can only
tence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God
describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, accord-
signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and par-
ing as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are
ticiples which signify time, are applied to Him because
applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative
His eternity includes all time. For as we can apprehend
pronouns.
and signify simple subsistences only by way of compound
Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?
Ia q. 13 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that no name can be applied to
ship towards creatures: thus in the words, “God is good,”
God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i,
we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the
9): “Everything said of God signifies not His substance,
same rule applies to other names.
but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some
Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue
relation, or something following from His nature or oper-
for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a
ation.”
reason be assigned why some names more than others are
Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i):
applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies
“You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the
in the same way as He is the cause of good things; there-
end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthily the divine
fore if the words “God is good,” signified no more than,
processions in the denomination of God.” Thus the names
“God is the cause of good things,” it might in like manner
applied by the holy doctors in praising God are distin-
be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause
guished according to the divine processions themselves.
of bodies. So also to say that He is a body implies that
But what expresses the procession of anything, does not
He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Sec-
signify its essence. Therefore the names applied to God
ondly, because it would follow that all names applied to
are not said of Him substantially.
God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a sec-
Objection 3. Further, a thing is named by us accord-
ondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine,
ing as we understand it. But God is not understood by us
forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in
in this life in His substance. Therefore neither is any name
the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, be-
we can use applied substantially to God.
cause this is against the intention of those who speak of
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi): “The
God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean
being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or
more than to say the He is the cause of our life, or that He
whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby His
differs from inanimate bodies.
substance is signified.” Therefore all names of this kind
Therefore we must hold a different doctrine—viz. that
signify the divine substance.
these names signify the divine substance, and are predi-
I answer that, Negative names applied to God, or sig-
cated substantially of God, although they fall short of a
nifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all
full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For
signify His substance, but rather express the distance of
these names express God, so far as our intellects know
the creature from Him, or His relation to something else,
Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures,
or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself.
it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it
But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God,
is shown above (q. 4, a. 2) that God prepossesses in Him-
as “good,” “wise,” and the like, various and many opin-
self all the perfections of creatures, being Himself simply
ions have been given. For some have said that all such
and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents
names, although they are applied to God affirmatively,
Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfec-
nevertheless have been brought into use more to express
tion; yet it represents Him not as something of the same
some remotion from God, rather than to express anything
species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose
that exists positively in Him. Hence they assert that when
form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind
we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an
of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies
inanimate thing; and the same in like manner applies to
represent the power of the sun. This was explained above
other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others
(q. 4, a. 3), in treating of the divine perfection. There-
say that these names applied to God signify His relation-
fore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but
63
in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it im-signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a
perfectly. So when we say, “God is good,” the meaning
certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the
is not, “God is the cause of goodness,” or “God is not
foot would be a stone∗. So we must say that these kinds
evil”; but the meaning is, “Whatever good we attribute to
of divine names are imposed from the divine processions;
creatures, pre-exists in God,” and in a more excellent and
for as according to the diverse processions of their perfec-
higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, be-
tions, creatures are the representations of God, although
cause He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He
in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows
causes goodness in things because He is good; according
and names God according to each kind of procession; but
to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), “Be-
nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the
cause He is good, we are.”
procession themselves, as if when we say “God lives,” the
Reply to Objection 1. Damascene says that these
sense were, “life proceeds from Him”; but to signify the
names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none
principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, of these names is perfectly expressed what He is; but each
although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than
one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as crea-
can be understood or signified.
tures represent Him imperfectly.
Reply to Objection 3. We cannot know the essence
Reply to Objection 2. In the significance of names,
of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know
that from which the name is derived is different some-
Him accordingly as He is represented in the perfections of
times from what it is intended to signify, as for instance,
creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him
this name “stone” [lapis] is imposed from the fact that
in that manner only.
it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed to
Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?
Ia q. 13 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that no name is applied literally
tellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as
to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken
it apprehends them it signifies them by names. There-
from creatures; as was explained above (a. 1). But the
fore as to the names applied to God—viz. the perfections
names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as
which they signify, such as goodness, life and the like,
when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. There-
and their mode of signification. As regards what is sig-
fore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
nified by these names, they belong properly to God, and
Objection 2. Further, no name can be applied literally
more properly than they belong to creatures, and are ap-
to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than
plied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of sig-
given to it. But all such names as “good,” “wise,” and the
nification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God;
like are more truly withheld from God than given to Him;
for their mode of signification applies to creatures.
as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii). Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. There are some names which
none of these names belong to God in their literal sense.
signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in
Objection 3. Further, corporeal names are applied to
such a way that the imperfect way in which creatures re-
God in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorpo-
ceive the divine perfection is part of the very signification
real. But all such names imply some kind of corporeal
of the name itself as “stone” signifies a material being,
condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and
and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a
composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all
metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these
these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
perfections absolutely, without any such mode of partici-
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii), “Some
pation being part of their signification as the words “be-
names there are which express evidently the property of
ing,” “good,” “living,” and the like, and such names can
the divinity, and some which express the clear truth of the
be literally applied to God.
divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to
Reply to Objection 2. Such names as these, as Diony-
God metaphorically by way of similitude.” Therefore not
sius shows, are denied of God for the reason that what
all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but
the name signifies does not belong to Him in the ordi-
there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense.
nary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way.
I answer that, According to the preceding article, our
Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance
knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which
and all life.
flow from Him to creatures, which perfections are in God
Reply to Objection 3. These names which are ap-
in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our in-
plied to God literally imply corporeal conditions not in
∗ This refers to the Latin etymology of the word “lapis” which has no place in English
64
the thing signified, but as regards their mode of significa-ically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing
tion; whereas those which are applied to God metaphor-
signified.
Whether names applied to God are synonymous?
Ia q. 13 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that these names applied to God
(AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea
are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those
signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of
which mean exactly the same. But these names applied to
the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it
God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the good-
knows God from creatures, in order to understand God,
ness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom.
forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flow-
Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.
ing from God to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in
Objection 2. Further, if it be said these names signify
God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are
one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can
received and divided and multiplied. As therefore, to the
be objected that an idea to which no reality corresponds
different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one
is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and
simple principle represented by different perfections of
the thing is one, it seems also that all these ideas are vain
creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the
notions.
various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there
Objection 3. Further, a thing which is one in real-
corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to
ity and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality
these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore al-
and many in idea. But God is supremely one. Therefore
though the names applied to God signify one thing, still
it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea;
because they signify that under many and different as-
and thus the names applied to God do not signify differ-
pects, they are not synonymous.
ent ideas; and thus they are synonymous.
Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since
On the contrary, All synonyms united with each
synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for
other are redundant, as when we say, “vesture clothing.”
words which signify different aspects of one things, do
Therefore if all names applied to God are synonymous,
not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because
we cannot properly say “good God” or the like, and yet it
the term only signifies the thing through the medium of
is written, “O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord
the intellectual conception, as was said above.
of hosts is Thy name” (Jer. 32:18).
Reply to Objection 2. The many aspects of these
I answer that, These names spoken of God are not
names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to
synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we
all of them one simple reality represented by them in a
said that these names are used to remove, or to express
manifold and imperfect manner.
the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow
Reply to Objection 3. The perfect unity of God re-
that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things
quires that what are manifold and divided in others should
denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But
exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it comes about that
even according to what was said above (a. 2), that these
He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our
names signify the divine substance, although in an im-
intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as things
perfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said
represent Him.
Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them?
Ia q. 13 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that the things attributed to God
agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univo-
and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is re-
cal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is
duced to the univocal, as many are reduced to one; for if
predicated univocally.
the name “dog” be said equivocally of the barking dog,
Objection 2. Further, there is no similitude among
and of the dogfish, it must be said of some univocally—
equivocal things. Therefore as creatures have a certain
viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infini-
likeness to God, according to the word of Genesis (Gn.
tude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree
1:26), “Let us make man to our image and likeness,” it
with their effects in name and definition, as man gener-
seems that something can be said of God and creatures
ates man; and there are some agents which are equivocal,
univocally.
as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only
Objection 3. Further, measure is homogeneous with
in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the first
the thing measured. But God is the first measure of all
65
beings. Therefore God is homogeneous with creatures; seen being understood by the things that are made” (Rom.
and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to
1:20). Therefore it must be said that these names are said
creatures.
of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according
On the contrary, whatever is predicated of various
to proportion.
things under the same name but not in the same sense, is
Now names are thus used in two ways: either accord-
predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to God in
ing as many things are proportionate to one, thus for ex-
the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance,
ample “healthy” predicated of medicine and urine in rela-
wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now
tion and in proportion to health of a body, of which the for-
a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is
mer is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one
part of the definition; and the same applies to other things.
thing is proportionate to another, thus “healthy” is said
Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is pred-
of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of
icated equivocally.
health in the animal body. And in this way some things are
Further, God is more distant from creatures than any
said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely
creatures are from each other. But the distance of some
equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name
creatures makes any univocal predication of them impos-
God only from creatures (a. 1). Thus whatever is said of
sible, as in the case of those things which are not in the
God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a
same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predi-
creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all per-
cated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equiv-
fections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of
ocal predication can be applied to them.
community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation
I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible be-
and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not,
tween God and creatures. The reason of this is that every
as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally
effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the
diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in
efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in
a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one
its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that
thing; thus “healthy” applied to urine signifies the sign of
what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in
animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause
the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for exam-
of the same health.
ple the sun by exercise of its one power produces mani-
Reply to Objection 1. Although equivocal predica-
fold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same
tions must be reduced to univocal, still in actions, the
way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections exist-
non-univocal agent must precede the univocal agent. For
ing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God
the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole
unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is
species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the gen-
applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in eration of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the
idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term
universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise
“wise” applied to man, we signify some perfection dis-
it would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in
tinct from a man’s essence, and distinct from his power
the species), but is a particular cause of this individual
and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when
which it places under the species by way of participation.
we apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything
Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not
distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus
an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before
also this term “wise” applied to man in some degree cir-
the particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is
cumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas
not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, oth-
this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves
erwise it could not produce its own likeness, but rather it
the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding
is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal pred-
the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this
ications are reduced to one first non-univocal analogical
term “wise” is not applied in the same way to God and
predication, which is being.
to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no
Reply to Objection 2. The likeness of the creature
name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.
to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the
Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God
same generic thing (q. 4, a. 3).
and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have
Reply to Objection 3. God is not the measure propor-
said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures
tioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that
nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all;
God and creatures should be in the same genus.
for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy
The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove
of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers,
indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of
who proved many things about God, and also against what
God and creatures; yet they do not prove that they are
the Apostle says: “The invisible things of God are clearly
predicated equivocally.
66
Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?
Ia q. 13 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that names are predicated pri-
definition of “healthy” which is applied to urine, which
marily of creatures rather than of God. For we name any-
is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal’s
thing accordingly as we know it, since “names”, as the
health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are
Philosopher says, “are signs of ideas.” But we know crea-
applied to creatures primarily rather than to God, because
tures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed
when said of God they mean only similitudes to such crea-
by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of
tures. For as “smiling” applied to a field means only that
God.
the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of
Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i):
the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name
“We name God from creatures.” But names transferred
of “lion” applied to God means only that God manifests
from creatures to God, are said primarily of creatures
strength in His works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear
rather than of God, as “lion,” “stone,” and the like. There-
that applied to God the signification of names can be de-
fore all names applied to God and creatures are applied
fined only from what is said of creatures. But to other
primarily to creatures rather than to God.
names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the
Objection 3. Further, all names equally applied to
same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the
God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all
cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said,
creatures, as Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.). But
“God is good,” it would then only mean “God is the cause
what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied
of the creature’s goodness”; thus the term good applied to
to it secondarily, for “healthy” is primarily predicated of
God would included in its meaning the creature’s good-
animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of
ness. Hence “good” would apply primarily to creatures
health. Therefore these names are said primarily of crea-
rather than to God. But as was shown above (a. 2), these
tures rather than of God.
names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also
On the contrary, It is written, “I bow my knees to the
essentially. For the words, “God is good,” or “wise,” sig-
Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in
nify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness,
heaven and earth is named” (Eph. 3:14,15); and the same
but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence
applies to the other names applied to God and creatures.
as regards what the name signifies, these names are ap-
Therefore these names are applied primarily to God rather
plied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because
than to creatures.
these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as re-
I answer that, In names predicated of many in an ana-
gards the imposition of the names, they are primarily ap-
logical sense, all are predicated because they have ref-
plied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they
erence to some one thing; and this one thing must be
have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures,
placed in the definition of them all. And since that ex-
as said above (a. 3).
pressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher
Reply to Objection 1. This objection refers to the im-
says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primar-
position of the name.
ily to that which is put in the definition of such other
Reply to Objection 2. The same rule does not apply
things, and secondarily to these others according as they
to metaphorical and to other names, as said above.
approach more or less to that first. Thus, for instance,
Reply to Objection 3. This objection would be valid
“healthy” applied to animals comes into the definition of
if these names were applied to God only as cause, and
“healthy” applied to medicine, which is called healthy as
not also essentially, for instance as “healthy” is applied to
being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the
medicine.
Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally?
Ia q. 13 a. 7
Objection 1. It seems that names which imply rela-
Objection 2. Further, that to which something applies
tion to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For
temporally can be described as made; for what is white
all such names signify the divine substance, as is univer-
temporally is made white. But to make does no apply to
sally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that this name
God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God tempo-
“Lord” is the name of power, which is the divine sub-
rally.
stance; and “Creator” signifies the action of God, which
Objection 3. Further, if any names are applied to God
is His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal,
temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule
but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God
holds good of all things that imply relation to creatures.
temporally, but eternally.
But some names are spoken of God implying relation of
67
God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity He knew for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies
and loved the creature, according to the word: “I have
to relations consequent upon action and passion, as mo-
loved thee with an everlasting love” (Jer. 31:3). Therefore
tive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the
also other names implying relation to creatures, as “Lord”
like.
and “Creator,” are applied to God from eternity.
Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a
Objection 4. Further, names of this kind signify rela-
reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and
tion. Therefore that relation must be something in God,
this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order;
or in the creature only. But it cannot be that it is some-
as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things
thing in the creature only, for in that case God would be
and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are
called “Lord” from the opposite relation which is in crea-
realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensi-
tures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore
ble and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in
the relation must be something in God also. But nothing
sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either
temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore
to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things;
these names are not applied to God temporally.
whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this
Objection 5. Further, a thing is called relative from
order, and hence in them there is no real relation to sci-
relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from
ence and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect
whiteness. Therefore if the relation of lordship is not re-
apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and
ally in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not
sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they
really Lord, which is plainly false.
are called relative, not forasmuch as they are related to
Objection 6. Further, in relative things which are not
other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise
simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as
for instance, “on the right” is not applied to a column, un-
a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it,
less it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which
as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things
relation is not really in the column, but in the animal.
which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous
Since therefore God is outside the whole order of cre-
in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God
ation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not con-
to the creature even without the existence of the creature;
versely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to
and thus these names “Lord” and “Creator” are predicated
God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to
of God from eternity, and not temporally.
creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as crea-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this
tures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent
relative appellation “Lord” is applied to God temporally.
these names which import relation to the creature from
I answer that, The names which import relation to
being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any
creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from
change in Him, but by reason of the change of the crea-
eternity.
ture; as a column is on the right of an animal, without
To see this we must learn that some have said that re-
change in itself, but by change in the animal.
lation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly
Reply to Objection 1. Some relative names are im-
seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves
posed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as
have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it
“master” and “servant,” “father,” and “son,” and the like,
is necessary to know that since relation has two extremes,
and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum
it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical.
esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from
Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when
which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing
mutual order or habitude can only go between things in
moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the
the apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing “the
like: and these relatives are called transcendental [secun-
same as itself.” For reason apprehending one thing twice
dum dici]. Thus, there is the same two-fold difference in
regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a
divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the
thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between
creature, as “Lord,” and these do not signify the divine
“being” and “non-being” formed by reason, apprehending
substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they pre-
“non-being” as an extreme. The same is true of relations
suppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes
that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species,
power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the
and the like.
divine essence directly, and consequently the correspond-
Now there are other relations which are realities as re-
ing habitudes, as “Saviour,” “Creator,” and suchlike; and
gards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude ex-
these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet
ists between two things according to some reality that be-
both names are said of God temporarily so far as they im-
longs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon
ply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not
quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like;
as signifying the essence, either directly or indirectly.
68
Reply to Objection 2. As relations applied to God creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him:
temporally are only in God in our idea, so, “to become”
and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature,
or “to be made” are applied to God only in idea, with no
it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality;
change in Him, as for instance when we say, “Lord, Thou
for He is called Lord according to the manner in which
art become [Douay: ‘hast been’] our refuge” (Ps. 89:1).
the creature is subject to Him.
Reply to Objection 3. The operation of the intellect
Reply to Objection 6. To know whether relations are
and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying
simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary
relations following upon the action of the intellect or will,
by nature or otherwise of things to which they belong but
are applied to God from eternity; whereas those follow-
the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its
ing upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of
idea includes another, and vice versa, then they are simul-
thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally,
taneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and
as “Saviour,” “Creator,” and the like.
the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not
Reply to Objection 4. Relations signified by these
vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This ap-
names which are applied to God temporally, are in God
plies to science and its object; for the object knowable is
only in idea; but the opposite relations in creatures are
considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or
real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denom-
as an act. Hence the knowable object in its mode of sig-
inated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so
nification exists before science, but if the same object is
that the opposite relations in God should also be under-
considered in act, then it is simultaneous with science in
stood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is
act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is
spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the crea-
known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still be-
ture is related to Him: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph.
cause the signification of Lord includes the idea of a ser-
v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because
vant and vice versa, these two relative terms, “Lord” and
knowledge relates to it.
“servant,” are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was
Reply to Objection 5. Since God is related to the
not “Lord” until He had a creature subject to Himself.
Whether this name “God” is a name of the nature?
Ia q. 13 a. 8
Objection 1. It seems that this name, “God,” is not a
Because therefore God is not known to us in His na-
name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ture, but is made known to us from His operations or ef-
1) that “God Theos is so called from the theein [which fects, we name Him from these, as said in a. 1; hence
means to care of] and to cherish all things; or from the
this name “God” is a name of operation so far as relates
aithein, that is to burn, for our God is a fire consuming to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed
all malice; or from theasthai, which means to consider all from His universal providence over all things; since all
things.” But all these names belong to operation. There-
who speak of God intend to name God as exercising provi-
fore this name “God” signifies His operation and not His
dence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii), “The
nature.
Deity watches over all with perfect providence and good-
Objection 2. Further, a thing is named by us as we
ness.” But taken from this operation, this name “God” is
know it. But the divine nature is unknown to us. There-
imposed to signify the divine nature.
fore this name “God” does not signify the divine nature.
Reply to Objection 1. All that Damascene says refers
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide i) that
to providence; which is the source of the signification of
“God” is a name of the nature.
the name “God.”
I answer that, Whence a name is imposed, and what
Reply to Objection 2. We can name a thing according
the name signifies are not always the same thing. For
to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties
as we know substance from its properties and operations,
and effects. Hence because we can know what stone is
so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its
in itself from its property, this name “stone” signifies the
property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from its
nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the definition of
act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which
still this name is not meant to signify the particular action,
the name signifies is the definition, as is said in Metaph.
but the stone’s substance. The things, on the other hand,
iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the di-
known to us in themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness
vine nature in itself, so as to know what it is; but only by
and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as
way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of nega-
regards such things the meaning of the name and its source
tion as stated above (q. 12, a. 12). Thus the name “God”
are the same.
signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to
69
signify something existing above all things, the principle name God intend to signify all this.
of all things and removed from all things; for those who
Whether this name “God” is communicable?
Ia q. 13 a. 9
Objection 1. It seems that this name “God” is com-
idea; for the plurality of this individual thing cannot be;
municable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by
nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying
a name shares in the name itself. But this name “God” sig-
any individual thing is properly communicable to many,
nifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others,
but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person
according to the words, “He hath given us great [Vulg.:
can be called “Achilles” metaphorically, forasmuch as he
‘most great’] and precious promises, that by these we
may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such
[Vulg.: ‘ye’] may be made partakers of the divine nature”
as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individu-
(2 Pet. 1:4). Therefore this name “God” can be commu-
alized not by any “suppositum,” but by and of themselves,
nicated to others.
as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in
Objection 2. Further, only proper names are not com-
themselves, could not be communicable either in reality
municable. Now this name “God” is not a proper, but an
or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was
appellative noun; which appears from the fact that it has a
said of individuals. Forasmuch as we are unable to un-
plural, according to the text, “I have said, You are gods”
derstand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are,
(Ps. 81:6). Therefore this name “God” is communicable.
we understand them as compound things having forms in
Objection 3. Further, this name “God” comes from
matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give
operation, as explained. But other names given to God
them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some
from His operations or effects are communicable; as
“suppositum.” Hence, so far as concerns images, the same
“good,” “wise,” and the like. Therefore this name “God”
rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of
is communicable.
compound things as to names given to us to signify sim-
On the contrary, It is written: “They gave the incom-
ple subsisting natures.
municable name to wood and stones” (Wis. 14:21), in
Since, then, this name “God” is given to signify the
reference to the divine name. Therefore this name “God”
divine nature as stated above (a. 8), and since the divine
is incommunicable.
nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (q. 11, a. 3),
I answer that, A name is communicable in two ways:
it follows that this name “God” is incommunicable in re-
properly, and by similitude. It is properly communica-
ality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way
ble in the sense that its whole signification can be given
as this name “sun” would be communicable according to
to many; by similitude it is communicable according to
the opinion of those who say there are many suns. There-
some part of the signification of the name. For instance
fore, it is written: “You served them who by nature are not
this name “lion” is properly communicable to all things
gods,” (Gal. 4:8), and a gloss adds, “Gods not in nature,
of the same nature as “lion”; by similitude it is commu-
but in human opinion.” Nevertheless this name “God” is
nicable to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as
communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some
for instance by courage, or strength, and those who thus
part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called
participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, how-
gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to the
ever, what names are properly communicable, we must
text, “I have said, You are gods” (Ps. 81:6).
consider that every form existing in the singular subject,
But if any name were given to signify God not as to
by which it is individualized, is common to many either
His nature but as to His “suppositum,” accordingly as He
in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many
is considered as “this something,” that name would be
in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is
absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the
not common to many in reality, but only in idea; for the
Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is like giv-
nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many
ing a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.
subjects; and the reason is because the mind understands
Reply to Objection 1. The divine nature is only com-
the nature of every species by abstraction from the sin-
municable according to the participation of some simili-
gular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is
tude.
outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the
Reply to Objection 2. This name “God” is an ap-
idea of a species, it can be understood as existing in many.
pellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the
But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided divine nature in the possessor; although God Himself in
off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify
reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do
any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and
not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the
70
mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incom-nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves ab-
municable according to the truth of the thing, as was said
solutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to
above concerning the name “sun.”
many. But this name “God” is given to God from His
Reply to Objection 3. These names “good,” “wise,”
own proper operation, which we experience continually,
and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding
to signify the divine nature.
from God to creatures; but they do not signify the divine
Whether this name “God” is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, Ia q. 13 a. 10
and according to opinion?
Objection 1. It seems that this name “God” is applied
in the definition of being as applied to “accident”; and
to God univocally by nature, by participation, and accord-
“healthy” applied to animal is placed in the definition of
ing to opinion. For where a diverse signification exists,
healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the
there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for
sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of
equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who
health.
says: “An idol is not God,” contradicts a pagan who says:
The same applies to the question at issue. For this
“An idol is God.” Therefore GOD in both senses is spoken
name “God,” as signifying the true God, includes the idea
of univocally.
of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or partic-
Objection 2. Further, as an idol is God in opinion,
ipation. For when we name anyone god by participation,
and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is
we understand by the name of god some likeness of the
called happiness in opinion, and not in truth. But this
true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this
name “beatitude” is applied univocally to this supposed
name god we understand and signify something which
happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this
men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has
name “God” is applied univocally to the true God, and to
different meanings, but that one of them is comprised in
God also in opinion.
the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said ana-
Objection 3. Further, names are called univocal be-
logically.
cause they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says:
Reply to Objection 1. The multiplication of names
“There is one God,” he understands by the name God an
does not depend on the predication of the name, but on
omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the
the signification: for this name “man,” of whomsoever it
heathen understands the same when he says: “An idol is
is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one
God.” Therefore this name “God” is applied univocally to
sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name “man”
both.
we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one
On the contrary, The idea in the intellect is the like-
meant to signify by this name “man” what man really is,
ness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i.
and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or
But the word “animal” applied to a true animal, and to a
something else. Hence it is evident that a Catholic saying
picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name “God”
that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that
applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied
it is God; because each of them uses this name GOD to
equivocally.
signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is
Further, No one can signify what he does not know.
God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opin-
But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when
ion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics
he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true De-
sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, “All
ity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true De-
the gods of the Gentiles are demons” (Ps. 95:5).
ity when he says that there is one God. Therefore this
The same remark applies to the Second and Third Ob-
name “God” is not applied univocally, but equivocally to
jections. For these reasons proceed from the different
the true God, and to God according to opinion.
predication of the name, and not from its various signi-
I answer that, This name “God” in the three aforesaid
fications.
significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally,
Reply to Objection 4. The term “animal” applied to
but analogically. This is apparent from this reason: Uni-
a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for
vocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal
the Philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense,
terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical terms a
including analogous names; because also being, which
word taken in one signification must be placed in the def-
is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be pred-
inition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for in-
icated equivocally of different predicaments.
stance, “being” which is applied to “substance” is placed
Reply to Objection 5. Neither a Catholic nor a pagan
71
knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God.
one knows it according to some idea of causality, or ex-
But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether,
cellence, or remotion (q. 12, a. 12). So a pagan can take
he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use
this name “God” in the same way when he says an idol
names the meaning of which we know not.
Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?
Ia q. 13 a. 11
Objection 1. It seems that this name HE WHO IS is
itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it
not the most proper name of God. For this name “God”
understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what
is an incommunicable name. But this name HE WHO IS,
God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the
is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE
names are, and the more universal and absolute they are,
WHO IS is not the most proper name of God.
the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Dam-
Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii)
ascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, “HE WHO IS, is the
that “the name of good excellently manifests all the pro-
principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending
cessions of God.” But it especially belongs to God to be
all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and
the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name
indeterminate sea of substance.” Now by any other name
“good” is supremely proper to God, and not this name HE
some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name
WHO IS.
HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is inde-
Objection 3. Further, every divine name seems to
terminate to all; and therefore it denominates the “infinite
imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only
ocean of substance.”
through creatures. But this name HE WHO IS imports no
Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies
relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is
present existence; and this above all properly applies to
not the most applicable to God.
God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augus-
On the contrary, It is written that when Moses asked,
tine says (De Trin. v).
“If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall
Reply to Objection 1. This name HE WHO IS is
I say to them?” The Lord answered him, “Thus shalt
the name of God more properly than this name “God,” as
thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you” (Ex.
regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the
3:13,14). Therefor this name HE WHO IS most properly
mode of signification and consignification, as said above.
belongs to God.
But as regards the object intended by the name, this name
I answer that, This name HE WHO IS is most prop-
“God” is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the di-
erly applied to God, for three reasons:
vine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton,
First, because of its signification. For it does not sig-
imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommu-
nify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the
nicable and, if one may so speak, singular.
existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said
Reply to Objection 2. This name “good” is the prin-
of no other (q. 3, a. 4), it is clear that among other names
cipal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not abso-
this one specially denominates God, for everything is de-
lutely; for existence considered absolutely comes before
nominated by its form.
the idea of cause.
Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other
Reply to Objection 3. It is not necessary that all the
names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it,
divine names should import relation to creatures, but it
add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain
suffices that they be imposed from some perfections flow-
way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect can-
ing from God to creatures. Among these the first is exis-
not know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in
tence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.
Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?
Ia q. 13 a. 12
Objection 1. It seems that affirmative propositions
cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affir-
cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel.
mative proposition is made is taken as a subject. There-
Hier. ii) that “negations about God are true; but affirma-
fore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about
tions are vague.”
God.
Objection 2. Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that
Objection 3. Further, every intellect is false which
“a simple form cannot be a subject.” But God is the most
understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has
absolutely simple form, as shown (q. 3 ): therefore He
existence without any composition as shown above (q. 3,
72
a. 7). Therefore since every affirmative intellect under-object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plu-
stands something as compound, it follows that a true affir-
rality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of
mative proposition about God cannot be made.
idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composi-
On the contrary, What is of faith cannot be false. But
tion.
some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is
Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius says that the af-
Three and One; and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true
firmations about God are vague or, according to another
affirmative propositions can be formed about God.
translation, “incongruous,” inasmuch as no name can be
I answer that, True affirmative propositions can be
applied to God according to its mode of signification.
formed about God. To prove this we must know that in
Reply to Objection 2. Our intellect cannot compre-
every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the
hend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in them-
subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and
selves; but it apprehends them as compound things in
different things in idea. And this appears to be the case
which there is something taken as subject and something
both in propositions which have an accidental predicate,
that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form
and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is
as a subject, and attributes something else to it.
manifest that “man” and “white” are the same in subject,
Reply to Objection 3. This proposition, “The intel-
and different in idea; for the idea of man is one thing, and
lect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false,”
that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say,
can be taken in two senses, accordingly as this adverb
“man is an animal”; since the same thing which is man is
“otherwise” determines the word “understanding” on the
truly animal; for in the same “suppositum” there is sen-
part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one
sible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and
who understands. Taken as referring to the thing under-
the rational nature by reason of which he is called man;
stood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any in-
hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to
tellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than
“suppositum,” but different as to idea. But in propositions
it is, is false. But this does not hold in the present case;
where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule
because our intellect, when forming a proposition about
in some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to
God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is
the “suppositum” what it places in the subject; and what
simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands,
it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form
the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in
existing in the “suppositum”; according to the saying that
understanding is different from the mode of the thing in
“predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects mate-
its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands
rially.” To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality
material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not
of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the
that it understands them to be immaterial things; but its
identity of the thing by the composition itself.
manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when
God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether
it understands simple things above itself, it understands
one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different
them according to its own mode, which is in a composite
conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Him-
manner; yet not so as to understand them to be compos-
self. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under dif-
ite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming
ferent conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple
composition in its ideas concerning God.
73
FIRST PART, QUESTION 14
Of God’s Knowledge
(In Sixteen Articles)
Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God’s operation. And since one kind of operation is immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to understand is a kind of life, after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the knower, and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added the treatment of ideas.
Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:
(1) Whether there is knowledge in God?
(2) Whether God understands Himself?
(3) Whether He comprehends Himself?
(4) Whether His understanding is His substance?
(5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?
(6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?
(7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?
(8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?
(9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things?
(10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?
(11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?
(12) Whether He knows the infinite?
(13) Whether He knows future contingent things?
(14) Whether He knows enunciable things?
(15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?
(16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?
Whether there is knowledge∗?
Ia q. 14 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that in God there is not knowl-
the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-
edge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong
intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas
to God, since it is the mean between potentiality and act.
the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and
Therefore knowledge is not in God.
extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii)
Objection 2. Further, since science is about conclu-
that “the soul is in a sense all things.” Now the contrac-
sions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something
tion of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we
else which is the knowledge of principles. But nothing
have said above (q. 7, a. 1) forms according as they are
is caused in God; therefore science is not in God.
the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of
Objection 3. Further, all knowledge is universal, or
infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a
particular. But in God there is no universal or particular
thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the
(q. 3, a. 5). Therefore in God there is not knowledge.
mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge. Hence
On the contrary, The Apostle says, “O the depth of
it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because
the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God”
they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because
(Rom. 11:33).
it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is
I answer that, In God there exists the most perfect
still further cognitive, because it is more separated from
knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent
matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since there-
beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in
fore God is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated
that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the
above (q. 7, a. 1), it follows that He occupies the highest
intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form
place in knowledge.
of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in
Reply to Objection 1. Because perfections flowing
∗ Scientia
74
from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Him-knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in
self (q. 4, a. 2), whenever a name taken from any created
such a way, however, that there must be removed from
perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its
each of them, so far as they enter into divine predica-
signification from anything that belongs to that imperfect
tion, everything that savors of imperfection; and every-
mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a qual-
thing that expresses perfection is to be retained in them.
ity of God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act.
Hence it is said, “With Him is wisdom and strength, He
Reply to Objection 2. Whatever is divided and multi-
hath counsel and understanding” (Job 12:13).
plied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly (q. 13,
Reply to Objection 3. Knowledge is according to the
a. 4). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, ac-
mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in
cording to the different objects of His knowledge. He has
the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now
“intelligence” as regards the knowledge of principles; he
since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that
has “science” as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has
of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after
“wisdom,” according as he knows the highest cause; he
the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or
has “counsel” or “prudence,” according as he knows what
particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according
is to be done. But God knows all these by one simple act
to any such mode.
of knowledge, as will be shown (a. 7). Hence the simple
Whether God understands Himself?
Ia q. 14 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that God does not understand
reason why we actually feel or know a thing is because
Himself. For it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis),
our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible
“Every knower who knows his own essence, returns com-
or intelligible species. And because of this only, it fol-
pletely to his own essence.” But God does not go out from
lows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or
His own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot
intelligible object, since both are in potentiality.
return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know
Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potential-
His own essence.
ity, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are alto-
Objection 2. Further, to understand is a kind of pas-
gether the same; so that He neither is without the intel-
sion and movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima
ligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it
iii); and knowledge also is a kind of assimilation to the
understands potentially; nor does the intelligible species
object known; and the thing known is the perfection of
differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it dif-
the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made
fers in our intellect when it understands actually; but the
perfect by itself, “nor,” as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), “is
intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and a thing its own likeness.” Therefore God does not under-thus God understands Himself through Himself.
stand Himself.
Reply to Objection 1.
Return to its own essence
Objection 3. Further, we are like to God chiefly in our
means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as
intellect, because we are the image of God in our mind, as
the form perfects the matter by giving it existence, it is in
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi). But our intellect under-
a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself inas-
stands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said
much as it has existence in itself. Therefore those cog-
in De Anima iii. Therefore God understands Himself only
nitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts
so far perchance as He understands other things.
of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each
On the contrary, It is written: “The things that are
of the senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are
of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God” (1 Cor.
subsisting, know themselves; hence it is said in De Cau-
2:11).
sis that, “whoever knows his essence returns to it.” Now
I answer that, God understands Himself through
it supremely belongs to God to be self-subsisting. Hence
Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although
according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns
in operations which pass to an external effect, the object
to His own essence, and knows Himself.
of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists out-
Reply to Objection 2. Movement and passion are
side the operator; nevertheless in operations that remain
taken equivocally, according as to understand is described
in the operator, the object signified as the term of opera-
as a kind of movement or passion, as stated in De Anima
tion, resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in the
iii. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of
operator, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher
something imperfect passing from one to another, but it is
says (De Anima iii) that “the sensible in act is sense in
an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect.
act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act.” For the
Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible
75
object, i.e. is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intel-the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter
lect which is sometimes in potentiality; because the fact
has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as regards
of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from
intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural
the intelligible object and assimilates it thereto through
things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised con-
the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing
cerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected
understood, and makes it to be perfected thereby, as po-
by the intelligible species of something; and in that way
tentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the divine
it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it under-
intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is not perfected
stands other things: for it is manifest that by knowing the
by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but
intelligible object it understands also its own act of un-
is its own perfection, and its own intelligible object.
derstanding, and by this act knows the intellectual faculty.
Reply to Objection 3. Existence in nature does not
But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in
belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it
the order of intelligible objects; therefore He understands
is reduced to act by a form. Now our passive intellect has
Himself through Himself.
Whether God comprehends Himself?
Ia q. 14 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that God does not comprehend
in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because
Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv),
it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all mat-
that “whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards it-
ter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above
self.” But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does
(Aa. 1,2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as
not comprehend Himself.
much as He is knowable; and for that reason He perfectly
Objection 2. If it is said that God is infinite to us, and comprehends Himself.
finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that ev-
Reply to Objection 1. The strict meaning of “com-
erything in God is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is
prehension” signifies that one thing holds and includes an-
finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly
other; and in this sense everything comprehended is finite,
finite than infinite; which is against what was laid down
as also is everything included in another. But God is not
above (q. 7, a. 1). Therefore God does not comprehend
said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as if
Himself.
His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if
On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest.
it held and included Himself; for these modes of speak-
xv), that “Everything that understands itself, comprehends
ing are to be taken by way of negation. But as God is
itself.” But God understands Himself. Therefore He com-
said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He is not contained
prehends Himself.
by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be com-
I answer that, God perfectly comprehends Himself,
prehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is
as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended
hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum.
when the end of the knowledge of it is attained, and this is
ep. cxii), “The whole is comprehended when seen, if it is
accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is know-
seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the
able; as, for instance, a demonstrable proposition is com-
seer.”
prehended when known by demonstration, not, however,
Reply to Objection 2. When it is said, “God is finite
when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is
to Himself,” this is to be understood according to a certain
manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is
similitude of proportion, because He has the same relation
perfectly knowable. For everything is knowable accord-
in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not
ing to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not
exceeding finite intellect. But God is not to be called fi-
known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it is nite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself
in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God
to be something finite.
Whether the act of God’s intellect is His substance?
Ia q. 14 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that the act of God’s intellect
Objection 2. Further, to understand one’s act of un-
is not His substance. For to understand is an operation.
derstanding, is to understand something that is neither
But an operation signifies something proceeding from the
great nor chiefly understood, and but secondary and ac-
operator. Therefore the act of God’s intellect is not His
cessory. If therefore God be his own act of understanding,
substance.
His act of understanding will be as when we understand
76
our act of understanding: and thus God’s act of under-tion; as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just
standing will not be something great.
as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to un-
Objection 3.
Further, every act of understanding
derstand follows on the intelligible species. Now in God
means understanding something. When therefore God un-
there is no form which is something other than His exis-
derstands Himself, if He Himself is not distinct from this
tence, as shown above (q. 3). Hence as His essence itself
act of understanding, He understands that He understands
is also His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that
Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of God’s
His act of understanding must be His essence and His ex-
intellect is not His substance.
istence.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii), “In
Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God,
God to be is the same as to be wise.” But to be wise is the
intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible
same thing as to understand. Therefore in God to be is the
species, and His act of understanding are entirely one and
same thing as to understand. But God’s existence is His
the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding,
substance, as shown above (q. 3, a. 4). Therefore the act
no kind of multiplicity is attached to His substance.
of God’s intellect is His substance.
Reply to Objection 1. To understand is not an op-
I answer that, It must be said that the act of God’s
eration proceeding out of the operator, but remaining in
intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding
him.
were other than His substance, then something else, as the
Reply to Objection 2. When that act of understand-
Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the act and per-
ing which is not subsistent is understood, something not
fection of the divine substance, to which the divine sub-
great is understood; as when we understand our act of un-
stance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is
derstanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the
altogether impossible; because the act of understanding is
divine understanding which is subsistent.
the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us
Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For
now consider how this is. As was laid down above (a. 2),
the act of divine understanding subsists in itself, and be-
to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic;
longs to its very self and is not another’s; hence it need
for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfec-
not proceed to infinity.
Whether God knows things other than Himself?
Ia q. 14 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that God does not know things
its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything
besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside
can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power
of God. But Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu.
extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other
xlvi) that “God does not behold anything out of Himself.”
things by the very fact that it is the first effective cause of Therefore He does not know things other than Himself.
all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (q. 2, a. 3), God
Objection 2. Further, the object understood is the
must necessarily know things other than Himself. And
perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God
this appears still more plainly if we add that the every ex-
understands other things besides Himself, something else
istence of the first effective cause—viz. God—is His own
will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He;
act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in
which is impossible.
God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of under-
Objection 3. Further, the act of understanding is spec-
standing, and all things must be in Him according to an
ified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from
intelligible mode: for everything which is in another, is in
its own object. Hence the intellectual act is so much the
it according to the mode of that in which it is.
nobler, the nobler the object understood. But God is His
Now in order to know how God knows things other
own intellectual act. If therefore God understands any-
than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in
thing other than Himself, then God Himself is specified
two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in
by something else than Himself; which cannot be. There-
itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to
fore He does not understand things other than Himself.
the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through
On the contrary, It is written: “All things are naked
the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through
and open to His eyes” (Heb. 4:13).
the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen
I answer that, God necessarily knows things other
in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man
than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly under-
is seen in a mirror by the image in the mirror, or by any
stands Himself; otherwise His existence would not be per-
other mode by which one thing is seen in another.
fect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now
So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because
if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that
He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other
77
things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His fection in the divine intellect other than the divine essence.
essence contains the similitude of things other than Him-
Reply to Objection 3. The intellectual act is not spec-
self.
ified by what is understood in another, but by the prin-
Reply to Objection 1. The passage of Augustine in
cipal object understood in which other things are under-
which it is said that God “sees nothing outside Himself”
stood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object,
is not to be taken in such a way, as if God saw nothing out-
inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the
side Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself
intellectual operation: since every operation is specified
He does not see except in Himself, as above explained.
by the form which is its principle of operation; as heat-
Reply to Objection 2. The object understood is a per-
ing by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified
fection of the one understanding not by its substance, but
by that intelligible form which makes the intellect in act.
by its image, according to which it is in the intellect, as
And this is the image of the principal thing understood,
its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For “a
which in God is nothing but His own essence in which
stone is not in the soul, but its image.” Now those things
all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not
which are other than God are understood by God, inas-
follow that the divine intellectual act, or rather God Him-
much as the essence of God contains their images as above
self, is specified by anything else than the divine essence
explained; hence it does not follow that there is any per-
itself.
Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?
Ia q. 14 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that God does not know things
sight” (Heb. 4:12,13).
other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was
I answer that, Some have erred on this point, saying
shown (a. 5), God knows things other than Himself, ac-
that God knows things other than Himself only in general,
cording as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him
that is, only as beings. For as fire, if it knew the nature of
as in their common and universal cause, and are known by
heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God,
God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know
through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows
them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore
the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they
God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by
are beings.
proper knowledge.
But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general
Objection 2. Further, the created essence is as distant
and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge.
from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant
Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potentiality to
from the created essence. But the divine essence cannot be
act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of
known by the created essence, as said above (q. 12/a. 2).
things, before it knows them in particular; as proceeding
Therefore neither can the created essence be known by the
from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys.
divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence,
i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things
it follows that He does not know what the creature is in
other than Himself is only universal and not special, it
its essence, so as to know “what it is,” which is to have
would follow that His understanding would not be abso-
proper knowledge of it.
lutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be per-
Objection 3. Further, proper knowledge of a thing
fect; and this is against what was said above (q. 4, a. 1).
can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows
We must therefore hold that God knows things other than
all things by His essence, it seems that He does not know
Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as
each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the
being is common to them, but in so far as one is distin-
proper ratio of many and diverse things. Therefore God
guished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe
has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowl-
that some wishing to show that God knows many things
edge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper
by one, bring forward some examples, as, for instance,
ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of
that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that
them.
proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would
On the contrary, To have a proper knowledge of
know all colors.
things is to know them not only in general, but as they
Now these examples although they are similar in part,
are distinct from each other. Now God knows things in
namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they
that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches “even to
fail in this respect, that multitude and diversity are caused
the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also
by the one universal principle, not as regards that which
and the marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents
is the principle of distinction, but only as regards that in
of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible in His
which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is
78
not caused by the light only, but by the different disposi-all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from
tion of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and like-
each other.
wise, the diversity of the lines is caused by their different
Reply to Objection 1. So to know a thing as it is in
position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and mul-
the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way
titude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowl-
this adverb “so” imports the mode of knowledge on the
edge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is
part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For
otherwise. For it was shown above (q. 4, a. 2) that what-
the knower does not always know the object known ac-
ever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists
cording to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye
and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not
does not know a stone according to the existence it has in
only what is common to creatures–viz. being—belongs to
the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye,
their perfection, but also what makes them distinguished
the eye knows the stone according to its existence outside
from each other; as living and understanding, and the like,
the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object
whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-
known according to the (mode of) existence it has in the
living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Like-
knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its
wise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its
(mode of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect
own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist
knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has
in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also
in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that it understands;
as regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And
while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own na-
therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the
ture. If however the adverb ‘so’ be understood to import
essence of God is compared to all other essences of things,
the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that
not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers,
sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the
or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly
perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to
the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the
animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers
mode of knowledge.
contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act
We must say therefore that God not only knows that
imperfect acts can be known not only in general, but also
all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in
by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows
Him, He knows them in their own nature and all the more
a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; and who-
perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.
ever knows the number six, knows the number three also
Reply to Objection 2. The created essence is com-
by proper knowledge.
pared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect
As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all
act. Therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead
the perfection contained in the essence of any other be-
us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the
ing, and far more, God can know in Himself all of them
converse.
with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each
Reply to Objection 3. The same thing cannot be
thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine
taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things.
perfection. Now God could not be said to know Him-
But the divine essence excels all creatures. Hence it can
self perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His
be taken as the proper ration of each thing according to
own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He
the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate in,
know the very nature of being perfectly, unless He knew
and imitate it.
all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows
Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?
Ia q. 14 a. 7
Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God
know the effect through its cause. But God knows things
is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual
through Himself; as an effect (is known) through its cause.
knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the Philosopher
Therefore His knowledge is discursive.
says (Topic. ii): “The habit of knowledge may regard
Objection 3. Further, God knows each creature more
many things at once; but actual understanding regards
perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their
only one thing at a time.” Therefore as God knows many
created causes; and thus we go discursively from causes
things, Himself and others, as shown above (AA 2,5), it
to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies
seems that He does not understand all at once, but dis-
to God.
courses from one to another.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), “God
Objection 2.
Further, discursive knowledge is to
does not see all things in their particularity or separately,
79
as if He saw alternately here and there; but He sees all thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence
things together at once.”
it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is
I answer that, In the divine knowledge there is no dis-
still unknown; and thus the second is known not in the
cursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowl-
first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning
edge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to
is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolv-
succession only, as when we have actually understood
ing the effects into their causes; and then the discursion
anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else;
ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in Himself as their
while the other mode of discursion is according to causal-
cause, His knowledge is not discursive.
ity, as when through principles we arrive at the knowl-
Reply to Objection 1. Altogether there is only one act
edge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot
of understanding in itself, nevertheless many things may
belong to God. For many things, which we understand in
be understood in one (medium), as shown above.
succession if each is considered in itself, we understand
Reply to Objection 2. God does not know by their
simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for
cause, known, as it were previously, effects unknown; but
instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see dif-
He knows the effects in the cause; and hence His knowl-
ferent things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one
edge is not discursive, as was shown above.
(thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things
Reply to Objection 3. God sees the effects of created
together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode
causes in the causes themselves, much better than we can;
of discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this
but still not in such a manner that the knowledge of the
second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for
effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the created
whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions does
causes, as is the case with us; and hence His knowledge is
not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse
not discursive.
Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?
Ia q. 14 a. 8
Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is
it has an inclination to an effect; and likewise, the intelli-
not the cause of things. For Origen says, on Rom. 8:30,
gible form does not denote a principle of action in so far
“Whom He called, them He also justified,” etc.: “A thing
as it resides in the one who understands unless there is
will happen not because God knows it as future; but be-
added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination
cause it is future, it is on that account known by God,
is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a
before it exists.”
relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowl-
Objection 2. Further, given the cause, the effect fol-
edge relates to opposites), it would not produce a determi-
lows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if
nate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the
the knowledge of God is the cause of things created, it
appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is
seems that creatures are eternal.
manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His
Objection 3. Further, “The thing known is prior to
being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowl-
knowledge, and is its measure,” as the Philosopher says
edge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is
(Metaph. x). But what is posterior and measured cannot
joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of
be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the
things is usually called the “knowledge of approbation.”
cause of things.
Reply to Objection 1. Origen spoke in reference to
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), “Not
that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality
because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual
does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said
and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they
above.
are.”
But when he says the reason why God foreknows
I answer that, The knowledge of God is the cause
some things is because they are future, this must be un-
of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures
derstood according to the cause of consequence, and not
what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by
according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the
his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause
future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the
of the things made by his art from the fact that the artifi-
futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.
cer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect
Reply to Objection 2. The knowledge of God is the
must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle
cause of things according as things are in His knowledge.
of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural
Now that things should be eternal was not in the knowl-
form, being a form that remains in that to which it gives
edge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is
existence, denotes a principle of action according only as
eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.
80
Reply to Objection 3. Natural things are midway be-sure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things,
tween the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we
and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is
receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is
midway between the knowledge of the builder who made
the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects
it, and the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowl-
of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its mea-
edge of the house from the house already built.
Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?
Ia q. 14 a. 9
Objection 1. It seems that God has not knowledge
ation of those things that are not actual. For though some
of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of
of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will
true things. But “truth” and “being” are convertible terms.
be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge
Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are
of vision: for since God’s act of understanding, which is
not.
His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is
Objection 2. Further, knowledge requires likeness be-
without succession, comprehending all time, the present
tween the knower and the thing known. But those things
glance of God extends over all time, and to all things
that are not cannot have any likeness to God, Who is very
which exist in any time, as to objects present to Him. But
being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God.
there are other things in God’s power, or the creature’s,
Objection 3. Further, the knowledge of God is the
which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as
cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause
regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision,
of things that are not, because a thing that is not, has no
but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the
cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are
things we see around us have distinct being outside the
not.
seer.
On the contrary, The Apostle says: “Who. . . calleth
Reply to Objection 1. Those things that are not actual
those things that are not as those that are” (Rom. 4:17).
are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true
I answer that, God knows all things whatsoever that
that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known
in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not
by God.
absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things ab-
Reply to Objection 2. Since God is very being every-
solutely are which are actual; whereas things which are
thing is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God;
not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a
as everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. So,
creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in
things in potentiality are known by God, although they are
power of thought or of imagination, or of any other man-
not in act.
ner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be
Reply to Objection 3. The knowledge of God, joined
made, or thought, or said by the creature, as also whatever
to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary
He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they
that what ever God knows, is, or was, or will be; but only
are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has
is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits
knowledge even of things that are not.
to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not that they
Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consider-
be, but that they be possible.
Whether God knows evil things?
Ia q. 14 a. 10
Objection 1. It seems that God does not know evil
Objection 3. Further, everything known is known ei-
things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the
ther by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God
intellect which is not in potentiality does not know pri-
knows, He knows through His essence, as is clear from
vation. But “evil is the privation of good,” as Augustine
the foregoing (a. 5). Now the divine essence neither is the
says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is
likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from
essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ.
the foregoing (a. 2 ), it seems that God does not know evil
Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.
things.
Objection 4. Further, what is known through another
Objection 2. Further, all knowledge is either the cause
and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil
of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge
is not known by God; for the thing known must be in
of God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil.
the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another,
Therefore God does not know evil things.
namely, through good, it would be known by Him imper-
81
fectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not that a point and every indivisible thing are known by pri-imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things.
vation of division. This is because simple and indivisible
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 15:11), “Hell and
forms are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially;
destruction are before God [Vulg: ‘the Lord’].”
for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be
I answer that, Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must
known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known
know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some
by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by
good things to which corruption by evil may be acciden-
privation existing in Himself, but by the opposite good.
tal. Hence God would not know good things perfectly,
Reply to Objection 2. The knowledge of God is not
unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is know-
the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil
able in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the
is known.
essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact
Reply to Objection 3. Although evil is not opposed
that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as
to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it
by light is known darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div.
is opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His
Nom. vii): “God through Himself receives the vision of
essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.
darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through
Reply to Objection 4. To know a thing by something
light.”
else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing
Reply to Objection 1. The saying of the Philosopher
is of itself knowable; but evil is not of itself knowable,
must be understood as meaning that the intellect which
forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation
is not in potentiality, does not know privation by privation
of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known
existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously,
except by good.
Whether God knows singular things?
Ia q. 14 a. 11
Objection 1. It seems that God does not know sin-
which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and
gular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial
unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know
than the human intellect. Now the human intellect by rea-
the universal and immaterial, and by another we know sin-
son of its immateriality does not know singular things;
gular and material things, nevertheless God knows both
but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), “reason has to
by His simple intellect.
do with universals, sense with singular things.” Therefore
Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that
God does not know singular things.
God knows singular things by universal causes. For noth-
Objection 2. Further, in us those faculties alone know
ing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from
the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from
some universal cause. They give the example of an as-
material conditions. But in God things are in the high-
trologer who knows all the universal movements of the
est degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God
heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to
does not know singular things.
come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things
Objection 3.
Further, all knowledge comes about
from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers
through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness
which, however they may be joined together, are not in-
of singular things in so far as they are singular, does not
dividualized except by individual matter. Hence he who
seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is mat-
knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the
ter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is altogether un-
son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind,
like God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know
would not know him in so far as he is this particular man.
singular things.
Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 16:2), “All the
know
ways of a man are open to His eyes.”
singular things in their singularity.
I answer that, God knows singular things. For all
On the other hand, others have said that God knows
perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher
singular things by the application of universal causes to
way, as is clear from the foregoing (q. 4, a. 2). Now to
particular effects. But this will not hold; forasmuch as no
know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God
one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that
must know singular things. Even the Philosopher consid-
thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of
ers it incongruous that anything known by us should be
knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge
unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues
of singular things.
(De Anima i and Metaph. iii) that God would be most ig-
Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God
norant if He did not know discord. Now the perfections
is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above
82
(a. 8), His knowledge extends as far as His causality ex-intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible
tends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only
species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of
to forms, which are the source of universality, but also
God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, be-
to matter, as we shall prove further on (q. 44, a. 2), the
ing the principle of all the principles which enter into the
knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which
composition of things, whether principles of the species
are individualized by matter. For since He knows things
or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not
other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness
only universal, but also singular things.
of things, or as their active principle, His essence must
Reply to Objection 2.
Although as regards the
be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by
species in the divine intellect its being has no material
Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular.
conditions like the images received in the imagination and
The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if
sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and mate-
it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the
rial things.
form.
Reply to Objection 3. Although matter as regards its
Reply to Objection 1. Our intellect abstracts the intel-
potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so
ligible species from the individualizing principles; hence
far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the like-to the divine being.
ness of the individual principles; and on that account our
Whether God can know infinite things?
Ia q. 14 a. 12
Objection 1. It seems that God cannot know infinite
eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for
things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the
ever, so that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we
infinite is that which, “to those who measure it, leaves
consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows
always something more to be measured,” as the Philoso-
infinite things even by the knowledge of vision. For God
pher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ.
knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which
Dei xii) that “whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is
will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on
bounded by the comprehension of the knower.” Now in-
for ever.
finite things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be
The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the
comprehended by the knowledge of God.
knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of
Objection 2. Further, if we say that things infinite in
the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sen-
themselves are finite in God’s knowledge, against this it
sible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual
may be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is
thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual.
untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said
But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness
in Phys. iii. But the infinite is not traversable either by the of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is par-finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore
ticipable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the
the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor even by
intelligible species of man in a certain way knows infinite
the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in God’s
men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as
knowledge, which is infinite.
communicating in the nature of the species; and the rea-
Objection 3. Further, the knowledge of God is the
son is because the intelligible species of our intellect is
measure of what is known.
But it is contrary to the
the likeness of man not as to the individual principles, but
essence of the infinite that it be measured. Therefore infi-
as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the
nite things cannot be known by God.
divine essence, whereby the divine intellect understands,
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii),
is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not
“Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it
only as regards the universal principles, but also as regards
can be comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no
the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence
bounds.”
it follows that the knowledge of God extends to infinite
I answer that, Since God knows not only things ac-
things, even as distinct from each other.
tual but also things possible to Himself or to created
Reply to Objection 1. The idea of the infinite pertains
things, as shown above (a. 9), and as these must be in-
to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the
finite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Al-
idea of quantity implies the order of parts. Therefore to
though the knowledge of vision which has relation only
know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to
to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite
know part after part; and in this way the infinite cannot be
things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is
known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will
83
always remain something else outside. But God does not Reply to Objection 3. The knowledge of God is the
know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated
measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not
part after part; since He knows all things simultaneously,
subject to this kind of measure; but it is the measure of
and not successively, as said above (a. 7). Hence there is
the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth
nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things.
of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the
Reply to Objection 2. Transition imports a certain
knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with
succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot
the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of
be traversed by the finite, nor by the infinite. But equal-
things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude
ity suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be
in continuous quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of
comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehen-
the ancients held; yet it is manifest that these would have
der. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be
a determinate and finite being, because their being would
comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in
be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would
itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as com-
be measurable as regards the knowledge of God.
prehended; but not as if it were traversable.
Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?
Ia q. 14 a. 13
Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God
In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent
is not of future contingent things.
For from a neces-
thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so
sary cause proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowl-
far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered edge of God is the cause of things known, as said above
as future, but as present; neither is it considered as con-
(a. 8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what
tingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as
He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowl-
determined to one; and on account of this it can be infal-
edge of God is not of contingent things.
libly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the
Objection 2. Further, every conditional proposition
sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down.
of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have
In another way a contingent thing can be considered as
an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is
it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as fu-
to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and
ture, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one;
from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can
forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite
follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true condi-
things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject
tional proposition, “If God knew that this thing will be, it
to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a con-
will be,” for the knowledge of God is only of true things.
tingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural
Now the antecedent conditional of this is absolutely nec-
knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things
essary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as
not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of
past. Therefore the consequent is also absolutely neces-
them is actually in itself. And although contingent things
sary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and
become actual successively, nevertheless God knows con-
so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.
tingent things not successively, as they are in their own
Objection 3. Further, everything known by God must
being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because
necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know,
His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His be-
must necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God
ing; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises
is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent
all time, as said above (q. 10, a. 2 ). Hence all things that
things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent fu-
are in time are present to God from eternity, not only be-
ture thing is known by God.
cause He has the types of things present within Him, as
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 32:15), “He Who
some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity
hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who under-
over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it
standeth all their works,” i.e. of men. Now the works of
is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by
men are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore
God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in
God knows future contingent things.
their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in
I answer that, Since as was shown above (a. 9), God
relation to their own causes.
knows all things; not only things actual but also things
Reply to Objection 1. Although the supreme cause is
possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are
necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the
future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future
proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a
contingent things.
plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent
84
cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first i.
cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are
Reply to Objection 3. Things reduced to act in time,
contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the
as known by us successively in time, but by God (are
knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary.
known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us
Reply to Objection 2. Some say that this antecedent,
they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future con-
“God knew this contingent to be future,” is not neces-
tingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone,
sary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it
whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he
imports relation to the future. This however does not re-
who goes along the road, does not see those who come
move necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to
after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a
the future, must have had it, although the future some-
height, sees at once all travelling by the way. Hence what
times does not follow. On the other hand some say that
is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself;
this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound
for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known
of necessary and contingent; as this saying is contingent,
by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary
“Socrates is a white man.” But this also is to no purpose;
according to the mode in which they are subject to the di-
for when we say, “God knew this contingent to be future,”
vine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as
contingent is used here only as the matter of the word,
considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposi-
and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its
tion, “Everything known by God must necessarily be,” is
contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity
usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to
or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or
the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and false; false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass,
for the sense is, “Everything which God knows is neces-
as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same ap-
sary.” If understood of the saying, it is composite and true;
plies to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said
for the sense is, “This proposition, ‘that which is known
that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it
by God is’ is necessary.”
follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely nec-
Now some urge an objection and say that this distinc-
essary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the
tion holds good with regard to forms that are separable
consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proxi-
from the subject; thus if I said, “It is possible for a white
mate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional
thing to be black,” it is false as applied to the saying, and
would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary
true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white,
cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for ex-
can become black; whereas this saying, ” a white thing
ample, if I said, “if the sun moves, the grass will grow.”
is black” can never be true. But in forms that are insepa-
Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the an-
rable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for
tecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul,
instance, if I said, “A black crow can be white”; for in
the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as
both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is insep-
it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is
arable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot
different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For
be known. This objection, however, would hold if these
example, when I say, “What the soul understands is im-
words “that which is known” implied any disposition in-
material,” this is to be understood that it is immaterial as
herent to the subject; but since they import an act of the
it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, knower, something can be attributed to the thing known,
“If God knew anything, it will be,” the consequent must
in itself (even if it always be known), which is not at-
be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e.
tributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge;
as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself,
is the antecedent: “For everything that is, while it is, must
which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.
be necessarily be,” as the Philosopher says in Peri Herm.
Whether God knows enunciable things?
Ia q. 14 a. 14
Objection 1. It seems that God does not know enun-
ness of enunciable things, since He is altogether simple.
ciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to
Therefore God does not know enunciable things.
our intellect as it composes and divides. But in the divine
On the contrary, It is written: “The Lord knoweth the
intellect, there is no composition. Therefore God does not
thoughts of men” (Ps. 93:11). But enunciable things are
know enunciable things.
contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows
Objection 2. Further, every kind of knowledge is
enunciable things.
made through some likeness. But in God there is no like-
I answer that, Since it is in the power of our intellect 85
to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in is, we do not forthwith understand other things which beHis own power or in that of creatures, as said above (a. 9),
long to him, but we understand them one by one, accord-
it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations
ing to a certain succession. On this account the things we
that can be formed.
understand as separated, we must reduce to one by way of
Now just as He knows material things immaterially,
composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now
and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enun-
the species of the divine intellect, which is God’s essence,
ciable things not after the manner of enunciable things,
suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding
as if in His intellect there were composition or division
His essence, God knows the essences of all things, and
of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple in-
also whatever can be accidental to them.
telligence, by understanding the essence of each thing;
Reply to Objection 1. This objection would avail if
as if we by the very fact that we understand what man
God knew enunciable things after the manner of enuncia-
is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man.
ble things.
This, however, does not happen in our intellect, which dis-
Reply to Objection 2. Enunciatory composition sig-
courses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intel-
nifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His ex-
ligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to
istence, which is His essence, is the similitude of all those
represent another. Hence when we understand what man
things which are signified by enunciation.
Whether the knowledge of God is variable?
Ia q. 14 a. 15
Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is
But “knowledge” and “love,” and the like, import rela-
variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable.
tions consequent upon the acts which are understood to
But whatever imports relation to the creature is applied
be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an
to God from time, and varies according to the variation
invariable manner.
of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable
Reply to Objection 2. God knows also what He can
according to the variation of creatures.
make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He
Objection 2. Further, whatever God can make, He can
can make more than He makes, it does not follow that He
know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore
can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to
He can know more than He knows. Thus His knowledge
the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said
can vary according to increase and diminution.
to know those things which are in act in some period of
Objection 3. Further, God knew that Christ would be
time. But from the fact that He knows some things might
born. But He does not know now that Christ will be born;
be which are not, or that some things might not be which
because Christ is not to be born in the future. Therefore
are, it does not follow that His knowledge is variable, but
God does not know everything He once knew; and thus
rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however,
the knowledge of God is variable.
anything existed which God did not previously know, and
On the contrary, It is said, that in God “there is no
afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable.
change nor shadow of alteration” (James 1:17).
But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any pe-
I answer that, Since the knowledge of God is His sub-
riod of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore
stance, as is clear from the foregoing (a. 4), just as His
from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time,
substance is altogether immutable, as shown above (q. 9,
it follows that it is known by God from eternity. There-
a. 1), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether in-
fore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He
variable.
knows; because such a proposition implies that first of all
Reply to Objection 1. “Lord”, “Creator” and the like,
He did not know, and then afterwards knew.
import relations to creatures in so far as they are in them-
Reply to Objection 3. The ancient Nominalists said
selves. But the knowledge of God imports relation to crea-
that it was the same thing to say “Christ is born” and “will
tures in so far as they are in God; because everything is
be born” and “was born”; because the same thing is sig-
actually understood according as it is in the one who un-
nified by these three—viz. the nativity of Christ. There-
derstands. Now created things are in God in an invari-
fore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He
able manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We
knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which
may also say that “Lord”, “Creator” and the like, import
means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This
the relations consequent upon the acts which are under-
opinion, however, is false; both because the diversity in
stood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they
the parts of a sentence causes a diversity of enunciations;
are in themselves; and thus these relations are attributed
and because it would follow that a proposition which is
to God variously, according to the variation of creatures.
true once would be always true; which is contrary to what
86
the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says false. The knowledge of God, however, would be vari-that this sentence, “Socrates sits,” is true when he is sit-
able if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation,
ting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be
by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect.
conceded that this proposition is not true, “Whatever God
Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and
knew He knows,” if referred to enunciable propositions.
falsity, for example, if when either as regards truth and
But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge
falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we
of God is variable. For as it is without variation in the di-
retained the same opinion about it; or as regards diverse
vine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing
opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting,
sometime to be, and sometime not to be, so it is with-
and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of
out variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an
which can be in God.
enunciable proposition is sometime true, and sometime
Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?
Ia q. 14 a. 16
Objection 1. It seems that God has not a speculative
end is partly speculative and partly practical: and when it
knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the
is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.
cause of things, as shown above (a. 8). But speculative
In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that
knowledge is not the cause of the things known. There-
God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He
fore the knowledge of God is not speculative.
Himself is not operable. But of all other things He has
Objection 2. Further, speculative knowledge comes
both speculative and practical knowledge. He has specu-
by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the
lative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we
divine knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of God is not
know speculatively in things by defining and dividing,
speculative.
God knows all this much more perfectly.
On the contrary, Whatever is the more excellent must
Now of things which He can make, but does not make
be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more
at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according
excellent than practical knowledge, as the Philosopher
as knowledge is called practical from the end. But He
says in the beginning of Metaphysics. Therefore God has
has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some pe-
a speculative knowledge of things.
riod of time. And, as regards evil things, although they
I answer that, Some knowledge is speculative only;
are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practi-
some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and
cal knowledge, like good things, inasmuch as He permits,
partly practical. In proof whereof it must be observed that
or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under
knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first,
the practical knowledge of the physician, inasmuch as he
on the part of the things known, which are not operable
cures them by his art.
by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about nat-
Reply to Objection 1. The knowledge of God is the
ural or divine thing. Secondly, as regards the manner of
cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is
knowing—as, for instance, if a builder consider a house
actually the cause of some, that is, of things that come to
by defining and dividing, and considering what belongs
be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of
to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in
others, that is, of things which He can make, and which
a speculative manner, and not as practically operable; for
nevertheless are never made.
operable means the application of form to matter, and not
Reply to Objection 2. The fact that knowledge is de-
the resolution of the composite into its universal formal
rived from things known does not essentially belong to
principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; “for the practi-
speculative knowledge, but only accidentally in so far as
cal intellect differs in its end from the speculative,” as the
it is human.
Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intel-
In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must
lect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the end
say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtain-
of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth.
able only if they are known in so far as they are operable.
Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be
Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way
made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only
perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally
to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative
as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative.
considerations as regards the end, although it concerns an
Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His spec-
operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative
ulative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other
by reason of the thing itself known, is merely speculative.
than Himself in Himself, and He knows Himself specula-
But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its
tively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he
87
possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things.
88
FIRST PART, QUESTION 15
Of Ideas
(In Three Articles)
After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are ideas?
(2) Whether they are many, or one only?
(3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?
Whether there are ideas?
Ia q. 15 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that there are no ideas. For
likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know
ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made
things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that
pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that
things may be known through them. Therefore there are
act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire gen-
no ideas.
erates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing
Objection 2. Further, God knows all things in Him-
to be made pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as
self, as has been already said (q. 14, a. 5). But He does
in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a
not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other
house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may
things.
be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends
Objection 3.
Further, an idea is considered to be
to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind.
the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine
As then the world was not made by chance, but by God
essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and effecting
acting by His intellect, as will appear later (q. 46, a. 1),
all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.
there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness
On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest.
of which the world was made. And in this the notion of
qu. xlvi),“Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one
an idea consists.
can be wise unless they are understood.”
Reply to Objection 1.
God does not understand
I answer that, It is necessary to suppose ideas in the
things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus
divine mind. For the Greek word Idea is in Latin “forma.”
Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion of Plato, who
Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, ex-
held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intel-
isting apart from the things themselves. Now the form
lect.
of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for
Reply to Objection 2. Although God knows Himself
one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is
and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the
called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of
operative principle of all things, except of Himself. It has
that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are
therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things;
said to be in him who knows them. In either case we must
though not with respect to Himself.
suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason:
Reply to Objection 3. God is the similitude of all
In all things not generated by chance, the form must
things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God
be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent
is identical with His essence.
does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the
Whether ideas are many?
Ia q. 15 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that ideas are not many. For an
Objection 3. Further, if it be said that ideas are multi-idea in God is His essence. But God’s essence is one only.
plied according to their relations to different creatures, it
Therefore there is only one idea.
may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas
Objection 2. Further, as the idea is the principle of
is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal,
knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in
then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal.
God there are not several arts or wisdoms. Therefore in
Objection 4. Further, these relations are either real in Him there is no plurality of ideas.
creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since
89
creatures are not from eternity, the plurality of ideas can-by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in
not be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according
matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the di-
to these relations. But if they are real in God, it follows
vine mind that it understand many things; though it would
that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality
be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to
of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene
be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas ex-
(De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one,
ist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can
except “ingenerability, generation, and procession.” Ideas
be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence
therefore are not many.
perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it
On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest.
can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in it-
qu. xlvi), “Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent
self, but as it can be participated in by creatures according
and immutable types of things, they themselves not be-
to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own
ing formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in
proper species, according to which it participates in some
the same manner, as being contained in the divine intel-
degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore,
ligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come
as God knows His essence as capable of such imitation by
into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with
any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea
them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all
of that creature; and in like manner as regards other crea-
that actually does so.”
tures. So it is clear that God understands many particular
I answer that, It must necessarily be held that ideas
types of things and these are many ideas.
are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that
Reply to Objection 1. The divine essence is not called
in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of
an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper
is the likeness or type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are
intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing
said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood
in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the
through the self-same essence.
Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. xii. Therefore the
Reply to Objection 2. By wisdom and art we sig-
order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is
nify that by which God understands; but an idea, that
not the accidental result of a succession of agents, as has
which God understands. For God by one understands
been supposed by those who have taught that God created
many things, and that not only according to what they are
only the first creature, and that this creature created the
in themselves, but also according as they are understood,
second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of be-
and this is to understand the several types of things. In
ings was produced. According to this opinion God would
the same way, an architect is said to understand a house,
have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if
when he understands the form of the house in matter.
the order itself of the universe was created by Him imme-
But if he understands the form of a house, as devised by
diately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of
himself, from the fact that he understands that he under-
the order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea of
stands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the
any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts
house. Now not only does God understand many things
of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot con-
by His essence, but He also understands that He under-
ceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of
stands many things by His essence. And this means that
its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind
He understands the several types of things; or that many
there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine
ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.
says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), “that each thing was
Reply to Objection 3. Such relations, whereby ideas
created by God according to the idea proper to it,” from
are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves,
which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many.
but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with
Now it can easily be seen how this is not repugnant to the
these things.
simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work
Reply to Objection 4. Relations multiplying ideas do
is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood,
not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not
and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a
real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are dis-
form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the
tinguished, but relations understood by God.
house in the mind of the builder, is something understood
90
Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?
Ia q. 15 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that there are not ideas in God
speculative manner.
of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in
Reply to Objection 1. Evil is known by God not
God; since it would follow that evil was in Him. But evil
through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil,
things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of
therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea
all things that God knows.
is an “exemplar” nor as a “type.”
Objection 2. Further, God knows things that neither
Reply to Objection 2. God has no practical knowl-
are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above
edge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will
(a. 9). But of such things there are no ideas, since, as
be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): “Acts of the divine will are
idea in God in so far as idea signifies an “exemplar” but
the determining and effective types of things.” Therefore
only in so far as it denotes a “type.”
there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.
Reply to Objection 3. Plato is said by some to have
Objection 3. Further, God knows primary matter, of
considered matter as not created; and therefore he postu-
which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence
lated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter.
the same conclusion.
Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God,
Objection 4. Further, it is certain that God knows
though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God;
not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents.
but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in
But there are not ideas of these, according to Plato’s teach-
itself can neither exist, nor be known.
ing, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri.
Reply to Objection 4. Genus can have no idea apart
Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not ideas in God of
from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an “ex-
all things known by Him.
emplar”; for genus cannot exist except in some species.
On the contrary, Ideas are types existing in the divine
The same is the case with those accidents that insepara-
mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu.
bly accompany their subject; for these come into being
xlvi). But God has the proper types of all things that He
along with their subject. But accidents which supervene
knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by
to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect
Him.
produces through the form of the house all the accidents
I answer that, As ideas, according to Plato, are prin-
that originally accompany it; whereas those that are su-
ciples of the knowledge of things and of their generation,
peradded to the house when completed, such as painting,
an idea has this twofold office, as it exists in the mind
or any other such thing, are produced through some other
of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the mak-
form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no
ing of things, it may be called an “exemplar,” and belongs
other idea than that of species; both because particular
to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of
things are individualized by matter, which, as some say,
knowledge, it is properly called a “type,” and may belong
he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea;
to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore,
and because the intention of nature regards the species,
it has respect to everything made by God in any period of
and produces individuals only that in them the species
time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect
may be preserved. However, divine providence extends
to all things known by God, even though they never come
not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown
to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to
later (q. 22, a. 3 ).
their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a
91
FIRST PART, QUESTION 16
Of Truth
(In Eight Articles)
Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?
(2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
(3) On the comparison of the true to being.
(4) On the comparison of the true to the good.
(5) Whether God is truth?
(6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?
(7) On the eternity of truth.
(8) On the unchangeableness of truth.
Whether truth resides only in the intellect?
Ia q. 16 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that truth does not reside only
the term of the intellect, namely true, is in the intellect it-
in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (So-
self. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is
liloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, “That is true
related to the appetite—and hence the aspect of goodness
which is seen”; since it would follow that stones hidden
passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far
in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they
as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since are not seen. He also condemns the following, “That is
the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing
object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass
and able to know,” for hence it would follow that nothing
from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the
would be true, unless someone could know it. Therefore
thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some
he defines truth thus: “That is true which is.” It seems,
relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be
then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.
in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally.
Objection 2. Further, whatever is true, is true by rea-
It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends
son of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by
will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is
which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is
the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that what-
related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but ac-
ever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contra-
cidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.
dictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at
Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it ac-
the same time.
cidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, every-
Objection 3.
Further, “that, on account of which
thing is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related a thing is so, is itself more so,” as is evident from the
to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that
Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing
artificial things are said to be true a being related to our
is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as
intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the
the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth
likeness of the form in the architect’s mind; and words are
resides rather in things than in the intellect.
said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi),
intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be
” The true and the false reside not in things, but in the
true in so far as they express the likeness of the species
intellect.”
that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true,
I answer that, As the good denotes that towards
which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according
which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that to-
to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then,
wards which the intellect tends. Now there is this differ-
truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in
ence between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowl-
things according as they are related to the intellect as their
edge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing
principle. Consequently there are various definitions of
known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the
truth. Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), “Truth is
desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of
that whereby is made manifest that which is;” and Hilary
the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and
says (De Trin. v) that “Truth makes being clear and ev-
92
ident” and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw
intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are re-
that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled
lated to the intellect, we have Augustine’s definition (De
to base the truth of things on their relation to our intel-
Vera Relig. xxxvi), “Truth is a supreme likeness with-
lect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible,
out any unlikeness to a principle”: also Anselm’s defini-
and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such,
tion (De Verit. xii), “Truth is rightness, perceptible by the
however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things
mind alone”; for that is right which is in accordance with
consists in their relation to the divine intellect.
the principle; also Avicenna’s definition (Metaph. viii, 6),
Reply to Objection 3. Although the truth of our in-
“The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which
tellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that
is immutably attached to it.” The definition that “Truth is
truth should be there primarily, any more than that health
the equation of thought and thing” is applicable to it under
should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal:
either aspect.
for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking about
of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same
the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this
way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of
truth, relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is ex-
truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a
cluded from every definition.
thought or a word is true “from the fact that a thing is, not
Reply to Objection 2. The ancient philosophers held
because a thing is true.”
that the species of natural things did not proceed from any
Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
Ia q. 16 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that truth does not reside only
mity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this.
in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philoso-
For although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet
pher says (De Anima iii) that as the senses are always true
it does not know the comparison which exists between the
as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect
thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it.
as regards “what a thing is.” Now composition and divi-
But the intellect can know its own conformity with the in-
sion are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing
telligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of
“what a thing is.” Therefore truth does not reside only in
a thing “what a thing is.” When, however, it judges that a
the intellect composing and dividing.
thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about
Objection 2. Further, Isaac says in his book On Def-
that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it
initions that truth is the equation of thought and thing.
does by composing and dividing: for in every proposition
Now just as the intellect with regard to complex things
it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified
can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple
by the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and
things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing
this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is
as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect also the intellect, when it knows “what a thing is”; but it
composing and dividing.
does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like man-
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi)
ner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth
that with regard to simple things and “what a thing is,”
therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing
truth is “found neither in the intellect nor in things.”
“what a thing is,” as in anything that is true; yet not as
I answer that, As stated before, truth resides, in its
the thing known in the knower, which is implied by the
primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is
word “truth”; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as
true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the
known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the
intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as
intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses;
it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form,
nor in the intellect knowing “what a thing is.”
as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the confor-
And thus the Objections given are solved.
mity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this confor-
Whether the true and being are convertible terms?
Ia q. 16 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that the true and being are not
Objection 2. Further, that which extends to being and
convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the in-
not-being is not convertible with being. But the true ex-
tellect, as stated (a. 1); but being is properly in things.
tends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is;
Therefore they are not convertible.
and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being
93
are not convertible.
in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily
Objection 3. Further, things which stand to each other
in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in
in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be con-
idea.
vertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for be-
Reply to Objection 2. Not-being has nothing in itself
ing is not understood except under the aspect of the true.
whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the
Therefore it seems they are not convertible.
intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii)
being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being,
that there is the same disposition of things in being and in
apprehended, that is, by reason.
truth.
Reply to Objection 3. When it is said that being can-
I answer that, As good has the nature of what is de-
not be apprehended except under the notion of the true,
sirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything,
this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as
in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore
to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of
it is said in De Anima iii that “the soul is in some man-
the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In
ner all things,” through the senses and the intellect. And
the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be appre-
therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true.
hended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also;
But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the
and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended un-
true adds relation to the intellect.
less the idea of being be apprehended also; since being
Reply to Objection 1. The true resides in things and
is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same
in the intellect, as said before (a. 1). But the true that is
if we compare the intelligible object with being. For be-
in things is convertible with being as to substance; while
ing cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet
the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being,
being can be understood while its intelligibility is not un-
as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs
derstood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet
to the nature of truth, as has been said already (a. 1). It
the true is not understood by understanding being.
may, however, be said that being also is in the things and
Whether good is logically prior to the true?
Ia q. 16 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that good is logically prior to
being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Sec-
the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as
ondly, it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally
is evident from Phys. i. But the good is more universal
precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowl-
than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of
edge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be
the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the
prior in idea to the good.
true.
Reply to Objection 1. The will and the intellect mu-
Objection 2. Further, good is in things, but the true in tually include one another: for the intellect understands
the intellect composing and dividing as said above (a. 2).
the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So
But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the
then, among things directed to the object of the will, are
intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true.
comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and con-
Objection 3. Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is versely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good
clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good;
stands as the universal, and the true as the particular;
since, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a
whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse
good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to
of the case. From the fact, then, that the true is a kind
the true.
of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of
On the contrary, What is in more things is prior log-
things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.
ically. But the true is in some things wherein good is
Reply to Objection 2. A thing is prior logically in
not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true
so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect ap-
is prior to good.
prehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends
I answer that, Although the good and the true are
that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that
convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ
it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of
logically. And in this manner the true, speaking abso-
truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in
lutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First,
things.
because the true is more closely related to being than is
Reply to Objection 3. The virtue which is called
good. For the true regards being itself simply and imme-
“truth” is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth
diately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as
according to which man shows himself in deed and word
94
as he really is. But truth as applied to “life” is used in a the truth of “justice” is found in man as he fulfills his duty
particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that
to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot ar-
to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has
gue from these particular truths to truth in general.
been said that truth exists in other things (a. 1). Whereas
Whether God is truth?
Ia q. 16 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that God is not truth. For truth
and first truth.
consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in
Reply to Objection 1. Although in the divine intellect
God there is not composition and division. Therefore in
there is neither composition nor division, yet in His sim-
Him there is not truth.
ple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows
Objection 2. Further, truth, according to Augustine
all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect.
(De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a “likeness to the principle.”
Reply to Objection 2. The truth of our intellect is ac-
But in God there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore
cording to its conformity with its principle, that is to say,
in God there is not truth.
to the things from which it receives knowledge. The truth
Objection 3. Further, whatever is said of God, is said
also of things is according to their conformity with their
of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of
principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot
God is the cause of all being; and His goodness the cause
be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps
of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a
be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore
principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence,
this will be from God; which is evidently false.
we cannot understand this unless the affirmative must be
On the contrary, Our Lord says, “I am the Way, the
resolved into the negative, as when one says: “the Father
Truth, and the Life” (Jn. 14:6).
is of Himself, because He is not from another.” Similarly,
I answer that, As said above (a. 1), truth is found in
the divine truth can be called a “likeness to the principle,”
the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and
inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His intel-
in things according as they have being conformable to an
lect.
intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For
Reply to Objection 3. Not-being and privation have
His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is
no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of
the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding
the intellect. Now all apprehension of the intellect is from
is the measure and cause of every other being and of ev-
God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement—
ery other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence
“that a person commits fornication is true”—is entirely
and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that
from God. But to argue, “Therefore that this person for-
truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign nicates is from God”, is a fallacy of Accident.
Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?
Ia q. 16 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that there is only one truth, ac-
are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof
cording to which all things are true. For according to Au-
of which we must consider that when anything is pred-
gustine (De Trin. xv, 1), “nothing is greater than the mind
icated of many things univocally, it is found in each of
of man, except God.” Now truth is greater than the mind
them according to its proper nature; as animal is found
of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth:
in each species of animal. But when anything is predi-
whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and
cated of many things analogically, it is found in only one
not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is
of them according to its proper nature, and from this one
truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God.
the rest are denominated. So healthiness is predicated of
Objection 2. Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv),
animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only
that, “as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is
in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine
that of truth to true things.” But there is only one time for
is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and
all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by
urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And
which all things are true.
although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet
On the contrary, it is written (Ps. 11:2), “Truths are
in either there is something whereby the one causes, and
decayed from among the children of men.”
the other indicates health. Now we have said (a. 1) that
I answer that, In one sense truth, whereby all things
truth resides primarily in the intellect; and secondarily in
95
things, according as they are related to the divine intel-Reply to Objection 1. The soul does not judge of
lect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the in-
things according to any kind of truth, but according to the
tellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many
primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as
truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the
in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the under-
same intellect, according to the number of things known.
standing. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is
Whence a gloss on Ps. 11:2, “Truths are decayed from
greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which
among the children of men,” says: “As from one man’s
resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, so many
but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even truths are reflected from the one divine truth.” But if we
as science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it
speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by
is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational
one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated ac-
soul, except God.
cording to its own entity. And thus, although the essences
Reply to Objection 2. The saying of Anselm is cor-
or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine in-
rect in so far as things are said to be true by their relation
tellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to
to the divine intellect.
be true.
Whether created truth is eternal?
Ia q. 16 a. 7
Objection 1. It seems that created truth is eternal. For eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the
Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) “Nothing is more
divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to
does it follow from this that anything else but God is eter-
three make five.” But the truth of these is a created truth.
nal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself,
Therefore created truth is eternal.
as shown already (a. 5).
Objection 2. Further, that which is always, is eter-
Reply to Objection 1. The nature of a circle, and the
nal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore
fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind
they are eternal. So therefore is truth, which is the most
of God.
universal.
Reply to Objection 2. That something is always and
Objection 3. Further, it was always true that what is
everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way,
true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth
as having in itself the power of extension to all time and
of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth,
to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and
so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore
always. In the other way as not having in itself determi-
some created truth is eternal.
nation to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be
Objection 4. Further, all that is without beginning and
one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all
end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without be-
distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said
ginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since
to be everywhere and always, in so far as universals are
it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true,
independent of place and time. It does not, however, fol-
of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it
low from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect,
began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an
if one exists that is eternal.
end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will Reply to Objection 3. That which now is, was future,
still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is eternal.
before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it
On the contrary, God alone is eternal, as laid down
would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing’s
before (q. 10, a. 3).
coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone
I answer that, The truth of enunciations is no other
eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true
than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides
that what now is would be, except in so far as its future
in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in
being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such
the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in a cause.
speech, it is called enunciable truth, according as it signi-
Reply to Objection 4. Because our intellect is not
fies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth
eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions
residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus
which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning
urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but
in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true
from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like
to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the
manner it has been already said that things are called true
divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is
from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were
true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this
96
is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our in-truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends
tellect; and not by reason of any truth in the things. For
it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not
as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.
Whether truth is immutable?
Ia q. 16 a. 8
Objection 1. It seems that truth is immutable. For Au-
lect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and
gustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that “Truth and mind
the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is im-
do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable,
mutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear
as the mind is.”
from what has been said before (q. 14, a. 15). Hence the
Objection 2. Further, what remains after every change
truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of
is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incor-
our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the subject
ruptible, since it remains after all generation and corrup-
of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth
tion. But truth remains after all change; for after every
to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. Whereas
change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not. Therefore
the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which
truth is immutable.
natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether
Objection 3. Further, if the truth of an enunciation
immutable.
changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing.
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of di-
But it does not thus change.
For truth, according to
vine truth.
Anselm (De Verit. viii), “is a certain rightness” in so far
Reply to Objection 2. The true and being are con-
as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind con-
vertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor
cerning it. But this proposition that “Socrates sits”, re-
corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so far as this be-
ceives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates
ing or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys. i,
does sit; and it has the same signification even though he
so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but
does not sit. Therefore the truth of the proposition in no
because that truth does not remain which was before.
way changes.
Reply to Objection 3. A proposition not only has
Objection 4. Further, where there is the same cause,
truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that
there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of
is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the
the truth of the three propositions, “Socrates sits, will sit,
divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth
sat.” Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or
in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the
other of these must be the true one. Therefore the truth of
intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect
these propositions remains immutable; and for the same
with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion
reason that of any other.
changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 11:2),“Truths are
therefore this proposition, “Socrates sits,” is true, as long
decayed from among the children of men.”
as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far
I answer that, Truth, properly speaking, resides only
as the expression is significative, and with the truth of sig-
in the intellect, as said before (a. 1); but things are called
nification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When
true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence
Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is
the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point
changed.
of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its
Reply to Objection 4. The sitting of Socrates, which
conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity
is the cause of the truth of the proposition, “Socrates sits,”
may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through
has not the same meaning when Socrates sits, after he
change in one of the two extremes. Hence in one way
sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results,
truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that
varies, and is variously signified by these propositions
a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself
concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not fol-
has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is
low, though one of the three propositions is true, that the
changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can
same truth remains invariable.
be a change from true to false. If, then, there is an intel-
97
FIRST PART, QUESTION 17
Concerning Falsity
(In Four Articles)
We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether falsity exists in things?
(2) Whether it exists in the sense?
(3) Whether it exists in the intellect?
(4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.
Whether falsity exists in things?
Ia q. 17 a. 1
Objection 1. It appears that falsity does not exist in
withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein
things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), “If the true
consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called
is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists
untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words
nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary.”
of the text, “Why do you love vanity, and seek after ly-
Objection 2. Further, false is derived from “fallere”
ing?” (Ps. 4:3): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are
[to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine
called the “truth of life” as being obedient to the order of
says (De Vera Relig. 33), they show nothing but their own
the divine intellect. Thus it is said, “He that doth truth,
species. Therefore the false is not found in things.
cometh to the light” (Jn. 3:21).
Objection 3. Further, the true is said to exist in things But in relation to our intellect, natural things which
by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above
are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not
(q. 16). But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God.
simply, but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way
Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity;
according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said
and thus nothing is false.
to be false as being signified or represented by word or
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34):
thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to
“Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imi-
be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we
tates unity without being unity.” But everything imitates
should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing,
the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augus-falsity exists.
tine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): “The true tragedian is a false
I answer that, Since true and false are opposed, and
Hector”: even as, on the contrary, anything can be called
since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we
true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another
must needs seek falsity, where primarily we find truth; that
way a thing can be called false, by way of cause—and
is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor
thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false
falsity exists, except in relation to the intellect. And since
opinion. And whereas it is innate in us to judge things by
every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it
external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise
“per se,” but is denominated relatively by what belongs to
from sense, which principally and naturally deals with ex-
it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply
ternal accidents, therefore those external accidents, which
when compared with the intellect on which it depends,
resemble things other than themselves, are said to be false
and to which it is compared “per se” but may be called
with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and
false relatively as directed to another intellect, to which
tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq.
it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend
ii, 6): “We call those things false that appear to our appre-
on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human.
hension like the true:” and the Philosopher says (Metaph.
Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and
v, 34): “Things are called false that are naturally apt to
in themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the
appear such as they are not, or what they are not.” In this
art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if
way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions
it falls short of the proper operation of his art.
or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this
In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be
way many wise and learned persons might be called false,
found, in so far as they are compared with the divine in-
as stated in Metaph. v, 34.
tellect; since whatever takes place in things proceeds from
Reply to Objection 1. A thing compared with the in-
the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case
tellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false
of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to
in respect to what it is not. Hence, “The true tragedian is
98
a false Hector,” as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in would be false simply, but as compared with our intellect;
things that are is found a certain non-being, so in things
and thus they are false only relatively.
that are is found a degree of falseness.
To the argument which is urged on the contrary, like-
Reply to Objection 2. Things do not deceive by their
ness or defective representation does not involve the idea
own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to fal-
of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opin-
sity, by the likeness they bear to things which they actually
ion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because
are not.
it resembles another thing; but only when the resemblance
Reply to Objection 3. Things are said to be false, not
is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any
as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they
one case, but in the majority of instances.
Whether there is falsity in the senses?
Ia q. 17 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that falsity is not in the senses.
object to be a man.
For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): “If all the bod-
Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper
ily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what
objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because
more we can require from them.” Thus it seems that we
of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form
are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that falsity
rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their
is not in them.
indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph.
agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of
iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the
an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person.
imagination.
But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects,
Objection 3. Further, in non-complex things there is
even a rightly disposed sense may have a false judgment,
neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But af-
because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally,
firmation and negation do not belong to the senses. There-
or as a consequence of being directed to other things.
fore in the senses there is no falsity.
Reply to Objection 1. The affection of sense is its
On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), “It
sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports
appears that the senses entrap us into error by their decep-
as it is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the
tive similitudes.”
judgment by which we judge that we experience sensa-
I answer that, Falsity is not to be sought in the senses tion. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected erro-except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in
neously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports
such a way as that the senses know truth, but in so far as
erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by
they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (q. 16,
sense about the object, but not about the fact of sensation.
a. 2), and this takes place through the senses apprehending
Reply to Objection 2. Falsity is said not to be proper
things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists
to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper ob-
in the senses through their apprehending or judging things
ject. Hence in another translation it is said more plainly,
to be otherwise than they really are.
“Sense, about its proper object, is never false.” Falsity is
The knowledge of things by the senses is in propor-
attributed to the imagination, as it represents the likeness
tion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the
of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone
likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In
perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing it-
the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight
self, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this
there is the likeness of colors, and of other sensible ob-
reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows,
jects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not
pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they
primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size,
convey the likeness of things that are not present in sub-
and of other sensible objects common to more than one
stance.
sense. Thirdly, neither primarily nor of its own nature,
Reply to Objection 3. This argument proves that the
but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man,
false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true
not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to the colored
and the false.
99
Whether falsity is in the intellect?
Ia q. 17 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that falsity is not in the intellect.
is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regard-
For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), “Everyone who is
ing truth (q. 16, a. 2), that falsity can exist in the intellect deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived.”
not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowl-
But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as
edge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity
we are deceived therein. Therefore falsity does not exist
does not exist as known, as stated above (a. 2).
in the intellect.
But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essen-
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (De An-
tially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity
ima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore
occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect
there is no falsity in the intellect.
whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as com-
On the contrary, It is said in De Anima iii, 21,[22]
position of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take
that “where there is composition of objects understood,
place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying
there is truth and falsehood.” But such composition is in
to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a
the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the
circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is
intellect.
false of another. In another way, by composing a defini-
I answer that, Just as a thing has being by its proper
tion of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the
form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the like-
definition is not only false of the thing, but false in itself.
ness of the thing known. Hence, as natural things can-
A definition such as ” a reasonable four-footed animal”
not fall short of the being that belongs to them by their
would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making
form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent qual-
it; for such a statement as “some reasonable animals are
ities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not
four-footed” is false in itself. For this reason the intellect
fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail
cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it
in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it
is either true, or it understands nothing at all.
is informed; but may fail with regard to something con-
Reply to Objection 1. Because the essence of a thing
sequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has
is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to
been said (a. 2) that sight is not deceived in its proper sen-
understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence, and
sible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to
judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in
that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as
which there is no falsity. In this sense Augustine’s words
the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper
must be understood, “that he who is deceived, understands
object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence
not that wherein he is deceived;” and not in the sense that
of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the
no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.
essence of a thing, as neither the sense about its proper
Reply to Objection 2. The intellect is always right as
object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may
regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them
be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it un-
for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a
derstands the essence, something which is not consequent
thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known
upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same
as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the
position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to
predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.
judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. There
Whether true and false are contraries?
Ia q. 17 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that true and false are not con-
Objection 3. Further, in God there is no contrariety,
traries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to
for “nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance,” as Au-
that which is not; for “truth,” as Augustine says (Soliloq.
gustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 2). But falsity is opposed
ii, 5), “is that which is.” But that which is and that which
to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, “They have
is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true and
laid hold on lying” (Jer. 8:5), that is to say, “an idol,” as a false are not contrary things.
gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.
Objection 2. Further, one of two contraries is not in
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Peri Herm.
the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine
ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one.
says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), “A tragedian would not be a false
I answer that, True and false are opposed as con-
Hector, if he were not a true tragedian.” Therefore true
traries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and
and false are not contraries.
negation. In proof of which it must be considered that
100
negation neither asserts anything nor determines any sub-is good,” is, “God is not good.”
ject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being,
Reply to Objection 2. Falsity is not founded in the
for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation as-
truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in
serts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it is
the good which is contrary to it, but in that which is its
“negation in a subject,” as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27;
proper subject. This happens in either, because true and
for blindness is not said except of one whose nature it is to
good are universals, and convertible with being. Hence,
see. Contraries, however, both assert something and deter-
as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being,
mine the subject, for blackness is a species of color. Fal-
so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in
sity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philoso-
some truth.
pher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said
Reply to Objection 3. Because contraries, and op-
or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what
posites by way of privation, are by nature about one and
it really is. For as truth implies an adequate apprehension
the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God,
of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear
considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness
that true and false are contraries.
or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false.
Reply to Objection 1. What is in things is the truth
But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the
of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the
false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So
intellect, wherein truth primarily resides. Hence the false
idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch
is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being,
as the false opinion concerning them is contrary to the true
and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the Philosopher
opinion of the divine unity.
proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement “God
101
FIRST PART, QUESTION 18
The Life of God
(In Four Articles)
Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise:
(1) To whom does it belong to live?
(2) What is life?
(3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?
(4) Whether all things in God are life?
Whether to live belongs to all natural things?
Ia q. 18 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that to live belongs to all nat-
movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act
ural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that
of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called
“Movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things
movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that
existing in nature.” But all natural things participate in
determine themselves to movement or operation of any
movement. Therefore all natural things partake of life.
kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do
Objection 2. Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch
so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude.
as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth
Reply to Objection 1. These words of the Philoso-
and decay. But local movement is naturally more perfect
pher may be understood either of the first movement,
than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the
namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of the movement
Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57). Since then, all
in its general sense. In either way is movement called the
natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local
life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude,
movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.
and not attributing it to them as their property. The move-
Objection 3. Further, amongst natural bodies the el-
ment of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures
ements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them,
as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved,
for we speak of “living waters.” Much more, therefore,
is in animals. Similarly also every natural movement in
have other natural bodies life.
respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the op-
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1)
erations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe
that “The last echo of life is heard in the plants,” whereby
were one animal, so that its movement came from an “in-
it is inferred that their life is life in its lowest degree. But trinsic moving force,” as some in fact have held, in that
inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they
case movement would really be the life of all natural bod-
have not life.
ies.
I answer that, We can gather to what things life be-
Reply to Objection 2. To bodies, whether heavy or
longs, and to what it does not, from such things as man-
light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they
ifestly possess life. Now life manifestly belongs to an-
are displaced from their natural conditions, and are out of
imals, for it said in De Vegetab. i∗ that in animals life
their proper place; for when they are in the place that is
is manifest. We must, therefore, distinguish living from
proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants
lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of
and other living things move with vital movement, in ac-
which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life
cordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by
is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an
approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far
animal begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and
as they recede from such movement, so far do they recede
as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is
from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are
considered to be alive. When it no longer has any move-
moved by an extrinsic force, either generating them and
ment of itself, but is only moved by another power, then
giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way.
its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby
They do not therefore move themselves, as do living bod-
it is clear that those things are properly called living that
ies.
move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it
Reply to Objection 3. Waters are called living that
be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect
have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are
being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, is called movement; or
not connected with a continually flowing source, are
∗ De Plantis i, 1
102
called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a of theirs is not from themselves but from the cause that
similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to
generates them. The same is the case with the movement
possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this
of other heavy and light bodies.
is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement
Whether life is an operation?
Ia q. 18 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that life is an operation. For
the abstract, just as the word “running” denotes “to run”
nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus.
in the abstract.
But life is divided by certain operations, as is clear from
Hence “living” is not an accidental but an essential
the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four
predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly
kinds of life, namely, nourishment, sensation, local move-
for the operations from which its name is taken, and thus
ment and understanding. Therefore life is an operation.
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is princi-
Objection 2. Further, the active life is said to be dif-
pally to sense or to understand.
ferent from the contemplative. But the contemplative is
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher here takes “to
only distinguished from the active by certain operations.
live” to mean an operation of life. Or it would be bet-
Therefore life is an operation.
ter to say that sensation and intelligence and the like, are
Objection 3. Further, to know God is an operation.
sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the ex-
But this is life, as is clear from the words of Jn. 18:3,
istence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic. ix, 9)
“Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the
that to live is to sense or to understand—in other words,
only true God.” Therefore life is an operation.
to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii,
Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations
37), “In living things, to live is to be.”
mentioned. For in this lower world there are four kinds
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said
of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of
(q. 17, a. 3), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the
nothing more than taking nourishment, and, as a conse-
essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge
quence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in
from sense, of which the proper objects are external ac-
addition, to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and
cidents. Hence from external appearances we come to
other animals without movement. Others have the further
the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we
power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals,
name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as
such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man,
is clear from what has already been said (q. 13, a. 1), so
have the still higher faculty of understanding.
from external properties names are often imposed to sig-
Reply to Objection 2. By vital operations are meant
nify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken
those whose principles are within the operator, and in
strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of
virtue of which the operator produces such operations of
which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less
itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such
strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they
natural principles of certain operations as are their nat-
are imposed. And so we see that the word “body” is used
ural powers, but something over and above these, such
to denote a genus of substances from the fact of their pos-
as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular
sessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to de-
kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources
note the dimensions themselves; in which sense body is
of pleasure. Thus, as by a similitude, any kind of work in
said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said
which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it,
of life. The name is given from a certain external appear-
his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered with a view
ance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify
to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said
this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and
to lead to life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong
this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the
naturally. To live, accordingly, is nothing else than to ex-
active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal.
ist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.
103
Whether life is properly attributed to God?
Ia q. 18 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that life is not properly at-
themselves the end of their operation, or movement; for
tributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as
this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural
they move themselves, as previously stated (a. 2). But
instinct they are moved to any action through the form ap-
movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does
prehended by sense. Hence such animals as move them-
life.
selves in respect to an end they themselves propose are su-
Objection 2. Further, in all living things we must
perior to these. This can only be done by reason and intel-
needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by
lect; whose province it is to know the proportion between
the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) that “the soul is the cause
the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate
and principle of the living body.” But God has no princi-
them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intel-
ple. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.
ligible beings; for their power of self-movement is more
Objection 3. Further, the principle of life in the living perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same
things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this
man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers;
exists only in corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be
and these by their command move the organs of move-
attributed to incorporeal things.
ment. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship,
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 83:3): “My heart and
i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing;
my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.”
and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with
I answer that, Life is in the highest degree properly
preparing the material for the ship.
in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since
But although our intellect moves itself to some things,
a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and
yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles,
not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power
which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot
is found in anything, the more perfect is the life of that
but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it
thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold or-
moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be
der is found. In the first place, the end moves the agent:
moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of
and the principal agent is that which acts through its form,
understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it nat-
and sometimes it does so through some instrument that
urally possesses, is not determined by another, must have
acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal
life in the most perfect degree. Such is God; and hence
agent, and does no more than execute the action. Accord-
in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher con-
ingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect
cludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelli-
of any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only
gent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His
in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by
intellect is most perfect and always in act.
which they act, and the end of the action being alike de-
Reply to Objection 1. As stated in Metaph. ix, 16,
termined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants,
action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to exter-
which move themselves according to their inherent nature,
nal matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other
with regard only to executing the movements of growth
kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to
and decay.
will. The difference between them is this, that the former
Other things have self-movement in a higher degree,
action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of
that is, not only with regard to executing the movement,
the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection
but even as regards to the form, the principle of move-
of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the
ment, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind
thing in movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the
are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a
act of the operator, is called its movement, by this simili-
naturally implanted form; but one received through sense.
tude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an
Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect
act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement
is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the
is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potential-
sense of touch, as shellfish, move only with the motion
ity; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is
of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement
to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In
hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the
the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement,
sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only
that which understands itself is said to move itself. It is in
connection and touch, but also objects apart from them-
this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself;
selves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive
not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imper-
movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive
fect.
through sense the form that is the principle of their move-
Reply to Objection 2. As God is His own very exis-
ment, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to
tence and understanding, so is He His own life; and there-
104
fore He so lives that He has not principle of life.
dividual. For this reason life is not found here below apart
Reply to Objection 3. Life in this lower world is be-
from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold good with
stowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to
incorruptible natures.
preserve the species, and nourishment to preserve the in-
Whether all things are life in God?
Ia q. 18 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that not all things are life in
not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they
God. For it is said (Acts 17:28), “In Him we live, and
are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine
move, and be.” But not all things in God are movement.
essence is life and not movement, it follows that things
Therefore not all things are life in Him.
existing in God in this manner are not movement, but life.
Objection 2. Further, all things are in God as their
Reply to Objection 2. The thing modelled must be
first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the
like the model according to the form, not the mode of be-
model. Since, then, not all things have life in themselves,
ing. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in
it seems that not all things are life in God.
the model from that which it has in the thing modelled.
Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Re-
Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect
lig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that
immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that ex-
does not live. If, therefore, things which in themselves
ists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence
have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist
the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are
more truly in God than themselves. But this appears to be
life in the divine mind, as having a divine existence in that
false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God
mind.
potentially.
Reply to Objection 3. If form only, and not mat-
Objection 4. Further, just as good things and things
ter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural
made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and
things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the
things that God can make, but never will be made. If,
ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in
therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known
fact, Plato held that the “separate” man was the true man;
by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will
and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by partic-
never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this
ipation. But since matter enters into the being of natural
appears inadmissible.
things, we must say that those things have simply being
On the contrary, (Jn. 1:3,4), it is said, “What was
in the divine mind more truly than in themselves, because
made, in Him was life.” But all things were made, except
in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in them-
God. Therefore all things are life in God.
selves a created being: whereas this particular being, a
I answer that, In God to live is to understand, as be-
man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in
fore stated (a. 3). In God intellect, the thing understood,
its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs
and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence
to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the
whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life
divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being in
of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been
the architect’s mind than in matter; yet a material house is
made by God are in Him as things understood, it follows
called a house more truly than the one which exists in the
that all things in Him are the divine life itself.
mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.
Reply to Objection 1. Creatures are said to be in God
Reply to Objection 4. Although bad things are in
in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held
God’s knowledge, as being comprised under that knowl-
together and preserved by the divine power; even as we
edge, yet they are not in God as created by Him, or pre-
say that things that are in our power are in us. And crea-
served by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are
tures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their
known by God through the types of good things. Hence
own natures. In this sense we must understand the words
it cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those
of the Apostle when he says, “In Him we live, move, and
things that are not in time may be called life in God in
be”; since our being, living, and moving are themselves
so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as
caused by God. In another sense things are said to be in
they are understood by God; but not in so far as life im-
God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they
plies a principle of operation.
are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are
105
FIRST PART, QUESTION 19
The Will of God
(In Twelve Articles)
After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is will in God?
(2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?
(3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?
(4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
(5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
(6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?
(7) Whether the will of God is mutable?
(8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
(9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?
(10) Whether God has free will?
(11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?
(12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?
Whether there is will in God?
Ia q. 19 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that there is not will in God. For both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intel-the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot
lectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being
assign to God any end. Therefore there is not will in God.
there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God,
Objection 2. Further, will is a kind of appetite. But
since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His
appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies
own existence, so is His will.
imperfection, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. Although nothing apart from
there is not will in God.
God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to
Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher
all things made by Him. And this by His essence, for by
(De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But
His essence He is good, as shown above (q. 6, a. 3): for
God is the first cause of movement, and Himself is un-
the end has the aspect of good.
moved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not
Reply to Objection 2. Will in us belongs to the appet-
will in God.
itive part, which, although named from appetite, has not
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom.
12:2):
for its only act the seeking what it does not possess; but
“That you may prove what is the will of God.”
also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess.
I answer that, There is will in God, as there is in-
In this respect will is said to be in God, as having always
tellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural
good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not
things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect
distinct from His essence.
is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now every-
Reply to Objection 3. A will of which the principal
thing has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when
object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another;
it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at but the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is
rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection,
His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence,
which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things
it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone,
without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also
in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to
intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended
be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that
through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when
the first mover moves itself.
possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it,
106
Whether God wills things apart from Himself?
Ia q. 19 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that God does not will things
inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things
apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine exis-
should be partakers therein.
tence. But God is not other than Himself. Therefore He
Reply to Objection 1. The divine will is God’s own
does not will things other than Himself.
existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according
Objection 2. Further, the willed moves the willer, as
to the different ways of understanding them and express-
the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54.
ing them, as is clear from what has already been said
If, therefore, God wills anything apart from Himself, His
(q. 13, a. 4). For when we say that God exists, no rela-
will must be moved by another; which is impossible.
tion to any other object is implied, as we do imply when
Objection 3. Further, if what is willed suffices the
we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not any-
willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness
thing apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart
suffices God, and completely satisfies His will. Therefore
from Himself.
God does not will anything apart from Himself.
Reply to Objection 2. In things willed for the sake of
Objection 4. Further, acts of will are multiplied in
the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end,
proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore,
and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears
God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it fol-
in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills
lows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently
to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than
His existence, which is His will. But this is impossible.
health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with
Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.
one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:3):
may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for
“This is the will of God, your sanctification.”
its own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from
I answer that, God wills not only Himself, but other
Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own
things apart from Himself. This is clear from the compar-
goodness, it does not follow that anything else moves His
ison which we made above (a. 1). For natural things have
will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things
a natural inclination not only towards their own proper
apart from Himself by understanding His own essence, so
good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed,
He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own
to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good
goodness.
amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that ev-
Reply to Objection 3. From the fact that His own
ery agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces
goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it
its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to
wills nothing apart from itself, but rather that it wills noth-
communicate as far as possible to others the good pos-
ing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine
sessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will,
intellect, though its perfection consists in its very knowl-
from which all perfection is derived in some kind of like-
edge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other
ness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect,
things.
communicate their good to others, much more does it ap-
Reply to Objection 4. As the divine intellect is one,
pertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its
as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the
own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He
divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only
wills both Himself to be, and other things to be; but Him-
through the one, that is, through its own goodness.
self as the end, and other things as ordained to that end;
Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?
Ia q. 19 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that whatever God wills He
of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary be-
wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But
ing, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown
whatever God wills, He wills from eternity, for otherwise
(q. 2, a. 3). But it belongs to His nature to will what-
His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills,
ever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and
He wills necessarily.
above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore
Objection 2. Further, God wills things apart from
whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.
Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now
Objection 4. Further, being that is not necessary, and
God wills His own goodness necessarily. Therefore He
being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing.
wills things apart from Himself necessarily.
If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He
Objection 3. Further, whatever belongs to the nature
wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore
107
possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so make the journey without one. The same applies to other
the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two
means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and
things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is im-
can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection
perfect and mutable.
can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing
Objection 5. Further, on the part of that which is in-
things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet
different to one or the other of two things, no action re-
it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He
sults unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other
wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will
power, as the Commentator∗ says in Phys. ii. If, then,
cannot change.
the Will of God is indifferent with regard to anything, it
Reply to Objection 1. From the fact that God wills
follows that His determination to act comes from another;
from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that
and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.
He wills it necessarily; except by supposition.
Objection 6. Further, whatever God knows, He knows
Reply to Objection 2.
Although God necessarily
necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence,
wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will
so is the divine will. Therefore whatever God wills, He
things willed on account of His goodness; for it can ex-
wills necessarily.
ist without other things.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph.
1:11):
Reply to Objection 3. It is not natural to God to will
“Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His
any of those other things that He does not will necessar-
will.” Now, what we work according to the counsel of the
ily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature,
will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not
but voluntary.
will necessarily whatever He wills.
Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes a necessary cause
I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing
has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a de-
is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by suppo-
ficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the
sition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from
sun’s power has a non-necessary relation to some contin-
the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part
gent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar
of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely neces-
power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from
sary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject
the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessar-
forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is abso-
ily will some of the things that He wills, does not result
lutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this
from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging
way it is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is
to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect
not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposi-
goodness of God can be without it; and such defect ac-
tion; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, companies all created good.
as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by
Reply to Objection 5. A naturally contingent cause
God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute
must be determined to act by some external power. The
necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the
divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines
divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness,
itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.
since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own
Reply to Objection 6. As the divine essence is nec-
goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness
essary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowl-
necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation
edge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to
to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to
the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed.
color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills
The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they
things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to
exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as
His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end
they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have
we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, un-
necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but
less they are such that the end cannot be attained without
no absolute necessity so as to be necessary in themselves,
them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take
in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God
ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily
knows necessarily whatever He wills, but does not will
will things without which the end is attainable, such as a
necessarily whatever He wills.
horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can
∗ Averroes
108
Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
Ia q. 19 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that the will of God is not the
the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence
cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1):
as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance
“As our sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its
with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate
very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its
being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and
light, so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays
contains in Himself the full perfection of being, it cannot
of goodness upon everything that exists.” But every vol-
be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He
untary agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore
were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in
God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause
being: and that this is impossible has been already shown
of things.
(q. 7, a. 2). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of
Objection 2. Further, The first in any order is that
His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own
which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things,
infinite perfection according to the determination of His
that comes first which is fire by its essence. But God is the
will and intellect.
first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is
Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their
His nature. He acts then by nature, and not by will. There-
cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes
fore the divine will is not the cause of things.
them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since ev-
Objection 3. Further, Whatever is the cause of any-
ery agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their
thing, through being “such” a thing, is the cause by na-
cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the
ture, and not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being
Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him
itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, be-
after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from
cause he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De Doctr.
Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed
Christ. i, 32), “Because God is good, we exist.” Therefore
from Him after the mode of will, for His inclination to put
God is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His
in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the
will.
will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things.
Objection 4. Further, Of one thing there is one cause.
Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius in these words does
But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said
not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but
before (q. 14, a. 8). Therefore the will of God cannot be
only in a certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communi-
considered the cause of things.
cates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all;
On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:26), “How could
and as election implies a certain distinction.
anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?”
Reply to Objection 2. Because the essence of God is
I answer that, We must hold that the will of God is
His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His
the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not,
essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect
as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.
and will.
This can be shown in three ways: First, from the or-
Reply to Objection 3. Good is the object of the will.
der itself of active causes. Since both intellect and na-
The words, therefore, “Because God is good, we exist,”
ture act for an end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural
are true inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His
agent must have the end and the necessary means prede-
willing all other things, as said before (a. 2, ad 2).
termined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and
Reply to Objection 4. Even in us the cause of one and
definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the
the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the
archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must
form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding
precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God
it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not deter-
is first in the order of agents, He must act by intellect and
mined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the
will.
will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to
This is shown, secondly, from the character of a nat-
operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect,
ural agent, of which the property is to produce one and
since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But
the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same
in God all these things are one.
way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of
109
Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
Ia q. 19 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that some cause can be assigned
same relation to the means to the end, as do the premisses
to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46):
to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.
“Who would venture to say that God made all things ir-
Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in an-
rationally?” But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason
other act the means to that end, his willing the end will
of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will of
be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the
God has some cause.
case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing
Objection 2. Further, in things made by one who wills
cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he
to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause,
wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as
there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him
God by one act understands all things in His essence, so
who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as
by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as
has been already shown (a. 4). If, then, there is no cause of
in God to understand the cause is not the cause of His un-
His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause,
derstanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the
except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in
cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His
vain, since science seeks to assign causes to effects. This
willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means
seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some
to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that;
cause to the divine will.
but does not will this on account of that.
Objection 3. Further, what is done by the willer, on
Reply to Objection 1. The will of God is reasonable,
account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, there-
not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in
fore, the will of God has no cause, it follows that all things
so far as He wills one thing to be on account of another.
made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause.
Reply to Objection 2. Since God wills effects to pro-
But this also is not admissible.
ceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28):
the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes sec-
“Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected.”
ondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreason-
But nothing is greater than the will of God. We must not
able to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not
then seek for a cause of it.
as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine
I answer that, In no wise has the will of God a cause.
says (De Trin. iii, 2): “Philosophers in their vanity have
In proof of which we must consider that, since the will
thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes,
follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the
being utterly unable to perceive the cause that is shown
person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of
above all others, the will of God.”
the understanding, in the person that understands. The
Reply to Objection 3. Since God wills effects to
case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and
come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other
its conclusion are understood separately from each other,
effect do not depend solely on the will of God, but on
the understanding the premiss is the cause that the con-
something else besides: but the first effect depends on the
clusion is known. If the understanding perceive the con-
divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that
clusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one
God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by
and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing
their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed
of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding
him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the comple-
the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and
tion of the universe. But this cannot be reduced to other
yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the
created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the
premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same
simple will of God; but the others on the order of other
with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the
causes.
Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?
Ia q. 19 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that the will of God is not al-
truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good ac-
ways fulfilled. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): “God
tually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore
will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowl-
the will of God is not always fulfilled.
edge of the truth.” But this does not happen. Therefore
Objection 3. Further, since the will of God is the first the will of God is not always fulfilled.
cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the
Objection 2. Further, as is the relation of knowledge
effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a
to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all
secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may
110
be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according
effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of
to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood
the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, is not
of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will.
always fulfilled.
This distinction must not be taken as applying to the di-
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 113:11): “God hath
vine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor
done all things, whatsoever He would.”
consequent, but to the things willed.
I answer that, The will of God must needs always be
To understand this we must consider that everything,
fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an
in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in
effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the
its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good
rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes.
or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are
The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall
taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be
short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the uni-
changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live
versal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for ex-
is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, abso-
ample, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be
lutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that
a being. Hence the same must happen in active causes.
a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him
Something may fall outside the order of any particular
is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said
active cause, but not outside the order of the universal
of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live;
cause; under which all particular causes are included: and
but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the
if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because
same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but
of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is
consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice ex-
included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore
acts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently,
an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal
but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is
cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen. For it
directed to things as they are in themselves, and in them-
may happen that a star is hindered from producing its ef-
selves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we
fects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things,
will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all par-
from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred
ticular circumstances are considered; and this is what is
through intermediate causes to the universal influence of
meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a
the first heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the univer-
just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in
sal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will
a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inas-
should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to
much as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called
depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in
a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear
another order; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away
that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what
from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back
He wills antecedently may not take place.
into the order of that will, when by its justice he is pun-
Reply to Objection 2. An act of the cognitive faculty
ished.
is according as the thing known is in the knower; while
Reply to Objection 1. The words of the Apostle,
an act of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they
“God will have all men to be saved,” etc. can be un-
exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of
derstood in three ways. First, by a restricted application,
being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does not
in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De
all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth;
praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), “God wills all men to
but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills
be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom
Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists.
He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved
Reply to Objection 3. A first cause can be hindered
whose salvation He does not will.” Secondly, they can be
in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when
understood as applying to every class of individuals, not
it is not the universal first cause, including within itself
to every individual of each class; in which case they mean
all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its
that God wills some men of every class and condition to
order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said above.
be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and
111
Whether the will of God is changeable?
Ia q. 19 a. 7
Objection 1. It seems that the Will of God is change-
changeable (q. 9, a. 1; q. 14, a. 15). Therefore His will
able. For the Lord says (Gn. 6:7): “It repenteth Me that
must be entirely unchangeable.
I have made man.” But whoever repents of what he has
Reply to Objection 1. These words of the Lord are
done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a change-
to be understood metaphorically, and according to the
able will.
likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy
Objection 2. Further, it is said in the person of the
what we have made; although we may even do so without
Lord: “I will speak against a nation and against a king-
change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at
dom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but
the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God
if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of
is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our
the evil that I have thought to do to them” (Jer. 18:7,8)
mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed
Therefore God has a changeable will.
from the face of the earth man whom He had made.
Objection 3. Further, whatever God does, He does
Reply to Objection 2. The will of God, as it is the
voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing,
first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate
for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at
causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since
another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable
however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to
will.
the first cause, there are many things in the divine power,
Objection 4. Further, God does not will of necessity
knowledge and will that are not included in the order of
what He wills, as said before (a. 3). Therefore He can
inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus,
both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can
one who looked only on inferior causes might have said:
incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substan-
“Lazarus will not rise again,” but looking at the divine
tially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that
first cause might have said: “Lazarus will rise again.”
place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable
And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the in-
as regards His will.
ferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of
On the contrary, It is said: “God is not as a man, that
the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will con-
He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be
versely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares
changed” (Num. 23:19).
that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the
I answer that, The will of God is entirely unchange-
order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet
able. On this point we must consider that to change the
does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine
will is one thing; to will that certain things should be
and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: “Take
changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be
order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live” (Is.
done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will
38:1). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it
to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would
was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will,
be changed, if one should begin to will what before he
which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi,
had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before.
5): “The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel”—
This cannot happen, unless we presuppose change either
that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He
in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of
says, “I also will repent,” His words must be understood
the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in
metaphorically. For men seem to repent, when they do not
two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing
fulfill what they have threatened.
begins to be good for him, and this does not take place
Reply to Objection 3. It does not follow from this
without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather
argument that God has a will that changes, but that He
begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was
sometimes wills that things should change.
not so before. In another way when he knows for the first
Reply to Objection 4. Although God’s willing a thing
time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know
is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by suppo-
it before; hence we take counsel in order to know what
sition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine
is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both
will, as has been said above (a. 3).
the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely un-
112
Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
Ia q. 19 a. 8
Objection 1.
It seems that the will of God im-
Secondly, because if the distinction between the contin-
poses necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says
gent and the necessary is to be referred only to secondary
(Enchiridion 103): “No one is saved, except whom God
causes, this must be independent of the divine intention
has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will
and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to
it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be.”
say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the di-
Objection 2.
Further, every cause that cannot be
vine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect
hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the
follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but
Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) “Nature always works in
also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus
the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it.” But the will
from defect of active power in the seed it may happen
of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (Rom.
that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points,
9:19): “Who resisteth His will?” Therefore the will of
that belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine
God imposes necessity on the things willed.
will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things
Objection 3. Further, whatever is necessary by its an-
are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they
tecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary
are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some
that animals should die, being compounded of contrary
things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the
elements. Now things created by God are related to the
right ordering of things, for the building up of the uni-
divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have
verse. Therefore to some effects He has attached neces-
necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God
sary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and
wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional
contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects.
statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that
Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contin-
God wills is necessary absolutely.
gent that the effects willed by God happen contingently,
On the contrary, All good things that exist God wills
but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it
to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things
being His will that they should happen contingently.
willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and
Reply to Objection 1. By the words of Augustine we
thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such
must understand a necessity in things willed by God that
things.
is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional state-
I answer that, The divine will imposes necessity on
ment that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is
some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some
necessarily true.
have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that
Reply to Objection 2. From the very fact that noth-
what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and
ing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those
what He produces by contingent causes contingent.
things happen that God wills to happen, but that they hap-
This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for
pen necessarily or contingently according to His will.
two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is
Reply to Objection 3. Consequents have necessity
contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the
from their antecedents according to the mode of the an-
fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by defi-
tecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have
ciency in the second cause, as the sun’s power is hindered
that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either
by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary
absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are ab-
cause can hinder God’s will from producing its effect.
solute necessities.
Whether God wills evils?
Ia q. 19 a. 9
Objection 1. It seems that God wills evils. For ev-
beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called
ery good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil
evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good
should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): “Al-
more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praise-
though evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is
worthy when contrasted with evil.” But God wills all that
good that not only good things should exist, but also evil
appertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe, for
things.” Therefore God wills evil things.
this is what God desires above all things in His creatures.
Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
Therefore God wills evil.
iv, 23): “Evil would conduce to the perfection of every-
Objection 3.
Further, that evil should exist, and
thing,” i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchirid-
should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God
ion 10,11): “Out of all things is built up the admirable
does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since
113
various evils do exist, God’s will would not always be ful-ishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such
filled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.
evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punish-
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): “No
ment; and in willing the preservation of the natural order,
wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse.
He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.
Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less there-
Reply to Objection 1. Some have said that although
fore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when
God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or
He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it.”
be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good
Therefore it is not by God’s will that man becomes worse.
that evil should be or be done. This they said because
Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. There-
things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end;
fore God wills not evil things.
and this order they thought was expressed in the words
I answer that, Since the ratio of good is the ratio of
“that evil should be or be done.” This, however, is not
appetibility, as said before (q. 5, a. 1), and since evil is
correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but ac-
opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such,
cidentally. For it is beside the intention of the sinner, that
should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or
any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the
animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will.
intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should
Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it
shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot there-
accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites.
fore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in
For a natural agent intends not privation or corruption, but
the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be
the form to which is annexed the privation of some other
or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which ap-
form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the
pertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it
corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his
essentially.
object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is
Reply to Objection 2. Evil does not operate towards
only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely plea-
the perfection and beauty of the universe, except acciden-
sure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an ac-
tally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in say-
companiment. Now the evil that accompanies one good,
ing that “evil would conduce to the perfection of the uni-
is the privation of another good. Never therefore would
verse,” draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.
evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the good
Reply to Objection 3. The statements that evil exists,
that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good
and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet
of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good
the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he
more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one
wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affir-
good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the
mative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor
evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards
wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done;
the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of pun-
and this is a good.
Whether God has free-will?
Ia q. 19 a. 10
Objection 1. It seems that God has not free-will. For
by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will.
Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son∗; “God alone
Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but
is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others,
other things not necessarily, as shown above (a. 3), He has
as having free-will, can be inclined to either side.”
free will with respect to what He does not necessarily will.
Objection 2. Further, free-will is the faculty of the
Reply to Objection 1. Jerome seems to deny free-will
reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But
to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to
God does not will evil, as has been said (a. 9). Therefore
sin.
there is not free-will in God.
Reply to Objection 2. Since the evil of sin consists
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): “The
in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God
Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, ac-
wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is man-
cording to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to
ifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He
necessity.”
can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He
I answer that, We have free-will with respect to what
can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we
we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our
ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will
will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to nat-
to sit down.
ural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act
∗ Ep. 146, ad Damas.
114
Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?
Ia q. 19 a. 11
Objection 1. It seems that the will of expression is not with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphori-to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the
cally called will in God; just as when anyone lays down
cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are
a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed.
assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions
Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor
ought to be assigned to the divine will.
the will of God, as in the words: “Thy will be done on
Objection 2. Further, every expression that is not in
earth, as it is in heaven” (Mat. 6:10). There is, however,
agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself,
this difference between will and anger, that anger is never
is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine
attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it
will are not in agreement with that will, they are false.
includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him prop-
But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions
erly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its
therefore must be assigned to the divine will.
proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor.
On the contrary, The will of God is one, since it is
Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure;
the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as
and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression,
many, as in the words of Ps. 110:2: “Great are the works
inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will.
of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills.” There-
Reply to Objection 1. Knowledge is not the cause of
fore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.
a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not
I answer that, Some things are said of God in their
put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Ac-
strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has
cordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to
been said before (q. 13, a. 3). When certain human pas-
will.
sions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this
Reply to Objection 2. Expressions of will are called
is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing
divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything;
that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphor-
but because what in us is the usual expression of our will,
ically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with
is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not
us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that pun-
a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger
ishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore pun-
in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in
ishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger
ourselves.
is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually
Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?
Ia q. 19 a. 12
Objection 1. It seems that five expressions of will—
of ways,” as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and
namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to
permission—are not rightly assigned to the divine will.
assign one expression only in the case of evil—namely,
For the same things that God bids us do by His precept
prohibition—and two—namely, counsel and precept—in
or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the
the case of good.
same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes per-
I answer that, By these signs we name the expression
mits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as dis-
of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will
tinct.
something. A man may show that he wills something, ei-
Objection 2. Further, God works nothing unless He
ther by himself or by means of another. He may show
wills it, as the Scripture says (Wis. 11:26). But the will
it by himself, by doing something either directly, or in-
of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure.
directly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he
Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the
works in his own person; in that way the expression of
will of expression.
his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by
Objection 3. Further, operation and permission ap-
not hindering the doing of a thing; for what removes an
pertain to all creatures in common, since God works in
impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect
them all, and permits some action in them all. But pre-
the expression is called permission. He declares his will
cept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures
by means of another when he orders another to perform a
only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one divi-
work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept,
sion, not being of one order.
and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which
Objection 4. Further, evil happens in more ways than
is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man
good, since “good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds
makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denom-
115
inated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of always the same as the will of good pleasure; while pre-that will. That precept, counsel, and prohibition are called
cept and counsel are not; both because the former regards
the will of God is clear from the words of Mat. 6:10:
the present, and the two latter the future; and because the
“Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.” That per-
former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect mission and operation are called the will of God is clear
as fulfilled by means of another.
from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: “Nothing is
Reply to Objection 3. Rational creatures are masters
done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by
of their own acts; and for this reason certain special ex-
permitting it, or by actually doing it.”
pressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inas-
Or it may be said that permission and operation re-
much as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily
fer to present time, permission being with respect to evil,
and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by
operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time,
the divine operation; therefore only operation and permis-
prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is
sion are concerned with these.
necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.
Reply to Objection 4. All evil of sin, though happen-
Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing to prevent
ing in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the
anyone declaring his will about the same matter in differ-
divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression
ent ways; thus we find many words that mean the same
is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good
thing.
Hence there is not reason why the same thing
stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since
should not be the subject of precept, operation, and coun-
there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to
sel; or of prohibition or permission.
the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of
Reply to Objection 2. As God may by metaphor be
precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more
said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills
perfectly, and these are the subject of counsel. Or it may
not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does,
be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtain-
properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to pre-
ing of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser
vent the same thing being the object of the will of good
evils.
pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is
116
FIRST PART, QUESTION 20
God’s Love
(In Four Articles)
We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether love exists in God?
(2) Whether He loves all things?
(3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?
(4) Whether He loves more the better things?
Whether love exists in God?
Ia q. 20 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that love does not exist in God.
of hate except as opposed to the object of love. Similarly,
For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion.
it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be
Therefore love is not in God.
referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whom-
Objection 2. Further, love, anger, sorrow and the
soever there is will and appetite, there must also be love:
like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow
since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also want-
and anger are not attributed to God, unless by metaphor.
ing. Now it has been shown that will is in God (q. 19,
Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.
a. 1), and hence we must attribute love to Him.
Objection 3. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
Reply to Objection 1. The cognitive faculty does not
“Love is a uniting and binding force.” But this cannot take
move except through the medium of the appetitive: and
place in God, since He is simple. Therefore love does not
just as in ourselves the universal reason moves through
exist in God.
the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De An-
On the contrary, It is written: “God is love” (Jn.
ima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, or
4:16).
the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the
I answer that, We must needs assert that in God there
sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is
is love: because love is the first movement of the will and
the proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily
of every appetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will
change therefore always accompanies an act of the sensi-
and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil,
tive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart,
as to their proper objects: and since good is essentially and
which, as the Philosopher says (De part. animal. iii, 4), is
especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas
the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts
evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as op-
of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have annexed
posed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and ap-
to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas
petite that regard good must naturally be prior to those that
acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy
regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love
and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of
to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior to that
the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It is in this which exists through another. Again, the more universal
latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher
is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is
says (Ethic. vii): “God rejoices by an operation that is
first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to
one and simple,” and for the same reason He loves with-
particular and special truths. Now there are certain acts
out passion.
of the will and appetite that regard good under some spe-
Reply to Objection 2. In the passions of the sensi-
cial condition, as joy and delight regard good present and
tive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material
possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as
element—namely, the bodily change—and a certain for-
yet possessed. Love, however, regards good universally,
mal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in
whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first
anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64),
act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other
the material element is the kindling of the blood about the
appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and ori-
heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as
gin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything,
regards the formal element of certain passions a certain
except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object
imperfection is implied, as in desire, which is of the good
117
we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love
have. This applies also to anger, which supposes sorrow.
ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possi-
Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply
ble, union with that good. So love is called the unitive
no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be at-
force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for
tributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad
the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Him-
1); neither can those that even on their formal side imply
self, Who is good by His essence, as above shown (q. 6,
imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically,
Aa. 1,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he
and from likeness of effects, as already show (q. 3, a. 2
wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were,
, ad 2; q. 19, a. 11). Whereas, those that do not imply
in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him
imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predi-
as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it
cated of God, though without attributing passion to Him,
aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our
as said before (q. 19, a. 11).
own. And then again the divine love is a binding force,
Reply to Objection 3. An act of love always tends
inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet it implies no
towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the
composition in God.
person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is
Whether God loves all things?
Ia q. 20 a. 2
Objection 1.
It seems that God does not love all
since to love anything is nothing else than to will good
things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1),
to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that
love places the lover outside himself, and causes him to
exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not
pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not
the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it
admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself,
as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to any-
and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible
thing, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its
to say that God loves things other than Himself.
goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love,
Objection 2. Further, the love of God is eternal. But
by which we will that it should preserve the good it has,
things apart from God are not from eternity; except in
and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we
God. Therefore God does not love anything, except as
direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and
it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other
creates goodness.
than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other
Reply to Objection 1. A lover is placed outside him-
than Himself.
self, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch
Objection 3.
Further, love is twofold—the love,
as he wills good to the beloved; and works for that good
namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God
by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence
does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire,
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): “On behalf of the truth
since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the
we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the
love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with
cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness,
irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii,
is placed outside Himself by His providence for all exist-
2). Therefore God does not love all things.
ing things.”
Objection 4. Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): “Thou
Reply to Objection 2. Although creatures have not
hatest all the workers of iniquity.” Now nothing is at the
existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they
same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love
have been in Him from eternity, God has known them
all things.
eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has
On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:25): “Thou lovest
loved them, even as we, by the images of things within
all things that are, and hatest none of the things which
us, know things existing in themselves.
Thou hast made.”
Reply to Objection 3. Friendship cannot exist except
I answer that, God loves all existing things. For all
towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning
existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the
love, and communicating one with another in the various
existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, what-
works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to
ever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above
the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is
(q. 19, a. 4) that God’s will is the cause of all things. It
benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational
must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any
creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share
kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To
in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly
every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence,
speaking, therefore, God does not love irrational creatures
118
with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated
desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures,
under another. God loves sinners in so far as they are ex-
and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in
isting natures; for they have existence and have it from
need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and
Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence
of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing
at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God.
for others as well as for ourselves.
Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.
Reply to Objection 4. Nothing prevents one and the
Whether God loves all things equally?
Ia q. 20 a. 3
Objection 1.
It seems that God loves all things
In another way on the part of the good itself that a person
equally. For it is said: “He hath equally care of all” (Wis.
wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that
6:8). But God’s providence over things comes from the
one more than another, for whom we will a greater good,
love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all
though our will is not more intense. In this way we must
things equally.
needs say that God loves some things more than others.
Objection 2. Further, the love of God is His essence.
For since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things,
But God’s essence does not admit of degree; neither there-
as has been said (a. 2), no one thing would be better than
fore does His love. He does not therefore love some things
another, if God did not will greater good for one than for
more than others.
another.
Objection 3. Further, as God’s love extends to created
Reply to Objection 1. God is said to have equally
things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is
care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal
not said to know some things more than others; nor will
good to all, but because He administers all things with a
one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He
like wisdom and goodness.
love some things more than others.
Reply to Objection 2. This argument is based on the
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx):
intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which
“God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them
is the divine essence. But the good that God wills for His
rational creatures more, and of these especially those who
creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no
are members of His only-begotten Son Himself.”
reason why it may not vary in degree.
I answer that, Since to love a thing is to will it good, Reply to Objection 3. To understand and to will de-in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In
note the act alone, and do not include in their meaning
one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is
objects from the diversity of which God may be said to
more or less intense. In this way God does not love some
know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to
things more than others, because He loves all things by an
God’s love.
act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same.
Whether God always loves more the better things?
Ia q. 20 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that God does not always love
this to be true, asked Peter, saying: “Simon, son of John,
more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is bet-
lovest thou Me more than these?” Yet Christ loved John
ter than the whole human race, being God and man. But
more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, com-
God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for
menting on the words, “Simon, son of John, lovest thou
it is said: “He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him
Me?”: “By this very mark is John distinguished from the
up for us all” (Rom. 8:32). Therefore God does not al-
other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He
ways love more the better things.
loved him more than the rest.” Therefore God does not
Objection 2. Further, an angel is better than a man.
always love more the better things.
Hence it is said of man: “Thou hast made him a little less
Objection 4. Further, the innocent man is better than
than the angels” (Ps. 8:6). But God loved men more than
the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3
He loved the angels, for it is said: “Nowhere doth He take
in Isa.), “a second plank after shipwreck.” But God loves
hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh
the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over
hold” (Heb. 2:16). Therefore God does not always love
him the more. For it is said: “I say to you that there shall
more the better things.
be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance,
Objection 3.
Further, Peter was better than John,
more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance”
since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing
(Lk. 15:7). Therefore God does not always love more the
119
better things.
he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He pre-
Objection 5. Further, the just man who is foreknown
serves it longer. For it does not end, as the active life does, is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more
with the life of the body.
the predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater
Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His mem-
good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love
bers, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for
more the better things.
which reason He gave him the care of the Church; but
On the contrary, Everything loves what is like it, as
that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved
appears from (Ecclus. 13:19): “Every beast loveth its
more by Him; on which account Christ commended His
like.” Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God.
mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of
Therefore the better things are more loved by God.
them loved Christ more with the love of charity, and un-
I answer that, It must needs be, according to what has
certain also which of them God loved more and ordained
been said before, that God loves more the better things .
to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. Peter is said
For it has been shown (Aa. 2,3), that God’s loving one
to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and
thing more than another is nothing else than His willing
fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect to
for that thing a greater good: because God’s will is the
certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him
cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some
rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity.
things are better than others, is that God wills for them
While others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his
a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the
more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his
better things.
gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was
Reply to Objection 1. God loves Christ not only more
the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John
than He loves the whole human race, but more than He
was the better, and was loved the more. However, it may
loves the entire created universe: because He willed for
seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters;
Him the greater good in giving Him “a name that is above
since “the Lord” and no other “is the weigher of spirits”
all names,” in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything
(Prov. 16:2).
of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up
Reply to Objection 4. The penitent and the innocent
to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He
are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether inno-
become thereby a glorious conqueror: “The government
cent or penitent, those are the better and better loved who
was placed upon His shoulder,” according to Is. 9:6.
have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is
Reply to Objection 2. God loves the human nature
the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to
assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more
rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, be-
than He loves all the angels; for that nature is better, es-
cause often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble,
pecially on the ground of the union with the Godhead.
and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words
But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing
(Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, “In battle the general loves
it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order
the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the
of grace and of glory: since according to Rev 21:17, the
enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has never
measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so
done a brave deed.”
that, in this respect, some angels are found nobler than
Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in
some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But
themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who
as to natural condition an angel is better than a man. God
deserved punishment, than as conferred on the innocent,
therefore did not assume human nature because He loved
to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred
man, absolutely speaking, more; but because the needs of
pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a
man were greater; just as the master of a house may give
king.
some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not
Reply to Objection 5. Since God’s will is the cause of
give to his own son in sound health.
goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by
Reply to Objection 3. This doubt concerning Peter
God is to be reckoned according to the time when some
and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine in-
good is to be given to him by divine goodness. Accord-
terprets it mystically, and says that the active life, signified ing therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the
by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified
divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the
by John, because the former is more conscious of the mis-
sinner is better; although according to some other time he
eries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently
is the worse; because even according to some time he is
desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God,
neither good nor bad.
120
FIRST PART, QUESTION 21
The Justice and Mercy of God
(In Four Articles)
After considering the divine love, we must treat of God’s justice and mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is justice in God?
(2) Whether His justice can be called truth?
(3) Whether there is mercy in God?
(4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?
Whether there is justice in God?
Ia q. 21 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that there is not justice in God.
anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be
For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance
attributed to God; since, as stated above (q. 20, a. 1 ), in
does not exist in God: neither therefore does justice.
God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which
Objection 2. Further, he who does whatsoever he
is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject of
wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But,
those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral virtues
as the Apostle says: “God worketh all things according to
are concerned with works of giving and expending; such
the counsel of His will” (Eph. 1:11). Therefore justice
as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside
cannot be attributed to Him.
not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there
Objection 3. Further, the act of justice is to pay what
is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God;
is due. But God is no man’s debtor. Therefore justice does
although not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not
not belong to God.
unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
Objection 4.
Further, whatever is in God, is His
x, 8), it would be absurd to praise God for His political
essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius
virtues.
says (De Hebdom.): “Good regards the essence; justice
Reply to Objection 2. Since good as perceived by in-
the act.” Therefore justice does not belong to God.
tellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 10:8): “The Lord is
will anything but what His wisdom approves. This is, as
just, and hath loved justice.”
it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His
I answer that, There are two kinds of justice. The one
will is right and just. Hence, what He does according to
consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and
His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do ac-
selling, and other kinds of intercourse and exchange. This
cording to law. But whereas law comes to us from some
the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative justice,
higher power, God is a law unto Himself.
that directs exchange and intercourse of business. This
Reply to Objection 3. To each one is due what is his
does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: “Who
own. Now that which is directed to a man is said to be
hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made
his own. Thus the master owns the servant, and not con-
him?” (Rom. 11:35). The other consists in distribu-
versely, for that is free which is its own cause. In the word
tion, and is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or
debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or necessity
a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then
of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order
the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any kind
has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one cre-
of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the
ated thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole,
order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of na-
accident to substance, and all things whatsoever to their
ture and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God.
end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to
Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii, 4): “We must
God. Thus in the divine operations debt may be regarded
needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to
in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in
all existing things what is proper to the condition of each;
either way God pays what is due. It is due to God that
and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the
there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and
powers that properly belong to it.”
wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness. In this
Reply to Objection 1. Certain of the moral virtues
respect, God’s justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch
are concerned with the passions, as temperance with con-
as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is also
cupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring, meekness with
due to a created thing that it should possess what is or-
121
dered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that 10): “When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since
other animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises
it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the
justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its
wicked, it is also just; since it befits Thy goodness.”
nature and condition. This debt however is derived from
Reply to Objection 4. Although justice regards act,
the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it
this does not prevent its being the essence of God; since
as ordered to it according to the divine wisdom. And al-
even that which is of the essence of a thing may be the
though God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He
principle of action. But good does not always regard act;
Himself is not the debtor, since He is not directed to other
since a thing is called good not merely with respect to act,
things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore,
but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this rea-
in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompani-
son it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related to the
ment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit.
just, as the general to the special.
Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog.
Whether the justice of God is truth?
Ia q. 21 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that the justice of God is not
is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in the equa-
truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says
tion of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist
(Dial. Verit. 13), it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his art.
resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Metaph.
Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of
vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). Therefore justice does not appertain to
justice related to the law with which they accord. There-
truth.
fore God’s justice, which establishes things in the order
Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher
conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law
(Ethic. iv, 7), truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth
of His justice, is suitably called truth. Thus we also in
therefore does not appertain to the idea of justice.
human affairs speak of the truth of justice.
On the contrary, it is said (Ps. 84:11): “Mercy and
Reply to Objection 1. Justice, as to the law that gov-
truth have met each other”: where truth stands for justice.
erns, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the com-
I answer that, Truth consists in the equation of mind
mand whereby our actions are governed according to the
and thing, as said above (q. 16, a. 1). Now the mind, that
law, it resides in the will.
is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and
Reply to Objection 2. The truth of which the Philoso-
measure; whereas the converse is the case with the mind
pher is speaking in this passage, is that virtue whereby a
that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore
man shows himself in word and deed such as he really
things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists
is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the
in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in our-
thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its cause
selves. For according as a thing is, or is not, our thoughts
and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice.
or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind
Whether mercy can be attributed to God?
Ia q. 21 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that mercy cannot be attributed
is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak,
to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says
sorrowful at heart [miserum cor]; being affected with sor-
(De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But there is no sorrow in God; and
row at the misery of another as though it were his own.
therefore there is no mercy in Him.
Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery
Objection 2. Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice.
of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of
But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For
mercy. To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others
it is said (2 Tim. 2:13): “If we believe not, He continueth
belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to
faithful: He cannot deny Himself.” But He would deny
Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call
Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His words.
by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by
Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.
the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the primary
On the contrary, it is said (Ps. 110:4): “He is a mer-
source of goodness is God, as shown above (q. 6 , a. 4).
ciful and gracious Lord.”
It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections
I answer that, Mercy is especially to be attributed to
appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His
God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of pas-
justice, liberality, and mercy; yet under different aspects.
sion. In proof of which it must be considered that a person
The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered,
122
appertains to goodness, as shown above (q. 6, Aa. 1,4); in than justice; thus a man who pays another two hundred
so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the
pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred,
bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already
does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or merci-
said (a. 1); in so far as God does not bestow them for His
fully. The case is the same with one who pardons an of-
own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs
fence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be
to liberality; in so far as perfections given to things by
said to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission
God expel defects, it belongs to mercy.
a forgiving: “Forgive one another, as Christ has forgiven
Reply to Objection 1. This argument is based on
you” (Eph. 4:32). Hence it is clear that mercy does not
mercy, regarded as an affection of passion.
destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And
Reply to Objection 2. God acts mercifully, not indeed
thus it is said: “Mercy exalteth itself above judgement”
by going against His justice, but by doing something more
(James 2:13).
Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?
Ia q. 21 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that not in every work of God
if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of
are mercy and justice. For some works of God are at-
something that precedes. And since we cannot go on to
tributed to mercy, as the justification of the ungodly; and
infinity, we must come to something that depends only
others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence
on the goodness of the divine will—which is the ultimate
it is said: “Judgment without mercy to him that hath not
end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is
done mercy” (James 2:13). Therefore not in every work
due to man on account of his rational soul; and his rational
of God do mercy and justice appear.
soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle attributes the con-
is on account of the divine goodness. So in every work of
version of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the
God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In
Gentiles to mercy (Rom. 15). Therefore not in every work
all that follows, the power of mercy remains, and works
of God are justice and mercy.
indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first
Objection 3. Further, many just persons are afflicted
cause is more intense than that of second causes. For this
in this world; which is unjust. Therefore not in every work
reason does God out of abundance of His goodness be-
of God are justice and mercy.
stow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully
Objection 4. Further, it is the part of justice to pay
than is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suf-
what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both
fice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine
justice and mercy presuppose something in their works:
goodness confers; because between creatures and God’s
whereas creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in cre-
goodness there can be no proportion.
ation neither mercy nor justice is found.
Reply to Objection 1. Certain works are attributed
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 24:10): “All the ways
to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some
of the Lord are mercy and truth.”
justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy. Even
I answer that, Mercy and truth are necessarily found
in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which,
in all God’s works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal
though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates,
of any kind of defect. Not every defect, however, can
in punishing short of what is deserved.
properly be called a misery; but only defect in a ratio-
In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when
nal nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is opposed
God remits sins on account of love, though He Himself
to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because
has mercifully infused that love. So we read of Mag-
since a debt paid according to the divine justice is one due
dalen: “Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath
either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the
loved much” (Lk. 7:47).
other can be lacking in any work of God: because God
Reply to Objection 2. God’s justice and mercy appear
can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and
both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But
goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have said, that
an aspect of justice appears in the conversion of the Jews
anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by
which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inas-
Him in created things, is done according to proper order
much as the Jews were saved on account of the promises
and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus
made to the fathers.
justice must exist in all God’s works. Now the work of di-
Reply to Objection 3. Justice and mercy appear in
vine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is
the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflic-
founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except
tions lesser faults are cleansed in them, and they are the
for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again,
more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this
123
Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): “The evils that press on us justice is preserved in creation; by the production of be-in this world force us to go to God.”
ings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and
Reply to Objection 4. Although creation presupposes
goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the
nothing in the universe; yet it does presuppose something
change of creatures from non-existence to existence.
in the knowledge of God. In this way too the idea of
124
FIRST PART, QUESTION 22
The Providence of God
(In Four Articles)
Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things; predestination and reprobation and all that is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong. Concerning God’s providence there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?
(2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?
(3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things?
(4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen?
Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?
Ia q. 22 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that providence is not becoming
past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from
to God. For providence, according to Tully (De Invent.
the remembrance of what is past and the understanding of
ii), is a part of prudence. But prudence, since, accord-
what is present, we gather how to provide for the future.
ing to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18), it gives good
Now it belongs to prudence, according to the Philoso-
counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never has any doubt
pher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end
for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence
whether in regard to oneself—as for instance, a man is
cannot belong to God.
said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the
Objection 2. Further, whatever is in God, is eter-
end of life–or in regard to others subject to him, in a fam-
nal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is con-
ily, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said (Mat. 24:45),
cerned with existing things that are not eternal, according
“a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed
to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore there is
over his family.” In this way prudence or providence may
no providence in God.
suitably be attributed to God. For in God Himself there
Objection 3. Further, there is nothing composite in
can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last
God. But providence seems to be something composite,
end. This type of order in things towards an end is there-
because it includes both the intellect and the will. There-
fore in God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De
fore providence is not in God.
Consol. iv, 6) that “Providence is the divine type itself,
On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 14:3): “But Thou,
seated in the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things”:
Father, governest all things by providence∗.”
which disposition may refer either to the type of the order
I answer that, It is necessary to attribute providence
of things towards an end, or to the type of the order of
to God. For all the good that is in created things has been
parts in the whole.
created by God, as was shown above (q. 6, a. 4). In cre-
Reply to Objection 1.
According to the Philoso-
ated things good is found not only as regards their sub-
pher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), “Prudence is what, strictly speak-
stance, but also as regards their order towards an end and
ing, commands all that ‘ebulia’ has rightly counselled and
especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the
‘synesis’ rightly judged”†. Whence, though to take coun-
divine goodness (q. 21, a. 4). This good of order existing
sel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is
in things created, is itself created by God. Since, how-
an inquiry into matters that are doubtful, nevertheless to
ever, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus
give a command as to the ordering of things towards an
it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist
end, the right reason of which He possesses, does belong
in Him, as is clear from what has gone before (q. 19, a. 4),
to God, according to Ps. 148:6: “He hath made a decree,
it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards
and it shall not pass away.” In this manner both prudence
their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type
and providence belong to God. Although at the same time
of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking,
it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is
providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which
called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry neces-
two other parts are directed—namely, remembrance of the
sitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which
∗ Vulg. But ‘Thy providence, O Father, governeth it.’
† Cf. Ia IIae,
q. 57, a. 6
125
those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is tellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. No-said: “Who worketh all things according to the counsel of
body gives a precept about things done for an end; un-
His will” (Eph. 1:11).
less he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the
Reply to Objection 2. Two things pertain to the care
moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty
of providence—namely, the “reason of order,” which is
is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even
called providence and disposition; and the execution of
if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect
order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is
equally, this would not affect the divine simplicity, since
eternal, and the second is temporal.
in God both the will and intellect are one and the same
Reply to Objection 3. Providence resides in the in-
thing, as we have said above (q. 19).
Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?
Ia q. 22 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that everything is not subject
ing (Job 22:14): “The clouds are His covert; and He doth
to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by
not consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of
chance. If then everything was foreseen by God, nothing
heaven.” Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the
would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would
generality of things corruptible, on account of the excel-
disappear; which is against common opinion.
lence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference
Objection 2. Further, a wise provider excludes any
to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion
defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he
of the others.
has a care. But we see many evils existing. Either, then,
We must say, however, that all things are subject to di-
God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or
vine providence, not only in general, but even in their own
else He does not have care for everything.
individual selves. This is mad evident thus. For since ev-
Objection 3. Further, whatever happens of necessity
ery agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards
does not require providence or prudence. Hence, accord-
that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent
ing to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9, 10,11): “Prudence
extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent
is the right reason of things contingent concerning which
something takes place which has no reference towards the
there is counsel and choice.” Since, then, many things
end, because the effect comes from a cause other than,
happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to
and outside the intention of the agent. But the causality of
providence.
God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only
Objection 4. Further, whatsoever is left to itself can-
as to constituent principles of species, but also as to the in-
not be subject to the providence of a governor. But men
dividualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible,
are left to themselves by God in accordance with the
but also of things corruptible. Hence all things that exist
words: “God made man from the beginning, and left him
in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God to-
in the hand of his own counsel” (Ecclus. 15:14). And par-
wards some end; as the Apostle says: “Those things that
ticularly in reference to the wicked: “I let them go accord-
are of God are well ordered†” (Rom. 13:1). Since, there-
ing to the desires of their heart” (Ps. 80:13). Everything,
fore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type
therefore, cannot be subject to divine providence.
of the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it
Objection 5. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9):
necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they par-
“God doth not care for oxen∗”: and we may say the same
ticipate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine
of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be
providence. It has also been shown (q. 14, Aa. 6,11) that
under the care of divine providence.
God knows all things, both universal and particular. And
On the contrary, It is said of Divine Wisdom: “She
since His knowledge may be compared to the things them-
reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things
selves, as the knowledge of art to the objects of art, all
sweetly” (Wis. 8:1).
things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all
I answer that, Certain persons totally denied the ex-
things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that
istence of providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans,
art.
maintaining that the world was made by chance. Oth-
Reply to Objection 1. There is a difference between
ers taught that incorruptible things only were subject to
universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the
providence and corruptible things not in their individual
order of a particular cause; but not the order of a univer-
selves, but only according to their species; for in this re-
sal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular
spect they are incorruptible. They are represented as say-
cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of
∗ Vulg. ‘Doth God take care for oxen?’
† Vulg.‘Those powers that
are, are ordained of God’: ‘Quae autem sunt, a Deo ordinatae sunt.’ St.
Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: ‘Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.’
126
some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but di-be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since
vine providence extends thus far, since God is the author
then, all particular causes are included under the univer-
of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved
sal cause, it could not be that any effect should take place
those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of
outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an
divine providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of
effect escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said to
matter, as Democritus, and others of the ancients.
be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we
Reply to Objection 4. When it is said that God left
regard the universal cause, outside whose range no effect
man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt
can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance,
from divine providence; but merely that he has not a pre-
the meeting of two servants, although to them it appears
fixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as
a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their
in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as
master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one place,
though directed by another towards an end; and do not act
in such a way that the one knows not about the other.
of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an
Reply to Objection 2. It is otherwise with one who
end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free
has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence
will, by which these are able to take counsel and make
is universal, because a particular provider excludes all de-
a choice. Hence it is significantly said: “In the hand of
fects from what is subject to his care as far as he can;
his own counsel.” But since the very act of free will is
whereas, one who provides universally allows some lit-
traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that ev-
tle defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be
erything happening from the exercise of free will must
hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things
be subject to divine providence. For human providence
are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they
is included under the providence of God, as a particular
are in keeping with the plan of universal nature; inasmuch
under a universal cause. God, however, extends His prov-
as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another,
idence over the just in a certain more excellent way than
or even to the universal good: for the corruption of one
over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything hap-
is the generation of another, and through this it is that a
pening which would impede their final salvation. For “to
species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides
them that love God, all things work together unto good”
universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to
(Rom. 8:28). But from the fact that He does not restrain
permit certain defects in particular effects, that the per-
the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon
fect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all
them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence
evil were prevented, much good would be absent from
from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they
the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were
were not preserved in existence by His providence. This
no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of
was the reason that had weight with Tully, who withdrew
martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Au-
from the care of divine providence human affairs concern-
gustine says (Enchiridion 2): “Almighty God would in no
ing which we take counsel.
wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so
Reply to Objection 5. Since a rational creature has,
almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil.”
through its free will, control over its actions, as was said
It would appear that it was on account of these two ar-
above (q. 19, a. 10), it is subject to divine providence in
guments to which we have just replied, that some were
an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a
persuaded to consider corruptible things—e.g. casual and
fault, or as a merit; and there is given it accordingly some-
evil things—as removed from the care of divine provi-
thing by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the
dence.
Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, how-
Reply to Objection 3. Man is not the author of na-
ever, that individual irrational creatures escape the care of
ture; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue
divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.
to his own use. Hence human providence does not reach
Whether God has immediate providence over everything?
Ia q. 22 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that God has not immediate
providence over all things.
providence over all things. For whatever is contained in
Objection 2. Further, it belongs to providence to or-
the notion of dignity, must be attributed to God. But it
der all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its
belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have min-
perfection and its good. But it appertains to every cause to
isters; through whose mediation he provides for his sub-
direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a
jects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate
cause of the effect of providence. If therefore God were to
127
have immediate providence over all things, all secondary idence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity,
causes would be withdrawn.
Who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things,
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion
and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species,
17) that, “It is better to be ignorant of some things than
and universal causes. The second providence, which is
to know them, for example, vile things”: and the Philoso-
over the individuals of all that can be generated and cor-
pher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But whatever is
rupted, he attributed to the divinities who circulate in the
better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not im-
heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move
mediate providence over bad and vile things.
corporeal things in a circular direction. The third provi-
On the contrary, It is said (Job 34:13): “What other
dence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom
hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set
the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the gods,
over the world which He made?” On which passage Gre-
as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14).
gory says (Moral. xxiv, 20): “Himself He ruleth the world
Reply to Objection 1. It pertains to a king’s dignity to which He Himself hath made.”
have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact
I answer that, Two things belong to providence—
that he has not the plan of those things which are done by
namely, the type of the order of things foreordained to-
them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every oper-
wards an end; and the execution of this order, which is
ative science is the more perfect, the more it considers the
called government. As regards the first of these, God has
particular things with which its action is concerned.
immediate providence over everything, because He has in
Reply to Objection 2. God’s immediate provision
His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest;
over everything does not exclude the action of secondary
and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He
causes; which are the executors of His order, as was said
gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence
above (q. 19, Aa. 5,8).
it must be that He has beforehand the type of those ef-
Reply to Objection 3. It is better for us not to know
fects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain in-
low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in
termediaries of God’s providence; for He governs things
our knowledge of what is better and higher; for we can-
inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His
not understand many things simultaneously; because the
power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so
thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil.
that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures.
This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simul-
Thus Plato’s opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De
taneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the
Provid. viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a threefold prov-
direction of evil.
Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?
Ia q. 22 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that divine providence imposes
providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon
necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has
things so as to destroy their contingency.
a “per se” cause, either present or past, which it necessar-
I answer that, Divine providence imposes necessity
ily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher
upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly be-
proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the providence of God, since
lieved. For to providence it belongs to order things to-
it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of ne-
wards an end.
Now after the divine goodness, which
cessity, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. There-
is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in
fore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things
things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which
foreseen.
would not be, were not all grades of being found in things.
Objection 2. Further, every provider makes his work
Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every
as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most
grade of being. And thus it has prepared for some things
powerful. Therefore He assigns the stability of necessity
necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for
to things provided.
others contingent causes, that they may happen by contin-
Objection 3. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv,
gency, according to the nature of their proximate causes.
6): “Fate from the immutable source of providence binds
Reply to Objection 1. The effect of divine providence
together human acts and fortunes by the indissoluble con-
is not only that things should happen somehow; but that
nection of causes.” It seems therefore that providence im-
they should happen either by necessity or by contingency.
poses necessity upon things foreseen.
Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to hap-
On the contrary, Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv,
pen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of
23) “to corrupt nature is not the work of providence.” But
necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the
it is in the nature of some things to be contingent. Divine
plan of divine providence conceives to happen from con-
128
tingency.
fect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain
Reply to Objection 2. The order of divine providence
to the necessity of the effects. We must remember that
is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen
properly speaking ‘necessary’ and “contingent” are con-
happen as they have been foreseen, whether from neces-
sequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of
sity or from contingency.
necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of
Reply to Objection 3. That indissolubility and un-
God, who provides universally for all being; not under the
changeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the
foresight of causes that provide only for some particular
certainty of providence, which fails not to produce its ef-
order of things.
129
FIRST PART, QUESTION 23
Of Predestination
(In Eight Articles)
After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?
(2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined?
(3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?
(4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen?
(5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election?
(6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved?
(7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?
(8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?
Whether men are predestined by God?
Ia q. 23 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that men are not predestined
Aa. 1,2). The end towards which created things are di-
by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): “It
rected by God is twofold; one which exceeds all propor-
must be borne in mind that God foreknows but does not
tion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eter-
predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in
nal, that consists in seeing God which is above the nature
us, but does not predetermine it all.” But human merit and
of every creature, as shown above (q. 12, a. 4). The other
demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our
end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which
own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit
end created being can attain according to the power of its
or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man’s pre-
nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the
destination is done away.
power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another;
Objection 2. Further, all creatures are directed to
thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark.
their end by divine providence, as was said above (q. 22,
Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of
Aa. 1,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined
eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God.
by God. Therefore neither are men.
The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him
Objection 3. Further, the angels are capable of beat-
is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which
itude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable
we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the
to angels, since in them there never was any unhappi-
mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre-
ness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De
existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type
praedest. sanct. 17), is the “purpose to take pity [mis-
of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the
erendi]”∗. Therefore men are not predestined.
end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine,
Objection 4. Further, the benefits God confers upon
is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as
men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men accord-
regards its objects, is a part of providence.
ing to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 2:12): “Now we
Reply to Objection 1. Damascene calls predestina-
have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit
tion an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natu-
that is of God: that we may know the things that are given
ral things which are predetermined towards one end. This
us from God.” Therefore if man were predestined by God,
is clear from his adding: “He does not will malice, nor
since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestina-
does He compel virtue.” Whence predestination is not ex-
tion would be made known to each predestined; which is
cluded by Him.
clearly false.
Reply to Objection 2. Irrational creatures are not ca-
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 8:30): “Whom
pable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human na-
He predestined, them He also called.”
ture. Whence they cannot be properly said to be predes-
I answer that, It is fitting that God should predestine
tined; although improperly the term is used in respect of
men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was
any other end.
shown above (q. 22, a. 2). Now it belongs to providence
Reply to Objection 3. Predestination applies to an-
to direct things towards their end, as was also said (q. 22,
gels, just as it does to men, although they have never been
∗ See q. 22, a. 3
130
unhappy. For movement does not take its species from the which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown previously
term “wherefrom” but from the term “whereto.” Because
(q. 21, Aa. 3,4).
it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of making
Reply to Objection 4. Even if by a special privilege
white, whether he who is made white was before black,
their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fit-
yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of
ting that it should be revealed to everyone; because, if so,
the notion of predestination whether one is predestined
those who were not predestined would despair; and secu-
to life eternal from the state of misery or not. Although
rity would beget negligence in the predestined.
it may be said that every conferring of good above that
Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?
Ia q. 23 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that predestination does place
in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God.
something in the predestined. For every action of itself
The execution of predestination is the calling and magni-
causes passion. If therefore predestination is action in
fication; according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:30): “Whom
God, predestination must be passion in the predestined.
He predestined, them He also called and whom He called,
Objection 2. Further, Origen says on the text, “He
them He also magnified [Vulg. ‘justified’].”
who was predestined,” etc. (Rom. 1:4): “Predestination is
Reply to Objection 1. Actions passing out to external
of one who is not; destination, of one who is.” And Au-
matter imply of themselves passion—for example, the ac-
gustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): “What is predestination
tions of warming and cutting; but not so actions remaining
but the destination of one who is?” Therefore predestina-
in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above
tion is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places
(q. 14, a. 2; q. 18, a. 3, ad 1). Predestination is an action
something in the predestined.
of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything
Objection 3. Further, preparation is something in the
in the predestined. But its execution, which passes out to
thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of
external things, has an effect in them.
God’s benefits, as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii,
Reply to Objection 2. Destination sometimes denotes
14). Therefore predestination is something in the predes-
a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination
tined.
can only be said of someone actually existing. It is taken,
Objection 4. Further, nothing temporal enters into the
however, in another sense for a mission which a person
definition of eternity. But grace, which is something tem-
conceives in the mind; and in this manner we are said to
poral, is found in the definition of predestination. For pre-
destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In
destination is the preparation of grace in the present; and
this latter way it is said that Eleazar “determined not to do
of glory in the future. Therefore predestination is not any-
any unlawful things for the love of life” (2 Macc. 6:20).
thing eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predes-
Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist.
tined, and not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal.
Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent na-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.
ture it implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not
ii, 14) that “predestination is the foreknowledge of God’s
actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted.
benefits.” But foreknowledge is not in the things fore-
Reply to Objection 3. Preparation is twofold: of the
known, but in the person who foreknows them. There-
patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing pre-
fore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not
pared; and of the agent to action, and this is in the agent.
in the predestined.
Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by
I answer that, Predestination is not anything in the
intellect is said to prepare itself to act, accordingly as it
predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We
preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God
have said above that predestination is a part of providence.
from all eternity prepared by predestination, conceiving
Now providence is not anything in the things provided for;
the idea of the order of some towards salvation.
but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved
Reply to Objection 4. Grace does not come into the
above (q. 22, a. 1). But the execution of providence which
definition of predestination, as something belonging to its
is called government, is in a passive way in the thing gov-
essence, but inasmuch as predestination implies a relation
erned, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it
to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object.
is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the order-
Whence it does not follow that predestination is anything
ing of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in
temporal.
the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is
131
Whether God reprobates any man?
Ia q. 23 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that God reprobates no man.
but also something more, as does providence, as was said
For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves ev-
above (q. 22, a. 1). Therefore, as predestination includes
ery man, according to (Wis. 11:25): “Thou lovest all
the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation in-
things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou
cludes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to
hast made.” Therefore God reprobates no man.
impose the punishment of damnation on account of that
Objection 2. Further, if God reprobates any man, it
sin.
would be necessary for reprobation to have the same re-
Reply to Objection 1. God loves all men and all crea-
lation to the reprobates as predestination has to the pre-
tures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He
destined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation
does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore,
of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will likewise be
as He does not wish this particular good—namely, eternal
the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For
life—He is said to hate or reprobated them.
it is said (Osee 13:9): “Destruction is thy own, O Israel;
Reply to Objection 2.
Reprobation differs in its
Thy help is only in Me.” God does not, then, reprobate
causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both
any man.
of what is expected in the future life by the predestined—
Objection 3. Further, to no one ought anything be im-
namely, glory—and of what is received in this life—
puted which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates any-
namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of
one, that one must perish. For it is said (Eccles. 7:14):
what is in the present—namely, sin; but it is the cause
“Consider the works of God, that no man can correct
of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of
whom He hath despised.” Therefore it could not be im-
what is assigned in the future—namely, eternal punish-
puted to any man, were he to perish. But this is false.
ment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person
Therefore God does not reprobate anyone.
who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the
On the contrary, It is said (Malachi 1:2,3): “I have
word of the prophet is true—namely, “Destruction is thy
loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.”
own, O Israel.”
I answer that, God does reprobate some. For it was
Reply to Objection 3. Reprobation by God does not
said above (a. 1) that predestination is a part of provi-
take anything away from the power of the person repro-
dence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit cer-
bated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot
tain defects in those things which are subject to provi-
obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying ab-
dence, as was said above (q. 22, a. 2). Thus, as men are
solute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility:
ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it
as was said above (q. 19, a. 3), that the predestined must
likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall
necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which
away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as
does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, al-
predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those
though anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace,
ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of
nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin
providence in regard to those who turn aside from that
comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly
end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge,
imputed to him as guilt.
Whether the predestined are chosen by God? ∗
Ia q. 23 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that the predestined are not cho-
Objection 3. Further, election implies some discrim-
sen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as
ination. Now God “wills all men to be saved” (1 Tim.
the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all without selec-
2:4). Therefore, predestination which ordains men to-
tion, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God
wards eternal salvation, is without election.
is communicated to some in an especial manner through
On the contrary, It is said (Eph. 1:4): “He chose us
a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without
in Him before the foundation of the world.”
any selection communicates His grace and glory; and this
I answer that, Predestination presupposes election in
belongs to predestination.
the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The
Objection 2. Further, election is of things that ex-
reason of this is that predestination, as stated above (a. 1),
ist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things
is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence,
which do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined with-
is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of out election.
some things towards an end; as was proved above (q. 22,
∗ “Eligantur.”
132
a. 2). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the divine goodness in general be considered, God communi-will for that end already exists. Whence the predestina-
cates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is
tion of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order
nothing which does not in some way share in His good-
of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong
ness, as we said above (q. 6, a. 4). But if we consider the
both election and love:—love, inasmuch as He wills them
communication of this or that particular good, He does
this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is
not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods
to wish well to anyone, as stated above (q. 20, Aa. 2,3):—
to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in
election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in prefer-
the conferring of grace and glory election is implied.
ence to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above
Reply to Objection 2. When the will of the person
(a. 3). Election and love, however, are differently ordered
choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already
in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in lov-
pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice must needs
ing does not cause good, but we are incited to love by
be of those things which already exist, as happens in our
the good which already exists; and therefore we choose
choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (q. 20,
someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In
a. 2). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11):
God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in
“Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does
loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that
not err in His choice.”
good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it
Reply to Objection 3. God wills all men to be saved
is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason,
by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but rel-
and election precedes predestination. Whence all the pre-
atively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will
destinate are objects of election and love.
simply.
Reply to Objection 1. If the communication of the
Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?
Ia q. 23 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that foreknowledge of merits is
was said above (a. 4), the reason of predestination must be
the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says (Rom.
sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will
8:29): “Whom He foreknew, He also predestined.” Again
of God. Now it was shown above (q. 19, a. 5 ), that we
a gloss of Ambrose on Rom. 9:15: “I will have mercy
cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of
upon whom I will have mercy” says: “I will give mercy
the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part
to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole
of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on
heart.” Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits
account of something else. Wherefore nobody has been
is the cause of predestination.
so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine pre-
Objection 2. Further, Divine predestination includes
destination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this
the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since
is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predesti-
predestination is “the purpose to have mercy,” as Augus-
nation has any cause; or what comes to the same thing,
tine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no
whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect
other reason for predestination than the foreknowledge of
of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.
merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of pre-
Accordingly there were some who held that the effect
destination.
of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account
Objection 3. Further, “There is no injustice in God”
of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opin-
(Rom. 9:14). Now it would seem unjust that unequal
ion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were
things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards
created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of
both nature and original sin; and inequality in them arises
their works different states were assigned to them in this
from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore
world when united with the body. The Apostle, however,
God does not prepare unequal things for men by predesti-
rebuts this opinion where he says (Rom. 9:11,12): “For
nating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge
when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or
of their merits and demerits.
evil. . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:5): “Not
her: The elder shall serve the younger.”
by works of justice which we have done, but according to
Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the
His mercy He saved us.” But as He saved us, so He pre-
reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the
destined that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowl-
Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came
edge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination.
from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came
I answer that, Since predestination includes will, as
about that the effect of predestination was granted to one,
133
and not to another, because the one made a beginning by manner of a final cause; as was explained above.
preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we
Reply to Objection 2. Predestination has its founda-
have the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 3:5), that “we
tion in the goodness of God as regards its effects in gen-
are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of our-
eral. Considered in its particular effects, however, one
selves.” Now no principle of action can be imagined pre-
effect is the reason of another; as already stated.
vious to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said
Reply to Objection 3. The reason for the predestina-
that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect
tion of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought
of predestination.
for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made
And so others said that merits following the effect of
all things through His goodness, so that the divine good-
predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us
ness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary
to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre-
that God’s goodness, which in itself is one and undivided,
ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand
should be manifested in many ways in His creation; be-
that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were
cause creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplic-
to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make
ity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the uni-
good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinc-
verse there are required different grades of being; some
tion between that which flows from grace, and that which
of which hold a high and some a low place in the uni-
flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come
verse. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved
from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is
in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things
the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered
should never happen, as was said above (q. 22, a. 2).
as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the
Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we
notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us
consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His
be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect
goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predes-
of predestination. Now there is no distinction between
tines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in
what flows from free will, and what is of predestination;
respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His
as there is not distinction between what flows from a sec-
justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God
ondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of
elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers,
God produces effects through the operation of secondary
saying (Rom. 9:22,23): “What if God, willing to show
causes, as was above shown (q. 22, a. 3). Wherefore, that
His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to
which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We
make His power known, endured [that is, permitted] with
must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may
much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that
be considered in a twofold light—in one way, in particu-
He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of
lar; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predes-
mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory” and (2 Tim.
tination should not be the reason or cause of another; a
2:20): “But in a great house there are not only vessels of
subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as
gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some,
its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of
indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor.” Yet why
the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced
He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no
to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that
reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says
God pre-ordained to give glory on account of merit, and
(Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): “Why He draws one, and another
that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In an-
He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to
other way, the effect of predestination may be considered
err.” Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be
in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the ef-
assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why
fect of predestination in general should have any cause as
one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning
coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing
under the form of fire, another under the form of earth,
him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of
that there might be a diversity of species in things of na-
predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither
ture. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this
does this happen otherwise than by divine help, accord-
particular form, and that under another, depends upon the
ing to the prophet Jeremias (Lam. 5:21): “convert us, O
simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer
Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.” Yet predesti-
it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that
nation has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness
in another; although the plan requires that some stones
of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of
should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on
predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it
this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He
proceeds, as from its first moving principle.
prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would
Reply to Objection 1. The use of grace foreknown by
be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect
God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the
of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratu-
134
itously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person justice. This is what the master of the house said: “Take
can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he de-
what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do
prives nobody of his due), without any infringement of
what I will?” (Mat. 20:14,15).
Whether predestination is certain?
Ia q. 23 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that predestination is not cer-
q. 19, a. 4) must also be taken into consideration; since
tain. Because on the words “Hold fast that which thou
they do not destroy contingency in things, although they
hast, that no one take thy crown,” (Rev 3:11), Augustine
themselves are most certain and infallible.
says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): “Another will not receive,
Reply to Objection 1. The crown may be said to be-
unless this one were to lose it.” Hence the crown which is
long to a person in two ways; first, by God’s predestina-
the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost.
tion, and thus no one loses his crown: secondly, by the
Therefore predestination cannot be certain.
merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours;
Objection 2. Further, granted what is possible, noth-
and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. An-
ing impossible follows.
But it is possible that one
other person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he
predestined—e.g. Peter—may sin and then be killed. But
takes the former’s place. For God does not permit some to
if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predes-
fall, without raising others; according to Job 34:24: “He
tination would be thwarted. This then, is not impossible.
shall break in pieces many and innumerable, and make
Therefore predestination is not certain.
others to stand in their stead.” Thus men are substituted
Objection 3. Further, whatever God could do in the
in the place of the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that
past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined
of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state
whom He hath predestined. Therefore now He is able not
of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen in that in
to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain.
eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done,
On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 8:29: “Whom He
in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by
foreknew, He also predestinated”, says: “Predestination
himself or by others.
is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of
Reply to Objection 2. Although it is possible for one
God, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be
who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mor-
freed.”
tal sin; yet it is not possible, supposed, as in fact it is sup-I answer that, Predestination most certainly and infal-
posed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow
libly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so
that predestination can fall short of its effect.
that, namely, its effect should take place from necessity.
Reply to Objection 3. Since predestination includes
For it was said above (a. 1), that predestination is a part
the divine will as stated above (a. 4): and the fact that
of providence. But not all things subject to providence
God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposi-
are necessary; some things happening from contingency,
tion that He so wills, on account of the immutability of the
according to the nature of the proximate causes, which di-
divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same
vine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the or-
must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not
der of providence is infallible, as was shown above (q. 22,
to say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He
a. 4). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet
has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, thought,
free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predes-
absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in
tination has its contingency. Moreover all that has been
this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed.
said about the divine knowledge and will (q. 14, a. 13;
Whether the number of the predestined is certain?
Ia q. 23 a. 7
Objection 1. It seems that the number of the predes-
Objection 2. Further, no reason can be assigned why
tined is not certain. For a number to which an addition
God pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more
can be made is not certain. But there can be an addition
than another. But nothing is arranged by God without a
to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is writ-
reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained
ten (Dt. 1:11): “The Lord God adds to this number many
by God cannot be certain.
thousands,” and a gloss adds, “fixed by God, who knows
Objection 3. Further, the operations of God are more
those who belong to Him.” Therefore the number of the
perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature,
predestined is not certain.
good is found in the majority of things; defect and evil in
135
the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed much as the good of the species is preserved through
by God at a certain figure, there would be more saved than
them. Whence, although God knows the total number of
lost. Yet the contrary follows from Mat. 7:13,14: “For
individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such like, is not
wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruc-
pre-ordained by God “per se”; but divine providence pro-
tion, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow
duces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation
is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and
of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature
few there are who find it!” Therefore the number of those
is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as
pre-ordained by God to be saved is not certain.
such incorruptible; more especially those who attain to
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat.
eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the
13): “The number of the predestined is certain, and can
ultimate end. Whence the number of the predestined is
neither be increased nor diminished.”
certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also by
I answer that, The number of the predestined is cer-
way of a principal pre-ordination.
tain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materi-
It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the num-
ally certain; as if we were to say that it was certain that a
ber of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained
hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these
by God for the good of the elect, in whose regard “all
or those individuals. But this destroys the certainty of pre-
things work together unto good” (Rom. 8:28). Concern-
destination; of which we spoke above (a. 6). Therefore
ing the number of all the predestined, some say that so
we must say that to God the number of the predestined
many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as
is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It must,
there were angels left; others, as many as the number of
however, be observed that the number of the predestined
angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that,
is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowl-
“to God alone is known the number for whom is reserved
edge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will
eternal happiness∗”
be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and
Reply to Objection 1. These words of Deuteronomy
the sands of the sea are certain to God); but by reason of
must be taken as applied to those who are marked out
His deliberate choice and determination. For the further
by God beforehand in respect to present righteousness.
evidence of which we must remember that every agent
For their number is increased and diminished, but not the
intends to make something finite, as is clear from what
number of the predestined.
has been said above when we treated of the infinite (q. 7,
Reply to Objection 2. The reason of the quantity of
Aa. 2,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure
any one part must be judged from the proportion of that
in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essen-
part of the whole. Thus in God the reason why He has
tial parts, which are by their very nature required for the
made so many stars, or so many species of things, or pre-
perfection of the whole. For of those things which are re-
destined so many, is according to the proportion of the
quired not principally, but only on account of something
principal parts to the good of the whole universe.
else, he does not select any definite number “per se”; but
Reply to Objection 3. The good that is proportionate
he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are neces-
to the common state of nature is to be found in the major-
sary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder
ity; and is wanting in the minority. The good that exceeds
thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also
the common state of nature is to be found in the minority,
the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make
and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the
in the house; and definite measurements of the walls and
majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guid-
roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of
ance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are
stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are sufficient
said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a
for the required measurements of the wall. So also must
profound knowledge of things intelligible are a very small
we consider concerning God in regard to the whole uni-
minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happi-
verse, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the mea-
ness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds the common
surements of the whole of the universe, and what number
state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived
would befit the essential parts of that universe—that is to
of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who
say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity;
are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however,
how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements,
appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for
and how many species. Individuals, however, which un-
that salvation, from which very many in accordance with
dergo corruption, are not ordained as it were chiefly for
the common course and tendency of nature fall short.
the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inas-
∗ From the ‘secret’ prayer of the missal, ‘pro vivis et defunctis.’
136
Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?
Ia q. 23 a. 8
Objection 1. It seems that predestination cannot be
nation two things are to be considered—namely, the di-
furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eter-
vine ordination; and its effect. As regards the former, in
nal can be preceded by anything temporal; and in conse-
no possible way can predestination be furthered by the
quence nothing temporal can help towards making some-
prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that
thing else eternal. But predestination is eternal. There-
anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, pre-
fore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they
destination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints,
cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined.
and by other good works; because providence, of which
Predestination therefore is not furthered by the prayers of
predestination is a part, does not do away with secondary
the saints.
causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary
Objection 2. Further, as there is no need of advice
causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects
except on account of defective knowledge, so there is not
are provided by God in such a way that natural causes
need of help except through defective power. But nei-
are directed to bring about those natural effects, without
ther of these things can be said of God when He predes-
which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of
tines. Whence it is said: “Who hath helped the Spirit of
a person is predestined by God in such a way, that what-
the Lord?∗ Or who hath been His counsellor?” (Rom.
ever helps that person towards salvation falls under the
11:34). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by
order of predestination; whether it be one’s own prayers
the prayers of the saints.
or those of another; or other good works, and such like,
Objection 3. Further, if a thing can be helped, it can
without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence,
also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered
the predestined must strive after good works and prayer;
by anything. Therefore it cannot be furthered by anything.
because through these means predestination is most cer-
On the contrary, It is said that “Isaac besought the
tainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said: “Labor more
Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard
that by good works you may make sure your calling and
him and made Rebecca to conceive” (Gn. 25:21). But
election” (2 Pet. 1:10).
from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predes-
Reply to Objection 1. This argument shows that pre-
tined. Now his predestination would not have happened if
destination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as
he had never been born. Therefore predestination can be
regards the preordination.
furthered by the prayers of the saints.
Reply to Objection 2. One is said to be helped by
I answer that, Concerning this question, there were
another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives
different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine
power from him: and to be helped thus belongs to the
predestination, said that prayers were superfluous, as also
weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to
anything else done to attain salvation; because whether
understand, “Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?” In
these things were done or not, the predestined would at-
another way one is said to be helped by a person through
tain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salva-
whom he carries out his work, as a master through a ser-
tion. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy
vant. In this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we
Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.
execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: “We are
Others declared that the divine predestination was al-
God’s co-adjutors.” Nor is this on account of any defect
tered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion
in the power of God, but because He employs intermedi-
of the Egyptians, who thought that the divine ordination,
ary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be pre-
which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sac-
served in the universe; and also that He may communicate
rifices and prayers. Against this also is the authority of
to creatures the dignity of causality.
Scripture. For it is said: “But the triumpher in Israel will
Reply to Objection 3. Secondary causes cannot es-
not spare and will not be moved to repentance” (1 Kings
cape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said
15:29); and that “the gifts and the calling of God are with-
above (q. 19, a. 6), indeed, they execute that order. And
out repentance” (Rom. 11:29).
therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but
Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predesti-
it cannot be impeded by them.
∗ Vulg.: ‘Who hath known the mind of the Lord?’
137
FIRST PART, QUESTION 24
The Book of Life
(In Three Articles)
We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry: (1) What is the book of life?
(2) Of what life is it the book?
(3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?
Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?
Ia q. 24 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that the book of life is not the
My commandments,” and further on, “Write them in the
same thing as pre-destination. For it is said, “All things
tables of thy heart.” For things are written down in mate-
are the book of life” (Ecclus. 4:32)—i.e. the Old and
rial books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of
New Testament according to a gloss. This, however, is
God, by which He firmly remembers that He has predes-
not predestination. Therefore the book of life is not pre-
tined some to eternal life, is called the book of life. For as
destination.
the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
the knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to
xx, 14) that “the book of life is a certain divine energy, by
be brought to eternal life, according to 2 Tim. 11:19: “The
which it happens that to each one his good or evil works
sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the
are recalled to memory.” But divine energy belongs seem-
Lord knoweth who are His.”
ingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine power.
Reply to Objection 1. The book of life may be un-
Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predes-
derstood in two senses. In one sense as the inscription
tination.
of those who are chosen to life; thus we now speak of
Objection 3. Further, reprobation is opposed to pre-
the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those
destination. So, if the book of life were the same as pre-
things which lead us to life may be called the book of life;
destination, there should also be a book of death, as there
and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done;
is a book of life.
and thus the Old and New Testament are called a book of
On the contrary, It is said in a gloss upon Ps. 68:29,
life; or of things already done, and thus that divine en-
“Let them be blotted out of the book of the living. This
ergy by which it happens that to each one his deeds will
book is the knowledge of God, by which He hath predes-
be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life.
tined to life those whom He foreknew.”
Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether it
I answer that, The book of life is in God taken in a
contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military
metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with hu-
service; or treats of the art of warfare, or relates the deeds
man affairs. For it is usual among men that they who are
of soldiers.
chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as,
Hence the solution of the Second Objection.
for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly were
Reply to Objection 3. It is the custom to inscribe, not
called “conscript” fathers. Now it is clear from the pre-
those who are rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence
ceding (q. 23, a. 4) that all the predestined are chosen by
there is no book of death corresponding to reprobation; as
God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore,
the book of life to predestination.
of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is
Reply to Objection 4. Predestination and the book of
said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of any-
life are different aspects of the same thing. For this latter
one when it is firmly held in the memory, according to
implies the knowledge of predestination; as also is made
Prov. 3:3: “Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep
clear from the gloss quoted above.
Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?
Ia q. 24 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that the book of life does not
life is so called in regard to divine life; and not only in
only regard the life of glory of the predestined. For the
regard to the life of the predestined.
book of life is the knowledge of life. But God, through
Objection 2. Further, as the life of glory comes from
His own life, knows all other life. Therefore the book of
God, so also does the life of nature. Therefore, if the
138
knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life; directed. But the life of glory is an end exceeding hu-so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so
man nature, as said above (q. 23, a. 1). Wherefore, strictly
called.
speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory.
Objection 3. Further, some are chosen to the life of
Reply to Objection 1. The divine life, even consid-
grace who are not chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear
ered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His
from what is said: “Have not I chosen you twelve, and
regard there is no election, and in consequence no book of
one of you is a devil?” (Jn. 6:71). But the book of life is
life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the
the inscription of the divine election, as stated above (a. 1
power of sense, or any of those things that are consequent
). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace.
on nature.
On the contrary, The book of life is the knowledge
From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objec-
of predestination, as stated above (a. 1). But predestina-
tion. For there is no election, nor a book of life, as regards
tion does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is
the life of nature.
directed to glory; for those are not predestined who have
Reply to Objection 3. The life of grace has the aspect,
grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life alto-
not of an end, but of something directed towards an end.
gether is only so called in regard to the life of glory.
Hence nobody is said to be chosen to the life of grace, ex-
I answer that, The book of life, as stated above (a. 1), cept so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to
reason those who, possessing grace, fail to obtain glory,
life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not
are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise
belong to him by nature; and again that to which a man
they are not said to be written in the book of life simply,
is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not
but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to fight;
knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to
since this is the proper duty to which military service is
eternal life, according to their participation in grace.
Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?
Ia q. 24 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that no one may be blotted out
ing.” But because not to be blotted out of the book of
of the book of life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx,
life is placed among the rewards of the just, according to
15): “God’s foreknowledge, which cannot be deceived, is
the text, “He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in
the book of life.” But nothing can be taken away from the
white garments, and I will not blot his name out of the
foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination. There-
book of life” (Apoc. 3:5) (and what is promised to holy
fore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of
men, is not merely something in the opinion of men), it
life.
can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blot-
Objection 2. Further, whatever is in a thing is in it
ted out, of the book of life is not only to be referred to the
according to the disposition of that thing. But the book of
opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book
life is something eternal and immutable. Therefore what-
of life is the inscription of those ordained to eternal life, to soever is written therein, is there not in a temporary way,
which one is directed from two sources; namely, from pre-
but immovably, and indelibly.
destination, which direction never fails, and from grace;
Objection 3. Further, blotting out is the contrary to
for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted
inscription. But nobody can be written a second time in
for eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because
the book of life. Neither therefore can he be blotted out.
some are directed by possessing grace, to obtain eternal
On the contrary, It is said, “Let them be blotted out
life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. There-
from the book of the living” (Ps. 68:29).
fore those who are ordained to possess eternal life through
I answer that, Some have said that none could be
divine predestination are written down in the book of life
blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact, but only
simply, because they are written therein to have eternal
in the opinion of men. For it is customary in the Scriptures
life in reality; such are never blotted out from the book of
to say that something is done when it becomes known.
life. Those, however, who are ordained to eternal life, not
Thus some are said to be written in the book of life, inas-
through divine predestination, but through grace, are said
much as men think they are written therein, on account
to be written in the book of life not simply, but relatively,
of the present righteousness they see in them; but when it
for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, becomes evident, either in this world or in the next, that
but in its cause only. Yet though these latter can be said
they have fallen from that state of righteousness, they are
to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must
then said to be blotted out. And thus a gloss explains the
not be referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and
passage: “Let them be blotted out of the book of the liv-
afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely,
139
because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life, this it is that the blotting out of the book of life refers.
and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace.
Reply to Objection 3. The way in which one is said
Reply to Objection 1. The act of blotting out does not
to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one
refer to the book of life as regards God’s foreknowledge,
is said to be written therein anew; either in the opinion of
as if in God there were any change; but as regards things
men, or because he begins again to have relation towards
foreknown, which can change.
eternal life through grace; which also is included in the
Reply to Objection 2. Although things are immutably
knowledge of God, although not anew.
in God, yet in themselves they are subject to change. To
140
FIRST PART, QUESTION 25
The Power of God
(In Six Articles)
After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God. About this are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is power in God?
(2) Whether His power is infinite?
(3) Whether He is almighty?
(4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?
(5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?
(6) Whether what He makes He could make better?
Whether there is power in God?
Ia q. 25 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that power is not in God. For
remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the
as primary matter is to power, so God, who is the first
highest degree.
agent, is to act. But primary matter, considered in itself,
Reply to Objection 1. Active power is not contrary to
is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent—namely,
act, but is founded upon it, for everything acts according
God—is devoid of power.
as it is actual: but passive power is contrary to act; for a
Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher
thing is passive according as it is potential. Whence this
(Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For
potentiality is not in God, but only active power.
form is better than matter; and action than active power,
Reply to Objection 2. Whenever act is distinct from
since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in
power, act must be nobler than power. But God’s ac-
God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as was shown
tion is not distinct from His power, for both are His di-
above (q. 3 , a. 3). Therefore, there is no power in God.
vine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His
Objection 3. Further, Power is the principle of oper-
essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be
ation. But the divine power is God’s essence, since there
anything in God nobler than His power.
is nothing accidental in God: and of the essence of God
Reply to Objection 3. In creatures, power is the prin-
there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in God.
ciple not only of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in
Objection 4. Further, it was shown above (q. 14, a. 8;
God the idea of power is retained, inasmuch as it is the
q. 19, a. 4) that God’s knowledge and will are the cause of
principle of an effect; not, however, as it is a principle of
things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical.
action, for this is the divine essence itself; except, per-
We ought not, therefore, to assign power to God; but only
chance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as
knowledge and will.
the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself all perfec-
On the contrary, It is said: “Thou art mighty, O Lord,
tion that exists in created things, can be understood ei-
and Thy truth is round about Thee” (Ps. 88:9).
ther under the notion of action, or under that of power;
I answer that, Power is twofold—namely, passive,
as also it is understood under the notion of “suppositum”
which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must
possessing nature, and under that of nature. Accordingly
assign to Him in the highest degree. For it is manifest that
the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the
everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the
principle of an effect.
active principle of something: whereas everything is pas-
Reply to Objection 4. Power is predicated of God not
sive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was
as something really distinct from His knowledge and will,
shown above (q. 3, a. 2; q. 4, Aa. 1, 2), that God is pure
but as differing from them logically; inasmuch as power
act, simply and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any
implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what
imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs
the will commands, and what knowledge directs, which
to Him to be an active principle, and in no way whatsoever
three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that
to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active prin-
the knowledge or will of God, according as it is the ef-
ciple is consistent with active power. For active power is
fective principle, has the notion of power contained in it.
the principle of acting upon something else; whereas pas-
Hence the consideration of the knowledge and will of God
sive power is the principle of being acted upon by some-
precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause pre-
thing else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It
cedes the operation and effect.
141
Whether the power of God is infinite?
Ia q. 25 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that the power of God is not in-
therefore, that it is imperfect.
finite. For everything that is infinite is imperfect according
Reply to Objection 2. The power of a univocal agent
to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is
is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of
far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite.
man, for example, is not able to do more than beget man.
Objection 2. Further, every power is made known by
But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly
its effect; otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the
manifest itself in the production of its effect: as, for exam-
power of God were infinite, it could produce an infinite
ple, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself
effect, but this is impossible.
in the production of an animal generated from putrefac-
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys.
tion. Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For
viii, 79) that if the power of any corporeal thing were infi-
nothing agrees with Him either in species or in genus, as
nite, it would cause instantaneous movement. God, how-
was shown above (q. 3, a. 5; q. 4, a. 3). Whence it follows
ever, does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves
that His effect is always less than His power. It is not nec-
the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal creature in
essary, therefore, that the infinite power of God should be
place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23).
manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if
Therefore, His power is not infinite.
it were to produce no effect, the power of God would not
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that
be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is or-
“God’s power is immeasurable. He is the living mighty
dained towards an end to which it does not attain. But the
one.” Now everything that is immeasurable is infinite.
power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards
Therefore the power of God is infinite.
an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), active power
Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher (Phys. viii,
exists in God according to the measure in which He is ac-
79) proves that if a body had infinite power, it would cause
tual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it is not
a non-temporal movement. And he shows that the power
limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what
of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can move
has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine
in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his
essence (q. 7, a. 1). Wherefore, it is necessary that the ac-
reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such ex-
tive power in God should be infinite. For in every agent
isted, would move without time; not, however, the power
is it found that the more perfectly an agent has the form
of an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is that one
by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance,
body moving another is a univocal agent; wherefore it fol-
the hotter a thing is, the greater the power has it to give
lows that the whole power of the agent is made known in
heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were
its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving
its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine essence,
body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary con-
through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above
clusion is that if its power were infinite, it would move be-
(q. 7, a. 1) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.
yond comparison faster, and this is to move without time.
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is here speak-
An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent;
ing of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any
whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power
form; and such infinity belongs to quantity. But the di-
should be manifested in motion, so as to move without
vine essence is otherwise, as was shown above (q. 7, a. 1);
time; and especially since it moves in accordance with the
and consequently so also His power. It does not follow,
disposition of its will.
Whether God is omnipotent?
Ia q. 25 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that God is not omnipotent. For
fests His omnipotence “especially by sparing and having
movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this
mercy”∗. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine
is impossible with God, for He is immovable, as was said
power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much
above (q. 2, a. 3). Therefore He is not omnipotent.
greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for ex-
Objection 2. Further, sin is an act of some kind. But
ample, to create another world, and the like. Therefore
God cannot sin, nor “deny Himself” as it is said in 2 Tim.
God is not omnipotent.
2:13. Therefore He is not omnipotent.
Objection 4. Further, upon the text, “God hath made
Objection 3. Further, it is said of God that He mani-
foolish the wisdom of this world” (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss
∗ Collect, 10th Sunday after Pentecost
† Vulg.: ‘Hath not God’, etc.
142
says: “God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish†
limited to any genus of being; but possesses within itself
by showing those things to be possible which it judges
the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or
to be impossible.” Whence it would seem that nothing is
can have the nature of being, is numbered among the ab-
to be judged possible or impossible in reference to infe-
solutely possible things, in respect of which God is called
rior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but
omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being
in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were om-
except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being
nipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore
and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea
impossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we
of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the
destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is
divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the di-
impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing
vine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power
at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent.
of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or
But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipo-
possible thing. Therefore, everything that does not imply
tent.
a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those pos-
On the contrary, It is said: “No word shall be impos-
sible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent:
sible with God” (Lk. 1:37).
whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come
I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent;
within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot
but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence
have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that
precisely consists: for there may be doubt as to the pre-
such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them.
cise meaning of the word ‘all’ when we say that God can
Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: “No
do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright,
word shall be impossible with God.” For whatever implies
since power is said in reference to possible things, this
a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can
phrase, “God can do all things,” is rightly understood to
possibly conceive such a thing.
mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for
Reply to Objection 1. God is said to be omnipotent in
this reason He is said to be omnipotent. Now according to
respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was
the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be pos-
shown above (a. 1). Whence the fact that He is immovable
sible in two ways. First in relation to some power, thus
or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence.
whatever is subject to human power is said to be possi-
Reply to Objection 2. To sin is to fall short of a per-
ble to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the re-
fect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short lation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now
in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore
God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able
it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence.
to do all things that are possible to created nature; for the
Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 3) that God
divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we
can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be under-
were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all
stood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is
things that are possible to His power, there would be a vi-
impossible—as, for instance, if we were to say that God
cious circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this
can do evil things if He will. For there is no reason why
would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent,
a conditional proposition should not be true, though both
because He can do all that He is able to do.
the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one
It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent be-
were to say: “If man is a donkey, he has four feet.” Or he
cause He can do all things that are possible absolutely;
may be understood to mean that God can do some things
which is the second way of saying a thing is possible. For
which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did
a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, ac-
them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking af-
cording to the relation in which the very terms stand to one
ter the common manner of the heathen, who thought that
another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with
men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury.
the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossi-
Reply to Objection 3. God’s omnipotence is particu-
ble when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the
larly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this
subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.
is it made manifest that God has supreme power, that He
It must, however, be remembered that since every
freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by
agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power
laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free will. Or,
there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object ac-
because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads
cording to the nature of that act on which its active power
them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is
is founded; for instance, the power of giving warmth is re-
the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was
lated as to its proper object to the being capable of being
said above (q. 21, a. 4), the effect of the divine mercy is
warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the
the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due
nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not
to anyone, except on account of something already given
143
him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipo-ence to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are
tence is particularly made manifest, because to it pertains
of such kind as to be done by inferior causes are said to
the first foundation of all good things.
be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is
Reply to Objection 4. The absolute possible is not so
according to the condition of the proximate cause that the
called in reference either to higher causes, or to inferior
effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above
causes, but in reference to itself. But the possible in refer-
(q. 14, a. 1, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world
ence to some power is named possible in reference to its
is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature,
proximate cause. Hence those things which it belongs to
it judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the
God alone to do immediately—as, for example, to create,
omnipotence of God does not take away from things their
to justify, and the like—are said to be possible in refer-
impossibility and necessity.
Whether God can make the past not to have been?
Ia q. 25 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that God can make the past not
Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5):
to have been. For what is impossible in itself is much
“Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what
more impossible than that which is only impossible ac-
is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to
cidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself,
say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true,
as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. There-
by the very fact that it is true, be false”: and the Philoso-
fore, and much more can He do what is only impossible
pher says (Ethic. vi, 2): “Of this one thing alone is God
accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impos-
deprived—namely, to make undone the things that have
sible accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is
been done.”
accidentally impossible, from the fact that his running is
Reply to Objection 1. Although it is impossible acci-
a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not
dentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the
to have been.
past thing itself, as, for instance, the running of Socrates;
Objection 2. Further, what God could do, He can
nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it
do now, since His power is not lessened. But God could
should not have been is impossible, not only in itself, but
have effected, before Socrates ran, that he should not run.
absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more
Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did
impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is
not run.
nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossi-
Objection 3.
Further, charity is a more excellent
ble in reference to some power, that is to say, some nat-
virtue than virginity. But God can supply charity that is
ural power; for such impossible things do come beneath
lost; therefore also lost virginity. Therefore He can so ef-
the scope of divine power.
fect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt.
Reply to Objection 2. As God, in accordance with
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. 22 ad Eustoch.):
the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and
“Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing
yet some things are not subject to His power, because they
that is corrupt not to have been corrupted.” Therefore, for
fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the im-
the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which
mutability of the divine power, whatever God could do,
is past should not have been.
He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in
I answer that, As was said above (q. 7, a. 2), there
the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to be done,
does not fall under the scope of God’s omnipotence any-
which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when
thing that implies a contradiction.
Now that the past
they have been done. So is God said not to be able to do
should not have been implies a contradiction. For as it
them, because they themselves cannot be done.
implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and
Reply to Objection 3. God can remove all corruption
is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit.
of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but
But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the
the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from
past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not
her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned
happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does
or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the
not come under the scope of divine power. This is what
sinner.
144
Whether God can do what He does not?
Ia q. 25 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that God cannot do other than
wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no
what He does. For God cannot do what He has not fore-
other course of events could happen. Wherefore we must
known and pre-ordained that He would do. But He neither
simply say that God can do other things than those He has
foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything ex-
done.
cept what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what
Reply to Objection 1. In ourselves, in whom power
He does.
and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again
Objection 2. Further, God can only do what ought to
intellect from wisdom, and will from justice, there can be
be done and what is right to be done. But God is not bound
something in the power which is not in the just will nor
to do what He does not; nor is it right that He should do
in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence, will
what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what
and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same.
He does.
Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which
Objection 3. Further, God cannot do anything that is
cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect.
not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for crea-
Nevertheless, because His will cannot be determined from
tures nor befitting them to be otherwise than as they are.
necessity to this or that order of things, except upon sup-
Therefore God cannot do except what He does.
position, as was said above (q. 19, a. 3), neither are the
On the contrary, It is said: “Thinkest thou that I can-
wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present or-
not ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more
der, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there being
than twelve legions of angels?” (Mat. 26:53). But He
something in the divine power which He does not will,
neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to
and which is not included in the order which He has place
refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not.
in things. Again, because power is considered as execut-
I answer that, In this matter certain persons erred in
ing, the will as commanding, and the intellect and wisdom
two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natu-
as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in
ral necessity in such way that as from the action of na-
itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance with His
ture nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes
absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has
place—as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must
the nature of being, as was said above (a. 3). What is,
come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the
however, attributed to the divine power, according as it
divine operation there could not result other things, nor
carries into execution the command of a just will, God is
another order of things, than that which now is. But we
said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this man-
showed above (q. 19, a. 3) that God does not act from nat-
ner, we must say that God can do other things by His abso-
ural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things;
lute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained
nor is that will naturally and from any necessity deter-
He would do. But it could not happen that He should do
mined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the
anything which He had not foreknown, and had not pre-
present course of events produced by God from any neces-
ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is
sity, so that other things could not happen. Others, how-
subject to His foreknowledge and pre-ordination, though
ever, said that the divine power is restricted to this present
His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does
course of events through the order of the divine wisdom
things because He wills so to do; yet the power to do them
and justice without which God does nothing. But since
does not come from His will, but from His nature.
the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else
Reply to Objection 2. God is bound to nobody but
but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that there
Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what
is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order
He ought, nothing else is meant by this than that God can
of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the
do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But
whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed
these words “befitting” and “just” may be understood in
in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion
two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb “is”;
of His justice consists, as said above (q. 21, a. 2), is not
and thus they would be restricted to the present order of
so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom
things; and would concern His power. Then what is said
should be restricted to this present order of things. Now
in the objection is false; for the sense is that God can do
it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man
nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however,
puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So,
they be joined directly with the verb “can” (which has
when the end is proportionate to the things made for that
the effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly
end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some defi-
with “is,” the present will be signified, but in a confused
nite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding
and general way. The sentence would then be true in this
beyond all proportion things created. Whence the divine
sense: “God cannot do anything except that which, if He
145
did it, would be suitable and just.”
order would be suitable and good to the things which now
Reply to Objection 3. Although this order of things
are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them
be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wis-
another order.
dom are not thus restricted. Whence, although no other
Whether God can do better than what He does?
Ia q. 25 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that God cannot do better than
of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of
He does. For whatever God does, He does in a most pow-
goodness, God can make better the things He has made.
erful and wise way. But a thing is so much the better done
Absolutely speaking, however, God can make something
as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore God
else better than each thing made by Him.
cannot do anything better than He does.
Reply to Objection 1. When it is said that God can
Objection 2. Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra
make a thing better than He makes it, if “better” is taken
Maximin. iii, 8): “If God could, but would not, beget
substantively, this proposition is true. For He can always
a Son His equal, He would have been envious.” For the
make something else better than each individual thing:
same reason, if God could have made better things than
and He can make the same thing in one way better than
He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have
it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If,
been envious. But envy is far removed from God. There-
however, “better” is taken as an adverb, implying the man-
fore God makes everything of the best. He cannot there-
ner of the making; thus God cannot make anything better
fore make anything better than He does.
than He makes it, because He cannot make it from greater
Objection 3. Further, what is very good and the best
wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the
of all cannot be bettered; because nothing is better than
thing done, He can make something better; because He
the best. But as Augustine says (Enchiridion 10), “each
can give to things made by Him a better manner of exis-
thing that God has made is good, and, taken all together
tence as regards the accidents, although not as regards the
they are very good; because in them all consists the won-
substance.
drous beauty of the universe.” Therefore the good in the
Reply to Objection 2. It is of the nature of a son that
universe could not be made better by God.
he should be equal to his father, when he comes to matu-
Objection 4. Further, Christ as man is full of grace
rity. But it is not of the nature of anything created, that
and truth, and has the Spirit without measure; and so He
it should be better than it was made by God. Hence the
cannot be better. Again created happiness is described
comparison fails.
as the highest good, and thus cannot be better. And the
Reply to Objection 3. The universe, the present cre-
Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of an-
ation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the
gels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot there-
most beautiful order given to things by God; in which the
fore make all things better than He has made them.
good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were
On the contrary, It is said (Eph. 3:20): “God is able
bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; as
to do all things more abundantly than we desire or under-
if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the
stand.”
melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could
I answer that, The goodness of anything is twofold;
make other things, or add something to the present cre-
one, which is of the essence of it—thus, for instance, to
ation; and then there would be another and a better uni-
be rational pertains to the essence of man. As regards this
verse.
good, God cannot make a thing better than it is itself; al-
Reply to Objection 4. The humanity of Christ, from
though He can make another thing better than it; even as
the fact that it is united to the Godhead; and created hap-
He cannot make the number four greater than it is; be-
piness from the fact that it is the fruition of God; and the
cause if it were greater it would no longer be four, but an-
Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God;
other number. For the addition of a substantial difference
have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite good,
in definitions is after the manner of the addition of unity
which is God. And on this account there cannot be any-
of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of goodness
thing better than these; just as there cannot be anything
is that which is over and above the essence; thus, the good
better than God.
146
FIRST PART, QUESTION 26
Of the Divine Beatitude
(In Four Articles)
After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude.
Concerning this, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?
(2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect?
(3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?
(4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?
Whether beatitude belongs to God?
Ia q. 26 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that beatitude does not belong
sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to which it is
to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol.
competent that good or ill may befall, and which can con-
iv) “is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good
trol its own actions. All of these things belong in a most
things.” But the aggregation of goods has no place in God;
excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to
nor has composition. Therefore beatitude does not belong
possess intelligence. Whence beatitude belongs to God in
to God.
the highest degree.
Objection 2. Further, beatitude or happiness is the re-
Reply to Objection 1. Aggregation of good is in God,
ward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9).
after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for
But reward does not apply to God; as neither does merit.
those things which in creatures is manifold, pre-exist in
Therefore neither does beatitude.
God, as was said above (q. 4, a. 2; q. 13, a. 4), in simplic-
On the contrary, The Apostle says:
“Which in
ity and unity.
His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only
Reply to Objection 2. It belongs as an accident to
Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords.” (1 Tim.
beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as
6:15).
anyone attains to beatitude; even as to be the term of gen-
I answer that, Beatitude belongs to God in a very spe-
eration belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes
cial manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant
from potentiality to act. As, then, God has being, though
by the term beatitude than the perfect good of an intel-
not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired
lectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a
by merit.
Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?
Ia q. 26 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that God is not called blessed in
beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His intellect.
respect to His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good.
I answer that, Beatitude, as stated above (a. 1), is the But good is said to be in God in regard to His essence,
perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as
because good has reference to being which is according
everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual
to essence, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). There-
nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is
fore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His
most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual
essence, and not to His intellect.
operation, by which in some sense it grasps everything.
Objection 2. Further, Beatitude implies the notion of
Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists
end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the
in understanding. Now in God, to be and to understand
good. Therefore beatitude is said to be in God with refer-
are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner
ence to His will, and not with reference to His intellect.
of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): “He
assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the
is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not
blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the
further praise.” To be in glory, however, is the same as to
assimilation to His beatitude.
be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect to
Reply to Objection 1. This argument proves that
our intellect, because “vision is the whole of the reward,”
beatitude belongs to God; not that beatitude pertains es-
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that
sentially to Him under the aspect of His essence; but
147
rather under the aspect of His intellect.
derstanding, divine beatitude precedes the act of the will
Reply to Objection 2. Since beatitude is a good, it
at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of the in-
is the object of the will; now the object is understood as
tellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the
prior to the act of a power. Whence in our manner of un-
intellect.
Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?
Ia q. 26 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that God is the beatitude of
stand. If, then, beatitude be considered on the side of the
each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was
object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed
said above (q. 6, Aa. 2,4). But it is quite impossible that
from this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance
there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from
with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): “Blessed is
what has been said above (q. 11, a. 3). Therefore, since it
he who knoweth Thee, though he know nought else.” But
is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme
as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is a created
good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God Him-
thing in beatified creatures; but in God, even in this way,
self.
it is an uncreated thing.
Objection 2. Further, beatitude is the last end of the
Reply to Objection 1. Beatitude, as regards its object,
rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational na-
is the supreme good absolutely, but as regards its act, in
ture belongs only to God. Therefore the beatitude of every
beatified creatures it is their supreme good, not absolutely,
blessed is God alone.
but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate.
On the contrary, The beatitude of one is greater than
Reply to Objection 2. End is twofold, namely, “ob-
that of another, according to 1 Cor. 15:41: “Star differ-
jective” and “subjective,” as the Philosopher says (Greater
eth from star in glory.” But nothing is greater than God.
Ethics i, 3), namely, the “thing itself” and “its use.” Thus
Therefore beatitude is something different from God.
to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition. Accord-
I answer that, The beatitude of an intellectual nature
ingly God is indeed the last end of a rational creature, as
consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may con-
the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, sider two things, namely, the object of the act, which is
or rather fruition, of the thing.
the thing understood; and the act itself which is to under-
Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?
Ia q. 26 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that the divine beatitude does
whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists
not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false
in delight, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to
beatitudes. But nothing false can be in God. Therefore the
Boethius (De Consol. iii, 10), He possesses joy in Him-
divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.
self and all things else for His delight; instead of riches
Objection 2. Further, a certain beatitude, according to
He has that complete self-sufficiency, which is promised
some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches,
by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dig-
and such like. Now none of these have to do with God,
nities, the government of all things; and in place of fame,
since He is incorporeal. Therefore His beatitude does not
He possesses the admiration of all creatures.
embrace all other beatitudes.
Reply to Objection 1. A particular kind of beatitude
On the contrary, Beatitude is a certain perfection.
is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beat-
But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection,
itude; and thus it is not in God. But whatever semblance
as was shown above (q. 4, a. 2 ). Therefore the divine
it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of it pre-
beatitude embraces all other beatitudes.
exists in the divine beatitude.
I answer that, Whatever is desirable in whatsoever
Reply to Objection 2. The good that exists in things
beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in
corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a
a more eminent degree in the divine beatitude. As to con-
spiritual manner.
templative happiness, God possesses a continual and most
We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains
certain contemplation of Himself and of all things else;
to the unity of the divine essence.
and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the
148
FIRST PART, QUESTION 27
The Procession of the Divine Persons
(In Five Articles)
Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it remains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity of the persons in God. And because the divine Persons are distinguished from each other according to the relations of origin, the order of the doctrine leads us to consider firstly, the question of origin or procession; secondly, the relations of origin; thirdly, the persons.
Concerning procession there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is procession in God?
(2) Whether any procession in God can be called generation?
(3) Whether there can be any other procession in God besides generation.
(4) Whether that other procession can be called generation?
(5) Whether there are more than two processions in God?
Whether there is procession in God?
Ia q. 27 a. 1
Objection 1.
It would seem that there cannot be
a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, “The Son can-
any procession in God. For procession signifies outward
not of Himself do anything” (Jn. 5:19); while many other
movement. But in God there is nothing mobile, nor any-
passages show the same, whereby we know that the Fa-
thing extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession in
ther is not the Son. Careful examination shows that both
God.
of these opinions take procession as meaning an outward
Objection 2. Further, everything which proceeds dif-
act; hence neither of them affirms procession as existing in
fers from that whence it proceeds. But in God there is no
God Himself; whereas, since procession always supposes
diversity; but supreme simplicity. Therefore in God there
action, and as there is an outward procession correspond-
is no procession.
ing to the act tending to external matter, so there must
Objection 3. Further, to proceed from another seems
be an inward procession corresponding to the act remain-
to be against the nature of the first principle. But God is
ing within the agent. This applies most conspicuously to
the first principle, as shown above (q. 2, a. 3). Therefore
the intellect, the action of which remains in the intelligent
in God there is no procession.
agent. For whenever we understand, by the very fact of
On the contrary, Our Lord says, “From God I pro-
understanding there proceeds something within us, which
ceeded” (Jn. 8:42).
is a conception of the object understood, a conception is-
I answer that, Divine Scripture uses, in relation to
suing from our intellectual power and proceeding from
God, names which signify procession. This procession
our knowledge of that object. This conception is signified
has been differently understood. Some have understood it
by the spoken word; and it is called the word of the heart
in the sense of an effect, proceeding from its cause; so Ar-
signified by the word of the voice.
ius took it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father
As God is above all things, we should understand what
as His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds
is said of God, not according to the mode of the lowest
from the Father and the Son as the creature of both. In
creatures, namely bodies, but from the similitude of the
this sense neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost would be
highest creatures, the intellectual substances; while even
true God: and this is contrary to what is said of the Son,
the similitudes derived from these fall short in the repre-
“That. . . we may be in His true Son. This is true God”
sentation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not to
(1 Jn. 5:20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, “Know
be understood from what it is in bodies, either according
you not that your members are the temple of the Holy
to local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth
Ghost?” (1 Cor. 6:19). Now, to have a temple is God’s
to its exterior effect, as, for instance, like heat from the
prerogative. Others take this procession to mean the cause
agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood
proceeding to the effect, as moving it, or impressing its
by way of an intelligible emanation, for example, of the
own likeness on it; in which sense it was understood by
intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet re-
Sabellius, who said that God the Father is called Son in
mains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands
assuming flesh from the Virgin, and that the Father also is
procession as existing in God.
called Holy Ghost in sanctifying the rational creature, and
Reply to Objection 1. This objection comes from the
moving it to life. The words of the Lord contradict such
idea of procession in the sense of local motion, or of an
149
action tending to external matter, or to an exterior effect; (q. 14, a. 2), the divine Word is of necessity perfectly one
which kind of procession does not exist in God, as we
with the source whence He proceeds, without any kind of
have explained.
diversity.
Reply to Objection 2. Whatever proceeds by way of
Reply to Objection 3. To proceed from a principle,
outward procession is necessarily distinct from the source
so as to be something outside and distinct from that prin-
whence it proceeds, whereas, whatever proceeds within
ciple, is irreconcilable with the idea of a first principle;
by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct;
whereas an intimate and uniform procession by way of an
indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely
intelligible act is included in the idea of a first principle.
it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear
For when we call the builder the principle of the house, in
that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the
the idea of such a principle is included that of his art; and
intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent
it would be included in the idea of the first principle were
agent; since the intellect by the very act of understand-
the builder the first principle of the house. God, Who is
ing is made one with the object understood. Thus, as the
the first principle of all things, may be compared to things
divine intelligence is the very supreme perfection of God
created as the architect is to things designed.
Whether any procession in God can be called generation?
Ia q. 27 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that no procession in God
from a horse. So in living things, which proceed from po-
can be called generation. For generation is change from
tential to actual life, such as men and animals, generation
non-existence to existence, and is opposed to corruption;
includes both these kinds of generation. But if there is
while matter is the subject of both. Nothing of all this be-
a being whose life does not proceed from potentiality to
longs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist in God.
act, procession (if found in such a being) excludes entirely
Objection 2. Further, procession exists in God, ac-
the first kind of generation; whereas it may have that kind
cording to an intelligible mode, as above explained (a. 1).
of generation which belongs to living things. So in this
But such a process is not called generation in us; therefore
manner the procession of the Word in God is generation;
neither is it to be so called in God.
for He proceeds by way of intelligible action, which is
Objection 3. Further, anything that is generated de-
a vital operation:—from a conjoined principle (as above
rives existence from its generator. Therefore such exis-
described):—by way of similitude, inasmuch as the con-
tence is a derived existence. But no derived existence can
cept of the intellect is a likeness of the object conceived:—
be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the divine exis-
and exists in the same nature, because in God the act of
tence is self-subsisting (q. 3, a. 4), it follows that no gen-
understanding and His existence are the same, as shown
erated existence can be the divine existence. Therefore
above (q. 14, a. 4). Hence the procession of the Word in
there is no generation in God.
God is called generation; and the Word Himself proceed-
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 2:7): “This day have I
ing is called the Son.
begotten Thee.”
Reply to Objection 1. This objection is based on the
I answer that, The procession of the Word in God is
idea of generation in the first sense, importing the issu-
called generation. In proof whereof we must observe that
ing forth from potentiality to act; in which sense it is not
generation has a twofold meaning: one common to every-
found in God.
thing subject to generation and corruption; in which sense
Reply to Objection 2. The act of human understand-
generation is nothing but change from non-existence to
ing in ourselves is not the substance itself of the intellect;
existence. In another sense it is proper and belongs to liv-
hence the word which proceeds within us by intelligible
ing things; in which sense it signifies the origin of a living
operation is not of the same nature as the source whence
being from a conjoined living principle; and this is prop-
it proceeds; so the idea of generation cannot be properly
erly called birth. Not everything of that kind, however, is
and fully applied to it. But the divine act of intelligence
called begotten; but, strictly speaking, only what proceeds
is the very substance itself of the one who understands
by way of similitude. Hence a hair has not the aspect of
(q. 14, a. 4). The Word proceeding therefore proceeds as
generation and sonship, but only that has which proceeds
subsisting in the same nature; and so is properly called
by way of a similitude. Nor will any likeness suffice; for
begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture employs terms which
a worm which is generated from animals has not the as-
denote generation of living things in order to signify the
pect of generation and sonship, although it has a generic
procession of the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and
similitude; for this kind of generation requires that there
birth; as is declared in the person of the divine Wisdom,
should be a procession by way of similitude in the same
“The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived;
specific nature; as a man proceeds from a man, and a horse
before the hills, I was brought forth.” (Prov. 8:24). In
150
our way of understanding we use the word “conception”
not as though that existence were received into matter or
in order to signify that in the word of our intellect is found
into a subject (which would conflict with the divine self-
the likeness of the thing understood, although there be no
subsistence); but when we speak of His existence as re-
identity of nature.
ceived, we mean that He Who proceeds receives divine
Reply to Objection 3. Not everything derived from
existence from another; not, however, as if He were other
another has existence in another subject; otherwise we
from the divine nature. For in the perfection itself of the
could not say that the whole substance of created be-
divine existence are contained both the Word intelligibly
ing comes from God, since there is no subject that could
proceeding and the principle of the Word, with whatever
receive the whole substance. So, then, what is gener-
belongs to His perfection (q. 4, a. 2).
ated in God receives its existence from the generator,
Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the Word?
Ia q. 27 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that no other procession
tellect, and of the will. The procession of the Word is by
exists in God besides the generation of the Word. Be-
way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the will
cause, for whatever reason we admit another procession,
within ourselves involves also another procession, that of
we should be led to admit yet another, and so on to infini-
love, whereby the object loved is in the lover; as, by the
tude; which cannot be. Therefore we must stop at the first,
conception of the word, the object spoken of or under-
and hold that there exists only one procession in God.
stood is in the intelligent agent. Hence, besides the pro-
Objection 2. Further, every nature possesses but one
cession of the Word in God, there exists in Him another
mode of self-communication; because operations derive
procession called the procession of love.
unity and diversity from their terms. But procession in
Reply to Objection 1. There is no need to go on to
God is only by way of communication of the divine na-
infinitude in the divine processions; for the procession
ture. Therefore, as there is only one divine nature (q. 11,
which is accomplished within the agent in an intellectual
a. 4 ), it follows that only one procession exists in God.
nature terminates in the procession of the will.
Objection 3. Further, if any other procession but the
Reply to Objection 2. All that exists in God, is God
intelligible procession of the Word existed in God, it could
(q. 3, Aa. 3,4); whereas the same does not apply to oth-
only be the procession of love, which is by the operation
ers. Therefore the divine nature is communicated by every
of the will. But such a procession is identified with the in-
procession which is not outward, and this does not apply
telligible procession of the intellect, inasmuch as the will
to other natures.
in God is the same as His intellect (q. 19, a. 1). Therefore
Reply to Objection 3. Though will and intellect are
in God there is no other procession but the procession of
not diverse in God, nevertheless the nature of will and in-
the Word.
tellect requires the processions belonging to each of them
On the contrary, The Holy Ghost proceeds from the
to exist in a certain order. For the procession of love oc-
Father (Jn. 15:26); and He is distinct from the Son, ac-
curs in due order as regards the procession of the Word;
cording to the words, “I will ask My Father, and He will
since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is con-
give you another Paraclete” (Jn. 14:16). Therefore in
ceived in the intellect. So as there exists a certain order of
God another procession exists besides the procession of
the Word to the principle whence He proceeds, although
the Word.
in God the substance of the intellect and its concept are
I answer that, There are two processions in God; the
the same; so, although in God the will and the intellect
procession of the Word, and another.
are the same, still, inasmuch as love requires by its very
In evidence whereof we must observe that procession
nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intel-
exists in God, only according to an action which does not
lect, there is a distinction of order between the procession
tend to anything external, but remains in the agent itself.
of love and the procession of the Word in God.
Such an action in an intellectual nature is that of the in-
Whether the procession of love in God is generation?
Ia q. 27 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the procession of love
traneous to the divine nature, and would be an external
in God is generation. For what proceeds by way of like-
procession. Therefore what proceeds in God by way of
ness of nature among living things is said to be generated
love, proceeds as generated and born.
and born. But what proceeds in God by way of love pro-
Objection 2. Further, as similitude is of the nature of
ceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise it would be ex-
the word, so does it belong to love. Hence it is said, that
151
“every beast loves its like” (Ecclus. 13:19). Therefore if pulse, accordingly as anyone is described as moved or im-the Word is begotten and born by way of likeness, it seems
pelled by love to perform an action.
becoming that love should proceed by way of generation.
Reply to Objection 1. All that exists in God is one
Objection 3. Further, what is not in any species is not
with the divine nature. Hence the proper notion of this or
in the genus. So if there is a procession of love in God,
that procession, by which one procession is distinguished
there ought to be some special name besides this common
from another, cannot be on the part of this unity: but the
name of procession. But no other name is applicable but
proper notion of this or that procession must be taken from
generation. Therefore the procession of love in God is
the order of one procession to another; which order is de-
generation.
rived from the nature of the will and intellect. Hence, each
On the contrary, Were this true, it would follow that
procession in God takes its name from the proper notion
the Holy Ghost Who proceeds as love, would proceed as
of will and intellect; the name being imposed to signify
begotten; which is against the statement of Athanasius:
what its nature really is; and so it is that the Person pro-
“The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son, not
ceeding as love receives the divine nature, but is not said
made, nor begotten, but proceeding.”
to be born.
I answer that, The procession of love in God ought
Reply to Objection 2. Likeness belongs in a different
not to be called generation. In evidence whereof we must
way to the word and to love. It belongs to the word as
consider that the intellect and the will differ in this re-
being the likeness of the object understood, as the thing
spect, that the intellect is made actual by the object un-
generated is the likeness of the generator; but it belongs
derstood residing according to its own likeness in the in-
to love, not as though love itself were a likeness, but be-
tellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any simil-
cause likeness is the principle of loving. Thus it does not
itude of the object willed within it, but by its having a
follow that love is begotten, but that the one begotten is
certain inclination to the thing willed. Thus the proces-
the principle of love.
sion of the intellect is by way of similitude, and is called
Reply to Objection 3. We can name God only from
generation, because every generator begets its own like;
creatures (q. 13, a. 1). As in creatures generation is the
whereas the procession of the will is not by way of simili-
only principle of communication of nature, procession in
tude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards
God has no proper or special name, except that of gener-
an object.
ation. Hence the procession which is not generation has
So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not pro-
remained without a special name; but it can be called spi-
ceed as begotten, or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit;
ration, as it is the procession of the Spirit.
which name expresses a certain vital movement and im-
Whether there are more than two processions in God?
Ia q. 27 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that there are more than
nature which is intellectual, and in the divine nature these
two processions in God. As knowledge and will are at-
actions are two, the acts of intelligence and of will. The
tributed to God, so is power. Therefore, if two processions
act of sensation, which also appears to be an operation
exist in God, of intellect and will, it seems that there must
within the agent, takes place outside the intellectual na-
also be a third procession of power.
ture, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the
Objection 2. Further, goodness seems to be the great-
sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is per-
est principle of procession, since goodness is diffusive of
fected by the action of the sensible object upon sense. It
itself. Therefore there must be a procession of goodness
follows that no other procession is possible in God but the
in God.
procession of the Word, and of Love.
Objection 3. Further, in God there is greater power
Reply to Objection 1. Power is the principle whereby
of fecundity than in us. But in us there is not only one
one thing acts on another. Hence it is that external action
procession of the word, but there are many: for in us from
points to power. Thus the divine power does not imply
one word proceeds another; and also from one love pro-
the procession of a divine person; but is indicated by the
ceeds another. Therefore in God there are more than two
procession therefrom of creatures.
processions.
Reply to Objection 2. As Boethius says (De Heb-
On the contrary, In God there are not more than two
dom.), goodness belongs to the essence and not to the op-
who proceed—the Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore
eration, unless considered as the object of the will.
there are in Him but two processions.
Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated
I answer that, The divine processions can be derived
from certain actions; no other processions can be under-
only from the actions which remain within the agent. In a
stood in God according to goodness and the like attributes
152
except those of the Word and of love, according as God and by one act also He wills all things. Hence there can-understands and loves His own essence, truth and good-
not exist in Him a procession of Word from Word, nor
ness.
of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one perfect
Reply to Objection 3. As above explained (q. 14, a. 5;
Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being manifested His
q. 19, a. 5), God understands all things by one simple act;
perfect fecundity.
153
FIRST PART, QUESTION 28
The Divine Relations
(In Four Articles)
The divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are real relations in God?
(2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are extrinsic to it?
(3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from each other?
(4) The number of these relations.
Whether there are real relations in God?
Ia q. 28 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there are no real rela-
lations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination and or-
tions in God. For Boethius says (De Trin. iv), “All possi-
der to the centre; and hence there exists in the heavy body
ble predicaments used as regards the Godhead refer to the
a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same ap-
substance; for nothing can be predicated relatively.” But
plies to other things. Sometimes, however, this regard to
whatever really exists in God can be predicated of Him.
another, signified by relation, is to be found only in the ap-
Therefore no real relation exists in God.
prehension of reason comparing one thing to another, and
Objection 2. Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that,
this is a logical relation only; as, for instance, when reason
“Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of
compares man to animal as the species to the genus. But
both to the Holy Ghost, is the relation of the same to the
when something proceeds from a principle of the same
same.” But a relation of this kind is only a logical one;
nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of
for every real relation requires and implies in reality two
procession, agree in the same order; and then they have
terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real relations,
real relations to each other. Therefore as the divine pro-
but are formed only by the mind.
cessions are in the identity of the same nature, as above
Objection 3. Further, the relation of paternity is the
explained (q. 27, Aa. 2,4), these relations, according to
relation of a principle. But to say that God is the principle
the divine processions, are necessarily real relations.
of creatures does not import any real relation, but only a
Reply to Objection 1. Relationship is not predicated
logical one. Therefore paternity in God is not a real re-
of God according to its proper and formal meaning, that is
lation; while the same applies for the same reason to the
to say, in so far as its proper meaning denotes comparison
other relations in God.
to that in which relation is inherent, but only as denoting
Objection 4. Further, the divine generation proceeds
regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius did not wish to
by way of an intelligible word. But the relations follow-
exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it was
ing upon the operation of the intellect are logical relations.
not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of in-
Therefore paternity and filiation in God, consequent upon
herence in Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but
generation, are only logical relations.
rather by way of relation to another.
On the contrary, The Father is denominated only
Reply to Objection 2. The relation signified by the
from paternity; and the Son only from filiation. Therefore,
term “the same” is a logical relation only, if in regard to
if no real paternity or filiation existed in God, it would fol-
absolutely the same thing; because such a relation can ex-
low that God is not really Father or Son, but only in our
ist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards
manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian heresy.
the order of anything to itself, according to some two
I answer that, relations exist in God really; in proof
aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when
whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found
things are called the same, not numerically, but generi-
something which is only in the apprehension and not in
cally or specifically. Thus Boethius likens the divine rela-
reality. This is not found in any other genus; forasmuch
tions to a relation of identity, not in every respect, but only as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their strict and
as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by
proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject.
these relations, as neither is it by relation of identity.
But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what
Reply to Objection 3. As the creature proceeds from
refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes
God in diversity of nature, God is outside the order of the
in the nature of things, as in those things which by their
whole creation, nor does any relation to the creature arise
own very nature are ordered to each other, and have a mu-
from His nature; for He does not produce the creature by
tual inclination; and such relations are necessarily real re-
necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will, as
154
is above explained (q. 14, Aa. 3,4; q. 19, a. 8). Therefore as existing between two objects perceived by the mind.
there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas
Those relations, however, which follow the operation of
in creatures there is a real relation to God; because crea-
the intellect, and which exist between the word intellectu-
tures are contained under the divine order, and their very
ally proceeding and the source whence it proceeds, are not
nature entails dependence on God. On the other hand, the
logical relations only, but are real relations; inasmuch as
divine processions are in one and the same nature. Hence
the intellect and the reason are real things, and are really
no parallel exists.
related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly; as
Reply to Objection 4. Relations which result from
a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds from it
the mental operation alone in the objects understood are
corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations
logical relations only, inasmuch as reason observes them
in God.
Whether relation in God is the same as His essence?
Ia q. 28 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the divine relation is
the measure of substance, and quality is the disposition
not the same as the divine essence. For Augustine says
of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken
(De Trin. v) that “not all that is said of God is said of His
from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect
substance, for we say some things relatively, as Father in
to something outside. So if we consider even in creatures,
respect of the Son: but such things do not refer to the sub-
relations formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be
stance.” Therefore the relation is not the divine essence.
“assistant,” and not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way,
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii)
they signify a respect which affects a thing related and
that, “every relative expression is something besides the
tends from that thing to something else; whereas, if rela-
relation expressed, as master is a man, and slave is a man.”
tion is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject,
Therefore, if relations exist in God, there must be some-
and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree
thing else besides relation in God. This can only be His
considered relation in the former mode only.
essence. Therefore essence differs from relation.
Now whatever has an accidental existence in crea-
Objection 3. Further, the essence of relation is the be-
tures, when considered as transferred to God, has a sub-
ing referred to another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic.
stantial existence; for there is no accident in God; since all
v). So if relation is the divine essence, it follows that
in Him is His essence. So, in so far as relation has an ac-
the divine essence is essentially itself a relation to some-
cidental existence in creatures, relation really existing in
thing else; whereas this is repugnant to the perfection of
God has the existence of the divine essence in no way dis-
the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and self-
tinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to
subsisting (q. 3, a. 4). Therefore relation is not the divine
something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but
essence.
rather to its opposite term.
On the contrary, Everything which is not the divine
Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God
essence is a creature. But relation really belongs to God;
is really the same as His essence and only differs in its
and if it is not the divine essence, it is a creature; and it
mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that re-
cannot claim the adoration of latria; contrary to what is
gard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of
sung in the Preface: “Let us adore the distinction of the
essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence
Persons, and the equality of their Majesty.”
do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.
I answer that, It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree
Reply to Objection 1. These words of Augustine do
erred on this point, but revoked his error later at the coun-
not imply that paternity or any other relation which is in
cil of Rheims. For he said that the divine relations are
God is not in its very being the same as the divine essence;
assistant, or externally affixed.
but that it is not predicated under the mode of substance,
To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider
as existing in Him to Whom it is applied; but as a rela-
that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two
tion. So there are said to be two predicaments only in
points for remark. One is the nature belonging to each
God, since other predicaments import habitude to that of
one of them considered as an accident; which commonly
which they are spoken, both in their generic and in their
applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for the
specific nature; but nothing that exists in God can have
essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of
any relation to that wherein it exists or of whom it is spo-
remark is the proper nature of each one of these genera.
ken, except the relation of identity; and this by reason of
In the genera, apart from that of “relation,” as in quantity
God’s supreme simplicity.
and quality, even the true idea of the genus itself is de-
Reply to Objection 2. As the relation which exists in
rived from a respect to the subject; for quantity is called
creatures involves not only a regard to another, but also
155
something absolute, so the same applies to God, yet not Reply to Objection 3. If the divine perfection con-in the same way. What is contained in the creature above
tained only what is signified by relative names, it would
and beyond what is contained in the meaning of relation,
follow that it is imperfect, being thus related to something
is something else besides that relation; whereas in God
else; as in the same way, if nothing more were contained
there is no distinction, but both are one and the same; and
in it than what is signified by the word “wisdom,” it would
this is not perfectly expressed by the word “relation,” as
not in that case be a subsistence. But as the perfection of
if it were comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that
the divine essence is greater than can be included in any
term. For it was above explained (q. 13, a. 2), in treating of
name, it does not follow, if a relative term or any other
the divine names, that more is contained in the perfection
name applied to God signify something imperfect, that
of the divine essence than can be signified by any name.
the divine essence is in any way imperfect; for the divine
Hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything
essence comprehends within itself the perfection of every
besides relation in reality; but only in the various names
genus (q. 4, a. 2).
imposed by us.
Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other?
Ia q. 28 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the divine relations
also be a real opposition. The very nature of relative op-
are not really distinguished from each other. For things
position includes distinction. Hence, there must be real
which are identified with the same, are identified with
distinction in God, not, indeed, according to that which
each other. But every relation in God is really the same
is absolute—namely, essence, wherein there is supreme
as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not re-
unity and simplicity—but according to that which is rela-
ally distinguished from each other.
tive.
Objection 2. Further, as paternity and filiation are by
Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher
name distinguished from the divine essence, so likewise
(Phys. iii), this argument holds, that whatever things are
are goodness and power. But this kind of distinction does
identified with the same thing are identified with each
not make any real distinction of the divine goodness and
other, if the identity be real and logical; as, for instance,
power. Therefore neither does it make any real distinction
a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ logically.
of paternity and filiation.
Hence in the same place he says that although action is
Objection 3. Further, in God there is no real distinc-
the same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does
tion but that of origin. But one relation does not seem to
not follow that action and passion are the same; because
arise from another. Therefore the relations are not really
action implies reference as of something “from which”
distinguished from each other.
there is motion in the thing moved; whereas passion im-
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God
plies reference as of something “which is from” another.
“the substance contains the unity; and relation multiplies
Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the
the trinity.” Therefore, if the relations were not really dis-
same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their
tinguished from each other, there would be no real trin-
own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects.
ity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is the error of
Hence they are distinguished from each other.
Sabellius.
Reply to Objection 2. Power and goodness do not im-
I answer that, The attributing of anything to another
port any opposition in their respective natures; and hence
involves the attribution likewise of whatever is contained
there is no parallel argument.
in it. So when “man” is attributed to anyone, a ratio-
Reply to Objection 3. Although relations, properly
nal nature is likewise attributed to him. The idea of re-
speaking, do not arise or proceed from each other, nev-
lation, however, necessarily means regard of one to an-
ertheless they are considered as opposed according to the
other, according as one is relatively opposed to another.
procession of one from another.
So as in God there is a real relation (a. 1), there must
Whether in God there are only four real relations—paternity, filiation, spiration, and Ia q. 28 a. 4
procession?
Objection 1. It would seem that in God there are not
stood; and of the one willing to the object willed; which
only four real relations—paternity, filiation, spiration and
are real relations not comprised under those above spec-
procession. For it must be observed that in God there exist
ified. Therefore there are not only four real relations in
the relations of the intelligent agent to the object under-
God.
156
Objection 2. Further, real relations in God are un-from the principle is called filiation. But the procession of
derstood as coming from the intelligible procession of the
Love has no proper name of its own (q. 27, a. 4); and so
Word. But intelligible relations are infinitely multiplied,
neither have the ensuing relations a proper name of their
as Avicenna says. Therefore in God there exists an infinite
own. The relation of the principle of this procession is
series of real relations.
called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding
Objection 3. Further, ideas in God are eternal (q. 15,
is called procession: although these two names belong to
a. 1); and are only distinguished from each other by rea-
the processions or origins themselves, and not to the rela-
son of their regard to things, as above stated. Therefore in
tions.
God there are many more eternal relations.
Reply to Objection 1. In those things in which there
Objection 4. Further, equality, and likeness, and iden-
is a difference between the intellect and its object, and the
tity are relations: and they are in God from eternity.
will and its object, there can be a real relation, both of sci-
Therefore several more relations are eternal in God than
ence to its object, and of the willer to the object willed.
the above named.
In God, however, the intellect and its object are one and
Objection 5. Further, it may also contrariwise be said
the same; because by understanding Himself, God under-
that there are fewer relations in God than those above
stands all other things; and the same applies to His will
named. For, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii text
and the object that He wills. Hence it follows that in God
24), “It is the same way from Athens to Thebes, as from
these kinds of relations are not real; as neither is the rela-
Thebes to Athens.” By the same way of reasoning there is
tion of a thing to itself. Nevertheless, the relation to the
the same relation from the Father to the Son, that of pater-
word is a real relation; because the word is understood as
nity, and from the Son to the Father, that of filiation; and
proceeding by an intelligible action; and not as a thing un-
thus there are not four relations in God.
derstood. For when we understand a stone; that which the
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph.
intellect conceives from the thing understood, is called the
v), every relation is based either on quantity, as double and
word.
half; or on action and passion, as the doer and the deed, the
Reply to Objection 2. Intelligible relations in our-
father and the son, the master and the servant, and the like.
selves are infinitely multiplied, because a man under-
Now as there is no quantity in God, for He is great without
stands a stone by one act, and by another act understands
quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1) it follows that
that he understands the stone, and again by another, un-
a real relation in God can be based only on action. Such
derstands that he understands this; thus the acts of under-
relations are not based on the actions of God according
standing are infinitely multiplied, and consequently also
to any extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of
the relations understood. This does not apply to God, inas-
God to creatures are not real in Him (q. 13, a. 7). Hence, it
much as He understands all things by one act alone.
follows that real relations in God can be understood only
Reply to Objection 3. Ideal relations exist as under-
in regard to those actions according to which there are
stood by God. Hence it does not follow from their plu-
internal, and not external, processions in God. These pro-
rality that there are many relations in God; but that God
cessions are two only, as above explained (q. 27, a. 5), one
knows these many relations.
derived from the action of the intellect, the procession of
Reply to Objection 4. Equality and similitude in God
the Word; and the other from the action of the will, the
are not real relations; but are only logical relations (q. 42,
procession of love. In respect of each of these processions
a. 3, ad 4).
two opposite relations arise; one of which is the relation
Reply to Objection 5. The way from one term to an-
of the person proceeding from the principle; the other is
other and conversely is the same; nevertheless the mutual
the relation of the principle Himself. The procession of
relations are not the same. Hence, we cannot conclude
the Word is called generation in the proper sense of the
that the relation of the father to the son is the same as
term, whereby it is applied to living things. Now the rela-
that of the son to the father; but we could conclude this of
tion of the principle of generation in perfect living beings
something absolute, if there were such between them.
is called paternity; and the relation of the one proceeding
157
FIRST PART, QUESTION 29
The Divine Persons
(In Four Articles)
Having premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the processions and the relations, we must now approach the subject of the persons.
First, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then comparatively as regards each other. We must consider the persons absolutely first in common; and then singly.
The general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four points: (1) The signification of this word “person”; (2) the number of the persons; (3) what is involved in the number of persons, or is opposed thereto; as diversity, and similitude, and the like; and (4) what belongs to our knowledge of the persons.
Four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point:
(1) The definition of “person.”
(2) The comparison of person to essence, subsistence, and hypostasis.
(3) Whether the name of person is becoming to God?
(4) What does it signify in Him?
The definition of “person”
Ia q. 29 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the definition of per-
exist in every genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way,
son given by Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient—
the individual belongs to the genus of substance. For sub-
that is, “a person is an individual substance of a rational
stance is individualized by itself; whereas the accidents
nature.” For nothing singular can be subject to definition.
are individualized by the subject, which is the substance;
But “person” signifies something singular. Therefore per-
since this particular whiteness is called “this,” because
son is improperly defined.
it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reason-
Objection 2. Further, substance as placed above in
able that the individuals of the genus substance should
the definition of person, is either first substance, or second
have a special name of their own; for they are called “hy-
substance. If it is the former, the word “individual” is su-
postases,” or first substances.
perfluous, because first substance is individual substance;
Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the
if it stands for second substance, the word “individual”
particular and the individual are found in the rational sub-
is false, for there is contradiction of terms; since second
stances which have dominion over their own actions; and
substances are the “genera” or “species.” Therefore this
which are not only made to act, like others; but which can
definition is incorrect.
act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. There-
Objection 3. Further, an intentional term must not be
fore also the individuals of the rational nature have a spe-
included in the definition of a thing. For to define a man
cial name even among other substances; and this name is
as “a species of animal” would not be a correct defini-
“person.”
tion; since man is the name of a thing, and “species” is a
Thus the term “individual substance” is placed in the
name of an intention. Therefore, since person is the name
definition of person, as signifying the singular in the genus
of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational nature), of substance; and the term “rational nature” is added, as
the word “individual” which is an intentional name comes
signifying the singular in rational substances.
improperly into the definition.
Reply to Objection 1. Although this or that singu-
Objection 4. Further, “Nature is the principle of mo-
lar may not be definable, yet what belongs to the general
tion and rest, in those things in which it is essentially,
idea of singularity can be defined; and so the Philosopher
and not accidentally,” as Aristotle says (Phys. ii). But
(De Praedic., cap. De substantia) gives a definition of first
person exists in things immovable, as in God, and in the
substance; and in this way Boethius defines person.
angels. Therefore the word “nature” ought not to enter
Reply to Objection 2. In the opinion of some, the
into the definition of person, but the word should rather
term “substance” in the definition of person stands for first
be “essence.”
substance, which is the hypostasis; nor is the term “indi-
Objection 5. Further, the separated soul is an individ-
vidual” superfluously added, forasmuch as by the name of
ual substance of the rational nature; but it is not a person.
hypostasis or first substance the idea of universality and of
Therefore person is not properly defined as above.
part is excluded. For we do not say that man in general is
I answer that, Although the universal and particular
an hypostasis, nor that the hand is since it is only a part.
158
But where “individual” is added, the idea of assumptibil-intrinsic principle, this term is extended to signify the in-
ity is excluded from person; for the human nature in Christ
trinsic principle of any kind of movement. In this sense he
is not a person, since it is assumed by a greater—that is,
defines “nature” (Phys. ii, 3). And since this kind of prin-
by the Word of God. It is, however, better to say that sub-
ciple is either formal or material, both matter and form are
stance is here taken in a general sense, as divided into first
commonly called nature. And as the essence of anything
and second, and when “individual” is added, it is restricted
is completed by the form; so the essence of anything, sig-
to first substance.
nified by the definition, is commonly called nature. And
Reply to Objection 3. Substantial differences being
here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says
unknown to us, or at least unnamed by us, it is sometimes
(De Duab. Nat.) that, “nature is the specific difference
necessary to use accidental differences in the place of sub-
giving its form to each thing,” for the specific difference
stantial; as, for example, we may say that fire is a simple,
completes the definition, and is derived from the special
hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are the effects
form of a thing. So in the definition of “person,” which
of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise,
means the singular in a determined “genus,” it is more
terms expressive of intention can be used in defining re-
correct to use the term “nature” than “essence,” because
alities if used to signify things which are unnamed. And
the latter is taken from being, which is most common.
so the term “individual” is placed in the definition of per-
Reply to Objection 5. The soul is a part of the human
son to signify the mode of subsistence which belongs to
species; and so, although it may exist in a separate state,
particular substances.
yet since it ever retains its nature of unibility, it cannot be Reply to Objection 4. According to the Philosopher
called an individual substance, which is the hypostasis or
(Metaph. v, 5), the word “nature” was first used to sig-
first substance, as neither can the hand nor any other part
nify the generation of living things, which is called nativ-
of man; thus neither the definition nor the name of person
ity. And because this kind of generation comes from an
belongs to it.
Whether “person” is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence?
Ia q. 29 a. 2
Objection 1.
It would seem that “person” is the
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph.
same as “hypostasis,” “subsistence,” and “essence.” For
v), substance is twofold. In one sense it means the quid-
Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that “the Greeks called the
dity of a thing, signified by its definition, and thus we
individual substance of the rational nature by the name hy-
say that the definition means the substance of a thing;
postasis.” But this with us signifies “person.” Therefore
in which sense substance is called by the Greeks ousia,
“person” is altogether the same as “hypostasis.”
what we may call “essence.” In another sense substance
Objection 2. Further, as we say there are three per-
means a subject or “suppositum,” which subsists in the
sons in God, so we say there are three subsistences in
genus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can
God; which implies that “person” and “subsistence” have
be applied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it
the same meaning. Therefore “person” and “subsistence”
is called “suppositum.” It is also called by three names
mean the same.
signifying a reality—that is, “a thing of nature,” “subsis-
Objection 3. Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.)
tence,” and “hypostasis,” according to a threefold consid-
that the Greek ousia, which means essence, signifies a
eration of the substance thus named. For, as it exists in
being composed of matter and form. Now that which is
itself and not in another, it is called “subsistence”; as we
composed of matter and form is the individual substance
say that those things subsist which exist in themselves,
called “hypostasis” and “person.” Therefore all the afore-
and not in another. As it underlies some common nature,
said names seem to have the same meaning.
it is called “a thing of nature”; as, for instance, this par-
Objection 4.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De
ticular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the
Duab. Nat.) that genera and species only subsist; whereas
accidents, it is called “hypostasis,” or “substance.” What
individuals are not only subsistent, but also substand. But
these three names signify in common to the whole genus
subsistences are so called from subsisting, as substance or
of substances, this name “person” signifies in the genus of
hypostasis is so called from substanding. Therefore, since
rational substances.
genera and species are not hypostases or persons, these
Reply to Objection 1. Among the Greeks the term
are not the same as subsistences.
“hypostasis,” taken in the strict interpretation of the word,
Objection 5. Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.)
signifies any individual of the genus substance; but in the
that matter is called hypostasis, and form is called ousio-
usual way of speaking, it means the individual of the ra-
sis—that is, subsistence. But neither form nor matter can tional nature, by reason of the excellence of that nature.
be called person. Therefore person differs from the others.
Reply to Objection 2. As we say “three persons” plu-
159
rally in God, and “three subsistences,” so the Greeks say when treating of divine simplicity (q. 3, a. 3).
“three hypostases.” But because the word “substance,”
Reply to Objection 4. Boethius says that genera and
which, properly speaking, corresponds in meaning to “hy-
species subsist, inasmuch as it belongs to some individ-
postasis,” is used among us in an equivocal sense, since
ual things to subsist, from the fact that they belong to
it sometimes means essence, and sometimes means hy-
genera and species comprised in the predicament of sub-
postasis, in order to avoid any occasion of error, it was
stance, but not because the species and genera themselves
thought preferable to use “subsistence” for hypostasis,
subsist; except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that
rather than “substance.”
the species of things subsisted separately from singular
Reply to Objection 3. Strictly speaking, the essence
things. To substand, however, belongs to the same indi-
is what is expressed by the definition. Now, the defini-
vidual things in relation to the accidents, which are out-
tion comprises the principles of the species, but not the
side the essence of genera and species.
individual principles. Hence in things composed of mat-
Reply to Objection 5. The individual composed of
ter and form, the essence signifies not only the form, nor
matter and form substands in relation to accident from the
only the matter, but what is composed of matter and the
very nature of matter. Hence Boethius says (De Trin.): “A
common form, as the principles of the species. But what
simple form cannot be a subject.” Its self-subsistence is
is composed of this matter and this form has the nature
derived from the nature of its form, which does not super-
of hypostasis and person. For soul, flesh, and bone be-
vene to the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to
long to the nature of man; whereas this soul, this flesh
the matter and makes it subsist as an individual. On this
and this bone belong to the nature of this man. Therefore
account, therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and
hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the
ousiosis, or subsistence, to the form, because the matter is idea of essence; nor are these identified with the essence
the principle of substanding, and form is the principle of
in things composed of matter and form, as we said above
subsisting.
Whether the word “person” should be said of God?
Ia q. 29 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the name “person”
God. Both because reason implies a discursive knowl-
should not be said of God.
For Dionysius says (Div.
edge, which does not apply to God, as we proved above
Nom.): “No one should ever dare to say or think any-
(q. 14, a. 12 ); and thus God cannot be said to have “a ra-
thing of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity, beyond
tional nature.” And also because God cannot be called an
what has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles.”
individual substance, since the principle of individuation
But the name “person” is not expressed to us in the Old or
is matter; while God is immaterial: nor is He the subject
New Testament. Therefore “person” is not to be applied
of accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore the
to God.
word “person” ought not to be attributed to God.
Objection 2. Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.):
On the contrary, In the Creed of Athanasius we say:
“The word person seems to be taken from those persons
“One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, an-
who represented men in comedies and tragedies. For per-
other of the Holy Ghost.”
son comes from sounding through [personando], since a
I answer that, “Person” signifies what is most perfect
greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity
in all nature—that is, a subsistent individual of a rational
in the mask. These “persons” or masks the Greeks called
nature. Hence, since everything that is perfect must be at-
prosopa, as they were placed on the face and covered the tributed to God, forasmuch as His essence contains every
features before the eyes.” This, however, can apply to God
perfection, this name “person” is fittingly applied to God;
only in a metaphorical sense. Therefore the word “per-
not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more
son” is only applied to God metaphorically.
excellent way; as other names also, which, while giv-
Objection 3. Further, every person is a hypostasis.
ing them to creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed
But the word “hypostasis” does not apply to God, since,
above when treating of the names of God (q. 13, a. 2).
as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), it signifies what is the
Reply to Objection 1. Although the word “person”
subject of accidents, which do not exist in God. Jerome
is not found applied to God in Scripture, either in the Old
also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that, “in this word hyposta-
or New Testament, nevertheless what the word signifies is
sis, poison lurks in honey.” Therefore the word “person”
found to be affirmed of God in many places of Scripture;
should not be said of God.
as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the
Objection 4. Further, if a definition is denied of any-
most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of God
thing, the thing defined is also denied of it. But the def-
only in the very terms themselves of Scripture, it would
inition of “person,” as given above, does not apply to
follow that no one could speak about God in any but the
160
original language of the Old or New Testament. The ur-does not underlie accidents; but it applies to Him in its ob-
gency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find new
jective sense, for it is imposed to signify the subsistence.
words to express the ancient faith about God. Nor is such
Jerome said that “poison lurks in this word,” forasmuch as
a kind of novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means
before it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics
profane, for it does not lead us astray from the sense of
used this term to deceive the simple, to make people pro-
Scripture. The Apostle warns us to avoid “profane novel-
fess many essences as they profess several hypostases,
ties of words” (1 Tim. 6:20).
inasmuch as the word “substance,” which corresponds to
Reply to Objection 2. Although this name “person”
hypostasis in Greek, is commonly taken amongst us to
may not belong to God as regards the origin of the term,
mean essence.
nevertheless it excellently belongs to God in its objective
Reply to Objection 4. It may be said that God has a
meaning. For as famous men were represented in come-
rational “nature,” if reason be taken to mean, not discur-
dies and tragedies, the name “person” was given to signify
sive thought, but in a general sense, an intelligent nature.
those who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high
But God cannot be called an “individual” in the sense that
rank in the Church came to be called “persons.” Thence
His individuality comes from matter; but only in the sense
by some the definition of person is given as “hypostasis
which implies incommunicability. “Substance” can be ap-
distinct by reason of dignity.” And because subsistence in
plied to God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence.
a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every indi-
There are some, however, who say that the definition of
vidual of the rational nature is called a “person.” Now the
Boethius, quoted above (a. 1), is not a definition of per-
dignity of the divine nature excels every other dignity; and
son in the sense we use when speaking of persons in God.
thus the name “person” pre-eminently belongs to God.
Therefore Richard of St. Victor amends this definition by
Reply to Objection 3. The word “hypostasis” does
adding that “Person” in God is “the incommunicable ex-
not apply to God as regards its source of origin, since He
istence of the divine nature.”
Whether this word “person” signifies relation?
Ia q. 29 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that this word “person,”
is predicated plurally of the Three in contrast to the nature
as applied to God, does not signify relation, but substance.
of the names belonging to the essence; nor does it in itself
For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6): “When we speak of
refer to another, as do the words which express relation.
the person of the Father, we mean nothing else but the sub-
Hence some have thought that this word “person” of
stance of the Father, for person is said in regard to Him-
itself expresses absolutely the divine essence; as this name
self, and not in regard to the Son.”
“God” and this word “Wise”; but that to meet heretical at-
Objection 2.
Further, the interrogation “What?”
tack, it was ordained by conciliar decree that it was to be
refers to essence. But, as Augustine says: “When we say
taken in a relative sense, and especially in the plural, or
there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the
with the addition of a distinguishing adjective; as when
Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked, Three what?
we say, “Three persons,” or, “one is the person of the Fa-
the answer is, Three persons.” Therefore person signifies
ther, another of the Son,” etc. Used, however, in the sin-
essence.
gular, it may be either absolute or relative. But this does
Objection 3. According to the Philosopher (Metaph.
not seem to be a satisfactory explanation; for, if this word
iv), the meaning of a word is its definition. But the def-
“person,” by force of its own signification, expresses the
inition of “person” is this: “The individual substance of
divine essence only, it follows that forasmuch as we speak
the rational nature,” as above stated. Therefore “person”
of “three persons,” so far from the heretics being silenced,
signifies substance.
they had still more reason to argue. Seeing this, others
Objection 4. Further, person in men and angels does
maintained that this word “person” in God signifies both
not signify relation, but something absolute. Therefore,
the essence and the relation. Some of these said that it sig-
if in God it signified relation, it would bear an equivocal
nifies directly the essence, and relation indirectly, foras-
meaning in God, in man, and in angels.
much as “person” means as it were “by itself one” [per se
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that “every
una]; and unity belongs to the essence. And what is “by
word that refers to the persons signifies relation.” But no
itself” implies relation indirectly; for the Father is under-
word belongs to person more strictly than the very word
stood to exist “by Himself,” as relatively distinct from the
“person” itself. Therefore this word “person” signifies re-
Son. Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it signi-
lation.
fies relation directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as
I answer that, A difficulty arises concerning the
in the definition of “person” the term nature is mentioned
meaning of this word “person” in God, from the fact that it
indirectly; and these come nearer to the truth.
161
To determine the question, we must consider that we can say that this signification of the word “person” was
something may be included in the meaning of a less com-
not clearly perceived before it was attacked by heretics.
mon term, which is not included in the more common
Hence, this word “person” was used just as any other ab-
term; as “rational” is included in the meaning of “man,”
solute term. But afterwards it was applied to express rela-
and not in the meaning of “animal.” So that it is one thing
tion, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this word to ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask
“person” means relation not only by use and custom, ac-
its meaning when the animal in question is man. Also, it
cording to the first opinion, but also by force of its own
is one thing to ask the meaning of this word “person” in
proper signification.
general; and another to ask the meaning of “person” as ap-
Reply to Objection 1. This word “person” is said in
plied to God. For “person” in general signifies the individ-
respect to itself, not to another; forasmuch as it signifies
ual substance of a rational figure. The individual in itself
relation not as such, but by way of a substance—which is
is undivided, but is distinct from others. Therefore “per-
a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine says that it signifies
son” in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature:
the essence, inasmuch as in God essence is the same as
thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones,
the hypostasis, because in God what He is, and whereby
and this soul, which are the individuating principles of a
He is are the same.
man, and which, though not belonging to “person” in gen-
Reply to Objection 2. The term “what” refers some-
eral, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular
times to the nature expressed by the definition, as when
human person.
we ask; What is man? and we answer: A mortal rational
Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin,
animal. Sometimes it refers to the “suppositum,” as when
as stated above (q. 28, Aa. 2,3), while relation in God is
we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A fish. So to
not as an accident in a subject, but is the divine essence it-
those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons.
self; and so it is subsistent, for the divine essence subsists.
Reply to Objection 3.
In God the individual—
Therefore, as the Godhead is God so the divine paternity
i.e. distinct and incommunicable substance—includes the
is God the Father, Who is a divine person. Therefore a
idea of relation, as above explained.
divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is
Reply to Objection 4. The different sense of the less
to signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation
common term does not produce equivocation in the more
is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in
common. Although a horse and an ass have their own
truth that which subsists in the divine nature is the divine
proper definitions, nevertheless they agree univocally in
nature itself. Thus it is true to say that the name “person”
animal, because the common definition of animal applies
signifies relation directly, and the essence indirectly; not,
to both. So it does not follow that, although relation is
however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way of
contained in the signification of divine person, but not in
a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the essence,
that of an angelic or of a human person, the word “person”
and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is the
is used in an equivocal sense. Though neither is it applied
same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is ex-
univocally, since nothing can be said univocally of God
pressed as distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as
and creatures (q. 13, a. 5).
such, enters into the notion of the person indirectly. Thus
162
FIRST PART, QUESTION 30
The Plurality of Persons in God
(In Four Articles)
We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are several persons in God?
(2) How many are they?
(3) What the numeral terms signify in God?
(4) The community of the term “person.”
Whether there are several persons in God?
Ia q. 30 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there are not several
say, “Three persons,” they say “Three hypostases.” We are
persons in God. For person is “the individual substance
not, however, accustomed to say Three substances, lest we
of a rational nature.” If then there are several persons in
be understood to mean three essences or natures, by rea-
God, there must be several substances; which appears to
son of the equivocal signification of the term.
be heretical.
Reply to Objection 2. The absolute properties in
Objection 2. Further, Plurality of absolute properties
God, such as goodness and wisdom, are not mutually op-
does not make a distinction of persons, either in God, or
posed; and hence, neither are they really distinguished
in ourselves. Much less therefore is this effected by a plu-
from each other. Therefore, although they subsist, nev-
rality of relations. But in God there is no plurality but of
ertheless they are not several subsistent realities—that is,
relations (q. 28, a. 3). Therefore there cannot be several
several persons. But the absolute properties in creatures
persons in God.
do not subsist, although they are really distinguished from
Objection 3. Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin.
each other, as whiteness and sweetness; on the other hand,
i), that “this is truly one which has no number.” But plu-
the relative properties in God subsist, and are really distin-
rality implies number. Therefore there are not several per-
guished from each other (q. 28, a. 3). Hence the plurality
sons in God.
of persons in God.
Objection 4. Further, where number is, there is whole
Reply to Objection 3. The supreme unity and sim-
and part. Thus, if in God there exist a number of persons,
plicity of God exclude every kind of plurality of absolute
there must be whole and part in God; which is inconsistent
things, but not plurality of relations. Because relations
with the divine simplicity.
are predicated relatively, and thus the relations do not im-
On the contrary, Athanasius says: “One is the per-
port composition in that of which they are predicated, as
son of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy
Boethius teaches in the same book.
Ghost.” Therefore the Father, and the Son, and the Holy
Reply to Objection 4. Number is twofold, simple or
Ghost are several persons.
absolute, as two and three and four; and number as exist-
I answer that, It follows from what precedes that
ing in things numbered, as two men and two horses. So, if
there are several persons in God. For it was shown above
number in God is taken absolutely or abstractedly, there is
(q. 29, a. 4) that this word “person” signifies in God a
nothing to prevent whole and part from being in Him, and
relation as subsisting in the divine nature. It was also es-
thus number in Him is only in our way of understanding;
tablished (q. 28, a. 1) that there are several real relations
forasmuch as number regarded apart from things num-
in God; and hence it follows that there are also several
bered exists only in the intellect. But if number be taken
realities subsistent in the divine nature; which means that
as it is in the things numbered, in that sense as existing in
there are several persons in God.
creatures, one is part of two, and two of three, as one man
Reply to Objection 1. The definition of “person” in-
is part of two men, and two of three; but this does not ap-
cludes “substance,” not as meaning the essence, but the
ply to God, because the Father is of the same magnitude
“suppositum” which is made clear by the addition of the
as the whole Trinity, as we shall show further on (q. 42,
term “individual.” To signify the substance thus under-
Aa. 1, 4).
stood, the Greeks use the name “hypostasis.” So, as we
163
Whether there are more than three persons in God?
Ia q. 30 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there are more than
the other to the other. Now, procession cannot belong to
three persons in God. For the plurality of persons in God
the Father and the Son, or to either of them; for thus it
arises from the plurality of the relative properties as stated
would follows that the procession of the intellect, which
above (a. 1). But there are four relations in God as stated
in God is generation, wherefrom paternity and filiation are
above (q. 28, a. 4), paternity, filiation, common spiration,
derived, would issue from the procession of love, whence
and procession. Therefore there are four persons in God.
spiration and procession are derived, if the person gener-
Objection 2. The nature of God does not differ from
ating and the person generated proceeded from the person
His will more than from His intellect. But in God, one per-
spirating; and this is against what was laid down above
son proceeds from the will, as love; and another proceeds
(q. 27 , Aa. 3,4). We must frequently admit that spiration
from His nature, as Son. Therefore another proceeds from
belongs to the person of the Father, and to the person of
His intellect, as Word, besides the one Who proceeds from
the Son, forasmuch as it has no relative opposition either
His nature, as Son; thus again it follows that there are not
to paternity or to filiation; and consequently that proces-
only three persons in God.
sion belongs to the other person who is called the person
Objection 3. Further, the more perfect a creature is,
of the Holy Ghost, who proceeds by way of love, as above
the more interior operations it has; as a man has under-
explained. Therefore only three persons exist in God, the
standing and will beyond other animals. But God in-
Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.
finitely excels every creature. Therefore in God not only
Reply to Objection 1. Although there are four rela-
is there a person proceeding from the will, and another
tions in God, one of them, spiration, is not separated from
from the intellect, but also in an infinite number of ways.
the person of the Father and of the Son, but belongs to
Therefore there are an infinite number of persons in God.
both; thus, although it is a relation, it is not called a prop-
Objection 4. Further, it is from the infinite goodness
erty, because it does not belong to only one person; nor
of the Father that He communicates Himself infinitely in
is it a personal relation—i.e. constituting a person. The
the production of a divine person. But also in the Holy
three relations—paternity, filiation, and procession—are
Ghost is infinite goodness. Therefore the Holy Ghost pro-
called personal properties, constituting as it were the per-
duces a divine person; and that person another; and so to
sons; for paternity is the person of the Father, filiation is
infinity.
the person of the Son, procession is the person of the Holy
Objection 5. Further, everything within a determinate
Ghost proceeding.
number is measured, for number is a measure. But the
Reply to Objection 2. That which proceeds by way of
divine persons are immense, as we say in the Creed of
intelligence, as word, proceeds according to similitude, as
Athanasius: “The Father is immense, the Son is immense,
also that which proceeds by way of nature; thus, as above
the Holy Ghost is immense.” Therefore the persons are
explained (q. 27, a. 3), the procession of the divine Word
not contained within the number three.
is the very same as generation by way of nature. But love,
On the contrary, It is said: “There are three who
as such, does not proceed as the similitude of that whence
bear witness in heaven, the father, the Word, and the Holy
it proceeds; although in God love is co-essential as being
Ghost” (1 Jn. 5:7). To those who ask, “Three what?” we
divine; and therefore the procession of love is not called
answer, with Augustine (De Trin. vii, 4), “Three persons.”
generation in God.
Therefore there are but three persons in God.
Reply to Objection 3. As man is more perfect than
I answer that, As was explained above, there can be
other animals, he has more intrinsic operations than other
only three persons in God. For it was shown above that the
animals, because his perfection is something composite.
several persons are the several subsisting relations really
Hence the angels, who are more perfect and more simple,
distinct from each other. But a real distinction between the
have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for they have no
divine relations can come only from relative opposition.
imagination, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists
Therefore two opposite relations must needs refer to two
only one real operation—that is, His essence. How there
persons: and if any relations are not opposite they must
are in Him two processions was above explained (q. 27,
needs belong to the same person. Since then paternity and
Aa. 1,4).
filiation are opposite relations, they belong necessarily to
Reply to Objection 4. This argument would prove if
two persons. Therefore the subsisting paternity is the per-
the Holy Ghost possessed another goodness apart from the
son of the Father; and the subsisting filiation is the person
goodness of the Father; for then if the Father produced a
of the Son. The other two relations are not opposed to
divine person by His goodness, the Holy Ghost also would
each other; therefore these two cannot belong to one per-
do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have one and
son: hence either one of them must belong to both of the
the same goodness. Nor is there any distinction between
aforesaid persons; or one must belong to one person, and
them except by the personal relations. So goodness be-
164
longs to the Holy Ghost, as derived from another; and it as a simple number, existing in the mind only, is measured
belongs to the Father, as the principle of its communica-
by one. But when we speak of a number of things as ap-
tion to another. The opposition of relation does not allow
plied to the persons in God, the notion of measure has no
the relation of the Holy Ghost to be joined with the re-
place, because the magnitude of the three persons is the
lation of principle of another divine person; because He
same (q. 42, Aa. 1,4), and the same is not measured by
Himself proceeds from the other persons who are in God.
the same.
Reply to Objection 5. A determinate number, if taken
Whether the numeral terms denote anything real in God?
Ia q. 30 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the numeral terms de-
of multitude, said that as knowledge exists in God accord-
note something real in God. For the divine unity is the di-
ing to the strict sense of the word, but not in the sense of
vine essence. But every number is unity repeated. There-
its genus (as in God there is no such thing as a quality), so
fore every numeral term in God signifies the essence; and
number exists in God in the proper sense of number, but
therefore it denotes something real in God.
not in the sense of its genus, which is quantity.
Objection 2. Further, whatever is said of God and of
But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are
creatures, belongs to God in a more eminent manner than
not derived from number, a species of quantity, for in that
to creatures. But the numeral terms denote something real
sense they could bear only a metaphorical sense in God,
in creatures; therefore much more so in God.
like other corporeal properties, such as length, breadth,
Objection 3. Further, if the numeral terms do not de-
and the like; but that they are taken from multitude in a
note anything real in God, and are introduced simply in a
transcendent sense. Now multitude so understood has re-
negative and removing sense, as plurality is employed to
lation to the many of which it is predicated, as “one” con-
remove unity, and unity to remove plurality; it follows that
vertible with “being” is related to being; which kind of
a vicious circle results, confusing the mind and obscuring
oneness does not add anything to being, except a negation
the truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be
of division, as we saw when treating of the divine unity
said that the numeral terms denote something real in God.
(q. 11, a. 1); for “one” signifies undivided being. So, of
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): “If we ad-
whatever we say “one,” we imply its undivided reality:
mit companionship”—that is, plurality—“we exclude the
thus, for instance, “one” applied to man signifies the un-
idea of oneness and of solitude;” and Ambrose says (De
divided nature or substance of a man. In the same way,
Fide i): “When we say one God, unity excludes plurality
when we speak of many things, multitude in this latter
of gods, and does not imply quantity in God.” Hence we
sense points to those things as being each undivided in
see that these terms are applied to God in order to remove
itself.
something; and not to denote anything positive.
But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes
I answer that, The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers
an accident added to being; as also does “one” which is
that the numeral terms do not denote anything positive in
the principle of that number. Therefore the numeral terms
God, but have only a negative meaning. Others, however,
in God signify the things of which they are said, and be-
assert the contrary.
yond this they add negation only, as stated (Sent. i, D,
In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all
24); in which respect the Master was right (Sent. i, D,
plurality is a consequence of division. Now division is
24). So when we say, the essence is one, the term “one”
twofold; one is material, and is division of the continu-
signifies the essence undivided; and when we say the per-
ous; from this results number, which is a species of quan-
son is one, it signifies the person undivided; and when we
tity. Number in this sense is found only in material things
say the persons are many, we signify those persons, and
which have quantity. The other kind of division is called
their individual undividedness; for it is of the very nature
formal, and is effected by opposite or diverse forms; and
of multitude that it should be composed of units.
this kind of division results in a multitude, which does not
Reply to Objection 1. One, as it is a transcendental, is belong to a genus, but is transcendental in the sense in
wider and more general than substance and relation. And
which being is divided by one and by many. This kind of
so likewise is multitude; hence in God it may mean both
multitude is found only in immaterial things.
substance and relation, according to the context. Still, the
Some, considering only that multitude which is a
very signification of such names adds a negation of di-
species of discrete quantity, and seeing that such kind of
vision, beyond substance and relation; as was explained
quantity has no place in God, asserted that the numeral
above.
terms do not denote anything real in God, but remove
Reply to Objection 2.
Multitude, which denotes
something from Him. Others, considering the same kind
something real in creatures, is a species of quantity, and
165
cannot be used when speaking of God: unlike transcen-unity (q. 11, a. 2).
dental multitude, which adds only indivision to those of
It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite ar-
which it is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is appli-
guments do not sufficiently prove the point advanced. Al-
cable to God.
though the idea of solitude is excluded by plurality, and
Reply to Objection 3. “One” does not exclude multi-
the plurality of gods by unity, it does not follow that these
tude, but division, which logically precedes one or mul-
terms express this signification alone. For blackness is
titude.
Multitude does not remove unity, but division
excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness
from each of the individuals which compose the multi-
does not signify the mere exclusion of blackness.
tude. This was explained when we treated of the divine
Whether this term “person” can be common to the three persons?
Ia q. 30 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that this term “person”
excluded by the fact that “person” is not a name of exclu-
cannot be common to the three persons.
For nothing
sion nor of intention, but the name of a reality. We must
is common to the three persons but the essence.
But
therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name
this term “person” does not signify the essence directly.
“person” is common by a community of idea, not as genus
Therefore it is not common to all three.
or species, but as a vague individual thing. The names of
Objection 2. Further, the common is the opposite to
genera and species, as man or animal, are given to signify
the incommunicable. But the very meaning of person is
the common natures themselves, but not the intentions of
that it is incommunicable; as appears from the definition
those common natures, signified by the terms “genus” or
given by Richard of St. Victor (q. 29, a. 3, ad 4). There-
“species.” The vague individual thing, as “some man,”
fore this term “person” is not common to all the three per-
signifies the common nature with the determinate mode
sons.
of existence of singular things—that is, something self-
Objection 3. Further, if the name “person” is common
subsisting, as distinct from others. But the name of a des-
to the three, it is common either really, or logically. But
ignated singular thing signifies that which distinguishes
it is not so really; otherwise the three persons would be
the determinate thing; as the name Socrates signifies this
one person; nor again is it so logically; otherwise person
flesh and this bone. But there is this difference—that the
would be a universal. But in God there is neither univer-
term “some man” signifies the nature, or the individual on
sal nor particular; neither genus nor species, as we proved
the part of its nature, with the mode of existence of singu-
above (q. 3, a. 5). Therefore this term ‘person’ is not com-
lar things; while this name “person” is not given to signify
mon to the three.
the individual on the part of the nature, but the subsistent
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that
reality in that nature. Now this is common in idea to the
when we ask, “Three what?” we say, “Three persons,” be-
divine persons, that each of them subsists distinctly from
cause what a person is, is common to them.
the others in the divine nature. Thus this name “person”
I answer that, The very mode of expression itself
is common in idea to the three divine persons.
shows that this term “person” is common to the three
Reply to Objection 1. This argument is founded on a
when we say “three persons”; for when we say “three
real community.
men” we show that “man” is common to the three. Now it
Reply to Objection 2. Although person is incommu-
is clear that this is not community of a real thing, as if one
nicable, yet the mode itself of incommunicable existence
essence were common to the three; otherwise there would
can be common to many.
be only one person of the three, as also one essence.
Reply to Objection 3. Although this community is
What is meant by such a community has been vari-
logical and not real, yet it does not follow that in God
ously determined by those who have examined the sub-
there is universal or particular, or genus, or species; both
ject. Some have called it a community of exclusion, foras-
because neither in human affairs is the community of per-
much as the definition of “person” contains the word “in-
son the same as community of genus or species; and be-
communicable.” Others thought it to be a community of
cause the divine persons have one being; whereas genus
intention, as the definition of person contains the word
and species and every other universal are predicated of
“individual”; as we say that to be a “species” is common
many which differ in being.
to horse and ox. Both of these explanations, however, are
166
FIRST PART, QUESTION 31
Of What Belongs to the Unity or Plurality in God
(In Four Articles)
We now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in God; which gives rise to four points of inquiry: (1) Concerning the word “Trinity”;
(2) Whether we can say that the Son is other than the Father?
(3) Whether an exclusive term, which seems to exclude otherness, can be joined to an essential name in God?
(4) Whether it can be joined to a personal term?
Whether there is trinity in God?
Ia q. 31 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem there is not trinity in God.
number of persons of one essence; and on this account we
For every name in God signifies substance or relation. But
cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not three
this name “Trinity” does not signify the substance; other-
persons. Yet it does not mean the relations themselves of
wise it would be predicated of each one of the persons:
the Persons, but rather the number of persons related to
nor does it signify relation; for it does not express a name
each other; and hence it is that the word in itself does not
that refers to another. Therefore the word “Trinity” is not
express regard to another.
to be applied to God.
Reply to Objection 2. Two things are implied in a
Objection 2. Further, this word “trinity” is a collec-
collective term, plurality of the “supposita,” and a unity
tive term, since it signifies multitude. But such a word
of some kind of order. For “people” is a multitude of men
does not apply to God; as the unity of a collective name is
comprehended under a certain order. In the first sense,
the least of unities, whereas in God there exists the great-
this word “trinity” is like other collective words; but in
est possible unity. Therefore this word “trinity” does not
the second sense it differs from them, because in the di-
apply to God.
vine Trinity not only is there unity of order, but also with
Objection 3. Further, every trine is threefold. But in
this there is unity of essence.
God there is not triplicity; since triplicity is a kind of in-
Reply to Objection 3. “Trinity” is taken in an abso-
equality. Therefore neither is there trinity in God.
lute sense; for it signifies the threefold number of persons.
Objection 4. Further, all that exists in God exists in
“Triplicity” signifies a proportion of inequality; for it is
the unity of the divine essence; because God is His own
a species of unequal proportion, according to Boethius
essence. Therefore, if Trinity exists in God, it exists in the
(Arithm. i, 23). Therefore in God there is not triplicity,
unity of the divine essence; and thus in God there would
but Trinity.
be three essential unities; which is heresy.
Reply to Objection 4. In the divine Trinity is to be
Objection 5. Further, in all that is said of God, the
understood both number and the persons numbered. So
concrete is predicated of the abstract; for Deity is God
when we say, “Trinity in Unity,” we do not place num-
and paternity is the Father. But the Trinity cannot be
ber in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three times
called trine; otherwise there would be nine realities in
one; but we place the Persons numbered in the unity of
God; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore the word
nature; as the “supposita” of a nature are said to exist in
trinity is not to be applied to God.
that nature. On the other hand, we say “Unity in Trinity”;
On the contrary, Athanasius says: “Unity in Trinity;
meaning that the nature is in its “supposita.”
and Trinity in Unity is to be revered.”
Reply to Objection 5. When we say, “Trinity is trine,”
I answer that, The name “Trinity” in God signifies
by reason of the number implied, we signify the multipli-
the determinate number of persons. And so the plurality
cation of that number by itself; since the word trine im-
of persons in God requires that we should use the word
ports a distinction in the “supposita” of which it is spoken.
trinity; because what is indeterminately signified by plu-
Therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity is trine; other-
rality, is signified by trinity in a determinate manner.
wise it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there would be
Reply to Objection 1. In its etymological sense, this
three “supposita” of the Trinity; as when we say, “God
word “Trinity” seems to signify the one essence of the
is trine,” it follows that there are three “supposita” of the
three persons, according as trinity may mean trine-unity.
Godhead.
But in the strict meaning of the term it rather signifies the
167
Whether the Son is other than the Father?
Ia q. 31 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the Son is not other
quality be taken away, we avoid the use of the term “dis-
than the Father. For “other” is a relative term implying
parity”: and lest we remove similitude, we avoid the terms
diversity of substance. If, then, the Son is other than the
“alien” and “discrepant.” For Ambrose says (De Fide i)
Father, He must be different from the Father; which is
that “in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy, but
contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. vii), that when
one Godhead”: and according to Hilary, as quoted above,
we speak of three persons, “we do not mean to imply di-
“in God there is nothing alien, nothing separable.”
versity.”
To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the
Objection 2. Further, whosoever are other from one
term “singularity,” lest we take away the communicabil-
another, differ in some way from one another. Therefore,
ity of the divine essence. Hence Hilary says (De Trin.
if the Son is other than the Father, it follows that He differs vii): “It is sacrilege to assert that the Father and the Son
from the Father; which is against what Ambrose says (De
are separate in Godhead.” We must avoid the adjective
Fide i), that “the Father and the Son are one in Godhead;
“only” [unici] lest we take away the number of persons.
nor is there any difference in substance between them, nor
Hence Hilary says in the same book: “We exclude from
any diversity.”
God the idea of singularity or uniqueness.” Nevertheless,
Objection 3. Further, the term alien is taken from
we say “the only Son,” for in God there is no plurality
“alius” [other]. But the Son is not alien from the Father,
of Sons. Yet, we do not say “the only God,” for the De-
for Hilary says (De Trin. vii) that “in the divine persons
ity is common to several. We avoid the word “confused,”
there is nothing diverse, nothing alien, nothing separable.”
lest we take away from the Persons the order of their na-
Therefore the Son is not other that the Father.
ture. Hence Ambrose says (De Fide i): “What is one is
Objection 4. Further, the terms “other person” and
not confused; and there is no multiplicity where there is
“other thing” [alius et aliud] have the same meaning, dif-
no difference.” The word “solitary” is also to be avoided,
fering only in gender. So if the Son is another person from
lest we take away the society of the three persons; for, as
the Father, it follows that the Son is a thing apart from the
Hilary says (De Trin. iv), “We confess neither a solitary
Father.
nor a diverse God.”
On the contrary, Augustine∗ says: “There is one
This word “other” [alius], however, in the masculine
essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which
sense, means only a distinction of “suppositum”; and
the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy
hence we can properly say that “the Son is other than the
Ghost another; although the Father is one person, the Son
Father,” because He is another “suppositum” of the divine
another, and the Holy Ghost another.”
nature, as He is another person and another hypostasis.
I answer that, Since as Jerome remarks†, a heresy
Reply to Objection 1. “Other,” being like the name of
arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the
a particular thing, refers to the “suppositum”; and so, there
Trinity we must proceed with care and with befitting mod-
is sufficient reason for using it, where there is a distinct
esty; because, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), “nowhere
substance in the sense of hypostasis or person. But diver-
is error more harmful, the quest more toilsome, the find-
sity requires a distinct substance in the sense of essence.
ing more fruitful.” Now, in treating of the Trinity, we must
Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Fa-
beware of two opposite errors, and proceed cautiously be-
ther, although He is another.
tween them—namely, the error of Arius, who placed a
Reply to Objection 2. “Difference” implies distinc-
Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the
tion of form. There is one form in God, as appears from
error of Sabellius, who placed unity of person with the
the text, “Who, when He was in the form of God” (Phil.
unity of essence.
2:6). Therefore the term “difference” does not properly
Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use
apply to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet,
of the terms diversity and difference in God, lest we take
Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 5) employs the term “differ-
away the unity of essence: we may, however, use the term
ence” in the divine persons, as meaning that the relative
“distinction” on account of the relative opposition. Hence
property is signified by way of form. Hence he says that
whenever we find terms of “diversity” or “difference” of
the hypostases do not differ from each other in substance,
Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of “diver-
but according to determinate properties. But “difference”
sity” or “difference” are taken to mean “distinction.” But
is taken for “distinction,” as above stated.
lest the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be
Reply to Objection 3. The term “alien” means what
taken away, the terms “separation” and “division,” which
is extraneous and dissimilar; which is not expressed by the
belong to the parts of a whole, are to be avoided: and lest
term “other” [alius]; and therefore we say that the Son is
∗ Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i.
† In substance, Ep. lvii.
168
“other” than the Father, but not that He is anything “alien.”
is this man? we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the
Reply to Objection 4. The neuter gender is formless;
“suppositum”; whereas, if we ask, What is he? we reply,
whereas the masculine is formed and distinct; and so is the
A rational and mortal animal. So, because in God distinc-
feminine. So the common essence is properly and aptly
tion is by the persons, and not by the essence, we say that
expressed by the neuter gender, but by the masculine and
the Father is other than the Son, but not something else;
feminine is expressed the determined subject in the com-
while conversely we say that they are one thing, but not
mon nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who
one person.
Whether the exclusive word “alone” should be added to the essential term in God?
Ia q. 31 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the exclusive word
vents the term “alone” being joined to any essential term
“alone” [solus] is not to be added to an essential term in
in God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God;
God. For, according to the Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3),
as if we said “God alone is eternal,” because nothing but
“He is alone who is not with another.” But God is with
God is eternal.
the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we can-
Reply to Objection 1. Although the angels and the
not say that God is alone.
souls of the saints are always with God, nevertheless, if
Objection 2. Further, whatever is joined to the essen-
plurality of persons did not exist in God, He would be
tial term in God can be predicated of every person “per
alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by associa-
se,” and of all the persons together; for, as we can prop-
tion with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus any-
erly say that God is wise, we can say the Father is a wise
one is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants
God; and the Trinity is a wise God. But Augustine says
and animals are with him in the garden. Likewise, God
(De Trin. vi, 9): “We must consider the opinion that the
would be alone or solitary, though angels and men were
Father is not true God alone.” Therefore God cannot be
with Him, supposing that several persons were not within
said to be alone.
Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does not
Objection 3.
Further if this expression “alone” is
take away absolute solitude from God; much less does it
joined to an essential term, it would be so joined as re-
remove respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.
gards either the personal predicate or the essential predi-
Reply to Objection 2. This expression “alone,” prop-
cate. But it cannot be the former, as it is false to say, “God
erly speaking, does not affect the predicate, which is taken
alone is Father,” since man also is a father; nor, again, can
formally, for it refers to the “suppositum,” as excluding
it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this saying were
any other suppositum from the one which it qualifies. But
true, “God alone creates,” it would follow that the “Father
the adverb “only,” being exclusive, can be applied either
alone creates,” as whatever is said of God can be said of
to subject or predicate. For we can say, “Only Socrates”—
the Father; and it would be false, as the Son also creates.
that is, no one else—“runs: and Socrates runs only”—that
Therefore this expression “alone” cannot be joined to an
is, he does nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that
essential term in God.
the Father is God alone, or the Trinity is God alone, un-
On the contrary, It is said, “To the King of ages, im-
less some implied meaning be assumed in the predicate,
mortal, invisible, the only God” (1 Tim. 1:17).
as, for instance, “The Trinity is God Who alone is God.”
I answer that, This term “alone” can be taken as a
In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is that God categorematical term, or as a syncategorematical term.
Who alone is God, if the relative be referred to the pred-
A categorematical term is one which ascribes absolutely
icate, and not to the “suppositum.” So, when Augustine
its meaning to a given “suppositum”; as, for instance,
says that the Father is not God alone, but that the Trinity
“white” to man, as when we say a “white man.” If the
is God alone, he speaks expositively, as he might explain
term “alone” is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way
the words, “To the King of ages, invisible, the only God,”
be joined to any term in God; for it would mean solitude
as applying not to the Father, but to the Trinity alone.
in the term to which it is joined; and it would follow that
Reply to Objection 3. In both ways can the term
God was solitary, against what is above stated (a. 2). A
“alone” be joined to an essential term. For this proposi-
syncategorematical term imports the order of the predi-
tion, “God alone is Father,” can mean two things, because
cate to the subject; as this expression “every one” or “no
the word “Father” can signify the person of the Father; and
one”; and likewise the term “alone,” as excluding every
then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can signify
other “suppositum” from the predicate. Thus, when we
that relation only; and thus it is false, because the relation
say, “Socrates alone writes,” we do not mean that Socrates
of paternity is found also in others, though not in a uni-
is solitary, but that he has no companion in writing, though
vocal sense. Likewise it is true to say God alone creates;
many others may be with him. In this way nothing pre-
nor, does it follow, “therefore the Father alone creates,”
169
because, as logicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the tained in that term: for instance, from the premiss, “Man
term to which it is joined that what is said exclusively of
alone is a mortal rational animal,” we cannot conclude,
that term cannot be said exclusively of an individual con-
“therefore Socrates alone is such.”
Whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term?
Ia q. 31 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that an exclusive diction
Father together with Him.” This, however, is not the usual
can be joined to the personal term, even though the predi-
way of speaking, unless we understand another implica-
cate is common. For our Lord speaking to the Father, said:
tion, as though we said “He who alone is called the Father
“That they may know Thee, the only true God” (Jn. 17:3).
is God.” But in the strict sense the exclusion affects the
Therefore the Father alone is true God.
predicate. And thus the proposition is false if it excludes
Objection 2. Further, He said: “No one knows the
another in the masculine sense; but true if it excludes it in
Son but the Father” (Mat. 11:27); which means that the
the neuter sense; because the Son is another person than
Father alone knows the Son. But to know the Son is com-
the Father, but not another thing; and the same applies to
mon (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion fol-
the Holy Ghost. But because this diction “alone,” prop-
lows.
erly speaking, refers to the subject, it tends to exclude an-
Objection 3. Further, an exclusive diction does not
other Person rather than other things. Hence such a way
exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which
of speaking is not to be taken too literally, but it should be
it is joined. Hence it does not exclude the part, nor the
piously expounded, whenever we find it in an authentic
universal; for it does not follow that if we say “Socrates
work.
alone is white,” that therefore “his hand is not white,” or
Reply to Objection 1. When we say, “Thee the only
that “man is not white.” But one person is in the concept
true God,” we do not understand it as referring to the per-
of another; as the Father is in the concept of the Son; and
son of the Father, but to the whole Trinity, as Augustine
conversely. Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is
expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if understood of the person
God, we do not exclude the Son, nor the Holy Ghost; so
of the Father, the other persons are not excluded by rea-
that such a mode of speaking is true.
son of the unity of essence; in so far as the word “only”
Objection 4. Further, the Church sings: “Thou alone
excludes another thing, as above explained.
art Most High, O Jesus Christ.”
The same Reply can be given to obj. 2. For an essen-
On the contrary, This proposition “The Father alone
tial term applied to the Father does not exclude the Son or
is God” includes two assertions—namely, that the Father
the Holy Ghost, by reason of the unity of essence. Hence
is God, and that no other besides the Father is God. But
we must understand that in the text quoted the term “no
this second proposition is false, for the Son is another
one”∗ is not the same as “no man,” which the word itself
from the Father, and He is God. Therefore this is false,
would seem to signify (for the person of the Father could
The Father alone is God; and the same of the like sayings.
not be excepted), but is taken according to the usual way
I answer that, When we say, “The Father alone is
of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any rational
God,” such a proposition can be taken in several senses.
nature.
If “alone” means solitude in the Father, it is false in a cat-
Reply to Objection 3. The exclusive diction does not
egorematical sense; but if taken in a syncategorematical
exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which
sense it can again be understood in several ways. For if
it is adjoined, if they do not differ in “suppositum,” as part
it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is
and universal. But the Son differs in “suppositum” from
true, the sense being “the Father alone is God”—that is,
the Father; and so there is no parity.
“He who with no other is the Father, is God.” In this way
Reply to Objection 4. We do not say absolutely that
Augustine expounds when he says (De Trin. vi, 6): “We
the Son alone is Most High; but that He alone is Most
say the Father alone, not because He is separate from the
High “with the Holy Ghost, in the glory of God the Fa-
Son, or from the Holy Ghost, but because they are not the
ther.”
∗ Nemo = non-homo, i.e. no man
170
FIRST PART, QUESTION 32
The Knowledge of the Divine Persons
(In Four Articles)
We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons; and this involves four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason?
(2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons?
(3) The number of the notions?
(4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these notions?
Whether the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason?
Ia q. 32 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the trinity of the di-
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. i), “Let no
vine persons can be known by natural reason. For philoso-
man think to reach the sacred mystery of generation by
phers came to the knowledge of God not otherwise than
his own mind.” And Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 5), “It is
by natural reason. Now we find that they said many things
impossible to know the secret of generation. The mind
about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Coelo
fails, the voice is silent.” But the trinity of the divine per-
et Mundo i, 2): “Through this number”—namely, three—
sons is distinguished by origin of generation and proces-
“we bring ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one
sion (q. 30, a. 2). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and
God, surpassing all things created.” And Augustine says
with his understanding grasp that for which no necessary
(Confess. vii, 9): “I have read in their works, not in so
reason can be given, it follows that the trinity of persons
many words, but enforced by many and various reasons,
cannot be known by reason.
that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with
I answer that, It is impossible to attain to the knowl-
God, and the Word was God,” and so on; in which passage
edge of the Trinity by natural reason. For, as above ex-
the distinction of persons is laid down. We read, more-
plained (q. 12, Aa. 4,12), man cannot obtain the knowl-
over, in a gloss on Rom. 1 and Ex. 8 that the magicians of
edge of God by natural reason except from creatures. Now
Pharaoh failed in the third sign—that is, as regards knowl-
creatures lead us to the knowledge of God, as effects do to
edge of a third person—i.e. of the Holy Ghost —and thus
their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason we can know
it is clear that they knew at least two persons. Likewise
of God that only which of necessity belongs to Him as
Trismegistus says: “The monad begot a monad, and re-
the principle of things, and we have cited this fundamen-
flected upon itself its own heat.” By which words the
tal principle in treating of God as above (q. 12, a. 12).
generation of the Son and procession of the Holy Ghost
Now, the creative power of God is common to the whole
seem to be indicated. Therefore knowledge of the divine
Trinity; and hence it belongs to the unity of the essence,
persons can be obtained by natural reason.
and not to the distinction of the persons. Therefore, by
Objection 2. Further, Richard St. Victor says (De
natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of
Trin. i, 4): “I believe without doubt that probable and even
the essence, but not what belongs to the distinction of the
necessary arguments can be found for any explanation of
persons. Whoever, then, tries to prove the trinity of per-
the truth.” So even to prove the Trinity some have brought
sons by natural reason, derogates from faith in two ways.
forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God, who
Firstly, as regards the dignity of faith itself, which consists communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the
in its being concerned with invisible things, that exceed
divine persons; while some are moved by the considera-
human reason; wherefore the Apostle says that “faith is of
tion that “no good thing can be joyfully possessed with-
things that appear not” (Heb. 11:1), and the same Apostle
out partnership.” Augustine proceeds (De Trin. x, 4; x,
says also, “We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not
11,12) to prove the trinity of persons by the procession of
the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world;
the word and of love in our own mind; and we have fol-
but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery which is
lowed him in this (q. 27 , Aa. 1,3). Therefore the trinity
hidden” (1 Cor. 2:6,7). Secondly, as regards the utility
of persons can be known by natural reason.
of drawing others to the faith. For when anyone in the en-
Objection 3. Further, it seems to be superfluous to
deavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are
teach what cannot be known by natural reason. But it
not cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers:
ought not to be said that the divine tradition of the Trin-
since they suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and
ity is superfluous. Therefore the trinity of persons can be
that we believe on such grounds.
known by natural reason.
Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of
171
faith, except by authority alone, to those who receive the ral science, where sufficient proof can be brought to show
authority; while as regards others it suffices to prove that
that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform
what faith teaches is not impossible. Hence it is said by
velocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as fur-
Dionysius (Div. Nom. ii): “Whoever wholly resists the
nishing a sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming
word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he re-
an already established principle, by showing the congruity
gards the truth of the word”—i.e. “the sacred word, we
of its results, as in astrology the theory of eccentrics and
too follow this rule.”
epicycles is considered as established, because thereby the
Reply to Objection 1. The philosophers did not know
sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be
the mystery of the trinity of the divine persons by its
explained; not, however, as if this proof were sufficient,
proper attributes, such as paternity, filiation, and proces-
forasmuch as some other theory might explain them. In
sion, according to the Apostle’s words, “We speak the
the first way, we can prove that God is one; and the like.
wisdom of God which none of the princes of the world”—
In the second way, reasons avail to prove the Trinity; as,
i.e. the philosophers—“knew” (1 Cor. 2:6). Nevertheless,
when assumed to be true, such reasons confirm it. We
they knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to
must not, however, think that the trinity of persons is ad-
the persons, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son,
equately proved by such reasons. This becomes evident
goodness to the Holy Ghost; as will later on appear. So,
when we consider each point; for the infinite goodness
when Aristotle said, “By this number,” etc., we must not
of God is manifested also in creation, because to produce
take it as if he affirmed a threefold number in God, but
from nothing is an act of infinite power. For if God com-
that he wished to say that the ancients used the threefold
municates Himself by His infinite goodness, it is not nec-
number in their sacrifices and prayers on account of some
essary that an infinite effect should proceed from God: but
perfection residing in the number three. In the Platonic
that according to its own mode and capacity it should re-
books also we find, “In the beginning was the word,” not
ceive the divine goodness. Likewise, when it is said that
as meaning the Person begotten in God, but as meaning
joyous possession of good requires partnership, this holds
the ideal type whereby God made all things, and which is
in the case of one not having perfect goodness: hence it
appropriated to the Son. And although they knew these
needs to share some other’s good, in order to have the
were appropriated to the three persons, yet they are said
goodness of complete happiness. Nor is the image in our
to have failed in the third sign—that is, in the knowl-
mind an adequate proof in the case of God, forasmuch
edge of the third person, because they deviated from the
as the intellect is not in God and ourselves univocally.
goodness appropriated to the Holy Ghost, in that know-
Hence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in Joan.) that by
ing God “they did not glorify Him as God” (Rom. 1);
faith we arrive at knowledge, and not conversely.
or, because the Platonists asserted the existence of one
Reply to Objection 3. There are two reason why the
Primal Being whom they also declared to be the father
knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for us. It
of the universe, they consequently maintained the exis-
was necessary for the right idea of creation. The fact of
tence of another substance beneath him, which they called
saying that God made all things by His Word excludes
“mind” or the “paternal intellect,” containing the idea of
the error of those who say that God produced things by
all things, as Macrobius relates (Som. Scip. iv). They
necessity. When we say that in Him there is a proces-
did not, however, assert the existence of a third separate
sion of love, we show that God produced creatures not be-
substance which might correspond to the Holy Ghost. So
cause He needed them, nor because of any other extrinsic
also we do not assert that the Father and the Son differ in
reason, but on account of the love of His own goodness.
substance, which was the error of Origen and Arius, who
So Moses, when he had said, “In the beginning God cre-
in this followed the Platonists. When Trismegistus says,
ated heaven and earth,” subjoined, “God said, Let there be
“Monad begot monad,” etc., this does not refer to the gen-
light,” to manifest the divine Word; and then said, “God
eration of the Son, or to the procession of the Holy Ghost,
saw the light that it was good,” to show proof of the di-
but to the production of the world. For one God produced
vine love. The same is also found in the other works of
one world by reason of His love for Himself.
creation. In another way, and chiefly, that we may think
Reply to Objection 2. Reason may be employed in
rightly concerning the salvation of the human race, ac-
two ways to establish a point: firstly, for the purpose of
complished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the
furnishing sufficient proof of some principle, as in natu-
Holy Ghost.
172
Whether there are notions in God?
Ia q. 32 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that in God there are no
Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost to be one God and
notions. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): “We must
three persons, to those who ask: “Whereby are They one
not dare to say anything of God but what is taught to us
God? and whereby are They three persons?” as we an-
by the Holy Scripture.” But Holy Scripture does not say
swer that They are one in essence or deity; so there must
anything concerning notions. Therefore there are none in
also be some abstract terms whereby we may answer that
God.
the persons are distinguished; and these are the proper-
Objection 2. Further, all that exists in God concerns
ties or notions signified by an abstract term, as paternity
the unity of the essence or the trinity of the persons. But
and filiation. Therefore the divine essence is signified as
the notions do not concern the unity of the essence, nor the
“What”; and the person as “Who”; and the property as
trinity of the persons; for neither can what belongs to the
“Whereby.”
essence be predicated of the notions: for instance, we do
The second motive is because one person in God is re-
not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor can what be-
lated to two persons—namely, the person of the Father to
longs to the persons be so predicated; for example, we do
the person of the Son and the person of the Holy Ghost.
not say that paternity begets, nor that filiation is begotten.
This is not, however, by one relation; otherwise it would
Therefore there do not exist notions in God.
follow that the Son also and the Holy Ghost would be re-
Objection 3. Further, we do not require to presup-
lated to the Father by one and the same relation. Thus,
pose any abstract notions as principles of knowing things
since relation alone multiplies the Trinity, it would follow
which are devoid of composition: for they are known of
that the Son and the Holy Ghost would not be two persons.
themselves. But the divine persons are supremely simple.
Nor can it be said with Prepositivus that as God is related
Therefore we are not to suppose any notions in God.
in one way to creatures, while creatures are related to Him
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
in divers ways, so the Father is related by one relation to
5): “We recognize difference of hypostases [i.e. of per-
the Son and to the Holy Ghost; whereas these two persons
sons], in the three properties; i.e. in the paternal, the filial, are related to the Father by two relations. For, since the
and the processional.” Therefore we must admit proper-
very specific idea of a relation is that it refers to another, it ties and notions in God.
must be said that two relations are not specifically differ-
I answer that, Prepositivus, considering the simplic-
ent if but one opposite relation corresponds to them. For
ity of the persons, said that in God there were no prop-
the relation of lord and father must differ according to the
erties or notions, and wherever there were mentioned, he
difference of filiation and servitude. Now, all creatures
propounded the abstract for the concrete. For as we are
are related to God as His creatures by one specific rela-
accustomed to say, “I beseech your kindness”—i.e. you
tion. But the Son and the Holy Ghost are not related to
who are kind—so when we speak of paternity in God, we
the Father by one and the same kind of relation. Hence
mean God the Father.
there is no parity.
But, as shown above (q. 3, a. 3, ad 1), the use of con-
Further, in God there is no need to admit any real rela-
crete and abstract names in God is not in any way re-
tion to the creature (q. 28, a. 1,3); while there is no reason
pugnant to the divine simplicity; forasmuch as we always
against our admitting in God, many logical relations. But
name a thing as we understand it. Now, our intellect can-
in the Father there must be a real relation to the Son and
not attain to the absolute simplicity of the divine essence,
to the Holy Ghost. Hence, corresponding to the two re-
considered in itself, and therefore, our human intellect ap-
lations of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, whereby they
prehends and names divine things, according to its own
are related to the Father, we must understand two rela-
mode, that is in so far as they are found in sensible ob-
tions in the Father, whereby He is related to the Son and
jects, whence its knowledge is derived. In these things we
to the Holy Ghost. Hence, since there is only one Person
use abstract terms to signify simple forms; and to signify
of the Father, it is necessary that the relations should be
subsistent things we use concrete terms. Hence also we
separately signified in the abstract; and these are what we
signify divine things, as above stated, by abstract names,
mean by properties and notions.
to express their simplicity; whereas, to express their sub-
Reply to Objection 1. Although the notions are not
sistence and completeness, we use concrete names.
mentioned in Holy Scripture, yet the persons are men-
But not only must essential names be signified in the
tioned, comprising the idea of notions, as the abstract is
abstract and in the concrete, as when we say Deity and
contained in the concrete.
God; or wisdom and wise; but the same applies to the per-
Reply to Objection 2. In God the notions have their
sonal names, so that we may say paternity and Father.
significance not after the manner of realities, but by way
Two chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises
of certain ideas whereby the persons are known; although
from the obstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the
in God these notions or relations are real, as stated above
173
(q. 28, a. 1). Therefore whatever has order to any essential on account of the real identity, substantive terms, whether
or personal act, cannot be applied to the notions; foras-
personal or essential, can be predicated of the notions; for
much as this is against their mode of signification. Hence
we can say that paternity is God, and that paternity is the
we cannot say that paternity begets, or creates, or is wise,
Father.
or is intelligent. The essentials, however, which are not
Reply to Objection 3. Although the persons are sim-
ordered to any act, but simply remove created conditions
ple, still without prejudice to their simplicity, the proper
from God, can be predicated of the notions; for we can say
ideas of the persons can be abstractedly signified, as above
that paternity is eternal, or immense, or such like. So also
explained.
Whether there are five notions?
Ia q. 32 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that there are not five
another, He can be known in two ways, because as the Son
notions. For the notions proper to the persons are the rela-
is from Him, the Father is known by the notion of “pater-
tions whereby they are distinguished from each other. But
nity”; and as the Holy Ghost is from Him, He is known by
the relations in God are only four (q. 28, a. 4). Therefore
the notion of “common spiration.” The Son can be known
the notions are only four in number.
as begotten by another, and thus He is known by “filia-
Objection 2. Further, as there is only one essence in
tion”; and also by another person proceeding from Him,
God, He is called one God, and because in Him there are
the Holy Ghost, and thus He is known in the same way as
three persons, He is called the Trine God. Therefore, if
the Father is known, by “common spiration.” The Holy
in God there are five notions, He may be called quinary;
Ghost can be known by the fact that He is from another,
which cannot be allowed.
or from others; thus He is known by “procession”; but not
Objection 3. Further, if there are five notions for the
by the fact that another is from Him, as no divine person
three persons in God, there must be in some one person
proceeds from Him.
two or more notions, as in the person of the Father there
Therefore, there are Five notions in God: “innascibil-
is innascibility and paternity, and common spiration. Ei-
ity,” “paternity,” “filiation,” and “procession.” Of these
ther these three notions really differ, or not. If they really
only four are relations, for “innascibility” is not a relation, differ, it follows that the person of the Father is composed
except by reduction, as will appear later (q. 33, a. 4, ad 3).
of several things. But if they differ only logically, it fol-
Four only are properties. For “common spiration” is not
lows that one of them can be predicated of another, so that
a property; because it belongs to two persons. Three are
we can say that as the divine goodness is the same as the
personal notions—i.e. constituting persons, “paternity,”
divine wisdom by reason of the common reality, so com-
“filiation,” and “procession.” “Common spiration” and
mon spiration is paternity; which is not to be admitted.
“innascibility” are called notions of Persons, but not per-
Therefore there are not five notions.
sonal notions, as we shall explain further on (q. 40, a. 1,
Objection 4. On the contrary, It seems that there are
ad 1).
more; because as the Father is from no one, and there-
Reply to Objection 1. Besides the four relations, an-
from is derived the notion of innascibility; so from the
other notion must be admitted, as above explained.
Holy Ghost no other person proceeds. And in this respect
Reply to Objection 2. The divine essence is signified
there ought to be a sixth notion.
as a reality; and likewise the persons are signified as real-
Objection 5. Further, as the Father and the Son are
ities; whereas the notions are signified as ideas notifying
the common origin of the Holy Ghost, so it is common to
the persons. Therefore, although God is one by unity of
the Son and the Holy Ghost to proceed from the Father.
essence, and trine by trinity of persons, nevertheless He is
Therefore, as one notion is common to the Father and the
not quinary by the five notions.
Son, so there ought to be one notion common to the Son
Reply to Objection 3. Since the real plurality in God
and to the Holy Ghost.
is founded only on relative opposition, the several prop-
I answer that, A notion is the proper idea whereby we
erties of one Person, as they are not relatively opposed to
know a divine Person. Now the divine persons are multi-
each other, do not really differ. Nor again are they predi-
plied by reason of their origin: and origin includes the idea
cated of each other, because they are different ideas of the
of someone from whom another comes, and of someone
persons; as we do not say that the attribute of power is the
that comes from another, and by these two modes a per-
attribute of knowledge, although we do say that knowl-
son can be known. Therefore the Person of the Father
edge is power.
cannot be known by the fact that He is from another; but
Reply to Objection 4. Since Person implies dignity,
by the fact that He is from no one; and thus the notion that
as stated above (q. 19, a. 3 ) we cannot derive a notion of
belongs to Him is called “innascibility.” As the source of
the Holy Spirit from the fact that no person is from Him.
174
For this does not belong to His dignity, as it belongs to the the Father; as the Father and the Son agree in one special
authority of the Father that He is from no one.
mode of producing the Holy Ghost. But the principle on
Reply to Objection 5. The Son and the Holy Ghost do
which a notion is based must be something special; thus
not agree in one special mode of existence derived from
no parity of reasoning exists.
Whether it is lawful to have various contrary opinions of notions?
Ia q. 32 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful to
faith; as for instance if anyone said that Samuel was not
have various contrary opinions of the notions. For Augus-
the son of Elcana, for it follows that the divine Scripture
tine says (De Trin. i, 3): “No error is more dangerous than
would be false. Concerning such things anyone may have
any as regards the Trinity”: to which mystery the notions
a false opinion without danger of heresy, before the matter
assuredly belong. But contrary opinions must be in some
has been considered or settled as involving consequences
way erroneous. Therefore it is not right to have contrary
against faith, and particularly if no obstinacy be shown;
opinions of the notions.
whereas when it is manifest, and especially if the Church
Objection 2. Further, the persons are known by the
has decided that consequences follow against faith, then
notions. But no contrary opinion concerning the persons
the error cannot be free from heresy. For this reason many
is to be tolerated. Therefore neither can there be about the
things are now considered as heretical which were for-
notions.
merly not so considered, as their consequences are now
On the contrary, The notions are not articles of faith.
more manifest.
Therefore different opinions of the notions are permissi-
So we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary
ble.
opinions about the notions, if he does not mean to up-
I answer that, Anything is of faith in two ways; di-
hold anything at variance with faith. If, however, anyone
rectly, where any truth comes to us principally as divinely
should entertain a false opinion of the notions, knowing or
taught, as the trinity and unity of God, the Incarnation
thinking that consequences against the faith would follow,
of the Son, and the like; and concerning these truths a
he would lapse into heresy.
false opinion of itself involves heresy, especially if it be
By what has been said all the objections may be
held obstinately. A thing is of faith, indirectly, if the de-
solved.
nial of it involves as a consequence something against
175
FIRST PART, QUESTION 33
Of the Person of the Father
(In Four Articles)
We now consider the persons singly; and first, the Person of the Father, concerning Whom there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Father is the Principle?
(2) Whether the person of the Father is properly signified by this name “Father”?
(3) Whether “Father” in God is said personally before it is said essentially?
(4) Whether it belongs to the Father alone to be unbegotten?
Whether it belongs to the Father to be the principle?
Ia q. 33 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the Father cannot be
Now the wider a term is, the more suitable it is to use as
called the principle of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. For
regards God (q. 13, a. 11), because the more special terms
principle and cause are the same, according to the Philoso-
are, the more they determine the mode adapted to the crea-
pher (Metaph. iv). But we do not say that the Father is the
ture. Hence this term “cause” seems to mean diversity of
cause of the Son. Therefore we must not say that He is the
substance, and dependence of one from another; which is
principle of the Son.
not implied in the word “principle.” For in all kinds of
Objection 2. Further, a principle is so called in rela-
causes there is always to be found between the cause and
tion to the thing principled. So if the Father is the principle the effect a distance of perfection or of power: whereas we
of the Son, it follows that the Son is a person principled,
use the term “principle” even in things which have no such
and is therefore created; which appears false.
difference, but have only a certain order to each other; as
Objection 3. Further, the word principle is taken from
when we say that a point is the principle of a line; or also
priority. But in God there is no “before” and “after,” as
when we say that the first part of a line is the principle of
Athanasius says. Therefore in speaking of God we ought
a line.
not to used the term principle.
Reply to Objection 2. It is the custom with the Greeks
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20),
to say that the Son and the Holy Ghost are principled. This
“The Father is the Principle of the whole Deity.”
is not, however, the custom with our Doctors; because, al-
I answer that, The word “principle” signifies only
though we attribute to the Father something of authority
that whence another proceeds: since anything whence
by reason of His being the principle, still we do not at-
something proceeds in any way we call a principle; and
tribute any kind of subjection or inferiority to the Son, or
conversely. As the Father then is the one whence another
to the Holy Ghost, to avoid any occasion of error. In this
proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle.
way, Hilary says (De Trin. ix): “By authority of the Giver,
Reply to Objection 1. The Greeks use the words
the Father is the greater; nevertheless the Son is not less
“cause” and “principle” indifferently, when speaking of
to Whom oneness of nature is give.”
God; whereas the Latin Doctors do not use the word
Reply to Objection 3. Although this word principle,
“cause,” but only “principle.” The reason is because “prin-
as regards its derivation, seems to be taken from priority,
ciple” is a wider term than “cause”; as “cause” is more
still it does not signify priority, but origin. For what a term common than “element.” For the first term of a thing, as
signifies, and the reason why it was imposed, are not the
also the first part, is called the principle, but not the cause.
same thing, as stated above (q. 13, a. 8).
Whether this name “Father” is properly the name of a divine person?
Ia q. 33 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that this name “Father” is
But a more common term is more properly applied to God,
not properly the name of a divine person. For the name
as stated above (q. 13, a. 11). Therefore the more proper
“Father” signifies relation. Moreover “person” is an in-
name of the divine person is begetter and genitor than Fa-
dividual substance. Therefore this name “Father” is not
ther.
properly a name signifying a Person.
Objection 3.
Further, a metaphorical term cannot
Objection 2. Further, a begetter is more common than
be the proper name of anyone. But the word is by us
father; for every father begets; but it is not so conversely.
metaphorically called begotten, or offspring; and conse-
176
quently, he of whom is the word, is metaphorically called its perfection, and by its end. Now generation signifies
father. Therefore the principle of the Word in God is not
something in process of being made, whereas paternity
properly called Father.
signifies the complement of generation; and therefore the
Objection 4. Further, everything which is said prop-
name “Father” is more expressive as regards the divine
erly of God, is said of God first before creatures. But
person than genitor or begettor.
generation appears to apply to creatures before God; be-
Reply to Objection 3. In human nature the word is
cause generation seems to be truer when the one who pro-
not a subsistence, and hence is not properly called begot-
ceeds is distinct from the one whence it proceeds, not only
ten or son. But the divine Word is something subsistent
by relation but also by essence. Therefore the name “Fa-
in the divine nature; and hence He is properly and not
ther” taken from generation does not seem to be the proper
metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Fa-
name of any divine person.
ther.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 88:27): “He shall cry
Reply to Objection 4. The terms “generation” and
out to me: Thou art my Father.”
“paternity” like the other terms properly applied to God,
I answer that, The proper name of any person sig-
are said of God before creatures as regards the thing sig-
nifies that whereby the person is distinguished from all
nified, but not as regards the mode of signification. Hence
other persons. For as body and soul belong to the nature
also the Apostle says, “I bend my knee to the Father of my
of man, so to the concept of this particular man belong
Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and
this particular soul and this particular body; and by these
on earth is named” (Eph. 3:14). This is explained thus.
is this particular man distinguished from all other men.
It is manifest that generation receives its species from the
Now it is paternity which distinguishes the person of the
term which is the form of the thing generated; and the
Father from all other persons. Hence this name “Father,”
nearer it is to the form of the generator, the truer and more
whereby paternity is signified, is the proper name of the
perfect is the generation; as univocal generation is more
person of the Father.
perfect than non-univocal, for it belongs to the essence of
Reply to Objection 1. Among us relation is not a
a generator to generate what is like itself in form. Hence
subsisting person. So this name “father” among us does
the very fact that in the divine generation the form of the
not signify a person, but the relation of a person. In God,
Begetter and Begotten is numerically the same, whereas
however, it is not so, as some wrongly thought; for in God
in creatures it is not numerically, but only specifically, the
the relation signified by the name “Father” is a subsist-
same, shows that generation, and consequently paternity,
ing person. Hence, as above explained (q. 29, a. 4), this
is applied to God before creatures. Hence the very fact
name “person” in God signifies a relation subsisting in the
that in God a distinction exists of the Begotten from the
divine nature.
Begetter as regards relation only, belongs to the truth of
Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher
the divine generation and paternity.
(De Anima ii, text 49), a thing is denominated chiefly by
Whether this name “Father” is applied to God, firstly as a personal name?
Ia q. 33 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that this name “Father”
things which have not a common concept. But the Son is
is not applied to God, firstly as a personal name. For in
compared to the creature by reason of filiation or gener-
the intellect the common precedes the particular. But this
ation, according to Col. 1:15: “Who is the image of the
name “Father” as a personal name, belongs to the person
invisible God, the first-born of every creature.” Therefore
of the Father; and taken in an essential sense it is com-
paternity taken in a personal sense is not prior to, but has
mon to the whole Trinity; for we say “Our Father” to the
the same concept as, paternity taken essentially.
whole Trinity. Therefore “Father” comes first as an essen-
On the contrary, The eternal comes before the tem-
tial name before its personal sense.
poral. But God is the Father of the Son from eternity;
Objection 2. Further, in things of which the concept is
while He is the Father of the creature in time. Therefore
the same there is no priority of predication. But paternity
paternity in God is taken in a personal sense as regards the
and filiation seem to be of the same nature, according as a
Son, before it is so taken as regards the creature.
divine person is Father of the Son, and the whole Trinity
I answer that, A name is applied to that wherein is
is our Father, or the creature’s; since, according to Basil
perfectly contained its whole signification, before it is ap-
(Hom. xv, De Fide), to receive is common to the creature
plied to that which only partially contains it; for the latter
and to the Son. Therefore “Father” in God is not taken as
bears the name by reason of a kind of similitude to that
an essential name before it is taken personally.
which answers perfectly to the signification of the name;
Objection 3. Further, it is not possible to compare
since all imperfect things are taken from perfect things.
177
Hence this name “lion” is applied first to the animal con-creatures.
taining the whole nature of a lion, and which is properly
Reply to Objection 1. Common terms taken abso-
so called, before it is applied to a man who shows some-
lutely, in the order of our intelligence, come before proper
thing of a lion’s nature, as courage, or strength, or the like; terms; because they are included in the understanding of
and of whom it is said by way of similitude.
proper terms; but not conversely. For in the concept of
Now it is manifest from the foregoing (q. 27, a. 2;
the person of the Father, God is understood; but not con-
q. 28, a. 4), that the perfect idea of paternity and filia-
versely. But common terms which import relation to the
tion is to be found in God the Father, and in God the Son,
creature come after proper terms which import personal
because one is the nature and glory of the Father and the
relations; because the person proceeding in God proceeds
Son. But in the creature, filiation is found in relation to
as the principle of the production of creatures. For as the
God, not in a perfect manner, since the Creator and the
word conceived in the mind of the artist is first under-
creature have not the same nature; but by way of a certain
stood to proceed from the artist before the thing designed,
likeness, which is the more perfect the nearer we approach
which is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the
to the true idea of filiation. For God is called the Father of
artist’s mind; so the Son proceeds from the Father before
some creatures, by reason only of a trace, for instance of
the creature, to which the name of filiation is applied as it
irrational creatures, according to Job 38:28: “Who is the
participates in the likeness of the Son, as is clear from the
father of the rain? or who begot the drops of dew?” Of
words of Rom. 8:29: “Whom He foreknew and predes-
some, namely, the rational creature (He is the Father), by
tined to be made conformable to the image of His Son.”
reason of the likeness of His image, according to Dt. 32:6:
Reply to Objection 2. To “receive” is said to be com-
“Is He not thy Father, who possessed, and made, and cre-
mon to the creature and to the Son not in a univocal sense,
ated thee?” And of others He is the Father by similitude
but according to a certain remote similitude whereby He
of grace, and these are also called adoptive sons, as or-
is called the First Born of creatures. Hence the authority
dained to the heritage of eternal glory by the gift of grace
quoted subjoins: “That He may be the First Born among
which they have received, according to Rom. 8:16,17:
many brethren,” after saying that some were conformed
“The Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit that we
to the image of the Son of God. But the Son of God pos-
are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs also.” Lastly, He
sesses a position of singularity above others, in having by
is the Father of others by similitude of glory, forasmuch
nature what He receives, as Basil also declares (Hom. xv
as they have obtained possession of the heritage of glory,
De Fide); hence He is called the only begotten (Jn. 1:18):
according to Rom. 5:2: “We glory in the hope of the glory
“The only begotten Who is in the bosom of the Father, He
of the sons of God.” Therefore it is plain that “paternity”
hath declared unto us.”
is applied to God first, as importing regard of one Person
From this appears the Reply to the Third Objection.
to another Person, before it imports the regard of God to
Whether it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten?
Ia q. 33 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not proper to
it signifies substance; therefore unbegotten and begotten
the Father to be unbegotten. For every property supposes
differ in substance. But the Son, Who is begotten, does
something in that of which it is the property. But “unbe-
not differ from the Father in substance. Therefore the Fa-
gotten” supposes nothing in the Father; it only removes
ther ought not to be called unbegotten.
something. Therefore it does not signify a property of the
Objection 4. Further, property means what belongs to
Father.
one alone. Since, then, there are more than one in God
Objection 2. Further, Unbegotten is taken either in a
proceeding from another, there is nothing to prevent sev-
privative, or in a negative sense. If in a negative sense,
eral not receiving their being from another. Therefore the
then whatever is not begotten can be called unbegotten.
Father is not alone unbegotten.
But the Holy Ghost is not begotten; neither is the divine
Objection 5. Further, as the Father is the principle of
essence. Therefore to be unbegotten belongs also to the
the person begotten, so is He of the person proceeding. So
essence; thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it be
if by reason of his opposition to the person begotten, it is
taken in a privative sense, as every privation signifies im-
proper to the Father to be unbegotten it follows that it is
perfection in the thing which is the subject of privation, it
proper to Him also to be unproceeding.
follows that the Person of the Father is imperfect; which
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): “One is
cannot be.
from one —that is, the Begotten is from the Unbegotten—
Objection 3. Further, in God, “unbegotten” does not
namely, by the property in each one respectively of in-
signify relation, for it is not used relatively. Therefore
nascibility and origin.”
178
I answer that, As in creatures there exist a first and gotten. In this sense the term “unbegotten” can be applied
a secondary principle, so also in the divine Persons, in
also to the Holy Ghost. Hence to consider it as a term
Whom there is no before or after, is formed the principle
proper to the Father alone, it must be further understood
not from a principle, Who is the Father; and the principle
that the name “unbegotten” belongs to a divine person as
from a principle, Who is the Son.
the principle of another person; so that it be understood to
Now in things created a first principle is known in two
imply negation in the genus of principle taken personally
ways; in one way as the first “principle,” by reason of
in God. Or that there be understood in the term “unbe-
its having a relation to what proceeds from itself; in an-
gotten” that He is not in any way derived from another;
other way, inasmuch as it is a “first” principle by reason
and not only that He is not from another by way only of
of its not being from another. Thus therefore the Father
generation. In this sense the term “unbegotten” does not
is known both by paternity and by common spiration, as
belong at all to the Holy Ghost, Who is from another by
regards the persons proceeding from Himself. But as the
procession, as a subsisting person; nor does it belong to
principle, not from a principle He is known by the fact that
the divine essence, of which it may be said that it is in the
He is not from another; and this belongs to the property
Son or in the Holy Ghost from another—namely, from the
of innascibility, signified by this word “begotten.”
Father.
Reply to Objection 1. Some there are who say that in-
Reply to Objection 3. According to Damascene (De
nascibility, signified by the word “unbegotten,” as a prop-
Fide Orth. ii, 9), “unbegotten” in one sense signifies the
erty of the Father, is not a negative term only, but either
same as “uncreated”; and thus it applies to the substance,
that it means both these things together—namely, that the
for thereby does the created substance differ from the un-
Father is from no one, and that He is the principle of oth-
created. In another sense it signifies what is not begotten,
ers; or that it imports universal authority, or also His plen-
and in this sense it is a relative term; just as negation is re-itude as the source of all. This, however, does not seem
duced to the genus of affirmation, as “not man” is reduced
true, because thus innascibility would not be a property
to the genus of substance, and “not white” to the genus of
distinct from paternity and spiration; but would include
quality. Hence, since “begotten” implies relation in God,
them as the proper is included in the common. For source
“unbegotten” belongs also to relation. Thus it does not
and authority signify in God nothing but the principle of
follow that the Father unbegotten is substantially distin-
origin. We must therefore say with Augustine (De Trin.
guished from the Son begotten; but only by relation; that
v, 7) that “unbegotten” imports the negation of passive
is, as the relation of Son is denied of the Father.
generation. For he says that “unbegotten” has the same
Reply to Objection 4. In every genus there must be
meaning as “not a son.” Nor does it follow that “unbegot-
something first; so in the divine nature there must be some
ten” is not the proper notion of the Father; for primary and
one principle which is not from another, and which we
simple things are notified by negations; as, for instance, a
call “unbegotten.” To admit two innascibles is to sup-
point is defined as what has no part.
pose the existence of two Gods, and two divine natures.
Reply to Objection 2. “Unbegotten” is taken some-
Hence Hilary says (De Synod.): “As there is one God, so
times in a negative sense only, and in that sense Jerome
there cannot be two innascibles.” And this especially be-
says that “the Holy Ghost is unbegotten,” that is, He is
cause, did two innascibles exist, one would not be from
not begotten. Otherwise “unbegotten” may be taken in a
the other, and they would not be distinguished by relative
kind of privation sense, but not as implying any imper-
opposition: therefore they would be distinguished from
fection. For privation can be taken in many ways; in one
each other by diversity of nature.
way when a thing has not what is naturally belongs to an-
Reply to Objection 5. The property of the Father,
other, even though it is not of its own nature to have it; as,
whereby He is not from another, is more clearly signified
for instance, if a stone be called a dead thing, as wanting
by the removal of the nativity of the Son, than by the re-
life, which naturally belongs to some other things. In an-
moval of the procession of the Holy Ghost; both because
other sense, privation is so called when something has not
the procession of the Holy Ghost has no special name, as
what naturally belongs to some members of its genus; as
stated above (q. 27, a. 4, ad 3), and because also in the
for instance when a mole is called blind. In a third sense
order of nature it presupposes the generation of the Son.
privation means the absence of what something ought to
Hence, it being denied of the Father that He is begotten,
have; in which sense, privation imports an imperfection.
although He is the principle of generation, it follows, as
In this sense, “unbegotten” is not attributed to the Father
a consequence, that He does not proceed by the proces-
as a privation, but it may be so attributed in the second
sion of the Holy Ghost, because the Holy Ghost is not
sense, meaning that a certain person of the divine nature is
the principle of generation, but proceeds from the person
not begotten, while some person of the same nature is be-
begotten.
179
FIRST PART, QUESTION 34
Of the Person of the Son
(In Three Articles)
We next consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to the Son—namely, “Son,” “Word,” and
“Image.” The idea of Son is gathered from the idea of Father. Hence it remains for us to consider Word and Image.
Concerning Word there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Word is an essential term in God, or a personal term?
(2) Whether it is the proper name of the Son?
(3) Whether in the name of Word is expressed relation to creatures?
Whether Word in God is a personal name?
Ia q. 34 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that Word in God is not
intellect. Again the vocal sound proceeds from the sig-
a personal name. For personal names are applied to God
nification or the imagination, as stated in De Anima ii,
in a proper sense, as Father and Son. But Word is applied
text 90. The vocal sound, which has no signification can-
to God metaphorically, as Origen says on (Jn. 1:1), “In
not be called a word: wherefore the exterior vocal sound
the beginning was the Word.” Therefore Word is not a
is called a word from the fact the it signifies the interior
personal name in God.
concept of the mind. Therefore it follows that, first and
Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De
chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word;
Trin. ix, 10), “The Word is knowledge with love;” and
secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior
according to Anselm (Monol. lx), “To speak is to the
concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the
Supreme Spirit nothing but to see by thought.” But knowl-
vocal sound is called a word. Damascene mentions these
edge and thought, and sight, are essential terms in God.
three kinds of words (De Fide Orth. i, 17), saying that
Therefore Word is not a personal term in God.
“word” is called “the natural movement of the intellect,
Objection 3. Further, it is essential to word to be spo-
whereby it is moved, and understands, and thinks, as light
ken. But, according to Anselm (Monol. lix), as the Father
and splendor;” which is the first kind. “Again,” he says,
is intelligent, the Son is intelligent, and the Holy Ghost
“the word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word, but
is intelligent, so the Father speaks, the Son speaks, and
is uttered in the heart;” which is the third kind. “Again,”
the Holy Ghost speaks; and likewise, each one of them is
also, “the word is the angel”—that is, the messenger “of
spoken. Therefore, the name Word is used as an essential
intelligence;” which is the second kind. Word is also used
term in God, and not in a personal sense.
in a fourth way figuratively for that which is signified or
Objection 4. Further, no divine person is made. But
effected by a word; thus we are wont to say, “this is the
the Word of God is something made.
For it is said,
word I have said,” or “which the king has commanded,”
“Fire, hail, snow, ice, the storms which do His Word” (Ps.
alluding to some deed signified by the word either by way
148:8). Therefore the Word is not a personal name in God.
of assertion or of command.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11):
Now word is taken strictly in God, as signifying the
“As the Son is related to the Father, so also is the Word to
concept of the intellect. Hence Augustine says (De Trin.
Him Whose Word He is.” But the Son is a personal name,
xv, 10): “Whoever can understand the word, not only be-
since it is said relatively. Therefore so also is Word.
fore it is sounded, but also before thought has clothed
I answer that, The name of Word in God, if taken
it with imaginary sound, can already see some likeness
in its proper sense, is a personal name, and in no way an
of that Word of Whom it is said: In the beginning was
essential name.
the Word.”
The concept itself of the heart has of its
To see how this is true, we must know that our own
own nature to proceed from something other than itself—
word taken in its proper sense has a threefold meaning;
namely, from the knowledge of the one conceiving. Hence
while in a fourth sense it is taken improperly or figura-
“Word,” according as we use the term strictly of God,
tively. The clearest and most common sense is when it is
signifies something proceeding from another; which be-
said of the word spoken by the voice; and this proceeds
longs to the nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch
from an interior source as regards two things found in the
as the divine persons are distinguished by origin (q. 27,
exterior word—that is, the vocal sound itself, and the sig-
Aa. 3,4,5). Hence the term “Word,” according as we use
nification of the sound. For, according to the Philosopher
the term strictly of God, is to be taken as said not essen-
(Peri Herm. i) vocal sound signifies the concept of the
tially, but personally.
180
Reply to Objection 1. The Arians, who sprang from no place in God. But when the intellect attains to the form
Origen, declared that the Son differed in substance from
of truth, it does not think, but perfectly contemplates the
the Father. Hence, they endeavored to maintain that when
truth. Hence Anselm (Monol. lx) takes “thought” in an
the Son of God is called the Word, this is not to be un-
improper sense for “contemplation.”
derstood in a strict sense; lest the idea of the Word pro-
Reply to Objection 3. As, properly speaking, Word
ceeding should compel them to confess that the Son of
in God is said personally, and not essentially, so likewise
God is of the same substance as the Father. For the in-
is to “speak.” Hence, as the Word is not common to the
terior word proceeds in such a manner from the one who
Father, Son and Holy Ghost, so it is not true that the Fa-
pronounces it, as to remain within him. But supposing
ther, Son, and Holy Ghost are one speaker. So Augustine
Word to be said metaphorically of God, we must still ad-
says (De Trin. vii, 1): “He who speaks in that co-eternal
mit Word in its strict sense. For if a thing be called a word
Word is understood as not alone in God, but as being with
metaphorically, this can only be by reason of some mani-
that very Word, without which, forsooth, He would not be
festation; either it makes something manifest as a word, or
speaking.” On the other hand, “to be spoken” belongs to
it is manifested by a word. If manifested by a word, there
each Person, for not only is the word spoken, but also the
must exist a word whereby it is manifested. If it is called
thing understood or signified by the word. Therefore in
a word because it exteriorly manifests, what it exteriorly
this manner to one person alone in God does it belong to
manifests cannot be called word except in as far as it sig-
be spoken in the same way as a word is spoken; whereas in
nifies the interior concept of the mind, which anyone may
the way whereby a thing is spoken as being understood in
also manifest by exterior signs. Therefore, although Word
the word, it belongs to each Person to be spoken. For the
may be sometimes said of God metaphorically, neverthe-
Father, by understanding Himself, the Son and the Holy
less we must also admit Word in the proper sense, and
Ghost, and all other things comprised in this knowledge,
which is said personally.
conceives the Word; so that thus the whole Trinity is “spo-
Reply to Objection 2. Nothing belonging to the intel-
ken” in the Word; and likewise also all creatures: as the
lect can be applied to God personally, except word alone;
intellect of a man by the word he conceives in the act
for word alone signifies that which emanates from an-
of understanding a stone, speaks a stone. Anselm took
other. For what the intellect forms in its conception is the
the term “speak” improperly for the act of understanding;
word. Now, the intellect itself, according as it is made ac-
whereas they really differ from each other; for “to under-
tual by the intelligible species, is considered absolutely;
stand” means only the habitude of the intelligent agent to
likewise the act of understanding which is to the actual
the thing understood, in which habitude no trace of origin
intellect what existence is to actual being; since the act
is conveyed, but only a certain information of our intel-
of understanding does not signify an act going out from
lect; forasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form
the intelligent agent, but an act remaining in the agent.
of the thing understood. In God, however, it means com-
Therefore when we say that word is knowledge, the term
plete identity, because in God the intellect and the thing
knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing intellect,
understood are altogether the same, as was proved above
or any one of its habits, but stands for what the intellect
(q. 14, Aa. 4,5). Whereas to “speak” means chiefly the
conceives by knowing. Hence also Augustine says (De
habitude to the word conceived; for “to speak” is nothing
Trin. vii, 1) that the Word is “begotten wisdom;” for it
but to utter a word. But by means of the word it imports
is nothing but the concept of the Wise One; and in the
a habitude to the thing understood which in the word ut-
same way It can be called “begotten knowledge.” Thus
tered is manifested to the one who understands. Thus,
can also be explained how “to speak” is in God “to see
only the Person who utters the Word is “speaker” in God,
by thought,” forasmuch as the Word is conceived by the
although each Person understands and is understood, and
gaze of the divine thought. Still the term “thought” does
consequently is spoken by the Word.
not properly apply to the Word of God. For Augustine
Reply to Objection 4. The term “word” is there taken
says (De Trin. xv, 16): “Therefore do we speak of the
figuratively, as the thing signified or effected by word is
Word of God, and not of the Thought of God, lest we
called word. For thus creatures are said to do the word of
believe that in God there is something unstable, now as-
God, as executing any effect, whereto they are ordained
suming the form of Word, now putting off that form and
from the word conceived of the divine wisdom; as anyone
remaining latent and as it were formless.” For thought
is said to do the word of the king when he does the work
consists properly in the search after the truth, and this has
to which he is appointed by the king’s word.
181
Whether “Word” is the Son’s proper name?
Ia q. 34 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that “Word” is not the
has a hypostatic being; but other words [as our own] are
proper name of the Son. For the Son is a subsisting per-
activities if the soul.”
son in God. But word does not signify a subsisting thing,
Reply to Objection 2. The error of Valentine was
as appears in ourselves. Therefore word cannot be the
condemned, not as the Arians pretended, because he as-
proper name of the person of the Son.
serted that the Son was born by being uttered, as Hilary
Objection 2. Further, the word proceeds from the
relates (De Trin. vi); but on account of the different mode
speaker by being uttered. Therefore if the Son is prop-
of utterance proposed by its author, as appears from Au-
erly the word, He proceeds from the Father, by way only
gustine (De Haeres. xi).
of utterance; which is the heresy of Valentine; as appears
Reply to Objection 3. In the term “Word” the same
from Augustine (De Haeres. xi).
property is comprised as in the name Son. Hence Augus-
Objection 3. Further, every proper name of a person
tine says (De Trin. vii, 11): “Word and Son express the
signifies some property of that person. Therefore, if the
same.” For the Son’s nativity, which is His personal prop-
Word is the Son’s proper name, it signifies some property
erty, is signified by different names, which are attributed
of His; and thus there will be several more properties in
to the Son to express His perfection in various ways. To
God than those above mentioned.
show that He is of the same nature as the Father, He is
Objection 4. Further, whoever understands conceives
called the Son; to show that He is co-eternal, He is called
a word in the act of understanding. But the Son under-
the Splendor; to show that He is altogether like, He is
stands. Therefore some word belongs to the Son; and
called the Image; to show that He is begotten immateri-
consequently to be Word is not proper to the Son.
ally, He is called the Word. All these truths cannot be
Objection 5. Further, it is said of the Son (Heb. 1:3):
expressed by only one name.
“Bearing all things by the word of His power;” whence
Reply to Objection 4. To be intelligent belongs to
Basil infers (Cont. Eunom. v, 11) that the Holy Ghost is
the Son, in the same way as it belongs to Him to be God,
the Son’s Word. Therefore to be Word is not proper to the
since to understand is said of God essentially, as stated
Son.
above (q. 14, Aa. 2,4). Now the Son is God begotten, and
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 11):
not God begetting; and hence He is intelligent, not as pro-
“By Word we understand the Son alone.”
ducing a Word, but as the Word proceeding; forasmuch as
I answer that, “Word,” said of God in its proper sense,
in God the Word proceeding does not differ really from
is used personally, and is the proper name of the person of
the divine intellect, but is distinguished from the principle
the Son. For it signifies an emanation of the intellect: and
of the Word only by relation.
the person Who proceeds in God, by way of emanation of
Reply to Objection 5. When it is said of the Son,
the intellect, is called the Son; and this procession is called
“Bearing all things by the word of His power”; “word”
generation, as we have shown above (q. 27, a. 2). Hence it
is taken figuratively for the effect of the Word. Hence
follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in God.
a gloss says that “word” is here taken to mean command;
Reply to Objection 1. “To be” and “to understand”
inasmuch as by the effect of the power of the Word, things
are not the same in us. Hence that which in us has intel-
are kept in being, as also by the effect of the power of the
lectual being, does not belong to our nature. But in God
Word things are brought into being. Basil speaks widely
“to be” and “to understand” are one and the same: hence
and figuratively in applying Word to the Holy Ghost; in
the Word of God is not an accident in Him, or an effect
the sense perhaps that everything that makes a person
of His; but belongs to His very nature. And therefore it
known may be called his word, and so in that way the
must needs be something subsistent; for whatever is in
Holy Ghost may be called the Son’s Word, because He
the nature of God subsists; and so Damascene says (De
manifests the Son.
Fide Orth. i, 18) that “the Word of God is substantial and
Whether the name “Word” imports relation to creatures?
Ia q. 34 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the name ‘Word’ does
creatures is said of God in time; as “Lord” and “Creator.”
not import relation to creatures. For every name that con-
But Word is said of God from eternity. Therefore it does
notes some effect in creatures, is said of God essentially.
not import relation to the creature.
But Word is not said essentially, but personally. Therefore
Objection 3. Further, Word imports relation to the
Word does not import relation to creatures.
source whence it proceeds. Therefore, if it imports rela-
Objection 2. Further, whatever imports relation to
tion to the creature, it follows that the Word proceeds from
182
the creature.
Son to be the Son, so it properly belongs to Him to be
Objection 4. Further, ideas (in God) are many ac-
God begotten, or the Creator begotten; and in this way the
cording to their various relations to creatures. Therefore
name Word imports relation to creatures.
if Word imports relation to creatures, it follows that in
Reply to Objection 2. Since the relations result from
God there is not one Word only, but many.
actions, some names import the relation of God to crea-
Objection 5. Further, if Word imports relation to the
tures, which relation follows on the action of God which
creature, this can only be because creatures are known by
passes into some exterior effect, as to create and to govern;
God. But God does not know beings only; He knows also
and the like are applied to God in time. But others import
non-beings. Therefore in the Word are implied relations
a relation which follows from an action which does not
to non-beings; which appears to be false.
pass into an exterior effect, but abides in the agent—as to
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu.
know and to will: such are not applied to God in time; and
63), that “the name Word signifies not only relation to the
this kind of relation to creatures is implied in the name of
Father, but also relation to those beings which are made
the Word. Nor is it true that all names which import the
through the Word, by His operative power.”
relation of God to creatures are applied to Him in time;
I answer that, Word implies relation to creatures. For
but only those names are applied in time which import re-
God by knowing Himself, knows every creature. Now the
lation following on the action of God passing into exterior
word conceived in the mind is representative of everything
effect.
that is actually understood. Hence there are in ourselves
Reply to Objection 3. Creatures are known to God
different words for the different things which we under-
not by a knowledge derived from the creatures them-
stand. But because God by one act understands Himself
selves, but by His own essence. Hence it is not necessary
and all things, His one only Word is expressive not only
that the Word should proceed from creatures, although the
of the Father, but of all creatures.
Word is expressive of creatures.
And as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as re-
Reply to Objection 4. The name of Idea is imposed
gards God, whereas as regards creatures, it is both cogni-
chiefly to signify relation to creatures; and therefore it is
tive and operative, so the Word of God is only expressive
applied in a plural sense to God; and it is not said per-
of what is in God the Father, but is both expressive and
sonally. But the name of Word is imposed chiefly to sig-
operative of creatures; and therefore it is said (Ps. 32:9):
nify the speaker, and consequently, relation to creatures,
“He spake, and they were made;” because in the Word is
inasmuch as God, by understanding Himself, understands
implied the operative idea of what God makes.
every creature; and so there is only one Word in God, and
Reply to Objection 1. The nature is also included
that is a personal one.
indirectly in the name of the person; for person is an indi-
Reply to Objection 5.
God’s knowledge of non-
vidual substance of a rational nature. Therefore the name
beings and God’s Word about non-beings are the same;
of a divine person, as regards the personal relation, does
because the Word of God contains no less than does the
not imply relation to the creature, but it is implied in what
knowledge of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14).
belongs to the nature. Yet there is nothing to prevent its
Nevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of be-
implying relation to creatures, so far as the essence is in-
ings, but is expressive and manifestive of non-beings.
cluded in its meaning: for as it properly belongs to the
183
FIRST PART, QUESTION 35
Of the Image
(In Two Articles)
We next inquire concerning the image: about which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether Image in God is said personally?
(2) Whether this name belongs to the Son alone?
Whether image in God is said personally?
Ia q. 35 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that image is not said per-
wise depicted. Further, neither the similitude of species or
sonally of God. For Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad
of figure is enough for an image, which requires also the
Petrum i) says, “The Godhead of the Holy Trinity and the
idea of origin; because, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii,
Image whereunto man is made are one.” Therefore Image
qu. 74): “One egg is not the image of another, because it
is said of God essentially, and not personally.
is not derived from it.” Therefore for a true image it is re-
Objection 2. Further, Hilary says (De Synod.): “An
quired that one proceeds from another like to it in species,
image is a like species of that which it represents.” But
or at least in specific sign. Now whatever imports proces-
species or form is said of God essentially. Therefore so
sion or origin in God, belongs to the persons. Hence the
also is Image.
name “Image” is a personal name.
Objection 3. Further, Image is derived from imita-
Reply to Objection 1.
Image, properly speaking,
tion, which implies “before” and “after.” But in the divine
means whatever proceeds forth in likeness to another.
persons there is no “before” and “after.” Therefore Image
That to the likeness of which anything proceeds, is prop-
cannot be a personal name in God.
erly speaking called the exemplar, and is improperly
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1):
called the image. Nevertheless Augustine (Fulgentius)
“What is more absurd than to say that an image is referred
uses the name of Image in this sense when he says that
to itself?” Therefore the Image in God is a relation, and is
the divine nature of the Holy Trinity is the Image to whom
thus a personal name.
man was made.
I answer that, Image includes the idea of similitude.
Reply to Objection 2. “Species,” as mentioned by
Still, not any kind of similitude suffices for the notion of
Hilary in the definition of image, means the form derived
image, but only similitude of species, or at least of some
from one thing to another. In this sense image is said to
specific sign. In corporeal things the specific sign consists
be the species of anything, as that which is assimilated to
chiefly in the figure. For we see that the species of dif-
anything is called its form, inasmuch as it has a like form.
ferent animals are of different figures; but not of different
Reply to Objection 3. Imitation in God does not sig-
colors. Hence if the color of anything is depicted on a
nify posteriority, but only assimilation.
wall, this is not called an image unless the figure is like-
Whether the name of Image is proper to the Son?
Ia q. 35 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the name of Image
Therefore Image is not proper to the Son.
is not proper to the Son; because, as Damascene says (De
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2):
Fide Orth. i, 18), “The Holy Ghost is the Image of the
“The Son alone is the Image of the Father.”
Son.” Therefore Image does not belong to the Son alone.
I answer that, The Greek Doctors commonly say that
Objection 2. Further, similitude in expression belongs
the Holy Ghost is the Image of both the Father and of the
to the nature of an image, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii,
Son; but the Latin Doctors attribute the name Image to the
qu. 74). But this belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who pro-
Son alone. For it is not found in the canonical Scripture
ceeds from another by way of similitude. Therefore the
except as applied to the Son; as in the words, “Who is
Holy Ghost is an Image; and so to be Image does not be-
the Image of the invisible God, the firstborn of creatures”
long to the Son alone.
(Col. 1:15) and again: “Who being the brightness of His
Objection 3. Further, man is also called the image of
glory, and the figure of His substance.” (Heb. 1:3).
God, according to 1 Cor. 11:7, “The man ought not to
Some explain this by the fact that the Son agrees with
cover his head, for he is the image and the glory of God.”
the Father, not in nature only, but also in the notion of
184
principle: whereas the Holy Ghost agrees neither with the called the Image; because the Son proceeds as word, and
Son, nor with the Father in any notion. This, however,
it is essential to word to be like species with that whence
does not seem to suffice. Because as it is not by reason of
it proceeds; whereas this does not essentially belong to
the relations that we consider either equality or inequality
love, although it may belong to that love which is the Holy
in God, as Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6), so neither (by
Ghost, inasmuch as He is the divine love.
reason thereof do we consider) that similitude which is
Reply to Objection 1.
Damascene and the other
essential to image. Hence others say that the Holy Ghost
Greek Doctors commonly employ the term image as
cannot be called the Image of the Son, because there can-
meaning a perfect similitude.
not be an image of an image; nor of the Father, because
Reply to Objection 2. Although the Holy Ghost is
again the image must be immediately related to that which
like to the Father and the Son, still it does not follow that
it is the image; and the Holy Ghost is related to the Father
He is the Image, as above explained.
through the Son; nor again is He the Image of the Father
Reply to Objection 3. The image of a thing may be
and the Son, because then there would be one image of
found in something in two ways. In one way it is found
two; which is impossible. Hence it follows that the Holy
in something of the same specific nature; as the image of
Ghost is in no way an Image. But this is no proof: for the
the king is found in his son. In another way it is found
Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost,
in something of a different nature, as the king’s image on
as we shall explain further on (q. 36, a. 4 ). Hence there
the coin. In the first sense the Son is the Image of the Fa-
is nothing to prevent there being one Image of the Father
ther; in the second sense man is called the image of God;
and of the Son, inasmuch as they are one; since even man
and therefore in order to express the imperfect character
is one image of the whole Trinity.
of the divine image in man, man is not simply called the
Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by
image, but “to the image,” whereby is expressed a certain
saying that, as the Holy Ghost, although by His proces-
movement of tendency to perfection. But it cannot be said
sion He receives the nature of the Father, as the Son also
that the Son of God is “to the image,” because He is the
receives it, nevertheless is not said to be “born”; so, al-
perfect Image of the Father.
though He receives the likeness of the Father, He is not
185
FIRST PART, QUESTION 36
Of the Person of the Holy Ghost
(In Four Articles)
We proceed to treat of what belongs to the person of the Holy Ghost, Who is called not only the Holy Ghost, but also the Love and Gift of God. Concerning the name “Holy Ghost” there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether this name, “Holy Ghost,” is the proper name of one divine Person?
(2) Whether that divine person Who is called the Holy Ghost, proceeds from the Father and the Son?
(3) Whether He proceeds from the Father through the Son?
(4) Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?
Whether this name “Holy Ghost” is the proper name of one divine person?
Ia q. 36 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that this name, “Holy
name of its own, as stated above (q. 27 , a. 4, ad 3). Hence
Ghost,” is not the proper name of one divine person. For
the relations also which follow from this procession are
no name which is common to the three persons is the
without a name (q. 28, a. 4): for which reason the Per-
proper name of any one person. But this name of ‘Holy
son proceeding in that manner has not a proper name. But
Ghost’∗ is common to the three persons; for Hilary (De
as some names are accommodated by the usual mode of
Trin.
viii) shows that the “Spirit of God” sometimes
speaking to signify the aforesaid relations, as when we
means the Father, as in the words of Is. 61:1: “The Spirit
use the names of procession and spiration, which in the
of the Lord is upon me;” and sometimes the Son, as when
strict sense more fittingly signify the notional acts than the
the Son says: “In the Spirit of God I cast out devils” (Mat.
relations; so to signify the divine Person, Who proceeds
12:28), showing that He cast out devils by His own nat-
by way of love, this name “Holy Ghost” is by the use of
ural power; and that sometimes it means the Holy Ghost,
scriptural speech accommodated to Him. The appropri-
as in the words of Joel 2:28: “I will pour out of My Spirit
ateness of this name may be shown in two ways. Firstly,
over all flesh.” Therefore this name ‘Holy Ghost’ is not
from the fact that the person who is called “Holy Ghost”
the proper name of a divine person.
has something in common with the other Persons. For,
Objection 2. Further, the names of the divine persons
as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17; v, 11), “Because the
are relative terms, as Boethius says (De Trin.). But this
Holy Ghost is common to both, He Himself is called that
name “Holy Ghost” is not a relative term. Therefore this
properly which both are called in common. For the Fa-
name is not the proper name of a divine Person.
ther also is a spirit, and the Son is a spirit; and the Father
Objection 3. Further, because the Son is the name of
is holy, and the Son is holy.” Secondly, from the proper
a divine Person He cannot be called the Son of this or of
signification of the name. For the name spirit in things
that. But the spirit is spoken of as of this or that man, as
corporeal seems to signify impulse and motion; for we
appears in the words, “The Lord said to Moses, I will take
call the breath and the wind by the term spirit. Now it is
of thy spirit and will give to them” (Num. 11:17) and also
a property of love to move and impel the will of the lover
“The Spirit of Elias rested upon Eliseus” (4 Kings 2:15).
towards the object loved. Further, holiness is attributed to
Therefore “Holy Ghost” does not seem to be the proper
whatever is ordered to God. Therefore because the divine
name of a divine Person.
person proceeds by way of the love whereby God is loved,
On the contrary, It is said (1 Jn. 5:7): “There are
that person is most properly named “The Holy Ghost.”
three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word,
Reply to Objection 1. The expression Holy Spirit, if
and the Holy Ghost.” As Augustine says (De Trin. vii,
taken as two words, is applicable to the whole Trinity: be-
4): “When we ask, Three what? we say, Three persons.”
cause by ‘spirit’ the immateriality of the divine substance
Therefore the Holy Ghost is the name of a divine person.
is signified; for corporeal spirit is invisible, and has but lit-I answer that, While there are two processions in
tle matter; hence we apply this term to all immaterial and
God, one of these, the procession of love, has no proper
invisible substances. And by adding the word “holy” we
∗ It should be borne in mind that the word “ghost” is the old English equivalent for the Latin “spiritus,” whether in the sense of “breath” or
“blast,” or in the sense of “spirit,” as an immaterial substance. Thus, we read in the former sense (Hampole, Psalter x, 7), “The Gost of Storms”
[spiritus procellarum], and in the latter “Trubled gost is sacrifice of God”
(Prose Psalter, A.D. 1325), and “Oure wrestlynge is. . . against the spiritual wicked gostes of the ayre” (More, “Comfort against Tribulation”); and in our modern expression of “giving up the ghost.” As applied to God, and not specially to the third Holy Person, we have an example from Maunder, “Jhesu Criste was the worde and the goste of Good.”186
(See Oxford Dictionary).
signify the purity of divine goodness. But if Holy Spirit understand the Holy Spirit as being breathed [spiratus].
be taken as one word, it is thus that the expression, in the
Reply to Objection 3. In the name Son we understand
usage of the Church, is accommodated to signify one of
that relation only which is of something from a principle,
the three persons, the one who proceeds by way of love,
in regard to that principle: but in the name “Father” we
for the reason above explained.
understand the relation of principle; and likewise in the
Reply to Objection 2. Although this name “Holy
name of Spirit inasmuch as it implies a moving power.
Ghost” does not indicate a relation, still it takes the place
But to no creature does it belong to be a principle as re-
of a relative term, inasmuch as it is accommodated to sig-
gards a divine person; but rather the reverse. Therefore
nify a Person distinct from the others by relation only. Yet
we can say “our Father,” and “our Spirit”; but we cannot
this name may be understood as including a relation, if we
say “our Son.”
Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son?
Ia q. 36 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the Holy Ghost does
much less so in God. But it is possible for the Holy
not proceed from the Son. For as Dionysius says (Div.
Ghost to be distinguished from the Son, even if He did not
Nom. i): “We must not dare to say anything concerning
proceed from Him. For Anselm says (De Process. Spir.
the substantial Divinity except what has been divinely ex-
Sancti, ii): “The Son and the Holy Ghost have their Being
pressed to us by the sacred oracles.” But in the Sacred
from the Father; but each in a different way; one by Birth,
Scripture we are not told that the Holy Ghost proceeds
the other by Procession, so that they are thus distinct from
from the Son; but only that He proceeds from the Father,
one another.” And further on he says: “For even if for
as appears from Jn. 15:26: “The Spirit of truth, Who pro-
no other reason were the Son and the Holy Ghost distinct,
ceeds from the Father.” Therefore the Holy Ghost does
this alone would suffice.” Therefore the Holy Spirit is dis-
not proceed from the Son.
tinct from the Son, without proceeding from Him.
Objection 2. Further, In the creed of the council of
On the contrary, Athanasius says: “The Holy Ghost
Constantinople (Can. vii) we read: “We believe in the
is from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, nor
Holy Ghost, the Lord and Life-giver, who proceeds from
begotten, but proceeding.”
the Father; with the Father and the Son to be adored and
I answer that, It must be said that the Holy Ghost is
glorified.” Therefore it should not be added in our Creed
from the Son. For if He were not from Him, He could
that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; and those who
in no wise be personally distinguished from Him; as ap-
added such a thing appear to be worthy of anathema.
pears from what has been said above (q. 28, a. 3; q. 30,
Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
a. 2). For it cannot be said that the divine Persons are dis-
i): “We say that the Holy Ghost is from the Father, and
tinguished from each other in any absolute sense; for it
we name Him the spirit of the Father; but we do not say
would follow that there would not be one essence of the
that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, yet we name Him
three persons: since everything that is spoken of God in an
the Spirit of the Son.” Therefore the Holy Ghost does not
absolute sense, belongs to the unity of essence. Therefore
proceed from the Son.
it must be said that the divine persons are distinguished
Objection 4. Further, Nothing proceeds from that
from each other only by the relations. Now the relations
wherein it rests. But the Holy Ghost rests in the Son;
cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as they
for it is said in the legend of St. Andrew: “Peace be to
are opposite relations; which appears from the fact that
you and to all who believe in the one God the Father,
the Father has two relations, by one of which He is re-
and in His only Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the
lated to the Son, and by the other to the Holy Ghost; but
one Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father, and abiding
these are not opposite relations, and therefore they do not
in the Son.” Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed
make two persons, but belong only to the one person of
from the Son.
the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost
Objection 5. Further, the Son proceeds as the Word.
there were two relations only, whereby each of them were
But our breath [spiritus] does not seem to proceed in our-
related to the Father, these relations would not be oppo-
selves from our word. Therefore the Holy Ghost does not
site to each other, as neither would be the two relations
proceed from the Son.
whereby the Father is related to them. Hence, as the per-
Objection 6. Further, the Holy Ghost proceeds per-
son of the Father is one, it would follow that the person of
fectly from the Father. Therefore it is superfluous to say
the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two
that He proceeds from the Son.
relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But
Objection 7. Further “the actual and the possible do
this is heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity.
not differ in things perpetual” (Phys. iii, text 32), and
Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to
187
each other by opposite relations. Now there cannot be in verbally expressed in Holy Scripture that the Holy Ghost
God any relations opposed to each other, except relations
proceeds from the Son, still we do find it in the sense of
of origin, as proved above (q. 28, a. 44). And opposite
Scripture, especially where the Son says, speaking of the
relations of origin are to be understood as of a “principle,”
Holy Ghost, “He will glorify Me, because He shall receive
and of what is “from the principle.” Therefore we must
of Mine” (Jn. 16:14). It is also a rule of Holy Scripture
conclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is
that whatever is said of the Father, applies to the Son, al-
from the Holy Ghost; which no one says; or that the Holy
though there be added an exclusive term; except only as
Ghost is from the Son, as we confess.
regards what belongs to the opposite relations, whereby
Furthermore, the order of the procession of each one
the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other.
agrees with this conclusion. For it was said above (q. 27,
For when the Lord says, “No one knoweth the Son, but
Aa. 2,4; q. 28, a. 4), that the Son proceeds by the way of
the Father,” the idea of the Son knowing Himself is not
the intellect as Word, and the Holy Ghost by way of the
excluded. So therefore when we say that the Holy Ghost
will as Love. Now love must proceed from a word. For
proceeds from the Father, even though it be added that He
we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a men-
proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not thereby
tal conception. Hence also in this way it is manifest that
be at all excluded; because as regards being the principle
the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.
of the Holy Ghost, the Father and the Son are not opposed
We derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very
to each other, but only as regards the fact that one is the
order of nature itself. For we nowhere find that several
Father, and the other is the Son.
things proceed from one without order except in those
Reply to Objection 2. In every council of the Church
which differ only by their matter; as for instance one smith
a symbol of faith has been drawn up to meet some preva-
produces many knives distinct from each other materially,
lent error condemned in the council at that time. Hence
with no order to each other; whereas in things in which
subsequent councils are not to be described as making a
there is not only a material distinction we always find that
new symbol of faith; but what was implicitly contained in
some order exists in the multitude produced. Hence also
the first symbol was explained by some addition directed
in the order of creatures produced, the beauty of the divine
against rising heresies. Hence in the decision of the coun-
wisdom is displayed. So if from the one Person of the Fa-
cil of Chalcedon it is declared that those who were congre-
ther, two persons proceed, the Son and the Holy Ghost,
gated together in the council of Constantinople, handed
there must be some order between them. Nor can any
down the doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not implying
other be assigned except the order of their nature, whereby
that there was anything wanting in the doctrine of their
one is from the other. Therefore it cannot be said that the
predecessors who had gathered together at Nicaea, but ex-
Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father in such
plaining what those fathers had understood of the matter.
a way as that neither of them proceeds from the other,
Therefore, because at the time of the ancient councils the
unless we admit in them a material distinction; which is
error of those who said that the Holy Ghost did not pro-
impossible.
ceed from the Son had not arisen, it was not necessary
Hence also the Greeks themselves recognize that the
to make any explicit declaration on that point; whereas,
procession of the Holy Ghost has some order to the Son.
later on, when certain errors rose up, another council∗ as-
For they grant that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit “of the
sembled in the west, the matter was explicitly defined by
Son”; and that He is from the Father “through the Son.”
the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority
Some of them are said also to concede that “He is from the
also the ancient councils were summoned and confirmed.
Son”; or that “He flows from the Son,” but not that He pro-
Nevertheless the truth was contained implicitly in the be-
ceeds; which seems to come from ignorance or obstinacy.
lief that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father.
For a just consideration of the truth will convince anyone
Reply to Objection 3. The Nestorians were the first
that the word procession is the one most commonly ap-
to introduce the error that the Holy Ghost did not pro-
plied to all that denotes origin of any kind. For we use the
ceed from the Son, as appears in a Nestorian creed con-
term to describe any kind of origin; as when we say that
demned in the council of Ephesus. This error was em-
a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the sun, a stream
braced by Theodoric the Nestorian, and several others af-
from a source, and likewise in everything else. Hence,
ter him, among whom was also Damascene. Hence, in
granted that the Holy Ghost originates in any way from
that point his opinion is not to be held. Although, too, it
the Son, we can conclude that the Holy Ghost proceeds
has been asserted by some that while Damascene did not
from the Son.
confess that the Holy Ghost was from the Son, neither do
Reply to Objection 1. We ought not to say about
those words of his express a denial thereof.
God anything which is not found in Holy Scripture either
Reply to Objection 4. When the Holy Ghost is said
explicitly or implicitly. But although we do not find it
to rest or abide in the Son, it does not mean that He does
∗ Council of Rome, under Pope Damasus
188
not proceed from Him; for the Son also is said to abide superfluous to say He proceeds from the Son, but rather it
in the Father, although He proceeds from the Father. Also
is absolutely necessary. Forasmuch as one power belongs
the Holy Ghost is said to rest in the Son as the love of the
to the Father and the Son; and because whatever is from
lover abides in the beloved; or in reference to the human
the Father, must be from the Son unless it be opposed to
nature of Christ, by reason of what is written: “On whom
the property of filiation; for the Son is not from Himself,
thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon
although He is from the Father.
Him, He it is who baptizes” (Jn. 1:33).
Reply to Objection 7.
The Holy Ghost is distin-
Reply to Objection 5. The Word in God is not taken
guished from the Son, inasmuch as the origin of one is
after the similitude of the vocal word, whence the breath
distinguished from the origin of the other; but the differ-
[spiritus] does not proceed; for it would then be only
ence itself of origin comes from the fact that the Son is
metaphorical; but after the similitude of the mental word,
only from the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from the
whence proceeds love.
Father and the Son; for otherwise the processions would
Reply to Objection 6. For the reason that the Holy
not be distinguished from each other, as explained above,
Ghost proceeds from the Father perfectly, not only is it not
and in q. 27.
Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son?
Ia q. 36 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the Holy Ghost does
agent acts, whether it be a final cause or a formal cause,
not proceed from the Father through the Son. For what-
whether it be effective or motive. It is a final cause when
ever proceeds from one through another, does not proceed
we say, for instance, that the artisan works through love
immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from
of gain. It is a formal cause when we say that he works
the Father through the Son, He does not proceed immedi-
through his art. It is a motive cause when we say that he
ately; which seems to be unfitting.
works through the command of another. Sometimes, how-
Objection 2. Further, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from
ever, that which is covered by this preposition “through”
the Father through the Son, He does not proceed from
is the cause of the action regarded as terminated in the
the Son, except on account of the Father. But “whatever
thing done; as, for instance, when we say, the artisan acts
causes a thing to be such is yet more so.” Therefore He
through the mallet, for this does not mean that the mallet
proceeds more from the Father than from the Son.
is the cause why the artisan acts, but that it is the cause
Objection 3. Further, the Son has His being by gen-
why the thing made proceeds from the artisan, and that
eration. Therefore if the Holy Ghost is from the Father
it has even this effect from the artisan. This is why it is
through the Son, it follows that the Son is first generated
sometimes said that this preposition “through” sometimes
and afterwards the Holy Ghost proceeds; and thus the pro-
denotes direct authority, as when we say, the king works
cession of the Holy Ghost is not eternal, which is hereti-
through the bailiff; and sometimes indirect authority, as
cal.
when we say, the bailiff works through the king.
Objection 4. Further, when anyone acts through an-
Therefore, because the Son receives from the Father
other, the same may be said conversely. For as we say
that the Holy Ghost proceeds from Him, it can be said
that the king acts through the bailiff, so it can be said con-
that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son,
versely that the bailiff acts through the king. But we can
or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through
never say that the Son spirates the Holy Ghost through
the Son, which has the same meaning.
the Father. Therefore it can never be said that the Father
Reply to Objection 1. In every action two things
spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son.
are to be considered, the “suppositum” acting, and the
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. xii): “Keep
power whereby it acts; as, for instance, fire heats through
me, I pray, in this expression of my faith, that I may ever
heat. So if we consider in the Father and the Son the
possess the Father—namely Thyself: that I may adore
power whereby they spirate the Holy Ghost, there is no
Thy Son together with Thee: and that I may deserve Thy
mean, for this is one and the same power. But if we con-
Holy Spirit, who is through Thy Only Begotten.”
sider the persons themselves spirating, then, as the Holy
I answer that, Whenever one is said to act through
Ghost proceeds both from the Father and from the Son,
another, this preposition “through” points out, in what is
the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father immediately,
covered by it, some cause or principle of that act. But
as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son; and thus
since action is a mean between the agent and the thing
He is said to proceed from the Father through the Son.
done, sometimes that which is covered by the preposi-
So also did Abel proceed immediately from Adam, inas-
tion “through” is the cause of the action, as proceeding
much as Adam was his father; and mediately, as Eve was
from the agent; and in that case it is the cause of why the
his mother, who proceeded from Adam; although, indeed,
189
this example of a material procession is inept to signify true. For we do not say that the mallet works through the
the immaterial procession of the divine persons.
carpenter; whereas we can say that the bailiff acts through
Reply to Objection 2. If the Son received from the
the king, because it is the bailiff’s place to act, since he
Father a numerically distinct power for the spiration of the
is master of his own act, but it is not the mallet’s place to
Holy Ghost, it would follow that He would be a secondary
act, but only to be made to act, and hence it is used only as
and instrumental cause; and thus the Holy Ghost would
an instrument. The bailiff is, however, said to act through
proceed more from the Father than from the Son; whereas,
the king, although this preposition “through” denotes a
on the contrary, the same spirative power belongs to the
medium, for the more a “suppositum” is prior in action, so
Father and to the Son; and therefore the Holy Ghost pro-
much the more is its power immediate as regards the ef-
ceeds equally from both, although sometimes He is said to
fect, inasmuch as the power of the first cause joins the sec-
proceed principally or properly from the Father, because
ond cause to its effect. Hence also first principles are said
the Son has this power from the Father.
to be immediate in the demonstrative sciences. Therefore,
Reply to Objection 3. As the begetting of the Son is
so far as the bailiff is a medium according to the order of
co-eternal with the begetter (and hence the Father does not
the subject’s acting, the king is said to work through the
exist before begetting the Son), so the procession of the
bailiff; but according to the order of powers, the bailiff is
Holy Ghost is co-eternal with His principle. Hence, the
said to act through the king, forasmuch as the power of
Son was not begotten before the Holy Ghost proceeded;
the king gives the bailiff’s action its effect. Now there is
but each of the operations is eternal.
no order of power between Father and Son, but only order
Reply to Objection 4. When anyone is said to work
of ‘supposita’; and hence we say that the Father spirates
through anything, the converse proposition is not always
through the Son; and not conversely.
Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?
Ia q. 36 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the Father and the
that the Son is the Father; and if the one is not the Father,
Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. For the Holy
it follows that the Father is not the Father. Therefore we
Ghost does not proceed from the Father and the Son as
cannot say that the Father and the Son are one principle of
they are one; not as they are one in nature, for the Holy
the Holy Ghost.
Ghost would in that way proceed from Himself, as He is
Objection 5. Further, if the Father and the Son are
one in nature with Them; nor again inasmuch as they are
one principle of the Holy Ghost, it seems necessary to
united in any one property, for it is clear that one prop-
say, conversely, that the one principle of the Holy Ghost
erty cannot belong to two subjects. Therefore the Holy
is the Father and the Son. But this seems to be false; for
Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as distinct
this word “principle” stands either for the person of the
from one another. Therefore the Father and the Son are
Father, or for the person of the Son; and in either sense it
not one principle of the Holy Ghost.
is false. Therefore this proposition also is false, that the
Objection 2. Further, in this proposition “the Father
Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost.
and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost,” we do
Objection 6. Further, unity in substance makes iden-
not designate personal unity, because in that case the Fa-
tity. So if the Father and the Son are the one principle of
ther and the Son would be one person; nor again do we
the Holy Ghost, it follows that they are the same princi-
designate the unity of property, because if one property
ple; which is denied by many. Therefore we cannot grant
were the reason of the Father and the Son being one prin-
that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy
ciple of the Holy Ghost, similarly, on account of His two
Ghost.
properties, the Father would be two principles of the Son
Objection 7. Further, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost
and of the Holy Ghost, which cannot be admitted. There-
are called one Creator, because they are the one princi-
fore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the
ple of the creature. But the Father and the Son are not
Holy Ghost.
one, but two Spirators, as many assert; and this agrees
Objection 3. Further, the Son is not one with the Fa-
also with what Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that “the Holy
ther more than is the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost and
Ghost is to be confessed as proceeding from Father and
the Father are not one principle as regards any other divine
Son as authors.” Therefore the Father and the Son are not
person. Therefore neither are the Father and the Son.
one principle of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 4. Further, if the Father and the Son are
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 14) that
one principle of the Holy Ghost, this one is either the Fa-
the Father and the Son are not two principles, but one prin-
ther or it is not the Father. But we cannot assert either of
ciple of the Holy Ghost.
these positions because if the one is the Father, it follows
I answer that, The Father and the Son are in every-
190
thing one, wherever there is no distinction between them properties that we speak of similitude or dissimilitude in
of opposite relation. Hence since there is no relative op-
God, but by reason of the essence. Hence, as the Father is
position between them as the principle of the Holy Ghost
not more like to Himself than He is to the Son; so likewise
it follows that the Father and the Son are one principle of
neither is the Son more like to the Father than is the Holy
the Holy Ghost.
Ghost.
Some, however, assert that this proposition is incor-
Reply to Objection 4. These two propositions, “The
rect: “The Father and the Son are one principle of the
Father and the Son are one principle which is the Father,”
Holy Ghost,” because, they declare, since the word “prin-
or, “one principle which is not the Father,” are not mutu-
ciple” in the singular number does not signify “person,”
ally contradictory; and hence it is not necessary to assert
but “property,” it must be taken as an adjective; and foras-
one or other of them. For when we say the Father and the
much as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjec-
Son are one principle, this word “principle” has not deter-
tive, it cannot properly be said that the Father and the Son
minate supposition but rather it stands indeterminately for
are one principle of the Holy Ghost unless one be taken
two persons together. Hence there is a fallacy of “figure
as an adverb, so that the meaning should be: They are one
of speech” as the argument concludes from the indetermi-
principle—that is, in one and the same way. But then it
nate to the determinate.
might be equally right to say that the Father is two prin-
Reply to Objection 5. This proposition is also true:—
ciples of the Son and of the Holy Ghost—namely, in two
The one principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the
ways. Therefore, we must say that, although this word
Son; because the word “principle” does not stand for one
“principle” signifies a property, it does so after the man-
person only, but indistinctly for the two persons as above
ner of a substantive, as do the words “father” and “son”
explained.
even in things created. Hence it takes its number from the
Reply to Objection 6. There is no reason against say-
form it signifies, like other substantives. Therefore, as the
ing that the Father and the Son are the same principle,
Father and the Son are one God, by reason of the unity of
because the word “principle” stands confusedly and in-
the form that is signified by this word “God”; so they are
distinctly for the two Persons together.
one principle of the Holy Ghost by reason of the unity of
Reply to Objection 7. Some say that although the Fa-
the property that is signified in this word “principle.”
ther and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, there
Reply to Objection 1. If we consider the spirative
are two spirators, by reason of the distinction of “sup-
power, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the
posita,” as also there are two spirating, because acts refer
Son as they are one in the spirative power, which in a cer-
to subjects. Yet this does not hold good as to the name
tain way signifies the nature with the property, as we shall
“Creator”; because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Fa-
see later (ad 7). Nor is there any reason against one prop-
ther and the Son as from two distinct persons, as above
erty being in two “supposita” that possess one common
explained; whereas the creature proceeds from the three
nature. But if we consider the “supposita” of the spira-
persons not as distinct persons, but as united in essence.
tion, then we may say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from
It seems, however, better to say that because spirating is
the Father and the Son, as distinct; for He proceeds from
an adjective, and spirator a substantive, we can say that
them as the unitive love of both.
the Father and the Son are two spirating, by reason of the
Reply to Objection 2. In the proposition “the Father
plurality of the “supposita” but not two spirators by rea-
and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost,” one
son of the one spiration. For adjectival words derive their
property is designated which is the form signified by the
number from the “supposita” but substantives from them-
term. It does not thence follow that by reason of the sev-
selves, according to the form signified. As to what Hilary
eral properties the Father can be called several principles,
says, that “the Holy ghost is from the Father and the Son
for this would imply in Him a plurality of subjects.
as His authors,” this is to be explained in the sense that the
Reply to Objection 3. It is not by reason of relative
substantive here stands for the adjective.
191
FIRST PART, QUESTION 37
Of the Name of the Holy Ghost—Love
(In Two Articles)
We now inquire concerning the name “Love,” on which arise two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?
(2) Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?
Whether “Love” is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?
Ia q. 37 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that “Love” is not the
tion,” as stated above (q. 27, a. 4, ad 3), and yet express
proper name of the Holy Ghost. For Augustine says (De
the origin rather than the relation in the strict sense of the
Trin. xv, 17): “As the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are
term. Nevertheless we must consider them in respect of
called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, but one; I
each procession simply. For as when a thing is under-
know not why the Father, Son and Holy Ghost should not
stood by anyone, there results in the one who understands
be called Charity, and all together one Charity.” But no
a conception of the object understood, which conception
name which is predicated in the singular of each person
we call word; so when anyone loves an object, a certain
and of all together, is a proper name of a person. There-
impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the
fore this name, “Love,” is not the proper name of the Holy
affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved
Ghost.
is said to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is
Objection 2. Further, the Holy Ghost is a subsisting
in the one who understands; so that when anyone under-
person, but love is not used to signify a subsisting person,
stands and loves himself he is in himself, not only by real
but rather an action passing from the lover to the beloved.
identity, but also as the object understood is in the one
Therefore Love is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
who understands, and the thing loved is in the lover. As
Objection 3.
Further, Love is the bond between
regards the intellect, however, words have been found to
lovers, for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “Love is
describe the mutual relation of the one who understands
a unitive force.” But a bond is a medium between what
the object understood, as appears in the word “to under-
it joins together, not something proceeding from them.
stand”; and other words are used to express the proces-
Therefore, since the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father
sion of the intellectual conception—namely, “to speak,”
and the Son, as was shown above (q. 36, a. 2), it seems
and “word.” Hence in God, “to understand” is applied
that He is not the Love or bond of the Father and the Son.
only to the essence; because it does not import relation
Objection 4. Further, Love belongs to every lover.
to the Word that proceeds; whereas “Word” is said per-
But the Holy Ghost is a lover: therefore He has love. So
sonally, because it signifies what proceeds; and the term
if the Holy Ghost is Love, He must be love of love, and
“to speak” is a notional term as importing the relation of
spirit from spirit; which is not admissible.
the principle of the Word to the Word Himself. On the
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxx, in Pente-
other hand, on the part of the will, with the exception of
cost.): “The Holy Ghost Himself is Love.”
the words “dilection” and “love,” which express the re-
I answer that, The name Love in God can be taken
lation of the lover to the object loved, there are no other
essentially and personally. If taken personally it is the
terms in use, which express the relation of the impression
proper name of the Holy Ghost; as Word is the proper
or affection of the object loved, produced in the lover by
name of the Son.
fact that he loves—to the principle of that impression, or
To see this we must know that since as shown above
“vice versa.” And therefore, on account of the poverty of
(q. 27, Aa. 2,3,4,5), there are two processions in God, one
our vocabulary, we express these relations by the words
by way of the intellect, which is the procession of the
“love” and “dilection”: just as if we were to call the Word
Word, and another by way of the will, which is the proces-
“intelligence conceived,” or “wisdom begotten.”
sion of Love; forasmuch as the former is the more known
It follows that so far as love means only the relation of
to us, we have been able to apply more suitable names to
the lover to the object loved, “love” and “to love” are said
express our various considerations as regards that proces-
of the essence, as “understanding” and “to understand”;
sion, but not as regards the procession of the will. Hence,
but, on the other hand, so far as these words are used to
we are obliged to employ circumlocution as regards the
express the relation to its principle, of what proceeds by
person Who proceeds, and the relations following from
way of love, and “vice versa,” so that by “love” is under-
this procession which are called “procession” and “spira-
stood the “love proceeding,” and by “to love” is under-
192
stood “the spiration of the love proceeding,” in that sense Reply to Objection 3. The Holy Ghost is said to be
“love” is the name of the person and “to love” is a notional
the bond of the Father and Son, inasmuch as He is Love;
term, as “to speak” and “to beget.”
because, since the Father loves Himself and the Son with
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is there speaking of
one Love, and conversely, there is expressed in the Holy
charity as it means the divine essence, as was said above
Ghost, as Love, the relation of the Father to the Son, and
(here and q. 24, a. 2, ad 4).
conversely, as that of the lover to the beloved. But from
Reply to Objection 2. Although to understand, and to
the fact that the Father and the Son mutually love one
will, and to love signify actions passing on to their objects,
another, it necessarily follows that this mutual Love, the
nevertheless they are actions that remain in the agents, as
Holy Ghost, proceeds from both. As regards origin, there-
stated above (q. 14, a. 4), yet in such a way that in the
fore, the Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the third per-
agent itself they import a certain relation to their object.
son in the Trinity; whereas as regards the aforesaid rela-
Hence, love also in ourselves is something that abides in
tion He is the bond between the two persons, as proceed-
the lover, and the word of the heart is something abiding
ing from both.
in the speaker; yet with a relation to the thing expressed
Reply to Objection 4. As it does not belong to the
by word, or loved. But in God, in whom there is noth-
Son, though He understands, to produce a word, for it be-
ing accidental, there is more than this; because both Word
longs to Him to understand as the word proceeding; so in
and Love are subsistent. Therefore, when we say that the
like manner, although the Holy Ghost loves, taking Love
Holy Ghost is the Love of the Father for the Son, or for
as an essential term, still it does not belong to Him to spi-
something else; we do not mean anything that passes into
rate love, which is to take love as a notional term; because
another, but only the relation of love to the beloved; as
He loves essentially as love proceeding; but not as the one
also in the Word is imported the relation of the Word to
whence love proceeds.
the thing expressed by the Word.
Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?
Ia q. 37 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the Father and the
tures, and this belongs to the essence. Therefore this also
Son do not love each other by the Holy Ghost. For Augus-
is false: “The Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost.”
tine (De Trin. vii, 1) proves that the Father is not wise by
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 5):
the Wisdom begotten. But as the Son is Wisdom begotten,
“The Holy Ghost is He whereby the Begotten is loved by
so the Holy Ghost is the Love proceeding, as explained
the one begetting and loves His Begetter.”
above (q. 27, a. 3). Therefore the Father and the Son do
I answer that, A difficulty about this question is ob-
not love Themselves by the Love proceeding, which is the
jected to the effect that when we say, “the Father loves the
Holy Ghost.
Son by the Holy Ghost,” since the ablative is construed as
Objection 2. Further, the proposition, “The Father
denoting a cause, it seems to mean that the Holy Ghost
and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost,” this word
is the principle of love to the Father and the Son; which
“love” is to be taken either essentially or notionally. But it
cannot be admitted.
cannot be true if taken essentially, because in the same
In view of this difficulty some have held that it is false,
way we might say that “the Father understands by the
that “the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy
Son”; nor, again, if it is taken notionally, for then, in like
Ghost”; and they add that it was retracted by Augustine
manner, it might be said that “the Father and the Son spi-
when he retracted its equivalent to the effect that “the Fa-
rate by the Holy Ghost,” or that “the Father generates by
ther is wise by the Wisdom begotten.” Others say that the
the Son.” Therefore in no way is this proposition true:
proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded, as
“ ‘The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy
that “the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost”—that
Ghost.”
is, “by His essential Love,” which is appropriated to the
Objection 3. Further, by the same love the Father
Holy Ghost. Others further say that this ablative should
loves the Son, and Himself, and us. But the Father does
be construed as importing a sign, so that it means, “the
not love Himself by the Holy Ghost; for no notional act is
Holy Ghost is the sign that the Father loves the Son”;
reflected back on the principle of the act; since it cannot
inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds from them both, as
be said that the “Father begets Himself,” or that “He spi-
Love. Others, again, say that this ablative must be con-
rates Himself.” Therefore, neither can it be said that “He
strued as importing the relation of formal cause, because
loves Himself by the Holy Ghost,” if “to love” is taken in
the Holy Ghost is the love whereby the Father and the Son
a notional sense. Again, the love wherewith He loves us is
formally love each other. Others, again, say that it should
not the Holy Ghost; because it imports a relation to crea-
be construed as importing the relation of a formal effect;
193
and these approach nearer to the truth.
Son love each other by the Holy Ghost, as was above ex-
To make the matter clear, we must consider that since
plained.
a thing is commonly denominated from its forms, as
Reply to Objection 2. When the idea of an action in-
“white” from whiteness, and “man” from humanity; ev-
cludes a determined effect, the principle of the action may
erything whence anything is denominated, in this partic-
be denominated both from the action, and from the effect;
ular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form.
so we can say, for instance, that a tree flowers by its flow-
So when I say, “this man is clothed with a garment,” the
ering and by its flower. When, however, the idea of an
ablative is to be construed as having relation to the for-
action does not include a determined effect, then in that
mal cause, although the garment is not the form. Now it
case, the principle of the action cannot be denominated
may happen that a thing may be denominated from that
from the effect, but only from the action. For we do not
which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is from its
say that the tree produces the flower by the flower, but by
action, but also as from the term itself of the action—that
the production of the flower. So when we say, “spirates”
is, the effect, when the effect itself is included in the idea
or “begets,” this imports only a notional act. Hence we
of the action. For we say that fire warms by heating, al-
cannot say that the Father spirates by the Holy Ghost, or
though heating is not the heat which is the form of the
begets by the Son. But we can say that the Father speaks
fire, but is an action proceeding from the fire; and we say
by the Word, as by the Person proceeding, “and speaks
that a tree flowers with the flower, although the flower is
by the speaking,” as by a notional act; forasmuch as “to
not the tree’s form, but is the effect proceeding from the
speak” imports a determinate person proceeding; since “to
form. In this way, therefore, we must say that since in God
speak” means to produce a word. Likewise to love, taken
“to love” is taken in two ways, essentially and notionally,
in a notional sense, means to produce love; and so it can
when it is taken essentially, it means that the Father and
be said that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost, as
the Son love each other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their
by the person proceeding, and by Love itself as a notional
essence. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 7): “Who
act.
dares to say that the Father loves neither Himself, nor the
Reply to Objection 3. The Father loves not only the
Son, nor the Holy Ghost, except by the Holy Ghost?” The
Son, but also Himself and us, by the Holy Ghost; because,
opinions first quoted are to be taken in this sense. But
as above explained, to love, taken in a notional sense, not
when the term Love is taken in a notional sense it means
only imports the production of a divine person, but also
nothing else than “to spirate love”; just as to speak is to
the person produced, by way of love, which has relation
produce a word, and to flower is to produce flowers. As
to the object loved. Hence, as the Father speaks Himself
therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower, so do we
and every creature by His begotten Word, inasmuch as the
say that the Father, by the Word or the Son, speaks Him-
Word “begotten” adequately represents the Father and ev-
self, and His creatures; and that the Father and the Son
ery creature; so He loves Himself and every creature by
love each other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love
the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds as
proceeding.
the love of the primal goodness whereby the Father loves
Reply to Objection 1. To be wise or intelligent is
Himself and every creature. Thus it is evident that rela-
taken only essentially in God; therefore we cannot say
tion to the creature is implied both in the Word and in the
that “the Father is wise or intelligent by the Son.” But
proceeding Love, as it were in a secondary way, inasmuch
to love is taken not only essentially, but also in a notional
as the divine truth and goodness are a principle of under-
sense; and in this way, we can say that the Father and the
standing and loving all creatures.
194
FIRST PART, QUESTION 38
Of the Name of the Holy Ghost, As Gift
(In Two Articles)
There now follows the consideration of the Gift; concerning which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether “Gift” can be a personal name?
(2) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?
Whether “Gift” is a personal name?
Ia q. 38 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that “Gift” is not a per-
its own power avails nothing: hence this must be given it
sonal name. For every personal name imports a distinction
from above; for that is said to be given to us which we
in God. But the name of “Gift” does not import a distinc-
have from another source. Thus a divine person can “be
tion in God; for Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): that
given,” and can be a “gift.”
“the Holy Ghost is so given as God’s Gift, that He also
Reply to Objection 1. The name “Gift” imports a
gives Himself as God.” Therefore “Gift” is not a personal
personal distinction , in so far as gift imports something
name.
belonging to another through its origin. Nevertheless, the
Objection 2. Further, no personal name belongs to the
Holy Ghost gives Himself, inasmuch as He is His own,
divine essence. But the divine essence is the Gift which
and can use or rather enjoy Himself; as also a free man be-
the Father gives to the Son, as Hilary says (De Trin. ix).
longs to himself. And as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract.
Therefore “Gift” is not a personal name.
xxix): “What is more yours than yourself?” Or we might
Objection 3. Further, according to Damascene (De
say, and more fittingly, that a gift must belong in a way to
Fide Orth. iv, 19) there is no subjection nor service in
the giver. But the phrase, “this is this one’s,” can be un-
the divine persons. But gift implies a subjection both as
derstood in several senses. In one way it means identity,
regards him to whom it is given, and as regards him by
as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix); and in that sense
whom it is given. Therefore “Gift” is not a personal name.
“gift” is the same as “the giver,” but not the same as the
Objection 4. Further, “Gift” imports relation to the
one to whom it is given. The Holy Ghost gives Himself in
creature, and it thus seems to be said of God in time. But
that sense. In another sense, a thing is another’s as a pos-
personal names are said of God from eternity; as “Father,”
session, or as a slave; and in that sense gift is essentially
and “Son.” Therefore “Gift” is not a personal name.
distinct from the giver; and the gift of God so taken is a
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19):
created thing. In a third sense “this is this one’s” through
“As the body of flesh is nothing but flesh; so the gift of the
its origin only; and in this sense the Son is the Father’s;
Holy Ghost is nothing but the Holy Ghost.” But the Holy
and the Holy Ghost belongs to both. Therefore, so far as
Ghost is a personal name; so also therefore is “Gift.”
gift in this way signifies the possession of the giver, it is
I answer that, The word “gift” imports an aptitude for
personally distinguished from the giver, and is a personal
being given. And what is given has an aptitude or relation
name.
both to the giver and to that to which it is given. For it
Reply to Objection 2. The divine essence is the Fa-
would not be given by anyone, unless it was his to give;
ther’s gift in the first sense, as being the Father’s by way
and it is given to someone to be his. Now a divine person
of identity.
is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son
Reply to Objection 3. Gift as a personal name in God
belongs to the Father; or as possessed by another. But we
does not imply subjection, but only origin, as regards the
are said to possess what we can freely use or enjoy as we
giver; but as regards the one to whom it is given, it implies
please: and in this way a divine person cannot be pos-
a free use, or enjoyment, as above explained.
sessed, except by a rational creature united to God. Other
Reply to Objection 4. Gift is not so called from being
creatures can be moved by a divine person, not, however,
actually given, but from its aptitude to be given. Hence
in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person,
the divine person is called Gift from eternity, although He
and to use the effect thereof. The rational creature does
is given in time. Nor does it follow that it is an essen-
sometimes attain thereto; as when it is made partaker of
tial name because it imports relation to the creature; but
the divine Word and of the Love proceeding, so as freely
that it includes something essential in its meaning; as the
to know God truly and to love God rightly. Hence the ra-
essence is included in the idea of person, as stated above
tional creature alone can possess the divine person. Nev-
(q. 34, a. 3).
ertheless in order that it may possess Him in this manner,
195
Whether “Gift” is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?
Ia q. 38 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that Gift is not the proper
tuitously forasmuch as we wish him well. So what we first
name of the Holy Ghost. For the name Gift comes from
give him is the love whereby we wish him well. Hence it
being given. But, as Is. 9:16 says: “A Son is give to us.”
is manifest that love has the nature of a first gift, through
Therefore to be Gift belongs to the Son, as well as to the
which all free gifts are given. So since the Holy Ghost
Holy Ghost.
proceeds as love, as stated above (q. 27, a. 4; q. 37, a. 1),
Objection 2. Further, every proper name of a person
He proceeds as the first gift. Hence Augustine says (De
signifies a property. But this word Gift does not signify a
Trin. xv, 24): “By the gift, which is the Holy Ghost,
property of the Holy Ghost. Therefore Gift is not a proper
many particular gifts are portioned out to the members of
name of the Holy Ghost.
Christ.”
Objection 3. Further, the Holy Ghost can be called
Reply to Objection 1. As the Son is properly called
the spirit of a man, whereas He cannot be called the gift
the Image because He proceeds by way of a word, whose
of any man, but “God’s Gift” only. Therefore Gift is not
nature it is to be the similitude of its principle, although
the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
the Holy Ghost also is like to the Father; so also, because
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20):
the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as love, He is
“As ‘to be born’ is, for the Son, to be from the Father, so,
properly called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For
for the Holy Ghost, ‘to be the Gift of God’ is to proceed
that the Son is given is from the Father’s love, according
from Father and Son.” But the Holy Ghost receives His
to the words, “God so loved the world, as to give His only
proper name from the fact that He proceeds from Father
begotten Son” (Jn. 3:16).
and Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the Holy
Reply to Objection 2. The name Gift involves the
Ghost.
idea of belonging to the Giver through its origin; and thus
I answer that, Gift, taken personally in God, is the
it imports the property of the origin of the Holy Ghost—
proper name of the Holy Ghost.
that is, His procession.
In proof of this we must know that a gift is properly
Reply to Objection 3. Before a gift is given, it be-
an unreturnable giving, as Aristotle says (Topic. iv, 4)—
longs only to the giver; but when it is given, it is his to
i.e. a thing which is not given with the intention of a
whom it is given. Therefore, because “Gift” does not im-
return—and it thus contains the idea of a gratuitous do-
port the actual giving, it cannot be called a gift of man, but
nation. Now, the reason of donation being gratuitous is
the Gift of God giving. When, however, it has been given,
love; since therefore do we give something to anyone gra-
then it is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man.
196
FIRST PART, QUESTION 39
Of the Persons in Relation to the Essence
(In Eight Articles)
Those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely, we next treat of what concerns the person in reference to the essence, to the properties, and to the notional acts; and of the comparison of these with each other.
As regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the essence in God is the same as the person?
(2) Whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence?
(3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in the plural, or in the singular?
(4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense?
(5) Whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in the abstract?
(6) Whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete essential names?
(7) Whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons?
(8) Which attributes should be appropriated to each person?
Whether in God the essence is the same as the person?
Ia q. 39 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that in God the essence
relations as realities. But as it was shown above (q. 28,
is not the same as person. For whenever essence is the
a. 2) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God
same as person or “suppositum,” there can be only one
they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that
“suppositum” of one nature, as is clear in the case of all
in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet
separate substances. For in those things which are really
that the persons are really distinguished from each other.
one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from
For person, as above stated (q. 29, a. 4), signifies relation
the other. But in God there is one essence and three per-
as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred
sons, as is clear from what is above expounded (q. 28, a. 3;
to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in
q. 30, a. 2). Therefore essence is not the same as person.
our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite rela-
Objection 2. Further, simultaneous affirmation and
tion, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition.
negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be
Thus there are one essence and three persons.
true. But affirmation and negation are true of essence and
Reply to Objection 1. There cannot be a distinction
of person. For person is distinct, whereas essence is not.
of “suppositum” in creatures by means of relations, but
Therefore person and essence are not the same.
only by essential principles; because in creatures relations
Objection 3. Further, nothing can be subject to it-
are not subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and
self. But person is subject to essence; whence it is called
so by reason of the opposition between them they distin-
“suppositum” or “hypostasis.” Therefore person is not the
guish the “supposita”; and yet the essence is not distin-
same as essence.
guished, because the relations themselves are not distin-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7):
guished from each other so far as they are identified with
“When we say the person of the Father we mean nothing
the essence.
else but the substance of the Father.”
Reply to Objection 2. As essence and person in God
I answer that, The truth of this question is quite clear differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something
if we consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown
can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other; and
above (q. 3, a. 3) that the divine simplicity requires that in
therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose
God essence is the same as “suppositum,” which in intel-
the other.
lectual substances is nothing else than person. But a dif-
Reply to Objection 3. Divine things are named by us
ficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine
after the way of created things, as above explained (q. 13,
persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains its
Aa. 1,3). And since created natures are individualized by
unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), “rela-
matter which is the subject of the specific nature, it fol-
tion multiplies the Trinity of persons,” some have thought
lows that individuals are called “subjects,” “supposita,”
that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they
or “hypostases.” So the divine persons are named “sup-
held the relations to be “adjacent”; considering only in the
posita” or “hypostases,” but not as if there really existed
relations the idea of “reference to another,” and not the
any real “supposition” or “subjection.”
197
Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence?
Ia q. 39 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem not right to say that the
unless some adjective qualifies the form; as when we say:
three persons are of one essence. For Hilary says (De
“That woman is of a handsome figure,” or: “This man is of
Synod.) that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost “are indeed
perfect virtue.” In like manner, as in God the persons are
three by substance, but one in harmony.” But the sub-
multiplied, and the essence is not multiplied, we speak of
stance of God is His essence. Therefore the three persons
one essence of the three persons, and three persons of the
are not of one essence.
one essence, provided that these genitives be understood
Objection 2. Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God
as designating the form.
except what can be confirmed by the authority of Holy
Reply to Objection 1. Substance is here taken for the
Writ, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Now
“hypostasis,” and not for the essence.
Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost
Reply to Objection 2. Although we may not find it
are of one essence. Therefore this should not be asserted.
declared in Holy Writ in so many words that the three per-
Objection 3. Further, the divine nature is the same
sons are of one essence, nevertheless we find it so stated
as the divine essence. It suffices therefore to say that the
as regards the meaning; for instance, “I and the Father are
three persons are of one nature.
one (Jn. 10:30),” and “I am in the Father, and the Father
Objection 4. Further, it is not usual to say that the
in Me (Jn. 10:38)”; and there are many other texts of the
person is of the essence; but rather that the essence is of
same import.
the person. Therefore it does not seem fitting to say that
Reply to Objection 3. Because “nature” designates
the three persons are of one essence.
the principle of action while “essence” comes from being
Objection 5. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii,
[essendo], things may be said to be of one nature which
6) that we do not say that the three persons are “from one
agree in some action, as all things which give heat; but
essence [ex una essentia],” lest we should seem to indi-
only those things can be said to be of “one essence” which
cate a distinction between the essence and the persons in
have one being. So the divine unity is better described by
God. But prepositions which imply transition, denote the
saying that the three persons are “of one essence,” than by
oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the
saying they are “of one nature.”
three persons are “of one essence [unius essentiae].”
Reply to Objection 4. Form, in the absolute sense,
Objection 6. Further, nothing should be said of God
is wont to be designated as belonging to that of which it
which can be occasion of error. Now, to say that the three
is the form, as we say “the virtue of Peter.” On the other
persons are of one essence or substance, furnishes occa-
hand, the thing having form is not wont to be designated
sion of error. For, as Hilary says (De Synod.): “One sub-
as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify
stance predicated of the Father and the Son signifies either
or designate the form. In which case two genitives are re-
one subsistent, with two denominations; or one substance
quired, one signifying the form, and the other signifying
divided into two imperfect substances; or a third prior sub-
the determination of the form, as, for instance, when we
stance taken and assumed by the other two.” Therefore it
say, “Peter is of great virtue [magnae virtutis],” or else one
must not be said that the three persons are of one sub-
genitive must have the force of two, as, for instance, “he
stance.
is a man of blood”—that is, he is a man who sheds much
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii)
blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence
that the word homoousion, which the Council of Nicaea
signifies a form as regards the person, it may properly be
adopted against the Arians, means that the three persons
said that the essence is of the person; but we cannot say
are of one essence.
the converse, unless we add some term to designate the
I answer that, As above explained (q. 13, Aa. 1,2),
essence; as, for instance, the Father is a person of the “di-
divine things are named by our intellect, not as they really
vine essence”; or, the three persons are “of one essence.”
are in themselves, for in that way it knows them not; but in
Reply to Objection 5. The preposition “from” or “out
a way that belongs to things created. And as in the objects
of” does not designate the habitude of a formal cause, but
of the senses, whence the intellect derives its knowledge,
rather the habitude of an efficient or material cause; which
the nature of the species is made individual by the matter,
causes are in all cases distinguished from those things of
and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is
which they are the causes. For nothing can be its own
the “suppositum” of the form; so also in God the essence
matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a thing may be its
is taken as the form of the three persons, according to our
own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So, when
mode of signification. Now in creatures we say that every
we say, “three persons of one essence,” taking essence as
form belongs to that whereof it is the form; as the health
having the habitude of form, we do not mean that essence
and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we do not
is different from person, which we should mean if we said,
say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form,
“three persons from the same essence.”
198
Reply to Objection 6. As Hilary says (De Synod.): to me, if I understand it rightly?. . . The oneness of nature
“It would be prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do
does not result from division, or from union or from com-
away with them, just because some do not think them
munity of possession, but from one nature being proper to
holy. So if some misunderstand homoousion, what is that both Father and Son.”
Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons?
Ia q. 39 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that essential names, as
they adjectives. For we say that many men are a college,
the name “God,” should not be predicated in the singular
or an army, or a people; but we say that many men are
of the three persons, but in the plural. For as “man” sig-
collegians. Now in God the divine essence is signified by
nifies “one that has humanity,” so God signifies “one that
way of a form, as above explained (a. 2), which, indeed,
has Godhead.” But the three persons are three who have
is simple and supremely one, as shown above (q. 3, a. 7;
Godhead. Therefore the three persons are “three Gods.”
q. 11, a. 4). So, names which signify the divine essence in
Objection 2. Further, Gn. 1:1, where it is said, “In
a substantive manner are predicated of the three persons
the beginning God created heaven and earth,” the Hebrew
in the singular, and not in the plural. This, then, is the rea-
original has “Elohim,” which may be rendered “Gods” or
son why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are “three
“Judges”: and this word is used on account of the plural-
men”; whereas we do not say the Father, Son and Holy
ity of persons. Therefore the three persons are “several
Ghost are “three Gods,” but “one God”; forasmuch as in
Gods,” and not “one” God.
the three “supposita” of human nature there are three hu-
Objection 3. Further, this word “thing” when it is said
manities, whereas in the three divine Persons there is but
absolutely, seems to belong to substance. But it is pred-
one divine essence. On the other hand, the names which
icated of the three persons in the plural. For Augustine
signify essence in an adjectival manner are predicated of
says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): “The things that are the
the three persons plurally, by reason of the plurality of
objects of our future glory are the Father, Son and Holy
“supposita.” For we say there are three “existent” or three
Ghost.” Therefore other essential names can be predicated
“wise” beings, or three “eternal,” “uncreated,” and “im-
in the plural of the three persons.
mense” beings, if these terms are understood in an adjec-
Objection 4. Further, as this word “God” signifies “a
tival sense. But if taken in a substantive sense, we say
being who has Deity,” so also this word “person” signifies
“one uncreated, immense, eternal being,” as Athanasius
a being subsisting in an intellectual nature. But we say
declares.
there are three persons. So for the same reason we can
Reply to Objection 1. Though the name “God” sig-
say there are “three Gods.”
nifies a being having Godhead, nevertheless the mode of
On the contrary, It is said (Dt. 6:4): “Hear, O Israel,
signification is different. For the name “God” is used sub-
the Lord thy God is one God.”
stantively; whereas “having Godhead” is used adjectively.
I answer that, Some essential names signify the
Consequently, although there are “three having Godhead,”
essence after the manner of substantives; while others sig-
it does not follow that there are three Gods.
nify it after the manner of adjectives. Those which signify
Reply to Objection 2. Various languages have diverse
it as substantives are predicated of the three persons in the
modes of expression. So as by reason of the plurality of
singular only, and not in the plural. Those which signify
“supposita” the Greeks said “three hypostases,” so also in
the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three per-
Hebrew “Elohim” is in the plural. We, however, do not
sons in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives
apply the plural either to “God” or to “substance,” lest
signify something by way of substance, while adjectives
plurality be referred to the substance.
signify something by way of accident, which adheres to a
Reply to Objection 3. This word “thing” is one of the
subject. Now just as substance has existence of itself, so
transcendentals. Whence, so far as it is referred to rela-
also it has of itself unity or multitude; wherefore the sin-
tion, it is predicated of God in the plural; whereas, so far
gularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon
as it is referred to the substance, it is predicated in the sinthe form signified by the name. But as accidents have their
gular. So Augustine says, in the passage quoted, that “the
existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality from
same Trinity is a thing supreme.”
their subject; and therefore the singularity and plurality of
Reply to Objection 4. The form signified by the word
adjectives depends upon their “supposita.” In creatures,
“person” is not essence or nature, but personality. So, as
one form does not exist in several “supposita” except by
there are three personalities—that is, three personal prop-
unity of order, as the form of an ordered multitude. So
erties in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost—it is predicated
if the names signifying such a form are substantives, they
of the three, not in the singular, but in the plural.
are predicated of many in the singular, but otherwise if
199
Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person?
Ia q. 39 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the concrete, essen-
by reason of the form signified—that is, Godhead. But
tial names cannot stand for the person, so that we can truly
sometimes it stands for the person, either for only one, as
say “God begot God.” For, as the logicians say, “a singu-
when we say, “God begets,” or for two, as when we say,
lar term signifies what it stands for.” But this name “God”
“God spirates”; or for three, as when it is said: “To the
seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be predicated
King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God,” etc. (1
in the plural, as above explained (a. 3). Therefore, since
Tim. 1:17).
it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for
Reply to Objection 1. Although this name “God”
person.
agrees with singular terms as regards the form signified
Objection 2. Further, a term in the subject is not mod-
not being multiplied; nevertheless it agrees also with gen-
ified by a term in the predicate, as to its signification;
eral terms so far as the form signified is to be found in
but only as to the sense signified in the predicate. But
several “supposita.” So it need not always stand for the
when I say, “God creates,” this name “God” stands for the
essence it signifies.
essence. So when we say “God begot,” this term “God”
Reply to Objection 2. This holds good against those
cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for per-
who say that the word “God” does not naturally stand for
son.
person.
Objection 3. Further, if this be true, “God begot,” be-
Reply to Objection 3. The word “God” stands for the
cause the Father generates; for the same reason this is true,
person in a different way from that in which this word
“God does not beget,” because the Son does not beget.
“man” does; for since the form signified by this word
Therefore there is God who begets, and there is God who
“man”—that is, humanity—is really divided among its
does not beget; and thus it follows that there are two Gods.
different subjects, it stands of itself for the person, even
Objection 4. Further, if “God begot God,” He begot
if there is no adjunct determining it to the person—that
either God, that is Himself, or another God. But He did
is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of the
not beget God, that is Himself; for, as Augustine says (De
human nature, however, is not a reality, but is only in the
Trin. i, 1), “nothing begets itself.” Neither did He beget
consideration of the mind. Hence this term “man” does
another God; as there is only one God. Therefore it is
not stand for the common nature, unless this is required
false to say, “God begot God.”
by some adjunct, as when we say, “man is a species”;
Objection 5. Further, if “God begot God,” He begot
whereas the form signified by the name “God”—that is,
either God who is the Father, or God who is not the Fa-
the divine essence—is really one and common. So of it-
ther. If God who is the Father, then God the Father was
self it stands for the common nature, but by some adjunct
begotten. If God who is not the Father, then there is a God
it may be restricted so as to stand for the person. So, when
who is not God the Father: which is false. Therefore it
we say, “God generates,” by reason of the notional act this
cannot be said that “God begot God.”
name “God” stands for the person of the Father. But when
On the contrary, In the Creed it is said, “God of
we say, “God does not generate,” there is no adjunct to
God.”
determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence
I answer that, Some have said that this name “God”
the phrase means that generation is repugnant to the di-
and the like, properly according to their nature, stand for
vine nature. If, however, something be added belonging
the essence, but by reason of some notional adjunct are
to the person of the Son, this proposition, for instance,
made to stand for the Person. This opinion apparently
“God begotten does not beget,” is true. Consequently, it
arose from considering the divine simplicity, which re-
does not follow that there exists a “God generator,” and a
quires that in God, He “who possesses” and “what is pos-
“God not generator”; unless there be an adjunct pertain-
sessed” be the same. So He who possesses Godhead,
ing to the persons; as, for instance, if we were to say, “the
which is signified by the name God, is the same as God-
Father is God the generator” and the “Son is God the non-
head. But when we consider the proper way of expressing
generator” and so it does not follow that there are many
ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered
Gods; for the Father and the Son are one God, as was said
no less than the thing signified. Hence as this word “God”
above (a. 3).
signifies the divine essence as in Him Who possesses it,
Reply to Objection 4. This is false, “the Father be-
just as the name “man” signifies humanity in a subject,
got God, that is Himself,” because the word “Himself,”
others more truly have said that this word “God,” from
as a reciprocal term, refers to the same “suppositum.”
its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand
Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi
for person, as does the word “man.” So this word “God”
ad Maxim.) that “God the Father begot another self [al-
sometimes stands for the essence, as when we say “God
terum se],” forasmuch as the word “se” is either in the
creates”; because this predicate is attributed to the subject
ablative case, and then it means “He begot another from
200
Himself,” or it indicates a single relation, and thus points false. Wherefore the negative of the proposition is true,
to identity of nature. This is, however, either a figurative
“He begot God Who is not God the Father.” If however,
or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would really
we understand these words not to be in apposition, and
mean, “He begot another most like to Himself.” Likewise
require something to be added, then, on the contrary, the
also it is false to say, “He begot another God,” because
affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is false; so
although the Son is another than the Father, as above ex-
that the meaning would be, “He begot God Who is God
plained (q. 31, a. 2), nevertheless it cannot be said that He
Who is the Father.” Such a rendering however appears to
is “another God”; forasmuch as this adjective “another”
be forced, so that it is better to say simply that the affir-
would be understood to apply to the substantive God; and
mative proposition is false, and the negative is true. Yet
thus the meaning would be that there is a distinction of
Prepositivus said that both the negative and affirmative
Godhead. Yet this proposition “He begot another God” is
are false, because this relative “Who” in the affirmative
tolerated by some, provided that “another” be taken as a
proposition can be referred to the “suppositum”; whereas
substantive, and the word “God” be construed in apposi-
in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the
tion with it. This, however, is an inexact way of speaking,
“suppositum.” Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that
and to be avoided, for fear of giving occasion to error.
“to be God the Father” is befitting to the person of the Son;
Reply to Objection 5. To say, “God begot God Who
and in the negative sense is that “to be God the Father,” is
is God the Father,” is wrong, because since the word “Fa-
to be removed from the Son’s divinity as well as from His
ther” is construed in apposition to “God,” the word “God”
personality. This, however, appears to be irrational; since,
is restricted to the person of the Father; so that it would
according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. ii), what is open
mean, “He begot God, Who is Himself the Father”; and
to affirmation, is open also to negation.
then the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is
Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?
Ia q. 39 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that abstract essential
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1):
names can stand for the person, so that this proposition
“Nothing begets itself.” But if the essence begets the
is true, “Essence begets essence.” For Augustine says (De
essence, it begets itself only, since nothing exists in God
Trin. vii, i, 2): “The Father and the Son are one Wisdom,
as distinguished from the divine essence. Therefore the
because they are one essence; and taken singly Wisdom is
essence does not beget essence.
from Wisdom, as essence from essence.”
I answer that, Concerning this, the abbot Joachim
Objection 2. Further, generation or corruption in our-
erred in asserting that as we can say “God begot God,” so
selves implies generation or corruption of what is within
we can say “Essence begot essence”: considering that, by
us. But the Son is generated. Therefore since the divine
reason of the divine simplicity God is nothing else but the
essence is in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is
divine essence. In this he was wrong, because if we wish
generated.
to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account
Objection 3. Further, God and the divine essence
not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode
are the same, as is clear from what is above explained
of its signification as above stated (a. 4). Now although
(q. 3, a. 3). But, as was shown, it is true to say that “God
“God” is really the same as “Godhead,” nevertheless the
begets God.” Therefore this is also true: “Essence begets
mode of signification is not in each case the same. For
essence.”
since this word “God” signifies the divine essence in Him
Objection 4. Further, a predicate can stand for that of
that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can of
which it is predicated. But the Father is the divine essence;
its own nature stand for person. Thus the things which
therefore essence can stand for the person of the Father.
properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of this
Thus the essence begets.
word, “God,” as, for instance, we can say “God is begot-
Objection 5. Further, the essence is “a thing beget-
ten” or is “Begetter,” as above explained (a. 4). The word
ting,” because the essence is the Father who is begetting.
“essence,” however, in its mode of signification, cannot
Therefore if the essence is not begetting, the essence will
stand for Person, because it signifies the essence as an ab-
be “a thing begetting,” and “not begetting”: which cannot
stract form. Consequently, what properly belongs to the
be.
persons whereby they are distinguished from each other,
Objection 6. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv,
cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would imply
20): “The Father is the principle of the whole Godhead.”
distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there
But He is principle only by begetting or spirating. There-
exists distinction in the “supposita.”
fore the Father begets or spirates the Godhead.
Reply to Objection 1. To express unity of essence
201
and of person, the holy Doctors have sometimes expressed are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.
themselves with greater emphasis than the strict propri-
Reply to Objection 5. The difference between sub-
ety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging upon
stantive and adjectival names consist in this, that the for-
such expressions we should rather explain them: thus,
mer carry their subject with them, whereas the latter do
for instance, abstract names should be explained by con-
not, but add the thing signified to the substantive. Whence
crete names, or even by personal names; as when we find
logicians are wont to say that the substantive is consid-
“essence from essence”; or “wisdom from wisdom”; we
ered in the light of “suppositum,” whereas the adjective
should take the sense to be, “the Son” who is essence and
indicates something added to the “suppositum.” There-
wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom.
fore substantive personal terms can be predicated of the
Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain or-
essence, because they are really the same; nor does it fol-
der should be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to ac-
low that a personal property makes a distinct essence; but
tion is more nearly allied to the persons because actions
it belongs to the “suppositum” implied in the substantive.
belong to “supposita.” So “nature from nature,” and “wis-
But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated
dom from wisdom” are less inexact than “essence from
of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot
essence.”
say that the “essence is begetting”; yet we can say that the
Reply to Objection 2. In creatures the one generated
“essence is a thing begetting,” or that it is “God begetting,”
has not the same nature numerically as the generator, but
if “thing” and God stand for person, but not if they stand
another nature, numerically distinct, which commences to
for essence. Consequently there exists no contradiction
exist in it anew by generation, and ceases to exist by cor-
in saying that “essence is a thing begetting,” and “a thing
ruption, and so it is generated and corrupted accidentally;
not begetting”; because in the first case “thing” stands for
whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as
person, and in the second it stands for the essence.
the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begot-
Reply to Objection 6. So far as Godhead is one in
ten either directly or accidentally.
several “supposita,” it agrees in a certain degree with the
Reply to Objection 3. Although God and the divine
form of a collective term. So when we say, “the Father
essence are really the same, nevertheless, on account of
is the principle of the whole Godhead,” the term Godhead
their different mode of signification, we must speak in a
can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as it is
different way about each of them.
the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow
Reply to Objection 4. The divine essence is predi-
that He is His own principle; as one of the people may
cated of the Father by mode of identity by reason of the
be called the ruler of the people without being ruler of
divine simplicity; yet it does not follow that it can stand
himself. We may also say that He is the principle of the
for the Father, its mode of signification being different.
whole Godhead; not as generating or spirating it, but as
This objection would hold good as regards things which
communicating it by generation and spiration.
Whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms?
Ia q. 39 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the persons cannot
persons cannot be predicated of this name “God,” except
be predicated of the concrete essential names; so that we
in an accidental sense.
can say for instance, “God is three persons”; or “God is
On the contrary, Augustine says, in his sermon on
the Trinity.” For it is false to say, “man is every man,” be-
Faith∗, “We believe that one God is one divinely named
cause it cannot be verified as regards any particular sub-
Trinity.”
ject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is
I answer that, As above explained (a. 5), although
every man. In the same way this proposition, “God is the
adjectival terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be
Trinity,” cannot be verified of any one of the “supposita”
predicated of the essence, nevertheless substantive terms
of the divine nature. For the Father is not the Trinity; nor
can be so predicated, owing to the real identity of essence
is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So to say, “God is the
and person. The divine essence is not only really the same
Trinity,” is false.
as one person, but it is really the same as the three persons.
Objection 2. Further, the lower is not predicated of
Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predi-
the higher except by accidental predication; as when I say,
cated of the essence as if we were to say, “The essence
“animal is man”; for it is accidental to animal to be man.
is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost.” And be-
But this name “God” as regards the three persons is as
cause this word “God” can of itself stand for the essence,
a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene says (De
as above explained (a. 4, ad 3), hence, as it is true to say,
Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of the
“The essence is the three persons”; so likewise it is true to
∗ Serm. ii, in coena Domini
202
say, “God is the three persons.”
theless it is true of the divine essence. This was denied by
Reply to Objection 1. As above explained this term
Porretanus because he did not take note of this distinction.
“man” can of itself stand for person, whereas an adjunct
Reply to Objection 2. When we say, “God,” or “the
is required for it to stand for the universal human nature.
divine essence is the Father,” the predication is one of
So it is false to say, “Man is every man”; because it cannot
identity, and not of the lower in regard to a higher species:
be verified of any particular human subject. On the con-
because in God there is no universal and singular. Hence,
trary, this word “God” can of itself be taken for the divine
as this proposition, “The Father is God” is of itself true, so
essence. So, although to say of any of the “supposita” of
this proposition “God is the Father” is true of itself, and
the divine nature, “God is the Trinity,” is untrue, never-
by no means accidentally.
Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons?
Ia q. 39 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the essential names
for the manifestation of the divine persons, so also in the
should not be appropriated to the persons. For whatever
same manner do we make use of the essential attributes.
might verge on error in faith should be avoided in the
And such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use
treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome says, “careless
of the essential attributes is called “appropriation.”
words involve risk of heresy”∗. But to appropriate to any
The divine person can be manifested in a twofold man-
one person the names which are common to the three per-
ner by the essential attributes; in one way by similitude,
sons, may verge on error in faith; for it may be supposed
and thus the things which belong to the intellect are appro-
either that such belong only to the person to whom they
priated to the Son, Who proceeds by way of intellect, as
are appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller de-
Word. In another way by dissimilitude; as power is appro-
gree than to the others. Therefore the essential attributes
priated to the Father, as Augustine says, because fathers
should not be appropriated to the persons.
by reason of old age are sometimes feeble; lest anything
Objection 2.
Further, the essential attributes ex-
of the kind be imagined of God.
pressed in the abstract signify by mode of form. But
Reply to Objection 1. The essential attributes are not
one person is not as a form to another; since a form is
appropriated to the persons as if they exclusively belonged
not distinguished in subject from that of which it is the
to them; but in order to make the persons manifest by way
form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially when
of similitude, or dissimilitude, as above explained. So,
expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the
no error in faith can arise, but rather manifestation of the
persons.
truth.
Objection 3. Further, property is prior to the appro-
Reply to Objection 2. If the essential attributes were
priated, for property is included in the idea of the appro-
appropriated to the persons as exclusively belonging to
priated. But the essential attributes, in our way of under-
each of them, then it would follow that one person would
standing, are prior to the persons; as what is common is
be as a form as regards another; which Augustine alto-
prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential attributes
gether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the Father
are not to be appropriated to the persons.
is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only
On the contrary, the Apostle says: “Christ the power
the Son were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son to-
of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor. 1:24).
gether only can be called wise, but not the Father without
I answer that, For the manifestation of our faith it is
the Son. But the Son is called the Wisdom of the Father,
fitting that the essential attributes should be appropriated
because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is Wisdom.
to the persons. For although the trinity of persons can-
For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both together
not be proved by demonstration, as was above expounded
are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the
(q. 32, a. 1), nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared
wisdom begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His
by things which are more known to us. Now the essential
own essence.
attributes of God are more clear to us from the standpoint
Reply to Objection 3. Although the essential attribute
of reason than the personal properties; because we can
is in its proper concept prior to person, according to our
derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from
way of understanding; nevertheless, so far as it is appro-
creatures which are sources of knowledge to us, such as
priated, there is nothing to prevent the personal property
we cannot obtain regarding the personal properties, as was
from being prior to that which is appropriated. Thus color
above explained (q. 32, a. 1). As, therefore, we make use
is posterior to body considered as body, but is naturally
of the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures
prior to “white body,” considered as white.
∗ In substance Ep. lvii.
203
Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a fitting manner Ia q. 39 a. 8
by the holy doctors?
Objection 1.
It would seem that the essential at-
where a gloss observes, “that is, with the Father Who is
tributes are appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the
My head,” also this word “Who is”; because on the text of
holy doctors. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii): “Eternity is
Is. 65:1, “Behold I go to the Gentiles,” a gloss adds, “The
in the Father, the species in the Image; and use is in the
Son speaks Who said to Moses, I am Who am.” These
Gift.” In which words he designates three names proper to
appear to belong to the Son, and are not appropriated. For
the persons: the name of the “Father,” the name “Image”
“truth,” according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 36), “is
proper to the Son (q. 35, a. 2), and the name “Bounty” or
the supreme similitude of the principle without any dis-
“Gift,” which is proper to the Holy Ghost (q. 38, a. 2). He
similitude.” So it seems that it properly belongs to the
also designates three appropriated terms. For he appro-
Son, Who has a principle. Also the “book of life” seems
priates “eternity” to the Father, “species” to the Son, and
proper to the Son, as signifying “a thing from another”;
“use” to the Holy Ghost. This he does apparently with-
for every book is written by someone. This also, “Who
out reason. For “eternity” imports duration of existence;
is,” appears to be proper to the Son; because if when it
“species,” the principle of existence; and ‘use’ belongs to
was said to Moses, “I am Who am,” the Trinity spoke,
the operation. But essence and operation are not found to
then Moses could have said, “He Who is Father, Son, and
be appropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms
Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you,” so also
are not fittingly appropriated to the persons.
he could have said further, “He Who is the Father, and the
Objection 2.
Further, Augustine says (De Doctr.
Son, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you,” pointing out a
Christ.
i, 5): “Unity is in the Father, equality in the
certain person. This, however, is false; because no per-
Son, and in the Holy Ghost is the concord of equality and
son is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot be
unity.” This does not, however, seem fitting; because one
common to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son.
person does not receive formal denomination from what is
I answer that, Our intellect, which is led to the knowl-
appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the
edge of God from creatures, must consider God according
wisdom begotten, as above explained (q. 37, a. 2, ad 1).
to the mode derived from creatures. In considering any
But, as he subjoins, “All these three are one by the Father;
creature four points present themselves to us in due order.
all are equal by the Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost.”
Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is considered as
The above, therefore, are not fittingly appropriated to the
a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its
Persons.
intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered.
Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine, to the
The fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to
Father is attributed “power,” to the Son “wisdom,” to the
its effects. Hence this fourfold consideration comes to our
Holy Ghost “goodness.” Nor does this seem fitting; for
mind in reference to God.
“strength” is part of power, whereas strength is found to
According to the first point of consideration, whereby
be appropriated to the Son, according to the text, “Christ
we consider God absolutely in His being, the appropri-
the strength∗ of God” (1 Cor. 1:24). So it is likewise
ation mentioned by Hilary applies, according to which
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words,
“eternity” is appropriated to the Father, “species” to the
“strength† came out from Him and healed all” (Lk. 6:19).
Son, “use” to the Holy Ghost. For “eternity” as mean-
Therefore power should not be appropriated to the Father.
ing a “being” without a principle, has a likeness to the
Objection 4. Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi,
property of the Father, Who is “a principle without a prin-
10): “What the Apostle says, “From Him, and by Him,
ciple.” Species or beauty has a likeness to the property of
and in Him,” is not to be taken in a confused sense.” And
the Son. For beauty includes three conditions, “integrity”
(Contra Maxim. ii) “ ‘from Him’ refers to the Father, ‘by
or “perfection,” since those things which are impaired are
Him’ to the Son, ‘in Him’ to the Holy Ghost.’ ” This, how-
by the very fact ugly; due “proportion” or “harmony”; and
ever, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words “in Him”
lastly, “brightness” or “clarity,” whence things are called
seem to imply the relation of final cause, which is first
beautiful which have a bright color.
among the causes. Therefore this relation of cause should
The first of these has a likeness to the property of the
be appropriated to the Father, Who is “the principle from
Son, inasmuch as He as Son has in Himself truly and per-
no principle.”
fectly the nature of the Father. To insinuate this, Augus-
Objection 5. Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the
tine says in his explanation (De Trin. vi, 10): “Where—
Son, according to Jn. 14:6, “I am the Way, the Truth, and
that is, in the Son—there is supreme and primal life,” etc.
the Life”; and likewise “the book of life,” according to Ps.
The second agrees with the Son’s property, inasmuch
39:9, “In the beginning of the book it is written of Me,”
as He is the express Image of the Father. Hence we see
∗ Douay: power
† Douay: virtue
204
that an image is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly repre-moved, we do not find equality in the Father, but we find
sents even an ugly thing. This is indicated by Augustine
it as soon as we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by
when he says (De Trin. vi, 10), “Where there exists won-
reason of the Son, not as if the Son were the principle of
drous proportion and primal equality,” etc.
equality in the Father, but that, without the Son equal to
The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the
the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because
Word, which is the light and splendor of the intellect, as
His equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son: for
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes
that the Holy Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from the
to the same when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): “As the per-
Son. Likewise, if the Holy Ghost, Who is the union of
fect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to speak, the
the two, be excluded, we cannot understand the oneness
art of the omnipotent God,” etc.
of the union between the Father and the Son. So all are
“Use” has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost;
connected by reason of the Holy Ghost; because given the
provided the “use” be taken in a wide sense, as includ-
Holy Ghost, we find whence the Father and the Son are
ing also the sense of “to enjoy”; according as “to use” is
said to be united.
to employ something at the beck of the will, and “to en-
According to the third consideration, which brings be-
joy” means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (De Trin.
fore us the adequate power of God in the sphere of causal-
x, 11). So “use,” whereby the Father and the Son enjoy
ity, there is said to be a third kind of appropriation, of
each other, agrees with the property of the Holy Ghost,
“power,” “wisdom,” and “goodness.” This kind of appro-
as Love. This is what Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10):
priation is made both by reason of similitude as regards
“That love, that delectation, that felicity or beatitude, is
what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of dis-
called use by him” (Hilary). But the “use” by which we
similitude if we consider what is in creatures. For “power”
enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy Ghost as
has the nature of a principle, and so it has a likeness to the
the Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De
heavenly Father, Who is the principle of the whole God-
Trin. vi, 10): “In the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the sweet-
head. But in an earthly father it is wanting sometimes by
ness of the Begettor and the Begotten, pours out upon us
reason of old age. “Wisdom” has likeness to the heavenly
mere creatures His immense bounty and wealth.” Thus it
Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but the concept
is clear how “eternity,” “species,” and “use” are attributed
of wisdom. In an earthly son this is sometimes absent by
or appropriated to the persons, but not essence or oper-
reason of lack of years. “Goodness,” as the nature and
ation; because, being common, there is nothing in their
object of love, has likeness to the Holy Ghost; but seems
concept to liken them to the properties of the Persons.
repugnant to the earthly spirit, which often implies a cer-
The second consideration of God regards Him as
tain violent impulse, according to Is. 25:4: “The spirit of
“one.” In that view Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5)
the strong is as a blast beating on the wall.” “Strength” is
appropriates “unity” to the Father, “equality” to the Son,
appropriated to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, not as de-
“concord” or “union” to the Holy Ghost. It is manifest
noting the power itself of a thing, but as sometimes used to
that these three imply unity, but in different ways. For
express that which proceeds from power; for instance, we
“unity” is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose any-
say that the strong work done by an agent is its strength.
thing else; and for this reason it is appropriated to the Fa-
According to the fourth consideration, i.e. God’s rela-
ther, to Whom any other person is not presupposed since
tion to His effects, there arise appropriation of the expres-
He is the “principle without principle.” “Equality” implies
sion “from Whom, by Whom, and in Whom.” For this
unity as regards another; for that is equal which has the
preposition “from” [ex] sometimes implies a certain rela-
same quantity as another. So equality is appropriated to
tion of the material cause; which has no place in God;
the Son, Who is the “principle from a principle.” “Union”
and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient
implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated to
cause, which can be applied to God by reason of His ac-
the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And
tive power; hence it is appropriated to the Father in the
from this we can understand what Augustine means when
same way as power. The preposition “by” [per] some-
he says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) that “The Three are one,
times designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say
by reason of the Father; They are equal by reason of the
that a smith works “by” a hammer. Hence the word “by”
Son; and are united by reason of the Holy Ghost.” For
is not always appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the
it is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we
Son properly and strictly, according to the text, “All things
find it first: just as in this lower world we attribute life
were made by Him” (Jn. 1:3); not that the Son is an in-
to the vegetative soul, because therein we find the first
strument, but as “the principle from a principle.” Some-
trace of life. Now “unity” is perceived at once in the per-
times it designates the habitude of a form “by” which an
son of the Father, even if by an impossible hypothesis, the
agent works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art.
other persons were removed. So the other persons derive
Hence, as wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so
their unity from the Father. But if the other persons be re-
also is the expression “by Whom.” The preposition “in”
205
strictly denotes the habitude of one containing. Now, God knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal life.
contains things in two ways: in one way by their simili-
Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son; although life
tudes; thus things are said to be in God, as existing in His
is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain
knowledge. In this sense the expression “in Him” should
kind of interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the
be appropriated to the Son. In another sense things are
property of the Holy Ghost as Love. To be written by an-
contained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness pre-
other is not of the essence of a book considered as such;
serves and governs them, by guiding them to a fitting end;
but this belongs to it only as a work produced. So this does
and in this sense the expression “in Him” is appropriated
not imply origin; nor is it personal, but an appropriation to
to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is “goodness.” Nor need the
a person. The expression “Who is” is appropriated to the
habitude of the final cause (though the first of causes) be
person of the Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason
appropriated to the Father, Who is “the principle without
of an adjunct, inasmuch as, in God’s word to Moses, was
a principle”: because the divine persons, of Whom the Fa-
prefigured the delivery of the human race accomplished
ther is the principle, do not proceed from Him as towards
by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as the word “Who” is taken
an end, since each of Them is the last end; but They pro-
in a relative sense, it may sometimes relate to the person
ceed by a natural procession, which seems more to belong
of the Son; and in that sense it would be taken person-
to the nature of a natural power.
ally; as, for instance, were we to say, “The Son is the
Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say
begotten ‘Who is,’ ” inasmuch as “God begotten is per-
that since “truth” belongs to the intellect, as stated above
sonal.” But taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And
(q. 16, a. 1), it is appropriated to the Son, without, how-
although the pronoun “this” [iste] seems grammatically to
ever, being a property of His. For truth can be considered
point to a particular person, nevertheless everything that
as existing in the thought or in the thing itself. Hence, as
we can point to can be grammatically treated as a per-
intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are referred
son, although in its own nature it is not a person; as we
to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to
may say, “this stone,” and “this ass.” So, speaking in a
be said of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine
grammatical sense, so far as the word “God” signifies and
belongs to truth as appropriated to the Son. The “book
stands for the divine essence, the latter may be designated
of life” directly means knowledge but indirectly it means
by the pronoun “this,” according to Ex. 15:2: “This is my
life. For, as above explained (q. 24, a. 1), it is God’s
God, and I will glorify Him.”
206
FIRST PART, QUESTION 40
Of the Persons As Compared to the Relations or Properties
(In Four Articles)
We now consider the persons in connection with the relations, or properties; and there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether relation is the same as person?
(2) Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons?
(3) Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons leaves the hypostases distinct?
(4) Whether the relations, according to our mode of understanding, presuppose the acts of the persons, or contrariwise?
Whether relation is the same as person?
Ia q. 40 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that in God relation is not
We must, however, say that there are properties in God;
the same as person. For when things are identical, if one
as we have shown (q. 32, a. 2). These are designated by
is multiplied the others are multiplied. But in one person
abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons. So,
there are several relations; as in the person of the Father
since the nature of a form requires it to be “in” that of
there is paternity and common spiration. Again, one re-
which it is the form, we must say that the properties are in
lation exists in two person, as common spiration in the
the persons, and yet that they are the persons; as we say
Father and in the Son. Therefore relation is not the same
that the essence is in God, and yet is God.
as person.
Reply to Objection 1. Person and property are re-
Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher
ally the same, but differ in concept. Consequently, it does
(Phys. iv, text. 24), nothing is contained by itself. But
not follow that if one is multiplied, the other must also
relation is in the person; nor can it be said that this occurs
be multiplied. We must, however, consider that in God,
because they are identical, for otherwise relation would be
by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real identity
also in the essence. Therefore relation, or property, is not
exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since
the same as person in God.
the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter
Objection 3. Further, when several things are identi-
and form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as
cal, what is predicated of one is predicated of the others.
the concrete, as “Godhead” and “God.” And as the divine
But all that is predicated of a Person is not predicated of
simplicity excludes the composition of subject and acci-
His property. For we say that the Father begets; but not
dent, it follows that whatever is attributed to God, is His
that the paternity is begetting. Therefore property is not
essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are the same in
the same as person in God.
God, because they are both in the divine essence. Accord-
On the contrary, in God “what is” and “whereby it
ing to this twofold identity, property in God is the same
is” are the same, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.).
person. For personal properties are the same as the per-
But the Father is Father by paternity. In the same way, the
sons because the abstract and the concrete are the same
other properties are the same as the persons.
in God; since they are the subsisting persons themselves,
I answer that, Different opinions have been held on
as paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son,
this point. Some have said that the properties are not the
and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the non-personal
persons, nor in the persons; and these have thought thus
properties are the same as the persons according to the
owing to the mode of signification of the relations, which
other reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed
do not indeed signify existence “in” something, but rather
to God is His own essence. Thus, common spiration is
existence “towards” something. Whence, they styled the
the same as the person of the Father, and the person of
relations “assistant,” as above explained (q. 28, a. 2). But
the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting person; but that
since relation, considered as really existing in God, is the
as there is one essence in the two persons, so also there is
divine essence Itself, and the essence is the same as per-
one property in the two persons, as above explained (q. 30,
son, as appears from what was said above (q. 39, a. 1),
a. 2 ).
relation must necessarily be the same as person.
Reply to Objection 2. The properties are said to be in
Others, therefore, considering this identity, said that
the essence, only by mode of identity; but in the persons
the properties were indeed the persons; but not “in” the
they exist by mode of identity, not merely in reality, but
persons; for, they said, there are no properties in God ex-
also in the mode of signification; as the form exists in its
cept in our way of speaking, as stated above (q. 32, a. 2).
subject. Thus the properties determine and distinguish the
207
persons, but not the essence.
but as forms of “supposita.” And so their mode of sig-
Reply to Objection 3. Notional participles and verbs
nification is against notional participles and verbs being
signify the notional acts: and acts belong to a “supposi-
predicated of the properties.
tum.” Now, properties are not designated as “supposita,”
Whether the persons are distinguished by the relations?
Ia q. 40 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the persons are not
it results from their matter or their form. Now origin of
distinguished by the relations. For simple things are dis-
a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but means
tinct by themselves. But the persons are supremely sim-
the way from something, or to something; as generation
ple. Therefore they are distinguished by themselves, and
signifies the way to a thing generated, and as proceeding
not by the relation.
from the generator. Hence it is not possible that what is
Objection 2. Further, a form is distinguished only in
generated and the generator should be distinguished by
relation to its genus. For white is distinguished from black
generation alone; but in the generator and in the thing
only by quality. But “hypostasis” signifies an individual in
generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to
the genus of substance. Therefore the hypostases cannot
be distinguished from each other. In a divine person there
be distinguished by relations.
is nothing to presuppose but essence, and relation or prop-
Objection 3. Further, what is absolute comes before
erty. Whence, since the persons agree in essence, it only
what is relative. But the distinction of the divine persons
remains to be said that the persons are distinguished from
is the primary distinction. Therefore the divine persons
each other by the relations. Secondly: because the dis-
are not distinguished by the relations.
tinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood
Objection 4. Further, whatever presupposes distinc-
as if what is common to them all is divided, because the
tion cannot be the first principle of distinction. But rela-
common essence remains undivided; but the distinguish-
tion presupposes distinction, which comes into its defini-
ing principles themselves must constitute the things which
tion; for a relation is essentially what is towards another.
are distinct. Now the relations or the properties distin-
Therefore the first distinctive principle in God cannot be
guish or constitute the hypostases or persons, inasmuch
relation.
as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as paternity
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.): “Relation
is the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the
alone multiplies the Trinity of the divine persons.”
abstract and the concrete do not differ. But it is against
I answer that, In whatever multitude of things is to
the nature of origin that it should constitute hypostasis or
be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek
person. For origin taken in an active sense signifies pro-
out the principle of distinction. So, as the three persons
ceeding from a subsisting person, so that it presupposes
agree in the unity of essence, we must seek to know the
the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as “nativity,”
principle of distinction whereby they are several. Now,
signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet
there are two principles of difference between the divine
constituting the person.
persons, and these are “origin” and “relation.” Although
It is therefore better to say that the persons or hy-
these do not really differ, yet they differ in the mode of
postases are distinguished rather by relations than by ori-
signification; for “origin” is signified by way of act, as
gin. For, although in both ways they are distinguished,
“generation”; and “relation” by way of the form, as “pa-
nevertheless in our mode of understanding they are dis-
ternity.”
tinguished chiefly and firstly by relations; whence this
Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act,
name “Father” signifies not only a property, but also the
have said that the divine hypostases are distinguished by
hypostasis; whereas this term “Begetter” or “Begetting”
origin, so that we may say that the Father is distinguished
signifies property only; forasmuch as this name “Father”
from the Son, inasmuch as the former begets and the lat-
signifies the relation which is distinctive and constitutive
ter is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the prop-
of the hypostasis; and this term “Begetter” or “Begotten”
erties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or
signifies the origin which is not distinctive and constitu-
persons as resulting therefrom; as also in creatures the
tive of the hypostasis.
properties manifest the distinctions of individuals, which
Reply to Objection 1. The persons are the subsisting
distinctions are caused by the material principles.
relations themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity
This opinion, however, cannot stand—for two reasons.
of the divine persons for them to be distinguished by the
Firstly, because, in order that two things be understood as
relations.
distinct, their distinction must be understood as resulting
Reply to Objection 2. The divine persons are not dis-
from something intrinsic to both; thus in things created
tinguished as regards being, in which they subsist, nor in
208
anything absolute, but only as regards something relative.
Reply to Objection 4. Relation presupposes the dis-
Hence relation suffices for their distinction.
tinction of the subjects, when it is an accident; but when
Reply to Objection 3. The more prior a distinction
the relation is subsistent, it does not presuppose, but
is, the nearer it approaches to unity; and so it must be the
brings about distinction. For when it is said that relation is
least possible distinction. So the distinction of the persons
by nature to be towards another, the word “another” sig-
must be by that which distinguishes the least possible; and
nifies the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous
this is by relation.
in the order of nature.
Whether the hypostases remain if the relations are mentally abstracted from the perIa q. 40 a. 3
sons?
Objection 1. It would seem that the hypostases re-
the intellect; as, for instance, if we abstract the form of a
main if the properties or relations are mentally abstracted
circle from brass, there remains in our intellect separately
from the persons. For that to which something is added,
the understanding both of a circle, and of brass. Now,
may be understood when the addition is taken away; as
although there is no universal nor particular in God, nor
man is something added to animal which can be under-
form and matter, in reality; nevertheless, as regards the
stood if rational be taken away. But person is something
mode of signification there is a certain likeness of these
added to hypostasis; for person is “a hypostasis distin-
things in God; and thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
guished by a property of dignity.” Therefore, if a personal
iii, 6) that “substance is common and hypostasis is par-
property be taken away from a person, the hypostasis re-
ticular.” So, if we speak of the abstraction of the uni-
mains.
versal from the particular, the common universal essence
Objection 2. Further, that the Father is Father, and
remains in the intellect if the properties are removed; but
that He is someone, are not due to the same reason. For as
not the hypostasis of the Father, which is, as it were, a
He is the Father by paternity, supposing He is some one by
particular.
paternity, it would follow that the Son, in Whom there is
But as regards the abstraction of the form from the
not paternity, would not be “someone.” So when paternity
matter, if the non-personal properties are removed, then
is mentally abstracted from the Father, He still remains
the idea of the hypostases and persons remains; as, for in-
“someone”—that is, a hypostasis. Therefore, if property
stance, if the fact of the Father’s being unbegotten or spi-
be removed from person, the hypostasis remains.
rating be mentally abstracted from the Father, the Father’s
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6):
hypostasis or person remains.
“Unbegotten is not the same as Father; for if the Father
If, however, the personal property be mentally ab-
had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent Him be-
stracted, the idea of the hypostasis no longer remains.
ing called unbegotten.” But if He had not begotten the
For the personal properties are not to be understood as
Son, there would be no paternity in Him. Therefore, if
added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added to a
paternity be removed, there still remains the hypostasis of
pre-existing subject: but they carry with them their own
the Father as unbegotten.
“supposita,” inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): “The Son
persons; thus paternity is the Father Himself. For hyposta-
has nothing else than birth.” But He is Son by “birth.”
sis signifies something distinct in God, since hypostasis
Therefore, if filiation be removed, the Son’s hypostasis no
means an individual substance. So, as relation distin-
more remains; and the same holds as regards the other
guishes and constitutes the hypostases, as above explained
persons.
(a. 2), it follows that if the personal relations are mentally
I answer that, Abstraction by the intellect is
abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain. Some, how-
twofold—when the universal is abstracted from the partic-
ever, think, as above noted, that the divine hypostases are
ular, as animal abstracted from man; and when the form
not distinguished by the relations, but only by origin; so
is abstracted from the matter, as the form of a circle is
that the Father is a hypostasis as not from another, and the
abstracted by the intellect from any sensible matter. The
Son is a hypostasis as from another by generation. And
difference between these two abstractions consists in the
that the consequent relations which are to be regarded as
fact that in the abstraction of the universal from the par-
properties of dignity, constitute the notion of a person, and
ticular, that from which the abstraction is made does not
are thus called “personal properties.” Hence, if these re-
remain; for when the difference of rationality is removed
lations are mentally abstracted, the hypostasis, but not the
from man, the man no longer remains in the intellect, but
persons, remain.
animal alone remains. But in the abstraction of the form
But this is impossible, for two reasons: first, because
from the matter, both the form and the matter remain in
the relations distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as
209
shown above (a. 2); secondly, because every hypostasis guishing relation belongs essentially to both.
of a rational nature is a person, as appears from the def-
Reply to Objection 2. By paternity the Father is not
inition of Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) that, “person is the
only Father, but is a person, and is “someone,” or a hy-
individual substance of a rational nature.” Hence, to have
postasis. It does not follow, however, that the Son is not
hypostasis and not person, it would be necessary to ab-
“someone” or a hypostasis; just as it does not follow that
stract the rationality from the nature, but not the property
He is not a person.
from the person.
Reply to Objection 3. Augustine does not mean to
Reply to Objection 1. Person does not add to hy-
say that the hypostasis of the Father would remain as un-
postasis a distinguishing property absolutely, but a distin-
begotten, if His paternity were removed, as if innascibility
guishing property of dignity, all of which must be taken
constituted and distinguished the hypostasis of the Father;
as the difference. Now, this distinguishing property is one
for this would be impossible, since “being unbegotten”
of dignity precisely because it is understood as subsisting
says nothing positive and is only a negation, as he himself
in a rational nature. Hence, if the distinguishing property
says. But he speaks in a general sense, forasmuch as not
be removed from the person, the hypostasis no longer re-
every unbegotten being is the Father. So, if paternity be
mains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of
removed, the hypostasis of the Father does not remain in
the nature removed; for both person and hypostasis are
God, as distinguished from the other persons, but only as
individual substances. Consequently, in God the distin-
distinguished from creatures; as the Jews understand it.
Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts?
Ia q. 40 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the notional acts are
as nativity is attributed to the Son, and procession to the
understood before the properties. For the Master of the
Holy Ghost. For, in the order of intelligence, origin, in
Sentences says (Sent. i, D, xxvii) that “the Father always
the passive sense, simply precedes the personal proper-
is, because He is ever begetting the Son.” So it seems that
ties of the person proceeding; because origin, as passively
generation precedes paternity in the order of intelligence.
understood, signifies the way to a person constituted by
Objection 2. Further, in the order of intelligence ev-
the property. Likewise, origin signified actively is prior
ery relation presupposes that on which it is founded; as
in the order of intelligence to the non-personal relation
equality presupposes quantity. But paternity is a relation
of the person originating; as the notional act of spiration
founded on the action of generation. Therefore paternity
precedes, in the order of intelligence, the unnamed rela-
presupposes generation.
tive property common to the Father and the Son. The per-
Objection 3. Further, active generation is to paternity
sonal property of the Father can be considered in a twofold
as nativity is to filiation. But filiation presupposes nativ-
sense: firstly, as a relation; and thus again in the order of
ity; for the Son is so called because He is born. Therefore
intelligence it presupposes the notional act, for relation,
paternity also presupposes generation.
as such, is founded upon an act: secondly, according as
On the contrary, Generation is the operation of the
it constitutes the person; and thus the notional act pre-
person of the Father. But paternity constitutes the person
supposes the relation, as an action presupposes a person
of the Father. Therefore in the order of intelligence, pater-
acting.
nity is prior to generation.
Reply to Objection 1. When the Master says that “be-
I answer that, According to the opinion that the prop-
cause He begets, He is Father,” the term “Father” is taken
erties do not distinguish and constitute the hypostases in
as meaning relation only, but not as signifying the sub-
God, but only manifest them as already distinct and con-
sisting person; for then it would be necessary to say con-
stituted, we must absolutely say that the relations in our
versely that because He is Father He begets.
mode of understanding follow upon the notional acts, so
Reply to Objection 2. This objection avails of pater-
that we can say, without qualifying the phrase, that “be-
nity as a relation, but not as constituting a person.
cause He begets, He is the Father.” A distinction, however,
Reply to Objection 3. Nativity is the way to the per-
is needed if we suppose that the relations distinguish and
son of the Son; and so, in the order of intelligence, it pre-
constitute the divine hypostases. For origin has in God
cedes filiation, even as constituting the person of the Son.
an active and passive signification—active, as generation
But active generation signifies a proceeding from the per-
is attributed to the Father, and spiration, taken for the no-
son of the Father; wherefore it presupposes the personal
tional act, is attributed to the Father and the Son; passive,
property of the Father.
210
FIRST PART, QUESTION 41
Of the Persons in Reference to the Notional Acts
(In Six Articles)
We now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts, concerning which six points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?
(2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary?
(3) Whether as regards these acts, a person proceeds from nothing or from something?
(4) Whether in God there exists a power as regards the notional acts?
(5) What this power means?
(6) Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?
Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?
Ia q. 41 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the notional acts are
Reply to Objection 2. The notional acts differ from
not to be attributed to the persons. For Boethius says
the relations of the persons only in their mode of signifi-
(De Trin.): “Whatever is predicated of God, of whatever
cation; and in reality are altogether the same. Whence the
genus it be, becomes the divine substance, except what
Master says that “generation and nativity in other words
pertains to the relation.” But action is one of the ten “gen-
are paternity and filiation” (Sent. i, D, xxvi). To see
era.” Therefore any action attributed to God belongs to
this, we must consider that the origin of one thing from
His essence, and not to a notion.
another is firstly inferred from movement: for that any-
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v,
thing be changed from its disposition by movement evi-
4,5) that, “everything which is said of God, is said of Him
dently arises from some cause. Hence action, in its pri-
as regards either His substance, or relation.” But what-
mary sense, means origin of movement; for, as movement
ever belongs to the substance is signified by the essential
derived from another into a mobile object, is called “pas-
attributes; and whatever belongs to the relations, by the
sion,” so the origin of movement itself as beginning from
names of the persons, or by the names of the properties.
another and terminating in what is moved, is called “ac-
Therefore, in addition to these, notional acts are not to be
tion.” Hence, if we take away movement, action implies
attributed to the persons.
nothing more than order of origin, in so far as action pro-
Objection 3. Further, the nature of action is of itself
ceeds from some cause or principle to what is from that
to cause passion. But we do not place passions in God.
principle. Consequently, since in God no movement ex-
Therefore neither are notional acts to be placed in God.
ists, the personal action of the one producing a person
On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad
is only the habitude of the principle to the person who
Petrum ii) says: “It is a property of the Father to beget the
is from the principle; which habitudes are the relations,
Son.” Therefore notional acts are to be placed in God.
or the notions. Nevertheless we cannot speak of divine
I answer that, In the divine persons distinction is
and intelligible things except after the manner of sensible
founded on origin. But origin can be properly designated
things, whence we derive our knowledge, and wherein ac-
only by certain acts. Wherefore, to signify the order of
tions and passions, so far as these imply movement, differ
origin in the divine persons, we must attribute notional
from the relations which result from action and passion,
acts to the persons.
and therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of
Reply to Objection 1. Every origin is designated by
the persons separately after the manner of act, and sepa-
an act. In God there is a twofold order of origin: one,
rately after the manner of relations. Thus it is evident that
inasmuch as the creature proceeds from Him, and this is
they are really the same, differing only in their mode of
common to the three persons; and so those actions which
signification.
are attributed to God to designate the proceeding of crea-
Reply to Objection 3. Action, so far as it means ori-
tures from Him, belong to His essence. Another order of
gin of movement, naturally involves passion; but action
origin in God regards the procession of person from per-
in that sense is not attributed to God. Whence, passions
son; wherefore the acts which designate the order of this
are attributed to Him only from a grammatical standpoint,
origin are called notional; because the notions of the per-
and in accordance with our manner of speaking, as we at-
sons are the mutual relations of the persons, as is clear
tribute “to beget” with the Father, and to the Son “to be
from what was above explained (q. 32, a. 2).
begotten.”
211
Whether the notional acts are voluntary?
Ia q. 41 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the notional acts are
the nature of a created being; because God is of Himself
voluntary. For Hilary says (De Synod.): “Not by natural
necessary being, whereas a creature is made from noth-
necessity was the Father led to beget the Son.”
ing. Thus, the Arians, wishing to prove the Son to be a
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says, “He trans-
creature, said that the Father begot the Son by will, tak-
ferred us to the kingdom of the Son of His love” (Col.
ing will in the sense of principle. But we, on the contrary,
1:13). But love belongs to the will. Therefore the Son
must assert that the Father begot the Son, not by will, but
was begotten of the Father by will.
by nature. Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.): “The will
Objection 3. Further, nothing is more voluntary than
of God gave to all creatures their substance: but perfect
love. But the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love from the Fa-
birth gave the Son a nature derived from a substance im-
ther and the Son. Therefore He proceeds voluntarily.
passible and unborn. All things created are such as God
Objection 4. Further, the Son proceeds by mode of
willed them to be; but the Son, born of God, subsists in
the intellect, as the Word. But every word proceeds by the
the perfect likeness of God.”
will from a speaker. Therefore the Son proceeds from the
Reply to Objection 1. This saying is directed against
Father by will, and not by nature.
those who did not admit even the concomitance of the Fa-
Objection 5. Further, what is not voluntary is nec-
ther’s will in the generation of the Son, for they said that
essary. Therefore if the Father begot the Son, not by the
the Father begot the Son in such a manner by nature that
will, it seems to follow that He begot Him by necessity;
the will to beget was wanting; just as we ourselves suffer
and this is against what Augustine says (Ad Orosium qu.
many things against our will from natural necessity—as,
vii).
for instance, death, old age, and like ills. This appears
On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same book,
from what precedes and from what follows as regards the
that, “the Father begot the Son neither by will, nor by ne-
words quoted, for thus we read: “Not against His will,
cessity.”
nor as it were, forced, nor as if He were led by natural
I answer that, When anything is said to be, or to be
necessity did the Father beget the Son.”
made by the will, this can be understood in two senses. In
Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle calls Christ the
one sense, the ablative designates only concomitance, as I
Son of the love of God, inasmuch as He is superabun-
can say that I am a man by my will—that is, I will to be
dantly loved by God; not, however, as if love were the
a man; and in this way it can be said that the Father begot
principle of the Son’s generation.
the Son by will; as also He is God by will, because He
Reply to Objection 3. The will, as a natural faculty,
wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In the other
wills something naturally, as man’s will naturally tends
sense, the ablative imports the habitude of a principle as
to happiness; and likewise God naturally wills and loves
it is said that the workman works by his will, as the will
Himself; whereas in regard to things other than Himself,
is the principle of his work; and thus in that sense it must
the will of God is in a way, undetermined in itself, as
be said the God the Father begot the Son, not by His will;
above explained (q. 19, a. 3). Now, the Holy Ghost pro-
but that He produced the creature by His will. Whence
ceeds as Love, inasmuch as God loves Himself, and hence
in the book De Synod, it is said: “If anyone say that the
He proceeds naturally, although He proceeds by mode of
Son was made by the Will of God, as a creature is said
will.
to be made, let him be anathema.” The reason of this is
Reply to Objection 4. Even as regards the intellec-
that will and nature differ in their manner of causation,
tual conceptions of the mind, a return is made to those
in such a way that nature is determined to one, while the
first principles which are naturally understood. But God
will is not determined to one; and this because the effect
naturally understands Himself, and thus the conception of
is assimilated to the form of the agent, whereby the latter
the divine Word is natural.
acts. Now it is manifest that of one thing there is only
Reply to Objection 5. A thing is said to be necessary
one natural form whereby it exists; and hence such as it
“of itself,” and “by reason of another.” Taken in the latter
is itself, such also is its work. But the form whereby the
sense, it has a twofold meaning: firstly, as an efficient and
will acts is not only one, but many, according to the num-
compelling cause, and thus necessary means what is vio-
ber of ideas understood. Hence the quality of the will’s
lent; secondly, it means a final cause, when a thing is said
action does not depend on the quality of the agent, but on
to be necessary as the means to an end, so far as without it
the agent’s will and understanding. So the will is the prin-
the end could not be attained, or, at least, so well attained.
ciple of those things which may be this way or that way;
In neither of these ways is the divine generation neces-
whereas of those things which can be only in one way, the
sary; because God is not the means to an end, nor is He
principle is nature. What, however, can exist in different
subject to compulsion. But a thing is said to be necessary
ways is far from the divine nature, whereas it belongs to
“of itself” which cannot but be: in this sense it is neces-
212
sary for God to be; and in the same sense it is necessary that the Father beget the Son.
Whether the notional acts proceed from something?
Ia q. 41 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the notional acts do
beginning, begot the Son equal to Himself.”
not proceed from anything. For if the Father begets the
I answer that, The Son was not begotten from noth-
Son from something, this will be either from Himself or
ing, but from the Father’s substance. For it was explained
from something else. If from something else, since that
above (q. 27, a. 2; q. 33, Aa. 2 ,3) that paternity, filia-
whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated,
tion and nativity really and truly exist in God. Now, this
it follows that something different from the Father exists
is the difference between true “generation,” whereby one
in the Son, and this contradicts what is laid down by Hi-
proceeds from another as a son, and “making,” that the
lary (De Trin. vii) that, “In them nothing diverse or dif-
maker makes something out of external matter, as a car-
ferent exists.” If the Father begets the Son from Himself,
penter makes a bench out of wood, whereas a man begets
since again that whence a thing is generated, if it be some-
a son from himself. Now, as a created workman makes a
thing permanent, receives as predicate the thing generated
thing out of matter, so God makes things out of nothing, as
therefrom just as we say, “The man is white,” since the
will be shown later on (q. 45, a. 1), not as if this nothing
man remains, when not from white he is made white—
were a part of the substance of the thing made, but be-
it follows that either the Father does not remain after the
cause the whole substance of a thing is produced by Him
Son is begotten, or that the Father is the Son, which is
without anything else whatever presupposed. So, were the
false. Therefore the Father does not beget the Son from
Son to proceed from the Father as out of nothing, then the
something, but from nothing.
Son would be to the Father what the thing made is to the
Objection 2. Further, that whence anything is gener-
maker, whereto, as is evident, the name of filiation would
ated is the principle regarding what is generated. So if the
not apply except by a kind of similitude. Thus, if the Son
Father generate the Son from His own essence or nature,
of God proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could
it follows that the essence or nature of the Father is the
not be properly and truly called the Son, whereas the con-
principle of the Son. But it is not a material principle, be-
trary is stated (1 Jn. 5:20): “That we may be in His true
cause in God nothing material exists; and therefore it is,
Son Jesus Christ.” Therefore the true Son of God is not
as it were, an active principle, as the begetter is the prin-
from nothing; nor is He made, but begotten.
ciple of the one begotten. Thus it follows that the essence
That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are
generates, which was disproved above (q. 39, a. 5).
called sons of God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense,
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii,
according to a certain likeness of assimilation to Him Who
6) that the three persons are not from the same essence;
is the true Son. Whence, as He is the only true and natural
because the essence is not another thing from person. But
Son of God, He is called the “only begotten,” according
the person of the Son is not another thing from the Fa-
to Jn. 1:18, “The only begotten Son, Who is in the bosom
ther’s essence. Therefore the Son is not from the Father’s
of the Father, He hath declared Him”; and so as others
essence.
are entitled sons of adoption by their similitude to Him,
Objection 4. Further, every creature is from nothing.
He is called the “first begotten,” according to Rom. 8:29:
But in Scripture the Son is called a creature; for it is said
“Whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made
(Ecclus. 24:5), in the person of the Wisdom begotten,“I
conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be the
came out of the mouth of the Most High, the first-born
first born of many brethren.” Therefore the Son of God
before all creatures”: and further on (Ecclus. 24:14) it
is begotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the
is said as uttered by the same Wisdom, “From the begin-
same way as man is born of man; for a part of the human
ning, and before the world was I created.” Therefore the
substance in generation passes into the substance of the
Son was not begotten from something, but from nothing.
one begotten, whereas the divine nature cannot be parted;
Likewise we can object concerning the Holy Ghost, by
whence it necessarily follows that the Father in begetting
reason of what is said (Zech. 12:1): “Thus saith the Lord
the Son does not transmit any part of His nature, but com-
Who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the founda-
municates His whole nature to Him, the distinction only
tions of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within
of origin remaining as explained above (q. 40, a. 2).
him”; and (Amos 4:13) according to another version∗: “I
Reply to Objection 1. When we say that the Son was
Who form the earth, and create the spirit.”
born of the Father, the preposition “of” designates a con-
On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad
substantial generating principle, but not a material princi-
Petrum i, 1) says: “God the Father, of His nature, without
ple. For that which is produced from matter, is made by
∗ The Septuagint
213
a change of form in that whence it is produced. But the which saves the distinction. But when we say that the
divine essence is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of
three persons are ‘of’ the divine essence, there is noth-
another form.
ing expressed to warrant the distinction signified by the
Reply to Objection 2. When we say the Son is begot-
preposition, so there is no parity of argument.
ten of the essence of the Father, as the Master of the Sen-
Reply to Objection 4. When we say “Wisdom was
tences explains (Sent. i, D, v), this denotes the habitude
created,” this may be understood not of Wisdom which
of a kind of active principle, and as he expounds, “the Son
is the Son of God, but of created wisdom given by God
is begotten of the essence of the Father”—that is, of the
to creatures: for it is said, “He created her [namely, Wis-
Father Who is essence; and so Augustine says (De Trin.
dom] in the Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all
xv, 13): “When I say of the Father Who is essence, it is
His works” (Ecclus. 1:9,10). Nor is it inconsistent for
the same as if I said more explicitly, of the essence of the
Scripture in one text to speak of the Wisdom begotten and
Father.”
wisdom created, for wisdom created is a kind of partici-
This, however, is not enough to explain the real mean-
pation of the uncreated Wisdom. The saying may also be
ing of the words. For we can say that the creature is from
referred to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that
God Who is essence; but not that it is from the essence
the sense be, “From the beginning and before the world
of God. So we may explain them otherwise, by observing
was I made”—that is, I was foreseen as united to the crea-
that the preposition “of” [de] always denotes consubstan-
ture. Or the mention of wisdom as both created and be-
tiality. We do not say that a house is “of” [de] the builder,
gotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the divine
since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say, how-
generation; for in generation what is generated receives
ever, that something is “of” another, if this is its consub-
the nature of the generator and this pertains to perfection;
stantial principle, no matter in what way it is so, whether
whereas in creation the Creator is not changed, but the
it be an active principle, as the son is said to be “of” the
creature does not receive the Creator’s nature. Thus the
father, or a material principle, as a knife is “of” iron; or
Son is called both created and begotten, in order that from
a formal principle, but in those things only in which the
the idea of creation the immutability of the Father may be
forms are subsisting, and not accidental to another, for we
understood, and from generation the unity of nature in the
can say that an angel is “of” an intellectual nature. In this
Father and the Son. In this way Hilary expounds the sense
way, then, we say that the Son is begotten ‘of’ the essence
of this text of Scripture (De Synod.). The other passages
of the Father, inasmuch as the essence of the Father, com-
quoted do not refer to the Holy Ghost, but to the created
municated by generation, subsists in the Son.
spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes air, sometimes
Reply to Objection 3. When we say that the Son
the breath of man, sometimes also the soul, or any other
is begotten of the essence of the Father, a term is added
invisible substance.
Whether in God there is a power in respect of the notional acts?
Ia q. 41 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that in God there is no
power does not exist in reference to the notional acts.
power in respect of the notional acts. For every kind of
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii,
power is either active or passive; neither of which can be
1): “If God the Father could not beget a co-equal Son,
here applied, there being in God nothing which we call
where is the omnipotence of God the Father?” Power
passive power, as above explained (q. 25, a. 1); nor can ac-
therefore exists in God regarding the notional acts.
tive power belong to one person as regards another, since
I answer that, As the notional acts exist in God, so
the divine persons were not made, as stated above (a. 3).
must there be also a power in God regarding these acts;
Therefore in God there is no power in respect of the no-
since power only means the principle of act. So, as we
tional acts.
understand the Father to be principle of generation; and
Objection 2. Further, the object of power is what is
the Father and the Son to be the principle of spiration,
possible. But the divine persons are not regarded as pos-
we must attribute the power of generating to the Father,
sible, but necessary. Therefore, as regards the notional
and the power of spiration to the Father and the Son; for
acts, whereby the divine persons proceed, there cannot be
the power of generation means that whereby the generator
power in God.
generates. Now every generator generates by something.
Objection 3. Further, the Son proceeds as the word,
Therefore in every generator we must suppose the power
which is the concept of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost
of generating, and in the spirator the power of spirating.
proceeds as love, which belongs to the will. But in God
Reply to Objection 1. As a person, according to no-
power exists as regards effects, and not as regards intellect
tional acts, does not proceed as if made; so the power in
and will, as stated above (q. 25, a. 1). Therefore, in God
God as regards the notional acts has no reference to a per-
214
son as if made, but only as regards the person as proceedin God the distinction of action and agent is one of reason
ing.
only, otherwise action would be an accident in God. And
Reply to Objection 2. Possible, as opposed to what
therefore with regard to those actions in respect of which
is necessary, is a consequence of a passive power, which
certain things proceed which are distinct from God, either
does not exist in God. Hence, in God there is no such
personally or essentially, we may ascribe power to God in
thing as possibility in this sense, but only in the sense of
its proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to God the
possible as contained in what is necessary; and in this lat-
power of creating, so we may ascribe the power of beget-
ter sense it can be said that as it is possible for God to be,
ting and of spirating. But “to understand” and “to will” are
so also is it possible that the Son should be generated.
not such actions as to designate the procession of some-
Reply to Objection 3. Power signifies a principle:
thing distinct from God, either essentially or personally.
and a principle implies distinction from that of which it is
Wherefore, with regard to these actions we cannot ascribe
the principle. Now we must observe a double distinction
power to God in its proper sense, but only after our way
in things said of God: one is a real distinction, the other is
of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we designate
a distinction of reason only. By a real distinction, God by
by different terms the intellect and the act of understand-
His essence is distinct from those things of which He is the
ing in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is
principle by creation: just as one person is distinct from
His very essence which has no principle.
the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But
Whether the power of begetting signifies a relation, and not the essence?
Ia q. 41 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the power of beget-
other than God, Who subsists from no other source than
ting, or of spirating, signifies the relation and not the
God.”
essence. For power signifies a principle, as appears from
We must therefore conclude that the power of beget-
its definition: for active power is the principle of action,
ting signifies principally the divine essence as the Master
as we find in Metaph. v, text 17. But in God principle
says (Sent. i, D, vii), and not the relation only. Nor does
in regard to Person is said notionally. Therefore, in God,
it signify the essence as identified with the relation, so as
power does not signify essence but relation.
to signify both equally. For although paternity is signi-
Objection 2. Further, in God, the power to act [posse]
fied as the form of the Father, nevertheless it is a personal
and ‘to act’ are not distinct. But in God, begetting signi-
property, being in respect to the person of the Father, what
fies relation. Therefore, the same applies to the power of
the individual form is to the individual creature. Now the
begetting.
individual form in things created constitutes the person
Objection 3. Further, terms signifying the essence in
begetting, but is not that by which the begetter begets, oth-
God, are common to the three persons. But the power of
erwise Socrates would beget Socrates. So neither can pa-
begetting is not common to the three persons, but proper
ternity be understood as that by which the Father begets,
to the Father. Therefore it does not signify the essence.
but as constituting the person of the Father, otherwise the
On the contrary, As God has the power to beget the
Father would beget the Father. But that by which the Fa-
Son, so also He wills to beget Him. But the will to beget
ther begets is the divine nature, in which the Son is like to
signifies the essence. Therefore, also, the power to beget.
Him. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
I answer that, Some have said that the power to beget
i, 18) that generation is the “work of nature,” not of na-
signifies relation in God. But this is not possible. For in
ture generating, but of nature, as being that by which the
every agent, that is properly called power, by which the
generator generates. And therefore the power of beget-
agent acts. Now, everything that produces something by
ting signifies the divine nature directly, but the relation
its action, produces something like itself, as to the form
indirectly.
by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his begetter
Reply to Objection 1. Power does not signify the re-
in his human nature, in virtue of which the father has the
lation itself of a principle, for thus it would be in the genus power to beget a man. In every begetter, therefore, that
of relation; but it signifies that which is a principle; not,
is the power of begetting in which the begotten is like the
indeed, in the sense in which we call the agent a principle,
begetter.
but in the sense of being that by which the agent acts. Now
Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets
the agent is distinct from that which it makes, and the gen-
Him, in the divine nature. Wherefore the divine nature in
erator from that which it generates: but that by which the
the Father is in Him the power of begetting. And so Hilary
generator generates is common to generated and genera-
says (De Trin. v): “The birth of God cannot but contain
tor, and so much more perfectly, as the generation is more
that nature from which it proceeded; for He cannot subsist
perfect. Since, therefore, the divine generation is most
215
perfect, that by which the Begetter begets, is common to essence is the same in reality as the act of begetting or
Begotten and Begetter by a community of identity, and not
paternity; although there is a distinction of reason.
only of species, as in things created. Therefore, from the
Reply to Objection 3. When I speak of the “power
fact that we say that the divine essence “is the principle by
of begetting,” power is signified directly, generation indi-
which the Begetter begets,” it does not follow that the di-
rectly: just as if I were to say, the “essence of the Father.”
vine essence is distinct (from the Begotten): which would
Wherefore in respect of the essence, which is signified,
follow if we were to say that the divine essence begets.
the power of begetting is common to the three persons:
Reply to Objection 2. As in God, the power of beget-
but in respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper to
ting is the same as the act of begetting, so the divine
the person of the Father.
Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?
Ia q. 41 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that a notional act can
one simple act. Wherefore there can be but one person
be directed to several Persons, so that there may be sev-
proceeding after the manner of word, which person is the
eral Persons begotten or spirated in God. For whoever
Son; and but one person proceeding after the manner of
has the power of begetting can beget. But the Son has the
love, which person is the Holy Ghost.
power of begetting. Therefore He can beget. But He can-
The third reason is taken from the manner in which the
not beget Himself: therefore He can beget another son.
persons proceed. For the persons proceed naturally, as we
Therefore there can be several Sons in God.
have said (a. 2), and nature is determined to one.
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim.
The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the
iii, 12): “The Son did not beget a Creator: not that He
divine persons. For this reason is the Son perfect, that the
could not, but that it behoved Him not.”
entire divine filiation is contained in Him, and that there
Objection 3.
Further, God the Father has greater
is but one Son. The argument is similar in regard to the
power to beget than has a created father. But a man can
other persons.
beget several sons. Therefore God can also: the more so
Reply to Objection 1. We can grant, without distinc-
that the power of the Father is not diminished after beget-
tion, that the Son has the same power as the Father; but
ting the Son.
we cannot grant that the Son has the power “generandi”
On the contrary, In God “that which is possible,” and
[of begetting] thus taking “generandi” as the gerund of the
“that which is” do not differ. If, therefore, in God it were
active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son has the
possible for there to be several Sons, there would be sev-
“power to beget.” Just as, although Father and Son have
eral Sons. And thus there would be more than three Per-
the same being, it does not follow that the Son is the Fa-
sons in God; which is heretical.
ther, by reason of the notional term added. But if the word
I answer that, As Athanasius says, in God there is
“generandi” [of being begotten] is taken as the gerundive
only “one Father, one Son, one Holy Ghost.” For this four
of the passive verb, the power “generandi” is in the Son—
reasons may be given.
that is, the power of being begotten. The same is to be
The first reason is in regard to the relations by which
said if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal verb,
alone are the Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons
so that the sense be “the power of generation”—that is, a
are the relations themselves as subsistent, there would not
power by which it is generated by some person.
be several Fathers, or several Sons in God, unless there
Reply to Objection 2. Augustine does not mean to
were more than one paternity, or more than one filiation.
say by those words that the Son could beget a Son: but
And this, indeed, would not be possible except owing to
that if He did not, it was not because He could not, as we
a material distinction: since forms of one species are not
shall see later on (q. 42, a. 6, ad 3).
multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God.
Reply to Objection 3. Divine perfection and the to-
Wherefore there can be but one subsistent filiation in God:
tal absence of matter in God require that there cannot be
just as there could be but one subsistent whiteness.
several Sons in God, as we have explained. Wherefore
The second reason is taken from the manner of the
that there are not several Sons is not due to any lack of
processions. For God understands and wills all things by
begetting power in the Father.
216
FIRST PART, QUESTION 42
Of Equality and Likeness Among the Divine Persons
(In Six Articles)
We now have to consider the persons as compared to one another: firstly, with regard to equality and likeness; secondly, with regard to mission. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry.
(1) Whether there is equality among the divine persons?
(2) Whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from Whom He proceeds in eternity?
(3) Whether there is any order among the divine persons?
(4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness?
(5) Whether the one divine person is in another?
(6) Whether they are equal in power?
Whether there is equality in God?
Ia q. 42 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that equality is not be-
of Godhead] who speak of either increase or decrease, as
coming to the divine persons. For equality is in relation to
the Arians do, who sunder the Trinity by distinguishing
things which are one in quantity as the Philosopher says
degrees as of numbers, thus involving a plurality.” Now
(Metaph. v, text 20). But in the divine persons there is no
the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the
quantity, neither continuous intrinsic quantity, which we
same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else than
call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity, which we call
His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any
place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of
inequality in the divine persons, they would not have the
discrete quantity, because two persons are more than one.
same essence; and thus the three persons would not be
Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.
one God; which is impossible. We must therefore admit
Objection 2. Further, the divine persons are of one
equality among the divine persons.
essence, as we have said (q. 39, a. 2). Now essence is
Reply to Objection 1. Quantity is twofold. There
signified by way of form. But agreement in form makes
is quantity of “bulk” or dimensive quantity, which is to
things to be alike, not to be equal. Therefore, we may
be found only in corporeal things, and has, therefore, no
speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not of equal-
place in God. There is also quantity of “virtue,” which is
ity.
measured according to the perfection of some nature or
Objection 3. Further, things wherein there is to be
form: to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of
found equality, are equal to one another, for equality is
something as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it is
reciprocal. But the divine persons cannot be said to be
more or less, perfect in heat. Now this virtual quantity is
equal to one another. For as Augustine says (De Trin. vi,
measured firstly by its source—that is, by the perfection
10): “If an image answers perfectly to that whereof it is
of that form or nature: such is the greatness of spiritual
the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that which
things, just as we speak of great heat on account of its in-
it represents cannot be said to be equal to the image.” But
tensity and perfection. And so Augustine says (De Trin.
the Son is the image of the Father; and so the Father is
vi, 18) that “in things which are great, but not in bulk, to
not equal to the Son. Therefore equality is not to be found
be greater is to be better,” for the more perfect a thing is
among the divine persons.
the better it is. Secondly, virtual quantity is measured by
Objection 4. Further, equality is a relation. But no
the effects of the form. Now the first effect of form is be-
relation is common to the three persons; for the persons
ing, for everything has being by reason of its form. The
are distinct by reason of the relations. Therefore equality
second effect is operation, for every agent acts through
is not becoming to the divine persons.
its form. Consequently virtual quantity is measured both
On the contrary, Athanasius says that “the three per-
in regard to being and in regard to action: in regard to
sons are co-eternal and co-equal to one another.”
being, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are
I answer that, We must needs admit equality among
of longer duration; and in regard to action, forasmuch as
the divine persons.
For, according to the Philosopher
things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act.
(Metaph. x, text 15,16, 17), equality signifies the negation
And so as Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i)
of greater or less. Now we cannot admit anything greater
says: “We understand equality to be in the Father, Son
or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius says (De
and Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one of them either pre-
Trin. i): “They must needs admit a difference [namely,
cedes in eternity, or excels in greatness, or surpasses in
217
power.”
form is principally in the cause, and secondarily in the
Reply to Objection 2. Where we have equality in
effect.
respect of virtual quantity, equality includes likeness and
But verbs signify equality with movement. And al-
something besides, because it excludes excess. For what-
though movement is not in God, there is something that
ever things have a common form may be said to be alike,
receives. Since, therefore, the Son receives from the Fa-
even if they do not participate in that form equally, just as
ther, this, namely, that He is equal to the Father, and not
the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot
conversely, for this reason we say that the Son is equalled
be said to be equal if one participates in the form more
to the Father, but not conversely.
perfectly than another. And because not only is the same
Reply to Objection 4. In the divine persons there
nature in both Father and Son, but also is it in both in per-
is nothing for us to consider but the essence which they
fect equality, therefore we say not only that the Son is like
have in common and the relations in which they are dis-
to the Father, in order to exclude the error of Eunomius,
tinct. Now equality implies both —namely, distinction
but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude the error
of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to itself;
of Arius.
and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons
Reply to Objection 3. Equality and likeness in God
equal to one another, that they are of the same greatness
may be designated in two ways—namely, by nouns and
and essence. Now it is clear that the relation of a thing
by verbs. When designated by nouns, equality in the di-
to itself is not a real relation. Nor, again, is one relation
vine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the Son is
referred to another by a further relation: for when we say
equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is be-
that paternity is opposed to filiation, opposition is not a
cause the divine essence is not more the Father’s than the
relation mediating between paternity and filiation. For in
Son’s. Wherefore, just as the Son has the greatness of the
both these cases relation would be multiplied indefinitely.
Father, and is therefore equal to the Father, so the Father
Therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons is
has the greatness of the Son, and is therefore equal to the
not a real relation distinct from the personal relations: but
Son. But in reference to creatures, Dionysius says (Div.
in its concept it includes both the relations which distin-
Nom. ix): “Equality and likeness are not mutual.” For
guish the persons, and the unity of essence. For this rea-
effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch as they
son the Master says (Sent. i, D, xxxi) that in these “it is
have the form of their causes; but not conversely, for the
only the terms that are relative.”
Whether the person proceeding is co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Ia q. 42 a. 2
Father?
Objection 1. It would seem that the person proceed-
realization of an idea [ideatio], as an external coffer arises
ing is not co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the
from the one in the mind. The twelfth is birth, as a man is
Father. For Arius gives twelve modes of generation. The
begotten of his father; which implies priority and posteri-
first mode is like the issue of a line from a point; wherein
ority of time. Thus it is clear that equality of nature or of
is wanting equality of simplicity. The second is like the
time is absent in every mode whereby one thing is from
emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent equality
another. So if the Son is from the Father, we must say that
of nature. The third is like the mark or impression made
He is less than the Father, or later than the Father, or both.
by a seal; wherein is wanting consubstantiality and ex-
Objection 2. Further, everything that comes from an-
ecutive power. The fourth is the infusion of a good will
other has a principle. But nothing eternal has a principle.
from God; wherein also consubstantiality is wanting. The
Therefore the Son is not eternal; nor is the Holy Ghost.
fifth is the emanation of an accident from its subject; but
Objection 3. Further, everything which is corrupted
the accident has no subsistence. The sixth is the abstrac-
ceases to be. Hence everything generated begins to be;
tion of a species from matter, as sense receives the species
for the end of generation is existence. But the Son is gen-
from the sensible object; wherein is wanting equality of
erated by the Father. Therefore He begins to exist, and is
spiritual simplicity. The seventh is the exciting of the will
not co-eternal with the Father.
by knowledge, which excitation is merely temporal. The
Objection 4. Further, if the Son be begotten by the Fa-
eighth is transformation, as an image is made of brass;
ther, either He is always being begotten, or there is some
which transformation is material. The ninth is motion
moment in which He is begotten. If He is always being
from a mover; and here again we have effect and cause.
begotten, since, during the process of generation, a thing
The tenth is the taking of species from genera; but this
must be imperfect, as appears in successive things, which
mode has no place in God, for the Father is not predicated
are always in process of becoming, as time and motion, it
of the Son as the genus of a species. The eleventh is the
follows that the Son must be always imperfect, which can-
218
not be admitted. Thus there is a moment to be assigned Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Ver-for the begetting of the Son, and before that moment the
bis Domini, Serm. 38), no mode of the procession of any
Son did not exist.
creature perfectly represents the divine generation. Hence
On the contrary, Athanasius declares that “all the
we need to gather a likeness of it from many of these
three persons are co-eternal with each other.”
modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat
I answer that, We must say that the Son is co-eternal
supplied from another; and thus it is declared in the coun-
with the Father. In proof of which we must consider that
cil of Ephesus: “Let Splendor tell thee that the co-eternal
for a thing which proceeds from a principle to be poste-
Son existed always with the Father; let the Word announce
rior to its principle may be due to two reasons: one on the
the impassibility of His birth; let the name Son insinuate
part of the agent, and the other on the part of the action.
His consubstantiality.” Yet, above them all the procession
On the part of the agent this happens differently as regards
of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly;
free agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account
the intellectual word not being posterior to its source ex-
of the choice of time; for as a free agent can choose the
cept in an intellect passing from potentiality to act; and
form it gives to the effect, as stated above (q. 41, a. 2), so
this cannot be said of God.
it can choose the time in which to produce its effect. In
Reply to Objection 2. Eternity excludes the principle
natural agents, however, the same happens from the agent
of duration, but not the principle of origin.
not having its perfection of natural power from the very
Reply to Objection 3. Every corruption is a change;
first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as, for instance, and so all that corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be.
a man is not able to generate from the very first. Consid-
The divine generation, however, is not changed, as stated
ered on the part of action, anything derived from a prin-
above (q. 27, a. 2). Hence the Son is ever being begotten,
ciple cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when
and the Father is always begetting.
the action is successive. So, given that an agent, as soon
Reply to Objection 4. In time there is something
as it exists, begins to act thus, the effect would not exist in indivisible—namely, the instant; and there is something
the same instant, but in the instant of the action’s termina-
else which endures—namely, time. But in eternity the in-
tion. Now it is manifest, according to what has been said
divisible “now” stands ever still, as we have said above
(q. 41, a. 2), that the Father does not beget the Son by will,
(q. 10, a. 2 ad 1, a. 4 ad 2). But the generation of the Son
but by nature; and also that the Father’s nature was per-
is not in the “now” of time, or in time, but in eternity. And
fect from eternity; and again that the action whereby the
so to express the presentiality and permanence of eternity,
Father produces the Son is not successive, because thus
we can say that “He is ever being born,” as Origen said
the Son would be successively generated, and this genera-
(Hom. in Joan. i). But as Gregory∗ and Augustine† said,
tion would be material, and accompanied with movement;
it is better to say “ever born,” so that “ever” may denote
which is quite impossible. Therefore we conclude that the
the permanence of eternity, and “born” the perfection of
Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus the
the only Begotten. Thus, therefore, neither is the Son im-
Son is co-eternal with the Father, and likewise the Holy
perfect, nor “was there a time when He was not,” as Arius
Ghost is co-eternal with both.
said.
Whether in the divine persons there exists an order of nature?
Ia q. 42 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that among the divine per-
nature. Therefore it is not subject to order; and order of
sons there does not exist an order of nature. For whatever
nature does not exist in it.
exists in God is the essence, or a person, or a notion. But
Objection 4. Further, the divine nature is the divine
the order of nature does not signify the essence, nor any
essence. But there is no order of essence in God. There-
of the persons, or notions. Therefore there is no order of
fore neither is there of nature.
nature in God.
On the contrary, Where plurality exists without or-
Objection 2. Further, wherever order of nature exists,
der, confusion exists. But in the divine persons there is
there one comes before another, at least, according to na-
no confusion, as Athanasius says. Therefore in God order
ture and intellect. But in the divine persons there exists
exists.
neither priority nor posteriority, as declared by Athana-
I answer that, Order always has reference to some
sius. Therefore, in the divine persons there is no order of
principle.
Wherefore since there are many kinds of
nature.
principle—namely, according to site, as a point; according
Objection 3. Further, wherever order exists, distinc-
to intellect, as the principle of demonstration; and accord-
tion also exists. But there is no distinction in the divine
ing to each individual cause—so are there many kinds of
∗ Moral. xxix, 21
† Super Ps. 2:7
219
order. Now principle, according to origin, without prior-from, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous
ity, exists in God as we have stated (q. 33, a. 1): so there
in the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one en-
must likewise be order according to origin, without prior-
ters the definition of the other. But in God the relations
ity; and this is called ‘the order of nature’: in the words
themselves are the persons subsisting in one nature. So,
of Augustine (Contra Maxim. iv): “Not whereby one is
neither on the part of the nature, nor on the part the rela-
prior to another, but whereby one is from another.”
tions, can one person be prior to another, not even in the
Reply to Objection 1. The order of nature signifies
order of nature and reason.
the notion of origin in general, not a special kind of ori-
Reply to Objection 3. The order of nature means not
gin.
the ordering of nature itself, but the existence of order in
Reply to Objection 2. In things created, even when
the divine Persons according to natural origin.
what is derived from a principle is co-equal in duration
Reply to Objection 4. Nature in a certain way implies
with its principle, the principle still comes first in the or-
the idea of a principle, but essence does not; and so the or-
der of nature and reason, if formally considered as prin-
der of origin is more correctly called the order of nature
ciple. If, however, we consider the relations of cause and
than the order of essence.
effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding there-
Whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness?
Ia q. 42 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the Son is not equal to
manner and by change. Therefore we must say that the
the Father in greatness. For He Himself said (Jn. 14:28):
Son was eternally equal to the Father in greatness. Hence,
“The Father is greater than I”; and the Apostle says (1 Cor.
Hilary says (De Synod. Can. 27): “Remove bodily weak-
15:28): “The Son Himself shall be subject to Him that put
ness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain
all things under Him.”
and all human shortcomings, then every son, by reason of
Objection 2. Further, paternity is part of the Father’s
his natural nativity, is the father’s equal, because he has a
dignity. But paternity does not belong to the Son. There-
like nature.”
fore the Son does not possess all the Father’s dignity; and
Reply to Objection 1. These words are to be under-
so He is not equal in greatness to the Father.
stood of Christ’s human nature, wherein He is less than
Objection 3. Further, wherever there exist a whole
the Father, and subject to Him; but in His divine nature
and a part, many parts are more than one only, or than
He is equal to the Father. This is expressed by Athana-
fewer parts; as three men are more than two, or than one.
sius, “Equal to the Father in His Godhead; less than the
But in God a universal whole exists, and a part; for under
Father in humanity”: and by Hilary (De Trin. ix): “By the
relation or notion, several notions are included. There-
fact of giving, the Father is greater; but He is not less to
fore, since in the Father there are three notions, while in
Whom the same being is given”; and (De Synod.): “The
the Son there are only two, the Son is evidently not equal
Son subjects Himself by His inborn piety”—that is, by
to the Father.
His recognition of paternal authority; whereas “creatures
On the contrary, It is said (Phil. 2:6): “He thought it
are subject by their created weakness.”
not robbery to be equal with God.”
Reply to Objection 2. Equality is measured by great-
I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Fa-
ness. In God greatness signifies the perfection of nature,
ther in greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but
as above explained (a. 1, ad 1), and belongs to the essence.
the perfection of His nature. Now it belongs to the very
Thus equality and likeness in God have reference to the
nature of paternity and filiation that the Son by genera-
essence; nor can there be inequality or dissimilitude aris-
tion should attain to the possession of the perfection of
ing from the distinction of the relations. Wherefore Au-
the nature which is in the Father, in the same way as it is
gustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 13), “The question of
in the Father Himself. But since in men generation is a
origin is, Who is from whom? but the question of equality
certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from po-
is, Of what kind, or how great, is he?” Therefore, pater-
tentiality to act, it follows that a man is not equal at first to nity is the Father’s dignity, as also the Father’s essence:
the father who begets him, but attains to equality by due
since dignity is something absolute, and pertains to the
growth, unless owing to a defect in the principle of gen-
essence. As, therefore, the same essence, which in the Fa-
eration it should happen otherwise. From what precedes
ther is paternity, in the Son is filiation, so the same dignity (q. 27, a. 2; q. 33, Aa. 2 ,3), it is evident that in God there which, in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation. It
exist real true paternity and filiation. Nor can we say that
is thus true to say that the Son possesses whatever dig-
the power of generation in the Father was defective, nor
nity the Father has; but we cannot argue—“the Father has
that the Son of God arrived at perfection in a successive
paternity, therefore the Son has paternity,” for there is a
220
transition from substance to relation. For the Father and ing, which is irreconcilable with the idea of universal, the
the Son have the same essence and dignity, which exist
parts of which are distinguished in being. Persons like-
in the Father by the relation of giver, and in the Son by
wise is not a universal term in God as we have seen above
relation of receiver.
(q. 30, a. 4). Wherefore all the relations together are not
Reply to Objection 3. In God relation is not a uni-
greater than only one; nor are all the persons something
versal whole, although it is predicated of each of the rela-
greater than only one; because the whole perfection of the
tions; because all the relations are one in essence and be-
divine nature exists in each person.
Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely?
Ia q. 42 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the Son and the Fa-
so to speak, follows His own nature in begetting an un-
ther are not in each other. For the Philosopher (Phys. iv,
changeable subsisting God. So we understand the nature
text. 23) gives eight modes of one thing existing in an-
of God to subsist in Him, for He is God in God.” It is also
other, according to none of which is the Son in the Father,
manifest that as regards the relations, each of two relative
or conversely; as is patent to anyone who examines each
opposites is in the concept of the other. Regarding ori-
mode. Therefore the Son and the Father are not in each
gin also, it is clear that the procession of the intelligible
other.
word is not outside the intellect, inasmuch as it remains in
Objection 2. Further, nothing that has come out from
the utterer of the word. What also is uttered by the word
another is within. But the Son from eternity came out
is therein contained. And the same applies to the Holy
from the Father, according to Mic. 5:2: “His going forth
Ghost.
is from the beginning, from the days of eternity.” There-
Reply to Objection 1. What is contained in creatures
fore the Son is not in the Father.
does not sufficiently represent what exists in God; so ac-
Objection 3. Further, one of two opposites cannot be
cording to none of the modes enumerated by the Philoso-
in the other. But the Son and the Father are relatively op-
pher, are the Son and the Father in each other. The mode
posed. Therefore one cannot be in the other.
the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be found
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 14:10): “I am in the
in that whereby something exists in its originating princi-
Father, and the Father is in Me.”
ple, except that the unity of essence between the principle
I answer that, There are three points of consideration
and that which proceeds therefrom is wanting in things
as regards the Father and the Son; the essence, the rela-
created.
tion and the origin; and according to each the Son and the
Reply to Objection 2. The Son’s going forth from the
Father are in each other. The Father is in the Son by His
Father is by mode of the interior procession whereby the
essence, forasmuch as the Father is His own essence and
word emerges from the heart and remains therein. Hence
communicates His essence to the Son not by any change
this going forth in God is only by the distinction of the
on His part. Hence it follows that as the Father’s essence
relations, not by any kind of essential separation.
is in the Son, the Father Himself is in the Son; likewise,
Reply to Objection 3. The Father and the Son are rel-
since the Son is His own essence, it follows that He Him-
atively opposed, but not essentially; while, as above ex-
self is in the Father in Whom is His essence. This is ex-
plained, one relative opposite is in the other.
pressed by Hilary (De Trin. v), “The unchangeable God,
Whether the Son is equal to the Father in power?
Ia q. 42 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the Son is not equal
Also, the Son hears: “As I hear, so I judge” (Jn. 5:30).
to the Father in power. For it is said (Jn. 5:19): “The Son
Therefore the Father has greater power than the Son.
cannot do anything of Himself but what He seeth the Fa-
Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the Father’s om-
ther doing.” But the Father can act of Himself. Therefore
nipotence to be able to beget a Son equal to Himself. For
the Father’s power is greater than the Son’s.
Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 7), “Were He unable
Objection 2. Further, greater is the power of him who
to beget one equal to Himself, where would be the om-
commands and teaches than of him who obeys and hears.
nipotence of God the Father?” But the Son cannot beget a
But the Father commands the Son according to Jn. 14:31:
Son, as proved above (q. 41, a. 6). Therefore the Son can-
“As the Father gave Me commandment so do I.” The Fa-
not do all that belongs to the Father’s omnipotence; and
ther also teaches the Son: “The Father loveth the Son,
hence He is not equal to Him power.
and showeth Him all things that Himself doth” (Jn. 5:20).
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:19): “Whatsoever
221
things the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like man-Himself [per se], that He does not act by Himself [a se].”
ner.”
Reply to Objection 2. The Father’s “showing” and
I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Fa-
the Son’s “hearing” are to be taken in the sense that the
ther in power. Power of action is a consequence of per-
Father communicates knowledge to the Son, as He com-
fection in nature. In creatures, for instance, we see that
municates His essence. The command of the Father can be
the more perfect the nature, the greater power is there for
explained in the same sense, as giving Him from eternity
action. Now it was shown above (a. 4) that the very notion
knowledge and will to act, by begetting Him. Or, better
of the divine paternity and filiation requires that the Son
still, this may be referred to Christ in His human nature.
should be the Father’s equal in greatness—that is, in per-
Reply to Objection 3. As the same essence is pater-
fection of nature. Hence it follows that the Son is equal
nity in the Father, and filiation in the Son: so by the same
to the Father in power; and the same applies to the Holy
power the Father begets, and the Son is begotten. Hence
Ghost in relation to both.
it is clear that the Son can do whatever the Father can
Reply to Objection 1. The words, “the Son cannot
do; yet it does not follow that the Son can beget; for to
of Himself do anything,” do not withdraw from the Son
argue thus would imply transition from substance to rela-
any power possessed by the Father, since it is immedi-
tion, for generation signifies a divine relation. So the Son
ately added, “Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son
has the same omnipotence as the Father, but with another
doth in like manner”; but their meaning is to show that the
relation; the Father possessing power as “giving” signified
Son derives His power from the Father, of Whom He re-
when we say that He is able to beget; while the Son pos-
ceives His nature. Hence, Hilary says (De Trin. ix), “The
sesses the power of “receiving,” signified by saying that
unity of the divine nature implies that the Son so acts of
He can be begotten.
222
FIRST PART, QUESTION 43
The Mission of the Divine Persons
(In Eight Articles)
We next consider the mission of the divine persons, concerning which there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is suitable for a divine person to be sent?
(2) Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?
(3) In what sense a divine person is invisibly sent?
(4) Whether it is fitting that each person be sent?
(5) Whether both the Son and the Holy Ghost are invisibly sent?
(6) To whom the invisible mission is directed?
(7) Of the visible mission
(8) Whether any person sends Himself visibly or invisibly?
Whether a divine person can be properly sent?
Ia q. 43 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that a divine person can-
in no way was he present before in the place whereto he
not be properly sent. For one who is sent is less than the
is sent, or because he begins to be there in some way in
sender. But one divine person is not less than another.
which he was not there hitherto. Thus the mission of a
Therefore one person is not sent by another.
divine person is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the
Objection 2. Further, what is sent is separated from
procession of origin from the sender, and as meaning a
the sender; hence Jerome says, commenting on Ezech.
new way of existing in another; thus the Son is said to be
16:53: “What is joined and tied in one body cannot be
sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He began
sent.” But in the divine persons there is nothing that is
to exist visibly in the world by taking our nature; whereas
separable, as Hilary says (De Trin. vii). Therefore one
“He was” previously “in the world” (Jn. 1:1).
person is not sent by another.
Reply to Objection 1. Mission implies inferiority in
Objection 3. Further, whoever is sent, departs from
the one sent, when it means procession from the sender
one place and comes anew into another. But this does not
as principle, by command or counsel; forasmuch as the
apply to a divine person, Who is everywhere. Therefore it
one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is the
is not suitable for a divine person to be sent.
wiser. In God, however, it means only procession of ori-
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 8:16): “I am not alone, gin, which is according to equality, as explained above
but I and the Father that sent Me.”
(q. 42, Aa. 4,6).
I answer that, the notion of mission includes two
Reply to Objection 2. What is so sent as to begin to
things: the habitude of the one sent to the sender; and
exist where previously it did not exist, is locally moved by
that of the one sent to the end whereto he is sent. Anyone
being sent; hence it is necessarily separated locally from
being sent implies a certain kind of procession of the one
the sender. This, however, has no place in the mission of a
sent from the sender: either according to command, as the
divine person; for the divine person sent neither begins to
master sends the servant; or according to counsel, as an
exist where he did not previously exist, nor ceases to exist
adviser may be said to send the king to battle; or accord-
where He was. Hence such a mission takes place without
ing to origin, as a tree sends forth its flowers. The habi-
a separation, having only distinction of origin.
tude to the term to which he is sent is also shown, so that
Reply to Objection 3. This objection rests on the idea
in some way he begins to be present there: either because
of mission according to local motion, which is not in God.
Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?
Ia q. 43 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that mission can be eter-
Therefore the mission of a divine person is not temporal,
nal. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi, in Ev.), “The Son is
but eternal.
sent as He is begotten.” But the Son’s generation is eter-
Objection 3. Further, mission implies procession. But
nal. Therefore mission is eternal.
the procession of the divine persons is eternal. Therefore
Objection 2. Further, a thing is changed if it becomes
mission is also eternal.
something temporally. But a divine person is not changed.
On the contrary, It is said (Gal. 4:4): “When the full-
223
ness of the time was come, God sent His Son.”
likewise by dwelling in man according to His invisible
I answer that, A certain difference is to be observed
mission.
in all the words that express the origin of the divine per-
Reply to Objection 1. Gregory speaks of the tempo-
sons. For some express only relation to the principle, as
ral generation of the Son, not from the Father, but from
“procession” and “going forth.” Others express the term
His mother; or it may be taken to mean that He could be
of procession together with the relation to the principle.
sent because eternally begotten.
Of these some express the eternal term, as “generation”
Reply to Objection 2.
That a divine person may
and “spiration”; for generation is the procession of the di-
newly exist in anyone, or be possessed by anyone in time,
vine person into the divine nature, and passive spiration is
does not come from change of the divine person, but from
the procession of the subsisting love. Others express the
change in the creature; as God Himself is called Lord tem-
temporal term with the relation to the principle, as “mis-
porally by change of the creature.
sion” and “giving.” For a thing is sent that it may be in
Reply to Objection 3. Mission signifies not only pro-
something else, and is given that it may be possessed; but
cession from the principle, but also determines the tempo-
that a divine person be possessed by any creature, or exist
ral term of the procession. Hence mission is only tempo-
in it in a new mode, is temporal.
ral. Or we may say that it includes the eternal procession,
Hence “mission” and “giving” have only a temporal
with the addition of a temporal effect. For the relation of a
significance in God; but “generation” and “spiration” are
divine person to His principle must be eternal. Hence the
exclusively eternal; whereas “procession” and “giving,”
procession may be called a twin procession, eternal and
in God, have both an eternal and a temporal signification:
temporal, not that there is a double relation to the princi-
for the Son may proceed eternally as God; but temporally,
ple, but a double term, temporal and eternal.
by becoming man, according to His visible mission, or
Whether the invisible mission of the divine person is only according to the gift of Ia q. 43 a. 3
sanctifying grace?
Objection 1. It would seem that the invisible mis-
that “the Holy Ghost proceeds temporally for the crea-
sion of the divine person is not only according to the gift
ture’s sanctification.” But mission is a temporal proces-
of sanctifying grace. For the sending of a divine person
sion. Since then the creature’s sanctification is by sancti-
means that He is given. Hence if the divine person is sent
fying grace, it follows that the mission of the divine per-
only according to the gift of sanctifying grace, the divine
son is only by sanctifying grace.
person Himself will not be given, but only His gifts; and
I answer that, The divine person is fittingly sent in
this is the error of those who say that the Holy Ghost is
the sense that He exists newly in any one; and He is given
not given, but that His gifts are given.
as possessed by anyone; and neither of these is otherwise
Objection 2. Further, this preposition, “according to,”
than by sanctifying grace.
denotes the habitude of some cause. But the divine person
For God is in all things by His essence, power and
is the cause why the gift of sanctifying grace is possessed,
presence, according to His one common mode, as the
and not conversely, according to Rom. 5:5, “the charity of
cause existing in the effects which participate in His good-
God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who
ness. Above and beyond this common mode, however,
is given to us.” Therefore it is improperly said that the
there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature
divine person is sent according to the gift of sanctifying
wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in
grace.
the knower, and the beloved in the lover. And since the ra-
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20)
tional creature by its operation of knowledge and love at-
that “the Son, when temporally perceived by the mind, is
tains to God Himself, according to this special mode God
sent.” But the Son is known not only by sanctifying grace,
is said not only to exist in the rational creature but also to
but also by gratuitous grace, as by faith and knowledge.
dwell therein as in His own temple. So no other effect can
Therefore the divine person is not sent only according to
be put down as the reason why the divine person is in the
the gift of sanctifying grace.
rational creature in a new mode, except sanctifying grace.
Objection 4. Further, Rabanus says that the Holy
Hence, the divine person is sent, and proceeds temporally
Ghost was given to the apostles for the working of mir-
only according to sanctifying grace.
acles. This, however, is not a gift of sanctifying grace,
Again, we are said to possess only what we can freely
but a gratuitous grace. Therefore the divine person is not
use or enjoy: and to have the power of enjoying the divine
given only according to the gift of sanctifying grace.
person can only be according to sanctifying grace. And
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4)
yet the Holy Ghost is possessed by man, and dwells within
224
him, in the very gift itself of sanctifying grace. Hence the known by us according to other effects, yet neither does
Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent.
He dwell in us, nor is He possessed by us according to
Reply to Objection 1. By the gift of sanctifying grace
those effects.
the rational creature is perfected so that it can freely use
Reply to Objection 4. The working of miracles man-
not only the created gift itself, but enjoy also the divine
ifests sanctifying grace as also does the gift of prophecy
person Himself; and so the invisible mission takes place
and any other gratuitous graces. Hence gratuitous grace
according to the gift of sanctifying grace; and yet the di-
is called the “manifestation of the Spirit” (1 Cor. 12:7).
vine person Himself is given.
So the Holy Ghost is said to be given to the apostles for
Reply to Objection 2. Sanctifying grace disposes the
the working of miracles, because sanctifying grace was
soul to possess the divine person; and this is signified
given to them with the outward sign. Were the sign only
when it is said that the Holy Ghost is given according to
of sanctifying grace given to them without the grace it-
the gift of grace. Nevertheless the gift itself of grace is
self, it would not be simply said that the Holy Ghost was
from the Holy Ghost; which is meant by the words, “the
given, except with some qualifying term; just as we read
charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy
of certain ones receiving the gift of the spirit of prophecy,
Ghost.”
or of miracles, as having from the Holy Ghost the power
Reply to Objection 3.
Although the Son can be
of prophesying or of working miracles.
Whether the Father can be fittingly sent?
Ia q. 43 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that it is fitting also that
to be sent; but this can only belong to the Son and to the
the Father should be sent. For being sent means that the
Holy Ghost, to Whom it belongs to be from another.
divine person is given. But the Father gives Himself since
Reply to Objection 1. In the sense of “giving” as a
He can only be possessed by His giving Himself. There-
free bestowal of something, the Father gives Himself, as
fore it can be said that the Father sends Himself.
freely bestowing Himself to be enjoyed by the creature.
Objection 2. Further, the divine person is sent accord-
But as implying the authority of the giver as regards what
ing to the indwelling of grace. But by grace the whole
is given, “to be given” only applies in God to the Per-
Trinity dwells in us according to Jn. 14:23: “We will
son Who is from another; and the same as regards “being
come to him and make Our abode with him.” Therefore
sent.”
each one of the divine persons is sent.
Reply to Objection 2. Although the effect of grace is
Objection 3. Further, whatever belongs to one person,
also from the Father, Who dwells in us by grace, just as
belongs to them all, except the notions and persons. But
the Son and the Holy Ghost, still He is not described as
mission does not signify any person; nor even a notion,
being sent, for He is not from another. Thus Augustine
since there are only five notions, as stated above (q. 32,
says (De Trin. iv, 20) that “The Father, when known by
a. 3). Therefore every divine person can be sent.
anyone in time, is not said to be sent; for there is no one
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 3),
whence He is, or from whom He proceeds.”
“The Father alone is never described as being sent.”
Reply to Objection 3. Mission, meaning procession
I answer that, The very idea of mission means pro-
from the sender, includes the signification of a notion, not
cession from another, and in God it means procession ac-
of a special notion, but in general; thus “to be from an-
cording to origin, as above expounded. Hence, as the Fa-
other” is common to two of the notions.
ther is not from another, in no way is it fitting for Him
Whether it is fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly?
Ia q. 43 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not fitting for
ing grace, since they can be held without the gift of char-
the Son to be sent invisibly. For invisible mission of the
ity, according to 1 Cor. 13:2: “If I should have prophecy,
divine person is according to the gift of grace. But all
and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge, and if I
gifts of grace belong to the Holy Ghost, according to 1
should have all faith so that I could move mountains, and
Cor. 12:11: “One and the same Spirit worketh all things.”
have not charity, I am nothing.” Therefore, since the Son
Therefore only the Holy Ghost is sent invisibly.
proceeds as the word of the intellect, it seems unfitting for
Objection 2. Further, the mission of the divine person
Him to be sent invisibly.
is according to sanctifying grace. But the gifts belonging
Objection 3. Further, the mission of the divine per-
to the perfection of the intellect are not gifts of sanctify-
son is a procession, as expounded above (Aa. 1,4). But
225
the procession of the Son and of the Holy Ghost differ Because the Holy Ghost is Love, the soul is assimilated to
from each other. Therefore they are distinct missions if
the Holy Ghost by the gift of charity: hence the mission
both are sent; and then one of them would be superfluous,
of the Holy Ghost is according to the mode of charity.
since one would suffice for the creature’s sanctification.
Whereas the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but
On the contrary, It is said of divine Wisdom (Wis.
one Who breathes forth Love. Hence Augustine says (De
9:10): “Send her from heaven to Thy Saints, and from the
Trin. ix 10): “The Word we speak of is knowledge with
seat of Thy greatness.”
love.” Thus the Son is sent not in accordance with every
I answer that, The whole Trinity dwells in the mind
and any kind of intellectual perfection, but according to
by sanctifying grace, according to Jn. 14:23: “We will
the intellectual illumination, which breaks forth into the
come to him, and will make Our abode with him.” But
affection of love, as is said (Jn. 6:45): “Everyone that
that a divine person be sent to anyone by invisible grace
hath heard from the Father and hath learned, cometh to
signifies both that this person dwells in a new way within
Me,” and (Ps. 38:4): “In my meditation a fire shall flame
him and that He has His origin from another. Hence, since
forth.” Thus Augustine plainly says (De Trin. iv, 20):
both to the Son and to the Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell
“The Son is sent, whenever He is known and perceived by
in the soul by grace, and to be from another, it therefore
anyone.” Now perception implies a certain experimental
belongs to both of them to be invisibly sent. As to the
knowledge; and this is properly called wisdom [sapientia],
Father, though He dwells in us by grace, still it does not
as it were a sweet knowledge [sapida scientia], according
belong to Him to be from another, and consequently He is
to Ecclus. 6:23: “The wisdom of doctrine is according to
not sent.
her name.”
Reply to Objection 1. Although all the gifts, consid-
Reply to Objection 3. Since mission implies the ori-
ered as such, are attributed to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch
gin of the person Who is sent, and His indwelling by
as He is by His nature the first Gift, since He is Love,
grace, as above explained (a. 1), if we speak of mission
as stated above (q. 38, a. 1), some gifts nevertheless, by
according to origin, in this sense the Son’s mission is dis-
reason of their own particular nature, are appropriated in
tinguished from the mission of the Holy Ghost, as gen-
a certain way to the Son, those, namely, which belong to
eration is distinguished from procession. If we consider
the intellect, and in respect of which we speak of the mis-
mission as regards the effect of grace, in this sense the
sion of the Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20)
two missions are united in the root which is grace, but are
that “The Son is sent to anyone invisibly, whenever He is
distinguished in the effects of grace, which consist in the
known and perceived by anyone.”
illumination of the intellect and the kindling of the affec-
Reply to Objection 2. The soul is made like to God
tion. Thus it is manifest that one mission cannot be with-
by grace. Hence for a divine person to be sent to any-
out the other, because neither takes place without sancti-
one by grace, there must needs be a likening of the soul
fying grace, nor is one person separated from the other.
to the divine person Who is sent, by some gift of grace.
Whether the invisible mission is to all who participate grace?
Ia q. 43 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the invisible mission
sion is not to all sharers in grace.
is not to all who participate grace. For the Fathers of the
Objection 4. Further, the Sacraments of the New Law
Old Testament had their share of grace. Yet to them was
contain grace, and it is not said that the invisible mission
made no invisible mission; for it is said (Jn. 7:39): “The
is sent to them. Therefore the invisible mission is not to
Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glori-
all that have grace.
fied.” Therefore the invisible mission is not to all partak-
On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Trin.
ers in grace.
iii, 4; xv, 27), the invisible mission is for the creature’s
Objection 2. Further, progress in virtue is only by
sanctification. Now every creature that has grace is sanc-
grace.
But the invisible mission is not according to
tified. Therefore the invisible mission is to every such
progress in virtue; because progress in virtue is contin-
creature.
uous, since charity ever increases or decreases; and thus
I answer that, As above stated (Aa. 3,4,5), mission in
the mission would be continuous. Therefore the invisible
its very meaning implies that he who is sent either begins
mission is not to all who share in grace.
to exist where he was not before, as occurs to creatures;
Objection 3. Further, Christ and the blessed have full-
or begins to exist where he was before, but in a new way,
ness of grace. But mission is not to them, for mission im-
in which sense mission is ascribed to the divine persons.
plies distance, whereas Christ, as man, and all the blessed
Thus, mission as regards the one to whom it is sent implies
are perfectly united to God. Therefore the invisible mis-
two things, the indwelling of grace, and a certain renewal
226
by grace. Thus the invisible mission is sent to all in whom or in the fervor of charity leading a man to expose himself
are to be found these two conditions.
to the danger of martyrdom, or to renounce his posses-
Reply to Objection 1. The invisible mission was di-
sions, or to undertake any arduous work.
rected to the Old Testament Fathers, as appears from what
Reply to Objection 3. The invisible mission is di-
Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), that the invisible mis-
rected to the blessed at the very beginning of their beati-
sion of the Son “is in man and with men. This was done
tude. The invisible mission is made to them subsequently,
in former times with the Fathers and the Prophets.” Thus
not by “intensity” of grace, but by the further revelation of
the words, “the Spirit was not yet given,” are to be applied
mysteries; which goes on till the day of judgment. Such
to that giving accompanied with a visible sign which took
an increase is by the “extension” of grace, because it ex-
place on the day of Pentecost.
tends to a greater number of objects. To Christ the invis-
Reply to Objection 2. The invisible mission takes
ible mission was sent at the first moment of His concep-
place also as regards progress in virtue or increase of
tion; but not afterwards, since from the beginning of His
grace. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), that “the
conception He was filled with all wisdom and grace.
Son is sent to each one when He is known and perceived
Reply to Objection 4. Grace resides instrumentally
by anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived ac-
in the sacraments of the New Law, as the form of a thing
cording to the capacity of the soul, whether journeying
designed resides in the instruments of the art designing,
towards God, or united perfectly to Him.” Such invisi-
according to a process flowing from the agent to the pas-
ble mission, however, chiefly occurs as regards anyone’s
sive object. But mission is only spoken of as directed to
proficiency in the performance of a new act, or in the ac-
its term. Hence the mission of the divine person is not sent
quisition of a new state of grace; as, for example, the pro-
to the sacraments, but to those who receive grace through
ficiency in reference to the gift of miracles or of prophecy,
the sacraments.
Whether it is fitting for the Holy Ghost to be sent visibly?
Ia q. 43 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the Holy Ghost is not
visible manner is only for the purpose of manifesting the
fittingly sent in a visible manner. For the Son as visibly
invisible mission; as invisible things are made known by
sent to the world is said to be less than the Father. But
the visible. So those to whom the invisible mission was
the Holy Ghost is never said to be less than the Father.
not sent, ought not to receive the visible mission; and to all
Therefore the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible
who received the invisible mission, whether in the New or
manner.
in the Old Testament, the visible mission ought likewise
Objection 2. Further, the visible mission takes place
to be sent; and this is clearly false. Therefore the Holy
by way of union to a visible creature, as the Son’s mis-
Ghost is not sent visibly.
sion according to the flesh. But the Holy Ghost did not
On the contrary, It is said (Mat. 3:16) that, when our
assume any visible creature; and hence it cannot be said
Lord was baptized, the Holy Ghost descended upon Him
that He exists otherwise in some creatures than in others,
in the shape of a dove.
unless perhaps as in a sign, as He is also present in the
I answer that, God provides for all things according
sacraments, and in all the figures of the law. Thus the
to the nature of each thing. Now the nature of man re-
Holy Ghost is either not sent visibly at all, or His visible
quires that he be led to the invisible by visible things, as
mission takes place in all these things.
explained above (q. 12, a. 12). Wherefore the invisible
Objection 3. Further, every visible creature is an ef-
things of God must be made manifest to man by the things
fect showing forth the whole Trinity. Therefore the Holy
that are visible. As God, therefore, in a certain way has
Ghost is not sent by reason of those visible creatures more
demonstrated Himself and His eternal processions to men
than any other person.
by visible creatures, according to certain signs; so was it
Objection 4. Further, the Son was visibly sent by rea-
fitting that the invisible missions also of the divine persons
son of the noblest kind of creature—namely, the human
should be made manifest by some visible creatures.
nature. Therefore if the Holy Ghost is sent visibly, He
This mode of manifestation applies in different ways
ought to be sent by reason of rational creatures.
to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. For it belongs to the
Objection 5. Further, whatever is done visibly by God
Holy Ghost, Who proceeds as Love, to be the gift of sanc-
is dispensed by the ministry of the angels; as Augustine
tification; to the Son as the principle of the Holy Ghost, it
says (De Trin. iii, 4,5,9). So visible appearances, if there
belongs to the author of this sanctification. Thus the Son
have been any, came by means of the angels. Thus the
has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification; the
angels are sent, and not the Holy Ghost.
Holy Ghost as the sign of sanctification.
Objection 6. Further, the Holy Ghost being sent in a
Reply to Objection 1. The Son assumed the visible
227
creature, wherein He appeared, into the unity of His per-and so likewise it was not required to last beyond what its
son, so that whatever can be said of that creature can be
use required.
said of the Son of God; and so, by reason of the nature
Reply to Objection 5. Those visible creatures were
assumed, the Son is called less than the Father. But the
formed by the ministry of the angels, not to signify the
Holy Ghost did not assume the visible creature, in which
person of an angel, but to signify the Person of the Holy
He appeared, into the unity of His person; so that what
Ghost. Thus, as the Holy Ghost resided in those visible
is said of it cannot be predicated of Him. Hence He can-
creatures as the one signified in the sign, on that account
not be called less than the Father by reason of any visible
the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, and not as an
creature.
angel.
Reply to Objection 2. The visible mission of the Holy
Reply to Objection 6. It is not necessary that the in-
Ghost does not apply to the imaginary vision which is that
visible mission should always be made manifest by some
of prophecy; because as Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 6):
visible external sign; but, as is said (1 Cor. 12:7)—“the
“The prophetic vision is not displayed to corporeal eyes
manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto
by corporeal shapes, but is shown in the spirit by the spir-
profit”—that is, of the Church. This utility consists in the
itual images of bodies. But whoever saw the dove and
confirmation and propagation of the faith by such visible
the fire, saw them by their eyes. Nor, again, has the Holy
signs. This has been done chiefly by Christ and by the
Ghost the same relation to these images that the Son has to
apostles, according to Heb. 2:3, “which having begun to
the rock, because it is said, “The rock was Christ” (1 Cor.
be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them
10:4). For that rock was already created, and after the
that heard.”
manner of an action was named Christ, Whom it typified;
Thus in a special sense, a mission of the Holy Ghost
whereas the dove and the fire suddenly appeared to signify
was directed to Christ, to the apostles, and to some of the
only what was happening. They seem, however, to be like
early saints on whom the Church was in a way founded;
to the flame of the burning bush seen by Moses and to the
in such a manner, however, that the visible mission made
column which the people followed in the desert, and to
to Christ should show forth the invisible mission made to
the lightning and thunder issuing forth when the law was
Him, not at that particular time, but at the first moment
given on the mountain. For the purpose of the bodily ap-
of His conception. The visible mission was directed to
pearances of those things was that they might signify, and
Christ at the time of His baptism by the figure of a dove, a
then pass away.” Thus the visible mission is neither dis-
fruitful animal, to show forth in Christ the authority of the
played by prophetic vision, which belongs to the imagina-
giver of grace by spiritual regeneration; hence the Father’s
tion, and not to the body, nor by the sacramental signs of
voice spoke, “This is My beloved Son” (Mat. 3:17), that
the Old and New Testament, wherein certain pre-existing
others might be regenerated to the likeness of the only Be-
things are employed to signify something. But the Holy
gotten. The Transfiguration showed it forth in the appear-
Ghost is said to be sent visibly, inasmuch as He showed
ance of a bright cloud, to show the exuberance of doctrine;
Himself in certain creatures as in signs especially made
and hence it was said, “Hear ye Him” (Mat. 17:5). To the
for that purpose.
apostles the mission was directed in the form of breathing
Reply to Objection 3. Although the whole Trinity
to show forth the power of their ministry in the dispen-
makes those creatures, still they are made in order to show
sation of the sacraments; and hence it was said, “Whose
forth in some special way this or that person. For as
sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven” (Jn. 20:23): and
the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are signified by diverse
again under the sign of fiery tongues to show forth the
names, so also can They each one be signified by differ-
office of teaching; whence it is said that, “they began to
ent things; although neither separation nor diversity exists
speak with divers tongues” (Acts 2:4). The visible mis-
amongst Them.
sion of the Holy Ghost was fittingly not sent to the fa-
Reply to Objection 4. It was necessary for the Son to
thers of the Old Testament, because the visible mission
be declared as the author of sanctification, as explained
of the Son was to be accomplished before that of the Holy
above.
Thus the visible mission of the Son was nec-
Ghost; since the Holy Ghost manifests the Son, as the Son
essarily made according to the rational nature to which
manifests the Father. Visible apparitions of the divine per-
it belongs to act, and which is capable of sanctification;
sons were, however, given to the Fathers of the Old Tes-
whereas any other creature could be the sign of sanctifi-
tament which, indeed, cannot be called visible missions;
cation. Nor was such a visible creature, formed for such a
because, according to Augustine (De Trin. ii, 17), they
purpose, necessarily assumed by the Holy Ghost into the
were not sent to designate the indwelling of the divine
unity of His person, since it was not assumed or used for
person by grace, but for the manifestation of something
the purpose of action, but only for the purpose of a sign;
else.
228
Whether a divine person is sent only by the person whence He proceeds eternally?
Ia q. 43 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that a divine person is
is to be explained as regards His human nature, by reason
sent only by the one whence He proceeds eternally. For
of which He was sent to preach by the Holy Ghost. Au-
as Augustine says (De Trin. iv), “The Father is sent by
gustine, however, says (De Trin. ii, 5) that the Son is sent
no one because He is from no one.” Therefore if a divine
by Himself, and by the Holy Ghost; and the Holy Ghost
person is sent by another, He must be from that other.
is sent by Himself, and by the Son; so that to be sent in
Objection 2. Further, the sender has authority over the
God does not apply to each person, but only to the person
one sent. But there can be no authority as regards a divine
proceeding from
person except from origin. Therefore the divine person
another, whereas to send belongs to each person.
sent must proceed from the one sending.
There is some truth in both of these opinions; because
Objection 3. Further, if a divine person can be sent
when a person is described as being sent, the person Him-
by one whence He does not proceed, then the Holy Ghost
self existing from another is designated, with the visible
may be given by a man, although He proceeds not from
or invisible effect, applicable to the mission of the divine
him; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin.
person. Thus if the sender be designated as the principle
xv). Therefore the divine person is sent only by the one
of the person sent, in this sense not each person sends,
whence He proceeds.
but that person only Who is the principle of that person
On the contrary, The Son is sent by the Holy Ghost,
who is sent; and thus the Son is sent only by the Father;
according to Is. 48:16, “Now the Lord God hath sent Me
and the Holy Ghost by the Father and the Son. If, how-
and His Spirit.” But the Son is not from the Holy Ghost.
ever, the person sending is understood as the principle of
Therefore a divine person is sent by one from Whom He
the effect implied in the mission, in that sense the whole
does not proceed.
Trinity sends the person sent. This reason does not prove
I answer that, There are different opinions on this
that a man can send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as man
point. Some say that the divine person is sent only by
cannot cause the effect of grace.
the one whence He proceeds eternally; and so, when it is
The answers to the objections appear from the above.
said that the Son of God is sent by the Holy Ghost, this
229
FIRST PART, QUESTION 44
The Procession of Creatures From God, and of the First Cause of All Things (In Four Articles)
After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration will be threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and government. Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1) the first cause of beings; (2) the mode of procession of creatures from the first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of things.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?
(2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent coordinate principle with Him?
(3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are other exemplar causes?
(4) Whether He is the final cause of things?
Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?
Ia q. 44 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not necessary
more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who
that every being be created by God. For there is noth-
possesses being most perfectly.
ing to prevent a thing from being without that which does
Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come
not belong to its essence, as a man can be found without
before multitude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4)
whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its cause
that whatever is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is
does not appear to be essential to beings, for some be-
the cause of every being and of every truth; just as what-
ings can be understood without it; therefore they can exist
ever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all heat.
without it; and therefore it is possible that some beings
Reply to Objection 1. Though the relation to its cause
should not be created by God.
is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it fol-
Objection 2. Further, a thing requires an efficient
lows, as a consequence, on what belongs to its essence;
cause in order to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but
because from the fact that a thing has being by partici-
exist does not require an efficient cause. But no necessary
pation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a being
thing can not exist, because whatever necessarily exists
cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be
cannot but exist. Therefore as there are many necessary
without having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be
things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from
caused does not enter into the essence of being as such,
God.
therefore is it possible for us to find a being uncaused.
Objection 3. Further, whatever things have a cause,
Reply to Objection 2. This objection has led some to
can be demonstrated by that cause. But in mathematics
say that what is necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text
demonstration is not made by the efficient cause, as ap-
46). But this is manifestly false in the demonstrative sci-
pears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3); therefore
ences, where necessary principles are the causes of neces-
not all beings are from God as from their efficient cause.
sary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says (Metaph.
On the contrary, It is said (Rom. 11:36): “Of Him,
v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have
and by Him, and in Him are all things.”
a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an efficient
I answer that, It must be said that every being in any
cause is required is not merely because the effect is not
way existing is from God. For whatever is found in any-
necessary, but because the effect might not be if the cause
thing by participation, must be caused in it by that to
were not. For this conditional proposition is true, whether
which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by
the antecedent and consequent be possible or impossible.
fire. Now it has been shown above (q. 3, a. 4) when treat-
Reply to Objection 3. The science of mathematics
ing of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-
treats its object as though it were something abstracted
subsisting Being; and also it was shown (q. 11, Aa. 3,4)
mentally, whereas it is not abstract in reality. Now, it is
that subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were
becoming that everything should have an efficient cause
self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is mul-
in proportion to its being. And so, although the object
tiplied by its recipients. Therefore all beings apart from
of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to
God are not their own being, but are beings by partici-
that cause is not the reason why it is brought under the
pation. Therefore it must be that all things which are di-
consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does
versified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be
not demonstrate that object from its efficient cause.
230
Whether primary matter is created by God?
Ia q. 44 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that primary matter is not
we must take into consideration that matter is contracted
created by God. For whatever is made is composed of
by its form to a determinate species, as a substance, be-
a subject and of something else (Phys. i, text 62). But
longing to a certain species, is contracted by a superven-
primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter
ing accident to a determinate mode of being; for instance,
cannot have been made by God.
man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, con-
Objection 2. Further, action and passion are opposite
sidered “being” under some particular aspect, either as
members of a division. But as the first active principle
“this” or as “such”; and so they assigned particular effi-
is God, so the first passive principle is matter. Therefore
cient causes to things. Then others there were who arose
God and primary matter are two principles divided against
to the consideration of “being,” as being, and who as-
each other, neither of which is from the other.
signed a cause to things, not as “these,” or as “such,” but
Objection 3. Further, every agent produces its like,
as “beings.”
and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its ac-
Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered
tuality, it follows that everything made is in some degree
as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according
actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, formally
as they are “such” by accidental forms, nor according as
considered in itself. Therefore it is against the nature of
they are “these” by substantial forms, but also according
primary matter to be a thing made.
to all that belongs to their being at all in any way. And
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7),
thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is cre-
Two “things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto
ated by the universal cause of things.
Thyself”—viz. angels—“the other nigh unto nothing”—
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher (Phys. i, text
viz. primary matter.
62), is speaking of “becoming” in particular—that is, from
I answer that, The ancient philosophers gradually,
form to form, either accidental or substantial. But here we
and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge
are speaking of things according to their emanation from
of truth. At first being of grosser mind, they failed to re-
the universal principle of being; from which emanation
alize that any beings existed except sensible bodies. And
matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from
those among them who admitted movement, did not con-
the former mode of being made.
sider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance,
Reply to Objection 2. Passion is an effect of ac-
in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and
tion. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle
separation. And supposing as they did that corporeal sub-
should be the effect of the first active principle, since ev-
stance itself was uncreated, they assigned certain causes
ery imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the first
for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, dis-
principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle says (Metaph.
cord, intellect, or something of that kind. An advance
xii, text 40).
was made when they understood that there was a distinc-
Reply to Objection 3. The reason adduced does not
tion between the substantial form and matter, which latter
show that matter is not created, but that it is not created
they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived
without form; for though everything created is actual, still
transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essen-
it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that even what is
tial forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain
potential in it should be created, if all that belongs to its
universal causes, such as the oblique circle∗, according to
being is created.
Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But
Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?
Ia q. 44 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the exemplar cause
species is found not only what belongs to the species, but
is something besides God. For the effect is like its ex-
also individuating principles added to the principles of the
emplar cause. But creatures are far from being like God.
species. Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing
Therefore God is not their exemplar cause.
species, as for instance, a “per se” man, and a “per se”
Objection 2. Further, whatever is by participation is
horse, and the like, which are called the exemplars. There-
reduced to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is
fore exemplar causes exist besides God.
reduced to fire, as stated above (a. 1). But whatever ex-
Objection 3.
Further, sciences and definitions are
ists in sensible things exists only by participation of some
concerned with species themselves, but not as these are
species. This appears from the fact that in all sensible
in particular things, because there is no science or defini-
∗ The zodiac
231
tion of particular things. Therefore there are some beings, by different things. In this manner therefore God Him-which are beings or species not existing in singular things,
self is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things
and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same con-
created one may be called the exemplar of another by the
clusion follows as above.
reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the
Objection 4.
Further, this likewise appears from
analogy of some kind of imitation.
Dionysius, who says (Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting
Reply to Objection 1. Although creatures do not at-
being is before self-subsisting life, and before self-
tain to a natural likeness to God according to similitude
subsisting wisdom.
of species, as a man begotten is like to the man begetting,
On the contrary, The exemplar is the same as the
still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they
idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46),
represent the divine idea, as a material house is like to the
are “the master forms, which are contained in the divine
house in the architect’s mind.
intelligence.” Therefore the exemplars of things are not
Reply to Objection 2. It is of a man’s nature to be in
outside God.
matter, and so a man without matter is impossible. There-
I answer that, God is the first exemplar cause of all
fore although this particular man is a man by participa-
things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the
tion of the species, he cannot be reduced to anything self-
production of anything an exemplar is necessary, it is in
existing in the same species, but to a superior species,
order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For
such as separate substances. The same applies to other
an artificer produces a determinate form in matter by rea-
sensible things.
son of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar
Reply to Objection 3. Although every science and
beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in
definition is concerned only with beings, still it is not nec-
the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature
essary that a thing should have the same mode in reality
receive determinate forms. This determination of forms
as the thought of it has in our understanding. For we ab-
must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first princi-
stract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from
ple, for divine wisdom devised the order of the universe,
the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the
which order consists in the variety of things. And there-
universals should exist outside the particulars in order to
fore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types
be their exemplars.
of all things, which types we have called ideas—i.e. ex-
Reply to Objection 4. As Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
emplar forms existing in the divine mind (q. 15, a. 1). And
iv), by “self-existing life and self-existing wisdom” he
these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things,
sometimes denotes God Himself, sometimes the powers
in reality are not apart from the divine essence, accord-
given to things themselves; but not any self-subsisting
ing as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely
things, as the ancients asserted.
Whether God is the final cause of all things?
Ia q. 44 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that God is not the final
I answer that, Every agent acts for an end: otherwise
cause of all things. For to act for an end seems to imply
one thing would not follow more than another from the
need of the end. But God needs nothing. Therefore it does
action of the agent, unless it were by chance. Now the
not become Him to act for an end.
end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is
Objection 2. Further, the end of generation, and the
the same, but in a different way respectively. For the im-
form of the thing generated, and the agent cannot be iden-
pression which the agent intends to produce, and which
tical (Phys. ii, text 70), because the end of generation is
the patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some
the form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent
things, however, are both agent and patient at the same
producing all things. Therefore He is not the final cause
time: these are imperfect agents, and to these it belongs
of all things.
to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something.
Objection 3. Further, all things desire their end. But
But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent
all things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him.
only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends
Therefore God is not the end of all things.
only to communicate His perfection, which is His good-
Objection 4. Further, the final cause is the first of
ness; while every creature intends to acquire its own per-
causes. If, therefore, God is the efficient cause and the
fection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and
final cause, it follows that before and after exist in Him;
goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all
which is impossible.
things.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): “The Lord
Reply to Objection 1. To act from need belongs only
has made all things for Himself.”
to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent
232
and patient. But this does not belong to God, and there-end, when they desire some good thing, whether this de-
fore He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because
sire be intellectual or sensible, or natural, i.e. without
He does not act for His own profit, but only for His own
knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except
goodness.
forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to God.
Reply to Objection 2. The form of the thing gener-
Reply to Objection 4. Since God is the efficient, the
ated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is
exemplar and the final cause of all things, and since pri-
the likeness of the form of the generator, which intends to
mary matter is from Him, it follows that the first principle
communicate its own likeness; otherwise the form of the
of all things is one in reality. But this does not prevent us
thing generated would be more noble than the generator,
from mentally considering many things in Him, some of
since the end is more noble than the means to the end.
which come into our mind before others.
Reply to Objection 3. All things desire God as their
233
FIRST PART, QUESTION 45
The Mode of Emanation of Things From the First Principle
(In Eight Articles)
The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the First Principle, and this is called creation, and includes eight points of inquiry:
(1) What is creation?
(2) Whether God can create anything?
(3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?
(4) To what things it belongs to be created?
(5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?
(6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any one Person?
(7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?
(8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature and of the will?
Whether to create is to make something from nothing?
Ia q. 45 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that to create is not to
the “not-being” which is “nothing.”
make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine uses the word cre-
Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): “To make concerns what did not
ation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created
exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing
signifies improvement in things; as when we say that a
forth something from what was already.”
bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation
Objection 2. Further, the nobility of action and of
in that way here, but as it is described above.
motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore
Reply to Objection 2. Changes receive species and
nobler from good to good, and from being to being, than
dignity, not from the term “wherefrom,” but from the term
from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the
“whereto.” Therefore a change is more perfect and ex-
most noble action, and first among all actions. Therefore
cellent when the term “whereto” of the change is more
it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being
noble and excellent, although the term “wherefrom,” cor-
to being.
responding to the term “whereto,” may be more imper-
Objection 3. Further, the preposition “from” [ex] im-
fect: thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent
ports relation of some cause, and especially of the ma-
than alteration, because the substantial form is nobler than
terial cause; as when we say that a statue is made from
the accidental form; and yet the privation of the substan-
brass. But “nothing” cannot be the matter of being, nor
tial form, which is the term “wherefrom” in generation,
in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make
is more imperfect than the contrary, which is the term
something from nothing.
“wherefrom” in alteration. Similarly creation is more per-
On the contrary, On the text of Gn. 1, “In the be-
fect and excellent than generation and alteration, because
ginning God created,” etc., the gloss has, “To create is to
the term “whereto” is the whole substance of the thing;
make something from nothing.”
whereas what is understood as the term “wherefrom” is
I answer that, As said above (q. 44, a. 2), we must
simply not-being.
consider not only the emanation of a particular being from
Reply to Objection 3. When anything is said to be
a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from
made from nothing, this preposition “from” [ex] does not
the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we
signify the material cause, but only order; as when we say,
designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds
“from morning comes midday”–i.e. after morning is mid-
by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that ema-
day. But we must understand that this preposition “from”
nation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but
[ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the
man is made from “not-man,” and white from “not-white.”
word “nothing,” or can be included in it. If taken in the
Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from
first sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation
the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any
between what is now and its previous non-existence. But
being should be presupposed before this emanation. For
if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is
nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the genera-
denied, and the sense is, “It is made from nothing—i.e.
tion of a man is from the “not-being” which is “not-man,”
it is not made from anything”—as if we were to say, “He
so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from
speaks of nothing,” because he does not speak of anything.
234
And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the material
anything is made from nothing. But in the first way this
cause, which is denied.
preposition “from” [ex] implies order, as has been said
Whether God can create anything?
Ia q. 45 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot create
cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that God
anything, because, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i,
brings things into being from nothing.
text 34), the ancient philosophers considered it as a com-
Reply to Objection 1. Ancient philosophers, as is
monly received axiom that “nothing is made from noth-
said above (q. 44, a. 2), considered only the emanation
ing.” But the power of God does not extend to the con-
of particular effects from particular causes, which neces-
traries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could
sarily presuppose something in their action; whence came
make the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation
their common opinion that “nothing is made from noth-
and negation are both true at the same time. Therefore
ing.” But this has no place in the first emanation from the
God cannot make anything from nothing, or create.
universal principle of things.
Objection 2. Further, if to create is to make some-
Reply to Objection 2. Creation is not change, ex-
thing from nothing, to be created is to be made. But to be
cept according to a mode of understanding. For change
made is to be changed. Therefore creation is change. But
means that the same something should be different now
every change occurs in some subject, as appears by the
from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same
definition of movement: for movement is the act of what
actual thing is different now from what it was before, as
is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything
in motion according to quantity, quality and place; but
to be made out of nothing by God.
sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality, as in
Objection 3. Further, what has been made must have
substantial change, the subject of which is matter. But in
at some time been becoming. But it cannot be said that
creation, by which the whole substance of a thing is pro-
what is created, at the same time, is becoming and has
duced, the same thing can be taken as different now and
been made, because in permanent things what is becom-
before only according to our way of understanding, so that
ing, is not, and what has been made, already is: and so it
a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and after-
would follow that something would be, and not be, at the
wards as existing. But as action and passion coincide as
same time. Therefore when anything is made, its becom-
to the substance of motion, and differ only according to
ing precedes its having been made. But this is impossible,
diverse relations (Phys. iii, text 20,21), it must follow that
unless there is a subject in which the becoming is sus-
when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain
tained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be
in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode
made from nothing.
of signification follows the mode of understanding as was
Objection 4.
Further, infinite distance cannot be
said above (q. 13, a. 1), creation is signified by mode of
crossed. But infinite distance exists between being and
change; and on this account it is said that to create is to
nothing. Therefore it does not happen that something is
make something from nothing. And yet “to make” and
made from nothing.
“to be made” are more suitable expressions here than “to
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): “In the begin-
change” and “to be changed,” because “to make” and “to
ning God created heaven and earth.”
be made” import a relation of cause to the effect, and of
I answer that, Not only is it impossible that anything
effect to the cause, and imply change only as a conse-
should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that
quence.
all things were created by God, as appears from what has
Reply to Objection 3. In things which are made with-
been said (q. 44, a. 1). For when anyone makes one thing
out movement, to become and to be already made are si-
from another, this latter thing from which he makes is pre-
multaneous, whether such making is the term of move-
supposed to his action, and is not produced by his action;
ment, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and
thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or
is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not the
brass, which are caused not by the action of art, but by the
term of movement, as the word is being made in the mind
action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things
and is made at the same time. In these things what is being
as regards their form, but presupposes matter. If therefore
made, is; but when we speak of its being made, we mean
God did only act from something presupposed, it would
that it is from another, and was not previously. Hence
follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by
since creation is without movement, a thing is being cre-
Him. Now it has been shown above (q. 44, Aa. 1,2), that
ated and is already created at the same time.
nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal
Reply to Objection 4. This objection proceeds from a
235
false imagination, as if there were an infinite medium be-imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a
tween nothing and being; which is plainly false. This false
change existing between two forms.
Whether creation is anything in the creature?
Ia q. 45 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that creation is not any-
thing pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the par-
thing in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive
ticular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in
sense is attributed to the creature, so creation taken in an
the production of all being by the universal cause of all
active sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken
beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces
actively is not anything in the Creator, because otherwise
things without movement. Now when movement is re-
it would follow that in God there would be something tem-
moved from action and passion, only relation remains, as
poral. Therefore creation taken passively is not anything
was said above (a. 2, ad 2). Hence creation in the creature
in the creature.
is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle
Objection 2. Further, there is no medium between the
of its being; even as in passion, which implies movement,
Creator and the creature. But creation is signified as the
is implied a relation to the principle of motion.
medium between them both: since it is not the Creator, as
Reply to Objection 1.
Creation signified actively
it is not eternal; nor is it the creature, because in that case means the divine action, which is God’s essence, with a
it would be necessary for the same reason to suppose an-
relation to the creature. But in God relation to the crea-
other creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore
ture is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason;
creation is not anything in the creature.
whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real re-
Objection 3. Further, if creation is anything besides
lation, as was said above (q. 13, a. 7) in treating of the
the created substance, it must be an accident belonging to
divine names.
it. But every accident is in a subject. Therefore a thing
Reply to Objection 2. Because creation is signified as
created would be the subject of creation, and so the same
a change, as was said above (a. 2, ad 2), and change is a
thing would be the subject and also the term of creation.
kind of medium between the mover and the moved, there-
This is impossible, because the subject is before the ac-
fore also creation is signified as a medium between the
cident, and preserves the accident; while the term is after
Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive creation is
the action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it
in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a fur-
exists, action and passion cease. Therefore creation itself
ther creation in its creation; because relations, or their en-
is not any thing.
tire nature being referred to something, are not referred by
On the contrary, It is greater for a thing to be made
any other relations, but by themselves; as was also shown
according to its entire substance, than to be made accord-
above (q. 42, a. 1, ad 4), in treating of the equality of the
ing to its substantial or accidental form. But generation
Persons.
taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made ac-
Reply to Objection 3. The creature is the term of cre-
cording to the substantial or the accidental form, is some-
ation as signifying a change, but is the subject of creation,
thing in the thing generated. Therefore much more is cre-
taken as a real relation, and is prior to it in being, as the
ation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole sub-
subject is to the accident. Nevertheless creation has a cer-
stance, something in the thing created.
tain aspect of priority on the part of the object to which it
I answer that, Creation places something in the thing
is directed, which is the beginning of the creature. Nor is
created according to relation only; because what is cre-
it necessary that as long as the creature is it should be cre-
ated, is not made by movement, or by change. For what
ated; because creation imports a relation of the creature to
is made by movement or by change is made from some-
the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.
Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things?
Ia q. 45 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that to be created does
nothing. But composite things are not from nothing, but
not belong to composite and subsisting things. For in the
are the result of their own component parts. Therefore
book, De Causis (prop. iv) it is said, “The first of crea-
composite things are not created.
tures is being.” But the being of a thing created is not
Objection 3. Further, what is presupposed in the sec-
subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking does not
ond emanation is properly produced by the first: as natural
belong to subsisting and composite things.
generation produces the natural thing, which is presup-
Objection 2. Further, whatever is created is from
posed in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in
236
natural generation is matter. Therefore matter, and not the co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called
composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.
rather “concreated” than “created” things; whereas, prop-
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): “In the be-
erly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.
ginning God created heaven and earth.” But heaven and
Reply to Objection 1. In the proposition “the first
earth are subsisting composite things. Therefore creation
of created things is being,” the word “being” does not re-
belongs to them.
fer to the subject of creation, but to the proper concept of
I answer that, To be created is, in a manner, to be
the object of creation. For a created thing is called cre-
made, as was shown above (q. 44, a. 2, ad 2,3). Now,
ated because it is a being, not because it is “this” being,
to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to
since creation is the emanation of all being from the Uni-
be made and to be created properly belong to whatever
versal Being, as was said above (a. 1). We use a similar
being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to sub-
way of speaking when we say that “the first visible thing
sisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the
is color,” although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is
case of separate substances, or composite, as in the case
what is seen.
of material substances. For being belongs to that which
Reply to Objection 2. Creation does not mean the
has being—that is, to what subsists in its own being. But
building up of a composite thing from pre-existing princi-
forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not
ples; but it means that the “composite” is created so that
as if they themselves were, but because something is by
it is brought into being at the same time with all its prin-
them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its sub-
ciples.
ject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher
Reply to Objection 3. This reason does not prove
(Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be
that matter alone is created, but that matter does not exist
“of a being” than “a being.” Therefore, as accidents and
except by creation; for creation is the production of the
forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to
whole being, and not only matter.
Whether it belongs to God alone to create?
Ia q. 45 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong
I answer that, It sufficiently appears at the first
to God alone to create, because, according to the Philoso-
glance, according to what precedes (a. 1), that to create
pher (De Anima ii, text 34), what is perfect can make its
can be the action of God alone. For the more universal
own likeness. But immaterial creatures are more perfect
effects must be reduced to the more universal and prior
than material creatures, which nevertheless can make their
causes. Now among all effects the most universal is being
own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man.
itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first
Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance
and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it
like to itself. But immaterial substance can be made only
is said (De Causis prop., iii) that “neither intelligence nor
by creation, since it has no matter from which to be made.
the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by di-
Therefore a creature can create.
vine operation.” Now to produce being absolutely, not as
Objection 2. Further, the greater the resistance is on
this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest
the part of the thing made, so much the greater power
that creation is the proper act of God alone.
is required in the maker. But a “contrary” resists more
It happens, however, that something participates the
than “nothing.” Therefore it requires more power to make
proper action of another, not by its own power, but instru-
(something) from its contrary, which nevertheless a crea-
mentally, inasmuch as it acts by the power of another; as
ture can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much
air can heat and ignite by the power of fire. And so some
more therefore can a creature do this.
have supposed that although creation is the proper act of
Objection 3. Further, the power of the maker is con-
the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the
sidered according to the measure of what is made. But
power of the first cause, can create. And thus Avicenna
created being is finite, as we proved above when treating
asserted that the first separate substance created by God
of the infinity of God (q. 7, Aa. 2,3,4). Therefore only a
created another after itself, and the substance of the world
finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation.
and its soul; and that the substance of the world creates
But to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of
the matter of inferior bodies. And in the same manner the
a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to
Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can communicate
create.
to a creature the power of creating, so that the latter can
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that
create ministerially, not by its own power.
neither good nor bad angels can create anything. Much
But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary
less therefore can any other creatures.
instrumental cause does not participate the action of the
237
superior cause, except inasmuch as by something proper like to itself as regards its being, but only as regards some
to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal
added perfection; as we may say that a superior angel il-
agent. If therefore it effects nothing, according to what
luminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv,
is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would
x). In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the
there be any need of certain instruments for certain ac-
Apostle says (Eph. 3:15): “From whom all paternity in
tions. Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, which
heaven and on earth is named.” From which evidently
it does by the property of its own form, produces the
appears that no created being can cause anything, unless
form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the prin-
something is presupposed; which is against the very idea
cipal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating is
of creation.
what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is ab-
Reply to Objection 2. A thing is made from its con-
solute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively
trary indirectly (Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the
and instrumentally to this effect, since creation is not from
subject which is in potentiality. And so the contrary resists
anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the ac-
the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from
tion of the instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossi-
the act which the agent intends to induce, as fire intends
ble for any creature to create, either by its own power or
to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but is
instrumentally—that is, ministerially.
impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, whereby
And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can
the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being re-
create, for no body acts except by touching or moving;
duced to act; and the more the potentiality is restrained,
and thus it requires in its action some pre-existing thing,
the more power is required in the agent to reduce the mat-
which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the
ter to act. Hence a much greater power is required in the
very idea of creation.
agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus therefore it
Reply to Objection 1. A perfect thing participating
appears that it is an act of much greater power to make a
any nature, makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely
thing from nothing, than from its contrary.
producing that nature, but by applying it to something
Reply to Objection 3. The power of the maker is
else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human
reckoned not only from the substance of the thing made,
nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause of
but also from the mode of its being made; for a greater
himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the
heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore although
man begotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a de-
to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power,
terminate matter whereby he is an individual man. But as
yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power:
an individual man participates human nature, so every cre-
which appears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a
ated being participates, so to speak, the nature of being;
greater power is required in the agent in proportion to the
for God alone is His own being, as we have said above
distance of the potentiality from the act, it follows that the
(q. 7, Aa. 1,2). Therefore no created being can produce a
power of that which produces something from no presup-
being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes “being” in
posed potentiality is infinite, because there is no propor-
“this”: and so it is necessary to presuppose that whereby
tion between “no potentiality” and the potentiality presup-
a thing is this thing, before the action whereby it makes
posed by the power of a natural agent, as there is no pro-
its own likeness. But in an immaterial substance it is not
portion between “not being” and “being.” And because
possible to presuppose anything whereby it is this thing;
no creature has simply an infinite power, any more than it
because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has be-
has an infinite being, as was proved above (q. 7, a. 2), it
ing, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore an immaterial
follows that no creature can create.
substance cannot produce another immaterial substance
Whether to create is proper to any person?
Ia q. 45 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that to create is proper to
create belongs to a Person.
some Person. For what comes first is the cause of what
Objection 2. Further, the divine Persons are distin-
is after; and what is perfect is the cause of what is im-
guished from each other only by their processions and re-
perfect. But the procession of the divine Person is prior
lations. Therefore whatever difference is attributed to the
to the procession of the creature: and is more perfect, be-
divine Persons belongs to them according to the proces-
cause the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of
sions and relations of the Persons. But the causation of
its principle; whereas the creature proceeds in imperfect
creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons; for
similitude. Therefore the processions of the divine Per-
in the Creed, to the Father is attributed that “He is the
sons are the cause of the processions of things, and so to
Creator of all things visible and invisible”; to the Son is
238
attributed that by Him “all things were made”; and to the Reply to Objection 1. The processions of the divine
Holy Ghost is attributed that He is “Lord and Life-giver.”
Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained.
Therefore the causation of creatures belongs to the Per-
Reply to Objection 2. As the divine nature, although
sons according to processions and relations.
common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a
Objection 3. Further, if it be said that the causation of kind of order, inasmuch as the Son receives the divine nathe creature flows from some essential attribute appropri-
ture from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both: so
ated to some one Person, this does not appear to be suf-
also likewise the power of creation, whilst common to the
ficient; because every divine effect is caused by every es-
three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the
sential attribute—viz. by power, goodness and wisdom—
Son receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from
and thus does not belong to one more than to another.
both. Hence to be the Creator is attributed to the Father as
Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought not
to Him Who does not receive the power of creation from
to be attributed to one Person more than to another, unless
another. And of the Son it is said (Jn. 1:3), “Through
they are distinguished in creating according to relations
Him all things were made,” inasmuch as He has the same
and processions.
power, but from another; for this preposition “through”
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that
usually denotes a mediate cause, or “a principle from a
all things caused are the common work of the whole God-
principle.” But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same
head.
power from both, is attributed that by His sway He gov-
I answer that, To create is, properly speaking, to
erns, and quickens what is created by the Father through
cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent
the Son. Again, the reason for this particular appropria-
produces its like, the principle of action can be considered
tion may be taken from the common notion of the appro-
from the effect of the action; for it must be fire that gener-
priation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated
ates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God accord-
(q. 39, a. 8, ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power
ing to His being, that is, His essence, which is common
which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is at-
to the three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any
tributed to Him to be the Creator. To the Son is appro-
one Person, but is common to the whole Trinity.
priated wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts;
Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the na-
and therefore it is said: “Through Whom all things were
ture of their procession, have a causality respecting the
made.” And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness,
creation of things. For as was said above (q. 14, a. 8;
to which belong both government, which brings things to
q. 19, a. 4), when treating of the knowledge and will of
their proper end, and the giving of life—for life consists
God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will,
in a certain interior movement; and the first mover is the
just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his
end, and goodness.
craft. Now the craftsman works through the word con-
Reply to Objection 3. Although every effect of God
ceived in his mind, and through the love of his will re-
proceeds from each attribute, each effect is reduced to that
garding some object. Hence also God the Father made the
attribute with which it is naturally connected; thus the or-
creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through
der of things is reduced to “wisdom,” and the justification
His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the proces-
of the sinner to “mercy” and “goodness” poured out super-
sions of the Persons are the type of the productions of
abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the
creatures inasmuch as they include the essential attributes,
very substance of a thing, is reduced to “power.”
knowledge and will.
Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity?
Ia q. 45 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that in creatures there is
and so on to infinitude.
not necessarily found a trace of the Trinity. For anything
Objection 3. Further, the effect represents only its
can be traced through its traces. But the trinity of persons
own cause. But the causality of creatures belongs to the
cannot be traced from the creatures, as was above stated
common nature, and not to the relations whereby the Per-
(q. 32, a. 1). Therefore there is no trace of the Trinity in
sons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore in the
creatures.
creature is to be found a trace not of the Trinity but of the
Objection 2. Further, whatever is in creatures is cre-
unity of essence.
ated. Therefore if the trace of the Trinity is found in crea-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10),
tures according to some of their properties, and if every-
that “the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures.”
thing created has a trace of the Trinity, it follows that we
I answer that, Every effect in some degree represents
can find a trace of the Trinity in each of these (properties):
its cause, but diversely. For some effects represent only
239
the causality of the cause, but not its form; as smoke rep-And therefore Augustine says (De Trin. vi 10) that the
resents fire. Such a representation is called a “trace”: for
trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according
a trace shows that someone has passed by but not who it
“as it is one individual,” and according “as it is formed by
is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the simil-
a species,” and according as it “has a certain relation of
itude of its form, as fire generated represents fire gener-
order.” And to these also are reduced those three, “num-
ating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and
ber,” “weight,” and “measure,” mentioned in the Book of
this is called the representation of “image.” Now the pro-
Wisdom (9:21). For “measure” refers to the substance of
cessions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of
the thing limited by its principles, “number” refers to the
intellect and will, as was said above (q. 27). For the Son
species, “weight” refers to the order. And to these three
proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost
are reduced the other three mentioned by Augustine (De
proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in rational crea-
Nat. Boni iii), “mode,” “species,” and “order,” and also
tures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the rep-
those he mentions (QQ. 83, qu. 18): “that which exists;
resentation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as
whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees.” For a
there is found in them the word conceived, and the love
thing exists by its substance, is distinct by its form, and
proceeding.
agrees by its order. Other similar expressions may be eas-
But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trin-
ily reduced to the above.
ity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things
Reply to Objection 1. The representation of the trace
which are necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to
is to be referred to the appropriations: in which manner we
their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being,
are able to arrive at a knowledge of the trinity of the divine
and has a form, whereby it is determined to a species, and
persons from creatures, as we have said (q. 32, a. 1).
has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created
Reply to Objection 2. A creature properly speaking
substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in
is a thing self-subsisting; and in such are the three above-
that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the
mentioned things to be found. Nor is it necessary that
“principle from no principle.” According as it has a form
these three things should be found in all that exists in the
and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing
creature; but only to a subsisting being is the trace as-
made by art is from the conception of the craftsman. Ac-
cribed in regard to those three things.
cording as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy
Reply to Objection 3. The processions of the persons
Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because the order of the
are also in some way the cause and type of creation; as
effect to something else is from the will of the Creator.
appears from the above (a. 6).
Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art?
Ia q. 45 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that creation is mingled
not creatures; which is heretical.
in works of nature and art. For in every operation of na-
On the contrary, Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15)
ture and art some form is produced. But it is not produced
distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of
from anything, since matter has no part in it. Therefore it
nature, from the work of creation.
is produced from nothing; and thus in every operation of
I answer that, The doubt on this subject arises from
nature and art there is creation.
the forms which, some said, do not come into existence
Objection 2. Further, the effect is not more power-
by the action of nature, but previously exist in matter; for
ful than its cause. But in natural things the only agent is
they asserted that forms are latent. This arose from ig-
the accidental form, which is an active or a passive form.
norance concerning matter, and from not knowing how
Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the op-
to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because
eration of nature; and therefore it must be produced by
forms pre-exist in matter, “in potentiality,” they asserted
creation.
that they pre-exist “simply.” Others, however, said that the
Objection 3. Further, in nature like begets like. But
forms were given or caused by a separate agent by way of
some things are found generated in nature by a thing un-
creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of nature
like to them; as is evident in animals generated through
is joined creation. But this opinion arose from ignorance
putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is not from na-
concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form
ture, but by creation; and the same reason applies to other
of the natural body is not subsisting, but is that by which
things.
a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be cre-
Objection 4. Further, what is not created, is not a
ated belong properly to a subsisting thing alone, as shown
creature. If therefore in nature’s productions there were
above (a. 4), it does not belong to forms to be made or to
not creation, it would follow that nature’s productions are
be created, but to be “concreated.” What, indeed, is prop-
240
erly made by the natural agent is the “composite,” which Reply to Objection 3. For the generation of imperis made from matter.
fect animals, a universal agent suffices, and this is to be
Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter,
found in the celestial power to which they are assimilated,
but is presupposed to the work of nature.
not in species, but according to a kind of analogy. Nor is
Reply to Objection 1. Forms begin to be actual when
it necessary to say that their forms are created by a sepa-
the composite things are made, not as though they were
rate agent. However, for the generation of perfect animals
made “directly,” but only “indirectly.”
the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper agent is
Reply to Objection 2. The active qualities in nature
required, in the shape of a univocal generator.
act by virtue of substantial forms: and therefore the nat-
Reply to Objection 4. The operation of nature takes
ural agent not only produces its like according to quality,
place only on the presupposition of created principles; and
but according to species.
thus the products of nature are called creatures.
241
FIRST PART, QUESTION 46
Of the Beginning of the Duration of Creatures
(In Three Articles)
Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures, about which there are three points for treatment: (1) Whether creatures always existed?
(2) Whether that they began to exist in an article of Faith?
(3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning?
Whether the universe of creatures always existed?
Ia q. 46 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the universe of crea-
moved always was, because movement is only in a mov-
tures, called the world, had no beginning, but existed from
able thing.
eternity. For everything which begins to exist, is a possi-
Objection 6. Further, every mover is either natural
ble being before it exists: otherwise it would be impossi-
or voluntary. But neither begins to move except by some
ble for it to exist. If therefore the world began to exist, it
pre-existing movement. For nature always moves in the
was a possible being before it began to exist. But possi-
same manner: hence unless some change precede either
ble being is matter, which is in potentiality to existence,
in the nature of the mover, or in the movable thing, there
which results from a form, and to non-existence, which
cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which
results from privation of form. If therefore the world be-
was not there before. And the will, without itself being
gan to exist, matter must have existed before the world.
changed, puts off doing what it proposes to do; but this
But matter cannot exist without form: while the matter of
can be only by some imagined change, at least on the part
the world with its form is the world. Therefore the world
of time. Thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow,
existed before it began to exist: which is impossible.
and not today, awaits something which will be tomorrow,
Objection 2. Further, nothing which has power to be
but is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass, and
always, sometimes is and sometimes is not; because so
for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without change,
far as the power of a thing extends so long is exists. But
because time is the measure of movement. Therefore it
every incorruptible thing has power to be always; for its
remains that before every new movement, there was a pre-
power does not extend to any determinate time. Therefore
vious movement; and so the same conclusion follows as
no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not:
before.
but everything which has a beginning at some time is, and
Objection 7. Further, whatever is always in its begin-
at some time is not; therefore no incorruptible thing be-
ning, and always in its end, cannot cease and cannot be-
gins to exist. But there are many incorruptible things in
gin; because what begins is not in its end, and what ceases
the world, as the celestial bodies and all intellectual sub-
is not in its beginning. But time always is in its beginning
stances. Therefore the world did not begin to exist.
and end, because there is no time except “now” which is
Objection 3. Further, what is unbegotten has no be-
the end of the past and the beginning of the future. There-
ginning. But the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that
fore time cannot begin or end, and consequently neither
matter is unbegotten, and also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text
can movement, the measure of what is time.
20) that the heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the universe
Objection 8. Further, God is before the world either
did not begin to exist.
in the order of nature only, or also by duration. If in the
Objection 4. Further, a vacuum is where there is not
order of nature only, therefore, since God is eternal, the
a body, but there might be. But if the world began to ex-
world also is eternal. But if God is prior by duration;
ist, there was first no body where the body of the world
since what is prior and posterior in duration constitutes
now is; and yet it could be there, otherwise it would not
time, it follows that time existed before the world, which
be there now. Therefore before the world there was a vac-
is impossible.
uum; which is impossible.
Objection 9. Further, if there is a sufficient cause,
Objection 5.
Further, nothing begins anew to be
there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect
moved except through either the mover or the thing moved
is an imperfect cause, requiring something else to make
being otherwise than it was before. But what is otherwise
the effect follow. But God is the sufficient cause of the
now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every
world; being the final cause, by reason of His goodness,
new movement there was a previous movement. There-
the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the ef-
fore movement always was; and therefore also the thing
ficient cause, by reason of His power as appears from the
242
above (q. 44, Aa. 2,3,4). Since therefore God is eternal, things never began to exist; but that they did not begin by
the world is also eternal.
the natural mode whereby things generated and corrupt-
Objection 10. Further, eternal action postulates an
ible begin.
eternal effect. But the action of God is His substance,
Reply to Objection 3. Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82)
which is eternal. Therefore the world is eternal.
proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 17:5), “Glorify Me, O
not a subject from which to derive its existence; and (De
Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the
Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves that heaven is un-
world was”; and (Prov. 8:22), “The Lord possessed Me in
generated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from which to
the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from
be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows
the beginning.”
either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin by
I answer that, Nothing except God can be eternal.
generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we
And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it
say that matter and heaven were produced into being by
has been shown above (q. 19, a. 4) that the will of God
creation, as appears above (q. 44, a. 1, ad 2).
is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary,
Reply to Objection 4. The notion of a vacuum is not
according as it is necessary for God to will them, since
only “in which is nothing,” but also implies a space ca-
the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the
pable of holding a body and in which there is not a body,
cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above (q. 19,
as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text 60). Whereas
a. 3), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that
we hold that there was no place or space before the world
God should will anything except Himself. It is not there-
was.
fore necessary for God to will that the world should al-
Reply to Objection 5. The first mover was always
ways exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it
in the same state: but the first movable thing was not al-
to exist, since the being of the world depends on the will
ways so, because it began to be whereas hitherto it was
of God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for
not. This, however, was not through change, but by cre-
the world to be always; and hence it cannot be proved by
ation, which is not change, as said above (q. 45, a. 2, as
demonstration.
2). Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle
Nor are Aristotle’s reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but rel-
gives (Phys. viii), is valid against those who admitted
atively, demonstrative—viz. in order to contradict the rea-
the existence of eternal movable things, but not eternal
sons of some of the ancients who asserted that the world
movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras
began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This ap-
and Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that
pears in three ways. Firstly, because, both in Phys. viii
movable things began to exist movement also existed.
and in De Coelo i, text 101, he premises some opinions,
Reply to Objection 6. The first agent is a voluntary
as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and brings
agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce
forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wher-
some effect, yet He did not produce an eternal effect. Nor
ever he speaks of this subject, he quotes the testimony of
is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not
the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but
even on account of imaginary time. For we must take into
of one persuading of what is probable. Thirdly, because
consideration the difference between a particular agent,
he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical
that presupposes something and produces something else,
problems, about which we have nothing to say from rea-
and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The
son, as, “whether the world is eternal.”
particular agent produces the form, and presupposes the
Reply to Objection 1. Before the world existed it was
matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form
possible for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a
in due proportion into a suitable matter. Hence it is correct
passive power which is matter, but according to the active
to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not
power of God; and also, according as a thing is called ab-
into another, on account of the different kinds of matter.
solutely possible, not in relation to any power, but from
But it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form
the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to
and matter together: whereas it is correct to say of Him
each other; in which sense possible is opposed to impos-
that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end.
sible, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text
Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it pre-
17).
supposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting
Reply to Objection 2. Whatever has power always
in time “after” and not in time “before,” according to an
to be, from the fact of having that power, cannot some-
imaginary succession of time after time. But the universal
times be and sometimes not be; but before it received that
agent who produces the thing and time also, is not cor-
power, it did not exist.
rectly described as acting now, and not before, according
Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De
to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if
Coelo i, text 120) does not prove simply that incorruptible
time were presupposed to His action; but He must be con-
243
sidered as giving time to His effect as much as and when signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time
He willed, and according to what was fitting to demon-
really existing; thus, when we say that above heaven there
strate His power. For the world leads more evidently to
is nothing, the word “above” signifies only an imaginary
the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was not
place, according as it is possible to imagine other dimen-
always, than if it had always been; since everything which
sions beyond those of the heavenly body.
was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not
Reply to Objection 9. As the effect follows from the
so manifest of what always was.
cause that acts by nature, according to the mode of its
Reply to Objection 7. As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99),
form, so likewise it follows from the voluntary agent, ac-
“before” and “after” belong to time, according as they are
cording to the form preconceived and determined by the
in movement. Hence beginning and end in time must be
agent, as appears from what was said above (q. 19, a. 4;
taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted the
q. 41, a. 2). Therefore, although God was from eternity
eternity of movement, it is necessary that any given mo-
the sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that
ment in movement be a beginning and an end of move-
the world was produced by Him, except as preordained
ment; which need not be if movement be a beginning.
by His will—that is, that it should have being after not
The same applies to the “now” of time. Thus it appears
being, in order more manifestly to declare its author.
that the idea of the instant “now,” as being always the be-
Reply to Objection 10. Given the action, the effect
ginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time
follows according to the requirement of the form, which
and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward this rea-
is the principle of action. But in agents acting by will,
son (Phys. viii, text 10) against those who asserted the
what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the
eternity of time, but denied the eternity of movement.
form, which is the principle of action. Therefore from the
Reply to Objection 8. God is prior to the world by
eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but
priority of duration. But the word “prior” signifies pri-
such an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which has
ority not of time, but of eternity. Or we may say that it
being after not being.
Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?
Ia q. 46 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not an article
equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would
of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world be-
be equal to God in duration. Therefore it is certain that
gan. For everything that is made has a beginning of its
the world did not always exist.
duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God
Objection 6. Further, if the world always was, the
is the effective cause of the world; indeed this is asserted
consequence is that infinite days preceded this present
by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be
day.
But it is impossible to pass through an infinite
demonstratively proved that the world began.
medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this
Objection 2. Further, if it is necessary to say that the present day; which is manifestly false.
world was made by God, it must therefore have been made
Objection 7. Further, if the world was eternal, gener-
from nothing or from something. But it was not made
ation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of
from something; otherwise the matter of the world would
another in an infinite series. But the father is the efficient
have preceded the world; against which are the arguments
cause of the son (Phys. ii, text 5). Therefore in efficient
of Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was un-
causes there could be an infinite series, which is disproved
generated. Therefore it must be said that the world was
(Metaph. ii, text 5).
made from nothing; and thus it has being after not being.
Objection 8. Further, if the world and generation al-
Therefore it must have begun.
ways were, there have been an infinite number of men.
Objection 3. Further, everything which works by in-
But man’s soul is immortal: therefore an infinite number
tellect works from some principle, as appears in all kinds
of human souls would actually now exist, which is impos-
of craftsmen. But God acts by intellect: therefore His
sible. Therefore it can be known with certainty that the
work has a principle. The world, therefore, which is His
world began, and not only is it known by faith.
effect, did not always exist.
On the contrary, The articles of faith cannot be
Objection 4. Further, it appears manifestly that cer-
proved demonstratively, because faith is of things “that
tain arts have developed, and certain countries have be-
appear not” (Heb. 11:1). But that God is the Creator of
gun to be inhabited at some fixed time. But this would not
the world: hence that the world began, is an article of
be the case if the world had been always. Therefore it is
faith; for we say, “I believe in one God,” etc. And again,
manifest that the world did not always exist.
Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied
Objection 5. Further, it is certain that nothing can be
of the past, saying, “In the beginning God created heaven
244
and earth”: in which words the newness of the world is God from nothing, not that it was made after nothing, ac-stated. Therefore the newness of the world is known only
cording to what we understand by the word creation, but
by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demon-
that it was not made from anything; and so also some of
stratively.
them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avi-
I answer that, By faith alone do we hold, and by no
cenna (Metaph. ix, text 4).
demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not al-
Reply to Objection 3.
This is the argument of
ways exist, as was said above of the mystery of the Trinity
Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys. viii, text 15). But it does
(q. 32, a. 1). The reason of this is that the newness of the
not lead to a necessary conclusion, except as to that intel-
world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world it-
lect which deliberates in order to find out what should be
self. For the principle of demonstration is the essence of
done, which is like movement. Such is the human intel-
a thing. Now everything according to its species is ab-
lect, but not the divine intellect (q. 14, Aa. 7,12).
stracted from “here” and “now”; whence it is said that
Reply to Objection 4. Those who hold the eternity of
universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be
the world hold that some region was changed an infinite
demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not al-
number of times, from being uninhabitable to being in-
ways. Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part
habitable and “vice versa,” and likewise they hold that the
of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of
arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents, were
God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards
subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence
those things which God must will of necessity; and what
Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such par-
He wills about creatures is not among these, as was said
ticular changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the
above (q. 19, a. 3). But the divine will can be manifested
whole world.
by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world
Reply to Objection 5. Even supposing that the world
began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstra-
always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as
tion or science. And it is useful to consider this, lest any-
Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6); because the divine Being
one, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should
is all being simultaneously without succession; but with
bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give
the world it is otherwise.
occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such
Reply to Objection 6. Passage is always understood
grounds we believe things that are of faith.
as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Civ.
choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number
Dei xi, 4), the opinion of philosophers who asserted the
of days which can be passed through. The objection is
eternity of the world was twofold. For some said that the
founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an
substance of the world was not from God, which is an in-
infinite number of mean terms.
tolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by proofs that
Reply to Objection 7. In efficient causes it is impos-
are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eter-
sible to proceed to infinity “per se”—thus, there cannot
nal, although made by God. For they hold that the world
be an infinite number of causes that are “per se” required
has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a
for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved
certain hardly intelligible way it was always made. “And
by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity.
they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei x, 31):
But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity “acciden-
for as, if the foot were always in the dust from eternity,
tally” as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the
there would always be a footprint which without doubt
causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of
was caused by him who trod on it, so also the world al-
only one cause, their multiplication being accidental, as
ways was, because its Maker always existed.” To under-
an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally,
stand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which
because one after the other may be broken. It is acciden-
acts by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time;
tal, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the
because the effect is only in the end of the action, and ev-
action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this par-
ery agent must be the principle of action. But if the action
ticular man as generator to be generated by another man;
is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for
for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another
the maker to be prior to the thing made in duration as ap-
man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient
pears in the case of illumination. Hence they say that it
causes—viz. the grade of a particular generator. Hence
does not follow necessarily if God is the active cause of
it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to
the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration;
infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the gen-
because creation, by which He produced the world, is not
eration of this man depended upon this man, and on an
a successive change, as was said above (q. 45, a. 2).
elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.
Reply to Objection 2. Those who would say that the
Reply to Objection 8. Those who hold the eternity
world was eternal, would say that the world was made by
of the world evade this reason in many ways. For some
245
do not think it impossible for there to be an actual infina course of time; a fuller consideration of which matters
ity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of Algazel,
will be given later (q. 75, a. 2; q. 118, a. 6). But be it noted who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. But
that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence
this was disproved above (q. 7, a. 4). Some say that the
one might say that the world was eternal, or least some
soul is corrupted with the body. And some say that of
creature, as an angel, but not man. But we are consider-
all souls only one will remain. But others, as Augustine
ing the question in general, as to whether any creature can
says∗, asserted on this account a circuit of souls—viz. that
exist from eternity.
souls separated from their bodies return again thither after
Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time?
Ia q. 46 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the creation of things
Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (Ps.
was not in the beginning of time. For whatever is not in
103:24), “Thou hast made all things in wisdom,” it may be
time, is not of any part of time. But the creation of things
understood that God made all things in the beginning—
was not in time; for by the creation the substance of things
that is, in the Son; according to the word of the Apostle
was brought into being; and time does not measure the
(Col. 1:16), “In Him”—viz. the Son—“were created all
substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things.
things.” But others said that corporeal things were created
Therefore creation was not in the beginning of time.
by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys.
exclude this it is expounded thus: “In the beginning”—
vi, text 40) that everything which is made, was being
i.e. before all things—“God created heaven and earth.”
made; and so to be made implies a “before” and “after.”
For four things are stated to be created together—viz. the
But in the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, there
empyrean heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the
is no “before” and “after.” Therefore, since to be created
earth, time, and the angelic nature.
is a kind of “being made,” it appears that things were not
Reply to Objection 1. Things are said to be created
created in the beginning of time.
in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time
Objection 3. Further, even time itself is created. But
were a measure of creation, but because together with
time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since
time heaven and earth were created.
time is divisible, and the beginning of time is indivisible.
Reply to Objection 2. This saying of the Philosopher
Therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning
is understood “of being made” by means of movement, or
of time.
as the term of movement. Because, since in every move-
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): “In the begin-
ment there is “before” and “after,” before any one point
ning God created heaven and earth.”
in a given movement—that is, whilst anything is in the
I answer that, The words of Genesis, “In the begin-
process of being moved and made, there is a “before” and
ning God created heaven and earth,” are expounded in
also an “after,” because what is in the beginning of move-
a threefold sense in order to exclude three errors. For
ment or in its term is not in “being moved.” But creation is
some said that the world always was, and that time had
neither movement nor the term of movement, as was said
no beginning; and to exclude this the words “In the begin-
above (q. 45, Aa. 2,3). Hence a thing is created in such a
ning” are expounded—viz. “of time.” And some said that
way that it was not being created before.
there are two principles of creation, one of good things
Reply to Objection 3. Nothing is made except as it
and the other of evil things, against which “In the be-
exists. But nothing exists of time except “now.” Hence
ginning” is expounded—“in the Son.” For as the effi-
time cannot be made except according to some “now”;
cient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of
not because in the first “now” is time, but because from it
power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the
time begins.
∗ Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4,5; De Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13
246
FIRST PART, QUESTION 47
Of the Distinction of Things in General
(In Three Articles)
After considering the production of creatures, we come to the consideration of the distinction of things. This consideration will be threefold—first, of the distinction of things in general; secondly, of the distinction of good and evil; thirdly, of the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creature.
Under the first head, there are three points of inquiry:
(1) The multitude or distinction of things.
(2) Their inequality.
(3) The unity of the world.
Whether the multitude and distinction of things come from God?
Ia q. 47 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the multitude and
Others have attributed the distinction of things to sec-
distinction of things does not come from God. For one
ondary agents, as did Avicenna, who said that God by
naturally always makes one. But God is supremely one,
understanding Himself, produced the first intelligence; in
as appears from what precedes (q. 11, a. 4). Therefore He
which, forasmuch as it was not its own being, there is nec-
produces but one effect.
essarily composition of potentiality and act, as will appear
Objection 2. Further, the representation is assimilated
later (q. 50, a. 3). And so the first intelligence, inasmuch
to its exemplar. But God is the exemplar cause of His ef-
as it understood the first cause, produced the second intel-
fect, as was said above (q. 44, a. 3). Therefore, as God is
ligence; and in so far as it understood itself as in poten-
one, His effect is one only, and not diverse.
tiality it produced the heavenly body, which causes move-
Objection 3. Further, the means are proportional to
ment, and inasmuch as it understood itself as having actu-
the end. But the end of the creation is one—viz. the divine
ality it produced the soul of the heavens.
goodness, as was shown above (q. 44 , a. 4). Therefore the
But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First,
effect of God is but one.
because it was shown above (q. 45, a. 5) that to create be-
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:4,7) that God “di-
longs to God alone, and hence what can be caused only
vided the light from the darkness,” and “divided waters
by creation is produced by God alone—viz. all those
from waters.” Therefore the distinction and multitude of
things which are not subject to generation and corruption.
things is from God.
Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the univer-
I answer that, The distinction of things has been as-
sality of things would not proceed from the intention of
cribed to many causes. For some attributed the distinction
the first agent, but from the concurrence of many active
to matter, either by itself or with the agent. Democritus,
causes; and such an effect we can describe only as being
for instance, and all the ancient natural philosophers, who
produced by chance. Therefore, the perfection of the uni-
admitted no cause but matter, attributed it to matter alone;
verse, which consists of the diversity of things, would thus
and in their opinion the distinction of things comes from
be a thing of chance, which is impossible.
chance according to the movement of matter. Anaxagoras,
Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude
however, attributed the distinction and multitude of things
of things come from the intention of the first agent, who
to matter and to the agent together; and he said that the
is God. For He brought things into being in order that
intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed
His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be
up in matter.
represented by them; and because His goodness could not
But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because,
be adequately represented by one creature alone, He pro-
as was shown above (q. 44, a. 2), even matter itself was
duced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting
created by God. Hence we must reduce whatever distinc-
to one in the representation of the divine goodness might
tion comes from matter to a higher cause. Secondly, be-
be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is
cause matter is for the sake of the form, and not the form
simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided
for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from
and hence the whole universe together participates the di-
their proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is
vine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than
not on account of the matter; but rather, on the contrary,
any single creature whatever.
created matter is formless, in order that it may be accom-
And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the
modated to different forms.
distinction of things, therefore Moses said that things are
247
made distinct by the word of God, which is the concept of uncreated image, which is perfect, is only one. But no
His wisdom; and this is what we read in Gn. 1:3,4: “God
creature represents the first exemplar perfectly, which is
said: Be light made. . . And He divided the light from the
the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented
darkness.”
by many things. Still, according as ideas are called exem-
Reply to Objection 1. The natural agent acts by the
plars, the plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind
form which makes it what it is, and which is only one in
to the plurality of things.
one thing; and therefore its effect is one only. But the vol-
Reply to Objection 3.
In speculative things the
untary agent, such as God is, as was shown above (q. 19,
medium of demonstration, which demonstrates the con-
a. 4), acts by an intellectual form. Since, therefore, it is
clusion perfectly, is one only; whereas probable means of
not against God’s unity and simplicity to understand many
proof are many. Likewise when operation is concerned, if
things, as was shown above (q. 15, a. 2), it follows that,
the means be equal, so to speak, to the end, one only is
although He is one, He can make many things.
sufficient. But the creature is not such a means to its end,
Reply to Objection 2. This reason would apply to the
which is God; and hence the multiplication of creatures is
representation which reflects the exemplar perfectly, and
necessary.
which is multiplied by reason of matter only; hence the
Whether the inequality of things is from God?
Ia q. 47 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the inequality of
punishment of sin, which is contrary to what is said: “God
things is not from God. For it belongs to the best to pro-
saw all the things that He had made, and they were very
duce the best. But among things that are best, one is not
good” (Gn. 1:31). And, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii,
greater than another. Therefore, it belongs to God, Who
3): “What can be more foolish than to say that the divine
is the Best, to make all things equal.
Architect provided this one sun for the one world, not to
Objection 2. Further, equality is the effect of unity
be an ornament to its beauty, nor for the benefit of cor-
(Metaph. v, text 20). But God is one. Therefore, He has
poreal things, but that it happened through the sin of one
made all things equal.
soul; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned, there would
Objection 3. Further, it is the part of justice to give
be a hundred suns in the world?”
unequal to unequal things. But God is just in all His
Therefore it must be said that as the wisdom of God is
works. Since, therefore, no inequality of things is presup-
the cause of the distinction of things, so the same wisdom
posed to the operation whereby He gives being to things,
is the cause of their inequality. This may be explained
it seems that He has made all things equal.
as follows. A twofold distinction is found in things; one
On the contrary, It is said (Ecclus. 33:7): “Why does
is a formal distinction as regards things differing specifi-
one day excel another, and one light another, and one year
cally; the other is a material distinction as regards things
another year, one sun another sun? [Vulg.: ‘when all come
differing numerically only. And as the matter is on ac-
of the sun’]. By the knowledge of the Lord they were dis-
count of the form, material distinction exists for the sake
tinguished.”
of the formal distinction. Hence we see that in incorrupt-
I answer that, When Origen wished to refute those
ible things there is only one individual of each species,
who said that the distinction of things arose from the con-
forasmuch as the species is sufficiently preserved in the
trary principles of good and evil, he said that in the be-
one; whereas in things generated and corruptible there are
ginning all things were created equal by God. For he as-
many individuals of one species for the preservation of the
serted that God first created only the rational creatures and
species. Whence it appears that formal distinction is of
all equal; and that inequality arose in them from free-will,
greater consequence than material. Now, formal distinc-
some being turned to God more and some less, and others
tion always requires inequality, because as the Philoso-
turned more and others less away from God. And so those
pher says (Metaph. viii, 10), the forms of things are like
rational creatures which were turned to God by free-will,
numbers in which species vary by addition or subtraction
were promoted to the order of angels according to the di-
of unity. Hence in natural things species seem to be ar-
versity of merits. And those who were turned away from
ranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect
God were bound down to bodies according to the diversity
than the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals
of their sin; and he said this was the cause of the creation
than plants, and men than other animals; and in each of
and diversity of bodies. But according to this opinion,
these one species is more perfect than others. Therefore,
it would follow that the universality of bodily creatures
as the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of
would not be the effect of the goodness of God as com-
things for the sake of the perfection of the universe, so
municated to creatures, but it would be for the sake of the
it is the cause of inequality. For the universe would not
248
be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in the Father, to Whom, according to Augustine (De Doctr.
things.
Christ. i, 5), is appropriated unity, the Son proceeds to
Reply to Objection 1. It is part of the best agent to
Whom is appropriated equality, and then from Him the
produce an effect which is best in its entirety; but this does
creature proceeds, to which belongs inequality; but never-
not mean that He makes every part of the whole the best
theless even creatures share in a certain equality—namely,
absolutely, but in proportion to the whole; in the case of an
of proportion.
animal, for instance, its goodness would be taken away if
Reply to Objection 3. This is the argument that per-
every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, therefore,
suaded Origen: but it holds only as regards the distribu-
God also made the universe to be best as a whole, accord-
tion of rewards, the inequality of which is due to unequal
ing to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make
merits. But in the constitution of things there is no in-
each single creature best, but one better than another. And
equality of parts through any preceding inequality, either
therefore we find it said of each creature, “God saw the
of merits or of the disposition of the matter; but inequality
light that it was good” (Gn. 1:4); and in like manner of
comes from the perfection of the whole. This appears also
each one of the rest. But of all together it is said, “God
in works done by art; for the roof of a house differs from
saw all the things that He had made, and they were very
the foundation, not because it is made of other material;
good” (Gn. 1:31).
but in order that the house may be made perfect of differ-
Reply to Objection 2. The first effect of unity is
ent parts, the artificer seeks different material; indeed, he
equality; and then comes multiplicity; and therefore from
would make such material if he could.
Whether there is only one world?
Ia q. 47 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that there is not only one
as shown above (q. 11, a. 3; q. 21, a. 1). Hence it must
world, but many. Because, as Augustine says (QQ. 83,
be that all things should belong to one world. Therefore
qu. 46), it is unfitting to say that God has created things
those only can assert that many worlds exist who do not
without a reason. But for the same reason He created one,
acknowledge any ordaining wisdom, but rather believe in
He could create many, since His power is not limited to
chance, as Democritus, who said that this world, besides
the creation of one world; but rather it is infinite, as was
an infinite number of other worlds, was made from a ca-
shown above (q. 25, a. 2). Therefore God has produced
sual concourse of atoms.
many worlds.
Reply to Objection 1. This reason proves that the
Objection 2. Further, nature does what is best and
world is one because all things must be arranged in one
much more does God. But it is better for there to be many
order, and to one end. Therefore from the unity of order
worlds than one, because many good things are better than
in things Aristotle infers (Metaph. xii, text 52) the unity
a few. Therefore many worlds have been made by God.
of God governing all; and Plato (Tim.), from the unity of
Objection 3. Further, everything which has a form in
the exemplar, proves the unity of the world, as the thing
matter can be multiplied in number, the species remaining
designed.
the same, because multiplication in number comes from
Reply to Objection 2. No agent intends material plu-
matter. But the world has a form in matter. Thus as when
rality as the end forasmuch as material multitude has no
I say “man” I mean the form, and when I say “this man,”
certain limit, but of itself tends to infinity, and the infinite I mean the form in matter; so when we say “world,” the
is opposed to the notion of end. Now when it is said that
form is signified, and when we say “this world,” the form
many worlds are better than one, this has reference to ma-
in the matter is signified. Therefore there is nothing to
terial order. But the best in this sense is not the intention
prevent the existence of many worlds.
of the divine agent; forasmuch as for the same reason it
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 1:10): “The world
might be said that if He had made two worlds, it would be
was made by Him,” where the world is named as one, as
better if He had made three; and so on to infinite.
if only one existed.
Reply to Objection 3. The world is composed of the
I answer that, The very order of things created by
whole of its matter. For it is not possible for there to be an-
God shows the unity of the world. For this world is called
other earth than this one, since every earth would naturally
one by the unity of order, whereby some things are or-
be carried to this central one, wherever it was. The same
dered to others. But whatever things come from God,
applies to the other bodies which are part of the world.
have relation of order to each other, and to God Himself,
249
FIRST PART, QUESTION 48
The Distinction of Things in Particular
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the distinction of things in particular; and firstly the distinction of good and evil; and then the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creatures.
Concerning the first, we inquire into evil and its cause.
Concerning evil, six points are to be considered:
(1) Whether evil is a nature?
(2) Whether evil is found in things?
(3) Whether good is the subject of evil?
(4) Whether evil totally corrupts good?
(5) The division of evil into pain and fault.
(6) Whether pain, or fault, has more the nature of evil?
Whether evil is a nature?
Ia q. 48 a. 1
Objection 1.
It would seem that evil is a nature.
fection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that
For every genus is a nature. But evil is a genus; for the
evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore it
Philosopher says (Praedic. x) that “good and evil are not
must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence
in a genus, but are genera of other things.” Therefore evil
of good. And this is what is meant by saying that “evil is
is a nature.
neither a being nor a good.” For since being, as such, is
Objection 2. Further, every difference which consti-
good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.
tutes a species is a nature. But evil is a difference con-
Reply to Objection 1. Aristotle speaks there accord-
stituting a species of morality; for a bad habit differs in
ing to the opinion of Pythagoreans, who thought that evil
species from a good habit, as liberality from illiberality.
was a kind of nature; and therefore they asserted the exis-
Therefore evil signifies a nature.
tence of the genus of good and evil. For Aristotle, espe-
Objection 3. Further, each extreme of two contraries
cially in his logical works, brings forward examples that
is a nature. But evil and good are not opposed as priva-
in his time were probable in the opinion of some philoso-
tion and habit, but as contraries, as the Philosopher shows
phers. Or, it may be said that, as the Philosopher says
(Praedic. x) by the fact that between good and evil there
(Metaph. iv, text 6), “the first kind of contrariety is habit
is a medium, and from evil there can be a return to good.
and privation,” as being verified in all contraries; since
Therefore evil signifies a nature.
one contrary is always imperfect in relation to another, as
Objection 4. Further, what is not, acts not. But evil
black in relation to white, and bitter in relation to sweet.
acts, for it corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a
And in this way good and evil are said to be genera not
nature.
simply, but in regard to contraries; because, as every form
Objection 5. Further, nothing belongs to the perfec-
has the nature of good, so every privation, as such, has the
tion of the universe except what is a being and a nature.
nature of evil.
But evil belongs to the perfection of the universe of things;
Reply to Objection 2. Good and evil are not con-
for Augustine says (Enchir. 10,11) that the “admirable
stitutive differences except in morals, which receive their
beauty of the universe is made up of all things. In which
species from the end, which is the object of the will, the
even what is called evil, well ordered and in its place, is
source of all morality. And because good has the nature
the eminent commendation of what is good.” Therefore
of an end, therefore good and evil are specific differences
evil is a nature.
in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence of
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv),
the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end
“Evil is neither a being nor a good.”
by itself constitute a moral species, except as it is joined
I answer that, One opposite is known through the
to the undue end; just as we do not find the privation of
other, as darkness is known through light. Hence also
the substantial form in natural things, unless it is joined
what evil is must be known from the nature of good. Now,
to another form. Thus, therefore, the evil which is a con-
we have said above that good is everything appetible; and
stitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to
thus, since every nature desires its own being and its own
the privation of another good; as the end proposed by the
perfection, it must be said also that the being and the per-
intemperate man is not the privation of the good of rea-
250
son, but the delight of sense without the order of reason.
a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter makes
Hence evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by
a wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final
reason of the good that is annexed.
cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient
Reply to Objection 3. This appears from the above.
cause. But in these two ways evil does not effect anything
For the Philosopher speaks there of good and evil in
of itself, that is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good
morality. Because in that respect, between good and evil
annexed to it. For every action comes from some form;
there is a medium, as good is considered as something
and everything which is desired as an end, is a perfection.
rightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right
And therefore, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “Evil
order, but also as injurious to another. Hence the Philoso-
does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some
pher says (Ethic. iv, i) that a “prodigal man is foolish, but
good joined to it: while of itself it is nothing definite, and
not evil.” And from this evil in morality, there may be
beside the scope of our will and intention.”
a return to good, but not from any sort of evil, for from
Reply to Objection 5. As was said above, the parts
blindness there is no return to sight, although blindness is
of the universe are ordered to each other, according as one
an evil.
acts on the other, and according as one is the end and ex-
Reply to Objection 4. A thing is said to act in a three-
emplar of the other. But, as was said above, this can only
fold sense. In one way, formally, as when we say that
happen to evil as joined to some good. Hence evil neither
whiteness makes white; and in that sense evil considered
belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor does it come
even as a privation is said to corrupt good, forasmuch as it
under the order of the same, except accidentally, that is,
is itself a corruption or privation of good. In another sense
by reason of some good joined to it.
Whether evil is found in things?
Ia q. 48 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that evil is not found in
quires that there should be some which can fail in good-
things. For whatever is found in things, is either some-
ness, and thence it follows that sometimes they do fail.
thing, or a privation of something, that is a “not-being.”
Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that
But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “evil is dis-
a thing fails in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is
tant from existence, and even more distant from non-
found in things, as corruption also is found; for corrup-
existence.” Therefore evil is not at all found in things.
tion is itself an evil.
Objection 2. Further, “being” and “thing” are con-
Reply to Objection 1. Evil is distant both from simple
vertible. If therefore evil is a being in things, it follows
being and from simple “not-being,” because it is neither a
that evil is a thing, which is contrary to what has been
habit nor a pure negation, but a privation.
said (a. 1).
Reply to Objection 2.
As the Philosopher says
Objection 3. Further, “the white unmixed with black
(Metaph. v, text 14), being is twofold. In one way it is
is the most white,” as the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4).
considered as signifying the entity of a thing, as divisi-
Therefore also the good unmixed with evil is the greater
ble by the ten “predicaments”; and in that sense it is con-
good. But God makes always what is best, much more
vertible with thing, and thus no privation is a being, and
than nature does. Therefore in things made by God there
neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being
is no evil.
conveys the truth of a proposition which unites together
On the contrary, On the above assumptions, all pro-
subject and attribute by a copula, notified by this word
hibitions and penalties would cease, for they exist only for
“is”; and in this sense being is what answers to the ques-
evils.
tion, “Does it exist?” and thus we speak of blindness as
I answer that, As was said above (q. 47, Aa. 1,2), the
being in the eye; or of any other privation. In this way
perfection of the universe requires that there should be in-
even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this
equality in things, so that every grade of goodness may be
distinction some, considering that things may be evil, or
realized. Now, one grade of goodness is that of the good
that evil is said to be in things, believed that evil was a
which cannot fail. Another grade of goodness is that of the
positive thing in itself.
good which can fail in goodness, and this grade is to be
Reply to Objection 3. God and nature and any other
found in existence itself; for some things there are which
agent make what is best in the whole, but not what is best
cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things, while
in every single part, except in order to the whole, as was
some there are which can lose it, as things corruptible.
said above (q. 47, a. 2). And the whole itself, which is the
As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires
universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if
that there should be not only beings incorruptible, but also
some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes
corruptible beings; so the perfection of the universe re-
fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, be-
251
cause “it belongs to Providence not to destroy, but to save no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was
nature,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); but it belongs
not corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be preserved
to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail; sec-
unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging justice
ondly, because, as Augustine says (Enchir. 11), “God is so
nor the patience of a sufferer be praised if there were no
powerful that He can even make good out of evil.” Hence
injustice.
many good things would be taken away if God permitted
Whether evil is in good as in its subject?
Ia q. 48 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that evil is not in good as
subject of the substantial form, and of privation of the op-
its subject. For good is something that exists. But Diony-
posite form; or whether it be being in relative potentiality,
sius says (Div. Nom. iv, 4) that “evil does not exist, nor
and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent body,
is it in that which exists.” Therefore, evil is not in good as
which is the subject both of darkness and light. It is, how-
its subject.
ever, manifest that the form which makes a thing actual
Objection 2. Further, evil is not a being; whereas
is a perfection and a good; and thus every actual being is
good is a being. But “non-being” does not require being
a good; and likewise every potential being, as such, is a
as its subject. Therefore, neither does evil require good as
good, as having a relation to good. For as it has being in
its subject.
potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality. Therefore,
Objection 3. Further, one contrary is not the subject
the subject of evil is good.
of another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore,
Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius means that evil is
evil is not in good as in its subject.
not in existing things as a part, or as a natural property of
Objection 4.
Further, the subject of whiteness is
any existing thing.
called white. Therefore also the subject of evil is evil. If,
Reply to Objection 2. “Not-being,” understood nega-
therefore, evil is in good as in its subject, it follows that
tively, does not require a subject; but privation is negation
good is evil, against what is said (Is. 5:20): “Woe to you
in a subject, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 4),
who call evil good, and good evil!”
and such “not-being” is an evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 14)
Reply to Objection 3. Evil is not in the good opposed
that “evil exists only in good.”
to it as in its subject, but in some other good, for the sub-
I answer that, As was said above (a. 1), evil imports
ject of blindness is not “sight,” but “animal.” Yet, it ap-
the absence of good. But not every absence of good is
pears, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 13), that the rule of
evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative and
dialectics here fails, where it is laid down that contraries
in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is
cannot exist together. But this is to be taken as referring to
not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not ex-
good and evil in general, but not in reference to any partic-
ist is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through
ular good and evil. For white and black, sweet and bitter,
not having the good belonging to something else; for in-
and the like contraries, are only considered as contraries
stance, a man would be evil who had not the swiftness of
in a special sense, because they exist in some determinate
the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good,
genus; whereas good enters into every genus. Hence one
taken in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for instance, the
good can coexist with the privation of another good.
privation of sight is called blindness.
Reply to Objection 4. The prophet invokes woe to
Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and
those who say that good as such is evil. But this does
the same—viz. being in potentiality, whether it be being
not follow from what is said above, as is clear from the
in absolute potentiality, as primary matter, which is the
explanation given.
Whether evil corrupts the whole good?
Ia q. 48 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that evil corrupts the
taken away by evil.
whole good. For one contrary is wholly corrupted by an-
Objection 3. Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts,
other. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore evil
and takes away good. But that from which something is
corrupts the whole good.
always being removed, is at some time consumed, unless
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion
it is infinite, which cannot be said of any created good.
12) that “evil hurts inasmuch as it takes away good.” But
Therefore evil wholly consumes good.
good is all of a piece and uniform. Therefore it is wholly
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12)
252
that “evil cannot wholly consume good.”
ies were interposed to infinity between the sun and the air,
I answer that, Evil cannot wholly consume good. To
the aptitude of the air to light would be infinitely dimin-
prove this we must consider that good is threefold. One
ished, but still it would never be wholly removed while the
kind of good is wholly destroyed by evil, and this is the
air remained, which in its very nature is transparent. Like-
good opposed to evil, as light is wholly destroyed by dark-
wise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude, whereby
ness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good is nei-
the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more less-
ther wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is
ened; and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed
the good which is the subject of evil; for by darkness the
between us and God, according to Is. 59:2: “Our sins have
substance of the air is not injured. And there is also a kind
divided between us and God.” Yet the aforesaid aptitude
of good which is diminished by evil, but is not wholly
of the soul is not wholly taken away, for it belongs to its
taken away; and this good is the aptitude of a subject to
very nature.
some actuality.
Reply to Objection 1. The good which is opposed to
The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not
evil is wholly taken away; but other goods are not wholly
to be considered by way of subtraction, as diminution in
removed, as said above.
quantity, but rather by way of remission, as diminution in
Reply to Objection 2. The aforesaid aptitude is a
qualities and forms. The remission likewise of this habi-
medium between subject and act. Hence, where it touches
tude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity. For this
act, it is diminished by evil; but where it touches the sub-
kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions
ject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although good is like
whereby the matter is prepared for actuality; which the
to itself, yet, on account of its relation to different things, more they are multiplied in the subject the more is it fitted
it is not wholly, but only partially taken away.
to receive its perfection and form; and, on the contrary,
Reply to Objection 3.
Some, imagining that the
it receives its remission by contrary dispositions which,
diminution of this kind of good is like the diminution of
the more they are multiplied in the matter, and the more
quantity, said that just as the continuous is infinitely divis-
they are intensified, the more is the potentiality remitted
ible, if the division be made in an ever same proportion
as regards the actuality.
(for instance, half of half, or a third of a third), so is it in Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multi-the present case. But this explanation does not avail here.
plied and intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, For when in a division we keep the same proportion, we
neither is the aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted in-
continue to subtract less and less; for half of half is less
finitely, as appears in the active and passive qualities of the than half of the whole. But a second sin does not neces-elements; for coldness and humidity, whereby the aptitude
sarily diminish the above mentioned aptitude less than a
of matter to the form of fire is diminished or remitted, can-
preceding sin, but perchance either equally or more.
not be infinitely multiplied. But if the contrary disposi-
Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is
tions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid aptitude is
a finite thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not
also infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless, it
“per se,” but accidentally; according as the contrary dis-
is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains,
positions are also increased infinitely, as explained above.
which is the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bod-
Whether evil is adequately divided into pain* and fault?
Ia q. 48 a. 5
∗
not a fault; for “temptation which involves no consent, is
Objection 1. It would seem that evil is not adequately
not a sin, but an occasion for the exercise of virtue,” as
divided into pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of
is said in a gloss on 2 Cor. 12; not is it a pain; because
evil. But in all creatures there is the defect of not being
temptation precedes the fault, and the pain follows after-
able to preserve their own existence, which nevertheless
wards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into pain
is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore evil is inadequately
and fault.
divided into pain and fault.
Objection 4. On the contrary, It would seem that this
Objection 2. Further, in irrational creatures there is
division is superfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchirid-
neither fault nor pain; but, nevertheless, they have corrup-
ion 12), a thing is evil “because it hurts.” But whatever
tion and defect, which are evils. Therefore not every evil
hurts is penal. Therefore every evil comes under pain.
is a pain or a fault.
I answer that, Evil, as was said above (a. 3) is the
Objection 3. Further, temptation is an evil, but it is
privation of good, which chiefly and of itself consists in
∗ Pain here means “penalty”: such was its original signification, being derived from “poena.” In this sense we say “Pain of death, Pain of loss, Pain of sense.”—Ed.
253
perfection and act. Act, however, is twofold; first, and sec-therefore not every defect of good is an evil, but the defect
ond. The first act is the form and integrity of a thing; the
of the good which is naturally due. For the want of sight
second act is its operation. Therefore evil also is twofold.
is not an evil in a stone, but it is an evil in an animal; since In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form, or of
it is against the nature of a stone to see. So, likewise, it
any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blind-
is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in exis-
ness is an evil, as also it is an evil to be wanting in any
tence by itself, because existence and conservation come
member of the body. In another way evil exists by the
from one and the same source. Hence this kind of defect
withdrawal of the due operation, either because it does not
is not an evil as regards a creature.
exist, or because it has not its due mode and order. But be-
Reply to Objection 2. Pain and fault do not divide
cause good in itself is the object of the will, evil, which is
evil absolutely considered, but evil that is found in volun-
the privation of good, is found in a special way in ratio-
tary things.
nal creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which
Reply to Objection 3.
Temptation, as importing
comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of
provocation to evil, is always an evil of fault in the
the thing, has the nature of a pain; and especially so on
tempter; but in the one tempted it is not, properly speak-
the supposition that all things are subject to divine provi-
ing, a fault; unless through the temptation some change is
dence and justice, as was shown above (q. 22, a. 2); for it
wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus is the action
is of the very nature of a pain to be against the will. But
of the agent in the patient. And if the tempted is changed
the evil which consists in the subtraction of the due oper-
to evil by the tempter he falls into fault.
ation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for this
Reply to Objection 4. In answer to the opposite argu-
is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect
ment, it must be said that the very nature of pain includes
action, of which he is master by the will. Therefore every
the idea of injury to the agent in himself, whereas the idea
evil in voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a
of fault includes the idea of injury to the agent in his op-
fault.
eration; and thus both are contained in evil, as including
Reply to Objection 1. Because evil is the privation of
the idea of injury.
good, and not a mere negation, as was said above (a. 3),
Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has?
Ia q. 48 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that pain has more of evil
becomes evil by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of
than fault. For fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But
pain, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “To be punished
reward has more good than merit, as its end. Therefore
is not an evil; but it is an evil to be made worthy of pun-
pain has more evil in it than fault has.
ishment.” And this because, since good absolutely con-
Objection 2. Further, that is the greater evil which is
sidered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ul-
opposed to the greater good. But pain, as was said above
timate act is operation, or the use of something possessed,
(a. 5), is opposed to the good of the agent, while fault is
it follows that the absolute good of man consists in good
opposed to the good of the action. Therefore, since the
operation, or the good use of something possessed. Now
agent is better than the action, it seems that pain is worse
we use all things by the act of the will. Hence from a
than fault.
good will, which makes a man use well what he has, man
Objection 3. Further, the privation of the end is a pain is called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a
consisting in forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil
man who has a bad will can use ill even the good he has,
of fault is privation of the order to the end. Therefore pain
as when a grammarian of his own will speaks incorrectly.
is a greater evil than fault.
Therefore, because the fault itself consists in the disor-
On the contrary, A wise workman chooses a less evil
dered act of the will, and the pain consists in the privation
in order to prevent a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb
of something used by the will, fault has more of evil in it
to save the whole body. But divine wisdom inflicts pain to
than pain has.
prevent fault. Therefore fault is a greater evil than pain.
The second reason can be taken from the fact that God
I answer that, Fault has the nature of evil more than
is the author of the evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault.
pain has; not only more than pain of sense, consisting in
And this is because the evil of pain takes away the crea-
the privation of corporeal goods, which kind of pain ap-
ture’s good, which may be either something created, as
peals to most men; but also more than any kind of pain,
sight, destroyed by blindness, or something uncreated, as
thus taking pain in its most general meaning, so as to in-
by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature for-
clude privation of grace or glory.
feits its uncreated good. But the evil of fault is properly
There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one
opposed to uncreated good; for it is opposed to the fulfil-
254
ment of the divine will, and to divine love, whereby the destroyed by fault is the more perfect good of the agent,
divine good is loved for itself, and not only as shared by
since it is the second perfection, than the good taken away
the creature. Therefore it is plain that fault has more evil
by pain, which is the first perfection.
in it than pain has.
Reply to Objection 3. Pain and fault are not to be
Reply to Objection 1. Although fault results in pain,
compared as end and order to the end; because one may
as merit in reward, yet fault is not intended on account
be deprived of both of these in some way, both by fault
of the pain, as merit is for the reward; but rather, on the
and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is removed
contrary, pain is brought about so that the fault may be
from the end and from the order to the end; by fault, inas-
avoided, and thus fault is worse than pain.
much as this privation belongs to the action which is not
Reply to Objection 2. The order of action which is
ordered to its due end.
255
FIRST PART, QUESTION 49
The Cause of Evil
(In Three Articles)
We next inquire into the cause of evil. Concerning this there are three points of inquire: (1) Whether good can be the cause of evil?
(2) Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?
(3) Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all evils?
Whether good can be the cause of evil?
Ia q. 49 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that good cannot be the
tion, either of the principal or the instrumental agent; thus
cause of evil. For it is said (Mat. 7:18): “A good tree
the defect in the movement of an animal may happen by
cannot bring forth evil fruit.”
reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the
Objection 2.
Further, one contrary cannot be the
case of children, or by reason only of the ineptitude of
cause of another. But evil is the contrary to good. There-
the instrument, as in the lame. On the other hand, evil is
fore good cannot be the cause of evil.
caused in a thing, but not in the proper effect of the agent,
Objection 3. Further, a deficient effect can proceed
sometimes by the power of the agent, sometimes by rea-
only from a deficient cause. But evil is a deficient effect.
son of a defect, either of the agent or of the matter. It is
Therefore its cause, if it has one, is deficient. But every-
caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent
thing deficient is an evil. Therefore the cause of evil can
when there necessarily follows on the form intended by
only be evil.
the agent the privation of another form; as, for instance,
Objection 4. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
when on the form of fire there follows the privation of the
that evil has no cause. Therefore good is not the cause of
form of air or of water. Therefore, as the more perfect
evil.
the fire is in strength, so much the more perfectly does it
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Julian. i, 9):
impress its own form, so also the more perfectly does it
“There is no possible source of evil except good.”
corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall
I answer that, It must be said that every evil in some
air and water comes from the perfection of the fire: but
way has a cause. For evil is the absence of the good,
this is accidental; because fire does not aim at the priva-
which is natural and due to a thing. But that anything
tion of the form of water, but at the bringing in of its own
fail from its natural and due disposition can come only
form, though by doing this it also accidentally causes the
from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition.
other. But if there is a defect in the proper effect of the
For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some
fire—as, for instance, that it fails to heat—this comes ei-
impelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except
ther by defect of the action, which implies the defect of
from some impediment. But only good can be a cause;
some principle, as was said above, or by the indisposition
because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as it is a
of the matter, which does not receive the action of the fire,
being, and every being, as such, is good.
the agent. But this very fact that it is a deficient being
And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see
is accidental to good to which of itself it belongs to act.
that the agent, the form, and the end, import some kind
Hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an acciden-
of perfection which belongs to the notion of good. Even
tal cause; and thus is good the cause of evil.
matter, as a potentiality to good, has the nature of good.
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Contra Ju-
Now that good is the cause of evil by way of the material
lian. i): “The Lord calls an evil will the evil tree, and a
cause was shown above (q. 48, a. 3). For it was shown that
good will a good tree.” Now, a good will does not pro-
good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause,
duce a morally bad act, since it is from the good will itself
rather is it a privation of form; likewise, neither has it a fi-that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless the
nal cause, but rather is it a privation of order to the proper
movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational
end; since not only the end has the nature of good, but also
creature, which is good; and thus good is the cause of
the useful, which is ordered to the end. Evil, however, has
evil.
a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally.
Reply to Objection 2. Good does not cause that evil
In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in
which is contrary to itself, but some other evil: thus the
the action otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil
goodness of the fire causes evil to the water, and man,
is caused by reason of the defect of some principle of ac-
good as to his nature, causes an act morally evil. And, as
256
explained above (q. 19, a. 9), this is by accident. More-follows in the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in
over, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes
the agent or in the matter, as was said above. But in vol-
another by accident: for instance, the exterior surround-
untary things the defect of the action comes from the will
ing cold heats (the body) through the concentration of the
actually deficient, inasmuch as it does not actually sub-
inward heat.
ject itself to its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a
Reply to Objection 3. Evil has a deficient cause in
fault, but fault follows upon it from the fact that the will
voluntary things otherwise than in natural things. For the
acts with this defect.
natural agent produces the same kind of effect as it is it-
Reply to Objection 4. Evil has no direct cause, but
self, unless it is impeded by some exterior thing; and this
only an accidental cause, as was said above.
amounts to some defect belonging to it. Hence evil never
Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?
Ia q. 49 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the supreme good,
things created is the good of the order of the universe.
God, is the cause of evil. For it is said (Is. 45:5,7): “I am
Now, the order of the universe requires, as was said above
the Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light, and
(q. 22, a. 2, ad 2; q. 48, a. 2), that there should be some
creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil.” And
things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And thus God,
Amos 3:6, “Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord
by causing in things the good of the order of the universe,
hath not done?”
consequently and as it were by accident, causes the cor-
Objection 2.
Further, the effect of the secondary
ruptions of things, according to 1 2:6: “The Lord killeth
cause is reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause
and maketh alive.” But when we read that “God hath not
of evil, as was said above (a. 1). Therefore, since God is
made death” (Wis. 1:13), the sense is that God does not
the cause of every good, as was shown above (q. 2 , a. 3;
will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order of jus-
q. 6, Aa. 1,4), it follows that also every evil is from God.
tice belongs to the order of the universe; and this requires
Objection 3. Further, as is said by the Philosopher
that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is
(Phys. ii, text 30), the cause of both safety and danger of
the author of the evil which is penalty, but not of the evil
the ship is the same. But God is the cause of the safety of
which is fault, by reason of what is said above.
all things. Therefore He is the cause of all perdition and
Reply to Objection 1. These passages refer to the evil
of all evil.
of penalty, and not to the evil of fault.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21),
Reply to Objection 2. The effect of the deficient sec-
that, “God is not the author of evil because He is not the
ondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause
cause of tending to not-being.”
as regards what it has of being and perfection, but not
I answer that, As appears from what was said (a. 1),
as regards what it has of defect; just as whatever there
the evil which consists in the defect of action is always
is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the motive
caused by the defect of the agent. But in God there is
power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not
no defect, but the highest perfection, as was shown above
come from the motive power, but from the curvature of the
(q. 4, a. 1). Hence, the evil which consists in defect of
leg. And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action
action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not
in a bad action, is reduced to God as the cause; whereas
reduced to God as to its cause.
whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the
But the evil which consists in the corruption of some
deficient secondary cause.
things is reduced to God as the cause. And this appears
Reply to Objection 3. The sinking of a ship is at-
as regards both natural things and voluntary things. For
tributed to the sailor as the cause, from the fact that he
it was said (a. 1) that some agent inasmuch as it produces
does not fulfil what the safety of the ship requires; but
by its power a form to which follows corruption and de-
God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety
fect, causes by its power that corruption and defect. But
of all. Hence there is no parity.
it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in
Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil?
Ia q. 49 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that there is one supreme
life against death; so also is the sinner against a just man.”
evil which is the cause of every evil. For contrary effects
Therefore there are many contrary principles, one of good,
have contrary causes. But contrariety is found in things,
the other of evil.
according to Ecclus. 33:15: “Good is set against evil, and
Objection 2. Further, if one contrary is in nature, so
257
is the other. But the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause.
cause of every good, as was shown above (q. 2, a. 3; q. 6,
Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one
Aa. 2,4). Therefore, also, there is a supreme evil opposed
good and the other evil, fell into this error from the same
to it as the cause of every evil.
cause, whence also arose other strange notions of the an-
Objection 3.
Further, as we find good and better
cients; namely, because they failed to consider the univer-
things, so we find evil and worse. But good and better are
sal cause of all being, and considered only the particular
so considered in relation to what is best. Therefore evil
causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they
and worse are so considered in relation to some supreme
found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own
evil.
nature, they thought that the very nature of that thing was
Objection 4. Further, everything participated is re-
evil; as, for instance, if one should say that the nature of
duced to what is essential.
But things which are evil
fire was evil because it burnt the house of a poor man. The
among us are evil not essentially, but by participation.
judgment, however, of the goodness of anything does not
Therefore we must seek for some supreme essential evil,
depend upon its order to any particular thing, but rather
which is the cause of every evil.
upon what it is in itself, and on its order to the whole uni-
Objection 5. Further, whatever is accidental is re-
verse, wherein every part has its own perfectly ordered
duced to that which is “per se.” But good is the accidental
place, as was said above (q. 47, a. 2, ad 1).
cause of evil. Therefore, we must suppose some supreme
Likewise, because they found two contrary particu-
evil which is the “per se” cause of evils. Nor can it be
lar causes of two contrary particular effects, they did not
said that evil has no “per se” cause, but only an accidental
know how to reduce these contrary particular causes to
cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist in
the universal common cause; and therefore they extended
the many, but only in the few.
the contrariety of causes even to the first principles. But
Objection 6. Further, the evil of the effect is reduced
since all contraries agree in something common, it is nec-
to the evil of the cause; because the deficient effect comes
essary to search for one common cause for them above
from the deficient cause, as was said above (Aa. 1,2). But
their own contrary proper causes; as above the contrary
we cannot proceed to infinity in this matter. Therefore, we
qualities of the elements exists the power of a heavenly
must suppose one first evil as the cause of every evil.
body; and above all things that exist, no matter how, there
On the contrary, The supreme good is the cause of
exists one first principle of being, as was shown above
every being, as was shown above (q. 2, a. 3; q. 6, a. 4).
(q. 2, a. 3).
Therefore there cannot be any principle opposed to it as
Reply to Objection 1. Contraries agree in one genus,
the cause of evils.
and they also agree in the nature of being; and therefore,
I answer that, It appears from what precedes that
although they have contrary particular cause, nevertheless
there is no one first principle of evil, as there is one first
we must come at last to one first common cause.
principle of good.
Reply to Objection 2. Privation and habit belong nat-
First, indeed, because the first principle of good is es-
urally to the same subject. Now the subject of privation
sentially good, as was shown above (q. 6, Aa. 3,4). But
is a being in potentiality, as was said above (q. 48, a. 3).
nothing can be essentially bad. For it was shown above
Hence, since evil is privation of good, as appears from
that every being, as such, is good (q. 5, a. 3); and that evil
what was said above (q. 48, Aa. 1, 2,3), it is opposed
can exist only in good as in its subject (q. 48, a. 3).
to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the
Secondly, because the first principle of good is the
supreme good, who is pure act.
highest and perfect good which pre-contains in itself all
Reply to Objection 3. Increase in intensity is in pro-
goodness, as shown above (q. 6, a. 2). But there cannot be
portion to the nature of a thing. And as the form is a per-
a supreme evil; because, as was shown above (q. 48, a. 4),
fection, so privation removes a perfection. Hence every
although evil always lessens good, yet it never wholly
form, perfection, and good is intensified by approach to
consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains, nothing
the perfect term; but privation and evil by receding from
can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philoso-
that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse,
pher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that “if the wholly evil could be,
by reason of access to the supreme evil, in the same way
it would destroy itself”; because all good being destroyed
as it is said to be good and better, by reason of access to
(which it need be for something to be wholly evil), evil
the supreme good.
itself would be taken away, since its subject is good.
Reply to Objection 4. No being is called evil by par-
Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the
ticipation, but by privation of participation. Hence it is not
idea of a first principle; both because every evil is caused
necessary to reduce it to any essential evil.
by good, as was shown above (a. 1), and because evil can
Reply to Objection 5. Evil can only have an acciden-
be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first
tal cause, as was shown above (a. 1). Hence reduction to
cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent to the direct
any ‘per se’ cause of evil is impossible. And to say that
258
evil is in the greater number is simply false. For things the senses is not the good of man as man—that is, in re-which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can
gard to reason; and more men seek good in regard to the
there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole uni-
senses than good according to reason.
verse. And again, in every species the defect of nature is
Reply to Objection 6. In the causes of evil we do
in the smaller number. In man alone does evil appear as
not proceed to infinity, but reduce all evils to some good
in the greater number; because the good of man as regards
cause, whence evil follows accidentally.
259
FIRST PART, QUESTION 50
Of the Substance of the Angels Absolutely Considered
(In Five Articles)
Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures: firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man.
Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, what belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation.
Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal things.
Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether incorporeal?
(2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of matter and form?
(3) We ask concerning their number.
(4) Of their difference from each other.
(5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.
Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal?
Ia q. 50 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that an angel is not en-
limited to “here” and “now.” Hence the perfection of the
tirely incorporeal. For what is incorporeal only as regards
universe requires the existence of an incorporeal creature.
ourselves, and not in relation to God, is not absolutely in-
The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force
corporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that
of intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction
“an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as re-
between sense and intellect, thought that nothing existed
gards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material.
in the world but what could be apprehended by sense and
Therefore he is not simply incorporeal.”
imagination. And because bodies alone fall under imagi-
Objection 2. Further, nothing is moved except a body,
nation, they supposed that no being existed except bodies,
as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, text 32). But Dama-
as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text 52,57). Thence
scene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that “an angel is an ever
came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no
movable intellectual substance.” Therefore an angel is a
spirit (Acts 23:8).
corporeal substance.
But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a rea-
Objection 3. Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct.
sonable proof that there are some incorporeal things com-
i, 7): “Every creature is limited within its own nature.”
prehensible by the intellect alone.
But to be limited belongs to bodies. Therefore, every
Reply to Objection 1. Incorporeal substances rank
creature is corporeal. Now angels are God’s creatures,
between God and corporeal creatures. Now the medium
as appears from Ps. 148:2: “Praise ye” the Lord, “all
compared to one extreme appears to be the other extreme,
His angels”; and, farther on (verse 4), “For He spoke, and
as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold; and
they were made; He commanded, and they were created.”
thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material
Therefore angels are corporeal.
and corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal ex-
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 103:4): “Who makes
isted in them.
His angels spirits.”
Reply to Objection 2. Movement is there taken in
I answer that, There must be some incorporeal crea-
the sense in which it is applied to intelligence and will.
tures. For what is principally intended by God in crea-
Therefore an angel is called an ever mobile substance, be-
tures is good, and this consists in assimilation to God
cause he is ever actually intelligent, and not as if he were
Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect to a
sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we are.
cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause
Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivoca-
according to that whereby the cause produces the effect;
tion.
as heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by
Reply to Objection 3. To be circumscribed by lo-
His intellect and will (q. 14, a. 8; q. 19, a. 4 ). Hence the
cal limits belongs to bodies only; whereas to be circum-
perfection of the universe requires that there should be in-
scribed by essential limits belongs to all creatures, both
tellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the action
corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De Spir.
of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is
Sanct. i, 7) that “although some things are not contained
260
in corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their substance.”
Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?
Ia q. 50 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that an angel is composed
real form, and another receives the spiritual form. Mat-
of matter and form. For everything which is contained un-
ter, however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded
der any genus is composed of the genus, and of the differ-
under quantity; and without quantity substance is indivisi-
ence which added to the genus makes the species. But the
ble, as Aristotle says (Phys. i, text 15). Therefore it would
genus comes from the matter, and the difference from the
follow that the matter of spiritual things is subject to quan-
form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is
tity; which cannot be. Therefore it is impossible that cor-
in a genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel
poreal and spiritual things should have the same matter.
is in the genus of substance. Therefore he is composed of
It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance
matter and form.
to have any kind of matter. For the operation belonging to
Objection 2. Further, wherever the properties of mat-
anything is according to the mode of its substance. Now
ter exist, there is matter. Now the properties of matter
to understand is an altogether immaterial operation, as ap-
are to receive and to substand; whence Boethius says (De
pears from its object, whence any act receives its species
Trin.) that “a simple form cannot be a subject”: and the
and nature. For a thing is understood according to its de-
above properties are found in the angel. Therefore an an-
gree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter
gel is composed of matter and form.
are individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend
Objection 3. Further, form is act. So what is form
as such. Hence it must be that every individual substance
only is pure act. But an angel is not pure act, for this be-
is altogether immaterial.
longs to God alone. Therefore an angel is not form only,
But things distinguished by the intellect are not neces-
but has a form in matter.
sarily distinguished in reality; because the intellect does
Objection 4. Further, form is properly limited and
not apprehend things according to their mode, but accord-
perfected by matter. So the form which is not in matter is
ing to its own mode. Hence material things which are
an infinite form. But the form of an angel is not infinite,
below our intellect exist in our intellect in a simpler mode
for every creature is finite. Therefore the form of an angel
than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on the
is in matter.
other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intel-
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
lect cannot attain to apprehend them, as they are in them-
“The first creatures are understood to be as immaterial as
selves, but by its own mode, according as it apprehends
they are incorporeal.”
composite things; and in this way also it apprehends God
I answer that, Some assert that the angels are com-
(q. 3).
posed of matter and form; which opinion Avicebron en-
Reply to Objection 1. It is difference which con-
deavored to establish in his book of the Fount of Life.
stitutes the species. Now everything is constituted in a
For he supposes that whatever things are distinguished by
species according as it is determined to some special grade
the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards incorpo-
of being because “the species of things are like numbers,”
real substance, the intellect apprehends that which distin-
which differ by addition and subtraction of unity, as the
guishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has
Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in mate-
in common with it. Hence he concludes that what distin-
rial things there is one thing which determines to a special
guishes incorporeal from corporeal substance is a kind of
grade, and that is the form; and another thing which is de-
form to it, and whatever is subject to this distinguishing
termined, and this is the matter; and hence from the latter
form, as it were something common, is its matter. There-
the “genus” is derived, and from the former the “differ-
fore, he asserts the universal matter of spiritual and cor-
ence.” Whereas in immaterial things there is no separate
poreal things is the same; so that it must be understood
determinator and thing determined; each thing by its own
that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the
self holds a determinate grade in being; and therefore in
matter of spiritual things, in the same way as the form of
them “genus” and “difference” are not derived from dif-
quantity is impressed in the matter of corporeal things.
ferent things, but from one and the same. Nevertheless,
But one glance is enough to show that there cannot
this differs in our mode of conception; for, inasmuch as
be one matter of spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is
our intellect considers it as indeterminate, it derives the
not possible that a spiritual and a corporeal form should be
idea of their “genus”; and inasmuch as it considers it de-
received into the same part of matter, otherwise one and
terminately, it derives the idea of their “difference.”
the same thing would be corporeal and spiritual. Hence it
Reply to Objection 2. This reason is given in the book
would follow that one part of matter receives the corpo-
on the Fount of Life, and it would be cogent, supposing
261
that the receptive mode of the intellect and of matter were an angel is composed of, “whereby he is,” and “what is,”
the same. But this is clearly false. For matter receives the
or “existence,” and “what is,” as Boethius says. For “what
form, that thereby it may be constituted in some species,
is,” is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But the intel-whereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the
lect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise
runner runs. But in God “existence” and “what is” are not
the opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would
different as was explained above (q. 3, a. 4). Hence God
be true, to the effect that we know earth by earth, and fire
alone is pure act.
by fire. But the intelligible form is in the intellect accord-
Reply to Objection 4. Every creature is simply finite,
ing to the very nature of a form; for as such is it so known
inasmuch as its existence is not absolutely subsisting, but
by the intellect. Hence such a way of receiving is not that
is limited to some nature to which it belongs. But there
of matter, but of an immaterial substance.
is nothing against a creature being considered relatively
Reply to Objection 3. Although there is no compo-
infinite. Material creatures are infinite on the part of mat-
sition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and
ter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the matter
potentiality. And this can be made evident if we consider
which receives it. But immaterial created substances are
the nature of material things which contain a twofold com-
finite in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense
position. The first is that of form and matter, whereby the
that their forms are not received in anything else; as if we
nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its
were to say, for example, that whiteness existing separate
own existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature
is infinite as regards the nature of whiteness, forasmuch as
itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act.
it is not contracted to any one subject; while its “being” is
Therefore if there be no matter, and supposing that the
finite as determined to some one special nature.
form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still
Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that “intel-
remains the relation of the form to its very existence, as of
ligence is finite from above,” as receiving its being from
potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is un-
above itself, and is “infinite from below,” as not received
derstood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that
in any matter.
Whether the angels exist in any great number?
Ia q. 50 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels are not in
ing to the requirements of the first bodies—that is, of the
great numbers. For number is a species of quantity, and
heavenly ones, so that in some way the shedding form of
follows the division of a continuous body. But this cannot
the aforesaid rays may be terminated in them; and hence
be in the angels, since they are incorporeal, as was shown
the same conclusion is to be drawn as before.
above (a. 1). Therefore the angels cannot exist in any great
On the contrary, It is said (Dan. 7:10): “Thousands
number.
of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousands times
Objection 2. Further, the more a thing approaches
a hundred thousand stood before Him.”
to unity, so much the less is it multiplied, as is evident
I answer that, There have been various opinions with
in numbers. But among other created natures the angelic
regard to the number of the separate substances. Plato
nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore since God
contended that the separate substances are the species of
is supremely one, it seems that there is the least possible
sensible things; as if we were to maintain that human na-
number in the angelic nature.
ture is a separate substance of itself: and according to
Objection 3. Further, the proper effect of the separate
this view it would have to be maintained that the num-
substances seems to be the movements of the heavenly
ber of the separate substances is the number of the species
bodies. But the movements of the heavenly bodies fall
of sensible things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view
within some small determined number, which we can ap-
(Metaph. i, text 31) because matter is of the very nature
prehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number
of the species of sensible things. Consequently the sep-
than the movements of the heavenly bodies.
arate substances cannot be the exemplar species of these
Objection 4. Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “all
sensible things; but have their own fixed natures, which
intelligible and intellectual substances subsist because of
are higher than the natures of sensible things. Neverthe-
the rays of the divine goodness.” But a ray is only multi-
less Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more
plied according to the different things that receive it. Now
perfect natures bear relation to these sensible things, as
it cannot be said that their matter is receptive of an intelli-
that of mover and end; and therefore he strove to find out
gible ray, since intellectual substances are immaterial, as
the number of the separate substances according to the
was shown above (a. 2). Therefore it seems that the mul-
number of the first movements.
tiplication of intellectual substances can only be accord-
But since this appears to militate against the teach-
262
ings of Sacred Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to Reply to Objection 1. In the angels number is not that
bring both into harmony, held that the angels, in so far as
of discrete quantity, brought about by division of what
they are styled immaterial substances, are multiplied ac-
is continuous, but that which is caused by distinction of
cording to the number of heavenly movements or bodies,
forms; according as multitude is reckoned among the tran-
as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he contended
scendentals, as was said above (q. 30, a. 3; q. 11).
that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine message
Reply to Objection 2. From the angelic nature being
are styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural
the nighest unto God, it must needs have least of multi-
things, which manifest God’s almighty power. It is, how-
tude in its composition, but not so as to be found in few
ever, quite foreign to the custom of the Scriptures for the
subjects.
powers of irrational things to be designated as angels.
Reply to Objection 3. This is Aristotle’s argument
Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch
(Metaph. xii, text 44), and it would conclude necessarily
as they are immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great
if the separate substances were made for corporeal sub-
number, far beyond all material multitude. This is what
stances. For thus the immaterial substances would exist
Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier.
xiv): “There are many
to no purpose, unless some movement from them were to
blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences, surpassing
appear in corporeal things. But it is not true that the im-
the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers.”
material substances exist on account of the corporeal, be-
The reason whereof is this, because, since it is the per-
cause the end is nobler than the means to the end. Hence
fection of the universe that God chiefly intends in the cre-
Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, text 44) that this is not a nec-
ation of things, the more perfect some things are, in so
essary argument, but a probable one. He was forced to
much greater an excess are they created by God. Now, as
make use of this argument, since only through sensible
in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their mag-
things can we come to know intelligible ones.
nitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to
Reply to Objection 4. This argument comes from the
their multitude. We see, in fact, that incorruptible bodies,
opinion of such as hold that matter is the cause of the dis-
exceed corruptible bodies almost incomparably in mag-
tinction of things; but this was refuted above (q. 47, a. 1).
nitude; for the entire sphere of things active and passive
Accordingly, the multiplication of the angels is not to be
is something very small in comparison with the heavenly
taken according to matter, nor according to bodies, but ac-
bodies. Hence it is reasonable to conclude that the imma-
cording to the divine wisdom devising the various orders
terial substances as it were incomparably exceed material
of immaterial substances.
substances as to multitude.
Whether the angels differ in species?
Ia q. 50 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels do not dif-
such thing as “first” and “second” [prius et posterius], as
fer in species. For since the “difference” is nobler than
the Philosopher says (Metaph. iii, text 2). But in the an-
the ‘genus,’ all things which agree in what is noblest in
gels even of the one order there are first, middle, and last,
them, agree likewise in their ultimate constitutive differ-
as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x). Therefore the angels
ence; and so they are the same according to species. But
are not of the same species.
all angels agree in what is noblest in them—that is to
I answer that, Some have said that all spiritual sub-
say, in intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one
stances, even souls, are of the one species. Others, again,
species.
that all the angels are of the one species, but not souls;
Objection 2. Further, more and less do not change a
while others allege that all the angels of one hierarchy, or
species. But the angels seem to differ only from one an-
even of one order, are of the one species.
other according to more and less—namely, as one is sim-
But this is impossible. For such things as agree in
pler than another, and of keener intellect. Therefore the
species but differ in number, agree in form, but are distin-
angels do not differ specifically.
guished materially. If, therefore, the angels be not com-
Objection 3.
Further, soul and angel are contra-
posed of matter and form, as was said above (a. 2), it
distinguished mutually from each other. But all souls are
follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one
of the one species. So therefore are the angels.
species; just as it would be impossible for there to be sev-
Objection 4. Further, the more perfect a thing is in na-
eral whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since white-
ture, the more ought it to be multiplied. But this would not
nesses are not several, except in so far as they are in sev-
be so if there were but one individual under one species.
eral substances. And if the angels had matter, not even
Therefore there are many angels of one species.
then could there be several angels of one species. For it
On the contrary, In things of one species there is no
would be necessary for matter to be the principle of dis-
263
tinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to Reply to Objection 2.
More and less change the
the division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but
species, not according as they are caused by the inten-
according to the diversity of their powers; and such diver-
sity or remissness of one form, but according as they are
sity of matter causes diversity not merely of species, but
caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance, if we
of genus.
say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way the
Reply to Objection 1. “Difference” is nobler than
angels are diversified according to more or less.
“genus,” as the determined is more noble than the unde-
Reply to Objection 3. The good of the species pre-
termined, and the proper than the common, but not as one
ponderates over the good of the individual. Hence it is
nature is nobler than another; otherwise it would be nec-
much better for the species to be multiplied in the angels
essary that all irrational animals be of the same species;
than for individuals to be multiplied in the one species.
or that there should be in them some form which is higher
Reply to Objection 4.
Numerical multiplication,
than the sensible soul. Therefore irrational animals differ
since it can be drawn out infinitely, is not intended by the
in species according to the various determined degrees of
agent, but only specific multiplication, as was said above
sensitive nature; and in like manner all the angels differ
(q. 47, a. 3). Hence the perfection of the angelic nature
in species according to the diverse degrees of intellectual
calls for the multiplying of species, but not for the multi-
nature.
plying of individuals in one species.
Whether the angels are incorruptible?
Ia q. 50 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels are not
form: whereas matter is an actual being by the form. Con-
incorruptible; for Damascene, speaking of the angel, says
sequently a subject composed of matter and form ceases
(De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that he is “an intellectual substance,
to be actually when the form is separated from the matter.
partaking of immortality by favor, and not by nature.”
But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the
Objection 2. Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: “O
angels, as was said above (a. 2), it cannot lose its being.
gods of gods, whose maker and father am I: You are in-
Therefore, the angel’s immateriality is the cause why it is
deed my works, dissoluble by nature, yet indissoluble be-
incorruptible by its own nature.
cause I so will it.” But gods such as these can only be
A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from
understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are cor-
its intellectual operation; for since everything acts accord-
ruptible by their nature
ing as it is actual, the operation of a thing indicates its
Objection 3. Further, according to Gregory (Moral.
mode of being. Now the species and nature of the oper-
xvi), “all things would tend towards nothing, unless the
ation is understood from the object. But an intelligible
hand of the Almighty preserved them.” But what can be
object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every in-
brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore, since the an-
tellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature.
gels were made by God, it would appear that they are cor-
Reply to Objection 1. Damascene is dealing with per-
ruptible of their own nature.
fect immortality, which includes complete immutability;
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
since “every change is a kind of death,” as Augustine says
the intellectual substances “have unfailing life, being free
(Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain perfect immutabil-
from all corruption, death, matter, and generation.”
ity only by favor, as will appear later (q. 62).
I answer that, It must necessarily be maintained that
Reply to Objection 2. By the expression ‘gods’ Plato
the angels are incorruptible of their own nature. The rea-
understands the heavenly bodies, which he supposed to
son for this is, that nothing is corrupted except by its form
be made up of elements, and therefore dissoluble of their
being separated from the matter. Hence, since an angel is
own nature; yet they are for ever preserved in existence by
a subsisting form, as is clear from what was said above
the Divine will.
(a. 2), it is impossible for its substance to be corrupt-
Reply to Objection 3. As was observed above (q. 44,
ible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can
a. 1) there is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause
never be separated from it; but what belongs to a thing,
of its necessity. Hence it is not repugnant to a necessary or
considered in relation to something else, can be separated,
incorruptible being to depend for its existence on another
when that something else is taken away, in view of which
as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that all things, even
it belonged to it. Roundness can never be taken from the
the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless preserved by
circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a bronze cir-
God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any
cle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its
principle of corruption in the angels; but that the nature
circular shape. Now to be belongs to a form considered
of the angels is dependent upon God as its cause. For
in itself; for everything is an actual being according to its
a thing is said to be corruptible not merely because God
264
can reduce it to non-existence, by withdrawing His act corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at least the
of preservation; but also because it has some principle of
potentiality of matter.
265
FIRST PART, QUESTION 51
Of the Angels in Comparison with Bodies
(In Three Articles)
We next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things; and in the first place about their comparison with bodies; secondly, of the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, thirdly, of their comparison with local movement.
Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them?
(2) Whether they assume bodies?
(3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?
Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them?
Ia q. 51 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that angels have bodies
the genus of intellectual substances, not having the ful-
naturally united to them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i):
ness of knowledge in its own nature, but acquiring it from
“It is God’s attribute alone—that is, it belongs to the Fa-
sensible things through the bodily senses, as will be ex-
ther, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as a property of nature,
plained later on (q. 84, a. 6; q. 89, a. 1). Now whenever
that He is understood to exist without any material sub-
we find something imperfect in any genus we must pre-
stance and without any companionship of corporeal ad-
suppose something perfect in that genus. Therefore in
dition.” Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super Cant.):
the intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellec-
“Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do
tual substances, which do not need to acquire knowledge
immortality, whose nature alone, neither for its own sake
from sensible things. Consequently not all intellectual
nor on account of anything else, needs the help of any cor-
substances are united to bodies; but some are quite sep-
poreal organ. But it is clear that every created spirit needs
arated from bodies, and these we call angels.
corporeal substance.” Augustine also says (Gen. ad lit.
Reply to Objection 1. As was said above (q. 50,
iii): “The demons are called animals of the atmosphere
a. 1) it was the opinion of some that every being is a
because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies.” But
body; and consequently some seem to have thought that
the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore
there were no incorporeal substances existing except as
angels have bodies naturally united to them.
united to bodies; so much so that some even held that God
Objection 2. Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev.) calls
was the soul of the world, as Augustine tells us (De Civ.
an angel a rational animal. But every animal is composed
Dei vii). As this is contrary to Catholic Faith, which as-
of body and soul. Therefore angels have bodies naturally
serts that God is exalted above all things, according to Ps.
united to them.
8:2: “Thy magnificence is exalted beyond the heavens”;
Objection 3. Further, life is more perfect in the angels Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of God, fol-than in souls. But the soul not only lives, but gives life to
lowed the above opinion of others regarding the other sub-
the body. Therefore the angels animate bodies which are
stances; being deceived here as he was also in many other
naturally united to them.
points, by following the opinions of the ancient philoso-
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
phers. Bernard’s expression can be explained, that the cre-
“the angels are understood to be incorporeal.”
ated spirit needs some bodily instrument, which is not nat-
I answer that, The angels have not bodies naturally
urally united to it, but assumed for some purpose, as will
united to them. For whatever belongs to any nature as an
be explained (a. 2). Augustine speaks, not as asserting the
accident is not found universally in that nature; thus, for
fact, but merely using the opinion of the Platonists, who
instance, to have wings, because it is not of the essence
maintained that there are some aerial animals, which they
of an animal, does not belong to every animal. Now since
termed demons.
to understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corpo-
Reply to Objection 2. Gregory calls the angel a ratio-
real energy, as will be shown later (q. 75, a. 2), it fol-
nal animal metaphorically, on account of the likeness to
lows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature
the rational nature.
of an intellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental
Reply to Objection 3. To give life effectively is a per-
to some intellectual substance on account of something
fection simply speaking; hence it belongs to God, as is
else. Even so it belongs to the human soul to be united
said (1 Kings 2:6): “The Lord killeth, and maketh alive.”
to a body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in
But to give life formally belongs to a substance which is
266
part of some nature, and which has not within itself the which is not united to a body is more perfect than one
full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual substance
which is united to a body.
Whether angels assume bodies?
Ia q. 51 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that angels do not assume
gel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all present. From
bodies. For there is nothing superfluous in the work of an
all this it is clearly shown that such apparitions were be-
angel, as there is nothing of the kind in the work of na-
held by bodily vision, whereby the object seen exists out-
ture. But it would be superfluous for the angels to assume
side the person beholding it, and can accordingly be seen
bodies, because an angel has no need for a body, since his
by all. Now by such a vision only a body can be beheld.
own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel
Consequently, since the angels are not bodies, nor have
does not assume a body.
they bodies naturally united with them, as is clear from
Objection 2. Further, every assumption is terminated
what has been said (a. 1; q. 50, a. 1), it follows that they
in some union; because to assume implies a taking to one-
sometimes assume bodies.
self [ad se sumere]. But a body is not united to an angel as
Reply to Objection 1. Angels need an assumed body,
to a form, as stated (a. 1); while in so far as it is united to not for themselves, but on our account; that by conversing
the angel as to a mover, it is not said to be assumed, other-
familiarly with men they may give evidence of that in-
wise it would follow that all bodies moved by the angels
tellectual companionship which men expect to have with
are assumed by them. Therefore the angels do not assume
them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed
bodies.
bodies under the Old Law was a figurative indication that
Objection 3. Further, angels do not assume bodies
the Word of God would take a human body; because all
from the earth or water, or they could not suddenly dis-
the apparitions in the Old Testament were ordained to that
appear; nor again from fire, otherwise they would burn
one whereby the Son of God appeared in the flesh.
whatever things they touched; nor again from air, because
Reply to Objection 2. The body assumed is united
air is without shape or color. Therefore the angels do not
to the angel not as its form, nor merely as its mover, but
assume bodies.
as its mover represented by the assumed movable body.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi)
For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties of intelligible
that angels appeared to Abraham under assumed bodies.
things are set forth by the likenesses of things sensible,
I answer that, Some have maintained that the angels
in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so
never assume bodies, but that all that we read in Scripture
fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligi-
of apparitions of angels happened in prophetic vision—
ble properties of an angel. And this is what we mean by
that is, according to imagination. But this is contrary to
an angel assuming a body.
the intent of Scripture; for whatever is beheld in imaginary
Reply to Objection 3. Although air as long as it is in
vision is only in the beholder’s imagination, and conse-
a state of rarefaction has neither shape nor color, yet when
quently is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine Scripture
condensed it can both be shaped and colored as appears in
from time to time introduces angels so apparent as to be
the clouds. Even so the angels assume bodies of air, con-
seen commonly by all; just as the angels who appeared to
densing it by the Divine power in so far as is needful for
Abraham were seen by him and by his whole family, by
forming the assumed body.
Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom; in like manner the an-
Whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?
Ia q. 51 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels exercise
out a purpose in the body assumed by the angel, if he per-
functions of life in assumed bodies. For pretence is un-
ceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the angel
becoming in angels of truth. But it would be pretence if
perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most spe-
the body assumed by them, which seems to live and to
cial function of life.
exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions.
Objection 3. Further, to move hither and thither is one
Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in the as-
of the functions of life, as the Philosopher says (De An-
sumed body.
ima ii). But the angels are manifestly seen to move in their
Objection 2. Further, in the works of the angels there
assumed bodies. For it was said (Gn. 18:16) that “Abra-
is nothing without a purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the
ham walked with” the angels, who had appeared to him,
other instruments of the senses, would be fashioned with-
“bringing them on the way”; and when Tobias said to the
267
angel (Tob. 5:7,8): “Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the properties of such men would lead us to men, and not
the city of Medes?” he answered: “I know it; and I have
to angels.
often walked through all the ways thereof.” Therefore the
Reply to Objection 2. Sensation is entirely a vital
angels often exercise functions of life in assumed bodies.
function. Consequently it can in no way be said that the
Objection 4. Further, speech is the function of a liv-
angels perceive through the organs of their assumed bod-
ing subject, for it is produced by the voice, while the voice
ies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned in vain; for they are
itself is a sound conveyed from the mouth. But it is evi-
not fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them,
dent from many passages of Sacred Scripture that angels
but to this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual
spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in their assumed bod-
powers of the angels may be made manifest; just as by the
ies they exercise functions of life.
eye the power of the angel’s knowledge is pointed out, and
Objection 5. Further, eating is a purely animal func-
other powers by the other members, as Dionysius teaches
tion. Hence the Lord after His Resurrection ate with His
(Coel. Hier.).
disciples in proof of having resumed life (Lk. 24). Now
Reply to Objection 3. Movement coming from a
when angels appeared in their assumed bodies they ate,
united mover is a proper function of life; but the bodies as-
and Abraham offered them food, after having previously
sumed by the angels are not thus moved, since the angels
adored them as God (Gn. 18). Therefore the angels exer-
are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved accidentally,
cise functions of life in assumed bodies.
when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as
Objection 6. Further, to beget offspring is a vital act.
movers are in the moved; and they are here in such a way
But this has befallen the angels in their assumed bodies;
as not to be elsewhere which cannot be said of God. Ac-
for it is related: “After the sons of God went in to the
cordingly, although God is not moved when the things are
daughters of men, and they brought forth children, these
moved in which He exists, since He is everywhere; yet the
are the mighty men of old, men of renown” (Gn. 6:4).
angels are moved accidentally according to the movement
Consequently the angels exercised vital functions in their
of the bodies assumed. But they are not moved accord-
assumed bodies.
ing to the movement of the heavenly bodies, even though
On the contrary, The bodies assumed by angels have
they be in them as the movers in the thing moved, because
no life, as was stated in the previous article (ad 3). There-
the heavenly bodies do not change place in their entirety;
fore they cannot exercise functions of life through as-
nor for the spirit which moves the world is there any fixed
sumed bodies.
locality according to any restricted part of the world’s sub-
I answer that, Some functions of living subjects
stance, which now is in the east, and now in the west, but
have something in common with other operations; just as
according to a fixed quarter; because “the moving energy
speech, which is the function of a living creature, agrees
is always in the east,” as stated in Phys. viii, text 84.
with other sounds of inanimate things, in so far as it is
Reply to Objection 4. Properly speaking, the angels
sound; and walking agrees with other movements, in so
do not talk through their assumed bodies; yet there is a
far as it is movement. Consequently vital functions can
semblance of speech, in so far as they fashion sounds in
be performed in assumed bodies by the angels, as to that
the air like to human voices.
which is common in such operations; but not as to that
Reply to Objection 5. Properly speaking, the angels
which is special to living subjects; because, according to
cannot be said to eat, because eating involves the taking
the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), “that which has the
of food convertible into the substance of the eater.
faculty has the action.” Hence nothing can have a function
Although after the Resurrection food was not con-
of life except what has life, which is the potential principle
verted into the substance of Christ’s body, but resolved
of such action.
into pre-existing matter; nevertheless Christ had a body
Reply to Objection 1. As it is in no wise contrary
of such a true nature that food could be changed into it;
to truth for intelligible things to be set forth in Scripture
hence it was a true eating. But the food taken by angels
under sensible figures, since it is not said for the pur-
was neither changed into the assumed body, nor was the
pose of maintaining that intelligible things are sensible,
body of such a nature that food could be changed into it;
but in order that properties of intelligible things may be
consequently, it was not a true eating, but figurative of
understood according to similitude through sensible fig-
spiritual eating. This is what the angel said to Tobias:
ures; so it is not contrary to the truth of the holy angels
“When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat and to
that through their assumed bodies they appear to be liv-
drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink” (Tob. 12:19).
ing men, although they are really not. For the bodies are
Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men,
assumed merely for this purpose, that the spiritual prop-
in whom, nevertheless, he worshipped God, as God is
erties and works of the angels may be manifested by the
wont to be in the prophets, as Augustine says (De Civ.
properties of man and of his works. This could not so fit-
Dei xvi).
tingly be done if they were to assume true men; because
Reply to Objection 6. As Augustine says (De Civ.
268
Dei xv): “Many persons affirm that they have had the ex-it to be wondered at that giants should be born of them;
perience, or have heard from such as have experienced it,
for they were not all giants, albeit there were many more
that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the common folk call in-
before than after the deluge.” Still if some are occasion-
cubi, have often presented themselves before women, and
ally begotten from demons, it is not from the seed of such
have sought and procured intercourse with them. Hence
demons, nor from their assumed bodies, but from the seed
it is folly to deny it. But God’s holy angels could not
of men taken for the purpose; as when the demon assumes
fall in such fashion before the deluge. Hence by the sons
first the form of a woman, and afterwards of a man; just as
of God are to be understood the sons of Seth, who were
they take the seed of other things for other generating pur-
good; while by the daughters of men the Scripture des-
poses, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), so that the person
ignates those who sprang from the race of Cain. Nor is
born is not the child of a demon, but of a man.
269
FIRST PART, QUESTION 52
Of the Angels in Relation to Place
(In Three Articles)
We now inquire into the place of the angels. Touching this there are three subjects of inquiry: (1) Is the angel in a place?
(2) Can he be in several places at once?
(3) Can several angels be in the same place?
Whether an angel is in a place?
Ia q. 52 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that an angel is not in
holy angels who dwell herein, keep us in peace.”
a place. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): “The com-
I answer that, It is befitting an angel to be in a place; mon opinion of the learned is that things incorporeal are
yet an angel and a body are said to be in a place in quite
not in a place.” And again, Aristotle observes (Phys. iv,
a different sense. A body is said to be in a place in such a
text 48,57) that “it is not everything existing which is in
way that it is applied to such place according to the con-
a place, but only a movable body.” But an angel is not a
tact of dimensive quantity; but there is no such quantity
body, as was shown above (q. 50). Therefore an angel is
in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently an
not in a place.
angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of
Objection 2. Further, place is a “quantity having po-
the angelic power in any manner whatever to any place.
sition.” But everything which is in a place has some posi-
Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel
tion. Now to have a position cannot benefit an angel, since
can be deemed commensurate with a place, or that he oc-
his substance is devoid of quantity, the proper difference
cupies a space in the continuous; for this is proper to a
of which is to have a position. Therefore an angel is not
located body which is endowed with dimensive quantity.
in a place.
In similar fashion it is not necessary on this account for
Objection 3. Further, to be in a place is to be mea-
the angel to be contained by a place; because an incor-
sured and to be contained by such place, as is evident from
poreal substance virtually contains the thing with which
the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 14,119). But an angel can
it comes into contact, and is not contained by it: for the
neither be measured nor contained by a place, because the
soul is in the body as containing it, not as contained by it.
container is more formal than the contained; as air with
In the same way an angel is said to be in a place which
regard to water (Phys. iv, text 35,49). Therefore an angel
is corporeal, not as the thing contained, but as somehow
is not in a place.
containing it.
On the contrary, It is said in the Collect∗: “Let Thy
And hereby we have the answers to the objections.
Whether an angel can be in several places at once?
Ia q. 52 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that an angel can be in
is evident from the angel destroying Sodom (Gn. 19:25).
several places at once. For an angel is not less endowed
Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time.
with power than the soul. But the soul is in several places
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii)
at once, for it is entirely in every part of the body, as Au-
that “while the angels are in heaven, they are not on earth.”
gustine says (De Trin. vi). Therefore an angel can be in
I answer that, An angel’s power and nature are finite,
several places at once.
whereas the Divine power and essence, which is the uni-
Objection 2. Further, an angel is in the body which
versal cause of all things, is infinite: consequently God
he assumes; and, since the body which he assumes is con-
through His power touches all things, and is not merely
tinuous, it would appear that he is in every part thereof.
present in some places, but is everywhere. Now since the
But according to the various parts there are various places.
angel’s power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but
Therefore the angel is at one time in various places.
to one determined thing. For whatever is compared with
Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
one power must be compared therewith as one determined
ii) that “where the angel operates, there he is.” But oc-
thing. Consequently since all being is compared as one
casionally he operates in several places at one time, as
thing to God’s universal power, so is one particular being
∗ Prayer at Compline, Dominican Breviary
270
compared as one with the angelic power. Hence, since the power is applied only to what is first moved by him. Now
angel is in a place by the application of his power to the
there is one part of the heavens in which there is move-
place, it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several
ment first of all, namely, the part to the east: hence the
places, but in only one place.
Philosopher (Phys. vii, text 84) attributes the power of the
Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For
heavenly mover to the part which is in the east. Secondly,
some who were unable to go beyond the reach of their
because philosophers do not hold that one separate sub-
imaginations supposed the indivisibility of the angel to be
stance moves all the spheres immediately. Hence it need
like that of a point; consequently they thought that an an-
not be everywhere.
gel could be only in a place which is a point. But they
So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains
were manifestly deceived, because a point is something
quite differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For
indivisible, yet having its situation; whereas the angel is
a body is in a place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is
indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situa-
measured by the place. An angel, however, is not there
tion. Consequently there is no occasion for determining
in a circumscribed fashion, since he is not measured by
in his regard one indivisible place as to situation: any
the place, but definitively, because he is in a place in such
place which is either divisible or indivisible, great or small
a manner that he is not in another. But God is neither
suffices, according as to his own free-will he applies his
circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is ev-
power to a great or to a small body. So the entire body
erywhere.
to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one
From this we can easily gather an answer to the ob-
place to him.
jections: because the entire subject to which the angelic
Neither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it neces-
power is immediately applied, is reputed as one place,
sary for him to be everywhere. First of all, because his
even though it be continuous.
Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place?
Ia q. 52 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that several angels can be
two complete causes to be the causes immediately of one
at the same time in the same place. For several bodies can-
and the same thing. This is evident in every class of
not be at the same time in the same place, because they fill
causes: for there is one proximate form of one thing, and
the place. But the angels do not fill a place, because only a
there is one proximate mover, although there may be sev-
body fills a place, so that it be not empty, as appears from
eral remote movers. Nor can it be objected that several
the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 52,58). Therefore several
individuals may row a boat, since no one of them is a per-
angels can be in the one place.
fect mover, because no one man’s strength is sufficient for
Objection 2. Further, there is a greater difference be-
moving the boat; while all together are as one mover, in so
tween an angel and a body than there is between two an-
far as their united strengths all combine in producing the
gels. But an angel and a body are at the one time in the
one movement. Hence, since the angel is said to be in one
one place: because there is no place which is not filled
place by the fact that his power touches the place imme-
with a sensible body, as we find proved in Phys. iv, text.
diately by way of a perfect container, as was said (a. 1),
58. Much more, then, can two angels be in the same place.
there can be but one angel in one place.
Objection 3. Further, the soul is in every part of the
Reply to Objection 1. Several angels are not hindered
body, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi). But demons,
from being in the same place because of their filling the
although they do not obsess souls, do obsess bodies occa-
place; but for another reason, as has been said.
sionally; and thus the soul and the demon are at the one
Reply to Objection 2. An angel and a body are not
time in the same place; and consequently for the same
in a place in the same way; hence the conclusion does not
reason all other spiritual substances.
follow.
On the contrary, There are not two souls in the same
Reply to Objection 3. Not even a demon and a soul
body. Therefore for a like reason there are not two angels
are compared to a body according to the same relation of
in the same place.
causality; since the soul is its form, while the demon is
I answer that, There are not two angels in the same
not. Hence the inference does not follow.
place. The reason of this is because it is impossible for
271
FIRST PART, QUESTION 53
Of the Local Movement of the Angels
(In Three Articles)
We must next consider the local movement of the angels; under which heading there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether an angel can be moved locally.
(2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes through intervening space?
(3) Whether the angel’s movement is in time or instantaneous?
Whether an angel can be moved locally?
Ia q. 53 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that an angel cannot be moved
angel in a place is nothing else than the various contacts
locally. For, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text
of various places successively, and not at once; because an
32,86) “nothing which is devoid of parts is moved”; be-
angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was said
cause, while it is in the term “wherefrom,” it is not moved;
above (q. 52, a. 2). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to
nor while it is in the term “whereto,” for it is then already
be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity
moved; consequently it remains that everything which is
can be found in such contacts. Because, as was said above
moved, while it is being moved, is partly in the term
(q. 52, a. 1), there is nothing to hinder us from assigning
“wherefrom” and partly in the term “whereto.” But an an-
a divisible place to an angel according to virtual contact;
gel is without parts. Therefore an angel cannot be moved
just as a divisible place is assigned to a body by contact
locally.
of magnitude. Hence as a body successively, and not all
Objection 2. Further, movement is “the act of an im-
at once, quits the place in which it was before, and thence
perfect being,” as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14).
arises continuity in its local movement; so likewise an an-
But a beatified angel is not imperfect. Consequently a be-
gel can successively quit the divisible place in which he
atified angel is not moved locally.
was before, and so his movement will be continuous. And
Objection 3. Further, movement is simply because of
he can all at once quit the whole place, and in the same
want. But the holy angels have no want. Therefore the
instant apply himself to the whole of another place, and
holy angels are not moved locally.
thus his movement will not be continuous.
On the contrary, It is the same thing for a beatified
Reply to Objection 1. This argument fails of its pur-
angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But
pose for a twofold reason. First of all, because Aristotle’s
it must necessarily be said that a blessed soul is moved
demonstration deals with what is indivisible according to
locally, because it is an article of faith that Christ’s soul
quantity, to which responds a place necessarily indivisi-
descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified angel is moved
ble. And this cannot be said of an angel.
locally.
Secondly, because Aristotle’s demonstration deals
I answer that, A beatified angel can be moved locally.
with movement which is continuous. For if the move-
As, however, to be in a place belongs equivocally to a
ment were not continuous, it might be said that a thing
body and to an angel, so likewise does local movement.
is moved where it is in the term “wherefrom,” and while
For a body is in a place in so far as it is contained under
it is in the term “whereto”: because the very succession
the place, and is commensurate with the place. Hence it is
of “wheres,” regarding the same thing, would be called
necessary for local movement of a body to be commensu-
movement: hence, in whichever of those “wheres” the
rate with the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it
thing might be, it could be said to be moved. But the con-
is that the continuity of movement is according to the con-
tinuity of movement prevents this; because nothing which
tinuity of magnitude; and according to priority and poste-
is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is
riority of local movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys.
not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing
iv, text 99). But an angel is not in a place as commensurate
moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it
and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is not
is being moved; but partly in the one, and partly in the
necessary for the local movement of an angel to be com-
other. Therefore, according as the angel’s movement is
mensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the
not continuous, Aristotle’s demonstration does not hold
exigency of the place, so as to have continuity therefrom;
good. But according as the angel’s movement is held to
but it is a non-continuous movement. For since the an-
be continuous, it can be so granted, that, while an angel
gel is in a place only by virtual contact, as was said above
is in movement, he is partly in the term “wherefrom,” and
(q. 52, a. 1), it follows necessarily that the movement of an
partly in the term “whereto” (yet so that such partiality
272
be not referred to the angel’s substance, but to the place); to something which is divisible.
because at the outset of his continuous movement the an-
Reply to Objection 2. The movement of that which
gel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins
is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect agent. But the
to be moved; but while he is actually in movement, he is
movement which is by application of energy is the act of
in part of the first place which he quits, and in part of the
one in act: because energy implies actuality.
second place which he occupies. This very fact that he
Reply to Objection 3. The movement of that which is
can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel
in potentiality is the act of an imperfect but the movement
from this, that he can occupy a divisible place by apply-
of what is in act is not for any need of its own, but for an-
ing his power; as a body does by application of magni-
other’s need. In this way, because of our need, the angel
tude. Hence it follows regarding a body which is movable
is moved locally, according to Heb. 1:14: “They are all∗
according to place, that it is divisible according to magni-
ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who receive
tude; but regarding an angel, that his power can be applied
the inheritance of salvation.”
Whether an angel passes through intermediate space?
Ia q. 53 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that an angel does not
out going through the middle: which is evident thus. Be-
pass through intermediate space.
For everything that
tween the two extreme limits there are infinite intermedi-
passes through a middle space first travels along a place of
ate places; whether the places be taken as divisible or as
its own dimensions, before passing through a greater. But
indivisible. This is clearly evident with regard to places
the place responding to an angel, who is indivisible, is
which are indivisible; because between every two points
confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes through
that are infinite intermediate points, since no two points
middle space, he must reckon infinite points in his move-
follow one another without a middle, as is proved in Phys.
ment: which is not possible.
vi, text. 1. And the same must of necessity be said of
Objection 2. Further, an angel is of simpler substance
divisible places: and this is shown from the continuous
than the soul. But our soul by taking thought can pass
movement of a body. For a body is not moved from place
from one extreme to another without going through the
to place except in time. But in the whole time which mea-
middle: for I can think of France and afterwards of Syria,
sures the movement of a body, there are not two “nows” in
without ever thinking of Italy, which stands between them.
which the body moved is not in one place and in another;
Therefore much more can an angel pass from one extreme
for if it were in one and the same place in two “nows,”
to another without going through the middle.
it would follow that it would be at rest there; since to be
On the contrary, If the angel be moved from one
at rest is nothing else than to be in the same place now
place to another, then, when he is in the term “whither,”
and previously. Therefore since there are infinite “nows”
he is no longer in motion, but is changed. But a process
between the first and the last “now” of the time which
of changing precedes every actual change: consequently
measures the movement, there must be infinite places be-
he was being moved while existing in some place. But he
tween the first from which the movement begins, and the
was not moved so long as he was in the term “whence.”
last where the movement ceases. This again is made ev-
Therefore, he was moved while he was in mid-space: and
ident from sensible experience. Let there be a body of
so it was necessary for him to pass through intervening
a palm’s length, and let there be a plane measuring two
space.
palms, along which it travels; it is evident that the first
I answer that, As was observed above in the preced-
place from which the movement starts is that of the one
ing article, the local motion of an angel can be continu-
palm; and the place wherein the movement ends is that
ous, and non-continuous. If it be continuous, the angel
of the other palm. Now it is clear that when it begins to
cannot pass from one extreme to another without passing
move, it gradually quits the first palm and enters the sec-
through the mid-space; because, as is said by the Philoso-
ond. According, then, as the magnitude of the palm is
pher (Phys. v, text 22; vi, text 77), “The middle is that into
divided, even so are the intermediate places multiplied;
which a thing which is continually moved comes, before
because every distinct point in the magnitude of the first
arriving at the last into which it is moved”; because the or-
palm is the beginning of a place, and a distinct point in the
der of first and last in continuous movement, is according
magnitude of the other palm is the limit of the same. Ac-
to the order of the first and last in magnitude, as he says
cordingly, since magnitude is infinitely divisible and the
(Phys. iv, text 99).
points in every magnitude are likewise infinite in poten-
But if an angel’s movement be not continuous, it is
tiality, it follows that between every two places there are
possible for him to pass from one extreme to another with-
infinite intermediate places.
∗ Vulg.: ‘Are they not all. . . ?’
273
Now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the wills, either through or without the intervening place.
intermediate places by the continuity of its movement; be-
Reply to Objection 1. The place of an angel is not
cause, as the intermediate places are infinite in potential-
taken as equal to him according to magnitude, but accord-
ity, so likewise must there be reckoned some infinitudes
ing to contact of power: and so the angel’s place can be
in movement which is continuous. Consequently, if the
divisible, and is not always a mere point. Yet even the in-
movement be not continuous, then all the parts of the
termediate divisible places are infinite, as was said above:
movement will be actually numbered. If, therefore, any
but they are consumed by the continuity of the movement,
movable body be moved, but not by continuous move-
as is evident from the foregoing.
ment, it follows, either that it does not pass through all
Reply to Objection 2. While an angel is moved lo-
the intermediate places, or else that it actually numbers
cally, his essence is applied to various places: but the
infinite places: which is not possible. Accordingly, then,
soul’s essence is not applied to the things thought of, but
as the angel’s movement is not continuous, he does not
rather the things thought of are in it. So there is no com-
pass through all intermediate places.
parison.
Now, the actual passing from one extreme to the other,
Reply to Objection 3. In continuous movement the
without going through the mid-space, is quite in keeping
actual change is not a part of the movement, but its conclu-
with an angel’s nature; but not with that of a body, be-
sion; hence movement must precede change. Accordingly
cause a body is measured by and contained under a place;
such movement is through the mid-space. But in move-
hence it is bound to follow the laws of place in its move-
ment which is not continuous, the change is a part, as a
ment. But an angel’s substance is not subject to place as
unit is a part of number: hence the succession of the var-
contained thereby, but is above it as containing it: hence
ious places, even without the mid-space, constitutes such
it is under his control to apply himself to a place just as he
movement.
Whether the movement of an angel is instantaneous?
Ia q. 53 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that an angel’s movement
On the contrary, In every change there is a before and
is instantaneous. For the greater the power of the mover,
after. Now the before and after of movement is reckoned
and the less the moved resist the mover, the more rapid is
by time. Consequently every movement, even of an angel,
the movement. But the power of an angel moving himself
is in time, since there is a before and after in it.
exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves a
I answer that, Some have maintained that the local
body. Now the proportion of velocities is reckoned ac-
movement of an angel is instantaneous. They said that
cording to the lessening of the time. But between one
when an angel is moved from place to place, during the
length of time and any other length of time there is pro-
whole of the preceding time he is in the term “where-
portion. If therefore a body is moved in time, an angel is
from”; but in the last instant of such time he is in the term
moved in an instant.
“whereto.” Nor is there any need for a medium between
Objection 2. Further, the angel’s movement is sim-
the terms, just as there is no medium between time and
pler than any bodily change. But some bodily change is
the limit of time. But there is a mid-time between two
effected in an instant, such as illumination; both because
“nows” of time: hence they say that a last “now” cannot
the subject is not illuminated successively, as it gets hot
be assigned in which it was in the term “wherefrom,” just
successively; and because a ray does not reach sooner
as in illumination, and in the substantial generation of fire,
what is near than what is remote. Much more therefore
there is no last instant to be assigned in which the air was
is the angel’s movement instantaneous.
dark, or in which the matter was under the privation of the
Objection 3. Further, if an angel be moved from place
form of fire: but a last time can be assigned, so that in the
to place in time, it is manifest that in the last instant of
last instant of such time there is light in the air, or the form such time he is in the term “whereto”: but in the whole
of fire in the matter. And so illumination and substantial
of the preceding time, he is either in the place immedi-
generation are called instantaneous movements.
ately preceding, which is taken as the term “wherefrom”;
But this does not hold good in the present case; and it
or else he is partly in the one, and partly in the other, it fol-is shown thus. It is of the nature of rest that the subject in
lows that he is divisible; which is impossible. Therefore
repose be not otherwise disposed now than it was before:
during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term
and therefore in every “now” of time which measures rest,
“wherefrom.” Therefore he rests there: since to be at rest
the subject reposing is in the same “where” in the first, in
is to be in the same place now and previously, as was said
the middle, and in the last “now.” On the other hand, it
(a. 2). Therefore it follows that he is not moved except in
is of the very nature of movement for the subject moved
the last instant of time.
to be otherwise now than it was before: and therefore in
274
every “now” of time which measures movement, the mov-which have their changeableness from the movement of
able subject is in various dispositions; hence in the last
the heavens; because the angel’s movement does not de-
“now” it must have a different form from what it had be-
pend upon the movement of the heavens.
fore. So it is evident that to rest during the whole time in
Reply to Objection 1.
If the time of the angel’s
some (disposition), for instance, in whiteness, is to be in it
movement be not continuous, but a kind of succession of
in every instant of such time. Hence it is not possible for
‘nows,’ it will have no proportion to the time which mea-
anything to rest in one term during the whole of the pre-
sures the movement of corporeal things, which is contin-
ceding time, and afterwards in the last instant of that time
uous; since it is not of the same nature. If, however, it be
to be in the other term. But this is possible in movement:
continuous, it is indeed proportionable, not, indeed, be-
because to be moved in any whole time, is not to be in the
cause of the proportion of the mover and the movable, but
same disposition in every instant of that time. Therefore
on account of the proportion of the magnitudes in which
all instantaneous changes of the kind are terms of a con-
the movement exists. Besides, the swiftness of the angel’s
tinuous movement: just as generation is the term of the al-
movement is not measured by the quantity of his power,
teration of matter, and illumination is the term of the local
but according to the determination of his will.
movement of the illuminating body. Now the local move-
Reply to Objection 2. Illumination is the term of a
ment of an angel is not the term of any other continuous
movement; and is an alteration, not a local movement, as
movement, but is of itself, depending upon no other move-
though the light were understood to be moved to what is
ment. Consequently it is impossible to say that he is in any
near, before being moved to what is remote. But the an-
place during the whole time, and that in the last “now” he
gel’s movement is local, and, besides, it is not the term of
is in another place: but some “now” must be assigned in
movement; hence there is no comparison.
which he was last in the preceding place. But where there
Reply to Objection 3. This objection is based on con-
are many “nows” succeeding one another, there is neces-
tinuous time. But the same time of an angel’s movement
sarily time; since time is nothing else than the reckoning
can be non-continuous. So an angel can be in one place in
of before and after in movement. It remains, then, that the
one instant, and in another place in the next instant, with-
movement of an angel is in time. It is in continuous time if
out any time intervening. If the time of the angel’s move-
his movement be continuous, and in non-continuous time
ment be continuous, he is changed through infinite places
if his movement is non-continuous for, as was said (a. 1),
throughout the whole time which precedes the last ‘now’;
his movement can be of either kind, since the continu-
as was already shown (a. 2). Nevertheless he is partly in
ity of time comes of the continuity of movement, as the
one of the continuous places, and partly in another, not
Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99).
because his substance is susceptible of parts, but because
But that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not
his power is applied to a part of the first place and to a part the same as the time which measures the movement of the
of the second, as was said above (a. 2).
heavens, and whereby all corporeal things are measured,
275
FIRST PART, QUESTION 54
Of the Knowledge of the Angels
(In Five Articles)
After considering what belongs to the angel’s substance, we now proceed to his knowledge. This investigation will be fourfold. In the first place inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge: secondly, into his medium of knowledge: thirdly, into the objects known: and fourthly, into the manner whereby he knows them.
Under the first heading there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Is the angel’s understanding his substance?
(2) Is his being his understanding?
(3) Is his substance his power of intelligence?
(4) Is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect?
(5) Is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the intellect?
Whether an angel’s act of understanding is his substance?
Ia q. 54 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the angel’s act of un-
same as His existence and His action.
derstanding is his substance. For the angel is both higher
Besides, if an angel’s act of understanding were his
and simpler than the active intellect of a soul. But the
substance, it would be necessary for it to be subsisting.
substance of the active intellect is its own action; as is
Now a subsisting act of intelligence can be but one; just
evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and from his Com-
as an abstract thing that subsists. Consequently an angel’s
mentator∗. Therefore much more is the angel’s substance
substance would neither be distinguished from God’s sub-
his action—that is, his act of understanding.
stance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph.
in itself, nor from the substance of another angel.
xii, text 39) that “the action of the intellect is life.” But
Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding,
“since in living things to live is to be,” as he says (De An-
there could then be no degrees of understanding more or
ima ii, text 37), it seems that life is essence. Therefore
less perfectly; for this comes about through the diverse
the action of the intellect is the essence of an angel who
participation of the act of understanding.
understands.
Reply to Objection 1. When the active intellect is
Objection 3. Further, if the extremes be one, then the
said to be its own action, such predication is not essential,
middle does not differ from them; because extreme is far-
but concomitant, because, since its very nature consists in
ther from extreme than the middle is. But in an angel the
act, instantly, so far as lies in itself, action accompanies it: intellect and the object understood are the same, at least
which cannot be said of the passive intellect, for this has
in so far as he understands his own essence. Therefore
no actions until after it has been reduced to act.
the act of understanding, which is between the intellect
Reply to Objection 2. The relation between “life”
and the thing understood, is one with the substance of the
and “to live” is not the same as that between “essence”
angel who understands.
and “to be”; but rather as that between “a race” and “to
On the contrary, The action of anything differs more
run,” one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and the
from its substance than does its existence. But no crea-
other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if “to live”
ture’s existence is its substance, for this belongs to God
is “to be,” that “life” is “essence.” Although life is some-
only, as is evident from what was said above (q. 3, a. 4).
times put for the essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. x),
Therefore neither the action of an angel, nor of any other
“Memory and understanding and will are one essence, one
creature, is its substance.
life”: yet it is not taken in this sense by the Philosopher,
I answer that, It is impossible for the action of an an-
when he says that “the act of the intellect is life.”
gel, or of any creature, to be its own substance. For an ac-
Reply to Objection 3. The action which is transient,
tion is properly the actuality of a power; just as existence
passing to some extrinsic object, is really a medium be-
is the actuality of a substance or of an essence. Now it is
tween the agent and the subject receiving the action. The
impossible for anything which is not a pure act, but which
action which remains within the agent, is not really a
has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own actual-
medium between the agent and the object, but only ac-
ity: because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God
cording to the manner of expression; for it really follows
alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the
the union of the object with the agent. For the act of un-
∗ Averroes, A.D. 1126-1198
276
derstanding is brought about by the union of the object which differs from both.
understood with the one who understands it, as an effect
Whether in the angel to understand is to exist?
Ia q. 54 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that in the angel to un-
of which the object is “the good”; each of which is con-
derstand is to exist. For in living things to live is to be,
vertible with being; and so, to understand and to will, of
as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 37). But to
themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives
“understand is in a sense to live” (De Anima ii, text. 37).
its species from its object. But the act of sensation is rel-
Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.
atively infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things; Objection 2. Further, cause bears the same relation to
as sight does to all things visible. Now the being of every
cause, as effect to effect. But the form whereby the angel
creature is restricted to one in genus and species; God’s
exists is the same as the form by which he understands at
being alone is simply infinite, comprehending all things
least himself. Therefore in the angel to understand is to
in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Hence the Di-
exist.
vine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its
On the contrary, The angel’s act of understanding is
own act of will.
his movement, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
Reply to Objection 1. Life is sometimes taken for the
But to exist is not movement. Therefore in the angel to be
existence of the living subject: sometimes also for a vital
is not to understand.
operation, that is, for one whereby something is shown to
I answer that, The action of the angel, as also the
be living. In this way the Philosopher says that to under-
action of any creature, is not his existence. For as it is
stand is, in a sense, to live: for there he distinguishes the
said (Metaph. ix, text. 16), there is a twofold class of
various grades of living things according to the various
action; one which passes out to something beyond, and
functions of life.
causes passion in it, as burning and cutting; and another
Reply to Objection 2. The essence of an angel is the
which does not pass outwards, but which remains within
reason of his entire existence, but not the reason of his
the agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such actions
whole act of understanding, since he cannot understand
nothing outside is changed, but the whole action takes
everything by his essence. Consequently in its own spe-
place within the agent. It is quite clear regarding the first
cific nature as such an essence, it is compared to the ex-
kind of action that it cannot be the agent’s very existence:
istence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding
because the agent’s existence is signified as within him,
it is compared as included in the idea of a more universal
while such an action denotes something as issuing from
object, namely, truth and being. Thus it is evident, that,
the agent into the thing done. But the second action of its
although the form is the same, yet it is not the principle
own nature has infinity, either simple or relative. As an ex-
of existence and of understanding according to the same
ample of simple infinity, we have the act “to understand,”
formality. On this account it does not follow that in the
of which the object is “the true”; and the act “to will,”
angel “to be” is the same as ‘to understand.’
Whether an angel’s power of intelligence is his essence?
Ia q. 54 a. 3
Objection 1.
It would seem that in an angel the
that God made the angelic nature “nigh unto Himself,”
power or faculty of understanding is not different from
while He made primary matter “nigh unto nothing”; from
his essence. For, “mind” and “intellect” express the power
this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler nature
of understanding. But in many passages of his writings,
than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary
Dionysius styles angels “intellects” and “minds.” There-
matter is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel
fore the angel is his own power of intelligence.
his own power of intelligence.
Objection 2. Further, if the angel’s power of intelli-
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that
gence be anything besides his essence, then it must needs
“the angels are divided into substance, power, and opera-
be an accident; for that which is besides the essence of
tion.” Therefore substance, power, and operation, are all
anything, we call it accident. But “a simple form cannot
distinct in them.
be a subject,” as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an an-
I answer that, Neither in an angel nor in any creature,
gel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what
is the power or operative faculty the same as its essence:
has been previously said (q. 50, a. 2).
which is made evident thus. Since every power is ordained
Objection 3. Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says,
to an act, then according to the diversity of acts must be
277
the diversity of powers; and on this account it is said that act cannot be the subject of accident, because subject is
each proper act responds to its proper power. But in ev-
compared to accident as potentiality is to act. God alone
ery creature the essence differs from the existence, and is
is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking there.
compared to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from
But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is
what has been already said (q. 44, a. 1). Now the act to
compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject
which the operative power is compared is operation. But
of accident; and especially of such accident as follows the
in the angel to understand is not the same as to exist, nor
species: for such accident belongs to the form—whereas
is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the
an accident which belongs to the individual, and which
same as his existence. Hence the angel’s essence is not his
does not belong to the whole species, results from the mat-
power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature
ter, which is the principle of individuation. And such a
its power of operation.
simple form is an angel.
Reply to Objection 1. An angel is called “intellect”
Reply to Objection 3. The power of matter is a po-
and “mind,” because all his knowledge is intellectual:
tentiality in regard to substantial being itself, whereas the
whereas the knowledge of a soul is partly intellectual and
power of operation regards accidental being. Hence there
partly sensitive.
is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 2. A simple form which is pure
Whether there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel?
Ia q. 54 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that there is both an ac-
necessary that there should be some power capable of ren-
tive and a passive intellect in an angel. The Philosopher
dering such natures actually intelligible: and this power in
says (De Anima iii, text. 17) that, “in the soul, just as in
us is called the active intellect.
every nature, there is something whereby it can become
But each of these necessities is absent from the an-
all things, and there is something whereby it can make all
gels. They are neither sometimes understanding only in
things.” But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there
potentiality, with regard to such things as they naturally
is an active and a passive intellect in an angel.
apprehend; nor, again, are their intelligible in potentiality,
Objection 2. Further, the proper function of the pas-
but they are actually such; for they first and principally
sive intellect is to receive; whereas to enlighten is the
understand immaterial things, as will appear later (q. 84,
proper function of the active intellect, as is made clear in
a. 7; q. 85, a. 1). Therefore there cannot be an active and
De Anima iii, text. 2,3,18. But an angel receives enlight-
a passive intellect in them, except equivocally.
enment from a higher angel, and enlightens a lower one.
Reply to Objection 1. As the words themselves show,
Therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect.
the Philosopher understands those two things to be in ev-
On the contrary, The distinction of active and pas-
ery nature in which there chances to be generation or mak-
sive intellect in us is in relation to the phantasms, which
ing. Knowledge, however, is not generated in the angels,
are compared to the passive intellect as colors to the sight;
but is present naturally. Hence there is not need for admit-
but to the active intellect as colors to the light, as is clear ting an active and a passive intellect in them.
from De Anima iii, text. 18. But this is not so in the an-
Reply to Objection 2. It is the function of the ac-
gel. Therefore there is no active and passive intellect in
tive intellect to enlighten, not another intellect, but things
the angel.
which are intelligible in potentiality, in so far as by ab-
I answer that, The necessity for admitting a passive
straction it makes them to be actually intelligible. It be-
intellect in us is derived from the fact that we understand
longs to the passive intellect to be in potentiality with re-
sometimes only in potentiality, and not actually. Hence
gard to things which are naturally capable of being known,
there must exist some power, which, previous to the act
and sometimes to apprehend them actually. Hence for one
of understanding, is in potentiality to intelligible things,
angel to enlighten another does not belong to the notion
but which becomes actuated in their regard when it ap-
of an active intellect: neither does it belong to the pas-
prehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them.
sive intellect for the angel to be enlightened with regard
This is the power which is denominated the passive intel-
to supernatural mysteries, to the knowledge of which he
lect. The necessity for admitting an active intellect is due
is sometimes in potentiality. But if anyone wishes to call
to this—that the natures of the material things which we
these by the names of active and passive intellect, he will
understand do not exist outside the soul, as immaterial and
then be speaking equivocally; and it is not about names
actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in potential-
that we need trouble.
ity so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently it is
278
Whether there is only intellectual knowledge in the angels?
Ia q. 54 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the knowledge of the
universe for the highest intellectual creature to be entirely
angels is not exclusively intellectual. For Augustine says
intelligent; and not in part, as is our soul. For this reason
(De Civ. Dei viii) that in the angels there is “life which un-
the angels are called “intellects” and “minds,” as was said
derstands and feels.” Therefore there is a sensitive faculty
above (a. 3, ad 1).
in them as well.
A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary ob-
Objection 2. Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono)
jections. First, it may be replied that those authorities
that the angels have learnt many things by experience.
are speaking according to the opinion of such men as
But experience comes of many remembrances, as stated
contended that angels and demons have bodies naturally
in Metaph. i, 1. Consequently they have likewise a power
united to them. Augustine often makes use of this opin-
of memory.
ion in his books, although he does not mean to assert it;
Objection 3. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
hence he says (De Civ. Dei xxi) that “such an inquiry
that there is a sort of “perverted phantasy” in the demons.
does not call for much labor.” Secondly, it may be said
But phantasy belongs to the imaginative faculty. There-
that such authorities and the like are to be understood by
fore the power of the imagination is in the demons; and
way of similitude. Because, since sense has a sure appre-
for the same reason it is in the angels, since they are of the
hension of its proper sensible object, it is a common usage
same nature.
of speech, when he understands something for certain, to
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev.), that
say that we “sense it.” And hence it is that we use the word
“man senses in common with the brutes, and understands
“sentence.” Experience can be attributed to the angels ac-
with the angels.”
cording to the likeness of the things known, although not
I answer that, In our soul there are certain powers
by likeness of the faculty knowing them. We have expe-
whose operations are exercised by corporeal organs; such
rience when we know single objects through the senses:
powers are acts of sundry parts of the body, as sight of the
the angels likewise know single objects, as we shall show
eye, and hearing of the ear. There are some other powers
(q. 57, a. 2), yet not through the senses. But memory can
of the soul whose operations are not performed through
be allowed in the angels, according as Augustine (De Trin.
bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of
x) puts it in the mind; although it cannot belong to them
any parts of the body. Now the angels have no bodies nat-
in so far as it is a part of the sensitive soul. In like fashion urally joined to them, as is manifest from what has been
‘a perverted phantasy’ is attributed to demons, since they
said already (q. 51, a. 1). Hence of the soul’s powers only
have a false practical estimate of what is the true good;
intellect and will can belong to them.
while deception in us comes properly from the phantasy,
The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing,
whereby we sometimes hold fast to images of things as
namely, that the separated substances are divided into in-
to the things themselves, as is manifest in sleepers and
tellect and will. And it is in keeping with the order of the
lunatics.
279
FIRST PART, QUESTION 55
Of the Medium of the Angelic Knowledge
(In Three Articles)
Next in order, the question arises as to the medium of the angelic knowledge. Under this heading there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Do the angels know everything by their substance, or by some species?
(2) If by species, is it by connatural species, or is it by such as they have derived from things?
(3) Do the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower angels?
Whether the angels know all things by their substance?
Ia q. 55 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels know all
ing or universal truth. The angel’s essence, however, does
things by their substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
not comprise all things in itself, since it is an essence re-
vii) that “the angels, according to the proper nature of a
stricted to a genus and species. This is proper to the Di-
mind, know the things which are happening upon earth.”
vine essence, which is infinite, simply and perfectly to
But the angel’s nature is his essence. Therefore the angel
comprise all things in Itself. Therefore God alone knows
knows things by his essence.
all things by His essence. But an angel cannot know all
Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher
things by his essence; and his intellect must be perfected
(Metaph. xii, text. 51; De Anima iii, text. 15), “in things
by some species in order to know things.
which are without matter, the intellect is the same as the
Reply to Objection 1. When it is said that the angel
object understood.” But the object understood is the same
knows things according to his own nature, the words “ac-
as the one who understands it, as regards that whereby it
cording to” do not determine the medium of such knowl-
is understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as
edge, since the medium is the similitude of the thing
the angels, the medium whereby the object is understood
known; but they denote the knowing power, which be-
is the very substance of the one understanding it.
longs to the angel of his own nature.
Objection 3. Further, everything which is contained
Reply to Objection 2. As the sense in act is the sensi-
in another is there according to the mode of the container.
ble in act, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 53, not so that the But an angel has an intellectual nature. Therefore what-sensitive power is the sensible object’s likeness contained
ever is in him is there in an intelligible mode. But all
in the sense, but because one thing is made from both as
things are in him: because the lower orders of beings are
from act and potentiality: so likewise the intellect in act
essentially in the higher, while the higher are in the lower
is said to be the thing understood in act, not that the sub-
participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
stance of the intellect is itself the similitude by which it
iv) that God “enfolds the whole in the whole,” i.e. all in
understands, but because that similitude is its form. Now,
all. Therefore the angel knows all things in his substance.
it is precisely the same thing to say “in things which are
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
without matter, the intellect is the same thing as the object
that “the angels are enlightened by the forms of things.”
understood,” as to say that “the intellect in act is the thing
Therefore they know by the forms of things, and not by
understood in act”; for a thing is actually understood, pre-
their own substance.
cisely because it is immaterial.
I answer that, The medium through which the intel-
Reply to Objection 3. The things which are beneath
lect understands, is compared to the intellect understand-
the angel, and those which are above him, are in a measure
ing it as its form, because it is by the form that the agent
in his substance, not indeed perfectly, nor according to
acts. Now in order that the faculty may be perfectly com-
their own proper formality—because the angel’s essence,
pleted by the form, it is necessary for all things to which
as being finite, is distinguished by its own formality from
the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence
other things—but according to some common formality.
it is that in things which are corruptible, the form does
Yet all things are perfectly and according to their own for-
not perfectly complete the potentiality of the matter: be-
mality in God’s essence, as in the first and universal op-
cause the potentiality of the matter extends to more things
erative power, from which proceeds whatever is proper or
than are contained under this or that form. But the in-
common to anything. Therefore God has a proper knowl-
tellective power of the angel extends to understanding all
edge of all things by His own essence: and this the angel
things: because the object of the intellect is universal be-
has not, but only a common knowledge.
280
Whether the angels understand by species drawn from things?
Ia q. 55 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels understand
The same is evident from the manner of existence of
by species drawn from things. For everything understood
such substances. The lower spiritual substances—that is,
is apprehended by some likeness within him who under-
souls—have a nature akin to a body, in so far as they are
stands it. But the likeness of the thing existing in another
the forms of bodies: and consequently from their very
is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the likeness
mode of existence it behooves them to seek their intel-
is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so
ligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies; oth-
that it is caused by such thing. All knowledge, then, of
erwise they would be united with bodies to no purpose.
the person understanding must either be the cause of the
On the other hand, the higher substances—that is, the
object understood, or else caused by it. Now the angel’s
angels—are utterly free from bodies, and subsist imma-
knowledge is not the cause of existing things; that belongs
terially and in their own intelligible nature; consequently
to the Divine knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary
they attain their intelligible perfection through an intel-
for the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to
ligible outpouring, whereby they received from God the
be derived from things.
species of things known, together with their intellectual
Objection 2. Further, the angelic light is stronger than nature. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8): “The
the light of the active intellect of the soul. But the light
other things which are lower than the angels are so cre-
of the active intellect abstracts intelligible species from
ated that they first receive existence in the knowledge of
phantasms. Therefore the light of the angelic mind can
the rational creature, and then in their own nature.”
also abstract species from sensible things. So there is
Reply to Objection 1. There are images of creatures
nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel under-
in the angel’s mind, not, indeed derived from creatures,
stands through species drawn from things.
but from God, Who is the cause of creatures, and in Whom
Objection 3. Further, the species in the intellect are
the likenesses of creatures first exist. Hence Augustine
indifferent to what is present or distant, except in so far as
says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, “As the type, according to
they are taken from sensible objects. Therefore, if the an-
which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God be-
gel does not understand by species drawn from things, his
fore the creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of
knowledge would be indifferent as to things present and
the same type exists first in the intellectual creature, and
distant; and so he would be moved locally to no purpose.
is afterwards the very fashioning of the creature.”
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that
Reply to Objection 2. To go from one extreme to the
the “angels do not gather their Divine knowledge from
other it is necessary to pass through the middle. Now the
things divisible or sensible.”
nature of a form in the imagination, which form is without
I answer that, The species whereby the angels un-
matter but not without material conditions, stands midway
derstand are not drawn from things, but are connatural
between the nature of a form which is in matter, and the
to them. For we must observe that there is a similarity
nature of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction
between the distinction and order of spiritual substances
from matter and from material conditions. Consequently,
and the distinction and order of corporeal substances. The
however powerful the angelic mind might be, it could
highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which
not reduce material forms to an intelligible condition, ex-
is fully perfected by the form; whereas in the lower bod-
cept it were first to reduce them to the nature of imagined
ies the potentiality of matter is not entirely perfected by
forms; which is impossible, since the angel has no imagi-
the form, but receives from some agent, now one form,
nation, as was said above (q. 54, a. 5). Even granted that
now another. In like fashion also the lower intellectual
he could abstract intelligible species from material things,
substances —that is to say, human souls—have a power
yet he would not do so; because he would not need them,
of understanding which is not naturally complete, but is
for he has connatural intelligible species.
successively completed in them by their drawing intel-
Reply to Objection 3. The angel’s knowledge is quite
ligible species from things. But in the higher spiritual
indifferent as to what is near or distant. Nevertheless his
substances—that is, the angels—the power of understand-
local movement is not purposeless on that account: for
ing is naturally complete by intelligible species, in so far
he is not moved to a place for the purpose of acquiring
as they have such species connatural to them, so as to un-
knowledge, but for the purpose of operation.
derstand all things which they can know naturally.
281
Whether the higher angels understand by more universal species than the lower an-Ia q. 55 a. 3
gels?
Objection 1. It would seem that the higher angels do
grasp an intelligible truth, unless it be explained to them
not understand by more universal species than the lower
in every part and detail; this comes of their weakness of
angels. For the universal, seemingly, is what is abstracted
intellect: while there are others of stronger intellect, who
from particulars. But angels do not understand by species
can grasp many things from few.
abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be said that the
Reply to Objection 1. It is accidental to the universal
species of the angelic intellect are more or less universal.
to be abstracted from particulars, in so far as the intellect
Objection 2. Further, whatever is known in detail is
knowing it derives its knowledge from things. But if there
more perfectly known than what is known generically; be-
be an intellect which does not derive its knowledge from
cause to know anything generically is, in a fashion, mid-
things, the universal which it knows will not be abstracted
way between potentiality and act. If, therefore, the higher
from things, but in a measure will be pre-existing to them;
angels know by more universal species than the lower, it
either according to the order of causality, as the universal
follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge
ideas of things are in the Word of God; or at least in the
than the lower; which is not befitting.
order of nature, as the universal ideas of things are in the
Objection 3. Further, the same cannot be the proper
angelic mind.
type of many. But if the higher angel knows various things
Reply to Objection 2. To know anything universally
by one universal form, which the lower angel knows by
can be taken in two senses. In one way, on the part of the
several special forms, it follows that the higher angel uses
thing known, namely, that only the universal nature of the
one universal form for knowing various things. Therefore
thing is known. To know a thing thus is something less
he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each;
perfect: for he would have but an imperfect knowledge of
which seems unbecoming.
a man who only knew him to be an animal. In another
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii)
way, on the part of the medium of such knowledge. In
that the higher angels have a more universal knowledge
this way it is more perfect to know a thing in the univer-
than the lower. And in De Causis it is said that the higher
sal; for the intellect, which by one universal medium can
angels have more universal forms.
know each of the things which are properly contained in
I answer that, For this reason are some things of a
it, is more perfect than one which cannot.
more exalted nature, because they are nearer to and more
Reply to Objection 3. The same cannot be the proper
like unto the first, which is God. Now in God the whole
and adequate type of several things. But if it be eminent,
plenitude of intellectual knowledge is contained in one
then it can be taken as the proper type and likeness of
thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by which God
many. Just as in man, there is a universal prudence with
knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found
respect to all the acts of the virtues; which can be taken as
in created intellects in a lower manner, and less simply.
the proper type and likeness of that prudence which in the
Consequently it is necessary for the lower intelligences to
lion leads to acts of magnanimity, and in the fox to acts
know by many forms what God knows by one, and by so
of wariness; and so on of the rest. The Divine essence,
many forms the more according as the intellect is lower.
on account of Its eminence, is in like fashion taken as the
Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer
proper type of each thing contained therein: hence each
species will he be able to apprehend the whole mass of in-
one is likened to It according to its proper type. The same
telligible objects. Therefore his forms must be more uni-
applies to the universal form which is in the mind of the
versal; each one of them, as it were, extending to more
angel, so that, on account of its excellence, many things
things. An example of this can in some measure be ob-
can be known through it with a proper knowledge.
served in ourselves. For some people there are who cannot
282
FIRST PART, QUESTION 56
Of the Angel’s Knowledge of Immaterial Things
(In Three Articles)
We now inquire into the knowledge of the angels with regard to the objects known by them. We shall treat of their knowledge, first, of immaterial things, secondly of things material. Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Does an angel know himself?
(2) Does one angel know another?
(3) Does the angel know God by his own natural principles?
Whether an angel knows himself?
Ia q. 56 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that an angel does not
species. But if it always actually possesses the species,
know himself. For Dionysius says that “the angels do not
it can thereby have actual knowledge without any preced-
know their own powers” (Coel. Hier. vi). But, when the
ing change or reception. From this it is evident that it is
substance is known, the power is known. Therefore an
not of the nature of knower, as knowing, to be moved by
angel does not know his own essence.
the object, but as knowing in potentiality. Now, for the
Objection 2. Further, an angel is a single substance,
form to be the principle of the action, it makes no dif-
otherwise he would not act, since acts belong to single
ference whether it be inherent in something else, or self-
subsistences. But nothing single is intelligible. There-
subsisting; because heat would give forth heat none the
fore, since the angel possesses only knowledge which is
less if it were self-subsisting, than it does by inhering in
intellectual, no angel can know himself.
something else. So therefore, if in the order of intelligible
Objection 3. Further, the intellect is moved by the
beings there be any subsisting intelligible form, it will un-
intelligible object: because, as stated in De Anima iii, 4
derstand itself. And since an angel is immaterial, he is a
understanding is a kind of passion. But nothing is moved
subsisting form; and, consequently, he is actually intelli-
by or is passive to itself; as appears in corporeal things.
gible. Hence it follows that he understands himself by his
Therefore the angel cannot understand himself.
form, which is his substance.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii) that
Reply to Objection 1. That is the text of the old trans-
“the angel knew himself when he was established, that is,
lation, which is amended in the new one, and runs thus:
enlightened by truth.”
“furthermore they,” that is to say the angels, “knew their
I answer that, As is evident from what has been pre-
own powers”: instead of which the old translation read—
viously said (q. 14, a. 2; q. 54, a. 2), the object is on a
“and furthermore they do not know their own powers.”
different footing in an immanent, and in a transient, ac-
Although even the letter of the old translation might be
tion. In a transient action the object or matter into which
kept in this respect, that the angels do not know their own
the action passes is something separate from the agent, as
power perfectly; according as it proceeds from the order
the thing heated is from what gave it heat, and the build-
of the Divine Wisdom, Which to the angels is incompre-
ing from the builder; whereas in an immanent action, for
hensible.
the action to proceed, the object must be united with the
Reply to Objection 2. We have no knowledge of sin-
agent; just as the sensible object must be in contact with
gle corporeal things, not because of their particularity, but
sense, in order that sense may actually perceive. And the
on account of the matter, which is their principle of indi-
object which is united to a faculty bears the same rela-
viduation. Accordingly, if there be any single things sub-
tion to actions of this kind as does the form which is the
sisting without matter, as the angels are, there is nothing
principle of action in other agents: for, as heat is the for-
to prevent them from being actually intelligible.
mal principle of heating in the fire, so is the species of the
Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to the intellect, in
thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye.
so far as if is in potentiality, to be moved and to be pas-
It must, however, be borne in mind that this image of
sive. Hence this does not happen in the angelic intellect,
the object exists sometimes only potentially in the know-
especially as regards the fact that he understands himself.
ing faculty; and then there is only knowledge in potential-
Besides the action of the intellect is not of the same nature
ity; and in order that there may be actual knowledge, it is
as the action found in corporeal things, which passes into
required that the faculty of knowledge be actuated by the
some other matter.
283
Whether one angel knows another?
Ia q. 56 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that one angel does not
angelic mind; and secondly, so as to subsist in their own
know another. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
natures. They proceeded into the angelic mind in such a
text. 4), that if the human intellect were to have in itself
way, that God impressed upon the angelic mind the im-
any one of the sensible things, then such a nature exist-
ages of the things which He produced in their own natural
ing within it would prevent it from apprehending external
being. Now in the Word of God from eternity there ex-
things; as likewise, if the pupil of the eye were colored
isted not only the forms of corporeal things, but likewise
with some particular color, it could not see every color.
the forms of all spiritual creatures. So in every one of
But as the human intellect is disposed for understanding
these spiritual creatures, the forms of all things, both cor-
corporeal things, so is the angelic mind for understanding
poreal and spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God;
immaterial things. Therefore, since the angelic intellect
yet so that in every angel there was impressed the form of
has within itself some one determinate nature from the
his own species according to both its natural and its intel-
number of such natures, it would seem that it cannot un-
ligible condition, so that he should subsist in the nature of
derstand other natures.
his species, and understand himself by it; while the forms
Objection 2. Further, it is stated in De Causis that
of other spiritual and corporeal natures were impressed
“every intelligence knows what is above it, in so far as
in him only according to their intelligible natures, so that
it is caused by it; and what is beneath it, in so far as it
by such impressed species he might know corporeal and
is its cause.” But one angel is not the cause of another.
spiritual creatures.
Therefore one angel does not know another.
Reply to Objection 1. The spiritual natures of the
Objection 3. Further, one angel cannot be known to
angels are distinguished from one another in a certain or-
another angel by the essence of the one knowing; because
der, as was already observed (q. 50, a. 4, ad 1,2). So the
all knowledge is effected by way of a likeness. But the
nature of an angel does not hinder him from knowing the
essence of the angel knowing is not like the essence of the
other angelic natures, since both the higher and lower bear
angel known, except generically; as is clear from what has
affinity to his nature, the only difference being according
been said before (q. 50, a. 4; q. 55, a. 1, ad 3). Hence, it
to their various degrees of perfection.
follows that one angel would not have a particular knowl-
Reply to Objection 2. The nature of cause and ef-
edge of another, but only a general knowledge. In like
fect does not lead one angel to know another, except on
manner it cannot be said that one angel knows another
account of likeness, so far as cause and effect are alike.
by the essence of the angel known; because that whereby
Therefore if likeness without causality be admitted in the
the intellect understands is something within the intellect;
angels, this will suffice for one to know another.
whereas the Trinity alone can penetrate the mind. Again,
Reply to Objection 3. One angel knows another by
it cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a
the species of such angel existing in his intellect, which
species; because that species would not differ from the
differs from the angel whose image it is, not according to
angel understood, since each is immaterial. Therefore in
material and immaterial nature, but according to natural
no way does it appear that one angel can understand an-
and intentional existence. The angel is himself a subsist-
other.
ing form in his natural being; but his species in the intel-
Objection 4. Further, if one angel did understand an-
lect of another angel is not so, for there it possesses only
other, this would be either by an innate species; and so
an intelligible existence. As the form of color on the wall
it would follow that, if God were now to create another
has a natural existence; but, in the deferent medium, it has
angel, such an angel could not be known by the existing
only intentional existence.
angels; or else he would have to be known by a species
Reply to Objection 4. God made every creature pro-
drawn from things; and so it would follow that the higher
portionate to the universe which He determined to make.
angels could not know the lower, from whom they receive
Therefore had God resolved to make more angels or more
nothing. Therefore in no way does it seem that one angel
natures of things, He would have impressed more intel-
knows another.
ligible species in the angelic minds; as a builder who, if
On the contrary, We read in De Causis that “every
he had intended to build a larger house, would have made
intelligence knows the things which are not corrupted.”
larger foundations. Hence, for God to add a new creature
I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. lit.
to the universe, means that He would add a new intelligi-
ii), such things as pre-existed from eternity in the Word
ble species to an angel.
of God, came forth from Him in two ways: first, into the
284
Whether an angle knows God by his own natural principles?
Ia q. 56 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels cannot
To the first-named class that knowledge of God is
know God by their natural principles. For Dionysius says
likened by which He is seen through His essence; and
(Div. Nom. i) that God “by His incomprehensible might
knowledge such as this cannot accrue to any creature from
is placed above all heavenly minds.” Afterwards he adds
its natural principles, as was said above (q. 12, a. 4). The
that, “since He is above all substances, He is remote from
third class comprises the knowledge whereby we know
all knowledge.”
God while we are on earth, by His likeness reflected in
Objection 2. Further, God is infinitely above the in-
creatures, according to Rom. 1:20: “The invisible things
tellect of an angel. But what is infinitely beyond cannot be
of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things
reached. Therefore it appears that an angel cannot know
that are made.”
Hence, too, we are said to see God
God by his natural principles.
in a mirror. But the knowledge, whereby according to
Objection 3. Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:12): “We
his natural principles the angel knows God, stands mid-
see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to
way between these two; and is likened to that knowledge
face.” From this it appears that there is a twofold knowl-
whereby a thing is seen through the species abstracted
edge of God; the one, whereby He is seen in His essence,
from it. For since God’s image is impressed on the very
according to which He is said to be seen face to face; the
nature of the angel in his essence, the angel knows God
other whereby He is seen in the mirror of creatures. As
in as much as he is the image of God. Yet he does not
was already shown (q. 12, a. 4), an angel cannot have the
behold God’s essence; because no created likeness is suf-
former knowledge by his natural principles. Nor does vi-
ficient to represent the Divine essence. Such knowledge
sion through a mirror belong to the angels, since they do
then approaches rather to the specular kind; because the
not derive their knowledge of God from sensible things, as
angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror representing the
Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the angels
Divine image.
cannot know God by their natural powers.
Reply to Objection 1.
Dionysius is speaking of
On the contrary, The angels are mightier in knowl-
the knowledge of comprehension, as his words expressly
edge than men. Yet men can know God through their nat-
state. In this way God is not known by any created intel-
ural principles; according to Rom. 1:19: “what is known
lect.
of God is manifest in them.” Therefore much more so can
Reply to Objection 2. Since an angel’s intellect and
the angels.
essence are infinitely remote from God, it follows that he
I answer that, The angels can have some knowledge
cannot comprehend Him; nor can he see God’s essence
of God by their own principles. In evidence whereof it
through his own nature. Yet it does not follow on that
must be borne in mind that a thing is known in three ways:
account that he can have no knowledge of Him at all: be-
first, by the presence of its essence in the knower, as light
cause, as God is infinitely remote from the angel, so the
can be seen in the eye; and so we have said that an angel
knowledge which God has of Himself is infinitely above
knows himself—secondly, by the presence of its simili-
the knowledge which an angel has of Him.
tude in the power which knows it, as a stone is seen by
Reply to Objection 3. The knowledge which an angel
the eye from its image being in the eye—thirdly, when the
has of God is midway between these two kinds of knowl-
image of the object known is not drawn directly from the
edge; nevertheless it approaches more to one of them, as
object itself, but from something else in which it is made
was said above.
to appear, as when we behold a man in a mirror.
285
FIRST PART, QUESTION 57
Of the Angel’s Knowledge of Material Things
(In Five Articles)
We next investigate the material objects which are known by the angels. Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the angels know the natures of material things?
(2) Whether they know single things?
(3) Whether they know the future?
(4) Whether they know secret thoughts?
(5) Whether they know all mysteries of grace?
Whether the angels know material things?
Ia q. 57 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels do not
pre-exist in the angels more simply and less materially
know material things. For the object understood is the
even than in themselves, yet in a more manifold manner
perfection of him who understands it. But material things
and less perfectly than in God.
cannot be the perfections of angels, since they are beneath
Now whatever exists in any subject, is contained in it
them. Therefore the angels do not know material things.
after the manner of such subject. But the angels are in-
Objection 2. Further, intellectual vision is only of
tellectual beings of their own nature. Therefore, as God
such things as exist within the soul by their essence, as
knows material things by His essence, so do the angels
is said in the gloss∗. But the material things cannot enter
know them, forasmuch as they are in the angels by their
by their essence into man’s soul, nor into the angel’s mind.
intelligible species.
Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision, but
Reply to Objection 1. The thing understood is the
only by imaginary vision, whereby the images of bodies
perfection of the one who understands, by reason of the
are apprehended, and by sensible vision, which regards
intelligible species which he has in his intellect. And thus
bodies in themselves. Now there is neither imaginary nor
the intelligible species which are in the intellect of an an-
sensible vision in the angels, but only intellectual. There-
gel are perfections and acts in regard to that intellect.
fore the angels cannot know material things.
Reply to Objection 2. Sense does not apprehend the
Objection 3. Further, material things are not actually
essences of things, but only their outward accidents. In
intelligible, but are knowable by apprehension of sense
like manner neither does the imagination; for it appre-
and of imagination, which does not exist in angels. There-
hends only the images of bodies. The intellect alone ap-
fore angels do not know material things.
prehends the essences of things. Hence it is said (De An-
On the contrary, Whatever the lower power can do,
ima iii, text. 26) that the object of the intellect is “what a
the higher can do likewise. But man’s intellect, which in
thing is,” regarding which it does not err; as neither does
the order of nature is inferior to the angel’s, can know ma-
sense regarding its proper sensible object. So therefore
terial things. Therefore much more can the mind of an
the essences of material things are in the intellect of man
angel.
and angels, as the thing understood is in him who under-
I answer that, The established order of things is for
stands, and not according to their real natures. But some
the higher beings to be more perfect than the lower; and
things are in an intellect or in the soul according to both
for whatever is contained deficiently, partially, and in
natures; and in either case there is intellectual vision.
manifold manner in the lower beings, to be contained in
Reply to Objection 3. If an angel were to draw his
the higher eminently, and in a certain degree of fulness
knowledge of material things from the material things
and simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest source
themselves, he would require to make them actually in-
of things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially in respect
telligible by a process of abstraction. But he does not de-
of His simple Being itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
rive his knowledge of them from the material things them-
1). But among other creatures the angels are nearest to
selves; he has knowledge of material things by actually
God, and resemble Him most; hence they share more fully
intelligible species of things, which species are connatu-
and more perfectly in the Divine goodness, as Dionysius
ral to him; just as our intellect has, by species which it
says (Coel. Hier. iv). Consequently, all material things
makes intelligible by abstraction.
∗ On 2 Cor. 12:2, taken from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 28)
286
Whether an angel knows singulars?
Ia q. 57 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that angels do not know
existing.
singulars. For the Philosopher says (Poster. i, text. 22):
Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man
“The sense has for its object singulars, but the intellect,
by his various powers of knowledge knows all classes
universals.” Now, in the angels there is no power of un-
of things, apprehending universals and immaterial things
derstanding save the intellectual power, as is evident from
by his intellect, and things singular and corporeal by the
what was said above (q. 54, a. 5). Consequently they do
senses, so an angel knows both by his one mental power.
not know singulars.
For the order of things runs in this way, that the higher
Objection 2. Further, all knowledge comes about by
a thing is, so much the more is its power united and far-
some assimilation of the knower to the object known. But
reaching: thus in man himself it is manifest that the com-
it is not possible for any assimilation to exist between an
mon sense which is higher than the proper sense, although
angel and a singular object, in so far as it is singular; be-
it is but one faculty, knows everything apprehended by the
cause, as was observed above (q. 50, a. 2), an angel is
five outward senses, and some other things which no outer
immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity.
sense knows; for example, the difference between white
Therefore the angel cannot know singulars.
and sweet. The same is to be observed in other cases. Ac-
Objection 3. Further, if an angel does know singulars,
cordingly, since an angel is above man in the order of na-
it is either by singular or by universal species. It is not by
ture, it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any one
singular species; because in this way he would require to
of his powers something which an angel by his one fac-
have an infinite number of species. Nor is it by universal
ulty of knowledge, namely, the intellect, does not know.
species; since the universal is not the sufficient principle
Hence Aristotle pronounces it ridiculous to say that a dis-
for knowing the singular as such, because singular things
cord, which is known to us, should be unknown to God
are not known in the universal except potentially. There-
(De Anima i, text. 80; Metaph. text. 15).
fore the angel does not know singulars.
The manner in which an angel knows singular things
On the contrary, No one can guard what he does not
can be considered from this, that, as things proceed from
know. But angels guard individual men, according to Ps.
God in order that they may subsist in their own natures,
90:11: “He hath given His angels charge over Thee.” Con-
so likewise they proceed in order that they may exist in
sequently the angels know singulars.
the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes forth
I answer that, Some have denied to the angels all
from God not only whatever belongs to their universal na-
knowledge of singulars. In the first place this derogates
ture, but likewise all that goes to make up their principles
from the Catholic faith, which asserts that these lower
of individuation; since He is the cause of the entire sub-
things are administered by angels, according to Heb. 1:14:
stance of the thing, as to both its matter and its form. And
“They are all ministering spirits.” Now, if they had no
for as much as He causes, does He know; for His knowl-
knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision
edge is the cause of a thing, as was shown above (q. 14,
over what is going on in this world; since acts belong to
a. 8). Therefore as by His essence, by which He causes
individuals: and this is against the text of Eccles. 5:5:
all things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows all
“Say not before the angel: There is no providence.” Sec-
things, not only as to their universal natures, but also as to
ondly, it is also contrary to the teachings of philosophy,
their singularity; so through the species imparted to them
according to which the angels are stated to be the movers
do the angels know things, not only as to their universal
of the heavenly spheres, and to move them according to
nature, but likewise in their individual conditions, in so far
their knowledge and will.
as they are the manifold representations of that one simple
Consequently others have said that the angel possesses
essence.
knowledge of singulars, but in their universal causes, to
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking
which all particular effects are reduced; as if the as-
of our intellect, which apprehends only by a process of
tronomer were to foretell a coming eclipse from the dis-
abstraction; and by such abstraction from material con-
positions of the movements of the heavens. This opinion
ditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal. Such a
does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to
manner of understanding is not in keeping with the nature
know a singular, merely in its universal causes, is not to
of the angels, as was said above (q. 55, a. 2, a. 3 ad 1), and
know it as singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The
consequently there is no comparison.
astronomer, knowing from computation of the heavenly
Reply to Objection 2. It is not according to their na-
movements that an eclipse is about to happen, knows it
ture that the angels are likened to material things, as one
in the universal; yet he does not know it as taking place
thing resembles another by agreement in genus, species,
now, except by the senses. But administration, providence
or accident; but as the higher bears resemblance to the
and movement are of singulars, as they are here and now
lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way there is
287
in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and Reply to Objection 3. Angels know singulars by uniform, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause
versal forms, which nevertheless are the images of things
whatever is to be found in things. For the same reason, the
both as to their universal, and as to their individuating
species in the angel’s intellect, which are images drawn
principles. How many things can be known by the same
from the Divine essence, are the images of things not only
species, has been already stated above (q. 55, a. 3, ad 3).
as to their form, but also as to their matter.
Whether angels know the future?
Ia q. 57 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels know fu-
In another way future events are known in themselves.
ture events. For angels are mightier in knowledge than
To know the future in this way belongs to God alone; and
men. But some men know many future events. Therefore
not merely to know those events which happen of neces-
much more do the angels.
sity, or in the majority of cases, but even casual and chance
Objection 2. Further, the present and the future are
events; for God sees all things in His eternity, which, be-
differences of time. But the angel’s intellect is above
ing simple, is present to all time, and embraces all time.
time; because, as is said in De Causis, “an intelligence
And therefore God’s one glance is cast over all things
keeps pace with eternity,” that is, aeviternity. Therefore,
which happen in all time as present before Him; and He
to the angel’s mind, past and future are not different, but
beholds all things as they are in themselves, as was said
he knows each indifferently.
before when dealing with God’s knowledge (q. 14, a. 13).
Objection 3. Further, the angel does not understand
But the mind of an angel, and every created intellect, fall
by species derived from things, but by innate universal
far short of God’s eternity; hence the future as it is in itself species. But universal species refer equally to present,
cannot be known by any created intellect.
past, and future. Therefore it appears that the angels know
Reply to Objection 1. Men cannot know future things
indifferently things past, present, and future.
except in their causes, or by God’s revelation. The an-
Objection 4. Further, as a thing is spoken of as distant gels know the future in the same way, but much more dis-by reason of time, so is it by reason of place. But angels
tinctly.
know things which are distant according to place. There-
Reply to Objection 2. Although the angel’s intellect
fore they likewise know things distant according to future
is above that time according to which corporeal move-
time.
ments are reckoned, yet there is a time in his mind accord-
On the contrary, Whatever is the exclusive sign of the
ing to the succession of intelligible concepts; of which
Divinity, does not belong to the angels. But to know fu-
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii) that “God moves the
ture events is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, according
spiritual creature according to time.” And thus, since there
to Is. 41:23: “Show the things that are to come hereafter,
is succession in the angel’s intellect, not all things that
and we shall know that ye are gods.” Therefore the angels
happen through all time, are present to the angelic mind.
do not know future events.
Reply to Objection 3. Although the species in the
I answer that, The future can be known in two ways.
intellect of an angel, in so far as they are species, refer
First, it can be known in its cause. And thus, future events
equally to things present, past, and future; nevertheless the
which proceed necessarily from their causes, are known
present, past, and future; nevertheless the present, past,
with sure knowledge; as that the sun will rise tomorrow.
and future do not bear the same relations to the species.
But events which proceed from their causes in the major-
Present things have a nature according to which they re-
ity of cases, are not known for certain, but conjecturally;
semble the species in the mind of an angel: and so they
thus the doctor knows beforehand the health of the patient.
can be known thereby. Things which are yet to come have
This manner of knowing future events exists in the angels,
not yet a nature whereby they are likened to such species;
and by so much the more than it does in us, as they under-
consequently, they cannot be known by those species.
stand the causes of things both more universally and more
Reply to Objection 4. Things distant according to
perfectly; thus doctors who penetrate more deeply into the
place are already existing in nature; and share in some
causes of an ailment can pronounce a surer verdict on the
species, whose image is in the angel; whereas this is not
future issue thereof. But events which proceed from their
true of future things, as has been stated. Consequently
causes in the minority of cases are quite unknown; such
there is no comparison.
as casual and chance events.
288
Whether angels know secret thoughts?
Ia q. 57 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels know se-
God alone can know the thoughts of hearts and affections
cret thoughts. For Gregory (Moral. xviii), explaining Job
of wills. The reason of this is, because the rational crea-
28:17: “Gold or crystal cannot equal it,” says that “then,”
ture is subject to God only, and He alone can work in it
namely in the bliss of those rising from the dead, “one
Who is its principal object and last end: this will be de-
shall be as evident to another as he is to himself, and when
veloped later (q. 63, a. 1; q. 105, a. 5). Consequently all
once the mind of each is seen, his conscience will at the
that is in the will, and all things that depend only on the
same time be penetrated.” But those who rise shall be like
will, are known to God alone. Now it is evident that it de-
the angels, as is stated (Mat. 22:30). Therefore an angel
pends entirely on the will for anyone actually to consider
can see what is in another’s conscience.
anything; because a man who has a habit of knowledge,
Objection 2.
Further, intelligible species bear the
or any intelligible species, uses them at will. Hence the
same relation to the intellect as shapes do to bodies. But
Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11): “For what man knoweth the
when the body is seen its shape is seen. Therefore, when
things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?”
an intellectual substance is seen, the intelligible species
Reply to Objection 1. In the present life one man’s
within it is also seen. Consequently, when one angel be-
thought is not known by another owing to a twofold hin-
holds another, or even a soul, it seems that he can see the
drance; namely, on account of the grossness of the body,
thoughts of both.
and because the will shuts up its secrets. The first obstacle
Objection 3. Further, the ideas of our intellect resem-
will be removed at the Resurrection, and does not exist at
ble the angel more than do the images in our imagination;
all in the angels; while the second will remain, and is in
because the former are actually understood, while the lat-
the angels now. Nevertheless the brightness of the body
ter are understood only potentially. But the images in our
will show forth the quality of the soul; as to its amount of
imagination can be known by an angel as corporeal things
grace and of glory. In this way one will be able to see the
are known: because the imagination is a corporeal faculty.
mind of another.
Therefore it seems that an angel can know the thoughts of
Reply to Objection 2. Although one angel sees the
the intellect.
intelligible species of another, by the fact that the species
On the contrary, What is proper to God does not be-
are proportioned to the rank of these substances according
long to the angels. But it is proper to God to read the
to greater or lesser universality, yet it does not follow that
secrets of hearts, according to Jer. 17:9: “The heart is per-
one knows how far another makes use of them by actual
verse above all things, and unsearchable; who can know
consideration.
it? I am the Lord, Who search the heart.” Therefore angels
Reply to Objection 3. The appetite of the brute does
do not know the secrets of hearts.
not control its act, but follows the impression of some
I answer that, A secret thought can be known in two
other corporeal or spiritual cause. Since, therefore, the
ways: first, in its effect. In this way it can be known not
angels know corporeal things and their dispositions, they
only by an angel, but also by man; and with so much the
can thereby know what is passing in the appetite or in the
greater subtlety according as the effect is the more hid-
imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts, and even of
den. For thought is sometimes discovered not merely by
man, in so far as the sensitive appetite sometimes, through
outward act, but also by change of countenance; and doc-
following some bodily impression, influences his conduct,
tors can tell some passions of the soul by the mere pulse.
as always happens in brutes. Yet the angels do not neces-
Much more then can angels, or even demons, the more
sarily know the movement of the sensitive appetite and
deeply they penetrate those occult bodily modifications.
the imaginative apprehension of man in so far as these are
Hence Augustine says (De divin. daemon.) that demons
moved by the will and reason; because, even the lower
“sometimes with the greatest faculty learn man’s disposi-
part of the soul has some share of reason, as obeying its
tions, not only when expressed by speech, but even when
ruler, as is said in Ethics iii, 12. But it does not follow
conceived in thought, when the soul expresses them by
that, if the angel knows what is passing through man’s
certain signs in the body”; although (Retract. ii, 30) he
sensitive appetite or imagination, he knows what is in the
says “it cannot be asserted how this is done.”
thought or will: because the intellect or will is not subject
In another way thoughts can be known as they are in
to the sensitive appetite or the imagination, but can make
the mind, and affections as they are in the will: and thus
various uses of them.
289
Whether the angels know the mysteries of grace?
Ia q. 57 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels know mys-
they all know them equally; but just as God wills them
teries of grace. For, the mystery of the Incarnation is the
to learn by revelation; as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10):
most excellent of all mysteries. But the angels knew of it
“But to us God hath revealed them through His Spirit”;
from the beginning; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v,
yet so that the higher angels beholding the Divine wis-
19): “This mystery was hidden in God through the ages,
dom more clearly, learn more and deeper mysteries in the
yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heav-
vision of God, which mysteries they communicate to the
enly places.” And the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:16): “That
lower angels by enlightening them. Some of these mys-
great mystery of godliness appeared unto angels∗.” There-
teries they knew from the very beginning of their creation;
fore the angels know the mysteries of grace.
others they are taught afterwards, as befits their ministra-
Objection 2. Further, the reasons of all mysteries of
tions.
grace are contained in the Divine wisdom. But the angels
Reply to Objection 1. One can speak in two ways
behold God’s wisdom, which is His essence. Therefore
of the mystery of the Incarnation. First of all, in general;
they know the mysteries of grace.
and in this way it was revealed to all from the commence-
Objection 3. Further, the prophets are enlightened by
ment of their beatitude. The reason of this is, that this
the angels, as is clear from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). But
is a kind of general principle to which all their duties are
the prophets knew mysteries of grace; for it is said (Amos
ordered. For “all are‡ ministering spirits, sent to minis-
3:7): “For the Lord God doth nothing without revealing
ter for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation
His secret to His servants the prophets.” Therefore angels
(Heb. 1:14)”; and this is brought by the mystery of the
know the mysteries of grace.
Incarnation. Hence it was necessary for all of them to be
On the contrary, No one learns what he knows al-
instructed in this mystery from the very beginning.
ready. Yet even the highest angels seek out and learn mys-
We can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation in an-
teries of grace. For it is stated (Coel. Hier. vii) that “Sa-
other way, as to its special conditions. Thus not all the
cred Scripture describes some heavenly essences as ques-
angels were instructed on all points from the beginning;
tioning Jesus, and learning from Him the knowledge of
even the higher angels learned these afterwards, as ap-
His Divine work for us; and Jesus as teaching them di-
pears from the passage of Dionysius already quoted.
rectly”: as is evident in Is. 63:1, where, on the angels
Reply to Objection 2. Although the angels in bliss
asking, “Who is he who cometh up from Edom?” Jesus
behold the Divine wisdom, yet they do not comprehend
answered, “It is I, Who speak justice.” Therefore the an-
it. So it is not necessary for them to know everything hid-
gels do not know mysteries of grace.
den in it.
I answer that, There is a twofold knowledge in the
Reply to Objection 3. Whatever the prophets knew
angel. The first is his natural knowledge, according to
by revelation of the mysteries of grace, was revealed in
which he knows things both by his essence, and by innate
a more excellent way to the angels. And although God
species. By such knowledge the angels cannot know mys-
revealed in general to the prophets what He was one day
teries of grace. For these mysteries depend upon the pure
to do regarding the salvation of the human race, still the
will of God: and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of
apostles knew some particulars of the same, which the
another angel, which depend upon the will of such angel,
prophets did not know. Thus we read (Eph. 3:4,5): “As
much less can he ascertain what depends entirely upon
you reading, may understand my knowledge in the mys-
God’s will. The Apostle reasons in this fashion (1 Cor.
tery of Christ, which in other generations was not known
2:11): “No one knoweth the things of a man†, but the
to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy
spirit of a man that is in him.” So, “the things also that
apostles.” Among the prophets also, the later ones knew
are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God.”
what the former did not know; according to Ps. 118:100:
There is another knowledge of the angels, which ren-
“I have had understanding above ancients,” and Gregory
ders them happy; it is the knowledge whereby they see
says: “The knowledge of Divine things increased as time
the Word, and things in the Word. By such vision they
went on” (Hom. xvi in Ezech.).
know mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries: nor do
∗ Vulg.: ‘Great is the mystery of godliness, which. . . appeared unto angels.’ † Vulg.: ‘What man knoweth the things of a man, but. . . ?’ ‡ Vulg.:
‘Are they not all.’
290
FIRST PART, QUESTION 58
Of the Mode of Angelic Knowledge
(In Seven Articles)
After the foregoing we have now to treat of the mode of the angelic knowledge, concerning which there are seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the angel’s intellect be sometimes in potentiality, and sometimes in act?
(2) Whether the angel can understand many things at the same time?
(3) Whether the angel’s knowledge is discursive?
(4) Whether he understands by composing and dividing?
(5) Whether there can be error in the angel’s intellect?
(6) Whether his knowledge can be styled as morning and evening?
(7) Whether the morning and evening knowledge are the same, or do they differ?
Whether the angel’s intellect is sometimes in potentiality, sometimes in act?
Ia q. 58 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the angel’s intellect
lects, the angels, have no intelligible potentiality which
is sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act. For
is not fully completed by connatural intelligible species.
movement is the act of what is in potentiality, as stated in
But with regard to things divinely revealed to them, there
Phys. iii, 6. But the angels’ minds are moved by under-
is nothing to hinder them from being in potentiality: be-
standing, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the
cause even the heavenly bodies are at times in potentiality
angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality.
to being enlightened by the sun.
Objection 2. Further, since desire is of a thing not
In the second way an angel’s intellect can be in poten-
possessed but possible to have, whoever desires to know
tiality with regard to things learnt by natural knowledge;
anything is in potentiality thereto. But it is said (1 Pet.
for he is not always actually considering everything that
1:12): “On Whom the angels desire to look.” Therefore
he knows by natural knowledge. But as to the knowledge
the angel’s intellect is sometimes in potentiality.
of the Word, and of the things he beholds in the Word, he
Objection 3. Further, in the book De Causis it is stated is never in this way in potentiality; because he is always
that “an intelligence understands according to the mode
actually beholding the Word, and the things he sees in the
of its substance.” But the angel’s intelligence has some
Word. For the bliss of the angels consists in such vision;
admixture of potentiality. Therefore it sometimes under-
and beatitude does not consist in habit, but in act, as the
stands potentially.
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8).
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii):
Reply to Objection 1. Movement is taken there not as
“Since the angels were created, in the eternity of the
the act of something imperfect, that is, of something ex-
Word, they enjoy holy and devout contemplation.” Now
isting in potentiality, but as the act of something perfect,
a contemplating intellect is not in potentiality, but in act.
that is, of one actually existing. In this way understanding
Therefore the intellect of an angel is not in potentiality.
and feeling are termed movements, as stated in De Anima
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (De Anima
iii, text. 28.
iii, text. 8; Phys. viii, 32), the intellect is in potential-
Reply to Objection 2. Such desire on the part of the
ity in two ways; first, “as before learning or discovering,”
angels does not exclude the object desired, but weariness
that is, before it has the habit of knowledge; secondly, as
thereof. Or they are said to desire the vision of God with
“when it possesses the habit of knowledge, but does not
regard to fresh revelations, which they receive from God
actually consider.” In the first way an angel’s intellect is
to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform.
never in potentiality with regard to the things to which his
Reply to Objection 3. In the angel’s substance there
natural knowledge extends. For, as the higher, namely, the
is no potentiality divested of act. In the same way, the an-
heavenly, bodies have no potentiality to existence, which
gel’s intellect is never so in potentiality as to be without
is not fully actuated, in the same way the heavenly intel-
act.
291
Whether an angel can understand many things at the same time?
Ia q. 58 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that an angel cannot un-
that many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be
derstand many things at the same time. For the Philoso-
understood at once; but in so far as they are comprised
pher says (Topic. ii, 4) that “it may happen that we know
under one intelligible concept, they can be understood to-
many things, but understand only one.”
gether. Now everything is actually intelligible according
Objection 2. Further, nothing is understood unless the
as its image is in the intellect. All things, then, which can
intellect be informed by an intelligible species; just at the
be known by one intelligible species, are known as one
body is formed by shape. But one body cannot be formed
intelligible object, and therefore are understood simulta-
into many shapes. Therefore neither can one intellect si-
neously. But things known by various intelligible species,
multaneously understand various intelligible things.
are apprehended as different intelligible objects.
Objection 3. Further, to understand is a kind of move-
Consequently, by such knowledge as the angels have
ment.
But no movement terminates in various terms.
of things through the Word, they know all things un-
Therefore many things cannot be understood altogether.
der one intelligible species, which is the Divine essence.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 32):
Therefore, as regards such knowledge, they know all
“The spiritual faculty of the angelic mind comprehends
things at once: just as in heaven “our thoughts will not be
most easily at the same time all things that it wills.”
fleeting, going and returning from one thing to another,
I answer that, As unity of term is requisite for unity of but we shall survey all our knowledge at the same time
movement, so is unity of object required for unity of op-
by one glance,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). But
eration. Now it happens that several things may be taken
by that knowledge wherewith the angels know things by
as several or as one; like the parts of a continuous whole.
innate species, they can at one time know all things which
For if each of the parts be considered severally they are
can be comprised under one species; but not such as are
many: consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are
under various species.
they grasped by one operation, nor all at once. In another
Reply to Objection 1. To understand many things as
way they are taken as forming one in the whole; and so
one, is, so to speak, to understand one thing.
they are grasped both by sense and intellect all at once and
Reply to Objection 2. The intellect is informed by
by one operation; as long as the entire continuous whole
the intelligible species which it has within it. So it can be-
is considered, as is stated in De Anima iii, text. 23. In
hold at the same time many intelligible objects under one
this way our intellect understands together both the sub-
species; as one body can by one shape be likened to many
ject and the predicate, as forming parts of one proposition;
bodies.
and also two things compared together, according as they
To the third objection the answer is the same as the
agree in one point of comparison. From this it is evident
first.
Whether an angel’s knowledge is discursive?
Ia q. 58 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the knowledge of
sive.
an angel is discursive. For the discursive movement of the
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that
mind comes from one thing being known through another.
the “angels do not acquire Divine knowledge from sepa-
But the angels know one thing through another; for they
rate discourses, nor are they led to something particular
know creatures through the Word. Therefore the intellect
from something common.”
of an angel knows by discursive method.
I answer that, As has often been stated (a. 1; q. 55,
Objection 2. Further, whatever a lower power can do,
a. 1), the angels hold that grade among spiritual sub-
the higher can do. But the human intellect can syllogize,
stances which the heavenly bodies hold among corporeal
and know causes in effects; all of which is the discur-
substances: for Dionysius calls them “heavenly minds”
sive method. Therefore the intellect of the angel, which
(a. 1; q. 55, a. 1). Now, the difference between heavenly
is higher in the order of nature, can with greater reason do
and earthly bodies is this, that earthly bodies obtain their
this.
last perfection by chance and movement: while the heav-
Objection 3. Further, Isidore (De sum. bono i, 10)
enly bodies have their last perfection at once from their
says that “demons learn more things by experience.” But
very nature. So, likewise, the lower, namely, the human,
experimental knowledge is discursive: for, “one experi-
intellects obtain their perfection in the knowledge of truth
ence comes of many remembrances, and one universal
by a kind of movement and discursive intellectual opera-
from many experiences,” as Aristotle observes (Poster. ii;
tion; that is to say, as they advance from one known thing
Metaph. vii). Therefore an angel’s knowledge is discur-
to another. But, if from the knowledge of a known prin-
292
ciple they were straightway to perceive as known all its ment of a kind. Now all movement is from something
consequent conclusions, then there would be no discur-
before to something after. Hence discursive knowledge
sive process at all. Such is the condition of the angels,
comes about according as from something previously
because in the truths which they know naturally, they at
known one attains to the knowledge of what is afterwards
once behold all things whatsoever that can be known in
known, and which was previously unknown. But if in the
them.
thing perceived something else be seen at the same time,
Therefore they are called “intellectual beings”: be-
as an object and its image are seen simultaneously in a
cause even with ourselves the things which are instantly
mirror, it is not discursive knowledge. And in this way
grasped by the mind are said to be understood [intelligi];
the angels know things in the Word.
hence “intellect” is defined as the habit of first principles.
Reply to Objection 2. The angels can syllogize, in
But human souls which acquire knowledge of truth by the
the sense of knowing a syllogism; and they see effects
discursive method are called “rational”; and this comes of
in causes, and causes in effects: yet they do not acquire
the feebleness of their intellectual light. For if they pos-
knowledge of an unknown truth in this way, by syllogiz-
sessed the fulness of intellectual light, like the angels, then ing from causes to effect, or from effect to cause.
in the first aspect of principles they would at once compre-
Reply to Objection 3. Experience is affirmed of an-
hend their whole range, by perceiving whatever could be
gels and demons simply by way of similitude, forasmuch
reasoned out from them.
as they know sensible things which are present, yet with-
Reply to Objection 1. Discursion expresses move-
out any discursion withal.
Whether the angels understand by composing and dividing?
Ia q. 58 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels understand
understand by discursion and reasoning. In like manner,
by composing and dividing. For, where there is multiplic-
if the intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the sub-
ity of things understood, there is composition of the same,
ject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be
as is said in De Anima iii, text. 21. But there is a mul-
attributed to, or removed from, the subject, it would never
titude of things understood in the angelic mind; because
understand by composing and dividing, but only by un-
angels apprehend different things by various species, and
derstanding the essence. Thus it is evident that for the
not all at one time. Therefore there is composition and
self-same reason our intellect understands by discursion,
division in the angel’s mind.
and by composing and dividing, namely, that in the first
Objection 2. Further, negation is far more remote
apprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not
from affirmation than any two opposite natures are; be-
at once grasp all that is virtually contained in it. And this
cause the first of distinctions is that of affirmation and
comes from the weakness of the intellectual light within
negation. But the angel knows certain distant natures not
us, as has been said (a. 3). Hence, since the intellectual
by one, but by diverse species, as is evident from what
light is perfect in the angel, for he is a pure and most clear
was said (a. 2). Therefore he must know affirmation and
mirror, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), it follows that
negation by diverse species. And so it seems that he un-
as the angel does not understand by reasoning, so neither
derstands by composing and dividing.
does he by composing and dividing.
Objection 3. Further, speech is a sign of the intel-
Nevertheless, he understands the composition and the
lect. But in speaking to men, angels use affirmative and
division of enunciations, just as he apprehends the reason-
negative expressions, which are signs of composition and
ing of syllogisms: for he understands simply, such things
of division in the intellect; as is manifest from many pas-
as are composite, things movable immovably, and mate-
sages of Sacred Scripture. Therefore it seems that the an-
rial things immaterially.
gel understands by composing and dividing.
Reply to Objection 1. Not every multitude of things
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that
understood causes composition, but a multitude of such
“the intellectual power of the angel shines forth with the
things understood that one of them is attributed to, or de-
clear simplicity of divine concepts.” But a simple intelli-
nied of, another. When an angel apprehends the nature of
gence is without composition and division. Therefore the
anything, he at the same time understands whatever can
angel understands without composition or division.
be either attributed to it, or denied of it. Hence, in appre-
I answer that, As in the intellect, when reasoning, the
hending a nature, he by one simple perception grasps all
conclusion is compared with the principle, so in the in-
that we can learn by composing and dividing.
tellect composing and dividing, the predicate is compared
Reply to Objection 2. The various natures of things
with the subject. For if our intellect were to see at once
differ less as to their mode of existing than do affirma-
the truth of the conclusion in the principle, it would never
tion and negation. Yet, as to the way in which they are
293
known, affirmation and negation have something more in firmative and negative forms of speech, shows that they
common; because directly the truth of an affirmation is
know both composition and division: yet not that they
known, the falsehood of the opposite negation is known
know by composing and dividing, but by knowing sim-
also.
ply the nature of a thing.
Reply to Objection 3. The fact that angels use af-
Whether there can be falsehood in the intellect of an angel?
Ia q. 58 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that there can be false-
for either they are not grasped at all, and so we know noth-
hood in the angel’s intellect. For perversity appertains to
ing respecting them; or else they are known precisely as
falsehood. But, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), there
they exist.
is “a perverted fancy” in the demons. Therefore it seems
So therefore, no falsehood, error, or deception can ex-
that there can be falsehood in the intellect of the angels.
ist of itself in the mind of any angel; yet it does so happen
Objection 2. Further, nescience is the cause of esti-
accidentally; but very differently from the way it befalls
mating falsely. But, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi),
us. For we sometimes get at the quiddity of a thing by a
there can be nescience in the angels. Therefore it seems
composing and dividing process, as when, by division and
there can be falsehood in them.
demonstration, we seek out the truth of a definition. Such
Objection 3. Further, everything which falls short of
is not the method of the angels; but through the (knowl-
the truth of wisdom, and which has a depraved reason,
edge of the) essence of a thing they know everything that
has falsehood or error in its intellect. But Dionysius (Div.
can be said regarding it. Now it is quite evident that the
Nom. vii) affirms this of the demons. Therefore it seems
quiddity of a thing can be a source of knowledge with
that there can be error in the minds of the angels.
regard to everything belonging to such thing, or excluded
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
from it; but not of what may be dependent on God’s super-
text. 41) that “the intelligence is always true.” Augustine
natural ordinance. Consequently, owing to their upright
likewise says (QQ. 83, qu. 32) that “nothing but what is
will, from their knowing the nature of every creature, the
true can be the object of intelligence” Therefore there can
good angels form no judgments as to the nature of the
be neither deception nor falsehood in the angel’s knowl-
qualities therein, save under the Divine ordinance; hence
edge.
there can be no error or falsehood in them. But since the
I answer that, The truth of this question depends
minds of demons are utterly perverted from the Divine
partly upon what has gone before. For it has been said
wisdom, they at times form their opinions of things sim-
(a. 4) that an angel understands not by composing and di-
ply according to the natural conditions of the same. Nor
viding, but by understanding what a thing is. Now the
are they ever deceived as to the natural properties of any-
intellect is always true as regards what a thing is, just as
thing; but they can be misled with regard to supernatural
the sense regarding its proper object, as is said in De An-
matters; for example, on seeing a dead man, they may sup-
ima iii, text. 26. But by accident, deception and falsehood
pose that he will not rise again, or, on beholding Christ,
creep in, when we understand the essence of a thing by
they may judge Him not to be God.
some kind of composition, and this happens either when
From all this the answers to the objections of both
we take the definition of one thing for another, or when
sides of the question are evident. For the perversity of
the parts of a definition do not hang together, as if we
the demons comes of their not being subject to the Divine
were to accept as the definition of some creature, “a four-
wisdom; while nescience is in the angels as regards things
footed flying beast,” for there is no such animal. And this
knowable, not naturally but supernaturally. It is, further-
comes about in things composite, the definition of which
more, evident that their understanding of what a thing is,
is drawn from diverse elements, one of which is as matter
is always true, save accidentally, according as it is, in an
to the other. But there is no room for error in understand-
undue manner, referred to some composition or division.
ing simple quiddities, as is stated in Metaph. ix, text. 22;
Whether there is a “morning” and an “evening” knowledge in the angels?
Ia q. 58 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that there is neither an
knowledge ought not to be termed morning and evening
evening nor a morning knowledge in the angels; because
knowledge.
evening and morning have an admixture of darkness. But
Objection 2. Further, between evening and morning
there is no darkness in the knowledge of an angel; since
the night intervenes; while noonday falls between morn-
there is no error nor falsehood. Therefore the angelic
ing and evening. Consequently, if there be a morning and
294
an evening knowledge in the angels, for the same reason to an admixture of darkness, but as compared to beginning
it appears that there ought to be a noonday and a night
and end. Or else it can be said, as Augustine puts it (Gen.
knowledge.
ad lit. iv, 23), that there is nothing to prevent us from
Objection 3. Further, knowledge is diversified ac-
calling something light in comparison with one thing, and
cording to the difference of the objects known: hence
darkness with respect to another. In the same way the
the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 38), “The sci-
life of the faithful and the just is called light in compar-
ences are divided just as things are.” But there is a three-
ison with the wicked, according to Eph. 5:8: “You were
fold existence of things: to wit, in the Word; in their own
heretofore darkness; but now, light in the Lord”: yet this
natures; and in the angelic knowledge, as Augustine ob-
very life of the faithful, when set in contrast to the life of
serves (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). If, therefore, a morning and
glory, is termed darkness, according to 2 Pet. 1:19: “You
an evening knowledge be admitted in the angels, because
have the firm prophetic word, whereunto you do well to
of the existence of things in the Word, and in their own
attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place.” So the
nature, then there ought to be admitted a third class of
angel’s knowledge by which he knows things in their own
knowledge, on account of the existence of things in the
nature, is day in comparison with ignorance or error; yet
angelic mind.
it is dark in comparison with the vision of the Word.
On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,31;
Reply to Objection 2.
The morning and evening
De Civ. Dei xii, 7,20) divides the knowledge of the angels
knowledge belong to the day, that is, to the enlightened
into morning and evening knowledge.
angels, who are quite apart from the darkness, that is,
I answer that, The expression “morning” and
from the evil spirits. The good angels, while knowing
“evening” knowledge was devised by Augustine; who in-
the creature, do not adhere to it, for that would be to turn
terprets the six days wherein God made all things, not as
to darkness and to night; but they refer this back to the
ordinary days measured by the solar circuit, since the sun
praise of God, in Whom, as in their principle, they know
was only made on the fourth day, but as one day, namely,
all things. Consequently after “evening” there is no night,
the day of angelic knowledge as directed to six classes of
but “morning”; so that morning is the end of the preced-
things. As in the ordinary day, morning is the beginning,
ing day, and the beginning of the following, in so far as the
and evening the close of day, so, their knowledge of the
angels refer to God’s praise their knowledge of the preced-
primordial being of things is called morning knowledge;
ing work. Noonday is comprised under the name of day,
and this is according as things exist in the Word. But their
as the middle between the two extremes. Or else the noon
knowledge of the very being of the thing created, as it
can be referred to their knowledge of God Himself, Who
stands in its own nature, is termed evening knowledge;
has neither beginning nor end.
because the being of things flows from the Word, as from
Reply to Objection 3. The angels themselves are also
a kind of primordial principle; and this flow is terminated
creatures. Accordingly the existence of things in the an-
in the being which they have in themselves.
gelic knowledge is comprised under evening knowledge,
Reply to Objection 1. Evening and morning knowl-
as also the existence of things in their own nature.
edge in the angelic knowledge are not taken as compared
Whether the morning and evening knowledge are one?
Ia q. 58 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the morning and the
“When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in
evening knowledge are one. For it is said (Gn. 1:5):
part shall be done away.” But, if the evening knowledge
“There was evening and morning, one day.” But by the
be different from the morning, it is compared to it as the
expression “day” the knowledge of the angels is to be un-
less perfect to the perfect. Therefore the evening knowl-
derstood, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23). There-
edge cannot exist together with the morning knowledge.
fore the morning and evening knowledge of the angels are
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24):
one and the same.
“There is a vast difference between knowing anything as
Objection 2. Further, it is impossible for one faculty
it is in the Word of God, and as it is in its own nature;
to have two operations at the same time. But the angels
so that the former belongs to the day, and the latter to the
are always using their morning knowledge; because they
evening.”
are always beholding God and things in God, according
I answer that, As was observed (a. 6), the evening
to Mat. 18:10. Therefore, if the evening knowledge were
knowledge is that by which the angels know things in their
different from the morning, the angel could never exercise
proper nature. This cannot be understood as if they drew
his evening knowledge.
their knowledge from the proper nature of things, so that
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10):
the preposition “in” denotes the form of a principle; be-
295
cause, as has been already stated (q. 55, a. 2), the angels cording to the unit of the thing understood; which, never-do not draw their knowledge from things. It follows, then,
theless, can be apprehended by various ways of knowing
that when we say “in their proper nature” we refer to the
it.
aspect of the thing known in so far as it is an object of
Reply to Objection 2. There can be two operations
knowledge; that is to say, that the evening knowledge is in
of the same faculty at the one time, one of which is re-
the angels in so far as they know the being of things which
ferred to the other; as is evident when the will at the same
those things have in their own nature.
time wills the end and the means to the end; and the in-
Now they know this through a twofold medium,
tellect at the same instant perceives principles and con-
namely, by innate ideas, or by the forms of things exist-
clusions through those principles, when it has already ac-
ing in the Word. For by beholding the Word, they know
quired knowledge. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24),
not merely the being of things as existing in the Word, but
the evening knowledge is referred to the morning knowl-
the being as possessed by the things themselves; as God
edge in the angels; hence there is nothing to hinder both
by contemplating Himself sees that being which things
from being at the same time in the angels.
have in their own nature. It, therefore, it be called evening
Reply to Objection 3. On the coming of what is per-
knowledge, in so far as when the angels behold the Word,
fect, the opposite imperfect is done away: just as faith,
they know the being which things have in their proper na-
which is of the things that are not seen, is made void when
ture, then the morning and the evening knowledge are
vision succeeds.
But the imperfection of the evening
essentially one and the same, and only differ as to the
knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the morn-
things known. If it be called evening knowledge, in so
ing knowledge. For that a thing be known in itself, is not
far as through innate ideas they know the being which
opposite to its being known in its cause. Nor, again, is
things have in their own natures, then the morning and
there any inconsistency in knowing a thing through two
the evening knowledge differ. Thus Augustine seems to
mediums, one of which is more perfect and the other less
understand it when he assigns one as inferior to the other.
perfect; just as we can have a demonstrative and a prob-
Reply to Objection 1. The six days, as Augustine
able medium for reaching the same conclusion. In like
understands them, are taken as the six classes of things
manner a thing can be known by the angel through the
known by the angels; so that the day’s unit is taken ac-
uncreated Word, and through an innate idea.
296
FIRST PART, QUESTION 59
The Will of the Angels
(In Four Articles)
In the next place we must treat of things concerning the will of the angels. In the first place we shall treat of the will itself; secondly, of its movement, which is love. Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is will in the angels?
(2) Whether the will of the angel is his nature, or his intellect?
(3) Is there free-will in the angels?
(4) Is there an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in them?
Whether there is will in the angels?
Ia q. 59 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no will in the
belongs to the intellect. This is most perfectly inclined
angels. For as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text.
towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it were merely
42), “The will is in the reason.” But there is no reason in
guided by another towards some particular good only, like
the angels, but something higher than reason. Therefore
things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular
there is no will in the angels, but something higher than
good only, as things which have only sensitive knowledge,
the will.
but as inclined towards good in general. Such inclination
Objection 2. Further, the will is comprised under the
is termed “will.” Accordingly, since the angels by their
appetite, as is evident from the Philosopher (De Anima iii,
intellect know the universal aspect of goodness, it is man-
text. 42). But the appetite argues something imperfect;
ifest that there is a will in them.
because it is a desire of something not as yet possessed.
Reply to Objection 1. Reason surpasses sense in a
Therefore, since there is no imperfection in the angels, es-
different way from that in which intellect surpasses rea-
pecially in the blessed ones, it seems that there is no will
son. Reason surpasses sense according to the diversity
in them.
of the objects known; for sense judges of particular ob-
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima
jects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore there
ii, text. 54) that the will is a mover which is moved; for it
must be one appetite tending towards good in the abstract,
is moved by the appetible object understood. Now the an-
which appetite belongs to reason; and another with a ten-
gels are immovable, since they are incorporeal. Therefore
dency towards particular good, which appetite belongs to
there is no will in the angels.
sense. But intellect and reason differ as to their manner of
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12)
knowing; because the intellect knows by simple intuition,
that the image of the Trinity is found in the soul according
while reason knows by a process of discursion from one
to memory, understanding, and will. But God’s image is
thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion reason
found not only in the soul of man, but also in the angelic
comes to know what intellect learns without it, namely,
mind, since it also is capable of knowing God. Therefore
the universal. Consequently the object presented to the
there is will in the angels.
appetitive faculty on the part of reason and on the part of
I answer that, We must necessarily place a will in the
intellect is the same. Therefore in the angels, who are
angels. In evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that,
purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher than the
since all things flow from the Divine will, all things in
will.
their own way are inclined by appetite towards good, but
Reply to Objection 2. Although the name of the ap-
in different ways. Some are inclined to good by their nat-
petitive part is derived from seeking things not yet pos-
ural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and inan-
sessed, yet the appetitive part reaches out not to these
imate bodies. Such inclination towards good is called
things only, but also to many other things; thus the name
“a natural appetite.” Others, again, are inclined towards
of a stone [lapis] is derived from injuring the foot [lae-
good, but with some knowledge; not that they know the
sione pedis], though not this alone belongs to a stone. In
aspect of goodness, but that they apprehend some partic-
the same way the irascible faculty is so denominated from
ular good; as in the sense, which knows the sweet, the
anger [ira]; though at the same time there are several other
white, and so on. The inclination which follows this ap-
passions in it, as hope, daring, and the rest.
prehension is called “a sensitive appetite.” Other things,
Reply to Objection 3. The will is called a mover
again, have an inclination towards good, but with a knowl-
which is moved, according as to will and to understand
edge whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness; this
are termed movements of a kind; and there is nothing to
297
prevent movement of this kind from existing in the angels, in De Anima iii, text. 28.
since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as stated
Whether in the angels the will differs from the intellect?
Ia q. 59 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that in the angel the will
Now the will has a natural tendency towards good.
does not differ from the intellect and from the nature. For
Consequently there alone are essence and will identified
an angel is more simple than a natural body. But a natural
where all good is contained within the essence of him who
body is inclined through its form towards its end, which is
wills; that is to say, in God, Who wills nothing beyond
its good. Therefore much more so is the angel. Now the
Himself except on account of His goodness. This cannot
angel’s form is either the nature in which he subsists, or
be said of any creature, because infinite goodness is quite
else it is some species within his intellect. Therefore the
foreign to the nature of any created thing. Accordingly,
angel inclines towards the good through his own nature,
neither the will of the angel, nor that of any creature, can
or through an intelligible species. But such inclination to-
be the same thing as its essence.
wards the good belongs to the will. Therefore the will of
In like manner neither can the will be the same thing as
the angel does not differ from his nature or his intellect.
the intellect of angel or man. Because knowledge comes
Objection 2. Further, the object of the intellect is the about in so far as the object known is within the knower;
true, while the object of the will is the good. Now the
consequently the intellect extends itself to what is outside
good and the true differ, not really but only logically∗.
it, according as what, in its essence, is outside it is dis-
Therefore will and intellect are not really different.
posed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the
Objection 3. Further, the distinction of common and
will goes out to what is beyond it, according as by a kind
proper does not differentiate the faculties; for the same
of inclination it tends, in a manner, to what is outside it.
power of sight perceives color and whiteness. But the
Now it belongs to one faculty to have within itself some-
good and the true seem to be mutually related as common
thing which is outside it, and to another faculty to tend to
to particular; for the true is a particular good, to wit, of
what is outside it. Consequently intellect and will must
the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good,
necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is not
does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true.
so with God, for He has within Himself universal being,
On the contrary, The will in the angels regards good
and the universal good. Therefore both intellect and will
things only, while their intellect regards both good and
are His nature.
bad things, for they know both. Therefore the will of the
Reply to Objection 1. A natural body is moved to its
angels is distinct from their intellect.
own being by its substantial form: while it is inclined to
I answer that, In the angels the will is a special fac-
something outside by something additional, as has been
ulty or power, which is neither their nature nor their in-
said.
tellect. That it is not their nature is manifest from this,
Reply to Objection 2. Faculties are not differentiated
that the nature or essence of a thing is completely com-
by any material difference of their objects, but according
prised within it: whatever, then, extends to anything be-
to their formal distinction, which is taken from the nature
yond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies
of the object as such. Consequently the diversity derived
that the inclination to being does not come from anything
from the notion of good and true suffices for the difference
superadded to the essence, but from the matter which de-
of intellect from will.
sires being before possessing it, and from the form which
Reply to Objection 3. Because the good and the true
keeps it in such being when once it exists. But the inclina-
are really convertible, it follows that the good is appre-
tion towards something extrinsic comes from something
hended by the intellect as something true; while the true
superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place comes
is desired by the will as something good. Nevertheless,
from gravity or lightness, while the inclination to make
the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for diversifying
something like itself comes from the active qualities.
the faculties, as was said above (ad 2).
∗ Cf. q. 16, a. 4
298
Whether there is free-will in the angels?
Ia q. 59 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no free-will
thing to be good. Consequently, wherever there is intel-
in the angels. For the act of free-will is to choose. But
lect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest that just as there can be no choice with the angels, because choice
there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and in is “the desire of something after taking counsel,” while
a higher degree of perfection than in man.
counsel is “a kind of inquiry,” as stated in Ethic. iii, 3.
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking
But the angels’ knowledge is not the result of inquiring,
of choice, as it is in man. As a man’s estimate in specu-
for this belongs to the discursiveness of reason. Therefore
lative matters differs from an angel’s in this, that the one
it appears that there is no free-will in the angels.
needs not to inquire, while the other does so need; so is it
Objection 2. Further, free-will implies indifference to
in practical matters. Hence there is choice in the angels,
alternatives. But in the angels on the part of their intellect
yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by
there is no such indifference; because, as was observed
the sudden acceptance of truth.
already (q. 58, a. 5), their intellect is not deceived as to
Reply to Objection 2. As was observed already (a. 2),
things which are naturally intelligible to them. Therefore
knowledge is effected by the presence of the known within
neither on the part of their appetitive faculty can there be
the knower. Now it is a mark of imperfection in anything
free-will.
not to have within it what it should naturally have. Con-
Objection 3. Further, the natural endowments of the
sequently an angel would not be perfect in his nature, if
angels belong to them according to degrees of more or
his intellect were not determined to every truth which he
less; because in the higher angels the intellectual nature is
can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty
more perfect than in the lower. But the free-will does not
comes of this, that the affection is directed to something
admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will in them.
outside. Yet the perfection of a thing does not come from
On the contrary, Free-will is part of man’s dignity.
everything to which it is inclined, but only from some-
But the angels’ dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore,
thing which is higher than it. Therefore it does not argue
since free-will is in men, with much more reason is it in
imperfection in an angel if his will be not determined with
the angels.
regard to things beneath him; but it would argue imperfec-
I answer that, Some things there are which act, not
tion in him, with he to be indeterminate to what is above
from any previous judgment, but, as it were, moved and
him.
made to act by others; just as the arrow is directed to the
Reply to Objection 3. Free-will exists in a nobler
target by the archer. Others act from some kind of judg-
manner in the higher angels than it does in the lower, as
ment; but not from free-will, such as irrational animals;
also does the judgment of the intellect. Yet it is true that
for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment
liberty, in so far as the removal of compulsion is consid-
whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself: such a judg-
ered, is not susceptible of greater and less degree; because
ment is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an
privations and negations are not lessened nor increased di-
agent endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment
rectly of themselves; but only by their cause, or through
which is free, in so far as it apprehends the common note
the addition of some qualification.
of goodness; from which it can judge this or the other
Whether there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels?
Ia q. 59 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that there is an irascible
Objection 3. Further, some virtues are said to reside
and a concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius
in the irascible appetite and some in the concupiscible:
says (Div. Nom. iv) that in the demons there is “unrea-
thus charity and temperance appear to be in the concupis-
sonable fury and wild concupiscence.” But demons are
cible, while hope and fortitude are in the irascible. But
of the same nature as angels; for sin has not altered their
these virtues are in the angels. Therefore there is both a
nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible
concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels.
appetite in the angels.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima
Objection 2. Further, love and joy are in the concu-
iii, text. 42) that the irascible and concupiscible are in
piscible; while anger, hope, and fear are in the irascible
the sensitive part, which does not exist in angels. Conse-
appetite. But in the Sacred Scriptures these things are at-
quently there is no irascible or concupiscible appetite in
tributed both to the good and to the wicked angels. There-
the angels.
fore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in
I answer that, The intellective appetite is not divided
the angels.
into irascible and concupiscible; only the sensitive ap-
299
petite is so divided. The reason of this is because, since are passions, are in the concupiscible appetite, but in so far
the faculties are distinguished from one another not ac-
as they express a simple act of the will, they are in the in-
cording to the material but only by the formal distinction
tellective part: in this sense to love is to wish well to any-
of objects, if to any faculty there respond an object accord-
one; and to be glad is for the will to repose in some good
ing to some common idea, there will be no distinction of
possessed. Universally speaking, none of these things is
faculties according to the diversity of the particular things
said of the angels, as by way of passions; as Augustine
contained under that common idea. Just as if the proper
says (De Civ. Dei ix).
object of the power of sight be color as such, then there are
Reply to Objection 3. Charity, as a virtue, is not in the not several powers of sight distinguished according to the
concupiscible appetite, but in the will; because the object
difference of black and white: whereas if the proper ob-
of the concupiscible appetite is the good as delectable to
ject of any faculty were white, as white, then the faculty
the senses. But the Divine goodness, which is the object
of seeing white would be distinguished from the faculty
of charity, is not of any such kind. For the same reason it
of seeing black.
must be said that hope does not exist in the irascible ap-
Now it is quite evident from what has been said (a. 1;
petite; because the object of the irascible appetite is some-
q. 16, a. 1), that the object of the intellective appetite, oththing arduous belonging to the sensible order, which the
erwise known as the will, is good according to the com-
virtue of hope does not regard; since the object of hope
mon aspect of goodness; nor can there be any appetite
is arduous and divine. Temperance, however, considered
except of what is good. Hence, in the intellective part,
as a human virtue, deals with the desires of sensible plea-
the appetite is not divided according to the distinction of
sures, which belong to the concupiscible faculty. Simi-
some particular good things, as the sensitive appetite is di-
larly, fortitude regulates daring and fear, which reside in
vided, which does not crave for what is good according to
the irascible part. Consequently temperance, in so far as
its common aspect, but for some particular good object.
it is a human virtue, resides in the concupiscible part, and
Accordingly, since there exists in the angels only an in-
fortitude in the irascible. But they do not exist in the an-
tellective appetite, their appetite is not distinguished into
gels in this manner. For in them there are no passions of
irascible and concupiscible, but remains undivided; and it
concupiscence, nor of fear and daring, to be regulated by
is called the will.
temperance and fortitude. But temperance is predicated
Reply to Objection 1. Fury and concupiscence are
of them according as in moderation they display their will
metaphorically said to be in the demons, as anger is some-
in conformity with the Divine will. Fortitude is likewise
times attributed to God;—on account of the resemblance
attributed to them, in so far as they firmly carry out the
in the effect.
Divine will. All of this is done by their will, and not by
Reply to Objection 2. Love and joy, in so far as they
the irascible or concupiscible appetite.
300
FIRST PART, QUESTION 60
Of the Love or Dilection of the Angels
(In Five Articles)
The next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which is love or dilection; because every act of the appetitive faculty comes of love.
Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is natural love in the angels?
(2) Whether there is in them love of choice?
(3) Whether the angel loves himself with natural love or with love of choice?
(4) Whether one angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself?
(5) Whether the angel loves God more than self with natural love?
Whether there is natural love or dilection in an angel?
Ia q. 60 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no natu-
ently in different natures; but in each according to its
ral love or dilection in the angels. For, natural love is
mode. Consequently, in the intellectual nature there is to
contradistinguished from intellectual love, as stated by
be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in the
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an angel’s love is intel-
sensitive nature, according to the sensitive appetite; but
lectual. Therefore it is not natural.
in a nature devoid of knowledge, only according to the
Objection 2. Further, those who love with natural love
tendency of the nature to something. Therefore, since an
are more acted upon than active in themselves; for nothing
angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love
has control over its own nature. Now the angels are not
in his will.
acted upon, but act of themselves; because they possess
Reply to Objection 1. Intellectual love is contradis-
free-will, as was shown above (q. 59, a. 3). Consequently
tinguished from that natural love, which is merely natural,
there is no natural love in them.
in so far as it belongs to a nature which has not likewise
Objection 3. Further, every love is either ordinate or
the perfection of either sense or intellect.
inordinate. Now ordinate love belongs to charity; while
Reply to Objection 2. All things in the world are
inordinate love belongs to wickedness. But neither of
moved to act by something else except the First Agent,
these belongs to nature; because charity is above nature,
Who acts in such a manner that He is in no way moved to
while wickedness is against nature. Therefore there is no
act by another; and in Whom nature and will are the same.
natural love in the angels.
So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to
On the contrary, Love results from knowledge; for,
act in so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him
nothing is loved except it be first known, as Augustine
by the Author of his nature. Yet he is not so moved to act
says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But there is natural knowledge in
that he does not act himself, because he has free-will.
the angels. Therefore there is also natural love.
Reply to Objection 3. As natural knowledge is al-
I answer that, We must necessarily place natural love
ways true, so is natural love well regulated; because nat-
in the angels. In evidence of this we must bear in mind
ural love is nothing else than the inclination implanted in
that what comes first is always sustained in what comes
nature by its Author. To say that a natural inclination is
after it. Now nature comes before intellect, because the
not well regulated, is to derogate from the Author of na-
nature of every subject is its essence. Consequently what-
ture. Yet the rectitude of natural love is different from the
ever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such
rectitude of charity and virtue: because the one rectitude
subjects as have intellect. But it is common to every na-
perfects the other; even so the truth of natural knowledge
ture to have some inclination; and this is its natural ap-
is of one kind, and the truth of infused or acquired knowl-
petite or love. This inclination is found to exist differ-
edge is of another.
301
Whether there is love of choice in the angels?
Ia q. 60 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no love of
of that good, which a man naturally wills as an end, is his
choice in the angels. For love of choice appears to be ra-
natural love; but the love which comes of this, which is of
tional love; since choice follows counsel, which lies in
something loved for the end’s sake, is the love of choice.
inquiry, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Now rational love is con-
There is however a difference on the part of the intel-
trasted with intellectual, which is proper to angels, as is
lect and on the part of the will. Because, as was stated al-
said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of choice
ready (q. 59, a. 2), the mind’s knowledge is brought about
in the angels.
by the inward presence of the known within the knower. It
Objection 2. Further, the angels have only natural
comes of the imperfection of man’s intellectual nature that
knowledge besides such as is infused: since they do not
his mind does not simultaneously possess all things capa-
proceed from principles to acquire the knowledge of con-
ble of being understood, but only a few things from which
clusions. Hence they are disposed to everything they can
he is moved in a measure to grasp other things. The act
know, as our intellect is disposed towards first principles,
of the appetitive faculty, on the contrary, follows the in-
which it can know naturally. Now love follows knowl-
clination of man towards things; some of which are good
edge, as has been already stated (a. 1; q. 16, a. 1). Con-
in themselves, and consequently are appetible in them-
sequently, besides their infused love, there is only natural
selves; others being good only in relation to something
love in the angels. Therefore there is no love of choice in
else, and being appetible on account of something else.
them.
Consequently it does not argue imperfection in the per-
On the contrary, We neither merit nor demerit by our
son desiring, for him to seek one thing naturally as his
natural acts. But by their love the angels merit or demerit.
end, and something else from choice as ordained to such
Therefore there is love of choice in them.
end. Therefore, since the intellectual nature of the angels
I answer that, There exists in the angels a natural
is perfect, only natural and not deductive knowledge is to
love, and a love of choice. Their natural love is the prin-
be found in them, but there is to be found in them both
ciple of their love of choice; because, what belongs to
natural love and love of choice.
that which precedes, has always the nature of a princi-
In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards
ple. Wherefore, since nature is first in everything, what
things which are above nature, since nature is not the suf-
belongs to nature must be a principle in everything.
ficient principle thereof: but we shall speak of them later
This is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his
on (q. 62).
intellect and his will. For the intellect knows principles
Reply to Objection 1. Not all love of choice is ra-
naturally; and from such knowledge in man comes the
tional love, according as rational is distinguished from in-
knowledge of conclusions, which are known by him not
tellectual love. For rational love is so called which fol-
naturally, but by discovery, or by teaching. In like manner,
lows deductive knowledge: but, as was said above (q. 59,
the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle
a. 3, ad 1), when treating of free-will, every choice does
does in the intellect, as is laid down in Phys. ii, text. 89.
not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only human
Consequently the will tends naturally to its last end; for
choice. Consequently the conclusion does not follow.
every man naturally wills happiness: and all other desires
The reply to the second objection follows from what
are caused by this natural desire; since whatever a man
has been said.
wills he wills on account of the end. Therefore the love
Whether the angel loves himself with both natural love, and love of choice?
Ia q. 60 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the angel does not
Objection 3. Further, love is a kind of movement. But
love himself both with natural love and a love of choice.
every movement tends towards something else. Therefore
For, as was said (a. 2), natural love regards the end itself;
it seems that an angel cannot love himself with either nat-
while love of choice regards the means to the end. But the
ural or elective love.
same thing, with regard to the same, cannot be both the
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8):
end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and
“Love for others comes of love for oneself.”
the love of choice cannot have the same object.
I answer that, Since the object of love is good, and
Objection 2. Further, as Dionysius observes (Div.
good is to be found both in substance and in accident, as
Nom. iv): “Love is a uniting and a binding power.” But
is clear from Ethic. i, 6, a thing may be loved in two
uniting and binding imply various things brought together.
ways; first of all as a subsisting good; and secondly as an
Therefore the angel cannot love himself.
accidental or inherent good. That is loved as a subsisting
302
good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But that under quite different aspects that an angel or a man loves
which we wish unto another, is loved as an accidental or
self with natural and with elective love, as was observed
inherent good: thus knowledge is loved, not that any good
above.
may come to it but that it may be possessed. This kind of
Reply to Objection 2. As to be one is better than to be
love has been called by the name “concupiscence” while
united, so there is more oneness in love which is directed
the first is called “friendship.”
to self than in love which unites one to others. Dionysius
Now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge,
used the terms “uniting” and “binding” in order to show
everything naturally seeks to procure what is good for it-
the derivation of love from self to things outside self; as
self; as fire seeks to mount upwards. Consequently both
uniting is derived from unity.
angel and man naturally seek their own good and perfec-
Reply to Objection 3. As love is an action which re-
tion. This is to love self. Hence angel and man naturally
mains within the agent, so also is it a movement which
love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires what
abides within the lover, but does not of necessity tend to-
is good for self. On the other hand, each loves self with
wards something else; yet it can be reflected back upon
the love of choice, in so far as from choice he wishes for
the lover so that he loves himself; just as knowledge is re-
something which will benefit himself.
flected back upon the knower, in such a way that he knows
Reply to Objection 1. It is not under the same but
himself.
Whether an angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself?
Ia q. 60 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that an angel does not
ically one with another, is the one according to nature.
love another with natural love as he loves himself. For
And so everything loves another which is one with it in
love follows knowledge. But an angel does not know an-
species, with a natural affection, in so far as it loves its
other as he knows himself: because he knows himself by
own species. This is manifest even in things devoid of
his essence, while he knows another by his similitude, as
knowledge: for fire has a natural inclination to communi-
was said above (q. 56, Aa. 1,2). Therefore it seems that
cate its form to another thing, wherein consists this other
one angel does not love another with natural love as he
thing’s good; as it is naturally inclined to seek its own
loves himself.
good, namely, to be borne upwards.
Objection 2. Further, the cause is more powerful than
So then, it must be said that one angel loves another
the effect; and the principle than what is derived from it.
with natural affection, in so far as he is one with him in na-
But love for another comes of love for self, as the Philoso-
ture. But so far as an angel has something else in common
pher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore one angel does not love
with another angel, or differs from him in other respects,
another as himself, but loves himself more.
he does not love him with natural love.
Objection 3. Further, natural love is of something as
Reply to Objection 1. The expression ‘as himself’
an end, and is unremovable. But no angel is the end of
can in one way qualify the knowledge and the love on
another; and again, such love can be severed from him,
the part of the one known and loved: and thus one angel
as is the case with the demons, who have no love for the
knows another as himself, because he knows the other to
good angels. Therefore an angel does not love another
be even as he knows himself to be. In another way the
with natural love as he loves himself.
expression can qualify the knowledge and the love on the
On the contrary, That seems to be a natural prop-
part of the knower and lover. And thus one angel does not
erty which is found in all, even in such as devoid of rea-
know another as himself, because he knows himself by
son. But, “every beast loves its like,” as is said, Ecclus.
his essence, and the other not by the other’s essence. In
13:19. Therefore an angel naturally loves another as he
like manner he does not love another as he loves himself,
loves himself.
because he loves himself by his own will; but he does not
I answer that, As was observed (a. 3), both angel and
love another by the other’s will.
man naturally love self. Now what is one with a thing, is
Reply to Objection 2. The expression “as” does not
that thing itself: consequently every thing loves what is
denote equality, but likeness. For since natural affection
one with itself. So, if this be one with it by natural union,
rests upon natural unity, the angel naturally loves less
it loves it with natural love; but if it be one with it by non-
what is less one with him. Consequently he loves more
natural union, then it loves it with non-natural love. Thus
what is numerically one with himself, than what is one
a man loves his fellow townsman with a social love, while
only generically or specifically. But it is natural for him
he loves a blood relation with natural affection, in so far as
to have a like love for another as for himself, in this re-
he is one with him in the principle of natural generation.
spect, that as he loves self in wishing well to self, so he
Now it is evident that what is generically or specif-
loves another in wishing well to him.
303
Reply to Objection 3. Natural love is said to be of the their still retaining a natural affection towards the good
end, not as of that end to which good is willed, but rather
angels, in so far as they share the same nature with them.
as of that good which one wills for oneself, and in con-
But they hate them, in so far as they are unlike them ac-
sequence for another, as united to oneself. Nor can such
cording to righteousness and unrighteousness.
natural love be stripped from the wicked angels, without
Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself?
Ia q. 60 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the angel does not
self more than he does God, because he naturally loves
love God by natural love more than he loves himself. For,
himself before God, and with greater intensity.
as was stated (a. 4), natural love rests upon natural union.
The falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if
Now the Divine nature is far above the angelic nature.
one but consider whither natural movement tends in the
Therefore, according to natural love, the angel loves God
natural order of things; because the natural tendency of
less than self, or even than another angel.
things devoid of reason shows the nature of the natural
Objection 2. Further, “That on account of which a
inclination residing in the will of an intellectual nature.
thing is such, is yet more so.” But every one loves an-
Now, in natural things, everything which, as such, natu-
other with natural love for his own sake: because one
rally belongs to another, is principally, and more strongly
thing loves another as good for itself. Therefore the an-
inclined to that other to which it belongs, than towards
gel does not love God more than self with natural love.
itself. Such a natural tendency is evidenced from things
Objection 3. Further, nature is self-centered in its op-
which are moved according to nature: because “accord-
eration; for we behold every agent acting naturally for its
ing as a thing is moved naturally, it has an inborn aptitude
own preservation. But nature’s operation would not be
to be thus moved,” as stated in Phys. ii, text. 78. For
self-centered were it to tend towards anything else more
we observe that the part naturally exposes itself in order
than to nature itself. Therefore the angel does not love
to safeguard the whole; as, for instance, the hand is with-
God more than himself from natural love.
out deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole body’s
Objection 4. Further, it is proper to charity to love
safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the same
God more than self. But to love from charity is not natu-
inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the
ral to the angels; for “it is poured out upon their hearts by
virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death
the Holy Spirit Who is given to them,” as Augustine says
for the public weal of the state; and if man were a natural
(De Civ. Dei xii, 9). Therefore the angels do not love God
part of the city, then such inclination would be natural to
more than themselves by natural love.
him.
Objection 5. Further, natural love lasts while nature
Consequently, since God is the universal good, and
endures. But the love of God more than self does not re-
under this good both man and angel and all creatures are
main in the angel or man who sins; for Augustine says (De
comprised, because every creature in regard to its entire
Civ. Dei xiv), “Two loves have made two cities; namely
being naturally belongs to God, it follows that from natu-
love of self unto the contempt of God has made the earthly
ral love angel and man alike love God before themselves
city; while love of God unto the contempt of self has made
and with a greater love.
Otherwise, if either of them
the heavenly city.” Therefore it is not natural to love God
loved self more than God, it would follow that natural love
more than self.
would be perverse, and that it would not be perfected but
On the contrary, All the moral precepts of the law
destroyed by charity.
come of the law of nature. But the precept of loving God
Reply to Objection 1. Such reasoning holds good of
more than self is a moral precept of the law. Therefore,
things adequately divided whereof one is not the cause
it is of the law of nature. Consequently from natural love
of the existence and goodness of the other; for in such
the angel loves God more than himself.
natures each loves itself naturally more than it does the
I answer that, There have been some who maintained
other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself than it is with
that an angel loves God more than himself with natural
the other. But where one is the whole cause of the exis-
love, both as to the love of concupiscence, through his
tence and goodness of the other, that one is naturally more
seeking the Divine good for himself rather than his own
loved than self; because, as we said above, each part natu-
good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, in
rally loves the whole more than itself: and each individual
so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than
naturally loves the good of the species more than its own
to himself; because he naturally wishes God to be God,
individual good. Now God is not only the good of one
while as for himself, he wills to have his own nature. But
species, but is absolutely the universal good; hence every-
absolutely speaking, out of the natural love he loves him-
thing in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.
304
Reply to Objection 2. When it is said that God is loved by everything with natural love. So far as He is the
loved by an angel “in so far” as He is good to the an-
good which of its very nature beatifies all with supernatu-
gel, if the expression “in so far” denotes an end, then it is
ral beatitude, He is love with the love of charity.
false; for he does not naturally love God for his own good,
Reply to Objection 5. Since God’s substance and
but for God’s sake. If it denotes the nature of love on the
universal goodness are one and the same, all who behold
lover’s part, then it is true; for it would not be in the nature God’s essence are by the same movement of love moved
of anyone to love God, except from this—that everything
towards the Divine essence as it is distinct from other
is dependent on that good which is God.
things, and according as it is the universal good. And
Reply to Objection 3.
Nature’s operation is self-
because He is naturally loved by all so far as He is the
centered not merely as to certain particular details, but
universal good, it is impossible that whoever sees Him in
much more as to what is common; for everything is in-
His essence should not love Him. But such as do not be-
clined to preserve not merely its individuality, but like-
hold His essence, know Him by some particular effects,
wise its species. And much more has everything a natural
which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way
inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good.
they are said to hate God; yet nevertheless, so far as He is
Reply to Objection 4. God, in so far as He is the uni-
the universal good of all, every thing naturally loves God
versal good, from Whom every natural good depends, is
more than itself.
305
FIRST PART, QUESTION 61
Of the Production of the Angels in the Order of Natural Being (In Four Articles)
After dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will, it now remains for us to treat of their creation, or, speaking in a general way, of their origin. Such consideration is threefold. In the first place we must see how they were brought into natural existence; secondly, how they were made perfect in grace or glory; and thirdly, how some of them became wicked.
Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the angel has a cause of his existence?
(2) Whether he has existed from eternity?
(3) Whether he was created before corporeal creatures?
(4) Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
Whether the angels have a cause of their existence?
Ia q. 61 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels have no
His own essence: while all other things have their exis-
cause of their existence. For the first chapter of Genesis
tence by participation. Now whatever exists by partici-
treats of things created by God. But there is no mention
pation is caused by what exists essentially; as everything
of angels. Therefore the angels were not created by God.
ignited is caused by fire. Consequently the angels, of ne-
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph.
cessity, were made by God.
viii, text. 16) that if any substance be a form without mat-
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
ter, “straightway it has being and unity of itself, and has
xi, 50) that the angels were not passed over in that account
no cause of its being and unity.” But the angels are imma-
of the first creation of things, but are designated by the
terial forms, as was shown above (q. 50, a. 2). Therefore
name “heavens” or of “light.” And they were either passed
they have no cause of their being.
over, or else designated by the names of corporeal things,
Objection 3. Further, whatever is produced by any
because Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as
agent, from the very fact of its being produced, receives
yet incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature; and
form from it. But since the angels are forms, they do not
if it had been divulged that there were creatures existing
derive their form from any agent. Therefore the angels
beyond corporeal nature, it would have proved to them
have no active cause.
an occasion of idolatry, to which they were inclined, and
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 148:2): “Praise ye
from which Moses especially meant to safeguard them.
Him, all His angels”; and further on, verse 5: “For He
Reply to Objection 2. Substances that are subsisting
spoke and they were made.”
forms have no ‘formal’ cause of their existence and unity,
I answer that, It must be affirmed that angels and ev-
nor such active cause as produces its effect by changing
erything existing, except God, were made by God. God
the matter from a state of potentiality to actuality; but they
alone is His own existence; while in everything else the
have a cause productive of their entire substance.
essence differs from the existence, as was shown above
From this the solution of the third difficulty is mani-
(q. 3, a. 4). From this it is clear that God alone exists of
fest.
Whether the angel was produced by God from eternity?
Ia q. 61 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the angel was pro-
other non-existing, but exists always.
duced by God from eternity. For God is the cause of the
Objection 3. Further, Augustine (De Trin. xiii) proves
angel by His being: for He does not act through something
the soul’s incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is ca-
besides His essence. But His being is eternal. Therefore
pable of truth. But as truth is incorruptible, so is it eternal.
He produced the angels from eternity.
Therefore the intellectual nature of the soul and of the an-
Objection 2. Further, everything which exists at one
gel is not only incorruptible, but likewise eternal.
period and not at another, is subject to time. But the an-
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 8:22), in the person
gel is above time, as is laid down in the book De Causis.
of begotten Wisdom: “The Lord possessed me in the be-
Therefore the angel is not at one time existing and at an-
ginning of His ways, before He made anything from the
306
beginning.” But, as was shown above (a. 1), the angels Reply to Objection 2. An angel is above that time
were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were
which is the measure of the movement of the heavens; be-
not.
cause he is above every movement of a corporeal nature.
I answer that, God alone, Father, Son and Holy
Nevertheless he is not above time which is the measure
Ghost, is from eternity. Catholic Faith holds this with-
of the succession of his existence after his non-existence,
out doubt; and everything to the contrary must be rejected
and which is also the measure of the succession which is
as heretical. For God so produced creatures that He made
in his operations. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii,
them “from nothing”; that is, after they had not been.
20,21) that “God moves the spiritual creature according to
Reply to Objection 1. God’s being is His will. So
time.”
the fact that God produced the angels and other creatures
Reply to Objection 3. Angels and intelligent souls
by His being does not exclude that He made them also
are incorruptible by the very fact of their having a nature
by His will. But, as was shown above (q. 19, a. 3; q. 46,
whereby they are capable of truth. But they did not pos-
a. 1 ), God’s will does not act by necessity in producing
sess this nature from eternity; it was bestowed upon them
creatures. Therefore He produced such as He willed, and
when God Himself willed it. Consequently it does not
when He willed.
follow that the angels existed from eternity.
Whether the angels were created before the corporeal world?
Ia q. 61 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels were cre-
of creature to creature; because the mutual relationship of
ated before the corporeal world. For Jerome says (In Ep.
creatures makes up the good of the universe. But no part is
ad Tit. i, 2): “Six thousand years of our time have not yet
perfect if separate from the whole. Consequently it is im-
elapsed; yet how shall we measure the time, how shall we
probable that God, Whose “works are perfect,” as it is said
count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones, Domina-
Dt. 32:4, should have created the angelic creature before
tions, and the other orders served God?” Damascene also
other creatures. At the same time the contrary is not to
says (De Fide Orth. ii): “Some say that the angels were
be deemed erroneous; especially on account of the opin-
begotten before all creation; as Gregory the Theologian
ion of Gregory Nazianzen, “whose authority in Christian
declares, He first of all devised the angelic and heavenly
doctrine is of such weight that no one has ever raised ob-
powers, and the devising was the making thereof.”
jection to his teaching, as is also the case with the doctrine
Objection 2. Further, the angelic nature stands mid-
of Athanasius,” as Jerome says.
way between the Divine and the corporeal natures. But
Reply to Objection 1. Jerome is speaking according
the Divine nature is from eternity; while corporeal nature
to the teaching of the Greek Fathers; all of whom hold the
is from time. Therefore the angelic nature was produced
creation of the angels to have taken place previously to
ere time was made, and after eternity.
that of the corporeal world.
Objection 3. Further, the angelic nature is more re-
Reply to Objection 2. God is not a part of, but far
mote from the corporeal nature than one corporeal na-
above, the whole universe, possessing within Himself the
ture is from another. But one corporeal nature was made
entire perfection of the universe in a more eminent way.
before another; hence the six days of the production of
But an angel is a part of the universe. Hence the compari-
things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much more,
son does not hold.
therefore, was the angelic nature made before every cor-
Reply to Objection 3. All corporeal creatures are one
poreal nature.
in matter; while the angels do not agree with them in mat-
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): “In the begin-
ter. Consequently the creation of the matter of the cor-
ning God created heaven and earth.” Now, this would not
poreal creature involves in a manner the creation of all
be true if anything had been created previously. Conse-
things; but the creation of the angels does not involve cre-
quently the angels were not created before corporeal na-
ation of the universe.
ture.
If the contrary view be held, then in the text of Gn.
I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point
1, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” the
to be found in the writings of the Fathers. The more proba-
words, “In the beginning,” must be interpreted, “In the
ble one holds that the angels were created at the same time
Son,” or “In the beginning of time”: but not, “In the be-
as corporeal creatures. For the angels are part of the uni-
ginning, before which there was nothing,” unless we say
verse: they do not constitute a universe of themselves; but
“Before which there was nothing of the nature of corpo-
both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting one
real creatures.”
universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship
307
Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
Ia q. 61 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels were not
empyrean heaven, or whatever else it be called. So Isidore
created in the empyrean heaven. For the angels are incor-
says that the highest heaven is the heaven of the angels,
poreal substances. Now a substance which is incorporeal
explaining the passage of Dt. 10:14: “Behold heaven is
is not dependent upon a body for its existence; and as a
the Lord’s thy God, and the heaven of heaven.”
consequence, neither is it for its creation. Therefore the
Reply to Objection 1. The angels were created in a
angels were not created in any corporeal place.
corporeal place, not as if depending upon a body either as
Objection 2. Further, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit.
to their existence or as to their being made; because God
iii, 10), that the angels were created in the upper atmo-
could have created them before all corporeal creation, as
sphere: therefore not in the empyrean heaven.
many holy Doctors hold. They were made in a corporeal
Objection 3. Further, the empyrean heaven is said to
place in order to show their relationship to corporeal na-
be the highest heaven. If therefore the angels were cre-
ture, and that they are by their power in touch with bodies.
ated in the empyrean heaven, it would not beseem them to
Reply to Objection 2. By the uppermost atmosphere
mount up to a still higher heaven. And this is contrary to
Augustine possibly means the highest part of heaven, to
what is said in Isaias, speaking in the person of the sinning
which the atmosphere has a kind of affinity owing to its
angel: “I will ascend into heaven” (Is. 14:13).
subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not speaking of all
On the contrary, Strabus, commenting on the text
the angels; but only of such as sinned, who, in the opin-
“In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” says:
ion of some, belonged to the inferior orders. But there is
“By heaven he does not mean the visible firmament, but
nothing to hinder us from saying that the higher angels, as
the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual firmament,
having an exalted and universal power over all corporeal
which is not so styled from its heat, but from its splendor;
things, were created in the highest place of the corporeal
and which was filled with angels directly it was made.”
creature; while the other angels, as having more restricted
I answer that, As was observed (a. 3), the universe
powers, were created among the inferior bodies.
is made up of corporeal and spiritual creatures. Conse-
Reply to Objection 3. Isaias is not speaking there of
quently spiritual creatures were so created as to bear some
any corporeal heaven, but of the heaven of the Blessed
relationship to the corporeal creature, and to rule over ev-
Trinity; unto which the sinning angel wished to ascend,
ery corporeal creature. Hence it was fitting for the an-
when he desired to be equal in some manner to God, as
gels to be created in the highest corporeal place, as pre-
will appear later on (q. 63, a. 3).
siding over all corporeal nature; whether it be styled the
308
FIRST PART, QUESTION 62
Of the Perfection of the Angels in the Order of Grace and of Glory (In Nine Articles)
In due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were made in the order of grace and of glory; under which heading there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Were the angels created in beatitude?
(2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God?
(3) Were they created in grace?
(4) Did they merit their beatitude?
(5) Did they at once enter into beatitude after merit?
(6) Did they receive grace and glory according to their natural capacities?
(7) After entering glory, did their natural love and knowledge remain?
(8) Could they have sinned afterwards?
(9) After entering into glory, could they advance farther?
Whether the angels were created in beatitude?
Ia q. 62 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels were cre-
and hence it is that it is naturally desired, since everything
ated in beatitude. For it is stated (De Eccl. Dogm. xxix)
naturally desires its ultimate perfection. Now there is a
that “the angels who continue in the beatitude wherein
twofold ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual
they were created, do not of their nature possess the ex-
nature. The first is one which it can procure of its own
cellence they have.” Therefore the angels were created in
natural power; and this is in a measure called beatitude
beatitude.
or happiness. Hence Aristotle (Ethic. x) says that man’s
Objection 2. Further, the angelic nature is nobler than
ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contempla-
the corporeal creature. But the corporeal creature straight-
tion, whereby in this life he can behold the best intelligible
way from its creation was made perfect and complete; nor
object; and that is God. Above this happiness there is still
did its lack of form take precedence in time, but only in
another, which we look forward to in the future, whereby
nature, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 15). Therefore
“we shall see God as He is.” This is beyond the nature of
neither did God create the angelic nature imperfect and
every created intellect, as was shown above (q. 12, a. 4).
incomplete. But its formation and perfection are derived
So, then, it remains to be said, that, as regards this first
from its beatitude, whereby it enjoys God. Therefore it
beatitude, which the angel could procure by his natural
was created in beatitude.
power, he was created already blessed. Because the angel
Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine (Gen.
does not acquire such beatitude by any progressive action,
ad lit. iv, 34; v, 5), the things which we read of as being
as man does, but, as was observed above (q. 58, Aa. 3 ,4),
made in the works of the six days, were made together at
is straightway in possession thereof, owing to his natural
one time; and so all the six days must have existed in-
dignity. But the angels did not have from the beginning
stantly from the beginning of creation. But, according
of their creation that ultimate beatitude which is beyond
to his exposition, in those six days, “the morning” was
the power of nature; because such beatitude is no part of
the angelic knowledge, according to which they knew the
their nature, but its end; and consequently they ought not
Word and things in the Word. Therefore straightway from
to have it immediately from the beginning.
their creation they knew the Word, and things in the Word.
Reply to Objection 1. Beatitude is there taken for
But the bliss of the angels comes of seeing the Word. Con-
that natural perfection which the angel had in the state of
sequently the angels were in beatitude straightway from
innocence.
the very beginning of their creation.
Reply to Objection 2. The corporeal creature in-
On the contrary, To be established or confirmed in
stantly in the beginning of its creation could not have the
good is of the nature of beatitude. But the angels were not
perfection to which it is brought by its operation; conse-
confirmed in good as soon as they were created; the fall of
quently, according to Augustine (Gen. ad. lit. v, 4,23;
some of them shows this. Therefore the angels were not
viii, 3), the growing of plants from the earth did not take
in beatitude from their creation.
place at once among the first works, in which only the
I answer that, By the name of beatitude is understood
germinating power of the plants was bestowed upon the
the ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature;
earth. In the same way, the angelic creature in the begin-
309
ning of its existence had the perfection of its nature; but it he knows the Word through His essence. By both kinds
did not have the perfection to which it had to come by its
of knowledge the angel knows things in the Word; im-
operation.
perfectly by his natural knowledge, and perfectly by his
Reply to Objection 3. The angel has a twofold knowl-
knowledge of glory.
Therefore the first knowledge of
edge of the Word; the one which is natural, and the other
things in the Word was present to the angel from the outset
according to glory. He has a natural knowledge whereby
of his creation; while the second was not, but only when
he knows the Word through a similitude thereof shining
the angels became blessed by turning to the good. And
in his nature; and he has a knowledge of glory whereby
this is properly termed their morning knowledge.
Whether an angel needs grace in order to turn to God?
Ia q. 62 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the angel had no need
movement of the will directed towards such beatitude, ex-
of grace in order to turn to God. For, we have no need of
cept it be moved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is
grace for what we can accomplish naturally. But the angel
what we call the help of grace. Therefore it must be said
naturally turns to God: because he loves God naturally, as
that an angel could not of his own will be turned to such
is clear from what has been said (q. 60, a. 5). Therefore
beatitude, except by the help of grace.
an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God.
Reply to Objection 1. The angel loves God naturally,
Objection 2. Further, seemingly we need help only
so far as God is the author of his natural being. But here
for difficult tasks. Now it was not a difficult task for the
we are speaking of turning to God, so far as God bestows
angel to turn to God; because there was no obstacle in him
beatitude by the vision of His essence.
to such turning. Therefore the angel had no need of grace
Reply to Objection 2. A thing is “difficult” which is
in order to turn to God.
beyond a power; and this happens in two ways. First of
Objection 3. Further, to turn oneself to God is to dis-
all, because it is beyond the natural capacity of the power.
pose oneself for grace; hence it is said (Zech. 1:3): “Turn
Thus, if it can be attained by some help, it is said to be
ye to Me, and I will turn to you.” But we do not stand in
“difficult”; but if it can in no way be attained, then it is
need of grace in order to prepare ourselves for grace: for
“impossible”; thus it is impossible for a man to fly. In an-
thus we should go on to infinity. Therefore the angel did
other way a thing may be beyond the power, not according
not need grace to turn to God.
to the natural order of such power, but owing to some in-
On the contrary, It was by turning to God that the an-
tervening hindrance; as to mount upwards is not contrary
gel reached to beatitude. If, then, he had needed no grace
to the natural order of the motive power of the soul; be-
in order to turn to God, it would follow that he did not re-
cause the soul, considered in itself, can be moved in any
quire grace in order to possess everlasting life. But this is
direction; but is hindered from so doing by the weight of
contrary to the saying of the Apostle (Rom. 6:23): “The
the body; consequently it is difficult for a man to mount
grace of God is life everlasting.”
upwards. To be turned to his ultimate beatitude is difficult
I answer that, The angels stood in need of grace in
for man, both because it is beyond his nature, and because
order to turn to God, as the object of beatitude. For, as
he has a hindrance from the corruption of the body and in-
was observed above (q. 60, a. 2) the natural movement
fection of sin. But it is difficult for an angel, only because
of the will is the principle of all things that we will. But
it is supernatural.
the will’s natural inclination is directed towards what is
Reply to Objection 3. Every movement of the will
in keeping with its nature. Therefore, if there is any-
towards God can be termed a conversion to God. And
thing which is above nature, the will cannot be inclined
so there is a threefold turning to God. The first is by the
towards it, unless helped by some other supernatural prin-
perfect love of God; this belongs to the creature enjoying
ciple. Thus it is clear that fire has a natural tendency to
the possession of God; and for such conversion, consum-
give forth heat, and to generate fire; whereas to generate
mate grace is required. The next turning to God is that
flesh is beyond the natural power of fire; consequently, fire
which merits beatitude; and for this there is required ha-
has no tendency thereto, except in so far as it is moved in-
bitual grace, which is the principle of merit. The third
strumentally by the nutritive soul.
conversion is that whereby a man disposes himself so that
Now it was shown above (q. 12, Aa. 4,5), when we
he may have grace; for this no habitual grace is required;
were treating of God’s knowledge, that to see God in
but the operation of God, Who draws the soul towards
His essence, wherein the ultimate beatitude of the ratio-
Himself, according to Lam 5:21: “Convert us, O Lord, to
nal creature consists, is beyond the nature of every created
Thee, and we shall be converted.” Hence it is clear that
intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have the
there is no need to go on to infinity.
310
Whether the angels were created in grace?
Ia q. 62 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels were not
is evident that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to
created in grace. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8)
beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to the natu-
that the angelic nature was first made without form, and
ral effect; hence (1 Jn. 3:9) grace is called the “seed” of
was called “heaven”: but afterwards it received its form,
God. As, then, in Augustine’s opinion it is contended that
and was then called “light.” But such formation comes
the seedlike forms of all natural effects were implanted
from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace.
in the creature when corporeally created, so straightway
Objection 2. Further, grace turns the rational creature
from the beginning the angels were created in grace.
towards God. If, therefore, the angel had been created in
Reply to Objection 1. Such absence of form in the
grace, no angel would ever have turned away from God.
angels can be understood either by comparison with their
Objection 3. Further, grace comes midway between
formation in glory; and so the absence of formation pre-
nature and glory. But the angels were not beatified in their
ceded formation by priority of time. Or else it can be
creation. Therefore it seems that they were not created in
understood of the formation according to grace: and so it
grace; but that they were first created in nature only, and
did not precede in the order of time, but in the order of
then received grace, and that last of all they were beatified.
nature; as Augustine holds with regard to the formation of
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9),
corporeal things (Gen. ad lit. i, 15).
“Who wrought the good will of the angels? Who, save
Reply to Objection 2. Every form inclines the subject
Him Who created them with His will, that is, with the
after the mode of the subject’s nature. Now it is the mode
pure love wherewith they cling to Him; at the same time
of an intellectual nature to be inclined freely towards the
building up their nature and bestowing grace on them?”
objects it desires. Consequently the movement of grace
I answer that, Although there are conflicting opin-
does not impose necessity; but he who has grace can fail
ions on this point, some holding that the angels were cre-
to make use of it, and can sin.
ated only in a natural state, while others maintain that
Reply to Objection 3. Although in the order of nature
they were created in grace; yet it seems more probable,
grace comes midway between nature and glory, neverthe-
and more in keeping with the sayings of holy men, that
less, in the order of time, in created nature, glory is not
they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all
simultaneous with nature; because glory is the end of the
things which, in the process of time, being created by the
operation of nature helped by grace. But grace stands not
work of Divine Providence, were produced by the opera-
as the end of operation, because it is not of works, but as
tion of God, were created in the first fashioning of things
the principle of right operation. Therefore it was fitting
according to seedlike forms, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
for grace to be given straightway with nature.
lit. viii, 3), such as trees, animals, and the rest. Now it
Whether an angel merits his beatitude?
Ia q. 62 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the angel did not
On the contrary, It is stated (Apoc. 21:17) that the
merit his beatitude. For merit arises from the difficulty
“measure of the angel” in that heavenly Jerusalem is “the
of the meritorious act. But the angel experienced no diffi-
measure of a man.” Therefore the same is the case with
culty in acting rightly. Therefore righteous action was not
the angel.
meritorious for him.
I answer that, Perfect beatitude is natural only to
Objection 2. Further, we do not merit by merely nat-
God, because existence and beatitude are one and the
ural operations. But it was quite natural for the angel to
same thing in Him. Beatitude, however, is not of the na-
turn to God. Therefore he did not thereby merit beatitude.
ture of the creature, but is its end. Now everything attains
Objection 3. Further, if a beatified angel merited his
its last end by its operation. Such operation leading to
beatitude, he did so either before he had it, or else after-
the end is either productive of the end, when such end is
wards. But it was not before; because, in the opinion of
not beyond the power of the agent working for the end,
many, he had no grace before whereby to merit it. Nor did
as the healing art is productive of health; or else it is de-
he merit it afterwards, because thus he would be meriting
serving of the end, when such end is beyond the capacity
it now; which is clearly false, because in that case a lower
of the agent striving to attain it; wherefore it is looked for
angel could by meriting rise up to the rank of a higher,
from another’s bestowing. Now it is evident from what
and the distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent;
has gone before (Aa. 1,2; q. 12, Aa. 4,5), ultimate beat-
which is not admissible. Consequently the angel did not
itude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature. It
merit his beatitude.
remains, then, that both man and angel merited their beat-
311
itude.
not stand, because free-will is not the sufficient cause of
And if the angel was created in grace, without which
merit; and, consequently, an act cannot be meritorious as
there is no merit, there would be no difficulty in saying
coming from free-will, except in so far as it is informed by
that he merited beatitude: as also, if one were to say that
grace; but it cannot at the same time be informed by im-
he had grace in any way before he had glory.
perfect grace, which is the principle of meriting, and by
But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude,
perfect grace, which is the principle of enjoying. Hence it
it would then have to be said that he had beatitude with-
does not appear to be possible for anyone to enjoy beati-
out merit, even as we have grace. This, however, is quite
tude, and at the same time to merit it.
foreign to the idea of beatitude; which conveys the no-
Consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace
tion of an end, and is the reward of virtue, as even the
ere he was admitted to beatitude, and that by such grace
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). Or else it will have to be
he merited beatitude.
said, as some others have maintained, that the angels merit
Reply to Objection 1. The angel’s difficulty of work-
beatitude by their present ministrations, while in beati-
ing righteously does not come from any contrariety or hin-
tude. This is quite contrary, again, to the notion of merit:
drance of natural powers; but from the fact that the good
since merit conveys the idea of a means to an end; while
work is beyond his natural capacity.
what is already in its end cannot, properly speaking, be
Reply to Objection 2. An angel did not merit beati-
moved towards such end; and so no one merits to produce
tude by natural movement towards God; but by the move-
what he already enjoys. Or else it will have to be said
ment of charity, which comes of grace.
that one and the same act of turning to God, so far as it
The answer to the Third Objection is evident from
comes of free-will, is meritorious; and so far as it attains
what we have said.
the end, is the fruition of beatitude. Even this view will
Whether the angel obtained beatitude immediately after one act of merit?
Ia q. 62 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the angel did not pos-
beatitude by only one meritorious act.
sess beatitude instantly after one act of merit. For it is
I answer that, The angel was beatified instantly af-
more difficult for a man to do well than for an angel. But
ter the first act of charity, whereby he merited beatitude.
man is not rewarded at once after one act of merit. There-
The reason whereof is because grace perfects nature ac-
fore neither was the angel.
cording to the manner of the nature; as every perfection is
Objection 2. Further, an angel could act at once, and
received in the subject capable of perfection, according to
in an instant, from the very outset of his creation, for even
its mode. Now it is proper to the angelic nature to receive
natural bodies begin to be moved in the very instant of
its natural perfection not by passing from one stage to an-
their creation; and if the movement of a body could be
other; but to have it at once naturally, as was shown above
instantaneous, like operations of mind and will, it would
(a. 1; q. 58, Aa. 3,4). But as the angel is of his nature in-
have movement in the first instant of its generation. Con-
clined to natural perfection, so is he by merit inclined to
sequently, if the angel merited beatitude by one act of his
glory. Hence instantly after merit the angel secured beat-
will, he merited it in the first instant of his creation; and
itude. Now the merit of beatitude in angel and man alike
so, if their beatitude was not retarded, then the angels were
can be from merely one act; because man merits beatitude
in beatitude in the first instant.
by every act informed by charity. Hence it remains that an
Objection 3. Further, there must be many intervals
angel was beatified straightway after one act of charity.
between things which are far apart. But the beatific state
Reply to Objection 1. Man was not intended to se-
of the angels is very far remote from their natural condi-
cure his ultimate perfection at once, like the angel. Hence
tion: while merit comes midway between. Therefore the
a longer way was assigned to man than to the angel for
angel would have to pass through many stages of merit in
securing beatitude.
order to reach beatitude.
Reply to Objection 2. The angel is above the time of
On the contrary, Man’s soul and an angel are or-
corporeal things; hence the various instants regarding the
dained alike for beatitude: consequently equality with an-
angels are not to be taken except as reckoning the succes-
gels is promised to the saints. Now the soul separated
sion of their acts. Now their act which merited beatitude
from the body, if it has merit deserving beatitude, enters at
could not be in them simultaneously with the act of beati-
once into beatitude, unless there be some obstacle. There-
tude, which is fruition; since the one belongs to imperfect
fore so does an angel. Now an angel instantly, in his first
grace, and the other to consummate grace. Consequently,
act of charity, had the merit of beatitude. Therefore, since
it remains for different instants to be conceived, in one
there was no obstacle within him, he passed at once into
of which the angel merited beatitude, and in another was
312
beatified.
dained. Consequently, only one meritorious act is re-
Reply to Objection 3. It is of the nature of an an-
quired; which act can so far be called an interval as
gel instantly to attain the perfection unto which he is or-
through it the angel is brought to beatitude.
Whether the angels receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural Ia q. 62 a. 6
gifts?
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels did not re-
for greater gifts of grace and fuller beatitude, whom He
ceive grace and glory according to the degree of their nat-
made of a higher nature.
ural gifts. For grace is bestowed of God’s absolute will.
Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the an-
Therefore the degree of grace depends on God’s will, and
gel. The angel is not a compound of different natures, so
not on the degree of their natural gifts.
that the inclination of the one thwarts or retards the ten-
Objection 2. Further, a moral act seems to be more
dency of the other; as happens in man, in whom the move-
closely allied with grace than nature is; because a moral
ment of his intellective part is either retarded or thwarted
act is preparatory to grace. But grace does not come “of
by the inclination of his sensitive part. But when there
works,” as is said Rom. 11:6. Therefore much less does
is nothing to retard or thwart it, nature is moved with its
the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their natu-
whole energy. So it is reasonable to suppose that the an-
ral gifts.
gels who had a higher nature, were turned to God more
Objection 3. Further, man and angel are alike or-
mightily and efficaciously. The same thing happens in
dained for beatitude or grace. But man does not receive
men, since greater grace and glory are bestowed according
more grace according to the degree of his natural gifts.
to the greater earnestness of their turning to God. Hence it
Therefore neither does the angel.
appears that the angels who had the greater natural pow-
On the contrary, Is the saying of the Master of the
ers, had the more grace and glory.
Sentences (Sent. ii, D, 3) that “those angels who were cre-
Reply to Objection 1. As grace comes of God’s will
ated with more subtle natures and of keener intelligence
alone, so likewise does the nature of the angel: and as
in wisdom, were likewise endowed with greater gifts of
God’s will ordained nature for grace, so did it ordain the
grace.”
various degrees of nature to the various degrees of grace.
I answer that, It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of Reply to Objection 2. The acts of the rational crea-graces and perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the
ture are from the creature itself; whereas nature is imme-
angels according to the degree of their natural gifts. The
diately from God. Accordingly it seems rather that grace
reason for this can be drawn from two sources. First of
is bestowed according to degree of nature than according
all, on the part of God, Who, in the order of His wisdom,
to works.
established various degrees in the angelic nature. Now as
Reply to Objection 3. Diversity of natural gifts is
the angelic nature was made by God for attaining grace
in one way in the angels, who are themselves different
and beatitude, so likewise the grades of the angelic nature
specifically; and in quite another way in men, who differ
seem to be ordained for the various degrees of grace and
only numerically. For specific difference is on account of
glory; just as when, for example, the builder chisels the
the end; while numerical difference is because of the mat-
stones for building a house, from the fact that he prepares
ter. Furthermore, there is something in man which can
some more artistically and more fittingly than others, it is
thwart or impede the movement of his intellective nature;
clear that he is setting them apart for the more ornate part
but not in the angels. Consequently the argument is not
of the house. So it seems that God destined those angels
the same for both.
Whether natural knowledge and love remain in the beatified angels?
Ia q. 62 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that natural knowledge
superfluous. But the knowledge and love of glory suffice
and love do not remain in the beatified angels. For it is
for the beatified angels. Therefore it would be superfluous
said (1 Cor. 13:10): “When that which is perfect is come,
for their natural knowledge and love to remain.
then that which is in part shall be done away.” But natural
Objection 3. Further, the same faculty has not two si-
love and knowledge are imperfect in comparison with be-
multaneous acts, as the same line cannot, at the same end,
atified knowledge and love. Therefore, in beatitude, natu-
be terminated in two points. But the beatified angels are
ral knowledge and love cease.
always exercising their beatified knowledge and love; for,
Objection 2. Further, where one suffices, another is
as is said Ethic. i, 8, happiness consists not in habit, but in 313
act. Therefore there can never be natural knowledge and the form. In the same way, the imperfection of natural
love in the angels.
knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the knowl-
On the contrary, So long as a nature endures, its op-
edge in glory; for nothing hinders us from knowing a thing
eration remains. But beatitude does not destroy nature,
through various mediums, as a thing may be known at
since it is its perfection. Therefore it does not take away
the one time through a probable medium and through a
natural knowledge and love.
demonstrative one. In like manner, an angel can know
I answer that, Natural knowledge and love remain in
God by His essence, and this appertains to his knowledge
the angels. For as principles of operations are mutually
of glory; and at the same time he can know God by his
related, so are the operations themselves. Now it is man-
own essence, which belongs to his natural knowledge.
ifest that nature is to beatitude as first to second; because
Reply to Objection 2. All things which make up beat-
beatitude is superadded to nature. But the first must ever
itude are sufficient of themselves. But in order for them to
be preserved in the second. Consequently nature must be
exist, they presuppose the natural gifts; because no beati-
preserved in beatitude: and in like manner the act of na-
tude is self-subsisting, except the uncreated beatitude.
ture must be preserved in the act of beatitude.
Reply to Objection 3. There cannot be two opera-
Reply to Objection 1. The advent of a perfection re-
tions of the one faculty at the one time, except the one be
moves the opposite imperfection. Now the imperfection
ordained to the other. But natural knowledge and love are
of nature is not opposed to the perfection of beatitude,
ordained to the knowledge and love of glory. Accordingly
but underlies it; as the imperfection of the power under-
there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love from
lies the perfection of the form, and the power is not taken
existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory.
away by the form, but the privation which is opposed to
Whether a beatified angel can sin?
Ia q. 62 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that a beatified angel can
ated good, such as is the union of beatitude, it is rendered
sin. For, as was said above (a. 7), beatitude does not do
unable to sin, for the reason already alleged.
away with nature. But it is of the very notion of created
Reply to Objection 2. The rational powers are re-
nature, that it can fail. Therefore a beatified angel can sin.
ferred to opposites in the things to which they are not in-
Objection 2. Further, the rational powers are referred
clined naturally; but as to the things whereunto they have
to opposites, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv,
a natural tendency, they are not referred to opposites. For
text. 3). But the will of the angel in beatitude does not
the intellect cannot but assent to naturally known princi-
cease to be rational. Therefore it is inclined towards good
ples; in the same way, the will cannot help clinging to
and evil.
good, formally as good; because the will is naturally or-
Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-
dained to good as to its proper object. Consequently the
will for man to be able to choose good or evil. But the
will of the angels is referred to opposites, as to doing
freedom of will is not lessened in the beatified angels.
many things, or not doing them. But they have no ten-
Therefore they can sin.
dency to opposites with regard to God Himself, Whom
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi) that
they see to be the very nature of goodness; but in all
“there is in the holy angels that nature which cannot sin.”
things their aim is towards God, which ever alternative
Therefore the holy angels cannot sin.
they choose, that is not sinful.
I answer that, The beatified angels cannot sin. The
Reply to Objection 3. Free-will in its choice of means
reason for this is, because their beatitude consists in see-
to an end is disposed just as the intellect is to conclusions.
ing God through His essence. Now, God’s essence is the
Now it is evident that it belongs to the power of the in-
very essence of goodness. Consequently the angel be-
tellect to be able to proceed to different conclusions, ac-
holding God is disposed towards God in the same way
cording to given principles; but for it to proceed to some
as anyone else not seeing God is to the common form of
conclusion by passing out of the order of the principles,
goodness. Now it is impossible for any man either to will
comes of its own defect. Hence it belongs to the perfec-
or to do anything except aiming at what is good; or for
tion of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose
him to wish to turn away from good precisely as such.
between opposite things, keeping the order of the end in
Therefore the beatified angel can neither will nor act, ex-
view; but it comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose
cept as aiming towards God. Now whoever wills or acts in
anything by turning away from the order of the end; and
this manner cannot sin. Consequently the beatified angel
this is to sin. Hence there is greater liberty of will in the
cannot sin.
angels, who cannot sin, than there is in ourselves, who can
Reply to Objection 1. Created good, considered in
sin.
itself, can fail. But from its perfect union with the uncre-
314
Whether the beatified angels advance in beatitude?
Ia q. 62 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that the beatified angels
being is in infinite degrees removed from the infinite; it
can advance in beatitude. For charity is the principle of
comes to pass that the rational creature understands God
merit. But there is perfect charity in the angels. Therefore
more or less clearly according to infinite degrees. And as
the beatified angels can merit. Now, as merit increases,
beatitude consists in vision, so the degree of vision lies in
the reward of beatitude increases. Therefore the beatified
a determinate mode of the vision.
angels can progress in beatitude.
Therefore every rational creature is so led by God to
Objection 2.
Further, Augustine says (De Doctr.
the end of its beatitude, that from God’s predestination it
Christ. i) that “God makes use of us for our own gain,
is brought even to a determinate degree of beatitude. Con-
and for His own goodness. The same thing happens to
sequently, when that degree is once secured, it cannot pass
the angels, whom He uses for spiritual ministrations”;
to a higher degree.
since “they are all∗ ministering spirits, sent to minister for
Reply to Objection 1. Merit belongs to a subject
them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation” (Heb.
which is moving towards its end. Now the rational crea-
1:14). This would not be for their profit were they not
ture is moved towards its end, not merely passively, but
to merit thereby, nor to advance to beatitude. It remains,
also by working actively. If the end is within the power of
then, that the beatified angels can merit, and can advance
the rational creature, then its action is said to procure the
in beatitude.
end; as man acquires knowledge by reflection: but if the
Objection 3. Further, it argues imperfection for any-
end be beyond its power, and is looked for from another,
one not occupying the foremost place not to be able to ad-
then the action will be meritorious of such end. But what
vance. But the angels are not in the highest degree of beat-
is already in the ultimate term is not said to be moved, but
itude. Therefore if unable to ascend higher, it would ap-
to have been moved. Consequently, to merit belongs to
pear that there is imperfection and defect in them; which
the imperfect charity of this life; whereas perfect charity
is not admissible.
does not merit but rather enjoys the reward. Even as in
On the contrary, Merit and progress belong to this
acquired habits, the operation preceding the habit is pro-
present condition of life. But angels are not wayfarers
ductive of the habit; but the operation from an acquired
travelling towards beatitude, they are already in posses-
habit is both perfect and enjoyable. In the same way the
sion of beatitude. Consequently the beatified angels can
act of perfect charity has no quality of merit, but belongs
neither merit nor advance in beatitude.
rather to the perfection of the reward.
I answer that, In every movement the mover’s inten-
Reply to Objection 2. A thing can be termed useful
tion is centered upon one determined end, to which he in-
in two ways. First of all, as being on the way to an end;
tends to lead the movable subject; because intention looks
and so the merit of beatitude is useful. Secondly, as the
to the end, to which infinite progress is repugnant. Now
part is useful for the whole; as the wall for a house. In
it is evident, since the rational creature cannot of its own
this way the angelic ministerings are useful for the beati-
power attain to its beatitude, which consists in the vision
fied angels, inasmuch as they are a part of their beatitude;
of God, as is clear from what has gone before (q. 12, a. 4),
for to pour out acquired perfection upon others is of the
that it needs to be moved by God towards its beatitude.
nature of what is perfect, considered as perfect.
Therefore there must be some one determined thing to
Reply to Objection 3. Although a beatified angel is
which every rational creature is directed as to its last end.
not absolutely in the highest degree of beatitude, yet, in
Now this one determinate object cannot, in the vision
his own regard he is in the highest degree, according to
of God, consist precisely in that which is seen; for the
Divine predestination. Nevertheless the joy of the angels
Supreme Truth is seen by all the blessed in various de-
can be increased with regard to the salvation of such as
grees: but it is on the part of the mode of vision, that
are saved by their ministrations, according to Lk. 15:10:
diverse terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of
“There is [Vulg.‘shall be’] joy before the angels of God
Him Who directs towards the end. For it is impossible
upon one sinner doing penance.” Such joy belongs to their
that as the rational creature is led on to the vision of the
accidental reward, which can be increased unto judgment
Supreme Essence, it should be led on in the same way to
day. Hence some writers say that they can merit as to their
the supreme mode of vision, which is comprehension, for
accidental reward. But it is better to say that the Blessed
this belongs to God only; as is evident from what was said
can in no wise merit without being at the same time a
above (q. 12, a. 7; q. 14, a. 3). But since infinite efficacy
wayfarer and a comprehensor; like Christ, Who alone was
is required for comprehending God, while the creature’s
such. For the Blessed acquire such joy from the virtue of
efficacy in beholding is only finite; and since every finite
their beatitude, rather than merit it.
∗ Vulg.: ‘Are they not all. . . ?’
315
FIRST PART, QUESTION 63
The Malice of the Angels with Regard to Sin
(In Nine Articles)
In the next place we must consider how angels became evil: first of all with regard to the evil of fault; and secondly, as to the evil of punishment. Under the first heading there are nine points for consideration: (1) Can there be evil of fault in the angels?
(2) What kind of sins can be in them?
(3) What did the angel seek in sinning?
(4) Supposing that some became evil by a sin of their own choosing, are any of them naturally evil?
(5) Supposing that it is not so, could any one of them become evil in the first instant of his creation by an act of his own will?
(6) Supposing that he did not, was there any interval between his creation and fall?
(7) Was the highest of them who fell, absolutely the highest among the angels?
(8) Was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the others sinning?
(9) Did as many sin as remained steadfast?
Whether the evil of fault can be in the angels?
Ia q. 63 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there can be no evil
fall short of rectitude. Were the craftsman’s hand the rule
of fault in the angels. For there can be no evil except in
itself engraving, he could not engrave the wood otherwise
things which are in potentiality, as is said by the Philoso-
than rightly; but if the rightness of engraving be judged
pher (Metaph. ix, text. 19), because the subject of priva-
by another rule, then the engraving may be right or faulty.
tion is a being in potentiality. But the angels have not be-
Now the Divine will is the sole rule of God’s act, because
ing in potentiality, since they are subsisting forms. There-
it is not referred to any higher end. But every created will
fore there can be no evil in them.
has rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according
Objection 2. Further, the angels are higher than the
to the Divine will, to which the last end is to be referred:
heavenly bodies. But philosophers say that there cannot
as every desire of a subordinate ought to be regulated by
be evil in the heavenly bodies. Therefore neither can there
the will of his superior; for instance, the soldier’s will, ac-
by in the angels.
cording to the will of his commanding officer. Thus only
Objection 3. Further, what is natural to a thing is al-
in the Divine will can there be no sin; whereas there can
ways in it. But it is natural for the angels to be moved by
be sin in the will of every creature; considering the condi-
the movement of love towards God. Therefore such love
tion of its nature.
cannot be withdrawn from them. But in loving God they
Reply to Objection 1. In the angels there is no poten-
do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin.
tiality to natural existence. Yet there is potentiality in their Objection 4. Further, desire is only of what is good
intellective part, as regards their being inclined to this or
or apparently good. Now for the angels there can be no
the other object. In this respect there can be evil in them.
apparent good which is not a true good; because in them
Reply to Objection 2. The heavenly bodies have none
either there can be no error at all, or at least not before
but a natural operation. Therefore as there can be no evil
guilt. Therefore the angels can desire only what it truly
of corruption in their nature; so neither can there be evil
good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good.
of disorder in their natural action. But besides their natu-
Consequently the angel does not sin by desire.
ral action there is the action of free-will in the angels, by
On the contrary, It is said (Job 4:18): “In His angels
reason of which evil may be in them.
He found wickedness.”
Reply to Objection 3. It is natural for the angel to turn I answer that, An angel or any other rational creature
to God by the movement of love, according as God is the
considered in his own nature, can sin; and to whatever
principle of his natural being. But for him to turn to God
creature it belongs not to sin, such creature has it as a gift
as the object of supernatural beatitude, comes of infused
of grace, and not from the condition of nature. The reason
love, from which he could be turned away by sinning.
of this is, because sinning is nothing else than a deviation
Reply to Objection 4. Mortal sin occurs in two ways
from that rectitude which an act ought to have; whether
in the act of free-will. First, when something evil is cho-
we speak of sin in nature, art, or morals. That act alone,
sen; as man sins by choosing adultery, which is evil of
the rule of which is the very virtue of the agent, can never
itself. Such sin always comes of ignorance or error; oth-
316
erwise what is evil would never be chosen as good. The comes of free-will by choosing something good in itself,
adulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of
but not according to proper measure or rule; so that the
an inordinate act as something good to be performed now,
defect which induces sin is only on the part of the choice
from the inclination of passion or of habit; even though he
which is not properly regulated, but not on the part of the
does not err in his universal judgment, but retains a right
thing chosen; as if one were to pray, without heeding the
opinion in this respect. In this way there can be no sin
order established by the Church. Such a sin does not pre-
in the angel; because there are no passions in the angels
suppose ignorance, but merely absence of consideration
to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest from what has
of the things which ought to be considered. In this way
been said above (q. 59, a. 4); nor, again, could any habit
the angel sinned, by seeking his own good, from his own
inclining to sin precede their first sin. In another way sin
free-will, insubordinately to the rule of the Divine will.
Whether only the sin of pride and envy can exist in an angel?
Ia q. 63 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there can be other
contrary. Now the envious man repines over the good
sins in the angels besides those of pride and envy. Because
possessed by another, inasmuch as he deems his neigh-
whosoever can delight in any kind of sin, can fall into the
bor’s good to be a hindrance to his own. But another’s
sin itself. But the demons delight even in the obscenities
good could not be deemed a hindrance to the good cov-
of carnal sins; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3).
eted by the wicked angel, except inasmuch as he coveted
Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons.
a singular excellence, which would cease to be singular
Objection 2. Further, as pride and envy are spiritual
because of the excellence of some other. So, after the sin
sins, so are sloth, avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are
of pride, there followed the evil of envy in the sinning
concerned with the spirit, just as carnal sins are with the
angel, whereby he grieved over man’s good, and also over
flesh. Therefore not only can there be pride and envy in
the Divine excellence, according as against the devil’s will
the angels; but likewise sloth and avarice.
God makes use of man for the Divine glory.
Objection 3. Further, according to Gregory (Moral.
Reply to Objection 1. The demons do not delight in
xxxi), many vices spring from pride; and in like manner
the obscenities of the sins of the flesh, as if they them-
from envy. But, if the cause is granted, the effect follows.
selves were disposed to carnal pleasures: it is wholly
If, therefore, there can be pride and envy in the angels, for
through envy that they take pleasure in all sorts of human
the same reason there can likewise be other vices in them.
sins, so far as these are hindrances to a man’s good.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
Reply to Objection 2. Avarice, considered as a spe-
3) that the devil “is not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor
cial kind of sin, is the immoderate greed of temporal pos-
anything of the like sort; yet he is proud and envious.”
sessions which serve the use of human life, and which
I answer that, Sin can exist in a subject in two ways:
can be estimated in value of money; to these demons are
first of all by actual guilt, and secondly by affection. As
not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal plea-
to guilt, all sins are in the demons; since by leading men
sures. Consequently avarice properly so called cannot be
to sin they incur the guilt of all sins. But as to affection
in them. But if every immoderate greed of possessing any
only those sins can be in the demons which can belong
created good be termed avarice, in this way avarice is con-
to a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot be af-
tained under the pride which is in the demons. Anger im-
fected by such pleasures as appertain to bodies, but only
plies passion, and so does concupiscence; consequently
by such as are in keeping with spiritual things; because
they can only exist metaphorically in the demons. Sloth
nothing is affected except with regard to something which
is a kind of sadness, whereby a man becomes sluggish
is in some way suited to its nature. But there can be no sin
in spiritual exercises because they weary the body; which
when anyone is incited to good of the spiritual order; un-
does not apply to the demons. So it is evident that pride
less in such affection the rule of the superior be not kept.
and envy are the only spiritual sins which can be found in
Such is precisely the sin of pride—not to be subject to a
demons; yet so that envy is not to be taken for a passion,
superior when subjection is due. Consequently the first
but for a will resisting the good of another.
sin of the angel can be none other than pride.
Reply to Objection 3. Under envy and pride, as found
Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also
in the demons, are comprised all other sins derived from
to be in them, since for the appetite to tend to the desire
them.
of something involves on its part resistance to anything
317
Whether the devil desired to be as God?
Ia q. 63 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the devil did not de-
that, because a man seeks to occupy a higher grade as to
sire to be as God. For what does not fall under apprehen-
accidentals, which can increase without the destruction of
sion, does not fall under desire; because the good which
the subject, he can also seek a higher grade of nature, to
is apprehended moves the appetite, whether sensible, ra-
which he could not attain without ceasing to exist. Now it
tional, or intellectual; and sin consists only in such desire.
is quite evident that God surpasses the angels, not merely
But for any creature to be God’s equal does not fall under
in accidentals, but also in degree of nature; and one an-
apprehension, because it implies a contradiction; for it the
gel, another. Consequently it is impossible for one angel
finite equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite.
of lower degree to desire equality with a higher; and still
Therefore an angel could not desire to be as God.
more to covet equality with God.
Objection 2. Further, the natural end can always be
To desire to be as God according to likeness can hap-
desired without sin. But to be likened unto God is the end
pen in two ways. In one way, as to that likeness whereby
to which every creature naturally tends. If, therefore, the
everything is made to be likened unto God. And so, if any-
angel desired to be as God, not by equality, but by like-
one desire in this way to be Godlike, he commits no sin;
ness, it would seem that he did not thereby sin.
provided that he desires such likeness in proper order, that
Objection 3.
Further, the angel was created with
is to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin
greater fulness of wisdom than man. But no man, save
were he to desire to be like unto God even in the right way,
a fool, ever makes choice of being the equal of an an-
as of his own, and not of God’s power. In another way one
gel, still less of God; because choice regards only things
may desire to be like unto God in some respect which is
which are possible, regarding which one takes delibera-
not natural to one; as if one were to desire to create heaven
tion. Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to
and earth, which is proper to God; in which desire there
be as God.
would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired to be
On the contrary, It is said, in the person of the devil
as God. Not that he desired to resemble God by being sub-
(Is. 14:13,14), “I will ascend into heaven. . . I will be like
ject to no one else absolutely; for so he would be desiring
the Most High.” And Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test. cxiii)
his own ‘not-being’; since no creature can exist except by
says that being “inflated with pride, he wished to be called
holding its existence under God. But he desired resem-
God.”
blance with God in this respect—by desiring, as his last
I answer that, Without doubt the angel sinned by
end of beatitude, something which he could attain by the
seeking to be as God. But this can be understood in two
virtue of his own nature, turning his appetite away from
ways: first, by equality; secondly, by likeness. He could
supernatural beatitude, which is attained by God’s grace.
not seek to be as God in the first way; because by natural
Or, if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which
knowledge he knew that this was impossible: and there
is bestowed by grace, he sought to have it by the power of
was no habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any pas-
his own nature; and not from Divine assistance according
sion fettering his mind, so as to lead him to choose what
to God’s ordering. This harmonizes with Anselm’s opin-
was impossible by failing in some particular; as some-
ion, who says∗ that “he sought that to which he would
times happens in ourselves. And even supposing it were
have come had he stood fast.” These two views in a man-
possible, it would be against the natural desire; because
ner coincide; because according to both, he sought to have
there exists in everything the natural desire of preserving
final beatitude of his own power, whereas this is proper to
its own nature; which would not be preserved were it to be
God alone.
changed into another nature. Consequently, no creature of
Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what
a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature;
exists of another, it follows from this furthermore that he
just as an ass does not desire to be a horse: for were it
sought to have dominion over others; wherein he also per-
to be so upraised, it would cease to be itself. But herein
versely wished to be like unto God.
the imagination plays us false; for one is liable to think
From this we have the answer to all the objections.
Whether any demons are naturally wicked?
Ia q. 63 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that some demons are nat-
dead.” But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore some
urally wicked. For Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine
demons are naturally wicked.
(De Civ. Dei x, 11): “There is a class of demons of crafty
Objection 2. Further, as the angels are created by
nature, pretending that they are gods and the souls of the
God, so are men. But some men are naturally wicked,
∗ De casu diaboli, iv.
318
of whom it is said (Wis. 12:10): “Their malice is natural.”
soever; consequently they cannot be naturally evil.
Therefore some angels may be naturally wicked.
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine rebukes Porphyry
Objection 3. Further, some irrational animals have
for saying that the demons are naturally deceitful; him-
wicked dispositions by nature: thus the fox is naturally
self maintaining that they are not naturally so, but of their
sly, and the wolf naturally rapacious; yet they are God’s
own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held that they are
creatures. Therefore, although the demons are God’s crea-
naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons are
tures, they may be naturally wicked.
animals with a sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
is inclined towards some particular good, with which evil
“the demons are not naturally wicked.”
may be connected. In this way, then, it can have a natural
I answer that, Everything which exists, so far as it
inclination to evil; yet only accidentally, inasmuch as evil
exists and has a particular nature, tends naturally towards
is connected with good.
some good; since it comes from a good principle; because
Reply to Objection 2. The malice of some men can
the effect always reverts to its principle. Now a particu-
be called natural, either because of custom which is a sec-
lar good may happen to have some evil connected with it;
ond nature; or on account of the natural proclivity on the
thus fire has this evil connected with it that it consumes
part of the sensitive nature to some inordinate passion, as
other things: but with the universal good no evil can be
some people are said to be naturally wrathful or lustful;
connected. If, then, there be anything whose nature is in-
but not on the part of the intellectual nature.
clined towards some particular good, it can tend naturally
Reply to Objection 3. Brute beasts have a natural
to some evil; not as evil, but accidentally, as connected
inclination in their sensitive nature towards certain partic-
with some good. But if anything of its nature be inclined
ular goods, with which certain evils are connected; thus
to good in general, then of its own nature it cannot be in-
the fox in seeking its food has a natural inclination to do
clined to evil. Now it is manifest that every intellectual
so with a certain skill coupled with deceit. Wherefore it
nature is inclined towards good in general, which it can
is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to him; as apprehend and which is the object of the will. Hence,
it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes
since the demons are intellectual substances, they can in
(De Div. Nom. iv).
no wise have a natural inclination towards any evil what-
Whether the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his Ia q. 63 a. 5
creation?
Objection 1. It would seem that the devil was wicked
Objection 4. Further, the angelic nature is more pow-
by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his cre-
erful than the corporeal nature. But a corporeal thing be-
ation. For it is said of the devil (Jn. 8:44): “He was a
gins to have its operation in the first instant of its creation; murderer from the beginning.”
as fire begins to move upwards in the first instant it is pro-
Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (Gen.
duced. Therefore the angel could also have his operation
ad lit. i, 15), the lack of form in the creature did not
in the first instant of his creation. Now this operation was
precede its formation in order of time, but merely in or-
either ordinate or inordinate. It ordinate, then, since he
der of nature. Now according to him (Gen. ad lit. ii,
had grace, he thereby merited beatitude. But with the an-
8), the “heaven,” which is said to have been created in
gels the reward follows immediately upon merit; as was
the beginning, signifies the angelic nature while as yet
said above (q. 62, a. 5). Consequently they would have
not fully formed: and when it is said that God said: “Be
become blessed at once; and so would never have sinned,
light made: and light was made,” we are to understand the
which is false. It remains, then, that they sinned by inor-
full formation of the angel by turning to the Word. Con-
dinate action in their first instant.
sequently, the nature of the angel was created, and light
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:31): “God saw
was made, in the one instant. But at the same moment
all the things that He had made, and they were very good.”
that light was made, it was made distinct from “darkness,”
But among them were also the demons. Therefore the
whereby the angels who sinned are denoted. Therefore in
demons were at some time good.
the first instant of their creation some of the angels were
I answer that, Some have maintained that the demons
made blessed, and some sinned.
were wicked straightway in the first instant of their cre-
Objection 3. Further, sin is opposed to merit. But
ation; not by their nature, but by the sin of their own will;
some intellectual nature can merit in the first instant of
because, as soon as he was made, the devil refused righ-
its creation; as the soul of Christ, or also the good angels.
teousness. To this opinion, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Therefore the demons likewise could sin in the first instant
Dei xi, 13), if anyone subscribes, he does not agree with
of their creation.
those Manichean heretics who say that the devil’s nature
319
is evil of itself. Since this opinion, however, is in contra-operation which begins with the existence comes of the
diction with the authority of Scripture—for it is said of the
agent from which it drew its nature; just as upward move-
devil under the figure of the prince of Babylon (Is. 14:12):
ment in fire comes of its productive cause. Therefore, if
“How art thou fallen. . . O Lucifer, who didst rise in the
there be anything which derives its nature from a defec-
morning!” and it is said to the devil in the person of the
tive cause, which can be the cause of a defective action,
King of Tyre (Ezech. 28:13): “Thou wast in the pleasures
it can in the first instant of its existence have a defective
of the paradise of God,” —consequently, this opinion was
operation; just as the leg, which is defective from birth,
reasonably rejected by the masters as erroneous.
through a defect in the principle of generation, begins at
Hence others have said that the angels, in the first in-
once to limp. But the agent which brought the angels into
stant of their creation, could have sinned, but did not. Yet
existence, namely, God, cannot be the cause of sin. Con-
this view also is repudiated by some, because, when two
sequently it cannot be said that the devil was wicked in
operations follow one upon the other, it seems impossible
the first instant of his creation.
for each operation to terminate in the one instant. Now it
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Civ.
is clear that the angel’s sin was an act subsequent to his
Dei xi, 15), when it is stated that “the devil sins from the
creation. But the term of the creative act is the angel’s
beginning,” “he is not to be thought of as sinning from the
very being, while the term of the sinful act is the being
beginning wherein he was created, but from the beginning
wicked. It seems, then, an impossibility for the angel to
of sin”: that is to say, because he never went back from his
have been wicked in the first instant of his existence.
sin.
This argument, however, does not satisfy. For it holds
Reply to Objection 2. That distinction of light and
good only in such movements as are measured by time,
darkness, whereby the sins of the demons are understood
and take place successively; thus, if local movement fol-
by the term darkness, must be taken as according to God’s
lows a change, then the change and the local movement
foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi,
cannot be terminated in the same instant.
But if the
15), that “He alone could discern light and darkness, Who
changes are instantaneous, then all at once and in the
also could foreknow, before they fell, those who would
same instant there can be a term to the first and the sec-
fall.”
ond change; thus in the same instant in which the moon
Reply to Objection 3. All that is in merit is from God;
is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere is lit up by the moon.
and consequently an angel could merit in the first instant
Now, it is manifest that creation is instantaneous; so also
of his creation. The same reason does not hold good of
is the movement of free-will in the angels; for, as has been
sin; as has been said.
already stated, they have no occasion for comparison or
Reply to Objection 4. God did not distinguish be-
discursive reasoning (q. 58, a. 3 ). Consequently, there
tween the angels before the turning away of some of them,
is nothing to hinder the term of creation and of free-will
and the turning of others to Himself, as Augustine says
from existing in the same instant.
(De Civ. Dei xi, 15). Therefore, as all were created in
We must therefore reply that, on the contrary, it was
grace, all merited in their first instant. But some of them
impossible for the angel to sin in the first instant by an
at once placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby
inordinate act of free-will. For although a thing can begin
destroying their preceding merit; and consequently they
to act in the first instant of its existence, nevertheless, that were deprived of the beatitude which they had merited.
Whether there was any interval between the creation and the fall of the angel?
Ia q. 63 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that there was some in-
Objection 3. Further, capability of sinning is common
terval between the angel’s creation and his fall. For, it
alike to man and angel. But there was some delay between
is said (Ezech. 28:15): “Thou didst walk perfect∗ in thy
man’s formation and his sin. Therefore, for the like rea-
ways from the day of thy creation until iniquity was found
son there was some interval between the devil’s formation
in thee.” But since walking is continuous movement, it
and his sin.
requires an interval. Therefore there was some interval
Objection 4. Further, the instant wherein the devil
between the devil’s creation and his fall.
sinned was distinct from the instant wherein he was cre-
Objection 2. Further, Origen says (Hom. i in Ezech.)
ated. But there is a middle time between every two in-
that “the serpent of old did not from the first walk upon
stants. Therefore there was an interval between his cre-
his breast and belly”; which refers to his sin. Therefore
ation and his fall.
the devil did not sin at once after the first instant of his
On the contrary, It is said of the devil (Jn. 8:44):
creation.
“He stood not in the truth”: and, as Augustine says (De
∗ Vulg.: ‘Thou hast walked in the midst of the stones of fire; thou wast perfect. . . ’
320
Civ. Dei xi, 15), “we must understand this in the sense, Reply to Objection 3. An angel has an inflexible free-that he was in the truth, but did not remain in it.”
will after once choosing; consequently, if after the first
I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this
instant, in which he had a natural movement to good, he
point. But the more probable one, which is also more in
had not at once placed a barrier to beatitude, he would
harmony with the teachings of the Saints, is that the devil
have been confirmed in good. It is not so with man; and
sinned at once after the first instant of his creation. This
therefore the argument does not hold good.
must be maintained if it be held that he elicited an act of
Reply to Objection 4. It is true to say that there is a
free-will in the first instant of his creation, and that he was middle time between every two instants, so far as time is
created in grace; as we have said (q. 62, a. 3). For since the
continuous, as it is proved Phys. vi, text. 2. But in the
angels attain beatitude by one meritorious act, as was said
angels, who are not subject to the heavenly movement,
above (q. 62, a. 5), if the devil, created in grace, merited in which is primarily measured by continuous time, time is
the first instant, he would at once have received beatitude
taken to mean the succession of their mental acts, or of
after that first instant, if he had not placed an impediment
their affections. So the first instant in the angels is un-
by sinning.
derstood to respond to the operation of the angelic mind,
If, however, it be contended that the angel was not cre-
whereby it introspects itself by its evening knowledge be-
ated in grace, or that he could not elicit an act of free-will
cause on the first day evening is mentioned, but not morn-
in the first instant, then there is nothing to prevent some
ing. This operation was good in them all. From such op-
interval being interposed between his creation and fall.
eration some of them were converted to the praise of the
Reply to Objection 1. Sometimes in Holy Scripture
Word by their morning knowledge while others, absorbed
spiritual instantaneous movements are represented by cor-
in themselves, became night, “swelling up with pride,” as
poreal movements which are measured by time. In this
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24). Hence the first act
way by “walking” we are to understand the movement of
was common to them all; but in their second they were
free-will tending towards good.
separated. Consequently they were all of them good in
Reply to Objection 2. Origen says, “The serpent of
the first instant; but in the second the good were set apart
old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly,”
from the wicked.
because of the first instant in which he was not wicked.
Whether the highest angel among those who sinned was the highest of all?
Ia q. 63 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the highest among
I answer that, Two things have to be considered in
the angels who sinned was not the highest of all. For it
sin, namely, the proneness to sin, and the motive for sin-
is stated (Ezech. 28:14): “Thou wast a cherub stretched
ning. If, then, in the angels we consider the proneness to
out, and protecting, and I set thee in the holy mountain of
sin, it seems that the higher angels were less likely to sin
God.” Now the order of the Cherubim is under the order
than the lower. On this account Damascene says (De Fide
of the Seraphim, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi, vii).
Orth. ii), that the highest of those who sinned was set over
Therefore, the highest angel among those who sinned was
the terrestrial order. This opinion seems to agree with the
not the highest of all.
view of the Platonists, which Augustine quotes (De Civ.
Objection 2. Further, God made intellectual nature
Dei vii, 6,7; x, 9,10,11). For they said that all the gods
in order that it might attain to beatitude. If therefore the
were good; whereas some of the demons were good, and
highest of the angels sinned, it follows that the Divine or-
some bad; naming as ‘gods’ the intellectual substances
dinance was frustrated in the noblest creature which is un-
which are above the lunar sphere, and calling by the name
fitting.
of “demons” the intellectual substances which are beneath
Objection 3. Further, the more a subject is inclined
it, yet higher than men in the order of nature. Nor is
towards anything, so much the less can it fall away from
this opinion to be rejected as contrary to faith; because
it. But the higher an angel is, so much the more is he in-
the whole corporeal creation is governed by God through
clined towards God. Therefore so much the less can he
the angels, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5). Conse-
turn away from God by sinning. And so it seems that the
quently there is nothing to prevent us from saying that the
angel who sinned was not the highest of all, but one of the
lower angels were divinely set aside for presiding over
lower angels.
the lower bodies, the higher over the higher bodies; and
On the contrary, Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.) says
the highest to stand before God. And in this sense Dam-
that the chief angel who sinned, “being set over all the
ascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that they who fell were of
hosts of angels, surpassed them in brightness, and was by
the lower grade of angels; yet in that order some of them
comparison the most illustrious among them.”
remained good.
321
But if the motive for sinning be considered, we find ity, which is incompatible with mortal sin.
Therefore
that it existed in the higher angels more than in the lower.
the first angel who sinned is called, not a Seraph, but a
For, as has been said (a. 2), the demons’ sin was pride; and
Cherub.
the motive of pride is excellence, which was greater in the
Reply to Objection 2. The Divine intention is not
higher spirits. Hence Gregory says that he who sinned was
frustrated either in those who sin, or in those who are
the very highest of all. This seems to be the more probable
saved; for God knows beforehand the end of both; and He
view: because the angels’ sin did not come of any prone-
procures glory from both, saving these of His goodness,
ness, but of free choice alone. Consequently that argu-
and punishing those of His justice. But the intellectual
ment seems to have the more weight which is drawn from
creature, when it sins, falls away from its due end. Nor
the motive in sinning. Yet this must not be prejudicial to
is this unfitting in any exalted creature; because the intel-
the other view; because there might be some motive for
lectual creature was so made by God, that it lies within its
sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower angels.
own will to act for its end.
Reply to Objection 1. Cherubim is interpreted “ful-
Reply to Objection 3. However great was the incli-
ness of knowledge,” while “Seraphim” means “those who
nation towards good in the highest angel, there was no
are on fire,” or “who set on fire.” Consequently Cheru-
necessity imposed upon him: consequently it was in his
bim is derived from knowledge; which is compatible with
power not to follow it.
mortal sin; but Seraphim is derived from the heat of char-
Whether the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning?
Ia q. 63 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of the high-
inducing them by a kind of exhortation. A token thereof
est angel was not the cause of the others sinning. For the
appears in this, that all the demons are subjects of that
cause precedes the effect. But, as Damascene observes
highest one; as is evident from our Lord’s words: “Go
(De Fide Orth. ii), they all sinned at one time. Therefore
[Vulg. ‘Depart from Me’], you cursed, into everlasting
the sin of one was not the cause of the others’ sinning.
fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels”
Objection 2. Further, an angel’s first sin can only be
(Mat. 25:41). For the order of Divine justice exacts that
pride, as was shown above (a. 2). But pride seeks excel-
whosoever consents to another’s evil suggestion, shall be
lence. Now it is more contrary to excellence for anyone to
subjected to him in his punishment; according to (2 Pet.
be subject to an inferior than to a superior; and so it does
2:19): “By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he
not appear that the angels sinned by desiring to be subject
is the slave.”
to a higher angel rather than to God. Yet the sin of one
Reply to Objection 1.
Although the demons all
angel would have been the cause of the others sinning, if
sinned in the one instant, yet the sin of one could be the
he had induced them to be his subjects. Therefore it does
cause of the rest sinning. For the angel needs no delay of
not appear that the sin of the highest angel was the cause
time for choice, exhortation, or consent, as man, who re-
of the others sinning.
quires deliberation in order to choose and consent, and vo-
Objection 3. Further, it is a greater sin to wish to be
cal speech in order to exhort; both of which are the work
subject to another against God, than to wish to be over
of time. And it is evident that even man begins to speak in
another against God; because there is less motive for sin-
the very instant when he takes thought; and in the last in-
ning. If, therefore, the sin of the foremost angel was the
stant of speech, another who catches his meaning can as-
cause of the others sinning, in that he induced them to
sent to what is said; as is especially evident with regard to
subject themselves to him, then the lower angels would
primary concepts, “which everyone accepts directly they
have sinned more deeply than the highest one; which is
are heard”∗.
contrary to a gloss on Ps. 103:26: “This dragon which
Taking away, then, the time for speech and delibera-
Thou hast formed—He who was the more excellent than
tion which is required in us; in the same instant in which
the rest in nature, became the greater in malice.” There-
the highest angel expressed his affection by intelligible
fore the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the
speech, it was possible for the others to consent thereto.
others sinning.
Reply to Objection 2. Other things being equal, the
On the contrary, It is said (Apoc. 12:4) that the
proud would rather be subject to a superior than to an in-
dragon “drew” with him “the third part of the stars of
ferior. Yet he chooses rather to be subject to an inferior
heaven.”
than to a superior, if he can procure an advantage under an
I answer that, The sin of the highest angel was the
inferior which he cannot under a superior. Consequently
cause of the others sinning; not as compelling them, but as
it was not against the demons’ pride for them to wish to
∗ Boethius, De Hebdom.
322
serve an inferior by yielding to his rule; for they wanted a. 6), an angel has nothing in him to retard his action,
to have him as their prince and leader, so that they might
and with his whole might he is moved to whatsoever he is
attain their ultimate beatitude of their own natural powers;
moved, be it good or bad. Consequently since the highest
especially because in the order of nature they were even
angel had greater natural energy than the lower angels, he
then subject to the highest angel.
fell into sin with intenser energy, and therefore he became
Reply to Objection 3. As was observed above (q. 62,
the greater in malice.
Whether those who sinned were as many as those who remained firm?
Ia q. 63 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that more angels sinned
men, and from forsaking the good dictated by reason,
than stood firm. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6):
which good is known to the few. In the angels there is
“Evil is in many, but good is in few.”
only an intellectual nature; hence the argument does not
Objection 2. Further, justice and sin are to be found
hold.
in the same way in men and in angels. But there are more
And from this we have the answer to the second diffi-
wicked men to be found than good; according to Eccles.
culty.
1:15: “The number of fools is infinite.” Therefore for the
Reply to Objection 3. According to those who hold
same reason it is so with the angels.
that the chief devil belonged to the lower order of the an-
Objection 3. Further, the angels are distinguished ac-
gels, who are set over earthly affairs, it is evident that
cording to persons and orders. Therefore if more angelic
some of every order did not fall, but only those of the low-
persons stood firm, it would appear that those who sinned
est order. According to those who maintain that the chief
were not from all the orders.
devil was of the highest order, it is probable that some
On the contrary, It is said (4 Kings 6:16): “There are
fell of every order; just as men are taken up into every or-
more with us than with them”: which is expounded of the
der to supply for the angelic ruin. In this view the liberty
good angels who are with us to aid us, and the wicked
of free-will is more established; which in every degree of
spirits who are our foes.
creature can be turned to evil. In the Sacred Scripture,
I answer that, More angels stood firm than sinned.
however, the names of some orders, as of Seraphim and
Because sin is contrary to the natural inclination; while
Thrones, are not attributed to demons; since they are de-
that which is against the natural order happens with less
rived from the ardor of love and from God’s indwelling,
frequency; for nature procures its effects either always, or
which are not consistent with mortal sin. Yet the names
more often than not.
of Cherubim, Powers, and Principalities are attributed to
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking
them; because these names are derived from knowledge
with regard to men, in whom evil comes to pass from
and from power, which can be common to both good and
seeking after sensible pleasures, which are known to most
bad.
323
FIRST PART, QUESTION 64
The Punishment of the Demons
(In Four Articles)
It now remains as a sequel to deal with the punishment of the demons; under which heading there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Of their darkness of intellect;
(2) Of their obstinacy of will;
(3) Of their grief;
(4) Of their place of punishment.
Whether the demons’ intellect is darkened by privation of the knowledge of all truth?
Ia q. 64 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the demons’ intel-
deriving it from someone else, as we know by learning;
lect is darkened by being deprived of the knowledge of all
or by long experience, as the things we learn by discov-
truth. For it they knew any truth at all, they would most
ery. Now, the demons cannot know the truth by their own
of all know themselves; which is to know separated sub-
nature, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 33),
stances. But this is not in keeping with their unhappiness:
the good angels are separated from them as light is from
for this seems to belong to great happiness, insomuch as
darkness; and every manifestation is made through light,
that some writers have assigned as man’s last happiness
as is said Eph. 5:13. In like manner they cannot learn by
the knowledge of the separated substances. Therefore the
revelation, nor by learning from the good angels: because
demons are deprived of all knowledge of truth.
“there is no fellowship of light with darkness∗” (2 Cor.
Objection 2. Further, what is most manifest in its na-
6:14). Nor can they learn by long experience: because
ture, seems to be specially manifest to the angels, whether
experience comes of the senses. Consequently there is no
good or bad. That the same is not manifest with regard to
knowledge of truth in them.
ourselves, comes from the weakness of our intellect which
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
draws its knowledge from phantasms; as it comes from the
that, “certain gifts were bestowed upon the demons which,
weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of
we say, have not been changed at all, but remain entire
the sun. But the demons cannot know God, Who is most
and most brilliant.” Now, the knowledge of truth stands
manifest of Himself, because He is the sovereign truth;
among those natural gifts. Consequently there is some
and this is because they are not clean of heart, whereby
knowledge of truth in them.
alone can God be seen. Therefore neither can they know
I answer that, The knowledge of truth is twofold: one
other things.
which comes of nature, and one which comes of grace.
Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine (Gen.
The knowledge which comes of grace is likewise twofold:
ad lit. iv, 22), the proper knowledge of the angels is
the first is purely speculative, as when Divine secrets are
twofold; namely, morning and evening. But the demons
imparted to an individual; the other is effective, and pro-
have no morning knowledge, because they do not see
duces love for God; which knowledge properly belongs to
things in the Word; nor have they the evening knowl-
the gift of wisdom.
edge, because this evening knowledge refers the things
Of these three kinds of knowledge the first was nei-
known to the Creator’s praise (hence, after “evening”
ther taken away nor lessened in the demons. For it fol-
comes “morning” [Gn. 1]). Therefore the demons can
lows from the very nature of the angel, who, according
have no knowledge of things.
to his nature, is an intellect or mind: since on account
Objection 4. Further, the angels at their creation knew
of the simplicity of his substance, nothing can be with-
the mystery of the kingdom of God, as Augustine says
drawn from his nature, so as to punish him by subtracting
(Gen. ad lit. v, 19; De Civ. Dei xi). But the demons are
from his natural powers, as a man is punished by being
deprived of such knowledge: “for if they had known it,
deprived of a hand or a foot or of something else. There-
they would never have crucified the Lord of glory,” as is
fore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the natural gifts
said 1 Cor. 2:8. Therefore, for the same reason, they are
remain entire in them. Consequently their natural knowl-
deprived of all other knowledge of truth.
edge was not diminished. The second kind of knowledge,
Objection 5. Further, whatever truth anyone knows is
however, which comes of grace, and consists in specu-
known either naturally, as we know first principles; or by
lation, has not been utterly taken away from them, but
∗ Vulg.: ‘What fellowship hath. . . ?’
324
lessened; because, of these Divine secrets only so much fails utterly, then it is night. So then the knowledge of
is revealed to them as is necessary; and that is done either
things in their own nature, when referred to the praise of
by means of the angels, or “through some temporal work-
the Creator, as it is in the good angels, has something of
ings of Divine power,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix,
the Divine light, and can be called evening knowledge;
21); but not in the same degree as to the holy angels, to
but if it be not referred to God, as is the case with the
whom many more things are revealed, and more fully, in
demons, it is not called evening, but “nocturnal” knowl-
the Word Himself. But of the third knowledge, as likewise
edge. Accordingly we read in Gn. 1:5 that the darkness,
of charity, they are utterly deprived.
which God separated from the light, “He called night.”
Reply to Objection 1. Happiness consists in self-
Reply to Objection 4. All the angels had some knowl-
application to something higher. The separated substances
edge from the very beginning respecting the mystery of
are above us in the order of nature; hence man can have
God’s kingdom, which found its completion in Christ; and
happiness of a kind by knowing the separated substances,
most of all from the moment when they were beatified by
although his perfect happiness consists in knowing the
the vision of the Word, which vision the demons never
first substance, namely, God. But it is quite natural for
had. Yet all the angels did not fully and equally appre-
one separate substance to know another; as it is natural for
hend it; hence the demons much less fully understood the
us to know sensible natures. Hence, as man’s happiness
mystery of the Incarnation, when Christ was in the world.
does not consist in knowing sensible natures; so neither
For, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 21), “It was
does the angel’s happiness consist in knowing separated
not manifested to them as it was to the holy angels, who
substances.
enjoy a participated eternity of the Word; but it was made
Reply to Objection 2. What is most manifest in its
known by some temporal effects, so as to strike terror into
nature is hidden from us by its surpassing the bounds of
them.” For had they fully and certainly known that He was
our intellect; and not merely because our intellect draws
the Son of God and the effect of His passion, they would
knowledge from phantasms. Now the Divine substance
never have procured the crucifixion of the Lord of glory.
surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect,
Reply to Objection 5. The demons know a truth in
but even of the angelic. Consequently, not even an angel
three ways: first of all by the subtlety of their nature;
can of his own nature know God’s substance. Yet on ac-
for although they are darkened by privation of the light
count of the perfection of his intellect he can of his nature
of grace, yet they are enlightened by the light of their in-
have a higher knowledge of God than man can have. Such
tellectual nature: secondly, by revelation from the holy
knowledge of God remains also in the demons. Although
angels; for while not agreeing with them in conformity of
they do not possess the purity which comes with grace,
will, they do agree, nevertheless, by their likeness of in-
nevertheless they have purity of nature; and this suffices
tellectual nature, according to which they can accept what
for the knowledge of God which belongs to them from
is manifested by others: thirdly, they know by long expe-
their nature.
rience; not as deriving it from the senses; but when the
Reply to Objection 3. The creature is darkness in
similitude of their innate intelligible species is completed
comparison with the excellence of the Divine light; and
in individual things, they know some things as present,
therefore the creature’s knowledge in its own nature is
which they previously did not know would come to pass,
called “evening” knowledge. For the evening is akin to
as we said when dealing with the knowledge of the angels
darkness, yet it possesses some light: but when the light
(q. 57, a. 3, ad 3).
Whether the will of the demons is obstinate in evil?
Ia q. 64 a. 2
Objection 1.
It would seem that the will of the
of justice.
demons is not obstinate in evil. For liberty of will be-
Objection 3. Further, if the demons have a will obsti-
longs to the nature of an intellectual being, which nature
nate in evil, then their will would be especially obstinate
remains in the demons, as we said above (a. 1). But liberty
in the sin whereby they fell. But that sin, namely, pride,
of will is directly and firstly ordained to good rather than
is in them no longer; because the motive for the sin no
to evil. Therefore the demons’ will is not so obstinate in
longer endures, namely, excellence. Therefore the demon
evil as not to be able to return to what is good.
is not obstinate in malice.
Objection 2. Further, since God’s mercy is infinite, it
Objection 4. Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv) that
is greater than the demons’ malice, which is finite. But
man can be reinstated by another, since he fell through an-
no one returns from the malice of sin to the goodness of
other. But, as was observed already (q. 63, a. 8), the lower
justice save through God’s mercy. Therefore the demons
demons fell through the highest one. Therefore their fall
can likewise return from their state of malice to the state
can be repaired by another. Consequently they are not ob-
325
stinate in malice.
by his reason apprehends movably, passing from one con-
Objection 5. Further, whoever is obstinate in malice,
sideration to another; and having the way open by which
never performs any good work. But the demon performs
he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently
some good works: for he confesses the truth, saying to
man’s will adheres to a thing movably, and with the power
Christ: “I know Who Thou art, the holy one of God” (Mk.
of forsaking it and of clinging to the opposite; whereas the
1:24). “The demons” also “believe and tremble” (Jam.
angel’s will adheres fixedly and immovably. Therefore, if
2:19). And Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv), that “they
his will be considered before its adhesion, it can freely
desire what is good and best, which is, to be, to live, to
adhere either to this or to its opposite (namely, in such
understand.” Therefore they are not obstinate in malice.
things as he does not will naturally); but after he has once
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 73:23): “The pride
adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary to say
of them that hate Thee, ascendeth continually”; and this
that man’s free-will is flexible to the opposite both before
is understood of the demons. Therefore they remain ever
and after choice; but the angel’s free-will is flexible ei-
obstinate in their malice.
ther opposite before the choice, but not after. Therefore
I answer that, It was Origen’s opinion∗ that every will
the good angels who adhered to justice, were confirmed
of the creature can by reason of free-will be inclined to
therein; whereas the wicked ones, sinning, are obstinate
good and evil; with the exception of the soul of Christ
in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men
on account of the union of the Word. Such a statement
who are damned ( Suppl., q. 98, Aa. 1, 2).
deprives angels and saints of true beatitude, because ev-
Reply to Objection 1. The good and wicked angels
erlasting stability is of the very nature of true beatitude;
have free-will, but according to the manner and condition
hence it is termed “life everlasting.” It is also contrary
of their state, as has been said.
to the authority of Sacred Scripture, which declares that
Reply to Objection 2. God’s mercy delivers from sin
demons and wicked men shall be sent “into everlasting
those who repent. But such as are not capable of repent-
punishment,” and the good brought “into everlasting life.”
ing, cling immovably to sin, and are not delivered by the
Consequently such an opinion must be considered erro-
Divine mercy.
neous; while according to Catholic Faith, it must be held
Reply to Objection 3. The devil’s first sin still re-
firmly both that the will of the good angels is confirmed in
mains in him according to desire; although not as to his
good, and that the will of the demons is obstinate in evil.
believing that he can obtain what he desired. Even so, if a
We must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in
man were to believe that he can commit murder, and wills
the gravity of the sin, but in the condition of their nature
to commit it, and afterwards the power is taken from him;
or state. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), “death
nevertheless, the will to murder can stay with him, so that
is to men, what the fall is to the angels.” Now it is clear
he would he had done it, or still would do it if he could.
that all the mortal sins of men, grave or less grave, are par-
Reply to Objection 4. The fact that man sinned from
donable before death; whereas after death they are without
another’s suggestion, is not the whole cause of man’s sin
remission and endure for ever.
being pardonable. Consequently the argument does not
To find the cause, then, of this obstinacy, it must be
hold good.
borne in mind that the appetitive power is in all things pro-
Reply to Objection 5. A demon’s act is twofold.
portioned to the apprehensive, whereby it is moved, as the
One comes of deliberate will; and this is properly called
movable by its mover. For the sensitive appetite seeks a
his own act. Such an act on the demon’s part is always
particular good; while the will seeks the universal good, as
wicked; because, although at times he does something
was said above (q. 59, a. 1); as also the sense apprehends
good, yet he does not do it well; as when he tells the truth
particular objects, while the intellect considers universals.
in order to deceive; and when he believes and confesses,
Now the angel’s apprehension differs from man’s in this
yet not willingly, but compelled by the evidence of things.
respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immov-
Another kind of act is natural to the demon; this can be
ably, as we apprehend immovably first principles which
good and bears witness to the goodness of nature. Yet he
are the object of the habit of “intelligence”; whereas man
abuses even such good acts to evil purpose.
Whether there is sorrow in the demons?
Ia q. 64 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no sorrow in
(De Gen. Contra Manich. ii, 17) says: “The devil has
the demons. For since sorrow and joy are opposites, they
power over them who despise God’s commandments, and
cannot be together in the same subject. But there is joy in
he rejoices over this sinister power.” Therefore there is no
the demons: for Augustine writing against the Maniches
sorrow in the demons.
∗ Peri Archon i. 6
326
Objection 2. Further, sorrow is the cause of fear, for them: and especially because it is of the very notion of
those things cause fear while they are future, which cause
punishment for it to be repugnant to the will. Moreover,
sorrow when they are present. But there is no fear in the
they are deprived of happiness, which they desire natu-
demons, according to Job 41:24, “Who was made to fear
rally; and their wicked will is curbed in many respects.
no one.” Therefore there is no grief in the demons.
Reply to Objection 1. Joy and sorrow about the same
Objection 3. Further, it is a good thing to be sorry
thing are opposites, but not about different things. Hence
for evil. But the demons can do no good action. There-
there is nothing to hinder a man from being sorry for one
fore they cannot be sorry, at least for the evil of sin; which
thing, and joyful for another; especially so far as sorrow
applies to the worm of conscience.
and joy imply simple acts of the will; because, not merely
On the contrary, The demon’s sin is greater than
in different things, but even in one and the same thing,
man’s sin. But man is punished with sorrow on account
there can be something that we will, and something that
of the pleasure taken in sin, according to Apoc. 18:7, “As
we will not.
much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in delicacies,
Reply to Objection 2.
As there is sorrow in the
so much torment and sorrow give ye to her.” Consequently
demons over present evil, so also there is fear of future
much more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow,
evil. Now when it is said, “He was made to fear no one,”
because he especially glorified himself.
this is to be understood of the fear of God which restrains
I answer that, Fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far
from sin. For it is written elsewhere that “the devils be-
as they are passions, cannot exist in the demons; for thus
lieve and tremble” (James 2:19).
they are proper to the sensitive appetite, which is a power
Reply to Objection 3. To be sorry for the evil of sin
in a corporeal organ. According, however, as they denote
on account of the sin bears witness to the goodness of the
simple acts of the will, they can be in the demons. And
will, to which the evil of sin is opposed. But to be sorry
it must be said that there is sorrow in them; because sor-
for the evil of punishment, for the evil of sin on account of
row, as denoting a simple act of the will, is nothing else
the punishment, bears witness to the goodness of nature,
than the resistance of the will to what is, or to what is not.
to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence Au-
Now it is evident that the demons would wish many things
gustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13), that “sorrow for good
not to be, which are, and others to be, which are not: for,
lost by punishment, is the witness to a good nature.” Con-
out of envy, they would wish others to be damned, who
sequently, since the demon has a perverse and obstinate
are saved. Consequently, sorrow must be said to exist in
will, he is not sorry for the evil of sin.
Whether our atmosphere is the demons’ place of punishment?
Ia q. 64 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that this atmosphere is not
gels. In another way, indirectly, as when anyone assailed
the demons’ place of punishment. For a demon is a spiri-
is exercised by fighting against opposition. It was fitting
tual nature. But a spiritual nature is not affected by place.
for this procuring of man’s welfare to be brought about
Therefore there is no place of punishment for demons.
through the wicked spirits, lest they should cease to be
Objection 2. Further, man’s sin is not graver than the
of service in the natural order. Consequently a twofold
demons’. But man’s place of punishment is hell. Much
place of punishment is due to the demons: one, by rea-
more, therefore, is it the demons’ place of punishment;
son of their sin, and this is hell; and another, in order that
and consequently not the darksome atmosphere.
they may tempt men, and thus the darksome atmosphere
Objection 3. Further, the demons are punished with
is their due place of punishment.
the pain of fire. But there is no fire in the darksome at-
Now the procuring of men’s salvation is prolonged
mosphere. Therefore the darksome atmosphere is not the
even to the judgment day: consequently, the ministry of
place of punishment for the demons.
the angels and wrestling with demons endure until then.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii,
Hence until then the good angels are sent to us here; and
10), that “the darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the
the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial: al-
demons until the judgment day.”
though some of them are even now in hell, to torment
I answer that, The angels in their own nature stand
those whom they have led astray; just as some of the good
midway between God and men. Now the order of Divine
angels are with the holy souls in heaven. But after the
providence so disposes, that it procures the welfare of the
judgment day all the wicked, both men and angels, will
inferior orders through the superior. But man’s welfare is
be in hell, and the good in heaven.
disposed by Divine providence in two ways: first of all,
Reply to Objection 1. A place is not penal to angel or
directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld
soul as if affecting the nature by changing it, but as affect-
from evil; and this is fittingly done through the good an-
ing the will by saddening it: because the angel or the soul
327
apprehends that it is in a place not agreeable to its will.
glory is not lessened by their coming to us, for they con-
Reply to Objection 2. One soul is not set over another
sider that place to be their own; in the same way as we say
in the order of nature, as the demons are over men in the
that the bishop’s honor is not lessened while he is not ac-
order of nature; consequently there is no parallel.
tually sitting on his throne. In like manner it must be said,
Reply to Objection 3. Some have maintained that the
that although the demons are not actually bound within
pain of sense for demons and souls is postponed until the
the fire of hell while they are in this dark atmosphere, nev-
judgment day: and that the beatitude of the saints is like-
ertheless their punishment is none the less; because they
wise postponed until the judgment day. But this is erro-
know that such confinement is their due. Hence it is said
neous, and contrary to the teaching of the Apostle (2 Cor.
in a gloss upon James 3:6: “They carry fire of hell with
5:1): “If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved,
them wherever they go.” Nor is this contrary to what is
we have a house in heaven.” Others, again, while not ad-
said (Lk. 8:31), “They besought the Lord not to cast them
mitting the same of souls, admit it as to demons. But it
into the abyss”; for they asked for this, deeming it to be a
is better to say that the same judgment is passed upon
punishment for them to be cast out of a place where they
wicked souls and wicked angels, even as on good souls
could injure men. Hence it is stated, “They [Vulg. ‘He’]
and good angels.
besought Him that He would not expel them [Vulg. ‘him’]
Consequently, it must be said that, although a heav-
out of the country” (Mk. 5:10).
enly place belongs to the glory of the angels, yet their
328
FIRST PART, QUESTION 65
The Work of Creation of Corporeal Creatures
(In Four Articles)
From the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of corporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy Scripture makes mention, three works are found, namely, the work of creation, as given in the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth”; the work of distinction as given in the words, “He divided the light from the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from the waters that are under the firmament”; and the work of adornment, expressed thus, “Let there be lights in the firmament.”
First, then, we must consider the work of creation; secondly, the work of distinction; and thirdly, the work of adornment. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether corporeal creatures are from God?
(2) Whether they were created on account of God’s goodness?
(3) Whether they were created by God through the medium of the angels?
(4) Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately from God.
Whether corporeal creatures are from God?
Ia q. 65 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that corporeal creatures
different. There must, therefore, be one principle of be-
are not from God. For it is said (Eccles. 3:14): “I have
ing from which all things in whatever way existing have
learned that all the works which God hath made, continue
their being, whether they are invisible and spiritual, or vis-
for ever.” But visible bodies do not continue for ever, for
ible and corporeal. But the devil is called the god of this
it is said (2 Cor. 4:18): “The things which are seen are
world, not as having created it, but because worldlings
temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.”
serve him, of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the
Therefore God did not make visible bodies.
same sense, “Whose god is their belly” (Phil. 3:19).
Objection 2. Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): “God saw
Reply to Objection 1. All the creatures of God in
all things that He had made, and they were very good.”
some respects continue for ever, at least as to matter, since
But corporeal creatures are evil, since we find them harm-
what is created will never be annihilated, even though it
ful in many ways; as may be seen in serpents, in the sun’s
be corruptible. And the nearer a creature approaches God,
heat, and other things. Now a thing is called evil, in so
Who is immovable, the more it also is immovable. For
far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not
corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their mat-
from God.
ter, though they change as regards their substantial form.
Objection 3. Further, what is from God does not with-
But incorruptible creatures endure with respect to their
draw us from God, but leads us to Him. But corporeal
substance, though they are mutable in other respects, such
creatures withdraw us from God. Hence the Apostle (2
as place, for instance, the heavenly bodies; or the affec-
Cor. 4:18): “While we look not at the things which are
tions, as spiritual creatures. But the Apostle’s words, “The
seen.” Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.
things which are seen are temporal,” though true even as
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 145:6): “Who made
regards such things considered in themselves (in so far as
heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them.”
every visible creature is subject to time, either as to being
I answer that, Certain heretics maintain that visible
or as to movement), are intended to apply to visible things
things are not created by the good God, but by an evil
in so far as they are offered to man as rewards. For such
principle, and allege in proof of their error the words of
rewards, as consist in these visible things, are temporal;
the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:4), “The god of this world hath
while those that are invisible endure for ever. Hence he
blinded the minds of unbelievers.” But this position is al-
said before (2 Cor. 4:17): “It worketh for us. . . an eternal
together untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some
weight of glory.”
point, there must be some cause for that agreement, since
Reply to Objection 2. Corporeal creatures accord-
things diverse in nature cannot be united of themselves.
ing to their nature are good, though this good is not uni-
Hence whenever in different things some one thing com-
versal, but partial and limited, the consequence of which
mon to all is found, it must be that these different things
is a certain opposition of contrary qualities, though each
receive that one thing from some one cause, as different
quality is good in itself. To those, however, who esti-
bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being
mate things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good
is found to be common to all things, however otherwise
they themselves can derive therefrom, everything which
329
is harmful to themselves seems simply evil. For they do by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20). If, then, they
not reflect that what is in some way injurious to one per-
withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use
son, to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves
them foolishly. Thus it is said (Wis. 14:11): “Creatures
the same thing may be evil in some respects, but good in
are turned into a snare to the feet of the unwise.” And the
others. And this could not be, if bodies were essentially
very fact that they can thus withdraw us from God proves
evil and harmful.
that they came from Him, for they cannot lead the foolish
Reply to Objection 3. Creatures of themselves do not
away from God except by the allurements of some good
withdraw us from God, but lead us to Him; for “the in-
that they have from Him.
visible things of God are clearly seen, being understood
Whether corporeal things were made on account of God’s goodness?
Ia q. 65 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that corporeal creatures
the evil in another might be punished. Secondly, because
were not made on account of God’s goodness. For it is
it would follow that the arrangement, which now exists, of
said (Wis. 1:14) that God “created all things that they
the corporeal world would arise from mere chance. For it
might be.” Therefore all things were created for their own
the sun’s body was made what it is, that it might serve for
being’s sake, and not on account of God’s goodness.
a punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature,
Objection 2. Further, good has the nature of an end;
it would follow, if other spiritual creatures had sinned in
therefore the greater good in things is the end of the lesser
the same way as the one to punish whom the sun had been
good. But spiritual creatures are related to corporeal crea-
created, that many suns would exist in the world; and so
tures, as the greater good to the lesser. Corporeal crea-
of other things. But such a consequence is altogether in-
tures, therefore, are created for the sake of spiritual crea-
admissible. Hence we must set aside this theory as false,
tures, and not on account of God’s goodness.
and consider that the entire universe is constituted by all
Objection 3. Further, justice does not give unequal
creatures, as a whole consists of its parts.
things except to the unequal. Now God is just: there-
Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to
fore inequality not created by God must precede all in-
the parts of that whole, we shall find, first, that each and
equality created by Him. But an inequality not created by
every part exists for the sake of its proper act, as the eye
God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all
for the act of seeing; secondly, that less honorable parts
inequality results from the different movements of free-
exist for the more honorable, as the senses for the intel-
will. Now, corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual
lect, the lungs for the heart; and, thirdly, that all parts are creatures. Therefore the former were made on account
for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form,
of movements of free-will, and not on account of God’s
since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole.
goodness.
Furthermore, the whole man is on account of an extrin-
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): “The Lord
sic end, that end being the fruition of God. So, therefore,
hath made all things for Himself.”
in the parts of the universe also every creature exists for
I answer that, Origen laid down∗ that corporeal crea-
its own proper act and perfection, and the less noble for
tures were not made according to God’s original purpose,
the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than man
but in punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he
exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature
maintained that God in the beginning made spiritual crea-
exists for the perfection of the entire universe. Further-
tures only, and all of equal nature; but that of these by
more, the entire universe, with all its parts, is ordained
the use of free-will some turned to God, and, according to
towards God as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were,
the measure of their conversion, were given an higher or a
and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God.
lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned
Reasonable creatures, however, have in some special and
from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies
higher manner God as their end, since they can attain to
according to the degree of their turning away. But this po-
Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him.
sition is erroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary Thus it is plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all
to Scripture, which, after narrating the production of each
corporeal things.
kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins, “God saw that it was
Reply to Objection 1. In the very fact of any creature
good” (Gn. 1), as if to say that everything was brought
possessing being, it represents the Divine being and Its
into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But
goodness. And, therefore, that God created all things, that
according to Origen’s opinion, the corporeal creature was
they might have being, does not exclude that He created
made, not because it was good that it should be, but that
them for His own goodness.
∗ Peri Archon ii.
330
Reply to Objection 2. The proximate end does not justice, places stones of the same kind in different parts
exclude the ultimate end. Therefore that corporeal crea-
of a building, not on account of any antecedent difference
tures were, in a manner, made for the sake of the spiritual,
in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection
does not prevent their being made on account of God’s
of the entire building, which could not be obtained ex-
goodness.
cept by the different positions of the stones; even so, God
Reply to Objection 3. Equality of justice has its place
from the beginning, to secure perfection in the universe,
in retribution, since equal rewards or punishments are due
has set therein creatures of various and unequal natures,
to equal merit or demerit. But this does not apply to things
according to His wisdom, and without injustice, since no
as at first instituted. For just as an architect, without in-
diversity of merit is presupposed.
Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the an-Ia q. 65 a. 3
gels?
Objection 1. It would seem that corporeal creatures
save by God alone.
were produced by God through the medium of the angels.
In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the
For, as all things are governed by the Divine wisdom, so
higher the cause, the more numerous the objects to which
by it were all things made, according to Ps. 103:24 “Thou
its causation extends. Now the underlying principle in
hast made all things in wisdom.” But “it belongs to wis-
things is always more universal than that which informs
dom to ordain,” as stated in the beginning of the Meta-
and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than living,
physics (i, 2). Hence in the government of things the
living than understanding, matter than form. The more
lower is ruled by the higher in a certain fitting order, as
widely, then, one thing underlies others, the more directly
Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4). Therefore in the produc-
does that thing proceed from a higher cause. Thus the
tion of things it was ordained that the corporeal should be
thing that underlies primarily all things, belongs properly
produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the higher.
to the causality of the supreme cause. Therefore no sec-
Objection 2. Further, diversity of effects shows di-
ondary cause can produce anything, unless there is pre-
versity of causes, since like always produces like. It then
supposed in the thing produced something that is caused
all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, were produced
by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a
immediately by God, there would be no diversity in crea-
thing in its entire substance, nothing being presupposed
tures, for one would not be further removed from God
either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that noth-
than another. But this is clearly false; for the Philosopher
ing can create except God alone, Who is the first cause.
says that some things are corruptible because they are far
Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created
removed from God (De Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59).
immediately by God, Moses said: “In the beginning God
Objection 3. Further, infinite power is not required to
created heaven and earth.”
produce a finite effect. But every corporeal thing is finite.
Reply to Objection 1. In the production of things an
Therefore, it could be, and was, produced by the finite
order exists, but not such that one creature is created by
power of spiritual creatures: for in suchlike beings there
another, for that is impossible; but rather such that by the
is no distinction between what is and what is possible: es-
Divine wisdom diverse grades are constituted in creatures.
pecially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that
Reply to Objection 2. God Himself, though one, has
nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault.
knowledge of many and different things without detriment
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): “In the begin-
to the simplicity of His nature, as has been shown above
ning God created heaven and earth”; by which are un-
(q. 15, a. 2); so that by His wisdom He is the cause of
derstood corporeal creatures. These, therefore, were pro-
diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer, by
duced immediately by God.
apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of
I answer that, Some have maintained that creatures
art.
proceeded from God by degrees, in such a way that the
Reply to Objection 3. The amount of the power of
first creature proceeded from Him immediately, and in its
an agent is measured not only by the thing made, but also
turn produced another, and so on until the production of
by the manner of making it; for one and the same thing
corporeal creatures. But this position is untenable, since
is made in one way by a higher power, in another by a
the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation,
lower. But the production of finite things, where nothing
by which matter itself is produced: for in the act of com-
is presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power,
ing into being the imperfect must be made before the per-
and, as such, can belong to no creature.
fect: and it is impossible that anything should be created,
331
Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels?
Ia q. 65 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the forms of bod-
the forms in the mind of the craftsman. This theory seems
ies come from the angels. For Boethius says (De Trin.
to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times,
i): “From forms that are without matter come the forms
who say that God indeed created all things, but that the
that are in matter.” But forms that are without matter are
devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it into
spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the
species.
forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from
But all these opinions seem to have a common origin;
spiritual substances.
they all, in fact, sought for a cause of forms as though
Objection 2. Further, all that is such by participa-
the form were of itself brought into being. Whereas, as
tion is reduced to that which is such by its essence. But
Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26,27,28), proves, what is,
spiritual substances are forms essentially, whereas corpo-
properly speaking, made, is the “composite.” Now, such
real creatures have forms by participation. Therefore the
are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they
forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual sub-
exist and at another exist not, without being themselves
stances.
generated or corrupted, but by reason of the generation or
Objection 3. Further, spiritual substances have more
corruption of the “composite”; since even forms have not
power of causation than the heavenly bodies. But the
being, but composites have being through forms: for, ac-
heavenly bodies give form to things here below, for which
cording to a thing’s mode of being, is the mode in which
reason they are said to cause generation and corruption.
it is brought into being. Since, then, like is produced from
Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from
like, we must not look for the cause of corporeal forms
spiritual substances.
in any immaterial form, but in something that is compos-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8):
ite, as this fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms,
“We must not suppose that this corporeal matter serves
therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some imma-
the angels at their nod, but rather that it obeys God thus.”
terial form, but by matter being brought from potentiality
But corporeal matter may be said thus to serve that from
into act by some composite agent. But since the compos-
which it receives its form. Corporeal forms, then, are not
ite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual
from the angels, but from God.
substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5), it fol-
I answer that, It was the opinion of some that all cor-
lows further that even corporeal forms are derived from
poreal forms are derived from spiritual substances, which
spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the
we call the angels. And there are two ways in which this
term of their movement. And, further still, the species of
has been stated. For Plato held that the forms of corpo-
the angelic intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal
real matter are derived from, and formed by, forms im-
types of corporeal forms, must be referred to God as the
materially subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he
first cause. But in the first production of corporeal crea-
held that there exists an immaterial man, and an immate-
tures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have
rial horse, and so forth, and that from such the individual
taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that
sensible things that we see are constituted, in so far as
bodies had when first produced came immediately form
in corporeal matter there abides the impression received
God, whose bidding alone matter obeys, as its own proper
from these separate forms, by a kind of assimilation, or
cause. To signify this, Moses prefaces each work with
as he calls it, “participation” (Phaedo xlix). And, accord-
the words, “God said, Let this thing be,” or “that,” to de-
ing to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to
note the formation of all things by the Word of God, from
the order of those separate substances; for example, that
Whom, according to Augustine∗, is “all form and fitness
there is a single separate substance, which is horse and
and concord of parts.”
the cause of all horses, whilst above this is separate life,
Reply to Objection 1. By immaterial forms Boethius
or “per se” life, as they term it, which is the cause of all
understands the types of things in the mind of God. Thus
life, and that above this again is that which they call being
the Apostle says (Heb. 11:3): “By faith we understand
itself, which is the cause of all being. Avicenna, however,
that the world was framed by the Word of God; that from
and certain others, have maintained that the forms of cor-
invisible things visible things might be made.” But if by
poreal things do not subsist “per se” in matter, but in the
immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that
intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in
from them come material forms, not by emanation, but by
the intellect of spiritual creatures (called “intelligences”
motion.
by them, but “angels” by us) proceed all the forms of cor-
Reply to Objection 2. Forms received into matter are
poreal matter, as the form of his handiwork proceeds from
to be referred, not to self-subsisting forms of the same
∗ Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad lit. i. 4
332
type, as the Platonists held, but either to intelligible forms that they may be able to be brought by movement into act.
of the angelic intellect, from which they proceed by move-
Reply to Objection 3. The heavenly bodies inform
ment, or, still higher, to the types in the Divine intellect, by earthly ones by movement, not by emanation.
which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things,
333
FIRST PART, QUESTION 66
On the Order of Creation Towards Distinction
(In Four Articles)
We must next consider the work of distinction; first, the ordering of creation towards distinction; secondly, the distinction itself. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation?
(2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same?
(3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with formless matter?
(4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it?
Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation?
Ia q. 66 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that formlessness of mat-
we thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness
ter preceded in time its formation. For it is said (Gn. 1:2):
of matter was prior in time either to its formation or to its
“The earth was void and empty,” or “invisible and shape-
distinction. As to formation, the argument is clear. For it
less,” according to another version∗; by which is under-
formless matter preceded in duration, it already existed;
stood the formlessness of matter, as Augustine says (Con-
for this is implied by duration, since the end of creation
fess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was formless until it re-
is being in act: and act itself is a form. To say, then, that
ceived its form.
matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being ex-
Objection 2. Further, nature in its working imitates
isted actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction in
the working of God, as a secondary cause imitates a first
terms. Nor can it be said that it possessed some common
cause. But in the working of nature formlessness precedes
form, on which afterwards supervened the different forms
form in time. It does so, therefore, in the Divine working.
that distinguish it. For this would be to hold the opin-
Objection 3. Further, matter is higher than accident,
ion of the ancient natural philosophers, who maintained
for matter is part of substance. But God can effect that ac-
that primary matter was some corporeal thing in act, as
cident exist without substance, as in the Sacrament of the
fire, air, water, or some intermediate substance. Hence,
Altar. He could, therefore, cause matter to exist without
it followed that to be made means merely to be changed;
form.
for since that preceding form bestowed actual substantial
On the contrary, An imperfect effect proves imper-
being, and made some particular thing to be, it would re-
fection in the agent. But God is an agent absolutely per-
sult that the supervening form would not simply make an
fect; wherefore it is said of Him (Dt. 32:4): “The works
actual being, but ‘this’ actual being; which is the proper
of God are perfect.” Therefore the work of His creation
effect of an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms
was at no time formless. Further, the formation of cor-
would be merely accidents, implying not generation, but
poreal creatures was effected by the work of distinction.
alteration. Hence we must assert that primary matter was
But confusion is opposed to distinction, as formlessness
not created altogether formless, nor under any one com-
to form. It, therefore, formlessness preceded in time the
mon form, but under distinct forms. And so, if the form-
formation of matter, it follows that at the beginning confu-
lessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of
sion, called by the ancients chaos, existed in the corporeal
primary matter, which in itself is formless, this formless-
creation.
ness did not precede in time its formation or distinction,
I answer that, On this point holy men differ in opin-
but only in origin and nature, as Augustine says; in the
ion. Augustine for instance (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), believes
same way as potentiality is prior to act, and the part to
that the formlessness of matter was not prior in time to
the whole. But the other holy writers understand by form-
its formation, but only in origin or the order of nature,
lessness, not the exclusion of all form, but the absence
whereas others, as Basil (Hom. ii In Hexaem.), Ambrose
of that beauty and comeliness which are now apparent
(In Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen.), hold
in the corporeal creation. Accordingly they say that the
that formlessness of matter preceded in time its forma-
formlessness of corporeal matter preceded its form in du-
tion. And although these opinions seem mutually contra-
ration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that
dictory, in reality they differ but little; for Augustine takes Augustine agrees with them in some respects, and in oth-the formlessness of matter in a different sense from the
ers disagrees, as will be shown later (q. 69, a. 1; q. 74,
others. In his sense it means the absence of all form, and if
a. 2).
∗ Septuagint
334
As far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis a form, is a kind of act; whereas matter, as such, is essen-threefold beauty was wanting to corporeal creatures, for
tially being in potentiality. Hence it is more repugnant that
which reason they are said to be without form. For the
matter should be in act without form, than for accident to
beauty of light was wanting to all that transparent body
be without subject.
which we call the heavens, whence it is said that “dark-
In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we
ness was upon the fact of the deep.” And the earth lacked
say that if, according to some holy writers, formlessness
beauty in two ways: first, that beauty which it acquired
was prior in time to the informing of matter, this arose,
when its watery veil was withdrawn, and so we read that
not from want of power on God’s part, but from His wis-
“the earth was void,” or “invisible,” inasmuch as the wa-
dom, and from the design of preserving due order in the
ters covered and concealed it from view; secondly, that
disposition of creatures by developing perfection from im-
which it derives from being adorned by herbs and plants,
perfection.
for which reason it is called “empty,” or, according to an-
In reply to the second argument, we say that certain
other reading†, “shapeless”—that is, unadorned. Thus af-
of the ancient natural philosophers maintained confusion
ter mention of two created natures, the heaven and the
devoid of all distinction; except Anaxagoras, who taught
earth, the formlessness of the heaven is indicated by the
that the intellect alone was distinct and without admix-
words, “darkness was upon the face of the deep,” since the
ture. But previous to the work of distinction Holy Scrip-
air is included under heaven; and the formlessness of the
ture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first
earth, by the words, “the earth was void and empty.”
being that of the heaven from the earth, in which even a
Reply to Objection 1. The word earth is taken differ-
material distinction is expressed, as will be shown later
ently in this passage by Augustine, and by other writers.
(a. 3; q. 68, a. 1). This is signified by the words, “In
Augustine holds that by the words “earth” and “water,”
the beginning God created heaven and earth.” The second
in this passage. primary matter itself is signified on ac-
distinction mentioned is that of the elements according to
count of its being impossible for Moses to make the idea
their forms, since both earth and water are named. That
of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except
air and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact
under the similitude of well-known objects. Hence he
that the corporeal nature of these would not be so evident
uses a variety of figures in speaking of it, calling it not
as that of earth and water, to the ignorant people to whom
water only, nor earth only, lest they should think it to be
Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus xxvi), nevertheless, under-
in very truth water or earth. At the same time it has so
stood air to be signified by the words, “Spirit of God,”
far a likeness to earth, in that it is susceptible of form, and since spirit is another name for air, and considered that
to water in its adaptability to a variety of forms. In this
by the word heaven is meant fire, for he held heaven to
respect, then, the earth is said to be “void and empty,” or
be composed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei
“invisible and shapeless,” that matter is known by means
viii, 11). But Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though other-
of form. Hence, considered in itself, it is called “invisible”
wise agreeing with Plato, says that fire is signified by the
or “void,” and its potentiality is completed by form; thus
word darkness, since, said he, fire does not shine in its
Plato says that matter is “place”∗. But other holy writers
own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable to hold
understand by earth the element of earth, and we have said
to what we stated above; because by the words “Spirit
(a. 1) how, in this sense, the earth was, according to them,
of God” Scripture usually means the Holy Ghost, Who
without form.
is said to “move over the waters,” not, indeed, in bodily
Reply to Objection 2. Nature produces effect in act
shape, but as the craftsman’s will may be said to move
from being in potentiality; and consequently in the op-
over the material to which he intends to give a form. The
erations of nature potentiality must precede act in time,
third distinction is that of place; since the earth is said to
and formlessness precede form. But God produces being
be under the waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the
in act out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce a per-
air, the subject of darkness, is described as being above
fect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of His
the waters, in the words: “Darkness was upon the face of
power.
the deep.” The remaining distinctions will appear from
Reply to Objection 3. Accident, inasmuch as it is a
what follows (q. 71).
† Septuagint
∗ Timaeus, quoted by Aristotle, Phys. iv, text. 15
335
Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same?
Ia q. 66 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the formless matter
arguing from their unity of form. And, indeed, if cor-
of all corporeal things is the same. For Augustine says
poreity were one form in itself, on which the other forms
(Confess. xii, 12): “I find two things Thou hast made, one
that distinguish bodies from each other supervene, this ar-
formed, the other formless,” and he says that the latter
gument would necessarily be true; for this form of cor-
was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby, he says,
poreity would inhere in matter immutably and so far all
the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore
bodies would be incorruptible. But corruption would then
the matter of all corporeal things is the same.
be merely accidental through the disappearance of suc-
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph.
cessive forms—that is to say, it would be corruption, not
v, text. 10): “Things that are one in genus are one in mat-
pure and simple, but partial, since a being in act would
ter.” But all corporeal things are in the same genus of
subsist under the transient form. Thus the ancient natu-
body. Therefore the matter of all bodies is the same.
ral philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was
Objection 3. Further, different acts befit different po-
some actual being, such as air or fire. But supposing that
tentialities, and the same act befits the same potentiality.
no form exists in corruptible bodies which remains sub-
But all bodies have the same form, corporeity. Therefore
sisting beneath generation and corruption, it follows nec-
all bodies have the same matter.
essarily that the matter of corruptible and incorruptible
Objection 4. Further, matter, considered in itself, is
bodies is not the same. For matter, as it is in itself, is
only in potentiality. But distinction is due to form. There-
in potentiality to form.
fore matter considered in itself is the same in all corporeal
Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect
things.
to all those forms to which it is common, and in receiving
On the contrary, Things of which the matter is the
any one form it is in act only as regards that form. Hence
same are mutually interchangeable and mutually active or
it remains in potentiality to all other forms. And this is the
passive, as is said (De Gener. i, text. 50). But heavenly
case even where some forms are more perfect than others,
and earthly bodies do not act upon each other mutually.
and contain these others virtually in themselves. For po-
Therefore their matter is not the same.
tentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection
I answer that, On this question the opinions of
and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in
philosophers have differed. Plato and all who preceded
potentiality to a perfect form, and “vice versa.” Matter,
Aristotle held that all bodies are of the nature of the four
therefore, whilst existing under the form of an incorrupt-
elements.
Hence because the four elements have one
ible body, would be in potentiality to the form of a cor-
common matter, as their mutual generation and corrup-
ruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the lat-
tion prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the
ter, it has both form and the privation of form; for want of
same. But the fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies
a form in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation.
was ascribed by Plato, not to the condition of matter, but
But this condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore
to the will of the artificer, God, Whom he represents as
impossible that bodies by nature corruptible, and those by
saying to the heavenly bodies: “By your own nature you
nature incorruptible, should possess the same matter.
are subject to dissolution, but by My will you are indis-
Neither can we say, as Averroes∗ imagines, that a
soluble, for My will is more powerful than the link that
heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven—beings
binds you together.” But this theory Aristotle (De Caelo i,
in potentiality with regard to place, though not to being,
text. 5) disproves by the natural movements of bodies. For
and that its form is a separate substance united to it as
since, he says, the heavenly bodies have a natural move-
its motive force. For it is impossible to suppose any be-
ment, different from that of the elements, it follows that
ing in act, unless in its totality it be act and form, or be
they have a different nature from them. For movement
something which has act or form. Setting aside, then,
in a circle, which is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not
in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed
by contraries, whereas the movements of the elements are
with motive power, if the heavenly body is not something
mutually opposite, one tending upwards, another down-
having form—that is, something composed of a form and
wards: so, therefore, the heavenly body is without con-
the subject of that form—it follows that in its totality it
trariety, whereas the elemental bodies have contrariety in
is form and act. But every such thing is something actu-
their nature. And as generation and corruption are from
ally understood, which the heavenly bodies are not, being
contraries, it follows that, whereas the elements are cor-
sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly
ruptible, the heavenly bodies are incorruptible. But in
bodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form
spite of this difference of natural corruption and incor-
alone which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the
ruption, Avicebron taught unity of matter in all bodies,
point at issue to inquire whether this is a soul or any other
∗ De Substantia Orbis ii.
336
thing. Hence this form perfects this matter in such a way potentiality, as is said in Metaph. x, text. 26. Logically
that there remains in it no potentiality with respect to be-
considered, however, there is but one genus of all bodies,
ing, but only to place, as Aristotle† says. So, then, the
since they are all included in the one notion of corporeity.
matter of the heavenly bodies and of the elements is not
Reply to Objection 3. The form of corporeity is not
the same, except by analogy, in so far as they agree in the
one and the same in all bodies, being no other than the
character of potentiality.
various forms by which bodies are distinguished, as stated
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine follows in this the
above.
opinion of Plato, who does not admit a fifth essence. Or
Reply to Objection 4. As potentiality is directed to-
we may say that formless matter is one with the unity of
wards act, potential beings are differentiated by their dif-
order, as all bodies are one in the order of corporeal crea-
ferent acts, as sight is by color, hearing by sound. There-
tures.
fore for this reason the matter of the celestial bodies is
Reply to Objection 2. If genus is taken in a physi-
different from that of the elemental, because the matter of
cal sense, corruptible and incorruptible things are not in
the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental form.
the same genus, on account of their different modes of
Whether the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless matter?
Ia q. 66 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the empyrean heaven
On the contrary, Strabus says that in the passage, “In
was not created at the same time as formless matter. For
the beginning God created heaven and earth,” heaven de-
the empyrean, if it is anything at all, must be a sen-
notes not the visible firmament, but the empyrean or fiery
sible body.
But all sensible bodies are movable, and
heaven.
the empyrean heaven is not movable. For if it were so,
I answer that, The empyrean heaven rests only on the
its movement would be ascertained by the movement of
authority of Strabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of
some visible body, which is not the case. The empyrean
whom agree in one respect, namely, in holding it to be the
heaven, then, was not created contemporaneously with
place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede say that as soon as
formless matter.
created it was filled with angels; and Basil∗ says: “Just as
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iii,
the lost are driven into the lowest darkness, so the reward
4) that “the lower bodies are governed by the higher in a
for worthy deeds is laid up in the light beyond this world,
certain order.” If, therefore, the empyrean heaven is the
where the just shall obtain the abode of rest.” But they
highest of bodies, it must necessarily exercise some in-
differ in the reasons on which they base their statement.
fluence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to be
Strabus and Bede teach that there is an empyrean heaven,
the case, especially as it is presumed to be without move-
because the firmament, which they take to mean the side-
ment; for one body cannot move another unless itself also
real heaven, is said to have been made, not in the begin-
be moved. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not cre-
ning, but on the second day: whereas the reason given
ated together with formless matter.
by Basil is that otherwise God would seem to have made
Objection 3. Further, if it is held that the empyrean
darkness His first work, as the Manicheans falsely assert,
heaven is the place of contemplation, and not ordained to
when they call the God of the Old Testament the God of
natural effects; on the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin.
darkness. These reasons, however, are not very cogent.
iv, 20): “In so far as we mentally apprehend eternal things,
For the question of the firmament, said to have been made
so far are we not of this world”; from which it is clear
on the second day, is solved in one way by Augustine, and
that contemplation lifts the mind above the things of this
in another by other holy writers. But the question of the
world. Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of
darkness is explained according to Augustine†, by sup-
contemplation.
posing that formlessness, signified by darkness, preceded
Objection 4. Further, among the heavenly bodies ex-
form not by duration, but by origin. According to oth-
ists a body, partly transparent and partly luminous, which
ers, however, since darkness is no creature, but a privation
we call the sidereal heaven. There exists also a heaven
of light, it is a proof of Divine wisdom, that the things it
wholly transparent, called by some the aqueous or crys-
created from nothing it produced first of all in an imper-
talline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher heaven,
fect state, and afterwards brought them to perfection. But
it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then
a better reason can be drawn from the state of glory it-
the air would be constantly illuminated, and there would
self. For in the reward to come a two-fold glory is looked
be no night. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not cre-
for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in the human body to
ated together with formless matter.
be glorified, but in the whole world which is to be made
† De Coelo i, text. 20
∗ Hom. ii. in Hexaem.
† Gen. ad lit. i; vii.
337
new. Now the spiritual glory began with the beginning of bodies of another order—those, namely, that are directed
the world, in the blessedness of the angels, equality with
only to natural ends. Yet it seems still more probable that
whom is promised to the saints. It was fitting, then, that
it does influence bodies that are moved, though itself mo-
even from the beginning, there should be made some be-
tionless, just as angels of the highest rank, who assist∗,
ginning of bodily glory in something corporeal, free at the
influence those of lower degree who act as messengers,
very outset from the servitude of corruption and change,
though they themselves are not sent, as Dionysius teaches
and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation,
(Coel. Hier. xii). For this reason it may be said that the in-
after the Resurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that
fluence of the empyrean upon that which is called the first
heaven is called the empyrean, i.e. fiery, not from its heat,
heaven, and is moved, produces therein not something that
but from its brightness. It is to be noticed, however, that
comes and goes as a result of movement, but something of
Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9,27) says that Porphyry sets
a fixed and stable nature, as the power of conservation or
the demons apart from the angels by supposing that the
causation, or something of the kind pertaining to dignity.
former inhabit the air, the latter the ether, or empyrean.
Reply to Objection 3. Corporeal place is assigned to
But Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as
contemplation, not as necessary, but as congruous, that the
sidereal, to be fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or
splendor without may correspond to that which is within.
ethereal, taking ethereal to denote the burning of flame,
Hence Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) says: “The minister-
and not as Aristotle understands it, swiftness of movement
ing spirit could not live in darkness, but made his habitual
(De Coel. i, text. 22). This much has been said to pre-
dwelling in light and joy.”
vent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained
Reply to Objection 4. As Basil says (Hom. ii in Hex-
an empyrean heaven in the sense understood by modern
aem.): “It is certain that the heaven was created spherical
writers.
in shape, of dense body, and sufficiently strong to separate
Reply to Objection 1. Sensible corporeal things are
what is outside it from what it encloses. On this account it
movable in the present state of the world, for by the move-
darkens the region external to it, the light by which itself
ment of corporeal creatures is secured by the multiplica-
is lit up being shut out from that region. “But since the
tion of the elements. But when glory is finally consum-
body of the firmament, though solid, is transparent, for
mated, the movement of bodies will cease. And such
that it does not exclude light (as is clear from the fact that
must have been from the beginning the condition of the
we can see the stars through the intervening heavens), we
empyrean.
may also say that the empyrean has light, not condensed
Reply to Objection 2. It is sufficiently probable, as
so as to emit rays, as the sun does, but of a more subtle na-
some assert, that the empyrean heaven, having the state
ture. Or it may have the brightness of glory which differs
of glory for its ordained end, does not influence inferior
from mere natural brightness.
Whether time was created simultaneously with formless matter?
Ia q. 66 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that time was not cre-
of created things, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time,
ated simultaneously with formless matter. For Augustine
must be reckoned among the things first created.
says (Confess. xii, 12): “I find two things that Thou didst
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3):
create before time was, the primary corporeal matter, and
“Both spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the
the angelic nature. “Therefore time was not created with
beginning of time.”
formless matter.
I answer that, It is commonly said that the first things Objection 2.
Further, time is divided by day and
created were these four—the angelic nature, the empyrean
night. But in the beginning there was neither day nor
heaven, formless corporeal matter, and time. It must be
night, for these began when “God divided the light from
observed, however, that this is not the opinion of Augus-
the darkness. “Therefore in the beginning time was not.
tine. For he (Confess. xii, 12) specifies only two things as
Objection 3. Further, time is the measure of the fir-
first created—the angelic nature and corporeal matter—
mament’s movement; and the firmament is said to have
making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these
been made on the second day. Therefore in the beginning
two, namely, the angelic nature and formless matter, pre-
time was not.
cede the formation, by nature only, and not by duration;
Objection 4. Further, movement precedes time, and
and therefore, as they precede formation, so do they pre-
therefore should be reckoned among the first things cre-
cede movement and time. Time, therefore, cannot be in-
ated, rather than time.
cluded among them. But the enumeration above given is
Objection 5. Further, as time is the extrinsic measure
that of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness
∗ Infra, q. 112, a. 3
338
of matter preceded by duration its form, and this view pos-measured by the first of its kind. And it must be granted
tulates the existence of time as the measure of duration:
that forthwith from the beginning, there was movement
for otherwise there would be no such measure.
of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and
Reply to Objection 1. The teaching of Augustine
affections in the angelic mind: while movement without
rests on the opinion that the angelic nature and formless
time cannot be conceived, since time is nothing else than
matter precede time by origin or nature.
“the measure of priority and succession in movement.”
Reply to Objection 2. As in the opinion of some holy
Reply to Objection 4. Among the first created things
writers matter was in some measure formless before it re-
are to be reckoned those which have a general relation-
ceived its full form, so time was in a manner formless
ship to things. And, therefore, among these time must be
before it was fully formed and distinguished into day and
included, as having the nature of a common measure; but
night.
not movement, which is related only to the movable sub-
Reply to Objection 3. If the movement of the firma-
ject.
ment did not begin immediately from the beginning, then
Reply to Objection 5. Place is implied as existing in
the time that preceded was the measure, not of the firma-
the empyrean heaven, this being the boundary of the uni-
ment’s movement, but of the first movement of whatso-
verse. And since place has reference to things permanent,
ever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure
it was created at once in its totality. But time, as not being
of the firmament’s movement, in so far as this is the first
permanent, was created in its beginning: even as actually
movement. But if the first movement was another than
we cannot lay hold of any part of time save the “now.”
this, time would have been its measure, for everything is
339
FIRST PART, QUESTION 67
On the Work of Distinction in Itself
(In Four Articles)
We must consider next the work of distinction in itself. First, the work of the first day; secondly, the work of the second day; thirdly the work of the third day.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the word light is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things?
(2) Whether light, in corporeal things, is itself corporeal?
(3) Whether light is a quality?
(4) Whether light was fittingly made on the first day?
Whether the word “light” is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things?
Ia q. 67 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that “light” is used in its
more extended meaning. This is clearly shown in the word
proper sense in spiritual things. For Augustine says (Gen.
“sight,” originally applied to the act of the sense, and then,
ad lit. iv, 28) that “in spiritual things light is better and
as sight is the noblest and most trustworthy of the senses,
surer: and that Christ is not called Light in the same sense
extended in common speech to all knowledge obtained
as He is called the Stone; the former is to be taken literally, through the other senses. Thus we say, “Seeing how it
and the latter metaphorically.”
tastes,” or “smells,” or “burns. “Further, sight is applied
Objection 2. Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) in-
to knowledge obtained through the intellect, as in those
cludes Light among the intellectual names of God. But
words: “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see
such names are used in their proper sense in spiritual
God” (Mat. 5:8). And thus it is with the word light. In its
things. Therefore light is used in its proper sense in spiri-
primary meaning it signifies that which makes manifest
tual matters.
to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended to that
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13):
which makes manifest to cognition of any kind. If, then,
“All that is made manifest is light.” But to be made mani-
the word is taken in its strict and primary meaning, it is
fest belongs more properly to spiritual things than to cor-
to be understood metaphorically when applied to spiritual
poreal. Therefore also does light.
things, as Ambrose says (De Fide ii). But if taken in its
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii) that
common and extended use, as applied to manifestation of
“Splendor” is among those things which are said of God
every kind, it may properly be applied to spiritual things.
metaphorically.
The answer to the objections will sufficiently appear
I answer that, Any word may be used in two ways—
from what has been said.
that is to say, either in its original application or in its
Whether light is a body?
Ia q. 67 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that light is a body. For
air. Therefore light is not a body.
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 5) that “light takes the
I answer that, Light cannot be a body, for three evi-
first place among bodies.“Therefore light is a body.
dent reasons. First, on the part of place. For the place of
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. v,
any one body is different from that of any other, nor is it
2) that “light is a species of fire.” But fire is a body, and
possible, naturally speaking, for any two bodies of what-
therefore so is light.
ever nature, to exist simultaneously in the same place;
Objection 3. Further, the powers of movement, in-
since contiguity requires distinction of place.
tersection, reflection, belong properly to bodies; and all
The second reason is from movement. For if light
these are attributes of light and its rays. Moreover, dif-
were a body, its diffusion would be the local movement
ferent rays of light, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) are
of a body. Now no local movement of a body can be in-
united and separated, which seems impossible unless they
stantaneous, as everything that moves from one place to
are bodies. Therefore light is a body.
another must pass through the intervening space before
On the contrary, Two bodies cannot occupy the same
reaching the end: whereas the diffusion of light is instan-
place simultaneously. But this is the case with light and
taneous. Nor can it be argued that the time required is too
340
short to be perceived; for though this may be the case in densed round the candle when this is done, since it burns
short distances, it cannot be so in distances so great as that
no more brightly then than it burned before.
which separates the East from the West. Yet as soon as the
Since, therefore, these things are repugnant, not only
sun is at the horizon, the whole hemisphere is illuminated
to reason, but to common sense, we must conclude that
from end to end. It must also be borne in mind on the part
light cannot be a body.
of movement that whereas all bodies have their natural de-
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine takes light to be a
terminate movement, that of light is indifferent as regards
luminous body in act—in other words, to be fire, the no-
direction, working equally in a circle as in a straight line.
blest of the four elements.
Hence it appears that the diffusion of light is not the local
Reply to Objection 2. Aristotle pronounces light to
movement of a body.
be fire existing in its own proper matter: just as fire in
The third reason is from generation and corruption.
aerial matter is “flame,” or in earthly matter is “burning
For if light were a body, it would follow that whenever the
coal.” Nor must too much attention be paid to the in-
air is darkened by the absence of the luminary, the body of
stances adduced by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he
light would be corrupted, and its matter would receive a
merely mentions them as the more or less probable opin-
new form. But unless we are to say that darkness is a body,
ions of various writers.
this does not appear to be the case. Neither does it ap-
Reply to Objection 3. All these properties are as-
pear from what matter a body can be daily generated large
signed to light metaphorically, and might in the same way
enough to fill the intervening hemisphere. Also it would
be attributed to heat. For because movement from place
be absurd to say that a body of so great a bulk is corrupted
to place is naturally first in the order of movement as is
by the mere absence of the luminary. And should anyone
proved Phys. viii, text. 55, we use terms belonging to lo-
reply that it is not corrupted, but approaches and moves
cal movement in speaking of alteration and movement of
around with the sun, we may ask why it is that when a
all kinds. For even the word distance is derived from the
lighted candle is obscured by the intervening object the
idea of remoteness of place, to that of all contraries, as is
whole room is darkened? It is not that the light is con-
said Metaph. x, text. 13.
Whether light is a quality?
Ia q. 67 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that light is not a quality.
ondly, because light produces natural effects, for by the
For every quality remains in its subject, though the active
rays of the sun bodies are warmed, and natural changes
cause of the quality be removed, as heat remains in water
cannot be brought about by mere intentions. Others have
removed from the fire. But light does not remain in the air
said that light is the sun’s substantial form, but this also
when the source of light is withdrawn. Therefore light is
seems impossible for two reasons. First, because substan-
not a quality.
tial forms are not of themselves objects of the senses; for
Objection 2. Further, every sensible quality has its
the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said De
opposite, as cold is opposed to heat, blackness to white-
Anima iii, text. 26: whereas light is visible of itself. In the ness. But this is not the case with light since darkness is
second place, because it is impossible that what is the sub-
merely a privation of light. Light therefore is not a sensi-
stantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of
ble quality.
another; since substantial forms of their very nature con-
Objection 3. Further, a cause is more potent than its
stitute species: wherefore the substantial form always and
effect. But the light of the heavenly bodies is a cause of
everywhere accompanies the species. But light is not the
substantial forms of earthly bodies, and also gives to col-
substantial form of air, for if it were, the air would be de-
ors their immaterial being, by making them actually vis-
stroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the
ible. Light, then, is not a sensible quality, but rather a
substantial form of the sun.
substantial or spiritual form.
We must say, then, that as heat is an active quality con-
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) says
sequent on the substantial form of fire, so light is an active
that light is a species of quality.
quality consequent on the substantial form of the sun, or
I answer that, Some writers have said that the light
of another body that is of itself luminous, if there is any
in the air has not a natural being such as the color on a
such body. A proof of this is that the rays of different stars
wall has, but only an intentional being, as a similitude of
produce different effects according to the diverse natures
color in the air. But this cannot be the case for two rea-
of bodies.
sons. First, because light gives a name to the air, since by
Reply to Objection 1. Since quality is consequent
it the air becomes actually luminous. But color does not
upon substantial form, the mode in which the subject re-
do this, for we do not speak of the air as colored. Sec-
ceives a quality differs as the mode differs in which a
341
subject receives a substantial form. For when matter re-disappearance of its active cause.
ceives its form perfectly, the qualities consequent upon the
Reply to Objection 2. It is accidental to light not
form are firm and enduring; as when, for instance, water
to have a contrary, forasmuch as it is the natural quality
is converted into fire. When, however, substantial form
of the first corporeal cause of change, which is itself re-
is received imperfectly, so as to be, as it were, in process
moved from contrariety.
of being received, rather than fully impressed, the con-
Reply to Objection 3. As heat acts towards perfect-
sequent quality lasts for a time but is not permanent; as
ing the form of fire, as an instrumental cause, by virtue of
may be seen when water which has been heated returns in
the substantial form, so does light act instrumentally, by
time to its natural state. But light is not produced by the
virtue of the heavenly bodies, towards producing substan-
transmutation of matter, as though matter were in receipt
tial forms; and towards rendering colors actually visible,
of a substantial form, and light were a certain inception of
inasmuch as it is a quality of the first sensible body.
substantial form. For this reason light disappears on the
Whether the production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day?
Ia q. 67 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the production of
ing, therefore, of this spiritual nature is signified by the
light is not fittingly assigned to the first day. For light,
production of light, that is to say, of spiritual light. For
as stated above (a. 3), is a quality. But qualities are acci-
a spiritual nature receives its form by the enlightenment
dents, and as such should have, not the first, but a subor-
whereby it is led to adhere to the Word of God.
dinate place. The production of light, then, ought not to
Other writers think that the production of spiritual
be assigned to the first day.
creatures was purposely omitted by Moses, and give var-
Objection 2.
Further, it is light that distinguishes
ious reasons. Basil∗ says that Moses begins his narra-
night from day, and this is effected by the sun, which is
tive from the beginning of time which belongs to sensible
recorded as having been made on the fourth day. There-
things; but that the spiritual or angelic creation is passed
fore the production of light could not have been on the
over, as created beforehand.
first day.
Chrysostom† gives as a reason for the omission that
Objection 3. Further, night and day are brought about
Moses was addressing an ignorant people, to whom mate-
by the circular movement of a luminous body. But move-
rial things alone appealed, and whom he was endeavoring
ment of this kind is an attribute of the firmament, and
to withdraw from the service of idols. It would have been
we read that the firmament was made on the second day.
to them a pretext for idolatry if he had spoken to them of
Therefore the production of light, dividing night from day,
natures spiritual in substance and nobler than all corporeal
ought not to be assigned to the first day.
creatures; for they would have paid them Divine worship,
Objection 4. Further, if it be said that spiritual light is since they were prone to worship as gods even the sun,
here spoken of, it may be replied that the light made on the
moon, and stars, which was forbidden them (Dt. 4).
first day dispels the darkness. But in the beginning spir-
But mention is made of several kinds of formlessness,
itual darkness was not, for even the demons were in the
in regard to the corporeal creature. One is where we read
beginning good, as has been shown (q. 63, a. 5). There-
that “the earth was void and empty,” and another where
fore the production of light ought not to be assigned to the
it is said that “darkness was upon the face of the deep.”
first day.
Now it seems to be required, for two reasons, that the
On the contrary, That without which there could not
formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all
be day, must have been made on the first day. But there
by the production of light. In the first place because light
can be no day without light. Therefore light must have
is a quality of the first body, as was stated (a. 3), and thus
been made on the first day.
by means of light it was fitting that the world should first
I answer that, There are two opinions as to the pro-
receive its form. The second reason is because light is a
duction of light. Augustine seems to say (De Civ. Dei xi,
common quality. For light is common to terrestrial and
9,33) that Moses could not have fittingly passed over the
celestial bodies. But as in knowledge we proceed from
production of the spiritual creature, and therefore when
general principles, so do we in work of every kind. For
we read, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,”
the living thing is generated before the animal, and the
a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the
animal before the man, as is shown in De Gener. Anim.
word “heaven,” and formless matter of the corporeal crea-
ii, 3. It was fitting, then, as an evidence of the Divine wis-
ture by the word “earth.” And spiritual nature was formed
dom, that among the works of distinction the production
first, as being of higher dignity than corporeal. The form-
of light should take first place, since light is a form of the
∗ Hom. i in Hexaem.
† Hom. ii in Genes.
342
primary body, and because it is more common quality.
signified by the words, “He called the light day, and the
Basil‡, indeed, adds a third reason: that all other things
darkness night.”
are made manifest by light. And there is yet a fourth, al-
Reply to Objection 3. Basil says (Hom. ii in Hex-
ready touched upon in the objections; that day cannot be
aem.) that day and night were then caused by expansion
unless light exists, which was made therefore on the first
and contraction of light, rather than by movement. But
day.
Augustine objects to this (Gen. ad lit. i), that there was
Reply to Objection 1. According to the opinion of
no reason for this vicissitude of expansion and contraction
those who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded
since there were neither men nor animals on the earth at
its form in duration, matter must be held to have been cre-
that time, for whose service this was required. Nor does
ated at the beginning with substantial forms, afterwards
the nature of a luminous body seem to admit of the with-
receiving those that are accidental, among which light
drawal of light, so long as the body is actually present;
holds the first place.
though this might be effected by a miracle. As to this,
Reply to Objection 2. In the opinion of some the light
however, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. i) that in the
here spoken of was a kind of luminous nebula, and that on
first founding of the order of nature we must not look for
the making of the sun this returned to the matter of which
miracles, but for what is in accordance with nature. We
it had been formed. But this cannot well be maintained,
hold, then, that the movement of the heavens is twofold.
as in the beginning of Genesis Holy Scripture records the
Of these movements, one is common to the entire heaven,
institution of that order of nature which henceforth is to
and is the cause of day and night. This, as it seems, had
endure. We cannot, then, say that what was made at that
its beginning on the first day. The other varies in propor-
time afterwards ceased to exist.
tion as it affects various bodies, and by its variations is
Others, therefore, held that this luminous nebula con-
the cause of the succession of days, months, and years.
tinues in existence, but so closely attached to the sun as
Thus it is, that in the account of the first day the distinc-
to be indistinguishable. But this is as much as to say that
tion between day and night alone is mentioned; this dis-
it is superfluous, whereas none of God’s works have been
tinction being brought about by the common movement of
made in vain. On this account it is held by some that the
the heavens. The further distinction into successive days,
sun’s body was made out of this nebula. This, too, is im-
seasons, and years recorded as begun on the fourth day,
possible to those at least who believe that the sun is dif-
in the words, “let them be for seasons, and for days, and
ferent in its nature from the four elements, and naturally
years” is due to proper movements.
incorruptible. For in that case its matter cannot take on
Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine teaches (Con-
another form.
fess. xii; Gen. ad lit. 1,15), formlessness did not precede
I answer, then, with Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), that
forms in duration; and so we must understand the produc-
the light was the sun’s light, formless as yet, being already
tion of light to signify the formation of spiritual creatures,
the solar substance, and possessing illuminative power in
not, indeed, with the perfection of glory, in which they
a general way, to which was afterwards added the special
were not created, but with the perfection of grace, which
and determinative power required to produce determinate
they possessed from their creation as said above (q. 62,
effects. Thus, then, in the production of this light a triple
a. 3). Thus the division of light from darkness will de-
distinction was made between light and darkness. First,
note the distinction of the spiritual creature from other cre-
as to the cause, forasmuch as in the substance of the sun
ated things as yet without form. But if all created things
we have the cause of light, and in the opaque nature of
received their form at the same time, the darkness must
the earth the cause of darkness. Secondly, as to place, for
be held to mean the spiritual darkness of the wicked, not
in one hemisphere there was light, in the other darkness.
as existing from the beginning but such as God foresaw
Thirdly, as to time; because there was light for one and
would exist.
darkness for another in the same hemisphere; and this is
‡ Hom. ii in Hexaem.
343
FIRST PART, QUESTION 68
On the Work of the Second Day
(In Four Articles)
We must next consider the work of the second day. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the firmament was made on the second day?
(2) Whether there are waters above the firmament?
(3) Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?
(4) Whether there is more than one heaven?
Whether the firmament was made on the second day?
Ia q. 68 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the firmament was
tion, because its parts are, so to say, not in disunion, but in not made on the second day. For it is said (Gn. 1:8): “God
harmony. Others held the firmament to be of the nature of
called the firmament heaven.” But the heaven existed be-
the four elements, not, indeed, compounded of them, but
fore days, as is clear from the words, “In the beginning
being as it were a simple element. Such was the opinion
God created heaven and earth.” Therefore the firmament
of Plato, who held that element to be fire. Others, again,
was not made on the second day.
have held that the heaven is not of the nature of the four
Objection 2. Further, the work of the six days is or-
elements, but is itself a fifth body, existing over and above
dered conformably to the order of Divine wisdom. Now it
these. This is the opinion of Aristotle (De Coel. i, text.
would ill become the Divine wisdom to make afterwards
6,32).
that which is naturally first. But though the firmament
According to the first opinion, it may, strictly speak-
naturally precedes the earth and the waters, these are men-
ing, be granted that the firmament was made, even as to
tioned before the formation of light, which was on the first
substance, on the second day. For it is part of the work of
day. Therefore the firmament was not made on the second
creation to produce the substance of the elements, while it
day.
belongs to the work of distinction and adornment to give
Objection 3. Further, all that was made in the six
forms to the elements that pre-exist.
days was formed out of matter created before days began.
But the belief that the firmament was made, as to its
But the firmament cannot have been formed out of pre-
substance, on the second day is incompatible with the
existing matter, for if so it would be liable to generation
opinion of Plato, according to whom the making of the
and corruption. Therefore the firmament was not made on
firmament implies the production of the element of fire.
the second day.
This production, however, belongs to the work of creation,
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:6): “God said:
at least, according to those who hold that formlessness of
let there be a firmament,” and further on (verse 8); “And
matter preceded in time its formation, since the first form
the evening and morning were the second day.”
received by matter is the elemental.
I answer that, In discussing questions of this kind two
Still less compatible with the belief that the substance
rules are to observed, as Augustine teaches (Gen. ad lit.
of the firmament was produced on the second day is the
i, 18). The first is, to hold the truth of Scripture without
opinion of Aristotle, seeing that the mention of days de-
wavering. The second is that since Holy Scripture can be
notes succession of time, whereas the firmament, being
explained in a multiplicity of senses, one should adhere
naturally incorruptible, is of a matter not susceptible of
to a particular explanation, only in such measure as to be
change of form; wherefore it could not be made out of
ready to abandon it, if it be proved with certainty to be
matter existing antecedently in time.
false; lest Holy Scripture be exposed to the ridicule of un-
Hence to produce the substance of the firmament be-
believers, and obstacles be placed to their believing.
longs to the work of creation. But its formation, in some
We say, therefore, that the words which speak of the
degree, belongs to the second day, according to both opin-
firmament as made on the second day can be understood
ions: for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), the light of
in two senses. They may be understood, first, of the starry
the sun was without form during the first three days, and
firmament, on which point it is necessary to set forth the
afterwards, on the fourth day, received its form.
different opinions of philosophers. Some of these be-
If, however, we take these days to denote merely se-
lieved it to be composed of the elements; and this was the
quence in the natural order, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad
opinion of Empedocles, who, however, held further that
lit. iv, 22,24), and not succession in time, there is then
the body of the firmament was not susceptible of dissolu-
nothing to prevent our saying, whilst holding any one of
344
the opinions given above, that the substantial formation of the beginning is not the same as that made on the second
the firmament belongs to the second day.
day; and there are several senses in which this may be un-
Another possible explanation is to understand by the
derstood. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 9) that the heaven
firmament that was made on the second day, not that in
recorded as made on the first day is the formless spiritual
which the stars are set, but the part of the atmosphere
nature, and that the heaven of the second day is the corpo-
where the clouds are collected, and which has received
real heaven. According to Bede (Hexaem. i) and Strabus,
the name firmament from the firmness and density of the
the heaven made on the first day is the empyrean, and the
air. “For a body is called firm,” that is dense and solid,
firmament made on the second day, the starry heaven. Ac-
“thereby differing from a mathematical body” as is re-
cording to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) that of the first
marked by Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). If, then, this ex-
day was spherical in form and without stars, the same, in
planation is adopted none of these opinions will be found
fact, that the philosophers speak of, calling it the ninth
repugnant to reason. Augustine, in fact (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4),
sphere, and the primary movable body that moves with
recommends it thus: “I consider this view of the question
diurnal movement: while by the firmament made on the
worthy of all commendation, as neither contrary to faith
second day he understands the starry heaven. According
nor difficult to be proved and believed.”
to another theory, touched upon by Augustine∗ the heaven
Reply to Objection 1.
According to Chrysostom
made on the first day was the starry heaven, and the fir-
(Hom. iii in Genes.), Moses prefaces his record by speak-
mament made on the second day was that region of the
ing of the works of God collectively, in the words, “In
air where the clouds are collected, which is also called
the beginning God created heaven and earth,” and then
heaven, but equivocally. And to show that the word is
proceeds to explain them part by part; in somewhat the
here used in an equivocal sense, it is expressly said that
same way as one might say: “This house was constructed
“God called the firmament heaven”; just as in a preced-
by that builder,” and then add: “First, he laid the founda-
ing verse it said that “God called the light day” (since the
tions, then built the walls, and thirdly, put on the roof.” In
word “day” is also used to denote a space of twenty-four
accepting this explanation we are, therefore, not bound to
hours). Other instances of a similar use occur, as pointed
hold that a different heaven is spoken of in the words: “In
out by Rabbi Moses.
the beginning God created heaven and earth,” and when
The second and third objections are sufficiently an-
we read that the firmament was made on the second day.
swered by what has been already said.
We may also say that the heaven recorded as created in
Whether there are waters above the firmament?
Ia q. 68 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there are not wa-
ters are, and whatever their mode of existence, we cannot
ters above the firmament. For water is heavy by nature,
for a moment doubt that they are there.” As to the nature
and heavy things tend naturally downwards, not upwards.
of these waters, all are not agreed. Origen says (Hom. i
Therefore there are not waters above the firmament.
in Gen.) that the waters that are above the firmament are
Objection 2. Further, water is fluid by nature, and flu-
“spiritual substances.” Wherefore it is written (Ps. 148:4):
ids cannot rest on a sphere, as experience shows. There-
“Let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name
fore, since the firmament is a sphere, there cannot be water
of the Lord,” and (Dan. 3:60): “Ye waters that are above
above it.
the heavens, bless the Lord.“To this Basil answers (Hom.
Objection 3. Further, water is an element, and ap-
iii in Hexaem.) that these words do not mean that these
pointed to the generation of composite bodies, according
waters are rational creatures, but that “the thoughtful con-
to the relation in which imperfect things stand towards
templation of them by those who understand fulfils the
perfect. But bodies of composite nature have their place
glory of the Creator.” Hence in the same context, fire,
upon the earth, and not above the firmament, so that water
hail, and other like creatures, are invoked in the same way,
would be useless there. But none of God’s works are use-
though no one would attribute reason to these.
less. Therefore there are not waters above the firmament.
We must hold, then, these waters to be material, but
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:7): ”(God)
their exact nature will be differently defined according
divided the waters that were under the firmament, from
as opinions on the firmament differ. For if by the firma-
those that were above the firmament.”
ment we understand the starry heaven, and as being of the
I answer with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that,
nature of the four elements, for the same reason it may
“These words of Scripture have more authority than the
be believed that the waters above the heaven are of the
most exalted human intellect. Hence, whatever these wa-
same nature as the elemental waters. But if by the firma-
∗ Gen. ad lit. ii, 1
345
ment we understand the starry heaven, not, however, as Him to work on them by way of miracle.” We leave this
being of the nature of the four elements then the waters
view, then, and answer that according to the last two opin-
above the firmament will not be of the same nature as the
ions on the firmament and the waters the solution appears
elemental waters, but just as, according to Strabus, one
from what has been said. According to the first opinion,
heaven is called empyrean, that is, fiery, solely on account
an order of the elements must be supposed different from
of its splendor: so this other heaven will be called aque-
that given by Aristotle, that is to say, that the waters sur-
ous solely on account of its transparence; and this heaven
rounding the earth are of a dense consistency, and those
is above the starry heaven. Again, if the firmament is held
around the firmament of a rarer consistency, in proportion
to be of other nature than the elements, it may still be said
to the respective density of the earth and of the heaven.
to divide the waters, if we understand by water not the el-
Or by the water, as stated, we may understand the mat-
ement but formless matter. Augustine, in fact, says (Super
ter of bodies to be signified.
Gen. cont. Manich. i, 5,7) that whatever divides bodies
Reply to Objection 2. The solution is clear from what
from bodies can be said to divide waters from waters.
has been said, according to the last two opinions. But ac-
If, however, we understand by the firmament that part
cording to the first opinion, Basil gives two replies (Hom.
of the air in which the clouds are collected, then the waters
iii in Hexaem.). He answers first, that a body seen as con-
above the firmament must rather be the vapors resolved
cave beneath need not necessarily be rounded, or convex,
from the waters which are raised above a part of the at-
above. Secondly, that the waters above the firmament are
mosphere, and from which the rain falls. But to say, as
not fluid, but exist outside it in a solid state, as a mass of
some writers alluded to by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4),
ice, and that this is the crystalline heaven of some writers.
that waters resolved into vapor may be lifted above the
Reply to Objection 3. According to the third opinion
starry heaven, is a mere absurdity. The solid nature of
given, the waters above the firmament have been raised
the firmament, the intervening region of fire, wherein all
in the form of vapors, and serve to give rain to the earth.
vapor must be consumed, the tendency in light and rar-
But according to the second opinion, they are above the
efied bodies to drift to one spot beneath the vault of the
heaven that is wholly transparent and starless. This, ac-
moon, as well as the fact that vapors are perceived not to
cording to some, is the primary mobile, the cause of the
rise even to the tops of the higher mountains, all to go to
daily revolution of the entire heaven, whereby the contin-
show the impossibility of this. Nor is it less absurd to say,
uance of generation is secured. In the same way the starry
in support of this opinion, that bodies may be rarefied in-
heaven, by the zodiacal movement, is the cause whereby
finitely, since natural bodies cannot be infinitely rarefied
different bodies are generated or corrupted, through the
or divided, but up to a certain point only.
rising and setting of the stars, and their various influences.
Reply to Objection 1. Some have attempted to solve
But according to the first opinion these waters are set there
this difficulty by supposing that in spite of the natural
to temper the heat of the celestial bodies, as Basil sup-
gravity of water, it is kept in its place above the firma-
poses (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). And Augustine says (Gen.
ment by the Divine power. Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii,
ad lit. ii, 5) that some have considered this to be proved
1), however will not admit this solution, but says “It is
by the extreme cold of Saturn owing to its nearness to the
our business here to inquire how God has constituted the
waters that are above the firmament.
natures of His creatures, not how far it may have pleased
Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?
Ia q. 68 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the firmament does
tinguishes waters from waters must be something which
not divide waters from waters. For bodies that are of one
is in contact with them on either side, as a wall standing
and the same species have naturally one and the same
in the midst of a river. But it is evident that the waters
place. But the Philosopher says (Topic. i, 6): “All water
below do not reach up to the firmament. Therefore the
is the same species.” Water therefore cannot be distinct
firmament does not divide the waters from the waters.
from water by place.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:6): “Let there be
Objection 2. Further, should it be said that the waters
a firmament made amidst the waters; and let it divide the
above the firmament differ in species from those under the
waters from the waters.”
firmament, it may be argued, on the contrary, that things
I answer that, The text of Genesis, considered super-
distinct in species need nothing else to distinguish them.
ficially, might lead to the adoption of a theory similar to
If then, these waters differ in species, it is not the firma-
that held by certain philosophers of antiquity, who taught
ment that distinguishes them.
that water was a body infinite in dimension, and the pri-
Objection 3. Further, it would appear that what dis-
mary element of all bodies. Thus in the words, “Darkness
346
was upon the face of the deep,” the word “deep” might and darkness, which, in fact, is the air.
be taken to mean the infinite mass of water, understood as
Whether, then, we understand by the firmament the
the principle of all other bodies. These philosophers also
starry heaven, or the cloudy region of the air, it is true to
taught that not all corporeal things are confined beneath
say that it divides the waters from the waters, according
the heaven perceived by our senses, but that a body of wa-
as we take water to denote formless matter, or any kind of
ter, infinite in extent, exists above that heaven. On this
transparent body, as fittingly designated under the name of
view the firmament of heaven might be said to divide the
waters. For the starry heaven divides the lower transparent
waters without from those within—that is to say, from all
bodies from the higher, and the cloudy region divides that
bodies under the heaven, since they took water to be the
higher part of the air, where the rain and similar things are
principle of them all.
generated, from the lower part, which is connected with
As, however, this theory can be shown to be false by
the water and included under that name.
solid reasons, it cannot be held to be the sense of Holy
Reply to Objection 1. If by the firmament is under-
Scripture. It should rather be considered that Moses was
stood the starry heaven, the waters above are not of the
speaking to ignorant people, and that out of condescen-
same species as those beneath. But if by the firmament is
sion to their weakness he put before them only such things
understood the cloudy region of the air, both these waters
as are apparent to sense. Now even the most uneducated
are of the same species, and two places are assigned to
can perceive by their senses that earth and water are cor-
them, though not for the same purpose, the higher being
poreal, whereas it is not evident to all that air also is corpothe place of their begetting, the lower, the place of their
real, for there have even been philosophers who said that
repose.
air is nothing, and called a space filled with air a vacuum.
Reply to Objection 2. If the waters are held to dif-
Moses, then, while he expressly mentions water and
fer in species, the firmament cannot be said to divide the
earth, makes no express mention of air by name, to avoid
waters, as the cause of their destruction, but only as the
setting before ignorant persons something beyond their
boundary of each.
knowledge. In order, however, to express the truth to
Reply to Objection 3. On account of the air and other
those capable of understanding it, he implies in the words:
similar bodies being invisible, Moses includes all such
“Darkness was upon the face of the deep,” the existence
bodies under the name of water, and thus it is evident that
of air as attendant, so to say, upon the water. For it may be
waters are found on each side of the firmament, whatever
understood from these words that over the face of the wa-
be the sense in which the word is used.
ter a transparent body was extended, the subject of light
Whether there is only one heaven?
Ia q. 68 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that there is only one
I answer that, On this point there seems to be a diver-
heaven. For the heaven is contrasted with the earth, in
sity of opinion between Basil and Chrysostom. The lat-
the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and
ter says that there is only one heaven (Hom. iv in Gen.),
earth.“But there is only one earth. Therefore there is only
and that the words ‘heavens of heavens’ are merely the
one heaven.
translation of the Hebrew idiom according to which the
Objection 2. Further, that which consists of the en-
word is always used in the plural, just as in Latin there
tire sum of its own matter, must be one; and such is the
are many nouns that are wanting in the singular. On the
heaven, as the Philosopher proves (De Coel. i, text. 95).
other hand, Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.), whom Dama-
Therefore there is but one heaven.
scene follows (De Fide Orth. ii), says that there are many
Objection 3. Further, whatever is predicated of many
heavens. The difference, however, is more nominal than
things univocally is predicated of them according to some
real. For Chrysostom means by the one heaven the whole
common notion. But if there are more heavens than one,
body that is above the earth and the water, for which rea-
they are so called univocally, for if equivocally only, they
son the birds that fly in the air are called birds of heaven∗.
could not properly be called many. If, then, they are
But since in this body there are many distinct parts, Basil
many, there must be some common notion by reason of
said that there are more heavens than one.
which each is called heaven, but this common notion can-
In order, then, to understand the distinction of heav-
not be assigned. Therefore there cannot be more than one
ens, it must be borne in mind that Scripture speaks of
heaven.
heaven in a threefold sense. Sometimes it uses the word in
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 148:4): “Praise Him,
its proper and natural meaning, when it denotes that body
ye heavens of heavens.”
on high which is luminous actually or potentially, and in-
∗ Ps. 8:9
347
corruptible by nature. In this body there are three heavens; Thirdly, there are metaphorical uses of the word
the first is the empyrean, which is wholly luminous; the
heaven, as when this name is applied to the Blessed Trin-
second is the aqueous or crystalline, wholly transparent;
ity, Who is the Light and the Most High Spirit. It is ex-
and the third is called the starry heaven, in part transpar-
plained by some, as thus applied, in the words, “I will as-
ent, and in part actually luminous, and divided into eight
cend into heaven”; whereby the evil spirit is represented
spheres. One of these is the sphere of the fixed stars; the
as seeking to make himself equal with God. Sometimes
other seven, which may be called the seven heavens, are
also spiritual blessings, the recompense of the Saints,
the spheres of the planets.
from being the highest of all good gifts, are signified by
In the second place, the name heaven is applied to
the word heaven, and, in fact, are so signified, according
a body that participates in any property of the heavenly
to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte), in the words,
body, as sublimity and luminosity, actual or potential.
“Your reward is very great in heaven” (Mat. 5:12).
Thus Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) holds as one heaven
Again, three kinds of supernatural visions, bodily,
all the space between the waters and the moon’s orb, call-
imaginative, and intellectual, are called sometimes so
ing it the aerial. According to him, then, there are three
many heavens, in reference to which Augustine (Gen. ad
heavens, the aerial, the starry, and one higher than both
lit. xii) expounds Paul’s rapture “to the third heaven.”
these, of which the Apostle is understood to speak when
Reply to Objection 1. The earth stands in relation
he says of himself that he was “rapt to the third heaven.”
to the heaven as the centre of a circle to its circumfer-
But since this space contains two elements, namely,
ence. But as one center may have many circumferences,
fire and air, and in each of these there is what is called a
so, though there is but one earth, there may be many heav-
higher and a lower region Rabanus subdivides this space
ens.
into four distinct heavens. The higher region of fire he
Reply to Objection 2. The argument holds good as to
calls the fiery heaven; the lower, the Olympian heaven
the heaven, in so far as it denotes the entire sum of corpo-
from a lofty mountain of that name: the higher region
real creation, for in that sense it is one.
of air he calls, from its brightness, the ethereal heaven;
Reply to Objection 3. All the heavens have in com-
the lower, the aerial. When, therefore, these four heavens
mon sublimity and some degree of luminosity, as appears
are added to the three enumerated above, there are seven
from what has been said.
corporeal heavens in all, in the opinion of Rabanus.
348
FIRST PART, QUESTION 69
On the Work of the Third Day
(In Two Articles)
We next consider the work of the third day. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) About the gathering together of the waters;
(2) About the production of plants.
Whether it was fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place, as Ia q. 69 a. 1
recorded, on the third day?
Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting that
was made on the first day. For as the spiritual nature is
the gathering together of the waters should take place on
higher than the corporeal, so the higher bodies are nobler
the third day. For what was made on the first and second
than the lower. Hence the formation of the higher bodies
days is expressly said to have been “made” in the words,
is indicated in the second place, by the words, “Let there
“God said: Be light made,” and “Let there be a firmament
be made a firmament,” by which is to be understood the
made.“But the third day is contradistinguished from the
impression of celestial forms on formless matter, that pre-
first and the second days. Therefore the work of the third
ceded with priority not of time, but of origin only. But in
day should have been described as a making not as a gath-
the third place the impression of elemental forms on form-
ering together.
less matter is recorded, also with a priority of origin only.
Objection 2. Further, the earth hitherto had been com-
Therefore the words, “Let the waters be gathered together,
pletely covered by the waters, wherefore it was described
and the dry land appear,” mean that corporeal matter was
as “invisible”∗. There was then no place on the earth to
impressed with the substantial form of water, so as to have
which the waters could be gathered together.
such movement, and with the substantial form of earth, so
Objection 3. Further, things which are not in con-
as to have such an appearance.
tinuous contact cannot occupy one place. But not all the
According, however, to other holy writers† an order
waters are in continuous contact, and therefore all were
of duration in the works is to be understood, by which is
not gathered together into one place.
meant that the formlessness of matter precedes its forma-
Objection 4. Further, a gathering together is a mode
tion, and one form another, in order of time. Nevertheless,
of local movement. But the waters flow naturally, and
they do not hold that the formlessness of matter implies
take their course towards the sea. In their case, therefore,
the total absence of form, since heaven, earth, and wa-
a Divine precept of this kind was unnecessary.
ter already existed, since these three are named as already
Objection 5. Further, the earth is given its name at its clearly perceptible to the senses; rather they understand
first creation by the words, “In the beginning God created
by formlessness the want of due distinction and of perfect
heaven and earth.” Therefore the imposition of its name
beauty, and in respect of these three Scripture mentions
on the third day seems to be recorded without necessity.
three kinds of formlessness. Heaven, the highest of them,
On the contrary, The authority of Scripture suffices.
was without form so long as “darkness” filled it, because it
I answer that, It is necessary to reply differently
was the source of light. The formlessness of water, which
to this question according to the different interpretations
holds the middle place, is called the “deep,” because, as
given by Augustine and other holy writers. In all these
Augustine says (Contr. Faust. xxii, 11), this word signi-
works, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15; iv,
fies the mass of waters without order. Thirdly, the form-
22,34; De Gen. Contr. Manich. i, 5, 7), there is no or-
less state of the earth is touched upon when the earth is
der of duration, but only of origin and nature. He says
said to be “void” or “invisible,” because it was covered by
that the formless spiritual and formless corporeal natures
the waters. Thus, then, the formation of the highest body
were created first of all, and that the latter are at first in-
took place on the first day. And since time results from the
dicated by the words “earth” and “water.” Not that this
movement of the heaven, and is the numerical measure of
formlessness preceded formation, in time, but only in ori-
the movement of the highest body, from this formation,
gin; nor yet that one formation preceded another in dura-
resulted the distinction of time, namely, that of night and
tion, but merely in the order of nature. Agreeably, then,
day. On the second day the intermediate body, water, was
to this order, the formation of the highest or spiritual na-
formed, receiving from the firmament a sort of distinction
ture is recorded in the first place, where it is said that light and order (so that water be understood as including cer-
∗ q. 66, a. 1, obj. 1
† q. 66, a. 1
349
tain other things, as explained above (q. 68, a. 3)). On ters be gathered together in one place,” that is, apart from
the third day the earth, the lowest body, received its form
the dry land. That the waters occupied more places than
by the withdrawal of the waters, and there resulted the
one seems to be implied by the words that follow, “The
distinction in the lowest body, namely, of land and sea.
gathering together of the waters He called Seas.”
Hence Scripture, having clearly expresses the manner in
Reply to Objection 4. The Divine command gives
which it received its form by the equally suitable words,
bodies their natural movement and by these natural move-
“Let the dry land appear.”
ments they are said to “fulfill His word.” Or we may say
Reply to Objection 1.
According to Augustine∗,
that it was according to the nature of water completely to
Scripture does not say of the work of the third day, that
cover the earth, just as the air completely surrounds both
it was made, as it says of those that precede, in order to
water and earth; but as a necessary means towards an end,
show that higher and spiritual forms, such as the angels
namely, that plants and animals might be on the earth, it
and the heavenly bodies, are perfect and stable in being,
was necessary for the waters to be withdrawn from a por-
whereas inferior forms are imperfect and mutable. Hence
tion of the earth. Some philosophers attribute this uncov-
the impression of such forms is signified by the gathering
ering of the earth’s surface to the action of the sun lifting
of the waters, and the appearing of the land. For “wa-
up the vapors and thus drying the land. Scripture, how-
ter,” to use Augustine’s words, “glides and flows away,
ever, attributes it to the Divine power, not only in the Book
the earth abides” (Gen. ad lit. ii, 11). Others, again, hold
of Genesis, but also Job 38:10 where in the person of the
that the work of the third day was perfected on that day
Lord it is said, “I set My bounds around the sea,” and Jer.
only as regards movement from place to place, and that
5:22, where it is written: “Will you not then fear Me, saith
for this reason Scripture had no reason to speak of it as
the Lord, who have set the sand a bound for the sea?”
made.
Reply to Objection 5. According to Augustine (De
Reply to Objection 2.
This argument is easily
Gen. Contr. Manich. i), primary matter is meant by the
solved, according to Augustine’s opinion (De Gen. Contr.
word earth, where first mentioned, but in the present pas-
Manich. i), because we need not suppose that the earth
sage it is to be taken for the element itself. Again it may
was first covered by the waters, and that these were after-
be said with Basil (Hom. iv in Hexaem.), that the earth
wards gathered together, but that they were produced in
is mentioned in the first passage in respect of its nature,
this very gathering together. But according to the other
but here in respect of its principal property, namely, dry-
writers there are three solutions, which Augustine gives
ness. Wherefore it is written: “He called the dry land,
(Gen. ad lit. i, 12). The first supposes that the waters
Earth.” It may also be said with Rabbi Moses, that the
are heaped up to a greater height at the place where they
expression, “He called,” denotes throughout an equivocal
were gathered together, for it has been proved in regard to
use of the name imposed. Thus we find it said at first
the Red Sea, that the sea is higher than the land, as Basil
that “He called the light Day”: for the reason that later
remarks (Hom. iv in Hexaem.). The second explains the
on a period of twenty-four hours is also called day, where
water that covered the earth as being rarefied or nebulous,
it is said that “there was evening and morning, one day.”
which was afterwards condensed when the waters were
In like manner it is said that “the firmament,” that is, the
gathered together. The third suggests the existence of hol-
air, “He called heaven”: for that which was first created
lows in the earth, to receive the confluence of waters. Of
was also called “heaven.” And here, again, it is said that
the above the first seems the most probable.
“the dry land,” that is, the part from which the waters had
Reply to Objection 3. All the waters have the sea as
withdrawn, “He called, Earth,” as distinct from the sea;
their goal, into which they flow by channels hidden or ap-
although the name earth is equally applied to that which
parent, and this may be the reason why they are said to
is covered with waters or not. So by the expression “He
be gathered together into one place. Or, “one place” is to
called” we are to understand throughout that the nature or
be understood not simply, but as contrasted with the place
property He bestowed corresponded to the name He gave.
of the dry land, so that the sense would be, “Let the wa-
Whether it was fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third Ia q. 69 a. 2
day?
Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting that
but of adornment. Therefore the production of plants, as
the production of plants should take place on the third
also belonging to the work of adornment, ought not to be
day. For plants have life, as animals have. But the pro-
recorded as taking place on the third day, which is devoted
duction of animals belongs to the work, not of distinction,
to the work of distinction.
∗ Gen. ad lit. ii, 7,8; iii, 20
350
Objection 2. Further, a work by which the earth is took place before they sprang up from the earth’s surface.
accursed should have been recorded apart from the work
And this is confirmed by reason, as follows. In these first
by which it receives its form. But the words of Gn. 3:17,
days God created all things in their origin or causes, and
“Cursed is the earth in thy work, thorns and thistles shall it
from this work He subsequently rested. Yet afterwards, by
bring forth to thee,” show that by the production of certain
governing His creatures, in the work of propagation, “He
plants the earth was accursed. Therefore the production
worketh until now.“Now the production of plants from out
of plants in general should not have been recorded on the
the earth is a work of propagation, and therefore they were
third day, which is concerned with the work of formation.
not produced in act on the third day, but in their causes
Objection 3. Further, as plants are firmly fixed to the
only. However, in accordance with other writers, it may
earth, so are stones and metals, which are, nevertheless,
be said that the first constitution of species belongs to the
not mentioned in the work of formation. Plants, therefore,
work of the six days, but the reproduction among them
ought not to have been made on the third day.
of like from like, to the government of the universe. And
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:12): “The earth
Scripture indicates this in the words, “before it sprung up
brought forth the green herb,” after which there follows,
in the earth,” and “before it grew,” that is, before like was
“The evening and the morning were the third day.”
produced from like; just as now happens in the natural
I answer that, On the third day, as said (a. 1), the
course by the production of seed. Wherefore Scripture
formless state of the earth comes to an end. But this state
says pointedly (Gn. 1:11): “Let the earth bring forth the
is described as twofold. On the one hand, the earth was
green herb, and such as may seed,” as indicating the pro-
“invisible” or “void,” being covered by the waters; on the
duction of perfection of perfect species, from which the
other hand, it was “shapeless” or “empty,” that is, with-
seed of others should arise. Nor does the question where
out that comeliness which it owes to the plants that clothe
the seminal power may reside, whether in root, stem, or
it, as it were, with a garment. Thus, therefore, in either
fruit, affect the argument.
respect this formless state ends on the third day: first,
Reply to Objection 1. Life in plants is hidden, since
when “the waters were gathered together into one place
they lack sense and local movement, by which the animate
and the dry land appeared”; secondly, when “the earth
and the inanimate are chiefly discernible. And therefore,
brought forth the green herb.” But concerning the pro-
since they are firmly fixed in the earth, their production is
duction of plants, Augustine’s opinion differs from that of
treated as a part of the earth’s formation.
others. For other commentators, in accordance with the
Reply to Objection 2. Even before the earth was ac-
surface meaning of the text, consider that the plants were
cursed, thorns and thistles had been produced, either vir-
produced in act in their various species on this third day;
tually or actually. But they were not produced in punish-
whereas Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5; viii, 3) says that
ment of man; as though the earth, which he tilled to gain
the earth is said to have then produced plants and trees in
his food, produced unfruitful and noxious plants. Hence
their causes, that is, it received then the power to produce
it is said: “Shall it bring forth TO THEE.”
them. He supports this view by the authority of Scrip-
Reply to Objection 3. Moses put before the people
ture, for it is said (Gn. 2:4,5): “These are the generations
such things only as were manifest to their senses, as we
of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in
have said (q. 67, a. 4; q. 68, a. 3). But minerals are gener-
the day that. . . God made the heaven and the earth, and
ated in hidden ways within the bowels of the earth. More-
every plant of the field before it sprung up in the earth,
over they seem hardly specifically distinct from earth, and
and every herb of the ground before it grew.” Therefore,
would seem to be species thereof. For this reason, there-
the production of plants in their causes, within the earth,
fore, he makes no mention of them.
351
FIRST PART, QUESTION 70
Of the Work of Adornment, As Regards the Fourth Day
(In Three Articles)
We must next consider the work of adornment, first as to each day by itself, secondly as to all seven days in general.
In the first place, then, we consider the work of the fourth day, secondly, that of the fifth day, thirdly, that of the sixth day, and fourthly, such matters as belong to the seventh day.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) As to the production of the lights;
(2) As to the end of their production;
(3) Whether they are living beings?
Whether the lights ought to have been produced on the fourth day?
Ia q. 70 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the lights ought not
these two works is added the work of adornment, which
to have been produced on the fourth day. For the heavenly
is distinct from perfect. For the perfection of the heaven
luminaries are by nature incorruptible bodies: wherefore
and the earth regards, seemingly, those things that belong
their matter cannot exist without their form. But as their
to them intrinsically, but the adornment, those that are ex-
matter was produced in the work of creation, before there
trinsic, just as the perfection of a man lies in his proper
was any day, so therefore were their forms. It follows,
parts and forms, and his adornment, in clothing or such
then, that the lights were not produced on the fourth day.
like. Now just as distinction of certain things is made
Objection 2. Further, the luminaries are, as it were,
most evident by their local movement, as separating one
vessels of light. But light was made on the first day. The
from another; so the work of adornment is set forth by
luminaries, therefore, should have been made on the first
the production of things having movement in the heavens,
day, not on the fourth.
and upon the earth. But it has been stated above (q. 69,
Objection 3. Further, the lights are fixed in the fir-
a. 1), that three things are recorded as created, namely, the
mament, as plants are fixed in the earth. For, the Scrip-
heaven, the water, and the earth; and these three received
ture says: “He set them in the firmament.” But plants are
their form from the three days’ work of distinction, so that
described as produced when the earth, to which they are
heaven was formed on the first day; on the second day the
attached, received its form. The lights, therefore, should
waters were separated; and on the third day, the earth was
have been produced at the same time as the firmament,
divided into sea and dry land. So also is it in the work
that is to say, on the second day.
of adornment; on the first day of this work, which is the
Objection 4. Further, plants are an effect of the sun,
fourth of creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the
moon, and other heavenly bodies. Now, cause precedes
heaven by their movements; on the second day, which is
effect in the order of nature. The lights, therefore, ought
the fifth, birds and fishes are called into being, to make
not to have been produced on the fourth day, but on the
beautiful the intermediate element, for they move in air
third day.
and water, which are here taken as one; while on the third
Objection 5. Further, as astronomers say, there are
day, which is the sixth, animals are brought forth, to move
many stars larger than the moon. Therefore the sun and
upon the earth and adorn it. It must also here be noted that
the moon alone are not correctly described as the “two
Augustine’s opinion (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) on the production
great lights.”
of lights is not at variance with that of other holy writers,
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
since he says that they were made actually, and not merely
I answer that, In recapitulating the Divine works,
virtually, for the firmament has not the power of produc-
Scripture says (Gn. 2:1): “So the heavens and the earth
ing lights, as the earth has of producing plants. Where-
were finished and all the furniture of them,” thereby indi-
fore Scripture does not say: “Let the firmament produce
cating that the work was threefold. In the first work, that
lights,” though it says: “Let the earth bring forth the green
of “creation,” the heaven and the earth were produced, but
herb.”
as yet without form. In the second, or work of “distinc-
Reply to Objection 1. In Augustine’s opinion there
tion,” the heaven and the earth were perfected, either by
is no difficulty here; for he does not hold a succession of
adding substantial form to formless matter, as Augustine
time in these works, and so there was no need for the mat-
holds (Gen. ad lit. ii, 11), or by giving them the order
ter of the lights to exist under another form. Nor is there
and beauty due to them, as other holy writers suppose. To
any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the heav-
352
enly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements, for it bade them to be there, even as He placed man in Paradise,
may be said that they were formed out of matter already
to be there. In the opinion of Aristotle, however, the stars
existing, as animals and plants were formed. For those,
are fixed in their orbits, and in reality have no other move-
however, who hold the heavenly bodies to be of another
ment but that of the spheres; and yet our senses perceive
nature from the elements, and naturally incorruptible, the
the movement of the luminaries and not that of the spheres
answer must be that the lights were substantially created
(De Coel. ii, text. 43). But Moses describes what is obvi-
at the beginning, but that their substance, at first formless,
ous to sense, out of condescension to popular ignorance,
is formed on this day, by receiving not its substantial form,
as we have already said (q. 67, a. 4; q. 68, a. 3). The
but a determination of power. As to the fact that the lights
objection, however, falls to the ground if we regard the
are not mentioned as existing from the beginning, but only
firmament made on the second day as having a natural
as made on the fourth day, Chrysostom (Hom. vi in Gen.)
distinction from that in which the stars are placed, even
explains this by the need of guarding the people from the
though the distinction is not apparent to the senses, the
danger of idolatry: since the lights are proved not to be
testimony of which Moses follows, as stated above (De
gods, by the fact that they were not from the beginning.
Coel. ii, text. 43). For although to the senses there ap-
Reply to Objection 2. No difficulty exists if we fol-
pears but one firmament; if we admit a higher and a lower
low Augustine in holding the light made on the first day to
firmament, the lower will be that which was made on the
be spiritual, and that made on this day to be corporeal. If,
second day, and on the fourth the stars were fixed in the
however, the light made on the first day is understood to
higher firmament.
be itself corporeal, then it must be held to have been pro-
Reply to Objection 4. In the words of Basil (Hom. v
duced on that day merely as light in general; and that on
in Hexaem.), plants were recorded as produced before the
the fourth day the lights received a definite power to pro-
sun and moon, to prevent idolatry, since those who believe
duce determinate effects. Thus we observe that the rays of
the heavenly bodies to be gods, hold that plants originate
the sun have one effect, those of the moon another, and so
primarily from these bodies. Although as Chrysostom re-
forth. Hence, speaking of such a determination of power,
marks (Hom. vi in Gen.), the sun, moon, and stars coop-
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that the sun’s light which
erate in the work of production by their movements, as the
previously was without form, was formed on the fourth
husbandman cooperates by his labor.
day.
Reply to Objection 5. As Chrysostom says, the two
Reply to Objection 3.
According to Ptolemy the
lights are called great, not so much with regard to their di-
heavenly luminaries are not fixed in the spheres, but have
mensions as to their influence and power. For though the
their own movement distinct from the movement of the
stars be of greater bulk than the moon, yet the influence
spheres. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Gen.)
of the moon is more perceptible to the senses in this lower
that He is said to have set them in the firmament, not be-
world. Moreover, as far as the senses are concerned, its
cause He fixed them there immovably, but because He
apparent size is greater.
Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable?
Ia q. 70 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the cause assigned
“to rule the night.” But such it probably did when first
for the production of the lights is not reasonable. For it
made; for men begin to count from the new moon. The
is said (Jer. 10:2): “Be not afraid of the signs of heaven,
moon, therefore, was not made “to rule the night.”
which the heathens fear.” Therefore the heavenly lights
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
were not made to be signs.
I answer that, As we have said above (q. 65, a. 2),
Objection 2. Further, sign is contradistinguished from
a corporeal creature can be considered as made either for
cause. But the lights are the cause of what takes place
the sake of its proper act, or for other creatures, or for the
upon the earth. Therefore they are not signs.
whole universe, or for the glory of God. Of these reasons
Objection 3. Further, the distinction of seasons and
only that which points out the usefulness of these things to
days began from the first day. Therefore the lights were
man, is touched upon by Moses, in order to withdraw his
not made “for seasons, and days, and years,” that is, in
people from idolatry. Hence it is written (Dt. 4:19): “Lest
order to distinguish them.
perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and
Objection 4. Further, nothing is made for the sake of
the moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived
that which is inferior to itself, “since the end is better than by error thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy
the means” (Topic. iii). But the lights are nobler than the
God created for the service of all nations.” Now, he ex-
earth. Therefore they were not made “to enlighten it.”
plains this service at the beginning of Genesis as three-
Objection 5. Further, the new moon cannot be said
fold. First, the lights are of service to man, in regard to
353
sight, which directs him in his works, and is most useful heaven and may be understood to have begun on that first
for perceiving objects. In reference to this he says: “Let
day. But the particular distinctions of days and seasons
them shine in the firmament and give life to the earth.”
and years, according as one day is hotter than another,
Secondly, as regards the changes of the seasons, which
one season than another, and one year than another, are
prevent weariness, preserve health, and provide for the ne-
due to certain particular movements of the stars: which
cessities of food; all of which things could not be secured
movements may have had their beginning on the fourth
if it were always summer or winter. In reference to this he
day.
says: “Let them be for seasons, and for days, and years.”
Reply to Objection 4. Light was given to the earth
Thirdly, as regards the convenience of business and work,
for the service of man, who, by reason of his soul, is no-
in so far as the lights are set in the heavens to indicate fair bler than the heavenly bodies. Nor is it untrue to say that
or foul weather, as favorable to various occupations. And
a higher creature may be made for the sake of a lower,
in this respect he says: “Let them be for signs.”
considered not in itself, but as ordained to the good of the
Reply to Objection 1. The lights in the heaven are set
universe.
for signs of changes effected in corporeal creatures, but
Reply to Objection 5. When the moon is at its per-
not of those changes which depend upon the free-will.
fection it rises in the evening and sets in the morning, and
Reply to Objection 2. We are sometimes brought
thus it rules the night, and it was probably made in its
to the knowledge of hidden effects through their sensible
full perfection as were plants yielding seed, as also were
causes, and conversely. Hence nothing prevents a sensible
animals and man himself. For although the perfect is de-
cause from being a sign. But he says “signs,” rather than
veloped from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the
“causes,” to guard against idolatry.
perfect must exist simply before the imperfect. Augustine,
Reply to Objection 3. The general division of time
however (Gen. ad lit. ii), does not say this, for he says that
into day and night took place on the first day, as regards
it is not unfitting that God made things imperfect, which
the diurnal movement, which is common to the whole
He afterwards perfected.
Whether the lights of heaven are living beings?
Ia q. 70 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the lights of heaven
intrinsic to the heavenly bodies: and consequently they
are living beings. For the nobler a body is, the more
are living beings.
nobly it should be adorned. But a body less noble than the
Objection 5.
Further, the first of movables is the
heaven, is adorned with living beings, with fish, birds, and
heaven. Now, of all things that are endowed with move-
the beasts of the field. Therefore the lights of heaven, as
ment the first moves itself, as is proved in Phys. viii, text.
pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also.
34, because, what is such of itself precedes that which is
Objection 2. Further, the nobler a body is, the nobler
by another. But only beings that are living move them-
must be its form. But the sun, moon, and stars are nobler
selves, as is shown in the same book (text. 27). Therefore
bodies than plants or animals, and must therefore have
the heavenly bodies are living beings.
nobler forms. Now the noblest of all forms is the soul, as
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii),
being the first principle of life. Hence Augustine (De Vera
“Let no one esteem the heavens or the heavenly bodies to
Relig. xxix) says: “Every living substance stands higher
be living things, for they have neither life nor sense.”
in the order of nature than one that has not life.” The lights
I answer that, Philosophers have differed on this
of heaven, therefore, are living beings.
question. Anaxagoras, for instance, as Augustine men-
Objection 3. Further, a cause is nobler than its effect.
tions (De Civ. Dei xviii, 41), “was condemned by the
But the sun, moon, and stars are a cause of life, as is es-
Athenians for teaching that the sun was a fiery mass of
pecially evidenced in the case of animals generated from
stone, and neither a god nor even a living being.” On the
putrefaction, which receive life from the power of the sun
other hand, the Platonists held that the heavenly bodies
and stars. Much more, therefore, have the heavenly bodies
have life. Nor was there less diversity of opinion among
a living soul.
the Doctors of the Church. It was the belief of Origen
Objection 4. Further, the movement of the heaven and
(Peri Archon i) and Jerome that these bodies were alive,
the heavenly bodies are natural (De Coel. i, text. 7,8): and
and the latter seems to explain in that sense the words
natural movement is from an intrinsic principle. Now the
(Eccles. 1:6), “The spirit goeth forward, surveying all
principle of movement in the heavenly bodies is a sub-
places round about.” But Basil (Hom. iii, vi in Hex-
stance capable of apprehension, and is moved as the de-
aem.) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) maintain that
sirer is moved by the object desired (Metaph. xii, text.
the heavenly bodies are inanimate. Augustine leaves the
36). Therefore, seemingly, the apprehending principle is
matter in doubt, without committing himself to either the-
354
ory, though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly this means nothing else but that substances of spiritual na-bodies are really living beings, their souls must be akin to
ture are united to them, and act as their moving power. A
the angelic nature (Gen. ad lit. ii, 18; Enchiridion lviii).
proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the direct in-
In examining the truth of this question, where such di-
fluence and contact of some spiritual substance, and not,
versity of opinion exists, we shall do well to bear in mind
like bodies of specific gravity, by nature, lies in the fact
that the union of soul and body exists for the sake of the
that whereas nature moves to one fixed end which having
soul and not of the body; for the form does not exist for
attained, it rests; this does not appear in the movement
the matter, but the matter for the form. Now the nature
of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they are moved
and power of the soul are apprehended through its opera-
by some intellectual substances. Augustine appears to be
tion, which is to a certain extent its end. Yet for some of
of the same opinion when he expresses his belief that all
these operations, as sensation and nutrition, our body is a
corporeal things are ruled by God through the spirit of life
necessary instrument. Hence it is clear that the sensitive
(De Trin. iii, 4).
and nutritive souls must be united to a body in order to
From what has been said, then, it is clear that the heav-
exercise their functions. There are, however, operations
enly bodies are not living beings in the same sense as
of the soul, which are not exercised through the medium
plants and animals, and that if they are called so, it can
of the body, though the body ministers, as it were, to their
only be equivocally. It will also be seen that the difference
production. The intellect, for example, makes use of the
of opinion between those who affirm, and those who deny,
phantasms derived from the bodily senses, and thus far
that these bodies have life, is not a difference of things but
is dependent on the body, although capable of existing
of words.
apart from it. It is not, however, possible that the func-
Reply to Objection 1. Certain things belong to the
tions of nutrition, growth, and generation, through which
adornment of the universe by reason of their proper move-
the nutritive soul operates, can be exercised by the heav-
ment; and in this way the heavenly luminaries agree with
enly bodies, for such operations are incompatible with a
others that conduce to that adornment, for they are moved
body naturally incorruptible. Equally impossible is it that
by a living substance.
the functions of the sensitive soul can appertain to the
Reply to Objection 2. One being may be nobler than
heavenly body, since all the senses depend on the sense
another absolutely, but not in a particular respect. While,
of touch, which perceives elemental qualities, and all the
then, it is not conceded that the souls of heavenly bod-
organs of the senses require a certain proportion in the ad-
ies are nobler than the souls of animals absolutely it must
mixture of elements, whereas the nature of the heavenly
be conceded that they are superior to them with regard
bodies is not elemental. It follows, then, that of the oper-
to their respective forms, since their form perfects their
ations of the soul the only ones left to be attributed to the
matter entirely, which is not in potentiality to other forms;
heavenly bodies are those of understanding and moving;
whereas a soul does not do this. Also as regards move-
for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual percep-
ment the power that moves the heavenly bodies is of a
tion, and is in proportion thereto. But the operations of
nobler kind.
the intellect, which does not act through the body, do not
Reply to Objection 3. Since the heavenly body is a
need a body as their instrument, except to supply phan-
mover moved, it is of the nature of an instrument, which
tasms through the senses. Moreover, the operations of the
acts in virtue of the agent: and therefore since this agent
sensitive soul, as we have seen, cannot be attributed to the
is a living substance the heavenly body can impart life in
heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the union of a soul to a
virtue of that agent.
heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the operations
Reply to Objection 4. The movements of the heav-
of the intellect. It remains, then, only to consider whether
enly bodies are natural, not on account of their active prin-
the movement of the heavenly bodies demands a soul as
ciple, but on account of their passive principle; that is to
the motive power, not that the soul, in order to move the
say, from a certain natural aptitude for being moved by an
heavenly body, need be united to the latter as its form; but
intelligent power.
by contact of power, as a mover is united to that which he
Reply to Objection 5. The heaven is said to move it-
moves. Wherefore Aristotle (Phys. viii, text. 42,43), after
self in as far as it is compounded of mover and moved; not
showing that the first mover is made up of two parts, the
by the union of the mover, as the form, with the moved,
moving and the moved, goes on to show the nature of the
as the matter, but by contact with the motive power, as we
union between these two parts. This, he says, is effected
have said. So far, then, the principle that moves it may
by contact which is mutual if both are bodies; on the part
be called intrinsic, and consequently its movement nat-
of one only, if one is a body and the other not. The Platon-
ural with respect to that active principle; just as we say
ists explain the union of soul and body in the same way, as
that voluntary movement is natural to the animal as ani-
a contact of a moving power with the object moved, and
mal (Phys. viii, text. 27).
since Plato holds the heavenly bodies to be living beings,
355
FIRST PART, QUESTION 71
On the Work of the Fifth Day
(In One Article)
We must next consider the work of the fifth day.
Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described. For the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to produce. But the power of water does not suffice for the production of every kind of fishes and birds since we find that many of them are generated from seed. Therefore the words, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the earth,” do not fittingly describe this work.
Objection 2: Further, fishes and birds are not produced from water only, but earth seems to predominate over water in their composition, as is shown by the fact that their bodies tend naturally to the earth and rest upon it. It is not, then, fittingly that fishes and birds are produced from water.
Objection 3: Further, fishes move in the waters, and birds in the air. If, then, fishes are produced from the waters, birds ought to be produced from the air, and not from the waters.
Objection 4: Further, not all fishes creep through the waters, for some, as seals, have feet and walk on land.
Therefore the production of fishes is not sufficiently described by the words, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life.”
Objection 5: Further, land animals are more perfect than birds and fishes which appears from the fact that they have more distinct limbs, and generation of a higher order. For they bring forth living beings, whereas birds and fishes bring forth eggs. But the more perfect has precedence in the order of nature. Therefore fishes and birds ought not to have been produced on the fifth day, before land animals.
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, As said above, (q. 70, a. 1), the order of the work of adornment corresponds to the order of the work of distinction. Hence, as among the three days assigned to the work of distinction, the middle, or second, day is devoted to the work of distinction of water, which is the intermediate body, so in the three days of the work of adornment, the middle day, which is the fifth, is assigned to the adornment of the intermediate body, by the production of birds and fishes. As, then, Moses makes mention of the lights and the light on the fourth day, to show that the fourth day corresponds to the first day on which he had said that the light was made, so on this fifth day he mentions the waters and the firmament of heaven to show that the fifth day corresponds to the second. It must, however, be observed that Augustine differs from other writers in his opinion about the production of fishes and birds, as he differs about the production of plants. For while others say that fishes and birds were produced on the fifth day actually, he holds that the nature of the waters produced them on that day potentially.
Reply to Objection 1: It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all kinds can be generated by various minglings of the elements, and naturally, without any kind of seed. This, however, seems repugnant to the fact that nature produces its effects by determinate means, and consequently, those things that are naturally generated from seed cannot be generated naturally in any other way. It ought, then, rather to be said that in the natural generation of all animals that are generated from seed, the active principle lies in the formative power of the seed, but that in the case of animals generated from putrefaction, the formative power of is the influence of the heavenly bodies. The material principle, however, in the generation of either kind of animals, is either some element, or something compounded of the elements. But at the first beginning of the world the active principle was the Word of God, which produced animals from material elements, either in act, as some holy writers say, or virtually, as Augustine teaches. Not as though the power possessed by water or earth of producing all animals resides in the earth and the water themselves, as Avicenna held, but in the power originally given to the elements of producing them from elemental matter by the power of seed or the influence of the stars.
Reply to Objection 2: The bodies of birds and fishes may be considered from two points of view. If considered in themselves, it will be evident that the earthly element must predominate, since the element that is least active, namely, the earth, must be the most abundant in quantity in order that the mingling may be duly tempered in the body of the animal. But if considered as by nature constituted to move with certain specific motions, thus they have some special affinity with the bodies in which they move; and hence the words in which their generation is described.
Reply to Objection 3: The air, as not being so apparent to the senses, is not enumerated by itself, but with other things: partly with the water, because the lower region of the air is thickened by watery exhalations; partly with the heaven as to the higher region. But birds move in the lower part of the air, and so are said to fly “beneath the firmament,” even if the firmament be taken to mean the region of clouds. Hence the production of birds is ascribed to 356
the water.
Reply to Objection 4: Nature passes from one extreme to another through the medium; and therefore there are creatures of intermediate type between the animals of the air and those of the water, having something in common with both; and they are reckoned as belonging to that class to which they are most allied, through the characters possessed in common with that class, rather than with the other. But in order to include among fishes all such intermediate forms as have special characters like to theirs, the words, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life,” are followed by these: “God created great whales,” etc.
Reply to Objection 5: The order in which the production of these animals is given has reference to the order of those bodies which they are set to adorn, rather than to the superiority of the animals themselves. Moreover, in generation also the more perfect is reached through the less perfect.
357
FIRST PART, QUESTION 72
On the Work of the Sixth Day
(In One Article)
We must now consider the work of the sixth day.
Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described. For as birds and fishes have a living soul, so also have land animals. But these animals are not themselves living souls. Therefore the words, “Let the earth bring forth the living creature,” should rather have been, “Let the earth bring forth the living four-footed creatures.”
Objection 2: Further, a genus ought not to be opposed to its species. But beasts and cattle are quadrupeds. Therefore quadrupeds ought not to be enumerated as a class with beasts and cattle.
Objection 3: Further, as animals belong to a determinate genus and species, so also does man. But in the making of man nothing is said of his genus and species, and therefore nothing ought to have been said about them in the production of other animals, whereas it is said “according to its genus” and “in its species.”
Objection 4: Further, land animals are more like man, whom God is recorded to have blessed, than are birds and fishes. But as birds and fishes are said to be blessed, this should have been said, with much more reason, of the other animals as well.
Objection 5: Further, certain animals are generated from putrefaction, which is a kind of corruption. But corruption is repugnant to the first founding of the world. Therefore such animals should not have been produced at that time.
Objection 6: Further, certain animals are poisonous, and injurious to man. But there ought to have been nothing injurious to man before man sinned. Therefore such animals ought not to have been made by God at all, since He is the Author of good; or at least not until man had sinned.
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, As on the fifth day the intermediate body, namely, the water, is adorned, and thus that day corresponds to the second day; so the sixth day, on which the lowest body, or the earth, is adorned by the production of land animals, corresponds to the third day. Hence the earth is mentioned in both places. And here again Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
v) that the production was potential, and other holy writers that it was actual.
Reply to Objection 1: The different grades of life which are found in different living creatures can be discovered from the various ways in which Scripture speaks of them, as Basil says (Hom. viii in Hexaem.). The life of plants, for instance, is very imperfect and difficult to discern, and hence, in speaking of their production, nothing is said of their life, but only their generation is mentioned, since only in generation is a vital act observed in them. For the powers of nutrition and growth are subordinate to the generative life, as will be shown later on (q. 78, a. 2). But amongst animals, those that live on land are, generally speaking, more perfect than birds and fishes, not because the fish is devoid of memory, as Basil upholds (Hom. viii in Hexaem.) and Augustine rejects (Gen. ad lit. iii), but because their limbs are more distinct and their generation of a higher order, (yet some imperfect animals, such as bees and ants, are more intelligent in certain ways). Scripture, therefore, does not call fishes “living creatures,” but “creeping creatures having life”; whereas it does call land animals “living creatures” on account of their more perfect life, and seems to imply that fishes are merely bodies having in them something of a soul, whilst land animals, from the higher perfection of their life, are, as it were, living souls with bodies subject to them. But the life of man, as being the most perfect grade, is not said to be produced, like the life of other animals, by earth or water, but immediately by God.
Reply to Objection 2: By “cattle,” domestic animals are signified, which in any way are of service to man: but by
“beasts,” wild animals such as bears and lions are designated. By “creeping things” those animals are meant which either have no feet and cannot rise from the earth, as serpents, or those whose feet are too short to life them far from the ground, as the lizard and tortoise. But since certain animals, as deer and goats, seem to fall under none of these classes, the word “quadrupeds” is added. Or perhaps the word “quadruped” is used first as being the genus, to which the others are added as species, for even some reptiles, such as lizards and tortoises, are four-footed.
Reply to Objection 3: In other animals, and in plants, mention is made of genus and species, to denote the generation of like from like. But it was unnecessary to do so in the case of man, as what had already been said of other creatures might be understood of him. Again, animals and plants may be said to be produced according to their kinds, to signify their remoteness from the Divine image and likeness, whereas man is said to be made “to the image and likeness of God.”
Reply to Objection 4: The blessing of God gives power to multiply by generation, and, having been mentioned in the preceding account of the making of birds and fishes, could be understood of the beasts of the earth, without requiring to be repeated. The blessing, however, is repeated in the case of man, since in him generation of children has 358
a special relation to the number of the elect∗, and to prevent anyone from saying that there was any sin whatever in the act of begetting children. As to plants, since they experience neither desire of propagation, nor sensation in generating, they are deemed unworthy of a formal blessing.
Reply to Objection 5: Since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it was not incompatible with the first formation of things, that from the corruption of the less perfect the more perfect should be generated. Hence animals generated from the corruption of inanimate things, or of plants, may have been generated then. But those generated from corruption of animals could not have been produced then otherwise than potentially.
Reply to Objection 6: In the words of Augustine (Super. Gen. contr. Manich. i): “If an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer he sees in it many appliances of which he does not understand the use, and which, if he is a foolish fellow, he considers unnecessary. Moreover, should he carelessly fall into the fire, or wound himself with a sharp-edged tool, he is under the impression that many of the things there are hurtful; whereas the craftsman, knowing their use, laughs at his folly. And thus some people presume to find fault with many things in this world, through not seeing the reasons for their existence. For though not required for the furnishing of our house, these things are necessary for the perfection of the universe.” And, since man before he sinned would have used the things of this world conformably to the order designed, poisonous animals would not have injured him.
∗ Cf. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. iii, 12
359
FIRST PART, QUESTION 73
On the Things That Belong to the Seventh Day
(In Three Articles)
We must next consider the things that belong to the seventh day. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) About the completion of the works;
(2) About the resting of God;
(3) About the blessing and sanctifying of this day.
Whether the completion of the Divine works ought to be ascribed to the seventh day?
Ia q. 73 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the completion of the
either an operation, as the end of the harpist is to play the
Divine works ought not to be ascribed to the seventh day.
harp; or something that is attained by an operation, as the
For all things that are done in this world belong to the Di-
end of the builder is the house that he makes by build-
vine works. But the consummation of the world will be at
ing. But the first perfection is the cause of the second,
the end of the world (Mat. 13:39,40). Moreover, the time
because the form is the principle of operation. Now the
of Christ’s Incarnation is a time of completion, wherefore
final perfection, which is the end of the whole universe,
it is called “the time of fulness∗” (Gal. 4:4). And Christ
is the perfect beatitude of the Saints at the consummation
Himself, at the moment of His death, cried out, “It is con-
of the world; and the first perfection is the completeness
summated” (Jn. 19:30). Hence the completion of the Di-
of the universe at its first founding, and this is what is as-
vine works does not belong to the seventh day.
cribed to the seventh day.
Objection 2. Further, the completion of a work is an
Reply to Objection 1. The first perfection is the cause
act in itself. But we do not read that God acted at all on the
of the second, as above said. Now for the attaining of beat-
seventh day, but rather that He rested from all His work.
itude two things are required, nature and grace. Therefore,
Therefore the completion of the works does not belong to
as said above, the perfection of beatitude will be at the end
the seventh day.
of the world. But this consummation existed previously in
Objection 3. Further, nothing is said to be complete to
its causes, as to nature, at the first founding of the world,
which many things are added, unless they are merely su-
as to grace, in the Incarnation of Christ. For, “Grace and
perfluous, for a thing is called perfect to which nothing is
truth came by Jesus Christ” (Jn. 1:17). So, then, on the
wanting that it ought to possess. But many things were
seventh day was the consummation of nature, in Christ’s
made after the seventh day, as the production of many
Incarnation the consummation of grace, and at the end of
individual beings, and even of certain new species that
the world will be the consummation of glory.
are frequently appearing, especially in the case of ani-
Reply to Objection 2. God did act on the seventh
mals generated from putrefaction. Also, God creates daily
day, not by creating new creatures, but by directing and
new souls. Again, the work of the Incarnation was a new
moving His creatures to the work proper to them, and
work, of which it is said (Jer. 31:22): “The Lord hath
thus He made some beginning of the “second” perfec-
created a new thing upon the earth.” Miracles also are
tion. So that, according to our version of the Scripture, the
new works, of which it is said (Eccles. 36:6): “Renew thy
completion of the works is attributed to the seventh day,
signs, and work new miracles.” Moreover, all things will
though according to another it is assigned to the sixth. Ei-
be made new when the Saints are glorified, according to
ther version, however, may stand, since the completion of
Apoc. 21:5: “And He that sat on the throne said: Behold
the universe as to the completeness of its parts belongs to
I make all things new.” Therefore the completion of the
the sixth day, but its completion as regards their opera-
Divine works ought not to be attributed to the seventh day.
tion, to the seventh. It may also be added that in continu-
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): “On the seventh
ous movement, so long as any movement further is possi-
day God ended His work which He had made.”
ble, movement cannot be called completed till it comes to
I answer that, The perfection of a thing is twofold,
rest, for rest denotes consummation of movement. Now
the first perfection and the second perfection. The ‘first’
God might have made many other creatures besides those
perfection is that according to which a thing is substan-
which He made in the six days, and hence, by the fact that
tially perfect, and this perfection is the form of the whole;
He ceased making them on the seventh day, He is said on
which form results from the whole having its parts com-
that day to have consummated His work.
plete. But the ‘second’ perfection is the end, which is
Reply to Objection 3. Nothing entirely new was af-
∗ Vulg.: ‘the fulness of time’
360
terwards made by God, but all things subsequently made different species, as the mule is the offspring of an ass and
had in a sense been made before in the work of the six
a mare; but even these existed previously in their causes,
days. Some things, indeed, had a previous experience ma-
in the works of the six days. Some also existed before-
terially, as the rib from the side of Adam out of which God
hand by way of similitude, as the souls now created. And
formed Eve; whilst others existed not only in matter but
the work of the Incarnation itself was thus foreshadowed,
also in their causes, as those individual creatures that are
for as we read (Phil. 2:7), The Son of God “was made in
now generated existed in the first of their kind. Species,
the likeness of men.” And again, the glory that is spiritual
also, that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand
was anticipated in the angels by way of similitude; and
in various active powers; so that animals, and perhaps
that of the body in the heaven, especially the empyrean.
even new species of animals, are produced by putrefac-
Hence it is written (Eccles. 1:10), “Nothing under the sun
tion by the power which the stars and elements received
is new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that
at the beginning. Again, animals of new kinds arise occa-
were before us.”
sionally from the connection of individuals belonging to
Whether God rested on the seventh day from all His work?
Ia q. 73 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that God did not rest on
sire. Now, in either sense God is said to have rested on the
the seventh day from all His work. For it is said (Jn. 5:17),
seventh day. First, because He ceased from creating new
“My Father worketh until now, and I work.” God, then,
creatures on that day, for, as said above (a. 1, ad 3), He
did not rest on the seventh day from all His work.
made nothing afterwards that had not existed previously,
Objection 2. Further, rest is opposed to movement, or
in some degree, in the first works; secondly, because He
to labor, which movement causes. But, as God produced
Himself had no need of the things that He had made, but
His work without movement and without labor, He cannot
was happy in the fruition of Himself. Hence, when all
be said to have rested on the seventh day from His work.
things were made He is not said to have rested “in” His
Objection 3. Further, should it be said that God rested
works, as though needing them for His own happiness,
on the seventh day by causing man to rest; against this it
but to have rested “from” them, as in fact resting in Him-
may be argued that rest is set down in contradistinction
self, as He suffices for Himself and fulfils His own desire.
to His work; now the words “God created” or “made”
And even though from all eternity He rested in Himself,
this thing or the other cannot be explained to mean that
yet the rest in Himself, which He took after He had fin-
He made man create or make these things. Therefore the
ished His works, is that rest which belongs to the seventh
resting of God cannot be explained as His making man to
day. And this, says Augustine, is the meaning of God’s
rest.
resting from His works on that day (Gen. ad lit. iv).
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): “God rested on
Reply to Objection 1. God indeed “worketh until
the seventh day from all the work which He had done.”
now” by preserving and providing for the creatures He
I answer that, Rest is, properly speaking, opposed to
has made, but not by the making of new ones.
movement, and consequently to the labor that arises from
Reply to Objection 2. Rest is here not opposed to
movement. But although movement, strictly speaking, is
labor or to movement, but to the production of new crea-
a quality of bodies, yet the word is applied also to spir-
tures, and to the desire tending to an external object.
itual things, and in a twofold sense. On the one hand,
Reply to Objection 3. Even as God rests in Himself
every operation may be called a movement, and thus the
alone and is happy in the enjoyment of Himself, so our
Divine goodness is said to move and go forth to its ob-
own sole happiness lies in the enjoyment of God. Thus,
ject, in communicating itself to that object, as Dionysius
also, He makes us find rest in Himself, both from His
says (Div. Nom. ii). On the other hand, the desire that
works and our own. It is not, then, unreasonable to say
tends to an object outside itself, is said to move towards
that God rested in giving rest to us. Still, this explanation
it. Hence rest is taken in two senses, in one sense meaning
must not be set down as the only one, and the other is the
a cessation from work, in the other, the satisfying of de-
first and principal explanation.
361
Whether blessing and sanctifying are due to the seventh day?
Ia q. 73 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that blessing and sancti-
fits the seventh day, since, as we explained (q. 72, ad 4),
fying are not due to the seventh day. For it is usual to call
the blessing referred to the increase by multiplication; for
a time blessed or holy for that some good thing has hap-
which reason God said to the creatures which He blessed:
pened in it, or some evil been avoided. But whether God
“Increase and multiply.” Now, this increase is effected
works or ceases from work nothing accrues to Him or is
through God’s Providence over His creatures, securing the
lost to Him. Therefore no special blessing or sanctifying
generation of like from like. And according to the sec-
are due to the seventh day.
ond meaning, it is right that the seventh day should have
Objection 2. Further, the Latin “benedictio” [bless-
been sanctified, since the special sanctification of every
ing] is derived from “bonitas” [goodness]. But it is the na-
creature consists in resting in God. For this reason things
ture of good to spread and communicate itself, as Diony-
dedicated to God are said to be sanctified.
sius says (Div. Nom. iv). The days, therefore, in which
Reply to Objection 1. The seventh day is said to be
God produced creatures deserved a blessing rather than
sanctified not because anything can accrue to God, or be
the day on which He ceased producing them.
taken from Him, but because something is added to crea-
Objection 3. Further, over each creature a blessing
tures by their multiplying, and by their resting in God.
was pronounced, as upon each work it was said, “God saw
Reply to Objection 2.
In the first six days crea-
that it was good.” Therefore it was not necessary that after
tures were produced in their first causes, but after being
all had been produced, the seventh day should be blessed.
thus produced, they are multiplied and preserved, and this
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:3), “God blessed
work also belongs to the Divine goodness. And the per-
the seventh day and sanctified it, because in it He had
fection of this goodness is made most clear by the knowl-
rested from all His work.”
edge that in it alone God finds His own rest, and we may
I answer that, As said above (a. 2), God’s rest on
find ours in its fruition.
the seventh day is understood in two ways. First, in that
Reply to Objection 3. The good mentioned in the
He ceased from producing new works, though He still
works of each day belongs to the first institution of na-
preserves and provides for the creatures He has made.
ture; but the blessing attached to the seventh day, to its
Secondly, in that after all His works He rested in Him-
propagation.
self. According to the first meaning, then, a blessing be-
362
FIRST PART, QUESTION 74
On All the Seven Days in Common
(In Three Articles)
We next consider all the seven days in common: and there are three points of inquiry: (1) As to the sufficiency of these days;
(2) Whether they are all one day, or more than one?
(3) As to certain modes of speaking which Scripture uses in narrating the works of the six days.
Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated?
Ia q. 74 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that these days are not
on the middle day, and adorned on the fifth, and the third
sufficiently enumerated. For the work of creation is no
part distinguished on the third day, and adorned on the
less distinct from the works of distinction and adornment
sixth. But Augustine, while agreeing with the above writ-
than these two works are from one another. But sepa-
ers as to the last three days, differs as to the first three,
rate days are assigned to distinction and to adornment, and
for, according to him, spiritual creatures are formed on
therefore separate days should be assigned to creation.
the first day, and corporeal on the two others, the higher
Objection 2. Further, air and fire are nobler elements
bodies being formed on the first these two days, and the
than earth and water. But one day is assigned to the dis-
lower on the second. Thus, then, the perfection of the Di-
tinction of water, and another to the distinction of the land.
vine works corresponds to the perfection of the number
Therefore, other days ought to be devoted to the distinc-
six, which is the sum of its aliquot parts, one, two, three;
tion of fire and air.
since one day is assigned to the forming of spiritual crea-
Objection 3. Further, fish differ from birds as much
tures, two to that of corporeal creatures, and three to the
as birds differ from the beasts of the earth, whereas man
work of adornment.
differs more from other animals than all animals whatso-
Reply to Objection 1. According to Augustine, the
ever differ from each other. But one day is devoted to the
work of creation belongs to the production of formless
production of fishes, and another to that of the beast of
matter, and of the formless spiritual nature, both of which
the earth. Another day, then, ought to be assigned to the
are outside of time, as he himself says (Confess. xii, 12).
production of birds and another to that of man.
Thus, then, the creation of either is set down before there
Objection 4. Further, it would seem, on the other
was any day. But it may also be said, following other
hand, that some of these days are superfluous. Light, for
holy writers, that the works of distinction and adornment
instance, stands to the luminaries in the relation of acci-
imply certain changes in the creature which are measur-
dent to subject. But the subject is produced at the same
able by time; whereas the work of creation lies only in
time as the accident proper to it. The light and the lu-
the Divine act producing the substance of beings instan-
minaries, therefore, ought not to have been produced on
taneously. For this reason, therefore, every work of dis-
different days.
tinction and adornment is said to take place “in a day,”
Objection 5. Further, these days are devoted to the
but creation “in the beginning” which denotes something
first instituting of the world. But as on the seventh day
indivisible.
nothing was instituted, that day ought not to be enumer-
Reply to Objection 2. Fire and air, as not distinctly
ated with the others.
known by the unlettered, are not expressly named by
I answer that, The reason of the distinction of these
Moses among the parts of the world, but reckoned with
days is made clear by what has been said above (q. 70,
the intermediate part, or water, especially as regards the
a. 1), namely, that the parts of the world had first to be
lowest part of the air; or with the heaven, to which the
distinguished, and then each part adorned and filled, as
higher region of air approaches, as Augustine says (Gen.
it were, by the beings that inhabit it. Now the parts into
ad lit. ii, 13).
which the corporeal creation is divided are three, accord-
Reply to Objection 3. The production of animals is
ing to some holy writers, these parts being the heaven, or
recorded with reference to their adorning the various parts
highest part, the water, or middle part, and the earth, or the
of the world, and therefore the days of their production
lowest part. Thus the Pythagoreans teach that perfection
are separated or united according as the animals adorn the
consists in three things, the beginning, the middle, and the
same parts of the world, or different parts.
end. The first part, then, is distinguished on the first day,
Reply to Objection 4. The nature of light, as existing
and adorned on the fourth, the middle part distinguished
in a subject, was made on the first day; and the making of
363
the luminaries on the fourth day does not mean that their from His works: and for this reason it was right that the
substance was produced anew, but that they then received
seventh day should be mentioned after the six. It may
a form that they had not before, as said above (q. 70, a. 1
also be said, with the other writers, that the world entered
ad 2).
on the seventh day upon a new state, in that nothing new
Reply to Objection 5. According to Augustine (Gen.
was to be added to it, and that therefore the seventh day is
ad lit. iv, 15), after all that has been recorded that is
mentioned after the six, from its being devoted to cessa-
assigned to the six days, something distinct is attributed
tion from work.
to the seventh—namely, that on it God rested in Himself
Whether all these days are one day?
Ia q. 74 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that all these days are
the first of the Divine works, the second day their knowl-
one day. For it is written (Gn. 2:4,5): “These are the
edge of the second work, and similarly with the rest. Thus,
generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were
then, each work is said to have been wrought in some one
created, in the day that the Lord. . . made the heaven and
of these days, inasmuch as God wrought in some one of
the earth, and every plant of the field, before it sprung up
these days, inasmuch as God wrought nothing in the uni-
in the earth.” Therefore the day in which God made “the
verse without impressing the knowledge thereof on the an-
heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field,” is one
gelic mind; which can know many things at the same time,
and the same day. But He made the heaven and the earth
especially in the Word, in Whom all angelic knowledge
on the first day, or rather before there was any day, but the
is perfected and terminated. So the distinction of days
plant of the field He made on the third day. Therefore the
denotes the natural order of the things known, and not
first and third days are but one day, and for a like reason
a succession in the knowledge acquired, or in the things
all the rest.
produced. Moreover, angelic knowledge is appropriately
Objection 2. Further, it is said (Ecclus. 18:1): “He
called “day,” since light, the cause of day, is to be found
that liveth for ever, created all things together.” But this
in spiritual things, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. iv,
would not be the case if the days of these works were more
28). In the opinion of the others, however, the days signify
than one. Therefore they are not many but one only.
a succession both in time, and in the things produced.
Objection 3. Further, on the seventh day God ceased
If, however, these two explanations are looked at as
from all new works. If, then, the seventh day is distinct
referring to the mode of production, they will be found
from the other days, it follows that He did not make that
not greatly to differ, if the diversity of opinion existing on
day; which is not admissible.
two points, as already shown (q. 67, a. 1; q. 69, a. 1), be-
Objection 4. Further, the entire work ascribed to one
tween Augustine and other writers is taken into account.
day God perfected in an instant, for with each work are
First, because Augustine takes the earth and the water as
the words (God) “said. . . . and it was. . . done.” If, then, He first created, to signify matter totally without form; but
had kept back His next work to another day, it would fol-
the making of the firmament, the gathering of the waters,
low that for the remainder of a day He would have ceased
and the appearing of dry land, to denote the impression
from working and left it vacant, which would be superflu-
of forms upon corporeal matter. But other holy writers
ous. The day, therefore, of the preceding work is one with
take the earth and the water, as first created, to signify
the day of the work that follows.
the elements of the universe themselves existing under the
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1), “The evening
proper forms, and the works that follow to mean some sort
and the morning were the second day. . . the third day,” and
of distinction in bodies previously existing, as also has
so on. But where there is a second and third there are more
been shown (q. 67, Aa. 1,4; q. 69, a. 1 ). Secondly, some
than one. There was not, therefore, only one day.
writers hold that plants and animals were produced actu-
I answer that, On this question Augustine differs
ally in the work of the six days; Augustine, that they were
from other expositors. His opinion is that all the days that
produced potentially. Now the opinion of Augustine, that
are called seven, are one day represented in a sevenfold
the works of the six days were simultaneous, is consis-
aspect (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22; De Civ. Dei xi, 9; Ad Oro-
tent with either view of the mode of production. For the
sium xxvi); while others consider there were seven dis-
other writers agree with him that in the first production
tinct days, not one only. Now, these two opinions, taken as
of things matter existed under the substantial form of the
explaining the literal text of Genesis, are certainly widely
elements, and agree with him also that in the first institut-
different. For Augustine understands by the word “day,”
ing of the world animals and plants did not exist actually.
the knowledge in the mind of the angels, and hence, ac-
There remains, however, a difference as to four points;
cording to him, the first day denotes their knowledge of
since, according to the latter, there was a time, after the
364
production of creatures, in which light did not exist, the and adornment. Hence the word “creation” is significant.
firmament had not been formed, and the earth was still
Reply to Objection 3. On the seventh day God ceased
covered by the waters, nor had the heavenly bodies been
from making new things, but not from providing for their
formed, which is the fourth difference; which are not con-
increase, and to this latter work it belongs that the first day sistent with Augustine’s explanation. In order, therefore,
is succeeded by other days.
to be impartial, we must meet the arguments of either side.
Reply to Objection 4. All things were not distin-
Reply to Objection 1. On the day on which God cre-
guished and adorned together, not from a want of power
ated the heaven and the earth, He created also every plant
on God’s part, as requiring time in which to work, but
of the field, not, indeed, actually, but “before it sprung up
that due order might be observed in the instituting of the
in the earth,” that is, potentially. And this work Augus-
world. Hence it was fitting that different days should be
tine ascribes to the third day, but other writers to the first
assigned to the different states of the world, as each suc-
instituting of the world.
ceeding work added to the world a fresh state of perfec-
Reply to Objection 2. God created all things together
tion.
so far as regards their substance in some measure form-
Reply to Objection 5. According to Augustine, the
less. But He did not create all things together, so far as
order of days refers to the natural order of the works at-
regards that formation of things which lies in distinction
tributed to the days.
Whether Scripture uses suitable words to express the work of the six days?
Ia q. 74 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem the Scripture does not use
ad lit. i, 4), the person of the Son is mentioned both in
suitable words to express the works of the six days. For as
the first creation of the world, and in its distinction and
light, the firmament, and other similar works were made
adornment, but differently in either place. For distinction
by the Word of God, so were the heaven and the earth.
and adornment belong to the work by which the world re-
For “all things were made by Him” (Jn. 1:3). Therefore
ceives its form. But as the giving form to a work of art is
in the creation of heaven and earth, as in the other works,
by means of the form of the art in the mind of the artist,
mention should have been made of the Word of God.
which may be called his intelligible word, so the giving
Objection 2. Further, the water was created by God,
form to every creature is by the word of God; and for this
yet its creation is not mentioned. Therefore the creation
reason in the works of distinction and adornment the Word
of the world is not sufficiently described.
is mentioned. But in creation the Son is mentioned as the
Objection 3. Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): “God saw
beginning, by the words, “In the beginning God created,”
all the things that He had made, and they were very good.”
since by creation is understood the production of formless
It ought, then, to have been said of each work, “God saw
matter. But according to those who hold that the elements
that it was good.” The omission, therefore, of these words
were created from the first under their proper forms, an-
in the work of creation and in that of the second day, is
other explanation must be given; and therefore Basil says
not fitting.
(Hom. ii, iii in Hexaem.) that the words, “God said,”
Objection 4. Further, the Spirit of God is God Him-
signify a Divine command. Such a command, however,
self. But it does not befit God to move and to occupy
could not have been given before creatures had been pro-
place. Therefore the words, “The Spirit of God moved
duced that could obey it.
over the waters,” are unbecoming.
Reply to Objection 2. According to Augustine (De
Objection 5. Further, what is already made is not
Civ. Dei ix, 33), by the heaven is understood the formless
made over again. Therefore to the words, “God said: Let
spiritual nature, and by the earth, the formless matter of all
the firmament be made. . . and it was so,” it is superfluous
corporeal things, and thus no creature is omitted. But, ac-
to add, “God made the firmament.” And the like is to be
cording to Basil (Hom. i in Hexaem.), the heaven and the
said of other works.
earth, as the two extremes, are alone mentioned, the inter-
Objection 6. Further, evening and morning do not
vening things being left to be understood, since all these
sufficiently divide the day, since the day has many parts.
move heavenwards, if light, or earthwards, if heavy. And
Therefore the words, “The evening and morning were the
others say that under the word, “earth,” Scripture is ac-
second day” or, “the third day,” are not suitable.
customed to include all the four elements as (Ps. 148:7,8)
Objection 7. Further, “first,” not “one,” corresponds
after the words, “Praise the Lord from the earth,” is added,
to “second” and “third.” It should therefore have been said
“fire, hail, snow, and ice.”
that, “The evening and the morning were the first day,”
Reply to Objection 3. In the account of the creation
rather than “one day.”
there is found something to correspond to the words, “God
Reply to Objection 1. According to Augustine (Gen.
saw that it was good,” used in the work of distinction and
365
adornment, and this appears from the consideration that over that which was incomplete and unfinished, since that
the Holy Spirit is Love. Now, “there are two things,” says
movement is not one of place, but of pre-eminent power,
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8) which came from God’s love
as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 7). It is the opinion,
of His creatures, their existence and their permanence.
however, of Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that the Spirit
That they might then exist, and exist permanently, “the
moved over the element of water, “fostering and quick-
Spirit of God,” it is said, “moved over the waters”—that is
ening its nature and impressing vital power, as the hen
to say, over that formless matter, signified by water, even
broods over her chickens.” For water has especially a life-
as the love of the artist moves over the materials of his art,
giving power, since many animals are generated in water,
that out of them he may form his work. And the words,
and the seed of all animals is liquid. Also the life of the
“God saw that it was good,” signify that the things that
soul is given by the water of baptism, according to Jn. 3:5:
He had made were to endure, since they express a certain
“Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost,
satisfaction taken by God in His works, as of an artist in
he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.”
his art: not as though He knew the creature otherwise, or
Reply to Objection 5. According to Augustine (Gen.
that the creature was pleasing to Him otherwise, than be-
ad lit. i, 8), these three phrases denote the threefold being
fore He made it. Thus in either work, of creation and of
of creatures; first, their being in the Word, denoted by the
formation, the Trinity of Persons is implied. In creation
command “Let. . . be made”; secondly, their being in the
the Person of the Father is indicated by God the Creator,
angelic mind, signified by the words, “It was. . . done”;
the Person of the Son by the beginning, in which He cre-
thirdly, their being in their proper nature, by the words,
ated, and the Person of the Holy Ghost by the Spirit that
“He made.” And because the formation of the angels is
moved over the waters. But in the formation, the Person
recorded on the first day, it was not necessary there to add,
of the Father is indicated by God that speaks, and the Per-
“He made.” It may also be said, following other writers,
son of the Son by the Word in which He speaks, and the
that the words, “He said,” and “Let. . . be made,” denote
Person of the Holy Spirit by the satisfaction with which
God’s command, and the words, “It was done,” the fulfil-
God saw that what was made was good. And if the words,
ment of that command. But as it was necessary, for the
“God saw that it was good,” are not said of the work of
sake of those especially who have asserted that all visible
the second day, this is because the work of distinguishing
things were made by the angels, to mention how things
the waters was only begun on that day, but perfected on
were made, it is added, in order to remove that error, that
the third. Hence these words, that are said of the third
God Himself made them. Hence, in each work, after the
day, refer also to the second. Or it may be that Scrip-
words, “It was done,” some act of God is expressed by
ture does not use these words of approval of the second
some such words as, “He made,” or, “He divided,” or, “He
days’ work, because this is concerned with the distinction
called.”
of things not evident to the senses of mankind. Or, again,
Reply to Objection 6. According to Augustine (Gen.
because by the firmament is simply understood the cloudy
ad lit. iv, 22,30), by the “evening” and the “morning” are
region of the air, which is not one of the permanent parts
understood the evening and the morning knowledge of the
of the universe, nor of the principal divisions of the world.
angels, which has been explained (q. 58, a. 6,7). But, ac-
The above three reasons are given by Rabbi Moses∗, and
cording to Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.), the entire period
to these may be added a mystical one derived from num-
takes its name, as is customary, from its more important
bers and assigned by some writers, according to whom
part, the day. And instance of this is found in the words
the work of the second day is not marked with approval
of Jacob, “The days of my pilgrimage,” where night is not
because the second number is an imperfect number, as re-
mentioned at all. But the evening and the morning are
ceding from the perfection of unity.
mentioned as being the ends of the day, since day begins
Reply to Objection 4. Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii) un-
with morning and ends with evening, or because evening
derstands by the “Spirit of the Lord,” the air or the wind,
denotes the beginning of night, and morning the beginning
as Plato also did, and says that it is so called according to
of day. It seems fitting, also, that where the first distinction the custom of Scripture, in which these things are through-of creatures is described, divisions of time should be de-
out attributed to God. But according to the holy writers,
noted only by what marks their beginning. And the reason
the Spirit of the Lord signifies the Holy Ghost, Who is
for mentioning the evening first is that as the evening ends
said to “move over the water”—that is to say, over what
the day, which begins with the light, the termination of the
Augustine holds to mean formless matter, lest it should
light at evening precedes the termination of the darkness,
be supposed that God loved of necessity the works He
which ends with the morning. But Chrysostom’s explana-
was to produce, as though He stood in need of them. For
tion is that thereby it is intended to show that the natural
love of that kind is subject to, not superior to, the object of day does not end with the evening, but with the morning
love. Moreover, it is fittingly implied that the Spirit moved
(Hom. v in Gen.).
∗ Perplex. ii.
366
Reply to Objection 7. The words “one day” are used to the point from which it commenced its course. And
when day is first instituted, to denote that one day is made
yet another, because at the completion of a week of seven
up of twenty-four hours. Hence, by mentioning “one,” the
days, the first day returns which is one with the eighth day.
measure of a natural day is fixed. Another reason may be
The three reasons assigned above are those given by Basil
to signify that a day is completed by the return of the sun
(Hom. ii in Hexaem.).
367
FIRST PART, QUESTION 75
Of Man Who Is Composed of a Spiritual and a Corporeal Substance: And in the First Place, Concerning What Belongs to the Essence of the Soul
(In Seven Articles)
Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of his origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the body has relation to the soul. Hence the first object of our consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang.
Hier. xi) says that three things are to be found in spiritual substances—essence, power, and operation—we shall treat first of what belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation.
Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union of the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry.
(1) Whether the soul is a body?
(2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence?
(3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?
(4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body?
(5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?
(6) Whether the soul is incorruptible?
(7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?
Whether the soul is a body?
Ia q. 75 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the soul is a body. For
imate.” Now life is shown principally by two actions,
the soul is the moving principle of the body. Nor does it
knowledge and movement. The philosophers of old, not
move unless moved. First, because seemingly nothing can
being able to rise above their imagination, supposed that
move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it
the principle of these actions was something corporeal:
has not; for instance, what is not hot does not give heat.
for they asserted that only bodies were real things; and
Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is
that what is not corporeal is nothing: hence they main-
not moved, it must be the cause of eternal, unchanging
tained that the soul is something corporeal. This opinion
movement, as we find proved Phys. viii, 6; and this does
can be proved to be false in many ways; but we shall make
not appear to be the case in the movement of an animal,
use of only one proof, based on universal and certain prin-
which is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul is a mover
ciples, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body.
moved. But every mover moved is a body. Therefore the
It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is
soul is a body.
a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a princi-
Objection 2.
Further, all knowledge is caused by
ple of vision; and the same might be applied to the other
means of a likeness. But there can be no likeness of a body
instruments of the soul: but it is the “first” principle of
to an incorporeal thing. If, therefore, the soul were not a
life, which we call the soul. Now, though a body may be
body, it could not have knowledge of corporeal things.
a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart is
Objection 3.
Further, between the mover and the
a principle of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can
moved there must be contact. But contact is only between
be the first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a
bodies. Since, therefore, the soul moves the body, it seems
principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong
that the soul must be a body.
to a body as such; since, if that were the case, every body
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that
would be a living thing, or a principle of life. Therefore
the soul “is simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch
a body is competent to be a living thing or even a princi-
as it does not occupy space by its bulk.”
ple of life, as “such” a body. Now that it is actually such
I answer that, To seek the nature of the soul, we must
a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act.
premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of
Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is
life of those things which live: for we call living things
not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the
“animate,”∗, and those things which have no life, “inan-
principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body.
∗ i.e. having a soul
368
Reply to Objection 1. As everything which is in mo-Reply to Objection 2. The likeness of a thing known
tion must be moved by something else, a process which
is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower;
cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we must allow that not
but given a thing which knows potentially, and afterwards
every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is to pass
knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be
from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has
in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only poten-
to the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act.
tially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but But, as is shown in Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which
only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the like-
is altogether immovable, and not moved either essentially,
ness of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of
or accidentally; and such a mover can cause an invariable
the soul, but that there be a potentiality in the soul for such movement. There is, however, another kind of mover,
a likeness. But the ancient philosophers omitted to distin-
which, though not moved essentially, is moved acciden-
guish between actuality and potentiality; and so they held
tally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable
that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of
movement; such a mover, is the soul. There is, again,
a body; and that it must be composed of the principles of
another mover, which is moved essentially—namely, the
which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies.
body. And because the philosophers of old believed that
Reply to Objection 3. There are two kinds of contact;
nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every
of “quantity,” and of “power.” By the former a body can
mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and
be touched only by a body; by the latter a body can be
is a body.
touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body.
Whether the human soul is something subsistent?
Ia q. 75 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the human soul is not
that which is in it naturally would impede the knowl-
something subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be
edge of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man’s
“this particular thing.” Now “this particular thing” is said
tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humor, is in-
not of the soul, but of that which is composed of soul and
sensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to
body. Therefore the soul is not something subsistent.
it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the na-
Objection 2. Further, everything subsistent operates.
ture of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now
But the soul does not operate; for, as the Philosopher says
every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it
(De Anima i, 4), “to say that the soul feels or understands
is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It
is like saying that the soul weaves or builds.” Therefore
is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a
the soul is not subsistent.
bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ
Objection 3. Further, if the soul were subsistent, it
would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a certain
would have some operation apart from the body. But it
determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but
has no operation apart from the body, not even that of un-
also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of
derstanding: for the act of understanding does not take
that same color.
place without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from
Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the
the body. Therefore the human soul is not something sub-
mind or the intellect has an operation “per se” apart from
sistent.
the body. Now only that which subsists can have an oper-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7):
ation “per se.” For nothing can operate but what is actual:
“Who understands that the nature of the soul is that of
for which reason we do not say that heat imparts heat, but
a substance and not that of a body, will see that those who
that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore,
maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are led astray
that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the
through associating with the soul those things without
mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent.
which they are unable to think of any nature—i.e. imagi-
Reply to Objection 1. “This particular thing” can be
nary pictures of corporeal things.” Therefore the nature of
taken in two senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; sec-
the human intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a
ondly, for that which subsists, and is complete in a specific
substance, that is, something subsistent.
nature. The former sense excludes the inherence of an ac-
I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the
cident or of a material form; the latter excludes also the
principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul,
imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called “this
is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent. For it is
particular thing” in the first sense, but not in the second.
clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowl-
Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature,
edge of all corporeal things. Now whatever knows certain
it can indeed be called “this particular thing,” in the first
things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because
sense, as being something subsistent; but not in the sec-
369
ond, for in this sense, what is composed of body and soul say that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand,
is said to be “this particular thing.”
and not in the same sense as when we say that what is
Reply to Objection 2. Aristotle wrote those words as
hot gives heat by its heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does
expressing not his own opinion, but the opinion of those
not give heat. We may therefore say that the soul under-
who said that to understand is to be moved, as is clear
stands, as the eye sees; but it is more correct to say that
from the context. Or we may reply that to operate “per
man understands through the soul.
se” belongs to what exists “per se.” But for a thing to ex-
Reply to Objection 3. The body is necessary for the
ist “per se,” it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent,
action of the intellect, not as its origin of action, but on
as an accident or a material form; even though it be part
the part of the object; for the phantasm is to the intellect
of something. Nevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist
what color is to the sight. Neither does such a dependence
“per se,” which is neither inherent in the above sense, nor
on the body prove the intellect to be non-subsistent; oth-
part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the hand
erwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent,
cannot be said to subsist “per se”; nor can it for that rea-
since it requires external objects of the senses in order to
son be said to operate “per se.” Hence the operation of the
perform its act of perception.
parts is through each part attributed to the whole. For we
Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?
Ia q. 75 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the souls of brute an-
the sensitive soul has no “per se” operation of its own,
imals are subsistent. For man is of the same ‘genus’ as
and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to
other animals; and, as we have just shown (a. 2), the soul
the composite. Wherefore we conclude that as the souls
of man is subsistent. Therefore the souls of other animals
of brute animals have no “per se” operations they are not
are subsistent.
subsistent. For the operation of anything follows the mode
Objection 2. Further, the relation of the sensitive fac-
of its being.
ulty to sensible objects is like the relation of the intellec-
Reply to Objection 1. Although man is of the same
tual faculty to intelligible objects. But the intellect, apart
“genus” as other animals, he is of a different “species.”
from the body, apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore
Specific difference is derived from the difference of form;
the sensitive faculty, apart from the body, perceives sen-
nor does every difference of form necessarily imply a di-
sible objects. Therefore, since the souls of brute animals
versity of “genus.”
are sensitive, it follows that they are subsistent; just as the Reply to Objection 2. The relation of the sensitive
human intellectual soul is subsistent.
faculty to the sensible object is in one way the same as
Objection 3. Further, the soul of brute animals moves
that of the intellectual faculty to the intelligible object, in the body. But the body is not a mover, but is moved.
so far as each is in potentiality to its object. But in another Therefore the soul of brute animals has an operation apart
way their relations differ, inasmuch as the impression of
from the body.
the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the
On the contrary, Is what is written in the book De
body; so that excessive strength of the sensible corrupts
Eccl. Dogm. xvi, xvii: “Man alone we believe to have a
sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect.
subsistent soul: whereas the souls of animals are not sub-
For an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible
sistent.”
objects is more able afterwards to understand those that
I answer that, The ancient philosophers made no dis-
are lower. If, however, in the process of intellectual oper-
tinction between sense and intellect, and referred both a
ation the body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch
corporeal principle, as has been said (a. 1). Plato, how-
as the intellect requires the operation of the sensitive pow-
ever, drew a distinction between intellect and sense; yet he
ers in the production of the phantasms.
referred both to an incorporeal principle, maintaining that
Reply to Objection 3. Motive power is of two kinds.
sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as such.
One, the appetitive power, commands motion. The oper-
From this it follows that even the souls of brute animals
ation of this power in the sensitive soul is not apart from
are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the operations
the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a like nature are
of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a
accompanied by a change in the body. The other motive
corporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation and the
power is that which executes motion in adapting the mem-
consequent operations of the sensitive soul are evidently
bers for obeying the appetite; and the act of this power
accompanied with change in the body; thus in the act of
does not consist in moving, but in being moved. Whence
vision, the pupil of the eye is affected by a reflection of
it is clear that to move is not an act of the sensitive soul
color: and so with the other senses. Hence it is clear that
without the body.
370
Whether the soul is man?
Ia q. 75 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the soul is man. For it
species, must belong to the substance of the species.
is written (2 Cor. 4:16): “Though our outward man is cor-
It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul
rupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day.” But
is this man; and this could be held if it were supposed
that which is within man is the soul. Therefore the soul is
that the operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it,
the inward man.
apart from the body; because in that case all the operations
Objection 2. Further, the human soul is a substance.
which are attributed to man would belong to the soul only;
But it is not a universal substance. Therefore it is a partic-
and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is
ular substance. Therefore it is a “hypostasis” or a person;
that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations
and it can only be a human person. Therefore the soul is
of a man is man. But it has been shown above (a. 3) that
man; for a human person is a man.
sensation is not the operation of the soul only. Since, then,
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) com-
sensation is an operation of man, but not proper to him, it
mends Varro as holding “that man is not a mere soul, nor
is clear that man is not a soul only, but something com-
a mere body; but both soul and body.”
posed of soul and body. Plato, through supposing that
I answer that, The assertion “the soul is man,” can
sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man to
be taken in two senses. First, that man is a soul; though
be a soul making use of the body.
this particular man, Socrates, for instance, is not a soul,
Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher
but composed of soul and body. I say this, forasmuch
(Ethic. ix, 8), a thing seems to be chiefly what is princi-
as some held that the form alone belongs to the species;
ple in it; thus what the governor of a state does, the state
while matter is part of the individual, and not the species.
is said to do. In this way sometimes what is principle
This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species be-
in man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, the intel-
longs what the definition signifies; and in natural things
lectual part which, in accordance with truth, is called the
the definition does not signify the form only, but the form
“inward” man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the
and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part
body is called man in the opinion of those whose observa-
of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the
tion does not go beyond the senses. And this is called the
principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as
“outward” man.
it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be com-
Reply to Objection 2. Not every particular substance
posed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so
is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the com-
it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul,
plete nature of its species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not
flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common to the
called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul
substance of all the individuals contained under a given
alone so called, since it is a part of the human species.
Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?
Ia q. 75 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the soul is composed
virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul.
of matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actu-
Objection 3. Further, things which have no matter,
ality. Now, whatsoever things are in actuality participate
have no cause of their existence, as the Philosopher says
of the First Act, which is God; by participation of Whom,
Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). But the soul has a cause of its
all things are good, are beings, and are living things, as
existence, since it is created by God. Therefore the soul
is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom. v).
has matter.
Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate
Objection 4. Further, what has no matter, and is a
of the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is pri-
form only, is a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to
mary matter. Therefore, since the human soul is, after a
God alone. Therefore the soul has matter.
manner, in potentiality; which appears from the fact that
On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9)
sometimes a man is potentially understanding; it seems
proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter,
that the human soul must participate of primary matter, as
nor of spiritual matter.
part of itself.
I answer that, The soul has no matter. We may con-
Objection 2. Further, wherever the properties of mat-
sider this question in two ways. First, from the notion of
ter are found, there matter is. But the properties of matter
a soul in general; for it belongs to the notion of a soul to
are found in the soul—namely, to be a subject, and to be
be the form of a body. Now, either it is a form by virtue
changed, for it is a subject to science, and virtue; and it
of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of itself.
changes from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to
If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible
371
that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we un-tentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive derstand something purely potential: for a form, as such,
potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of
is an act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be
the things received by each. For primary matter receives
part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actual-
individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives abso-
ity as being opposite thereto. If, however, it be a form by
lute forms. Hence the existence of such a potentiality in
virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is com-that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the “primary
posed of matter and form.
animate.”
Reply to Objection 2. To be a subject and to be
Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of
changed belong to matter by reason of its being in poten-
the human soul inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is
tiality. As, therefore, the potentiality of the intelligence is clear that whatever is received into something is received
one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another,
according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is
so in each is there a different reason of subjection and
known in as far as its form is in the knower. But the in-
change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and
tellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for
is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its
instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and there-
being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species.
fore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal
Reply to Objection 3. The form causes matter to be,
idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual
and so does the agent; wherefore the agent causes mat-
soul itself is an absolute form, and not something com-
ter to be, so far as it actualizes it by transmuting it to the
posed of matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were
act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe
composed of matter and form, the forms of things would
its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause
be received into it as individuals, and so it would only
transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words
know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive
quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things
powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since
composed of matter and form “there is no other cause but
matter is the principle by which forms are individualized.
that which moves from potentiality to act; while whatso-
It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every
ever things have no matter are simply beings at once.”∗
intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms ab-
Reply to Objection 4.
Everything participated is
solutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form.
compared to the participator as its act. But whatever cre-
Reply to Objection 1. The First Act is the universal
ated form be supposed to subsist “per se,” must have ex-
principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually “pre-
istence by participation; for “even life,” or anything of
containing all things,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
that sort, “is a participator of existence,” as Dionysius says
Wherefore things participate of It not as a part of them-
(Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by
selves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as poten-
the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who
tiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act.
is His own existence, is pure act and infinite. But in in-
But the acts received which proceed from the First Infi-
tellectual substances there is composition of actuality and
nite Act, and are participations thereof, are diverse, so that
potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form
there cannot be one potentiality which receives all acts, as
and participated existence. Wherefore some say that they
there is one act, from which all participated acts are de-
are composed of that “whereby they are” and that “which
rived; for then the receptive potentiality would equal the
they are”; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.
active potentiality of the First Act. Now the receptive po-
Whether the human soul is incorruptible?
Ia q. 75 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the human soul is
But the souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore,
corruptible. For those things that have a like beginning
also, the human soul is corruptible.
and process seemingly have a like end. But the begin-
Objection 2. Further, whatever is out of nothing can
ning, by generation, of men is like that of animals, for
return to nothingness; because the end should correspond
they are made from the earth. And the process of life is
to the beginning. But as it is written (Wis. 2:2), “We are
alike in both; because “all things breathe alike, and man
born of nothing”; which is true, not only of the body, but
hath nothing more than the beast,” as it is written (Eccles.
also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in the same
3:19). Therefore, as the same text concludes, “the death of
passage, “After this we shall be as if we had not been,”
man and beast is one, and the condition of both is equal.”
even as to our soul.
∗ The Leonine edition has, “simpliciter sunt quod vere entia aliquid.”
The Parma edition of St. Thomas’s Commentary on Aristotle has, “sta-tim per se unum quiddam est. . . et ens quiddam.”
372
Objection 3.
Further, nothing is without its own
of contraries are not themselves contrary, since contraries
proper operation. But the operation proper to the soul,
belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it is impossi-
which is to understand through a phantasm, cannot be
ble for the intellectual soul to be corruptible. Moreover
without the body. For the soul understands nothing with-
we may take a sign of this from the fact that everything
out a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body
naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now,
as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the
in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowl-
soul cannot survive the dissolution of the body.
edge. The senses indeed do not know existence, except
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
under the conditions of “here” and “now,” whereas the in-
human souls owe to Divine goodness that they are “intel-
tellect apprehends existence absolutely, and for all time;
lectual,” and that they have “an incorruptible substantial
so that everything that has an intellect naturally desires
life.”
always to exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain.
I answer that, We must assert that the intellectual
Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible.
principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible.
Reply to Objection 1. Solomon reasons thus in the
For a thing may be corrupted in two ways—“per se,” and
person of the foolish, as expressed in the words of Wis-
accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance to be
dom 2. Therefore the saying that man and animals have
generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the gener-
a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for all
ation or corruption of something else. For generation and
animals alike are made of earth. But it is not true of the
corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to
soul. For the souls of brutes are produced by some power
it, which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption.
of the body; whereas the human soul is produced by God.
Therefore, whatever has existence “per se” cannot be gen-
To signify this it is written as to other animals: “Let the
erated or corrupted except ‘per se’; while things which do
earth bring forth the living soul” (Gn. 1:24): while of
not subsist, such as accidents and material forms, acquire
man it is written (Gn. 2:7) that “He breathed into his face
existence or lost it through the generation or corruption
the breath of life.” And so in the last chapter of Ecclesi-
of composite things. Now it was shown above (Aa. 2,3)
astes (12:7) it is concluded: ”(Before) the dust return into
that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the
its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to God
human soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted,
Who gave it.” Again the process of life is alike as to the
when their bodies are corrupted; while the human soul
body, concerning which it is written (Eccles. 3:19): “All
could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted “per se.”
things breathe alike,” and (Wis. 2:2), “The breath in our
This, indeed, is impossible, not only as regards the human
nostrils is smoke.” But the process is not alike of the soul;
soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is a form
for man is intelligent, whereas animals are not. Hence it
alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue
is false to say: “Man has nothing more than beasts.” Thus
of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a
death comes to both alike as to the body, by not as to the
form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore mat-
soul.
ter acquires actual existence as it acquires the form; while
Reply to Objection 2. As a thing can be created by
it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But
reason, not of a passive potentiality, but only of the active
it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself; and
potentiality of the Creator, Who can produce something
therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to
out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can be reduced
exist.
to nothing, we do not imply in the creature a potentiality
Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and
to non-existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing
form, as some pretend, we should nevertheless have to
to sustain existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible
maintain that it is incorruptible. For corruption is found
because there is in it a potentiality to non-existence.
only where there is contrariety; since generation and cor-
Reply to Objection 3. To understand through a phan-
ruption are from contraries and into contraries. Wherefore
tasm is the proper operation of the soul by virtue of its
the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject to
union with the body. After separation from the body it
contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no con-
will have another mode of understanding, similar to other
trariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according
substances separated from bodies, as will appear later on
to the manner of its existence, and those things which
(q. 89, a. 1).
it receives are without contrariety; for the notions even
373
Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?
Ia q. 75 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the soul is of the
fect than another; and the same applies to other species,
same species as an angel. For each thing is ordained to
because differences which divide a “genus” are contrary
its proper end by the nature of its species, whence is de-
to one another. Contraries, however, are compared to one
rived its inclination for that end. But the end of the soul is
another as the perfect to the imperfect, since the “prin-
the same as that of an angel—namely, eternal happiness.
ciple of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof,” as is
Therefore they are of the same species.
written Metaph. x (Did. ix, 4). The same would follow
Objection 2.
Further, the ultimate specific differ-
if the aforesaid substances were composed of matter and
ence is the noblest, because it completes the nature of the
form. For if the matter of one be distinct from the matter
species. But there is nothing nobler either in an angel or
of another, it follows that either the form is the principle
in the soul than their intellectual nature. Therefore the
of the distinction of matter—that is to say, that the matter
soul and the angel agree in the ultimate specific differ-
is distinct on account of its relation to divers forms; and
ence: therefore they belong to the same species.
even then there would result a difference of species and
Objection 3. Further, it seems that the soul does not
inequality of nature: or else the matter is the principle of
differ from an angel except in its union with the body. But
the distinction of forms. But one matter cannot be distinct
as the body is outside the essence of the soul, it seems that
from another, except by a distinction of quantity, which
it does not belong to its species. Therefore the soul and
has no place in these incorporeal substances, such as an
angel are of the same species.
angel and the soul. So that it is not possible for the angel
On the contrary, Things which have different natural
and the soul to be of the same species. How it is that there
operations are of different species. But the natural oper-
can be many souls of one species will be explained later
ations of the soul and of an angel are different; since, as
(q. 76, a. 2, ad 1).
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), “Angelic minds have sim-
Reply to Objection 1. This argument proceeds from
ple and blessed intelligence, not gathering their knowl-
the proximate and natural end. Eternal happiness is the
edge of Divine things from visible things.” Subsequently
ultimate and supernatural end.
he says the contrary to this of the soul. Therefore the soul
Reply to Objection 2. The ultimate specific differ-
and an angel are not of the same species.
ence is the noblest because it is the most determinate,
I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon iii, 5) held that
in the same way as actuality is nobler than potentiality.
human souls and angels are all of the same species; and
Thus, however, the intellectual faculty is not the noblest,
this because he supposed that in these substances the dif-
because it is indeterminate and common to many degrees
ference of degree was accidental, as resulting from their
of intellectuality; as the sensible faculty is common to
free-will: as we have seen above (q. 47, a. 2). But this can-
many degrees in the sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible
not be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot be diver-
things are not of one species, so neither are all intellectual
sity of number without diversity of species and inequality
things of one species.
of nature; because, as they are not composed of matter and
Reply to Objection 3. The body is not of the essence
form, but are subsistent forms, it is clear that there is nec-
of the soul; but the soul by the nature of its essence can
essarily among them a diversity of species. For a separate
be united to the body, so that, properly speaking, not the
form cannot be understood otherwise than as one of a sin-
soul alone, but the “composite,” is the species. And the
gle species; thus, supposing a separate whiteness to exist,
very fact that the soul in a certain way requires the body
it could only be one; forasmuch as one whiteness does not
for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a
differ from another except as in this or that subject. But
grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an angel, who is
diversity of species is always accompanied with a diver-
not united to a body.
sity of nature; thus in species of colors one is more per-
374
FIRST PART, QUESTION 76
Of the Union of Body and Soul
(In Eight Articles)
We now consider the union of the soul with the body; and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?
(2) Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied numerically according to the number of bodies; or is there one intelligence for all men?
(3) Whether in the body the form of which is an intellectual principle, there is some other soul?
(4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial form?
(5) Of the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual principle is the form?
(6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of another body?
(7) Whether by means of an accident?
(8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body?
Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?
Ia q. 76 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that the intellectual principle is is not united to the body as its form; because a form is
not united to the body as its form. For the Philosopher
that by which a thing exists: so that the very existence of
says (De Anima iii, 4) that the intellect is “separate,” and
a form does not belong to the form by itself. But the intel-
that it is not the act of any body. Therefore it is not united
lectual principle has “per se” existence and is subsistent,
to the body as its form.
as was said above (q. 75, a. 2). Therefore it is not united
Objection 2. Further, every form is determined ac-
to the body as its form.
cording to the nature of the matter of which it is the form;
Objection 6. Further, whatever exists in a thing by
otherwise no proportion would be required between mat-
reason of its nature exists in it always. But to be united to
ter and form. Therefore if the intellect were united to the
matter belongs to the form by reason of its nature; because
body as its form, since every body has a determinate na-
form is the act of matter, not by an accidental quality, but
ture, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate
by its own essence; otherwise matter and form would not
nature; and thus, it would not be capable of knowing all
make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one.
things, as is clear from what has been said (q. 75, a. 2);
Therefore a form cannot be without its own proper mat-
which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. Therefore
ter. But the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, the intellect is not united to the body as its form.
as was shown above (q. 75, a. 6), remains separate from
Objection 3. Further, whatever receptive power is an
the body, after the dissolution of the body. Therefore the
act of a body, receives a form materially and individu-
intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form.
ally; for what is received must be received according to
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher,
the condition of the receiver. But the form of the thing un-
Metaph. viii (Did. vii 2), difference is derived from the
derstood is not received into the intellect materially and
form. But the difference which constitutes man is “ratio-
individually, but rather immaterially and universally: oth-
nal,” which is applied to man on account of his intellectual
erwise the intellect would not be capable of the knowledge
principle. Therefore the intellectual principle is the form
of immaterial and universal objects, but only of individu-
of man.
als, like the senses. Therefore the intellect is not united to
I answer that, We must assert that the intellect which
the body as its form.
is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of
Objection 4. Further, power and action have the same
the human body. For that whereby primarily anything
subject; for the same subject is what can, and does, act.
acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be at-
But the intellectual action is not the action of a body, as
tributed: for instance, that whereby a body is primarily
appears from above (q. 75, a. 2). Therefore neither is
healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primar-
the intellectual faculty a power of the body. But virtue
ily is knowledge; hence health is a form of the body, and
or power cannot be more abstract or more simple than
knowledge is a form of the soul. The reason is because
the essence from which the faculty or power is derived.
nothing acts except so far as it is in act; wherefore a thing
Therefore neither is the substance of the intellect the form
acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the
of a body.
first thing by which the body lives is the soul. And as life
Objection 5. Further, whatever has “per se” existence
appears through various operations in different degrees of
375
living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is
all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the pri-
united to the body as its motor; and hence that the intel-
mary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local
lect and body form one thing so that the act of the intellect
movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore
could be attributed to the whole. This is, however, absurd
this principle by which we primarily understand, whether
for many reasons. First, because the intellect does not
it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form move the body except through the appetite, the movement
of the body. This is the demonstration used by Aristotle
of which presupposes the operation of the intellect. The
(De Anima ii, 2).
reason therefore why Socrates understands is not because
But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the
he is moved by his intellect, but rather, contrariwise, he is
form of the body he must first explain how it is that this ac-
moved by his intellect because he understands. Secondly,
tion of understanding is the action of this particular man;
because since Socrates is an individual in a nature of one
for each one is conscious that it is himself who under-
essence composed of matter and form, if the intellect be
stands. Now an action may be attributed to anyone in
not the form, it follows that it must be outside the essence,
three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. v, 1);
and then the intellect is the whole Socrates as a motor to
for a thing is said to move or act, either by virtue of its
the thing moved. Whereas the act of intellect remains in
whole self, for instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue
the agent, and does not pass into something else, as does
of a part, as a man sees by his eye; or through an acciden-
the action of heating. Therefore the action of understand-
tal quality, as when we say that something that is white
ing cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason that he
builds, because it is accidental to the builder to be white.
is moved by his intellect. Thirdly, because the action of
So when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it is
a motor is never attributed to the thing moved, except as
clear that this is not attributed to him accidentally; since
to an instrument; as the action of a carpenter to a saw.
it is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated of him
Therefore if understanding is attributed to Socrates, as the
essentially. We must therefore say either that Socrates un-
action of what moves him, it follows that it is attributed to
derstands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained,
him as to an instrument. This is contrary to the teaching
holding that man is an intellectual soul; or that intelli-
of the Philosopher, who holds that understanding is not
gence is a part of Socrates. The first cannot stand, as was
possible through a corporeal instrument (De Anima iii,
shown above (q. 75, a. 4), for this reason, that it is one and
4). Fourthly, because, although the action of a part be at-
the same man who is conscious both that he understands,
tributed to the whole, as the action of the eye is attributed
and that he senses. But one cannot sense without a body:
to a man; yet it is never attributed to another part, except
therefore the body must be some part of man. It follows
perhaps indirectly; for we do not say that the hand sees be-
therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands
cause the eye sees. Therefore if the intellect and Socrates
is a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the
are united in the above manner, the action of the intellect
body of Socrates.
cannot be attributed to Socrates. If, however, Socrates be a
The Commentator held that this union is through the
whole composed of a union of the intellect with whatever
intelligible species, as having a double subject, in the pos-
else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be united to
sible intellect, and in the phantasms which are in the cor-
those other things only as a motor, it follows that Socrates
poreal organs. Thus through the intelligible species the
is not one absolutely, and consequently neither a being
possible intellect is linked to the body of this or that par-
absolutely, for a thing is a being according as it is one.
ticular man. But this link or union does not sufficiently
There remains, therefore, no other explanation than
explain the fact, that the act of the intellect is the act
that given by Aristotle—namely, that this particular man
of Socrates. This can be clearly seen from comparison
understands, because the intellectual principle is his form.
with the sensitive faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds
Thus from the very operation of the intellect it is made
to consider things relating to the intellect. For the relation
clear that the intellectual principle is united to the body as
of phantasms to the intellect is like the relation of colors to its form.
the sense of sight, as he says De Anima iii, 5,7. Therefore,
The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the
as the species of colors are in the sight, so are the species
human species. For the nature of each thing is shown by
of phantasms in the possible intellect. Now it is clear that
its operation. Now the proper operation of man as man
because the colors, the images of which are in the sight,
is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other
are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to the
animals. Whence Aristotle concludes (Ethic. x, 7) that
wall: for we do not say that the wall sees, but rather that it
the ultimate happiness of man must consist in this oper-
is seen. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phan-
ation as properly belonging to him. Man must therefore
tasms are in the possible intellect, it does not follow that
derive his species from that which is the principle of this
Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands, but
operation. But the species of anything is derived from its
that he or his phantasms are understood.
form. It follows therefore that the intellectual principle is
376
the proper form of man.
organ, like the act of seeing. But it exists in matter so far
But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the
as the soul itself, to which this power belongs, is the form
more it rises above corporeal matter, the less it is merged
of the body, and the term of human generation. And so
in matter, and the more it excels matter by its power and
the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that the intellect is
its operation; hence we find that the form of a mixed body
separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ.
has another operation not caused by its elemental quali-
From this it is clear how to answer the Second and
ties. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms,
Third objections: since, in order that man may be able
the more we find that the power of the form excels the el-
to understand all things by means of his intellect, and that
ementary matter; as the vegetative soul excels the form of
his intellect may understand immaterial things and univer-
the metal, and the sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul.
sals, it is sufficient that the intellectual power be not the
Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms.
act of the body.
Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the
Reply to Objection 4. The human soul, by reason of
fact that it has an operation and a power in which corpo-
its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely
real matter has no share whatever. This power is called
embraced by matter. Therefore there is nothing to prevent
the intellect.
some power thereof not being the act of the body, although
It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul
the soul is essentially the form of the body.
is composed of matter and form, it would follow that in
Reply to Objection 5. The soul communicates that
no way could the soul be the form of the body. For since
existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out
the form is an act, and matter is only in potentiality, that
of which and the intellectual soul there results unity of
which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form
existence; so that the existence of the whole composite is
of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form
also the existence of the soul. This is not the case with
by virtue of some part of itself, then that part which is the
other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human
form we call the soul, and that of which it is the form we
soul retains its own existence after the dissolution of the
call the “primary animate,” as was said above (q. 75, a. 5).
body; whereas it is not so with other forms.
Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (Phys.
Reply to Objection 6. To be united to the body be-
ii, 2), the ultimate natural form to which the consideration
longs to the soul by reason of itself, as it belongs to a light of the natural philosopher is directed is indeed separate;
body by reason of itself to be raised up. And as a light
yet it exists in matter. He proves this from the fact that
body remains light, when removed from its proper place,
“man and the sun generate man from matter.” It is sepa-
retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for its
rate indeed according to its intellectual power, because the
proper place; so the human soul retains its proper exis-
intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal organ, as
tence when separated from the body, having an aptitude
the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understand-
and a natural inclination to be united to the body.
ing is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal
Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied according to the number of bodies?
Ia q. 76 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual prin-
your intellect, my intellect is an individual, and so is
ciple is not multiplied according to the number of bodies,
yours; for individuals are things which differ in num-
but that there is one intellect in all men. For an immaterial
ber but agree in one species. Now whatever is received
substance is not multiplied in number within one species.
into anything must be received according to the condi-
But the human soul is an immaterial substance; since it
tion of the receiver. Therefore the species of things would
is not composed of matter and form as was shown above
be received individually into my intellect, and also into
(q. 75, a. 5). Therefore there are not many human souls
yours: which is contrary to the nature of the intellect
in one species. But all men are of one species. Therefore
which knows universals.
there is but one intellect in all men.
Objection 4. Further, the thing understood is in the
Objection 2. Further, when the cause is removed, the
intellect which understands. If, therefore, my intellect
effect is also removed. Therefore, if human souls were
is distinct from yours, what is understood by me must
multiplied according to the number of bodies, it follows
be distinct from what is understood by you; and con-
that the bodies being removed, the number of souls would
sequently it will be reckoned as something individual,
not remain; but from all the souls there would be but a
and be only potentially something understood; so that the
single remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away
common intention will have to be abstracted from both;
with the distinction of rewards and punishments.
since from things diverse something intelligible common
Objection 3. Further, if my intellect is distinct from
to them may be abstracted. But this is contrary to the na-
377
ture of the intellect; for then the intellect would seem not one stroke. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect
to be distinct from the imagination. It seems, therefore, to
is united or coupled to this or that man, the intellect has
follow that there is one intellect in all men.
the precedence of all the other things which appertain to
Objection 5.
Further, when the disciple receives
man; for the sensitive powers obey the intellect, and are
knowledge from the master, it cannot be said that the mas-
at its service. Therefore, if we suppose two men to have
ter’s knowledge begets knowledge in the disciple, because
several intellects and one sense—for instance, if two men
then also knowledge would be an active form, such as heat
had one eye—there would be several seers, but one sight.
is, which is clearly false. It seems, therefore, that the same
But if there is one intellect, no matter how diverse may
individual knowledge which is in the master is commu-
be all those things of which the intellect makes use as in-
nicated to the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is
struments, in no way is it possible to say that Socrates and
one intellect in both. Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of
Plato are otherwise than one understanding man. And if to
the disciple and master is but one; and, consequently, the
this we add that to understand, which is the act of the in-
same applies to all men.
tellect, is not affected by any organ other than the intellect
Objection 6. Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animae
itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent and
xxxii) says: “If I were to say that there are many human
one action: that is to say that all men are but one “under-
souls, I should laugh at myself.” But the soul seems to be
stander,” and have but one act of understanding, in regard,
one chiefly on account of the intellect. Therefore there is
that is, of one intelligible object.
one intellect of all men.
However, it would be possible to distinguish my in-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3)
tellectual action form yours by the distinction of the
that the relation of universal causes to universals is like
phantasms—that is to say, were there one phantasm of a
the relation of particular causes to individuals. But it is
stone in me, and another in you—if the phantasm itself,
impossible that a soul, one in species, should belong to
as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a form
animals of different species. Therefore it is impossible
of the possible intellect; since the same agent according
that one individual intellectual soul should belong to sev-
to divers forms produces divers actions; as, according to
eral individuals.
divers forms of things with regard to the same eye, there
I answer that, It is absolutely impossible for one in-
are divers visions. But the phantasm itself is not a form
tellect to belong to all men. This is clear if, as Plato
of the possible intellect; it is the intelligible species ab-
maintained, man is the intellect itself. For it would fol-
stracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now in one
low that Socrates and Plato are one man; and that they are
intellect, from different phantasms of the same species,
not distinct from each other, except by something outside
only one intelligible species is abstracted; as appears in
the essence of each. The distinction between Socrates and
one man, in whom there may be different phantasms of a
Plato would be no other than that of one man with a tunic
stone; yet from all of them only one intelligible species
and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd.
of a stone is abstracted; by which the intellect of that one
It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according
man, by one operation, understands the nature of a stone,
to the opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed
notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if
that the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is
there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phan-
the form of man. For it is impossible for many distinct
tasms which are in this one and that one would not cause
individuals to have one form, as it is impossible for them
a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that
to have one existence, for the form is the principle of ex-
man. It follows, therefore, that it is altogether impossible
istence.
and unreasonable to maintain that there exists one intellect
Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may
for all men.
hold as to the manner of the union of the intellect to this
Reply to Objection 1. Although the intellectual soul,
or that man. For it is manifest that, supposing there is one
like an angel, has no matter from which it is produced,
principal agent, and two instruments, we can say that there
yet it is the form of a certain matter; in which it is unlike
is one agent absolutely, but several actions; as when one
an angel. Therefore, according to the division of matter,
man touches several things with his two hands, there will
there are many souls of one species; while it is quite im-
be one who touches, but two contacts. If, on the contrary,
possible for many angels to be of one species.
we suppose one instrument and several principal agents,
Reply to Objection 2. Everything has unity in the
we might say that there are several agents, but one act;
same way that it has being; consequently we must judge
for example, if there be many drawing a ship by means
of the multiplicity of a thing as we judge of its being. Now
of a rope; there will be many drawing, but one pull. If,
it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its very be-however, there is one principal agent, and one instrument,
ing, is united to the body as its form; yet, after the dissolu-
we say that there is one agent and one action, as when the
tion of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being.
smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and
In like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to
378
the multiplicity of the bodies; yet, after the dissolution of cording to its likeness; for “the stone is not in the soul, but the bodies, the souls retain their multiplied being.
its likeness is,” as is said, De Anima iii, 8. Yet it is the
Reply to Objection 3. Individuality of the intelligent
stone which is understood, not the likeness of the stone;
being, or of the species whereby it understands, does not
except by a reflection of the intellect on itself: otherwise,
exclude the understanding of universals; otherwise, since
the objects of sciences would not be things, but only intel-
separate intellects are subsistent substances, and conse-
ligible species. Now it happens that different things, ac-
quently individual, they could not understand universals.
cording to different forms, are likened to the same thing.
But the materiality of the knower, and of the species
And since knowledge is begotten according to the assimi-
whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the uni-
lation of the knower to the thing known, it follows that the
versal. For as every action is according to the mode of
same thing may happen to be known by several knowers;
the form by which the agent acts, as heating is accord-
as is apparent in regard to the senses; for several see the
ing to the mode of the heat; so knowledge is according
same color, according to different likenesses. In the same
to the mode of the species by which the knower knows.
way several intellects understand one object understood.
Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and
But there is this difference, according to the opinion of
multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which
Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligence—that a
come from the matter. Therefore if the form, which is the
thing is perceived by the sense according to the disposi-
means of knowledge, is material—that is, not abstracted
tion which it has outside the soul —that is, in its individu-
from material conditions—its likeness to the nature of a
ality; whereas the nature of the thing understood is indeed
species or genus will be according to the distinction and
outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists
multiplication of that nature by means of individuating
outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is
principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing
understood. For the common nature is understood as apart
in general will be impossible. But if the species be ab-
from the individuating principles; whereas such is not its
stracted from the conditions of individual matter, there
mode of existence outside the soul. But, according to the
will be a likeness of the nature without those things which
opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the
make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowl-
soul in the same condition as those under which it is un-
edge of the universal. Nor does it matter, as to this particu-
derstood; for he supposed that the natures of things exist
lar point, whether there be one intellect or many; because,
separate from matter.
even if there were but one, it would necessarily be an in-
Reply to Objection 5. One knowledge exists in the
dividual intellect, and the species whereby it understands,
disciple and another in the master. How it is caused will
an individual species.
be shown later on (q. 117, a. 1).
Reply to Objection 4. Whether the intellect be one or
Reply to Objection 6. Augustine denies a plurality of
many, what is understood is one; for what is understood
souls, that would involve a plurality of species.
is in the intellect, not according to its own nature, but ac-
Whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different Ia q. 76 a. 3
from one another?
Objection 1. It would seem that besides the intellec-
soul; and, therefore, “animal” will not be one genus com-
tual soul there are in man other souls essentially different
mon to man and other animals, which is absurd.
from one another, such as the sensitive soul and the nu-
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph.
tritive soul. For corruptible and incorruptible are not of
viii (Did. vii, 2), that the genus is taken from the matter,
the same substance. But the intellectual soul is incorrupt-
and difference from the form. But “rational,” which is the
ible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and the nu-
difference constituting man, is taken from the intellectual
tritive, are corruptible, as was shown above (q. 75, a. 6).
soul; while he is called “animal” by reason of his having
Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual soul, the
a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the intel-
sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same.
lectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a
Objection 2. Further, if it be said that the sensitive
sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the in-
soul in man is incorruptible; on the contrary, “corruptible
tellectual soul is not essentially the same as the sensitive
and incorruptible differ generically,” says the Philosopher,
soul, but presupposes it as a material subject.
Metaph. x (Did. ix, 10). But the sensitive soul in the
On the contrary, It is said in the book De Ecclesias-
horse, the lion, and other brute animals, is corruptible. If,
ticis Dogmatibus xv: “Nor do we say that there are two
therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive soul in
souls in one man, as James and other Syrians write; one,
man and brute animals will not be of the same “genus.”
animal, by which the body is animated, and which is min-
Now an animal is so called from its having a sensitive
gled with the blood; the other, spiritual, which obeys the
379
reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul in man, other, the subject belonging to the definition of the predi-that both gives life to the body by being united to it, and
cate; as a surface is presupposed to color; so that if we say
orders itself by its own reasoning.”
that a body with a surface is colored, we have the second
I answer that, Plato held that there were several souls
manner of essential predication.) Therefore, if we have
in one body, distinct even as to organs, to which souls he
one form by which a thing is an animal, and another form
referred the different vital actions, saying that the nutri-
by which it is a man, it follows either that one of these
tive power is in the liver, the concupiscible in the heart,
two things could not be predicated of the other, except ac-
and the power of knowledge in the brain. Which opinion
cidentally, supposing these two forms not to be ordered to
is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard to
one another—or that one would be predicated of the other
those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs; for this
according to the second manner of essential predication,
reason, that in those animals which continue to live when
if one soul be presupposed to the other. But both of these
they have been divided in each part are observed the oper-
consequences are clearly false: because “animal” is pred-
ations of the soul, as sense and appetite. Now this would
icated of man essentially and not accidentally; and man is
not be the case if the various principles of the soul’s op-
not part of the definition of an animal, but the other way
erations were essentially different, and distributed in the
about. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is
various parts of the body. But with regard to the intellec-
animal and man; otherwise man would not really be the
tual part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be “only
thing which is an animal, so that animal can be essentially
logically” distinct from the other parts of the soul, “or also
predicated of man.
locally.”
Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that
The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he
when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes an-
held, the soul was supposed to be united to the body, not
other, which could never be the case unless the principle
as its form, but as its motor. For it involves nothing unrea-
of action were essentially one.
sonable that the same movable thing be moved by several
We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive
motors; and still less if it be moved according to its vari-
soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are nu-
ous parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united
merically one soul. This can easily be explained, if we
to the body as its form, it is quite impossible for several
consider the differences of species and forms. For we ob-
essentially different souls to be in one body. This can be
serve that the species and forms of things differ from one
made clear by three different reasons.
another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order of
In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely
things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate,
one, in which there were several souls. For nothing is ab-
and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute
solutely one except by one form, by which a thing has
animals; and in each of these genera there are various de-
existence: because a thing has from the same source both
grees. For this reason Aristotle, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3),
existence and unity; and therefore things which are de-
compares the species of things to numbers, which differ
nominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as,
in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. And
for instance, “a white man.” If, therefore, man were ‘liv-
(De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls to the
ing’ by one form, the vegetative soul, and ‘animal’ by an-
species of figures, one of which contains another; as a
other form, the sensitive soul, and “man” by another form,
pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the in-
the intellectual soul, it would follow that man is not abso-
tellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the
lutely one. Thus Aristotle argues, Metaph. viii (Did. vii,
sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive souls
6), against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct
of plants. Therefore, as a surface which is of a pentagonal
from the idea of a biped, then a biped animal is not ab-
shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by
solutely one. For this reason, against those who hold that
another—since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous
there are several souls in the body, he asks (De Anima
as contained in the pentagonal—so neither is Socrates a
i, 5), “what contains them?”—that is, what makes them
man by one soul, and animal by another; but by one and
one? It cannot be said that they are united by the one
the same soul he is both animal and man.
body; because rather does the soul contain the body and
Reply to Objection 1. The sensitive soul is incorrupt-
make it one, than the reverse.
ible, not by reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of
Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the man-
its being intellectual. When, therefore, a soul is sensitive
ner in which one thing is predicated of another. Those
only, it is corruptible; but when with sensibility it has also
things which are derived from various forms are predi-
intellectuality, it is incorruptible. For although sensibility
cated of one another, either accidentally, (if the forms are
does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intel-
not ordered to one another, as when we say that something
lectuality of its incorruptibility.
white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of
Reply to Objection 2. Not forms, but composites, are
essential predication, (if the forms are ordered one to an-
classified either generically or specifically. Now man is
380
corruptible like other animals. And so the difference of ner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one
corruptible and incorruptible which is on the part of the
and the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as
forms does not involve a generic difference between man
we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what
and the other animals.
belongs to the sensitive soul, and something more, rea-
Reply to Objection 3. The embryo has first of all a
son can consider separately what belongs to the power of
soul which is merely sensitive, and when this is removed,
the sensitive soul, as something imperfect and material.
it is supplanted by a more perfect soul, which is both sen-
And because it observes that this is something common to
sitive and intellectual: as will be shown further on (q. 118,
man and to other animals, it forms thence the notion of the
a. 2, ad 2).
“genus”; while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds
Reply to Objection 4. We must not consider the di-
the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting; thence
versity of natural things as proceeding from the various
it gathers the “difference” of man.
logical notions or intentions, which flow from our man-
Whether in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul?
Ia q. 76 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that in man there is an-
is not united to the body as its form, but only as its mo-
other form besides the intellectual soul. For the Philoso-
tor, as the Platonists maintain, it would necessarily follow
pher says (De Anima ii, 1), that “the soul is the act of a
that in man there is another substantial form, by which the
physical body which has life potentially.” Therefore the
body is established in its being as movable by the soul. If,
soul is to the body as a form of matter. But the body has
however, the intellectual soul be united to the body as its
a substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some
substantial form, as we have said above (a. 1), it is impos-
other substantial form in the body precedes the soul.
sible for another substantial form besides the intellectual
Objection 2. Further, man moves himself as every
soul to be found in man.
animal does.
Now everything that moves itself is di-
In order to make this evident, we must consider that
vided into two parts, of which one moves, and the other
the substantial form differs from the accidental form in
is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5). But
this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be
the part which moves is the soul. Therefore the other part
“simply,” but to be “such,” as heat does not make a thing
must be such that it can be moved. But primary matter
to be simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by the coming
cannot be moved (Phys. v, 1), since it is a being only
of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or
potentially; indeed everything that is moved is a body.
generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some
Therefore in man and in every animal there must be an-
particular condition; and in like manner, when an acci-
other substantial form, by which the body is constituted.
dental form is removed, a thing is said to be corrupted,
Objection 3. Further, the order of forms depends on
not simply, but relatively. Now the substantial form gives
their relation to primary matter; for “before” and “after”
being simply; therefore by its coming a thing is said to
apply by comparison to some beginning. Therefore if
be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted
there were not in man some other substantial form besides
simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who
the rational soul, and if this were to inhere immediately
held that primary matter was some actual being—for in-
to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the
stance, fire or air, or something of that sort—maintained
most imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately.
that nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and
Objection 4. Further, the human body is a mixed
stated that “every becoming is nothing but an alteration,”
body. Now mingling does not result from matter alone;
as we read, Phys. i, 4. Therefore, if besides the intel-
for then we should have mere corruption. Therefore the
lectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial
forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body; and
form by which the subject of the soul were made an ac-
these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human body
tual being, it would follow that the soul does not give be-
there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual
ing simply; and consequently that it is not the substantial
soul.
form: and so at the advent of the soul there would not be
On the contrary, Of one thing there is but one sub-
simple generation; nor at its removal simple corruption,
stantial being. But the substantial form gives substantial
all of which is clearly false.
being. Therefore of one thing there is but one substan-
Whence we must conclude, that there is no other sub-
tial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man.
stantial form in man besides the intellectual soul; and that
Therefore it is impossible for there to be in man another
the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive
substantial form besides the intellectual soul.
souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and
I answer that, If we suppose that the intellectual soul
itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other
381
things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute body; and that the mixture is made by the contrary quali-animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants, and universally
ties of the elements being reduced to an average. But this
of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect.
is impossible, because the various forms of the elements
Reply to Objection 1. Aristotle does not say that the
must necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the dis-
soul is the act of a body only, but “the act of a physical
tinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without
organic body which has life potentially”; and that this po-
which matter cannot be divisible. Now matter subject to
tentiality “does not reject the soul.” Whence it is clear that
dimension is not to be found except in a body. But various
when the soul is called the act, the soul itself is included;
bodies cannot be in the same place. Whence it follows that
as when we say that heat is the act of what is hot, and
elements in the mixed body would be distinct as to situ-
light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were
ation. And then there would not be a real mixture which
two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by
is in respect of the whole; but only a mixture apparent to
the light. In like manner, the soul is said to be the “act
sense, by the juxtaposition of particles.
of a body,” etc., because by the soul it is a body, and is
Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by
organic, and has life potentially. Yet the first act is said
reason of their imperfection, are a medium between ac-
to be in potentiality to the second act, which is operation;
cidental and substantial forms, and so can be “more” or
for such a potentiality “does not reject”—that is, does not
“less”; and therefore in the mixture they are modified and
exclude—the soul.
reduced to an average, so that one form emerges from
Reply to Objection 2. The soul does not move the
them. But this is even still more impossible. For the sub-
body by its essence, as the form of the body, but by the
stantial being of each thing consists in something indivisi-
motive power, the act of which presupposes the body to
ble, and every addition and subtraction varies the species,
be already actualized by the soul: so that the soul by its
as in numbers, as stated in Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3);
motive power is the part which moves; and the animate
and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form
body is the part moved.
to receive “more” or “less.” Nor is it less impossible for
Reply to Objection 3. We observe in matter various
anything to be a medium between substance and accident.
degrees of perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and
Therefore we must say, in accordance with the
understanding. Now what is added is always more per-
Philosopher (De Gener. i, 10), that the forms of the el-
fect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the first
ements remain in the mixed body, not actually but vir-
degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while that form
tually. For the proper qualities of the elements remain,
which gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on,
though modified; and in them is the power of the elemen-
is the most perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immedi-
tary forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper dis-
ately.
position for the substantial form of the mixed body; for
Reply to Objection 4. Avicenna held that the sub-
instance, the form of a stone, or of any sort of soul.
stantial forms of the elements remain entire in the mixed
Whether the intellectual soul is properly united to such a body?
Ia q. 76 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul
Objection 4. Further, what is susceptible of a more
is improperly united to such a body. For matter must be
perfect form should itself be more perfect. But the intel-
proportionate to the form. But the intellectual soul is in-
lectual soul is the most perfect of souls. Therefore since
corruptible. Therefore it is not properly united to a cor-
the bodies of other animals are naturally provided with a
ruptible body.
covering, for instance, with hair instead of clothes, and
Objection 2. Further, the intellectual soul is a per-
hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally pro-
fectly immaterial form; a proof whereof is its operation
vided with arms, as claws, teeth, and horns; it seems that
in which corporeal matter does not share. But the more
the intellectual soul should not have been united to a body
subtle is the body, the less has it of matter. Therefore the
which is imperfect as being deprived of the above means
soul should be united to a most subtle body, to fire, for
of protection.
instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima
body.
ii, 1), that “the soul is the act of a physical organic body
Objection 3. Further, since the form is the principle of having life potentially.”
the species, one form cannot produce a variety of species.
I answer that, Since the form is not for the matter,
But the intellectual soul is one form. Therefore, it should
but rather the matter for the form, we must gather from
not be united to a body which is composed of parts be-
the form the reason why the matter is such as it is; and
longing to various species.
not conversely. Now the intellectual soul, as we have seen
382
above (q. 55, a. 2) in the order of nature, holds the lowest by force of the matter itself. So the intellectual soul replace among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not
quires a body of equable complexion, which, however, is
naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels
corruptible by force of its matter. If, however, it be said
are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by
that God could avoid this, we answer that in the forma-
way of the senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But
tion of natural things we do not consider what God might
nature never fails in necessary things: therefore the intel-
do; but what is suitable to the nature of things, as Augus-
lectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of
tine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 1). God, however, provided in
understanding, but also with the power of feeling. Now
this case by applying a remedy against death in the gift of
the action of the senses is not performed without a cor-
grace.
poreal instrument. Therefore it behooved the intellectual
Reply to Objection 2. A body is not necessary to
soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ
the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation
of sense.
considered as such; but on account of the sensitive power,
Now all the other senses are based on the sense of
which requires an organ of equable temperament. There-
touch. But the organ of touch requires to be a medium
fore the intellectual soul had to be united to such a body,
between contraries, such as hot and cold, wet and dry, and
and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which
the like, of which the sense of touch has the perception;
fire was in excess; because otherwise there could not be an
thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries, and is
equability of temperament. And this body of an equable
able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of
temperament has a dignity of its own by reason of its be-
touch is reduced to an equable complexion, the more sen-
ing remote from contraries, thereby resembling in a way
sitive will be the touch. But the intellectual soul has the
a heavenly body.
power of sense in all its completeness; because what be-
Reply to Objection 3. The parts of an animal, for in-
longs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in
stance, the eye, hand, flesh, and bones, and so forth, do
the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Therefore
not make the species; but the whole does, and therefore,
the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be
properly speaking, we cannot say that these are of differ-
a mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable
ent species, but that they are of various dispositions. This
complexion. For this reason among animals, man has the
is suitable to the intellectual soul, which, although it be
best sense of touch. And among men, those who have the
one in its essence, yet on account of its perfection, is man-
best sense of touch have the best intelligence. A sign of
ifold in power: and therefore, for its various operations it
which is that we observe “those who are refined in body
requires various dispositions in the parts of the body to
are well endowed in mind,” as stated in De Anima ii, 9.
which it is united. For this reason we observe that there
Reply to Objection 1. Perhaps someone might at-
is a greater variety of parts in perfect than in imperfect
tempt to answer this by saying that before sin the human
animals; and in these a greater variety than in plants.
body was incorruptible. This answer does not seem suf-
Reply to Objection 4. The intellectual soul as com-
ficient; because before sin the human body was immortal
prehending universals, has a power extending to the in-
not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise its
finite; therefore it cannot be limited by nature to cer-
immortality would not be forfeited through sin, as neither
tain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed means
was the immortality of the devil.
whether of defence or of clothing, as is the case with other
Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in
animals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge
matter two conditions are to be found; one which is cho-
and power in regard to fixed particular things. Instead of
sen in order that the matter be suitable to the form; the
all these, man has by nature his reason and his hands,
other which follows by force of the first disposition. The
which are “the organs of organs” (De Anima iii), since
artisan, for instance, for the form of the saw chooses iron
by their means man can make for himself instruments of
adapted for cutting through hard material; but that the
an infinite variety, and for any number of purposes.
teeth of the saw may become blunt and rusted, follows
Whether the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental Ia q. 76 a. 6
dispositions?
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul
the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since
is united to the body through the medium of accidental
the soul is a substantial form.
dispositions. For every form exists in its proper disposed
Objection 2. Further, various forms of one species re-
matter. But dispositions to a form are accidents. There-
quire various parts of matter. But various parts of matter
fore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter before
are unintelligible without division in measurable quanti-
383
ties. Therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter be-we have said above (a. 4). Wherefore it is impossible for
fore the substantial forms, which are many belonging to
any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter before
one species.
the substantial form, and consequently before the soul.
Objection 3. Further, what is spiritual is connected
Reply to Objection 1. As appears from what has
with what is corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue
been already said (a. 4), the more perfect form virtually
of the soul is its power. Therefore it seems that the soul
contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms; therefore
is united to the body by means of a power, which is an
while remaining one and the same, it perfects matter ac-
accident.
cording to the various degrees of perfection. For the same
On the contrary, Accident is posterior to substance,
essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living
both in the order of time and in the order of reason, as the
being, an animal, and a man. Now it is clear that to ev-
Philosopher says, Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 1). Therefore it
ery “genus” follow its own proper accidents. Therefore as
is unintelligible that any accidental form exist in matter
matter is apprehended as perfected in its existence, before
before the soul, which is the substantial form.
it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so those accidents
I answer that, If the soul were united to the body,
which belong to existence are understood to exist before
merely as a motor, there would be nothing to prevent the
corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in mat-
existence of certain dispositions mediating between the
ter before the form, not as regards all its effects, but as
soul and the body; on the contrary, they would be nec-
regards the subsequent effect.
essary, for on the part of the soul would be required the
Reply to Objection 2. Dimensions of quantity are ac-
power to move the body; and on the part of the body, a
cidents consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the
certain aptitude to be moved by the soul.
whole matter. Wherefore matter, once understood as cor-
If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body
poreal and measurable, can be understood as distinct in its
as the substantial form, as we have already said above
various parts, and as receptive of different forms accord-
(a. 1), it is impossible for any accidental disposition to
ing to the further degrees of perfection. For although it is
come between the body and the soul, or between any sub-
essentially the same form which gives matter the various
stantial form whatever and its matter. The reason is be-
degrees of perfection, as we have said (ad 1), yet it is con-
cause since matter is in potentiality to all manner of acts
sidered as different when brought under the observation
in a certain order, what is absolutely first among the acts
of reason.
must be understood as being first in matter. Now the first
Reply to Objection 3. A spiritual substance which
among all acts is existence. Therefore, it is impossible
is united to a body as its motor only, is united thereto by
for matter to be apprehended as hot, or as having quan-
power or virtue. But the intellectual soul is united by its
tity, before it is actual. But matter has actual existence by
very being to the body as a form; and yet it guides and
the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely, as
moves the body by its power and virtue.
Whether the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body?
Ia q. 76 a. 7
Objection 1. It seems that the soul is united to the an-
ments, and unite them together.
imal body by means of a body. For Augustine says (Gen.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii,
ad lit. vii, 19), that “the soul administers the body by
1): “We need not ask if the soul and body are one, as nei-
light,” that is, by fire, “and by air, which is most akin to a
ther do we ask if wax and its shape are one.” But the shape
spirit.” But fire and air are bodies. Therefore the soul is
is united to the wax without a body intervening. Therefore
united to the human body by means of a body.
also the soul is thus united to the body.
Objection 2. Further, a link between two things seems
I answer that, If the soul, according to the Platonists, to be that thing the removal of which involves the cessa-were united to the body merely as a motor, it would be
tion of their union. But when breathing ceases, the soul is
right to say that some other bodies must intervene between
separated from the body. Therefore the breath, which is a
the soul and body of man, or any animal whatever; for a
subtle body, is the means of union between soul and body.
motor naturally moves what is distant from it by means of
Objection 3. Further, things which are very distant
something nearer.
from one another, are not united except by something be-
If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form,
tween them. But the intellectual soul is very distant from
as we have said (a. 1), it is impossible for it to be united by the body, both because it is incorporeal, and because it
means of another body. The reason of this is that a thing is
is incorruptible. Therefore it seems to be united to the
one, according as it is a being. Now the form, through it-
body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would
self, makes a thing to be actual since it is itself essentially be some heavenly light, which would harmonize the ele-an act; nor does it give existence by means of something
384
else. Wherefore the unity of a thing composed of matter the body as the form to matter.
and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by reason
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine speaks there of the
of its very nature is united to matter as its act. Nor is there soul as it moves the body; whence he uses the word “ad-any other cause of union except the agent, which causes
ministration.” It is true that it moves the grosser parts of
matter to be in act, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii
the body by the more subtle parts. And the first instrument
(Did. vii, 6).
of the motive power is a kind of spirit, as the Philosopher
From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those
says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x).
who maintained the existence of some mediate bodies be-
Reply to Objection 2. The union of soul and body
tween the soul and body of man. Of these certain Platon-
ceases at the cessation of breath, not because this is the
ists said that the intellectual soul has an incorruptible body
means of union, but because of the removal of that dis-
naturally united to it, from which it is never separated, and
position by which the body is disposed for such a union.
by means of which it is united to the corruptible body of
Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, as the first
man. Others said that the soul is united to the body by
instrument of motion.
means of a corporeal spirit. Others said it is united to the
Reply to Objection 3. The soul is indeed very dis-
body by means of light, which, they say, is a body and of
tant from the body, if we consider the condition of each
the nature of the fifth essence; so that the vegetative soul
separately: so that if each had a separate existence, many
would be united to the body by means of the light of the
means of connection would have to intervene. But inas-
sidereal heaven; the sensible soul, by means of the light
much as the soul is the form of the body, it has not an
of the crystal heaven; and the intellectual soul by means
existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its
of the light of the empyrean heaven. Now all this is fic-
own existence is united to the body immediately. This is
tious and ridiculous: for light is not a body; and the fifth
the case with every form which, if considered as an act, is
essence does not enter materially into the composition of
very distant from matter, which is a being only in poten-
a mixed body (since it is unchangeable), but only virtu-
tiality.
ally: and lastly, because the soul is immediately united to
Whether the soul is in each part of the body?
Ia q. 76 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that the whole soul is not
dent on the soul. Thus one part would not depend on an-
in each part of the body; for the Philosopher says in De
other; nor would one part be nobler than another; which
causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x): “It is not
is clearly untrue. Therefore the soul is not in each part of
necessary for the soul to be in each part of the body; it
the body.
suffices that it be in some principle of the body causing
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), that
the other parts to live, for each part has a natural move-
“in each body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in
ment of its own.”
each part is entire.”
Objection 2. Further, the soul is in the body of which
I answer that, As we have said, if the soul were united
it is the act. But it is the act of an organic body. There-
to the body merely as its motor, we might say that it is
fore it exists only in an organic body. But each part of the
not in each part of the body, but only in one part through
human body is not an organic body. Therefore the whole
which it would move the others. But since the soul is
soul is not in each part.
united to the body as its form, it must necessarily be in
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (De An-
the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an
ima. ii, 1) that the relation of a part of the soul to a part
accidental form, but the substantial form of the body. Now
of the body, such as the sight to the pupil of the eye, is the
the substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each
same as the relation of the soul to the whole body of an
part of the whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a
animal. If, therefore, the whole soul is in each part of the
form of the whole which does not give existence to each
body, it follows that each part of the body is an animal.
of the parts of the body, is a form consisting in compo-
Objection 4. Further, all the powers of the soul are
sition and order, such as the form of a house; and such
rooted in the essence of the soul. If, therefore, the whole
a form is accidental. But the soul is a substantial form;
soul be in each part of the body, it follows that all the
and therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of
powers of the soul are in each part of the body; thus the
the whole, but also of each part. Therefore, on the with-
sight will be in the ear, and hearing in the eye, and this is
drawal of the soul, as we do not speak of an animal or a
absurd.
man unless equivocally, as we speak of a painted animal
Objection 5. Further, if the whole soul is in each part
or a stone animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the flesh
of the body, each part of the body is immediately depen-
and bones, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1). A
385
proof of which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no species and essence, then the whole whiteness is in each
part of the body retains its proper action; although that
part of a surface.
which retains its species, retains the action of the species.
Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality,
But act is in that which it actuates: wherefore the soul
neither essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is
must be in the whole body, and in each part thereof.
enough to say that the whole soul is in each part of the
That it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded
body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by
from this, that since a whole is that which is divided into
totality of power. For it is not in each part of the body,
parts, there are three kinds of totality, corresponding to
with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight,
three kinds of division. There is a whole which is di-
it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; vided into parts of quantity, as a whole line, or a whole
and so forth. We must observe, however, that since the
body. There is also a whole which is divided into logical
soul requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is
and essential parts: as a thing defined is divided into the
not the same as its relation to the parts; for to the whole
parts of a definition, and a composite into matter and form.
it is compared primarily and essentially, as to its proper
There is, further, a third kind of whole which is potential,
and proportionate perfectible; but to the parts, secondar-
divided into virtual parts. The first kind of totality does
ily, inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole.
not apply to forms, except perhaps accidentally; and then
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking
only to those forms, which have an indifferent relation-
there of the motive power of the soul.
ship to a quantitative whole and its parts; as whiteness,
Reply to Objection 2. The soul is the act of an organic
as far as its essence is concerned, is equally disposed to
body, as of its primary and proportionate perfectible.
be in the whole surface and in each part of the surface;
Reply to Objection 3. An animal is that which is
and, therefore, the surface being divided, the whiteness is
composed of a soul and a whole body, which is the soul’s
accidentally divided. But a form which requires variety
primary and proportionate perfectible. Thus the soul is
in the parts, such as a soul, and specially the soul of per-
not in a part. Whence it does not follow that a part of an
fect animals, is not equally related to the whole and the
animal is an animal.
parts: hence it is not divided accidentally when the whole
Reply to Objection 4. Some of the powers of the soul
is divided. So therefore quantitative totality cannot be at-
are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the
tributed to the soul, either essentially or accidentally. But
body, namely the intellect and the will; whence these pow-
the second kind of totality, which depends on logical and
ers are not said to be in any part of the body. Other powers
essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs to
are common to the soul and body; wherefore each of these
forms: and likewise the virtual totality, because a form is
powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that
the principle of operation.
part of the body, which is adapted to the operation of such
Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness
a power.
is in the whole surface and in each part thereof, it is neces-
Reply to Objection 5. One part of the body is said to
sary to distinguish. If we mean quantitative totality which
be nobler than another, on account of the various powers,
whiteness has accidentally, then the whole whiteness is
of which the parts of the body are the organs. For that part
not in each part of the surface. The same is to be said
which is the organ of a nobler power, is a nobler part of
of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the
the body: as also is that part which serves the same power
whole surface moves the sight more than the whiteness
in a nobler manner.
which is in a small part thereof. But if we mean totality of
386
FIRST PART, QUESTION 77
Of Those Things Which Belong to the Powers of the Soul in General (In Eight Articles)
We proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the soul; first, in general, secondly, in particular.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the essence of the soul is its power?
(2) Whether there is one power of the soul, or several?
(3) How the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another?
(4) Of the orders of the powers, one to another;
(5) Whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their subject?
(6) Whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul?
(7) Whether one power rises from another?
(8) Whether all the powers of the soul remain in the soul after death?
Whether the essence of the soul is its power?
Ia q. 77 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the essence of the
substantial differences; and they are taken from sense and
soul is its power. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4), that
reason, which are powers of the soul. Therefore the pow-
“mind, knowledge, and love are in the soul substantially,
ers of the soul are not accidents; and so it would seem that
or, which is the same thing, essentially”: and (De Trin. x,
the power of the soul is its own essence.
11), that “memory, understanding, and will are one life,
On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that
one mind, one essence.”
“heavenly spirits are divided into essence, power, and op-
Objection 2. Further, the soul is nobler than primary
eration.” Much more, then, in the soul is the essence dis-
matter. But primary matter is its own potentiality. Much
tinct from the virtue or power.
more therefore is the soul its own power.
I answer that, It is impossible to admit that the power
Objection 3. Further, the substantial form is simpler
of the soul is its essence, although some have maintained
than the accidental form; a sign of which is that the sub-
it. For the present purpose this may be proved in two
stantial form is not intensified or relaxed, but is indivisi-
ways. First, because, since power and act divide being
ble. But the accidental form is its own power. Much more
and every kind of being, we must refer a power and its act
therefore is that substantial form which is the soul.
to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the genus
Objection 4. Further, we sense by the sensitive power
of substance, the power directed to that act cannot be in
and we understand by the intellectual power. But “that by
the genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul
which we first sense and understand” is the soul, accord-
is not in the genus of substance; for this belongs to God
ing to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2). Therefore the
alone, whose operation is His own substance. Wherefore
soul is its own power.
the Divine power which is the principle of His operation
Objection 5. Further, whatever does not belong to the
is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true either of
essence is an accident. Therefore if the power of the soul
the soul, or of any creature; as we have said above when
is something else besides the essence thereof, it is an ac-
speaking of the angels (q. 54, a. 3). Secondly, this may be
cident, which is contrary to Augustine, who says that the
also shown to be impossible in the soul. For the soul by its
foregoing (see obj. 1) “are not in the soul as in a subject
very essence is an act. Therefore if the very essence of the
as color or shape, or any other quality, or quantity, are in
soul were the immediate principle of operation, whatever
a body; for whatever is so, does not exceed the subject in
has a soul would always have actual vital actions, as that
which it is: Whereas the mind can love and know other
which has a soul is always an actually living thing. For as
things” (De Trin. ix, 4).
a form the soul is not an act ordained to a further act, but
Objection 6. Further, ” a simple form cannot be a sub-
the ultimate term of generation. Wherefore, for it to be in
ject.” But the soul is a simple form; since it is not com-
potentiality to another act, does not belong to it according
posed of matter and form, as we have said above (q. 75,
to its essence, as a form, but according to its power. So the
a. 5). Therefore the power of the soul cannot be in it as in
soul itself, as the subject of its power, is called the first act, a subject.
with a further relation to the second act. Now we observe
Objection 7. Further, an accident is not the principle
that what has a soul is not always actual with respect to
of a substantial difference. But sensitive and rational are
its vital operations; whence also it is said in the definition
387
of the soul, that it is “the act of a body having life poten-but not the proximate principle. In this sense the Philoso-
tially”; which potentiality, however, “does not exclude the
pher says that “the soul is that whereby we understand and
soul.” Therefore it follows that the essence of the soul is
sense.”
not its power. For nothing is in potentiality by reason of
Reply to Objection 5. If we take accident as mean-
an act, as act.
ing what is divided against substance, then there can be
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of the
no medium between substance and accident; because they
mind as it knows and loves itself. Thus knowledge and
are divided by affirmation and negation, that is, according
love as referred to the soul as known and loved, are
to existence in a subject, and non-existence in a subject.
substantially or essentially in the soul, for the very sub-
In this sense, as the power of the soul is not its essence, it
stance or essence of the soul is known and loved. In the
must be an accident; and it belongs to the second species
same way are we to understand what he says in the other
of accident, that of quality. But if we take accident as
passage, that those things are “one life, one mind, one
one of the five universals, in this sense there is a medium
essence.” Or, as some say, this passage is true in the sense
between substance and accident. For the substance is all
in which the potential whole is predicated of its parts, be-
that belongs to the essence of a thing; whereas whatever
ing midway between the universal whole, and the integral
is beyond the essence of a thing cannot be called accident
whole. For the universal whole is in each part according
in this sense; but only what is not caused by the essential
to its entire essence and power; as animal in a man and
principle of the species. For the ‘proper’ does not belong
in a horse; and therefore it is properly predicated of each
to the essence of a thing, but is caused by the essential
part. But the integral whole is not in each part, neither
principles of the species; wherefore it is a medium be-
according to its whole essence, nor according to its whole
tween the essence and accident thus understood. In this
power. Therefore in no way can it be predicated of each
sense the powers of the soul may be said to be a medium
part; yet in a way it is predicated, though improperly, of
between substance and accident, as being natural proper-
all the parts together; as if we were to say that the wall,
ties of the soul. When Augustine says that knowledge and
roof, and foundations are a house. But the potential whole
love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject, this must
is in each part according to its whole essence, not, how-
be understood in the sense given above, inasmuch as they
ever, according to its whole power. Therefore in a way
are compared to the soul, not as loving and knowing, but
it can be predicated of each part, but not so properly as
as loved and known. His argument proceeds in this sense;
the universal whole. In this sense, Augustine says that the
for if love were in the soul loved as in a subject, it would
memory, understanding, and the will are the one essence
follow that an accident transcends its subject, since even
of the soul.
other things are loved through the soul.
Reply to Objection 2. The act to which primary mat-
Reply to Objection 6. Although the soul is not com-
ter is in potentiality is the substantial form. Therefore the
posed of matter and form, yet it has an admixture of po-
potentiality of matter is nothing else but its essence.
tentiality, as we have said above (q. 75, a. 5, ad 4); and
Reply to Objection 3. Action belongs to the com-
for this reason it can be the subject of an accident. The
posite, as does existence; for to act belongs to what ex-
statement quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure Act;
ists. Now the composite has substantial existence through
in treating of which subject Boethius employs that phrase
the substantial form; and it operates by the power which
(De Trin. i).
results from the substantial form. Hence an active acci-
Reply to Objection 7. Rational and sensitive, as dif-
dental form is to the substantial form of the agent (for
ferences, are not taken from the powers of sense and rea-
instance, heat compared to the form of fire) as the power
son, but from the sensitive and rational soul itself. But
of the soul is to the soul.
because substantial forms, which in themselves are un-
Reply to Objection 4. That the accidental form is a
known to us, are known by their accidents; nothing pre-
principle of action is due to the substantial form. There-
vents us from sometimes substituting accidents for sub-
fore the substantial form is the first principle of action;
stantial differences.
Whether there are several powers of the soul?
Ia q. 77 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there are not several
in power. Therefore above all others it has one virtue or
powers of the soul. For the intellectual soul approaches
power.
nearest to the likeness of God. But in God there is one
Objection 3. Further, to operate belongs to what is in
simple power: and therefore also in the intellectual soul.
act. But by the one essence of the soul, man has actual ex-
Objection 2. Further, the higher a power is, the more
istence in the different degrees of perfection, as we have
unified it is. But the intellectual soul excels all other forms seen above (q. 76, Aa. 3,4). Therefore by the one power
388
of the soul he performs operations of various degrees.
can acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, accord-
On the contrary, The Philosopher places several
ing to his nature, of those to whom beatitude is possible;
powers in the soul (De Anima ii, 2,3).
therefore the human soul requires many and various op-
I answer that, Of necessity we must place several
erations and powers. But to angels a smaller variety of
powers in the soul. To make this evident, we observe that,
powers is sufficient. In God there is no power or action
as the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, 12), the lowest or-
beyond His own Essence.
der of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they
There is yet another reason why the human soul
acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few movements;
abounds in a variety of powers—because it is on the con-
and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect
fines of spiritual and corporeal creatures; and therefore the
goodness by many movements; and those yet higher ac-
powers of both meet together in the soul.
quire perfect goodness by few movements; and the high-
Reply to Objection 1.
The intellectual soul ap-
est perfection is found in those things which acquire per-
proaches to the Divine likeness, more than inferior crea-
fect goodness without any movement whatever. Thus he
tures, in being able to acquire perfect goodness; although
is least of all disposed of health, who can only acquire
by many and various means; and in this it falls short of
imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better dis-
more perfect creatures.
posed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of
Reply to Objection 2. A unified power is superior if it
many remedies; and better still, he who can by few reme-
extends to equal things: but a multiform power is superior
dies; best of all is he who has perfect health without any
to it, if it is over many things.
remedies. We conclude, therefore, that things which are
Reply to Objection 3. One thing has one substantial
below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they
existence, but may have several operations. So there is
have a few determinate operations and powers. But man
one essence of the soul, with several powers.
can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he
Whether the powers are distinguished by their acts and objects?
Ia q. 77 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the powers of the soul
(De Anima ii, 4) that “acts and operations precede the
are not distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is
powers according to reason; and these again are preceded
determined to its species by what is subsequent and ex-
by their opposites,” that is their objects. Therefore the
trinsic to it. But the act is subsequent to the power; and
powers are distinguished according to their acts and ob-
the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore the soul’s powers
jects.
are not specifically distinct by acts and objects.
I answer that, A power as such is directed to an act.
Objection 2. Further, contraries are what differ most
Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from
from each other. Therefore if the powers are distinguished
the act to which it is directed, and consequently the nature
by their objects, it follows that the same power could not
of a power is diversified, as the nature of the act is diver-
have contrary objects. This is clearly false in almost all
sified. Now the nature of an act is diversified according to
the powers; for the power of vision extends to white and
the various natures of the objects. For every act is either
black, and the power to taste to sweet and bitter.
of an active power or of a passive power. Now, the object
Objection 3. Further, if the cause be removed, the ef-
is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and mov-
fect is removed. Hence if the difference of powers came
ing cause: for color is the principle of vision, inasmuch
from the difference of objects, the same object would not
as it moves the sight. On the other hand, to the act of an
come under different powers. This is clearly false; for the
active power the object is a term and end; as the object of
same thing is known by the cognitive power, and desired
the power of growth is perfect quantity, which is the end
by the appetitive.
of growth. Now, from these two things an act receives
Objection 4. Further, that which of itself is the cause
its species, namely, from its principle, or from its end or
of anything, is the cause thereof, wherever it is. But var-
term; for the act of heating differs from the act of cool-
ious objects which belong to various powers, belong also
ing, in this, that the former proceeds from something hot,
to some one power; as sound and color belong to sight and
which is the active principle, to heat; the latter from some-
hearing, which are different powers, yet they come under
thing cold, which is the active principle, to cold. There-
the one power of common sense. Therefore the powers
fore the powers are of necessity distinguished by their acts
are not distinguished according to the difference of their
and objects.
objects.
Nevertheless, we must observe that things which are
On the contrary, Things that are subsequent are dis-
accidental do not change the species. For since to be col-
tinguished by what precedes. But the Philosopher says
ored is accidental to an animal, its species is not changed
389
by a difference of color, but by a difference in that which Reply to Objection 2. If any power were to have one
belongs to the nature of an animal, that is to say, by a
of two contraries as such for its object, the other contrary
difference in the sensitive soul, which is sometimes ra-
would belong to another power. But the power of the soul
tional, and sometimes otherwise. Hence “rational” and
does not regard the nature of the contrary as such, but
“irrational” are differences dividing animal, constituting
rather the common aspect of both contraries; as sight does
its various species. In like manner therefore, not any va-
not regard white as such, but as color. This is because of
riety of objects diversifies the powers of the soul, but a
two contraries one, in a manner, includes the idea of the
difference in that to which the power of its very nature is
other, since they are to one another as perfect and imper-
directed. Thus the senses of their very nature are directed
fect.
to the passive quality which of itself is divided into color,
Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents things which
sound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive
coincide in subject, from being considered under different
power with regard to color, namely, the sight, and another
aspects; therefore they can belong to various powers of
with regard to sound, namely, hearing. But it is accidental
the soul.
to a passive quality, for instance, to something colored, to
Reply to Objection 4. The higher power of itself re-
be a musician or a grammarian, great or small, a man or a
gards a more universal formality of the object than the
stone. Therefore by reason of such differences the powers
lower power; because the higher a power is, to a greater
of the soul are not distinct.
number of things does it extend. Therefore many things
Reply to Objection 1. Act, though subsequent in ex-
are combined in the one formality of the object, which the
istence to power, is, nevertheless, prior to it in intention
higher power considers of itself; while they differ in the
and logically; as the end is with regard to the agent. And
formalities regarded by the lower powers of themselves.
the object, although extrinsic, is, nevertheless, the princi-
Thus it is that various objects belong to various lower
ple or end of the action; and those conditions which are
powers; which objects, however, are subject to one higher
intrinsic to a thing, are proportionate to its principle and
power.
end.
Whether among the powers of the soul there is order?
Ia q. 77 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no order
observe a triple order among them, two of which corre-
among the powers of the soul. For in those things which
spond to the dependence of one power on another; while
come under one division, there is no before and after, but
the third is taken from the order of the objects. Now the
all are naturally simultaneous. But the powers of the soul
dependence of one power on another can be taken in two
are contradistinguished from one another. Therefore there
ways; according to the order of nature, forasmuch as per-
is no order among them.
fect things are by their nature prior to imperfect things;
Objection 2. Further, the powers of the soul are re-
and according to the order of generation and time; foras-
ferred to their objects and to the soul itself. On the part of
much as from being imperfect, a thing comes to be per-
the soul, there is not order among them, because the soul
fect. Thus, according to the first kind of order among the
is one. In like manner the objects are various and dissimi-
powers, the intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive
lar, as color and sound. Therefore there is no order among
powers; wherefore they direct them and command them.
the powers of the soul.
Likewise the sensitive powers are prior in this order to the
Objection 3. Further, where there is order among
powers of the nutritive soul.
powers, we find that the operation of one depends on the
In the second kind of order, it is the other way about.
operation of another. But the action of one power of the
For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of
soul does not depend on that of another; for sight can act
generation to the powers of the sensitive soul; for which,
independently of hearing, and conversely. Therefore there
therefore, they prepare the body. The same is to be said of
is no order among the powers of the soul.
the sensitive powers with regard to the intellectual. But
On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 3)
in the third kind of order, certain sensitive powers are
compares the parts or powers of the soul to figures. But
ordered among themselves, namely, sight, hearing, and
figures have an order among themselves. Therefore the
smelling. For the visible naturally comes first; since it is
powers of the soul have order.
common to higher and lower bodies. But sound is audi-
I answer that, Since the soul is one, and the powers
ble in the air, which is naturally prior to the mingling of
are many; and since a number of things that proceed from
elements, of which smell is the result.
one must proceed in a certain order; there must be some
Reply to Objection 1. The species of a given genus
order among the powers of the soul. Accordingly we may
are to one another as before and after, like numbers and
390
figures, if considered in their nature; although they may jects, and furthermore on the part of the acts, as we have
be said to be simultaneous, according as they receive the
said above.
predication of the common genus.
Reply to Objection 3. This argument is verified as
Reply to Objection 2. This order among the powers
regards those powers among which order of the third kind
of the soul is both on the part of the soul (which, though
exists. Those powers among which the two other kinds
it be one according to its essence, has a certain aptitude to
of order exist are such that the action of one depends on
various acts in a certain order) and on the part of the ob-
another.
Whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject?
Ia q. 77 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that all the powers of the
understanding and will. Hence the powers of these opera-
soul are in the soul as their subject. For as the powers of
tions are in the soul as their subject. But some operations
the body are to the body; so are the powers of the soul to
of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs;
the soul. But the body is the subject of the corporeal pow-
as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is
ers. Therefore the soul is the subject of the powers of the
with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive
soul.
parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of
Objection 2. Further, the operations of the powers of
these operations have their subject in the composite, and
the soul are attributed to the body by reason of the soul;
not in the soul alone.
because, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2), “The
Reply to Objection 1. All the powers are said to be-
soul is that by which we sense and understand primar-
long to the soul, not as their subject, but as their principle; ily.” But the natural principles of the operations of the
because it is by the soul that the composite has the power
soul are the powers. Therefore the powers are primarily
to perform such operations.
in the soul.
Reply to Objection 2. All such powers are primarily
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
in the soul, as compared to the composite; not as in their
7,24) that the soul senses certain things, not through the
subject, but as in their principle.
body, in fact, without the body, as fear and such like; and
Reply to Objection 3. Plato’s opinion was that sensa-
some things through the body. But if the sensitive powers
tion is an operation proper to the soul, just as understand-
were not in the soul alone as their subject, the soul could
ing is. Now in many things relating to Philosophy Augus-
not sense anything without the body. Therefore the soul
tine makes use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting them
is the subject of the sensitive powers; and for a similar
as true, but relating them. However, as far as the present
reason, of all the other powers.
question is concerned, when it is said that the soul senses
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somno et
some things with the body, and some without the body,
Vigilia i) that “sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor
this can be taken in two ways. Firstly, the words “with
to the body, but to the composite.” Therefore the sensitive
the body or without the body” may determine the act of
power is in “the composite” as its subject. Therefore the
sense in its mode of proceeding from the sentient. Thus
soul alone is not the subject of all the powers.
the soul senses nothing without the body, because the ac-
I answer that, The subject of operative power is that
tion of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a
which is able to operate, for every accident denominates
corporeal organ. Secondly, they may be understood as de-
its proper subject. Now the same is that which is able to
termining the act of sense on the part of the object sensed.
operate, and that which does operate. Wherefore the “sub-
Thus the soul senses some things with the body, that is,
ject of power” is of necessity “the subject of operation,” as
things existing in the body, as when it feels a wound or
again the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Somno
something of that sort; while it senses some things with-
et Vigilia. Now, it is clear from what we have said above
out the body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but
(q. 75, Aa. 2,3; q. 76, a. 1, ad 1), that some operations
only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad
of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as
or joyful on hearing something.
Whether the powers of the soul flow from its essence?
Ia q. 77 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the powers of the
soul are many and various, they cannot proceed from its
soul do not flow from its essence. For different things do
essence.
not proceed from one simple thing. But the essence of the
Objection 2. Further, that from which a thing pro-
soul is one and simple. Since, therefore, the powers of the
ceeds is its cause. But the essence of the soul cannot be
391
said to be the cause of the powers; as is clear if one conneous accident, the subject is receptive only, the accident
siders the different kinds of causes. Therefore the powers
being caused by an extrinsic agent. Secondly, substan-
of the soul do not flow from its essence.
tial and accidental forms differ, because, since that which
Objection 3. Further, emanation involves some sort of
is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is
movement. But nothing is moved by itself, as the Philoso-
the more principal, matter therefore exists on account of
pher proves (Phys. vii, 1,2); except, perhaps, by reason of
the substantial form; while on the contrary, the accidental
a part of itself, as an animal is said to be moved by itself,
form exists on account of the completeness of the subject.
because one part thereof moves and another is moved.
Now it is clear, from what has been said (a. 5), that
Neither is the soul moved, as the Philosopher proves (De
either the subject of the soul’s powers is the soul itself
Anima i, 4). Therefore the soul does not produce its pow-
alone, which can be the subject of an accident, forasmuch
ers within itself.
as it has something of potentiality, as we have said above
On the contrary, The powers of the soul are its nat-
(a. 1, ad 6); or else this subject is the composite. Now the
ural properties. But the subject is the cause of its proper
composite is actual by the soul. Whence it is clear that
accidents; whence also it is included in the definition of
all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the
accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 4). There-
soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the
fore the powers of the soul proceed from its essence as
soul, as from their principle; because it has already been
their cause.
said that the accident is caused by the subject according
I answer that, The substantial and the accidental form
as it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in
partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that each
potentiality.
is an act; and that by each of them something is after
Reply to Objection 1. From one simple thing many
a manner actual. They differ, however, in two respects.
things may proceed naturally, in a certain order; or again
First, because the substantial form makes a thing to exist
if there be diversity of recipients. Thus, from the one
absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential.
essence of the soul many and various powers proceed;
But the accidental form does not make a thing to exist
both because order exists among these powers; and also
absolutely but to be such, or so great, or in some particu-
by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs.
lar condition; for its subject is an actual being. Hence it
Reply to Objection 2. The subject is both the final
is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial form
cause, and in a way the active cause, of its proper acci-
prior to its being observed in the subject: and since that
dent. It is also as it were the material cause, inasmuch as
which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, the sub-
it is receptive of the accident. From this we may gather
stantial form causes existence in its subject. On the other
that the essence of the soul is the cause of all its powers,
hand, actuality is observed in the subject of the acciden-
as their end, and as their active principle; and of some as
tal form prior to its being observed in the accidental form;
receptive thereof.
wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by
Reply to Objection 3. The emanation of proper ac-
the actuality of the subject. So the subject, forasmuch as
cidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation,
it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form: but but by a certain natural resultance; thus one thing results
forasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the
naturally from another, as color from light.
proper and “per se” accident; for with regard to the extra-
Whether one power of the soul arises from another?
Ia q. 77 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that one power of the soul
is like it in species. Now the powers of the soul are oppo-
does not arise from another. For if several things arise to-
sitely divided, as various species. Therefore one of them
gether, one of them does not arise from another. But all
does not proceed from another.
the powers of the soul are created at the same time with
On the contrary, Powers are known by their actions.
the soul. Therefore one of them does not arise from an-
But the action of one power is caused by the action of an-
other.
other power, as the action of the imagination by the action
Objection 2. Further, the power of the soul arises
of the senses. Therefore one power of the soul is caused
from the soul as an accident from the subject. But one
by another.
power of the soul cannot be the subject of another; be-
I answer that, In those things which proceed from one
cause nothing is the accident of an accident. Therefore
according to a natural order, as the first is the cause of all, one power does not arise from another.
so that which is nearer to the first is, in a way, the cause
Objection 3. Further, one opposite does not arise from
of those which are more remote. Now it has been shown
the other opposite; but everything arises from that which
above (a. 4) that among the powers of the soul there are
392
several kinds of order. Therefore one power of the soul material with regard to the intelligence. On this account,
proceeds from the essence of the soul by the medium of
the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order
another. But since the essence of the soul is compared to
of generation, for the animal is generated before the man.
the powers both as a principle active and final, and as a
Reply to Objection 1. As the power of the soul flows
receptive principle, either separately by itself, or together
from the essence, not by a transmutation, but by a certain
with the body; and since the agent and the end are more
natural resultance, and is simultaneous with the soul, so is
perfect, while the receptive principle, as such, is less per-
it the case with one power as regards another.
fect; it follows that those powers of the soul which pre-
Reply to Objection 2. An accident cannot of itself
cede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are
be the subject of an accident; but one accident is received
the principles of the others, after the manner of the end
prior to another into substance, as quantity prior to qual-
and active principle. For we see that the senses are for
ity. In this sense one accident is said to be the subject
the sake of the intelligence, and not the other way about.
of another; as surface is of color, inasmuch as substance
The senses, moreover, are a certain imperfect participa-
receives an accident through the means of another. The
tion of the intelligence; wherefore, according to their nat-
same thing may be said of the powers of the soul.
ural origin, they proceed from the intelligence as the im-
Reply to Objection 3. The powers of the soul are op-
perfect from the perfect. But considered as receptive prin-
posed to one another, as perfect and imperfect; as also are
ciples, the more perfect powers are principles with regard
the species of numbers and figures. But this opposition
to the others; thus the soul, according as it has the sensi-
does not prevent the origin of one from another, because
tive power, is considered as the subject, and as something
imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect things.
Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body?
Ia q. 77 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that all the powers of the
Objection 6. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
soul remain in the soul separated from the body. For we
xii, 32) that, as the soul, when the body lies senseless,
read in the book De Spiritu et Anima that “the soul with-
yet not quite dead, sees some things by imaginary vision;
draws from the body, taking with itself sense and imagi-
so also when by death the soul is quite separate from the
nation, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and iras-
body. But the imagination is a power of the sensitive part.
cibility.”
Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in the
Objection 2.
Further, the powers of the soul are
separate soul; and consequently all the other powers.
its natural properties. But properties are always in that
On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that
to which they belong; and are never separated from it.
“of two substances only does man consist; the soul with
Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even after death.
its reason, and the body with its senses.” Therefore the
Objection 3. Further, the powers even of the sensi-
body being dead, the sensitive powers do not remain.
tive soul are not weakened when the body becomes weak;
I answer that, As we have said already (Aa. 5,6,7),
because, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), “If an
all the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their
old man were given the eye of a young man, he would see
principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as
even as well as a young man.” But weakness is the road
their subject; as the intelligence and the will. These pow-
to corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not
ers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the
corrupted when the body is corrupted, but remain in the
body. But other powers are subjected in the composite; as
separated soul.
all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now ac-
Objection 4. Further, memory is a power of the sensi-
cidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject.
tive soul, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin.
Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers
1). But memory remains in the separated soul; for it was
do not remain actually; but they remain virtually in the
said to the rich glutton whose soul was in hell: “Remem-
soul, as in their principle or root.
ber that thou didst receive good things during thy lifetime”
So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in
(Lk. 16:25). Therefore memory remains in the separated
the soul even after the corruption of the body. It is much
soul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive
more false that, as they say also, the acts of these powers
part.
remain in the separate soul; because these powers have no
Objection 5. Further, joy and sorrow are in the concu-
act apart from the corporeal organ.
piscible part, which is a power of the sensitive soul. But it
Reply to Objection 1. That book has no authority,
is clear that separate souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or
and so what is there written can be despised with the same
rewards which they receive. Therefore the concupiscible
facility as it was said; although we may say that the soul
power remains in the separate soul.
takes with itself these powers, not actually but virtually.
393
Reply to Objection 2. These powers, which we say Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7) places memory in the mind; not as a
do not actually remain in the separate soul, are not the
part of the sensitive soul.
properties of the soul alone, but of the composite.
Reply to Objection 5. In the separate soul, sorrow
Reply to Objection 3. These powers are said not to
and joy are not in the sensitive, but in the intellectual ap-
be weakened when the body becomes weak, because the
petite, as in the angels.
soul remains unchangeable, and is the virtual principle of
Reply to Objection 6. Augustine in that passage is
these powers.
speaking as inquiring, not as asserting. Wherefore he re-
Reply to Objection 4. The recollection spoken of
tracted some things which he had said there (Retrac. ii,
there is to be taken in the same way as Augustine (De
24).
394
FIRST PART, QUESTION 78
Of the Specific Powers of the Soul
(In Four Articles)
We next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. The theologian, however, has only to inquire specifically concerning the intellectual and appetitive powers, in which the virtues reside. And since the knowledge of these powers depends to a certain extent on the other powers, our consideration of the powers of the soul taken specifically will be divided into three parts: first, we shall consider those powers which are a preamble to the intellect; secondly, the intellectual powers; thirdly, the appetitive powers.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The powers of the soul considered generally;
(2) The various species of the vegetative part;
(3) The exterior senses;
(4) The interior senses.
Whether there are to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul?
Ia q. 78 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there are not to be
and four are called modes of living. The reason of this
distinguished five genera of powers in the soul—namely,
diversity lies in the various souls being distinguished ac-
vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellec-
cordingly as the operation of the soul transcends the op-
tual. For the powers of the soul are called its parts. But
eration of the corporeal nature in various ways; for the
only three parts of the soul are commonly assigned—
whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is related
namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the ra-
to it as its matter and instrument. There exists, therefore,
tional soul. Therefore there are only three genera of pow-
an operation of the soul which so far exceeds the corpo-
ers in the soul, and not five.
real nature that it is not even performed by any corporeal
Objection 2. Further, the powers of the soul are the
organ; and such is the operation of the “rational soul.”
principles of its vital operations. Now, in four ways is a
Below this, there is another operation of the soul, which
thing said to live. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii,
is indeed performed through a corporeal organ, but not
2): “In several ways a thing is said to live, and even if only
through a corporeal quality, and this is the operation of the
one of these is present, the thing is said to live; as intellect
“sensitive soul”; for though hot and cold, wet and dry, and
and sense, local movement and rest, and lastly, movement
other such corporeal qualities are required for the work of
of decrease and increase due to nourishment.” Therefore
the senses, yet they are not required in such a way that the
there are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the
operation of the senses takes place by virtue of such qual-
appetitive is excluded.
ities; but only for the proper disposition of the organ. The
Objection 3. Further, a special kind of soul ought not
lowest of the operations of the soul is that which is per-
to be assigned as regards what is common to all the pow-
formed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue of a corporeal
ers. Now desire is common to each power of the soul.
quality. Yet this transcends the operation of the corporeal
For sight desires an appropriate visible object; whence we
nature; because the movements of bodies are caused by
read (Ecclus. 40:22): “The eye desireth favor and beauty,
an extrinsic principle, while these operations are from an
but more than these green sown fields.” In the same way
intrinsic principle; for this is common to all the operations
every other power desires its appropriate object. There-
of the soul; since every animate thing, in some way, moves
fore the appetitive power should not be made a special
itself. Such is the operation of the “vegetative soul”; for
genus of the powers of the soul.
digestion, and what follows, is caused instrumentally by
Objection 4. Further, the moving principle in animals
the action of heat, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii,
is sense, intellect or appetite, as the Philosopher says (De
4).
Anima iii, 10). Therefore the motive power should not be
Now the powers of the soul are distinguished generi-
added to the above as a special genus of soul.
cally by their objects. For the higher a power is, the more
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima
universal is the object to which it extends, as we have said
ii, 3), “The powers are the vegetative, the sensitive, the
above (q. 77, a. 3, ad 4). But the object of the soul’s op-
appetitive, the locomotion, and the intellectual.”
eration may be considered in a triple order. For in the
I answer that, There are five genera of powers of the
soul there is a power the object of which is only the body
soul, as above numbered. Of these, three are called souls,
that is united to that soul; the powers of this genus are
395
called “vegetative” for the vegetative power acts only on movement to seek necessaries of life from a distance. And
the body to which the soul is united. There is another
there are some living things which with these have intel-
genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a
lectual power—namely, men. But the appetitive power
more universal object—namely, every sensible body, not
does not constitute a degree of living things; because
only the body to which the soul is united. And there is yet
wherever there is sense there is also appetite (De Anima
another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus re-
ii, 3).
gards a still more universal object—namely, not only the
Thus the first two objectives are hereby solved.
sensible body, but all being in universal. Wherefore it is
Reply to Objection 3. The “natural appetite” is that
evident that the latter two genera of the soul’s powers have
inclination which each thing has, of its own nature, for
an operation in regard not merely to that which is united to
something; wherefore by its natural appetite each power
them, but also to something extrinsic. Now, since what-
desires something suitable to itself. But the “animal ap-
ever operates must in some way be united to the object
petite” results from the form apprehended; this sort of ap-
about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this
petite requires a special power of the soul—mere appre-
something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul’s op-
hension does not suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists
eration, must be related to the soul in a twofold manner.
in its own nature, whereas in the apprehensive power it
First, inasmuch as this something extrinsic has a natural
exists not according to its own nature, but according to
aptitude to be united to the soul, and to be by its likeness
its likeness. Whence it is clear that sight desires naturally
in the soul. In this way there are two kinds of powers
a visible object for the purpose of its act only—namely,
—namely, the “sensitive” in regard to the less common
for the purpose of seeing; but the animal by the appetitive
object—the sensible body; and the “intellectual,” in re-
power desires the thing seen, not merely for the purpose
gard to the most common object—universal being. Sec-
of seeing it, but also for other purposes. But if the soul
ondly, forasmuch as the soul itself has an inclination and
did not require things perceived by the senses, except on
tendency to the something extrinsic. And in this way
account of the actions of the senses, that is, for the pur-
there are again two kinds of powers in the soul: one—
pose of sensing them; there would be no need for a spe-
the “appetitive”—in respect of which the soul is referred
cial genus of appetitive powers, since the natural appetite
to something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the
of the powers would suffice.
intention; the other—the “locomotive” power—in respect
Reply to Objection 4. Although sense and appetite
of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to
are principles of movement in perfect animals, yet sense
the term of its operation and movement; for every animal
and appetite, as such, are not sufficient to cause move-
is moved for the purpose of realizing its desires and inten-
ment, unless another power be added to them; for immov-
tions.
able animals have sense and appetite, and yet they have
The modes of living are distinguished according to the
not the power of motion. Now this motive power is not
degrees of living things. There are some living things in
only in the appetite and sense as commanding the move-
which there exists only vegetative power, as the plants.
ment, but also in the parts of the body, to make them obey
There are others in which with the vegetative there exists
the appetite of the soul which moves them. Of this we
also the sensitive, but not the locomotive power; such as
have a sign in the fact that when the members are deprived
immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which
of their natural disposition, they do not move in obedience
besides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals,
to the appetite.
which require many things for their life, and consequently
Whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly described as the nutritive, aug-Ia q. 78 a. 2
mentative, and generative?
Objection 1. It would seem that the parts of the veg-
or not living. Therefore the generative force should not be
etative soul are not fittingly described—namely, the nu-
classed as a power of the soul.
tritive, augmentative, and generative. For these are called
Objection 3. Further, the soul is more powerful than
“natural” forces. But the powers of the soul are above the
the body. But the body by the same force gives species
natural forces. Therefore we should not class the above
and quantity; much more, therefore, does the soul. There-
forces as powers of the soul.
fore the augmentative power of the soul is not distinct
Objection 2. Further, we should not assign a partic-
from the generative power.
ular power of the soul to that which is common to living
Objection 4. Further, everything is preserved in be-
and non-living things. But generation is common to all
ing by that whereby it exists. But the generative power
things that can be generated and corrupted, whether living
is that whereby a living thing exists. Therefore by the
396
same power the living thing is preserved. Now the nutri-a thing which is already perfect to “produce another like
tive force is directed to the preservation of the living thing
unto itself.” And the generative power is served by the
(De Anima ii, 4), being “a power which is capable of pre-
augmentative and nutritive powers; and the augmentative
serving whatever receives it.” Therefore we should not
power by the nutritive.
distinguish the nutritive power from the generative.
Reply to Objection 1. Such forces are called natural,
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii,
both because they produce an effect like that of nature,
2,4) that the operations of this soul are “generation, the
which also gives existence, quantity and preservation (al-
use of food,” and (cf. De Anima iii, 9) “growth.”
though the above forces accomplish these things in a more
I answer that, The vegetative part has three powers.
perfect way); and because those forces perform their ac-
For the vegetative part, as we have said (a. 1), has for its
tions instrumentally, through the active and passive quali-
object the body itself, living by the soul; for which body a
ties, which are the principles of natural actions.
triple operation of the soul is required. One is whereby it
Reply to Objection 2. Generation of inanimate things
acquires existence, and to this is directed the “generative”
is entirely from an extrinsic source; whereas the genera-
power. Another is whereby the living body acquires its
tion of living things is in a higher way, through something
due quantity; to this is directed the “augmentative” power.
in the living thing itself, which is the semen containing the
Another is whereby the body of a living thing is preserved
principle productive of the body. Therefore there must be
in its existence and in its due quantity; to this is directed
in the living thing a power that prepares this semen; and
the “nutritive” power.
this is the generative power.
We must, however, observe a difference among these
Reply to Objection 3. Since the generation of living
powers. The nutritive and the augmentative have their ef-
things is from a semen, it is necessary that in the begin-
fect where they exist, since the body itself united to the
ning an animal of small size be generated. For this reason
soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and nu-
it must have a power in the soul, whereby it is brought to
tritive powers which exist in one and the same soul. But
its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is generated
the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same
from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent; therefore
body but in another; for a thing cannot generate itself.
it receives at once its nature and its quantity, according to
Therefore the generative power, in a way, approaches to
the condition of the matter.
the dignity of the sensitive soul, which has an operation
Reply to Objection 4. As we have said above (a. 1),
extending to extrinsic things, although in a more excel-
the operation of the vegetative principle is performed by
lent and more universal manner; for that which is highest
means of heat, the property of which is to consume hu-
in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest
midity. Therefore, in order to restore the humidity thus
in the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius (Div.
lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food is
Nom. vii). Therefore, of these three powers, the gener-
changed into the substance of the body. This is also nec-
ative has the greater finality, nobility, and perfection, as
essary for the action of the augmentative and generative
the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4), for it belongs to
powers.
Whether the five exterior senses are properly distinguished?
Ia q. 78 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem inaccurate to distinguish
touch grasps several contraries; such as hot or cold, damp
five exterior senses. But there are many kinds of acci-
or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a single sense but
dents. Therefore, as powers are distinguished by their ob-
several. Therefore there are more than five senses.
jects, it seems that the senses are multiplied according to
Objection 4. Further, a species is not divided against
the number of the kinds of accidents.
its genus. But taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should
Objection 2. Further, magnitude and shape, and other
not be classed as a distinct sense of touch.
things which are called “common sensibles,” are “not sen-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
sibles by accident,” but are contradistinguished from them
1): “There is no other besides the five senses.”
by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 6). Now the diversity of
I answer that, The reason of the distinction and num-
objects, as such, diversifies the powers. Since, therefore,
ber of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs
magnitude and shape are further from color than sound is,
in which one or other of the elements preponderate, as wa-
it seems that there is much more need for another sensi-
ter, air, or the like. By others it has been assigned to the
tive power than can grasp magnitude or shape than for that
medium, which is either in conjunction or extrinsic and is
which grasps color or sound.
either water or air, or such like. Others have ascribed it
Objection 3. Further, one sense regards one contra-
to the various natures of the sensible qualities, according
riety; as sight regards white and black. But the sense of
as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from
397
complexity. But none of these explanations is apt. For the the motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves (Phys.
powers are not for the organs, but the organs for the pow-
viii, 7). Touch and taste are the most material of all: of
ers; wherefore there are not various powers for the reason
the distinction of which we shall speak later on (ad 3,4).
that there are various organs; on the contrary, for this has
Hence it is that the three other senses are not exercised
nature provided a variety of organs, that they might be
through a medium united to them, to obviate any natural
adapted to various powers. In the same way nature pro-
immutation in their organ; as happens as regards these two
vided various mediums for the various senses, according
senses.
to the convenience of the acts of the powers. And to be
Reply to Objection 1. Not every accident has in it-
cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities does not per-
self a power of immutation but only qualities of the third
tain to the senses, but to the intellect.
species, which are the principles of alteration: therefore
The reason of the number and distinction of the exte-
only suchlike qualities are the objects of the senses; be-
rior senses must therefore be ascribed to that which be-
cause “the senses are affected by the same things whereby
longs to the senses properly and “per se.” Now, sense is
inanimate bodies are affected,” as stated in Phys. vii, 2.
a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior
Reply to Objection 2. Size, shape, and the like, which
sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immuta-
are called “common sensibles,” are midway between “ac-
tion is what is “per se” perceived by the sense, and accord-
cidental sensibles” and “proper sensibles,” which are the
ing to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive
objects of the senses. For the proper sensibles first, and
powers diversified.
of their very nature, affect the senses; since they are qual-
Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the
ities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles are
other spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the
all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is clear
form of the immuter being received according to its natu-
that they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about
ral existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received
quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity, since the no-
into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual immutation takes
tion of shape consists of fixing the bounds of magnitude.
place by the form of the immuter being received, accord-
Movement and rest are sensed according as the subject is
ing to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing im-
affected in one or more ways in the magnitude of the sub-
muted, as the form of color is received into the pupil
ject or of its local distance, as in the movement of growth
which does not thereby become colored. Now, for the
or of locomotion, or again, according as it is affected in
operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required,
some sensible qualities, as in the movement of alteration;
whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the
and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a way, to sense
sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone
one thing and many. Now quantity is the proximate sub-
sufficed for the sense’s action, all natural bodies would
ject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of
feel when they undergo alteration.
color. Therefore the common sensibles do not move the
But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only,
senses first and of their own nature, but by reason of the
as in “sight” while in others we find not only spiritual but
sensible quality; as the surface by reason of color. Yet they
also a natural immutation; either on the part of the ob-
are not accidental sensibles, for they produce a certain va-
ject only, or likewise on the part of the organ. On the
riety in the immutation of the senses. For sense is im-
part of the object we find natural immutation, as to place,
muted differently by a large and by a small surface: since
in sound which is the object of “hearing”; for sound is
whiteness itself is said to be great or small, and therefore
caused by percussion and commotion of air: and we find
it is divided according to its proper subject.
natural immutation by alteration, in odor which is the ob-
Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher seems to
ject of “smelling”; for in order to exhale an odor, a body
say (De Anima ii, 11), the sense of touch is generically
must be in a measure affected by heat. On the part of
one, but is divided into several specific senses, and for this
an organ, natural immutation takes place in “touch” and
reason it extends to various contrarieties; which senses,
“taste”; for the hand that touches something hot becomes
however, are not separate from one another in their or-
hot, while the tongue is moistened by the humidity of the
gan, but are spread throughout the whole body, so that
flavored morsel. But the organs of smelling and hearing
their distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives
are not affected in their respective operations by any nat-
the sweet and the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue,
ural immutation unless indirectly.
but not in the whole body; so it is easily distinguished
Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation
from touch. We might also say that all those contrarieties
either in its organ or in its object, is the most spiritual,
agree, each in some proximate genus, and all in a com-
the most perfect, and the most universal of all the senses.
mon genus, which is the common and formal object of
After this comes the hearing and then the smell, which re-
touch. Such common genus is, however, unnamed, just as
quire a natural immutation on the part of the object; while
the proximate genus of hot and cold is unnamed.
local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to,
Reply to Objection 4. The sense of taste, according
398
to a saying of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9), is a kind by reason of the quality which is its proper object. But
of touch existing in the tongue only. It is not distinct from
the organ of taste is not necessarily immuted by a natural
touch in general, but only from the species of touch dis-
immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper
tributed in the body. But if touch is one sense only, on
object, so that the tongue itself becomes sweet and bitter:
account of the common formality of its object: we must
but by reason of a quality which is a preamble to, and on
say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason of a
which is based, the flavor, which quality is moisture, the
different formality of immutation. For touch involves a
object of touch.
natural, and not only a spiritual, immutation in its organ,
Whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished?
Ia q. 78 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the interior senses are
6,7,24) describes three kinds of vision; namely, corpo-
not suitably distinguished. For the common is not divided
real, which is the action of the sense; spiritual, which is
against the proper. Therefore the common sense should
an action of the imagination or phantasy; and intellectual,
not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers, in
which is an action of the intellect. Therefore there is no
addition to the proper exterior senses.
interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the
Objection 2. Further, there is no need to assign an in-
imagination.
terior power of apprehension when the proper and exterior
On the contrary, Avicenna (De Anima iv, 1) assigns
sense suffices. But the proper and exterior senses suffice
five interior sensitive powers; namely, “common sense,
for us to judge of sensible things; for each sense judges of
phantasy, imagination, and the estimative and memorative
its proper object. In like manner they seem to suffice for
powers.”
the perception of their own actions; for since the action of
I answer that, As nature does not fail in necessary
the sense is, in a way, between the power and its object,
things, there must needs be as many actions of the sen-
it seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its
sitive soul as may suffice for the life of a perfect animal.
own vision, as being nearer to it, than the color; and in
If any of these actions cannot be reduced to the same one
like manner with the other senses. Therefore for this there
principle, they must be assigned to diverse powers; since a
is no need to assign an interior power, called the common
power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate prin-
sense.
ciple of the soul’s operation.
Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher
Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect an-
(De Memor. et Remin. i), the imagination and the mem-
imal, the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the
ory are passions of the “first sensitive.” But passion is not
actual time of sensation, but also when it is absent. Oth-
divided against its subject. Therefore memory and imagi-
erwise, since animal motion and action follow apprehen-
nation should not be assigned as powers distinct from the
sion, an animal would not be moved to seek something
senses.
absent: the contrary of which we may observe specially
Objection 4. Further, the intellect depends on the
in perfect animals, which are moved by progression, for
senses less than any power of the sensitive part. But the in-
they are moved towards something apprehended and ab-
tellect knows nothing but what it receives from the senses;
sent. Therefore an animal through the sensitive soul must
whence we read (Poster. i, 8), that “those who lack one
not only receive the species of sensible things, when it
sense lack one kind of knowledge.” Therefore much less
is actually affected by them, but it must also retain and
should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they
preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corpo-
call the “estimative” power, for the perception of inten-
real things, reduced to diverse principles; for moist things
tions which the sense does not perceive.
are apt to receive, but retain with difficulty, while it is the Objection 5.
Further, the action of the cogitative
reverse with dry things. Wherefore, since the sensitive
power, which consists in comparing, adding and dividing,
power is the act of a corporeal organ, it follows that the
and the action of the reminiscence, which consists in the
power which receives the species of sensible things must
use of a kind of syllogism for the sake of inquiry, is not
be distinct from the power which preserves them.
less distant from the actions of the estimative and memo-
Again we must observe that if an animal were moved
rative powers, than the action of the estimative is from the
by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the
action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add
sense, there would be no need to suppose that an ani-
the cognitive and reminiscitive to the estimative and mem-
mal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms
orative powers, or the estimative and memorative powers
which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes
should not be made distinct from the imagination.
pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the
Objection 6. Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii,
animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only
399
because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the
also on account of other advantages and uses, or disad-
one form of a golden mountain, which we have never
vantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf,
seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals
not on account of its color or shape, but as a natural en-
other than man, in whom the imaginative power suffices
emy: and again a bird gathers together straws, not because
thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this action
they are pleasant to the sense, but because they are useful
in his book De sensu et sensibilibus (viii). So there is no
for building its nest. Animals, therefore, need to perceive
need to assign more than four interior powers of the sen-
such intentions, which the exterior sense does not per-
sitive part—namely, the common sense, the imagination,
ceive. And some distinct principle is necessary for this;
and the estimative and memorative powers.
since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immu-
Reply to Objection 1. The interior sense is called
tation caused by the sensible, which is not the case with
“common” not by predication, as if it were a genus; but as
the perception of those intentions.
the common root and principle of the exterior senses.
Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms,
Reply to Objection 2. The proper sense judges of the
the “proper sense” and the “common sense” are ap-
proper sensible by discerning it from other things which
pointed, and of their distinction we shall speak farther on
come under the same sense; for instance, by discerning
(ad 1,2). But for the retention and preservation of these
white from black or green. But neither sight nor taste
forms, the “phantasy” or “imagination” is appointed;
can discern white from sweet: because what discerns be-
which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it
tween two things must know both. Wherefore the dis-
were a storehouse of forms received through the senses.
cerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense;
Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are
to which, as to a common term, all apprehensions of the
not received through the senses, the “estimative” power is
senses must be referred: and by which, again, all the
appointed: and for the preservation thereof, the “memora-
intentions of the senses are perceived; as when some-
tive” power, which is a storehouse of such-like intentions.
one sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the
A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of
proper sense, which only knows the form of the sensible
memory in animals is found in some such intention, for
by which it is immuted, in which immutation the action of
instance, that something is harmful or otherwise. And the
sight is completed, and from immutation follows another
very formality of the past, which memory observes, is to
in the common sense which perceives the act of vision.
be reckoned among these intentions.
Reply to Objection 3. As one power arises from the
Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there
soul by means of another, as we have seen above (q. 77,
is no difference between man and other animals; for they
a. 7), so also the soul is the subject of one power through
are similarly immuted by the extrinsic sensible. But there
another. In this way the imagination and the memory are
is a difference as to the above intentions: for other an-
called passions of the “first sensitive.”
imals perceive these intentions only by some natural in-
Reply to Objection 4. Although the operation of the
stinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of
intellect has its origin in the senses: yet, in the thing ap-
ideas. Therefore the power by which in other animals is
prehended through the senses, the intellect knows many
called the natural estimative, in man is called the “cog-
things which the senses cannot perceive. In like manner
itative,” which by some sort of collation discovers these
does the estimative power, though in a less perfect man-
intentions. Wherefore it is also called the “particular rea-
ner.
son,” to which medical men assign a certain particular or-
Reply to Objection 5. The cogitative and memora-
gan, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares
tive powers in man owe their excellence not to that which
individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason com-
is proper to the sensitive part; but to a certain affinity
pares universal intentions. As to the memorative power,
and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak,
man has not only memory, as other animals have in the
overflows into them. Therefore they are not distinct pow-
sudden recollection of the past; but also “reminiscence”
ers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals.
by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection of
Reply to Objection 6. Augustine calls that vision
the past by the application of individual intentions. Avi-
spiritual which is effected by the images of bodies in the
cenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the
absence of bodies. Whence it is clear that it is common to
imaginative, a fifth power, which combines and divides
all interior apprehensions.
imaginary forms: as when from the imaginary form of
400
FIRST PART, QUESTION 79
Of the Intellectual Powers
(In Thirteen Articles)
The next question concerns the intellectual powers, under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence?
(2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power?
(3) If it is a passive power, whether there is an active intellect?
(4) Whether it is something in the soul?
(5) Whether the active intellect is one in all?
(6) Whether memory is in the intellect?
(7) Whether the memory be distinct from the intellect?
(8) Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect?
(9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers?
(10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect?
(11) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers?
(12) Whether “synderesis” is a power of the intellectual part?
(13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part?
Whether the intellect is a power of the soul?
Ia q. 79 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect is not
that which operates is the immediate principle of opera-
a power of the soul, but the essence of the soul. For the
tion, when operation itself is its being: for as power is
intellect seems to be the same as the mind. Now the mind
to operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in
is not a power of the soul, but the essence; for Augustine
God alone His action of understanding is His very Being.
says (De Trin. ix, 2): “Mind and spirit are not relative
Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His essence: while
things, but denominate the essence.” Therefore the intel-
in other intellectual creatures, the intellect is power.
lect is the essence of the soul.
Reply to Objection 1. Sense is sometimes taken for
Objection 2. Further, different genera of the soul’s
the power, and sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the
powers are not united in some one power, but only in
sensitive soul takes its name from its chief power, which
the essence of the soul. Now the appetitive and the in-
is sense. And in like manner the intellectual soul is some-
tellectual are different genera of the soul’s powers as the
times called intellect, as from its chief power; and thus we
Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but they are united in
read (De Anima i, 4), that the “intellect is a substance.”
the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the in-
And in this sense also Augustine says that the mind is
telligence and will in the mind. Therefore the mind and
spirit and essence (De Trin. ix, 2; xiv, 16).
intellect of man is of the very essence of the soul and not
Reply to Objection 2. The appetitive and intellectual
a power thereof.
powers are different genera of powers in the soul, by rea-
Objection 3.
Further, according to Gregory, in a
son of the different formalities of their objects. But the
homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), “man understands
appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual power
with the angels.” But angels are called “minds” and “in-
and partly with the sensitive in its mode of operation ei-
tellects.” Therefore the mind and intellect of man are not
ther through a corporeal organ or without it: for appetite
a power of the soul, but the soul itself.
follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts
Objection 4. Further, a substance is intellectual by
the will in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason
the fact that it is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial
(De Anima iii, 9).
through its essence. Therefore it seems that the soul must
Reply to Objection 3. In the angels there is no other
be intellectual through its essence.
power besides the intellect, and the will, which follows the
On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns the intel-
intellect. And for this reason an angel is called a “mind”
lectual faculty as a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3).
or an “intellect”; because his whole power consists in this.
I answer that, In accordance with what has been al-
But the soul has many other powers, such as the sensitive
ready shown (q. 54, a. 3; q. 77, a. 1) it is necessary to
and nutritive powers, and therefore the comparison fails.
say that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the
Reply to Objection 4. The immateriality of the cre-
very essence of the soul. For then alone the essence of
ated intelligent substance is not its intellect; and through
401
its immateriality it has the power of intelligence. Where-soul, but that it is its virtue and power.
fore it follows not that the intellect is the substance of the
Whether the intellect is a passive power?
Ia q. 79 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect is not a
is compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to
passive power. For everything is passive by its matter, and
act.
acts by its form. But the intellectual power results from
Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There
the immateriality of the intelligent substance. Therefore it
is a potentiality which is always perfected by its act: as
seems that the intellect is not a passive power.
the matter of the heavenly bodies (q. 58, a. 1). And there
Objection 2. Further, the intellectual power is incor-
is another potentiality which is not always in act, but pro-
ruptible, as we have said above (q. 79, a. 6). But “if the
ceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe in things that
intellect is passive, it is corruptible” (De Anima iii, 5).
are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the angelic intel-
Therefore the intellectual power is not passive.
lect is always in act as regards those things which it can
Objection 3. Further, the “agent is nobler than the pa-
understand, by reason of its proximity to the first intel-
tient,” as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and Aristotle
lect, which is pure act, as we have said above. But the
(De Anima iii, 5) says. But all the powers of the vege-
human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelli-
tative part are active; yet they are the lowest among the
gence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine
powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, all the intellec-
intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligi-
tual powers, which are the highest, are active.
ble, and is at first “like a clean tablet on which nothing is
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
written,” as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This
4) that “to understand is in a way to be passive.”
is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in
I answer that, To be passive may be taken in three
potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to
ways. Firstly, in its most strict sense, when from a thing
understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to
is taken something which belongs to it by virtue either of
understand is “in a way to be passive”; taking passion in
its nature, or of its proper inclination: as when water loses
the third sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive
coolness by heating, and as when a man becomes ill or
power.
sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive,
Reply to Objection 1. This objection is verified of
when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken
passion in the first and second senses, which belong to
away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is
primary matter. But in the third sense passion is in any-
said to be passive, but also he who is healed; not only
thing which is reduced from potentiality to act.
he that is sad, but also he that is joyful; or whatever way
Reply to Objection 2. “Passive intellect” is the name
he be altered or moved. Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing
given by some to the sensitive appetite, in which are the
is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in
passions of the soul; which appetite is also called “ratio-
potentiality to something receives that to which it was in
nal by participation,” because it “obeys the reason” (Ethic.
potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And ac-
i, 13). Others give the name of passive intellect to the
cordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may
cogitative power, which is called the “particular reason.”
be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus
And in each case “passive” may be taken in the two first
with us to understand is to be passive. This is clear from
senses; forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of
the following reason. For the intellect, as we have seen
a corporeal organ. But the intellect which is in potential-
above (q. 78, a. 1), has an operation extending to univer-
ity to things intelligible, and which for this reason Aris-
sal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be
totle calls the “possible” intellect (De Anima iii, 4) is not
in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of
passive except in the third sense: for it is not an act of a
the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find
corporeal organ. Hence it is incorruptible.
an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the
Reply to Objection 3. The agent is nobler than the pa-
act of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which
tient, if the action and the passion are referred to the same
is the Essence of God, in which originally and virtually,
thing: but not always, if they refer to different things.
all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the
Now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole
Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure act. But
universal being: while the vegetative power is active in re-
no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole
gard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united
universal being; otherwise it would needs be an infinite
to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive
being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of
force being nobler than such an active one.
all things intelligible, by reason of its very existence; but
402
Whether there is an active intellect?
Ia q. 79 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no active
era and species of things. But since Aristotle did not allow
intellect. For as the senses are to things sensible, so is
that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as
our intellect to things intelligible. But because sense is in
forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it fol-
potentiality to things sensible, the sense is not said to be
lows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which
active, but only passive. Therefore, since our intellect is in
we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing
potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we cannot
is reduced from potentiality to act except by something
say that the intellect is active, but only that it is passive.
in act; as the senses as made actual by what is actually
Objection 2. Further, if we say that also in the senses
sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the in-
there is something active, such as light: on the con-
tellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by
trary, light is required for sight, inasmuch as it makes the
abstraction of the species from material conditions. And
medium to be actually luminous; for color of its own na-
such is the necessity for an active intellect.
ture moves the luminous medium. But in the operation of
Reply to Objection 1. Sensible things are found in
the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be
act outside the soul; and hence there is no need for an ac-
brought into act. Therefore there is no necessity for an
tive sense. Wherefore it is clear that in the nutritive part
active intellect.
all the powers are active, whereas in the sensitive part all
Objection 3. Further, the likeness of the agent is re-
are passive: but in the intellectual part, there is something
ceived into the patient according to the nature of the pa-
active and something passive.
tient. But the passive intellect is an immaterial power.
Reply to Objection 2. There are two opinions as to
Therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to be
the effect of light. For some say that light is required for
received into it immaterially. Now a form is intelligible
sight, in order to make colors actually visible. And ac-
in act from the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore
cording to this the active intellect is required for under-
there is no need for an active intellect to make the species
standing, in like manner and for the same reason as light
actually intelligible.
is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
is required for sight; not for the colors to become actually
5), “As in every nature, so in the soul is there something
visible; but in order that the medium may become actually
by which it becomes all things, and something by which
luminous, as the Commentator says on De Anima ii. And
it makes all things.” Therefore we must admit an active
according to this, Aristotle’s comparison of the active in-
intellect.
tellect to light is verified in this, that as it is required for I answer that, According to the opinion of Plato,
understanding, so is light required for seeing; but not for
there is no need for an active intellect in order to make
the same reason.
things actually intelligible; but perhaps in order to provide
Reply to Objection 3. If the agent pre-exist, it may
intellectual light to the intellect, as will be explained far-
well happen that its likeness is received variously into var-
ther on (a. 4). For Plato supposed that the forms of natural
ious things, on account of their dispositions. But if the
things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that
agent does not pre-exist, the disposition of the recipient
they are intelligible: since a thing is actually intelligible
has nothing to do with the matter. Now the intelligible
from the very fact that it is immaterial. And he called such
in act is not something existing in nature; if we consider
forms “species or ideas”; from a participation of which, he
the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart
said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that
from matter. And therefore in order to understand them,
individuals might be naturally established in their proper
the immaterial nature of the passive intellect would not
genera and species: and that our intellect was formed by
suffice but for the presence of the active intellect which
such participation in order to have knowledge of the gen-
makes things actually intelligible by way of abstraction.
Whether the active intellect is something in the soul?
Ia q. 79 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the active intellect is
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii,
not something in the soul. For the effect of the active intel-
5) says of the active intellect, “that it does not sometimes
lect is to give light for the purpose of understanding. But
understand and sometimes not understand.” But our soul
this is done by something higher than the soul: according
does not always understand: sometimes it understands,
to Jn. 1:9, “He was the true light that enlighteneth every
sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the active
man coming into this world.” Therefore the active intel-
intellect is not something in our soul.
lect is not something in the soul.
Objection 3. Further, agent and patient suffice for ac-
403
tion. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is a passive ral things, besides the universal active causes, each one is
power, is something belonging to the soul; and also the
endowed with its proper powers derived from those uni-
active intellect, which is an active power: it follows that a
versal causes: for the sun alone does not generate man;
man would always be able to understand when he wished,
but in man is the power of begetting man: and in like
which is clearly false. Therefore the active intellect is not
manner with other perfect animals. Now among these
something in our soul.
lower things nothing is more perfect than the human soul.
Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii,
Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power de-
5) says that the active intellect is a “substance in actual
rived from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up
being.” But nothing can be in potentiality and in act with
the phantasms. And we know this by experience, since we
regard to the same thing. If, therefore, the passive intel-
perceive that we abstract universal forms from their par-
lect, which is in potentiality to all things intelligible, is
ticular conditions, which is to make them actually intelli-
something in the soul, it seems impossible for the active
gible. Now no action belongs to anything except through
intellect to be also something in our soul.
some principle formally inherent therein; as we have said
Objection 5. Further, if the active intellect is some-
above of the passive intellect (q. 76, a. 1). Therefore the
thing in the soul, it must be a power. For it is neither a
power which is the principle of this action must be some-
passion nor a habit; since habits and passions are not in
thing in the soul. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii,
the nature of agents in regard to the passivity of the soul;
5) compared the active intellect to light, which is some-
but rather passion is the very action of the passive power;
thing received into the air: while Plato compared the sepa-
while habit is something which results from acts. But ev-
rate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius
ery power flows from the essence of the soul. It would
says in his commentary on De Anima iii. But the sep-
therefore follow that the active intellect flows from the
arate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is
essence of the soul. And thus it would not be in the soul
God Himself, Who is the soul’s Creator, and only beati-
by way of participation from some higher intellect: which
tude; as will be shown later on (q. 90, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 3,
is unfitting. Therefore the active intellect is not something
a. 7). Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual
in our soul.
light from Him, according to Ps. 4:7, “The light of Thy
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us.”
5), that “it is necessary for these differences,” namely, the
Reply to Objection 1. That true light enlightens as
passive and active intellect, “to be in the soul.”
a universal cause, from which the human soul derives a
I answer that, The active intellect, of which the
particular power, as we have explained.
Philosopher speaks, is something in the soul. In order
Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher says those
to make this evident, we must observe that above the in-
words not of the active intellect, but of the intellect in act: tellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior
of which he had already said: “Knowledge in act is the
intellect, from which the soul acquires the power of un-
same as the thing.” Or, if we refer those words to the ac-
derstanding. For what is such by participation, and what
tive intellect, then they are said because it is not owing to
is mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-
the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes
existence of something essentially such, immovable and
we do not understand, but to the intellect which is in po-
perfect. Now the human soul is called intellectual by
tentiality.
reason of a participation in intellectual power; a sign of
Reply to Objection 3. If the relation of the active in-
which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in part.
tellect to the passive were that of the active object to a
Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by argu-
power, as, for instance, of the visible in act to the sight; it ing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement.
would follow that we could understand all things instantly,
Again it has an imperfect understanding; both because
since the active intellect is that which makes all things (in
it does not understand everything, and because, in those
act). But now the active intellect is not an object, rather
things which it does understand, it passes from potential-
is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act: for
ity to act. Therefore there must needs be some higher in-
which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we re-
tellect, by which the soul is helped to understand.
quire the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of
Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially
the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation;
separate, is the active intellect, which by lighting up the
since through one thing understood, other things come to
phantasms as it were, makes them to be actually intelli-
be understood, as from terms are made propositions, and
gible. But, even supposing the existence of such a sepa-
from first principles, conclusions. From this point of view
rate active intellect, it would still be necessary to assign
it matters not whether the active intellect is something be-
to the human soul some power participating in that su-
longing to the soul, or something separate from the soul.
perior intellect, by which power the human soul makes
Reply to Objection 4. The intellectual soul is indeed
things actually intelligible. Just as in other perfect natu-
actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate
404
species. On the contrary, phantasms are actual images of of its being in potentiality to such species.
certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Where-
Reply to Objection 5. Since the essence of the soul
fore nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as
is immaterial, created by the supreme intellect, nothing
it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it
prevents that power which it derives from the supreme in-
makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the
tellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from
conditions of individual matter: which power is called the
the essence of the soul, in the same way as its other pow-
“active intellect”; and another power, receptive of such
ers.
species, which is called the “passive intellect” by reason
Whether the active intellect is one in all?
Ia q. 79 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that there is one active
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher proves that
intellect in all. For what is separate from the body is not
the active intellect is separate, by the fact that the passive
multiplied according to the number of bodies. But the
intellect is separate: because, as he says (De Anima iii,
active intellect is “separate,” as the Philosopher says (De
5), “the agent is more noble than the patient.” Now the
Anima iii, 5). Therefore it is not multiplied in the many
passive intellect is said to be separate, because it is not the human bodies, but is one for all men.
act of any corporeal organ. And in the same sense the ac-
Objection 2. Further, the active intellect is the cause
tive intellect is also called “separate”; but not as a separate of the universal, which is one in many. But that which is
substance.
the cause of unity is still more itself one. Therefore the
Reply to Objection 2. The active intellect is the cause
active intellect is the same in all.
of the universal, by abstracting it from matter. But for this
Objection 3. Further, all men agree in the first intel-
purpose it need not be the same intellect in all intelligent
lectual concepts. But to these they assent by the active
beings; but it must be one in its relationship to all those
intellect. Therefore all agree in one active intellect.
things from which it abstracts the universal, with respect
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima
to which things the universal is one. And this befits the
iii, 5) that the active intellect is as a light. But light is not active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial.
the same in the various things enlightened. Therefore the
Reply to Objection 3. All things which are of one
same active intellect is not in various men.
species enjoy in common the action which accompanies
I answer that, The truth about this question depends
the nature of the species, and consequently the power
on what we have already said (a. 4). For if the active in-
which is the principle of such action; but not so as that
tellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were
power be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible
some separate substance, there would be one active intel-
principles is the action belonging to the human species.
lect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold
Wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is
that there is one active intellect for all. But if the active
the principle of this action: and this power is the active
intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its
intellect. But there is no need for it to be identical in all.
powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active
Yet it must be derived by all from one principle. And thus
intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied accord-
the possession by all men in common of the first princi-
ing to the number of men, as we have said above (q. 76,
ples proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato
a. 2). For it is impossible that one same power belong to
compares to the sun; but not the unity of the active intel-
various substances.
lect, which Aristotle compares to light.
Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul?
Ia q. 79 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that memory is not in
Objection 2. Further, memory is of the past. But
the intellectual part of the soul. For Augustine says (De
the past is said of something with regard to a fixed time.
Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that to the higher part of the soul belongs
Memory, therefore, knows a thing under a condition of
those things which are not “common to man and beast.”
a fixed time; which involves knowledge under the condi-
But memory is common to man and beast, for he says (De
tions of “here” and “now.” But this is not the province of
Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that “beasts can sense corporeal things
the intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is not in
through the senses of the body, and commit them to mem-
the intellectual part, but only in the sensitive.
ory.” Therefore memory does not belong to the intellec-
Objection 3. Further, in the memory are preserved
tual part of the soul.
the species of those things of which we are not actually
405
thinking. But this cannot happen in the intellect, because thing through them, but also after ceasing to act through
the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that the intelli-
them, much more cogent reason is there for the intellect
gible species are received into it. Now the intellect in act
to receive the species unchangeably and lastingly, whether
implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect
it receive them from things sensible, or derive them from
actually understands all things of which it has the species.
some superior intellect. Thus, therefore, if we take mem-
Therefore the memory is not in the intellectual part.
ory only for the power of retaining species, we must say
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that
that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion of
“memory, understanding, and will are one mind.”
memory we include its object as something past, then the
I answer that, Since it is of the nature of the memory
memory is not in the intellectual, but only in the sensi-
to preserve the species of those things which are not ac-
tive part, which apprehends individual things. For past,
tually apprehended, we must first of all consider whether
as past, since it signifies being under a condition of fixed
the intelligible species can thus be preserved in the intel-
time, is something individual.
lect: because Avicenna held that this was impossible. For
Reply to Objection 1. Memory, if considered as re-
he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive part, as
tentive of species, is not common to us and other animals.
to some powers, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal
For species are not retained in the sensitive part of the
organs, in which certain species may be preserved apart
soul only, but rather in the body and soul united: since the
from actual apprehension. But in the intellect, which has
memorative power is the act of some organ. But the intel-
no corporeal organ, nothing but what is intelligible exists.
lect in itself is retentive of species, without the association Wherefore every thing of which the likeness exists in the
of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says
intellect must be actually understood. Thus, therefore, ac-
(De Anima iii, 4) that “the soul is the seat of the species,
cording to him, as soon as we cease to understand some-
not the whole soul, but the intellect.”
thing actually, the species of that thing ceases to be in our
Reply to Objection 2. The condition of past may
intellect, and if we wish to understand that thing anew, we
be referred to two things—namely, to the object which
must turn to the active intellect, which he held to be a sep-
is known, and to the act of knowledge. These two are
arate substance, in order that the intelligible species may
found together in the sensitive part, which apprehends
thence flow again into our passive intellect. And from the
something from the fact of its being immuted by a present
practice and habit of turning to the active intellect there is
sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remem-
formed, according to him, a certain aptitude in the passive
bers to have sensed before in the past, and to have sensed
intellect for turning to the active intellect; which aptitude
some past sensible thing. But as concerns the intellectual
he calls the habit of knowledge. According, therefore, to
part, the past is accidental, and is not in itself a part of the this supposition, nothing is preserved in the intellectual
object of the intellect. For the intellect understands man,
part that is not actually understood: wherefore it would
as man: and to man, as man, it is accidental that he exist
not be possible to admit memory in the intellectual part.
in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act,
But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of
the condition of past, even as such, may be understood
Aristotle. For he says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the
to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because
passive intellect “is identified with each thing as knowing
our soul’s act of understanding is an individual act, ex-
it, it is said to be in act,” and that “this happens when it can isting in this or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to
operate of itself. And, even then, it is in potentiality, but
understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow. And this is
not in the same way as before learning and discovering.”
not incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an
Now, the passive intellect is said to be each thing, inas-
act of understanding, though something individual, is yet
much as it receives the intelligible species of each thing.
an immaterial act, as we have said above of the intellect
To the fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelli-
(q. 76, a. 1); and therefore, as the intellect understands it-
gible things it owes its being able to operate when it wills,
self, though it be itself an individual intellect, so also it
but not so that it be always operating: for even then is it in
understands its act of understanding, which is an individ-
potentiality in a certain sense, though otherwise than be-
ual act, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then,
fore the act of understanding—namely, in the sense that
the notion of memory, in as far as it regards past events,
whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to ac-
is preserved in the intellect, forasmuch as it understands
tual consideration.
that it previously understood: but not in the sense that it
The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For
understands the past as something “here” and “now.”
what is received into something is received according to
Reply to Objection 3.
The intelligible species is
the conditions of the recipient. But the intellect is of a
sometimes in the intellect only in potentiality, and then
more stable nature, and is more immovable than corpo-
the intellect is said to be in potentiality. Sometimes the
real nature. If, therefore, corporeal matter holds the forms
intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ulti-
which it receives, not only while it actually does some-
mate completion of the act, and then it understands in act.
406
And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state, knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species,
between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual
even when it does not understand in act.
Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect?
Ia q. 79 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual mem-
ity.” Wherefore the passive intellect is not differentiated
ory is distinct from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin.
by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a dis-
x, 11) assigns to the soul memory, understanding, and
tinction between the power of the active intellect and of
will. But it is clear that the memory is a distinct power
the passive intellect: because as regards the same object,
from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the intel-
the active power which makes the object to be in act must
lect.
be distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the
Objection 2. Further, the reason of distinction among
object existing in act. Thus the active power is compared
the powers in the sensitive part is the same as in the intel-
to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality;
lectual part. But memory in the sensitive part is distinct
whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is compared
from sense, as we have said (q. 78, a. 4). Therefore mem-
to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act.
ory in the intellectual part is distinct from the intellect.
Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in
Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine (De
the intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it
Trin. x, 11; xi, 7), memory, understanding, and will are
is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the in-
equal to one another, and one flows from the other. But
tellect: for it belongs to the nature of a passive power to
this could not be if memory and intellect were the same
retain as well as to receive.
power. Therefore they are not the same power.
Reply to Objection 1. Although it is said (3 Sent. D,
On the contrary, From its nature the memory is the
1) that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this
treasury or storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De
is not in accordance with the meaning of Augustine, who
Anima iii) attributes this to the intellect, as we have said
says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that “if we take memory, in-
(a. 6, ad 1). Therefore the memory is not another power
telligence, and will as always present in the soul, whether
from the intellect.
we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain
I answer that, As has been said above (q. 77, a. 3), the to the memory only. And by intelligence I mean that by
powers of the soul are distinguished by the different for-
which we understand when actually thinking; and by will
mal aspects of their objects: since each power is defined
I mean that love or affection which unites the child and
in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which
its parent.” Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not
is its object. It has also been said above (q. 59, a. 4) that
take the above three for three powers; but by memory he
if any power by its nature be directed to an object accord-
understands the soul’s habit of retention; by intelligence,
ing to the common ratio of the object, that power will not
the act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will.
be differentiated according to the individual differences
Reply to Objection 2. Past and present may differen-
of that object: just as the power of sight, which regards its
tiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers,
object under the common ratio of color, is not differenti-
for the reason give above.
ated by differences of black and white. Now, the intellect
Reply to Objection 3. Intelligence arises from mem-
regards its object under the common ratio of being: since
ory, as act from habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but
the passive intellect is that “in which all are in potential-
not as a power to a power.
Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect?
Ia q. 79 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that the reason is a dis-
the same power.
tinct power from the intellect. For it is stated in De Spiritu
Objection 3. Further, man has intellect in common
et Anima that “when we wish to rise from lower things to
with the angels, and sense in common with the brutes.
higher, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination,
But reason, which is proper to man, whence he is called a
then reason, then the intellect.” Therefore the reason is
rational animal, is a power distinct from sense. Therefore
distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense.
is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the intel-
Objection 2. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv,
lect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they
6), that intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time.
are called intellectual.
But it does not belong to the same power to be in eternity
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20)
and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not
that “that in which man excels irrational animals is reason,
407
or mind, or intelligence or whatever appropriate name we of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear
like to give it.” Therefore, reason, intellect and mind are
that rest and movement are not to be referred to different
one power.
powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things:
I answer that, Reason and intellect in man cannot be
since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a cer-
distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if we
tain place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do
consider their respective actions. For to understand is sim-
we understand and reason: and so it is clear that in man
ply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to ad-
reason and intellect are the same power.
vance from one thing understood to another, so as to know
Reply to Objection 1. That enumeration is made ac-
an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according
cording to the order of actions, not according to the dis-
to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible
tinction of powers. Moreover, that book is not of great
truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another;
authority.
but apprehend the truth simply and without mental dis-
Reply to Objection 2. The answer is clear from what
cussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man
we have said. For eternity is compared to time as im-
arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing
movable to movable. And thus Boethius compared the
from one thing to another; and therefore he is called ratio-
intellect to eternity, and reason to time.
nal. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding,
Reply to Objection 3. Other animals are so much
as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of
lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge
which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imper-
of truth, which reason seeks. But man attains, although
fect. And since movement always proceeds from some-
imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which
thing immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it
angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of knowl-
is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discov-
edge is not of a different genus fro that which is in the
ery, advances from certain things simply understood—
human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the
namely, the first principles; and, again, by way of judg-
imperfect.
ment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light
Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers?
Ia q. 79 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that the higher and lower
which, according to Augustine, “is intent on the disposal
reason are distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin.
of temporal things.” Therefore the higher reason is an-
xii, 4,7), that the image of the Trinity is in the higher part
other power than the lower.
of the reason, and not in the lower. But the parts of the
Objection 4. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
soul are its powers. Therefore the higher and lower rea-
ii) that “opinion rises from the imagination: then the mind
son are two powers.
by judging of the truth or error of the opinion discovers the
Objection 2. Further, nothing flows from itself. Now,
truth: whence” men’s (mind) “is derived from” metiendo
the lower reason flows from the higher, and is ruled and di-
[measuring]. “And therefore the intellect regards those
rected by it. Therefore the higher reason is another power
things which are already subject to judgment and true de-
from the lower.
cision.” Therefore the opinionative power, which is the
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic.
lower reason, is distinct from the mind and the intellect,
vi, 1) that “the scientific part” of the soul, by which the
by which we may understand the higher reason.
soul knows necessary things, is another principle, and an-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4)
other part from the “opinionative” and “reasoning” part
that “the higher and lower reason are only distinct by their
by which it knows contingent things. And he proves this
functions.” Therefore they are not two powers.
from the principle that for those things which are “gener-
I answer that, The higher and lower reason, as they
ically different, generically different parts of the soul are
are understood by Augustine, can in no way be two pow-
ordained.” Now contingent and necessary are generically
ers of the soul. For he says that “the higher reason is
different, as corruptible and incorruptible. Since, there-
that which is intent on the contemplation and consulta-
fore, necessary is the same as eternal, and temporal the
tion of things eternal”: forasmuch as in contemplation
same as contingent, it seems that what the Philosopher
it sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes
calls the “scientific” part must be the same as the higher
its rules of action from them.
But he calls the lower
reason, which, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 7)
reason that which “is intent on the disposal of temporal
“is intent on the consideration and consultation of things
things.” Now these two—namely, eternal and temporal
eternal”; and that what the Philosopher calls the “reason-
—are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of
ing” or “opinionative” part is the same as the lower reason,
them is the means of knowing the other. For by way
408
of discovery, we come through knowledge of temporal And the “opinionative” and “ratiocinative” part is more
things to that of things eternal, according to the words of
limited than the lower reason; for it regards only things
the Apostle (Rom. 1:20), “The invisible things of God
contingent. Neither must we say, without any qualifica-
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
tion, that a power, by which the intellect knows necessary
made”: while by way of judgment, from eternal things al-
things, is distinct from a power by which it knows contin-
ready known, we judge of temporal things, and according
gent things: because it knows both under the same objec-
to laws of things eternal we dispose of temporal things.
tive aspect—namely, under the aspect of being and truth.
But it may happen that the medium and what is at-
Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have
tained thereby belong to different habits: as the first in-
perfect being in truth; since it penetrates to their very
demonstrable principles belong to the habit of the intel-
essence, from which it demonstrates their proper acci-
lect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from them
dents. On the other hand, it knows contingent things, but
belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that
imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but imperfect being
from the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in
and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not
another science—for example, perspective. But the power
vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the mode
of the reason is such that both medium and term belong to
of acting, and consequently the principles of the actions
it. For the act of the reason is, as it were, a movement
and the habits themselves. And therefore the Philosopher
from one thing to another. But the same movable thing
postulates two lesser parts of the soul—namely, the “sci-
passes through the medium and reaches the end. Where-
entific” and the “ratiocinative,” not because they are two
fore the higher and lower reasons are one and the same
powers, but because they are distinct according to a differ-
power. But according to Augustine they are distinguished
ent aptitude for receiving various habits, concerning the
by the functions of their actions, and according to their
variety of which he inquires. For contingent and neces-
various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher rea-
sary, though differing according to their proper genera,
son, science to the lower.
nevertheless agree in the common aspect of being, which
Reply to Objection 1. We speak of parts, in whatever
the intellect considers, and to which they are variously
way a thing is divided. And so far as reason is divided
compared as perfect and imperfect.
according to its various acts, the higher and lower reason
Reply to Objection 4. That distinction given by Dam-
are called parts; but not because they are different powers.
ascene is according to the variety of acts, not according to
Reply to Objection 2. The lower reason is said to flow
the variety of powers. For “opinion” signifies an act of the
from the higher, or to be ruled by it, as far as the princi-
intellect which leans to one side of a contradiction, whilst
ples made use of by the lower reason are drawn from and
in fear of the other. While to “judge” or “measure” [men-
directed by the principles of the higher reason.
surare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain princi-
Reply to Objection 3. The “scientific” part, of which
ples to examine propositions. From this is taken the word
the Philosopher speaks, is not the same as the higher rea-
“mens” [mind]. Lastly, to “understand” is to adhere to the
son: for necessary truths are found even among temporal
formed judgment with approval.
things, of which natural science and mathematics treat.
Whether intelligence is a power distinct from intellect?
Ia q. 79 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that the intelligence is an-
gence is an act separate from others attributed to the in-
other power than the intellect. For we read in De Spiritu
tellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that “the
et Anima that “when we wish to rise from lower to higher
first movement is called intelligence; but that intelligence
things, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination,
which is about a certain thing is called intention; that
then reason, then intellect, and afterwards intelligence.”
which remains and conforms the soul to that which is
But imagination and sense are distinct powers. Therefore
understood is called invention, and invention when it re-
also intellect and intelligence are distinct.
mains in the same man, examining and judging of itself,
Objection 2. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4)
is called phronesis [that is, wisdom], and phronesis if di-
that “sense considers man in one way, imagination in an-
lated makes thought, that is, orderly internal speech; from
other, reason in another, intelligence in another.” But in-
which, they say, comes speech expressed by the tongue.”
tellect is the same power as reason. Therefore, seemingly,
Therefore it seems that intelligence is some special power.
intelligence is a distinct power from intellect, as reason is
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
a distinct power from imagination or sense.
6) that “intelligence is of indivisible things in which there
Objection 3. Further, “actions came before powers,”
is nothing false.” But the knowledge of these things be-
as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). But intelli-
longs to the intellect. Therefore intelligence is not another
409
power than the intellect.
Reply to Objection 2. Boethius takes intelligence as
I answer that, This word “intelligence” properly sig-
meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act
nifies the intellect’s very act, which is to understand.
of the reason. Wherefore he also says that reason alone
However, in some works translated from the Arabic, the
belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs
separate substances which we call angels are called “in-
to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things with-
telligences,” and perhaps for this reason, that such sub-
out any investigation.
stances are always actually understanding. But in works
Reply to Objection 3. All those acts which Dama-
translated from the Greek, they are called “intellects” or
scene enumerates belong to one power—namely, the intel-
“minds.” Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as
lectual power. For this power first of all only apprehends
power is from power; but as act is from power. And such
something; and this act is called “intelligence.” Secondly,
a division is recognized even by the philosophers. For
it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of some-
sometimes they assign four intellects—namely, the “ac-
thing else, or to some operation; and this is called “inten-
tive” and “passive” intellects, the intellect “in habit,” and
tion.” And when it goes on in search of what it “intends,”
the “actual” intellect. Of which four the active and passive
it is called “invention.” When, by reference to something
intellects are different powers; just as in all things the ac-
known for certain, it examines what it has found, it is said
tive power is distinct from the passive. But three of these
to know or to be wise, which belongs to “phronesis” or
are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which
“wisdom”; for “it belongs to the wise man to judge,” as
is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called pas-
the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has
sive; sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge,
obtained something for certain, as being fully examined,
and thus it is called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is
it thinks about the means of making it known to others;
in the second act, which is to consider, and thus it is called
and this is the ordering of “interior speech,” from which
intellect in act, or actual intellect.
proceeds “external speech.” For every difference of acts
Reply to Objection 1. If this authority is accepted,
does not make the powers vary, but only what cannot be
intelligence there means the act of the intellect. And thus
reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above
it is divided against intellect as act against power.
(q. 78, a. 4).
Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers?
Ia q. 79 a. 11
Objection 1. It would seem that the speculative and
power; for it is accidental to a thing colored to be man, or
practical intellects are distinct powers. For the appre-
to be great or small; hence all such things are apprehended
hensive and motive are different kinds of powers, as is
by the same power of sight. Now, to a thing apprehended
clear from De Anima ii, 3. But the speculative intellect is
by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed to
merely an apprehensive power; while the practical intel-
operation or not, and according to this the speculative and
lect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct powers.
practical intellects differ. For it is the speculative intel-
Objection 2. Further, the different nature of the object lect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation,
differentiates the power. But the object of the speculative
but to the consideration of truth; while the practical intel-
intellect is “truth,” and of the practical is “good”; which
lect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation.
differ in nature. Therefore the speculative and practical
And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10);
intellect are distinct powers.
that “the speculative differs from the practical in its end.”
Objection 3. Further, in the intellectual part, the prac-Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative,
tical intellect is compared to the speculative, as the esti-
the other practical—i.e. operative.
mative is to the imaginative power in the sensitive part.
Reply to Objection 1. The practical intellect is a mo-
But the estimative differs from the imaginative, as power
tive power, not as executing movement, but as directing
form power, as we have said above (q. 78, a. 4). Therefore
towards it; and this belongs to it according to its mode of
also the speculative intellect differs from the practical.
apprehension.
On the contrary, The speculative intellect by exten-
Reply to Objection 2. Truth and good include one
sion becomes practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power
another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would
is not changed into another. Therefore the speculative and
not be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it
practical intellects are not distinct powers.
would not be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the
I answer that, The speculative and practical intellects
appetite may be something true, as having the aspect of
are not distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as
good, for example, when some one desires to know the
we have said above (q. 77, a. 3), what is accidental to the
truth; so the object of the practical intellect is good di-
nature of the object of a power, does not differentiate that
rected to the operation, and under the aspect of truth. For
410
the practical intellect knows truth, just as the speculative, the sensitive powers, which do not differentiate the intel-but it directs the known truth to operation.
lectual powers, as we have said above (a. 7 , ad 2; q. 77,
Reply to Objection 3. Many differences differentiate
a. 3, ad 4).
Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others?
Ia q. 79 a. 12
Objection 1. It would seem that “synderesis” is a
ing, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the
special power, distinct from the others. For those things
understanding of certain things—namely, those which are
which fall under one division, seem to be of the same
naturally known without any investigation on the part of
genus. But in the gloss of Jerome on Ezech. 1:6, “syn-
reason, as from an immovable principle—and ends also at
deresis” is divided against the irascible, the concupiscible,
the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those princi-
and the rational, which are powers. Therefore “syndere-
ples naturally known, we judge of those things which we
sis” is a power.
have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the
Objection 2. Further, opposite things are of the same
speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that
genus. But “synderesis” and sensuality seem to be op-
practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore
posed to one another because “synderesis” always incites
we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only spec-
to good; while sensuality always incites to evil: whence it
ulative principles, but also practical principles. Now the
is signified by the serpent, as is clear from Augustine (De
first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do
Trin. xii, 12,13). It seems, therefore, that ‘synderesis’ is a
not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which
power just as sensuality is.
is called “the understanding of principles,” as the Philoso-
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii,
pher explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first practical
10) that in the natural power of judgment there are certain
principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to
“rules and seeds of virtue, both true and unchangeable.”
a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we
And this is what we call synderesis. Since, therefore, the
call “synderesis.” Whence “synderesis” is said to incite
unchangeable rules which guide our judgment belong to
to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first
the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says (De Trin.
principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we
xii, 2), it seems that “synderesis” is the same as reason:
have discovered. It is therefore clear that “synderesis” is
and thus it is a power.
not a power, but a natural habit.
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher
Reply to Objection 1. The division given by Jerome
(Metaph.
viii, 2), “rational powers regard opposite
is taken from the variety of acts, and not from the variety
things.” But “synderesis” does not regard opposites, but
of powers; and various acts can belong to one power.
inclines to good only. Therefore “synderesis” is not a
Reply to Objection 2. In like manner, the opposition
power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power,
of sensuality to “syneresis” is an opposition of acts, and
since it is not found in brute animals.
not of the different species of one genus.
I answer that, “Synderesis” is not a power but a habit;
Reply to Objection 3. Those unchangeable notions
though some held that it is a power higher than reason;
are the first practical principles, concerning which no one
while others∗ said that it is reason itself, not as reason, but errs; and they are attributed to reason as to a power, and to
as a nature. In order to make this clear we must observe
“synderesis” as to a habit. Wherefore we judge naturally
that, as we have said above (a. 8), man’s act of reason-
both by our reason and by “synderesis.”
Whether conscience be a power?
Ia q. 79 a. 13
Objection 1.
It would seem that conscience is a
Objection 2. Further, nothing is a subject of sin, ex-
power; for Origen says† that “conscience is a correcting
cept a power of the soul. But conscience is a subject of
and guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is
sin; for it is said of some that “their mind and conscience
led away from evil and made to cling to good.” But in
are defiled” (Titus 1:15). Therefore it seems that con-
the soul, spirit designates a power—either the mind itself,
science is a power.
according to the text (Eph. 4:13), “Be ye renewed in the
Objection 3. Further, conscience must of necessity be
spirit of your mind”—or the imagination, whence imagi-
either an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act; for
nary vision is called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
thus it would not always exist in man. Nor is it a habit;
lit. xii, 7,24). Therefore conscience is a power.
for conscience is not one thing but many, since we are di-
∗ Cf. Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. II, q. 73
† Commentary on
Rom. 2:15
411
rected in our actions by many habits of knowledge. There-conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way,
fore conscience is a power.
so far as by conscience we judge that something done is
On the contrary, Conscience can be laid aside. But a
well done or ill done, and in this sense conscience is said
power cannot be laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a
to excuse, accuse, or torment. Now, it is clear that all
power.
these things follow the actual application of knowledge to
I answer that, Properly speaking, conscience is not
what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking, conscience
a power, but an act. This is evident both from the very
denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act,
name and from those things which in the common way
sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural
of speaking are attributed to conscience. For conscience,
habit—namely, ‘synderesis’: thus Jerome calls ‘syndere-
according to the very nature of the word, implies the re-
sis’ conscience (Gloss. Ezech. 1:6); Basil∗, the “natural
lation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be
power of judgment,” and Damascene† says that it is the
resolved into “cum alio scientia,” i.e. knowledge applied
“law of our intellect.” For it is customary for causes and
to an individual case. But the application of knowledge
effects to be called after one another.
to something is done by some act. Wherefore from this
Reply to Objection 1. Conscience is called a spirit,
explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an
so far as spirit is the same as mind; because conscience is
act.
a certain pronouncement of the mind.
The same is manifest from those things which are at-
Reply to Objection 2. The conscience is said to be de-
tributed to conscience. For conscience is said to witness,
filed, not as a subject, but as the thing known is in knowl-
to bind, or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke.
edge; so far as someone knows he is defiled.
And all these follow the application of knowledge or sci-
Reply to Objection 3. Although an act does not al-
ence to what we do: which application is made in three
ways remain in itself, yet it always remains in its cause,
ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have
which is power and habit. Now all the habits by which
done or not done something; “Thy conscience knoweth
conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have
that thou hast often spoken evil of others” (Eccles. 7:23),
their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first prin-
and according to this, conscience is said to witness. In an-
ciples, which is called “synderesis.” And for this special
other way, so far as through the conscience we judge that
reason, this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we
something should be done or not done; and in this sense,
have said above.
∗ Hom. in princ. Proverb.
† De Fide Orth. iv. 22
412
FIRST PART, QUESTION 80
Of the Appetitive Powers in General
(In Two Articles)
Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which there are four heads of consideration: first, the appetitive powers in general; second, sensuality; third, the will; fourth, the free-will. Under the first there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the soul?
(2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and sensitive as distinct powers?
Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul?
Ia q. 80 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the appetite is not
example, sense receives the species of all things sensi-
a special power of the soul. For no power of the soul is
ble, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the to be assigned for those things which are common to ani-soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect:
mate and to inanimate things. But appetite is common to
and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way,
animate and inanimate things: since “all desire good,” as
approach to a likeness to God, “in Whom all things pre-
the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite
exist,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
is not a special power of the soul.
Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have
Objection 2. Further, powers are differentiated by
knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of
their objects. But what we desire is the same as what we
natural forms; so must there be in them an inclination sur-
know. Therefore the appetitive power is not distinct from
passing the natural inclination, which is called the natu-
the apprehensive power.
ral appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to the
Objection 3. Further, the common is not divided from
appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal
the proper. But each power of the soul desires some par-
is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to
ticular desirable thing—namely its own suitable object.
which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is nec-
Therefore, with regard to this object which is the desirable
essary to assign an appetitive power to the soul.
in general, we should not assign some particular power
Reply to Objection 1. Appetite is found in things
distinct from the others, called the appetitive power.
which have knowledge, above the common manner in
On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes (De
which it is found in all things, as we have said above.
Anima ii, 3) the appetitive from the other powers. Dama-
Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particu-
scene also (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes the appeti-
lar power.
tive from the cognitive powers.
Reply to Objection 2. What is apprehended and what
I answer that, It is necessary to assign an appetitive
is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe
thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible,
that some inclination follows every form: for example,
whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diver-
fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its
sity of aspect in the objects, and not material diversity,
like. Now, the form is found to have a more perfect ex-
which demands a diversity of powers.
istence in those things which participate knowledge than
Reply to Objection 3. Each power of the soul is a
in those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack
form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something.
knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only
Wherefore each power desires by the natural appetite that
to its own being—that is, to its nature. Therefore this
object which is suitable to itself. Above which natural ap-
natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which
petite is the animal appetite, which follows the apprehen-
is called the natural appetite. But in those things which
sion, and by which something is desired not as suitable to
have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natu-
this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for
ral being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is
hearing; but simply as suitable to the animal.
nevertheless receptive of the species of other things: for
413
Whether the sensitive and intellectual appetites are distinct powers?
Ia q. 80 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the sensitive and in-
hended appetible is a mover which is not moved, while
tellectual appetites are not distinct powers. For powers are
the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in
not differentiated by accidental differences, as we have
De Anima iii, 10 and Metaph. xii (Did. xi, 7). Now things
seen above (q. 77, a. 3). But it is accidental to the ap-
passive and movable are differentiated according to the
petible object whether it be apprehended by the sense or
distinction of the corresponding active and motive prin-
by the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and intellectual
ciples; because the motive must be proportionate to the
appetites are not distinct powers.
movable, and the active to the passive: indeed, the pas-
Objection 2. Further, intellectual knowledge is of uni-
sive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its
versals; and so it is distinct from sensitive knowledge,
active principle. Therefore, since what is apprehended by
which is of individual things. But there is no place for this
the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are gener-
distinction in the appetitive part: for since the appetite is a ically different; consequently, the intellectual appetite is
movement of the soul to individual things, seemingly ev-
distinct from the sensitive.
ery act of the appetite regards an individual thing. There-
Reply to Objection 1. It is not accidental to the thing
fore the intellectual appetite is not distinguished from the
desired to be apprehended by the sense or the intellect;
sensitive.
on the contrary, this belongs to it by its nature; for the
Objection 3.
Further, as under the apprehensive
appetible does not move the appetite except as it is appre-
power, the appetitive is subordinate as a lower power, so
hended. Wherefore differences in the thing apprehended
also is the motive power. But the motive power which in
are of themselves differences of the appetible. And so the
man follows the intellect is not distinct from the motive
appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction
power which in animals follows sense. Therefore, for a
of the things apprehended, as their proper objects.
like reason, neither is there distinction in the appetitive
Reply to Objection 2.
The intellectual appetite,
part.
though it tends to individual things which exist outside the
On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9)
soul, yet tends to them as standing under the universal; as
distinguishes a double appetite, and says (De Anima iii,
when it desires something because it is good. Wherefore
11) that the higher appetite moves the lower.
the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii, 4) that hatred can re-
I answer that, We must needs say that the intellectual
gard a universal, as when “we hate every kind of thief.” In
appetite is a distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For
the same way by the intellectual appetite we may desire
the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally
the immaterial good, which is not apprehended by sense,
moved by the thing apprehended: wherefore the appre-
such as knowledge, virtue, and suchlike.
414
FIRST PART, QUESTION 81
Of the Power of Sensuality
(In Three Articles)
Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power?
(2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?
(3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?
Whether sensuality is only appetitive?
Ia q. 81 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that sensuality is not
petite: since the operation of the apprehensive power is
only appetitive, but also cognitive. For Augustine says
completed in the very fact that the thing apprehended is
(De Trin. xii, 12) that “the sensual movement of the soul
in the one that apprehends: while the operation of the ap-
which is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and
petitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires
beasts.” But the bodily senses belong to the apprehensive
is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the opera-
powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.
tion of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: whereas
Objection 2. Further, things which come under one
the operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to
division seem to be of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin.
movement. Wherefore by sensual movement we under-
xii, 12) divides sensuality against the higher and lower
stand the operation of the appetitive power: so that sensu-
reason, which belong to knowledge. Therefore sensuality
ality is the name of the sensitive appetite.
also is apprehensive.
Reply to Objection 1. By saying that the sensual
Objection 3. Further, in man’s temptations sensuality
movement of the soul is directed to the bodily senses,
stands in the place of the “serpent.” But in the tempta-
Augustine does not give us to understand that the bod-
tion of our first parents, the serpent presented himself as
ily senses are included in sensuality, but rather that the
one giving information and proposing sin, which belong
movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to the bod-
to the cognitive power. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive
ily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended
power.
through the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses ap-
On the contrary, Sensuality is defined as “the ap-
pertain to sensuality as a preamble.
petite of things belonging to the body.”
Reply to Objection 2. Sensuality is divided against
I answer that, The name sensuality seems to be taken
higher and lower reason, as having in common with them
from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks
the act of movement: for the apprehensive power, to
(De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as the name of a power is
which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive
taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing. Now
power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality.
the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive
Reply to Objection 3. The serpent not only showed
apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is
and proposed sin, but also incited to the commission of
not so properly called a movement as the act of the ap-
sin. And in this, sensuality is signified by the serpent.
Whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the irascible and concupiscible as dis-Ia q. 81 a. 2
tinct powers?
Objection 1. It would seem that the sensitive ap-
only what is suitable according to the senses. But such is
petite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible
the object of the concupiscible power. Therefore there is
as distinct powers. For the same power of the soul regards
no sensitive appetite differing from the concupiscible.
both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and
Objection 3. Further, hatred is in the irascible part:
white, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11).
for Jerome says on Mat. 13:33: “We ought to have the
But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the
hatred of vice in the irascible power.” But hatred is con-
concupiscible power regards what is suitable, while the
trary to love, and is in the concupiscible part. Therefore
irascible is concerned with what is harmful, it seems that
the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers.
irascible and concupiscible are the same power in the soul.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De
Objection 2. Further, the sensitive appetite regards
Natura Hominis) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12)
415
assign two parts to the sensitive appetite, the irascible and fore also the passions of the irascible appetite counter-the concupiscible.
act the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since the
I answer that, The sensitive appetite is one generic
concupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; and
power, and is called sensuality; but it is divided into two
anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many
powers, which are species of the sensitive appetite—the
cases. This is clear also from the fact that the irascible
irascible and the concupiscible. In order to make this
is, as it were, the champion and defender of the concupis-
clear, we must observe that in natural corruptible things
cible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition
there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition
of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or
of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is harm-
against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible
ful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary
flies. And for this reason all the passions of the irasci-
agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what
ble appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible
is suitable, and are productive of harm. For example, fire
appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger rises
has a natural inclination, not only to rise from a lower po-
from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates
sition, which is unsuitable to it, towards a higher position
in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are
which is suitable, but also to resist whatever destroys or
about things concupiscible—namely, food and sex, as the
hinders its action. Therefore, since the sensitive appetite
Philosopher says∗.
is an inclination following sensitive apprehension, as nat-
Reply to Objection 1. The concupiscible power re-
ural appetite is an inclination following the natural form,
gards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable. But
there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive
the object of the irascible power is to resist the onslaught
powers—one through which the soul is simply inclined to
of the unsuitable.
seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and to fly
Reply to Objection 2. As in the apprehensive powers
from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible:
of the sensitive part there is an estimative power, which
and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that
perceives those things which do not impress the senses, as
hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called
we have said above (q. 78, a. 2); so also in the sensitive
the irascible. Whence we say that its object is some-
appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards
thing arduous, because its tendency is to overcome and
something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses,
rise above obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced
but because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and
to one principle: for sometimes the soul busies itself with
this is the irascible power.
unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupis-
Reply to Objection 3. Hatred belongs simply to the
cible appetite, in order that, following the impulse of the
concupiscible appetite: but by reason of the strife which
irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles. Where-
arises from hatred, it may belong to the irascible appetite.
Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?
Ia q. 81 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the irascible and con-
reason.
cupiscible appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
concupiscible are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does
ii, 12) that “the part of the soul which is obedient and
not obey reason, wherefore it is signified by the serpent,
amenable to reason is divided into concupiscence and
as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the
anger.”
irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason.
I answer that, In two ways the irascible and concu-
Objection 2. Further, what obeys a certain thing does
piscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the in-
not resist it. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites
tellect or reason, and the will; first, as to reason, secondly
resist reason: according to the Apostle (Rom. 7:23): “I
as to the will. They obey the reason in their own acts, be-
see another law in my members fighting against the law
cause in other animals the sensitive appetite is naturally
of my mind.” Therefore the irascible and concupiscible
moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, es-
appetites do not obey reason.
teeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the es-
Objection 3. Further, as the appetitive power is in-
timative power, as we have said above (q. 78, a. 4), is
ferior to the rational part of the soul, so also is the sen-
replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some
sitive power. But the sensitive part of the soul does not
‘the particular reason,’ because it compares individual in-
obey reason: for we neither hear nor see just when we
tentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is natu-
wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the powers of
rally moved by this particular reason. But this same par-
the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupscible, obey
ticular reason is naturally guided and moved according to
∗ De Animal. Histor. viii.
416
the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters par-power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic
ticular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions.
and royal power.” For a power is called despotic whereby
Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the
a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in
sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and
any way the orders of the one that commands them, since
irascible; and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw
they have nothing of their own. But that power is called
particular conclusions from universal principles is not the
politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects,
work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason: hence it
who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have
is that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey the
nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which
reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can ex-
they can resist the orders of him who commands. And
perience this in himself: for by applying certain universal
so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power,
considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified
because the members of the body cannot in any way re-
or excited.
sist the sway of the soul, but at the soul’s command both
To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in ex-
hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved
ecution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For
by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the in-
in other animals movement follows at once the concu-
tellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concu-
piscible and irascible appetites: for instance, the sheep,
piscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite
fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has no supe-
has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist
rior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not
the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is nat-
moved at once, according to the irascible and concupis-
urally moved, not only by the estimative power in other
cible appetites: but he awaits the command of the will,
animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the
which is the superior appetite. For wherever there is or-
universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and
der among a number of motive powers, the second only
sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irasci-
moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower appetite
ble and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch
is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher ap-
as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which rea-
petite consents. And this is what the Philosopher says (De
son forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And
Anima iii, 11), that “the higher appetite moves the lower
so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist
appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower.” In this
reason in something, we must not conclude that they do
way, therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are subject
not obey.
to reason.
Reply to Objection 3. The exterior senses require for
Reply to Objection 1. Sensuality is signified by the
action exterior sensible things, whereby they are affected,
serpent, in what is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the
and the presence of which is not ruled by reason. But the
irascible and concupiscible powers denominate the sensi-
interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not
tive appetite rather on the part of the act, to which they are
require exterior things. Therefore they are subject to the
led by the reason, as we have said.
command of reason, which can not only incite or modify
Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Polit.
the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form
i, 2): “We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic
the phantasms of the imagination.
principle: for the soul dominates the body by a despotic
417
FIRST PART, QUESTION 82
Of the Will
(In Five Articles)
We next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether the will desires something of necessity?
(2) Whether it desires anything of necessity?
(3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect?
(4) Whether the will moves the intellect?
(5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible?
Whether the will desires something of necessity?
Ia q. 82 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the will desires noth-
to the will. For we call that violent which is against the in-
ing. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it any-
clination of a thing. But the very movement of the will is
thing is necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the
an inclination to something. Therefore, as a thing is called
will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will
natural because it is according to the inclination of nature,
desires is desired of necessity.
so a thing is called voluntary because it is according to
Objection 2. Further, the rational powers, according
the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is impossi-
to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite
ble for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural,
things. But the will is a rational power, because, as he
so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or
says (De Anima iii, 9), “the will is in the reason.” There-
violent, and voluntary.
fore the will extends to opposite things, and therefore it is
But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when
determined to nothing of necessity.
the end cannot be attained except in one way: thus from
Objection 3. Further, by the will we are masters of
the will to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to
our own actions. But we are not masters of that which
wish for a ship.
is of necessity. Therefore the act of the will cannot be
In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant
necessitated.
to the will. Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4)
of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must
that “all desire happiness with one will.” Now if this were
of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness:
not necessary, but contingent, there would at least be a
since the end is in practical matters what the principle is
few exceptions. Therefore the will desires something of
in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally
necessity.
and immovably must be the root and principle of all else
I answer that, The word “necessity” is employed in
appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first
many ways. For that which must be is necessary. Now
in everything, and every movement arises from something
that a thing must be may belong to it by an intrinsic
immovable.
principle—either material, as when we say that every-
Reply to Objection 1. The words of Augustine are
thing composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible—
to be understood of the necessity of coercion. But natural
or formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three
necessity “does not take away the liberty of the will,” as
angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. And
he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10).
this is “natural” and “absolute necessity.” In another way,
Reply to Objection 2. The will, so far as it desires
that a thing must be, belongs to it by reason of something
a thing naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect as re-
extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent. On the part
gards natural principles than to the reason, which extends
of the end, as when without it the end is not to be attained
to opposite things. Wherefore in this respect it is rather an
or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be neces-
intellectual than a rational power.
sary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This
Reply to Objection 3. We are masters of our own
is called “necessity of end,” and sometimes also “utility.”
actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that.
On the part of the agent, a thing must be, when someone
But choice regards not the end, but “the means to the end,”
is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9). Wherefore the de-
contrary. This is called “necessity of coercion.”
sire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions of
Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant
which we are masters.
418
Whether the will desires of necessity, whatever it desires?
Ia q. 82 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the will desires all
connection of these conclusions with the principles; but it
things of necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius
does not assent of necessity until through the demonstra-
says (Div. Nom. iv) that “evil is outside the scope of the
tion it recognizes the necessity of such connection. It is
will.” Therefore the will tends of necessity to the good
the same with the will. For there are certain individual
which is proposed to it.
goods which have not a necessary connection with happi-
Objection 2. Further, the object of the will is com-
ness, because without them a man can be happy: and to
pared to the will as the mover to the thing movable.
such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are
But the movement of the movable necessarily follows the
some things which have a necessary connection with hap-
mover. Therefore it seems that the will’s object moves it
piness, by means of which things man adheres to God, in
of necessity.
Whom alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until
Objection 3. Further, as the thing apprehended by
through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity
sense is the object of the sensitive appetite, so the thing
of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to
apprehended by the intellect is the object of the intellec-
God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God.
tual appetite, which is called the will. But what is ap-
But the will of the man who sees God in His essence of
prehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of
necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of neces-
necessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that
sity to be happy. It is therefore clear that the will does not
“animals are moved by things seen.” Therefore it seems
desire of necessity whatever it desires.
that whatever is apprehended by the intellect moves the
Reply to Objection 1. The will can tend to nothing
will of necessity.
except under the aspect of good. But because good is of
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that
many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity de-
“it is the will by which we sin and live well,” and so the
termined to one.
will extends to opposite things. Therefore it does not de-
Reply to Objection 2. The mover, then, of necessity
sire of necessity all things whatsoever it desires.
causes movement in the thing movable, when the power
I answer that, The will does not desire of necessity
of the mover exceeds the thing movable, so that its entire
whatsoever it desires. In order to make this evident we
capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the
must observe that as the intellect naturally and of neces-
will regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is
sity adheres to the first principles, so the will adheres to
not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is
the last end, as we have said already (a. 1). Now there are
not of necessity moved by it.
some things intelligible which have not a necessary con-
Reply to Objection 3. The sensitive power does not
nection with the first principles; such as contingent propo-
compare different things with each other, as reason does:
sitions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the
but it simply apprehends some one thing. Therefore, ac-
first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent
cording to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite
of necessity. But there are some propositions which have
in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that
a necessary connection with the first principles: such as
compares several things together: therefore from several
demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a
things the intellectual appetite—that is, the will—may be
denial of the first principles. And to these the intellect as-
moved; but not of necessity from one thing.
sents of necessity, when once it is aware of the necessary
Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect?
Ia q. 82 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the will is a higher
Objection 3. Further, habits are proportioned to their
power than the intellect. For the object of the will is good
powers, as perfections to what they make perfect. But the
and the end. But the end is the first and highest cause.
habit which perfects the will—namely, charity—is more
Therefore the will is the first and highest power.
noble than the habits which perfect the intellect: for it is
Objection 2. Further, in the order of natural things we
written (1 Cor. 13:2): “If I should know all mysteries,
observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect. And
and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am
this also appears in the powers of the soul: for sense pre-
nothing.” Therefore the will is a higher power than the
cedes the intellect, which is more noble. Now the act of
intellect.
the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the intel-
On the contrary, The Philosopher holds the intellect
lect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power
to be the higher power than the intellect.
than the intellect.
I answer that, The superiority of one thing over an-
419
other can be considered in two ways: “absolutely” and ror,” which are objects of the intellect, “are in the mind.”
“relatively.” Now a thing is considered to be such abso-
When, therefore, the thing in which there is good is no-
lutely which is considered such in itself: but relatively as
bler than the soul itself, in which is the idea understood;
it is such with regard to something else. If therefore the
by comparison with such a thing, the will is higher than
intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves,
the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less no-
then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if
ble than the soul, then even in comparison with that thing
we compare their respective objects to one another. For
the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the love of
the object of the intellect is more simple and more abso-
God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the con-
lute than the object of the will; since the object of the in-
trary, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the
tellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the appetible
love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler
good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of
than the will.
the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract a
Reply to Objection 1. The aspect of causality is per-
thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore
ceived by comparing one thing to another, and in such a
the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the
comparison the idea of good is found to be nobler: but
will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in
truth signifies something more absolute, and extends to
its order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something
and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But rel-
true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as
atively and by comparison with something else, we find
the intellect is a thing, and truth its end. And among
that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from
other ends this is the most excellent: as also is the intellect the fact that the object of the will occurs in something
among the other powers.
higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect.
Reply to Objection 2. What precedes in order of gen-
Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively
eration and time is less perfect: for in one and in the same
nobler than sight, inasmuch as something in which there
thing potentiality precedes act, and imperfection precedes
is sound is nobler than something in which there is color,
perfection. But what precedes absolutely and in the order
though color is nobler and simpler than sound. For as we
of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes potential-
have said above (q. 16, a. 1; q. 27, a. 4), the action of the
ity. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the
intellect consists in this—that the idea of the thing under-
motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the ac-
stood is in the one who understands; while the act of the
tive precedes the passive; for good which is understood
will consists in this—that the will is inclined to the thing
moves the will.
itself as existing in itself. And therefore the Philosopher
Reply to Objection 3. This reason is verified of the
says in Metaph. vi (Did. v, 2) that “good and evil,” which
will as compared with what is above the soul. For charity
are objects of the will, “are in things,” but “truth and er-
is the virtue by which we love God.
Whether the will moves the intellect?
Ia q. 82 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the will does not
act of the intellect by another act of the will, and so on
move the intellect. For what moves excels and precedes
indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does
what is moved, because what moves is an agent, and “the
not move the intellect.
agent is nobler than the patient,” as Augustine says (Gen.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5).
26): “It is in our power to learn an art or not, as we list.”
But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have
But a thing is in our power by the will, and we learn art
said above (a. 3). Therefore the will does not move the
by the intellect. Therefore the will moves the intellect.
intellect.
I answer that, A thing is said to move in two ways:
Objection 2. Further, what moves is not moved by
First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end
what is moved, except perhaps accidentally. But the in-
moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will,
tellect moves the will, because the good apprehended by
because the good understood is the object of the will, and
the intellect moves without being moved; whereas the ap-
moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move
petite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not
as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and
moved by the will.
what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the
Objection 3. Further, we can will nothing but what
will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul,
we understand. If, therefore, in order to understand, the
as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The rea-
will moves by willing to understand, that act of the will
son is, because wherever we have order among a number
must be preceded by another act of the intellect, and this
of active powers, that power which regards the universal
420
end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And cause under the notion of being and truth is contained both
we may observe this both in nature and in things politic.
the will itself, and its act, and its object. Wherefore the in-
For the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation
tellect understands the will, and its act, and its object, just of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all
as it understands other species of things, as stone or wood,
inferior bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of
which are contained in the common notion of being and
its own species or of the individual. The king also, who
truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common
aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his
nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a
rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules
thing and a special power; then the intellect itself, and its
over his own particular city. Now the object of the will is
act, and its object, which is truth, each of which is some
good and the end in general, and each power is directed to
species of good, are contained under the common notion
some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the
of good. And in this way the will is higher than the intel-
perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of
lect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand
truth. Therefore the will as agent moves all the powers of
why these powers include one another in their acts, be-
the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers
cause the intellect understands that the will wills, and the
of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will.
will wills the intellect to understand. In the same way
Reply to Objection 1. The intellect may be consid-
good is contained in truth, inasmuch as it is an understood
ered in two ways: as apprehensive of universal being and
truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired good.
truth, and as a thing and a particular power having a de-
Reply to Objection 2. The intellect moves the will in
terminate act. In like manner also the will may be con-
one sense, and the will moves the intellect in another, as
sidered in two ways: according to the common nature of
we have said above.
its object—that is to say, as appetitive of universal good—
Reply to Objection 3. There is no need to go on in-
and as a determinate power of the soul having a determi-
definitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all
nate act. If, therefore, the intellect and the will be com-
the rest. For every movement of the will must be preceded
pared with one another according to the universality of
by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not pre-
their respective objects, then, as we have said above (a. 3),
ceded by an act of the will; but the principle of counselling
the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will. If,
and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than
however, we take the intellect as regards the common na-
our intellect —namely, God—as also Aristotle says (Eth.
ture of its object and the will as a determinate power, then
Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there
again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, be-
is no need to proceed indefinitely.
Whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior ap-Ia q. 82 a. 5
petite?
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to distin-
assign an irascible and concupiscible power to the intel-
guish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior ap-
lectual part.
petite, which is the will. For the concupiscible power is
Objection 3. Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima)
so called from “concupiscere” [to desire], and the irasci-
that “the soul has these powers”—namely, the irascible,
ble part from “irasci” [to be angry]. But there is a con-
concupiscible, and rational—“before it is united to the
cupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite,
body.” But no power of the sensitive part belongs to the
but only to the intellectual, which is the will; as the con-
soul alone, but to the soul and body united, as we have
cupiscence of wisdom, of which it is said (Wis. 6:21):
said above (q. 78, Aa. 5,8). Therefore the irascible and
“The concupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the eternal
concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the intellec-
kingdom.” There is also a certain anger which cannot be-
tual appetite.
long to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual;
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De
as when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore
Nat. Hom.) says “that the irrational” part of the soul is di-
Jerome commenting on Mat. 13:33 warns us “to have the
vided into the desiderative and irascible, and Damascene
hatred of vice in the irascible part.” Therefore we should
says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the Philosopher
distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts of the intel-
says (De Anima iii, 9) “that the will is in reason, while
lectual soul as well as in the sensitive.
in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and
Objection 2. Further, as is commonly said, charity is
anger,” or “desire and animus.”
in the concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But
I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible are not
they cannot be in the sensitive appetite, because their ob-
parts of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will.
jects are not sensible, but intellectual. Therefore we must
Because, as was said above (q. 59, a. 4; q. 79, a. 7), a
421
power which is directed to an object according to some Reply to Objection 1. Love, concupiscence, and the
common notion is not differentiated by special differences
like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are
which are contained under that common notion. For in-
taken as passions—arising, that is, with a certain commo-
stance, because sight regards the visible thing under the
tion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood,
common notion of something colored, the visual power
and in this sense they are only in the sensitive appetite.
is not multiplied according to the different kinds of color:
They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as
but if there were a power regarding white as white, and not
they are simple affections without passion or commotion
as something colored, it would be distinct from a power
of the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this
regarding black as black.
sense, too, they are attributed to the angels and to God.
Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the com-
But if taken in this sense, they do not belong to different
mon notion of good, because neither do the senses appre-
powers, but only to one power, which is called the will.
hend the universal. And therefore the parts of the sensitive
Reply to Objection 2. The will itself may be said to
appetite are differentiated by the different notions of par-
irascible, as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sud-
ticular good: for the concupiscible regards as proper to it
den movement of a passion, but from a judgment of the
the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses
reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be
and suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the
concupiscible on account of its desire for good. And thus
notion of good as something that wards off and repels
in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope—
what is hurtful. But the will regards good according to the
that is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this
common notion of good, and therefore in the will, which
way, too, we may understand the words quoted (De Spir-
is the intellectual appetite, there is no differentiation of apitu et Anima); that the irascible and concupiscible pow-
petitive powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite
ers are in the soul before it is united to the body (as long
an irascible power distinct from a concupiscible power:
as we understand priority of nature, and not of time), al-
just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehen-
though there is no need to have faith in what that book
sive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of
says. Whence the answer to the third objection is clear.
the senses.
422
FIRST PART, QUESTION 83
Of Free-Will
(In Four Articles)
We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether man has free-will?
(2) What is free-will—a power, an act, or a habit?
(3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive?
(4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct?
Whether man has free-will?
Ia q. 83 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that man has not free-
ing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a nat-
will. For whoever has free-will does what he wills. But
ural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from
man does not what he wills; for it is written (Rom. 7:19):
reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is
“For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I
to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man
will not, that I do.” Therefore man has not free-will.
acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power
Objection 2. Further, whoever has free-will has in
he judges that something should be avoided or sought.
his power to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But
But because this judgment, in the case of some particu-
this is not in man’s power: for it is written (Rom. 9:16):
lar act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act
“It is not of him that willeth”—namely, to will—“nor of
of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free
him that runneth”—namely, to run. Therefore man has
judgment and retains the power of being inclined to var-
not free-will.
ious things. For reason in contingent matters may follow
Objection 3. Further, what is “free is cause of itself,”
opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and
as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is
rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are con-
moved by another is not free. But God moves the will, for
tingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of rea-
it is written (Prov. 21:1): “The heart of the king is in the
son may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate
hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it”
to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary
and (Phil. 2:13): “It is God Who worketh in you both to
that man have a free-will.
will and to accomplish.” Therefore man has not free-will.
Reply to Objection 1. As we have said above (q. 81,
Objection 4. Further, whoever has free-will is master
a. 3, ad 2), the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the rea-
of his own actions. But man is not master of his own ac-
son, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the
tions: for it is written (Jer. 10:23): “The way of a man is
reason forbids. This is therefore the good which man does
not his: neither is it in a man to walk.” Therefore man has
not when he wishes—namely, “not to desire against rea-
not free-will.
son,” as Augustine says.
Objection 5. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
Reply to Objection 2. Those words of the Apostle
5): “According as each one is, such does the end seem to
are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does
him.” But it is not in our power to be of one quality or
not run of his free-will, but because the free-will is not
another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is
sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by God.
natural to us to follow some particular end, and therefore
Reply to Objection 3. Free-will is the cause of its
we are not free in so doing.
own movement, because by his free-will man moves him-
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): “God
self to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty
made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand
that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as nei-
of his own counsel”; and the gloss adds: “That is of his
ther for one thing to be cause of another need it be the
free-will.”
first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves
I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels,
causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving
exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and pun-
natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natu-
ishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident,
ral, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive
we must observe that some things act without judgment;
their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause
as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things
of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing
which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but
according to its own nature.
not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, see-
Reply to Objection 4. “Man’s way” is said “not to be
423
his” in the execution of his choice, wherein he may be im-organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal qual-
peded, whether he will or not. The choice itself, however,
ity, such also does his end seem to him, because from such
is in us, but presupposes the help of God.
a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject some-
Reply to Objection 5. Quality in man is of two kinds:
thing. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment
natural and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be
of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said
in the intellectual part, or in the body and its powers. From
(q. 81, a. 3). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to
the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a nat-
free-will.
ural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally
The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by
desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, in-
virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than
deed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as
to another. And yet even these inclinations are subject
is clear from what we have said above (q. 82, Aa. 1,2). But
to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are sub-
on the part of the body and its powers man may be such
ject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them,
by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a
whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them,
temperament or disposition due to any impression what-
or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is
ever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect
repugnant to free-will.
the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a corporeal
Whether free-will is a power?
Ia q. 83 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that free-will is not a
rally inclined are not subject to free-will, as we have said
power. For free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But
of the desire of happiness (q. 82, Aa. 1,2). Wherefore it
judgment denominates an act, not a power. Therefore
is against the very notion of free-will that it should be a
free-will is not a power.
natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit is
Objection 2. Further, free-will is defined as “the fac-
against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.
ulty of the will and reason.” But faculty denominates a
Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as
facility of power, which is due to a habit. Therefore free-
that “by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with
will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De Gratia et Lib.
regard to actions and passions” (Ethic. ii, 5); for by tem-
Arb. 1,2) that free-will is “the soul’s habit of disposing of
perance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences,
itself.” Therefore it is not a power.
and by intemperance ill-disposed: and by knowledge we
Objection 3. Further, no natural power is forfeited
are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know
through sin. But free-will is forfeited through sin; for Au-
the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the free-
gustine says that “man, by abusing free-will, loses both it
will is indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it
and himself.” Therefore free-will is not a power.
is impossible for free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a
On the contrary, Nothing but a power, seemingly, is
power.
the subject of a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace,
Reply to Objection 1. It is not unusual for a power to
by the help of which it chooses what is good. Therefore
be named from its act. And so from this act, which is a
free-will is a power.
free judgment, is named the power which is the principle
I answer that, Although free-will∗ in its strict sense
of this act. Otherwise, if free-will denominated an act, it
denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call
would not always remain in man.
free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which
Reply to Objection 2. Faculty sometimes denomi-
man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is
nates a power ready for operation, and in this sense fac-
both power and habit; for we say that we know something
ulty is used in the definition of free-will. But Bernard
both by knowledge and by the intellectual power. There-
takes habit, not as divided against power, but as signify-
fore free-will must be either a power or a habit, or a power
ing a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of
with a habit. That it is neither a habit nor a power together
relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and
with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways. First of
by a habit: for by a power man is, as it were, empowered
all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit; for it to do the action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or
is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not natu-
ill.
ral habit in us with respect to those things which come un-
Reply to Objection 3. Man is said to have lost free-
der free-will: for we are naturally inclined to those things
will by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is
of which we have natural habits—for instance, to assent
freedom from coercion, but as regards freedom from fault
to first principles: while those things which we are natu-
and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat later in the treatise
∗ Liberum arbitrium—i.e. free judgment
424
on Morals in the second part of this work ( Ia IIae, q. 85, seqq.; q. 109).
Whether free-will is an appetitive power?
Ia q. 83 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that free-will is not an ap-
to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since he says that
petitive, but a cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide
choice is either “an appetitive intellect or an intellectual
Orth. ii, 27) says that “free-will straightway accompa-
appetite.” But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being an
nies the rational nature.” But reason is a cognitive power.
intellectual appetite when he describes choice as “a desire
Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
proceeding from counsel.” And the reason of this is be-
Objection 2. Further, free-will is so called as though
cause the proper object of choice is the means to the end:
it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cogni-
and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is
tive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object
Objection 3. Further, the principal function of free-
of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act
will is to choose. But choice seems to belong to knowl-
of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive
edge, because it implies a certain comparison of one thing
power.
to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. There-
Reply to Objection 1. The appetitive powers accom-
fore free-will is a cognitive power.
pany the apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
that free-will straightway accompanies the rational power.
3) that choice is “the desire of those things which are in
Reply to Objection 2. Judgment, as it were, con-
us.” But desire is an act of the appetitive power: therefore
cludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is termi-
choice is also. But free-will is that by which we choose.
nated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by
Therefore free-will is an appetitive power.
the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher
I answer that, The proper act of free-will is choice:
(Ethic. iii, 3) says that, “having formed a judgment by
for we say that we have a free-will because we can take
counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel.” And
one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose.
in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-
Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by
will takes its name.
considering the nature of choice. Now two things con-
Reply to Objection 3.
This comparison which is
cur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the
implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel,
other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the
which is an act of reason. For though the appetite does
cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge
not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by
one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the
the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some
appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should ac-
likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to
cept the judgment of counsel. Therefore Aristotle (Ethic.
another.
vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally
Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will?
Ia q. 83 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that free-will is a power
petite.
But in the intellect there are two powers—the
distinct from the will.
For Damascene says (De Fide
active and the passive. Therefore, also on the part of
Orth. ii, 22) that thelesis is one thing and boulesis anthe intellectual appetite, there must be another power be-
other. But thelesis is the will, while boulesis seems to be sides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be free-will.
the free-will, because boulesis, according to him, is will Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.
as concerning an object by way of comparison between
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
two things. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct
14) free-will is nothing else than the will.
power from the will.
I answer that, The appetitive powers must be propor-
Objection 2. Further, powers are known by their acts.
tionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above
But choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from
(q. 64, a. 2). Now, as on the part of the intellectual ap-
the act of willing, because “the act of the will regards the
prehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of
end, whereas choice regards the means to the end” (Ethic.
the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will which
iii, 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the
is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear
will.
from their relations to their respective objects and acts.
Objection 3. Further, the will is the intellectual ap-
For the act of “understanding” implies the simple accep-
425
tation of something; whence we say that we understand to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is
first principles, which are known of themselves without
free-will. But it has been shown above (q. 79, a. 8) that it
any comparison. But to “reason,” properly speaking, is
belongs to the same power both to understand and to rea-
to come from one thing to the knowledge of another:
son, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and
wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclu-
to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same
sions, which are known from the principles. In like man-
power to will and to choose: and on this account the will
ner on the part of the appetite to “will” implies the simple
and the free-will are not two powers, but one.
appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to re-
Reply to Objection 1. Boulesis is distinct from thele-gard the end, which is desired for itself. But to “choose”
sis on account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts.
is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something
Reply to Objection 2. Choice and will—that is, the
else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means
act of willing —are different acts: yet they belong to the
to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles
same power, as also to understand and to reason, as we
are related to the conclusion to which we assent on ac-
have said.
count of the principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the
Reply to Objection 3. The intellect is compared to the
end is related to the means, which is desired on account
will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to
of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is
distinguish in the will an active and a passive will.
426
FIRST PART, QUESTION 84
How the Soul While United to the Body Understands Corporeal Things Beneath It (In Eight Articles)
We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the intellectual and the appetitive powers: for the other powers of the soul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian. Furthermore, the acts of the appetitive part of the soul come under the consideration of the science of morals; wherefore we shall treat of them in the second part of this work, to which the consideration of moral matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part we shall treat now.
In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order: First, we shall inquire how the soul understands when united to the body; secondly, how it understands when separated therefrom.
The former of these inquiries will be threefold: (1) How the soul understands bodies which are beneath it; (2) How it understands itself and things contained in itself; (3) How it understands immaterial substances, which are above it.
In treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three points to be considered: (1) Through what does the soul know them? (2) How and in what order does it know them? (3) What does it know in them?
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?
(2) Whether it understands them through its essence, or through any species?
(3) If through some species, whether the species of all things intelligible are naturally innate in the soul?
(4) Whether these species are derived by the soul from certain separate immaterial forms?
(5) Whether our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it understands?
(6) Whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from the senses?
(7) Whether the intellect can, through the species of which it is possessed, actually understand, without turning to the phantasms?
(8) Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered by an obstacle in the sensitive powers?
Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?
Ia q. 84 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the soul does not
the world save bodies. And because they observed that
know bodies through the intellect. For Augustine says
all bodies are mobile, and considered them to be ever in
(Soliloq. ii, 4) that “bodies cannot be understood by the
a state of flux, they were of opinion that we can have no
intellect; nor indeed anything corporeal unless it can be
certain knowledge of the true nature of things. For what is
perceived by the senses.” He says also (Gen. ad lit. xii,
in a continual state of flux, cannot be grasped with any de-
24) that intellectual vision is of those things that are in the gree of certitude, for it passes away ere the mind can form
soul by their essence. But such are not bodies. Therefore
a judgment thereon: according to the saying of Heraclitus,
the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect.
that “it is not possible twice to touch a drop of water in a
Objection 2. Further, as sense is to the intelligible,
passing torrent,” as the Philosopher relates (Metaph. iv,
so is the intellect to the sensible. But the soul can by
Did. iii, 5).
no means, through the senses, understand spiritual things,
After these came Plato, who, wishing to save the certi-
which are intelligible.
Therefore by no means can it,
tude of our knowledge of truth through the intellect, main-
through the intellect, know bodies, which are sensible.
tained that, besides these things corporeal, there is an-
Objection 3. Further, the intellect is concerned with
other genus of beings, separate from matter and move-
things that are necessary and unchangeable. But all bod-
ment, which beings he called “species” or “ideas,” by par-
ies are mobile and changeable. Therefore the soul cannot
ticipation of which each one of these singular and sensi-
know bodies through the intellect.
ble things is said to be either a man, or a horse, or the like.
On the contrary, Science is in the intellect. If, there-
Wherefore he said that sciences and definitions, and what-
fore, the intellect does not know bodies, it follows that
ever appertains to the act of the intellect, are not referred
there is no science of bodies; and thus perishes natural
to these sensible bodies, but to those beings immaterial
science, which treats of mobile bodies.
and separate: so that according to this the soul does not
I answer that, It should be said in order to elucidate
understand these corporeal things, but the separate species
this question, that the early philosophers, who inquired
thereof.
into the natures of things, thought there was nothing in
Now this may be shown to be false for two reasons.
427
First, because, since those species are immaterial and im-of sensible things without receiving matter, such as the
movable, knowledge of movement and matter would be
color of gold without receiving gold. So also the intellect,
excluded from science (which knowledge is proper to
according to its own mode, receives under conditions of
natural science), and likewise all demonstration through
immateriality and immobility, the species of material and
moving and material causes. Secondly, because it seems
mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver accord-
ridiculous, when we seek for knowledge of things which
ing to the mode of the receiver. We must conclude, there-
are to us manifest, to introduce other beings, which can-
fore, that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a
not be the substance of those others, since they differ from
knowledge which is immaterial, universal, and necessary.
them essentially: so that granted that we have a knowl-
Reply to Objection 1. These words of Augustine are
edge of those separate substances, we cannot for that rea-
to be understood as referring to the medium of intellectual
son claim to form a judgment concerning these sensible
knowledge, and not to its object. For the intellect knows
things.
bodies by understanding them, not indeed through bodies,
Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth be-
nor through material and corporeal species; but through
cause, having observed that all knowledge takes place
immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the
through some kind of similitude, he thought that the form
soul by their own essence.
of the thing known must of necessity be in the knower in
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Civ.
the same manner as in the thing known. Then he observed
Dei xxii, 29), it is not correct to say that as the sense
that the form of the thing understood is in the intellect un-
knows only bodies so the intellect knows only spiritual
der conditions of universality, immateriality, and immo-
things; for it follows that God and the angels would not
bility: which is apparent from the very operation of the
know corporeal things. The reason of this diversity is that
intellect, whose act of understanding has a universal ex-
the lower power does not extend to those things that be-
tension, and is subject to a certain amount of necessity: for
long to the higher power; whereas the higher power oper-
the mode of action corresponds to the mode of the agent’s
ates in a more excellent manner those things which belong
form. Wherefore he concluded that the things which we
to the lower power.
understand must have in themselves an existence under
Reply to Objection 3. Every movement presupposes
the same conditions of immateriality and immobility.
something immovable: for when a change of quality oc-
But there is no necessity for this. For even in sensi-
curs, the substance remains unmoved; and when there is
ble things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise
a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved.
in one sensible than in another: for instance, whiteness
Moreover the various conditions of mutable things are
may be of great intensity in one, and of a less intensity
themselves immovable; for instance, though Socrates be
in another: in one we find whiteness with sweetness, in
not always sitting, yet it is an immovable truth that when-
another without sweetness. In the same way the sensible
ever he does sit he remains in one place. For this reason
form is conditioned differently in the thing which is exter-
there is nothing to hinder our having an immovable sci-
nal to the soul, and in the senses which receive the forms
ence of movable things.
Whether the soul understands corporeal things through its essence?
Ia q. 84 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the soul understands
(Coel. Hier. xii). Therefore all corporeal creatures exist
corporeal things through its essence. For Augustine says
in a more excellent way in the soul than in themselves.
(De Trin. x, 5) that the soul “collects and lays hold of the
Therefore the soul can know corporeal creatures through
images of bodies which are formed in the soul and of the
its essence.
soul: for in forming them it gives them something of its
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3) that
own substance.” But the soul understands bodies by im-
“the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through
ages of bodies. Therefore the soul knows bodies through
the bodily senses.” But the soul itself cannot be known
its essence, which it employs for the formation of such
through the bodily senses. Therefore it does not know
images, and from which it forms them.
corporeal things through itself.
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (De An-
I answer that, The ancient philosophers held that the
ima iii, 8) that “the soul, after a fashion, is everything.”
soul knows bodies through its essence. For it was uni-
Since, therefore, like is known by like, it seems that the
versally admitted that “like is known by like.” But they
soul knows corporeal things through itself.
thought that the form of the thing known is in the knower
Objection 3. Further, the soul is superior to corpo-
in the same mode as in the thing known. The Platonists
real creatures. Now lower things are in higher things in a
however were of a contrary opinion. For Plato, having
more eminent way than in themselves, as Dionysius says
observed that the intellectual soul has an immaterial na-
428
ture, and an immaterial mode of knowledge, held that the ing conditions of matter, has more perfect knowledge than
forms of things known subsist immaterially. While the
the senses, which receive the form of the thing known,
earlier natural philosophers, observing that things known
without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions.
are corporeal and material, held that things known must
Moreover, among the senses, sight has the most perfect
exist materially even in the soul that knows them. And
knowledge, because it is the least material, as we have
therefore, in order to ascribe to the soul a knowledge of
remarked above (q. 78, a. 3): while among intellects the
all things, they held that it has the same nature in common
more perfect is the more immaterial.
with all. And because the nature of a result is determined
It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there
by its principles, they ascribed to the soul the nature of
be an intellect which knows all things by its essence, then
a principle; so that those who thought fire to be the prin-
its essence must needs have all things in itself immate-
ciple of all, held that the soul had the nature of fire; and
rially; thus the early philosophers held that the essence
in like manner as to air and water. Lastly, Empedocles,
of the soul, that it may know all things, must be actually
who held the existence of our four material elements and
composed of the principles of all material things. Now
two principles of movement, said that the soul was com-
this is proper to God, that His Essence comprise all things
posed of these. Consequently, since they held that things
immaterially as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause.
exist in the soul materially, they maintained that all the
God alone, therefore, understands all things through His
soul’s knowledge is material, thus failing to discern intel-
Essence: but neither the human soul nor the angels can do
lect from sense.
so.
But this opinion will not hold. First, because in the
Reply to Objection 1.
Augustine in that passage
material principle of which they spoke, the various results
is speaking of an imaginary vision, which takes place
do not exist save in potentiality. But a thing is not known
through the image of bodies. To the formation of such im-
according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it
ages the soul gives part of its substance, just as a subject is is in act, as is shown Metaph. ix (Did. viii, 9): where-given in order to be informed by some form. In this way
fore neither is a power known except through its act. It
the soul makes such images from itself; not that the soul
is therefore insufficient to ascribe to the soul the nature
or some part of the soul be turned into this or that image;
of the principles in order to explain the fact that it knows
but just as we say that a body is made into something col-
all, unless we further admit in the soul natures and forms
ored because of its being informed with color. That this
of each individual result, for instance, of bone, flesh, and
is the sense, is clear from what follows. For he says that
the like; thus does Aristotle argue against Empedocles (De
the soul “keeps something”—namely, not informed with
Anima i, 5). Secondly, because if it were necessary for the
such image—“which is able freely to judge of the species
thing known to exist materially in the knower, there would
of these images”: and that this is the “mind” or “intel-
be no reason why things which have a material existence
lect.” And he says that the part which is informed with
outside the soul should be devoid of knowledge; why, for
these images—namely, the imagination—is “common to
instance, if by fire the soul knows fire, that fire also which
us and beasts.”
is outside the soul should not have knowledge of fire.
Reply to Objection 2. Aristotle did not hold that the
We must conclude, therefore, that material things
soul is actually composed of all things, as did the earlier
known must needs exist in the knower, not materially, but
philosophers; he said that the soul is all things, “after a
immaterially. The reason of this is, because the act of
fashion,” forasmuch as it is in potentiality to all—through
knowledge extends to things outside the knower: for we
the senses, to all things sensible—through the intellect, to
know things even that are external to us. Now by mat-
all things intelligible.
ter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing.
Reply to Objection 3. Every creature has a finite and
Wherefore it is clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio of
determinate essence. Wherefore although the essence of
materiality. And consequently things that are not recep-
the higher creature has a certain likeness to the lower crea-
tive of forms save materially, have no power of knowl-
ture, forasmuch as they have something in common gener-
edge whatever—such as plants, as the Philosopher says
ically, yet it has not a complete likeness thereof, because
(De Anima ii, 12). But the more immaterially a thing re-
it is determined to a certain species other than the species
ceives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is
of the lower creature. But the Divine Essence is a perfect
its knowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the
likeness of all, whatsoever may be found to exist in things
species not only from matter, but also from the individuat-
created, being the universal principle of all.
429
Whether the soul understands all things through innate species?
Ia q. 84 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the soul understands
realization of its act. But this seems to be unreasonable.
all things through innate species. For Gregory says, in
First, because, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all
a homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), that “man has
things, it seems impossible for the soul so far to forget the
understanding in common with the angels.” But angels
existence of such knowledge as not to know itself to be
understand all things through innate species: wherefore in
possessed thereof: for no man forgets what he knows nat-
the book De Causis it is said that “every intelligence is full
urally; that, for instance, the whole is larger than the part,
of forms.” Therefore the soul also has innate species of
and such like. And especially unreasonable does this seem
things, by means of which it understands corporeal things.
if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united to
Objection 2. Further, the intellectual soul is more ex-
the body, as we have established above (q. 76 , a. 1): for
cellent than corporeal primary matter. But primary matter
it is unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be
was created by God under the forms to which it has po-
totally hindered by that which belongs to it naturally. Sec-
tentiality. Therefore much more is the intellectual soul
ondly, the falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from
created by God under intelligible species. And so the soul
the fact that if a sense be wanting, the knowledge of what
understands corporeal things through innate species.
is apprehended through that sense is wanting also: for in-
Objection 3. Further, no one can answer the truth ex-
stance, a man who is born blind can have no knowledge of
cept concerning what he knows. But even a person un-
colors. This would not be the case if the soul had innate
taught and devoid of acquired knowledge, answers the
images of all intelligible things. We must therefore con-
truth to every question if put to him in orderly fashion,
clude that the soul does not know corporeal things through
as we find related in the Meno (xv seqq.) of Plato, con-
innate species.
cerning a certain individual. Therefore we have some
Reply to Objection 1. Man indeed has intelligence
knowledge of things even before we acquire knowledge;
in common with the angels, but not in the same degree
which would not be the case unless we had innate species.
of perfection: just as the lower grades of bodies, which
Therefore the soul understands corporeal things through
merely exist, according to Gregory (Homily on Ascen-
innate species.
sion, xxix In Ev.), have not the same degree of perfection
On the contrary, The Philosopher, speaking of the
as the higher bodies. For the matter of the lower bodies
intellect, says (De Anima iii, 4) that it is like “a tablet on
is not totally completed by its form, but is in potentiality
which nothing is written.”
to forms which it has not: whereas the matter of heavenly
I answer that, Since form is the principle of action,
bodies is totally completed by its form, so that it is not
a thing must be related to the form which is the principle
in potentiality to any other form, as we have said above
of an action, as it is to that action: for instance, if upward
(q. 66, a. 2). In the same way the angelic intellect is per-
motion is from lightness, then that which only potentially
fected by intelligible species, in accordance with its na-
moves upwards must needs be only potentially light, but
ture; whereas the human intellect is in potentiality to such
that which actually moves upwards must needs be actu-
species.
ally light. Now we observe that man sometimes is only
Reply to Objection 2. Primary matter has substan-
a potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect.
tial being through its form, consequently it had need to
And he is reduced from such potentiality to act—through
be created under some form: else it would not be in act.
the action of sensible objects on his senses, to the act of
But when once it exists under one form it is in potential-
sensation—by instruction or discovery, to the act of un-
ity to others. On the other hand, the intellect does not
derstanding. Wherefore we must say that the cognitive
receive substantial being through the intelligible species;
soul is in potentiality both to the images which are the
and therefore there is no comparison.
principles of sensing, and to those which are the principles
Reply to Objection 3. If questions be put in an or-
of understanding. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii,
derly fashion they proceed from universal self-evident
4) held that the intellect by which the soul understands has
principles to what is particular. Now by such a process
no innate species, but is at first in potentiality to all such
knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner. Where-
species.
fore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question,
But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes
this is not because he had knowledge previously, but be-
unable to act according to that form on account of some
cause he thus learns for the first time. For it matters not
hindrance, as a light thing may be hindered from mov-
whether the teacher proceed from universal principles to
ing upwards; for this reason did Plato hold that naturally
conclusions by questioning or by asserting; for in either
man’s intellect is filled with all intelligible species, but
case the mind of the listener is assured of what follows by
that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from the
that which preceded.
430
Whether the intelligible species are derived by the soul from certain separate forms?
Ia q. 84 a. 4
Objection 1.
It would seem that the intelligible
real matter, are derived from the ideas as certain images
species are derived by the soul from some separate forms.
thereof: so he held that the intelligible species of our in-
For whatever is such by participation is caused by what is
tellect are images of the ideas, derived therefrom. And
such essentially; for instance, that which is on fire is re-
for this reason, as we have said above (a. 1), he referred
duced to fire as the cause thereof. But the intellectual soul
sciences and definitions to those ideas.
forasmuch as it is actually understanding, participates the
But since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things
thing understood: for, in a way, the intellect in act is the
that their forms should subsist without matter, as Aris-
thing understood in act. Therefore what in itself and in
totle proves in many ways (Metaph. vi), Avicenna (De
its essence is understood in act, is the cause that the intel-
Anima v) setting this opinion aside, held that the intelligi-
lectual soul actually understands. Now that which in its
ble species of all sensible things, instead of subsisting in
essence is actually understood is a form existing without
themselves without matter, pre-exist immaterially in the
matter. Therefore the intelligible species, by which the
separate intellects: from the first of which, said he, such
soul understands, are caused by some separate forms.
species are derived by a second, and so on to the last sep-
Objection 2. Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, arate intellect which he called the “active intelligence,”
as the sensible is to the sense. But the sensible species
from which, according to him, intelligible species flow
which are in the senses, and by which we sense, are
into our souls, and sensible species into corporeal matter.
caused by the sensible object which exists actually out-
And so Avicenna agrees with Plato in this, that the intelli-
side the soul. Therefore the intelligible species, by which
gible species of our intellect are derived from certain sep-
our intellect understands, are caused by some things actu-
arate forms; but these Plato held to subsist of themselves,
ally intelligible, existing outside the soul. But these can
while Avicenna placed them in the “active intelligence.”
be nothing else than forms separate from matter. There-
They differ, too, in this respect, that Avicenna held that
fore the intelligible forms of our intellect are derived from
the intelligible species do not remain in our intellect after
some separate substances.
it has ceased actually to understand, and that it needs to
Objection 3. Further, whatever is in potentiality is re-
turn (to the active intellect) in order to receive them anew.
duced to act by something actual. If, therefore, our intel-
Consequently he does not hold that the soul has innate
lect, previously in potentiality, afterwards actually under-
knowledge, as Plato, who held that the participated ideas
stands, this must needs be caused by some intellect which
remain immovably in the soul.
is always in act. But this is a separate intellect. Therefore
But in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned
the intelligible species, by which we actually understand,
for the soul being united to the body. For it cannot be said
are caused by some separate substances.
that the intellectual soul is united to the body for the sake
On the contrary, If this were true we should not need
of the body: for neither is form for the sake of matter,
the senses in order to understand. And this is proved to
nor is the mover for the sake of the moved, but rather the
be false especially from the fact that if a man be wanting
reverse. Especially does the body seem necessary to the
in a sense, he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles
intellectual soul, for the latter’s proper operation which is
corresponding to that sense.
to understand: since as to its being the soul does not de-
I answer that, Some have held that the intelligible
pend on the body. But if the soul by its very nature had an
species of our intellect are derived from certain separate
inborn aptitude for receiving intelligible species through
forms or substances. And this in two ways. For Plato, as
the influence of only certain separate principles, and were
we have said (a. 1), held that the forms of sensible things
not to receive them from the senses, it would not need
subsist by themselves without matter; for instance, the
the body in order to understand: wherefore to no purpose
form of a man which he called “per se” man, and the form
would it be united to the body.
or idea of a horse which is called “per se” horse, and so
But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in or-
forth. He said therefore that these forms are participated
der to understand, through being in some way awakened
both by our soul and by corporeal matter; by our soul, to
by them to the consideration of those things, the intelligi-
the effect of knowledge thereof, and by corporeal matter
ble species of which it receives from the separate princi-
to the effect of existence: so that, just as corporeal matter
ples: even this seems an insufficient explanation. For this
by participating the idea of a stone, becomes an individ-
awakening does not seem necessary to the soul, except in
uating stone, so our intellect, by participating the idea of
as far as it is overcome by sluggishness, as the Platonists
a stone, is made to understand a stone. Now participation
expressed it, and by forgetfulness, through its union with
of an idea takes place by some image of the idea in the
the body: and thus the senses would be of no use to the
participator, just as a model is participated by a copy. So
intellectual soul except for the purpose of removing the
just as he held that the sensible forms, which are in corpo-
obstacle which the soul encounters through its union with
431
the body. Consequently the reason of the union of the soul Reply to Objection 1. The intelligible species which
with the body still remains to be sought.
are participated by our intellect are reduced, as to their
And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are
first cause, to a first principle which is by its essence
necessary to the soul, because by them it is aroused to
intelligible—namely, God. But they proceed from that
turn to the “active intelligence” from which it receives
principle by means of the sensible forms and material
the species: neither is this a sufficient explanation. Be-
things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius
cause if it is natural for the soul to understand through
says (Div. Nom. vii).
species derived from the “active intelligence,” it follows
Reply to Objection 2. Material things, as to the being
that at times the soul of an individual wanting in one of
which they have outside the soul, may be actually sensi-
the senses can turn to the active intelligence, either from
ble, but not actually intelligible. Wherefore there is no
the inclination of its very nature, or through being roused
comparison between sense and intellect.
by another sense, to the effect of receiving the intelligible
Reply to Objection 3. Our passive intellect is reduced
species of which the corresponding sensible species are
from potentiality to act by some being in act, that is, by
wanting. And thus a man born blind could have knowl-
the active intellect, which is a power of the soul, as we
edge of colors; which is clearly untrue. We must there-
have said (q. 79, a. 4); and not by a separate intelligence,
fore conclude that the intelligible species, by which our
as proximate cause, although perchance as remote cause.
soul understands, are not derived from separate forms.
Whether the intellectual soul knows material things in the eternal types?
Ia q. 84 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul
ous imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must
does not know material things in the eternal types. For that
be careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the
in which anything is known must itself be known more
heathens.” Consequently whenever Augustine, who was
and previously. But the intellectual soul of man, in the
imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists, found in their
present state of life, does not know the eternal types: for
teaching anything consistent with faith, he adopted it: and
it does not know God in Whom the eternal types exist, but
those thing which he found contrary to faith he amended.
is “united to God as to the unknown,” as Dionysius says
Now Plato held, as we have said above (a. 4), that the
(Myst. Theolog. i). Therefore the soul does not know all
forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter;
in the eternal types.
and these he called ideas, by participation of which he
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Rom. 1:20) that
said that our intellect knows all things: so that just as cor-
“the invisible things of God are clearly seen. . . by the
poreal matter by participating the idea of a stone becomes
things that are made.” But among the invisible things of
a stone, so our intellect, by participating the same idea,
God are the eternal types. Therefore the eternal types are
has knowledge of a stone. But since it seems contrary to
known through creatures and not the converse.
faith that forms of things themselves, outside the things
Objection 3. Further, the eternal types are nothing
themselves and apart from matter, as the Platonists held,
else but ideas, for Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46) that
asserting that “per se” life or “per se” wisdom are creative
“ideas are permanent types existing in the Divine mind.”
substances, as Dionysius relates (Div. Nom. xi); there-
If therefore we say that the intellectual soul knows all
fore Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), for the ideas defended
things in the eternal types, we come back to the opinion of
by Plato, substituted the types of all creatures existing in
Plato who said that all knowledge is derived from them.
the Divine mind, according to which types all things are
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 25):
made in themselves, and are known to the human soul.
“If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both
When, therefore, the question is asked: Does the hu-
see that what I say is true, where do we see this, I pray?
man soul know all things in the eternal types? we must
Neither do I see it in you, nor do you see it in me: but
reply that one thing is said to be known in another in two
we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above
ways. First, as in an object itself known; as one may see
our minds.” Now the unchangeable truth is contained in
in a mirror the images of things reflected therein. In this
the eternal types. Therefore the intellectual soul knows all
way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all
true things in the eternal types.
things in the eternal types; but the blessed who see God,
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
and all things in Him, thus know all things in the eternal
ii, 11): “If those who are called philosophers said by
types. Secondly, on thing is said to be known in another
chance anything that was true and consistent with our
as in a principle of knowledge: thus we might say that we
faith, we must claim it from them as from unjust posses-
see in the sun what we see by the sun. And thus we must
sors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens are spuri-
needs say that the human soul knows all things in the eter-
432
nal types, since by participation of these types we know iv, 16): “Although the philosophers prove by convincing
all things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is arguments that all things occur in time according to the
nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated
eternal types, were they able to see in the eternal types, or
light, in which are contained the eternal types. Whence it
to find out from them how many kinds of animals there
is written (Ps. 4:6,7), “Many say: Who showeth us good
are and the origin of each? Did they not seek for this in-
things?” which question the Psalmist answers, “The light
formation from the story of times and places?”
of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us,” as though
But that Augustine did not understand all things to be
he were to say: By the seal of the Divine light in us, all
known in their “eternal types” or in the “unchangeable
things are made known to us.
truth,” as though the eternal types themselves were seen, is
But since besides the intellectual light which is in us,
clear from what he says (QQ. 83, qu. 46)—viz. that “not
intelligible species, which are derived from things, are
each and every rational soul can be said to be worthy of
required in order for us to have knowledge of material
that vision,” namely, of the eternal types, “but only those
things; therefore this same knowledge is not due merely
that are holy and pure,” such as the souls of the blessed.
to a participation of the eternal types, as the Platonists
From what has been said the objections are easily
held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas suf-
solved.
ficed for knowledge. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin.
Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things?
Ia q. 84 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that intellectual knowl-
I answer that, On this point the philosophers held
edge is not derived from sensible things. For Augustine
three opinions. For Democritus held that “all knowledge
says (QQ. 83, qu. 9) that “we cannot expect to learn the
is caused by images issuing from the bodies we think of
fulness of truth from the senses of the body.” This he
and entering into our souls,” as Augustine says in his let-
proves in two ways. First, because “whatever the bod-
ter to Dioscorus (cxviii, 4). And Aristotle says (De Somn.
ily senses reach, is continually being changed; and what
et Vigil.) that Democritus held that knowledge is cause by
is never the same cannot be perceived.” Secondly, be-
a “discharge of images.” And the reason for this opinion
cause, “whatever we perceive by the body, even when not
was that both Democritus and the other early philosophers
present to the senses, may be present to the imagination,
did not distinguish between intellect and sense, as Aristo-
as when we are asleep or angry: yet we cannot discern by
tle relates (De Anima iii, 3). Consequently, since the sense
the senses, whether what we perceive be the sensible ob-
is affected by the sensible, they thought that all our knowl-
ject or the deceptive image thereof. Now nothing can be
edge is affected by this mere impression brought about by
perceived which cannot be distinguished from its counter-
sensible things. Which impression Democritus held to be
feit.” And so he concludes that we cannot expect to learn
caused by a discharge of images.
the truth from the senses. But intellectual knowledge ap-
Plato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is dis-
prehends the truth. Therefore intellectual knowledge can-
tinct from the senses: and that it is an immaterial power
not be conveyed by the senses.
not making use of a corporeal organ for its action. And
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal,
xii, 16): “We must not thing that the body can make any
he held that intellectual knowledge is not brought about
impression on the spirit, as though the spirit were to sup-
by sensible things affecting the intellect, but by separate
ply the place of matter in regard to the body’s action; for
intelligible forms being participated by the intellect, as we
that which acts is in every way more excellent than that
have said above (Aa. 4 ,5). Moreover he held that sense is
which it acts on.” Whence he concludes that “the body
a power operating of itself. Consequently neither is sense,
does not cause its image in the spirit, but the spirit causes
since it is a spiritual power, affected by the sensible: but
it in itself.” Therefore intellectual knowledge is not de-
the sensible organs are affected by the sensible, the result
rived from sensible things.
being that the soul is in a way roused to form within it-
Objection 3. Further, an effect does not surpass the
self the species of the sensible. Augustine seems to touch
power of its cause. But intellectual knowledge extends
on this opinion (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) where he says that
beyond sensible things: for we understand some things
the “body feels not, but the soul through the body, which
which cannot be perceived by the senses. Therefore intel-
it makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing
lectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.
within itself what is announced from without.” Thus ac-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. i,
cording to Plato, neither does intellectual knowledge pro-
1; Poster. ii, 15) that the principle of knowledge is in the
ceed from sensible knowledge, nor sensible knowledge
senses.
exclusively from sensible things; but these rouse the sen-
433
sible soul to the sentient act, while the senses rouse the intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the
intellect to the act of understanding.
material cause.
Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he
Reply to Objection 1. Those words of Augustine
agreed that intellect and sense are different. But he held
mean that we must not expect the entire truth from the
that the sense has not its proper operation without the co-
senses. For the light of the active intellect is needed,
operation of the body; so that to feel is not an act of the
through which we achieve the unchangeable truth of
soul alone, but of the “composite.” And he held the same
changeable things, and discern things themselves from
in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part. Since,
their likeness.
therefore, it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects
Reply to Objection 2.
In this passage Augustine
which are outside the soul should produce some effect
speaks not of intellectual but of imaginary knowledge.
in the “composite,” Aristotle agreed with Democritus in
And since, according to the opinion of Plato, the imag-
this, that the operations of the sensitive part are caused
ination has an operation which belongs to the soul only,
by the impression of the sensible on the sense: not by a
Augustine, in order to show that corporeal images are im-
discharge, as Democritus said, but by some kind of op-
pressed on the imagination, not by bodies but by the soul,
eration. For Democritus maintained that every operation
uses the same argument as Aristotle does in proving that
is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from De
the active intellect must be separate, namely, because “the
Gener. i, 8. But Aristotle held that the intellect has an op-
agent is more noble than the patient.” And without doubt,
eration which is independent of the body’s cooperation.
according to the above opinion, in the imagination there
Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the in-
must needs be not only a passive but also an active power.
corporeal. And therefore in order to cause the intellectual
But if we hold, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that
operation according to Aristotle, the impression caused by
the action of the imagination, is an action of the “com-
the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is
posite,” there is no difficulty; because the sensible body
required, for “the agent is more noble than the patient,” as
is more noble than the organ of the animal, in so far as
he says (De Gener. i, 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that the
it is compared to it as a being in act to a being in poten-
intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere intel-
tiality; even as the object actually colored is compared to
lectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression
the pupil which is potentially colored. It may, however,
of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher
be said, although the first impression of the imagination is
and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect,
through the agency of the sensible, since “fancy is move-
of which we have spoken above (q. 79, Aa. 3,4) causes the
ment produced in accordance with sensation” (De Anima
phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelli-
iii, 3), that nevertheless there is in man an operation which
gible, by a process of abstraction.
by synthesis and analysis forms images of various things,
According to this opinion, then, on the part of
even of things not perceived by the senses. And Augus-
the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the
tine’s words may be taken in this sense.
senses. But since the phantasms cannot of themselves
Reply to Objection 3. Sensitive knowledge is not the
affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actu-
entire cause of intellectual knowledge. And therefore it
ally intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said
is not strange that intellectual knowledge should extend
that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of
further than sensitive knowledge.
Whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which Ia q. 84 a. 7
it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms?
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect can actu-
Objection 3. There are no phantasms of incorporeal
ally understand through the intelligible species of which it
things: for the imagination does not transcend time and
is possessed, without turning to the phantasms. For the in-
space. If, therefore, our intellect cannot understand any-
tellect is made actual by the intelligible species by which
thing actually without turning to the phantasms, it follows
it is informed. But if the intellect is in act, it understands.
that it cannot understand anything incorporeal. Which is
Therefore the intelligible species suffices for the intellect
clearly false: for we understand truth, and God, and the
to understand actually, without turning to the phantasms.
angels.
Objection 2. Further, the imagination is more depen-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima
dent on the senses than the intellect on the imagination.
iii, 7) that “the soul understands nothing without a phan-
But the imagination can actually imagine in the absence
tasm.”
of the sensible. Therefore much more can the intellect
I answer that, In the present state of life in which the understand without turning to the phantasms.
soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our
434
intellect to understand anything actually, except by turn-individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a
ing to the phantasms. First of all because the intellect,
stone or any material thing cannot be known completely
being a power that does not make use of a corporeal or-
and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing in
gan, would in no way be hindered in its act through the
the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through
lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there were not
the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the
required the act of some power that does make use of a
intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must
corporeal organ. Now sense, imagination and the other
of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive
powers belonging to the sensitive part, make use of a cor-
the universal nature existing in the individual. But if the
poreal organ. Wherefore it is clear that for the intellect
proper object of our intellect were a separate form; or if, as
to understand actually, not only when it acquires fresh
the Platonists say, the natures of sensible things subsisted
knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge already
apart from the individual; there would be no need for the
acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and
intellect to turn to the phantasms whenever it understands.
of the other powers. For when the act of the imagination
Reply to Objection 1. The species preserved in the
is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance
passive intellect exist there habitually when it does not un-
in a case of frenzy; or when the act of the memory is hin-
derstand them actually, as we have said above (q. 79, a. 6).
dered, as in the case of lethargy, we see that a man is hin-
Wherefore for us to understand actually, the fact that the
dered from actually understanding things of which he had
species are preserved does not suffice; we need further to
a previous knowledge. Secondly, anyone can experience
make use of them in a manner befitting the things of which
this of himself, that when he tries to understand some-
they are the species, which things are natures existing in
thing, he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way
individuals.
of examples, in which as it were he examines what he is
Reply to Objection 2.
Even the phantasm is the
desirous of understanding. For this reason it is that when
likeness of an individual thing; wherefore the imagina-
we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay
tion does not need any further likeness of the individual,
examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for
whereas the intellect does.
the purpose of understanding.
Reply to Objection 3. Incorporeal things, of which
Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge
there are no phantasms, are known to us by comparison
is proportioned to the thing known. Wherefore the proper
with sensible bodies of which there are phantasms. Thus
object of the angelic intellect, which is entirely separate
we understand truth by considering a thing of which we
from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a
possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
body. Whereas the proper object of the human intellect,
i), we know as cause, by way of excess and by way of
which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing
remotion. Other incorporeal substances we know, in the
in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible
present state of life, only by way of remotion or by some
things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible.
comparison to corporeal things. And, therefore, when we
Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in an individ-
understand something about these things, we need to turn
ual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter: for
to phantasms of bodies, although there are no phantasms
instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in an
of the things themselves.
individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an
Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered through suspension of the sensitive Ia q. 84 a. 8
powers?
Objection 1. It would seem that the judgment of the
On the contrary, What a man does while asleep,
intellect is not hindered by suspension of the sensitive
against the moral law, is not imputed to him as a sin; as
powers. For the superior does not depend on the infe-
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15). But this would not
rior. But the judgment of the intellect is higher than the
be the case if man, while asleep, had free use of his rea-
senses. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hin-
son and intellect. Therefore the judgment of the intellect
dered through suspension of the senses.
is hindered by suspension of the senses.
Objection 2. Further, to syllogize is an act of the in-
I answer that, As we have said above (a. 7), our in-
tellect. But during sleep the senses are suspended, as is
tellect’s proper and proportionate object is the nature of a
said in De Somn. et Vigil. i and yet it sometimes happens
sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment concerning any-
to us to syllogize while asleep. Therefore the judgment
thing cannot be formed, unless all that pertains to that
of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the
thing’s nature be known; especially if that be ignored
senses.
which is the term and end of judgment. Now the Philoso-
435
pher says (De Coel. iii), that “as the end of a practical sci-certain exhalations, as we read in De Somn. et Vigil. iii.
ence is action, so the end of natural science is that which
And, therefore, according to the amount of such evapora-
is perceived principally through the senses”; for the smith
tion, the senses are more or less suspended. For when the
does not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose
amount is considerable, not only are the senses suspended,
of action, in order that he may produce a certain individual
but also the imagination, so that there are no phantasms;
knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher does not
thus does it happen, especially when a man falls asleep
seek to know the nature of a stone and of a horse, save for
after eating and drinking copiously. If, however, the evap-
the purpose of knowing the essential properties of those
oration be somewhat less, phantasms appear, but distorted
things which he perceives with his senses. Now it is clear
and without sequence; thus it happens in a case of fever.
that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he
And if the evaporation be still more attenuated, the phan-
knows the action of the knife: and in like manner the nat-
tasms will have a certain sequence: thus especially does
ural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things,
it happen towards the end of sleep in sober men and those
unless he knows sensible things. But in the present state
who are gifted with a strong imagination. If the evapora-
of life whatever we understand, we know by comparison
tion be very slight, not only does the imagination retain
to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not possi-
its freedom, but also the common sense is partly freed; so
ble for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the
that sometimes while asleep a man may judge that what he
senses are suspended, through which sensible things are
sees is a dream, discerning, as it were, between things, and
known to us.
their images. Nevertheless, the common sense remains
Reply to Objection 1. Although the intellect is su-
partly suspended; and therefore, although it discriminates
perior to the senses, nevertheless in a manner it receives
some images from the reality, yet is it always deceived in
from the senses, and its first and principal objects are
some particular. Therefore, while man is asleep, accord-
founded in sensible things. And therefore suspension of
ing as sense and imagination are free, so is the judgment
the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to the judg-
of his intellect unfettered, though not entirely. Conse-
ment of the intellect.
quently, if a man syllogizes while asleep, when he wakes
Reply to Objection 2. The senses are suspended in
up he invariably recognizes a flaw in some respect.
the sleeper through certain evaporations and the escape of
436
FIRST PART, QUESTION 85
Of the Mode and Order of Understanding
(In Eight Articles)
We come now to consider the mode and order of understanding. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether our intellect understands by abstracting the species from the phantasms?
(2) Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are what our intellect understands, or that whereby it understands?
(3) Whether our intellect naturally first understands the more universal?
(4) Whether our intellect can know many things at the same time?
(5) Whether our intellect understands by the process of composition and division?
(6) Whether the intellect can err?
(7) Whether one intellect can understand better than another?
(8) Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?
Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraction from Ia q. 85 a. 1
phantasms?
Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect does not
color, but rather streams on to it. Therefore in no way do
understand corporeal and material things by abstraction
we understand by abstraction from phantasms.
from the phantasms. For the intellect is false if it under-
Objection 5. Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii,
stands an object otherwise than as it really is. Now the
7) says that “the intellect understands the species in the
forms of material things do not exist as abstracted from
phantasm”; and not, therefore, by abstraction.
the particular things represented by the phantasms. There-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima
fore, if we understand material things by abstraction of the
iii, 4) that “things are intelligible in proportion as they
species from the phantasm, there will be error in the intel-
are separate from matter.” Therefore material things must
lect.
needs be understood according as they are abstracted from
Objection 2. Further, material things are those nat-
matter and from material images, namely, phantasms.
ural things which include matter in their definition. But
I answer that, As stated above (q. 84, a. 7), the object nothing can be understood apart from that which enters
of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge.
into its definition. Therefore material things cannot be
Now there are three grades of the cognitive powers. For
understood apart from matter. Now matter is the principle
one cognitive power, namely, the sense, is the act of a cor-
of individualization. Therefore material things cannot be
poreal organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive
understood by abstraction of the universal from the partic-
power is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And since
ular, which is the process whereby the intelligible species
such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore ev-
is abstracted from the phantasm.
ery power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge of
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (De An-
the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power
ima iii, 7) that the phantasm is to the intellectual soul
which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any
what color is to the sight. But seeing is not caused by
way connected with corporeal matter; such is the angelic
abstraction of species from color, but by color impressing
intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is therefore
itself on the sight. Therefore neither does the act of un-
a form existing apart from matter: for though angels know
derstanding take place by abstraction of something from
material things, yet they do not know them save in some-
the phantasm, but by the phantasm impressing itself on
thing immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God.
the intellect.
But the human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not
Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (De An-
the act of an organ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the ima iii, 5) there are two things in the intellectual soul—
form the body, as is clear from what we have said above
the passive intellect and the active intellect. But it does
(q. 76, a. 1). And therefore it is proper to it to know a form
not belong to the passive intellect to abstract the intelligi-
existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as exist-
ble species from the phantasm, but to receive them when
ing in this individual matter. But to know what is in indi-
abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the
vidual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract
active intellect, which is related to the phantasm, as light
the form from individual matter which is represented by
is to color; since light does not abstract anything from
the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our in-
437
tellect understands material things by abstracting from the is not part of the species. If that were so, matter would
phantasms; and through material things thus considered
not enter into the definition of natural things. Therefore it
we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as,
must be said otherwise, that matter is twofold, common,
on the contrary, angels know material things through the
and “signate” or individual; common, such as flesh and
immaterial.
bone; and individual, as this flesh and these bones. The
But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the
intellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing
human intellect, and not its being in a way united to the
from the individual sensible matter, but not from the com-
body, held that the objects of the intellect are separate
mon sensible matter; for example, it abstracts the species
ideas; and that we understand not by abstraction, but by
of man from “this flesh and these bones,” which do not be-
participating things abstract, as stated above (q. 84 , a. 1).
long to the species as such, but to the individual (Metaph.
Reply to Objection 1. Abstraction may occur in two
vii, Did. vi, 10), and need not be considered in the species:
ways: First, by way of composition and division; thus
whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the in-
we may understand that one thing does not exist in some
tellect form “flesh and bones.”
other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly, by way
Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by
of simple and absolute consideration; thus we understand
the intellect from sensible matter, not only from individ-
one thing without considering the other. Thus for the in-
ual, but also from common matter; not from common
tellect to abstract one from another things which are not
intelligible matter, but only from individual matter. For
really abstract from one another, does, in the first mode
sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to sensible
of abstraction, imply falsehood. But, in the second mode
qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the
of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract things which
like: while intelligible matter is substance as subject to
are not really abstract from one another, does not involve
quantity. Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance
falsehood, as clearly appears in the case of the senses. For
before other sensible qualities are. Hence quantities, such
if we understood or said that color is not in a colored body,
as number, dimension, and figures, which are the termi-
or that it is separate from it, there would be error in this
nations of quantity, can be considered apart from sensible
opinion or assertion. But if we consider color and its prop-
qualities; and this is to abstract them from sensible matter;
erties, without reference to the apple which is colored; or
but they cannot be considered without understanding the
if we express in word what we thus understand, there is
substance which is subject to the quantity; for that would
no error in such an opinion or assertion, because an apple
be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet
is not essential to color, and therefore color can be un-
they can be considered apart from this or that substance;
derstood independently of the apple. Likewise, the things
for that is to abstract them from individual intelligible
which belong to the species of a material thing, such as a
matter. But some things can be abstracted even from com-
stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from
mon intelligible matter, such as “being,” “unity,” “power,”
the individualizing principles which do not belong to the
“act,” and the like; all these can exist without matter, as
notion of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting
is plain regarding immaterial things. Because Plato failed
the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species
to consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above ex-
from the phantasm; that is, by considering the nature of
plained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have
the species apart from its individual qualities represented
stated to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in re-
by the phantasms. If, therefore, the intellect is said to be
ality.
false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is,
Reply to Objection 3. Colors, as being in individ-
that is so, if the word “otherwise” refers to the thing un-
ual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existence as
derstood; for the intellect is false when it understands a
the power of sight: therefore they can impress their own
thing otherwise than as it is; and so the intellect would be
image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are images
false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its matter
of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the
in such a way as to regard the species as not existing in
same mode of existence as the human intellect, and there-
matter, as Plato held. But it is not so, if the word “oth-
fore have not the power of themselves to make an impres-
erwise” be taken as referring to the one who understands.
sion on the passive intellect. This is done by the power
For it is quite true that the mode of understanding, in one
of the active intellect which by turning towards the phan-
who understands, is not the same as the mode of a thing
tasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness
in existing: since the thing understood is immaterially in
which represents, as to its specific conditions only, the
the one who understands, according to the mode of the
thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the intelligi-
intellect, and not materially, according to the mode of a
ble species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm; not
material thing.
that the identical form which previously was in the phan-
Reply to Objection 2. Some have thought that the
tasm is subsequently in the passive intellect, as a body
species of a natural thing is a form only, and that matter
transferred from one place to another.
438
Reply to Objection 4. Not only does the active intellect we are able to disregard the conditions of individual-
lect throw light on the phantasm: it does more; by its own
ity, and to take into our consideration the specific nature,
power it abstracts the intelligible species from the phan-
the image of which informs the passive intellect.
tasm. It throws light on the phantasm, because, just as the
Reply to Objection 5. Our intellect both abstracts the
sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction
intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it
with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active
considers the natures of things in universal, and, never-
intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the abstrac-
theless, understands these natures in the phantasms since
tion therefrom of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the
it cannot understand even the things of which it abstracts
active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the
the species, without turning to the phantasms, as we have
phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intel-
said above (q. 84, a. 7).
Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intelIa q. 85 a. 2
lect as that which is understood?
Objection 1.
It would seem that the intelligible
ery science would not be concerned with objects outside
species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our in-
the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the
tellect as that which is understood. For the understood in
soul; thus, according to the teaching of the Platonists all
act is in the one who understands: since the understood
science is about ideas, which they held to be actually un-
in act is the intellect itself in act. But nothing of what is
derstood∗. Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead
understood is in the intellect actually understanding, save
to the opinion of the ancients who maintained that “what-
the abstracted intelligible species. Therefore this species
ever seems, is trueӠ, and that consequently contradicto-
is what is actually understood.
ries are true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its
Objection 2.
Further, what is actually understood
own impression only, it can judge of that only. Now a
must be in something; else it would be nothing. But it
thing seems according to the impression made on the cog-
is not in something outside the soul: for, since what is
nitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive faculty will al-
outside the soul is material, nothing therein can be actu-
ways judge of its own impression as such; and so every
ally understood. Therefore what is actually understood is
judgment will be true: for instance, if taste perceived only
in the intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else than
its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste per-
the aforesaid intelligible species.
ceives that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (1 Peri
anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter,
Herm. i) that “words are signs of the passions in the soul.”
this would be equally true; for each would judge accord-
But words signify the things understood, for we express
ing to the impression on his taste. Thus every opinion
by word what we understand. Therefore these passions of
would be equally true; in fact, every sort of apprehension.
the soul—viz. the intelligible species, are what is actually
Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species
understood.
is related to the intellect as that by which it understands:
On the contrary, The intelligible species is to the in-
which is proved thus. There is a twofold action (Metaph.
tellect what the sensible image is to the sense. But the
ix, Did. viii, 8), one which remains in the agent; for in-
sensible image is not what is perceived, but rather that by
stance, to see and to understand; and another which passes
which sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species
into an external object; for instance, to heat and to cut; and
is not what is actually understood, but that by which the
each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form.
intellect understands.
And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to
I answer that, Some have asserted that our intellec-
something external is the likeness of the object of the ac-
tual faculties know only the impression made on them; as,
tion, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated;
for example, that sense is cognizant only of the impres-
so the form from which proceeds an action remaining in
sion made on its own organ. According to this theory,
the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which
the intellect understands only its own impression, namely,
the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the
the intelligible species which it has received, so that this
likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible
species is what is understood.
species, is the form by which the intellect understands.
This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons.
But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflec-
First, because the things we understand are the objects
tion it understands both its own act of intelligence, and
of science; therefore if what we understand is merely the
the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible
intelligible species in the soul, it would follow that ev-
species is that which is understood secondarily; but that
∗ q. 84, a. 1
† Aristotle, Metaph. iii. 5
439
which is primarily understood is the object, of which the where is the color which is seen apart from the smell, it
species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion
is quite clear that the color which is seen is only in the
of the ancient philosophers, who said that “like is known
apple: but that it be perceived apart from the smell, this
by like.” For they said that the soul knows the earth out-
is owing to the sight, forasmuch as the faculty of sight re-
side itself, by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, ceives the likeness of color and not of smell. In like man-therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the
ner humanity understood is only in this or that man; but
earth, according to Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says
that humanity be apprehended without conditions of in-
“that a stone is not in the soul, but only the likeness of the
dividuality, that is, that it be abstracted and consequently
stone”; it follows that the soul knows external things by
considered as universal, occurs to humanity inasmuch as
means of its intelligible species.
it is brought under the consideration of the intellect, in
Reply to Objection 1. The thing understood is in the
which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but not of
intellect by its own likeness; and it is in this sense that
the principles of individuality.
we say that the thing actually understood is the intellect
Reply to Objection 3. There are two operations in
in act, because the likeness of the thing understood is the
the sensitive part. One, in regard of impression only, and
form of the intellect, as the likeness of a sensible thing
thus the operation of the senses takes place by the senses
is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not follow
being impressed by the sensible. The other is formation,
that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually
inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of
understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof.
an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both
Reply to Objection 2. In these words “the thing actu-
of these operations are found in the intellect. For in the
ally understood” there is a double implication—the thing
first place there is the passion of the passive intellect as in-which is understood, and the fact that it is understood.
formed by the intelligible species; and then the passive in-
In like manner the words “abstract universal” imply two
tellect thus informed forms a definition, or a division, or a
things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction or univer-
composition, expressed by a word. Wherefore the concept
sality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be
conveyed by a word is its definition; and a proposition
understood, abstracted or considered as universal is only
conveys the intellect’s division or composition. Words do
in individuals; but that it is understood, abstracted or con-
not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves;
sidered as universal is in the intellect. We see something
but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose
similar to this is in the senses. For the sight sees the color
of judging of external things.
of the apple apart from its smell. If therefore it be asked
Whether the more universal is first in our intellectual cognition?
Ia q. 85 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the more universal
sal to the singular and individual” (Phys. i, 1)
is not first in our intellectual cognition. For what is first
I answer that, In our knowledge there are two things
and more known in its own nature, is secondarily and less
to be considered. First, that intellectual knowledge in
known in relation to ourselves. But universals come first
some degree arises from sensible knowledge: and, be-
as regards their nature, because “that is first which does
cause sense has singular and individual things for its ob-
not involve the existence of its correlative” (Categor. ix).
ject, and intellect has the universal for its object, it follows Therefore the universals are secondarily known as regards
that our knowledge of the former comes before our knowl-
our intellect.
edge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our in-
Objection 2. Further, the composition precedes the
tellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of ac-
simple in relation to us. But universals are the more sim-
tuality; and every power thus proceeding from potentiality
ple. Therefore they are known secondarily by us.
to actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i,
medium between potentiality and actuality, before accom-
1), that the object defined comes in our knowledge before
plishing the perfect act. The perfect act of the intellect is
the parts of its definition. But the more universal is part
complete knowledge, when the object is distinctly and de-
of the definition of the less universal, as “animal” is part
terminately known; whereas the incomplete act is imper-
of the definition of “man.” Therefore the universals are
fect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly, and
secondarily known by us.
as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is
Objection 4. Further, we know causes and principles
known partly in act and partly in potentiality, and hence
by their effects. But universals are principles. Therefore
the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that “what is manifest
universals are secondarily known by us.
and certain is known to us at first confusedly; afterwards
On the contrary, “We must proceed from the univer-
we know it by distinguishing its principles and elements.”
440
Now it is evident that to know an object that comprises the imperfect and the potential come first. In this way
many things, without proper knowledge of each thing con-
the more common comes first in the order of nature; as
tained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. In this way
appears clearly in the generation of man and animal; for
we can have knowledge not only of the universal whole,
“the animal is generated before man,” as the Philosopher
which contains parts potentially, but also of the integral
says (De Gener. Animal ii, 3). The other order is the or-
whole; for each whole can be known confusedly, with-
der of perfection or of the intention of nature: for instance,
out its parts being known. But to know distinctly what
act considered absolutely is naturally prior to potentiality,
is contained in the universal whole is to know the less
and the perfect to the imperfect: thus the less common
common, as to “animal” indistinctly is to know it as “an-
comes naturally before the more common; as man comes
imal”; whereas to know “animal” distinctly is know it as
before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at
“rational” or “irrational animal,” that is, to know a man
the generation of animal but goes on to the generation of
or a lion: therefore our intellect knows “animal” before it
man.
knows man; and the same reason holds in comparing any
Reply to Objection 2. The more common universal
more universal idea with the less universal.
may be compared to the less common, as the whole, and
Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from
as the part. As the whole, considering that in the more uni-
potentiality to act, the same order of knowledge appears
versal is potentially contained not only the less universal,
in the senses. For by sense we judge of the more common
but also other things, as in “animal” is contained not only
before the less common, in reference both to place and
“man” but also “horse.” As part, considering that the less
time; in reference to place, when a thing is seen afar off
common contains in its idea not only the more common,
it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal;
but also more; as “man” contains not only “animal” but
and to be an animal before it is seen to be a man, and to
also “rational.” Therefore “animal” in itself comes into
be a man before it seen to be Socrates or Plato; and the
our knowledge before “man”; but “man” comes before
same is true as regards time, for a child can distinguish
“animal” considered as part of the same idea.
man from not man before he distinguishes this man from
Reply to Objection 3. A part can be known in two
that, and therefore “children at first call men fathers, and
ways. First, absolutely considered in itself; and thus noth-
later on distinguish each one from the others” (Phys. i, 1).
ing prevents the parts being known before the whole, as
The reason of this is clear: because he who knows a thing
stones are known before a house is known. Secondly as
indistinctly is in a state of potentiality as regards its prin-
belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must needs
ciple of distinction; as he who knows “genus” is in a state
know the whole before its parts. For we know a house
of potentiality as regards “difference.” Thus it is evident
vaguely before we know its different parts. So likewise
that indistinct knowledge is midway between potentiality
principles of definition are known before the thing defined
and act.
is known; otherwise the thing defined would not be known
We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the sin-
at all. But as parts of the definition they are known after.
gular and individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowl-
For we know man vaguely as man before we know how to
edge of the universal; as sensible knowledge is prior to
distinguish all that belongs to human nature.
intellectual knowledge. But in both sense and intellect the
Reply to Objection 4. The universal, as understood
knowledge of the more common precedes the knowledge
with the intention of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a
of the less common.
principle of knowledge, in so far as the intention of univer-
Reply to Objection 1. The universal can be consid-
sality results from the mode of understanding by way of
ered in two ways. First, the universal nature may be con-
abstraction. But what is a principle of knowledge is not of
sidered together with the intention of universality. And
necessity a principle of existence, as Plato thought: since
since the intention of universality—viz. the relation of
at times we know a cause through its effect, and substance
one and the same to many—is due to intellectual abstrac-
through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus consid-
tion, the universal thus considered is a secondary consid-
ered, according to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a
eration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that the “uni-
principle of existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear
versal animal is either nothing or something secondary.”
(Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 13). But if we consider the generic
But according to Plato, who held that universals are sub-
or specific nature itself as existing in the singular, thus in
sistent, the universal considered thus would be prior to the
a way it is in the nature of a formal principle in regard
particular, for the latter, according to him, are mere partic-
to the singulars: for the singular is the result of matter,
ipations of the subsistent universals which he called ideas.
while the idea of species is from the form. But the generic
Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature
nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the
itself—for instance, animality or humanity as existing in
fashion of a material principle, because the generic nature
the individual. And thus we must distinguish two orders
is taken from that which is material in a thing, while the
of nature: one, by way of generation and time; and thus
idea of species is taken from that which is formal: thus the
441
notion of animal is taken from the sensitive part, whereas form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, knowl-the notion of man is taken from the intellectual part. Thus
edge of any cause or principle should be secondary: since
it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species
at times through sensible causes we become acquainted
and not to the individual, or the genus: because the form
with unknown effects, and sometimes conversely.
is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of the
Whether we can understand many things at the same time?
Ia q. 85 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that we can understand
reason of this is that it is impossible for one and the same
many things at the same time. For intellect is above time,
subject to be perfected at the same time by many forms of
whereas the succession of before and after belongs to
one genus and diverse species, just as it is impossible for
time. Therefore the intellect does not understand differ-
one and the same body at the same time to have different
ent things in succession, but at the same time.
colors or different shapes. Now all intelligible species be-
Objection 2. Further, there is nothing to prevent dif-
long to one genus, because they are the perfections of one
ferent forms not opposed to each other from actually being
intellectual faculty: although the things which the species
in the same subject, as, for instance, color and smell are in
represent belong to different genera. Therefore it is im-
the apple. But intelligible species are not opposed to each
possible for one and the same intellect to be perfected at
other. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the same in-
the same time by different intelligible species so as actu-
tellect being in act as regards different intelligible species, ally to understand different things.
and thus it can understand many things at the same time.
Reply to Objection 1. The intellect is above that time,
Objection 3.
Further, the intellect understands a
which is the measure of the movement of corporeal things.
whole at the same time, such as a man or a house. But
But the multitude itself of intelligible species causes a cer-
a whole contains many parts. Therefore the intellect un-
tain vicissitude of intelligible operations, according as one
derstands many things at the same time.
operation succeeds another. And this vicissitude is called
Objection 4. Further, we cannot know the difference
time by Augustine, who says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22),
between two things unless we know both at the same time
that “God moves the spiritual creature through time.”
(De Anima iii, 2), and the same is to be said of any other
Reply to Objection 2. Not only is it impossible for
comparison. But our intellect knows the difference and
opposite forms to exist at the same time in the same sub-
comparison between one thing and another. Therefore it
ject, but neither can any forms belonging to the same
knows many things at the same time.
genus, although they be not opposed to one another, as
On the contrary, It is said (Topic. ii, 10) that “under-
is clear from the examples of colors and shapes.
standing is of one thing only, knowledge is of many.”
Reply to Objection 3. Parts can be understood in
I answer that, The intellect can, indeed, understand
two ways. First, in a confused way, as existing in the
many things as one, but not as many: that is to say by
whole, and thus they are known through the one form of
“one” but not by “many” intelligible species. For the
the whole, and so are known together. In another way they
mode of every action follows the form which is the princi-
are known distinctly: thus each is known by its species;
ple of that action. Therefore whatever things the intellect
and so they are not understood at the same time.
can understand under one species, it can understand at the
Reply to Objection 4. If the intellect sees the dif-
same time: hence it is that God sees all things at the same
ference or comparison between one thing and another, it
time, because He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence.
knows both in relation to their difference or comparison;
But whatever things the intellect understands under differ-
just, as we have said above (ad 3), as it knows the parts in
ent species, it does not understand at the same time. The
the whole.
Whether our intellect understands by composition and division?
Ia q. 85 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect does not
stracts from time, as also from other individual conditions.
understand by composition and division. For composition
Therefore the intellect does not understand by composi-
and division are only of many; whereas the intellect can-
tion and division.
not understand many things at the same time. Therefore it
Objection 3. Further, the intellect understands things
cannot understand by composition and division.
by a process of assimilation to them. But composition and
Objection 2. Further, every composition and division
division are not in things, for nothing is in things but what
implies past, present, or future time. But the intellect ab-
is signified by the predicate and the subject, and which is
442
one and the same, provided that the composition be true, from the phantasms, it does not understand actually with-for “man” is truly what “animal” is. Therefore the intel-
out turning to the phantasms, as we have said (a. 1; q. 84,
lect does not act by composition and division.
a. 7). And forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms, compo-
On the contrary, Words signify the conceptions of
sition and division of the intellect involve time.
the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). But
Reply to Objection 3. The likeness of a thing is re-
in words we find composition and division, as appears in
ceived into the intellect according to the mode of the in-
affirmative and negative propositions. Therefore the intel-
tellect, not according to the mode of the thing. Where-
lect acts by composition and division.
fore something on the part of the thing corresponds to the
I answer that, The human intellect must of necessity
composition and division of the intellect; but it does not
understand by composition and division. For since the in-
exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For
tellect passes from potentiality to act, it has a likeness to
the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity
things which are generated, which do not attain to perfec-
of a material thing, which comes under the action of the
tion all at once but acquire it by degrees: so likewise the
senses and the imagination. Now in a material thing there
human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the
is a twofold composition. First, there is the composition
first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends something
of form with matter; and to this corresponds that compo-
about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first and sition of the intellect whereby the universal whole is pred-proper object; and then it understands the properties, ac-
icated of its part: for the genus is derived from common
cidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus it
matter, while the difference that completes the species is
necessarily compares one thing with another by composi-
derived from the form, and the particular from individual
tion or division; and from one composition and division it
matter. The second comparison is of accident with sub-
proceeds to another, which is the process of reasoning.
ject: and to this real composition corresponds that com-
But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incor-
position of the intellect, whereby accident is predicated of
ruptible things, have their perfection at once from the be-
subject, as when we say “the man is white.” Neverthe-
ginning. Hence the angelic and the Divine intellect have
less composition of the intellect differs from composition
the entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly; and
of things; for in the latter the things are diverse, whereas
hence also in knowing the quiddity of a thing they know
composition of the intellect is a sign of the identity of the
at once whatever we can know by composition, division,
components. For the above composition of the intellect
and reasoning. Therefore the human intellect knows by
does not imply that “man” and “whiteness” are identical,
composition, division and reasoning. But the Divine intel-
but the assertion, “the man is white,” means that “the man
lect and the angelic intellect know, indeed, composition,
is something having whiteness”: and the subject, which
division, and reasoning, not by the process itself, but by
is a man, is identified with a subject having whiteness. It
understanding the simple essence.
is the same with the composition of form and matter: for
Reply to Objection 1. Composition and division of
animal signifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational,
the intellect are made by differentiating and comparing.
that which has an intellectual nature; man, that which has
Hence the intellect knows many things by composition
both; and Socrates that which has all these things together
and division, as by knowing the difference and compar-
with individual matter; and according to this kind of iden-
ison of things.
tity our intellect predicates the composition of one thing
Reply to Objection 2. Although the intellect abstracts
with another.
Whether the intellect can be false?
Ia q. 85 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect can be
that “everyone who is deceived, does not rightly under-
false; for the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 4)
stand that wherein he is deceived.” And the Philosopher
that “truth and falsehood are in the mind.” But the mind
says (De Anima iii, 10), that “the intellect is always true.”
and intellect are the same, as is shown above (q. 79, a. 1).
I answer that, The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 6)
Therefore falsehood may be in the mind.
compares intellect with sense on this point. For sense
Objection 2. Further, opinion and reasoning belong
is not deceived in its proper object, as sight in regard to
to the intellect. But falsehood exists in both. Therefore
color; has accidentally through some hindrance occurring
falsehood can be in the intellect.
to the sensile organ—for example, the taste of a fever-
Objection 3. Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty.
stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through
But sin involves falsehood: for “those err that work evil”
his tongue being vitiated by ill humors. Sense, however,
(Prov. 14:22). Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.
may be deceived as regards common sensible objects, as
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32),
size or figure; when, for example, it judges the sun to be
443
only a foot in diameter, whereas in reality it exceeds the of an organ; but on the part of the composition affecting
earth in size. Much more is sense deceived concerning ac-
the definition, when, for instance, the definition of a thing
cidental sensible objects, as when it judges that vinegar is
is false in relation to something else, as the definition of a
honey by reason of the color being the same. The reason
circle applied to a triangle; or when a definition is false in
of this is evident; for every faculty, as such, is “per se”
itself as involving the composition of things incompatible;
directed to its proper object; and things of this kind are
as, for instance, to describe anything as “a rational winged
always the same. Hence, as long as the faculty exists, its
animal.” Hence as regards simple objects not subject to
judgment concerning its own proper object does not fail.
composite definitions we cannot be deceived unless, in-
Now the proper object of the intellect is the “quiddity”
deed, we understand nothing whatever about them, as is
of a material thing; and hence, properly speaking, the in-
said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 10.
tellect is not at fault concerning this quiddity; whereas it
Reply to Objection 1.
The Philosopher says that
may go astray as regards the surroundings of the thing in
falsehood is in the intellect in regard to composition and
its essence or quiddity, in referring one thing to another, as
division. The same answer applies to the Second Objec-
regards composition or division, or also in the process of
tion concerning opinion and reasoning, and to the Third
reasoning. Therefore, also in regard to those propositions,
Objection, concerning the error of the sinner, who errs
which are understood, the intellect cannot err, as in the
in the practical judgment of the appetible object. But in
case of first principles from which arises infallible truth in
the absolute consideration of the quiddity of a thing, and
the certitude of scientific conclusions.
of those things which are known thereby, the intellect is
The intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived
never deceived. In this sense are to be understood the au-
in the quiddity of composite things, not by the defect of
thorities quoted in proof of the opposite conclusion.
its organ, for the intellect is a faculty that is independent
Whether one person can understand one and the same thing better than another can?
Ia q. 85 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that one person cannot
cause to understand it otherwise than as it is, either bet-
understand one and the same thing better than another
ter or worse, would entail being deceived, and such a one
can. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32), “Whoever
would not understand it, as Augustine argues (QQ. 83, qu.
understands a thing otherwise than as it is, does not un-
32). In another sense the word “more” can be taken as de-
derstand it at all. Hence it is clear that there is a perfect
termining the act of understanding on the part of him who
understanding, than which none other is more perfect: and
understands; and so one may understand the same thing
therefore there are not infinite degrees of understanding a
better than someone else, through having a greater power
thing: nor can one person understand a thing better than
of understanding: just as a man may see a thing better with
another can.”
his bodily sight, whose power is greater, and whose sight
Objection 2. Further, the intellect is true in its act
is more perfect. The same applies to the intellect in two
of understanding. But truth, being a certain equality be-
ways. First, as regards the intellect itself, which is more
tween thought and thing, is not subject to more or less; for
perfect. For it is plain that the better the disposition of a
a thing cannot be said to be more or less equal. Therefore
body, the better the soul allotted to it; which clearly ap-
a thing cannot be more or less understood.
pears in things of different species: and the reason thereof
Objection 3. Further, the intellect is the most formal
is that act and form are received into matter according to
of all that is in man. But different forms cause different
matter’s capacity: thus because some men have bodies of
species. Therefore if one man understands better than an-
better disposition, their souls have a greater power of un-
other, it would seem that they do not belong to the same
derstanding, wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, 9), that “it
species.
is to be observed that those who have soft flesh are of apt
On the contrary, Experience shows that some under-
mind.” Secondly, this occurs in regard to the lower pow-
stand more profoundly than do others; as one who carries
ers of which the intellect has need in its operation: for
a conclusion to its first principles and ultimate causes un-
those in whom the imaginative, cogitative, and memora-
derstands it better than the one who reduces it only to its
tive powers are of better disposition, are better disposed
proximate causes.
to understand.
I answer that, A thing being understood more by one
The reply to the First Objection is clear from the
than by another may be taken in two senses. First, so that
above; likewise the reply to the Second, for the truth of
the word “more” be taken as determining the act of under-
the intellect consists in the intellect understanding a thing
standing as regards the thing understood; and thus, one
as it is.
cannot understand the same thing more than another, be-
Reply to Objection 3. The difference of form which
444
is due only to the different disposition of matter, causes ent individuals have different forms, diversified according
not a specific but only a numerical difference: for differ-
to the difference of matter.
Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?
Ia q. 85 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect under-
is that both these kinds of indivisible are understood by
stands the indivisible before the divisible. For the Philoso-
the intellect of itself, as being its proper object. The third
pher says (Phys. i, 1) that “we understand and know from
kind of indivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a
the knowledge of principles and elements.” But princi-
point and unity, which cannot be divided either actually
ples are indivisible, and elements are of divisible things.
or potentially. And this indivisible is known secondarily,
Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the divisi-
through the privation of divisibility. Wherefore a point is
ble.
defined by way of privation “as that which has no parts”;
Objection 2. Further, the definition of a thing con-
and in like manner the notion of “one” is that is “indivis-
tains what is known previously, for a definition “proceeds
ible,” as stated in Metaph. x, Did. ix, 1. And the reason
from the first and more known,” as is said Topic. vi, 4.
of this is that this indivisible has a certain opposition to a
But the indivisible is part of the definition of the divisible; corporeal being, the quiddity of which is the primary and
as a point comes into the definition of a line; for as Eu-
proper object of the intellect.
clid says, “a line is length without breadth, the extremities
But if our intellect understood by participation of cer-
of which are points”; also unity comes into the definition
tain separate indivisible (forms), as the Platonists main-
of number, for “number is multitude measured by one,”
tained, it would follow that a like indivisible is understood
as is said Metaph. x, Did. ix, 6. Therefore our intellect
primarily; for according to the Platonists what is first is
understands the indivisible before the divisible.
first participated by things.
Objection 3. Further, “Like is known by like.” But
Reply to Objection 1. In the acquisition of knowl-
the indivisible is more like to the intellect than is the di-
edge, principles and elements are not always (known)
visible; because “the intellect is simple” (De Anima iii,
first: for sometimes from sensible effects we arrive at the
4). Therefore our intellect first knows the indivisible.
knowledge of principles and intelligible causes. But in
On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 6) that “the
perfect knowledge, the knowledge of effects always de-
indivisible is expressed as a privation.” But privation is
pends on the knowledge of principles and elements: for
known secondarily. Therefore likewise is the indivisible.
as the Philosopher says in the same passage: “Then do we
I answer that, The object of our intellect in its present consider that we know, when we can resolve principles
state is the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts
into their causes.”
from the phantasms, as above stated (q. 84, a. 7). And
Reply to Objection 2. A point is not included in the
since that which is known first and of itself by our cogni-
definition of a line in general: for it is manifest that in a
tive power is its proper object, we must consider its rela-
line of indefinite length, and in a circular line, there is no
tionship to that quiddity in order to discover in what order
point, save potentially. Euclid defines a finite straight line: the indivisible is known. Now the indivisible is threefold,
and therefore he mentions a point in the definition, as the
as is said De Anima iii, 6. First, the continuous is indi-
limit in the definition of that which is limited. Unity is the
visible, since actually it is undivided, although potentially
measure of number: wherefore it is included in the defi-
divisible: and this indivisible is known to us before its di-
nition of a measured number. But it is not included in the
vision, which is a division into parts: because confused
definition of the divisible, but rather conversely.
knowledge is prior to distinct knowledge, as we have said
Reply to Objection 3. The likeness through which
above (a. 3). Secondly, the indivisible is so called in re-
we understand is the species of the known in the knower;
lation to species, as man’s reason is something indivisi-
therefore a thing is known first, not on account of its nat-
ble. This way, also, the indivisible is understood before
ural likeness to the cognitive power, but on account of
its division into logical parts, as we have said above (De
the power’s aptitude for the object: otherwise sight would
Anima iii, 6); and again before the intellect disposes and
perceive hearing rather than color.
divides by affirmation and negation. The reason of this
445
FIRST PART, QUESTION 86
What Our Intellect Knows in Material Things
(In Four Articles)
We now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it knows singulars?
(2) Whether it knows the infinite?
(3) Whether it knows contingent things?
(4) Whether it knows future things?
Whether our intellect knows singulars?
Ia q. 86 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect knows
because, as we have said above (q. 85, a. 7), even after ab-
singulars. For whoever knows composition, knows the
stracting the intelligible species, the intellect, in order to
terms of composition. But our intellect knows this com-
understand, needs to turn to the phantasms in which it un-
position; “Socrates is a man”: for it belongs to the intellect
derstands the species, as is said De Anima iii, 7. Therefore
to form a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows this
it understands the universal directly through the intelligi-
singular, Socrates.
ble species, and indirectly the singular represented by the
Objection 2. Further, the practical intellect directs to phantasm. And thus it forms the proposition “Socrates is
action. But action has relation to singular things. There-
a man.” Wherefore the reply to the first objection is clear.
fore the intellect knows the singular.
Reply to Objection 2. The choice of a particular thing
Objection 3. Further, our intellect understands itself.
to be done is as the conclusion of a syllogism formed by
But in itself it is a singular, otherwise it would have no ac-
the practical intellect, as is said Ethic. vii, 3. But a singu-
tion of its own; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore
lar proposition cannot be directly concluded from a uni-
our intellect knows singulars.
versal proposition, except through the medium of a sin-
Objection 4. Further, a superior power can do what-
gular proposition. Therefore the universal principle of the
ever is done by an inferior power. But sense knows the
practical intellect does not move save through the medium
singular. Much more, therefore, can the intellect know it.
of the particular apprehension of the sensitive part, as is
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 5),
said De Anima iii, 11.
that “the universal is known by reason; and the singular is
Reply to Objection 3. Intelligibility is incompatible
known by sense.”
with the singular not as such, but as material, for nothing
I answer that, Our intellect cannot know the singular
can be understood otherwise than immaterially. Therefore
in material things directly and primarily. The reason of
if there be an immaterial singular such as the intellect,
this is that the principle of singularity in material things
there is no reason why it should not be intelligible.
is individual matter, whereas our intellect, as have said
Reply to Objection 4. The higher power can do what
above (q. 85, a. 1), understands by abstracting the intel-
the lower power can, but in a more eminent way. Where-
ligible species from such matter. Now what is abstracted
fore what the sense knows materially and concretely,
from individual matter is the universal. Hence our intel-
which is to know the singular directly, the intellect knows
lect knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and
immaterially and in the abstract, which is to know the uni-
as it were by a kind of reflection, it can know the singular,
versal.
Whether our intellect can know the infinite?
Ia q. 86 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect can
in some genera, as in number, proportion, and figure.
know the infinite. For God excels all infinite things. But
Therefore our intellect can know the infinite.
our intellect can know God, as we have said above (q. 12,
Objection 3. Further, if one body can coexist with
a. 1). Much more, therefore, can our intellect know all
another in the same place, there is nothing to prevent an
other infinite things.
infinite number of bodies being in one place. But one in-
Objection 2. Further, our intellect can naturally know
telligible species can exist with another in the same intel-
“genera” and “species.” But there is an infinity of species
lect, for many things can be habitually known at the same
446
time. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowl-tellect know the infinite, but only potentially as explained
edge of an infinite number of things.
above.
Objection 4. Further, as the intellect is not a corpo-
Reply to Objection 1. As we have said above (q. 7,
real faculty, as we have said (q. 76, a. 1), it appears to be
a. 1), God is called infinite, because He is a form unlimited
an infinite power. But an infinite power has a capacity for
by matter; whereas in material things, the term ‘infinite’
an infinite object. Therefore our intellect can know the
is applied to that which is deprived of any formal term.
infinite.
And form being known in itself, whereas matter cannot
On the contrary, It is said (Phys. i, 4) that “the infi-
be known without form, it follows that the material infi-
nite, considered as such, is unknown.”
nite is in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God,
I answer that, Since a faculty and its object are pro-
is of Himself known; but He is unknown to us by rea-
portional to each other, the intellect must be related to the
son of our feeble intellect, which in its present state has
infinite, as is its object, which is the quiddity of a material a natural aptitude for material objects only. Therefore we
thing. Now in material things the infinite does not exist ac-
cannot know God in our present life except through ma-
tually, but only potentially, in the sense of one succeeding
terial effects. In the future life this defect of intellect will another, as is said Phys. iii, 6. Therefore infinity is poten-be removed by the state of glory, when we shall be able to
tially in our mind through its considering successively one
see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to
thing after another: because never does our intellect un-
comprehend Him.
derstand so many things, that it cannot understand more.
Reply to Objection 2. The nature of our mind is to
On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the
know species abstracted from phantasms; therefore it can-
infinite either actually or habitually. Not actually, for our
not know actually or habitually species of numbers or fig-
intellect cannot know actually at the same time, except
ures that are not in the imagination, except in a general
what it knows through one species. But the infinite is
way and in their universal principles; and this is to know
not represented by one species, for if it were it would be
them potentially and confusedly.
something whole and complete. Consequently it cannot
Reply to Objection 3. If two or more bodies were in
be understood except by a successive consideration of one
the same place, there would be no need for them to oc-
part after another, as is clear from its definition (Phys. iii, cupy the place successively, in order for the things placed
6): for the infinite is that “from which, however much we
to be counted according to this succession of occupation.
may take, there always remains something to be taken.”
On the other hand, the intelligible species enter into our
Thus the infinite could not be known actually, unless all
intellect successively; since many things cannot be actu-
its parts were counted: which is impossible.
ally understood at the same time: and therefore there must
For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowl-
be a definite and not an infinite number of species in our
edge of the infinite: because in us habitual knowledge re-
intellect.
sults from actual consideration: since by understanding
Reply to Objection 4. As our intellect is infinite in
we acquire knowledge, as is said Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore it
power, so does it know the infinite. For its power is in-
would not be possible for us to have a habit of an infinity
deed infinite inasmuch as it is not terminated by corporeal
of things distinctly known, unless we had already consid-
matter. Moreover it can know the universal, which is ab-
ered the entire infinity thereof, counting them according
stracted from individual matter, and which consequently
to the succession of our knowledge: which is impossible.
is not limited to one individual, but, considered in itself,
And therefore neither actually nor habitually can our in-
extends to an infinite number of individuals.
Whether our intellect can know contingent things?
Ia q. 86 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect cannot
But some sciences are of the contingent things, as the
know contingent things: because, as the Philosopher says
moral sciences, the objects of which are human actions
(Ethic. vi, 6), the objects of understanding, wisdom and
subject to free-will; and again, the natural sciences in
knowledge are not contingent, but necessary things.
as far as they relate to things generated and corruptible.
Objection 2. Further, as stated in Phys. iv, 12, “what
Therefore the intellect knows contingent things.
sometimes is and sometimes is not, is measured by time.”
I answer that, Contingent things can be considered
Now the intellect abstracts from time, and from other ma-
in two ways; either as contingent, or as containing some
terial conditions. Therefore, as it is proper to a contingent
element of necessity, since every contingent thing has in
thing sometime to be and sometime not to be, it seems that
it something necessary: for example, that Socrates runs,
contingent things are not known by the intellect.
is in itself contingent; but the relation of running to mo-
On the contrary, All knowledge is in the intellect.
tion is necessary, for it is necessary that Socrates move if
447
he runs. Now contingency arises from matter, for contin-of the intellect, as we have said above (a. 1). Therefore
gency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and potentiality
the contingent, considered as such, is known directly by
belongs to matter; whereas necessity results from form,
sense and indirectly by the intellect; while the universal
because whatever is consequent on form is of necessity
and necessary principles of contingent things are known
in the subject. But matter is the individualizing princi-
only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the objects
ple: whereas the universal comes from the abstraction of
of science in their universal principles, then all science is
the form from the particular matter. Moreover it was laid
of necessary things. But if we consider the things them-
down above (a. 1) that the intellect of itself and directly
selves, thus some sciences are of necessary things, some
has the universal for its object; while the object of sense is
of contingent things.
the singular, which in a certain way is the indirect object
From which the replies to the objections are clear.
Whether our intellect can know the future?
Ia q. 86 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect knows
as to produce a certain result more frequently than not,
the future. For our intellect knows by means of intelligi-
then can the future be known more or less conjecturally,
ble species abstracted from the “here” and “now,” and re-
according as its cause is more or less inclined to produce
lated indifferently to all time. But it can know the present.
the effect.
Therefore it can know the future.
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers that
Objection 2. Further, man, while his senses are in
knowledge which is drawn from universal causal princi-
suspense, can know some future things, as in sleep, and in
ples; from these the future may be known, according to
frenzy. But the intellect is freer and more vigorous when
the order of the effects to the cause.
removed from sense. Therefore the intellect of its own
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Confess.
nature can know the future.
xii∗), the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that
Objection 3. The intellectual knowledge of man is
by its very nature it can know the future; hence when with-
superior to any knowledge of brutes. But some animals
drawn from corporeal sense, and, as it were, concentrated
know the future; thus crows by their frequent cawing fore-
on itself, it shares in the knowledge of the future. Such an
tell rain. Therefore much more can the intellect know the
opinion would be reasonable if we were to admit that the
future.
soul receives knowledge by participating the ideas as the
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 8:6,7), “There
Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul by its
is a great affliction for man, because he is ignorant of
nature would know the universal causes of all effects, and
things past; and things to come he cannot know by any
would only be impeded in its knowledge by the body, and
messenger.”
hence when withdrawn from the corporeal senses it would
I answer that, We must apply the same distinction
know the future.
to future things, as we applied above (a. 3) to contingent
But since it is connatural to our intellect to know
things. For future things considered as subject to time are
things, not thus, but by receiving its knowledge from the
singular, and the human intellect knows them by reflec-
senses; it is not natural for the soul to know the future
tion only, as stated above (a. 1). But the principles of fu-
when withdrawn from the senses: rather does it know the
ture things may be universal; and thus they may enter the
future by the impression of superior spiritual and corpo-
domain of the intellect and become the objects of science.
real causes; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power
Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in
the human intellect is enlightened through the ministry of
a general way, we must observe that the future may be
angels, and the phantasms are directed to the knowledge
known in two ways: either in itself, or in its cause. The
of future events; or, by the influence of demons, when
future cannot be known in itself save by God alone; to
the imagination is moved regarding the future known to
Whom even that is present which in the course of events
the demons, as explained above (q. 57, a. 3). The soul
is future, forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces
is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of
the whole course of time, as we have said above when
spiritual causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, as
treating of God’s knowledge (q. 14, a. 13). But foras-
it is then nearer to the spiritual world, and freer from ex-
much as it exists in its cause, the future can be known by
ternal distractions. The same may also come from supe-
us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such as to have a
rior corporeal causes. For it is clear that superior bodies
necessary connection with its future result, then the future
influence inferior bodies. Hence, in consequence of the
is known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer
sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal organs, the in-
foresees the future eclipse. If, however, the cause be such
fluence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to
∗ Gen. ad lit. xii. 13
448
be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many Reply to Objection 3. Brute animals have no power
future events, the imagination receives certain images of
above the imagination wherewith to regulate it, as man
some such events. These images are perceived more at
has his reason, and therefore their imagination follows
night and while we sleep than in the daytime and while
entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies. Thus from
we are awake, because, as stated in De Somn. et Vigil.
such animals’ movements some future things, such as rain
ii†, “impressions made by day are evanescent. The night
and the like, may be known rather from human move-
air is calmer, when silence reigns, hence bodily impres-
ments directed by reason. Hence the Philosopher says (De
sions are made in sleep, when slight internal movements
Somn. et Vig.), that “some who are most imprudent are
are felt more than in wakefulness, and such movements
most far-seeing; for their intelligence is not burdened with
produce in the imagination images from which the future
cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety mov-
may be foreseen.”
ing at the caprice of whatever is brought to bear on it.”
† De Divinat. per somn. ii.
449
FIRST PART, QUESTION 87
How the Intellectual Soul Knows Itself and All Within Itself (In Four Articles)
We have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence?
(2) Whether it knows its own habits?
(3) How does the intellect know its own act?
(4) How does it know the act of the will?
Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence?
Ia q. 87 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul
act of intelligence is not completed by his essence. For al-
knows itself by its own essence. For Augustine says (De
though an angel understands himself by his own essence,
Trin. ix, 3), that “the mind knows itself, because it is in-
still he cannot understand all other things by his own
corporeal.”
essence; for he knows things other than himself by their
Objection 2. Further, both angels and human souls
likenesses. Now the human intellect is only a potentiality
belong to the genus of intellectual substance. But an angel
in the genus of intelligible beings, just as primary matter
understands itself by its own essence. Therefore likewise
is a potentiality as regards sensible beings; and hence it
does the human soul.
is called “possible”∗. Therefore in its essence the human
Objection 3. Further, “in things void of matter, the
mind is potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself
intellect and that which is understood are the same” (De
the power to understand, but not to be understood, except
Anima iii, 4). But the human mind is void of matter, not
as it is made actual. For even the Platonists asserted than
being the act of a body as stated above (q. 76, a. 1). There-
an order of intelligible beings existed above the order of
fore the intellect and its object are the same in the human
intellects, forasmuch as the intellect understands only by
mind; and therefore the human mind understands itself by
participation of the intelligible; for they said that the par-
its own essence.
ticipator is below what it participates. If, therefore, the
On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that “the
human intellect, as the Platonists held, became actual by
intellect understands itself in the same way as it under-
participating separate intelligible forms, it would under-
stands other things.” But it understands other things, not
stand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings.
by their essence, but by their similitudes. Therefore it
But as in this life our intellect has material and sensible
does not understand itself by its own essence.
things for its proper natural object, as stated above (q. 84,
I answer that, Everything is knowable so far as it is in a. 7), it understands itself according as it is made actual
act, and not, so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix, Did.
by the species abstracted from sensible things, through the
viii, 9): for a thing is a being, and is true, and therefore
light of the active intellect, which not only actuates the in-
knowable, according as it is actual. This is quite clear as
telligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumen-
regards sensible things, for the eye does not see what is
tality, actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect potentially, but what is actually colored. In like manner it
knows itself not by its essence, but by its act. This hap-
is clear that the intellect, so far as it knows material things, pens in two ways: In the first place, singularly, as when
does not know save what is in act: and hence it does not
Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul
know primary matter except as proportionate to form, as
because he perceives that he understands. In the second
is stated Phys. i, 7. Consequently immaterial substances
place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the
are intelligible by their own essence according as each one
human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is
is actual by its own essence.
true, however, that the judgment and force of this knowl-
Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and
edge, whereby we know the nature of the soul, comes to
perfect act, is simply and perfectly in itself intelligible;
us according to the derivation of our intellectual light from
and hence God by His own Essence knows Himself, and
the Divine Truth which contains the types of all things as
all other things also. The angelic essence belongs, indeed,
above stated (q. 84, a. 5). Hence Augustine says (De Trin.
to the genus of intelligible things as “act,” but not as a
ix, 6): “We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as
“pure act,” nor as a “complete act,” and hence the angel’s
perfectly as possible define, not what each man’s mind is,
∗ Possibilis—elsewhere in this translation rendered “passive”—Ed.
450
but what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types.”
man mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to in-
There is, however, a difference between these two kinds of
telligible things—as is the passive intellect—or is the act
knowledge, and it consists in this, that the mere presence
of intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms—as
of the mind suffices for the first; the mind itself being the
is the active intellect.
principle of action whereby it perceives itself, and hence
Reply to Objection 3. This saying of the Philoso-
it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as re-
pher is universally true in every kind of intellect. For as
gards the second kind of knowledge, the mere presence of
sense in act is the sensible in act, by reason of the sen-
the mind does not suffice, and there is further required a
sible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so like-
careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant of the
wise the intellect in act is the object understood in act, by
soul’s nature, and many have erred about it. So Augustine
reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is
says (De Trin. x, 9), concerning such mental inquiry: “Let
the form of the intellect in act. So the human intellect,
the mind strive not to see itself as if it were absent, but to
which becomes actual by the species of the object under-
discern itself as present”—i.e. to know how it differs from
stood, is itself understood by the same species as by its
other things; which is to know its essence and nature.
own form. Now to say that in “things without matter the
Reply to Objection 1.
The mind knows itself by
intellect and what is understood are the same,” is equal to
means of itself, because at length it acquires knowledge
saying that “as regards things actually understood the in-
of itself, though led thereto by its own act: because it is
tellect and what is understood are the same.” For a thing
itself that it knows since it loves itself, as he says in the
is actually understood in that it is immaterial. But a dis-
same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident in
tinction must be drawn: since the essences of some things
two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else
are immaterial—as the separate substances called angels,
except itself, as first principles are called self-evident; or
each of which is understood and understands, whereas
because it is not accidentally knowable, as color is visible
there are other things whose essences are not wholly im-
of itself, whereas substance is visible by its accident.
material, but only the abstract likenesses thereof. Hence
Reply to Objection 2. The essence of an angel is an
the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that the proposition
act in the genus of intelligible things, and therefore it is
quoted is true only of separate substances; because in a
both intellect and the thing understood. Hence an angel
sense it is verified in their regard, and not in regard of
apprehends his own essence through itself: not so the hu-
other substances, as already stated (Reply obj. 2).
Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence?
Ia q. 87 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect knows
powers, are known by their acts.
the habits of the soul by their essence. For Augustine says
I answer that, A habit is a kind of medium between
(De Trin. xiii, 1): “Faith is not seen in the heart wherein it
mere power and mere act. Now, it has been said (a. 1) that
abides, as the soul of a man may be seen by another from
nothing is known but as it is actual: therefore so far as a
the movement of the body; but we know most certainly
habit fails in being a perfect act, it falls short in being of
that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence”;
itself knowable, and can be known only by its act; thus,
and the same principle applies to the other habits of the
for example, anyone knows he has a habit from the fact
soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by
that he can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may
their acts, but by themselves.
inquire into the nature and idea of the habit by consider-
Objection 2. Further, material things outside the soul
ing the act. The first kind of knowledge of the habit arises
are known by their likeness being present in the soul,
from its being present, for the very fact of its presence
and are said therefore to be known by their likenesses.
causes the act whereby it is known. The second kind of
But the soul’s habits are present by their essence in the
knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, as is
soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by their
explained above of the mind (a. 1).
essence.
Reply to Objection 1. Although faith is not known
Objection 3. Further, “whatever is the cause of a thing
by external movement of the body, it is perceived by the
being such is still more so.” But habits and intelligible
subject wherein it resides, by the interior act of the heart.
species cause things to be known by the soul. Therefore
For no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that
they are still more known by the soul in themselves.
he believes.
On the contrary, Habits like powers are the princi-
Reply to Objection 2. Habits are present in our intel-
ples of acts. But as is said (De Anima ii, 4), “acts and
lect, not as its object since, in the present state of life, our operations are logically prior to powers.” Therefore in the
intellect’s object is the nature of a material thing as stated
same way they are prior to habits; and thus habits, like the
above (q. 84, a. 7), but as that by which it understands.
451
Reply to Objection 3. The axiom, “whatever is the causes. So of two things belonging essentially to the order
cause of a thing being such, is still more so,” is true of
of the objects of knowledge, the one which is the cause of
things that are of the same order, for instance, of the same
the other being known, is the more known, as principles
kind of cause; for example, we may say that health is de-
are more known than conclusions. But habit as such does
sirable on account of life, and therefore life is more de-
not belong to the order of objects of knowledge; nor are
sirable still. But if we take things of different orders the
things known on account of the habit, as on account of an
axiom is not true: for we may say that health is caused by
object known, but as on account of a disposition or form
medicine, but it does not follow that medicine is more de-
whereby the subject knows: and therefore the argument
sirable than health, for health belongs to the order of final
does not prove.
causes, whereas medicine belongs to the order of efficient
Whether our intellect knows its own act?
Ia q. 87 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect does
thing, together with its perfection, understood. And there
not know its own act. For what is known is the object of
is yet another, namely, the human intellect, which neither
the knowing faculty. But the act differs from the object.
is its own act of understanding, nor is its own essence the
Therefore the intellect does not know its own act.
first object of its act of understanding, for this object is
Objection 2. Further, whatever is known is known by
the nature of a material thing. And therefore that which
some act. If, then, the intellect knows its own act, it knows
is first known by the human intellect is an object of this
it by some act, and again it knows that act by some other
kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by
act; this is to proceed indefinitely, which seems impossi-
which that object is known; and through the act the intel-
ble.
lect itself is known, the perfection of which is this act of
Objection 3. Further, the intellect has the same rela-
understanding. For this reason did the Philosopher assert
tion to its act as sense has to its act. But the proper sense
that objects are known before acts, and acts before powers
does not feel its own act, for this belongs to the common
(De Anima ii, 4).
sense, as stated De Anima iii, 2. Therefore neither does
Reply to Objection 1. The object of the intellect is
the intellect understand its own act.
something universal, namely, “being” and “the true,” in
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), “I
which the act also of understanding is comprised. Where-
understand that I understand.”
fore the intellect can understand its own act. But not pri-
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2) a thing is
marily, since the first object of our intellect, in this state
intelligible according as it is in act. Now the ultimate
of life, is not every being and everything true, but “being”
perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation:
and “true,” as considered in material things, as we have
for this is not an act tending to something else in which
said above (q. 84, a. 7), from which it acquires knowledge
lies the perfection of the work accomplished, as build-
of all other things.
ing is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in
Reply to Objection 2. The intelligent act of the hu-
the agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix,
man intellect is not the act and perfection of the material
Did. viii, 8. Therefore the first thing understood of the
nature understood, as if the nature of the material thing
intellect is its own act of understanding. This occurs in
and intelligent act could be understood by one act; just
different ways with different intellects. For there is an
as a thing and its perfection are understood by one act.
intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of in-
Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone
telligence, so that in God the understanding of His intel-
is distinct from the act whereby it understands that it un-
ligence, and the understanding of His Essence, are one
derstands a stone; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty
and the same act, because His Essence is His act of un-
in the intellect being thus potentially infinite, as explained
derstanding. But there is another intellect, the angelic,
above (q. 86, a. 2).
which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said
Reply to Objection 3. The proper sense feels by rea-
above (q. 79, a. 1), and yet the first object of that act is
son of the immutation in the material organ caused by the
the angelic essence. Wherefore although there is a log-
external sensible. A material object, however, cannot im-
ical distinction between the act whereby he understands
mute itself; but one is immuted by another, and therefore
that he understands, and that whereby he understands his
the act of the proper sense is perceived by the common
essence, yet he understands both by one and the same act;
sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform
because to understand his own essence is the proper per-
the act of understanding by the material immutation of an
fection of his essence, and by one and the same act is a
organ; and so there is no comparison.
452
Whether the intellect understands the act of the will?
Ia q. 87 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect does not
subject intelligibly as in its principle and proper subject.
understand the act of the will. For nothing is known by the
Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima
intellect, unless it be in some way present in the intellect.
iii, 9)—that “the will is in the reason.” Now whatever is
But the act of the will is not in the intellect; since the will intelligibly in an intelligent subject, is understood by that
and the intellect are distinct. Therefore the act of the will
subject. Therefore the act of the will is understood by the
is not known by the intellect.
intellect, both inasmuch as one knows that one wills; and
Objection 2. Further, the act is specified by the object.
inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act, and conse-
But the object of the will is not the same as the object of
quently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or
the intellect. Therefore the act of the will is specifically
power.
distinct from the object of the intellect, and therefore the
Reply to Objection 1. This argument would hold
act of the will is not known by the intellect.
good if the will and the intellect were in different sub-
Objection 3. Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the
jects, as they are distinct powers; for then whatever was
soul’s affections that “they are known neither by images
in the will would not be in the intellect. But as both are
as bodies are known; nor by their presence, like the arts;
rooted in the same substance of the soul, and since one is
but by certain notions.” Now it does not seem that there
in a certain way the principle of the other, consequently
can be in the soul any other notions of things but either
what is in the will is, in a certain way, also in the intellect.
the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof.
Reply to Objection 2. The “good” and the “true”
Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect to known
which are the objects of the will and of the intellect, dif-
such affections of the soul as the acts of the will.
fer logically, but one is contained in the other, as we have
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), “I
said above (q. 82, a. 4, ad 1; q. 16, a. 4, ad 1); for the true understand that I will.”
is good and the good is true. Therefore the objects of the
I answer that, As stated above (q. 59, a. 1), the act
will fall under the intellect, and those of the intellect can
of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the
fall under the will.
form understood; just as the natural appetite is an inclina-
Reply to Objection 3. The affections of the soul are
tion consequent on the natural form. Now the inclination
in the intellect not by similitude only, like bodies; nor by
of a thing resides in it according to its mode of existence;
being present in their subject, as the arts; but as the thing
and hence the natural inclination resides in a natural thing
caused is in its principle, which contains some notion of
naturally, and the inclination called the sensible appetite is
the thing caused. And so Augustine says that the soul’s
in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the intelligible
affections are in the memory by certain notions.
inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the intelligent 453
FIRST PART, QUESTION 88
How the Human Soul Knows What Is Above Itself
(In Three Articles)
We must now consider how the human soul knows what is above itself, viz. immaterial substances. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand the immaterial substances called angels, in themselves?
(2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of material things?
(3) Whether God is the first object of our knowledge?
Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial sub-Ia q. 88 a. 1
stances in themselves?
Objection 1. It would seem that the human soul in the
intelligible substances, even the superior and immaterial.
present state of life can understand immaterial substances
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 9:16): “The
in themselves. For Augustine (De Trin. ix, 3) says: “As
things that are in heaven, who shall search out?” But
the mind itself acquires the knowledge of corporeal things
these substances are said to be in heaven, according to
by means of the corporeal senses, so it gains from itself
Mat. 18:10, “Their angels in heaven,” etc. Therefore im-
the knowledge of incorporeal things.” But these are the
material substances cannot be known by human investiga-
immaterial substances. Therefore the human mind under-
tion.
stands immaterial substances.
I answer that, In the opinion of Plato, immaterial sub-
Objection 2. Further, like is known by like. But the
stances are not only understood by us, but are the objects
human mind is more akin to immaterial than to material
we understand first of all. For Plato taught that immaterial
things; since its own nature is immaterial, as is clear from
subsisting forms, which he called “Ideas,” are the proper
what we have said above (q. 76, a. 1). Since then our
objects of our intellect, and thus first and “per se” under-
mind understands material things, much more is it able to
stood by us; and, further, that material objects are known
understand immaterial things.
by the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are mixed up
Objection 3. Further, the fact that objects which are
with the mind. Hence the purer the intellect is, so much
in themselves most sensible are not most felt by us, comes
the more clearly does it perceive the intelligible truth of
from sense being corrupted by their very excellence. But
immaterial things.
the intellect is not subject to such a corrupting influence
But in Aristotle’s opinion, which experience corrobo-
from its object, as is stated De Anima iii, 4. Therefore
rates, our intellect in its present state of life has a natural things which are in themselves in the highest degree of
relationship to the natures of material things; and there-
intelligibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. As ma-
fore it can only understand by turning to the phantasms,
terial things, however, are intelligible only so far as we
as we have said above (q. 84, a. 7). Thus it clearly ap-
make them actually so by abstracting them from material
pears that immaterial substances which do not fall under
conditions, it is clear that those substances are more intel-
sense and imagination, cannot first and “per se” be known
ligible in themselves whose nature is immaterial. There-
by us, according to the mode of knowledge which experi-
fore they are much more known to us than are material
ence proves us to have.
things.
Nevertheless Averroes (Comment.
De Anima iii)
Objection 4. Further, the Commentator says (Metaph.
teaches that in this present life man can in the end arrive at
ii) that “nature would be frustrated in its end” were we un-
the knowledge of separate substances by being coupled or
able to understand abstract substances, “because it would
united to some separate substance, which he calls the “ac-
have made what in itself is naturally intelligible not to be
tive intellect,” and which, being a separate substance it-
understood at all.” But in nature nothing is idle or pur-
self, can naturally understand separate substances. Hence,
poseless. Therefore immaterial substances can be under-
when it is perfectly united to us so that by its means we are
stood by us.
able to understand perfectly, we also shall be able to un-
Objection 5. Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is derstand separate substances, as in the present life through
intellect to the intelligible. But our sight can see all things the medium of the passive intellect united to us, we can
corporeal, whether superior and incorruptible; or lower
understand material things. Now he said that the active
and corruptible. Therefore our intellect can understand all
intellect is united to us, thus. For since we understand
454
by means of both the active intellect and intelligible ob-follows that the knowledge of all material things would
jects, as, for instance, we understand conclusions by prin-
not make the active intellect to be so united to us as to en-
ciples understood; it is clear that the active intellect must
able us by its instrumentality to understand separate sub-
be compared to the objects understood, either as the prin-
stances.
cipal agent is to the instrument, or as form to matter. For
Fourthly, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly
an action is ascribed to two principles in one of these two
possible for anyone in this world to understand all ma-
ways; to a principal agent and to an instrument, as cutting
terial things: and thus no one, or very few, could reach
to the workman and the saw; to a form and its subject,
to perfect felicity; which is against what the Philosopher
as heating to heat and fire. In both these ways the active
says (Ethic. i, 9), that happiness is a “kind of common
intellect can be compared to the intelligible object as per-
good, communicable to all capable of virtue.” Further, it
fection is to the perfectible, and as act is to potentiality.
is unreasonable that only the few of any species attain to
Now a subject is made perfect and receives its perfection
the end of the species.
at one and the same time, as the reception of what is ac-
Fifthly, the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic.
i,
tually visible synchronizes with the reception of light in
10), that happiness is “an operation according to perfect
the eye. Therefore the passive intellect receives the in-
virtue”; and after enumerating many virtues in the tenth
telligible object and the active intellect together; and the
book, he concludes (Ethic. i, 7) that ultimate happiness
more numerous the intelligible objects received, so much
consisting in the knowledge of the highest things intelli-
the nearer do we come to the point of perfect union be-
gible is attained through the virtue of wisdom, which in
tween ourselves and the active intellect; so much so that
the sixth chapter he had named as the chief of specula-
when we understand all the intelligible objects, the active
tive sciences. Hence Aristotle clearly places the ultimate
intellect becomes one with us, and by its instrumentality
felicity of man in the knowledge of separate substances,
we can understand all things material and immaterial. In
obtainable by speculative science; and not by being united
this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to consist.
to the active intellect as some imagined.
Nor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter whether
Sixthly, as was shown above (q. 79, a. 4), the active in-
the passive intellect in that state of happiness understands
tellect is not a separate substance; but a faculty of the soul, separate substances by the instrumentality of the active
extending itself actively to the same objects to which the
intellect, as he himself maintains, or whether (as he says
passive intellect extends receptively; because, as is stated
Alexander holds) the passive intellect can never under-
(De Anima iii, 5), the passive intellect is “all things po-
stand separate substances (because according to him it is
tentially,” and the active intellect is “all things in act.”
corruptible), but man understands separate substances by
Therefore both intellects, according to the present state
means of the active intellect.
of life, extend to material things only, which are made ac-
This opinion, however, is untrue. First, because, sup-
tually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received
posing the active intellect to be a separate substance, we
in the passive intellect. Hence in the present state of life
could not formally understand by its instrumentality, for
we cannot understand separate immaterial substances in
the medium of an agent’s formal action consists in its
themselves, either by the passive or by the active intellect.
form and act, since every agent acts according to its ac-
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine may be taken to
tuality, as was said of the passive intellect (q. 70, a. 1).
mean that the knowledge of incorporeal things in the mind
Secondly, this opinion is untrue, because in the above ex-
can be gained by the mind itself. This is so true that
planation, the active intellect, supposing it to be a separate
philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning the
substance, would not be joined to us in its substance, but
soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate sub-
only in its light, as participated in things understood; and
stances. For by knowing itself, it attains to some knowl-
would not extend to the other acts of the active intellect
edge of incorporeal substances, such as is within its com-
so as to enable us to understand immaterial substances;
pass; not that the knowledge of itself gives it a perfect and
just as when we see colors set off by the sun, we are not
absolute knowledge of them.
united to the substance of the sun so as to act like the sun,
Reply to Objection 2. The likeness of nature is not
but its light only is united to us, that we may see the col-
a sufficient cause of knowledge; otherwise what Empedo-
ors. Thirdly, this opinion is untrue, because granted that,
cles said would be true —that the soul needs to have the
as above explained, the active intellect were united to us
nature of all in order to know all. But knowledge requires
in substance, still it is not said that it is wholly so united
that the likeness of the thing known be in the knower, as
in regard to one intelligible object, or two; but rather in
a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in the
regard to all intelligible objects. But all such objects to-
present state of life, is such that it can be informed with
gether do not equal the force of the active intellect, as it
similitudes abstracted from phantasms: and therefore it
is a much greater thing to understand separate substances
knows material things rather than immaterial substances.
than to understand all material things. Hence it clearly
Reply to Objection 3. There must needs be some pro-
455
portion between the object and the faculty of knowledge; Secondly, to be understood by us is not the end of sep-such as of the active to the passive, and of perfection to the
arate substances: while only that is vain and purposeless,
perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of great power are
which fails to attain its end. It does not follow, therefore,
not grasped by the senses, is due not merely to the fact that
that immaterial substances are purposeless, even if they
they corrupt the organ, but also to their being impropor-
are not understood by us at all.
tionate to the sensitive power. And thus it is that immate-
Reply to Objection 5. Sense knows bodies, whether
rial substances are improportionate to our intellect, in our
superior or inferior, in the same way, that is, by the sensi-
present state of life, so that it cannot understand them.
ble acting on the organ. But we do not understand material
Reply to Objection 4. This argument of the Com-
and immaterial substances in the same way. The former
mentator fails in several ways. First, because if separate
we understand by a process of abstraction, which is im-
substances are not understood by us, it does not follow
possible in the case of the latter, for there are no phan-
that they are not understood by any intellect; for they are
tasms of what is immaterial.
understood by themselves, and by one another.
Whether our intellect can understand immaterial substances through its knowledge Ia q. 88 a. 2
of material things?
Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect can
again be made subject to abstraction; and as the process of
know immaterial substances through the knowledge of
abstraction cannot go on forever, it must arrive at length at
material things. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that
some immaterial quiddity, absolutely without matter; and
“the human mind cannot be raised up to immaterial con-
this would be the understanding of immaterial substance.
templation of the heavenly hierarchies, unless it is led
Now this opinion would be true, were immaterial sub-
thereto by material guidance according to its own nature.”
stances the forms and species of these material things; as
Therefore we can be led by material things to know im-
the Platonists supposed. But supposing, on the contrary,
material substances.
that immaterial substances differ altogether from the quid-
Objection 2. Further, science resides in the intellect.
dity of material things, it follows that however much our
But there are sciences and definitions of immaterial sub-
intellect abstract the quiddity of material things from mat-
stances; for Damascene defines an angel (De Fide Orth.
ter, it could never arrive at anything akin to immaterial
ii, 3); and we find angels treated of both in theology and
substance. Therefore we are not able perfectly to under-
philosophy. Therefore immaterial substances can be un-
stand immaterial substances through material substances.
derstood by us.
Reply to Objection 1. From material things we can
Objection 3. Further, the human soul belongs to the
rise to some kind of knowledge of immaterial things, but
genus of immaterial substances. But it can be understood
not to the perfect knowledge thereof; for there is no proper
by us through its act by which it understands material
and adequate proportion between material and immaterial
things. Therefore also other material substances can be
things, and the likenesses drawn from material things for
understood by us, through their material effects.
the understanding of immaterial things are very dissimilar
Objection 4. Further, the only cause which cannot
therefrom, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii).
be comprehended through its effects is that which is in-
Reply to Objection 2. Science treats of higher things
finitely distant from them, and this belongs to God alone.
principally by way of negation. Thus Aristotle (De Coel.
Therefore other created immaterial substances can be un-
i, 3) explains the heavenly bodies by denying to them in-
derstood by us through material things.
ferior corporeal properties. Hence it follows that much
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that
less can immaterial substances be known by us in such a
“intelligible things cannot be understood through sensible
way as to make us know their quiddity; but we may have
things, nor composite things through simple, nor incorpo-
a scientific knowledge of them by way of negation and by
real through corporeal.”
their relation to material things.
I answer that, Averroes says (De Anima iii) that a
Reply to Objection 3. The human soul understands it-
philosopher named Avempace∗ taught that by the under-
self through its own act of understanding, which is proper
standing of natural substances we can be led, according
to it, showing perfectly its power and nature. But the
to true philosophical principles, to the knowledge of im-
power and nature of immaterial substances cannot be per-
material substances. For since the nature of our intellect
fectly known through such act, nor through any other ma-
is to abstract the quiddity of material things from matter,
terial thing, because there is no proportion between the
anything material residing in that abstracted quiddity can
latter and the power of the former.
∗ Ibn-Badja, Arabian Philosopher; ob. 1183
456
Reply to Objection 4. Created immaterial substances ral genus or logical genus; because God is in no genus,
are not in the same natural genus as material substances,
as stated above (q. 3, a. 5).
Hence through the like-
for they do not agree in power or in matter; but they be-
ness derived from material things we can know some-
long to the same logical genus, because even immaterial
thing positive concerning the angels, according to some
substances are in the predicament of substance, as their
common notion, though not according to the specific na-
essence is distinct from their existence. But God has no
ture; whereas we cannot acquire any such knowledge at
connection with material things, as regards either natu-
all about God.
Whether God is the first object known by the human mind?
Ia q. 88 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that God is the first ob-
the Apostle (Rom. 1:20), “the invisible things of God
ject known by the human mind. For that object in which
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
all others are known, and by which we judge others, is
made”: while the first object of our knowledge in this life
the first thing known to us; as light is to the eye, and first
is the “quiddity of a material thing,” which is the proper
principles to the intellect. But we know all things in the
object of our intellect, as appears above in many passages
light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as
(q. 84, a. 7; q. 85, a. 8; q. 87, a. 2, ad 2)
Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2; De Vera Relig. xxxi;∗).
Reply to Objection 1. We see and judge of all things
Therefore God is the first object known to us.
in the light of the first truth, forasmuch as the light it-
Objection 2. Further, whatever causes a thing to be
self of our mind, whether natural or gratuitous, is nothing
such is more so. But God is the cause of all our knowl-
else than the impression of the first truth upon it, as stated
edge; for He is “the true light which enlighteneth every
above (q. 12, a. 2). Hence, as the light itself of our intel-
man that cometh into this world” (Jn. 1:9). Therefore
lect is not the object it understands, much less can it be
God is our first and most known object.
said that God is the first object known by our intellect.
Objection 3. Further, what is first known in the image
Reply to Objection 2. The axiom, “Whatever causes
is the exemplar to which it is made. But in our mind is
a thing to be such is more so,” must be understood of
the image of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7).
things belonging to one and the same order, as explained
Therefore God is the first object known to our mind.
above (q. 81, a. 2, ad 3). Other things than God are known
On the contrary, “No man hath seen God at any time”
because of God; not as if He were the first known object,
(Jn. 1:18).
but because He is the first cause of our faculty of knowl-
I answer that, Since the human intellect in the present
edge.
state of life cannot understand even immaterial created
Reply to Objection 3. If there existed in our souls a
substances (a. 1), much less can it understand the essence
perfect image of God, as the Son is the perfect image of
of the uncreated substance. Hence it must be said sim-
the Father, our mind would know God at once. But the
ply that God is not the first object of our knowledge.
image in our mind is imperfect; hence the argument does
Rather do we know God through creatures, according to
not prove.
∗ Confess. xii, 25
457
FIRST PART, QUESTION 89
Of the Knowledge of the Separated Soul
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the knowledge of the separated soul. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the soul separated from the body can understand?
(2) Whether it understands separate substances?
(3) Whether it understands all natural things?
(4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars?
(5) Whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain?
(6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired?
(7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul’s knowledge?
(8) Whether souls separated from the body know what happens here?
Whether the separated soul can understand anything?
Ia q. 89 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the soul separated
ence shows. Did this not proceed from the soul’s very
from the body can understand nothing at all. For the
nature, but accidentally through its being bound up with
Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4) that “the understanding
the body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would van-
is corrupted together with its interior principle.” But by
ish; for in that case when the body was once removed, the
death all human interior principles are corrupted. There-
soul would at once return to its own nature, and would
fore also the intellect itself is corrupted.
understand intelligible things simply, without turning to
Objection 2. Further, the human soul is hindered from
the phantasms, as is exemplified in the case of other sep-
understanding when the senses are tied, and by a dis-
arate substances. In that case, however, the union of soul
tracted imagination, as explained above (q. 84, Aa. 7,8).
and body would not be for the soul’s good, for evidently it
But death destroys the senses and imagination, as we have
would understand worse in the body than out of it; but for
shown above (q. 77, a. 8). Therefore after death the soul
the good of the body, which would be unreasonable, since
understands nothing.
matter exists on account of the form, and not the form for
Objection 3. Further, if the separated soul can under-
the sake of matter. But if we admit that the nature of the
stand, this must be by means of some species. But it does
soul requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms,
not understand by means of innate species, because it has
it will seem, since death does not change its nature, that it
none such; being at first “like a tablet on which nothing
can then naturally understand nothing; as the phantasms
is written”: nor does it understand by species abstracted
are wanting to which it may turn.
from things, for it does not then possess organs of sense
To solve this difficulty we must consider that as noth-
and imagination which are necessary for the abstraction of
ing acts except so far as it is actual, the mode of action in
species: nor does it understand by means of species, for-
every agent follows from its mode of existence. Now the
merly abstracted and retained in the soul; for if that were
soul has one mode of being when in the body, and another
so, a child’s soul would have no means of understand-
when apart from it, its nature remaining always the same;
ing at all: nor does it understand by means of intelligible
but this does not mean that its union with the body is an
species divinely infused, for such knowledge would not
accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs
be natural, such as we treat of now, but the effect of grace.
to its very nature, just as the nature of a light object is not Therefore the soul apart from the body understands noth-changed, when it is in its proper place, which is natural to
ing.
it, and outside its proper place, which is beside its nature.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima i,
The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently
1), “If the soul had no proper operation, it could not be
with that mode of existence, has a mode of understanding,
separated from the body.” But the soul is separated from
by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal
the body; therefore it has a proper operation and above all,
organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a
that which consists in intelligence. Therefore the soul can
mode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible
understand when it is apart from the body.
objects, as is proper to other separate substances. Hence
I answer that, The difficulty in solving this question
it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the
arises from the fact that the soul united to the body can
phantasms as it is for it to be joined to the body; but to
understand only by turning to the phantasms, as experi-
be separated from the body is not in accordance with its
458
nature, and likewise to understand without turning to the those who have a better understanding, unless things are
phantasms is not natural to it; and hence it is united to
explained to them singly and in detail. Now it is clear that
the body in order that it may have an existence and an op-
in the natural order human souls hold the lowest place
eration suitable to its nature. But here again a difficulty
among intellectual substances. But the perfection of the
arises. For since nature is always ordered to what is best,
universe required various grades of being. If, therefore,
and since it is better to understand by turning to simply
God had willed souls to understand in the same way as
intelligible objects than by turning to the phantasms; God
separate substances, it would follow that human knowl-
should have ordered the soul’s nature so that the nobler
edge, so far from being perfect, would be confused and
way of understanding would have been natural to it, and
general. Therefore to make it possible for human souls to
it would not have needed the body for that purpose.
possess perfect and proper knowledge, they were so made
In order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that
that their nature required them to be joined to bodies, and
while it is true that it is nobler in itself to understand by
thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge of sen-
turning to something higher than to understand by turning
sible things from the sensible things themselves; thus we
to phantasms, nevertheless such a mode of understand-
see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be
ing was not so perfect as regards what was possible to
taught by sensible examples.
the soul. This will appear if we consider that every in-
It is clear then that it was for the soul’s good that it was
tellectual substance possesses intellective power by the
united to a body, and that it understands by turning to the
influence of the Divine light, which is one and simple
phantasms. Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart
in its first principle, and the farther off intellectual crea-
from the body, and also to understand in another way.
tures are from the first principle so much the more is the
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher’s words care-
light divided and diversified, as is the case with lines ra-
fully examined will show that he said this on the previous
diating from the centre of a circle. Hence it is that God
supposition that understanding is a movement of body and
by His one Essence understands all things; while the su-
soul as united, just as sensation is, for he had not as yet
perior intellectual substances understand by means of a
explained the difference between intellect and sense. We
number of species, which nevertheless are fewer and more
may also say that he is referring to the way of understand-
universal and bestow a deeper comprehension of things,
ing by turning to phantasms. This is also the meaning of
because of the efficaciousness of the intellectual power
the second objection.
of such natures: whereas the inferior intellectual natures
Reply to Objection 3. The separated soul does not
possess a greater number of species, which are less uni-
understand by way of innate species, nor by species ab-
versal, and bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in
stracted then, nor only by species retained, and this the
proportion as they recede from the intellectual power of
objection proves; but the soul in that state understands by
the higher natures. If, therefore, the inferior substances
means of participated species arising from the influence
received species in the same degree of universality as
of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other separate
the superior substances, since they are not so strong in
substances; though in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as
understanding, the knowledge which they would derive
it ceases to act by turning to corporeal (phantasms), the
through them would be imperfect, and of a general and
soul turns at once to the superior things; nor is this way of
confused nature. We can see this to a certain extent in
knowledge unnatural, for God is the author of the influx
man, for those who are of weaker intellect fail to acquire
of both of the light of grace and of the light of nature.
perfect knowledge through the universal conceptions of
Whether the separated soul understands separate substances?
Ia q. 89 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the separated soul
God alone can enter into the soul; nor by means of species
does not understand separate substances. For the soul is
abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel is more
more perfect when joined to the body than when existing
simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at
apart from it, being an essential part of human nature; and
all understand separate substances.
every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in that
Objection 3. Further, some philosophers said that the
whole. But the soul in the body does not understand sep-
ultimate happiness of man consists in the knowledge of
arate substances as shown above (q. 88, a. 1). Therefore
separate substances. If, therefore, the separated soul can
much less is it able to do so when apart from the body.
understand separate substances, its happiness would be
Objection 2. Further, whatever is known is known
secured by its separation alone; which cannot be reason-
either by its presence or by its species. But separate sub-
ably be said.
stances cannot be known to the soul by their presence, for
On the contrary, Souls apart from the body know
459
other separated souls; as we see in the case of the rich as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul apart
man in hell, who saw Lazarus and Abraham (Lk. 16:23).
from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated
Therefore separated souls see the devils and the angels.
souls, but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of
I answer that, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), “our
the angels so far as its natural knowledge is concerned.
mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by
But the knowledge of glory is otherwise.
itself”—i.e. by knowing itself (q. 88, a. 1, ad 1). There-
Reply to Objection 1. The separated soul is, indeed,
fore from the knowledge which the separated soul has of
less perfect considering its nature in which it communi-
itself, we can judge how it knows other separate things.
cates with the nature of the body: but it has a greater
Now it was said above (a. 1), that as long as it is united
freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care of the
to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms,
body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the
and therefore it does not understand itself save through be-
present life.
coming actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted
Reply to Objection 2. The separated soul understands
from phantasms; for thus it understands itself through its
the angels by means of divinely impressed ideas; which,
own act, as shown above (q. 87, a. 1). When, however,
however, fail to give perfect knowledge of them, foras-
it is separated from the body, it understands no longer by
much as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an
turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply intelligible
angel.
objects; hence in that state it understands itself through
Reply to Objection 3. Man’s ultimate happiness con-
itself. Now, every separate substance “understands what
sists not in the knowledge of any separate substances; but
is above itself and what is below itself, according to the
in the knowledge of God, Who is seen only by grace. The
mode of its substance” (De Causis viii): for a thing is un-
knowledge of other separate substances if perfectly under-
derstood according as it is in the one who understands;
stood gives great happiness—not final and ultimate hap-
while one thing is in another according to the nature of
piness. But the separated soul does not understand them
that in which it is. And the mode of existence of a sep-
perfectly, as was shown above in this article.
arated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but is the same
Whether the separated soul knows all natural things?
Ia q. 89 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the separated soul
thereof. Now angels through such species know all nat-
knows all natural things.
For the types of all natural
ural things perfectly; because all that God has produced
things exist in separate substances. Therefore, as sepa-
in the respective natures of natural things has been pro-
rated souls know separate substances, they also know all
duced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine
natural things.
says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Hence it follows that separated
Objection 2.
Further, whoever understands the
souls know all natural things not with a certain and proper
greater intelligible, will be able much more to understand
knowledge, but in a general and confused manner.
the lesser intelligible. But the separated soul understands
Reply to Objection 1. Even an angel does not under-
immaterial substances, which are in the highest degree of
stand all natural things through his substance, but through
intelligibility. Therefore much more can it understand all
certain species, as stated above (q. 87, a. 1). So it does
natural things which are in a lower degree of intelligibil-
not follow that the soul knows all natural things because
ity.
it knows separate substances after a fashion.
On the contrary, The devils have greater natural
Reply to Objection 2. As the soul separated from the
knowledge than the separated soul; yet they do not know
body does not perfectly understand separate substances,
all natural things, but have to learn many things by long
so neither does it know all natural things perfectly; but it
experience, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono i). There-
knows them confusedly, as above explained in this article.
fore neither can the separated soul know all natural things.
Reply to Objection 3. Isidore speaks of the knowl-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the separated
edge of the future which neither angels, nor demons,
soul, like the angels, understands by means of species,
nor separated souls, know except so far as future things
received from the influence of the Divine light. Neverthe-
pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine revela-
less, as the soul by nature is inferior to an angel, to whom
tion. But we are here treating of the knowledge of natural
this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the
things.
body through such species does not receive perfect knowl-
Reply to Objection 4. Knowledge acquired here by
edge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge.
study is proper and perfect; the knowledge of which we
Separated souls, therefore, have the same relation through
speak is confused. Hence it does not follow that to study
such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of nat-
in order to learn is useless.
ural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge
460
Whether the separated soul knows singulars?
Ia q. 89 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the separated soul
versal and individual principles (q. 14, a. 2), so likewise
does not know singulars. For no cognitive power besides
separate substances can know singulars by species which
the intellect remains in the separated soul, as is clear from
are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine Essence.
what has been said above (q. 77, a. 8). But the intellect
There is a difference, however, between angels and sepa-
cannot know singulars, as we have shown (q. 86, a. 1).
rated souls in the fact that through these species the angels
Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars.
have a perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas
Objection 2. Further, the knowledge of the singular
separated have only a confused knowledge. Hence the
is more determinate than knowledge of the universal. But
angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, through these
the separated soul has no determinate knowledge of the
species, know not only the specific natures of things, but
species of natural things, therefore much less can it know
also the singulars contained in those species; whereas sep-
singulars.
arated souls by these species know only those singulars to
Objection 3. Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not
which they are determined by former knowledge in this
by sense, for the same reason it would know all singulars.
life, or by some affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the
But it does not know all singulars. Therefore it knows
disposition of the Divine order; because whatever is re-
none.
ceived into anything is conditioned according to the mode
On the contrary, The rich man in hell said: “I have
of the recipient.
five brethren” (Lk. 16:28).
Reply to Objection 1. The intellect does not know the
I answer that, Separated souls know some singulars,
singular by way of abstraction; neither does the separated
but not all, not even all present singulars. To understand
soul know it thus; but as explained above.
this, we must consider that there is a twofold way of
Reply to Objection 2. The knowledge of the sepa-
knowing things, one by means of abstraction from phan-
rated soul is confined to those species or individuals to
tasms, and in this way singulars cannot be directly known
which the soul has some kind of determinate relation, as
by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above (q. 86,
we have said.
a. 1). The other way of understanding is by the infusion of
Reply to Objection 3. The separated soul has not the
species by God, and in that way it is possible for the intel-
same relation to all singulars, but one relation to some,
lect to know singulars. For as God knows all things, uni-
and another to others. Therefore there is not the same rea-
versal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of uni-
son why it should know all singulars.
Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul?
Ia q. 89 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the habit of knowl-
destroyed by death.
edge acquired in this life does not remain in the soul sep-
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum),
arated from the body: for the Apostle says: “Knowledge
“Let us learn on earth that kind of knowledge which will
shall be destroyed” (1 Cor. 13:8).
remain with us in heaven.”
Objection 2. Further, some in this world who are less
I answer that, Some say that the habit of knowledge
good enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better.
resides not in the intellect itself, but in the sensitive pow-
If, therefore, the habit of knowledge remained in the soul
ers, namely, the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative,
after death, it would follow that some who are less good
and that the intelligible species are not kept in the pas-
would, even in the future life, excel some who are better;
sive intellect. If this were true, it would follow that when
which seems unreasonable.
the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here acquired
Objection 3. Further, separated souls will possess
would also be entirely destroyed.
knowledge by influence of the Divine light. Supposing,
But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is
therefore, that knowledge here acquired remained in the
“the abode of species,” as the Philosopher says (De An-
separated soul, it would follow that two forms of the same
ima iii, 4), the habit of knowledge here acquired must be
species would co-exist in the same subject which cannot
partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers and partly in the
be.
intellect. This can be seen by considering the very ac-
Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic.
tions from which knowledge arises. For “habits are like
vi, 4,5), that “a habit is a quality hard to remove: yet
the actions whereby they are acquired” (Ethic. ii, 1). Now
sometimes knowledge is destroyed by sickness or the
the actions of the intellect, by which knowledge is here
like.” But in this life there is no change so thorough as
acquired, are performed by the mind turning to the phan-
death. Therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge is
tasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers. Hence through
461
such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain facility in trary to truth. And thus knowledge may be corrupted by
considering the species received: and the aforesaid sen-
its contrary when a false argument seduces anyone from
sitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the
the knowledge of truth. For this reason the Philosopher in
action of the intellect when it turns to them to consider
the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge
the intelligible object. But as the intellectual act resides
is corrupted directly: namely, “forgetfulness” on the part
chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it re-
of the memorative power, and “deception” on the part of
sides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers,
a false argument. But these have no place in the sepa-
the same distinction is to be applied to habit.
rated soul. Therefore we must conclude that the habit of
Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life
knowledge, so far as it is in the intellect, remains in the
does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what
separated soul.
belongs to the sensitive powers; but as regards what be-
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is not speaking of
longs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because, as
knowledge as a habit, but as to the act of knowing; and
the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form
hence he says, in proof of the assertion quoted, “Now, I
may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when cor-
know in part.”
rupted by its contrary, as heat, by cold; and secondly, indi-
Reply to Objection 2. As a less good man may ex-
rectly, when its subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that
ceed a better man in bodily stature, so the same kind of
human knowledge is not corrupted through corruption of
man may have a habit of knowledge in the future life
the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty, as
which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, how-
above stated (q. 79, a. 2, ad 2). Neither can the intelligi-
ever, cannot be compared with the other prerogatives en-
ble species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their
joyed by the better man.
contrary; for there is no contrary to intelligible “inten-
Reply to Objection 3. These two kinds of knowledge
tions,” above all as regards simple intelligence of “what
are not of the same species, so there is no impossibility.
a thing is.” But contrariety may exist in the intellect as re-
Reply to Objection 4. This objection considers the
gards mental composition and division, or also reasoning;
corruption of knowledge on the part of the sensitive pow-
so far as what is false in statement or argument is con-
ers.
Whether the act of knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul?
Ia q. 89 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the act of knowledge
I answer that, Action offers two things for our
here acquired does not remain in the separated soul. For
consideration—its species and its mode. Its species comes
the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), that when the body
from the object, whereto the faculty of knowledge is di-
is corrupted, “the soul neither remembers nor loves.” But
rected by the (intelligible) species, which is the object’s
to consider what is previously known is an act of mem-
similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the power
ory. Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of
of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the
knowledge here acquired.
species of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is Objection 2. Further, intelligible species cannot have
due to the eye’s visual power. Therefore as the intelligi-
greater power in the separated soul than they have in the
ble species remain in the separated soul, as stated above
soul united to the body. But in this life we cannot under-
(a. 5), and since the state of the separated soul is not the
stand by intelligible species without turning to phantasms,
same as it is in this life, it follows that through the intel-
as shown above (q. 84, a. 7). Therefore the separated soul
ligible species acquired in this life the soul apart from the
cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by intel-
body can understand what it understood formerly, but in a
ligible species acquired in this life.
different way; not by turning to phantasms, but by a mode
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii,
suited to a soul existing apart from the body. Thus the act
1), that “habits produce acts similar to those whereby they
of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul,
are acquired.” But the habit of knowledge is acquired here
but in a different way.
by acts of the intellect turning to phantasms: therefore it
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher speaks of re-
cannot produce any other acts. These acts, however, are
membrance, according as memory belongs to the sensitive
not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in the
part, but not as belonging in a way to the intellect, as ex-
state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge
plained above (q. 79, a. 6).
acquired in this life.
Reply to Objection 2. The different mode of intelli-
On the contrary, It was said to Dives in hell (Lk.
gence is produced by the different state of the intelligent
16:25): “Remember thou didst receive good things in thy
soul; not by diversity of species.
lifetime.”
Reply to Objection 3. The acts which produce a habit
462
are like the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethic. v, 8:
in mode. For example, to do just things, but not justly,
Magn. Moral. i, 34).
that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of political justice,
Whether local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul?
Ia q. 89 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that local distance im-
in either case a determinate distance would be necessary.
pedes the separated soul’s knowledge. For Augustine says
This is, however, impossible because abstraction of the
(De Cura pro Mort. xiii), that “the souls of the dead are
species from the sensible is done through the senses and
where they cannot know what is done here.” But they
other sensible faculties which do not remain actually in
know what is done among themselves. Therefore local
the soul apart from the body. But the soul when separated
distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul.
understands singulars by species derived from the Divine
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Divin. Dae-
light, which is indifferent to what is near or distant. Hence
mon. iii), that “the demon’s rapidity of movement enables
knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered by local
them to tell things unknown to us.” But agility of move-
distance.
ment would be useless in that respect unless their knowl-
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine says that the souls
edge was impeded by local distance; which, therefore, is a
of the departed cannot see what is done here, not because
much greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated
they are ‘there,’ as if impeded by local distance; but for
soul, whose nature is inferior to the demon’s.
some other cause, as we shall explain (a. 8).
Objection 3. Further, as there is distance of place, so
Reply to Objection 2. Augustine speaks there in ac-
is there distance of time. But distance of time impedes
cordance with the opinion that demons have bodies natu-
knowledge in the separated soul, for the soul is ignorant
rally united to them, and so have sensitive powers, which
of the future. Therefore it seems that distance of place
require local distance. In the same book he expressly sets
also impedes its knowledge.
down this opinion, though apparently rather by way of
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 16:23), that Dives,
narration than of assertion, as we may gather from De Civ.
“lifting up his eyes when he was in torment, saw Abra-
Dei xxi, 10.
ham afar off.” Therefore local distance does not impede
Reply to Objection 3. The future, which is distant in
knowledge in the separated soul.
time, does not actually exist, and therefore is not know-
I answer that, Some have held that the separated soul
able in itself, because so far as a thing falls short of being, knows the singular by abstraction from the sensible. If
so far does it fall short of being knowable. But what is
that were so, it might be that local distance would im-
locally distant exists actually, and is knowable in itself.
pede its knowledge; for either the sensible would need
Hence we cannot argue from distance of time to distance
to act upon the soul, or the soul upon the sensible, and
of place.
Whether separated souls know that takes place on earth?
Ia q. 89 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that separated souls know
not understand whether his children come to honor or dis-
what takes place on earth; for otherwise they would have
honor.”
no care for it, as they have, according to what Dives said
I answer that, By natural knowledge, of which we
(Lk. 16:27,28), “I have five brethren. . . he may testify
are treating now, the souls of the dead do not know what
unto them, lest they also come into the place of torments.”
passes on earth. This follows from what has been laid
Therefore separated souls know what passes on earth.
down (a. 4), since the separated soul has knowledge of
Objection 2. Further, the dead often appear to the liv-
singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either
ing, asleep or awake, and tell them of what takes place
by some vestige of previous knowledge or affection, or by
there; as Samuel appeared to Saul (1 Kings 28:11). But
the Divine order. Now the souls departed are in a state
this could not be unless they knew what takes place here.
of separation from the living, both by Divine order and
Therefore they know what takes place on earth.
by their mode of existence, whilst they are joined to the
Objection 3. Further, separated souls know what hap-
world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and hence they
pens among themselves. If, therefore, they do not know
are ignorant of what goes on among us. Whereof Gregory
what takes place among us, it must be by reason of local
gives the reason thus: “The dead do not know how the
distance; which has been shown to be false (a. 7).
living act, for the life of the spirit is far from the life of
On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:21): “He will
the flesh; and so, as corporeal things differ from incorpo-
463
real in genus, so they are distinct in knowledge” (Moral.
not suffer from sorrow, nor do they interfere in mundane
xii). Augustine seems to say the same (De Cura pro Mort.
affairs, except in accordance with Divine justice.
xiii), when he asserts that, “the souls of the dead have no
Reply to Objection 1. The souls of the departed may
concern in the affairs of the living.”
care for the living, even if ignorant of their state; just as
Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided
we care for the dead by pouring forth prayer on their be-
in opinion as regards the souls of the blessed in heaven,
half, though we are ignorant of their state. Moreover, the
for Gregory continues the passage above quoted: “The
affairs of the living can be made known to them not im-
case of the holy souls is different, for since they see the
mediately, but the souls who pass hence thither, or by an-
light of Almighty God, we cannot believe that external
gels and demons, or even by “the revelation of the Holy
things are unknown to them.” But Augustine (De Cura
Ghost,” as Augustine says in the same book.
pro Mort. xiii) expressly says: “The dead, even the saints
Reply to Objection 2. That the dead appear to the
do not know what is done by the living or by their own
living in any way whatever is either by the special dispen-
children,” as a gloss quotes on the text, “Abraham hath
sation of God; in order that the souls of the dead may in-
not known us” (Is. 63:16). He confirms this opinion by
terfere in affairs of the living—and this is to be accounted
saying that he was not visited, nor consoled in sorrow by
as miraculous. Or else such apparitions occur through the
his mother, as when she was alive; and he could not think
instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowl-
it possible that she was less kind when in a happier state;
edge of the departed; as may likewise happen when the
and again by the fact that the Lord promised to king Josias
living appear, without their own knowledge, to others liv-
that he should die, lest he should see his people’s afflic-
ing, as Augustine says in the same book. And so it may
tions (4 Kings 22:20). Yet Augustine says this in doubt;
be said of Samuel that he appeared through Divine reve-
and premises, “Let every one take, as he pleases, what I
lation; according to Ecclus. 46:23, “he slept, and told the
say.” Gregory, on the other hand, is positive, since he says,
king the end of his life.” Or, again, this apparition was
“We cannot believe.” His opinion, indeed, seems to be the
procured by the demons; unless, indeed, the authority of
more probable one—that the souls of the blessed who see
Ecclesiasticus be set aside through not being received by
God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the
the Jews as canonical Scripture.
angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what hap-
Reply to Objection 3. This kind of ignorance does
pens among those living on earth. But as the souls of the
not proceed from the obstacle of local distance, but from
blessed are most perfectly united to Divine justice, they do
the cause mentioned above.
464
FIRST PART, QUESTION 90
Of the First Production of Man’s Soul
(In Four Articles)
After the foregoing we must consider the first production of man, concerning which there are four subjects of treatment: (1) the production of man himself; (2) the end of this production; (3) the state and condition of the first man; (4) the place of his abode. Concerning the production of man, there are three things to be considered: (1) the production of man’s soul; (2) the production of man’s body; (3) the production of the woman.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man’s soul was something made, or was of the Divine substance?
(2) Whether, if made, it was created?
(3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality?
(4) Whether it was made before the body?
Whether the soul was made or was of God’s substance?
Ia q. 90 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the soul was not
fore they said that God was a body, which they consid-
made, but was God’s substance. For it is written (Gn. 2:7):
ered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they
“God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed
held that the soul was of the same nature as that body
into his face the breath of life, and man was made a liv-
which they regarded as the first principle, as is stated De
ing soul.” But he who breathes sends forth something of
Anima i, 2, it followed that the soul was of the nature
himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the
of God Himself. According to this supposition, also, the
Divine substance.
Manichaeans, thinking that God was corporeal light, held
Objection 2. Further, as above explained (q. 75, a. 5),
that the soul was part of that light bound up with the body.
the soul is a simple form. But a form is an act. There-
Then a further step in advance was made, and some
fore the soul is a pure act; which applies to God alone.
surmised the existence of something incorporeal, not apart
Therefore the soul is of God’s substance.
from the body, but the form of a body; so that Varro said,
Objection 3. Further, things that exist and do differ
“God is a soul governing the world by movement and rea-
are the same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way
son,” as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 6∗) So some
differ, for they could only be differentiated by certain dif-
supposed man’s soul to be part of that one soul, as man
ferences, and thus would be composite. Therefore God
is a part of the whole world; for they were unable to go
and the human mind are the same.
so far as to understand the different degrees of spiritual
On the contrary, Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii,
substance, except according to the distinction of bodies.
15) mentions certain opinions which he calls “exceed-
But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above
ingly and evidently perverse, and contrary to the Catholic
(q. 3, Aa. 1,8; and q. 75, a. 1), wherefore it is evidently
Faith,” among which the first is the opinion that “God
false that the soul is of the substance of God.
made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself.”
Reply to Objection 1. The term “breathe” is not to
I answer that, To say that the soul is of the Divine
be taken in the material sense; but as regards the act of
substance involves a manifest improbability. For, as is
God, to breathe [spirare], is the same as to “make a spirit.”
clear from what has been said (q. 77 , a. 2; q. 79, a. 2;
Moreover, in the material sense, man by breathing does
q. 84, a. 6), the human soul is sometimes in a state of po-
not send forth anything of his own substance, but an ex-
tentiality to the act of intelligence —acquires its knowl-
traneous thing.
edge somehow from things—and thus has various pow-
Reply to Objection 2. Although the soul is a simple
ers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature,
form in its essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a
Which is a pure act—receives nothing from any other—
being by participation, as above explained (q. 75, a. 5, ad
and admits of no variety in itself, as we have proved (q. 3,
4). Therefore it is not a pure act like God.
Aa. 1,7; q. 9, a. 1).
Reply to Objection 3. That which differs, properly
This error seems to have originated from two state-
speaking, differs in something; wherefore we seek for dif-
ments of the ancients. For those who first began to observe
ference where we find also resemblance. For this reason
the nature of things, being unable to rise above their imag-
things which differ must in some way be compound; since
ination, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. There-
they differ in something, and in something resemble each
∗ The words as quoted are to be found iv. 31.
465
other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet man and a horse differ by the difference of rational and ir-all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things
rational; but we cannot say that these again differ by some
are diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differ-
further difference.
ences which enter into their composition. For instance, a
Whether the soul was produced by creation?
Ia q. 90 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the soul was not pro-
of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speak-
duced by creation. For that which has in itself something
ing, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be
material is produced from matter. But the soul is in part
made; but such are said to be made through the composite
material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was
substances being made. On the other hand, the rational
made of matter; and hence it was not created.
soul is a subsistent form, as above explained (q. 75, a. 2).
Objection 2.
Further, every actuality of matter is
Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And
educed from the potentiality of that matter; for since mat-
since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter—whether
ter is in potentiality to act, any act pre-exists in matter
corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being—or
potentially. But the soul is the act of corporeal matter, as
spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one
is clear from its definition. Therefore the soul is educed
spiritual substance into another, we must conclude that it
from the potentiality of matter.
cannot exist except by creation.
Objection 3. Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if
Reply to Objection 1. The soul’s simple essence is as
the soul is created, all other forms also are created. Thus
the material element, while its participated existence is its
no forms would come into existence by generation; which
formal element; which participated existence necessarily
is not true.
co-exists with the soul’s essence, because existence natu-
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:27): “God cre-
rally follows the form. The same reason holds if the soul
ated man to His own image.” But man is like to God in
is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as
his soul. Therefore the soul was created.
some maintain; because the said matter is not in potential-
I answer that, The rational soul can be made only by
ity to another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial
creation; which, however, is not true of other forms. The
body; otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore
reason is because, since to be made is the way to exis-
the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter.
tence, a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable
Reply to Objection 2. The production of act from the
to its mode of existence. Now that properly exists which
potentiality of matter is nothing else but something be-
itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own exis-
coming actually that previously was in potentiality. But
tence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly
since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on
called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but
corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the capac-
something is (modified) by it, and so far is it called a be-
ity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (q. 75, a. 2), it is
ing; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by
not educed from the potentiality of matter.
it something is white. Hence it is said Metaph. vii, Did.
Reply to Objection 3. As we have said, there is no
vi, 1 that an accident should be described as “of some-
comparison between the rational soul and other forms.
thing rather than as something.” The same is to be said
Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately?
Ia q. 90 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the rational soul is not says (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are pro-immediately made by God, but by the instrumentality of
duced into existence by the higher, and souls by angels.
the angels. For spiritual things have more order than cor-
Objection 3. Further, “perfect is that which can pro-
poreal things. But inferior bodies are produced by means
duce its like,” as is stated Metaph. v. But spiritual sub-
of the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). There-
stances are much more perfect than corporeal. Therefore,
fore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are since bodies produce their like in their own species, much
produced by means of the superior spirits, the angels.
more are angels able to produce something specifically in-
Objection 2. Further, the end corresponds to the be-
ferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul.
ginning of things; for God is the beginning and end of all.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7) that God Him-
Therefore the issue of things from their beginning corre-
self “breathed into the face of man the breath of life.”
sponds to the forwarding of them to their end. But “in-
I answer that, Some have held that angels, acting by
ferior things are forwarded by the higher,” as Dionysius
the power of God, produce rational souls. But this is quite
466
impossible, and is against faith. For it has been proved by creation. Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be
that the rational soul cannot be produced except by cre-
produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced,
ation. Now, God alone can create; for the first agent alone
save immediately by God.
can act without presupposing the existence of anything;
Thus the replies to the objections are clear.
For
while the second cause always presupposes something de-
that bodies produce their like or something inferior to
rived from the first cause, as above explained (q. 75, a. 3):
themselves, and that the higher things lead forward the
and every agent, that presupposes something to its act,
inferior—all these things are effected through a certain
acts by making a change therein. Therefore everything
transmutation.
else acts by producing a change, whereas God alone acts
Whether the human soul was produced before the body?
Ia q. 90 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the human soul was
ated, together with the angels; and that afterwards, by its
made before the body. For the work of creation preceded
own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he
the work of distinction and adornment, as shown above
does not say this by way of assertion; as his words prove.
(q. 66, a. 1; q. 70, a. 1). But the soul was made by cre-
For he says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 29): “We may believe, if nei-
ation; whereas the body was made at the end of the work
ther Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was made on
of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before
the sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to
the body.
its causal virtue in the elements of the world, but that the
Objection 2. Further, the rational soul has more in
soul was already created.”
common with the angels than with the brute animals. But
Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the
angels were created before bodies, or at least, at the be-
soul has of itself a complete species and nature, and that
ginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body of man
it is not united to the body as its form, but as its admin-
was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were
istrator. But if the soul is united to the body as its form,
made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the
and is naturally a part of human nature, the above supposi-
body.
tion is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the
Objection 3. Further, the end is proportionate to the
first things in their perfect natural state, as their species
beginning.
But in the end the soul outlasts the body.
required. Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has
Therefore in the beginning it was created before the body.
its natural perfection only as united to the body. There-
On the contrary, The proper act is produced in its
fore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created
proper potentiality. Therefore since the soul is the proper
without the body.
act of the body, the soul was produced in the body.
Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about
I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that
the work of the six days (q. 74, a. 2), we may say that the
not only the soul of the first man, but also the souls of
human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a cer-
all men were created at the same time as the angels, be-
tain generic similitude, so far as it has intellectual nature
fore their bodies: because he thought that all spiritual sub-
in common with the angels; but was itself created at the
stances, whether souls or angels, are equal in their natu-
same time as the body. According to the other saints, both
ral condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of
the body and soul of the first man were produced in the
them—namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies—
work of the six days.
are united to bodies while others remain in their different
Reply to Objection 1. If the soul by its nature were
orders entirely free from matter. Of this opinion we have
a complete species, so that it might be created as to itself,
already spoken (q. 47, a. 2); and so we need say nothing
this reason would prove that the soul was created by itself
about it here.
in the beginning. But as the soul is naturally the form of
Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), says that
the body, it was necessarily created, not separately, but in
the soul of the first man was created at the same time as
the body.
the angels, before the body, for another reason; because
Reply to Objection 2. The same observation applies
he supposes that the body of man, during the work of the
to the second objection. For if the soul had a species of
six days, was produced, not actually, but only as to some
itself it would have something still more in common with
“causal virtues”; which cannot be said of the soul, because
the angels. But, as the form of the body, it belongs to the
neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spir-
animal genus, as a formal principle.
itual matter, nor could it be produced from any created
Reply to Objection 3. That the soul remains after the
virtue. Therefore it seems that the soul itself, during the
body, is due to a defect of the body, namely, death. Which
work of the six days, when all things were made, was cre-
defect was not due when the soul was first created.
467
FIRST PART, QUESTION 91
The Production of the First Man’s Body
(In Four Articles)
We have now to consider the production of the first man’s body. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The matter from which it was produced;
(2) The author by whom it was produced;
(3) The disposition it received in its production;
(4) The mode and order of its production.
Whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth?
Ia q. 91 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the body of the first
temperament. As to the elements, he has them in their
man was not made of the slime of the earth. For it is
very substance, yet in such a way that the higher elements,
an act of greater power to make something out of noth-
fire and air, predominate in him by their power; for life is
ing than out of something; because “not being” is farther
mostly found where there is heat, which is from fire; and
off from actual existence than “being in potentiality.” But
where there is humor, which is of the air. But the inferior
since man is the most honorable of God’s lower creatures,
elements abound in man by their substance; otherwise the
it was fitting that in the production of man’s body, the
mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced, un-
power of God should be most clearly shown. Therefore it
less the inferior elements, which have the less power, pre-
should not have been made of the slime of the earth, but
dominated in quantity. Therefore the body of man is said
out of nothing.
to have been formed from the slime of the earth; because
Objection 2. Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler
earth and water mingled are called slime, and for this rea-
than earthly bodies. But the human body has the greatest
son man is called ‘a little world,’ because all creatures of
nobility; since it is perfected by the noblest form, which
the world are in a way to be found in him.
is the rational soul. Therefore it should not be made of an
Reply to Objection 1. The power of the Divine Cre-
earthly body, but of a heavenly body.
ator was manifested in man’s body when its matter was
Objection 3. Further, fire and air are nobler than earth produced by creation.
But it was fitting that the hu-
and water, as is clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since
man body should be made of the four elements, that man
the human body is most noble, it should rather have been
might have something in common with the inferior bod-
made of fire and air than of the slime of the earth.
ies, as being something between spiritual and corporeal
Objection 4. Further, the human body is composed of
substances.
the four elements. Therefore it was not made of the slime
Reply to Objection 2. Although the heavenly body is
of the earth, but of the four elements.
in itself nobler than the earthly body, yet for the acts of
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7): “God made
the rational soul the heavenly body is less adapted. For
man of the slime of the earth.”
the rational soul receives the knowledge of truth in a cer-
I answer that, As God is perfect in His works, He
tain way through the senses, the organs of which cannot
bestowed perfection on all of them according to their ca-
be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor
pacity: “God’s works are perfect” (Dt. 32:4). He Him-
is it true that something of the fifth essence enters materi-
self is simply perfect by the fact that “all things are pre-
ally into the composition of the human body, as some say,
contained” in Him, not as component parts, but as “united
who suppose that the soul is united to the body by means
in one simple whole,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v);
of light. For, first of all, what they say is false—that light
in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause,
is a body. Secondly, it is impossible for something to be
according to its one virtue. This perfection is bestowed
taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and
on the angels, inasmuch as all things which are produced
to be mingled with the elements, since a heavenly body is
by God in nature through various forms come under their
impassible; wherefore it does not enter into the composi-
knowledge. But on man this perfection is bestowed in an
tion of mixed bodies, except as in the effects of its power.
inferior way. For he does not possess a natural knowl-
Reply to Objection 3. If fire and air, whose action
edge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed
is of greater power, predominated also in quantity in the
of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the
human body, they would entirely draw the rest into them-
genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heav-
selves, and there would be no equality in the mingling,
enly bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable
such as is required in the composition of man, for the
468
sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses.
two contraries, as much needs be the case with regard to
For the organ of any particular sense must not actually
touch; for the medium is in potentiality to the extremes.
have the contraries of which that sense has the percep-
Reply to Objection 4. In the slime of the earth are
tion, but only potentially; either in such a way that it is
earth, and water binding the earth together. Of the other
entirely void of the whole “genus” of such contraries—
elements, Scripture makes no mention, because they are
thus, for instance, the pupil of the eye is without color,
less in quantity in the human body, as we have said; and
so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors; which is
because also in the account of the Creation no mention is
not possible in the organ of touch, since it is composed
made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of
of the very elements, the qualities of which are perceived
uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was
by that sense—or so that the organ is a medium between
immediately addressed.
Whether the human body was immediately produced by God?
Ia q. 91 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the human body was
must be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure form,
not produced by God immediately. For Augustine says
not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in
(De Trin. iii, 4), that “corporeal things are disposed by
matter, and which form is only made by the fact that the
God through the angels.” But the human body was made
composite is made. So a form which is in matter can only
of corporeal matter, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore it
be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as
was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and
composite is made by composite. Now God, though He is
not immediately by God.
absolutely immaterial, can alone by His own power pro-
Objection 2. Further, whatever can be made by a cre-
duce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can produce
ated power, is not necessarily produced immediately by
a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding material
God. But the human body can be produced by the created
form. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body
power of a heavenly body; for even certain animals are
except by making use of something in the nature of a seed,
produced from putrefaction by the active power of a heav-
as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no pre-
enly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated
existing body has been formed whereby another body of
where heat and cold are extreme, but only in temperate
the same species could be generated, the first human body
regions. Therefore the human body was not necessarily
was of necessity made immediately by God.
produced immediately by God.
Reply to Objection 1. Although the angels are the
Objection 3. Further, nothing is made of corporeal
ministers of God, as regards what He does in bodies, yet
matter except by some material change. But all corpo-
God does something in bodies beyond the angels’ power,
real change is caused by a movement of a heavenly body,
as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the
which is the first movement. Therefore, since the human
blind: and by this power He formed the body of the first
body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a
man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels
heavenly body had part in its production.
could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the
Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii,
first man, in the same way as they will do at the last res-
24) that man’s body was made during the work of the six
urrection by collecting the dust.
days, according to the causal virtues which God inserted
Reply to Objection 2.
Perfect animals, produced
in corporeal creatures; and that afterwards it was actually
from seed, cannot be made by the sole power of a heav-
produced. But what pre-exists in the corporeal creature
enly body, as Avicenna imagined; although the power of a
by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some cor-
heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of
poreal body. Therefore the human body was produced by
natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 26),
some created power, and not immediately by God.
“man and the sun beget man from matter.” For this rea-
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:1): “God
son, a place of moderate temperature is required for the
created man out of the earth.”
production of man and other animals. But the power of
I answer that, The first formation of the human body
heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some im-
could not be by the instrumentality of any created power,
perfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is
but was immediately from God. Some, indeed, supposed
clear that more conditions are required to produce a per-
that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived
fect than an imperfect thing.
from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher refutes
Reply to Objection 3. The movement of the heavens
this opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms can-
causes natural changes; but not changes that surpass the
not be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as
order of nature, and are caused by the Divine Power alone,
we have explained (q. 65, a. 4); and because the agent
as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see: like 469
to which also is the making of man from the slime of the some pre-existing creature can produce it. Secondly, in
earth.
passive potentiality only; that is, that out of pre-existing
Reply to Objection 4. An effect may be said to pre-
matter it can be produced by God. In this sense, according
exist in the causal virtues of creatures, in two ways. First,
to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous
both in active and in passive potentiality, so that not only
work in their causal virtues.
can it be produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that
Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition?
Ia q. 91 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the body of man was
Reply to Objection 1. The sense of touch, which is
not given an apt disposition. For since man is the noblest
the foundation of the other senses, is more perfect in man
of animals, his body ought to be the best disposed in what
than in any other animal; and for this reason man must
is proper to an animal, that is, in sense and movement.
have the most equable temperament of all animals. More-
But some animals have sharper senses and quicker move-
over man excels all other animals in the interior sensitive
ment than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds
powers, as is clear from what we have said above (q. 78,
a swifter flight. Therefore man’s body was not aptly dis-
a. 4). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the
posed.
other animals in some of the exterior senses; thus of all
Objection 2. Further, perfect is what lacks nothing.
animals he has the least sense of smell. For man needs the
But the human body lacks more than the body of other
largest brain as compared to the body; both for his greater
animals, for these are provided with covering and natural
freedom of action in the interior powers required for the
arms of defense, in which man is lacking. Therefore the
intellectual operations, as we have seen above (q. 84, a. 7);
human body is very imperfectly disposed.
and in order that the low temperature of the brain may
Objection 3. Further, man is more distant from plants
modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable
than he is from the brutes. But plants are erect in stature,
in man for him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the
while brutes are prone in stature. Therefore man should
brain, by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the
not be of erect stature.
smell, which requires dryness. In the same way, we may
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 7:30): “God
suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight,
made man right.”
and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on account
I answer that, All natural things were produced by
of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the
the Divine art, and so may be called God’s works of art.
perfect equability of his temperament. The same reason
Now every artist intends to give to his work the best dis-
suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid in
position; not absolutely the best, but the best as regards
movement than man, since this excellence of speed is in-
the proposed end; and even if this entails some defect, the
consistent with the equability of the human temperament.
artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes him-
Reply to Objection 2. Horns and claws, which are
self a saw for the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron,
the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide and
which is suitable for the object in view; and he does not
quantity of hair or feathers, which are the clothing of an-
prefer to make it of glass, though this be a more beautiful
imals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly element;
material, because this very beauty would be an obstacle to
which does not agree with the equability and softness of
the end he has in view. Therefore God gave to each natu-
the human temperament. Therefore such things do not
ral being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the
suit the nature of man. Instead of these, he has reason and
view of its proper end. This is what the Philosopher says
hands whereby he can make himself arms and clothes, and
(Phys. ii, 7): “And because it is better so, not absolutely,
other necessaries of life, of infinite variety. Wherefore the
but for each one’s substance.”
hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), “the organ of
Now the proximate end of the human body is the ratio-
organs.” Moreover this was more becoming to the rational
nal soul and its operations; since matter is for the sake of
nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number
the form, and instruments are for the action of the agent. I
of things, so as to make for itself an infinite number of
say, therefore, that God fashioned the human body in that
instruments.
disposition which was best, as most suited to such a form
Reply to Objection 3. An upright stature was becom-
and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition
ing to man for four reasons. First, because the senses
of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect
are given to man, not only for the purpose of procuring
arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the con-
the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed on other
ditions required in the body, in order to make it suitably
animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence,
proportioned to the soul and its operations.
whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of
470
the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he
takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own
would have a protruding mouth, with thick and hard lips,
sake. Therefore, as the senses are situated chiefly in the
and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt
face, other animals have the face turned to the ground,
by exterior things; as we see in other animals. Moreover,
as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a
such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is rea-
livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by
son’s proper operation.
the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and
Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above
penetrates further into the differences of things, he may
plants. For man’s superior part, his head, is turned to-
freely survey the sensible objects around him, both heav-
wards the superior part of the world, and his inferior part
enly and earthly, so as to gather intelligible truth from all
is turned towards the inferior world; and therefore he is
things. Secondly, for the greater freedom of the acts of the
perfectly disposed as to the general situation of his body.
interior powers; the brain, wherein these actions are, in a
Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower
way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above
world, since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their
other parts of the body. Thirdly, because if man’s stature
inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals
were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands
have a middle disposition, for the superior part of the an-
as fore-feet; and thus their utility for other purposes would
imal is that by which it takes food, and the inferior part
cease. Fourthly, because if man’s stature were prone to the
that by which it rids itself of the surplus.
ground, and he used his hands as fore-feet, he would be
Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in Scripture?
Ia q. 91 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the production of the
tion, Scripture uses a special way of speaking, to show
human body is not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as
that other things were made for man’s sake. For we are
the human body was made by God, so also were the other
accustomed to do with more deliberation and care what
works of the six days. But in the other works it is written,
we have chiefly in mind.
“God said; Let it be made, and it was made.” Therefore
Reply to Objection 2. We must not imagine that when
the same should have been said of man.
God said “Let us make man,” He spoke to the angels, as
Objection 2. Further, the human body was made by
some were perverse enough to think. But by these words
God immediately, as explained above (a. 2). Therefore it
is signified the plurality of the Divine Person, Whose im-
was not fittingly said, “Let us make man.”
age is more clearly expressed in man.
Objection 3. Further, the form of the human body is
Reply to Objection 3. Some have thought that man’s
the soul itself which is the breath of life. Therefore, hav-
body was formed first in priority of time, and that after-
ing said, “God made man of the slime of the earth,” he
wards the soul was infused into the formed body. But
should not have added: “And He breathed into him the
it is inconsistent with the perfection of the production of
breath of life.”
things, that God should have made either the body with-
Objection 4. Further, the soul, which is the breath of
out the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is
life, is in the whole body, and chiefly in the heart. There-
a part of human nature. This is especially unfitting as re-
fore it was not fittingly said: “He breathed into his face
gards the body, for the body depends on the soul, and not
the breath of life.”
the soul on the body.
Objection 5. Further, the male and female sex belong
To remove the difficulty some have said that the
to the body, while the image of God belongs to the soul.
words, “God made man,” must be understood of the pro-
But the soul, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii,
duction of the body with the soul; and that the subse-
24), was made before the body. Therefore having said:
quent words, “and He breathed into his face the breath of
“To His image He made them,” he should not have added,
life,” should be understood of the Holy Ghost; as the Lord
“male and female He created them.”
breathed on His Apostles, saying, “Receive ye the Holy
On the contrary, Is the authority of Scripture.
Ghost” (Jn. 20:22). But this explanation, as Augustine
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine observes (Gen.
says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 24), is excluded by the very words
ad lit. vi, 12), man surpasses other things, not in the fact
of Scripture. For we read farther on, “And man was made
that God Himself made man, as though He did not make
a living soul”; which words the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:45)
other things; since it is written (Ps. 101:26), “The work
refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore,
of Thy hands is the heaven,” and elsewhere (Ps. 94:5),
by breath of life we must understand the soul, so that the
“His hands laid down the dry land”; but in this, that man
words, “He breathed into his face the breath of life,” are a
is made to God’s image. Yet in describing man’s produc-
sort of exposition of what goes before; for the soul is the
471
form of the body.
one time; wherefore according to him man’s soul, which
Reply to Objection 4.
Since vital operations are
he holds to have been made with the angels, was not made
more clearly seen in man’s face, on account of the senses
before the sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of
which are there expressed; therefore Scripture says that
the first man was made actually, and his body in its causal
the breath of life was breathed into man’s face.
elements. But other doctors hold that on the sixth day both
Reply to Objection 5. According to Augustine (Gen.
body and soul of man were actually made.
ad lit. iv, 34), the works of the six days were done all at
472
FIRST PART, QUESTION 92
The Production of the Woman
(In Four Articles)
We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production of things?
(2) Whether the woman should have been made from man?
(3) Whether of man’s rib?
(4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?
Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things?
Ia q. 92 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the woman should
sex, and the passive power to the female. And as among
not have been made in the first production of things. For
animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation,
the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 3), that “the female
to which their life is principally directed; therefore the
is a misbegotten male.” But nothing misbegotten or de-
male sex is not found in continual union with the female
fective should have been in the first production of things.
in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that
Therefore woman should not have been made at that first
we may consider that by this means the male and female
production.
are one, as in plants they are always united; although in
Objection 2. Further, subjection and limitation were
some cases one of them preponderates, and in some the
a result of sin, for to the woman was it said after sin (Gn.
other. But man is yet further ordered to a still nobler vital
3:16): “Thou shalt be under the man’s power”; and Gre-
action, and that is intellectual operation. Therefore there
gory says that, “Where there is no sin, there is no inequal-
was greater reason for the distinction of these two forces
ity.” But woman is naturally of less strength and dignity
in man; so that the female should be produced separately
than man; “for the agent is always more honorable than
from the male; although they are carnally united for gen-
the patient,” as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16).
eration. Therefore directly after the formation of woman,
Therefore woman should not have been made in the first
it was said: “And they shall be two in one flesh” (Gn.
production of things before sin.
2:24).
Objection 3. Further, occasions of sin should be cut
Reply to Objection 1. As regards the individual na-
off. But God foresaw that the woman would be an occa-
ture, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active
sion of sin to man. Therefore He should not have made
force in the male seed tends to the production of a per-
woman.
fect likeness in the masculine sex; while the production
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:18): “It is not
of woman comes from defect in the active force or from
good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to
some material indisposition, or even from some external
himself.”
influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist,
I answer that, It was necessary for woman to be
as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2).
made, as the Scripture says, as a “helper” to man; not, in-
On the other hand, as regards human nature in general,
deed, as a helpmate in other works, as some say, since man
woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature’s in-
can be more efficiently helped by another man in other
tention as directed to the work of generation. Now the
works; but as a helper in the work of generation. This
general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the
can be made clear if we observe the mode of generation
universal Author of nature. Therefore, in producing na-
carried out in various living things. Some living things
ture, God formed not only the male but also the female.
do not possess in themselves the power of generation, but
Reply to Objection 2. Subjection is twofold. One
are generated by some other specific agent, such as some
is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of a
plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bod-
subject for his own benefit; and this kind of subjection be-
ies, from some fitting matter and not from seed: others
gan after sin. There is another kind of subjection which is
possess the active and passive generative power together;
called economic or civil, whereby the superior makes use
as we see in plants which are generated from seed; for the
of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this
noblest vital function in plants is generation. Wherefore
kind of subjection existed even before sin. For good or-
we observe that in these the active power of generation in-
der would have been wanting in the human family if some
variably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect
were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So
animals the active power of generation belongs to the male
by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject
473
to man, because in man the discretion of reason predomi-universe would have been imperfect. Nor was it fitting for
nates. Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state
the common good to be destroyed in order that individual
of innocence, as we shall prove (q. 96, a. 3).
evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful
Reply to Objection 3. If God had deprived the world
that He can direct any evil to a good end.
of all those things which proved an occasion of sin, the
Whether woman should have been made from man?
Ia q. 92 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that woman should not
mother, and shall cleave to his wife.” This was most nec-
have been made from man. For sex belongs both to man
essary as regards the human race, in which the male and
and animals. But in the other animals the female was not
female live together for life; which is not the case with
made from the male. Therefore neither should it have
other animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says
been so with man.
(Ethic. viii, 12), the human male and female are united,
Objection 2. Further, things of the same species are
not only for generation, as with other animals, but also for
of the same matter. But male and female are of the same
the purpose of domestic life, in which each has his or her
species. Therefore, as man was made of the slime of the
particular duty, and in which the man is the head of the
earth, so woman should have been made of the same, and
woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be
not from man.
made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there
Objection 3. Further, woman was made to be a help-
is a sacramental reason for this. For by this is signified
mate to man in the work of generation. But close relation-
that the Church takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore
ship makes a person unfit for that office; hence near rela-
the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32): “This is a great sacrament;
tions are debarred from intermarriage, as is written (Lev.
but I speak in Christ and in the Church.”
18:6). Therefore woman should not have been made from
Reply obj. 1 is clear from the foregoing.
man.
Reply to Objection 2. Matter is that from which
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:5): “He
something is made. Now created nature has a determi-
created of him,” that is, out of man, “a helpmate like to
nate principle; and since it is determined to one thing, it
himself,” that is, woman.
has also a determinate mode of proceeding. Wherefore
I answer that, When all things were first formed, it
from determinate matter it produces something in a de-
was more suitable for the woman to be made from man
terminate species. On the other hand, the Divine Power,
that (for the female to be from the male) in other animals.
being infinite, can produce things of the same species out
First, in order thus to give the first man a certain dignity
of any matter, such as a man from the slime of the earth,
consisting in this, that as God is the principle of the whole
and a woman from out of man.
universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the prin-
Reply to Objection 3. A certain affinity arises from
ciple of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says that
natural generation, and this is an impediment to matri-
“God made the whole human race from one” (Acts 17:26).
mony. Woman, however, was not produced from man
Secondly, that man might love woman all the more, and
by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone.
cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be fashioned
Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and
from himself. Hence it is written (Gn. 2:23,24): “She was
so this argument does not prove.
taken out of man, wherefore a man shall leave father and
Whether the woman was fittingly made from the rib of man?
Ia q. 92 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the woman should
a rib of Adam.
not have been formed from the rib of man. For the rib
Objection 2. Further, in those things which were first
was much smaller than the woman’s body. Now from
created there was nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of
a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only—either
Adam belonged to the integrity of his body. So, if a rib
by addition (and then the woman ought to have been de-
was removed, his body remained imperfect; which is un-
scribed as made out of that which was added, rather than
reasonable to suppose.
out of the rib itself)—or by rarefaction, because, as Au-
Objection 3. Further, a rib cannot be removed from
gustine says (Gen. ad lit. x): “A body cannot increase in
man without pain.
But there was no pain before sin.
bulk except by rarefaction.” But the woman’s body is not
Therefore it was not right for a rib to be taken from the
more rarefied than man’s—at least, not in the proportion
man, that Eve might be made from it.
of a rib to Eve’s body. Therefore Eve was not formed from
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:22): “God built
474
the rib, which He took from Adam, into a woman.”
rarefaction, which is for the same matter to receive greater
I answer that, It was right for the woman to be made
dimensions, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv). To say,
from a rib of man. First, to signify the social union of
therefore, that the same matter is enlarged, without being
man and woman, for the woman should neither “use au-
rarefied, is to combine contradictories —viz. the defini-
thority over man,” and so she was not made from his head;
tion with the absence of the thing defined.
nor was it right for her to be subject to man’s contempt as
Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such mul-
his slave, and so she was not made from his feet. Sec-
tiplication of matter, we must admit an addition of matter:
ondly, for the sacramental signification; for from the side
either by creation, or which is more probable, by conver-
of Christ sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed—
sion. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.) that
namely, blood and water—on which the Church was es-
“Christ filled five thousand men with five loaves, in the
tablished.
same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest
Reply to Objection 1. Some say that the woman’s
of corn”—that is, by transformation of the nourishment.
body was formed by a material increase, without anything
Nevertheless, we say that the crowds were fed with five
being added; in the same way as our Lord multiplied the
loaves, or that woman was made from the rib, because an
five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an in-
addition was made to the already existing matter of the
crease of matter would either be by a change of the very
loaves and of the rib.
substance of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimen-
Reply to Objection 2. The rib belonged to the inte-
sions. Not by change of the substance of the matter, both
gral perfection of Adam, not as an individual, but as the
because matter, considered in itself, is quite unchange-
principle of the human race; just as the semen belongs to
able, since it has a potential existence, and has nothing
the perfection of the begetter, and is released by a natural
but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and size
and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore, was it
are extraneous to the essence of matter itself. Wherefore
possible that by the Divine power the body of the woman
multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as
should be produced from the man’s rib.
the matter itself remains the same without anything added
From this it is clear how to answer the third objection.
to it; unless it receives greater dimensions. This implies
Whether the woman was formed immediately by God?
Ia q. 92 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the woman was not
is the human semen of man or woman. Wherefore from
formed immediately by God. For no individual is pro-
any other matter an individual of the human species can-
duced immediately by God from another individual alike
not naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author
in species. But the woman was made from a man who is
of nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the
of the same species. Therefore she was not made imme-
ordinary course of nature. Therefore God alone could pro-
diately by God.
duce either a man from the slime of the earth, or a woman
Objection 2. Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says
from the rib of man.
that corporeal things are governed by God through the an-
Reply to Objection 1. This argument is verified when
gels. But the woman’s body was formed from corporeal
an individual is begotten, by natural generation, from that
matter. Therefore it was made through the ministry of the
which is like it in the same species.
angels, and not immediately by God.
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Gen. ad
Objection 3. Further, those things which pre-exist in
lit. ix, 15), we do not know whether the angels were em-
creatures as to their causal virtues are produced by the
ployed by God in the formation of the woman; but it is
power of some creature, and not immediately by God.
certain that, as the body of man was not formed by the an-
But the woman’s body was produced in its causal virtues
gels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body
among the first created works, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
of the woman formed by them from the man’s rib.
lit. ix, 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
God.
ix, 18): “The first creation of things did not demand that
On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same work:
woman should be made thus; it made it possible for her
“God alone, to Whom all nature owes its existence, could
to be thus made.” Therefore the body of the woman did
form or build up the woman from the man’s rib.”
indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things first
I answer that, As was said above (a. 2, ad 2), the nat-
created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a
ural generation of every species is from some determinate
potentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of
matter. Now the matter whence man is naturally begotten
the Creator.
475
FIRST PART, QUESTION 93
The End or Term of the Production of Man
(In Nine Articles)
We now treat of the end or term of man’s production, inasmuch as he is said to be made “to the image and likeness of God.” There are under this head nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the image of God is in man?
(2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures?
(3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man?
(4) Whether the image of God is in every man?
(5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence, or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them?
(6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only?
(7) Whether the image of God is in man’s power or in his habits and acts?
(8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every object?
(9) Of the difference between “image” and “likeness.”
Whether the image of God is in man?
Ia q. 93 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is
essence of a perfect image; for in a perfect image noth-
not in man. For it is written (Is. 40:18): “To whom have
ing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a
you likened God? or what image will you make for Him?”
copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some like-
Objection 2. Further, to be the image of God is the
ness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet
property of the First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says
this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar
(Col. 1:15): “Who is the image of the invisible God, the
infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a like-
First-Born of every creature.” Therefore the image of God
ness to God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect.
is not to be found in man.
And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was
Objection 3. Further, Hilary says (De Synod∗) that
made “to” God’s likeness; for the preposition “to” signi-
“an image is of the same species as that which it repre-
fies a certain approach, as of something at a distance.
sents”; and he also says that “an image is the undivided
Reply to Objection 1. The Prophet speaks of bodily
and united likeness of one thing adequately representing
images made by man. Therefore he says pointedly: “What
another.” But there is no species common to both God and
image will you make for Him?” But God made a spiritual
man; nor can there be a comparison of equality between
image to Himself in man.
God and man. Therefore there can be no image of God in
Reply to Objection 2. The First-Born of creatures
man.
is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:26): “Let Us
which He is the Image, and so He is said to be the “Im-
make man to Our own image and likeness.”
age,” and never “to the image.” But man is said to be both
I answer that, As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74):
“image” by reason of the likeness; and “to the image” by
“Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but
reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect
where there is likeness, there is not necessarily an image.”
likeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature,
Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and
the Image of God exists in His first-born Son; as the im-
that an image adds something to likeness—namely, that it
age of the king is in his son, who is of the same nature
is copied from something else. For an “image” is so called
as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature,
because it is produced as an imitation of something else;
as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as Augustine
wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and
says explains in De decem Chordis (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De
equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other
Tempore).
egg, because it is not copied from it.
Reply to Objection 3. As unity means absence of
But equality does not belong to the essence of an im-
division, a species is said to be the same as far as it is
age; for as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): “Where there
one. Now a thing is said to be one not only numerically,
is an image there is not necessarily equality,” as we see in
specifically, or generically, but also according to a certain
a person’s image reflected in a glass. Yet this is of the
analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one with
∗ Super i can. Synod. Ancyr.
476
God, or like to Him; but when Hilary says “of a thing stood of a perfect image.
which adequately represents another,” this is to be under-
Whether the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures?
Ia q. 93 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God
Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the
is to be found in irrational creatures. For Dionysius says
ultimate difference. But some things are like to God first
(Div. Nom. ii): “Effects are contingent images of their
and most commonly because they exist; secondly, because
causes.” But God is the cause not only of rational, but
they live; and thirdly because they know or understand;
also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of God is
and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51) “ap-
to be found in irrational creatures.
proach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures
Objection 2. Further, the more distinct a likeness is,
nothing comes nearer to Him.” It is clear, therefore, that
the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But
intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the solar ray has a
to God’s image.
very great similitude to the Divine goodness.” Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. Everything imperfect is a par-
it is made to the image of God.
ticipation of what is perfect. Therefore even what falls
Objection 3. Further, the more perfect anything is in
short of the nature of an image, so far as it possesses any
goodness, the more it is like God. But the whole universe
sort of likeness to God, participates in some degree the
is more perfect in goodness than man; for though each in-
nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects are
dividual thing is good, all things together are called “very
“contingent images of their causes”; that is, as much as
good” (Gn. 1:31). Therefore the whole universe is to the
they happen [contingit] to be so, but not absolutely.
image of God, and not only man.
Reply to Objection 2. Dionysius compares the solar
Objection 4. Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says
ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality; not as re-
of God: “Holding the world in His mind, and forming it
gards its natural dignity which is involved in the idea of
into His image.” Therefore the whole world is to the im-
an image.
age of God, and not only the rational creature.
Reply to Objection 3. The universe is more perfect
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi,
in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards ex-
12): “Man’s excellence consists in the fact that God made
tension and diffusion; but intensively and collectively the
him to His own image by giving him an intellectual soul,
likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the in-
which raises him above the beasts of the field.” Therefore
tellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest
things without intellect are not made to God’s image.
good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided
I answer that, Not every likeness, not even what is
against the whole, but only against another part. Where-
copied from something else, is sufficient to make an im-
fore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to
age; for if the likeness be only generic, or existing by
the image of God, we do not mean that the universe in
virtue of some common accident, this does not suffice
any part is not to God’s image, but that the other parts are
for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a
excluded.
worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called
Reply to Objection 4. Boethius here uses the word
man’s image, merely because of the generic likeness. Nor,
“image” to express the likeness which the product of an art
if anything is made white like something else, can we say
bears to the artistic species in the mind of the artist. Thus
that it is the image of that thing; for whiteness is an ac-
every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof
cident belonging to many species. But the nature of an
in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using the word
image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the
“image” in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in na-
king exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific acci-
ture, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to
dent, and chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man’s
the First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as
image in copper. Whence Hilary says pointedly that “an
intelligent, like to the Supreme Wisdom.
image is of the same species.”
Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is?
Ia q. 93 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels are not
His image. Therefore it is not true to say that the angels
more to the image of God than man is. For Augustine
are more than man to the image of God.
says in a sermon de Imagine xliii (de verbis Apost. xxvii)
Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (QQ.
that God granted to no other creature besides man to be to
83, qu. 51), “man is so much to God’s image that God did
477
not make any creature to be between Him and man: and the image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the
therefore nothing is more akin to Him.” But a creature is
angels. But these do not of themselves belong to the na-
called God’s image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore
ture of the Divine image in man, unless we presuppose the
the angels are not more to the image of God than man.
first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise
Objection 3. Further, a creature is said to be to God’s
even brute animals would be to God’s image. Therefore,
image so far as it is of an intellectual nature. But the intel-
as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the
lectual nature does not admit of intensity or remissness;
image of God than man is, we must grant that, absolutely
for it is not an accidental thing, since it is a substance.
speaking, the angels are more to the image of God than
Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God
man is, but that in some respects man is more like to God.
than man.
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine excludes the infe-
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom.
in Evang.
rior creatures bereft of reason from the image of God; but
xxxiv): “The angel is called a “seal of resemblance”
not the angels.
[Ezech. 28:12] because in him the resemblance of the Di-
Reply to Objection 2. As fire is said to be specifically vine image is wrought with greater expression.”
the most subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of
I answer that, We may speak of God’s image in two
fire is more subtle than another; so we say that nothing is
ways. First, we may consider in it that in which the im-
more like to God than the human soul in its generic and
age chiefly consists, that is, the intellectual nature. Thus
intellectual nature, because as Augustine had said previ-
the image of God is more perfect in the angels than in
ously, “things which have knowledge, are so near to Him
man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect, as
in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer.” Where-
is clear from what has been said (q. 58, a. 3; q. 79, a. 8).
fore this does not mean that the angels are not more to
Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as
God’s image.
regards its accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man
Reply to Objection 3. When we say that substance
a certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact that man
does not admit of more or less, we do not mean that one
proceeds from man, as God from God; and also in the fact
species of substance is not more perfect than another; but
that the whole human soul is in the whole body, as God
that one and the same individual does not participate in
from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul
its specific nature at one time more than at another; nor
is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is
do we mean that a species of substance is shared among
in regard to the whole world. In these and the like things
different individuals in a greater or lesser degree.
Whether the image of God is found in every man?
Ia q. 93 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is
God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man
not found in every man. For the Apostle says that “man is
possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and lov-
the image of God, but woman is the image [Vulg. glory]
ing God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of
of man” (1 Cor. 11:7). Therefore, as woman is an individ-
the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly, inas-
ual of the human species, it is clear that every individual
much as man actually and habitually knows and loves
is not an image of God.
God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29):
conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows
“Whom God foreknew, He also predestined to be made
and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the
conformable to the image of His Son.” But all men are
likeness of glory. Wherefore on the words, “The light of
not predestined. Therefore all men have not the confor-
Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us” (Ps. 4:7),
mity of image.
the gloss distinguishes a threefold image of “creation,”
Objection 3. Further, likeness belongs to the nature of
of “re-creation,” and of “likeness.” The first is found in
the image, as above explained (a. 1). But by sin man be-
all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the
comes unlike God. Therefore he loses the image of God.
blessed.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 38:7): “Surely man
Reply to Objection 1. The image of God, in its prin-
passeth as an image.”
cipal signification, namely the intellectual nature, is found
I answer that, Since man is said to be the image of
both in man and in woman. Hence after the words, “To the
God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most
image of God He created him,” it is added, “Male and fe-
perfectly like God according to that in which he can best
male He created them” (Gn. 1:27). Moreover it is said
imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual
“them” in the plural, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iii, 22)
nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands
remarks, lest it should be thought that both sexes were
and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of
united in one individual. But in a secondary sense the im-
478
age of God is found in man, and not in woman: for man is man is not of woman, but woman of man; and man was
the beginning and end of woman; as God is the beginning
not created for woman, but woman for man.”
and end of every creature. So when the Apostle had said
Reply obj. 2 and 3: These reasons refer to the image
that “man is the image and glory of God, but woman is
consisting in the conformity of grace and glory.
the glory of man,” he adds his reason for saying this: “For
Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons?
Ia q. 93 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God
and plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the
does not exist in man as to the Trinity of Persons. For Au-
distinction of the Divine Persons is suitable to the Divine
gustine says (Fulgentius De Fide ad Petrum i): “One in
Nature; and therefore to be to the image of God by imi-
essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and one is the
tation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the
image to which man was made.” And Hilary (De Trin. v)
same image by the representation of the Divine Persons:
says: “Man is made to the image of that which is common
but rather one follows from the other. We must, there-
in the Trinity.” Therefore the image of God in man is of
fore, say that in man there exists the image of God, both
the Divine Essence, and not of the Trinity of Persons.
as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of
Objection 2. Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.)
Persons; for also in God Himself there is one Nature in
that the image of God in man is to be referred to eternity.
Three Persons.
Damascene also says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the im-
Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections.
age of God in man belongs to him as “an intelligent being
Reply to Objection 3. This argument would avail if
endowed with free-will and self-movement.” Gregory of
the image of God in man represented God in a perfect
Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio xvi) also asserts that, when
manner. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 6), there
Scripture says that “man was made to the image of God,
is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves
it means that human nature was made a participator of all
and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: “We
good: for the Godhead is the fulness of goodness.” Now
see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves;
all these things belong more to the unity of the Essence
whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity.”
than to the distinction of the Persons. Therefore the im-
Reply to Objection 4. Some have said that in man
age of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but
there is an image of the Son only. Augustine rejects this
the unity of the Essence.
opinion (De Trin. xii, 5,6). First, because as the Son is like
Objection 3. Further, an image leads to the knowl-
to the Father by a likeness of essence, it would follow of
edge of that of which it is the image. Therefore, if there is
necessity if man were made in likeness to the Son, that he
in man the image of God as to the Trinity of Persons; since
is made to the likeness of the Father. Secondly, because
man can know himself by his natural reason, it follows
if man were made only to the image of the Son, the Fa-
that by his natural knowledge man could know the Trin-
ther would not have said, “Let Us make man to Our own
ity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown
image and likeness”; but “to Thy image.” When, there-
above (q. 32, a. 1).
fore, it is written, “He made him to the image of God,”
Objection 4. Further, the name of Image is not appli-
the sense is not that the Father made man to the image of
cable to any of the Three Persons, but only to the Son; for
the Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that
Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2) that “the Son alone is the
the Divine Trinity made man to Its image, that is, of the
image of the Father.” Therefore, if in man there were an
whole Trinity. When it is said that God “made man to His
image of God as regards the Person, this would not be an
image,” this can be understood in two ways: first, so that
image of the Trinity, but only of the Son.
this preposition “to” points to the term of the making, and
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): “The plu-
then the sense is, “Let Us make man in such a way that
rality of the Divine Persons is proved from the fact that
Our image may be in him.” Secondly, this preposition ‘to’
man is said to have been made to the image of God.”
may point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, “This
I answer that, as we have seen (q. 40, a. 2), the dis-
book is made (like) to that one.” Thus the image of God
tinction of the Divine Persons is only according to origin,
is the very Essence of God, Which is incorrectly called an
or, rather, relations of origin. Now the mode of origin is
image forasmuch as image is put for the exemplar. Or, as
not the same in all things, but in each thing is adapted
some say, the Divine Essence is called an image because
to the nature thereof; animated things being produced in
thereby one Person imitates another.
one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way,
479
Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only?
Ia q. 93 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is
hostile army.
not only in man’s mind. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:7)
Therefore we may observe this difference between ra-
that “the man is the image. . . of God.” But man is not only
tional creatures and others, both as to the representation
mind. Therefore the image of God is to be observed not
of the likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as
only in his mind.
to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Gn. 1:27): “God
as to the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures
created man to His own image; to the image of God He
seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the
created him; male and female He created them.” But the
species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being
distinction of male and female is in the body. Therefore
and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (a. 2);
the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the
whereas other creatures do not understand, although we
mind.
observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created
Objection 3. Further, an image seems to apply prin-
them, if we consider their disposition. Likewise as the un-
cipally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the
created Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the
body. Therefore the image of God is to be seen in man’s
Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these,
body also, and not in his mind.
as we have seen (q. 28, a. 3); so we may say that in ra-
Objection 4. Further, according to Augustine (Gen.
tional creatures wherein we find a procession of the word
ad lit. xii, 7,24) there is a threefold vision in us, “corpo-
in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will,
real,” “spiritual,” or imaginary, and “intellectual.” There-
there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain
fore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind
representation of the species. In other creatures, however,
there exists in us a trinity by reason of which we are made
we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and
to the image of God, for the like reason there must be an-
love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence
other trinity in the others.
of these in the Cause that produced them. For in the fact
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:23,24):
that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that
“Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the
it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the
new man.” Whence we are given to understand that our
(mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house
renewal which consists in putting on the new man, be-
points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the
longs to the mind. Now, he says (Col. 3:10): “Putting on
maker’s love by reason of which he directs the effect to a
the new” man; “him who is renewed unto knowledge” of
good end; as also the use of the house points to the will
God, “according to the image of Him that created him,”
of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by
where the renewal which consists in putting on the new
way of an “image” in his mind; but in the other parts of
man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to
his being by way of a “trace.”
the image of God belongs to the mind only.
Reply to Objection 1. Man is called to the image of
I answer that, While in all creatures there is some
God; not that he is essentially an image; but that the im-
kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we
age of God is impressed on his mind; as a coin is an image
find a likeness of “image” as we have explained above
of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore
(Aa. 1,2); whereas in other creatures we find a like-
there is no need to consider the image of God as existing
ness by way of a “trace.” Now the intellect or mind is
in every part of man.
that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures;
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Trin.
wherefore this image of God is not found even in the
xii, 5), some have thought that the image of God was not
rational creature except in the mind; while in the other
in man individually, but severally. They held that “the
parts, which the rational creature may happen to possess,
man represents the Person of the Father; those born of
we find the likeness of a “trace,” as in other creatures to
man denote the person of the Son; and that the woman
which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can
is a third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she
be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this
so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter.”
if we consider the way in which a “trace,” and the way in
All of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it would
which an “image,” represents anything. An “image” rep-
follow that the Holy Ghost is the principle of the Son, as
resents something by likeness in species, as we have said;
the woman is the principle of the man’s offspring; sec-
while a “trace” represents something by way of an effect,
ondly, because one man would be only the image of one
which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to
Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not
the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the
have mentioned the image of God in man until after the
movements of animals are called “traces”: so also ashes
birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that
are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a
when Scripture had said, “to the image of God He cre-
480
ated him,” it added, “male and female He created them,”
which occurs by the impression on the sight of a certain
not to imply that the image of God came through the dis-
likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention of the
tinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both
will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what is seen.
sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual
Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the
distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to
species kept in the memory; secondly, the vision itself,
both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sex-
which is caused by the penetrative power of the soul, that
ual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle (Col. 3:10), after
is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the species;
saying, “According to the image of Him that created him,”
and thirdly, we find the intention of the will joining both
added, “Where there is neither male nor female”∗ (Vulg.
together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Di-
“neither Gentile nor Jew”).
vine image. For the species of the external body is ex-
Reply to Objection 3. Although the image of God in
trinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the
man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because
memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious
“the body of man alone among terrestrial animals is not
to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of rep-
inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look up-
resenting the connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine
ward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it
Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only
is made to God’s image and likeness, rather than the bod-
from the species of the external body, but from this, and
ies of other animals,” as Augustine remarks (QQ. 83, qu.
at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like man-
51). But this is not to be understood as though the image
ner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is
of God were in man’s body; but in the sense that the very
preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination.
shape of the human body represents the image of God in
For these reasons the procession of the Son from the Fa-
the soul by way of a trace.
ther alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention
Reply to Objection 4. Both in the corporeal and in the
of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from
imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says
them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the
(De Trin. xi, 2). For in corporeal vision there is first the
procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son
species of the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision,
is not thus properly represented.
Whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul?
Ia q. 93 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is
the actual vision, whether sensible or imaginative. There-
not found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De
fore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man
Civ. Dei xi, 26), that “man was made to God’s image,
is like to God’s image, must be referred to actual vision.
inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love
I answer that, As above explained (a. 2), a certain
this existence and knowledge.” But to exist does not sig-
representation of the species belongs to the nature of an
nify an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found
image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be
in the soul’s acts.
found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul ap-
Objection 2. Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) as-
proaches the nearest to a representation of the species of
signs God’s image in the soul to these three things—mind,
the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct
knowledge, and love. But mind does not signify an act,
from each other by reason of the procession of the Word
but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul.
from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting
Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts of
Both. But in our soul word “cannot exist without actual
the soul.
thought,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore,
Objection 3. Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) as-
first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in
signs the image of the Trinity in the soul to “memory, un-
the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowl-
derstanding, and will.” But these three are “natural powers
edge which we possess, by actual thought we form an in-
of the soul,” as the Master of the Sentences says (1 Sent.
ternal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since
D iii). Therefore the image of God is in the powers, and
the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and ev-
does not extend to the acts of the soul.
erything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secon-
Objection 4. Further, the image of the Trinity always
darily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be
remains in the soul. But an act does not always remain.
considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the
Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts.
habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) as-
Reply to Objection 1. Our being bears the image of
signs the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to God so far as if is proper to us, and excels that of the other
∗ these words are in reality from Gal. 3:28
481
animals, that is to say, in so far as we are endowed with that whereby we understand with actual thought; and by
a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the same as that which
will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites this child
Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), and which consists
with its parent.” From which it is clear that he places the
in mind, knowledge, and love.
image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding
Reply to Objection 2. Augustine observed this trin-
and will, than in these as existing in the habitual retention
ity, first, as existing in the mind. But because the mind,
of the memory; although even thus the image of the Trin-
though it knows itself entirely in a certain degree, yet also
ity exists in the soul in a certain degree, as he says in the
in a way does not know itself—namely, as being distinct
same place. Thus it is clear that memory, understanding,
from others (and thus also it searches itself, as Augus-
and will are not three powers as stated in the Sentences.
tine subsequently proves—De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as
Reply to Objection 4. Someone might answer by re-
though knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind,
ferring to Augustine’s statement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that
he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the
“the mind ever remembers itself, ever understands itself,
mind, namely, memory, understanding, and will; which
ever loves itself”; which some take to mean that the soul
everyone is conscious of possessing; and assigns the im-
ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he ex-
age of the Trinity pre-eminently to these three, as though
cludes this interpretation by adding that “it does not al-
the first assignation were in part deficient.
ways think of itself as actually distinct from other things.”
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine proves (De Trin.
Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves
xiv, 7), we may be said to understand, will, and to love
itself, not actually but habitually; though we might say
certain things, both when we actually consider them, and
that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself when-
when we do not thing of them. When they are not under
ever it understands anything. But since it is not always
our actual consideration, they are objects of our memory
actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must
only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual
say that these acts, although not always actually existing,
retention of knowledge and love∗. “But since,” as he says,
yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers.
“a word cannot be there without actual thought (for we
Wherefore, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): “If the ra-
think everything that we say, even if we speak with that
tional soul is made to the image of God in the sense that
interior word belonging to no nation’s tongue), this im-
it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and
age chiefly consists in these three things, memory, under-
consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from
standing, and will. And by understanding I mean here
the beginning of its existence.”
Whether the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul only by comparison with God Ia q. 93 a. 8
as its object?
Objection 1. It would seem that the image of the Di-
perfectly conformed to the image of God by the beatific
vine Trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with
vision; wherefore it is written (2 Cor. 3:18): “We. . . are
God as its object. For the image of the Divine Trinity is to
transformed into the same image from glory to glory.” But
be found in the soul, as shown above (a. 7), according as
temporal things are known by the beatific vision. There-
the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love from
fore the image of God exists in us even according to tem-
both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object.
poral things.
Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12):
as regards any object.
“The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii,
remembrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself;
4) that “when we seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in
but because it can also remember, understand, and love
the whole of the soul, without separating the process of
God by Whom it was made.” Much less, therefore, is the
reasoning in temporal matters from the consideration of
image of God in the soul, in respect of other objects.
things eternal.” Therefore the image of the Trinity is to be
I answer that, As above explained (Aa. 2,7), image
found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects.
means a likeness which in some degree, however small,
Objection 3. Further, it is by grace that we can know
attains to a representation of the species. Wherefore we
and love God. If, therefore, the image of the Trinity is
need to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in the soul
found in the soul by reason of the memory, understand-
some kind of representation of species of the Divine Per-
ing, and will or love of God, this image is not in man by
sons, so far as this is possible to a creature. Now the Di-
nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all.
vine Persons, as above stated (Aa. 6,7), are distinguished
Objection 4. Further, the saints in heaven are most
from each other according to the procession of the word
∗ Cf. q. 79, a. 7, ad 1
482
from the speaker, and the procession of love from both.
things, “any third thing should be required to make up the
Moreover the Word of God is born of God by the knowl-
trinity,” as he adds in the same passage. But in that part of
edge of Himself; and Love proceeds from God according
the reason which is concerned with temporal things, “al-
as He loves Himself. But it is clear that diversity of ob-
though a trinity may be found; yet the image of God is
jects diversifies the species of word and love; for in the
not to be seen there,” as he says farther on; forasmuch as
human mind the species of a stone is specifically different
this knowledge of temporal things is adventitious to the
from that of a horse, which also the love regarding each of
soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal things
them is specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine
are known are not always present; but sometimes they are
image in man to the verbal concept born of the knowl-
actually present, and sometimes present only in memory
edge of God, and to the love derived therefrom. Thus the
even after they begin to exist in the soul. Such is clearly
image of God is found in the soul according as the soul
the case with faith, which comes to us temporally for this
turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn
present life; while in the future life faith will no longer
to God. Now the mind may turn towards an object in two
exist, but only the remembrance of faith.
ways: directly and immediately, or indirectly and medi-
Reply to Objection 3. The meritorious knowledge
ately; as, for instance, when anyone sees a man reflected
and love of God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a
in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that
certain natural knowledge and love as seen above (q. 12,
man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 8), the “the mind
a. 12; q. 56, a. 3; q. 60, a. 5). This, too, is natural that the remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If
mind, in order to understand God, can make use of rea-
we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God,
son, in which sense we have already said that the image
but, nevertheless, rightly called the image of God.” But
of God abides ever in the soul; “whether this image of God
this is due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself
be so obsolete,” as it were clouded, “as almost to amount
absolutely, but that thereby it can furthermore turn to God,
to nothing,” as in those who have not the use of reason;
as appears from the authority quoted above (Arg. On the
“or obscured and disfigured,” as in sinners; or “clear and
contrary).
beautiful,” as in the just; as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv,
Reply to Objection 1. For the notion of an image it
6).
is not enough that something proceed from another, but
Reply to Objection 4. By the vision of glory tempo-
it is also necessary to observe what proceeds and whence
ral things will be seen in God Himself; and such a vision
it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of God proceeds
of things temporal will belong to the image of God. This
from knowledge of God.
is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6), when he says
Reply to Objection 2. In all the soul we may see a
that “in that nature to which the mind will blissfully ad-
kind of trinity, not, however, as though besides the ac-
here, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable”; for in
tion of temporal things and the contemplation of eternal
the Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures.
Whether “likeness” is properly distinguished from “image”?
Ia q. 93 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that “likeness” is not
D, xvi) “that the image is taken from the memory, the un-
properly distinguished from “image.” For “genus” is not
derstanding and the will, while the likeness is from inno-
properly distinguished from “species.” Now, “likeness” is
cence and righteousness.”
to “image” as genus to species: because, “where there is
Objection 4. Further, knowledge of truth belongs to
image, forthwith there is likeness, but not conversely” as
the intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74). Therefore “likeness” is
things are parts of the image. Therefore it is incorrect
not properly to be distinguished from “image.”
to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that “the image consists in the
Objection 2. Further, the nature of the image consists
knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of virtue.”
not only in the representation of the Divine Persons, but
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51):
also in the representation of the Divine Essence, to which
“Some consider that these two were mentioned not with-
representation belong immortality and indivisibility. So it
out reason, namely “image” and “likeness,” since, if they
is not true to say that the “likeness is in the essence be-
meant the same, one would have sufficed.”
cause it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is
I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity, for one-
in other things” (Sent. ii, D, xvi).
ness in quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says
Objection 3. Further, the image of God in man is
(Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15). Now, since “one” is a tran-
threefold—the image of nature, of grace, and of glory, as
scendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to each
above explained (a. 4). But innocence and righteousness
single thing, just as the good and the true. Wherefore, as
belong to grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said (Sent. ii,
the good can be compared to each individual thing both as
483
its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some fying the expression and perfection of the image. In this
perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind
sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the im-
of comparison between “likeness” and “image.” For the
age implies “an intelligent being, endowed with free-will
good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an indi-
and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of
vidual good; and, again, the good is subsequent to man,
power, as far as this may be possible in man.” In the same
inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good,
sense “likeness” is said to belong to “the love of virtue”:
by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness
for there is no virtue without love of virtue.
may be considered in the light of a preamble to image,
Reply to Objection 1. “Likeness” is not distinct from
inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as
“image” in the general notion of “likeness” (for thus it is
we have said above (a. 1): and, again, it may be consid-
included in “image”); but so far as any “likeness” falls
ered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a
short of “image,” or again, as it perfects the idea of “im-
certain perfection of image. For we say that an image is
age.”
like or unlike what it represents, according as the repre-
Reply to Objection 2. The soul’s essence belongs to
sentation is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be
the “image,” as representing the Divine Essence in those
distinguished from image in two ways: first as its pream-
things which belong to the intellectual nature; but not in
ble and existing in more things, and in this sense like-
those conditions subsequent to general notions of being,
ness regards things which are more common than the in-
such as simplicity and indissolubility.
tellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be
Reply to Objection 3. Even certain virtues are natural
seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that “the
to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we
spirit” (namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the
may say that a natural “likeness” exists in the soul. Nor it
image of God. “But the other parts of man,” belonging
is unfitting to us the term “image” from one point of view
to the soul’s inferior faculties, or even to the body, “are
and from another the term “likeness.”
in the opinion of some made to God’s likeness.” In this
Reply to Objection 4. Love of the word, which is
sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the likeness of
knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of “image”; but
God is found in the soul’s incorruptibility; for corrupt-
love of virtue belongs to “likeness,” as virtue itself be-
ible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings.
longs to likeness.
But likeness may be considered in another way, as signi-
484
FIRST PART, QUESTION 94
Of the State and Condition of the First Man As Regards His Intellect (In Four Articles)
We next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as regards his soul; secondly, as regards his body.
Concerning the first there are two things to be considered: (1) The condition of man as to his intellect; (2) the condition of man as to his will.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God?
(2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels?
(3) Whether he possessed all knowledge?
(4) Whether he could err or be deceived?
Whether the first man saw God through His Essence?
Ia q. 94 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the first man saw
it, and shuns unhappiness. Wherefore no one who sees the
God through His Essence. For man’s happiness consists
Essence of God can willingly turn away from God, which
in the vision of the Divine Essence. But the first man,
means to sin. Hence all who see God through His Essence
“while established in paradise, led a life of happiness in
are so firmly established in the love of God, that for eter-
the enjoyment of all things,” as Damascene says (De Fide
nity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is
Orth. ii, 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
clear that he did not see God through His Essence.
10): “If man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how
Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowl-
happy must he have been in paradise, that place of inef-
edge than we do now. Thus in a sense his knowledge was
fable happiness!” Therefore the first man in paradise saw
midway between our knowledge in the present state, and
God through His Essence.
the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see God
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
through His Essence. To make this clear, we must con-
xiv, loc. cit.) that “the first man lacked nothing which
sider that the vision of God through His Essence is con-
his good-will might obtain.” But our good-will can ob-
tradistinguished from the vision of God through His crea-
tain nothing better than the vision of the Divine Essence.
tures. Now the higher the creature is, and the more like
Therefore man saw God through His Essence.
it is to God, the more clearly is God seen in it; for in-
Objection 3. Further, the vision of God is His Essence
stance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in
is whereby God is seen without a medium or enigma. But
which his image is the more clearly expressed. Thus God
man in the state of innocence “saw God immediately,” as
is seen in a much more perfect manner through His in-
the Master of the Sentences asserts (Sent. iv, D, i). He also
telligible effects than through those which are only sensi-
saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies obscurity,
ble or corporeal. But in his present state man is impeded
as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity re-
as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible
sulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state saw
creatures, because he is distracted by and occupied with
God through His Essence.
sensible things. Now, it is written (Eccles. 7:30): “God
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46):
made man right.” And man was made right by God in this
“That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is
sense, that in him the lower powers were subjected to the
natural.” But to see God through His Essence is most spir-
higher, and the higher nature was made so as not to be
itual. Therefore the first man in the primitive state of his
impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not
natural life did not see God through His Essence.
impeded by exterior things from a clear and steady con-
I answer that, The first man did not see God through
templation of the intelligible effects which he perceived
His Essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life;
by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a natural or
unless, perhaps, it be said that he saw God in a vision,
by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence Augustine says (Gen.
when “God cast a deep sleep upon Adam” (Gn. 2:21). The
ad lit. xi, 33) that, “perhaps God used to speak to the first
reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is beatitude
man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind
itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence
a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on
has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude.
him the experience of which the angels are capable in the
Now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away
participation of the Divine Essence.” Therefore, through
from beatitude, since naturally and necessarily he desires
these intelligible effects of God, man knew God then more
485
clearly than we know Him now.
something unknown; such as the medium in a demonstra-
Reply to Objection 1. Man was happy in paradise,
tion. God was seen without this second kind of medium,
but not with that perfect happiness to which he was des-
but not without the first kind. For there was no need for the
tined, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence.
first man to attain to the knowledge of God by demonstra-
He was, however, endowed with “a life of happiness in a
tion drawn from an effect, such as we need; since he knew
certain measure,” as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18),
God simultaneously in His effects, especially in the intel-
so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfec-
ligible effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must
tion.
remark that the obscurity which is implied in the word
Reply to Objection 2. A good will is a well-ordered
enigma may be of two kinds: first, so far as every creature
will; but the will of the first man would have been ill-
is something obscure when compared with the immensity
ordered had he wished to have, while in the state of merit,
of the Divine light; and thus Adam saw God in an enigma,
what had been promised to him as a reward.
because he saw Him in a created effect: secondly, we may
Reply to Objection 3. A medium (of knowledge) is
take obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is impeded
twofold; one through which, and, at the same time, in
in the consideration of intelligible things by being preoc-
which, something is seen, as, for example, a man is seen
cupied with sensible things; in which sense Adam did not
through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another kind
see God in an enigma.
of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of
Whether Adam in the state of innocence saw the angels through their essence?
Ia q. 94 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that Adam, in the state
with integrity as to this life, in that the body was entirely
of innocence, saw the angels through their essence. For
subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we have said
Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1): “In paradise man was accus-
above (a. 1). Now it is clear from what has been already
tomed to enjoy the words of God; and by purity of heart
said (q. 84, a. 7; q. 85, a. 1; q. 89, a. 1) that since the
and loftiness of vision to have the company of the good
soul is adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards
angels.”
animal life, it is fitting that it should have that mode of un-
Objection 2. Further, the soul in the present state is
derstanding which is by turning to phantasms. Wherefore
impeded from the knowledge of separate substances by
this mode of understanding was becoming to the soul of
union with a corruptible body which “is a load upon the
the first man also.
soul,” as is written Wis. 9:15. Wherefore the separate soul
Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there
can see separate substances, as above explained (q. 89,
are three degrees of movement in the soul, as Dionysius
a. 2). But the body of the first man was not a load upon
says (Div. Nom. iv). The first is by the soul “passing
his soul; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he
from exterior things to concentrate its powers on itself”;
was able to see separate substances.
the second is by the soul ascending “so as to be associ-
Objection 3. Further, one separate substance knows
ated with the united superior powers,” namely the angels;
another separate substance, by knowing itself (De Causis
the third is when the soul is “led on” yet further “to the
xiii). But the soul of the first man knew itself. Therefore
supreme good,” that is, to God.
it knew separate substances.
In virtue of the first movement of the soul from ex-
On the contrary, The soul of Adam was of the same
terior things to itself, the soul’s knowledge is perfected.
nature as ours. But our souls cannot now understand sep-
This is because the intellectual operation of the soul has
arate substances. Therefore neither could Adam’s soul.
a natural order to external things, as we have said above
I answer that, The state of the human soul may be dis-
(q. 87, a. 3): and so by the knowledge thereof, our intellec-
tinguished in two ways. First, from a diversity of mode in
tual operation can be known perfectly, as an act through
its natural existence; and in this point the state of the sep-
its object. And through the intellectual operation itself,
arate soul is distinguished from the state of the soul joined
the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power
to the body. Secondly, the state of the soul is distinguished
through its proper act. But in the second movement we do
in relation to integrity and corruption, the state of natural
not find perfect knowledge. Because, since the angel does
existence remaining the same: and thus the state of inno-
not understand by turning to phantasms, but by a far more
cence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man’s
excellent process, as we have said above (q. 55, a. 2); the
soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and
above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the soul
govern the body; wherefore the first man is said to have
knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge
been made into a “living soul”; that is, a soul giving life
of an angel. Much less does the third movement lead to
to the body—namely animal life. But he was endowed
perfect knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the
486
fact that they know themselves, are not able to arrive at Reply to Objection 2. That the soul of the first man
the knowledge of the Divine Substance, by reason of its
fell short of the knowledge regarding separate substances,
surpassing excellence. Therefore the soul of the first man
was not owing to the fact that the body was a load upon
could not see the angels in their essence. Nevertheless he
it; but to the fact that its connatural object fell short of
had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the
the excellence of separate substances. We, in our present
angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelli-
state, fall short on account of both these reasons.
gible things within him was more certain and fixed than
Reply to Objection 3. The soul of the first man was
our knowledge. And it was on account of this excellence
not able to arrive at knowledge of separate substances by
of knowledge that Gregory says that “he enjoyed the com-
means of its self-knowledge, as we have shown above;
pany of the angelic spirits.”
for even each separate substance knows others in its own
This makes clear the reply to the first objection.
measure.
Whether the first man knew all things?
Ia q. 94 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the first man did not
state, as regards his body, for the work of generation, so
know all things. For if he had such knowledge it would
also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct
be either by acquired species, or by connatural species, or
and govern others.
by infused species. Not, however, by acquired species; for
Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowl-
this kind of knowledge is acquired by experience, as stated
edge, and so the first man was established by God in such
in Metaph. i, 1; and the first man had not then gained
a manner as to have knowledge of all those things for
experience of all things. Nor through connatural species,
which man has a natural aptitude. And such are what-
because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul,
ever are virtually contained in the first self-evident princi-
as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4), is “like a clean tablet
ples, that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know.
on which nothing is written.” And if his knowledge came
Moreover, in order to direct his own life and that of oth-
by infused species, it would have been of a different kind
ers, man needs to know not only those things which can be
from ours, which we acquire from things themselves.
naturally known, but also things surpassing natural knowl-
Objection 2. Further, individuals of the same species
edge; because the life of man is directed to a supernatural
have the same way of arriving at perfection. Now other
end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of faith men have not, from the beginning, knowledge of all
in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man
things, but they acquire it in the course of time accord-
was endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatu-
ing to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam know
ral truths as was necessary for the direction of human life
all things when he was first created.
in that state. But those things which cannot be known by
Objection 3. Further, the present state of life is given merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the
to man in order that his soul may advance in knowledge
direction of human life, were not known by the first man;
and merit; indeed, the soul seems to be united to the body
such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and
for that purpose. Now man would have advanced in merit
some individual facts, as for instance the number of peb-
in that state of life; therefore also in knowledge. Therefore
bles in a stream; and the like.
he was not endowed with knowledge of all things.
Reply to Objection 1. The first man had knowledge
On the contrary, Man named the animals (Gn. 2:20).
of all things by divinely infused species. Yet his knowl-
But names should be adapted to the nature of things.
edge was not different from ours; as the eyes which Christ
Therefore Adam knew the animals’ natures; and in like
gave to the man born blind were not different from those
manner he was possessed of the knowledge of all other
given by nature.
things.
Reply to Objection 2. To Adam, as being the first
I answer that, In the natural order, perfection comes
man, was due to a degree of perfection which was not due
before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for
to other men, as is clear from what is above explained.
whatever is in potentiality is made actual only by some-
Reply to Objection 3. Adam would have advanced in
thing actual. And since God created things not only for
natural knowledge, not in the number of things known, but
their own existence, but also that they might be the prin-
in the manner of knowing; because what he knew specula-
ciples of other things; so creatures were produced in their
tively he would subsequently have known by experience.
perfect state to be the principles as regards others. Now
But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also
man can be the principle of another man, not only by gen-
have advanced as regards the number of things known,
eration of the body, but also by instruction and govern-
by further revelation; as the angels advance by further en-
ment. Hence, as the first man was produced in his perfect
lightenment. Moreover there is no comparison between
487
advance in knowledge and advance in merit; since one can be to another a principle of knowledge.
man cannot be a principle of merit to another, although he
Whether man in his first state could be deceived?
Ia q. 94 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that man in his primi-
(Ethic. vi, 2). So that, as long as the state of innocence
tive state could have been deceived. For the Apostle says
continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to as-
(1 Tim. 2:14) that “the woman being seduced was in the
sent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfec-
transgression.”
tions, such as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members
Objection 2. Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi) of the first man, though no evil could be therein; so there
that, “the woman was not frightened at the serpent speak-
could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge,
ing, because she thought that he had received the faculty
but no false opinion.
of speech from God.” But this was untrue. Therefore be-
This is clear also from the very rectitude of the prim-
fore sin the woman was deceived.
itive state, by virtue of which, while the soul remained
Objection 3. Further, it is natural that the farther off subject to God, the lower faculties in man were subject to
anything is from us, the smaller it seems to be. Now,
the higher, and were no impediment to their action. And
the nature of the eyes is not changed by sin. Therefore
from what has preceded (q. 85, a. 6), it is clear that as re-
this would have been the case in the state of innocence.
gards its proper object the intellect is ever true; and hence
Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of
it is never deceived of itself; but whatever deception oc-
what he saw, just as he is deceived now.
curs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the
Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natu-
2) that, in sleep the soul adheres to the images of things
ral power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such
as if they were the things themselves. But in the state of
images, but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep.
innocence man would have eaten and consequently have
Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have been de-was incompatible with deception of the intellect.
ceived, adhering to images as to realities.
Reply to Objection 1. Though the woman was de-
Objection 5. Further, the first man would have been
ceived before she sinned in deed, still it was not till she
ignorant of other men’s thoughts, and of future contingent
had already sinned by interior pride. For Augustine says
events, as stated above (a. 3). So if anyone had told him
(Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that “the woman could not have be-
what was false about these things, he would have been
lieved the words of the serpent, had she not already acqui-
deceived.
esced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii,
of self-conceit.”
18): “To regard what is true as false, is not natural to man
Reply to Objection 2. The woman thought that the
as created; but is a punishment of man condemned.”
serpent had received this faculty, not as acting in accor-
I answer that, in the opinion of some, deception may
dance with nature, but by virtue of some supernatural op-
mean two things; namely, any slight surmise, in which one
eration. We need not, however, follow the Master of the
adheres to what is false, as though it were true, but without
Sentences in this point.
the assent of belief—or it may mean a firm belief. Thus
Reply to Objection 3. Were anything presented to
before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of these
the imagination or sense of the first man, not in accor-
ways as regards those things to which his knowledge ex-
dance with the nature of things, he would not have been
tended; but as regards things to which his knowledge did
deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to judge
not extend, he might have been deceived, if we take decep-
the truth.
tion in the wide sense of the term for any surmise without
Reply to Objection 4. A man is not accountable for
assent of belief. This opinion was held with the idea that
what occurs during sleep; as he has not then the use of his
it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion in
reason, wherein consists man’s proper action.
such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly,
Reply to Objection 5. If anyone had said something
he is not to be blamed.
untrue as regards future contingencies, or as regards se-
Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the
cret thoughts, man in the primitive state would not have
integrity of the primitive state of life; because, as Augus-
believed it was so: but he might have believed that such a
tine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), in that state of life “sin was thing was possible; which would not have been to enter-avoided without struggle, and while it remained so, no evil
tain a false opinion.
could exist.” Now it is clear that as truth is the good of the
It might also be said that he would have been divinely
intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the Philosopher says
guided from above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to
488
which his knowledge did not extend.
reply that man had already sinned in his heart, and that he
If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when
failed to have recourse to the Divine aid.
tempted, though he was then most in need of guidance, we
489
FIRST PART, QUESTION 95
Of Things Pertaining to the First Man’s Will—Namely, Grace and Righteousness (In Four Articles)
We next consider what belongs to the will of the first man; concerning which there are two points of treatment: (1) the grace and righteousness of the first man; (2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the first man was created in grace?
(2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul?
(3) Whether he had all virtues?
(4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now?
Whether the first man was created in grace?
Ia q. 95 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the first man was not
I answer that, Some say that man was not created in
created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between
grace; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently be-
Adam and Christ, says (1 Cor. 15:45): “The first Adam
fore sin: and many authorities of the Saints declare that
was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quicken-
man possessed grace in the state of innocence.
ing spirit.” But the spirit is quickened by grace. Therefore
But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith
Christ alone was made in grace.
man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as oth-
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et
ers say, he was created in grace, according to Eccles. 7:30,
Nov. Test., qu. 123)∗ that “Adam did not possess the
“God made man right.” For this rectitude consisted in his
Holy Ghost.” But whoever possesses grace has the Holy
reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason,
Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in grace.
and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et
cause of both the second and the third; since while reason
Grat. x) that “God so ordered the life of the angels and
was subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to
men, as to show first what they could do by free-will, then
reason, as Augustine says†. Now it is clear that such a
what they could do by His grace, and by the discernment
subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower pow-
of righteousness.” God thus first created men and angels
ers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would
in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards be-
have remained after sin; since even in the demons the nat-
stowed grace on them.
ural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div.
Objection 4. Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D,
Nom. iv). Hence it is clear that also the primitive sub-
xxiv): “When man was created he was given sufficient
jection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was
help to stand, but not sufficient to advance.” But whoever
not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment
has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the first man
of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of
was not created in grace.
greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine says
Objection 5. Further, the reception of grace requires
(De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, “as soon as they disobeyed the
the consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiri-
Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were
tual marriage takes place between God and the soul. But
ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of
consent presupposes existence. Therefore man did not re-
disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment
ceive grace in the first moment of his creation.
corresponding to their own disobedience.” Hence if the
Objection 6. Further, nature is more distant from
loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the
grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace con-
soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were sub-
summated. But in man grace precedes glory. Therefore
jected to the soul through grace existing therein.
much more did nature precede grace.
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle in these words
On the contrary, Man and angel are both ordained to
means to show that there is a spiritual body, if there is an
grace. But the angels were created in grace, for Augustine
animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual life of the body be-
says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9): “God at the same time fashioned
gan in Christ, who is “the firstborn of the dead,” as the
their nature and endowed them with grace.” Therefore
body’s animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle’s
man also was created in grace.
words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no spir-
∗ Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St.
Augustine
† Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i,
16
490
itual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as Reply to Objection 4. The Master here speaks ac-regards the body.
cording to the opinion of those who held that man was not
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says in the same
created in grace, but only in a state of nature. We may
passage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls,
also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was
was in some degree gifted with the Holy Ghost; but “he
not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he
did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess
could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which
Him now,” who are admitted to eternal happiness directly
was added.
after death.
Reply to Objection 5. As the motion of the will is not
Reply to Objection 3. This passage from Augustine
continuous there is nothing against the first man having
does not assert that angels or men were created with nat-
consented to grace even in the first moment of his exis-
ural free-will before they possessed grace; but that God
tence.
shows first what their free-will could do before being con-
Reply to Objection 6. We merit glory by an act of
firmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by be-
grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature; hence
ing so confirmed.
the comparison fails.
Whether passions existed in the soul of the first man?
Ia q. 95 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the first man’s soul
be possessed then, as burning concupiscence. But those
had no passions. For by the passions of the soul “the flesh
passions which regard present good, as joy and love; or
lusteth against the spirit” (Gal. 5:7). But this did not hap-
which regard future good to be had at the proper time, as
pen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of
desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state
innocence there were no passions of the soul.
of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in
Objection 2. Further, Adam’s soul was nobler than
ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions
his body. But his body was impassible. Therefore no pas-
reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our
sions were in his soul.
passions forestall and hinder reason’s judgment; at other
Objection 3. Further, the passions of the soul are re-
times they follow reason’s judgment, accordingly as the
strained by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral
sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in the
virtues were perfect. Therefore the passions were entirely
state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly sub-
excluded from him.
ject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the soul
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason.
10) that “in our first parents there was undisturbed love of
Reply to Objection 1. The flesh lusts against the spirit God,” and other passions of the soul.
by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which
I answer that, The passions of the soul are in the
could not occur in the state of innocence.
sensual appetite, the object of which is good and evil.
Reply to Objection 2. The human body was impassi-
Wherefore some passions of the soul are directed to what
ble in the state of innocence as regards the passions which
is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and
alter the disposition of nature, as will be explained later on
sorrow. And since in the primitive state, evil was neither
(q. 97, a. 2); likewise the soul was impassible as regards
present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which
the passions which impede the free use of reason.
a good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine says
Reply to Objection 3. Perfection of moral virtue does
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion with
not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for
evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither the temperate man desires as he ought to desire, and what
had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to
he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii, 11.
Whether Adam had all the virtues?
Ia q. 95 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that Adam had not all the
the passions which have evil as their object; as meekness
virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb passions:
with anger; fortitude with fear. But these passions did
thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temper-
not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above (a. 2).
ance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state
Therefore neither did those virtues exist then.
of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions.
Objection 3. Further, penance is a virtue that regards
Therefore neither did these virtues then exist.
sin committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with un-
Objection 2. Further, some virtues are concerned with
happiness. But in the state of innocence neither sin nor
491
unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did those virtues virtues existed as habits in the first man, but not as to their exist.
acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if there
Objection 4. Further, perseverance is a virtue. But
had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness
Adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin.
in his neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy
Therefore he possessed not every virtue.
it. This is in accordance with what the Philosopher says,
Objection 5. Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not
“Shame, which regards what is ill done, may be found in a
exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity
virtuous man, but only conditionally; as being so disposed
of knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the
that he would be ashamed if he did wrong” (Ethic. iv, 9).
perfection of the primitive state.
Reply to Objection 1. It is accidental to temperance
On the contrary, Augustine says, in a homily (Serm.
and fortitude to subdue superabundant passion, in so far
contra Judaeos): “The prince of sin overcame Adam who
as they are in a subject which happens to have superabun-
was made from the slime of the earth to the image of God,
dant passions, and yet those virtues are ‘per se’ competent
adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance, reful-
to moderate the passions.
gent with brightness.”
Reply to Objection 2. Passions which have evil for
I answer that, in the state of innocence man in a cer-
their object were incompatible with the perfection of the
tain sense possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved
primitive state, if that evil be in the one affected by the
from what precedes. For it was shown above (a. 1) that
passion; such as fear and sorrow. But passions which re-
such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason
late to evil in another are not incompatible with the perfec-
was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason. Now
tion of the primitive state; for in that state man could hate
the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby rea-
the demons’ malice, as he could love God’s goodness.
son is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated
Thus the virtues which relate to such passions could exist
according to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in
in the primitive state, in habit and in act. Virtues, how-
the Treatise on the Virtues ( Ia IIae, q. 63, a. 2). Where-
ever, relating to passions which regard evil in the same
fore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man
subject, if relating to such passions only, could not exist
should in a sense possess every virtue.
in the primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have
It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their
said above of penance and of mercy. But other virtues
very nature do not involve imperfection, such as charity
there are which have relation not to such passions only,
and justice; and these virtues did exist in the primitive
but to others; such as temperance, which relates not only
state absolutely, both in habit and in act. But other virtues
to sorrow, but also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not
are of such a nature as to imply imperfection either in their
only to fear, but also to daring and hope. Thus the act of
act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be
temperance could exist in the primitive state, so far as it
consistent with the perfection of the primitive state, such
moderates pleasure; and in like manner, fortitude, as mod-
virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is
erating daring and hope, but not as moderating sorrow and
of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet
fear.
possessed. For the perfection of that state did not extend
Reply to Objection 3. appears from what has been
to the vision of the Divine Essence, and the possession
said above.
of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith
Reply to Objection 4. Perseverance may be taken in
and hope could exist in the primitive state, both as to habit
two ways: in one sense as a particular virtue, signifying
and as to act. But any virtue which implies imperfection
a habit whereby a man makes a choice of persevering in
incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state,
good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In an-
could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act;
other sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; sig-
for instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin commit-
nifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in
ted; and mercy, which is sorrow for others’ unhappiness;
which sense Adam did not possess perseverance.
because sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible
Reply to Objection 5. appears from what has been
with the perfection of the primitive state. Wherefore such
said above.
Whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are?
Ia q. 95 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the actions of the
grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since
first man were less meritorious than ours are. For grace is
grace is the source of merit, our actions are more merito-
given to us through the mercy of God, Who succors most
rious.
those who are most in need. Now we are more in need of
Objection 2. Further, struggle and difficulty are re-
grace than was man in the state of innocence. Therefore
quired for merit; for it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): “He. . . is
492
not crowned except he strive lawfully” and the Philoso-because, as man would have had greater virtue, he would
pher says (Ethic. ii, 3): “The object of virtue is the diffi-
have performed greater works. But if we consider the pro-
cult and the good.” But there is more strife and difficulty
portionate degree, a greater reason for merit exists after
now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit.
sin, on account of man’s weakness; because a small deed
Objection 3.
Further, the Master says (Sent.
ii.,
is more beyond the capacity of one who works with dif-
D, xxiv) that “man would not have merited in resisting
ficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it
temptation; whereas he does merit now, when he resists.”
easily.
Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in the
Reply to Objection 1. After sin man requires grace
primitive state.
for more things than before sin; but he does not need grace
On the contrary, if such were the case, man would be
more; forasmuch as man even before sin required grace to
better off after sinning.
obtain eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need
I answer that, Merit as regards degree may be gauged
of grace. But after sin man required grace also for the
in two ways. First, in its root, which is grace and charity.
remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness.
Merit thus measured corresponds in degree to the essen-
Reply to Objection 2. Difficulty and struggle belong
tial reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God; for
to the degree of merit according to the proportionate de-
the greater the charity whence our actions proceed, the
gree of the work done, as above explained. It is also a
more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree
sign of the will’s promptitude striving after what is diffi-
of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself.
cult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is caused by
This degree is of two kinds, absolute and proportional.
the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person
The widow who put two mites into the treasury performed
performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another
a deed of absolutely less degree than the others who put
performs an arduous deed; because he is ready to do even
great sums therein. But in proportionate degree the widow
what may be difficult to him. But the actual difficulty, by
gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in
its penal character, enables the deed to satisfy for sin.
proportion to her means. In each of these cases the de-
Reply to Objection 3. The first man would not have
gree of merit corresponds to the accidental reward, which
gained merit in resisting temptation, according to the
consists in rejoicing for created good.
opinion of those who say that he did not possess grace;
We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence
even as now there is no merit to those who have not grace.
man’s works were more meritorious than after sin was
But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the
committed, if we consider the degree of merit on the part
primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in
of grace, which would have been more copious as meet-
our present state. Hence man was more able then than
ing with no obstacle in human nature: and in like man-
now to resist temptation even without grace.
ner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done;
493
FIRST PART, QUESTION 96
Of the Mastership Belonging to Man in the State of Innocence (In Four Articles)
We next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of innocence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals?
(2) Whether he was master over all creatures?
(3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were equal?
(4) Whether in that state man would have been master over men?
Whether Adam in the state of innocence had mastership over the animals?
Ia q. 96 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of in-
in the use of natural things; thus the imperfect are for the
nocence Adam had no mastership over the animals. For
use of the perfect; as the plants make use of the earth for
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14), that the animals were
their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and
brought to Adam, under the direction of the angels, to re-
man makes use of both plants and animals. Therefore it
ceive their names from him. But the angels need not have
is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be
intervened thus, if man himself were master over the an-
master over animals. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit.
imals. Therefore in the state of innocence man had no
i, 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural,
mastership of the animals.
because man thereby exercises a natural right. Secondly,
Objection 2. Further, it is unfitting that elements hos-
this is proved by the order of Divine Providence which
tile to one another should be brought under the mastership
always governs inferior things by the superior. Where-
of one. But many animals are hostile to one another, as
fore, as man, being made to the image of God, is above
the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all animals were not
other animals, these are rightly subject to his government.
brought under the mastership of man.
Thirdly, this is proved from a property of man and of other
Objection 3. Further, Jerome says∗: “God gave man
animals. For we see in the latter a certain participated
mastership over the animals, although before sin he had
prudence of natural instinct, in regard to certain particular
no need of them: for God foresaw that after sin animals
acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence as re-
would become useful to man.” Therefore, at least before
gards all practical matters. Now whatever is participated
sin, it was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership.
is subject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the
Objection 4. Further, it is proper to a master to com-
subjection of other animals to man is proved to be natural.
mand. But a command is not given rightly save to a ra-
Reply to Objection 1. A higher power can do many
tional being. Therefore man had no mastership over the
things that an inferior power cannot do to those which are
irrational animals.
subject to them. Now an angel is naturally higher than
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:26): “Let him
man. Therefore certain things in regard to animals could
have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of
be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for
the air, and the beasts of the earth” [Vulg.“and the whole
instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals.
earth”].
Reply to Objection 2. In the opinion of some, those
I answer that, As above stated (q. 95, a. 1) for his dis-animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, in
obedience to God, man was punished by the disobedience
that state, have been tame, not only in regard to man, but
of those creatures which should be subject to him. There-
also in regard to other animals. But this is quite unreason-
fore in the state of innocence, before man had disobeyed,
able. For the nature of animals was not changed by man’s
nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him.
sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh
Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be
of others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and
proved in three ways. First, from the order observed by
falcon. Nor does Bede’s gloss on Gn. 1:30, say that trees
nature; for just as in the generation of things we perceive
and herbs were given as food to all animals and birds, but
a certain order of procession of the perfect from the imper-
to some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy
fect (thus matter is for the sake of form; and the imperfect
between some animals. They would not, however, on this
form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there order
account have been excepted from the mastership of man:
∗ The words quoted are not in St. Jerome’s works. St. Thomas may have had in mind Bede, Hexaem., as quoted in the Glossa ordinaria on Gn. 1:26
494
as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experi-the mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all
mental knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the
this. Of this Providence man would have been the execu-
fact that God led the animals to man, that he might give
tor, as appears even now in regard to domestic animals,
them names expressive of their respective natures.
since fowls are given by men as food to the trained falcon.
Reply to Objection 4. All animals by their natural
Reply to Objection 3. In the state of innocence man
instinct have a certain participation of prudence and rea-
would not have had any bodily need of animals—neither
son: which accounts for the fact that cranes follow their
for clothing, since then they were naked and not ashamed,
leader, and bees obey their queen. So all animals would
there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence—nor
have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present
for food, since they fed on the trees of paradise—nor to
state some domestic animals obey him.
carry him about, his body being strong enough for that
Whether man had mastership over all other creatures?
Ia q. 96 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of inno-
things; and so according as he is master of what is within
cence man would not have had mastership over all other
himself, in the same way he can have mastership over
creatures. For an angel naturally has a greater power than
other things. Now we may consider four things in man:
man. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8), “corpo-
his “reason,” which makes him like to the angels’; his
real matter would not have obeyed even the holy angels.”
“sensitive powers,” whereby he is like the animals; his
Much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state
“natural forces,” which liken him to the plants; and “the
of innocence.
body itself,” wherein he is like to inanimate things. Now
Objection 2. Further, the only powers of the soul ex-
in man reason has the position of a master and not of a
isting in plants are nutritive, augmentative, and generative.
subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over the an-
Now these doe not naturally obey reason; as we can see
gels in the primitive state; so when we read “all creatures,”
in the case of any one man. Therefore, since it is by his
we must understand the creatures which are not made to
reason that man is competent to have mastership, it seems
God’s image. Over the sensitive powers, as the irascible
that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over
and concupiscible, which obey reason in some degree, the
plants.
soul has mastership by commanding. So in the state of
Objection 3. Further, whosoever is master of a thing,
innocence man had mastership over the animals by com-
can change it. But man could not have changed the course
manding them. But of the natural powers and the body it-
of the heavenly bodies; for this belongs to God alone, as
self man is master not by commanding, but by using them.
Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii). Therefore man had
Thus also in the state of innocence man’s mastership over
no dominion over them.
plants and inanimate things consisted not in commanding
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:26): “That he
or in changing them, but in making use of them without
may have dominion over. . . every creature.”
hindrance.
I answer that, Man in a certain sense contains all
The answers to the objections appear from the above.
Whether men were equal in the state of innocence?
Ia q. 96 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of in-
men seems to arise, on the part of God, from the fact that
nocence all would have been equal. For Gregory says
He rewards some and punishes others; and on the part of
(Moral. xxi): “Where there is no sin, there is no inequal-
nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of na-
ity.” But in the state of innocence there was no sin. There-
ture, are born weak and deficient, others strong and per-
fore all were equal.
fect, which would not have been the case in the primitive
Objection 2. Further, likeness and equality are the
state. Therefore, etc.
basis of mutual love, according to Ecclus. 13:19, “Every
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 13:1): “The
beast loveth its like; so also every man him that is nearest
things which are of God, are well ordered” [Vulg.“Those
to himself.” Now in that state there was among men an
that are, are ordained of God”]. But order chiefly consists
abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore
in inequality; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13):
all were equal in the state of innocence.
“Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper
Objection 3. Further, the cause ceasing, the effect
place.” Therefore in the primitive state, which was most
also ceases. But the cause of present inequality among
proper and orderly, inequality would have existed.
495
I answer that, We must needs admit that in the prim-beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so that, however,
itive state there would have been some inequality, at least
in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been
as regards sex, because generation depends upon diversity
no defect or fault either in soul or body.
of sex: and likewise as regards age; for some would have
Reply to Objection 1. By those words Gregory means
been born of others; nor would sexual union have been
to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and
sterile.
vice; the result of which is that some are placed in subjec-
Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been
tion to others as a penalty.
inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. For man
Reply to Objection 2. Equality is the cause of equal-
worked not of necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue
ity in mutual love. Yet between those who are unequal
of which man can apply himself, more or less, to action,
there can be a greater love than between equals; although
desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a
there be not an equal response: for a father naturally loves
greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others.
his son more than a brother loves his brother; although the
There might also have been bodily disparity. For the
son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him.
human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of na-
Reply to Objection 3. The cause of inequality could
ture, so as not to receive from exterior sources more or
be on the part of God; not indeed that He would punish
less advantage and help: since indeed it was dependent on
some and reward others, but that He would exalt some
food wherewith to sustain life.
above others; so that the beauty of order would the more
So we may say that, according to the climate, or the
shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise on the
movement of the stars, some would have been born more
part of nature as above described, without any defect of
robust in body than others, and also greater, and more
nature.
Whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man?
Ia q. 96 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of inno-
fice of governing and directing free men, can be called a
cence man would not have been master over man. For Au-
master. In the state of innocence man could have been a
gustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): “God willed that man,
master of men, not in the former but in the latter sense.
who was endowed with reason and made to His image,
This distinction is founded on the reason that a slave dif-
should rule over none but irrational creatures; not over
fers from a free man in that the latter has the disposal of
men, but over cattle.”
himself, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics,
Objection 2. Further, what came into the world as a
whereas a slave is ordered to another. So that one man
penalty for sin would not have existed in the state of inno-
is master of another as his slave when he refers the one
cence. But man was made subject to man as a penalty; for
whose master he is, to his own—namely the master’s use.
after sin it was said to the woman (Gn. 3:16): “Thou shalt
And since every man’s proper good is desirable to him-
be under thy husband’s power.” Therefore in the state of
self, and consequently it is a grievous matter to anyone
innocence man would not have been subject to man.
to yield to another what ought to be one’s own, therefore
Objection 3. Further, subjection is opposed to lib-
such dominion implies of necessity a pain inflicted on the
erty. But liberty is one of the chief blessings, and would
subject; and consequently in the state of innocence such a
not have been lacking in the state of innocence, “where
mastership could not have existed between man and man.
nothing was wanting that man’s good-will could desire,”
But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore man
him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common
would not have been master over man in the state of inno-
good. Such a kind of mastership would have existed in
cence.
the state of innocence between man and man, for two rea-
On the contrary, The condition of man in the state of
sons. First, because man is naturally a social being, and
innocence was not more exalted than the condition of the
so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life.
angels. But among the angels some rule over others; and
Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people
so one order is called that of “Dominations.” Therefore it
unless under the presidency of one to look after the com-
was not beneath the dignity of the state of innocence that
mon good; for many, as such, seek many things, whereas
one man should be subject to another.
one attends only to one. Wherefore the Philosopher says,
I answer that, Mastership has a twofold meaning.
in the beginning of the Politics, that wherever many things
First, as opposed to slavery, in which sense a master
are directed to one, we shall always find one at the head
means one to whom another is subject as a slave. In an-
directing them. Secondly, if one man surpassed another
other sense mastership is referred in a general sense to any
in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting
kind of subject; and in this sense even he who has the of-
unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, ac-
496
cording to 1 Pet. 4:10, “As every man hath received grace, sel”: and (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): “The natural order of
ministering the same one to another.” Wherefore Augus-
things requires this; and thus did God make man.”
tine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 14): “Just men command not
From this appear the replies to the objections which
by the love of domineering, but by the service of coun-
are founded on the first-mentioned mode of mastership.
497
FIRST PART, QUESTION 97
Of the Preservation of the Individual in the Primitive State (In Four Articles)
We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man: first, as regards the preservation of the individual; secondly, as regards the preservation of the species.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal?
(2) Whether he was impassible?
(3) Whether he stood in need of food?
(4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life?
Whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal?
Ia q. 97 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of in-
ible, yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it
nocence man was not immortal. For the term “mortal”
wholly from corruption; and this is called incorruptibility
belongs to the definition of man. But if you take away the
of glory; because as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.):
definition, you take away the thing defined. Therefore as
“God made man’s soul of such a powerful nature, that
long as man was man he could not be immortal.
from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds to the body a
Objection 2. Further, corruptible and incorruptible
fulness of health, with the vigor of incorruption.” Thirdly,
are generically distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph.
a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient
x, Did. ix, 10). But there can be no passing from one
cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal
genus to another. Therefore if the first man was incorrupt-
in the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet.
ible, man could not be corruptible in the present state.
et Nov. Test. qu. 19∗): “God made man immortal as long
Objection 3. Further, if man were immortal in the
as he did not sin; so that he might achieve for himself life
state of innocence, this would have been due either to na-
or death.” For man’s body was indissoluble not by reason
ture or to grace. Not to nature, for since nature does not
of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but by reason of a su-
change within the same species, he would also have been
pernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was
immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to
enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long
grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, ac-
as it remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees
cording to Wis. 10:2: “He brought him out of his sins.”
with reason; for since the rational soul surpasses the ca-
Hence he would have regained his immortality; which is
pacity of corporeal matter, as above explained (q. 76, a. 1),
clearly not the case. Therefore man was not immortal in
it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the
the state of innocence.
power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the
Objection 4. Further, immortality is promised to man
capacity of corporeal matter.
as a reward, according to Apoc. 21:4: “Death shall be no
Reply obj. 1 and 2: These objections are founded on
more.” But man was not created in the state of reward, but
natural incorruptibility and immortality.
that he might deserve the reward. Therefore man was not
Reply to Objection 3. This power of preserving the
immortal in the state of innocence.
body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:12): “By sin
And though man recovered grace as regards remission of
death came into the world.” Therefore man was immortal
guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immor-
before sin.
tality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this was
I answer that, A thing may be incorruptible in three
reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect
ways. First, on the part of matter—that is to say, either
of nature was to be restored into something better, as we
because it possesses no matter, like an angel; or because
shall explain further on ( IIIa, q. 14 , a. 4, ad 1).
it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only,
Reply to Objection 4. The promised reward of the
like the heavenly bodies. Such things as these are incor-
immortality of glory differs from the immortality which
ruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is incor-
was bestowed on man in the state of innocence.
ruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corrupt-
∗ Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine 498
Whether in the state of innocence man would have been passible?
Ia q. 97 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of in-
active or passive, according as one thing changes another
nocence man was passible. For “sensation is a kind of
from its natural disposition. Secondly, “passion” can be
passion.” But in the state of innocence man would have
taken in a general sense for any kind of change, even if
been sensitive. Therefore he would have been passible.
belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus un-
Objection 2. Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now,
derstanding and sensation are said to be passions. In this
man slept in the state of innocence, according to Gn. 2:21,
second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence,
“God cast a deep sleep upon Adam.” Therefore he would
and was passive both in soul and body. In the first sense,
have been passible.
man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was like-
Objection 3. Further, the same passage goes on to say
wise immortal; for he could curb his passion, as he could
that “He took a rib out of Adam.” Therefore he was pas-
avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin.
sible even to the degree of the cutting out of part of his
Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections;
body.
since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his nat-
Objection 4. Further, man’s body was soft. But a soft
ural disposition, but are ordered to his natural welfare.
body is naturally passible as regards a hard body; there-
Reply to Objection 3. As already explained (q. 92,
fore if a hard body had come in contact with the soft body
a. 3, ad 2), the rib was in Adam as the principle of the hu-
of the first man, the latter would have suffered from the
man race, as the semen in man, who is a principle through
impact. Therefore the first man was passible.
generation. Hence as man does not suffer any natural de-
On the contrary, Had man been passible, he would
terioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the
have been also corruptible, because, as the Philosopher
separation of the rib.
says (Top. vi, 3): “Excessive suffering wastes the very
Reply to Objection 4. Man’s body in the state of in-
substance.”
nocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a
I answer that, “Passion” may be taken in two senses.
hard body; partly by the use of his reason, whereby he
First, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer
could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by Divine
when changed from its natural disposition. For passion is
Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful
the effect of action; and in nature contraries are mutually
nature could come upon him unawares.
Whether in the state of innocence man had need of food?
Ia q. 97 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of inno-
this clear, we must observe that the rational soul is both
cence man did not require food. For food is necessary for
soul and spirit. It is called a soul by reason of what it
man to restore what he has lost. But Adam’s body suf-
possesses in common with other souls—that is, as giving
fered no loss, as being incorruptible. Therefore he had no
life to the body; whence it is written (Gn. 2:7): “Man
need of food.
was made into a living soul”; that is, a soul giving life
Objection 2. Further, food is needed for nourishment.
to the body. But the soul is called a spirit according to
But nourishment involves passibility. Since, then, man’s
what properly belongs to itself, and not to other souls, as
body was impassible; it does not appear how food could
possessing an intellectual immaterial power.
be needful to him.
Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul commu-
Objection 3. Further, we need food for the preserva-
nicated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul; and
tion of life. But Adam could preserve his life otherwise;
so the body was called “animal”∗, through having its life
for had he not sinned, he would not have died. Therefore
from the soul. Now the first principle of life in these in-
he did not require food.
ferior creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4)
Objection 4. Further, the consumption of food in-
is the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use
volves voiding of the surplus, which seems unsuitable to
of food, generation, and growth. Wherefore such opera-
the state of innocence. Therefore it seems that man did
tions befitted man in the state of innocence. But in the
not take food in the primitive state.
final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a certain On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:16): “Of every
extent, communicate to the body what properly belongs
tree in paradise ye shall [Vulg. ‘thou shalt’] eat.”
to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone; impassibility,
I answer that, In the state of innocence man had an
glory, and power to the good, whose bodies will be called
animal life requiring food; but after the resurrection he
“spiritual.” So, after the resurrection, man will not require
will have a spiritual life needing no food. In order to make
food; whereas he required it in the state of innocence.
∗ From ‘anima’, a soul; Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44 seqq.
499
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (QQ. Vet.
the food taken was passible; although this kind of passion
et Nov. Test. qu. 19†): “How could man have an im-
conduced to the perfection of the nature.
mortal body, which was sustained by food? Since an im-
Reply to Objection 3. If man had not taken food he
mortal being needs neither food nor drink.” For we have
would have sinned; as he also sinned by taking the for-
explained (a. 1) that the immortality of the primitive state
bidden fruit. For he was told at the same time, to abstain
was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on
from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and to eat of
any intrinsic disposition of the body: so that by the action
every other tree of Paradise.
of heat, the body might lose part of its humid qualities;
Reply to Objection 4. Some say that in the state of
and to prevent the entire consumption of the humor, man
innocence man would not have taken more than necessary
was obliged to take food.
food, so that there would have been nothing superfluous;
Reply to Objection 2. A certain passion and alter-
which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying
ation attends nutriment, on the part of the food changed
that there would have been no faecal matter. Wherefore
into the substance of the thing nourished. So we cannot
there was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by
thence conclude that man’s body was passible, but that
God as to be decorous and suitable to the state.
Whether in the state of innocence man would have acquired immortality by the tree Ia q. 97 a. 4
of life?
Objection 1. It would seem that the tree of life could
the humor which is caused from extraneous sources, being
not be the cause of immortality. For nothing can act be-
added to the humor already existing, lessens the specific
yond its own species; as an effect does not exceed its
active power: as water added to wine takes at first the taste
cause. But the tree of life was corruptible, otherwise it
of wine, then, as more water is added, the strength of the
could not be taken as food; since food is changed into the
wine is diminished, till the wine becomes watery. In like
substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree of life
manner, we may observe that at first the active force of the
could not give incorruptibility or immortality.
species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of
Objection 2. Further, effects caused by the forces of
the food as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well
plants and other natural agencies are natural. If therefore
as what suffices for growth; later on, however, the assim-
the tree of life caused immortality, this would have been
ilated food does not suffice for growth, but only replaces
natural immortality.
what is lost. Last of all, in old age, it does not suffice
Objection 3. Further, this would seem to be reduced
even for this purpose; whereupon the body declines, and
to the ancient fable, that the gods, by eating a certain
finally dies from natural causes. Against this defect man
food, became immortal; which the Philosopher ridicules
was provided with a remedy in the tree of life; for its ef-
(Metaph. iii, Did. ii, 4).
fect was to strengthen the force of the species against the
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 3:22): “Lest per-
weakness resulting from the admixture of extraneous nu-
haps he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and
triment. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26):
eat, and live for ever.” Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet.
“Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to slake his
et Nov. Test. qu. 19∗): “A taste of the tree of life warded
thirst; and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of old
off corruption of the body; and even after sin man would
age”; and (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19†) “The tree of
have remained immortal, had he been allowed to eat of the
life, like a drug, warded off all bodily corruption.”
tree of life.”
Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither
I answer that, The tree of life in a certain degree was
was the soul’s intrinsic power of preserving the body due
the cause of immortality, but not absolutely. To under-
to the tree of life, nor was it of such efficiency as to give
stand this, we must observe that in the primitive state
the body a disposition to immortality, whereby it might
man possessed, for the preservation of life, two reme-
become indissoluble; which is clear from the fact that ev-
dies, against two defects. One of these defects was the
ery bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree of life
lost of humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts
could not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of
as the soul’s instrument: as a remedy against such loss
living for an infinite time, but only for a definite time. For
man was provided with food, taken from the other trees
it is manifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is of paradise, as now we are provided with the food, which
its effect; therefore, since the power of the tree of life was
we take for the same purpose. The second defect, as the
finite, man’s life was to be preserved for a definite time by
Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), arises from the fact that
partaking of it once; and when that time had elapsed, man
† Works of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St.
Augustine
∗ Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious
works of St. Augustine
† Work of an anonymous author, among the
supposititious works of St. Augustine
500
was to be either transferred to a spiritual life, or had need cause immortality; while the others show that it caused
to eat once more of the tree of life.
incorruption by warding off corruption, according to the
From this the replies to the objections clearly appear.
explanation above given.
For the first proves that the tree of life did not absolutely
501
FIRST PART, QUESTION 98
Of the Preservation of the Species
(In Two Articles)
We next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species; and, first, of generation; secondly, of the state of the offspring. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation?
(2) Whether generation would have been through coition?
Whether in the state of innocence generation existed?
Ia q. 98 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem there would have been
perpetual; while what is only for a time is seemingly not
no generation in the state of innocence. For, as stated in
the chief purpose of nature, but as it were, subordinate
Phys. v, 5, “corruption is contrary to generation.” But
to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist, na-
contraries affect the same subject: also there would have
ture’s purpose would become void.
been no corruption in the state of innocence. Therefore
Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlast-
neither would there have been generation.
ing and permanent except the species, it follows that the
Objection 2. Further, the object of generation is the
chief purpose of nature is the good of the species; for the
preservation in the species of that which is corruptible in
preservation of which natural generation is ordained. On
the individual. Wherefore there is no generation in those
the other hand, incorruptible substances survive, not only
individual things which last for ever. But in the state of in-
in the species, but also in the individual; wherefore even
nocence man would have lived for ever. Therefore in the
the individuals are included in the chief purpose of nature.
state of innocence there would have been no generation.
Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part
Objection 3. Further, by generation man is multiplied.
of the naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the
But the multiplication of masters requires the division of
soul, which is incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude
property, to avoid confusion of mastership. Therefore,
of individuals should be the direct purpose of nature, or
since man was made master of the animals, it would have
rather of the Author of nature, Who alone is the Creator
been necessary to make a division of rights when the hu-
of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for the multi-
man race increased by generation. This is against the nat-
plication of the human race, He established the begetting
ural law, according to which all things are in common, as
of offspring even in the state of innocence.
Isidore says (Etym. v, 4). Therefore there would have
Reply to Objection 1. In the state of innocence the
been no generation in the state of innocence.
human body was in itself corruptible, but it could be pre-
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:28): “Increase
served from corruption by the soul. Therefore, since gen-
and multiply, and fill the earth.” But this increase could
eration belongs to things corruptible, man was not to be
not come about save by generation, since the original
deprived thereof.
number of mankind was two only. Therefore there would
Reply to Objection 2. Although generation in the
have been generation in the state of innocence.
state of innocence might not have been required for the
I answer that, In the state of innocence there would
preservation of the species, yet it would have been re-
have been generation of offspring for the multiplication
quired for the multiplication of the individual.
of the human race; otherwise man’s sin would have been
Reply to Objection 3. In our present state a division
very necessary, for such a great blessing to be its result.
of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplic-
We must, therefore, observe that man, by his nature, is
ity of masters, inasmuch as community of possession is a
established, as it were, midway between corruptible and
source of strife, as the Philosopher says (Politic. ii, 5). In
incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorrupt-
the state of innocence, however, the will of men would
ible, while his body is naturally corruptible. We must also
have been so ordered that without any danger of strife
observe that nature’s purpose appears to be different as re-
they would have used in common, according to each one’s
gards corruptible and incorruptible things. For that seems
need, those things of which they were masters—a state of
to be the direct purpose of nature, which is invariable and
things to be observed even now among many good men.
502
Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition?
Ia q. 98 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that generation by coition
is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal mem-
would not have existed in the state of innocence. For, as
bers make it clear. So we cannot allow that these members
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first
would not have had a natural use, as other members had,
man in the terrestrial Paradise was “like an angel.” But in
before sin.
the future state of the resurrection, when men will be like
Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in
the angels, “they shall neither marry nor be married,” as is
the present state of life, two things to be considered. One,
written Mat. 22:30. Therefore neither in paradise would
which comes from nature, is the union of man and woman;
there have been generation by coition.
for in every act of generation there is an active and a pas-
Objection 2. Further, our first parents were created at
sive principle. Wherefore, since wherever there is distinc-
the age of perfect development. Therefore, if generation
tion of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is
by coition had existed before sin, they would have had in-
female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose
tercourse while still in paradise: which was not the case
of generation there should be concurrence of male and fe-
according to Scripture (Gn. 4:1).
male. The second thing to be observed is a certain de-
Objection 3. Further, in carnal intercourse, more than
formity of excessive concupiscence, which in the state of
at any other time, man becomes like the beasts, on account
innocence would not have existed, when the lower pow-
of the vehement delight which he takes therein; whence
ers were entirely subject to reason. Wherefore Augustine
contingency is praiseworthy, whereby man refrains from
says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): “We must be far from suppos-
such pleasures. But man is compared to beasts by rea-
ing that offspring could not be begotten without concupis-
son of sin, according to Ps. 48:13: “Man, when he was
cence. All the bodily members would have been equally
in honor, did not understand; he is compared to senseless
moved by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive,
beasts, and is become like to them.” Therefore, before
with calmness of soul and body.”
sin, there would have been no such intercourse of man
Reply to Objection 1. In paradise man would have
and woman.
been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an
Objection 4. Further, in the state of innocence there
animal life in his body. After the resurrection man will be
would have been no corruption. But virginal integrity
like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body. Wherefore
is corrupted by intercourse. Therefore there would have
there is no parallel.
been no such thing in the state of innocence.
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Gen. ad
On the contrary, God made man and woman before
lit. ix, 4), our first parents did not come together in par-
sin (Gn. 1,2). But nothing is void in God’s works. There-
adise, because on account of sin they were ejected from
fore, even if man had not sinned, there would have been
paradise shortly after the creation of the woman; or be-
such intercourse, to which the distinction of sex is or-
cause, having received the general Divine command rela-
dained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made
tive to generation, they awaited the special command rel-
to be a help to man (Gn. 2:18,20). But she is not fitted
ative to time.
to help man except in generation, because another man
Reply to Objection 3. Beasts are without reason. In
would have proved a more effective help in anything else.
this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition,
Therefore there would have been such generation also in
because he cannot moderate concupiscence. In the state
the state of innocence.
of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened
I answer that, Some of the earlier doctors, consider-
that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of
ing the nature of concupiscence as regards generation in
sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible
our present state, concluded that in the state of innocence
delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater
generation would not have been effected in the same way.
purity of nature and the greater sensibility of the body),
Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Hom. Opif. xvii) that in
but because the force of concupiscence would not have so
paradise the human race would have been multiplied by
inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed
some other means, as the angels were multiplied without
by reason, whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure,
coition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds that
but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving
God made man male and female before sin, because He
to it immoderately. By “immoderately” I mean going be-
foreknew the mode of generation which would take place
yond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take
after sin, which He foresaw. But this is unreasonable. For
less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton,
what is natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited
but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. This
by sin. Now it is clear that generation by coition is natural
is what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do
to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed
not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of inno-
even before sin, as above explained (q. 97, a. 3), just as it
cence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind.
503
Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy without prejudice to virginal integrity; this would have re-in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our
mained intact, as it does in the menses. And just as in giv-
present state, not because it removes fecundity, but be-
ing birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans of
cause it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity
pain, but by the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving,
would have been without lust.
the union was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate
Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine says (De Civ.
action.”
Dei xiv, 26): In that state “intercourse would have been
504
FIRST PART, QUESTION 99
Of the Condition of the Offspring As to the Body
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the condition of the offspring—first, as regards the body; secondly, as regards virtue; thirdly, in knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full powers of the body immediately after birth?
(2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex?
Whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of body Ia q. 99 a. 1
as to the use of its members immediately after birth?
Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of in-
ately after birth. Because in proportion to other animals
nocence children would have had perfect strength of the
man has naturally a larger brain. Wherefore it is natural,
body, as to the use of its members, immediately after
on account of the considerable humidity of the brain in
birth. For Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss.
children, that the nerves which are instruments of move-
i, 38): “This weakness of the body befits their weakness
ment, should not be apt for moving the limbs. On the
of mind.” But in the state of innocence there would have
other hand, no Catholic doubts it possible for a child to
been no weakness of mind. Therefore neither would there
have, by Divine power, the use of its limbs immediately
have been weakness of body in infants.
after birth.
Objection 2. Further, some animals at birth have suf-
Now we have it on the authority of Scripture that “God
ficient strength to use their members. But man is nobler
made man right” (Eccles. 7:30), which rightness, as Au-
than other animals. Therefore much more is it natural to
gustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 11), consists in the per-
man to have strength to use his members at birth; and thus
fect subjection of the body to the soul. As, therefore, in
it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not that
the primitive state it was impossible to find in the human
strength.
limbs anything repugnant to man’s well-ordered will, so
Objection 3. Further, inability to secure a proffered
was it impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the
pleasure causes affliction. But if children had not full
will’s commands. Now the human will is well ordered
strength in the use of their limbs, they would often have
when it tends to acts which are befitting to man. But the
been unable to procure something pleasurable offered to
same acts are not befitting to man at every season of life.
them; and so they would have been afflicted, which was
We must, therefore, conclude that children would not have
not possible before sin. Therefore, in the state of inno-
had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the
cence, children would not have been deprived of the use
purpose of performing every kind of act; but only for the
of their limbs.
acts befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the
Objection 4. Further, the weakness of old age seems
like.
to correspond to that of infancy. But in the state of in-
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of the
nocence there would have been no weakness of old age.
weakness which we observe in children even as regards
Therefore neither would there have been such weakness
those acts which befit the state of infancy; as is clear from
in infancy.
his preceding remark that “even when close to the breast,
On the contrary, Everything generated is first imper-
and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than to suckle.”
fect. But in the state of innocence children would have
Reply to Objection 2. The fact that some animals
been begotten by generation. Therefore from the first they
have the use of their limbs immediately after birth, is due,
would have been imperfect in bodily size and power.
not to their superiority, since more perfect animals are not
I answer that, By faith alone do we hold truths which
so endowed; but to the dryness of the brain, and to the op-
are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority.
erations proper to such animals being imperfect, so that a
Wherefore, in making any assertion, we must be guided
small amount of strength suffices them.
by the nature of things, except in those things which are
Reply obj. 3 is clear from what we have said above.
above nature, and are made known to us by Divine au-
We may add that they would have desired nothing except
thority. Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is befitting with an ordinate will; and only what was befitting to their
to the principles of human nature that children should not
state of life.
have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immedi-
Reply to Objection 4.
In the state of innocence
505
man would have been born, yet not subject to corruption.
tile defects which result from birth; but not senile defects
Therefore in that state there could have been certain infan-
leading to corruption.
Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born?
Ia q. 99 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that in the primitive state
of human nature would have been lacking in the state of
woman would not have been born. For the Philosopher
innocence. And as different grades belong to the perfec-
says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that woman is a “misbe-
tion of the universe, so also diversity of sex belongs to
gotten male,” as though she were a product outside the
the perfection of human nature. Therefore in the state of
purpose of nature. But in that state nothing would have
innocence, both sexes would have been begotten.
been unnatural in human generation. Therefore in that
Reply to Objection 1. Woman is said to be a “mis-
state women would not have been born.
begotten male,” as being a product outside the purpose of
Objection 2. Further, every agent produces its like,
nature considered in the individual case: but not against
unless prevented by insufficient power or ineptness of
the purpose of universal nature, as above explained (q. 92,
matter: thus a small fire cannot burn green wood. But
a. 1, ad 2).
in generation the active force is in the male. Since, there-
Reply to Objection 2. The generation of woman is
fore, in the state of innocence man’s active force was not
not occasioned either by a defect of the active force or by
subject to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of
inept matter, as the objection proposes; but sometimes by
the woman, it seems that males would always have been
an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the Philosopher says
born.
(De Animal. Histor. vi, 19): “The northern wind favors
Objection 3. Further, in the state of innocence gener-
the generation of males, and the southern wind that of fe-
ation is ordered to the multiplication of the human race.
males”: sometimes also by some impression in the soul
But the race would have been sufficiently multiplied by
(of the parents), which may easily have some effect on
the first man and woman, from the fact that they would
the body (of the child). Especially was this the case in the
have lived for ever. Therefore, in the state of innocence,
state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the
there was no need for women to be born.
soul; so that by the mere will of the parent the sex of the
On the contrary, Nature’s process in generation
offspring might be diversified.
would have been in harmony with the manner in which
Reply to Objection 3. The offspring would have been
it was established by God. But established male and fe-
begotten to an animal life, as to the use of food and gen-
male in human nature, as it is written (Gn. 1,2). Therefore
eration. Hence it was fitting that all should generate, and
also in the state of innocence male and female would have
not only the first parents. From this it seems to follow that
been born.
males and females would have been in equal number.
I answer that, Nothing belonging to the completeness
506
FIRST PART, QUESTION 100
Of the Condition of the Offspring As Regards Righteousness
(In Two Articles)
We now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to righteousness. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?
(2) Whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness?
Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?
Ia q. 100 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of inno-
ture. This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the
cence men would not have been born in a state of righ-
same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original
teousness. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. i):
righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is
“Before sin the first man would have begotten children
transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this
sinless; but not heirs to their father’s righteousness.”
reason also, the children would have been assimilated to
Objection 2. Further, righteousness is effected by
their parents as regards original righteousness.
grace, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:16,21). Now grace
Reply to Objection 1. These words of Hugh are to be
is not transfused from one to another, for thus it would be
understood as referring, not to the habit of righteousness,
natural; but is infused by God alone. Therefore children
but to the execution of the act thereof.
would not have been born righteous.
Reply to Objection 2. Some say that children would
Objection 3. Further, righteousness is in the soul. But
have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which
the soul is not transmitted from the parent. Therefore nei-
is the principle of merit, but with original righteousness.
ther would righteousness have been transmitted from par-
But since the root of original righteousness, which con-
ents, to the children.
ferred righteousness on the first man when he was made,
On the contrary, Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x):
consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to
“As long as man did not sin, he would have begotten chil-
God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, as
dren endowed with righteousness together with the ratio-
above explained (q. 95, a. 1), we must conclude that if
nal soul.”
children were born in original righteousness, they would
I answer that, Man naturally begets a specific like-
also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that
ness to himself. Hence whatever accidental qualities re-
the first man was created in grace (q. 95, a. 1). This grace,
sult from the nature of the species, must be alike in parent
however, would not have been natural, for it would not
and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would
have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would
not have occurred in the state of innocence. But individ-
have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving
ual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and
a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which
child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man
is not transmitted by the parent, is infused by God as soon
was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of
as the human body is apt to receive it.
the species, not as caused by the principles of the species,
From this the reply to the third objection is clear.
but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human na-
Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righ-Ia q. 100 a. 2
teousness?
Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of inno-
born confirmed in righteousness.
cence children would have been born confirmed in righ-
Objection 2. Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo
teousness. For Gregory says (Moral. iv) on the words of
i, 18): “If our first parents had lived so as not to yield to
Job 3:13: “For now I should have been asleep, etc.: If no
temptation, they would have been confirmed in grace, so
sinful corruption had infected our first parent, he would
that with their offspring they would have been unable to
not have begotten “children of hell”; no children would
sin any more.” Therefore the children would have been
have been born of him but such as were destined to be
born confirmed in righteousness.
saved by the Redeemer.” Therefore all would have been
Objection 3. Further, good is stronger than evil. But
507
by the sin of the first man there resulted, in those born of privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin
him, the necessity of sin. Therefore, if the first man had
Mother of God. And as soon as Adam had attained to
persevered in righteousness, his descendants would have
that happy state of seeing God in His Essence, he would
derived from him the necessity of preserving righteous-
have become spiritual in soul and body; and his animal
ness.
life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation.
Objection 4. Further, the angels who remained faith-
Hence it is clear that children would not have been born
ful to God, while the others sinned, were at once con-
confirmed in righteousness.
firmed in grace, so as to be unable henceforth to sin. In
Reply to Objection 1. If Adam had not sinned, he
like manner, therefore, man would have been confirmed
would not have begotten “children of hell” in the sense
in grace if he had persevered. But he would have begot-
that they would contract from him sin which is the cause
ten children like himself. Therefore they also would have
of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will they could
been born confirmed in righteousness.
have become “children of hell.” If, however, they did not
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
become “children of hell” by falling into sin, this would
10): “Happy would have been the whole human race if
not have been owing to their being confirmed in righteous-
neither they—that is our first parents—had committed any
ness, but to Divine Providence preserving them free from
evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their
sin.
race had committed any sin for which they would have
Reply to Objection 2. Anselm does not say this by
been condemned.” From which words we gather that even
way of assertion, but only as an opinion, which is clear
if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants
from his mode of expression as follows: “It seems that if
might have done evil; and therefore they would not have
they had lived, etc.”
been born confirmed in righteousness.
Reply to Objection 3. This argument is not conclu-
I answer that, It does not seem possible that in the
sive, though Anselm seems to have been influenced by it,
state of innocence children would have been born con-
as appears from his words above quoted. For the necessity
firmed in righteousness. For it is clear that at their birth
of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been
they would not have had greater perfection than their par-
such that they could not return to righteousness, which is
ents at the time of begetting. Now the parents, as long
the case only with the damned. Wherefore neither would
as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in
the parents have transmitted to their descendants the ne-
righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed in
cessity of not sinning, which is only in the blessed.
righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vi-
Reply to Objection 4. There is no comparison be-
sion of God; and when once it has seen God, it cannot but
tween man and the angels; for man’s free-will is change-
cleave to Him Who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom
able, both before and after choice; whereas the angel’s is
no one can turn away, since nothing is desired or loved but
not changeable, as we have said above in treating of the
under the aspect of good. I say this according to the gen-
angels (q. 64, a. 2).
eral law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special
508
FIRST PART, QUESTION 101
Of the Condition of the Offspring As Regards Knowledge
(In Two Articles)
We next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge?
(2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth?
Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowl-Ia q. 101 a. 1
edge?
Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of inno-
proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were
cence children would have been born with perfect knowl-
endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the
edge. For Adam would have begotten children like him-
sensitive powers. We must conclude then, that, in the state
self. But Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge (q. 94,
of innocence, children would not have been born with per-
a. 3). Therefore children would have been born of him
fect knowledge; but in course of time they would have ac-
with perfect knowledge.
quired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learn-
Objection 2. Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as
ing.
Bede says (Cf. Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 3). But ignorance is pri-
Reply to Objection 1. The perfection of knowledge
vation of knowledge. Therefore before sin children would
was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he
have had perfect knowledge as soon as they were born.
was established as the father and instructor of the whole
Objection 3. Further, children would have been gifted
human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not
with righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required
in that respect, but only in those accidents which were
for righteousness, since it directs our actions. Therefore
natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature.
they would also have been gifted with knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2.
Ignorance is privation of
On the contrary, The human soul is naturally “like a
knowledge due at some particular time; and this would not
blank tablet on which nothing is written,” as the Philoso-
have been in children from their birth, for they would have
pher says (De Anima iii, 4). But the nature of the soul is
possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence,
the same now as it would have been in the state of inno-
no ignorance would have been in them, but only nescience
cence. Therefore the souls of children would have been
in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in
without knowledge at birth.
the holy angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii).
I answer that, As above stated (q. 99, a. 1), as re-
Reply to Objection 3. Children would have had suffi-
gards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely
cient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness,
on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we
in which men are guided by universal principles of right;
must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. Now it is
and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more
natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses,
complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise
as above explained (q. 55, a. 2; q. 84, a. 6); and for this
their knowledge of other universal principles.
reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its Whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth?
Ia q. 101 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that children would have
the wolf. Much more, therefore, would men in the state of
had perfect use of reason at birth. For that children have
innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth.
not perfect use of reason in our present state, is due to the
On the contrary, In all things produced by generation
soul being weighed down by the body; which was not the
nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. There-
case in paradise, because, as it is written, “The corrupt-
fore children would not have had the perfect use of reason
ible body is a load upon the soul” (Wis. 9:15). Therefore,
from the very outset.
before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom,
I answer that, As above stated (q. 84, a. 7), the use of children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth.
reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sen-
Objection 2. Further, some animals at birth have the
sitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tired and
use of their natural powers, as the lamb at once flees from
the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the
509
perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep that particular state, as explained above regarding the use
or delirious. Now the sensitive powers are situate in cor-
of their limbs (q. 99, a. 1).
poreal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hin-
Reply to Objection 1. The corruptible body is a load
dered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered
upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in
also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now
those matters which belong to man at all ages.
children are hindered in the use of these powers on ac-
Reply to Objection 2. Even other animals have not
count of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they have
at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they
perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. There-
have later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach
fore, in the state of innocence, children would not have
their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other
had the perfect use of reason, which they would have en-
animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in man
joyed later on in life. Yet they would have had a more
from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above
perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding
(q. 99, a. 1).
510
FIRST PART, QUESTION 102
Of Man’s Abode, Which Is Paradise
(In Four Articles)
We next consider man’s abode, which is paradise. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place?
(2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation?
(3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise?
(4) Whether he should have been created in paradise?
Whether paradise is a corporeal place?
Ia q. 102 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that paradise is not a cor-
narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explana-
poreal place. For Bede∗ says that “paradise reaches to the
tion we may offer. And so paradise, as Isidore says (Etym.
lunar circle.” But no earthly place answers that descrip-
xiv, 3), “is a place situated in the east, its name being the
tion, both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth
Greek for garden.” It was fitting that it should be in the
to be raised up so high, and because beneath the moon is
east; for it is to be believed that it was situated in the most the region of fire, which would consume the earth. There-excellent part of the earth. Now the east is the right hand
fore paradise is not a corporeal place.
on the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (De Coel. ii,
Objection 2. Further, Scripture mentions four rivers
2); and the right hand is nobler than the left: hence it was
as rising in paradise (Gn. 2:10). But the rivers there men-
fitting that God should place the earthly paradise in the
tioned have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the
east.
Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore paradise is not a cor-
Reply to Objection 1. Bede’s assertion is untrue, if
poreal place.
taken in its obvious sense. It may, however, be explained
Objection 3. Further, although men have explored the
to mean that paradise reaches to the moon, not literally,
entire habitable world, yet none have made mention of the
but figuratively; because, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3),
place of paradise. Therefore apparently it is not a corpo-
the atmosphere there is “a continually even temperature”;
real place.
and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies, which are
Objection 4. Further, the tree of life is described as
devoid of opposing elements. Mention, however, is made
growing in paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual
of the moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the
thing, for it is written of Wisdom that “She is a tree of
heavenly bodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, more-
life to them that lay hold on her” (Prov. 3:18). Therefore
over, the most akin to the earth; hence it is observed to
paradise also is not a corporeal, but a spiritual place.
be overshadowed by clouds so as to be almost obscured.
Objection 5. Further, if paradise be a corporeal place,
Others say that paradise reached to the moon—that is, to
the trees also of paradise must be corporeal. But it seems
the middle space of the air, where rain, and wind, and the
they were not; for corporeal trees were produced on the
like arise; because the moon is said to have influence on
third day, while the planting of the trees of paradise is
such changes. But in this sense it would not be a fit place
recorded after the work of the six days. Therefore par-
for human dwelling, through being uneven in temperature,
adise was not a corporeal place.
and not attuned to the human temperament, as is the lower
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1):
atmosphere in the neighborhood of the earth.
“Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some un-
Reply to Objection 2. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
derstand a place merely corporeal; others a place entirely
viii, 7): “It is probable that man has no idea where par-
spiritual; while others, whose opinion, I confess, hold that
adise was, and that the rivers, whose sources are said to be
paradise was both corporeal and spiritual.”
known, flowed for some distance underground, and then
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii,
sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that such is the
21): “Nothing prevents us from holding, within proper
case with some other streams?”
limits, a spiritual paradise; so long as we believe in the
Reply to Objection 3. The situation of paradise is
truth of the events narrated as having there occurred.” For
shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas,
whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set down as
or some torrid region, which cannot be crossed; and so
matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of
people who have written about topography make no men-
this method, we must hold to the historical truth of the
tion of it.
∗ Strabus, Gloss on Gn. 2:8
511
Reply to Objection 4. The tree of life is a material ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3), the plants were not actually produced
tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a
on the third day, but in their seminal virtues; whereas, af-
life-preserving power as above stated (q. 97 , a. 4). Yet
ter the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise
it had a spiritual signification; as the rock in the desert
and others, were actually produced. According to other
was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In like
holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were ac-
manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a
tually produced on the third day, including the trees of
material tree, so called in view of future events; because,
paradise; and what is said of the trees of paradise being
after eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the
planted after the work of the six days is to be understood,
consequent punishment, the difference between the good
they say, by way of recapitulation. Whence our text reads:
of obedience and the evil of rebellion. It may also be said
“The Lord God had planted a paradise of pleasure from
to signify spiritually the free-will as some say.
the beginning” (Gn. 2:8).
Reply to Objection 5. According to Augustine (Gen.
Whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man?
Ia q. 102 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that paradise was not a
corruption by food. Among those things which corrupt
place adapted to be the abode of man. For man and angels
the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmo-
are similarly ordered to beatitude. But the angels from the
sphere of unequal temperature; and to such corruption a
very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in
remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In
the abode of the blessed—that is, the empyrean heaven.
paradise both conditions were found; because, as Dama-
Therefore the place of man’s habitation should have been
scene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): “Paradise was perme-
there also.
ated with the all pervading brightness of a temperate, pure,
Objection 2. Further, if some definite place were re-
and exquisite atmosphere, and decked with ever-flowering
quired for man’s abode, this would be required on the part
plants.” Whence it is clear that paradise was most fit to be
either of the soul or of the body. If on the part of the soul,
a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his original
the place would be in heaven, which is adapted to the na-
state of immortality.
ture of the soul; since the desire of heaven is implanted
Reply to Objection 1. The empyrean heaven is the
in all. On the part of the body, there was no need for
highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of
any other place than the one provided for other animals.
change. By the first of these two conditions, it is a fit-
Therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode
ting abode for the angelic nature: for, as Augustine says
of man.
(De Trin. ii), “God rules corporeal creatures through spir-
Objection 3. Further, a place which contains nothing
itual creatures.” Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature is useless. But after sin, paradise was not occupied by
should be established above the entire corporeal nature, as
man. Therefore if it were adapted as a dwelling-place for
presiding over it. By the second condition, it is a fitting
man, it seems that God made paradise to no purpose.
abode for the state of beatitude, which is endowed with
Objection 4. Further, since man is of an even temper-
the highest degree of stability. Thus the abode of beati-
ament, a fitting place for him should be of even tempera-
tude was suited to the very nature of the angel; therefore
ture. But paradise was not of an even temperature; for it is
he was created there. But it is not suited to man’s nature,
said to have been on the equator—a situation of extreme
since man is not set as a ruler over the entire corporeal
heat, since twice in the year the sun passes vertically over
creation: it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to
the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was not a
his beatitude. Wherefore he was not placed from the be-
fit dwelling-place for man.
ginning in the empyrean heaven, but was destined to be
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
transferred thither in the state of his final beatitude.
11): “Paradise was a divinely ordered region, and worthy
Reply to Objection 2. It is ridiculous to assert that
of him who was made to God’s image.”
any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spir-
I answer that, As above stated (q. 97, a. 1), Man
itual substances, though some particular place may have
was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had
a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances. For the
a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul
earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as regards
there was a power preserving the body from corruption.
both his body and his soul—that is, inasmuch as in his
Now the human body may be corrupted from within or
soul was the force which preserved the human body from
from without. From within, the body is corrupted by the
corruption. This could not be said of the other animals.
consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above ex-
Therefore, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11):
plained (q. 97, a. 4), and man was able to ward off such
“No irrational animal inhabited paradise”; although, by a
512
certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither by ity of day and night; that it is never too cold there, because
God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein
the sun is never too far off; and never too hot, because, al-
by the complicity of the devil.
though the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants, it
Reply to Objection 3. Paradise did not become use-
does not remain long in that position. However, Aristotle
less through being unoccupied by man after sin, just as
distinctly says (Meteor. ii, 5) that such a region is unin-
immortality was not conferred on man in vain, though he
habitable on account of the heat. This seems to be more
was to lose it. For thereby we learn God’s kindness to
probable; because, even those regions where the sun does
man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that
not pass vertically overhead, are extremely hot on account
Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise.
of the mere proximity of the sun. But whatever be the
Reply to Objection 4. Those who say that paradise
truth of the matter, we must hold that paradise was situ-
was on the equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situa-
ated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator
tion is most temperate, on account of the unvarying equal-
or elsewhere.
Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it?
Ia q. 102 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that man was not placed
I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii,
in paradise to dress and keep it. For what was brought on
10), these words in Genesis may be understood in two
him as a punishment of sin would not have existed in par-
ways. First, in the sense that God placed man in paradise
adise in the state of innocence. But the cultivation of the
that He might Himself work in man and keep him, by
soil was a punishment of sin (Gn. 3:17). Therefore man
sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once re-
was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it.
lapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light
Objection 2. Further, there is no need of a keeper
ceases to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption
when there is no fear of trespass with violence. But in par-
and evil. Secondly, that man might dress and keep par-
adise there was no fear of trespass with violence. There-
adise, which dressing would not have involved labor, as it
fore there was no need for man to keep paradise.
did after sin; but would have been pleasant on account of
Objection 3. Further, if man was placed in paradise
man’s practical knowledge of the powers of nature. Nor
to dress and keep it, man would apparently have been
would man have kept paradise against a trespasser; but
made for the sake of paradise, and not contrariwise; which
he would have striven to keep paradise for himself lest he
seems to be false. Therefore man was not place in par-
should lose it by sin. All of which was for man’s good;
adise to dress and keep it.
wherefore paradise was ordered to man’s benefit, and not
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2: 15): “The Lord
conversely.
God took man and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to
Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear.
dress and keep it.”
Whether man was created in paradise?
Ia q. 102 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that man was created
I answer that, Paradise was a fitting abode for man as
in paradise. For the angel was created in his dwelling-
regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this
place—namely, the empyrean heaven. But before sin par-
incorruptibility was man’s, not by nature, but by a super-
adise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems that
natural gift of God. Therefore that this might be attributed
man was created in paradise.
to God, and not to human nature, God made man outside
Objection 2. Further, other animals remain in the
of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there
place where they are produced, as the fish in the water,
during the whole of his animal life; and, having attained
and walking animals on the earth from which they were
to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven.
made. Now man would have remained in paradise after
Reply to Objection 1. The empyrean heaven was a
he was created (q. 97, a. 4). Therefore he was created in
fitting abode for the angels as regards their nature, and
paradise.
therefore they were created there.
Objection 3. Further, woman was made in paradise.
In the same way I reply to the second objection, for
But man is greater than woman. Therefore much more
those places befit those animals in their nature.
should man have been made in paradise.
Reply to Objection 3. Woman was made in paradise,
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:15): “God took
not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the
man and placed him in paradise.”
dignity of the principle from which her body was formed.
513
For the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already.
514
FIRST PART, QUESTION 103
Of the Government of Things in General
(In Eight Articles)
Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this government. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the world is governed by someone?
(2) What is the end of this government?
(3) Whether the world is governed by one?
(4) Of the effects of this government?
(5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government?
(6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God?
(7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything?
(8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?
Whether the world is governed by anyone?
Ia q. 103 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the world is not gov-
goodness, which, as we have said above (q. 44, a. 4; q. 65,
erned by anyone. For it belongs to those things to be gov-
a. 2), was the cause of the production of things in exis-
erned, which move or work for an end. But natural things
tence. For as “it belongs to the best to produce the best,”
which make up the greater part of the world do not move,
it is not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should
or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their
produce things without giving them their perfection. Now
end. Therefore the world is not governed.
a thing’s ultimate perfection consists in the attainment of
Objection 2. Further, those things are governed which
its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it
are moved towards an object. But the world does not ap-
brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end:
pear to be so directed, but has stability in itself. Therefore
and this is to govern.
it is not governed.
Reply to Objection 1. A thing moves or operates for
Objection 3. Further, what is necessarily determined
an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end,
by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require
as man and other rational creatures; and such things have
any external principle of government. But the principal
knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Sec-
parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined
ondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an end, as
to something particular in their actions and movements.
though moved or directed by another thereto, as an ar-
Therefore the world does not require to be governed.
row directed to the target by the archer, who knows the
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:3): “But Thou,
end unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the movement
O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence.” And
of the arrow towards a definite end shows clearly that it
Boethius says (De Consol. iii): “Thou Who governest this
is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvary-
universe by mandate eternal.”
ing course of natural things which are without knowledge,
I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the
shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason.
government of the world, saying that all things happened
Reply to Objection 2. In all created things there is
by chance. But such an opinion can be refuted as impos-
a stable element, at least primary matter; and something
sible in two ways. First, by observation of things them-
belonging to movement, if under movement we include
selves: for we observe that in nature things happen always
operation. And things need governing as to both: because
or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case
even that which is stable, since it is created from noth-
unless some sort of providence directed nature towards
ing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by
good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the un-
a governing hand, as will be explained later (q. 104, a. 1).
failing order we observe in things is a sign of their being
Reply to Objection 3. The natural necessity inher-
governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house
ent in those beings which are determined to a particular
we gather therefrom the intention of him that put it in or-
thing, is a kind of impression from God, directing them to
der, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristo-
their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so
tle∗. Secondly, this is clear from a consideration of Divine
as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the
∗ Cleanthes
515
archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, fore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow
inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their
shows the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of
nature, while that which natural things receive from man
things shows the government of Divine Providence.
in addition to their nature is somewhat violent. Where-
Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world?
Ia q. 103 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the end of the gov-
Universal Good; Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its
ernment of the world is not something existing outside
Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas
the world. For the end of the government of a thing is that
a particular good is good by participation. Now it is man-
whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto
ifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good
a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself; thus
which is not such by participation. Wherefore that good
a sick man is brought back to health, which is something
which is the end of the whole universe must be a good
good in him. Therefore the end of government of things is
outside the universe.
some good not outside, but within the things themselves.
Reply to Objection 1. We may acquire some good
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i,
in many ways: first, as a form existing in us, such as
1): “Some ends are an operation; some are a work”—i.e.
health or knowledge; secondly, as something done by us,
produced by an operation. But nothing can be produced
as a builder attains his end by building a house; thirdly,
by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists
as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the
in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the end of
buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into posses-
the government of things.
sion. Wherefore nothing prevents something outside the
Objection 3. Further, the good of the multitude seems
universe being the good to which it is directed.
to consist in order, and peace which is the “tranquillity of
Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher is speaking of
order,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the
the ends of various arts; for the end of some arts consists
world is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the
in the operation itself, as the end of a harpist is to play
end of the government of the world is the peaceful order in
the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in some-
things themselves. Therefore the end of the government
thing produced, as the end of a builder is not the act of
of the world is not an extrinsic good.
building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 16:4): “The Lord
something extrinsic is the end not only as made, but also
hath made all things for Himself.” But God is outside the
as possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we
entire order of the universe. Therefore the end of all things
were to say that Hercules is the end of the statue made
is something extrinsic to them.
to represent him. Therefore we may say that some good
I answer that, As the end of a thing corresponds to
outside the whole universe is the end of the government
its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end
of the universe, as something possessed and represented;
of things if we know their beginning. Therefore, since the
for each thing tends to a participation thereof, and to an
beginning of all things is something outside the universe,
assimilation thereto, as far as is possible.
namely, God, it is clear from what has been expounded
Reply to Objection 3. A good existing in the uni-
above (q. 44, Aa. 1,2), that we must conclude that the end
verse, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof;
of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by
this. however, is not its ultimate end, but is ordered to the
reason. For it is clear that good has the nature of an end;
extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is
wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some
ordered to the general, as stated in Metaph. xii, Did. xi,
particular good; while the universal end of all things is the
10.
Whether the world is governed by one?
Ia q. 103 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the world is not gov-
one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity
erned by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. Now,
or unskillfulness of the ruler; which cannot apply to God.
we see in the government of the universe that things are
But created things agree not together, and act against each
not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contin-
other; as is evident in the case of contraries. Therefore the
gently and some of necessity in variously different ways.
world is not governed by one.
Therefore the world is not governed by one.
Objection 3. Further, in nature we always find what is
Objection 2. Further, things which are governed by
the better. But it “is better that two should be together than
516
one” (Eccles. 4:9). Therefore the world is not governed Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that
by one, but by many.
several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, except so
On the contrary, We confess our belief in one God
far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is
and one Lord, according to the words of the Apostle (1
a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things
Cor. 8:6): “To us there is but one God, the Father. . . and
united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one
one Lord”: and both of these pertain to government. For
than by several. From this it follows that the government
to the Lord belongs dominion over subjects; and the name
of the world, being the best form of government, must be
of God is taken from Providence as stated above (q. 13,
by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph.
a. 8). Therefore the world is governed by one.
xii, Did. xi, 10): “Things refuse to be ill governed; and
I answer that, We must of necessity say that the world
multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there
is governed by one. For since the end of the government
should be one ruler.”
of the world is that which is essentially good, which is the
Reply to Objection 1. Movement is “the act of a thing
greatest good; the government of the world must be the
moved, caused by the mover.” Wherefore dissimilarity
best kind of government. Now the best government is the
of movements is caused by diversity of things moved,
government by one. The reason of this is that government
which diversity is essential to the perfection of the uni-
is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the
verse (q. 47, Aa. 1,2; q. 48, a. 2), and not by a diversity of
end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to
governors.
the idea of goodness, as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii,
Reply to Objection 2. Although contraries do not
11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they
agree with each other in their proximate ends, neverthe-
desire unity; without which they would cease to exist. For
less they agree in the ultimate end, so far as they are in-
a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that
cluded in the one order of the universe.
things resist division, as far as they can; and the dissolu-
Reply to Objection 3.
If we consider individual
tion of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the
goods, then two are better than one. But if we consider
intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace.
the essential good, then no addition is possible.
Whether the effect of government is one or many?
Ia q. 103 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that there is but one ef-
fect of the government of the world may be taken in three
fect of the government of the world and not many. For the
ways. First, on the part of the end itself; and in this way
effect of government is that which is caused in the things
there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme
governed. This is one, namely, the good which consists in
good. Secondly, the effect of the government of the world
order; as may be seen in the example of an army. There-
may be considered on the part of those things by means of
fore the government of the world has but one effect.
which the creature is made like to God. Thus there are, in
Objection 2. Further, from one there naturally pro-
general, two effects of the government. For the creature
ceeds but one. But the world is governed by one as we
is assimilated to God in two things; first, with regard to
have proved (a. 3). Therefore also the effect of this gov-
this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like
ernment is but one.
Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this, that
Objection 3. Further, if the effect of government is
God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature
not one by reason of the unity of the Governor, it must be
becomes like God by moving others to be good. Where-
many by reason of the many things governed. But these
fore there are two effects of government, the preservation
are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we cannot as-
of things in their goodness, and the moving of things to
sign any definite number to the effects of government.
good. Thirdly, we may consider in the individual the ef-
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii):
fects of the government of the world; and in this way they
“God contains all and fills all by His providence and per-
are without number.
fect goodness.” But government belongs to providence.
Reply to Objection 1. The order of the universe in-
Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine
cludes both the preservation of things created by God and
government.
their movement. As regards these two things we find or-
I answer that, The effect of any action may be judged
der among them, inasmuch as one is better than another;
from its end; because it is by action that the attainment
and one is moved by another.
of the end is effected. Now the end of the government
From what has been said above, we can gather the
of the world is the essential good, to the participation and
replies to the other two objections.
similarity of which all things tend. Consequently the ef-
517
Whether all things are subject to the Divine government?
Ia q. 103 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that not all things are
abandoned the earth” (Ezech. 9:9).
subject to the Divine government. For it is written (Ec-
Reply to Objection 1. These things are said to be un-
cles. 9:11): “I saw that under the sun the race is not to the
der the sun which are generated and corrupted according
swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise,
to the sun’s movement. In all such things we find chance:
nor riches to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time
not that everything is casual which occurs in such things;
and chance in all.” But things subject to the Divine gov-
but that in each one there is an element of chance. And
ernment are not ruled by chance. Therefore those things
the very fact that an element of chance is found in those
which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine gov-
things proves that they are subject to government of some
ernment.
kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9):
higher being, they would tend to nothing definite, espe-
“God hath no care for oxen.” But he that governs has care
cially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So noth-
for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not sub-
ing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes the
ject to the Divine government.
nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen
Objection 3. Further, what can govern itself needs not
by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher
to be governed by another. But the rational creature can
cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance
govern itself; since it is master of its own act, and acts
in all things, but “time and chance,” that is to say, that
of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems
defects may be found in these things according to some
proper to things which are governed. Therefore all things
order of time.
are not subject to the Divine government.
Reply to Objection 2. Government implies a cer-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11):
tain change effected by the governor in the things gov-
“Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even
erned. Now every movement is the act of a movable thing,
the bowels of the lowest animal, even the wing of the bird,
caused by the moving principle, as is laid down Phys. iii,
the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God en-
3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is
dowed with every fitting detail of their nature.” Therefore
an act. Consequently, various movable things must be
all things are subject to His government.
moved variously, even as regards movement by one and
I answer that, For the same reason is God the ruler of
the same mover. Thus by the one art of the Divine gov-
things as He is their cause, because the same gives exis-
ernor, various things are variously governed according to
tence as gives perfection; and this belongs to government.
their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of them-
Now God is the cause not indeed only of some particular
selves, having dominion over their actions; and these are
kind of being, but of the whole universal being, as proved
governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by
above (q. 44, Aa. 1,2). Wherefore, as there can be noth-
God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in
ing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing
this, that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly
which is not subject to His government. This can also
from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and pun-
be proved from the nature of the end of government. For
ishments. But irrational creatures which do not act but are
a man’s government extends over all those things which
acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence, when
come under the end of his government. Now the end of
the Apostle says that “God hath no care for oxen,” he does
the Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have
not wholly withdraw them from the Divine government,
shown (a. 2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is
but only as regards the way in which rational creatures are
not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, as is clear
governed.
from what we have said above (q. 44, a. 4; q. 65, a. 2),
Reply to Objection 3. The rational creature governs
so it is impossible for anything to escape from the Divine
itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to
government.
be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and
Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said
will. Therefore above the government whereby the ra-
that the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or
tional creature governs itself as master of its own act, it
that even human affairs, were not subject to the Divine
requires to be governed by God.
government. These are represented as saying, “God hath
518
Whether all things are immediately governed by God?
Ia q. 103 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that all things are gov-
The reason of this is that as God is the very essence
erned by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Neme-
of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in
sius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the opinion of Plato who
its highest degree of goodness. Now the highest degree of
divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes
goodness in any practical order, design or knowledge (and
to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things
such is the design of government) consists in knowing the
and all universals; the second providence he attributes to
individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the
the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to
one who can only give his attention to general principles,
watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes
but who can consider the least details; and so on in other
a third providence to certain spirits who are guardians on
things. Therefore we must say that God has the design of
earth of human actions. Therefore it seems that all things
the government of all things, even of the very least.
are immediately governed by God.
But since things which are governed should be
Objection 2. Further, it is better that a thing be done
brought to perfection by government, this government
by one, if possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says
will be so much the better in the degree the things gov-
(Phys. viii, 6). But God can by Himself govern all things
erned are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater per-
without any intermediary cause. Therefore it seems that
fection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of
He governs all things immediately.
goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. There-
Objection 3. Further, in God nothing is defective or
fore God so governs things that He makes some of them
imperfect. But it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to gov-
to be causes of others in government; as a master, who
ern by means of others; thus an earthly king, by reason
not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also
of his not being able to do everything himself, and be-
the faculty of teaching others.
cause he cannot be everywhere at the same time, requires
Reply to Objection 1. Plato’s opinion is to be re-
to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs
jected, because he held that God did not govern all things
all things immediately.
immediately, even in the design of government; this is
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): “As
clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is
the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly
the design of government, into three parts.
way by bodies of greater subtlety and power; so all bodies
Reply to Objection 2. If God governed alone, things
are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and
would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Where-
unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and just spirit of life; fore all that is effected by many would not be accom-and this spirit by God Himself.”
plished by one.
I answer that, In government there are two things to
Reply to Objection 3. That an earthly king should
be considered; the design of government, which is prov-
have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of
idence itself; and the execution of the design. As to the
his being imperfect, but also of his dignity; because by
design of government, God governs all things immedi-
the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into
ately; whereas in its execution, He governs some things
greater evidence.
by means of others.
Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government?
Ia q. 103 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem possible that something
with the eternal design. Therefore, if nothing happens
may occur outside the order of the Divine government.
outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that
For Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that “God disposes all
all things happen by necessity, and nothing is contingent;
for good.” Therefore, if nothing happens outside the or-
which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to
der of the Divine government, it would follow that no evil
occur outside the order of the Divine government.
exists.
On the contrary, It is written (Esther 13:9): “O Lord,
Objection 2. Further, nothing that is in accordance
Lord, almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and
with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance.
there is none that can resist Thy will.”
Therefore, if nothing occurs outside the order of the Di-
I answer that, It is possible for an effect to result out-vine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous
side the order of some particular cause; but not outside
and casual.
the order of the universal cause. The reason of this is that
Objection 3. Further, the order of Divine Providence
no effect results outside the order of a particular cause,
is certain and unchangeable; because it is in accordance
except through some other impeding cause; which other
519
cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; evil through its escaping from the order of some particu-as indigestion may occur outside the order of the nutri-
lar good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine
tive power by some such impediment as the coarseness
government, it would wholly cease to exist.
of the food, which again is to be ascribed to some other
Reply to Objection 2. Things are said to be fortuitous
cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause.
as regards some particular cause from the order of which
Therefore as God is the first universal cause, not of one
they escape. But as to the order of Divine providence,
genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for
“nothing in the world happens by chance,” as Augustine
anything to occur outside the order of the Divine govern-
declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
ment; but from the very fact that from one point of view
Reply to Objection 3. Certain effects are said to be
something seems to evade the order of Divine providence
contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which
considered in regard to one particular cause, it must nec-
may fail in their effects; and not as though anything could
essarily come back to that order as regards some other
happen entirely outside the order of Divine government.
cause.
The very fact that something occurs outside the order of
Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing wholly evil
some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself
in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown
subject to the Divine government.
above (q. 48, a. 3). Therefore something is said to be
Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?
Ia q. 103 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem possible that some resis-
ways: firstly from the fact that the order of the Divine gov-
tance can be made to the order of the Divine government.
ernment is wholly directed to good, and everything by its
For it is written (Is. 3:8): “Their tongue and their devices
own operation and effort tends to good only, “for no one
are against the Lord.”
acts intending evil,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
Objection 2. Further, a king does not justly punish
secondly from the fact that, as we have said above (a. 1, ad
those who do not rebel against his commands. Therefore
3; a. 5, ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natu-
if no one rebelled against God’s commands, no one would
ral or voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from
be justly punished by God.
the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow towards a
Objection 3. Further, everything is subject to the or-
fixed point is nothing but an impulse received from the
der of the Divine government. But some things oppose
archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free,
others. Therefore some things rebel against the order of
attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of its own
the Divine government.
accord. For this reason God is said “to order all things
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol.
iii):
sweetly.”
“There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this
Reply to Objection 1. Some are said to think or
sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that
speak, or act against God: not that they entirely resist the
ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly,” as is said
order of the Divine government; for even the sinner in-
(Wis. 8) of Divine wisdom.
tends the attainment of a certain good: but because they
I answer that, We may consider the order of Divine
resist some particular good, which belongs to their nature
providence in two ways: in general, inasmuch as it pro-
or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God.
ceeds from the governing cause of all; and in particular,
Reply obj. 2 is clear from the above.
inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which
Reply to Objection 3. From the fact that one thing
executes the order of the Divine government.
opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist
Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the or-
the order of a particular cause; but not that order which
der of the Divine government. This can be proved in two
depends on the universal cause of all things.
520
FIRST PART, QUESTION 104
The Special Effects of the Divine Government
(In Four Articles)
We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular; concerning which four points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God?
(2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God?
(3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness?
(4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?
Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?
Ia q. 104 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that creatures do not need
Objection 4. Further, if God keeps creatures in be-
to be kept in being by God. For what cannot not-be, does
ing, this is done by some action. Now every action of an
not need to be kept in being; just as that which cannot de-
agent, if that action be efficacious, produces something in
part, does not need to be kept from departing. But some
the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God must
creatures by their very nature cannot not-be. Therefore
produce something in the creature. But this is not so; be-
not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The
cause this action does not give being to the creature, since
middle proposition is proved thus. That which is included
being is not given to that which already is: nor does it add
in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its
anything new to the creature; because either God would
contrary cannot be in it; thus a multiple of two must nec-
not keep the creature in being continually, or He would be
essarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number.
continually adding something new to the creature; either
Now form brings being with itself, because everything is
of which is unreasonable. Therefore creatures are not kept
actually in being, so far as it has form. But some crea-
in being by God.
tures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 1:3): “Upholding
(q. 50, Aa. 2,5): and thus to be is in them of themselves.
all things by the word of His power.”
The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose mat-
I answer that, Both reason and faith bind us to say
ter is in potentiality to one form only, as above explained
that creatures are kept in being by God. To make this
of heavenly bodies (q. 66, a. 2). Therefore such creatures
clear, we must consider that a thing is preserved by an-
as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot
other in two ways.
First, indirectly, and accidentally;
not-be; for there can be no potentiality to not-being, either
thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing
in the form which has being of itself, or in matter exist-
the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to pre-
ing under a form which it cannot lose, since it is not in
serve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. In
potentiality to any other form.
this way God preserves some things, but not all, for there
Objection 2. Further, God is more powerful than any
are some things of such a nature that nothing can corrupt
created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to
them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from cor-
act, can cause its effect to be preserved in being; thus the
ruption. Secondly, a thing is said to preserve another ‘per
house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to
se’ and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends
build; and water remains hot for some time after the fire
on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without
has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause
it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by
His creature to be kept in being, after He has ceased to
God. For the being of every creature depends on God, so
create it.
that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into
Objection 3. Further, nothing violent can occur, ex-
nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of
cept there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to
the Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi).
not-being is unnatural and violent to any creature, since
This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on
all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no creature
its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must observe that
can tend to not-being, except through some active cause
an agent may be the cause of the “becoming” of its effect,
of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature
but not directly of its “being.” This may be seen both in
that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual
artificial and in natural beings: for the builder causes the
substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures
house in its “becoming,” but he is not the direct cause of
cannot tend to not-being, even if God were to withdraw
its “being.” For it is clear that the “being” of the house is
His action.
a result of its form, which consists in the putting together
521
and arrangement of the materials, and results from the nat-it has the form of fire imperfectly and inchoately, the heat
ural qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the
will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect
food by applying the natural activity of fire; thus a builder
participation of the principle of heat. On the other hand,
constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and
air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same
wood which are able to be put together in a certain or-
way as it exists in the sun, which is the principle of light.
der and to preserve it. Therefore the “being” of a house
Therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases
depends on the nature of these materials, just as its “be-
with the action of the sun.
coming” depends on the action of the builder. The same
Now every creature may be compared to God, as the
principle applies to natural things. For if an agent is not
air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun pos-
the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the
sesses light by its nature, and as the air is enlightened by
cause of “being” which results from that form; but it will
sharing the sun’s nature; so God alone is Being in virtue
be the cause of the effect, in its “becoming” only.
of His own Essence, since His Essence is His existence;
Now it is clear that of two things in the same species
whereas every creature has being by participation, so that
one cannot directly cause the other’s form as such, since it
its essence is not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine
would then be the cause of its own form, which is essen-
says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): “If the ruling power of God
tially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the
were withdrawn from His creatures, their nature would at
cause of this form for as much as it is in matter—in other
once cease, and all nature would collapse.” In the same
words, it may be the cause that “this matter” receives “this
work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says: “As the air becomes
form.” And this is to be the cause of “becoming,” as when
light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by
man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a
the presence of God, and in His absence returns at once to
natural effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from
darkness.”
its active cause an impression specifically the same as in
Reply to Objection 1. “Being” naturally results from
that active cause, then the “becoming” of the effect, but
the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine
not its “being,” depends on the agent.
action; just as light results from the diaphanous nature of
Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to
the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the po-
receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it
tentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and heavenly
exists in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents
bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His
which do not produce an effect of the same species as
influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.
themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the genera-
Reply to Objection 2. God cannot grant to a creature
tion of inferior bodies which differ from them in species.
to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine
Such an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and
influence: as neither can He make it not to have received
not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is
its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be pre-
not merely the cause of “becoming” but also the cause of
served by God in so far as the being of an effect depends
“being.”
on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison
Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue
with an agent that is not the cause of ‘being’ but only of
when that action of the agent ceases which causes the “be-
“becoming.”
coming” of the effect: so neither can the “being” of a thing
Reply to Objection 3. This argument holds in regard
continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is
to that preservation which consists in the removal of cor-
the cause of the effect not only in “becoming” but also in
ruption: but all creatures do not need to be preserved thus,
“being.” This is why hot water retains heat after the ces-
as stated above.
sation of the fire’s action; while, on the contrary, the air
Reply to Objection 4. The preservation of things by
does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when
God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives ex-
the sun ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter
istence, which action is without either motion or time; so
susceptive of the fire’s heat in the same way as it exists in
also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual
the fire. Wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect
influence of the sun.
form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if
Whether God preserves every creature immediately?
Ia q. 104 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that God preserves ev-
serves all things immediately.
ery creature immediately. For God creates and preserves
Objection 2. Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to things by the same action, as above stated (a. 1, ad 4). But
another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve
God created all things immediately. Therefore He pre-
itself; much less therefore can it be given to a creature
522
to preserve another. Therefore God preserves all things vation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher
without any intermediate cause preserving them.
causes: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi,
Objection 3. Further, an effect is kept in being by the
6), that the first, namely the diurnal movement is the cause
cause, not only of its “becoming,” but also of its being.
of the continuation of things generated; whereas the sec-
But all created causes do not seem to cause their effects
ond movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of
except in their “becoming,” for they cause only by mov-
diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like man-
ing, as above stated (q. 45, a. 3). Therefore they do not
ner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the plan-
cause so as to keep their effects in being.
ets, those things which are permanent and fixed. So we
On the contrary, A thing is kept in being by that
conclude that God keeps certain things in being, by means
which gives it being. But God gives being by means
of certain causes.
of certain intermediate causes. Therefore He also keeps
Reply to Objection 1. God created all things imme-
things in being by means of certain causes.
diately, but in the creation itself He established an order
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), a thing keeps
among things, so that some depend on others, by which
another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and acciden-
they are preserved in being, though He remains the prin-
tally, by removing or hindering the action of a corrupting
cipal cause of their preservation.
cause; secondly, directly and “per se,” by the fact that that
Reply to Objection 2. Since an effect is preserved
on it depends the other’s being, as the being of the effect
by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no ef-
depends on the cause. And in both ways a created thing
fect can be its own cause, but can only produce another
keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corpo-
effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of
real things there are many causes which hinder the action
self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving
of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preser-
another.
vatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and
Reply to Objection 3. No created nature can be the
in like manner with many other things. It happens also
cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new
that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For
form, or disposition, except by virtue of some change;
when we have a series of causes depending on one an-
for the created nature acts always on something presup-
other, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends
posed. But after causing the form or disposition in the
first and principally on the first cause, it also depends in
effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause
a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the
preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it
first cause is the principal cause of the preservation of the
is lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken
effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a
place, while the preservation of the light is without any
secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle cause
further change in the air due to the presence of the source
is higher and nearer to the first cause.
of light.
For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preser-
Whether God can annihilate anything?
Ia q. 104 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot anni-
corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything.
hilate anything. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21)
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 10:24): “Correct
that “God is not the cause of anything tending to non-
me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury,
existence.” But He would be such a cause if He were to
lest Thou bring me to nothing.”
annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate any-
I answer that, Some have held that God, in giving ex-
thing.
istence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were
Objection 2. Further, by His goodness God is the
this true, God could not annihilate anything, since His na-
cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (De
ture cannot change. But, as we have said above (q. 19,
Doctr. Christ. i, 32): “Because God is good, we exist.”
a. 4), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely con-
But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot
trary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God cre-
cause things to cease to exist; which would be the case
ated things of His own free-will, according to Ps. 134:6:
were He to annihilate anything.
“Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done.” Therefore
Objection 3. Further, if God were to annihilate any-
that God gives existence to a creature depends on His will;
thing it would be by His action. But this cannot be; be-
nor does He preserve things in existence otherwise than by
cause the term of every action is existence. Hence even the
continually pouring out existence into them, as we have
action of a corrupting cause has its term in something gen-
said. Therefore, just as before things existed, God was
erated; for when one thing is generated another undergoes
free not to give them existence, and not to make them; so
523
after they are made, He is free not to continue their exis-Reply to Objection 2. God’s goodness is the cause
tence; and thus they would cease to exist; and this would
of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the
be to annihilate them.
Divine goodness does not depend on creatures; but by His
Reply to Objection 1. Non-existence has no direct
free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His good-
cause; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has
ness, He might not have produced things into existence,
existence, and a being essentially as such is a cause of
so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not pre-
something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a thing
serve things in existence.
to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has this ten-
Reply to Objection 3. If God were to annihilate any-
dency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But
thing, this would not imply an action on God’s part; but a
indirectly God can be the cause of things being reduced to
mere cessation of His action.
non-existence, by withdrawing His action therefrom.
Whether anything is annihilated?
Ia q. 104 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that something is annihi-
ruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not per-
lated. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But in the
tain to the manifestation of grace; since rather the power
beginning there was nothing but God. Therefore all things
and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation
must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but God.
of things in existence. Wherefore we must conclude by
Therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing.
denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated.
Objection 2.
Further, every creature has a finite
Reply to Objection 1. That things are brought into
power. But no finite power extends to the infinite. Where-
existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the
fore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that, “a finite
power of Him Who made them; but that they should be
power cannot move in infinite time.” Therefore a creature
reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since
cannot last for an infinite duration; and so at some time it
the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserv-
will be reduced to nothing.
ing all things in existence, according to the Apostle: “Up-
Objection 3. Further, forms and accidents have no
holding all things by the word of His power” (Heb. 1:3).
matter as part of themselves. But at some time they cease
Reply to Objection 2. A creature’s potentiality to ex-
to exist. Therefore they are reduced to nothing.
istence is merely receptive; the active power belongs to
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 3:14): “I have
God Himself, from Whom existence is derived. Where-
learned that all the works that God hath made continue for
fore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the
ever.”
infinity of the Divine power. To some things, however, is
I answer that, Some of those things which God does
given a determinate power of duration for a certain time,
in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course
so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent
of things; others happen miraculously, and not in accor-
from receiving the influx of existence which comes from
dance with the natural order, as will be explained (q. 105,
Him Whom finite power cannot resist, for an infinite, but
a. 6). Now whatever God wills to do according to the nat-
only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary,
ural order of things may be observed from their nature; but
although they have a finite power, continue to exist for
those things which occur miraculously, are ordered for the
ever.
manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, “To each
Reply to Objection 3. Forms and accidents are not
one is given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit” (1
complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one
Cor. 12:7); and subsequently he mentions, among others,
of them is something “of a being”; for it is called a be-
the working of miracles.
ing, because something is by it. Yet so far as their mode
Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is
of existence is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to
annihilated. For, either they are immaterial, and therefore
nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that
have no potentiality to non-existence; or they are material,
they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of the sub-
and then they continue to exist, at least in matter, which is
ject.
incorruptible, since it is the subject of generation and cor-
524
FIRST PART, QUESTION 105
Of the Change of Creatures by God
(In Eight Articles)
We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures by God; secondly, the change of one creature by another.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form?
(2) Whether He can immediately move a body?
(3) Whether He can move the intellect?
(4) Whether He can move the will?
(5) Whether God works in every worker?
(6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things?
(7) Whether all that God does is miraculous?
(8) Of the diversity of miracles.
Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form?
Ia q. 105 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot move
Reply to Objection 1. An effect is assimilated to the
the matter immediately to receive the form. For as the
active cause in two ways. First, according to the same
Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), nothing can
species; as man is generated by man, and fire by fire. Sec-
bring a form into any particular matter, except that form
ondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the
which is in matter; because, like begets like. But God is
form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause: thus
not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in
animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and miner-
matter.
als are like the sun and stars, by whose power they are
Objection 2. Further, any agent inclined to several ef-
produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause
fects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to
as regards all that over which the power of that cause ex-
a particular one by some other cause; for, as the Philoso-
tends. Now the power of God extends to both matter and
pher says (De Anima iii, 11), a general assertion does not
form; as we have said above (q. 14, a. 2; q. 44, a. 2);
move the mind, except by means of some particular ap-
wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened
prehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause
to God by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the
of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any particular
composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore
form, except by means of a particular agent.
just as the composite generator can move matter to a form
Objection 3. As universal being depends on the first
by generating a composite thing like itself; so also can
universal cause, so determinate being depends on deter-
God. But no other form not existing in matter can do this;
minate particular causes; as we have seen above (q. 104,
because the power of no other separate substance extends
a. 2). But the determinate being of a particular thing is
over matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible
from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are pro-
matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making
duced by God, only by means of particular causes.
use of corporeal seeds.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7): “God formed
Reply to Objection 2. This argument would hold if
man of the slime of the earth.”
God were to act of natural necessity. But since He acts by
I answer that, God can move matter immediately to
His will and intellect, which knows the particular and not
form; because whatever is in passive potentiality can be
only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He
reduced to act by the active power which extends over
can determinately imprint this or that form on matter.
that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power ex-
Reply to Objection 3. The fact that secondary causes
tends over matter, as produced by God, it can be reduced
are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; where-
to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by
fore since God ordains other causes to certain effects He
matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing else
can also produce certain effects by Himself without any
but the act of matter.
other cause.
525
Whether God can move a body immediately?
Ia q. 105 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot move a
fore, as God can imprint form immediately in matter, it
body immediately. For as the mover and the moved must
follows that He can move any body whatever in respect of
exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vii,
any movement whatever.
2), it follows that there must be some contact between
Reply to Objection 1. There are two kinds of contact;
the mover and moved. But there can be no contact be-
corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and
tween God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1):
virtual contact, as the cause of sadness is said to touch the
“There is no contact with God.” Therefore God cannot
one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God,
move a body immediately.
as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is touched; but
Objection 2. Further, God is the mover unmoved.
according to virtual contact He touches creatures by mov-
But such also is the desirable object when apprehended.
ing them; but He is not touched, because the natural power
Therefore God moves as the object of desire and appre-
of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius
hension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the
understand the words, “There is no contact with God”;
intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power.
that is, so that God Himself be touched.
Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.
Reply to Objection 2. God moves as the object of
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys.
desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He
viii, 10) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. But
always moves as being desired and apprehended by that
it is impossible for a body to be moved in one instant;
which is moved; but as being desired and known by Him-
for since every movement is between opposites, it follows
self; for He does all things for His own goodness.
that two opposites would exist at once in the same subject,
Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher (Phys. viii,
which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved
10) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is
immediately by an infinite power. But God’s power is in-
not a power of the first mover “of bulk,” by the following
finite, as we have explained (q. 25, a. 2). Therefore God
argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which
cannot move a body immediately.
he proves from the fact that the first mover can move in
On the contrary, God produced the works of the six
infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power
days immediately among which is included the move-
“of bulk,” would move without time, which is impossible;
ments of bodies, as is clear from Gn. 1:9 “Let the waters
therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in
be gathered together into one place.” Therefore God alone
something which is not measured by its bulk. Whence it
can move a body immediately.
is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only
I answer that, It is erroneous to say that God can-
be the result of an infinite power. The reason is that ev-
not Himself produce all the determinate effects which are
ery power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by
produced by any created cause. Wherefore, since bodies
the necessity of its nature. But an infinite power surpasses
are moved immediately by created causes, we cannot pos-
out of all proportion any finite power. Now the greater
sibly doubt that God can move immediately any bodies
the power of the mover, the greater is the velocity of the
whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated
movement. Therefore, since a finite power moves in a de-
(a. 1). For every movement of any body whatever, either
terminate time, it follows that an infinite power does not
results from a form, as the movements of things heavy
move in any time; for between one time and any other
and light result from the form which they have from their
time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power
generating cause, for which reason the generator is called
which is not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being,
the mover; or else tends to a form, as heating tends to the
which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to
form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint
them; and therefore, since it cannot be fitting for a body
a form, to dispose to that form, and to give the movement
to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves
which results from that form; for fire not only generates
without time.
fire, but it also heats and moves things upwards. There-
Whether God moves the created intellect immediately?
Ia q. 105 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that God does not imme-
not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover.
diately move the created intellect. For the action of the
Therefore the intellect is not moved by another; and so
intellect is governed by its own subject; since it does not
apparently God cannot move the created intellect.
pass into external matter; as stated in Metaph. ix, Did.
Objection 2. Further, anything which in itself is a suf-
viii, 8. But the action of what is moved by another does
ficient principle of movement, is not moved by another.
526
But the movement of the intellect is its act of understand-the cause of all that follows, we must conclude that from
ing; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to
Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since
feel is a kind of movement, as the Philosopher says (De
He is the First Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him
Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which is natural to
as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligi-
the soul, is a sufficient principle of understanding. There-
bly in Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the
fore it is not moved by another.
intelligible types of everything exist first of all in God, and Objection 3. Further, as the senses are moved by the
are derived from Him by other intellects in order that these
sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. But
may actually understand; so also are they derived by crea-
God is not intelligible to us, and exceeds the capacity of
tures that they may subsist. Therefore God so moves the
our intellect. Therefore God cannot move our intellect.
created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual
On the contrary, The teacher moves the intellect of
power, whether natural, or superadded; and impresses on
the one taught. But it is written (Ps. 93:10) that God
the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains
“teaches man knowledge.” Therefore God moves the hu-
and preserves both power and species in existence.
man intellect.
Reply to Objection 1. The intellectual operation is
I answer that, As in corporeal movement that is
performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a sec-
called the mover which gives the form that is the principle
ondary cause; but it proceeds from God as from its first
of movement, so that is said to move the intellect, which
cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the
is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellec-
one who understands.
tual operation, called the movement of the intellect. Now
Reply to Objection 2. The intellectual light together
there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the
with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient
intelligent being; one which is the intellectual power it-
principle of understanding; but it is a secondary principle,
self, which principle exists in the one who understands in
and depends upon the First Principle.
potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual un-
Reply to Objection 3. The intelligible object moves
derstanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood
our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it
in the one who understands. So a thing is said to move
its own likeness, by means of which the intellect is able
the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the
to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses
power of understanding; or impresses on him the likeness
on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the cre-
of the thing understood.
ated intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as
Now God moves the created intellect in both ways.
we have seen above (q. 12, a. 2; q. 56, a. 3). Hence He
For He is the First immaterial Being; and as intellectuality
moves the created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelli-
is a result of immateriality, it follows that He is the First
gible to it, as we have explained (q. 12, a. 4).
intelligent Being. Therefore since in each order the first is
Whether God can move the created will?
Ia q. 105 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot move
accomplish.”
the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is
I answer that, As the intellect is moved by the object
forced. But the will cannot be forced. Therefore it is not
and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated
moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by
above (a. 3), so is the will moved by its object, which is
God.
good, and by Him who creates the power of willing. Now
Objection 2. Further, God cannot make two contra-
the will can be moved by good as its object, but by God
dictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow
alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move
if He moved the will; for to be voluntarily moved means
a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the
to be moved from within, and not by another. Therefore
mover surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the
God cannot move the will.
thing movable. Now the potentiality of the will extends
Objection 3. Further, movement is attributed to the
to the universal good; for its object is the universal good;
mover rather than to the one moved; wherefore homicide
just as the object of the intellect is the universal being. But is not ascribed to the stone, but to the thrower. Therefore,
every created good is some particular good; God alone is
if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are
the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the capacity
not imputed to man for reward or blame. But this is false.
of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In like
Therefore God does not move the will.
manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:13): “It is God
to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of
who worketh in us [Vulgate—‘you’] both to will and to
the will, which is universal good. But to incline towards
527
the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inthe ultimate end is proportionate; just as in human affairs
clination.
to him that presides over the community belongs the di-
Reply to Objection 2. To be moved voluntarily, is to
recting of his subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in
be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet
both ways it belongs to God to move the will; but espe-
this interior principle may be caused by an exterior prin-
cially in the second way by an interior inclination of the
ciple; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to
will.
being moved by another.
Reply to Objection 1. A thing moved by another is
Reply to Objection 3. If the will were so moved by
forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is
another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the
moved by another giving to it the proper natural inclina-
act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame.
tion, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to
But since its being moved by another does not prevent its
move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not
being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2),
forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does
it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.
Whether God works in every agent?
Ia q. 105 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that God does not work in
is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency
second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature.
to God. If therefore God works in every agent, He works
We must therefore understand that God works in things in
sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous
such a manner that things have their proper operation.
for the created agent to work at all.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that as
Objection 2. Further, the same work cannot proceed
there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of
at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and
action, but is the subject that receives the effect of action.
the same movement belong to two movable things. There-
On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are
fore if the creature’s operation is from God operating in
principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first
the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from the
principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the
creature; and so no creature works at all.
second is the agent; the third is the form of that which
Objection 3. Further, the maker is the cause of the op-
the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts
eration of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby
through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things
it operates. Therefore, if God is the cause of the opera-
made by art. For the craftsman is moved to action by the
tion of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as
end, which is the thing wrought, for instance a chest or a
He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the
bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its
beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God
being sharp.
does not operate any further in the operating creature.
Thus then does God work in every worker, according
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 26:12): “Lord,
to these three things. First as an end. For since every op-
Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: ‘for’] us.”
eration is for the sake of some good, real or apparent; and
I answer that, Some have understood God to work in
nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as
every agent in such a way that no created power has any
far as it participates in a likeness to the Supreme Good,
effect in things, but that God alone is the ultimate cause
which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause
of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that
of every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed
gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth. But this is
that where there are several agents in order, the second al-
impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect
ways acts in virtue of the first; for the first agent moves
would be taken away from created things: and this would
the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God
imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the
Himself: and therefore He is the cause of action in ev-
power of the cause, that it bestows active power on its ef-
ery agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only
fect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen
moves things to operated, as it were applying their forms
to exist in things, would be bestowed on things to no pur-
and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the
pose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all
axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the
things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless,
axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms
if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the pur-
and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause
pose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is
of action not only by giving the form which is the prin-
always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently
ciple of action, as the generator is said to be the cause
as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which
of movement in things heavy and light; but also as pre-
528
serving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is and sinews.”
said to be the cause of the manifestation of colors, inas-
Reply to Objection 1.
God works sufficiently in
much as it gives and preserves the light by which colors
things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that
are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is within
the operation of secondary agents is superfluous.
the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the
Reply to Objection 2. One action does not proceed
First and Universal Cause; and because in all things God
from two agents of the same order. But nothing hinders
Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is
the same action from proceeding from a primary and a
innermost in all things; it follows that in all things God
secondary agent.
works intimately. For this reason in Holy Scripture the
Reply to Objection 3. God not only gives things their
operations of nature are attributed to God as operating in
form, but He also preserves them in existence, and ap-
nature, according to Job 10:11: “Thou hast clothed me
plies them to act, and is moreover the end of every action,
with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones
as above explained.
Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature?
Ia q. 105 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot do any-
the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding
thing outside the established order of nature. For Augus-
from Him, not by a natural necessity, but by the choice
tine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3) says: “God the Maker and
of His own will; for He could have created another order
Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature.” But
of things. Wherefore God can do something outside this
that which is outside the natural order seems to be against
order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by
nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural
producing the effects of secondary causes without them,
order.
or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes
Objection 2. Further, as the order of justice is from
do not extend. So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3):
God, so is the order of nature. But God cannot do any-
“God acts against the wonted course of nature, but by no
thing outside the order of justice; for then He would do
means does He act against the supreme law; because He
something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything out-
does not act against Himself.”
side the order of nature.
Reply to Objection 1. In natural things something
Objection 3. Further, God established the order of na-
may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It
ture. Therefore it God does anything outside the order of
may happen by the action of an agent which did not give
nature, it would seem that He is changeable; which cannot
them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a
be said.
man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi,
him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that
3): “God sometimes does things which are contrary to the
would be against nature. It may also happen by the ac-
ordinary course of nature.”
tion of the agent on whom the natural inclination depends;
I answer that, From each cause there results a certain
and this is not against nature, as is clear in the ebb and
order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and
flow of the tide, which is not against nature; although it
so, according to the multiplicity of causes, there results a
is against the natural movement of water in a downward
multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause
direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly
is subjected to cause. Wherefore a higher cause is not sub-
body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies
jected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An ex-
depends. Therefore since the order of nature is given to
ample of this may be seen in human affairs. On the father
things by God; if He does anything outside this order, it
of a family depends the order of the household; which or-
is not against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra
der is contained in the order of the city; which order again
Faust. xxvi, 3): “That is natural to each thing which is
depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order de-
caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and or-
pends on that of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is
der in nature.”
ordered.
Reply to Objection 2. The order of justice arises by
If therefore we consider the order of things depend-
relation to the First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice;
ing on the first cause, God cannot do anything against
and therefore God can do nothing against such order.
this order; for, if He did so, He would act against His
Reply to Objection 3. God fixed a certain order in
foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But if we
things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to
consider the order of things depending on any secondary
Himself whatever he intended to do otherwise than by a
cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for
particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He
He is not subject to the order of secondary causes; but, on
does not change.
529
Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous?
Ia q. 105 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that not everything which
I answer that, The word miracle is derived from ad-
God does outside the natural order of things, is miracu-
miration, which arises when an effect is manifest, whereas
lous. For the creation of the world, and of souls, and the
its cause is hidden; as when a man sees an eclipse without
justification of the unrighteous, are done by God outside
knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the begin-
the natural order; as not being accomplished by the action
ning of his Metaphysics. Now the cause of a manifest ef-
of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called mir-
fect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Where-
acles. Therefore not everything that God does outside the
fore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all to oth-
natural order is a miracle.
ers: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer.
Objection 2. Further, a miracle is “something diffi-
Now a miracle is so called as being full of wonder; as
cult, which seldom occurs, surpassing the faculty of na-
having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause
ture, and going so far beyond our hopes as to compel our
is God. Wherefore those things which God does outside
astonishment”∗. But some things outside the order of na-
those causes which we know, are called miracles.
ture are not arduous; for they occur in small things, such
Reply to Objection 1. Creation, and the justification
as the recovery and healing of the sick. Nor are they of
of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not,
rare occurrence, since they happen frequently; as when
properly speaking, miracles, because they are not of a na-
the sick were placed in the streets, to be healed by the
ture to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur
shadow of Peter (Acts 5:15). Nor do they surpass the fac-
outside the order of nature, since they do not belong to
ulty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor
that order.
are they beyond our hopes, since we all hope for the res-
Reply to Objection 2. An arduous thing is called
urrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside
a miracle, not on account of the excellence of the thing
the course of nature. Therefore not all things are outside
wherein it is done, but because it surpasses the faculty of
the course of natur are miraculous.
nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it
Objection 3. Further, the word miracle is derived
does not often happen, but because it is outside the usual
from admiration. Now admiration concerns things man-
natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to
ifest to the senses. But sometimes things happen out-
be above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of the
side the order of nature, which are not manifest to the
substance of the thing done, but also on account of the
senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowl-
manner and order in which it is done. Again, a miracle
edge without studying or being taught. Therefore not ev-
is said to go beyond the hope “of nature,” not above the
erything that occurs outside the order of nature is miracu-
hope “of grace,” which hope comes from faith, whereby
lous.
we believe in the future resurrection.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi,
Reply to Objection 3. The knowledge of the Apos-
3): “Where God does anything against that order of nature
tles, although not manifest in itself, yet was made mani-
which we know and are accustomed to observe, we call it
fest in its effect, from which it was shown to be wonderful.
a miracle.”
Whether one miracle is greater than another?
Ia q. 105 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that one miracle is not
do, and greater than these shall he do.”
greater than another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volu-
I answer that, Nothing is called a miracle by compar-
sian. cxxxvii): “In miraculous deeds, the whole measure
ison with the Divine Power; because no action is of any
of the deed is the power of the doer.” But by the same
account compared with the power of God, according to Is.
power of God all miracles are done. Therefore one mira-
40:15: “Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket,
cle is not greater than another.
and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance.” But a
Objection 2. Further, the power of God is infinite.
thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power of
But the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion;
nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of na-
and therefore no more reason exists to wonder at one ef-
ture is surpassed, the greater the miracle. Now the power
fect thereof than at another. Therefore one miracle is not
of nature is surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the sub-
greater than another.
stance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the
On the contrary, The Lord says, speaking of miracu-
same place, or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human
lous works (Jn. 14:12): “The works that I do, he also shall
body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable
∗ St. Augustine, De utilitate credendi xvi.
530
to do; and these hold the highest rank among miracles.
suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a
Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the
natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and
deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the
Elias; and these hold the lowest place in miracles. More-
dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature
over, each of these kinds has various degrees, according
can give life, but not to the dead; and such hold the sec-
to the different ways in which the power of nature is sur-
ond rank in miracles. Thirdly, a thing surpasses nature’s
passed.
power in the measure and order in which it is done; as
From this is clear how to reply to the objections, argu-
when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treat-
ing as they do from the Divine power.
ment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air is
531
FIRST PART, QUESTION 106
How One Creature Moves Another
(In Four Articles)
We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will be threefold: (1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual creatures; (2) How bodies move; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature.
Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered: (1) How an angel acts on an angel; (2) How an angel acts on a corporeal nature; (3) How an angel acts on man.
The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both of the good and of the bad angels.
Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?
(2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?
(3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?
(4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he knows himself?
Whether one angel enlightens another?
Ia q. 106 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that one angel does not
knows himself. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii):
enlighten another. For the angels possess now the same
“Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly
beatitude which we hope to obtain. But one man will not
beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds.”
then enlighten another, according to Jer. 31:34: “They
Now since two things concur in the intellectual oper-
shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every
ation, as we have said (q. 105, a. 3), namely, the intel-
man his brother.” Therefore neither does an angel en-
lectual power, and the likeness of the thing understood;
lighten another now.
in both of these one angel can notify the known truth to
Objection 2. Further, light in the angels is threefold;
another. First, by strengthening his intellectual power;
of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlight-
for just as the power of an imperfect body is strength-
ened in the light of nature by the Creator; in the light of
ened by the neighborhood of a more perfect body —for
grace by the Justifier; in the light of glory by the Beatifier; instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of
all of which comes from God. Therefore one angel does
what is hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior an-
not enlighten another.
gel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him:
Objection 3. Further, light is a form in the mind. But
since in spiritual things, for one thing to turn to another,
the rational mind is “informed by God alone, without cre-
corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. Sec-
ated intervention,” as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51).
ondly, one angel manifests the truth to another as regards
Therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of an-
the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior an-
other.
gel receives the knowledge of truth by a kind of univer-
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii)
sal conception, to receive which the inferior angel’s in-
that “the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, en-
tellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is natural to him
lightened and perfected by the angels of the first hierar-
to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore
chy.”
the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which
I answer that, One angel enlightens another. To make
he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the
this clear, we must observe that intellectual light is noth-
inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge.
ing else than a manifestation of truth, according to Eph.
Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself
5:13: “All that is made manifest is light.” Hence to en-
to others, divides into many points the knowledge which
lighten means nothing else but to communicate to others
he possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by
the manifestation of the known truth; according to the
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): “Every intellectual substance
Apostle (Eph. 3:8): “To me the least of all the saints is
with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform
given this grace. . . to enlighten all men, that they may see
knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to
what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been
lead its inferiors upwards by analogy.”
hidden from eternity in God.” Therefore one angel is said
Reply to Objection 1. All the angels, both inferior
to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he
and superior, see the Essence of God immediately, and in
532
this respect one does not teach another. It is of this truth Reply to Objection 2. An angel does not enlighten
that the prophet speaks; wherefore he adds: “They shall
another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory;
teach no more every man his brother, saying: ‘Know the
but by strengthening his natural light, and by manifesting
Lord’: for all shall know Me, from the least of them even
to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace,
to the greatest.” But all the types of the Divine works,
and of glory, as explained above.
which are known in God as in their cause, God knows in
Reply to Objection 3. The rational mind is formed
Himself, because He comprehends Himself; but of others
immediately by God, either as the image from the exem-
who see God, each one knows the more types, the more
plar, forasmuch as it is made to the image of God alone;
perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior angel knows
or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for the
more about the types of the Divine works than an inferior
created mind is always considered to be unformed, except
angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the lat-
it adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlight-
ter; and as to this Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the
enment that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were,
angels “are enlightened by the types of existing things.”
dispositions to this ultimate form.
Whether one angel moves another angel’s will?
Ia q. 106 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that one angel can move
ficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But
another angel’s will. Because, according to Dionysius
he inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifest-
quoted above (a. 1), as one angel enlightens another, so
ing some created good ordered to God’s goodness. And
does he cleanse and perfect another. But cleansing and
thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or
perfecting seem to belong to the will: for the former seems
of God, by way of persuasion.
to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while
But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved
to be perfected is to obtain an end, which is the object
at all save by God. For the operation of the will is a cer-
of the will. Therefore an angel can move another angel’s
tain inclination of the willer to the thing willed. And He
will.
alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the
Objection 2. Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
creature the power to will: just as that agent alone can
vii): “The names of the angels designate their properties.”
change the natural inclination, which can give the power
Now the Seraphim are so called because they “kindle” or
to which follows that natural inclination. Now God alone
“give heat”: and this is by love which belongs to the will.
gave to the creature the power to will, because He alone
Therefore one angel moves another angel’s will.
is the author of the intellectual nature. Therefore an angel
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (De An-
cannot move another angel’s will.
ima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. But
Reply to Objection 1. Cleansing and perfecting are
as the intellect of the superior angel is higher, so also is
to be understood according to the mode of enlightenment.
his will. It seems, therefore, that the superior angel can
And since God enlightens by changing the intellect and
change the will of another angel.
will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will,
On the contrary, To him it belongs to change the will,
and perfects unto the end of the intellect and will. But
to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness: for righ-
the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intel-
teousness is the rightness of the will. But God alone be-
lect, as explained above (a. 1); therefore an angel is to be
stows righteousness. Therefore one angel cannot change
understood as cleansing from the defect of nescience in
another angel’s will.
the intellect; and as perfecting unto the consummate end
I answer that, As was said above (q. 105, a. 4), the
of the intellect, and this is the knowledge of truth. Thus
will is changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and
Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that “in the heavenly hier-
on the part of the power. On the part of the object, both the
archy the chastening of the inferior essence is an enlight-
good itself which is the object of the will, moves the will,
ening of things unknown, that leads them to more perfect
as the appetible moves the appetite; and he who points
knowledge.” For instance, we might say that corporeal
out the object, as, for instance, one who proves something
sight is cleansed by the removal of darkness; enlightened
to be good. But as we have said above (q. 105, a. 4),
by the diffusion of light; and perfected by being brought
other goods in a measure incline the will, yet nothing suf-
to the perception of the colored object.
ficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that
Reply to Objection 2. One angel can induce another
is God. And this good He alone shows, that it may be
to love God by persuasion as explained above.
seen by the blessed, Who, when Moses asked: “Show me
Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher speaks of the
Thy glory,” answered: “I will show thee all good” (Ex.
lower sensitive appetite which can be moved by the supe-
33:18,19). Therefore an angel does not move the will suf-
rior intellectual appetite, because it belongs to the same
533
nature of the soul, and because the inferior appetite is a angels.
power in a corporeal organ. But this does not apply to the
Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?
Ia q. 106 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that an inferior angel can
side the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the
enlighten a superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy
superior cause, as in human affairs the command of the
is derived from, and represents the heavenly hierarchy;
president is passed over from obedience to the prince. So
and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is called “our mother”
it happens that God works miraculously outside the or-
(Gal. 4:26). But in the Church even superiors are enlight-
der of corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the
ened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (1
knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that
Cor. 14:31): “You may all prophesy one by one, that all
belongs to spiritual substances in no way belongs to the
may learn and all may be exhorted.” Therefore, likewise
ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are
in the heavenly hierarchy, the superiors can be enlightened
not made known to us; as are the operations of sensible
by inferiors.
bodies. Thus the order which belongs to spiritual sub-
Objection 2. Further, as the order of corporeal sub-
stances is never passed over by God; so that the inferiors
stances depends on the will of God, so also does the order
are always moved by the superior, and not conversely.
of spiritual substances. But, as was said above (q. 105,
Reply to Objection 1. The ecclesiastical hierarchy
a. 6), God sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal
imitates the heavenly in some degree, but by a perfect like-
substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the
ness. For in the heavenly hierarchy the perfection of the
order of spiritual substances, by enlightening inferior oth-
order is in proportion to its nearness to God; so that those
erwise than through their superiors. Therefore in that way
who are the nearer to God are the more sublime in grade,
the inferiors enlightened by God can enlighten superiors.
and more clear in knowledge; and on that account the su-
Objection 3. Further, one angel enlightens the other
periors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas in
to whom he turns, as was above explained (a. 1). But since
the ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the
this turning to another is voluntary, the highest angel can
nearer to God in sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are
turn to the lowest passing over the others. Therefore he
not conspicuous for science; and some also are eminent
can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter can en-
in one kind of science, and fail in another; and on that
lighten his superiors.
account superiors may be taught by inferiors.
On the contrary, Dionysius says that “this is the Di-
Reply to Objection 2. As above explained, there is
vine unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by
no similarity between what God does outside the order of
the superior” (Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v).
corporeal nature, and that of spiritual nature. Hence the
I answer that, The inferior angels never enlighten the
argument does not hold.
superior, but are always enlightened by them. The reason
Reply to Objection 3. An angel turns voluntarily to
is, because, as above explained (q. 105, a. 6), one order
enlighten another angel, but the angel’s will is ever regu-
is under another, as cause is under cause; and hence as
lated by the Divine law which made the order in the an-
cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order. Therefore
gels.
there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done out-
Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself knows?
Ia q. 106 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the superior angel
gels did not know it until it was accomplished. Thus we
does not enlighten the inferior concerning all he himself
find that on some of the angels inquiring, as it were, in
knows. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the su-
ignorance: “Who is this King of glory?” other angels,
perior angels have a more universal knowledge; and the
who knew, answered: “The Lord of Hosts, He is the King
inferior a more particular and individual knowledge. But
of glory,” as Dionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But
more is contained under a universal knowledge than under
this would not apply if the superior angels enlightened the
a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the superior
inferior concerning all they know themselves. Therefore
angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being
they do not do so.
enlightened by the former.
Objection 3. Further, if the superior angels enlighten
Objection 2. Further, the Master of the Sentences
the inferior about all they know, nothing that the superior
(ii, D, 11) says that the superior angels had long known
angels know would be unknown to the inferior angels.
the Mystery of the Incarnation, whereas the inferior an-
Therefore the superior angels could communicate noth-
534
ing more to the inferior; which appears open to objection.
vine goodness, impart the same to those below them.
Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all
Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by
things.
the inferior as by the superior angels; and therefore the
On the contrary, Gregory∗ says: “In that heavenly
superior ever remain in a higher order, and have a more
country, though there are some excellent gifts, yet noth-
perfect knowledge; as the master understands the same
ing is held individually.” And Dionysius says: “Each
thing better than the pupil who learns from him.
heavenly essence communicates to the inferior the gift de-
Reply to Objection 1. The knowledge of the superior
rived from the superior” (Coel. Hier. xv), as quoted above
angels is said to be more universal as regards the more
(a. 1).
eminent mode of knowledge.
I answer that, Every creature participates in the Di-
Reply to Objection 2. The Master’s words are not
vine goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to
to be understood as if the inferior angels were entirely
others; for it is of the nature of good to communicate it-
ignorant of the Mystery of the Incarnation but that they
self to others. Hence also corporeal agents give their like-
did not know it as fully as the superior angels; and that
ness to others so far as they can. So the more an agent is
they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards when
established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much
the Mystery was accomplished.
the more does it strive to transmit its perfections to others
Reply to Objection 3. Till the Judgment Day some
as far as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes
new things are always being revealed by God to the high-
those who by grace share in the Divine goodness; saying:
est angels, concerning the course of the world, and espe-
“As every man hath received grace, ministering the same
cially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always
one to another; as good stewards of the manifold grace
something for the superior angels to make known to the
of God” (1 Pet. 4:10). Much more therefore do the holy
inferior.
angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Di-
∗ Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf. Gregory, Hom. xxxiv, in Ev.
535
FIRST PART, QUESTION 107
The Speech of the Angels
(In Five Articles)
We next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether one angel speaks to another?
(2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior?
(3) Whether an angel speaks to God?
(4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance?
(5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?
Whether one angel speaks to another?
Ia q. 107 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that one angel does not
instance, either to the performing of an action, or to being
speak to another. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in
made known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to
the state of the resurrection “each one’s body will not hide
the actual consideration of any habitual knowledge, then
his mind from his fellows.” Much less, therefore, is one
a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is
angel’s mind hidden from another. But speech manifests
called “the interior word.” And by the fact that the con-
to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is
cept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to
not necessary that one angel should speak to another.
another by the will of the angel himself, the concept of one
Objection 2.
Further, speech is twofold; interior,
angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel
whereby one speaks to oneself; and exterior, whereby
speaks to another; for to speak to another only means to
one speaks to another. But exterior speech takes place by
make known the mental concept to another.
some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bod-
Reply to Objection 1. Our mental concept is hidden
ily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot
by a twofold obstacle. The first is in the will, which can
apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak
retain the mental concept within, or can direct it exter-
to another.
nally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another,
Objection 3. Further, the speaker incites the hearer to
according to 1 Cor. 2:11: “What man knoweth the things
listen to what he says. But it does not appear that one an-
of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?” The other
gel incites another to listen; for this happens among us by
obstacle whereby the mental concept is excluded from an-
some sensible sign. Therefore one angel does not speak
other one’s knowledge, comes from the body; and so it
to another.
happens that even when the will directs the concept of the
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:1): “If
mind to make itself known, it is not at once make known
I speak with the tongues of men and of angels.”
to another; but some sensible sign must be used. Gregory
I answer that, The angels speak in a certain way. But,
alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): “To other
as Gregory says (Moral. ii): “It is fitting that our mind, ris-
eyes we seem to stand aloof as it were behind the wall of
ing above the properties of bodily speech, should be lifted
the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known,
to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech.”
we go out as it were by the door of the tongue to show
To understand how one angel speaks to another, we
what we really are.” But an angel is under no such obsta-
must consider that, as we explained above (q. 82, a. 4),
cle, and so he can make his concept known to another at
when treating of the actions and powers of the soul, the
once.
will moves the intellect to its operation. Now an intelli-
Reply to Objection 2. External speech, made by the
gible object is present to the intellect in three ways; first,
voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of
habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin.
the body. Hence it does not befit an angel; but only interior
xiv, 6,7); secondly, as actually considered or conceived;
speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the inte-
thirdly, as related to something else. And it is clear that
rior speech by mental concept, but also its being ordered
the intelligible object passes from the first to the second
to another’s knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an
stage by the command of the will, and hence in the defini-
angel is called metaphorically the angel’s power, whereby
tion of habit these words occur, “which anyone uses when
he manifests his mental concept.
he wills.” So likewise the intelligible object passes from
Reply to Objection 3. There is no need to draw the
the second to the third stage by the will; for by the will the
attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see
concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for
each other in the Word; for as one ever sees the other, so he
536
ever sees what is ordered to himself. But because by their is affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is
very nature they can speak to each other, and even now
aroused by the sensible object, so the mind of an angel
the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the
can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power.
intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as sense
Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior?
Ia q. 107 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the inferior angel
we actually consider anything. But because truth is the
does not speak to the superior. For on the text (1 Cor.
light of the intellect, and God Himself is the rule of all
13:1), “If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels,”
truth; the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind,
a gloss remarks that the speech of the angels is an enlight-
as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and en-
enment whereby the superior enlightens the inferior. But
lightenment; for example, when one man says to another:
the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above
“Heaven was created by God”; or, “Man is an animal.”
explained (q. 106, a. 3). Therefore neither do the inferior
The manifestation, however, of what depends on the will
speak to the superior.
of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlight-
Objection 2. Further, as was said above (q. 106, a. 1),
enment, but is only a speech; for instance, when one says
to enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is
to another: “I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that.”
known to another; and this is to speak. Therefore to speak
The reason is that the created will is not a light, nor a rule
and to enlighten are the same; so the same conclusion fol-
of truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate
lows.
what comes from the created will is not, as such, an en-
Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): “God
lightening. For to know what you may will, or what you
speaks to the angels by the very fact that He shows to
may understand does not belong to the perfection of my
their hearts His hidden and invisible things.” But this is
intellect; but only to know the truth in reality.
to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever God speaks, He
Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or in-
enlightens. In the same way every angelic speech is an
ferior by comparison with this principle, God; and there-
enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way
fore enlightenment, which depends on the principle which
speak to a superior angel.
is God, is conveyed only by the superior angels to the infe-
On the contrary, According to the exposition of
rior. But as regards the will as the principle, he who wills
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), the inferior angels said to
is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of
the superior: “Who is this King of Glory?”
what belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by the one
I answer that, The inferior angels can speak to the
who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak
superior. To make this clear, we must consider that every
to the inferior, and the inferior speak to the superior.
angelic enlightening is an angelic speech; but on the other
From this clearly appear the replies to the first and sec-
hand, not every speech is an enlightening; because, as we
ond objections.
have said (a. 1), for one angel to speak to another angel
Reply to Objection 3. Every speech of God to the an-
means nothing else, but that by his own will he directs his
gels is an enlightening; because since the will of God is
mental concept in such a way, that it becomes known to
the rule of truth, it belongs to the perfection and enlight-
the other. Now what the mind conceives may be reduced
enment of the created mind to know even what God wills.
to a twofold principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal
But the same does not apply to the will of the angels, as
truth; and to the will of the one who understands, whereby
was explained above.
Whether an angel speaks to God?
Ia q. 107 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that an angel does not
in some ways appears to be unreasonable, since an angel
speak to God. For speech makes known something to an-
sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems
other. But an angel cannot make known anything to God,
that an angel never speaks to God.
Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not speak
On the contrary, It is written (Zech. 1:12): “The an-
to God.
gel of the Lord answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how
Objection 2. Further, to speak is to order the mental
long wilt Thou not have mercy on Jerusalem.” Therefore
concept in reference to another, as was shown above (a. 1).
an angel speaks to God.
But an angel ever orders his mental concept to God. So
I answer that, As was said above (Aa. 1,2), the angel
if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks to God; which
speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else.
537
Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner.
can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that
In one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another,
“the angels speak to God, when by contemplating what is
as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and
above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration.”
in human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and
Reply to Objection 1. Speech is not always for the
in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of
purpose of making something known to another; but is
what concerns the truth, or of whatever depends on the
sometimes finally ordered to the purpose of manifesting
created will; because God is the principle and source of
something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples
all truth and of all will. In another way one thing is or-
ask instruction from the master.
dered to another to receive something, as in natural things
Reply to Objection 2. The angels are ever speaking
the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech
to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His
the disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks
works; but they speak to Him by consulting Him about
to God, either by consulting the Divine will of what ought
what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any
to be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he
new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.
Whether local distance influences the angelic speech?
Ia q. 107 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that local distance affects
dentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist
the angelic speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
at all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted
i, 13): “An angel works where he is.” But speech is an an-
from “here and now,” neither difference of time nor local
gelic operation. Therefore, as an angel is in a determinate
distance has any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic
place, it seems that an angel’s speech is limited by the
speech local distance is no impediment.
bounds of that place.
Reply to Objection 1. The angelic speech, as above
Objection 2. Further, a speaker cries out on account
explained (a. 1, ad 2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless,
of the distance of the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim
by another; and therefore it exists in the angel who speaks,
that “they cried one to another” (Is. 6:3). Therefore in the
and consequently where the angel is who speaks. But as
angelic speech local distance has some effect.
local distance does not prevent one angel seeing another,
On the contrary, It is said that the rich man in hell
so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is or-
spoke to Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance
dered to him on the part of another; and this is to perceive
(Lk. 16:24). Much less therefore does local distance im-
his speech.
pede the speech of one angel to another.
Reply to Objection 2. The cry mentioned is not a
I answer that, The angelic speech consists in an intel-
bodily voice raised by reason of the local distance; but is
lectual operation, as explained above (Aa. 1,2,3). And the
taken to signify the magnitude of what is said, or the in-
intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the “here
tensity of the affection, according to what Gregory says
and now.” For even our own intellectual operation takes
(Moral. ii): “The less one desires, the less one cries out.”
place by abstraction from the “here and now,” except acci-
Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another?
Ia q. 107 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that all the angels know
cates what he learns to the others.” Therefore the speech
what one speaks to another. For unequal local distance is
of one angel to another extends to all.
the reason why all men do not know what one man says
On the contrary, One man can speak to another
to another. But in the angelic speech local distance has no
alone; much more can this be the case among the angels.
effect, as above explained (a. 4). Therefore all the angels
I answer that, As above explained (Aa. 1,2), the men-
know what one speaks to another.
tal concept of one angel can be perceived by another when
Objection 2. Further, all the angels have the intellec-
the angel who possesses the concept refers it by his will
tual power in common. So if the mental concept of one
to another. Now a thing can be ordered through some
ordered to another is known by one, it is for the same rea-
cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the
son known by all.
concept of one (angel) may be known by one and not by
Objection 3.
Further, enlightenment is a kind of
another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of
speech. But the enlightenment of one angel by another ex-
one angel to another; whereas others do not, not through
tends to all the angels, because, as Dionysius says (Coel.
the obstacle of local distance, but on account of the will
Hier. xv): “Each one of the heavenly beings communi-
so ordering, as explained above.
538
From this appear the replies to the first and second ob-all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may be
jections.
of something ordered to the principle of the created will,
Reply to Objection 3.
Enlightenment is of those
which is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not
truths that emanate from the first rule of truth, which is
necessary that these speeches should be common to all.
the principle common to all the angels; and in that way
539
FIRST PART, QUESTION 108
Of the Angelic Degrees of Hierarchies and Orders
(In Eight Articles)
We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and orders; for it was said above (q. 106, a. 3), that the superior angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely.
Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy?
(2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order?
(3) Whether in one order there are many angels?
(4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural?
(5) Of the names and properties of each order.
(6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another.
(7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?
(8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?
Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy?
Ia q. 108 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that all the angels belong
long to different principalities: thus, under one king there
to one hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among
are different cities, which are governed by different laws
creatures, it is evident that they are ordered for the best.
and administrators. Now it is evident that men do not re-
But the best ordering of a multitude is for it to be governed
ceive the Divine enlightenments in the same way as do
by one authority, as the Philosopher shows (Metaph. xii,
the angels; for the angels receive them in their intelligible
Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4). Therefore as a hierarchy is noth-
purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs,
ing but a sacred principality, it seems that all the angels
as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must
belong to one hierarchy.
needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic
Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii)
hierarchy. In the same manner we distinguish three an-
that “hierarchy is order, knowledge, and action.” But all
gelic hierarchies. For it was shown above (q. 55, a. 3), in
the angels agree in one order towards God, Whom they
treating of the angelic knowledge, that the superior angels
know, and by Whom in their actions they are ruled. There-
have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the in-
fore all the angels belong to one hierarchy.
ferior angels. This universal knowledge has three grades
Objection 3. Further, the sacred principality called hi-
among the angels. For the types of things, concerning
erarchy is to be found among men and angels. But all men
which the angels are enlightened, can be considered in a
are of one hierarchy. Therefore likewise all the angels are
threefold manner. First as preceding from God as the first
of one hierarchy.
universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs to
On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distin-
the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and,
guishes three hierarchies of angels.
“as it were, placed in the vestibule of God,” as Dionysius
I answer that, Hierarchy means a “sacred” principal-
says (Coel. Hier. vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types
ity, as above explained. Now principality includes two
depend on the universal created causes which in some way
things: the prince himself and the multitude ordered un-
are already multiplied; which mode belongs to the second
der the prince. Therefore because there is one God, the
hierarchy. Thirdly, forasmuch as these types are applied
Prince not only of all the angels but also of men and all
to particular things as depending on their causes; which
creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the an-
mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy. All this will appear
gels, but also of all rational creatures, who can be partic-
more clearly when we treat of each of the orders (a. 6).
ipators of sacred things; according to Augustine (De Civ.
In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of
Dei xii, 1): “There are two cities, that is, two societies,
the multitude of subjects.
one of the good angels and men, the other of the wicked.”
Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the
But if we consider the principality on the part of the mul-
opinion of Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine
titude ordered under the prince, then principality is said
Persons, and call it the “supercelestial” hierarchy. For in
to be “one” accordingly as the multitude can be subject
the Divine Persons there exists, indeed, a natural order,
in “one” way to the government of the prince. And those
but there is no hierarchical order, for as Dionysius says
that cannot be governed in the same way by a prince be-
(Coel. Hier. iii): “The hierarchical order is so directed
540
that some be cleansed, enlightened, and perfected; and self, Whom all see in one way—that is, in His essence—
that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect”; which far be
there is no hierarchical distinction among the angels; but
it from us to apply to the Divine Persons.
there is such a distinction as regards the types of created
Reply to Objection 1. This objection considers prin-
things, as above explained.
cipality on the part of the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is
Reply to Objection 3. All men are of one species, and
best ruled by one ruler, as the Philosopher asserts in those
have one connatural mode of understanding; which is not
passages.
the case in the angels: and hence the same argument does
Reply to Objection 2. As regards knowing God Him-
not apply to both.
Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy?
Ia q. 108 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that in the one hierarchy
all may be reduced to three, when we consider that every
there are not several orders. For when a definition is mul-
multitude has a beginning, a middle, and an end. So in
tiplied, the thing defined is also multiplied. But hierarchy
every city, a threefold order of men is to be seen, some
is order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii). Therefore, if
of whom are supreme, as the nobles; others are the last,
there are many orders, there is not one hierarchy only, but
as the common people, while others hold a place between
many.
these, as the middle-class [populus honorabilis]. In the
Objection 2. Further, different orders are different
same way we find in each angelic hierarchy the orders
grades, and grades among spirits are constituted by differ-
distinguished according to their actions and offices, and
ent spiritual gifts. But among the angels all the spiritual
all this diversity is reduced to three—namely, to the sum-
gifts are common to all, for “nothing is possessed individ-
mit, the middle, and the base; and so in every hierarchy
ually” (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore there are not different
Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi).
orders of angels.
Reply to Objection 1. Order is twofold. In one way
Objection 3. Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy
it is taken as the order comprehending in itself different
the orders are distinguished according to the actions of
grades; and in that way a hierarchy is called an order. In
“cleansing,” “enlightening,” and “perfecting.”
For the
another way one grade is called an order; and in that sense
order of deacons is “cleansing,” the order of priests, is
the several orders of one hierarchy are so called.
“enlightening,” and of bishops “perfecting,” as Dionysius
Reply to Objection 2. All things are possessed in
says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the angels cleanses, en-
common by the angelic society, some things, however, be-
lightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no distinction of
ing held more excellently by some than by others. Each
orders among the angels.
gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can com-
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21)
municate it, than by the one who cannot communicate it;
that “God has set the Man Christ above all principality
as the hot thing which can communicate heat is more per-
and power, and virtue, and dominion”: which are the var-
fect that what is unable to give heat. And the more per-
ious orders of the angels, and some of them belong to one
fectly anyone can communicate a gift, the higher grade he
hierarchy, as will be explained (a. 6).
occupies, as he is in the more perfect grade of mastership
I answer that, As explained above, one hierarchy is
who can teach a higher science. By this similitude we can
one principality—that is, one multitude ordered in one
reckon the diversity of grades or orders among the angels,
way under the rule of a prince. Now such a multitude
according to their different offices and actions.
would not be ordered, but confused, if there were not in
Reply to Objection 3. The inferior angel is supe-
it different orders. So the nature of a hierarchy requires
rior to the highest man of our hierarchy, according to the
diversity of orders.
words, “He that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven,
This diversity of order arises from the diversity of
is greater than he”—namely, John the Baptist, than whom
offices and actions, as appears in one city where there
“there hath not risen a greater among them that are born of
are different orders according to the different actions; for
women” (Mat. 11:11). Hence the lesser angel of the heav-
there is one order of those who judge, and another of those
enly hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and
who fight, and another of those who labor in the fields, and
perfect, and in a higher way than can the orders of our hi-
so forth.
erarchy. Thus the heavenly orders are not distinguished
But although one city thus comprises several orders,
by reason of these, but by reason of other different acts.
541
Whether there are many angels in one order?
Ia q. 108 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that there are not many angels
order, inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in an-
in one order. For it was shown above (q. 50, a. 4), that all
other, and animals in another; whilst he who knows natu-
the angels are unequal. But equals belong to one order.
ral things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders
Therefore there are not many angels in one order.
in the heavenly bodies themselves, and in each of the other
Objection 2. Further, it is superfluous for a thing to
orders.
be done by many, which can be done sufficiently by one.
Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as
But that which belongs to one angelic office can be done
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi). Hence we can only dis-
sufficiently by one angel; so much more sufficiently than
tinguish the angelic offices and orders in a general way, so
the one sun does what belongs to the office of the sun, as
as to place many angels in one order. But if we knew the
the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If, there-
offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we should
fore, the orders are distinguished by their offices, as stated
know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his
above (a. 2), several angels in one order would be super-
own order among things, and much more so than any star,
fluous.
though this be hidden from us.
Objection 3. Further, it was said above (obj. 1) that
Reply to Objection 1. All the angels of one order are
all the angels are unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for
in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they
instance, three or four), are of one order, the lowest one of
are placed in that order; but absolutely speaking they are
the superior order will be more akin to the highest of the
not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) that in
inferior order than with the highest of his own order; and
one and the same order of angels there are those who are
thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the
first, middle, and last.
latter than with the former. Therefore there are not many
Reply to Objection 2. That special distinction of or-
angels of one order.
ders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and
On the contrary, It is written: “The Seraphim cried
order, is hidden from us.
to one another” (Is. 6:3). Therefore there are many angels
Reply to Objection 3. As in a surface which is partly
in the one order of the Seraphim.
white and partly black, the two parts on the borders of
I answer that, Whoever knows anything perfectly, is
white and black are more akin as regards their position
able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to
than any other two white parts, but are less akin in qual-
the minutest details, whereas he who knows a thing in
ity; so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders
an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general
are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them
way, and only as regards a few points. Thus, one who
is akin to the others of its own order, but less akin in their
knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their or-
fitness for similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends
ders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one
to a definite limit.
Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic nature?
Ia q. 108 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the distinction of hi-
copied from the heavenly. But the orders among men are
erarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the an-
not from nature, but by the gift of grace; for it is not a nat-
gels. For hierarchy is “a sacred principality,” and Diony-
ural gift for one to be a bishop, and another a priest, and
sius places in its definition that it “approaches a resem-
another a deacon. Therefore neither in the angels are the
blance to God, as far as may be” (Coel. Hier. iii). But
orders from nature, but from grace only.
sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace,
On the contrary, The Master says (ii, D. 9) that “an
and not by nature. Therefore the distinction of hierarchies
angelic order is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are
and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature.
likened to each other by some gift of grace, just as they
Objection 2. Further, the Seraphim are called “burn-
agree also in the participation of natural gifts.” Therefore
ing” or “kindling,” as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii).
the distinction of orders among the angels is not only by
This belongs to charity which comes not from nature but
gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature.
from grace; for “it is poured forth in our hearts by the
I answer that, The order of government, which is the
Holy Ghost Who is given to us” (Rom. 5:5): “which is
order of a multitude under authority, is derived from its
said not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels,” as
end. Now the end of the angels may be considered in two
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic
ways. First, according to the faculty of nature, so that
orders are not from nature, but from grace.
they may know and love God by natural knowledge and
Objection 3. Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is
love; and according to their relation to this end the orders
542
of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly, are given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their
the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what
natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above ex-
is above their natural powers, which consists in the vision
plained (q. 62, a. 6). Hence among men the orders are
of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition
distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and
of His goodness; to which end they can reach only by
not according to natural gifts.
grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the an-
From the above the replies to the objections are evi-
gels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of grace, but
dent.
dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels
Whether the orders of the angels are properly named?
Ia q. 108 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the orders of the an-
is said to be in another by way of property, if it is ad-
gels are not properly named. For all the heavenly spir-
equate and proportionate to its nature: by excess when
its are called angels and heavenly virtues. But common
an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but
names should not be appropriated to individuals. There-
is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, as we have
fore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly named.
stated (q. 13, a. 2) concerning all the names which are
Objection 2. Further, it belongs to God alone to be
attributed to God: by participation, when an attribute is
Lord, according to the words, “Know ye that the Lord He
possessed by something not fully but partially; thus holy
is God” (Ps. 99:3). Therefore one order of the heavenly
men are called gods by participation. Therefore, if any-
spirits is not properly called “Dominations.”
thing is to be called by a name designating its property,
Objection 3. Further, the name “Domination” seems
it ought not to be named from what it participates imper-
to imply government and likewise the names “Principal-
fectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from
ities” and “Powers.” Therefore these three names do not
that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we
seem to be properly applied to three orders.
wish properly to name a man, we should call him a “ratio-
Objection 4. Further, archangels are as it were angel
nal substance,” but not an “intellectual substance,” which
princes. Therefore this name ought not to be given to any
latter is the proper name of an angel; because simple intel-
other order than to the “Principalities.”
ligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to man by
Objection 5. Further, the name “Seraphim” is de-
participation; nor do we call him a “sensible substance,”
rived from ardor, which pertains to charity; and the name
which is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less
“Cherubim” from knowledge. But charity and knowledge
than the property of a man, and belongs to man in a more
are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore they ought
excellent way than to other animals.
not to be names of any particular orders.
So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spir-
Objection 6. Further, Thrones are seats. But from
itual perfections are common to all the angels, and that
the fact that God knows and loves the rational creature
they are all more excellently in the superior than in the
He is said to sit within it. Therefore there ought not to
inferior angels. Further, as in these perfections there are
be any order of “Thrones” besides the “Cherubim” and
grades, the superior perfection belongs to the superior or-
“Seraphim.” Therefore it appears that the orders of angels
der as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by
are not properly styled.
participation; and conversely the inferior perfection be-
On the contrary is the authority of Holy Scripture
longs to the inferior order as its property, and to the su-
wherein they are so named. For the name “Seraphim”
perior by way of excess; and thus the superior order is
is found in Is. 6:2; the name “Cherubim” in Ezech. 1
denominated from the superior perfection.
(Cf. 10:15,20); “Thrones” in Col. 1:16; “Dominations,”
So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the
“Virtues,” “Powers,” and “Principalities” are mentioned in
names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual
Eph. 1:21; the name “Archangels” in the canonical epistle
perfections they signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in
of St. Jude (9), and the name “Angels” is found in many
expounding these names (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) seems
places of Scripture.
to regard more the exterior ministrations; for he says that
I answer that, As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii),
“angels are so called as announcing the least things; and
in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to ob-
the archangels in the greatest; by the virtues miracles
serve that the proper name of each order expresses its
are wrought; by the powers hostile powers are repulsed;
property. Now to see what is the property of each order,
and the principalities preside over the good spirits them-
we must consider that in coordinated things, something
selves.”
may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property,
Reply to Objection 1. Angel means “messenger.” So
by way of excess, and by way of participation. A thing
all the heavenly spirits, so far as they make known Divine
543
things, are called “angels.” But the superior angels enjoy is to be done by those who are subject to them. To preside
a certain excellence, as regards this manifestation, from
[principari] as Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is “to be
which the superior orders are denominated. The lowest
first among others,” as being first in carrying out what is
order of angels possess no excellence above the common
ordered to be done. And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from man-
ix) that the name of “Principalities” signifies “one who
ifestation only; and thus the common name remains as it
leads in a sacred order.” For those who lead others, being
were proper to the lowest order, as Dionysius says (Coel.
first among them, are properly called “princes,” according
Hier. v). Or we may say that the lowest order can be
to the words, “Princes went before joined with singers”
specially called the order of “angels,” forasmuch as they
(Ps. 67:26).
announce things to us immediately.
Reply to Objection 4. The “Archangels,” according
“Virtue” can be taken in two ways. First, commonly,
to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ix), are between the “Principal-
considered as the medium between the essence and the op-
ities” and the “Angels.” A medium compared to one ex-
eration, and in that sense all the heavenly spirits are called
treme seems like the other, as participating in the nature of
heavenly virtues, as also “heavenly essences.” Secondly,
both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, and
as meaning a certain excellence of strength; and thus it
hot compared to cold. So the “Archangels” are called the
is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius
“angel princes”; forasmuch as they are princes as regards
says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the “name ‘virtues’ signifies
the “Angels,” and angels as regards the Principalities. But
a certain virile and immovable strength”; first, in regard
according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) they are called
of those Divine operations which befit them; secondly, in
“Archangels,” because they preside over the one order of
regard to receiving Divine gifts. Thus it signifies that they
the “Angels”; as it were, announcing greater things: and
undertake fearlessly the Divine behests appointed to them;
the “Principalities” are so called as presiding over all the
and this seems to imply strength of mind.
heavenly “Virtues” who fulfil the Divine commands.
Reply to Objection 2. As Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
Reply to Objection 5. The name “Seraphim” does not
xii): “Dominion is attributed to God in a special manner,
come from charity only, but from the excess of charity, ex-
by way of excess: but the Divine word gives the more
pressed by the word ardor or fire. Hence Dionysius (Coel.
illustrious heavenly princes the name of Lord by partici-
Hier. vii) expounds the name “Seraphim” according to the
pation, through whom the inferior angels receive the Di-
properties of fire, containing an excess of heat. Now in fire
vine gifts.” Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii)
we may consider three things. First, the movement which
that the name “Domination” means first “a certain liberty,
is upwards and continuous. This signifies that they are
free from servile condition and common subjection, such
borne inflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force
as that of plebeians, and from tyrannical oppression,” en-
which is “heat,” which is not found in fire simply, but ex-
dured sometimes even by the great. Secondly, it signifies
ists with a certain sharpness, as being of most penetrating
“a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy which does not
action, and reaching even to the smallest things, and as it
bend to any servile act, or to the act, of those who are
were, with superabundant fervor; whereby is signified the
subject to or oppressed by tyrants.” Thirdly, it signifies
action of these angels, exercised powerfully upon those
“the desire and participation of the true dominion which
who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervor, and
belongs to God.” Likewise the name of each order signi-
cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly we consider
fies the participation of what belongs to God; as the name
in fire the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies
“Virtues” signifies the participation of the Divine virtue;
that these angels have in themselves an inextinguishable
and the same principle applies to the rest.
light, and that they also perfectly enlighten others.
Reply to Objection 3.
The names “Domination,”
In the same way the name “Cherubim” comes from a
“Power,” and “Principality” belong to government in dif-
certain excess of knowledge; hence it is interpreted “ful-
ferent ways. The place of a lord is only to prescribe what
ness of knowledge,” which Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) ex-
is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Evang.), that
pounds in regard to four things: the perfect vision of God;
“some companies of the angels, because others are subject
the full reception of the Divine Light; their contemplation
to obedience to them, are called dominations.” The name
in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard to
“Power” points out a kind of order, according to what the
the fact that possessing this knowledge fully, they pour it
Apostle says, “He that resisteth the power, resisteth the
forth copiously upon others.
ordination of God” (Rom. 13:2). And so Dionysius says
Reply to Objection 6. The order of the “Thrones” ex-
(Coel. Hier. viii) that the name “Power” signifies a kind of
cels the inferior orders as having an immediate knowledge
ordination both as regards the reception of Divine things,
of the types of the Divine works; whereas the “Cherubim”
and as regards the Divine actions performed by superiors
have the excellence of knowledge and the “Seraphim” the
towards inferiors by leading them to things above. There-
excellence of ardor. And although these two excellent
fore, to the order of “Powers” it belongs to regulate what
attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the
544
“Thrones” does not include the other two; and so the order Secondly, because in material seats is displayed strength,
of the “Thrones” is distinguished from the orders of the
forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them. But here the
“Cherubim” and the “Seraphim.” For it is a common rule
reverse is the case; for the angels themselves are made
in all things that the excellence of the inferior is contained
firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives him who
in the superior, but not conversely. But Dionysius (Coel.
sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the
Hier. vii) explains the name “Thrones” by its relation
angels receive God in themselves, and in a certain way
to material seats, in which we may consider four things.
bear Him to the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its
First, the site; because seats are raised above the earth,
shape, a seat is open on one side to receive the sitter; and
and to the angels who are called “Thrones” are raised up
thus are the angels promptly open to receive God and to
to the immediate knowledge of the types of things in God.
serve Him.
Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned?
Ia q. 108 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the grades of the or-
(1:16), numbering the same orders from the highest, he
ders are not properly assigned. For the order of prelates is
says: “Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principal-
the highest. But the names of “Dominations,” “Principal-
ities, or Powers, all things were created by Him and in
ities,” and “Powers” of themselves imply prelacy. There-
Him.” Here he places the “Principalities” between “Dom-
fore these orders ought not to be supreme.
inations” and “Powers,” as does also Gregory.
Objection 2. Further, the nearer an order is to God,
Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of
the higher it is. But the order of “Thrones” is the nearest
Dionysius, in which we see, that, as said above (a. 1), the
to God; for nothing is nearer to the sitter than the seat.
highest hierarchy contemplates the ideas of things in God
Therefore the order of the “Thrones” is the highest.
Himself; the second in the universal causes; and third in
Objection 3. Further, knowledge comes before love,
their application to particular effects. And because God
and intellect is higher than will. Therefore the order of
is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but also
“Cherubim” seems to be higher than the “Seraphim.”
of the whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to
Objection 4.
Further, Gregory (Hom.
xxiv in
consider the end; to the middle one belongs the universal
Evang.) places the “Principalities” above the “Powers.”
disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs
These therefore are not placed immediately above the
the application of this disposition to the effect, which is
Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix).
the carrying out of the work; for it is clear that these three
On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places
things exist in every kind of operation. So Dionysius,
in the highest hierarchy the “Seraphim” as the first, the
considering the properties of the orders as derived from
“Cherubim” as the middle, the “Thrones” as the last; in
their names, places in the first hierarchy those orders the
the middle hierarchy he places the “Dominations,” as the
names of which are taken from their relation to God, the
first, the “Virtues” in the middle, the “Powers” last; in
“Seraphim,” “Cherubim,” and “Thrones”; and he places in
the lowest hierarchy the “Principalities” first, then the
the middle hierarchy those orders whose names denote a
“Archangels,” and lastly the “Angels.”
certain kind of common government or disposition—the
I answer that, The grades of the angelic orders are
“Dominations,” “Virtues,” and “Powers”; and he places
assigned by Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Diony-
in the third hierarchy the orders whose names denote the
sius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree as regards all except
execution of the work, the “Principalities,” “Angels,” and
the “Principalities” and “Virtues.” For Dionysius places
“Archangels.”
the “Virtues” beneath the “Dominations,” and above
As regards the end, three things may be considered.
the “Powers”; the “Principalities” beneath the “Powers”
For firstly we consider the end; then we acquire perfect
and above the “Archangels.” Gregory, however, places
knowledge of the end; thirdly, we fix our intention on the
the “Principalities” between the “Dominations” and the
end; of which the second is an addition to the first, and
“Powers”; and the “Virtues” between the “Powers” and
the third an addition to both. And because God is the end
the “Archangels.” Each of these placings may claim au-
of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as the
thority from the words of the Apostle, who (Eph. 1:20,21)
Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10); so a some-
enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest
what similar order may be seen in human affairs. For there
saying that “God set Him,” i.e. Christ, “on His right hand
are some who enjoy the dignity of being able with famil-
in the heavenly places above all Principality and Power,
iarity to approach the king or leader; others in addition
and Virtue, and Dominion.” Here he places “Virtues”
are privileged to know his secrets; and others above these
between “Powers” and “Dominations,” according to the
ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this
placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians
similitude, we can understand the disposition in the orders
545
of the first hierarchy; for the “Thrones” are raised up so The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by
as to be the familiar recipients of God in themselves, in
Gregory is also reasonable. For since the “Dominations”
the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in
appoint and order what belongs to the Divine ministra-
Himself; and this is proper to the whole of the first hierar-
tions, the orders subject to them are arranged according to
chy. The “Cherubim” know the Divine secrets superemi-
the disposition of those things in which the Divine min-
nently; and the “Seraphim” excel in what is the supreme
istrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin.
excellence of all, in being united to God Himself; and all
iii), “bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferior by the this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can
superior; and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the
be called the “Thrones”; as, from what is common to all
bad spirit by the good spirit.” So the first order after the
the heavenly spirits together, they are all called “Angels.”
“Dominations” is called that of “Principalities,” who rule
As regards government, three things are comprised
even over good spirits; then the “Powers,” who coerce the
therein, the first of which is to appoint those things which
evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly pow-
are to be done, and this belongs to the “Dominations”; the
ers, as it is written (Rom. 13:3,4). After these come the
second is to give the power of carrying out what is to be
“Virtues,” which have power over corporeal nature in the
done, which belongs to the “Virtues”; the third is to order
working of miracles; after these are the “Angels” and the
how what has been commanded or decided to be done can
“Archangels,” who announce to men either great things
be carried out by others, which belongs to the “Powers.”
above reason, or small things within the purview of rea-
The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in
son.
announcing Divine things. Now in the execution of any
Reply to Objection 1. The angel’s subjection to God
action there are beginners and leaders; as in singing, the
is greater than their presiding over inferior things; and the
precentors; and in war, generals and officers; this belongs
latter is derived from the former. Thus the orders which
to the “Principalities.” There are others who simply exe-
derive their name from presiding are not the first and high-
cute what is to be done; and these are the “Angels.” Oth-
est; but rather the orders deriving their name from their
ers hold a middle place; and these are the “Archangels,”
nearness and relation to God.
as above explained.
Reply to Objection 2. The nearness to God desig-
This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable
nated by the name of the “Thrones,” belongs also to the
one. For the highest in an inferior order always has affin-
“Cherubim” and “Seraphim,” and in a more excellent way,
ity to the lowest in the higher order; as the lowest animals
as above explained.
are near to the plants. Now the first order is that of the Di-
Reply to Objection 3. As above explained (q. 27,
vine Persons, which terminates in the Holy Ghost, Who is
a. 3), knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing
Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the first
known is in the knower; but love as the lover is united
hierarchy has affinity, denominated as it is from the fire of
to the object loved. Now higher things are in a nobler way
love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the
in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things
“Thrones,” who in their own order are akin to the “Domi-
are in higher things in a nobler way than they are in them-
nations”; for the “Thrones,” according to Gregory (Hom.
selves. Therefore to know lower things is better than to
xxiv in Ev.), are so called “because through them God ac-
love them; and to love the higher things, God above all, is
complishes His judgments,” since they are enlightened by
better than to know them.
Him in a manner adapted to the immediate enlightening
Reply to Objection 4. A careful comparison will
of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition
show that little or no difference exists in reality between
of the Divine ministrations. The order of the “Powers”
the dispositions of the orders according to Dionysius and
is akin to the order of the “Principalities”; for as it be-
Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name “Principalities”
longs to the “Powers” to impose order on those subject to
from their “presiding over good spirits,” which also agrees
them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of
with the “Virtues” accordingly as this name expressed
“Principalities,” who, as presiding over the government of
a certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits
peoples and kingdoms (which occupies the first and prin-
in the execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, ac-
cipal place in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the
cording to Gregory, the “Virtues” seem to be the same
execution thereof; “for the good of a nation is more di-
as “Principalities” of Dionysius. For to work miracles
vine than the good of one man” (Ethic. i, 2); and hence
holds the first place in the Divine ministrations; since
it is written, “The prince of the kingdom of the Persians
thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the
resisted me” (Dan. 10:13).
“Archangels” and the “Angels.”
546
Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?
Ia q. 108 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the orders of angels
are directed towards leading others to their end; but it will
will not outlast the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle
remain, accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the
says (1 Cor. 15:24), that Christ will “bring to naught all
end. Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have different
principality and power, when He shall have delivered up
duties to perform in battle and in triumph.
the kingdom to God and the Father,” and this will be in
Reply to Objection 1. The principalities and powers
the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all
will come to an end in that final consummation as regards
others will be abolished in that state.
their office of leading others to their end; because when
Objection 2. Further, to the office of the angelic or-
the end is attained, it is no longer necessary to tend to-
ders it belongs to cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after
wards the end. This is clear from the words of the Apos-
the Day of Judgment one angel will not cleanse, enlighten,
tle, “When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God
or perfect another, because they will not advance any more
and the Father,” i.e. when He shall have led the faithful to
in knowledge. Therefore the angelic orders would remain
the enjoyment of God Himself.
for no purpose.
Reply to Objection 2. The actions of angels over the
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says of the angels
other angels are to be considered according to a likeness
(Heb. 1:14), that “they are all ministering spirits, sent to
to our own intellectual actions. In ourselves we find many
minister to them who shall receive the inheritance of sal-
intellectual actions which are ordered according to the or-
vation”; whence it appears that the angelic offices are or-
der of cause and effect; as when we gradually arrive at
dered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. But all
one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is mani-
the elect are in pursuit of salvation until the Day of Judg-
fest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the
ment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not
preceding middle terms not only in the new acquisition of
outlast the Day of Judgment.
knowledge, but also as regards the keeping of the knowl-
On the contrary, It is written (Judges 5:20): “Stars
edge acquired. A proof of this is that when anyone forgets
remaining in their order and courses,” which is applied to
any of the preceding middle terms he can have opinion or
the angels. Therefore the angels will ever remain in their
belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he is
orders.
ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since the inferior
I answer that, In the angelic orders we may consider
angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of
two things; the distinction of grades, and the execution of
the superior angels, their knowledge depends on the light
their offices. The distinction of grades among the angels
of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition
takes place according to the difference of grace and na-
of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the
ture, as above explained (a. 4); and these differences will
knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment
ever remain in the angels; for these differences of natures
the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of
cannot be taken from them unless they themselves be cor-
some things, still this will not prevent their being enlight-
rupted. The difference of glory will also ever remain in
ened by the superior angels.
them according to the difference of preceding merit. As
Reply to Objection 3. Although after the Day of
to the execution of the angelic offices, it will to a certain
Judgment men will not be led any more to salvation by the
degree remain after the Day of Judgment, and to a certain
ministry of the angels, still those who are already saved
degree will cease. It will cease accordingly as their offices
will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.
Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?
Ia q. 108 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that men are not taken
to the angelic orders.
up into the orders of the angels. For the human hierarchy
Objection 3. Further, as the good angels lead on to
is stationed beneath the lowest heavenly hierarchy, as the
good, so do the demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous
lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle beneath
to say that the souls of bad men are changed into demons;
the first. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are never
for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in Matt.). There-
transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither
fore it does not seem that the souls of the saints will be
are men transferred to the angelic orders.
transferred to the orders of angels.
Objection 2. Further, certain offices belong to the or-
On the contrary, The Lord says of the saints that,
ders of the angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce
“they will be as the angels of God” (Mat. 22:30). I an-
the demons, and the like; which do not appear to belong to
swer that, As above explained (Aa. 4,7), the orders of the
the souls of the saints. Therefore they are not transferred
angels are distinguished according to the conditions of na-
547
ture and according to the gifts of grace. Considered only proportion to their natural gifts. This, however, does not
as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be as-
apply to men, as above explained (a. 4; q. 62, a. 6). So,
sumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction
as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the natural
will always remain. In view of this distinction, some as-
grade of the superior, neither can they be transferred to
serted that men can in no way be transferred to an equal-
the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to
ity with the angels; but this is erroneous, contradicting
the grade of grace, but not of nature.
as it does the promise of Christ saying that the children
Reply to Objection 2. The angels according to the
of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven
order of nature are between us and God; and therefore
(Lk. 20:36). For whatever belongs to nature is the ma-
according to the common law not only human affairs are
terial part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from
administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But
grace which depends on the liberality of God, and not on
holy men even after this life are of the same nature with
the order of nature. Therefore by the gift of grace men can
ourselves; and hence according to the common law they
merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels,
do not administer human affairs, “nor do they interfere
in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men
in the things of the living,” as Augustine says (De cura
are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however,
pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a certain special dispensa-
say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic
tion it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to ex-
orders, but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other
ercise these offices; by working miracles, by coercing the
will constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding
demons, or by doing something of that kind, as Augustine
to the whole society of the angels. But this is against what
says (De cura pro mortuis xvi).
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), that “there will not
Reply to Objection 3. It is not erroneous to say that
be two societies of men and angels, but only one; because
men are transferred to the penalty of demons; but some
the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone.”
erroneously stated that the demons are nothing but souls
Reply to Objection 1. Grace is given to the angels in
of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom rejects.
548
FIRST PART, QUESTION 109
The Ordering of the Bad Angels
(In Four Articles)
We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are orders among the demons?
(2) Whether among them there is precedence?
(3) Whether one enlightens another?
(4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?
Whether there are orders among the demons?
Ia q. 109 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there are no orders
and the perfect, which is that of consummate glory.
among the demons. For order belongs to good, as also
If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light
mode, and species, as Augustine says (De Nat. Boni iii);
of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the
and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But there
angelic orders, and never were. But if we consider them
is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore in the
in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons
bad angels there are no orders.
were at the time in the orders of angels, but fell away from
Objection 2. Further, the angelic orders are contained
them, according to what was said above (q. 62, a. 3), that
under a hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy,
all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider
which is defined as a holy principality; for they are void
them in the light of nature, in that view they are still in
of all holiness. Therefore among the demons there are no
those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts;
orders.
as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Objection 3. Further, the demons fell from every one
Reply to Objection 1. Good can exist without evil;
of the angelic orders; as is commonly supposed. There-
whereas evil cannot exist without good (q. 49, a. 3); so
fore, if some demons are said to belong to an order, as
there is order in the demons, as possessing a good nature.
falling from that order, it would seem necessary to give
Reply to Objection 2. If we consider the ordering of
them the names of each of those orders. But we never find
the demons on the part of God Who orders them, it is sa-
that they are called “Seraphim,” or “Thrones,” or “Domi-
cred; for He uses the demons for Himself; but on the part
nations.” Therefore on the same ground they are not to be
of the demons’ will it is not a sacred thing, because they
placed in any other order.
abuse their nature for evil.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): “Our
Reply to Objection 3. The name “Seraphim” is given
wrestling. . . is against principalities and powers, against
from the ardor of charity; and the name “Thrones” from
the rulers of the world of this darkness.”
the Divine indwelling; and the name “Dominations” im-
I answer that, As explained above (q. 108, Aa. 4,7,8),
ports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to sin;
order in the angels is considered both according to the
and therefore these names are not given to the angels who
grade of nature; and according to that of grace. Now grace
sinned.
has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit;
Whether among the demons there is precedence?
Ia q. 109 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no prece-
no precedence among the demons.
dence among the demons. For every precedence is ac-
Objection 3. If there be precedence among them it
cording to some order of justice. But the demons are
is either according to nature, or according to their sin or
wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no prece-
punishment. But it is not according to their nature, for
dence among them.
subjection and service do not come from nature but from
Objection 2. Further, there is no precedence where
subsequent sin; neither is it according to sin or punish-
obedience and subjection do not exist. But these cannot
ment, because in that case the superior demons who have
be without concord; which is not to be found among the
sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the infe-
demons, according to the text, “Among the proud there
rior. Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.
are always contentions” (Prov. 13:10). Therefore there is
On the contrary, On 1 Cor. 15:24 the gloss says:
549
“While the world lasts, angels will preside over angels, Reply to Objection 1. The authority of the demons
men over men, and demons over demons.”
is not founded on their justice, but on the justice of God
I answer that, Since action follows the nature of a
ordering all things.
thing, where natures are subordinate, actions also must be
Reply to Objection 2. The concord of the demons,
subordinate to each other. Thus it is in corporeal things,
whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual
for as the inferior bodies by natural order are below the
friendships, but from their common wickedness whereby
heavenly bodies, their actions and movements are sub-
they hate men, and fight against God’s justice. For it be-
ject to the actions and movements of the heavenly bodies.
longs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those
Now it is plain from what we have said (a. 1), that the
whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their
demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence
own wickedness.
their actions are subject to the action of those above them,
Reply to Objection 3. The demons are not equal in
and this is what we mean by precedence—that the action
nature; and so among them there exists a natural prece-
of the subject should be under the action of the prelate.
dence; which is not the case with men, who are naturally
So the very natural disposition of the demons requires
equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not
that there should be authority among them. This agrees
for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their detriment; too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate,
because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree
which “reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth
to unhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be
all things sweetly” (Wis. 8:1).
more unhappy.
Whether there is enlightenment in the demons?
Ia q. 109 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that enlightenment is in
ifestation of the truth in reference to God, Who enlightens
the demons. For enlightenment means the manifestation
every intellect. Another kind of manifestation of the truth
of the truth. But one demon can manifest truth to another,
is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to an-
because the superior excel in natural knowledge. There-
other. Now the demon’s perversity does not lead one to
fore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.
order another to God, but rather to lead away from the Di-
Objection 2. Further, a body abounding in light can
vine order; and so one demon does not enlighten another;
enlighten a body deficient in light, as the sun enlightens
but one can make known his mental concept to another by
the moon. But the superior demons abound in the partici-
way of speech.
pation of natural light. Therefore it seems that the superior
Reply to Objection 1. Not every kind of manifesta-
demons can enlighten the inferior.
tion of the truth is enlightenment, but only that which is
On the contrary, Enlightenment is not without
above described.
cleansing and perfecting, as stated above (q. 106, a. 1).
Reply to Objection 2. According to what belongs to
But to cleanse does not befit the demons, according to the
natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of
words: “What can be made clean by the unclean?” (Ec-
the truth either in the angels, or in the demons, because, as
clus. 34:4). Therefore neither can they enlighten.
above explained (q. 55, a. 2; q. 58, a. 2; q. 79, a. 2), they
I answer that, There can be no enlightenment prop-
know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowl-
erly speaking among the demons. For, as above explained
edge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the superior
(q. 107, a. 2), enlightenment properly speaking is the man-
demons does not prove that they can enlighten others.
Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?
Ia q. 109 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the good angels have
to the good angels; which cannot be admitted.
no precedence over the bad angels. For the angels’ prece-
Objection 3. Further, the angels’ precedence follows
dence is especially connected with enlightenment. But
upon the order of nature, as above explained (a. 2). But
the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by the
if the demons fell from every order, as is commonly said,
good angels. Therefore the good angels do not rule over
many of the demons are superior to many good angels
the bad.
in the natural order. Therefore the good angels have no
Objection 2. Further, superiors are responsible as re-
precedence over all the bad angels.
gards negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects. But
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that
the demons do much evil. Therefore if they are subject to
“the treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the
the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be charged
rational, pious, and just spirit of life”; and Gregory says
550
(Hom. xxxiv) that “the Powers are the angels to whose This revelation, if compared to the angelic revealers, can
charge are subjected the hostile powers.”
be called an enlightenment, forasmuch as they direct it
I answer that, The whole order of precedence is first
to God; but it is not an enlightenment on the part of the
and originally in God; and it is shared by creatures ac-
demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the fulfil-
cordingly as they are the nearer to God. For those crea-
ment of their own wickedness.
tures, which are more perfect and nearer to God, have the
Reply to Objection 2. The holy angels are the minis-
power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection and
ters of the Divine wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom
that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the crea-
permits some evil to be done by bad angels or men, for
tures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which per-
the sake of the good that follows; so also the good angels
fection the demons are deprived; and therefore the good
do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.
angels have precedence over the bad, and these are ruled
Reply to Objection 3. An angel who is inferior in the
by them.
natural order presides over demons, although these may
Reply to Objection 1. Many things concerning Di-
be naturally superior; because the power of Divine jus-
vine mysteries are made known by the holy angels to
tice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the
the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice requires the
natural power of the angels. Hence likewise among men,
demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or
“the spiritual man judgeth all things” (1 Cor. 2:15), and
for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge’s
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that “the virtuous
assessors make known his sentence to the executioners.
man is the rule and measure of all human acts.”
551
FIRST PART, QUESTION 110
How Angels Act On Bodies
(In Four Articles)
We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?
(2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?
(3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies locally?
(4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?
Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?
Ia q. 110 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the corporeal crea-
but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of
ture is not governed by angels. For whatever possesses
incorporeal substances.
a determinate mode of action, needs not to be governed
Reply to Objection 1. Corporeal things have determi-
by any superior power; for we require to be governed lest
nate actions; but they exercise such actions only according
we do what we ought not. But corporeal things have their
as they are moved; because it belongs to a body not to act
actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon
unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature must be moved
them. Therefore they do not need the government of an-
by a spiritual creature.
gels.
Reply to Objection 2. The reason alleged is accord-
Objection 2. Further, the lowest things are ruled by
ing to the opinion of Aristotle who laid down (Metaph.
the superior. But some corporeal things are inferior, and
xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual sub-
others are superior. Therefore they need not be governed
stances; the number of which he endeavored to assign ac-
by the angels.
cording to the number of motions apparent in the heav-
Objection 3. Further, the different orders of the an-
enly bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiri-
gels are distinguished by different offices. But if corpo-
tual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bod-
real creatures were ruled by the angels, there would be
ies, except perhaps human souls; and this was because
as many angelic offices as there are species of things. So
he did not consider that any operations were exercised in
also there would be as many orders of angels as there are
the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the
species of things; which is against what is laid down above
movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. But because
(q. 108, a. 2). Therefore the corporeal creature is not gov-
we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies
erned by angels.
besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the move-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that
ments of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore
“all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life”; and Gre-
in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an
gory says (Dial. iv, 6), that “in this visible world nothing
immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies,
takes place without the agency of the invisible creature.”
but also over the inferior bodies.
I answer that, It is generally found both in human af-
Reply to Objection 3. Philosophers have held differ-
fairs and in natural things that every particular power is
ent opinions about immaterial substances. For Plato laid
governed and ruled by the universal power; as, for exam-
down that immaterial substances were types and species
ple, the bailiff’s power is governed by the power of the
of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal
king. Among the angels also, as explained above (q. 55,
than others; and so he held that immaterial substances
a. 3 ; q. 108, a. 1), the superior angels who preside over
preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and differ-
the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it
ent ones over different bodies. But Aristotle held that im-
is manifest that the power of any individual body is more
material substances are not the species of sensible bodies,
particular than the power of any spiritual substance; for
but something higher and more universal; and so he did
every corporeal form is a form individualized by matter,
not attribute to them any immediate presiding over sin-
and determined to the “here and now”; whereas imma-
gle bodies, but only over the universal agents, the heav-
terial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as
enly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he
the inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are
agreed with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to
ruled by the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by
preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive el-
the angels. This is not only laid down by the holy doctors,
ements; because, as Plato also said, he held that the forms
552
of these sensible things are derived from immaterial sub-is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside
stances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed
over animals than over plants; because each angel, even
only one immaterial substance to preside over all inferior
the least, has a higher and more universal power than any
bodies, which he called the “active intelligence.”
kind of corporeal things: the reason is to be sought in the
The holy doctors held with the Platonists that differ-
order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers over
ent spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things.
different things. Nor does it follow that there are more
For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): “Every visible thing
than nine orders of angels, because, as above expounded
in this world has an angelic power placed over it”; and
(q. 108, a. 2), the orders are distinguished by their gen-
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4): “The devil was one
eral offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels
of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial or-
whose proper office it is to preside over the demons are of
der”; and Origen says on the text, “When the ass saw the
the order of the “powers”; so to the order of the “virtues”
angel” (Num. 22:23), that “the world has need of angels
do those angels seem to belong who preside over purely
who preside over beasts, and over the birth of animals,
corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are
and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other
sometimes performed.
things” (Hom. xiv in Num.). The reason of this, however,
Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel?
Ia q. 110 a. 2
Objection 1.
It would seem that corporeal matter
I answer that, The Platonists∗ asserted that the forms
obeys the mere will of an angel. For the power of an angel
which are in matter are caused by immaterial forms, be-
excels the power of the soul. But corporeal matter obeys
cause they said that the material forms are participations
a conception of the soul; for the body of man is changed
of immaterial forms.
Avicenna followed them in this
by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold, and
opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which
sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore
are in matter proceed from the concept of the “intellect”;
much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception
and that corporeal agents only dispose [matter] for the
of an angel.
forms. They seem to have been deceived on this point,
Objection 2. Further, whatever can be done by an in-
through supposing a form to be something made “per se,”
ferior power, can be done by a superior power. Now the
so that it would be the effect of a formal principle. But,
power of an angel is superior to corporeal power. But a
as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what
body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter;
is made, properly speaking, is the “composite”: for this
as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much more ef-
properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas
ficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal
the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as
matter.
that by which something is; and consequently neither is a
Objection 3. Further, all corporeal nature is under an-
form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is;
gelic administration, as appears above (a. 1), and thus it
since to be is nothing but the way to existence.
appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for
Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the
an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in ef-
maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. So what-
fects there is something that is due to the power of their
ever makes natural things, has a likeness to the composite;
principal agents, and which cannot be due to the power of
either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets
the instrument; and this it is that takes the principal place
fire, or because the whole “composite” as to both mat-
in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the force of
ter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God
natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul:
alone. Therefore every informing of matter is either im-
but that living flesh is thus generated is due to the power
mediately from God, or form some corporeal agent; but
of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw;
not immediately from an angel.
but that it assumes the length the form of a bed is from the
Reply to Objection 1. Our soul is united to the body
design of the [joiner’s] art. Therefore the substantial form
as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be
which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects,
formally changed by the soul’s concept; especially as the
is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the
movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied
angels in receiving its form.
with a certain bodily change, is subject to the command
On the contrary, Augustine says “It is not to be
of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connec-
thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels;
tion with natural bodies; and hence the argument does not
for it obeys God alone.”
hold.
∗ Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii, p. 218
553
Reply to Objection 2. Whatever an inferior power some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for
can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way,
which the power of corporeal agents would not suffice.
but in a more excellent way; for example, the intellect
This, however, is not to obey an angel’s will (as neither
knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense
does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by reg-
knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter in
ulating the fire according to the prescription of his art he
a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is
produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by
by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the
itself); since to reduce matter to the act of the substantial
superior cause.
form does not exceed the power of a corporeal agent; for
Reply to Objection 3. There is nothing to prevent
it is natural for like to make like.
Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion?
Ia q. 110 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that bodies do not obey
7). The reason of this is that what is moved locally is
the angels in local motion. For the local motion of natu-
not as such in potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only
ral bodies follows on their forms. But the angels do not
to something extrinsic—that is, to place. Therefore the
cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated above (a. 2).
corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved im-
Therefore neither can they cause in them local motion.
mediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii,
also the philosophers asserted that the supreme bodies are
7) proves that local motion is the first of all movements.
moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see
But the angels cannot cause other movements by a formal
that the soul moves the body first and chiefly by a local
change of the matter. Therefore neither can they cause
motion.
local motion.
Reply to Objection 1. There are in bodies other local
Objection 3. Further, the corporeal members obey the
movements besides those which result from the forms; for
concept of the soul as regards local movement, as having
instance, the ebb and flow of the sea does not follow from
in themselves some principle of life. In natural bodies,
the substantial form of the water, but from the influence
however, there is not vital principle. Therefore they do
of the moon; and much more can local movements result
not obey the angels in local motion.
from the power of spiritual substances.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9)
Reply to Objection 2. The angels, by causing local
that the angels use corporeal seed to produce certain ef-
motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other move-
fects. But they cannot do this without causing local move-
ments; that is, by employing corporeal agents to produce
ment. Therefore bodies obey them in local motion.
these effects, as a workman employs fire to soften iron.
I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii):
Reply to Objection 3. The power of an angel is not
“Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the
so limited as is the power of the soul. Hence the motive
principles of the second.” Hence it is clear that the in-
power of the soul is limited to the body united to it, which
ferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with su-
is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things.
perior nature. Now corporeal nature is below the spiritual
But an angel’s power is not limited to any body; hence it
nature. But among all corporeal movements the most per-
can move locally bodies not joined to it.
fect is local motion, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii,
Whether angels can work miracles?
Ia q. 110 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels can work
where in the same work∗. Therefore the demons can work
miracles. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.):
miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels.
“Those spirits are called virtues by whom signs and mira-
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says in the same
cles are usually done.”
work† that “it is not absurd to believe that all the things
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu.
we see happen may be brought about by the lower pow-
79) that “magicians work miracles by private contracts;
ers that dwell in our atmosphere.” But when an effect of
good Christians by public justice, bad Christians by the
natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural
signs of public justice.” But magicians work miracles be-
cause, we call it a miracle, as, for instance, when anyone
cause they are “heard by the demons,” as he says else-
is cured of a fever without the operation of nature. There-
∗ Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St.
Augustine
† Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious
works of St. Augustine
554
fore the angels and demons can work miracles.
the order of the whole created nature. But as we do not
Objection 4. Further, superior power is not subject
know all the power of created nature, it follows that when
to the order of an inferior cause. But corporeal nature is
anything is done outside the order of created nature by
inferior to an angel. Therefore an angel can work outside
a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards
the order of corporeal agents; which is to work miracles.
ourselves. So when the demons do anything of their own
On the contrary, It is written of God (Ps. 135:4):
natural power, these things are called “miracles” not in
“Who alone doth great wonders.”
an absolute sense, but in reference to ourselves. In this
I answer that, A miracle properly so called is when
way the magicians work miracles through the demons;
something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not
and these are said to be done by “private contracts,” foras-
enough for a miracle if something is done outside the or-
much as every power of the creature, in the universe, may
der of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would
be compared to the power of a private person in a city.
perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards, as such
Hence when a magician does anything by compact with
a thing is outside the order of the stone’s nature. So for a
the devil, this is done as it were by private contract. On
miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole
the other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole universe
created nature. But God alone can do this, because, what-
as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians,
ever an angel or any other creature does by its own power,
so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to
is according to the order of created nature; and thus it is
work miracles by “public justice”: but bad Christians by
not a miracle. Hence God alone can work miracles.
the “signs of public justice,” as by invoking the name of
Reply to Objection 1. Some angels are said to work
Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs.
miracles; either because God works miracles at their re-
Reply to Objection 3. Spiritual powers are able to ef-
quest, in the same way as holy men are said to work mir-
fect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing
acles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the
corporeal seeds by local movement.
miracles which take place; as in collecting the dust in the
Reply to Objection 4. Although the angels can do
general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.
something which is outside the order of corporeal nature,
Reply to Objection 2. Properly speaking, as said
yet they cannot do anything outside the whole created or-
above, miracles are those things which are done outside
der, which is essential to a miracle, as above explained.
555
FIRST PART, QUESTION 111
The Action of the Angels On Man
(In Four Articles)
We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How far they can change them by their own natural power; (2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?
(2) Whether he can change man’s will?
(3) Whether he can change man’s imagination?
(4) Whether he can change man’s senses?
Whether an angel can enlighten man?
Ia q. 111 a. 1
Objection 1.
It would seem that an angel cannot
his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity
enlighten man. For man is enlightened by faith; hence
of the inferior angel, as explained above (q. 106, a. 1).
Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes enlightenment to
The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the uni-
baptism, as “the sacrament of faith.” But faith is imme-
versal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it
diately from God, according to Eph. 2:8: “By grace you
to understand by turning to the phantasms, as above ex-
are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it
plained (q. 84, a. 7). So the angels propose the intelligible
is the gift of God.” Therefore man is not enlightened by
truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, ac-
an angel; but immediately by God.
cording to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), that, “It
Objection 2. Further, on the words, “God hath man-
is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise
ifested it to them” (Rom. 1:19), the gloss observes that
than shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils.” On the
“not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of
other hand, the human intellect as the inferior, is strength-
Divine truths to men, but God also revealed them by His
ened by the action of the angelic intellect. And in these
work,” that is, by His creature. But both are immediately
two ways man is enlightened by an angel.
from God—that is, natural reason and the creature. There-
Reply to Objection 1. Two dispositions concur in the
fore God enlightens man immediately.
virtue of faith; first, the habit of the intellect whereby it
Objection 3. Further, whoever is enlightened is con-
is disposed to obey the will tending to Divine truth. For
scious of being enlightened. But man is not conscious of
the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced
being enlightened by angels. Therefore he is not enlight-
by the reason, but as commanded by the will; hence Au-
ened by them.
gustine says, “No one believes except willingly.” In this
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that
respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, faith re-
the revelation of Divine things reaches men through the
quires that what is to be believed be proposed to the be-
ministry of the angels. But such revelation is an enlighten-
liever; which is accomplished by man, according to Rom.
ment as we have stated (q. 106, a. 1; q. 107, a. 2). There-
10:17, “Faith cometh by hearing”; principally, however,
fore men are enlightened by the angels.
by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men.
I answer that, Since the order of Divine Providence
Hence the angels have some part in the enlightenment of
disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of
faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not
higher, as explained above (q. 109, a. 2); as the inferior
only concerning what is to be believed; but also as regards
angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are
what is to be done.
inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them.
Reply to Objection 2. Natural reason, which is im-
The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment
mediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel, as
are in one way alike and in another way unlike. For, as
we have said above. Again, the more the human intellect
was shown above (q. 106, a. 1), the enlightenment which
is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can
consists in making known Divine truth has two functions;
be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus
namely, according as the inferior intellect is strengthened
man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from
by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the
creatures a more perfect knowledge of God.
intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are
Reply to Objection 3. Intellectual operation and en-
proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. This
lightenment can be understood in two ways. First, on the
takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides
part of the object understood; thus whoever understands
556
or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is enlight-what the intellect is, which is the principle of the intel-
ened, because he knows that the object is made known to
lectual operation. In like manner not everyone who is en-
him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it
lightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by
does not follow that whoever understands a truth, knows
him.
Whether the angels can change the will of man?
Ia q. 111 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels can change
Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards
the will of man. For, upon the text, “Who maketh His an-
an angel, this can be only in one way—by the good ap-
gels spirits and His ministers a flame of fire” (Heb. 1:7),
prehended by the intellect. Hence in as far as anyone may
the gloss notes that “they are fire, as being spiritually fer-
be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible
vent, and as burning away our vices.” This could not be,
good, so far does he move the will. In this way also God
however, unless they changed the will. Therefore the an-
alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and
gels can change the will.
man move the will by way of persuasion, as above ex-
Objection 2. Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv,
plained (q. 106, a. 2).
11), that, “the devil does not send wicked thoughts, but
In addition to this mode the human will can be moved
kindles them.” Damascene, however, says that he also
from without in another way; namely, by the passion re-
sends them; for he remarks that “every malicious act and
siding in the sensitive appetite: thus by concupiscence or
unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into
anger the will is inclined to will something. In this man-
men” (De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good
ner the angels, as being able to rouse these passions, can
angels introduce and kindle good thoughts. But this could
move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever
only be if they changed the will. Therefore the will is
remains free to consent to, or to resist, the passion.
changed by them.
Reply to Objection 1. Those who act as God’s min-
Objection 3. Further, the angel, as above explained,
isters, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices,
enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms.
and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion.
But as the imagination which serves the intellect can be
Reply to Objection 2.
The demon cannot put
changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite which
thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since
serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a corpo-
the act of the cogitative faculty is subject to the will; nev-
real organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so
ertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inas-
can he change the will.
much as he incites to thought, by the desire of the things
On the contrary, To change the will belongs to God
thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the pas-
alone, according to Prov. 21:1: “The heart of the king is
sions. Damascene calls this kindling “a putting in” be-
in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall
cause such a work is accomplished within.
But good
turn it.”
thoughts are attributed to a higher principle, namely, God,
I answer that, The will can be changed in two ways.
though they may be procured by the ministry of the an-
First, from within; in which way, since the movement of
gels.
the will is nothing but the inclination of the will to the
Reply to Objection 3. The human intellect in its
thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because
present state can understand only by turning to the phan-
He gives the power of such an inclination to the intellec-
tasms; but the human will can will something following
tual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God
the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sen-
alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will
sitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.
is from God alone, Who causes the will.
Whether an angel can change man’s imagination?
Ia q. 111 a. 3
Objection 1.
It would seem that an angel cannot
Objection 2. Further, since the forms in the imagina-
change man’s imagination. For the phantasy, as is said De
tion are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in
Anima iii, is “a motion caused by the sense in act.” But
sensible matter. But an angel cannot impress forms upon
if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be
sensible matter (q. 110, a. 2). Therefore he cannot impress
caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is contrary to the
forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it.
nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
faculty, to be changed by an angel.
xii, 12): “One spirit by intermingling with another can
557
communicate his knowledge to the other spirit by these great that such appearances may even occur to those who
images, so that the latter either understands it himself, or
are awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as
accepts it as understood by the other.” But it does not seem
this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors, and
that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination,
sometimes also by the will of man who voluntarily imag-
nor that the imagination can receive the knowledge of an
ines what he previously experienced, so also the same may
angel. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot change the
be done by the power of a good or a bad angel, sometimes
imagination.
with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without
Objection 4. Further, in the imaginative vision man
such alienation.
cleaves to the similitudes of the things as to the things
Reply to Objection 1. The first principle of the imag-
themselves. But in this there is deception. So as a good
ination is from the sense in act. For we cannot imag-
angel cannot be the cause of deception, it seems that
ine what we have never perceived by the senses, either
he cannot cause the imaginative vision, by changing the
wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine
imagination.
color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed
On the contrary, Those things which are seen in
in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement
dreams are seen by imaginative vision.
But the an-
arises from the impressions preserved within.
gels reveal things in dreams, as appears from Mat.
Reply to Objection 2. An angel changes the imag-
1:20;[2]:13,[19] in regard to the angel who appeared to
ination, not indeed by the impression of an imaginative
Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imag-
form in no way previously received from the senses (for
ination.
he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but by
I answer that, Both a good and a bad angel by their
local movement of the spirits and humors, as above ex-
own natural power can move the human imagination. This
plained.
may be explained as follows.
For it was said above
Reply to Objection 3. The commingling of the an-
(q. 110, a. 3), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as
gelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling
regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused
of essences, but by reason of an effect which he produces
by the local movement of bodies is subject to the natu-
in the imagination in the way above stated; so that he
ral power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imagina-
shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the way
tive apparitions are sometimes caused in us by the local
he knows.
movement of animal spirits and humors. Hence Aristo-
Reply to Objection 4. An angel causing an imagina-
tle says (De Somn. et Vigil.)∗, when assigning the cause
tive vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same
of visions in dreams, that “when an animal sleeps, the
time, so that it knows what these images signify; and then
blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle,
there is not deception. But sometimes by the angelic op-
and movements descend with it,” that is, the impressions
eration the similitudes of things only appear in the imagi-
left from the movements are preserved in the animal spir-
nation; but neither then is deception caused by the angel,
its, “and move the sensitive principle”; so that a certain
but by the defect in the intellect to whom such things ap-
appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were be-
pear. Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when
ing then changed by the external objects themselves. In-
He spoke many things to the people in parables, which He
deed, the commotion of the spirits and humors may be so
did not explain to them.
Whether an angel can change the human senses?
Ia q. 111 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that an angel cannot change the
by the sensible objects. But an angel cannot change the
human senses. For the sensitive operation is a vital opera-
order of nature (q. 110, a. 4). Therefore an angel cannot
tion. But such an operation does not come from an extrin-
change the senses; but these are changed always by the
sic principle. Therefore the sensitive operation cannot be
sensible object.
caused by an angel.
On the contrary, The angels who overturned Sodom,
Objection 2. Further, the sensitive operation is nobler
“struck the people of Sodom with blindness or aorasia, so than the nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutri-that they could not find the door” (Gn. 19:11).† The same
tive power, nor other natural forms. Therefore neither can
is recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria
he change the sensitive power.
(4 Kings 6:18).
Objection 3. Further, the senses are naturally moved
I answer that, The senses may be changed in a
∗ De Insomniis iii.
† It is worth noting that these are the only two
passages in the Greek version where the word aorasia appears. It expresses, in fact, the effect produced on the people of Sodom—namely, dazzling (French version, “eblouissement”), which the Latin “caecitas”
(blindness) does not necessarily imply.
558
twofold manner; from without, as when affected by the operation cannot be without the interior principle which
sensible object: and from within, for we see that the
is the sensitive power; but this interior principle can be
senses are changed when the spirits and humors are dis-
moved in many ways by the exterior principle, as above
turbed; as for example, a sick man’s tongue, charged with
explained.
choleric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like
Reply to Objection 2. By the interior movement of
with the other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power,
the spirits and humors an angel can do something towards
can work a change in the senses both ways. For an an-
changing the act of the nutritive power, and also of the ap-
gel can offer the senses a sensible object from without,
petitive and sensitive power, and of any other power using
formed by nature or by the angel himself, as when he as-
a corporeal organ.
sumes a body, as we have said above (q. 51, a. 2). Like-
Reply to Objection 3. An angel can do nothing out-
wise he can move the spirits and humors from within, as
side the entire order of creatures; but he can outside some
above remarked, whereby the senses are changed in vari-
particular order of nature, since he is not subject to that or-
ous ways.
der; thus in some special way an angel can work a change
Reply to Objection 1. The principle of the sensitive
in the senses outside the common mode of nature.
559
FIRST PART, QUESTION 112
The Mission of the Angels
(In Four Articles)
We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise four points of inquiry: (1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry?
(2) Whether all are sent?
(3) Whether those who are sent, assist?
(4) From what orders they are sent.
Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry?
Ia q. 112 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels are not
does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches to one
sent on works of ministry. For every mission is to some
thing in such a way as not to reach another; and so he is
determinate place. But intellectual actions do not deter-
“here” in such a manner as not to be “there.” But it is clear
mine a place, for intellect abstracts from the “here” and
from what was above stated (q. 110, a. 1), that the corpo-
“now.” Since therefore the angelic actions are intellectual,
real creature is governed by the angels. Hence, whenever
it appears that the angels are not sent to perform their own
an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal
actions.
creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by
Objection 2. Further, the empyrean heaven is the
his power; and in that way begins to be there afresh. Now
place that beseems the angelic dignity. Therefore if they
all this takes place by Divine command. Hence it follows
are sent to us in ministry, it seems that something of their
that an angel is sent by God.
dignity would be lost; which is unseemly.
Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, pro-
Objection 3. Further, external occupation hinders the
ceeds from God as from its first principle, at Whose nod
contemplation of wisdom; hence it is said: “He that is
and by Whose authority the angels work; and is reduced to
less in action, shall receive wisdom” (Ecclus. 38:25). So
God as to its last end. Now this is what is meant by a min-
if some angels are sent on external ministrations, they
ister: for a minister is an intelligent instrument; while an
would seemingly be hindered from contemplation. But
instrument is moved by another, and its action is ordered
the whole of their beatitude consists in the contemplation
to another. Hence angels’ actions are called ‘ministries’;
of God. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be
and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry.
lessened; which is unfitting.
Reply to Objection 1. An operation can be intellec-
Objection 4. Further, to minister is the part of an infetual in two ways. In one way, as dwelling in the intellect
rior; hence it is written (Lk. 22:27): “Which is the greater,
itself, as contemplation; such an operation does not de-
he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? is not he that sit-mand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine says (De
teth at table?” But the angels are naturally greater than we
Trin. iv, 20): “Even we ourselves as mentally tasting
are. Therefore they are not sent to administer to us.
something eternal, are not in this world.” In another sense
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 23:20): “Behold I
an action is said to be intellectual because it is regulated
will send My angels who shall go before thee.”
and commanded by some intellect; in that sense the intel-
I answer that, From what has been said above (q. 108,
lectual operations evidently have sometimes a determinate
a. 6), it may be shown that some angels are sent in min-
place.
istry by God. For, as we have already stated (q. 43, a. 1),
Reply to Objection 2. The empyrean heaven belongs
in treating of the mission of the Divine Persons, he is said
to the angelic dignity by way of congruity; forasmuch as
to be sent who in any way proceeds from another so as
it is congruous that the higher body should be attributed to
to begin to be where he was not, or to be in another way,
that nature which occupies a rank above bodies. Yet an an-
where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost
gel does not derive his dignity from the empyrean heaven;
is said to be sent as proceeding from the Father by ori-
so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, noth-
gin; and begins to be in a new way, by grace or by the
ing of his dignity is lost, as neither does a king lessen
nature assumed, where He was before by the presence of
his dignity when not actually sitting on his regal throne,
His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present every-
which suits his dignity.
where, because, since He is the universal agent, His power
Reply to Objection 3. In ourselves the purity of con-
reaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things (q. 8,
templation is obscured by exterior occupation; because
a. 1). An angel’s power, however, as a particular agent,
we give ourselves to action through the sensitive faculties,
560
the action of which when intense impedes the action of the manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation.”
intellectual powers. An angel, on the contrary, regulates
Reply to Objection 4. In their external actions the
his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. Hence
angels chiefly minister to God, and secondarily to us; not
it follows that his external occupations in no respect im-
because we are superior to them, absolutely speaking, but
pede his contemplation; because given two actions, one
because, since every man or angel by cleaving to God is
of which is the rule and the reason of the other, one does
made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior to every
not hinder but helps the other. Wherefore Gregory says
creature. Hence the Apostle says (Phil. 2:3): “Esteeming
(Moral. ii) that “the angels do not go abroad in such a
others better than themselves.”
Whether all the angels are sent in ministry?
Ia q. 112 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that all the angels are sent
condensation of the clouds to rain, and by producing some
in ministry. For the Apostle says (Heb. 1:14): “All are
such effects. Nor can anyone doubt that God can immedi-
ministering spirits, sent to minister” [Vulg. ‘Are they not
ately reveal things to men without the help of the angels,
all. . . ?’].
and the superior angels without the inferior. From this
Objection 2. Further, among the orders, the highest is
standpoint some have said that according to the general
that of the Seraphim, as stated above (q. 108, a. 6). But
law the superior angels are not sent, but only the inferior;
a Seraph was sent to purify the lips of the prophet (Is.
yet that sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior
6:6,7). Therefore much more are the inferior orders sent.
angels also are sent.
Objection 3. Further, the Divine Persons infinitely ex-
It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove
cel all the angelic orders. But the Divine Persons are sent.
that Christ is greater than the angels who were chosen as
Therefore much more are even the highest angels sent.
the messengers of the law; in order that He might show
Objection 4. Further, if the superior angels are not
the excellence of the new over the old law. Hence there
sent to the external ministries, this can only be because the
is no need to apply this to any other angels besides those
superior angels execute the Divine ministries by means of
who were sent to give the law.
the inferior angels. But as all the angels are unequal, as
Reply to Objection 2. According to Dionysius (Coel.
stated above (q. 50, a. 4), each angel has an angel infe-
Hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet’s
rior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the
lips was one of the inferior order; but was called a “Ser-
last angel would be sent in ministry; which contradicts
aph,” that is, “kindling ” in an equivocal sense, because
the words, “Thousands of thousands ministered to Him”
he came to “kindle” the lips of the prophet. It may also
(Dan. 7:10).
be said that the superior angels communicate their own
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom.
xxxiv in
proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the
Evang.), quoting the statement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier.
ministry of the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim
xiii), that “the higher ranks fulfil no exterior service.”
is described as purifying by fire the prophet’s lips, not as
I answer that, As appears from what has been said
if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did
above (q. 106, a. 3; q. 110, a. 1), the order of Divine
so by his power; as the Pope is said to absolve a man when
Providence has so disposed not only among the angels,
he gives absolution by means of someone else.
but also in the whole universe, that inferior things are ad-
Reply to Objection 3. The Divine Persons are not
ministered by the superior. But the Divine dispensation,
sent in ministry, but are said to be sent in an equivocal
however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards
sense, as appears from what has been said (q. 43, a. 1).
corporeal things, for the sake of a higher order, that is,
Reply to Objection 4. A manifold grade exists in the
according as it is suitable for the manifestation of grace.
Divine ministries. Hence there is nothing to prevent an-
That the man born blind was enlightened, that Lazarus
gels though unequal from being sent immediately in min-
was raised from the dead, was accomplished immediately
istry, in such a manner however that the superior are sent
by God without the action of the heavenly bodies. More-
to the higher ministries, and the lower to the inferior min-
over both good and bad angels can work some effect in
istries.
these bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the
561
Whether all the angels who are sent, assist?
Ia q. 112 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels who are
to whom the royal commands are conveyed by those who
sent also assist. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.):
are in attendance—for instance, those who are placed at
“So the angels are sent, and assist; for, though the angelic
the head of the administration of various cities; these are
spirit is limited, yet the supreme Spirit, God, is not lim-
said to administer, not to assist.
ited.”
We must therefore observe that all the angels gaze
Objection 2. Further, the angel was sent to administer
upon the Divine Essence immediately; in regard to which
to Tobias. Yet he said, “I am the angel Raphael, one of the
all, even those who minister, are said to assist. Hence Gre-
seven who stand before the Lord” (Tob. 12:15). Therefore
gory says (Moral. ii) that “those who are sent on the ex-
the angels who are sent, assist.
ternal ministry of our salvation can always assist and see
Objection 3. Further, every holy angel is nearer to
the face of the Father.” Yet not all the angels can perceive
God than Satan is. Yet Satan assisted God, according to
the secrets of the Divine mysteries in the clearness itself
Job 1:6: “When the sons of God came to stand before
of the Divine Essence; but only the superior angels who
the Lord, Satan also was present among them.” Therefore
announce them to the inferior: and in that respect only the
much more do the angels, who are sent to minister, assist.
superior angels belonging to the highest hierarchy are said
Objection 4. Further, if the inferior angels do not as-
to assist, whose special prerogative it is to be enlightened
sist, the reason is because they receive the Divine enlight-
immediately by God.
enment, not immediately, but through the superior angels.
From this may be deduced the reply to the first and
But every angel receives the Divine enlightenment from a
second objections, which are based on the first mode of
superior, except the one who is highest of all. Therefore
assisting.
only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to
Reply to Objection 3. Satan is not described as hav-
the text of Dan. 7:10: “Ten thousand times a hundred
ing assisted, but as present among the assistants; for, as
thousand stood before Him.” Therefore the angels who
Gregory says (Moral. ii), “though he has lost beatitude,
are sent also assist.
still he has retained a nature like to the angels.”
On the contrary, Gregory says, on Job 25:3: “Is there
Reply to Objection 4. All the assistants see some
any numbering of His soldiers?” (Moral. xvii): “Those
things immediately in the glory of the Divine Essence;
powers assist, who do not go forth as messengers to men.”
and so it may be said that it is the prerogative of the whole
Therefore those who are sent in ministry do not assist.
of the highest hierarchy to be immediately enlightened by
I answer that, The angels are spoken of as “assisting”
God; while the higher ones among them see more than is
and “administering,” after the likeness of those who at-
seen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as
tend upon a king; some of whom ever wait upon him, and
also among those who assist the king, one knows more of
hear his commands immediately; while others there are
the king’s secrets than another.
Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent?
Ia q. 112 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that all the angels of the
external ministry properly belongs to an angel according
second hierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist,
as he acts by Divine command in respect of any corporeal
or minister, according to Dan. 7:10. But the angels of the
creature; which is part of the execution of the Divine min-
second hierarchy do not assist; for they are enlightened by
istry. Now the angelic properties are manifested by their
the angels of the first hierarchy, as Dionysius says (Coel.
names, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and therefore
Hier. viii). Therefore all the angels of the second hierar-
the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry
chy are sent in ministry.
whose names signify some kind of administration. But
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii)
the name “dominations” does not signify any such admin-
that “there are more who minister than who assist.” This
istration, but only disposition and command in adminis-
would not be the case if the angels of the second hierarchy
tering. On the other hand, the names of the inferior orders
were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the angels of the
imply administration, for the “Angels” and “Archangels”
second hierarchy are sent to minister.
are so called from “announcing”; the “Virtues” and “Pow-
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii)
ers” are so called in respect of some act; and it is right
that the “Dominations are above all subjection.” But to
that the “Prince,” according to what Gregory says (Hom.
be sent implies subjection. Therefore the dominations are
xxxiv in Evang.), “be first among the workers.” Hence it
not sent to minister.
belongs to these five orders to be sent to external ministry;
I answer that, As above stated (a. 1), to be sent to
not to the four superior orders.
562
Reply to Objection 1. The Dominations are reckoned Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the
among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as dis-
multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material
posing and commanding what is to be done by others; thus
things; so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior
an architect does not put his hands to the production of his
in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior
art, but only disposes and orders what others are to do.
incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal natures in mul-
Reply to Objection 2. A twofold reason may be given
titude; because whatever is better is more intended and
in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering
more multiplied by God. Hence, as the assistants are supe-
angels. For Gregory says that those who minister are
rior to the ministers there will be more assistants than min-
more numerous than those who assist; because he takes
isters. In this way, the words “thousands of thousands”
the words (Dan. 7:10) “thousands of thousands minis-
are taken by way of multiplication, to signify “a thousand
tered to Him,” not in a multiple but in a partitive sense,
times a thousand.” And because ten times a hundred is a
to mean “thousands out of thousands”; thus the number
thousand, if it were said “ten times a hundred thousand”
of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess;
it would mean that there are as many assistants as minis-
while the number of assistants is finite as in the words
ters: but since it is written “ten thousand times a hundred
added, “and ten thousand times a hundred thousand as-
thousand,” we are given to understand that the assistants
sisted Him.” This explanation rests on the opinion of
are much more numerous than the ministers. Nor is this
the Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the
said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but
one first principle, the smaller they are in number; as the
rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude.
multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together
This opinion is verified as regards the number of orders,
of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a
as six administer and three assist.
thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage.
563
FIRST PART, QUESTION 113
Of the Guardianship of the Good Angels
(In Eight Articles)
We next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and their warfare against the bad angels. Under the first head eight points of inquiry arise:
(1) Whether men are guarded by the angels?
(2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel?
(3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of angels?
(4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?
(5) When does an angel’s guardianship of a man begin?
(6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men?
(7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded?
(8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their guardianship?
Whether men are guarded by the angels?
Ia q. 113 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that men are not guarded
angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in
by the angels. For guardians are deputed to some because
order to regulate them and move them to good.
they either know not how, or are not able, to guard them-
Reply to Objection 1. By free-will man can avoid evil
selves, as children and the sick. But man is able to guard
to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; foras-
himself by his free-will; and knows how by his natural
much as he is weak in affection towards good on account
knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded
of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal
by an angel.
natural knowledge of the law, which by nature belongs to
Objection 2. Further, a strong guard makes a weaker
man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in
one superfluous. But men are guarded by God, accord-
a sufficient degree; because in the application of the uni-
ing to Ps. 120:4: “He shall neither slumber nor sleep,
versal principles of law to particular actions man happens
that keepeth Israel.” Therefore man does not need to be
to be deficient in many ways. Hence it is written (Wis.
guarded by an angel.
9:14): “The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our
Objection 3. Further, the loss of the guarded redounds
counsels uncertain.” Thus man needs to be guarded by the
to the negligence of the guardian; hence it was said to a
angels.
certain one: “Keep this man; and if he shall slip away, thy
Reply to Objection 2. Two things are required for a
life shall be for his life” (3 Kings 20:39). Now many per-
good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good,
ish daily through falling into sin; whom the angels could
which is effected in us by the habit of mortal virtue. Sec-
help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in some
ondly, that reason should discover the proper methods
such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent
to make perfect the good of virtue; this the Philosopher
if men are given to their guardianship. But that is clearly
(Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. As regards the first,
false. Therefore the angels are not the guardians of men.
God guards man immediately by infusing into him grace
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 90:11): “He hath
and virtues; as regards the second, God guards man as
given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy
his universal instructor, Whose precepts reach man by the
ways.”
medium of the angels, as above stated (q. 111, a. 1).
I answer that, According to the plan of Divine Provi-
Reply to Objection 3. As men depart from the natural
dence, we find that in all things the movable and variable
instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do
are moved and regulated by the immovable and invari-
they depart from the instigation of the good angels, which
able; as all corporeal things by immovable spiritual sub-
takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may
stances, and the inferior bodies by the superior which are
do what is right. Hence that men perish is not to be im-
invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated
puted to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of
as regards conclusions, about which we may have various
men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside
opinions, by the principles which we hold in an invariable
the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace
manner. It is moreover manifest that as regards things to
of God, as likewise that miracles occur outside the order
be done human knowledge and affection can vary and fail
of nature.
from good in many ways; and so it was necessary that
564
Whether each man is guarded by an angel?
Ia q. 113 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that each man is not
to coerce the demons, the “Virtues” to work miracles in
guarded by an angel. For an angel is stronger than a man.
things corporeal; while it is probable that the different
But one man suffices to guard many men. Therefore much
species are presided over by different angels of the same
more can one angel guard many men.
order. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose that different
Objection 2. Further, the lower things are brought to
angels are appointed to the guardianship of different men.
God through the medium of the higher, as Dionysius says
Reply to Objection 1. A guardian may be assigned
(Coel. Hier. iv, xiii). But as all the angels are unequal
to a man for two reasons: first, inasmuch as a man is an
(q. 50, a. 4), there is only one angel between whom and
individual, and thus to one man one guardian is due; and
men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one angel
sometimes several are appointed to guard one. Secondly,
who immediately keeps men.
inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one
Objection 3. Further, the greater angels are deputed
man is appointed as guardian of a whole community; to
to the greater offices. But it is not a greater office to keep
whom it belongs to provide what concerns one man in his
one man more than another; since all men are naturally
relation to the whole community, such as external works,
equal. Since therefore of all the angels one is greater than
which are sources of strength or weakness to others. But
another, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x), it seems that
angel guardians are given to men also as regards invisible
different men are not guarded by different angels.
and occult things, concerning the salvation of each one in
On the contrary, On the text, “Their angels in
his own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to
heaven,” etc. (Mat. 8:10), Jerome says: “Great is the
guard individual men.
dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed to
Reply to Objection 2. As above stated (q. 112, a. 3,
guard it from its birth.”
ad 4), all the angels of the first hierarchy are, as to some
I answer that, Each man has an angel guardian ap-
things, enlightened by God directly; but as to other things,
pointed to him. This rests upon the fact that the guardian-
only the superior are directly enlightened by God, and
ship of angels belongs to the execution of Divine prov-
these reveal them to the inferior. And the same also ap-
idence concerning men. But God’s providence acts dif-
plies to the inferior orders: for a lower angel is enlight-
ferently as regards men and as regards other corruptible
ened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other
creatures, for they are related differently to incorruptibil-
respects by the one immediately above him. Thus it is
ity. For men are not only incorruptible in the common
possible that some one angel enlightens a man immedi-
species, but also in the proper forms of each individual,
ately, and yet has other angels beneath him whom he en-
which are the rational souls, which cannot be said of other
lightens.
incorruptible things. Now it is manifest that the provi-
Reply to Objection 3. Although men are equal in na-
dence of God is chiefly exercised towards what remains
ture, still inequality exists among them, according as Di-
for ever; whereas as regards things which pass away, the
vine Providence orders some to the greater, and others to
providence of God acts so as to order their existence to the
the lesser things, according to Ecclus. 33:11,12: “With
things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of God
much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diver-
is related to each man as it is to every genus or species
sified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and ex-
of things corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom.
alted, and some of them hath He cursed and brought low.”
xxxiv in Evang.), the different orders are deputed to the
Thus it is a greater office to guard one man than another.
different “genera” of things, for instance, the “Powers”
Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels?
Ia q. 113 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the guardianship of
But five orders are sent in external ministry (q. 112, a. 4).
men does not belong only to the lowest order of the angels.
Therefore all the angels of the five orders are deputed to
For Chrysostom says that the text (Mat. 18:10), “Their an-
the guardianship of men.
gels in heaven,” etc. is to be understood not of any angels
Objection 3. Further, for the guardianship of men it
but of the highest. Therefore the superior angels guard
seems especially necessary to coerce the demons, which
men.
belongs most of all to the Powers, according to Gregory
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says that angels “are
(Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work miracles, which
sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance
belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders are also de-
of salvation” (Heb. 1:14); and thus it seems that the mis-
puted to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest
sion of the angels is directed to the guardianship of men.
order.
565
On the contrary, In the Psalm (90) the guardianship the “Virtues”; and likewise the demons by the “Powers,”
of men is attributed to the angels; who belong to the low-
and the good spirits by the “Principalities,” according to
est order, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. v, ix).
Gregory’s opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.).
I answer that, As above stated (a. 2), man is guarded
Reply to Objection 1. Chrysostom can be taken to
in two ways; in one way by particular guardianship, ac-
mean the highest in the lowest order of angels; for, as
cording as to each man an angel is appointed to guard
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in each order there are
him; and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order
first, middle, and last. It is, however, probable that the
of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory, to
greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen by God
announce the “lesser things”; for it seems to be the least
for the higher degree of glory.
of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the sal-
Reply to Objection 2. Not all the angels who are
vation of only one man. The other kind of guardianship
sent have guardianship of individual men; but some orders
is universal, multiplied according to the different orders.
have a universal guardianship, greater or less, as above ex-
For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is. Thus
plained.
the guardianship of the human race belongs to the order
Reply to Objection 3. Even inferior angels exercise
of “Principalities,” or perhaps to the “Archangels,” whom
the office of the superior, as they share in their gifts, and
we call the angel princes. Hence, Michael, whom we call
they are executors of the superiors’ power; and in this way
an archangel, is also styled “one of the princes” (Dan.
all the angels of the lowest order can coerce the demons,
10:13). Moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by
and work miracles.
Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men?
Ia q. 113 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that angels are not ap-
159:4: “In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a
pointed to the guardianship of all men. For it is written
snare for me.” And therefore as guardians are appointed
of Christ (Phil. 2:7) that “He was made in the likeness
for men who have to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel
of men, and in habit found as a man.” If therefore angels
guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a way-
are appointed to the guardianship of all men, Christ also
farer. When, however, he arrives at the end of life he no
would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly,
longer has a guardian angel; but in the kingdom he will
for Christ is greater than all the angels. Therefore angels
have an angel to reign with him, in hell a demon to punish
are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.
him.
Objection 2.
Further, Adam was the first of all
Reply to Objection 1. Christ as man was guided im-
men. But it was not fitting that he should have an an-
mediately by the Word of God: wherefore He needed not
gel guardian, at least in the state of innocence: for then
be guarded by an angel. Again as regards His soul, He
he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore angels are not
was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible
appointed to the guardianship of all men.
body, He was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was right
Objection 3.
Further, angels are appointed to the
that He should have not a guardian angel as superior to
guardianship of men, that they may take them by the
Him, but a ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence
hand and guide them to eternal life, encourage them to
it is written (Mat. 4:11) that “angels came and ministered
good works, and protect them against the assaults of the
to Him.”
demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation, never
Reply to Objection 2. In the state of innocence man
attain to eternal life. Infidels, also, though at times they
was not threatened by any peril from within: because
perform good works, do not perform them well, for they
within him all was well ordered, as we have said above
have not a right intention: for “faith directs the intention”
(q. 95, Aa. 1,3). But peril threatened from without on ac-
as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in Ps. 31). Moreover, the
count of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the
coming of Antichrist will be “according to the working of
event. For this reason he needed a guardian angel.
Satan,” as it is written (2 Thess. 2:9). Therefore angels
Reply to Objection 3. Just as the foreknown, the infi-
are not deputed to the guardianship of all men.
dels, and even Anti-christ, are not deprived of the interior
On the contrary, is the authority of Jerome quoted
help of natural reason; so neither are they deprived of that
above (a. 2), for he says that “each soul has an angel ap-
exterior help granted by God to the whole human race—
pointed to guard it.”
namely the guardianship of the angels. And although the
I answer that, Man while in this state of life, is, as
help which they receive therefrom does not result in their
it were, on a road by which he should journey towards
deserving eternal life by good works, it does neverthe-
heaven. On this road man is threatened by many dan-
less conduce to their being protected from certain evils
gers both from within and from without, according to Ps.
which would hurt both themselves and others. For even
566
the demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt do as much harm as he would wish.
as much as they would. In like manner Antichrist will not
Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth?
Ia q. 113 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that an angel is not ap-
are conferred by God on man as a rational being, are be-
pointed to guard a man from his birth. For angels are “sent
stowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives
to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of
that nature. Among the latter benefits we must count the
salvation,” as the Apostle says (Heb. 1:14). But men be-
guardianship of angels, as we have said above (Aa. 1,4).
gin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are
Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man has an
baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard a man
angel guardian appointed to him.
from the time of his baptism, not of his birth.
Reply to Objection 1. Angels are sent to minister, and
Objection 2. Further, men are guarded by angels in
that efficaciously indeed, for those who shall receive the
as far as angels enlighten and instruct them. But children
inheritance of salvation, if we consider the ultimate effect
are not capable of instruction as soon as they are born, for
of their guardianship, which is the realizing of that inher-
they have not the use of reason. Therefore angels are not
itance. But for all that, the angelic ministrations are not
appointed to guard children as soon as they are born.
withdrawn for others although they are not so efficacious
Objection 3. Further, a child has a rational soul for
as to bring them to salvation: efficacious, nevertheless,
some time before birth, just as well as after. But it does
they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils.
not appear that an angel is appointed to guard a child be-
Reply to Objection 2. Guardianship is ordained to en-
fore its birth, for they are not then admitted to the sacra-
lightenment by instruction, as to its ultimate and principal
ments of the Church. Therefore angels are not appointed
effect. Nevertheless it has many other effects consistent
to guard men from the moment of their birth.
with childhood; for instance to ward off the demons, and
On the contrary, Jerome says (vide A, 4) that “each
to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm.
soul has an angel appointed to guard it from its birth.”
Reply to Objection 3. As long as the child is in the
I answer that, as Origen observes (Tract. v, super
mother’s womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of
Matt.) there are two opinions on this matter. For some
a certain intimate tie, is still part of her: just as the fruit have held that the angel guardian is appointed at the time
while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore
of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the time of birth.
it can be said with some degree of probability, that the an-
The latter opinion Jerome approves (vide A, 4), and with
gel who guards the mother guards the child while in the
reason. For those benefits which are conferred by God
womb. But at its birth, when it becomes separate from the
on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism; such as
mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome,
receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which
above quoted, says.
Whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man?
Ia q. 113 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the angel guardian
On the contrary, The demons are ever assailing us,
sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to
according to 1 Pet. 5:8: “Your adversary the devil, as a
guard. For it is said (Jer. 51:9) in the person of the angels:
roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour.”
“We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed:
Much more therefore do the good angels ever guard us.
let us forsake her.” And (Is. 5:5) it is written: “I will
I answer that, As appears above (a. 2), the guardian-
take away the hedge”—that is, “the guardianship of the
ship of the angels is an effect of Divine providence in re-
angels” [gloss]—“and it shall be wasted.”
gard to man. Now it is evident that neither man, nor any-
Objection 2. Further, God’s guardianship excels that
thing at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of
of the angels. But God forsakes man at times, according
God: for in as far as a thing participates being, so far is it
to Ps. 21:2: “O God, my God, look upon me: why hast
subject to the providence that extends over all being. God
Thou forsaken me?” Much rather therefore does an angel
indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering
guardian forsake man.
of His providence, but only in so far as He allows man
Objection 3. Further, according to Damascene (De
to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault. In like
Fide Orth. ii, 3), “When the angels are here with us, they
manner it must be said that the angel guardian never for-
are not in heaven.” But sometimes they are in heaven.
sakes a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some
Therefore sometimes they forsake us.
particular, for instance by not preventing him from being
567
subject to some trouble, or even from falling into sin, ac-Reply to Objection 3. Although an angel may for-
cording to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense
sake a man sometimes locally, he does not for that reason
Babylon and the House of Israel are said to have been for-
forsake him as to the effect of his guardianship: for even
saken by the angels, because their angel guardians did not
when he is in heaven he knows what is happening to man;
prevent them from being subject to tribulation.
nor does he need time for his local motion, for he can be
From this the answers are clear to the first and second
with man in an instant.
objections.
Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard?
Ia q. 113 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that angels grieve for the
simply speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the
ills of those whom they guard. For it is written (Is. 33:7):
will of the blessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
“The angels of peace shall weep bitterly.” But weeping is
1) that is called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a
a sign of grief and sorrow. Therefore angels grieve for the
particular case, and at a particular time, having considered
ills of those whom they guard.
all the circumstances; although universally speaking, such
Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De
a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not
Civ. Dei xiv, 15), “sorrow is for those things that hap-
will the casting of his cargo into the sea, considered uni-
pen against our will.” But the loss of the man whom he
versally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened
has guarded is against the guardian angel’s will. There-
danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is volun-
fore angels grieve for the loss of men.
tary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage.
Objection 3. Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so
Therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels
penance is contrary to sin. But angels rejoice about one
do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but
sinner doing penance, as we are told, Lk. 15:7. Therefore
they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine jus-
they grieve for the just man who falls into sin.
tice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected
Objection 4. Further, on Numbers 18:12: “Whatso-
to pains and are allowed to fall into sin.
ever first-fruits they offer,” etc. the gloss of Origen says:
Reply to Objection 1. These words of Isaias may be
“The angels are brought to judgment as to whether men
understood of the angels, i.e. the messengers, of Ezechias,
have fallen through their negligence or through their own
who wept on account of the words of Rabsaces, as related
fault.” But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills
Is. 37:2 seqq.: this would be the literal sense. According
which have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels
to the allegorical sense the “angels of peace” are the apos-
grieve for men’s sins.
tles and preachers who weep for men’s sins. If according
On the contrary, Where there is grief and sorrow,
to the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the
there is not perfect happiness: wherefore it is written
blessed angels, then the expression is metaphorical, and
(Apoc. 21:4): “Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor
signifies that universally speaking the angels will the sal-
crying, nor sorrow.” But the angels are perfectly happy.
vation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute passions
Therefore they have no cause for grief.
to God and the angels.
I answer that, Angels do not grieve, either for sins or
The reply to the second objection appears from what
for the pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, ac-
has been said.
cording to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those
Reply to Objection 3. Both in man’s repentance and
things which occur against our will. But nothing happens
in man’s sin there is one reason for the angel’s joy, namely
in the world contrary to the will of the angels and the other
the fulfilment of the ordering of the Divine Providence.
blessed, because they will cleaves entirely to the ordering
Reply to Objection 4. The angels are brought into
of Divine justice; while nothing happens in the world save
judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as wit-
what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore
nesses to convict man of weakness.
Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels?
Ia q. 113 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that there can be strife
Objection 2. Further, where there is perfect charity
or discord among the angels. For it is written (Job 25:2):
and just authority there can be no strife. But all this exists
“Who maketh peace in His high places.” But strife is op-
among the angels. Therefore there is no strife among the
posed to peace. Therefore among the high angels there is
angels.
no strife.
Objection 3. Further, if we say that angels strive for
568
those whom they guard, one angel must needs take one put up for that same people.
side, and another angel the opposite side. But if one side
But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of
is in the right the other side is in the wrong. It will follow
the kingdom of Persia was a good angel appointed to the
therefore, that a good angel is a compounder of wrong;
guardianship of that kingdom. To see therefore how one
which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among
angel can be said to resist another, we must note that the
good angels.
Divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and vari-
On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 10:13): “The
ous men are executed by the angels. Now in their actions,
prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and
the angels are ruled by the Divine decree. But it happens
twenty days.” But this prince of the Persians was the angel
at times in various kingdoms or various men there are con-
deputed to the guardianship of the kingdom of the Per-
trary merits or demerits, so that one of them is subject to or
sians. Therefore one good angel resists the others; and
placed over another. As to what is the ordering of Divine
thus there is strife among them.
wisdom on such matters, the angels cannot know it unless
I answer that, The raising of this question is occa-
God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult Divine
sioned by this passage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by
wisdom thereupon. Wherefore forasmuch as they consult
saying that the prince of the kingdom of the Persians is
the Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing
the angel who opposed the setting free of the people of
merits, they are said to resist one another: not that their
Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his prayers being
wills are in opposition, since they are all of one mind as
offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may
to the fulfilment of the Divine decree; but that the things
have been caused by some prince of the demons having
about which they seek knowledge are in opposition.
led the Jewish captives in Persia into sin; which sin was
From this the answers to the objections are clear.
an impediment to the efficacy of the prayer which Daniel
569
FIRST PART, QUESTION 114
Of the Assaults of the Demons
(In Five Articles)
We now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether men are assailed by the demons?
(2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?
(3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or temptations of the demons?
(4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading men astray?
(5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from making further assaults?
Whether men are assailed by the demons?
Ia q. 114 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that men are not assailed
Who knows how to make orderly use of evil by ordering
by the demons. For angels are sent by God to guard man.
it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels,
But demons are not sent by God: for the demons’ inten-
both their guardianship and the ordering thereof are to be
tion is the loss of souls; whereas God’s is the salvation of
referred to God as their first author.
souls. Therefore demons are not deputed to assail man.
Reply to Objection 1. The wicked angels assail men
Objection 2. Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak in two ways. Firstly by instigating them to sin; and thus
to be set against the strong, and the ignorant against the as-
they are not sent by God to assail us, but are sometimes
tute. But men are weak and ignorant, whereas the demons
permitted to do so according to God’s just judgments. But
are strong and astute. It is not therefore to be permitted by
sometimes their assault is a punishment to man: and thus
God, the author of all justice, that men should be assailed
they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish
by demons.
Achab, King of Israel, as is related in 3 Kings 22:20. For
Objection 3. Further, the assaults of the flesh and the
punishment is referred to God as its first author. Never-
world are enough for man’s exercise. But God permits His
theless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an
elect to be assailed that they may be exercised. Therefore
intention other than that for which they are sent; for they
there is no need for them to be assailed by the demons.
punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are sent by God
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): “Our
on account of His justice.
wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against Prin-
Reply to Objection 2. In order that the conditions
cipalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of
of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the
this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high
promised recompense, to be gained principally through
places.”
the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of
I answer that, Two things may be considered in the
the angels. Wherefore (4 Kings 6:16), Eliseus said to his
assault of the demons—the assault itself, and the order-
servant: “Fear not, for there are more with us than with
ing thereof. The assault itself is due to the malice of
them.”
the demons, who through envy endeavor to hinder man’s
Reply to Objection 3. The assault of the flesh and
progress; and through pride usurp a semblance of Divine
the world would suffice for the exercise of human weak-
power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the
ness: but it does not suffice for the demon’s malice, which
angels of God in their various offices minister to man’s
makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the
salvation. But the ordering of the assault is from God,
Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect.
Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?
Ia q. 114 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that to tempt is not proper
But the demons know what happens among men. There-
to the devil. For God is said to tempt, according to Gn.
fore the demons do not tempt.
22:1, “God tempted Abraham.” Moreover man is tempted
Objection 3. Further, temptation is the road to sin.
by the flesh and the world. Again, man is said to tempt
Now sin dwells in the will. Since therefore the demons
God, and to tempt man. Therefore it is not proper to the
cannot change man’s will, as appears from what has been
devil to tempt.
said above (q. 111, a. 2), it seems that it is not in their
Objection 2. Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance.
province to tempt.
570
On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 3:5): “Lest devil. God is said to tempt that He may know, in the same
perhaps he that tempteth should have tempted you”: to
sense as that is said to know which makes others to know.
which the gloss adds, “that is, the devil, whose office it is
Hence it is written (Dt. 13:3): “The Lord your God trieth
to tempt.”
you, that it may appear whether you love him.”
I answer that, To tempt is, properly speaking, to make
The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the in-
trial of something. Now we make trial of something in or-
struments or matter of temptations; inasmuch as one can
der to know something about it: hence the immediate end
know what sort of man someone is, according as he fol-
of every tempter is knowledge. But sometimes another
lows or resists the desires of the flesh, and according as
end, either good or bad, is sought to be acquired through
he despises worldly advantages and adversity: of which
that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one de-
things the devil also makes use in tempting.
sires to know of someone, what sort of a man he is as to
Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.
knowledge, or virtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad
Reply to Objection 2. The demons know what hap-
end, when that knowledge is sought with the purpose of
pens outwardly among men; but the inward disposition of
deceiving or ruining him.
man God alone knows, Who is the “weigher of spirits”
From this we can gather how various beings are said
(Prov. 16:2). It is this disposition that makes man more
to tempt in various ways. For man is said to tempt, some-
prone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts,
times indeed merely for the sake of knowing something;
in order to explore this inward disposition of man, so that
and for this reason it is a sin to tempt God; for man, being
he may tempt him to that vice to which he is most prone.
uncertain as it were, presumes to make an experiment of
Reply to Objection 3.
Although a demon cannot
God’s power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help,
change the will, yet, as stated above (q. 111, a. 3), he can
sometimes in order to hurt. The devil, however, always
change the inferior powers of man, in a certain degree:
tempts in order to hurt by urging man into sin. In this
by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it can
sense it is said to be his proper office to tempt: for thought
nevertheless be inclined.
at times man tempts thus, he does this as minister of the
Whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil?
Ia q. 114 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that all sins are due to the
the cause of the wood burning. In this way we must admit
temptation of the devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
that the devil is the cause of all our sins; because he it was
iv) that “the multitude of demons is the cause of all evils,
who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there
both to themselves and to others.” And Damascene says
resulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race: and
(De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that “all malice and all uncleanness
in this sense we must take the words of Damascene and
have been devised by the devil.”
Dionysius.
Objection 2. Further, of every sinner can be said what
But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something,
the Lord said of the Jews (Jn. 8:44): “You are of your
when its action tends directly thereunto. And in this way
father the devil.” But this was in as far as they sinned
the devil is not the cause of every sin: for all sins are not
through the devil’s instigation. Therefore every sin is due
committed at the devil’s instigation, but some are due to
to the devil’s instigation.
the free-will and the corruption of the flesh. For, as Ori-
Objection 3. Further, as angels are deputed to guard
gen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there were no devil,
men, so demons are deputed to assail men. But every good
men would have the desire for food and love and such
thing we do is due to the suggestion of the good angels:
like pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may
because the Divine gifts are borne to us by the angels.
arise unless those desires are curbed by reason, especially
Therefore all the evil we do, is due to the instigation of
if we presuppose the corruption of our natures. Now it is
the devil.
in the power of the free-will to curb this appetite and keep
On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat.
it in order. Consequently there is no need for all sins to be
xlix): “Not all our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil,
due to the instigation of the devil. But those sins which
but sometimes they arise from the movement of our free-
are due thereto man perpetrates “through being deceived
will.”
by the same blandishments as were our first parents,” as
I answer that, One thing can be the cause of another
Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii).
in two ways; directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an
Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.
agent is the cause of a disposition to a certain effect, it is
Reply to Objection 2. When man commits sin with-
said to be the occasional and indirect cause of that effect:
out being thereto instigated by the devil, he nevertheless
for instance, we might say that he who dries the wood is
becomes a child of the devil thereby, in so far as he imi-
571
tates him who was the first to sin.
of the angels. For this reason the angels take part in all
Reply to Objection 3. Man can of his own accord
our good works: whereas all our sins are not due to the
fall into sin: but he cannot advance in merit without the
demons’ instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin
Divine assistance, which is borne to man by the ministry
which is not sometimes due to the demons’ suggestion.
Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?
Ia q. 114 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the demons cannot
toms”; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 19).
lead men astray by means of real miracles. For the activ-
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says in the same
ity of the demons will show itself especially in the works
place, the works of Antichrist may be called lying won-
of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says (2 Thess. 2:9),
ders, “either because he will deceive men’s senses by
his “coming is according to the working of Satan, in all
means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he
power, and signs, and lying wonders.” Much more there-
will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies, they
fore at other times do the demons perform lying wonders.
will lead those into falsehood who believe in him.”
Objection 2. Further, true miracles are wrought by
Reply to Objection 2. As we have said above (q. 110,
some corporeal change. But demons are unable to change
a. 2), corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad
the nature of a body; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
angels at their will, so that demons be able by their power
xviii, 18): “I cannot believe that the human body can re-
to transmute matter from one form to another; but they
ceive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon’s art or
can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the
power.” Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles.
world, in order to produce these effects, as Augustine says
Objection 3. Further, an argument is useless which
(De Trin. iii, 8,9). Therefore it must be admitted that all
may prove both ways. If therefore real miracles can be
the transformation of corporeal things which can be pro-
wrought by demons, to persuade one of what is false, they
duced by certain natural powers, to which we must as-
will be useless to confirm the teaching of the faith. This is
sign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by
unfitting; for it is written (Mk. 16:20): “The Lord working
the operation of the demons, by the employment of these
withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed.”
seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into
On the contrary, Augustine says (q. 83;∗): “Often by
serpents or frogs, which can be produced by putrefaction.
means of the magic art miracles are wrought like those
On the contrary, those transformations which cannot be
which are wrought by the servants of God.”
produced by the power of nature, cannot in reality be ef-
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said
fected by the operation of the demons; for instance, that
above (q. 110, a. 4), if we take a miracle in the strict
the human body be changed into the body of a beast, or
sense, the demons cannot work miracles, nor can any crea-
that the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times
ture, but God alone: since in the strict sense a miracle is
something of this sort seems to be effected by the oper-
something done outside the order of the entire created na-
ation of demons, it is not real but a mere semblance of
ture, under which order every power of a creature is con-
reality.
tained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide
Now this may happen in two ways.
Firstly, from
sense, for whatever exceeds the human power and experi-
within; in this way a demon can work on man’s imagina-
ence. And thus demons can work miracles, that is, things
tion and even on his corporeal senses, so that something
which rouse man’s astonishment, by reason of their being
seems otherwise that it is, as explained above (q. 111,
beyond his power and outside his sphere of knowledge.
Aa. 3,4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes
For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and
by the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without:
knowledge of another, leads him to marvel at what he has
for just as he can from the air form a body of any form and
done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked
shape, and assume it so as to appear in it visibly: so, in
a miracle.
the same way he can clothe any corporeal thing with any
It is to be noted, however, that although these works
corporeal form, so as to appear therein. This is what Au-
of demons which appear marvelous to us are not real mir-
gustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): “Man’s imagination,
acles, they are sometimes nevertheless something real.
which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of
Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the demons’ power pro-
an innumerable number of things, appears to other men’s
duced real serpents and frogs. And “when fire came down
senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some an-
from heaven and at one blow consumed Job’s servants and
imal.” This not to be understood as though the imagi-
sheep; when the storm struck down his house and with
nation itself or the images formed therein were identified
it his children—these were the work of Satan, not phan-
with that which appears embodied to the senses of another
∗ Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4, among the supposititious works of St.
Augustine
572
man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man’s it for a different end and by a different right. The former
imagination, can offer the same picture to another man’s
do it for their own glory; the latter, for the glory of God:
senses.
the former, by certain private compacts; the latter by the
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (QQ. 83,
evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every
qu. 79): “When magicians do what holy men do, they do
creature is subject.”
Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from making Ia q. 114 a. 5
further assaults?
Objection 1. It would seem that a demon who is over-
more probable as long as we understand it to be so for a
come by a man, is not for that reason hindered from any
certain definite time: wherefore (Lk. 4:13) it is written:
further assault. For Christ overcame the tempter most ef-
“All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him
fectively. Yet afterwards the demon assailed Him by in-
for a time.” There are two reasons for this. One is on the
stigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore it is not true that
part of God’s clemency; for as Chrysostom says (Super
the devil when conquered ceases his assaults.
Matt. Hom. v)∗, “the devil does not tempt man for just
Objection 2. Further, to inflict punishment on one
as long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for al-
who has been worsted in a fight, is to incite him to a
though He allows him to tempt for a short time, He orders
sharper attack.
But this is not befitting God’s mercy.
him off on account of our weakness.” The other reason
Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from
is taken from the astuteness of the devil. As to this, Am-
further assaults.
brose says on Lk. 4:13: “The devil is afraid of persisting,
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 4:11): “Then the
because he shrinks from frequent defeat.” That the devil
devil left Him,” i.e. Christ Who overcame.
does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is ap-
I answer that, Some say that when once a demon has
parent from Mat. 12:44: “I will return into my house from
been overcome he can no more tempt any man at all, nei-
whence I came out.”
ther to the same nor to any other sin. And others say that
From what has been said, the objections can easily be
he can tempt others, but not the same man. This seems
solved.
∗ In the Opus Imperfectum, among his supposititious works
573
FIRST PART, QUESTION 115
Of the Action of the Corporeal Creature
(In Six Articles)
We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal actions there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a body can be active?
(2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?
(3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies?
(4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?
(5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?
(6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence?
Whether a body can be active?
Ia q. 115 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that no bodies are active.
hold.”
For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): “There are things
I answer that, It is apparent to the senses that some
that are acted upon, but do not act; such are bodies: there
bodies are active. But concerning the action of bodies
is one Who acts but is not acted upon; this is God: there
there have been three errors. For some denied all action
are things that both act and are acted upon; these are the
to bodies. This is the opinion of Avicebron in his book
spiritual substances.”
on The Fount of Life, where, by the arguments mentioned
Objection 2.
Further, every agent except the first
above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that
agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its ac-
all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies,
tion. But there is not substance below the corporeal sub-
are the actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all
stance which can be susceptible of the latter’s action;
bodies: so that, according to him, it is not fire that heats,
since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings. Therefore
but a spiritual power which penetrates, by means of the
corporeal substance is not active.
fire. And this opinion seems to be derived from that of
Objection 3. Further, every corporeal substance is
Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal
limited by quantity. But quantity hinders substance from
matter are participated thereby, and determined and lim-
movement and action, because it surrounds it and pene-
ited thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as
trates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving
it were universal; wherefore he said that these separate
light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in
forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter. There-
quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move.
fore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter
Therefore no corporeal substance is active.
is determined to this matter individualized by quantity,
Objection 4. Further, the power of action in every
Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and
agent is according to its propinquity to the first active
imprisoned by quantity, as the principle of individuality,
cause. But bodies, being most composite, are most re-
so as to be unable by action to extend to any other matter:
mote from the first active cause, which is most simple.
and that the spiritual and immaterial form alone, which
Therefore no bodies are active.
is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on
Objection 5. Further, if a body is an agent, the term of something else.
its action is either a substantial, or an accidental form. But
But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not
it is not a substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a an agent, but that it is not a universal agent. For in propor-body any principle of action, save an active quality, which
tion as a thing is participated, so, of necessity, must that be is an accident; and an accident cannot be the cause of a
participated which is proper thereto; thus in proportion to
substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent
the participation of light is the participation of visibility.
than the effect. Likewise, neither is it an accidental form,
But to act, which is nothing else than to make something
for “an accident does not extend beyond its subject,” as
to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; where-
Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are
fore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact
active.
of its being a form not determined by matter subject to
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv)
quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate
that among other qualities of corporeal fire, “it shows its
and universal: but to the fact that it is determined to this
greatness in its action and power on that of which it lays
matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular.
574
Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as the Pla-thus, “There is a mover who is not moved, to wit, the
tonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of
first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists
every ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corpo-
something moved which is purely passive,” that this is to
real matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from
be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a
this body to that. Hence such an action is effected by the
pure potentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is
contact of two bodies.
composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both
But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that
active and passive.
of Plato. For Plato held only substantial forms to be sep-
Reply to Objection 3. Quantity does not entirely
arate; while he referred accidents to the material princi-
hinder the corporeal form from action, as stated above;
ples which are “the great” and “the small,” which he con-
but from being a universal agent, forasmuch as a form is
sidered to be the first contraries, by others considered to
individualized through being in matter subject to quan-
the “the rare” and “the dense.” Consequently both Plato
tity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to
and Avicenna, who follows him to a certain extent, held
the purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not
that corporeal agents act through their accidental forms,
cause weight; as is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Sec-
by disposing matter for the substantial form; but that the
ondly, it is false that weight retards movement; on the con-
ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the sub-
trary, the heavier a thing, the greater its movement, if we
stantial form is due to an immaterial principle. And this
consider the movement proper thereto. Thirdly, because
is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of
action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus
which we have spoken above when treating of the creation
held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to
(q. 45, a. 8).
act.
The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that
Reply to Objection 4. A body is not that which is
action takes place through the issue of atoms from the cor-
most distant from God; for it participates something of a
poreal agent, while passion consists in the reception of the
likeness to the Divine Being, forasmuch as it has a form.
atoms in the pores of the passive body. This opinion is dis-
That which is most distant from God is primary matter;
proved by Aristotle (De Gener. i, 8,9). For it would fol-
which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality.
low that a body would not be passive as a whole, and the
Reply to Objection 5. The term of a body’s action is
quantity of the active body would be diminished through
both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the
its action; which things are manifestly untrue.
active quality, such as heat, although itself an accident,
We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as
acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its
it is in act, on a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.
instrument: wherefore its action can terminate in a sub-
Reply to Objection 1. This passage of Augustine is to
stantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the
be understood of the whole corporeal nature considered as
soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh.
a whole, while thus has no nature inferior to it, on which
But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it
it can act; as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal,
against the nature of an accident to surpass its subject in
and the uncreated nature on the created. Nevertheless one
acting, but it is to surpass it in being; unless indeed one
body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potential-
were to imagine that an accident transfers its identical self
ity to that which the other has in act.
from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained
From this follows the solution of the second objec-
action by an issue of atoms.
tion. But it must be observed, when Avicebron argues
Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?
Ia q. 115 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there are no semi-
to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
nal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue [ratio] implies
Objection 3. Further, seeds are active principles. But
something of a spiritual order. But in corporeal matter
there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as
nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, ac-
we have said above, matter is not competent to act (a. 1, ad
cording to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore there
2,4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal
are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
matter.
Objection 2. Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8,9)
Objection 4.
Further, there are said to be certain
says that demons produce certain results by employing
“causal virtues” (Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which
with a hidden movement certain seeds, which they know
seem to suffice for the production of things. But seminal
to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be em-
virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the
ployed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable
scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal virtues. There-
575
fore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues ther particular effects, as the primordial universal causes
in corporeal matter.
to the first effects produced.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8):
Reply to Objection 1.
These active and passive
“Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and
virtues of natural things, thought not called “virtues” [ra-
visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal
tiones] by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can
things of this world.”
nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, foras-
I answer that, It is customary to name things after
much as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes
what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima
ideales].
ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are
Reply to Objection 2.
These active and passive
the most perfect: wherefore the word “nature” has been
virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when
transferred from living things to all natural things. For the
they are employed with local movement for the produc-
word itself, “nature,” as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v,
tion of certain results, we speak of the demons as employ-
Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of
ing seeds.
living things, which is called “nativity”: and because liv-
Reply to Objection 3. The seed of the male is the ac-
ing things are generated from a principle united to them,
tive principle in the generation of an animal. But that can
as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother,
be called seed also which the female contributes as the
to whom it is united, consequently the word “nature” has
passive principle. And thus the word “seed” covers both
been applied to every principle of movement existing in
active and passive principles.
that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the active and
Reply to Objection 4. From the words of Augustine
passive principles of the generation of living things are the
when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather
seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore
that they are also causal virtues, just as seed is a kind of
Augustine fittingly gave the name of “seminal virtues”
cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, “as a mother is
[seminales rationes] to all those active and passive virtues
pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself
which are the principles of natural generation and move-
pregnant with the causes of unborn things.” Nevertheless,
ment.
the “typal ideas” can be called “causal virtues,” but not,
These active and passive virtues may be considered
strictly speaking, “seminal virtues,” because seed is not a
in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine
separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought
says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they are principally and orig-
outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are
inally in the Word of God, as “typal ideas.” Secondly,
miracles wrought outside the scope of the passive virtues
they are in the elements of the world, where they were
so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to
produced altogether at the beginning, as in “universal
any purpose that God commands. But miracles are said to
causes.” Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the
be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues,
succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for
and the passive potentialities which are ordered to such
instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in “particular
active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that
causes.” Fourthly, they are in the “seeds” produced from
they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues.
animals and plants. And these again are compared to fur-
Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below?
Ia q. 115 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the heavenly bodies
below is produced through the action of heat and cold,
are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below.
moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do
For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7): “We say that
not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bod-
they”—namely, the heavenly bodies—“are not the cause
ies are not the cause of what is produced here below.
of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of storms
Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
and atmospheric changes.”
v, 6): “Nothing is more corporeal than sex.” But sex is
Objection 2. Further, for the production of anything,
not caused by the heavenly bodies: a sign of this is that
an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there
of twins born under the same constellation, one may be
is passive matter; and there are contrary agents—heat and
male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are
cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things
not the cause of things produced in bodies here below.
here below, there is no need to ascribe causality to the
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4):
heavenly bodies.
“Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a cer-
Objection 3. Further, the agent produces its like. Now
tain order by those of a more subtle and powerful nature.”
it is to be observed that everything which is produced here
And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that “the light of the
576
sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies, moves act. And therefore it is necessary to suppose some active
them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfec-
principle above these material dispositions.
tion.”
This is why the Platonists maintained the existence
I answer that, Since every multitude proceeds from
of separate species, by participation of which the infe-
unity; and since what is immovable is always in the same
rior bodies receive their substantial forms. But this does
way of being, whereas what is moved has many ways
not seem enough. For the separate species, since they are
of being: it must be observed that throughout the whole
supposed to be immovable, would always have the same
of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable.
mode of being: and consequently there would be no va-
Therefore the more immovable certain things are, the
riety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies:
more are they the cause of those things which are most
which is clearly false.
movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of all bodies the
Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De
most immovable, for they are not moved save locally.
Gener. ii, 10), to suppose a movable principle, which by
Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are
reason of its presence or absence causes variety in the gen-
various and multiform, must be referred to the movement
eration and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the
of the heavenly bodies, as to their cause.
heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates here
Reply to Objection 1. These words of Damascene are
below, moves to the production of the species, as the in-
to be understood as denying that the heavenly bodies are
strument of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says
the first cause of generation and corruption here below;
(Phys. ii, 2) that “man and the sun generate man.”
for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly
Reply to Objection 3. The heavenly bodies have not a
bodies are gods.
specific likeness to the bodies here below. Their likeness
Reply to Objection 2. The active principles of bodies
consists in this, that by reason of their universal power,
here below are only the active qualities of the elements,
whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is contained in
such as hot and cold and the like. If therefore the sub-
them. In this way also we say that all things are like God.
stantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save
Reply to Objection 4. The actions of heavenly bodies
according to accidents of that kind, the principles of which
are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the
the early natural philosophers held to be the “rare” and the
various dispositions of matter. Now it happens at times
“dense”; there would be no need to suppose some princi-
that the matter in the human conception is not wholly dis-
ple above these inferior bodies, for they would be of them-
posed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes
selves sufficient to act. But to anyone who considers the
into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes
matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely
this as an argument against divination by stars: because
material dispositions in regard to the substantial forms of
the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things,
natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to
according to the various dispositions of matter.
Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?
Ia q. 115 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the heavenly bodies
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
are the cause of human actions. For since the heavenly
7) that “the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of
bodies are moved by spiritual substances, as stated above
human actions.”
(q. 110, a. 3), they act by virtue thereof as their instru-
I answer that, The heavenly bodies can directly and
ments. But those spiritual substances are superior to our
of themselves act on bodies, as stated above (a. 3). They
souls. Therefore it seems that they can cause impressions
can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which
on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.
are the acts of corporeal organs, but accidentally: because
Objection 2. Further, every multiform is reducible to
the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by ob-
a uniform principle. But human actions are various and
stacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot
multiform. Therefore it seems that they are reducible to
see well. Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers
the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their
affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding
principles.
that intellect does not differ from sense; it would follow of
Objection 3. Further, astrologers often foretell the
necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human
truth concerning the outcome of wars, and other human
choice and action. It would also follow that man is led
actions, of which the intellect and will are the principles.
by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in
But they could not do this by means of the heavenly bod-
which there are powers other than those which are affixed
ies, unless these were the cause of human actions. There-
to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in
fore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.
virtue of the action of heavenly bodies, is done naturally.
577
It would therefore follow that man has no free-will, and the father of men and of gods brings on” (Odyssey xviii
that he would have determinate actions, like other natu-
135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will
ral things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary
are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that heav-
to human habit. It must be observed, however, that indi-
enly bodies be the cause of human actions.
rectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bod-
Reply to Objection 1. The spiritual substances, that
ies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as
move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal
both intellect and will receive something from the inferior
things by means of the heavenly bodies; but they act im-
powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this
mediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On
the intellect and will are differently situated. For the intel-
the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated
lect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive
above (q. 111, a. 2).
powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or mem-
Reply to Objection 2. Just as the multiformity of cor-
orative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is,
poreal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the
of necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary,
heavenly movement as to its cause: so the multiformity
does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the infe-
of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is re-
rior appetite; for although the passions in the irascible and
duced to a uniform principle which is the Divine intellect
concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will;
and will.
nevertheless the will retains the power of following the
Reply to Objection 3. The majority of men follow
passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of
their passions, which are movements of the sensitive ap-
the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior pow-
petite, in which movements of the heavenly bodies can co-
ers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which
operate: but few are wise enough to resist these passions.
is the proximate cause of human actions, than on the in-
Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the truth in
tellect.
the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not
To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the
in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his
cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that
passions by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers them-
intellect does not differ from sense. Wherefore some of
selves are wont to say that “the wise man is stronger than
these said that “such is the will of men, as is the day which
the stars”∗, forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.
Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?
Ia q. 115 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that heavenly bodies can
I answer that, There have been three opinions about
act on the demons. For the demons, according to certain
the demons. In the first place the Peripatetics denied the
phases of the moon, can harass men, who on that account
existence of demons; and held that what is ascribed to the
are called lunatics, as appears from Mat. 4:24 and 17:14.
demons, according to the necromantic art, is effected by
But this would not be if they were not subject to the heav-
the power of the heavenly bodies. This is what Augustine
enly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them.
(De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Por-
Objection 2. Further, necromancers observe certain
phyry, namely, that “on earth men fabricate certain pow-
constellations in order to invoke the demons. But these
ers useful in producing certain effects of the stars.” But
would not be invoked through the heavenly bodies unless
this opinion is manifestly false. For we know by experi-
they were subject to them. Therefore they are subject to
ence that many things are done by demons, for which the
them.
power of heavenly bodies would in no way suffice: for
Objection 3. Further, heavenly bodies are more pow-
instance, that a man in a state of delirium should speak
erful than inferior bodies. But the demons are confined to
an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors of whom
certain inferior bodies, namely, “herbs, stones, animals,
he has no previous knowledge; that necromancers make
and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures,” as
statues to speak and move, and other like things.
Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11).
For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that
Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action
demons are “animals with an aerial body and a passive
of heavenly bodies.
soul,” as Apuleius says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei
On the contrary, The demons are superior in the or-
viii, 16). And this is the second of the opinions mentioned
der of nature, to the heavenly bodies. But the “agent is
above: according to which it could be said that demons
superior to the patient,” as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we
xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not subject to the ac-
have said man is subject thereto (a. 4). But this opinion
tion of heavenly bodies.
is proved to be false from what we have said above (q. 51,
∗ Ptolemy, Centiloquium, prop. 5
578
a. 1): for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb
united to bodies. Hence it is clear that they are subject to
man’s imagination, when they observe that the brain is
the action of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor acci-
thereto disposed.
dentally, neither directly nor indirectly.
Reply to Objection 2.
Demons when summoned
Reply to Objection 1. That demons harass men, ac-
through certain constellations, come for two reasons.
cording to certain phases of the moon, happens in two
Firstly, in order to lead man into the error of believing that
ways. Firstly, they do so in order to “defame God’s crea-
there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly, because
ture,” namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv, 24) and
they consider that under certain constellations corporeal
Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because
matter is better disposed for the result for which they are
as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the
summoned.
natural forces, as stated above (q. 114, a. 4, ad 2) they take
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Civ.
into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended result.
Dei xxi, 6), the “demons are enticed through various kinds
Now it is manifest that “the brain is the most moist of all
of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs, rites, not as an an-
the parts of the body,” as Aristotle says∗: wherefore it is
imal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs”; that is to
the most subject to the action of the moon, the property
say, forasmuch as these things are offered to them in token
of which is to move what is moist. And it is precisely
of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.
in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the
Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?
Ia q. 115 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that heavenly bodies im-
ies produces certain inclinations in corporeal nature, the
pose necessity on things subject to their action. For given
will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these incli-
a sufficient cause, the effect follows of necessity. But
nations. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the effect of
heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects.
heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will,
Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their movements
not only in man himself, but also in other things to which
and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their
human action extends.
effects follow of necessity.
But in natural things there is no such principle, en-
Objection 2. Further, an agent’s effect results of ne-
dowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impres-
cessity in matter, when the power of the agent is such
sions produced by heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems
that it can subject the matter to itself entirely. But the
that in such things at least, everything happens of neces-
entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of
sity; according to the reasoning of some of the ancients
heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than theirs.
who supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and
Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity
that, given the cause, the effect follows of necessity; con-
received in corporeal matter.
cluded that all things happen of necessity. This opinion
Objection 3. Further, if the effect of the heavenly
is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 3) as to this
body does not follow of necessity, this is due to some hin-
double supposition.
dering cause. But any corporeal cause, that might possibly
For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause
hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must of necessity be
whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. For some
reducible to some heavenly principle: since the heavenly
causes are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them,
bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below.
not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the
Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary,
minority to fail in producing them. But that such cases
it follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessar-
do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering
ily hindered. Consequently it would follow that all that
cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems
takes place here below happens of necessity.
not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somn. et
of necessity.
Vigil.†): “It is not incongruous that many of the signs ob-
Therefore we must say, in the second place, that ev-
served in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as
erything that is a being “per se,” has a cause; but what is
rain and wind, should not be fulfilled.” Therefore not all
accidentally, has not a cause, because it is not truly a be-
the effects of heavenly bodies take place of necessity.
ing, since it is not truly one. For (that a thing is) “white”
I answer that, This question is partly solved by what
has a cause, likewise (that a man is) “musical” has not
was said above (a. 4); and in part presents some difficulty.
a cause, but (that a being is) “white-musical” has not a
For it was shown that although the action of heavenly bod-
cause, because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it
∗ De Part. Animal. ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De Somn. et Vigil. iii
† De Divin. per Somn. ii
579
is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause particular inferior causes, which can fail in their effects in
so ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of
the minority of cases.
cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and
Reply to Objection 2. The power of a heavenly body
the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it is acci-
is not infinite. Wherefore it requires a determinate dispo-
dental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this
sition in matter, both as to local distance and as to other
clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-
conditions, in order to produce its effect. Therefore as lo-
existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. For
cal distance hinders the effect of a heavenly body (for the
instance, that some terrestrial body take fire in the higher
sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in Ethiopia);
regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some
so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or
heavenly power: again, that there be on the surface of the
other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly
earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heav-
body.
enly principle. But that the burning body should alight on
Reply to Objection 3. Although the cause that hin-
this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly
ders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heav-
body, but is accidental. Consequently not all the effects of
enly body as its cause; nevertheless the clashing of two
heavenly bodies result of necessity.
causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of
Reply to Objection 1. The heavenly bodies are causes
a heavenly body, as stated above.
of effects that take place here below, through the means of
580
FIRST PART, QUESTION 116
On Fate
(In Four Articles)
We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Is there such a thing as fate?
(2) Where is it?
(3) Is it unchangeable?
(4) Are all things subject to fate?
Whether there be such a thing as fate?
Ia q. 116 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that fate is nothing. For
we have proved above (q. 115, a. 4) that human actions
Gregory says in a homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in
are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies, save ac-
Evang.): “Far be it from the hearts of the faithful to think
cidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate, since it
that fate is anything real.”
has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of
Objection 2. Further, what happens by fate is not un-
necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what takes
foreseen, for as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), “fate is
place. Secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally:
understood to be derived from the verb ‘fari’ which means
for it has been said (q. 115, a. 6) that what is accidental, is to speak”; as though things were said to happen by fate,
properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every
which are “fore-spoken” by one who decrees them to hap-
action of nature terminates in some one thing. Where-
pen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-
fore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the
like. If therefore things happen by fate, there will be nei-
proper effect of an active natural principle. No natural
ther luck nor chance in the world.
cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man
On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be de-
intending to dig a grace finds a treasure. Now it is mani-
fined. But Boethius (De Consol. iv) defines fate thus:
fest that a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural
“Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things, by
principle: wherefore its effects in this world are natural.
which Providence connects each one with its proper or-
It is therefore impossible that any active power of a heav-
der.”
enly body be the cause of what happens by accident here
I answer that, In this world some things seem to hap-
below, whether by luck or by chance.
pen by luck or chance. Now it happens sometimes that
We must therefore say that what happens here by ac-
something is lucky or chance-like as compared to infe-
cident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is
rior causes, which, if compared to some higher cause, is
reduced to a preordaining cause, which is Divine Prov-
directly intended. For instance, if two servants are sent
idence. For nothing hinders that which happens by acci-
by their master to the same place; the meeting of the two
dent being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise the
servants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as com-
intellect could not form this proposition: “The digger of
pared to the master, who had ordered it, it is directly in-
a grave found a treasure.” And just as an intellect can ap-
tended.
prehend this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who
So there were some who refused to refer to a higher
knows a place where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a
cause such events which by luck or chance take place here
rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there. Consequently,
below. These denied the existence of fate and Providence,
nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or
as Augustine relates of Tully (De Civ. Dei v, 9). And this
by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which
is contrary to what we have said above about Providence
acts by the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For
(q. 22, a. 2).
God alone can change the will, as shown above (q. 105,
On the other hand, some have considered that every-
a. 4). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the
thing that takes place here below by luck or by chance,
principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God
whether in natural things or in human affairs, is to be re-
alone.
duced to a superior cause, namely, the heavenly bodies.
So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below
According to these fate is nothing else than “a disposition
is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained,
of the stars under which each one is begotten or born”∗.
and as it were “fore-spoken,” we can admit the existence
But this will not hold. First, as to human affairs: because
of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the use of this
∗ Cf. St. Augustine De Civ. Dei v, 1,8,9
581
word, on account of those who twisted its application to a objection’s solution is manifest.
certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine
Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders certain things
says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): “If anyone ascribes human affairs
happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their
to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him
proximate causes: but not if compared to Divine Prov-
keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue.” For this reason
idence, whereby “nothing happens at random in the
Gregory denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first
world,” as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
Whether fate is in created things?
Ia q. 116 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that fate is not in created
spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which
things. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the
obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements of the
“Divine will or power is called fate.” But the Divine will
stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of
or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is
the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain
not in creatures but in God.
of fate is forged.” Of each of these things we have spo-
Objection 2. Further, fate is compared to things that
ken above (a. 1; q. 104, a. 2; q. 110, a. 1; q. 113; q. 114).
happen by fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word
It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes
proves. But the universal cause that of itself effects what
themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their
takes place by accident here below, is God alone, as stated
effects.
above (a. 1). Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures.
Reply to Objection 1. The ordering itself of second
Objection 3. Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either causes, which Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the “se-a substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be
ries of causes,” has not the nature of fate, except as depen-
multiplied according to the number of creatures. Since,
dent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be
therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that
called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially fate
fate is not in creatures, but in God.
is the very disposition or “series,” i.e. order, of second
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol.
iv):
causes.
“Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things.”
Reply to Objection 2. Fate has the nature of a cause,
I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated
just as much as the second causes themselves, the order-
above (q. 22, a. 3; q. 103, a. 6), Divine Providence pro-
ing of which is called fate.
duces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore
Reply to Objection 3. Fate is called a disposition, not
consider the ordering of the effects in two ways. Firstly,
that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the
as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the
sense in which it signifies order, which is not a substance,
effects is called Providence. But if we consider this or-
but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation
dering as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to
to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is one. But if it
the production of certain effects, thus it has the nature of
be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate
fate. This is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): “Fate is
causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote:
worked out when Divine Providence is served by certain
“Thy fate draws thee.”
Whether fate is unchangeable?
Ia q. 116 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that fate is not unchangeable.
world, but all things would happen of necessity.
For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): “As reasoning is to
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that
the intellect, as the begotten is to that which is, as time to
fate is an unchangeable disposition.
eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is the fickle chain of I answer that, The disposition of second causes
fate to the unwavering simplicity of Providence.”
which we call fate, can be considered in two ways: firstly,
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii,
in regard to the second causes, which are thus disposed or
7): “If we be moved, what is in us is moved.” But fate is
ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle, namely,
a “disposition inherent to changeable things,” as Boethius
God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, therefore, have
says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is changeable.
held that the series itself or dispositions of causes is in
Objection 3. Further, if fate is unchangeable, what
itself necessary, so that all things would happen of neces-
is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity.
sity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given
But things ascribed to fate seem principally to be contin-
a cause the effect must follow of necessity. But this is
gencies. Therefore there would be no contingencies in the
false, as proved above (q. 115, a. 6).
582
Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, absolute but of conditional necessity. In this sense we
even as dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the
say that this conditional is true and necessary: “If God
Egyptians said that fate could be changed by certain sacri-
foreknew that this would happen, it will happen.” Where-
fices, as Gregory of Nyssa says (Nemesius, De Homine).
fore Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle,
This too has been disproved above for the reason that it is
shortly afterwards adds—“which, since it is derived from
repugnant to Divine Providence.
an unchangeable Providence must also itself be unchange-
We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard
able.”
to second causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine
From this the answers to the objections are clear.
Providence, it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of
Whether all things are subject to fate?
Ia q. 116 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that all things are subject to
ever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject also
fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): “The chain of
to fate. But whatever is done immediately by God, since
fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements
it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to
to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transfor-
fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual sub-
mation. By fate all things that are born into the world and
stances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De
perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring
Consol. iv): viz. that “those things which are nigh to God
and seed.” Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from
have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable or-
the domain of fate.
der of fate.” Hence it is clear that “the further a thing is
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v,
from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of
1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will
fate”; since so much the more it is bound up with second
and power. But the Divine will is cause of all things that
causes.
happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). There-
Reply to Objection 1. All the things mentioned in
fore all things are subject to fate.
this passage are done by God by means of second causes;
Objection 3. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv)
for this reason they are contained in the order of fate. But
that fate “is a disposition inherent to changeable things.”
it is not the same with everything else, as stated above.
But all creatures are changeable, and God alone is truly
Reply to Objection 2. Fate is to be referred to the Di-
unchangeable, as stated above (q. 9, a. 2). Therefore fate
vine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently
is in all things.
it does not follow that whatever is subject to the Divine
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that
will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated.
“some things subject to Providence are above the ordering
Reply to Objection 3. Although all creatures are in
of fate.”
some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), fate is the order-from changeable created causes. And these, therefore, are
ing of second causes to effects foreseen by God. What-
not subject to fate, as stated above.
583
FIRST PART, QUESTION 117
Of Things Pertaining to the Action of Man
(In Four Articles)
We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. In the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly in regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the first, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge?
(2) Whether man can teach an angel?
(3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?
(4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?
Whether one man can teach another?
Ia q. 117 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that one man cannot teach
mon, as stated above (q. 76, a. 2). From this it follows
another. For the Lord says (Mat. 22:8): “Be not you called
that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Con-
Rabbi”: on which the gloss of Jerome says, “Lest you give
sequently he held that one man does not cause another to
to men the honor due to God.” Therefore to be a master is
have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself;
properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master
but that he communicates the identical knowledge which
to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper
he has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phan-
to God.
tasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intel-
Objection 2. Further, if one man teaches another this
ligible apprehension. This opinion is true so far as knowl-
is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge,
edge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the
so as to cause knowledge in the other.
But a quality
identity of the thing known: for the same objective truth
through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is
is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that
an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is
all men have but one passive intellect, and the same intel-
an active quality just as heat is.
ligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his
Objection 3. Further, for knowledge we require in-
opinion is false, as stated above (q. 76, a. 2).
tellectual light, and the species of the thing understood.
Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists,
But a man cannot cause either of these in another man.
who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from
Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in
the very beginning, through the participation of separate
another man.
forms, as stated above (q. 84, Aa. 3,4); but that the soul
Objection 4. Further, the teacher does nothing in re-
is hindered, through its union with the body, from the
gard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so
free consideration of those things which it knows. Ac-
as to signify something by words or gestures. But it is not
cording to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowl-
possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him,
edge from his master, but is roused by him to consider
by putting signs before him. For these are signs either of
what he knows; so that to learn would be nothing else
things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If
than to remember. In the same way they held that natu-
of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are pro-
ral agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which
posed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does
matter acquires by a participation of separate substances.
not acquire it from the master. If they are signs of things
But against this we have proved above (q. 79, a. 2; q. 84,
that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom:
a. 3) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure
for instance, if one were to speak Greek to a man who
potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De
only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. There-
Anima iii, 4).
fore in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by
We must therefore decide the question differently, by
teaching him.
saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner,
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:7):
by reducing him from potentiality to act, as the Philoso-
“Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle. . . a
pher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order to make this clear, we
doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth.”
must observe that of effects proceeding from an exterior
I answer that, On this question there have been vari-
principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone;
ous opinions. For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii,
as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art
maintains that all men have one passive intellect in com-
alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an
584
exterior principle, sometimes from an interior principle: which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge
thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an ex-
of truth previously unknown. Secondly, by strengthening
terior principle, namely by the medical art, sometimes by
the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active
an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force
power as of a higher nature, as explained above (q. 106,
of nature. In these latter effects two things must be no-
a. 1; q. 111, a. 1) of the angelic enlightenment, because
ticed. First, that art in its work imitates nature for just as
all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order;
nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of
but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of
the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. Secondly,
principles to conclusions, by reason of his not having suf-
we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not as
ficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions
principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as
from the principles. Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i,
helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle,
2) that “a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowl-
by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments
edge.” In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer to
and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use
know.
in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, the teacher
nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature
only brings exterior help as the physician who heals: but
makes use for the intended end.
just as the interior nature is the principal cause of the heal-
Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an inte-
ing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal
rior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge
cause of knowledge. But both of these are from God.
by his own research; and from an exterior principle, as
Therefore as of God is it written: “Who healeth all thy
is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For in every
diseases” (Ps. 102:3); so of Him is it written: “He that
man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the
teacheth man knowledge” (Ps. 93:10), inasmuch as “the
light of the active intellect, through which certain univer-
light of His countenance is signed upon us” (Ps. 4:7),
sal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood
through which light all things are shown to us.
as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone ap-
Reply to Objection 2.
As Averroes argues, the
plies these universal principles to certain particular things,
teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the
the memory or experience of which he acquires through
manner of a natural active cause. Wherefore knowledge
the senses; then by his own research advancing from the
need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which
known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he
one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by
knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads
which one is directed in working.
the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowl-
Reply to Objection 3. The master does not cause the
edge of things previously unknown to him; according to
intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the in-
what the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): “All teaching and
telligible species directly: but he moves the disciple by
all learning proceed from previous knowledge.”
teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect,
Now the master leads the disciple from things known
forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are pro-
to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner.
posed to him from without.
Firstly, by proposing to him certain helps or means of in-
Reply to Objection 4. The signs proposed by the
struction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition
master to the disciple are of things known in a general and
of science: for instance, he may put before him certain
confused manner; but not known in detail and distinctly.
less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the dis-
Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself,
ciple is able to judge from previous knowledge: or he may
he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own
propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of
master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him,
likeness or of opposition, or something of the sort, from
such as is required in a master.
Whether man can teach the angels?
Ia q. 117 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that men teach angels.
can instruct the inferior angels, as stated above (q. 116,
For the Apostle says (Eph. 3:10): “That the manifold wis-
a. 1; q. 112, a. 3). But some men are instructed imme-
dom of God may be made known to the principalities and
diately concerning Divine things by the Word of God; as
powers in the heavenly places through the Church.” But
appears principally of the apostles from Heb. 1:1,2: “Last
the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some
of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son.”
things are made known to angels through men.
Therefore some men have been able to teach the angels.
Objection 2. Further, the superior angels, who are en-
Objection 3. Further, the inferior angels are instructed lightened immediately concerning Divine things by God,
by the superior. But some men are higher than some
585
angels; since some men are taken up to the highest an-which is contained in the principalities and powers who
gelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom. xxxiv
knew it “from all ages, but not before all ages: because
in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be
the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection
instructed by men concerning Divine things.
this Church composed of men will be gathered together.”
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
It can also be explained otherwise that “what is hid-
that every Divine enlightenment to the superior angels,
den, is known by the angels, not only in God, but also here
by making their thoughts known to them; but concerning
where when it takes place and is made public,” as Augus-
Divine things superior angels are never enlightened by in-
tine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v, 19). Thus when the
ferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same way as
mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled by the
inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men
apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became
are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from
apparent to the angels, which were hidden from them be-
Our Lord’s words (Mat. 11:11): “There hath not risen
fore. In this way we can understand what Jerome says
among them that are born of woman a greater than John
(Comment. in Ep. ad Eph.)—that from the preaching of
the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven
the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is to
is greater than he.” Therefore angels are never enlight-
say, through the preaching of the apostles, the mysteries
ened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by
were realized in the things themselves: thus by the preach-
means of speech make known to angels the thoughts of
ing of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which mystery
their hearts: because it belongs to God alone to know the
the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted.
heart’s secrets.
Reply to Objection 2. The apostles were instructed
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19)
immediately by the Word of God, not according to His
thus explains this passage of the Apostle, who in the pre-
Divinity, but according as He spoke in His human nature.
ceding verses says: “To me, the least of all the saints, is
Hence the argument does not prove.
given this grace. . . to enlighten all men, that they may see
Reply to Objection 3. Certain men in this state of life
what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been
are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually;
hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the mul-
forasmuch as they have such great charity that they can
tiform wisdom of God was made known to the principal-
merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by
ities and powers in the heavenly places—that is, through
certain angels. In the same way we might say that the seed
the Church.” As though he were to say: This mystery
of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though
was hidden from men, but not from the Church in heaven,
actually it is much smaller.
Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?
Ia q. 117 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that man by the power of
Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change
his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says
corporeal matter.
(Dialog. ii, 30): “Saints work miracles sometimes by
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8):
prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by prayer,
“Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will.”
raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof deliv-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 110, a. 2), corpo-
ered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira.” But in the
real matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form save
working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal mat-
either by some agent composed of matter and form, or by
ter. Therefore men, by the power of the soul, can change
God Himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist vir-
corporeal matter.
tually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore of the
Objection 2. Further, on these words (Gal. 3:1):
angels also we have stated (q. 110, a. 2) that they cannot
“Who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the
change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by
truth?” the gloss says that “some have blazing eyes, who
employing corporeal agents for the production of certain
by a single look bewitch others, especially children.” But
effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural
this would not be unless the power of the soul could
power, change corporeal matter, except by means of bod-
change corporeal matter. Therefore man can change cor-
ies.
poreal matter by the power of his soul.
Reply to Objection 1. The saints are said to work mir-
Objection 3. Further, the human body is nobler than
acles by the power of grace, not of nature. This is clear
other inferior bodies. But by the apprehension of the hu-
from what Gregory says in the same place: “Those who
man soul the human body is changed to heat and cold, as
are sons of God, in power, as John says—what wonder is
appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change
there that they should work miracles by that power?”
sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death.
Reply to Objection 2. Avicenna assigns the cause of
586
bewitchment to the fact that corporeal matter has a natu-wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, accord-
ral tendency to obey spiritual substance rather than natu-
ing to the above explanation, the countenance becomes
ral contrary agents. Therefore when the soul is of strong
venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have
imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This he says
a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possi-
is the cause of the “evil eye.”
ble that by God’s permission, or from some hidden deed,
But it has been shown above (q. 110, a. 2) that cor-
the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may
poreal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will,
have some compact with them.
but the Creator alone. Therefore it is better to say, that
Reply to Objection 3. The soul is united to the body
by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits of the body
as its form; and the sensitive appetite, which obeys the
united to that soul are changed, which change in the spir-
reason in a certain way, as stated above (q. 81, a. 3), it is
its takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more
the act of a corporeal organ. Therefore at the apprehen-
subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which
sion of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs
is in contact with them to a certain distance: in the same
be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But
way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the
the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to
look of a “menstruata,” as Aristotle says (De Somn. et
work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of a
Vigil.;∗).
change in the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2).
Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to
Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?
Ia q. 117 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that the separate human soul
power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of
can move bodies at least locally. For a body naturally
a body; though, by the power of God, it can exceed those
obeys a spiritual substance as to local motion, as stated
limits.
above (q. 110, a. 5). But the separate soul is a spiritual
Reply to Objection 1. There are certain spiritual sub-
substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its
stances whose powers are not determinate to certain bod-
command.
ies; such are the angels who are naturally unfettered by a
Objection 2. Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is
body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to
said in the narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Ma-
movement. But if the motive power of a separate sub-
gus, by sorcery retained power over the soul of a child that
stance is naturally determinate to move a certain body,
he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical
that substance will not be able to move a body of higher
wonders. But this could not have been without some cor-
degree, but only one of lower degree: thus according to
poreal change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate
philosophers the mover of the lower heaven cannot move
soul has the power to move bodies locally.
the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its na-
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (De Anima i,
ture determinate to move the body of which it is the form,
3) that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever
it cannot by its natural power move any other body.
but its own.
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine (De Civ. Dei
I answer that, The separate soul cannot by its natural
x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the
power move a body. For it is manifest that, even while the
demons often pretend to be the souls of the dead, in order
soul is united to the body, it does not move the body ex-
to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is therefore
cept as endowed with life: so that if one of the members
credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon
become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as to local mo-
who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magi-
tion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by
cian had slain.
the separate soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural
∗ De Insomniis ii
587
FIRST PART, QUESTION 118
Of the Production of Man From Man As to the Soul
(In Three Articles)
We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the soul; secondly, as to the body.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?
(2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?
(3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?
Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?
Ia q. 118 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the sensitive soul is
the world is to animals produced from these elements—
not transmitted with the semen, but created by God. For
for instance by putrefaction. But in the latter animals the
every perfect substance, not composed of matter and form,
soul is produced by the elemental power, according to Gn.
that begins to exist, acquires existence not by generation,
1:20: “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures
but by creation: for nothing is generated save from mat-
having life.” Therefore also the souls of animals semi-
ter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise
nally generated are produced by the seminal power.
it could not move the body; and since it is the form of a
I answer that, Some have held that the sensitive souls
body, it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore it
of animals are created by God (q. 65, a. 4). This opinion
begins to exist not by generation but by creation.
would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having
Objection 2. Further, in living things the principle
being and operation of itself. For thus, as having being
of generation is the generating power; which, since it is
and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper
one of the powers of the vegetative soul, is of a lower or-
to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be
der than the sensitive soul. Now nothing acts beyond its
made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive
species. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be caused by
soul would arrive at existence by creation.
the animal’s generating power.
But this principle is false—namely, that being and op-
Objection 3. Further, the generator begets its like: so
eration are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made
that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause
clear above (q. 75, a. 3): for it would not cease to exist
of generation. But neither the sensitive soul itself nor any
when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a sub-
part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the
sistent form, its relation to existence is that of the corpo-
sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some part of the body;
real forms, to which existence does not belong as proper
while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body,
to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the sub-
because there is not a particle of the body which is not
sistent composites exist through them.
made from the semen and by the power thereof. There-
Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And
fore the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen.
since the generator is like the generated, it follows of
Objection 4. Further, if there be in the semen any
necessity that both the sensitive soul, and all other like
principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle
forms are naturally brought into existence by certain cor-
either remains after the animal is begotten, or it does not
poreal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to
remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it would be
act, through some corporeal power of which they are pos-
identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal;
sessed.
which is impossible, for thus there would be identity be-
Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope
tween begetter and begotten, maker and made: or it would
its action has: for instance, the hotter a body, the greater
be distinct therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it
the distance to which its heat carries. Therefore bodies
has been proved above (q. 76, a. 4) that in one animal
not endowed with life, which are the lowest in the order
there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. If
of nature, generate their like, not through some medium,
on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain,
but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But
this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would
living bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to gen-
act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the
erate their like, both without and with a medium. With-
sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen.
out a medium—in the work of nutrition, in which flesh
On the contrary, The power in the semen is to the an-
generates flesh: with a medium—in the act of generation,
imal seminally generated, as the power in the elements of
because the semen of the animal or plant derives a cer-
588
tain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the enly body, it has been said that “man and the sun generate
instrument derives a certain motive power from the prin-
man.” Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumen-
cipal agent. And as it matters not whether we say that
tally by the soul’s power, as also by the nutritive power, as
something is moved by the instrument or by the principal
stated (De Anima ii, 4).
agent, so neither does it matter whether we say that the
Reply to Objection 4. In perfect animals, generated
soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the genera-
by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as
tor, or by some seminal power derived therefrom.
the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3); but the
Reply to Objection 1. The sensitive soul is not a
foetal matter is provided by the female. In this matter, the
perfect self-subsistent substance. We have said enough
vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not as to
(q. 25, a. 3) on this point, nor need we repeat it here.
the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul
Reply to Objection 2. The generating power begets
is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract
not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul,
nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter
of which it is a power. Therefore the generating power
therefore is transmuted by the power which is in the semen
of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets
of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive
an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a
soul; not as though the force itself which was in the semen
more perfect effect is its generating power ordained.
becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator
Reply to Objection 3. This active force which is in
and generated would be identical; moreover, this would
the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the gen-
be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as
erator, is, as it were, a certain movement of this soul itself: the Philosopher says. And after the sensitive soul, by the
nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus
power of the active principle in the semen, has been pro-
the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe, but a cer-
duced in one of the principal parts of the thing generated,
tain movement towards that form. Consequently there is
then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to
no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it
work towards the perfection of its own body, by nourish-
is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy,
ment and growth. As to the active power which was in
as is attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover,
the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved
there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heav-
and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there any-
enly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior bodies also
thing unreasonable in this, because this force is not the
act towards the production of the species as stated above
principal but the instrumental agent; and the movement of
(q. 115, a. 3, ad 2). And since in this (vital) spirit the
an instrument ceases when once the effect has been pro-
power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heav-
duced.
Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen?
Ia q. 118 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul
semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by
is produced from the semen. For it is written (Gn. 46:26):
the power of the semen.
“All the souls that came out of [Jacob’s] thigh, sixty-six.”
Objection 4. Further, man begets his like in species.
But nothing is produced from the thigh of a man, except
But the human species is constituted by the rational soul.
from the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is pro-
Therefore the rational soul is from the begetter.
duced from the semen.
Objection 5. Further, it cannot be said that God con-
Objection 2. Further, as shown above (q. 76, a. 3),
curs in sin. But if the rational soul be created by God,
the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in sub-
sometimes God concurs in the sin of adultery, since some-
stance, one soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man
times offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse. Therefore
is generated from the semen, as in other animals; where-
the rational soul is not created by God.
fore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that
On the contrary, It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat.
the animal and the man are not made at the same time,
xiv that “the rational soul is not engendered by coition.”
but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul.
I answer that, It is impossible for an active power ex-
Therefore also the intellectual soul is produced from the
isting in matter to extend its action to the production of an
semen.
immaterial effect. Now it is manifest that the intellectual
Objection 3. Further, it is one and the same agent
principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation
whose action is directed to the matter and to the form: else
in which the body takes no part whatever. It is therefore
from the matter and the form there would not result some-
impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellec-
thing simply one. But the intellectual soul is the form of
tual principle.
the human body, which is produced by the power of the
Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of
589
the begetter according as the soul of the begetter is the act not generation simply, because the subject thereof would
of the body, making use of the body in its operation. Now
be a being in act. For if the vegetative soul is from the
the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of
beginning in the matter of offspring, and is subsequently
the intellect. Therefore the power of the intellectual prin-
gradually brought to perfection; this will imply addition
ciple, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence the
of further perfection without corruption of the preceding
Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): “It follows
perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of gener-
that the intellect alone comes from without.”
ation properly so called. Fourthly, because either that
Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation in-
which is caused by the action of God is something sub-
dependent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above
sistent: and thus it must needs be essentially distinct from
(q. 75, a. 2): therefore to be and to be made are proper to it.
the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent; and we
Moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be
shall then come back to the opinion of those who held the
caused through generation, but only through creation by
existence of several souls in the body—or else it is not
God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused
subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: and
by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to be
from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul
non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body.
perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted.
It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is
There is again another explanation, according to those
transmitted with the semen.
who held that all men have but one intellect in common:
Reply to Objection 1. In the passage quoted, the part
but this has been disproved above (q. 76, a. 2).
is put instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by
We must therefore say that since the generation of one
the figure of synecdoche.
thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity
Reply to Objection 2. Some say that the vital func-
that both in men and in other animals, when a more per-
tions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but
fect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted: yet
from the soul of the mother; or from the formative power
so that the supervening form contains the perfection of the
of the semen. Both of these explanations are false; for
previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way
vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth
that through many generations and corruptions we arrive
cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it
at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other an-
must be said that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive
imals. This indeed is apparent to the senses in animals
soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the in-
generated from putrefaction. We conclude therefore that
tellectual soul.
the intellectual soul is created by God at the end of human
Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative
generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and
soul which existed first, another, namely the sensitive,
nutritive, the pre-existing forms being corrupted.
soul supervenes; and in addition to this, again another,
Reply to Objection 3. This argument holds in the case
namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in man
of diverse agents not ordered to one another. But where
three souls of which one would be in potentiality to an-
there are many agents ordered to one another, nothing hin-
other. This has been disproved above (q. 76, a. 3).
ders the power of the higher agent from reaching to the
Therefore others say that the same soul which was at
ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior agents ex-
first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of
tend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the gener-
the seminal power, becomes a sensitive soul; and finally
ation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter,
this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through
but the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is man-
the active seminal power, but by the power of a higher
ifest from what has been said above (q. 105, a. 5; q. 110,
agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from with-
a. 1) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instru-
out. For this reason the Philosopher says that the intellect
ment of a spiritual power, especially of God. Therefore
comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because
nothing hinders the formation of the body from being due
no substantial form is susceptible of more or less; but
to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from
addition of greater perfection constitutes another species,
God alone.
just as the addition of unity constitutes another species of
Reply to Objection 4. Man begets his like, forasmuch
number. Now it is not possible for the same identical form
as by his seminal power the matter is disposed for the re-
to belong to different species. Secondly, because it would
ception of a certain species of form.
follow that the generation of an animal would be a contin-
Reply to Objection 5. In the action of the adulterer,
uous movement, proceeding gradually from the imperfect
what is of nature is good; in this God concurs. But what
to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because it
there is of inordinate lust is evil; in this God does not con-
would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is
cur.
590
Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world?
Ia q. 118 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that human souls were
a body.
created together at the beginning of the world. For it is
But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to
written (Gn. 2:2): “God rested Him from all His work
be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is
which He had done.” This would not be true if He created
united to a body. And the reason must be either because
new souls every day. Therefore all souls were created at
the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because
the same time.
the soul willed it—this seems incongruous. First, because
Objection 2. Further, spiritual substances before all
it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united
others belong to the perfection of the universe. If there-
to the body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need
fore souls were created with the bodies, every day innu-
it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since “na-
merable spiritual substances would be added to the per-
ture does not fail in what is necessary.” Secondly, because
fection of the universe: consequently at the beginning the
there would be no reason why, having been created from
universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to
the beginning of the world, the soul should, after such a
Gn. 2:2, where it is said that “God ended” all “His work.”
long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For
Objection 3. Further, the end of a thing corresponds
a spiritual substance is above time, and superior to the
to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains, when
heavenly revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that
the body perishes. Therefore it began to exist before the
this body was united to this soul by chance: since for this
body.
union to take place two wills would have to concur—to
On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv,
wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the begetter.
xviii) that “the soul is created together with the body.”
If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural
I answer that, Some have maintained that it is ac-
on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of some
cidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body,
violent cause, and to the soul would have something of
asserting that the soul is of the same nature as those spir-
a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping with the
itual substances which are not united to a body. These,
opinion of Origen, who held that souls were embodies in
therefore, stated that the souls of men were created to-
punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are
gether with the angels at the beginning. But this state-
unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not
ment is false. Firstly, in the very principle on which it is
created before bodies, but are created at the same time as
based. For if it were accidental to the soul to be united to
they are infused into them.
the body, it would follow that man who results from this
Reply to Objection 1. God is said to have rested on
union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man,
the seventh day, not from all work, since we read (Jn.
which is false, as proved above (q. 75, a. 4). Moreover,
5:17): “My Father worketh until now”; but from the cre-
that the human soul is not of the same nature as the an-
ation of any new genera and species, which may not have
gels, is proved from the different mode of understanding,
already existed in the first works. For in this sense, the
as shown above (q. 55, a. 2; q. 85, a. 1 ): for man under-
souls which are created now, existed already, as to the
stands through receiving from the senses, and turning to
likeness of the species, in the first works, which included
phantasms, as stated above (q. 84, Aa. 6,7; q. 85, a. 1).
the creation of Adam’s soul.
For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body,
Reply to Objection 2. Something can be added every
which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive
day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of
part: whereas this cannot be said of an angel.
individuals, but not as to the number of species.
Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in it-
Reply to Objection 3. That the soul remains without
self. For if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was
it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it
a result of sin. Consequently it was not fitting that God
is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection.
should make the soul without the body from the begin-
Now it was not fitting that God should begin His work
ning: for as it is written (Wis. 1:13,16): “God made not
with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make
death. . . but the wicked with works and words have called
man without a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a
it to them.”
man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without
591
FIRST PART, QUESTION 119
Of the Propagation of Man As to the Body
(In Two Articles)
We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?
(2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is produced from the surplus food?
Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature?
Ia q. 119 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that none of the food is
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph.
changed into true human nature. For it is written (Mat.
ii), “The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its re-
15:17): “Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into
lation to being.” Therefore that belongs to the true nature
the belly, and is cast out into the privy.” But what is cast
of any thing which enters into the constitution of that na-
out is not changed into the reality of human nature. There-
ture. But nature can be considered in two ways: firstly,
fore none of the food is changed into true human nature.
in general according to the species; secondly, as in the in-
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5)
dividual. And whereas the form and the common matter
distinguishes flesh belonging to the “species” from flesh
belong to a thing’s true nature considered in general; indi-
belonging to “matter”; and says that the latter “comes and
vidual signate matter, and the form individualized by that
goes.” Now what is formed from food comes and goes.
matter belong to the true nature considered in this partic-
Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging
ular individual. Thus a soul and body belong to the true
to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true hu-
human nature in general, but to the true human nature of
man nature belongs to the species. Therefore the food is
Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.
not changed into true human nature.
Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist
Objection 3. Further, the “radical humor” seems to
but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun can-
belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost,
not exist save in the matter in which it actually is. And
it cannot be recovered, according to physicians. But it
in this sense some have said that the human form cannot
could be recovered if the food were changed into the hu-
exist but in a certain individual matter, which, they said,
mor. Therefore food is not changed into true human na-
was given that form at the very beginning in the first man.
ture.
So that whatever may have been added to that which was
Objection 4. Further, if the food were changed into
derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong
true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be re-
to the truth of human nature, as not receiving in truth the
stored. But man’s death is due only to the loss of some-
form of human nature.
thing. Therefore man would be able by taking food to
But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was
insure himself against death in perpetuity.
the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself:
Objection 5. Further, if the food is changed into true
and in this way the multitude of human bodies is derived
human nature, there is nothing in man which may not re-
from the body of the first man. According to these, the
cede or be repaired: for what is generated in a man from
food is not changed into true human nature; we take food,
his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a
they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of
man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end
natural heat, and prevent the consumption of the “radical
nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at
humor”; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent
the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically
its being consumed by fire.
the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be
But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, be-
numerically the same, identity of matter is necessary. But
cause it comes to the same that a form can be produced in
this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed
another matter, or that it can cease to be in its proper mat-
into true human nature.
ter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corrupt-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi):
ible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that the human
“The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its
form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which
form, is changed into the texture of the members.” But
is its subject: else the human body would not be corrupt-
the texture of the members belongs to true human nature.
ible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter,
Therefore the food is changed into the reality of human
so that something else be changed into true human na-
nature.
ture. Secondly, because in all beings whose entire matter
592
is contained in one individual there is only one individual And if anything further is produced from the food, this
in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon
does not belong to true human nature, properly speak-
and such like. Thus there would only be one individual
ing. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because this
of the human species. Thirdly, because multiplication of
opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in
matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in re-
which, although there be a power of generating their like
spect of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so
in species, there is not the power of generating their like
that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of
in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nu-
the substance itself of the matter. But as long as the sub-
tritive power. Nothing, therefore, would be added to liv-
stance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be
ing bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not
multiplied; for multitude cannot consist in the addition of
changed into their true nature. Secondly, because the ac-
a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from
tive seminal power is a certain impression derived from
division. Therefore some other substance must be added
the soul of the begetter, as stated above (q. 118, a. 1).
to matter, either by creation, or by something else being
Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the
changed into it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied
soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal
save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water;
power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human
or by the change of some other things, as fire is multiplied
nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power,
by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it
imprint the true form of human nature on the food which is
is manifest that the multiplication of matter in the human
assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for
body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a
growth, else at the term of growth, food would be need-
man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body
ful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the
of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of flesh matter:
action of natural heat. But there would be no renewal, un-
for, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): “All things were
less what is formed from the food, took the place of what
created together as to the substance of matter, but not as
is lost. Wherefore just as that which was there previously
to the specific form.” Consequently the multiplication of
belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is
the human body can only be the result of the food being
formed from the food.
changed into the true human nature. Fourthly, because,
Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the
since man does not differ from animals and plants in re-
food is really changed into the true human nature by rea-
gard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies
son of its assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and
of animals and plants do not increase through a change
such like parts. This is what the Philosopher says (De An-
of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through
ima ii, 4): “Food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially
some kind of multiplication. Which multiplication can-
flesh.”
not be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend
Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord does not say that the
beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does anything
“whole” of what enters into the mouth, but “all”—because
increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change
something from every kind of food is cast out into the
of something else into it. Consequently the whole process
privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from
of generation and nourishment, which are called “natural
food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast aside
forces,” would be miraculous. Which is altogether inad-
through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.
missible.
Reply to Objection 2.
By flesh belonging to the
Wherefore others have said that the human form can
species, some have understood that which first receives
indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider
the human species, which is derived from the begetter:
the human nature in general: but not if we consider it as
this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh
in this individual. For in the individual the form remains
belonging to the matter these understand what is gener-
confined to a certain determinate matter, on which it is
ated from food: and this, they say, does not always re-
first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that
main, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to
it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution
the mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that “just as in
of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally
things which have their species in matter”—for instance,
belongs to the true human nature. But since this mat-
wood or stone—“so in flesh, there is something belonging
ter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other
to the species, and something belonging to matter.” Now
matter must be added, through the change of food into
it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate
the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such
things, which are not generated seminally, or nourished.
a quantity as suffices for the increase required. And this
Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by
matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human
mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed
nature: because it is not required for the primary exis-
with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of exam-
tence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him.
ple: that which is added, and that to which it is added,
593
cannot be different natures, since they are already made is weakened by continuous action, because such agents
one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason
are also patient.
Therefore the transforming virtue is
for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the
strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough
other remains.
for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. Later
It must therefore be said that this distinction of the
on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what
Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the
is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do
same flesh considered from different points of view. For
this; and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails
if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is,
altogether, the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that
according to that which is formed therein, thus it remains
transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further
always: because the nature of flesh always remains to-
additions of water, so as to become at length watery, as
gether with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh
the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).
according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradu-
Reply to Objection 5. As the Philosopher says (De
ally destroyed and renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace,
Gener. i, 5), when a certain matter is directly transformed
the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually con-
into fire, then fire is said to be generated anew: but when
sumed, and other matter is substituted in its place.
matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire
Reply to Objection 3. The “radical humor” is said
is said to be fed. Wherefore if the entire matter together
to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded
loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into
on. If this be taken away it cannot be renewed; as when
fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if, while one
a man’s hand or foot is amputated. But the “nutritive hu-
piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on
mor” is that which has not yet received perfectly the spe-
until the first piece is entirely consumed, the same iden-
cific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood,
tical fire will remain all the time: because that which is
and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue
added passes into what pre-existed. It is the same with
of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed.
living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is
Reply to Objection 4. Every virtue of a passible body
renewed which was consumed by natural heat.
Whether the semen is produced from surplus food?
Ia q. 119 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the semen is not pro-
plus food.”
duced from the surplus food, but from the substance of
I answer that, This question depends in some way on
the begetter. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 8)
what has been stated above (a. 1; q. 118, a. 1). For if
that “generation is a work of nature, producing, from the
human nature has a virtue for the communication of its
substance of the begetter, that which is begotten.” But that
form to alien matter not only in another, but also in its
which is generated is produced from the semen. Therefore
own subject; it is clear that the food which at first is dis-
the semen is produced from the substance of the begetter.
similar, becomes at length similar through the form com-
Objection 2. Further, the son is like his father, in re-
municated to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a
spect of that which he receives from him. But if the semen
thing should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually:
from which something is generated, is produced from the
hence in things generated we observe that at first each is
surplus food, a man would receive nothing from his grand-
imperfect and is afterwards perfected. But it is clear that
father and his ancestors in whom the food never existed.
the common is to the proper and determinate, as imper-
Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather
fect is to perfect: therefore we see that in the generation
or ancestors, than to any other men.
of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or
Objection 3. Further, the food of the generator is
the horse. So therefore food first of all receives a certain
sometimes the flesh of cows, pigs and suchlike. If there-
common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which
fore, the semen were produced from surplus food, the man
virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that part.
begotten of such semen would be more akin to the cow
Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solu-
and the pig, than to his father or other relations.
tion from what is already transformed into the substance
Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x,
of the members. For this solution, if it does not retain the
20) that we were in Adam “not only by seminal virtue, but
nature of the member it is taken from, it would no longer
also in the very substance of the body.” But this would not
be of the nature of the begetter, and would be due to a pro-
be, if the semen were produced from surplus food. There-
cess of corruption; and consequently it would not have the
fore the semen is not produced therefrom.
power of transforming something else into the likeness of
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves in many
that nature. But if it retained the nature of the member it
ways (De Gener. Animal. i, 18) that “the semen is sur-
is taken from, then, since it is limited to a certain part of
594
the body, it would not have the power of moving towards to the begotten is on account not of the matter, but of the
(the production of) the whole nature, but only the nature
form of the agent that generates its like. Wherefore in or-
of that part. Unless one were to say that the solution is
der for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need
taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains the
that the corporeal seminal matter should have been in the
nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small an-
grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue derived
imal in act; and generation of animal from animal would
from the soul of the grandfather through the father. In like
be a mere division, as mud is generated from mud, and
manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is
as animals which continue to live after being cut in two:
not in relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the
which is inadmissible.
forms.
It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is
Reply to Objection 4. These words of Augustine are
not something separated from what was before the actual
not to be understood as though the immediate seminal
whole; rather is it the whole, though potentially, having
virtue, or the corporeal substance from which this individ-
the power, derived from the soul of the begetter, to pro-
ual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that both
duce the whole body, as stated above (a. 1; q. 108, a. 1
were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal mat-
). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that
ter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls
which is generated from the food, before it is transformed
the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam:
into the substance of the members. Therefore the semen is
and likewise the active seminal power of the father, which
taken from this. In this sense the nutritive power is said to
is the immediate seminal virtue (in the production) of this
serve the generative power: because what is transformed
man.
by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the gener-
But Christ is said to have been in Adam according
ative power. A sign of this, according to the Philosopher,
to the “corporeal substance,” not according to the semi-
is that animals of great size, which require much food,
nal virtue. Because the matter from which His Body was
have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies,
formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin Mother,
and generated seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the
was derived from Adam; whereas the active virtue was not
same reason.
derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by
Reply to Objection 1. Generation is from the sub-
the seminal virtue of a man, but by the operation of the
stance of the begetter in animals and plants, inasmuch as
Holy Ghost. For “such a birth was becoming to Him,”∗,
the semen owes its virtue to the form of the begetter, and
WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED.
inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance.
Amen.
Reply to Objection 2. The likeness of the begetter
∗ Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary, O. P.
595
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART
PROLOGUE
Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be made in God’s image, in so far as the image implies “an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement”: now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image, i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 1
Of Man’s Last End
(In Eight Articles)
In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and secondly, those things by means of which man may advance towards this end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end. And since the last end of human life is stated to be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2) happiness.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?
(2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?
(3) Whether a man’s actions are specified by their end?
(4) Whether there is any last end of human life?
(5) Whether one man can have several last ends?
(6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?
(7) Whether all men have the same last end?
(8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?
Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?
Ia IIae q. 1 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong to
everything for an end.
man to act for an end. For a cause is naturally first. But
I answer that, Of actions done by man those alone
an end, in its very name, implies something that is last.
are properly called “human,” which are proper to man as
Therefore an end is not a cause. But that for which a man
man. Now man differs from irrational animals in this,
acts, is the cause of his action; since this preposition “for”
that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions
indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does not be-
alone are properly called human, of which man is mas-
long to man to act for an end.
ter. Now man is master of his actions through his reason
Objection 2. Further, that which is itself the last end
and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as “the fac-
is not for an end. But in some cases the last end is an ac-
ulty and will of reason.” Therefore those actions are prop-
tion, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man
erly called human which proceed from a deliberate will.
does not do everything for an end.
And if any other actions are found in man, they can be
Objection 3. Further, then does a man seem to act for
called actions “of a man,” but not properly “human” ac-
an end, when he acts deliberately. But man does many
tions, since they are not proper to man as man. Now it
things without deliberation, sometimes not even thinking
is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are
of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one’s
caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its
foot or hand, or scratches one’s beard, while intent on
object. But the object of the will is the end and the good.
something else. Therefore man does not do everything
Therefore all human actions must be for an end.
for an end.
Reply to Objection 1. Although the end be last in the
On the contrary, All things contained in a genus are
order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent’s derived from the principle of that genus. Now the end
intention. And it is this way that it is a cause.
is the principle in human operations, as the Philosopher
Reply to Objection 2. If any human action be the last
states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it belongs to man to do
end, it must be voluntary, else it would not be human, as
596
stated above. Now an action is voluntary in one of two a human action be the last end, it must be an action com-ways: first, because it is commanded by the will, e.g. to
manded by the will: so that there, some action of man, at
walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited by the
least the act of willing, is for the end. Therefore whatever
will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is impos-
a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even
sible for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end.
when he does that action in which the last end consists.
For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of
Reply to Objection 3. Such like actions are not prop-
sight is color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be
erly human actions; since they do not proceed from de-
the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to
liberation of the reason, which is the proper principle of
a visible object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot
human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary
be the very act of willing. Consequently it follows that if
end, but not one that is fixed by reason.
Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?
Ia IIae q. 1 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that it is proper to the
are possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; be-
rational nature to act for an end. For man, to whom it be-
cause they have dominion over their actions through their
longs to act for an end, never acts for an unknown end. On
free-will, which is the “faculty of will and reason.” But
the other hand, there are many things that have no knowl-
those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural
edge of an end; either because they are altogether without
inclination, as being moved by another and not by them-
knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do
selves; since they do not know the nature of an end as
not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as irrational an-
such, and consequently cannot ordain anything to an end,
imals. Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to
but can be ordained to an end only by another. For the en-
act for an end.
tire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instru-
Objection 2. Further, to act for an end is to order one’s ment to the principal agent, as stated above ( Ia, q. 22, a. 2, action to an end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore
ad 4; Ia, q. 103, a. 1, ad 3). Consequently it is proper to
it does not belong to things that lack reason.
the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing [agens]
Objection 3. Further, the good and the end is the ob-
and leading itself to the end: whereas it is proper to the
ject of the will. But “the will is in the reason” (De Anima
irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by
iii, 9). Therefore to act for an end belongs to none but a
another, whether it apprehend the end, as do irrational an-
rational nature.
imals, or do not apprehend it, as is the case of those things
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5)
which are altogether void of knowledge.
that “not only mind but also nature acts for an end.”
Reply to Objection 1. When a man of himself acts for
I answer that, Every agent, of necessity, acts for an
an end, he knows the end: but when he is directed or led
end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one an-
by another, for instance, when he acts at another’s com-
other, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity,
mand, or when he is moved under another’s compulsion,
be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final
it is not necessary that he should know the end. And it is
cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive
thus with irrational creatures.
form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for noth-
Reply to Objection 2. To ordain towards an end be-
ing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent
longs to that which directs itself to an end: whereas to be
does not move except out of intention for an end. For if
ordained to an end belongs to that which is directed by
the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it
another to an end. And this can belong to an irrational
would not do one thing rather than another: consequently
nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason.
in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of
Reply to Objection 3. The object of the will is the
necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has
end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be
the nature of an end. And just as this determination is ef-
no will in those things that lack reason and intellect, since
fected, in the rational nature, by the “rational appetite,”
they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a nat-
which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused
ural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate to some
by their natural inclination, which is called the “natural
particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are
appetite.”
moved by a universal cause: thus the governor of a city,
Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to
who intends the common good, moves, by his command,
an end, by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as
all the particular departments of the city. Consequently
a thing, moving itself to the end, as man; secondly, as a
all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their
thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow tends to a
particular ends by some rational will which extends to the
determinate end through being moved by the archer who
universal good, namely by the Divine will.
directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that
597
Whether human acts are specified by their end?
Ia IIae q. 1 a. 3
Objection 1.
It would seem that human acts are
man, is the end. In like manner it is their terminus: for
not specified by their end. For the end is an extrinsic
the human act terminates at that which the will intends as
cause. But everything is specified by an intrinsic princi-
the end; thus in natural agents the form of the thing gener-
ple. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end.
ated is conformed to the form of the generator. And since,
Objection 2. Further, that which gives a thing its
as Ambrose says (Prolog. super Luc.) “morality is said
species should exist before it. But the end comes into ex-
properly of man,” moral acts properly speaking receive
istence afterwards. Therefore a human act does not derive
their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as
its species from the end.
human acts.
Objection 3. Further, one thing cannot be in more
Reply to Objection 1. The end is not altogether ex-
than one species. But one and the same act may happen to
trinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle be ordained to various ends. Therefore the end does not
or terminus; and thus it just this that is essential to an act, give the species to human acts.
viz. to proceed from something, considered as action, and
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Mor.
Eccl.
to proceed towards something, considered as passion.
et Manich. ii, 13): “According as their end is worthy
Reply to Objection 2. The end, in so far as it pre-
of blame or praise so are our deeds worthy of blame or
exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above
praise.”
(a. 1, ad 1). And it is thus that it gives the species to the
I answer that Each thing receives its species in re-
human or moral act.
spect of an act and not in respect of potentiality; where-
Reply to Objection 3. One and the same act, in so far
fore things composed of matter and form are established
as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one
in their respective species by their own forms. And this
proximate end, from which it has its species: but it can be
is also to be observed in proper movements. For since
ordained to several remote ends, of which one is the end
movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion,
of the other. It is possible, however, that an act which is
each of these receives its species from an act; action in-
one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to sev-
deed from the act which is the principle of acting, and pas-
eral ends of the will: thus this act “to kill a man,” which
sion from the act which is the terminus of the movement.
is but one act in respect of its natural species, can be or-
Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than a
dained, as to an end, to the safeguarding of justice, and to
certain movement proceeding from heat, while heating as
the satisfying of anger: the result being that there would
a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat:
be several acts in different species of morality: since in
and it is the definition that shows the specific nature. And
one way there will be an act of virtue, in another, an act
either way, human acts, whether they be considered as ac-
of vice. For a movement does not receive its species from
tions, or as passions, receive their species from the end.
that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that
For human acts can be considered in both ways, since man
which is its “per se” terminus. Now moral ends are acci-
moves himself, and is moved by himself. Now it has been
dental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation to a
stated above (a. 1) that acts are called human, inasmuch
natural end is accidental to morality. Consequently there
as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the object
is no reason why acts which are the same considered in
of the will is the good and the end. And hence it is clear
their natural species, should not be diverse, considered in
that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are hu-
their moral species, and conversely.
Whether there is one last end of human life?
Ia IIae q. 1 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no last end
are infinite, since, given any number, the reason can think
of human life, but that we proceed to infinity. For good is
of one yet greater. But desire of the end is consequent on
essentially diffusive, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv).
the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that
Consequently if that which proceeds from good is itself
there is also an infinite series of ends.
good, the latter must needs diffuse some other good: so
Objection 3. Further, the good and the end is the ob-
that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good
ject of the will. But the will can react on itself an infinite
has the nature of an end. Therefore there is an indefinite
number of times: for I can will something, and will to will
series of ends.
it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore there is an infinite se-
Objection 2. Further, things pertaining to the reason
ries of ends of the human will, and there is no last end of
can be multiplied to infinity: thus mathematical quantities
the human will.
have no limit. For the same reason the species of numbers
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii,
598
2) that “to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that And in this way it happens that there is an accidental in-it is good.” But the good is that which has the nature of
finity of ends, and of things ordained to the end.
an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of an end to
Reply to Objection 1. The very nature of good is that
proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is necessary to fix one
something flows from it, but not that it flows from some-
last end.
thing else. Since, therefore, good has the nature of end,
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, it is not possi-
and the first good is the last end, this argument does not
ble to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any
prove that there is no last end; but that from the end, al-
point of view. For in whatsoever things there is an essen-
ready supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely
tial order of one to another, if the first be removed, those
towards those things that are ordained to the end. And this
that are ordained to the first, must of necessity be removed
would be true if we considered but the power of the First
also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5)
Good, which is infinite. But, since the First Good dif-
that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of move-
fuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper
ment, because then there would be no first mover, without
to flow forth into its effects according to a certain fixed
which neither can the others move, since they move only
form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow
through being moved by the first mover. Now there is to
of good things from the First Good from Which all other
be observed a twofold order in ends—the order of inten-
goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the dif-
tion and the order of execution: and in either of these or-
fusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely but, as it is
ders there must be something first. For that which is first
written (Wis. 11:21), God disposes all things “in number,
in the order of intention, is the principle, as it were, mov-
weight and measure.”
ing the appetite; consequently, if you remove this princi-
Reply to Objection 2. In things which are of them-
ple, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the
selves, reason begins from principles that are known natu-
other hand, the principle in execution is that wherein op-
rally, and advances to some term. Wherefore the Philoso-
eration has its beginning; and if this principle be taken
pher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no infinite pro-
away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the
cess in demonstrations, because there we find a process of
intention is the last end; while the principle in execution is
things having an essential, not an accidental, connection
the first of the things which are ordained to the end. Con-
with one another. But in those things which are acciden-
sequently, on neither side is it possible to go to infinity
tally connected, nothing hinders the reason from proceed-
since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired,
ing indefinitely. Now it is accidental to a stated quantity
nor would any action have its term, nor would the inten-
or number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it.
tion of the agent be at rest; while if there is no first thing
Wherefore in such like things nothing hinders the reason
among those that are ordained to the end, none would be-
from an indefinite process.
gin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term,
Reply to Objection 3. This multiplication of acts of
but would continue indefinitely.
the will reacting on itself, is accidental to the order of
On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being
ends. This is clear from the fact that in regard to one and
in things that are ordained to one another not essentially
the same end, the will reacts on itself indifferently once or
but accidentally; for accidental causes are indeterminate.
several times.
Whether one man can have several last ends?
Ia IIae q. 1 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem possible for one man’s
before it placed its last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it
will to be directed at the same time to several things, as
could place it in something else, e.g. riches. Therefore
last ends. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that
even after having placed his last end in pleasure, a man
some held man’s last end to consist in four things, viz. “in
can at the same time place his last end in riches. There-
pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue.” But these
fore it is possible for one man’s will to be directed at the
are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can
same time to several things, as last ends.
place the last end of his will in many things.
On the contrary, That in which a man rests as in his
Objection 2. Further, things not in opposition to one
last end, is master of his affections, since he takes there-
another do not exclude one another. Now there are many
from his entire rule of life. Hence of gluttons it is written
things which are not in opposition to one another. There-
(Phil. 3:19): “Whose god is their belly”: viz. because
fore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the
they place their last end in the pleasures of the belly. Now
will does not exclude others.
according to Mat. 6:24, “No man can serve two masters,”
Objection 3. Further, by the fact that it places its last such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. There-end in one thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But
fore it is impossible for one man to have several last ends
599
not ordained to one another.
receive their species from the end, as stated above (a. 3),
I answer that, It is impossible for one man’s will to
they must needs receive their genus from the last end,
be directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends.
which is common to them all: just as natural things are
Three reasons may be assigned for this. First, because,
placed in a genus according to a common form. Since,
since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires
then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as
for his ultimate end, that which he desires as his perfect
such, to one genus, the last end must needs be one. And
and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix,
all the more because in every genus there is one first prin-
1): “In speaking of the end of good we mean now, not that
ciple; and the last end has the nature of a first principle, as it passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected
stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as man,
so as to be complete.” It is therefore necessary for the last
is to the whole human race, so is the last end of any indi-
end so to fill man’s appetite, that nothing is left besides it
vidual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men
for man to desire. Which is not possible, if something else
there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual
be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not pos-
man must be fixed on one last end.
sible for the appetite so to tend to two things, as though
Reply to Objection 1. All these several objects were
each were its perfect good.
considered as one perfect good resulting therefrom, by
The second reason is because, just as in the process of
those who placed in them the last end.
reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known,
Reply to Objection 2. Although it is possible to find
so in the process of the rational appetite, i.e. the will,
several things which are not in opposition to one another,
the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired.
yet it is contrary to a thing’s perfect good, that anything
Now this must needs be one: since nature tends to one
besides be required for that thing’s perfection.
thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational
Reply to Objection 3. The power of the will does not
appetite is the last end. Therefore that to which the will
extend to making opposites exist at the same time. Which
tends, as to its last end, is one.
would be the case were it to tend to several diverse objects
The third reason is because, since voluntary actions
as last ends, as has been shown above (ad 2).
Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end?
Ia IIae q. 1 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that man does not will all,
and of art. Wherefore every beginning of perfection is or-
whatsoever he wills, for the last end. For things ordained
dained to complete perfection which is achieved through
to the last end are said to be serious matter, as being use-
the last end. Secondly, because the last end stands in the
ful. But jests are foreign to serious matter. Therefore what
same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in
man does in jest, he ordains not to the last end.
other movements. Now it is clear that secondary moving
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says at the be-
causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by
ginning of his Metaphysics 1,[2] that speculative science
the first mover. Therefore secondary objects of the ap-
is sought for its own sake. Now it cannot be said that each
petite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the
speculative science is the last end. Therefore man does
first object of the appetite, which is the last end.
not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end.
Reply to Objection 1. Actions done jestingly are not
Objection 3. Further, whosoever ordains something
directed to any external end; but merely to the good of the
to an end, thinks of that end. But man does not always
jester, in so far as they afford him pleasure or relaxation.
think of the last end in all that he desires or does. There-
But man’s consummate good is his last end.
fore man neither desires nor does all for the last end.
Reply to Objection 2. The same applies to specula-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
tive science; which is desired as the scientist’s good, in-
1): “That is the end of our good, for the sake of which we
cluded in complete and perfect good, which is the ultimate
love other things, whereas we love it for its own sake.”
end.
I answer that, Man must, of necessity, desire all,
Reply to Objection 3. One need not always be think-
whatsoever he desires, for the last end. This is evident
ing of the last end, whenever one desires or does some-
for two reasons. First, because whatever man desires, he
thing: but the virtue of the first intention, which was in
desires it under the aspect of good. And if he desire it,
respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed
not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he must,
to any object whatever, even though one’s thoughts be not
of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, be-
actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along
cause the beginning of anything is always ordained to its
the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every
completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature
step.
600
Whether all men have the same last end?
Ia IIae q. 1 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that all men have not the
ment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment
same last end. For before all else the unchangeable good
in which the last end consists, as stated above (a. 5). But
seems to be the last end of man. But some turn away from
as to the thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are
the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men
not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches
have not the same last end.
as their consummate good; some, pleasure; others, some-
Objection 2. Further, man’s entire life is ruled accord-
thing else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to
ing to his last end. If, therefore, all men had the same last
some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to others,
end, they would not have various pursuits in life. Which
the sweetness of honey, or of something similar. Yet that
is evidently false.
sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in which
Objection 3. Further, the end is the term of action.
he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like man-
But actions are of individuals. Now although men agree
ner that good is most complete which the man with well
in their specific nature, yet they differ in things pertaining
disposed affections desires for his last end.
to individuals. Therefore all men have not the same last
Reply to Objection 1. Those who sin turn from that
end.
in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3)
away from the intention of the last end, which intention
that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happi-
they mistakenly seek in other things.
ness.
Reply to Objection 2. Various pursuits in life are
I answer that, We can speak of the last end in two
found among men by reason of the various things in which
ways: first, considering only the aspect of last end; sec-
men seek to find their last end.
ondly, considering the thing in which the aspect of last
Reply to Objection 3. Although actions are of indi-
end is realized. So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all
viduals, yet their first principle of action is nature, which
agree in desiring the last end: since all desire the fulfil-
tends to one thing, as stated above (a. 5).
Whether other creatures concur in that last end?
Ia IIae q. 1 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that all other creatures
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2),
concur in man’s last end. For the end corresponds to the
the end is twofold—the end “for which” and the end “by
beginning. But man’s beginning—i.e. God—is also the
which”; viz. the thing itself in which is found the aspect
beginning of all else. Therefore all other things concur in
of good, and the use or acquisition of that thing. Thus we
man’s last end.
say that the end of the movement of a weighty body is
Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
either a lower place as “thing,” or to be in a lower place,
that “God turns all things to Himself as to their last end.”
as “use”; and the end of the miser is money as “thing,” or
But He is also man’s last end; because He alone is to be
possession of money as “use.”
enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i,
If, therefore, we speak of man’s last end as of the thing
5,22). Therefore other things, too, concur in man’s last
which is the end, thus all other things concur in man’s
end.
last end, since God is the last end of man and of all other
Objection 3. Further, man’s last end is the object of
things. If, however, we speak of man’s last end, as of
the will. But the object of the will is the universal good,
the acquisition of the end, then irrational creatures do not
which is the end of all. Therefore other things, too, concur
concur with man in this end. For man and other rational
in man’s last end.
creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving
On the contrary, man’s last end is happiness; which
God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire
all men desire, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But
their last end, in so far as they share in the Divine likeness,
“happiness is not possible for animals bereft of reason,”
inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know.
as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5). Therefore other things
Hence it is evident how the objections are solved:
do not concur in man’s last end.
since happiness means the acquisition of the last end.
601
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 2
Of Those Things in Which Man’s Happiness Consists
(In Eight Articles)
We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether happiness consists in wealth?
(2) Whether in honor?
(3) Whether in fame or glory?
(4) Whether in power?
(5) Whether in any good of the body?
(6) Whether in pleasure?
(7) Whether in any good of the soul?
(8) Whether in any created good?
Whether man’s happiness consists in wealth?
Ia IIae q. 2 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness con-
the sake of something else, viz. as a support of human
sists in wealth. For since happiness is man’s last end, it
nature: consequently it cannot be man’s last end, rather is
must consist in that which has the greatest hold on man’s
it ordained to man as to its end. Wherefore in the order
affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written (Eccles.
of nature, all such things are below man, and made for
10:19): “All things obey money.” Therefore man’s happi-
him, according to Ps. 8:8: “Thou hast subjected all things
ness consists in wealth.
under his feet.”
Objection 2. Further, according to Boethius (De Con-
And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the
sol. iii), happiness is “a state of life made perfect by the
sake of natural wealth; since man would not seek it except
aggregate of all good things.” Now money seems to be
because, by its means, he procures for himself the neces-
the means of possessing all things: for, as the Philosopher
saries of life. Consequently much less can it be consid-
says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented, that it might be
ered in the light of the last end. Therefore it is impossible
a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man
for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in
desires. Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
wealth.
Objection 3.
Further, since the desire for the
Reply to Objection 1.
All material things obey
sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this
money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who
is the case with riches more than anything else; since “a
know no other than material goods, which can be obtained
covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches” (Eccles.
for money. But we should take our estimation of human
5:9). Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as it is
On the contrary, Man’s good consists in retaining
for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge
happiness rather than in spreading it. But as Boethius says
whether a thing is palatable.
(De Consol. ii), “wealth shines in giving rather than in
Reply to Objection 2. All things salable can be had
hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous
for money: not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold.
man is applauded.” Therefore man’s happiness does not
Hence it is written (Prov. 17:16): “What doth it avail a
consist in wealth.
fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom.”
I answer that, It is impossible for man’s happiness to
Reply to Objection 3. The desire for natural riches
consist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philoso-
is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a certain
pher says (Polit. i, 3), viz. natural and artificial. Natural
measure. But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite,
wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his nat-
for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which
ural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, cars, dwellings,
is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear (Polit. i,
and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a
3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than
direct help to nature, as money, but is invented by the art
the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly
of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a mea-
the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and
sure of things salable.
other things despised: because the more we possess it, the
Now it is evident that man’s happiness cannot consist
more we know it. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:29):
in natural wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for
“They that eat me shall yet hunger.” Whereas in the de-
602
sire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the thirst again.” The reason of this is that we realize more
contrary is the case: for when we already possess them,
their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very
we despise them, and seek others: which is the sense of
fact shows that they are imperfect, and the sovereign good
Our Lord’s words (Jn. 4:13): “Whosoever drinketh of
does not consist therein.
this water,” by which temporal goods are signified, “shall
Whether man’s happiness consists in honors?
Ia IIae q. 2 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness con-
some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and
sists in honors. For happiness or bliss is “the reward of
attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored.
virtue,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor
Now a man’s excellence is in proportion, especially to his
more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue
happiness, which is man’s perfect good; and to its parts,
is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). There-
i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share of happi-
fore happiness consists especially in honor.
ness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but
Objection 2. Further, that which belongs to God and
happiness cannot principally consist therein.
to persons of great excellence seems especially to be hap-
Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
piness, which is the perfect good. But that is honor, as
i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the vir-
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover, the Apos-
tuous work: but they receive honor from men by way of
tle says (1 Tim. 1:17): “To. . . the only God be honor and
reward, “as from those who have nothing greater to offer.”
glory.” Therefore happiness consists in honor.
But virtue’s true reward is happiness itself, for which the
Objection 3. Further, that which man desires above
virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would
all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man
no longer be a virtue, but ambition.
than honor: since man suffers loss in all other things, lest
Reply to Objection 2. Honor is due to God and to
he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore happiness con-
persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of ex-
sists in honor.
cellence already existing: not that honor makes them ex-
On the contrary, Happiness is in the happy. But
cellent.
honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who hon-
Reply to Objection 3. That man desires honor above
ors, and who offers deference to the person honored, as
all else, arises from his natural desire for happiness, from
the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore happiness
which honor results, as stated above. Wherefore man
does not consist in honor.
seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose
I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to con-
judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy.
sist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of
Whether man’s happiness consists in fame or glory?
Ia IIae q. 2 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness con-
(De Consol. ii): “You seem to beget unto yourselves eter-
sists in glory. For happiness seems to consist in that which
nity, when you think of your fame in future time.” There-
is paid to the saints for the trials they have undergone in
fore man’s happiness consists in fame or glory.
the world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says (Rom.
On the contrary, Happiness is man’s true good. But
8:18): “The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be
it happens that fame or glory is false: for as Boethius says
compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in
(De Consol. iii), “many owe their renown to the lying
us.” Therefore happiness consists in glory.
reports spread among the people. Can anything be more
Objection 2. Further, good is diffusive of itself, as
shameful? For those who receive false fame, must needs
stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But man’s good is
blush at their own praise.” Therefore man’s happiness
spread abroad in the knowledge of others by glory more
does not consist in fame or glory.
than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose∗,
I answer that, Man’s happiness cannot consist in hu-
glory consists “in being well known and praised.” There-
man fame or glory. For glory consists “in being well
fore man’s happiness consists in glory.
known and praised,” as Ambrose† says. Now the thing
Objection 3. Further, happiness is the most enduring
known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to
good. Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this
God’s knowledge: for human knowledge is caused by the
men attain to eternity after a fashion. Hence Boethius says
things known, whereas God’s knowledge is the cause of
∗ Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13
† Augustine, Contra
Maxim. Arian. ii, 13
603
the things known. Wherefore the perfection of human Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle speaks, then, not
good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by hu-
of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which
man knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another’s
is from God, with His Angels. Hence it is written (Mk.
happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by,
8:38): “The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of
human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently
His Father, before His angels”∗.
man’s happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the
Reply to Objection 2. A man’s good which, through
other hand, man’s good depends on God’s knowledge as
fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowl-
its cause. And therefore man’s beatitude depends, as on
edge be true, must needs be derived from good existing
its cause, on the glory which man has with God; accord-
in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or
ing to Ps. 90:15,16: “I will deliver him, and I will glorify
inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, it does
him; I will fill him with length of days, and I will show
not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not ex-
him my salvation.”
ist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows
Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge
that fame can nowise make man happy.
often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are
Reply to Objection 3. Fame has no stability; in fact,
human acts. For this reason human glory is frequently de-
it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it en-
ceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is
dures, this is by accident. But happiness endures of itself,
always true; hence it is written (2 Cor. 10:18): “He. . . is
and for ever.
approved. . . whom God commendeth.”
Whether man’s happiness consists in power?
Ia IIae q. 2 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that happiness consists
Now four general reasons may be given to prove
in power. For all things desire to become like to God, as
that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external
to their last end and first beginning. But men who are in
goods. First, because, since happiness is man’s supreme
power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be
good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the forego-
most like to God: hence also in Scripture they are called
ing can be found both in good and in evil men. Secondly,
“gods” (Ex. 22:28), “Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods.”
because, since it is the nature of happiness to “satisfy of
Therefore happiness consists in power.
itself,” as stated in Ethic. i, 7, having gained happiness,
Objection 2. Further, happiness is the perfect good.
man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring
But the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule
any one of the foregoing, man may still lack many goods
others; which belongs to those who are in power. There-
that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily
fore happiness consists in power.
health, and such like. Thirdly, because, since happiness is
Objection 3. Further, since happiness is supremely
the perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom.
desirable, it is contrary to that which is before all to be
This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is written (Ec-
shunned. But, more than aught else, men shun servitude,
cles. 5:12) that “riches” are sometimes “kept to the hurt of
which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists
the owner”; and the same may be said of the other three.
in power.
Fourthly, because man is ordained to happiness through
On the contrary, Happiness is the perfect good. But
principles that are in him; since he is ordained thereto
power is most imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Con-
naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due
sol. iii), “the power of man cannot relieve the gnawings
rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for
of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety”: and
which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore
further on: “Think you a man is powerful who is sur-
it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the forego-
rounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed,
ing.
but whom he fears still more?”
Reply to Objection 1. God’s power is His goodness:
I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But
in power; and this for two reasons. First because power
it is not so with men. Consequently it is not enough for
has the nature of principle, as is stated in Metaph. v, 12,
man’s happiness, that he become like God in power, un-
whereas happiness has the nature of last end. Secondly,
less he become like Him in goodness also.
because power has relation to good and evil: whereas hap-
Reply to Objection 2. Just as it is a very good thing
piness is man’s proper and perfect good. Wherefore some
for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so
happiness might consist in the good use of power, which
is it a very bad thing if he makes a bad use of it. And so it
is by virtue, rather than in power itself.
is that power is towards good and evil.
∗ St. Thomas joins Mk. 8:38 with Lk. 12:8 owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was quoting from memory
604
Reply to Objection 3. Servitude is a hindrance to the it; not because man’s supreme good consists in power.
good use of power: therefore is it that men naturally shun
Whether man’s happiness consists in any bodily good?
Ia IIae q. 2 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness con-
as his end: since man is not the supreme good. There-
sists in bodily goods. For it is written (Ecclus. 30:16):
fore the last end of man’s reason and will cannot be the
“There is no riches above the riches of the health of the
preservation of man’s being.
body.” But happiness consists in that which is best. There-
Secondly, because, granted that the end of man’s will
fore it consists in the health of the body.
and reason be the preservation of man’s being, it could
Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v),
not be said that the end of man is some good of the body.
that “to be” is better than “to live,” and “to live” is better
For man’s being consists in soul and body; and though the
than all that follows. But for man’s being and living, the
being of the body depends on the soul, yet the being of
health of the body is necessary. Since, therefore, happi-
the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above
ness is man’s supreme good, it seems that health of the
( Ia, q. 75, a. 2); and the very body is for the soul, as
body belongs more than anything else to happiness.
matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that
Objection 3. Further, the more universal a thing is,
puts them into motion, that by their means he may do his
the higher the principle from which it depends; because
work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to
the higher a cause is, the greater the scope of its power.
the goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently hap-
Now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists
piness, which is man’s last end, cannot consist in goods of
in its flowing into something, so the causality of the end
the body.
consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the
Reply to Objection 1. Just as the body is ordained to
First Cause is that which flows into all things, so the last
the soul, as its end, so are external goods ordained to the
end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being it-
body itself. And therefore it is with reason that the good
self is that which is most desired by all. Therefore man’s
of the body is preferred to external goods, which are sig-
happiness consists most of all in things pertaining to his
nified by “riches,” just as the good of the soul is preferred
being, such as the health of the body.
to all bodily goods.
On the contrary, Man surpasses all other animals
Reply to Objection 2. Being taken simply, as includ-
in regard to happiness. But in bodily goods he is sur-
ing all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that fol-
passed by many animals; for instance, by the elephant in
lows it; for thus being itself includes all these. And in this
longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness.
sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as
Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in goods of
participated in this or that thing, which does not possess
the body.
the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being,
I answer that, It is impossible for man’s happiness to
such as the being of any creature; then it is evident that
consist in the goods of the body; and this for two reasons.
being itself together with an additional perfection is more
First, because, if a thing be ordained to another as to its
excellent. Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that
end, its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its
things that live are better than things that exist, and intel-
being. Hence a captain does not intend as a last end, the
ligent better than living things.
preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is
Reply to Objection 3. Since the end corresponds to
ordained to something else as its end, viz. to navigation.
the beginning; this argument proves that the last end is
Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may
the first beginning of being, in Whom every perfection of
steer its course, so man is given over to his will and rea-
being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion,
son; according to Ecclus. 15:14: “God made man from
some desire as to being only, some as to living being,
the beginning and left him in the hand of his own coun-
some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy.
sel.” Now it is evident that man is ordained to something
And this belongs to few.
Whether man’s happiness consists in pleasure?
Ia IIae q. 2 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness con-
it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in wishing
sists in pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is
to be pleased” (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists
not desired for something else, but other things for it. But
principally in pleasure and delight.
this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: “for
Objection 2.
Further, “the first cause goes more
605
deeply into the effect than the second cause” (De Causis independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity
i). Now the causality of the end consists in its attract-
in regard to the body and those parts of the soul which
ing the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves
are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are
most the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end.
in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a
Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so
form is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by mat-
far absorbs man’s will and reason, that it causes him to
ter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in
despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man’s last
a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which is a power of the
end, which is happiness, consists principally in pleasure.
body, knows the singular, which is determinate through
Objection 3. Further, since desire is for good, it seems matter: whereas the intellect, which is a power indepen-that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both
dent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted
wise and foolish, and even irrational creatures. Therefore
from matter, and contains an infinite number of singulars.
delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is
Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the
the supreme good, consists in pleasure.
body, and which causes bodily delight through being ap-
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol.
iii):
prehended by sense, is not man’s perfect good, but is quite
“Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses,
a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence it is
will perceive that pleasures had a sad ending: and if they
written (Wis. 7:9) that “all gold in comparison of her, is
can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should
as a little sand.” And therefore bodily pleasure is neither
not say that the very beasts are happy too.”
happiness itself, nor a proper accident of happiness.
I answer that, Because bodily delights are more gen-
Reply to Objection 1. It comes to the same whether
erally known, “the name of pleasure has been appropri-
we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else
ated to them” (Ethic. vii, 13), although other delights
than the appetite’s rest in good: thus it is owing to the
excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them.
same natural force that a weighty body is borne down-
Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence
wards and that it rests there. Consequently just as good
is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one
is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that
for anything else, if the preposition “for” denote the fi-
he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that ev-
nal cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive
ery delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness,
cause, thus delight is desirable for something else, i.e. for
or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a
the good, which is the object of that delight, and conse-
man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either
quently is its principle, and gives it its form: for the reason in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting
that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.
good, if indeed it be the perfect good, is precisely man’s
Reply to Objection 2. The vehemence of desire for
happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness,
sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the
either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent. There-
senses, through being the principles of our knowledge, are
fore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from
more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are
the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but some-
desired by the majority.
thing resulting therefrom as its proper accident.
Reply to Objection 3. All desire delight in the same
But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect
way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by
good even in that way. For it results from a good ap-
reason of the good and not conversely, as stated above
prehended by sense, which is a power of the soul, which
(ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the
power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to
supreme and essential good, but that every delight results
the body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man’s
from some good, and that some delight results from that
perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the ca-
which is the essential and supreme good.
pacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which is
Whether some good of the soul constitutes man’s happiness?
Ia IIae q. 2 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that some good of the
sire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus
soul constitutes man’s happiness. For happiness is man’s
we love a friend for whom we desire money, more than
good. Now this is threefold: external goods, goods of the
we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he de-
body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not con-
sires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more than
sist in external goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown
all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all:
above (Aa. 4,5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.
which is evident from the fact that for its sake all else is
Objection 2. Further, we love that for which we de-
loved and desired. Therefore happiness consists in some
606
good of man himself: not, however, in goods of the body; good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none
therefore, in goods of the soul.
of them can be man’s last end.
Objection 3. Further, perfection is something belong-
But if we speak of man’s last end, as to the attainment
ing to that which is perfected. But happiness is a perfec-
or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the
tion of man. Therefore happiness is something belonging
thing itself desired as an end, thus does something of man,
to man. But it is not something belonging to the body, as
in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man
shown above (a. 5). Therefore it is something belonging
attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing
to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.
itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes
On the contrary, As Augustine says (De Doctr.
happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of
Christ. i, 22), “that which constitutes the life of happi-
this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say
ness is to be loved for its own sake.” But man is not to
that happiness is something belonging to the soul; but that
be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be
which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.
loved for God’s sake. Therefore happiness consists in no
Reply to Objection 1. Inasmuch as this division in-
good of the soul.
cludes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the
I answer that, As stated above (q. 1, a. 8), the end is
soul is not only power, habit, or act, but also the object of
twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to at-
these, which is something outside. And in this way noth-
tain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession of
ing hinders us from saying that what constitutes happiness
that thing. If, then, we speak of man’s last end, it is impos-
is a good of the soul.
sible for man’s last end to be the soul itself or something
Reply to Objection 2. As far as the proposed objec-
belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as
tion is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good
something existing in potentiality: for it becomes know-
desired; whereas a friend is loved as that for which good is
ing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually
desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it
virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since po-
is not the same kind of love in both cases. As to whether
tentiality is for the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that
man loves anything more than himself with the love of
which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end.
friendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat
Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end.
of Charity.
In like manner neither can anything belonging to it,
Reply to Objection 3. Happiness, itself, since it is a
whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the
perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but
last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now
that which constitutes happiness, viz. which makes man
man’s appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal
happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above.
good. And any good inherent to the soul is a participated
Whether any created good constitutes man’s happiness?
Ia IIae q. 2 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that some created good
then man’s capacity does not include that good which sur-
constitutes man’s happiness. For Dionysius says (Div.
passes the limits of all creation, it seems that man can be
Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom “unites the ends of first
made happy by some created good. Consequently some
things to the beginnings of second things,” from which
created good constitutes man’s happiness.
we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
the base of the higher nature. But man’s highest good is
26): “As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man’s
happiness. Since then the angel is above man in the order
life of happiness: of Whom it is written: ‘Happy is that
of nature, as stated in Ia, q. 111, a. 1, it seems that man’s
people whose God is the Lord’ (Ps. 143:15).”
happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.
I answer that, It is impossible for any created good to
Objection 2. Further, the last end of each thing is that constitute man’s happiness. For happiness is the perfect
which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for
good, which lulls the appetite altogether; else it would not
the whole, as for its end. But the universe of creatures
be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired.
which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who
Now the object of the will, i.e. of man’s appetite, is the
is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as perfect to im-
universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the uni-
perfect. Therefore man’s happiness consists in the whole
versal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man’s
universe of creatures.
will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in
Objection 3. Further, man is made happy by that
any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has
which lulls his natural desire. But man’s natural desire
goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can sat-
does not reach out to a good surpassing his capacity. Since
isfy the will of man, according to the words of Ps. 102:5:
607
“Who satisfieth thy desire with good things.” Therefore the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as
God alone constitutes man’s happiness.
part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to God,
Reply to Objection 1. The summit of man does in-
as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the
deed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of
good of the universe, but God himself.
likeness; but man does not rest there as in his last end, but
Reply to Objection 3. Created good is not less than
reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which
that good of which man is capable, as of something in-
is the common object of happiness of all the blessed, as
trinsic and inherent to him: but it is less than the good of
being the infinite and perfect good.
which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite.
Reply to Objection 2. If a whole be not the last end,
And the participated good which is in an angel, and in the
but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part
whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.
thereof is not the whole itself, but something else. Now
608
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 3
What Is Happiness
(In Eight Articles)
We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are required for it.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?
(2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?
(3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part?
(4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an operation of the intellect, or of the will?
(5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect?
(6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?
(7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances viz. angels?
(8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His Essence?
Whether happiness is something uncreated?
Ia IIae q. 3 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that happiness is some-
In the first sense, then, man’s last end is the uncreated
thing uncreated. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii): “We
good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness
must needs confess that God is happiness itself.”
can perfectly satisfy man’s will. But in the second way,
Objection 2. Further, happiness is the supreme good.
man’s last end is something created, existing in him, and
But it belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then,
this is nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of
there are not several supreme goods, it seems that happi-
the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If,
ness is the same as God.
therefore, we consider man’s happiness in its cause or ob-
Objection 3. Further, happiness is the last end, to
ject, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it
which man’s will tends naturally. But man’s will should
as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something
tend to nothing else as an end, but to God, Who alone is to
created.
be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22).
Reply to Objection 1.
God is happiness by His
Therefore happiness is the same as God.
Essence: for He is happy not by acquisition or participa-
On the contrary, Nothing made is uncreated. But
tion of something else, but by His Essence. On the other
man’s happiness is something made; because according
hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii),
to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3): “Those things are to
by participation; just as they are called “gods,” by partic-
be enjoyed which make us happy.” Therefore happiness is
ipation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of
not something uncreated.
which man is said to be happy, is something created.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 1, a. 8; q. 2, a. 7), Reply to Objection 2.
Happiness is called man’s
our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which
supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment
we desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money.
of the supreme good.
Secondly there is the attainment or possession, the use or
Reply to Objection 3. Happiness is said to be the last
enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the
end, in the same way as the attainment of the end is called
end of the miser is the possession of money; and the end
the end.
of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable.
Whether happiness is an operation?
Ia IIae q. 3 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that happiness is not an
is not an operation.
operation. For the Apostle says (Rom. 6:22): “You have
Objection 2. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii)
your fruit unto sanctification, and the end, life everlast-
that happiness is “a state made perfect by the aggregate
ing.” But life is not an operation, but the very being of
of all good things.” But state does not indicate operation.
living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness,
Therefore happiness is not an operation.
609
Objection 3. Further, happiness signifies something by some kind of operation. And so it is that he proves
existing in the happy one: since it is man’s final perfec-
happiness to be “the perfect good” (Ethic. i, 7).
tion. But the meaning of operation does not imply any-
Reply to Objection 3. As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 ac-
thing existing in the operator, but rather something pro-
tion is twofold. One proceeds from the agent into outward
ceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness is not an opera-
matter, such as “to burn” and “to cut.” And such an op-
tion.
eration cannot be happiness: for such an operation is an
Objection 4. Further, happiness remains in the happy
action and a perfection, not of the agent, but rather of the
one. Now operation does not remain, but passes. There-
patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an
fore happiness is not an operation.
action that remains in the agent, such as to feel, to under-
Objection 5. Further, to one man there is one happi-
stand, and to will: and such an action is a perfection and
ness. But operations are many. Therefore happiness is not
an act of the agent. And such an operation can be happi-
an operation.
ness.
Objection 6. Further, happiness is in the happy one
Reply to Objection 4. Since happiness signifies some
uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted;
final perfection; according as various things capable of
for instance, by sleep, or some other occupation, or by
happiness can attain to various degrees of perfection, so
cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic.
i,
in God there is happiness essentially; since His very Being
13) that “happiness is an operation according to perfect
is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Him-
virtue.”
self. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect
I answer that, In so far as man’s happiness is some-
of some operation, by which they are united to the Un-
thing created, existing in him, we must needs say that it
created Good: and this operation of theirs is one only and
is an operation. For happiness is man’s supreme perfec-
everlasting. But in men, according to their present state
tion. Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual;
of life, the final perfection is in respect of an operation
since potentiality without act is imperfect. Consequently
whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither
happiness must consist in man’s last act. But it is evi-
can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, be-
dent that operation is the last act of the operator, where-
cause operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And
fore the Philosopher calls it “second act” (De Anima ii,
for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happi-
1): because that which has a form can be potentially op-
ness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philoso-
erating, just as he who knows is potentially considering.
pher, in placing man’s happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10),
And hence it is that in other things, too, each one is said
says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, con-
to be “for its operation” (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man’s
cludes: “We call men happy, but only as men.” But God
happiness must of necessity consist in an operation.
has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be “as
Reply to Objection 1. Life is taken in two senses.
the angels. . . in heaven” (Mat. 22:30).
First for the very being of the living. And thus happiness
Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the
is not life: since it has been shown (q. 2 , a. 5) that the
objection fails: because in that state of happiness, man’s
being of a man, no matter in what it may consist, is not
mind will be united to God by one, continual, everlast-
that man’s happiness; for of God alone is it true that His
ing operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall
Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the opera-
short of the unity and continuity of that operation so do
tion of the living, by which operation the principle of life
we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a par-
is made actual: thus we speak of active and contemplative
ticipation of happiness: and so much the greater, as the
life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense eternal life
operation can be more continuous and more one. Conse-
is said to be the last end, as is clear from Jn. 17:3: “This is quently the active life, which is busy with many things,
eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God.”
has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which
Reply to Objection 2. Boethius, in defining happi-
is busied with one thing, i.e. the contemplation of truth.
ness, considered happiness in general: for considered thus
And if at any time man is not actually engaged in this op-
it is the perfect common good; and he signified this by
eration, yet since he can always easily turn to it, and since
saying that happiness is “a state made perfect by the ag-
he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying
gregate of all good things,” thus implying that the state of
himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the latter
a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But
seems, as it were, continuous. From these remarks the
Aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness, show-
replies to Objections 5 and 6 are evident.
ing by what man is established in this state, and that it is
610
Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the intellective part Ia IIae q. 3 a. 3
only?
Objection 1. It would seem that happiness consists
happiness does not consist in goods of the body, which
in an operation of the senses also. For there is no more
goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of
excellent operation in man than that of the senses, except
the senses.
the intellective operation. But in us the intellective oper-
Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong
ation depends on the sensitive: since “we cannot under-
to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: an-
stand without a phantasm” (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore
tecedently, in respect of imperfect happiness, such as can
happiness consists in an operation of the senses also.
be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect de-
Objection 2. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii)
mands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in
that happiness is “a state made perfect by the aggregate of
that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because
all good things.” But some goods are sensible, which we
at the resurrection, “from the very happiness of the soul,”
attain by the operation of the senses. Therefore it seems
as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) “the body and the
that the operation of the senses is needed for happiness.
bodily senses will receive a certain overflow, so as to be
Objection 3. Further, happiness is the perfect good,
perfected in their operations”; a point which will be ex-
as we find proved in Ethic. i, 7: which would not be
plained further on when we treat of the resurrection ( IIa
true, were not man perfected thereby in all his parts. But
IIae, Qq. 82 -85). But then the operation whereby man’s
some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive opera-
mind is united to God will not depend on the senses.
tions. Therefore sensitive operation is required for happi-
Reply to Objection 1. This objection proves that the
ness.
operation of the senses is required antecedently for imper-
On the contrary, Irrational animals have the sensitive
fect happiness, such as can be had in this life.
operation in common with us: but they have not happiness
Reply to Objection 2. Perfect happiness, such as the
in common with us. Therefore happiness does not consist
angels have, includes the aggregate of all good things, by
in a sensitive operation.
being united to the universal source of all good; not that it
I answer that, A thing may belong to happiness in
requires each individual good. But in this imperfect hap-
three ways: (1) essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) conse-
piness, we need the aggregate of those goods that suffice
quently. Now the operation of sense cannot belong to
for the most perfect operation of this life.
happiness essentially. For man’s happiness consists essen-
Reply to Objection 3. In perfect happiness the entire
tially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is
man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an
his last end, as shown above (a. 1): to Which man can-
overflow from the higher. But in the imperfect happiness
not be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in
of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the perfection
like manner, because, as shown above (q. 2, a. 5), man’s
of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.
Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the intellect or of Ia IIae q. 3 a. 4
the will?
Objection 1. It would seem that happiness consists in
it must needs be man’s most excellent operation. But the
an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
love of God, which is an act of the will, is a more excellent
10,11), that man’s happiness consists in peace; wherefore
operation than knowledge, which is an operation of the in-
it is written (Ps. 147:3): “Who hath placed peace in thy
tellect, as the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 13). Therefore it
end [Douay: ‘borders’]”. But peace pertains to the will.
seems that happiness consists in an act of the will.
Therefore man’s happiness is in the will.
Objection 5. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii,
Objection 2. Further, happiness is the supreme good.
5) that “happy is he who has whatever he desires, and de-
But good is the object of the will. Therefore happiness
sires nothing amiss.” And a little further on (6) he adds:
consists in an operation of the will.
“He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires:
Objection 3. Further, the last end corresponds to the
for good things make a man happy, and such a man al-
first mover: thus the last end of the whole army is victory,
ready possesses some good—i.e. a good will.” Therefore
which is the end of the general, who moves all the men.
happiness consists in an act of the will.
But the first mover in regard to operations is the will: be-
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 17:3): “This is
cause it moves the other powers, as we shall state further
eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God.”
on (q. 9, Aa. 1,3). Therefore happiness regards the will.
Now eternal life is the last end, as stated above (a. 2, ad
Objection 4. Further, if happiness be an operation,
1). Therefore man’s happiness consists in the knowledge
611
of God, which is an act of the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1. Peace pertains to man’s last
I answer that, As stated above (q. 2, a. 6) two things
end, not as though it were the very essence of happiness;
are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of
but because it is antecedent and consequent thereto: an-
happiness: the other, that is, as it were, its proper accident, tecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which
i.e. the delight connected with it. I say, then, that as to the disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: conse-very essence of happiness, it is impossible for it to consist
quent inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he
in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been
remains at peace, his desire being at rest.
said (Aa. 1,2; q. 2, a. 7) that happiness is the attainment of
Reply to Objection 2. The will’s first object is not its the last end. But the attainment of the end does not consist
act: just as neither is the first object of the sight, vision,
in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the
but a visible thing. Wherefore, from the very fact that
end, both absent, when it desires it; and present, when it
happiness belongs to the will, as the will’s first object, it
is delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the
follows that it does not belong to it as its act.
desire itself of the end is not the attainment of the end, but
Reply to Objection 3. The intellect apprehends the
is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to
end before the will does: yet motion towards the end be-
the will from the end being present; and not conversely, is
gins in the will. And therefore to the will belongs that
a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in
which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz.
it. Therefore, that the end be present to him who desires
delight or enjoyment.
it, must be due to something else than an act of the will.
Reply to Objection 4. Love ranks above knowledge
This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends.
in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining: for
For if the acquisition of money were through an act of the
“naught is loved save what is known,” as Augustine says
will, the covetous man would have it from the very mo-
(De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an intelligi-
ment that he wished for it. But at the moment it is far
ble end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain a
from him; and he attains it, by grasping it in his hand, or
sensible end by an act of sense.
in some like manner; and then he delights in the money
Reply to Objection 5. He who has whatever he de-
got. And so it is with an intelligible end. For at first we
sires, is happy, because he has what he desires: and this
desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its indeed is by something other than the act of his will. But
being made present to us by an act of the intellect; and
to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a nec-
then the delighted will rests in the end when attained.
essary disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned
So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an
among the good things which make a man happy, foras-
act of the intellect: but the delight that results from hap-
much as it is an inclination of the will: just as a movement
piness pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says
is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for instance, “al-
(Confess. x, 23) that happiness is “joy in truth,” because,
teration” to the genus “quality.”
to wit, joy itself is the consummation of happiness.
Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical intellect?
Ia IIae q. 3 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that happiness is an oper-
Objection 3. Further, happiness is a good of man him-
ation of the practical intellect. For the end of every crea-
self. But the speculative intellect is more concerned with
ture consists in becoming like God. But man is like God,
things outside man; whereas the practical intellect is con-
by his practical intellect, which is the cause of things un-
cerned with things belonging to man himself, viz. his op-
derstood, rather than by his speculative intellect, which
erations and passions. Therefore man’s happiness consists
derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man’s hap-
in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the
piness consists in an operation of the practical intellect
speculative.
rather than of the speculative.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that
Objection 2.
Further, happiness is man’s perfect
“contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our
good. But the practical intellect is ordained to the good
actions, and the everlasting perfection of our joys.”
rather than the speculative intellect, which is ordained to
I answer that, Happiness consists in an operation of
the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference to the
the speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This
perfection of the practical intellect, but not in reference
is evident for three reasons. First because if man’s happi-
to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to
ness is an operation, it must needs be man’s highest op-
which we are said to be knowing or understanding. There-
eration. Now man’s highest operation is that of his high-
fore man’s happiness consists in an act of the practical in-
est power in respect of its highest object: and his high-
tellect rather than of the speculative.
est power is the intellect, whose highest object is the Di-
612
vine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of stated in Ethic. x, 7,8.
the speculative intellect. Consequently happiness consists
Reply to Objection 1. The asserted likeness of the
principally in such an operation, viz. in the contemplation
practical intellect to God is one of proportion; that is to
of Divine things. And since that “seems to be each man’s
say, by reason of its standing in relation to what it knows,
self, which is best in him,” according to Ethic. ix, 8, and
as God does to what He knows. But the likeness of the
x, 7, therefore such an operation is most proper to man
speculative intellect to God is one of union and “informa-
and most delightful to him.
tion”; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may
Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contempla-
be answered that, in regard to the principal thing known,
tion is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of
which is His Essence, God has not practical but merely
the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake but for
speculative knowledge.
the sake of action: and these very actions are ordained to
Reply to Objection 2. The practical intellect is or-
some end. Consequently it is evident that the last end can-
dained to good which is outside of it: but the specula-
not consist in the active life, which pertains to the practical tive intellect has good within it, viz. the contemplation of
intellect.
truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is per-
Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the
fected and made good thereby: such a good the practical
contemplative life man has something in common with
intellect has not; but it directs man thereto.
things above him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom
Reply to Objection 3. This argument would hold, if
he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to
man himself were his own last end; for then the consid-
the active life, other animals also have something in com-
eration and direction of his actions and passions would
mon with man, although imperfectly.
be his happiness. But since man’s last end is something
Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we
outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by
await in the life to come, consists entirely in contempla-
an operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man’s
tion. But imperfect happiness, such as can be had here,
happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intel-
consists first and principally, in an operation of the prac-
lect rather than of the practical intellect.
tical intellect directing human actions and passions, as
Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?
Ia IIae q. 3 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness con-
happiness does not consist in the consideration of these.
sists in the consideration of speculative sciences.
For
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2, ad 4), man’s hap-
the Philosopher says (Ethic.
i, 13) that “happiness is
piness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by
an operation according to perfect virtue.” And in distin-
perfect happiness we are to understand that which attains
guishing the virtues, he gives no more than three specu-
to the true notion of happiness; and by imperfect happi-
lative virtues—“knowledge,” “wisdom” and “understand-
ness that which does not attain thereto, but partakes of
ing,” which all belong to the consideration of speculative
some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect pru-
sciences. Therefore man’s final happiness consists in the
dence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to be
consideration of speculative sciences.
done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational an-
Objection 2. Further, that which all desire for its own
imals, who are possessed of certain particular instincts in
sake, seems to be man’s final happiness. Now such is the
respect of works similar to works of prudence.
consideration of speculative sciences; because, as stated
Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essen-
in Metaph. i, 1, “all men naturally desire to know”; and, a
tially in the consideration of speculative sciences.
To
little farther on (2), it is stated that speculative sciences are prove this, we must observe that the consideration of a
sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists
speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of
in the consideration of speculative sciences.
the principles of that science: since the entire science is
Objection 3. Further, happiness is man’s final per-
virtually contained in its principles. Now the first prin-
fection. Now everything is perfected, according as it is
ciples of speculative sciences are received through the
reduced from potentiality to act. But the human intel-
senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning
lect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative
of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at the end of the Poste-
sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration of
rior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consider-
these sciences, man’s final happiness consists.
ation of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:23): “Let not
knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man’s final hap-
the wise man glory in his wisdom”: and this is said in
piness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the
reference to speculative sciences. Therefore man’s final
knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by
613
something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes ation of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible
of something higher. Now it is evident that the form of a
forms there is a participation of the higher substances, so
stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently
the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain par-
the intellect is not perfected by the form of a stone, as
ticipation of true and perfect happiness.
such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to
Reply to Objection 1.
In his book on Ethics the
that which is above the human intellect, viz. the intelli-
Philosopher treats of imperfect happiness, such as can be
gible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is
had in this life, as stated above (a. 2, ad 4).
by something else is reduced to that which is of itself.
Reply to Objection 2. Not only is perfect happiness
Therefore man’s final perfection must needs be through
naturally desired, but also any likeness or participation
knowledge of something above the human intellect. But it
thereof.
has been shown ( Ia, q. 88, a. 2), that man cannot acquire
Reply to Objection 3. Our intellect is reduced to act,
through sensibles, the knowledge of separate substances,
in a fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences,
which are above the human intellect. Consequently it fol-
but not to its final and perfect act.
lows that man’s happiness cannot consist in the consider-
Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels?
Ia IIae q. 3 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness con-
its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things
sists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, an-
is the same in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1); whatever
gels. For Gregory says in a homily (xxvi in Evang.): “It
are beings by participation, are true by participation. Now
avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we fail to angels have being by participation: because in God alone
take part in the feasts of angels”; by which he means final
is His Being His Essence, as shown in the Ia, q. 44, a. 1. It
happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels
follows that contemplation of Him makes man perfectly
by contemplating them. Therefore it seems that man’s fi-
happy. However, there is no reason why we should not
nal happiness consists in contemplating the angels.
admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation
Objection 2. Further, the final perfection of each thing of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration
is for it to be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is
of speculative science.
said to be a perfect figure, because its beginning and end
Reply to Objection 1. We shall take part in the feasts
coincide. But the beginning of human knowledge is from
of the angels, by contemplating not only the angels, but,
the angels, by whom men are enlightened, as Dionysius
together with them, also God Himself.
says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the hu-
Reply to Objection 2. According to those that hold
man intellect consists in contemplating the angels.
human souls to be created by the angels, it seems fitting
Objection 3. Further, each nature is perfect, when
enough, that man’s happiness should consist in the con-
united to a higher nature; just as the final perfection of
templation of the angels, in the union, as it were, of man
a body is to be united to the spiritual nature. But above
with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as stated in Ia,
the human intellect, in the natural order, are the angels.
q. 90, a. 3. Wherefore the final perfection of the human
Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect is to
intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle
be united to the angels by contemplation.
both of the creation of the soul and of its enlightenment.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:24): “Let him
Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated in the
that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and
Ia, q. 111, a. 2, ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he
knoweth Me.” Therefore man’s final glory or happiness
helps man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object
consists only in the knowledge of God.
of man’s happiness.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), man’s perfect
Reply to Objection 3. The lower nature may reach
happiness consists not in that which perfects the intel-
the higher in two ways. First, according to a degree of
lect by some participation, but in that which is so by its
the participating power: and thus man’s final perfection
essence. Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection
will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as
of a power is so in so far as the proper formal object of that
that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained by
power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intel-
the power: and thus the final perfection of each power is
lect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever
to attain that in which is found the fulness of its formal
has participated truth, does not perfect the intellect with
object.
614
Whether man’s happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?
Ia IIae q. 3 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness does
urally remains in the man the desire to know about the
not consist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Diony-
cause, “what it is.” And this desire is one of wonder, and
sius says (Myst. Theol. i) that by that which is highest in
causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the Meta-
his intellect, man is united to God as to something alto-
physics (i, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse
gether unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is
of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause,
not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of
and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and
the intellect, namely, happiness, does not consist in God
from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry
being seen in His Essence.
cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the
Objection 2. Further, the higher the perfection be-
cause.
longs to the higher nature. But to see His own Essence
If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence
is the perfection proper to the Divine intellect. Therefore
of some created effect, knows no more of God than “that
the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach
He is”; the perfection of that intellect does not yet reach
to this, but consists in something less.
simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 3:2): “When He
desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly
shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: ‘be-
happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect
cause’] we shall see Him as He is.”
needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And
I answer that, Final and perfect happiness can consist
thus it will have its perfection through union with God as
in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To
with that object, in which alone man’s happiness consists,
make this clear, two points must be observed. First, that
as stated above (Aa. 1,7; q. 2, a. 8).
man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains
Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius speaks of the knowl-
for him to desire and seek: secondly, that the perfection
edge of wayfarers journeying towards happiness.
of any power is determined by the nature of its object.
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 1, a. 8),
Now the object of the intellect is “what a thing is,” i.e. the
the end has a twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing
essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Where-
itself which is desired: and in this way, the same thing
fore the intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows
is the end of the higher and of the lower nature, and in-
the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the
deed of all things, as stated above (q. 1, a. 8). Secondly,
essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to know
as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the
the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause “what
higher nature is different from that of the lower, accord-
it is”; that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause sim-
ing to their respective habitudes to that thing. So then in
ply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the
the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence,
knowledge of that the cause is. Consequently, when man
comprehends It, is higher than that of a man or angel who
knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there nat-
sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.
615
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 4
Of Those Things That Are Required for Happiness
(In Eight Articles)
We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness: and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether delight is required for happiness?
(2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?
(3) Whether comprehension is required?
(4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?
(5) Whether the body is necessary for man’s happiness?
(6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?
(7) Whether any external goods are necessary?
(8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?
Whether delight is required for happiness?
Ia IIae q. 4 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that delight is not required
for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happi-
for happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that “vi-
ness. For it is caused by the appetite being at rest in the
sion is the entire reward of faith.” But the prize or reward
good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else
of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states
but the attainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be
(Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides vision is required
without concomitant delight.
for happiness.
Reply to Objection 1. From the very fact that a re-
Objection 2. Further, happiness is “the most self-
ward is given to anyone, the will of him who deserves it is
sufficient of all goods,” as the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
at rest, and in this consists delight. Consequently, delight
i, 7). But that which needs something else is not self-
is included in the very notion of reward.
sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists
Reply to Objection 2. The very sight of God causes
in seeing God, as stated above (q. 3, a. 8); it seems that
delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need de-
delight is not necessary for happiness.
light.
Objection 3. Further, the “operation of bliss or hap-
Reply to Objection 3. Delight that is attendant upon
piness should be unhindered” (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight
the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does
hinders the operation of the intellect: since it destroys the
it perfect it, as stated in Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with
estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore delight is
delight, we do with greater care and perseverance. On the
not necessary for happiness.
other hand, delight which is extraneous to the operation is
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that
a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the atten-
happiness is “joy in truth.”
tion because, as already observed, we are more attentive
I answer that, One thing may be necessary for an-
to those things that delight us; and when we are very at-
other in four ways. First, as a preamble and preparation to
tentive to one thing, we must needs be less attentive to
it: thus instruction is necessary for science. Secondly, as
another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sen-
perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for the life of the
sual delight that is contrary to reason, hinders the estimate
body. Thirdly, as helping it from without: thus friends are
of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the spec-
necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something
ulative intellect.
attendant on it: thus we might say that heat is necessary
Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?
Ia IIae q. 4 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that in happiness, delight
Objection 2. Further, that by reason of which a thing
ranks before vision. For “delight is the perfection of oper-
is desirable, is yet more desirable. But operations are de-
ation” (Ethic. x, 4). But perfection ranks before the thing
sired on account of the delight they afford: hence, too,
perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the operation of
nature has adjusted delight to those operations which are
the intellect, i.e. vision.
necessary for the preservation of the individual and of
616
the species, lest animals should disregard such operations.
reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.
Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks before the opera-
Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
tion of the intellect, which is vision.
x, 4) “delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth,”
Objection 3.
Further, vision corresponds to faith;
because it is a result of youth. Consequently delight is
while delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But
a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a perfection
charity ranks before faith, as the Apostle says (1 Cor.
whereby vision is made perfect in its own species.
13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vi-
Reply to Objection 2. The apprehension of the senses
sion.
does not attain to the universal good, but to some particu-
On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect.
lar good which is delightful. And consequently, according
But vision is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks
to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations
before delight.
are sought for the sake of delight. But the intellect appre-
I answer that, The Philosopher discusses this ques-
hends the universal good, the attainment of which results
tion (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one
in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather
consider the matter carefully, the operation of the intel-
than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which
lect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For
is the Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on
delight consists in a certain repose of the will. Now that
account of the operations. And we should form our es-
the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of
timate of things not simply according to the order of the
the goodness of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore
sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the
the will reposes in an operation, the will’s repose is caused
intellectual appetite.
by the goodness of the operation. Nor does the will seek
Reply to Objection 3. Charity does not seem the
good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the
beloved good for the sake of delight: it is for charity a
will would be the end, which has been disproved above
consequence that it delights in the good gained which it
(q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; q. 3, a. 4): but it seeks to be at rest in
loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its end,
the operation, because that operation is its good. Conse-
but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to
quently it is evident that the operation in which the will
charity.
Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?
Ia IIae q. 4 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that comprehension is not
the last end, those things that are required for Happiness
necessary for happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Pauli-
must be gathered from the way in which man is ordered to
nam de Videndo Deum;∗): “To reach God with the mind
an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly
is happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible.” There-
through his intellect, and partly through his will: through
fore happiness is without comprehension.
his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of
Objection 2. Further, happiness is the perfection of
the end pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, first
man as to his intellective part, wherein there are no other
by love which is the will’s first movement towards any-
powers than the intellect and will, as stated in the Ia,
thing; secondly, by a real relation of the lover to the thing
Qq. 79 and following. But the intellect is sufficiently
beloved, which relation may be threefold. For sometimes
perfected by seeing God, and the will by enjoying Him.
the thing beloved is present to the lover: and then it is no
Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.
longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is
Objection 3. Further, happiness consists in an opera-
impossible to attain it: and then, too, it is not sought for.
tion. But operations are determined by their objects: and
But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised
there are two universal objects, the true and the good: of
above the capability of the attainer, so that he cannot have
which the true corresponds to vision, and good to delight.
it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to
Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.
that which he hopes for, and this relation alone causes a
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:24): “So
search for the end. To these three, there are a correspond-
run that you may comprehend [Douay: ‘obtain’].” But
ing three in Happiness itself. For perfect knowledge of
happiness is the goal of the spiritual race: hence he says
the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of
(2 Tim. 4:7,8): “I have fought a good fight, I have finished
the end corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight in
my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest there is laid
the end now present results from love, as already stated
up for me a crown of justice.” Therefore comprehension
(a. 2, ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with
is necessary for Happiness.
Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of
I answer that, Since Happiness consists in gaining
the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies pres-
∗ Cf. Serm. xxxciii De Verb. Dom.
617
ence of the end; and delight or enjoyment, which implies Reply to Objection 2. Just as hope and love pertain to
repose of the lover in the object beloved.
the will, because it is the same one that loves a thing, and
Reply to Objection 1. Comprehension is twofold.
that tends towards it while not possessed, so, too, compre-
First, inclusion of the comprehended in the comprehen-
hension and delight belong to the will, since it is the same
sor; and thus whatever is comprehended by the finite, is
that possesses a thing and reposes therein.
itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended
Reply to Objection 3. Comprehension is not a dis-
by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means
tinct operation from vision; but a certain relation to the
nothing but the holding of something already present and
end already gained. Wherefore even vision itself, or the
possessed: thus one who runs after another is said to com-
thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of com-
prehend∗ him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense
prehension.
comprehension is necessary for Happiness.
Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?
Ia IIae q. 4 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that rectitude of the will
duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in comparison to
is not necessary for Happiness. For Happiness consists
what is ordained to the end is as form compared to matter.
essentially in an operation of the intellect, as stated above
Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it
(q. 3, a. 4). But rectitude of the will, by reason of which
be duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except
men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for the
it be duly ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain
perfect operation of the intellect: for Augustine says (Re-
Happiness, without rectitude of the will. Concomitantly,
tract. i, 4) “I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O
because as stated above (q. 3, a. 8), final Happiness con-
God, Who didst will none but the clean of heart to know
sists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very
the truth. For it can be answered that many who are not
essence of goodness. So that the will of him who sees the
clean of heart, know many truths.” Therefore rectitude of
Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves,
the will is not necessary for Happiness.
in subordination to God; just as the will of him who sees
Objection 2. Further, what precedes does not depend
not God’s Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves,
on what follows. But the operation of the intellect pre-
under the common notion of good which he knows. And
cedes the operation of the will. Therefore Happiness,
this is precisely what makes the will right. Wherefore it is
which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not
evident that Happiness cannot be without a right will.
depend on rectitude of the will.
Reply to Objection 2. Every act of the will is pre-
Objection 3. Further, that which is ordained to an-
ceded by an act of the intellect: but a certain act of the
other as its end, is not necessary, when the end is already
will precedes a certain act of the intellect. For the will
gained; as a ship, for instance, after arrival in port. But
tends to the final act of the intellect which is happiness.
rectitude of will, which is by reason of virtue, is ordained
And consequently right inclination of the will is required
to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, Happiness once ob-
antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a
tained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary.
right course in order to strike the target.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:8): “Blessed
Reply to Objection 3.
Not everything that is or-
are the clean of heart; for they shall see God”: and (Heb.
dained to the end, ceases with the getting of the end: but
12:14): “Follow peace with all men, and holiness; without
only that which involves imperfection, such as movement.
which no man shall see God.”
Hence the instruments of movement are no longer neces-
I answer that, Rectitude of will is necessary for
sary when the end has been gained: but the due order to
Happiness both antecedently and concomitantly.
An-
the end is necessary.
tecedently, because rectitude of the will consists in being
Whether the body is necessary for man’s happiness?
Ia IIae q. 4 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the body is necessary
separated from its whole. Therefore the soul cannot be
for Happiness. For the perfection of virtue and grace pre-
happy without the body.
supposes the perfection of nature. But Happiness is the
Objection 2. Further, Happiness is a perfect opera-
perfection of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without the
tion, as stated above (q. 3, Aa. 2,5). But perfect operation
body, has not the perfection of nature; since it is naturally
follows perfect being: since nothing operates except in
a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while
so far as it is an actual being. Since, therefore, the soul
∗ In English we should say ‘catch.’
618
has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, “walk by
just as neither has a part, while separate from its whole; it
sight,” seeing the Essence of God, wherein is true Happi-
seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body.
ness.
Objection 3. Further, Happiness is the perfection of
Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect
man. But the soul, without the body, is not man. There-
needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of
fore Happiness cannot be in the soul separated from the
the phantasms, wherein it looks on the intelligible truth,
body.
as stated in the Ia, q. 84, a. 7. Now it is evident that the
Objection 4. Further, according to the Philosopher
Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, as
(Ethic. vii, 13) “the operation of bliss,” in which operation
stated in the Ia, q. 12, a. 3. Wherefore, since man’s perfect
happiness consists, is “not hindered.” But the operation of
Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it
the separate soul is hindered; because, as Augustine says
does not depend on the body. Consequently, without the
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the soul “has a natural desire to
body the soul can be happy.
rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back,
We must, however, notice that something may belong
so to speak, from tending with all its might to the heav-
to a thing’s perfection in two ways. First, as constitut-
enward journey,” i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence.
ing the essence thereof; thus the soul is necessary for
Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body.
man’s perfection. Secondly, as necessary for its well-
Objection 5. Further, Happiness is the sufficient good
being: thus, beauty of body and keenness of perfection
and lulls desire. But this cannot be said of the separated
belong to man’s perfection. Wherefore though the body
soul; for it yet desires to be united to the body, as Augus-
does not belong in the first way to the perfection of human
tine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore the soul is not
Happiness, yet it does in the second way. For since oper-
happy while separated from the body.
ation depends on a thing’s nature, the more perfect is the
Objection 6. Further, in Happiness man is equal to the
soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper oper-
angels. But the soul without the body is not equal to the
ation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence, Augustine,
angels, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore
after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) “whether that perfect
it is not happy.
Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the dead sep-
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 14:13): “Happy
arated from their bodies,” answers “that they cannot see
[Douay: ‘blessed’] are the dead who die in the Lord.”
the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It;
I answer that, Happiness is twofold; the one is imper-
either for some other more hidden reason, or because they
fect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting
have a natural desire to rule the body.”
in the vision of God. Now it is evident that the body is
Reply to Objection 1. Happiness is the perfection of
necessary for the happiness of this life. For the happi-
the soul on the part of the intellect, in respect of which the
ness of this life consists in an operation of the intellect,
soul transcends the organs of the body; but not accord-
either speculative or practical. And the operation of the
ing as the soul is the natural form of the body. Wherefore
intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which
the soul retains that natural perfection in respect of which
is only in a bodily organ, as was shown in the Ia, q. 84,
happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural
Aa. 6,7. Consequently that happiness which can be had
perfection in respect of which it is the form of the body.
in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to
Reply to Objection 2. The relation of the soul to be-
perfect Happiness, which consists in the vision of God,
ing is not the same as that of other parts: for the being
some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul
of the whole is not that of any individual part: wherefore,
separated from the body; and have said that the souls of
either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole is
saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain to
destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the animal
that Happiness until the Day of Judgment, when they will
is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual
receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be
being, just as a part of a line has another being from that
false, both by authority and by reason. By authority, since
of the whole line. But the human soul retains the being of
the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6): “While we are in the body,
the composite after the destruction of the body: and this
we are absent from the Lord”; and he points out the reason
because the being of the form is the same as that of its
of this absence, saying: “For we walk by faith and not by
matter, and this is the being of the composite. Now the
sight.” Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk
soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the Ia, q. 75,
by faith and not by sight, bereft of the vision of the Divine
a. 2. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from
Essence, we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of
the body it has perfect being and that consequently it can
the saints, separated from their bodies, are in God’s pres-
have a perfect operation; although it has not the perfect
ence; wherefore the text continues: “But we are confident
specific nature.
and have a good will to be absent. . . from the body, and to
Reply to Objection 3. Happiness belongs to man in
be present with the Lord.” Whence it is evident that the
respect of his intellect: and, therefore, since the intel-
619
lect remains, it can have Happiness. Thus the teeth of way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its share.
an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be white,
Reply to Objection 5. The desire of the separated
can retain their whiteness, even after extraction.
soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since,
Reply to Objection 4. One thing is hindered by an-
to wit, it has that which suffices its appetite. But it is not
other in two ways. First, by way of opposition; thus cold
wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not pos-
hinders the action of heat: and such a hindrance to opera-
sess that good in every way that it would wish to possess
tion is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some
it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Hap-
kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered
piness increases not in intensity, but in extent.
has not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every
Reply to Objection 6. The statement made (Gen. ad
way: and such a hindrance to operation is not incompati-
lit. xii, 35) to the effect that “the souls of the departed see ble with Happiness, but prevents it from being perfect in
not God as the angels do,” is not to be understood as re-
every way. And thus it is that separation from the body is
ferring to inequality of quantity; because even now some
said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might
souls of the Blessed are raised to the higher orders of the
to the vision of the Divine Essence. For the soul desires
angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower an-
to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also may
gels. But it refers to inequality of proportion: because the
overflow into the body, as far as possible. And therefore,
angels, even the lowest, have every perfection of Happi-
as long as it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the
ness that they ever will have, whereas the separated souls
body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in such a
of the saints have not.
Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness?
Ia IIae q. 4 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that perfection of the
But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have main-
body is not necessary for man’s perfect Happiness. For
tained that no disposition of body is necessary for Happi-
perfection of the body is a bodily good. But it has been
ness; indeed, that it is necessary for the soul to be entirely
shown above (q. 2) that Happiness does not consist in bod-
separated from the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei
ily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is
xxii, 26) quotes the words of Porphyry who said that “for
necessary for man’s Happiness.
the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything
Objection 2. Further, man’s Happiness consists in the
corporeal.” But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural
vision of the Divine Essence, as shown above (q. 3, a. 8).
to the soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for
But the body has not part in this operation, as shown above
the perfection of the soul to exclude its natural perfection.
(a. 5). Therefore no disposition of the body is necessary
Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition
for Happiness.
of the body is necessary, both antecedently and conse-
Objection 3. Further, the more the intellect is ab-
quently, for that Happiness which is in all ways perfect.
stracted from the body, the more perfectly it understands.
Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
But Happiness consists in the most perfect operation of
xii, 35), “if body be such, that the governance thereof is
the intellect. Therefore the soul should be abstracted from
difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corrupt-
the body in every way. Therefore, in no way is a disposi-
ible and weighs upon the soul, the mind is turned away
tion of the body necessary for Happiness.
from that vision of the highest heaven.” Whence he con-
On the contrary, Happiness is the reward of virtue;
cludes that, “when this body will no longer be ‘natural,’
wherefore it is written (Jn. 13:17): “You shall be blessed,
but ‘spiritual,’ then will it be equalled to the angels, and
if you do them.” But the reward promised to the saints is
that will be its glory, which erstwhile was its burden.”
not only that they shall see and enjoy God, but also that
Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul
their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is written (Is.
there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this too
66:14): “You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and
will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad
your bones shall flourish like a herb.” Therefore good dis-
Dioscor.) that “God gave the soul such a powerful nature
position of the body is necessary for Happiness.
that from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of
I answer that, If we speak of that happiness which
incorruption overflows into the lower nature.”
man can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well-
Reply to Objection 1. Happiness does not consist in
disposed body is of necessity required for it. For this
bodily good as its object: but bodily good can add a cer-
happiness consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
tain charm and perfection to Happiness.
i, 13) in “an operation according to perfect virtue”; and it
Reply to Objection 2. Although the body has not part
is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the
in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of
body, from every operation of virtue.
God is seen, yet it might prove a hindrance thereto. Con-
620
sequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hin-this corruptible body which weighs upon the soul; but not
der the mind from being lifted up.
from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to
Reply to Objection 3. The perfect operation of the in-
the spirit. On this point we shall treat in the Third Part of
tellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from
this work ( IIa IIae, q. 82, seqq.).
Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness?
Ia IIae q. 4 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that external goods also
God. The reason of this is that all suchlike external goods
are necessary for Happiness. For that which is promised
are requisite either for the support of the animal body; or
the saints for reward, belongs to Happiness. But exter-
for certain operations which belong to human life, which
nal goods are promised the saints; for instance, food and
we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that
drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said (Lk. 22:30):
perfect Happiness which consists in seeing God, will be
“That you may eat and drink at My table in My king-
either in the soul separated from the body, or in the soul
dom”: and (Mat. 6:20): “Lay up to yourselves treasures in
united to the body then no longer animal but spiritual.
heaven”: and (Mat. 25:34): “Come, ye blessed of My Fa-
Consequently these external goods are nowise necessary
ther, possess you the kingdom.” Therefore external goods
for that Happiness, since they are ordained to the animal
are necessary for Happiness.
life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation,
Objection 2. Further, according to Boethius (De Con-
as being more Godlike, approaches nearer than that of ac-
sol. iii): happiness is “a state made perfect by the aggre-
tion to the likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it
gate of all good things.” But some of man’s goods are
stands in less need of these goods of the body as stated in
external, although they be of least account, as Augustine
Ethic. x, 8.
says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore they too are neces-
Reply to Objection 1. All those material promises
sary for Happiness.
contained in Holy Scripture, are to be understood
Objection 3. Further, Our Lord said (Mat. 5:12):
metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont to express
“Your reward is very great in heaven.” But to be in heaven
spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in or-
implies being in a place. Therefore at least external place
der “that from things we know, we may rise to the de-
is necessary for Happiness.
sire of things unknown,” as Gregory says (Hom. xi in
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 72:25): “For what
Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the delight of Hap-
have I in heaven? and besides Thee what do I desire upon
piness; wealth, the sufficiency of God for man; the king-
earth?” As though to say: “I desire nothing but this,”—“It
dom, the lifting up of man to union of God.
is good for me to adhere to my God.” Therefore nothing
Reply to Objection 2. These goods that serve for
further external is necessary for Happiness.
the animal life, are incompatible with that spiritual life
I answer that, For imperfect happiness, such as can
wherein perfect Happiness consists. Nevertheless in that
be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as be-
Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good things,
longing to the essence of happiness, but by serving as in-
because whatever good there be in these things, we shall
struments to happiness, which consists in an operation of
possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness.
virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. For man needs in this life,
Reply to Objection 3. According to Augustine (De
the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of con-
Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is not material heaven that is
templative virtue, and for the operation of active virtue,
described as the reward of the saints, but a heaven raised
for which latter he needs also many other things by means
on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily
of which to perform its operations.
place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed to the
On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise
Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of a
necessary for perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing
certain fitness and adornment.
Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness?
Ia IIae q. 4 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that friends are neces-
for Happiness.
sary for Happiness. For future Happiness is frequently
Objection 2. Further, Boethius∗ says that “there is no
designated by Scripture under the name of “glory.” But
delight in possessing any good whatever, without some-
glory consists in man’s good being brought to the notice
one to share it with us.” But delight is necessary for Hap-
of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends is necessary
piness. Therefore fellowship of friends is also necessary.
∗ Seneca, Ep. 6
621
Objection 3. Further, charity is perfected in Happi-his perfection in God. But the fellowship of friends con-
ness. But charity includes the love of God and of our
duces to the well-being of Happiness. Hence Augustine
neighbor. Therefore it seems that fellowship of friends
says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that “the spiritual creatures re-
is necessary for Happiness.
ceive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity,
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 7:11): “All good
truth, and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to
things came to me together with her,” i.e. with divine wis-
be helped from without, perhaps it is only by this that they
dom, which consists in contemplating God. Consequently
see one another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship.”
nothing else is necessary for Happiness.
Reply to Objection 1. That glory which is essential to
I answer that, If we speak of the happiness of this
Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with
life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says
God.
(Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to make use of them, since he
Reply to Objection 2. This saying is to be understood
suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses
of the possession of good that does not fully satisfy. This
perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for the pur-
does not apply to the question under consideration; be-
pose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to
cause man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good.
them; that he may delight in seeing them do good; and
Reply to Objection 3. Perfection of charity is essen-
again that he may be helped by them in his good work.
tial to Happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the
For in order that man may do well, whether in the works
love of our neighbor. Wherefore if there were but one soul
of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he
enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no neigh-
needs the fellowship of friends.
bor to love. But supposing one neighbor to be there, love
But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in
of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently,
our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not
friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect Happi-
essential to Happiness; since man has the entire fulness of
ness.
622
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 5
Of the Attainment of Happiness
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether man can attain Happiness?
(2) Whether one man can be happier than another?
(3) Whether any man can be happy in this life?
(4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost?
(5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers?
(6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher creature?
(7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may obtain Happiness of God?
(8) Whether every man desires Happiness?
Whether man can attain happiness?
Ia IIae q. 5 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that man cannot attain
Happiness consists.
happiness. For just as the rational is above the sensible
Reply to Objection 1. The rational exceeds the sen-
nature, so the intellectual is above the rational, as Diony-
sitive nature, otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the
sius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in several passages.
rational. For the rational exceeds the sensitive nature in re-
But irrational animals that have the sensitive nature only,
spect of the object of its knowledge: since the senses have
cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore nei-
no knowledge whatever of the universal, whereas the rea-
ther can man, who is of rational nature, attain the end of
son has knowledge thereof. But the intellectual surpasses
the intellectual nature, which is Happiness.
the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing the same in-
Objection 2. Further, True Happiness consists in see-
telligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith
ing God, Who is pure Truth. But from his very nature,
the truth which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry
man considers truth in material things: wherefore “he un-
of reason, as was made clear in the Ia, q. 58, a. 3; Ia, q. 79, derstands the intelligible species in the phantasm” (De
a. 8. Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at
Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain Happiness.
that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the ratio-
Objection 3. Further, Happiness consists in attain-
nal nature can attain Happiness, which is the perfection of
ing the Sovereign Good. But we cannot arrive at the top
the intellectual nature: but otherwise than the angels. Be-
without surmounting the middle. Since, therefore, the an-
cause the angels attained it forthwith after the beginning
gelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway
of their creation: whereas man attains if after a time. But
between God and human nature; it seems that he cannot
the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.
attain Happiness.
Reply to Objection 2. To man in the present state
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:12): “Blessed is
of life the natural way of knowing intelligible truth is by
the man whom Thou shalt instruct, O Lord.”
means of phantasms. But after this state of life, he has
I answer that, Happiness is the attainment of the Per-
another natural way, as was stated in the Ia, q. 84, a. 7 ;
fect Good. Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect
Ia, q. 89, a. 1.
Good can attain Happiness. Now, that man is capable of
Reply to Objection 3. Man cannot surmount the an-
the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can
gels in the degree of nature so as to be above them nat-
apprehend the universal and perfect good, and because his
urally. But he can surmount them by an operation of the
will can desire it. And therefore man can attain Happi-
intellect, by understanding that there is above the angels
ness. This can be proved again from the fact that man
something that makes men happy; and when he has at-
is capable of seeing God, as stated in Ia, q. 12, a. 1: in
tained it, he will be perfectly happy.
which vision, as we stated above (q. 3, a. 8) man’s perfect
623
Whether one man can be happier than another?
Ia IIae q. 5 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that one man cannot be
i.e. the Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoy-
happier than another. For Happiness is “the reward of
ment of that same Good. As to that Good itself, Which is
virtue,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But equal
the object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot
reward is given for all the works of virtue; because it is
be greater than another, since there is but one Sovereign
written (Mat. 20:10) that all who labor in the vineyard
Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made
“received every man a penny”; for, as Gregory says (Hom.
happy. But as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good,
xix in Evang.), “each was equally rewarded with eternal
one man can be happier than another; because the more a
life.” Therefore one man cannot be happier than another.
man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now, that one
Objection 2. Further, Happiness is the supreme good.
man enjoys God more than another, happens through his
But nothing can surpass the supreme.
Therefore one
being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him.
man’s Happiness cannot be surpassed by another’s.
And in this sense one man can be happier than another.
Objection 3. Further, since Happiness is “the perfect
Reply to Objection 1. The one penny signifies that
and sufficient good” (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man’s
Happiness is one in its object. But the many mansions
desire. But his desire is not at rest, if he yet lacks some
signify the manifold Happiness in the divers degrees of
good that can be got. And if he lack nothing that he can
enjoyment.
get, there can be no still greater good. Therefore either
Reply to Objection 2. Happiness is said to be the
man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness
supreme good, inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or
can be greater.
enjoyment of the Supreme Good.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 14:2): “In My Fa-
Reply to Objection 3. None of the Blessed lacks any
ther’s house there are many mansions”; which, according
desirable good; since they have the Infinite Good Itself,
to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in Joan.) signify “the diverse
Which is “the good of all good,” as Augustine says (Enarr.
dignities of merits in the one eternal life.” But the dig-
in Ps. 134). But one is said to be happier than another, by
nity of eternal life which is given according to merit, is
reason of diverse participation of the same good. And the
Happiness itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of
addition of other goods does not increase Happiness, since
Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all.
Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): “He who knows Thee, and
I answer that, As stated above (q. 1, a. 8; q. 2, a. 7), others besides, is not the happier for knowing them, but is
Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself,
happy for knowing Thee alone.”
Whether one can be happy in this life?
Ia IIae q. 5 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that Happiness can be had
cannot be happy in this life.
in this life. For it is written (Ps. 118:1): “Blessed are the
I answer that, A certain participation of Happiness
undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord.”
can be had in this life: but perfect and true Happiness can-
But this happens in this life. Therefore one can be happy
not be had in this life. This may be seen from a twofold
in this life.
consideration.
Objection 2. Further, imperfect participation in the
First, from the general notion of happiness. For since
Sovereign Good does not destroy the nature of Happi-
happiness is a “perfect and sufficient good,” it excludes
ness, otherwise one would not be happier than another.
every evil, and fulfils every desire. But in this life every
But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in this life,
evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to
by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. Therefore
many unavoidable evils; to ignorance on the part of the in-
man can be happy in this life.
tellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite,
Objection 3. Further, what is said by many cannot
and to many penalties on the part of the body; as Augus-
be altogether false: since what is in many, comes, ap-
tine sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither
parently, from nature; and nature does not fail altogether.
can the desire for good be satiated in this life. For man
Now many say that Happiness can be had in this life, as
naturally desires the good, which he has, to be abiding.
appears from Ps. 143:15: “They have called the people
Now the goods of the present life pass away; since life it-
happy that hath these things,” to wit, the good things in
self passes away, which we naturally desire to have, and
this life. Therefore one can be happy in this life.
would wish to hold abidingly, for man naturally shrinks
On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:1): “Man born
from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true Hap-
of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many
piness in this life.
miseries.” But Happiness excludes misery. Therefore man
Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature
624
of Happiness, viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be on the
man cannot obtain in this life, as was shown in the Ia,
part of the participator, who indeed attains the object of
q. 12, a. 11. Hence it is evident that none can attain true
Happiness, in itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however,
and perfect Happiness in this life.
in comparison with the way in which God enjoys Him-
Reply to Objection 1. Some are said to be happy in
self. This imperfection does not destroy the true nature
this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Hap-
of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation,
piness in the life to come, according to Rom. 8:24: “We
as stated above (q. 3, a. 2), the true nature of Happiness
are saved by hope”; or on account of a certain participa-
is taken from the object, which specifies the act, and not
tion of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of the
from the subject.
Sovereign Good.
Reply to Objection 3. Men esteem that there is some
Reply to Objection 2. The imperfection of partici-
kind of happiness to be had in this life, on account of a
pated Happiness is due to one of two causes. First, on
certain likeness to true Happiness. And thus they do not
the part of the object of Happiness, which is not seen in
fail altogether in their estimate.
Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the nature of
Whether happiness once had can be lost?
Ia IIae q. 5 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that Happiness can be
circumstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of
lost. For Happiness is a perfection. But every perfection is
happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state (Ethic. i,
in the thing perfected according to the mode of the latter.
10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but “as
Since then man is, by his nature, changeable, it seems that
men,” whose nature is subject to change.
Happiness is participated by man in a changeable manner.
But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we
And consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness.
await after this life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri
Objection 2. Further, Happiness consists in an act of
Archon. ii, 3), following the error of certain Platonists,
the intellect; and the intellect is subject to the will. But
held that man can become unhappy after the final Happi-
the will can be directed to opposites. Therefore it seems
ness.
that it can desist from the operation whereby man is made
This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons.
happy: and thus man will cease to be happy.
First, from the general notion of happiness. For since hap-
Objection 3. Further, the end corresponds to the be-
piness is the “perfect and sufficient good,” it must needs
ginning. But man’s Happiness has a beginning, since man
set man’s desire at rest and exclude every evil. Now man
was not always happy. Therefore it seems that it has an
naturally desires to hold to the good that he has, and to
end.
have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46) of the righ-
be troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of
teous that “they shall god. . . into life everlasting,” which,
knowing that he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for
as above stated (a. 2), is the Happiness of the saints. Now
true Happiness that man have the assured opinion of never
what is eternal ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be
losing the good that he possesses. If this opinion be true, it
lost.
follows that he never will lose happiness: but if it be false,
I answer that, If we speak of imperfect happiness,
it is in itself an evil that he should have a false opinion:
such as can be had in this life, in this sense it can be
because the false is the evil of the intellect, just as the true lost. This is clear of contemplative happiness, which is
is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will
lost either by forgetfulness, for instance, when knowledge
no longer be truly happy, if evil be in him.
is lost through sickness; or again by certain occupations,
Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific
whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contempla-
nature of Happiness. For it has been shown above (q. 3,
tion.
a. 8) that man’s perfect Happiness consists in the vision
This is also clear of active happiness: since man’s will
of the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone
can be changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in
seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to see It. Because
whose act that happiness principally consists. If, how-
every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be with-
ever, the virtue remain unimpaired, outward changes can
out, is either insufficient, something more sufficing being
indeed disturb such like happiness, in so far as they hin-
desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience at-
der many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away
tached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome.
altogether because there still remains an act of virtue,
But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all
whereby man bears these trials in a praiseworthy man-
good things, since it unites it to the source of all good-
ner. And since the happiness of this life can be lost, a
ness; hence it is written (Ps. 16:15): “I shall be satisfied
625
when Thy glory shall appear”; and (Wis. 7:11): “All good cause such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such
things came to me together with her,” i.e. with the con-
things as are subject to time and movement.
templation of wisdom. In like manner neither has it any
Reply to Objection 1.
Happiness is consummate
inconvenience attached to it; because it is written of the
perfection, which excludes every defect from the happy.
contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): “Her conversation
And therefore whoever has happiness has it altogether
hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness.” It
unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which
is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake Hap-
raises man to the participation of eternity which tran-
piness of his own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose
scends all change.
Happiness, through God taking it away from him. Be-
Reply to Objection 2. The will can be directed to op-
cause, since the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment,
posites, in things which are ordained to the end; but it is
it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for
ordained, of natural necessity, to the last end. This is ev-
some fault; and he that sees God cannot fall into a fault,
ident from the fact that man is unable not to wish to be
since rectitude of the will, of necessity, results from that
happy.
vision as was shown above (q. 4, a. 4). Nor again can it be
Reply to Objection 3. Happiness has a beginning ow-
withdrawn by any other agent. Because the mind that is
ing to the condition of the participator: but it has no end
united to God is raised above all other things: and conse-
by reason of the condition of the good, the participation
quently no other agent can sever the mind from that union.
of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning of hap-
Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on, man
piness is from one cause, its endlessness is from another.
should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; be-
Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?
Ia IIae q. 5 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that man can attain Hap-
perfect Happiness, as stated above (q. 3, a. 8), consists in
piness by his natural powers. For nature does not fail in
the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God’s
necessary things. But nothing is so necessary to man as
Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but also of
that by which he attains the last end. Therefore this is not
every creature, as was shown in the Ia, q. 12, a. 4. For the
lacking to human nature. Therefore man can attain Hap-
natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the
piness by his natural powers.
mode of his substance: thus it is said of the intelligence
Objection 2. Further, since man is more noble than ir-
(De Causis; Prop. viii) that “it knows things that are above
rational creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped
it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of
than they. But irrational creatures can attain their end by
its substance.” But every knowledge that is according to
their natural powers. Much more therefore can man attain
the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of
Happiness by his natural powers.
the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created
Objection 3. Further, Happiness is a “perfect opera-
substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature,
tion,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now
can attain final Happiness by his natural powers.
the beginning of a thing belongs to the same principle as
Reply to Objection 1. Just as nature does not fail
the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the imperfect op-
man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with
eration, which is as the beginning in human operations,
weapons and clothing, as it provided other animals, be-
is subject to man’s natural power, whereby he is master
cause it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able
of his own actions; it seems that he can attain to perfect
to get these things for himself; so neither did it fail man
operation, i.e. Happiness, by his natural powers.
in things necessary, although it gave him not the where-
On the contrary, Man is naturally the principle of his
withal to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. But
action, by his intellect and will. But final Happiness pre-
it did give him free-will, with which he can turn to God,
pared for the saints, surpasses the intellect and will of
that He may make him happy. “For what we do by means
man; for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) “Eye hath not
of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves” (Ethic.
seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart
iii, 3).
of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love
Reply to Objection 2.
The nature that can attain
Him.” Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his nat-
perfect good, although it needs help from without in or-
ural powers.
der to attain it, is of more noble condition than a nature
I answer that, Imperfect happiness that can be had in
which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imper-
this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers,
fect good, although it need no help from without in or-
in the same way as virtue, in whose operation it consists:
der to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12).
on this point we shall speak further on (q. 63). But man’s
Thus he is better disposed to health who can attain per-
626
fect health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who can power. But this does not follow of necessity, if they be
attain but imperfect health, without the help of medicine.
of different species: for not everything, that can cause
And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the
the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfec-
perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine assis-
tion. Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to
tance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational
man’s natural power, is not of the same species as that
creature, which is not capable of attaining this good, but
perfect operation which is man’s happiness: since oper-
attains some imperfect good by its natural powers.
ation takes its species from its object. Consequently the
Reply to Objection 3. When imperfect and perfect
argument does not prove.
are of the same species, they can be caused by the same
Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?
Ia IIae q. 5 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that man can be made
stowed through the action of any creature: but by God
happy through the action of some higher creature, viz. an
alone is man made happy, if we speak of perfect Happi-
angel. For since we observe a twofold order in things—
ness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the
one, of the parts of the universe to one another, the other,
same is to be said of it as of the virtue, in whose act it
of the whole universe to a good which is outside the uni-
consists.
verse; the former order is ordained to the second as to
Reply to Objection 1. It often happens in the case of
its end (Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order of the
active powers ordained to one another, that it belongs to
parts of an army is dependent on the order of the parts of
the highest power to reach the last end, while the lower
an army is dependent on the order of the whole army to
powers contribute to the attainment of that last end, by
the general. But the mutual order of the parts of the uni-
causing a disposition thereto: thus to the art of sailing,
verse consists in the higher creatures acting on the lower,
which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use
as stated in the Ia, q. 109, a. 2: while happiness consists in
a ship for the end for which it was made. Thus, too, in the
the order of man to a good which is outside the universe,
order of the universe, man is indeed helped by the angels
i.e. God. Therefore man is made happy, through a higher
in the attainment of his last end, in respect of certain pre-
creature, viz. an angel, acting on him.
liminary dispositions thereto: whereas he attains the last
Objection 2. Further, that which is such in potential-
end itself through the First Agent, which is God.
ity, can be reduced to act, by that which is such actually:
Reply to Objection 2. When a form exists perfectly
thus what is potentially hot, is made actually hot, by some-
and naturally in something, it can be the principle of ac-
thing that is actually hot. But man is potentially happy.
tion on something else: for instance a hot thing heats
Therefore he can be made actually happy by an angel who
through heat. But if a form exist in something imperfectly,
is actually happy.
and not naturally, it cannot be the principle whereby it is
Objection 3. Further, Happiness consists in an op-
communicated to something else: thus the “intention” of
eration of the intellect as stated above (q. 3, a. 4). But
color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white;
an angel can enlighten man’s intellect as shown in the Ia,
nor indeed can everything enlightened or heated give heat
q. 111, a. 1. Therefore an angel can make a man happy.
or light to something else; for if they could, enlightening
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): “The Lord
and heating would go on to infinity. But the light of glory,
will give grace and glory.”
whereby God is seen, is in God perfectly and naturally;
I answer that, Since every creature is subject to the
whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness
laws of nature, from the very fact that its power and ac-
or participation. Consequently no creature can communi-
tion are limited: that which surpasses created nature, can-
cate its Happiness to another.
not be done by the power of any creature. Consequently if
Reply to Objection 3. A happy angel enlightens the
anything need to be done that is above nature, it is done by
intellect of a man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions
God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restor-
of the Divine works: but not as to the vision of the Divine
ing sight to the blind, and such like. Now it has been
Essence, as was stated in the Ia, q. 106, a. 1: since in order
shown above (a. 5) that Happiness is a good surpassing
to see this, all are immediately enlightened by God.
created nature. Therefore it is impossible that it be be-
627
Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from God?
Ia IIae q. 5 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that no works of man are
perfect good without movement, belongs to that which
necessary that he may obtain Happiness from God. For
has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs
since God is an agent of infinite power, He requires be-
to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not to
fore acting, neither matter, nor disposition of matter, but
be moved towards Happiness by any previous operation.
can forthwith produce the whole effect. But man’s works,
Now since Happiness surpasses every created nature, no
since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient
pure creature can becomingly gain Happiness, without the
cause thereof, as stated above (a. 6), can be required only
movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the
as dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not re-
angel, who is above man in the natural order, obtained it,
quire dispositions before acting, bestows Happiness with-
according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one move-
out any previous works.
ment of a meritorious work, as was explained in the Ia,
Objection 2. Further, just as God is the immediate
q. 62, a. 5; whereas man obtains it by many movements of
cause of Happiness, so is He the immediate cause of na-
works which are called merits. Wherefore also according
ture. But when God first established nature, He produced
to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of
creatures without any previous disposition or action on the
works of virtue.
part of the creature, but made each one perfect forthwith
Reply to Objection 1. Works are necessary to man
in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happi-
in order to gain Happiness; not on account of the insuffi-
ness on man without any previous works.
ciency of the Divine power which bestows Happiness, but
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 4:6)
that the order in things be observed.
that Happiness is of the man “to whom God reputeth jus-
Reply to Objection 2. God produced the first crea-
tice without works.” Therefore no works of man are nec-
tures so that they are perfect forthwith, without any pre-
essary for attaining Happiness.
vious disposition or operation of the creature; because He
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 13:17): “If you
instituted the first individuals of the various species, that
know these things, you shall be blessed if you do them.”
through them nature might be propagated to their progeny.
Therefore Happiness is obtained through works.
In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on
I answer that, Rectitude of the will, as stated above
others through Christ, who is God and Man, “Who,” ac-
(q. 4, a. 4), is necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing
cording to Heb. 2:10, “had brought many children into
else than the right order of the will to the last end; and it is glory”; therefore, from the very beginning of His concep-therefore necessary for obtaining the end, just as the right
tion, His soul was happy, without any previous meritori-
disposition of matter, in order to receive the form. But
ous operation. But this is peculiar to Him: for Christ’s
this does not prove that any work of man need precede his
merit avails baptized children for the gaining of Happi-
Happiness: for God could make a will having a right ten-
ness, though they have no merits of their own; because by
dency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end;
Baptism they are made members of Christ.
just as sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time
Reply to Objection 3. The Apostle is speaking of the
introduces the form. But the order of Divine wisdom de-
Happiness of Hope, which is bestowed on us by sancti-
mands that it should not be thus; for as is stated in De
fying grace, which is not given on account of previous
Coel. ii, 12, “of those things that have a natural capacity
works. For grace is not a term of movement, as Hap-
for the perfect good, one has it without movement, some
piness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that
by one movement, some by several.” Now to possess the
tends towards Happiness.
Whether every man desires happiness?
Ia IIae q. 5 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that not all desire Happi-
But some consider it impossible for man to see the Divine
ness. For no man can desire what he knows not; since the
Essence; wherefore they desire it not. Therefore all men
apprehended good is the object of the appetite (De An-
do not desire Happiness.
ima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness is. This
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii,
is evident from the fact that, as Augustine says (De Trin.
5) that “happy is he who has all he desires, and desires
xiii, 4), “some thought that Happiness consists in plea-
nothing amiss.” But all do not desire this; for some de-
sures of the body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some in
sire certain things amiss, and yet they wish to desire such
other things.” Therefore not all desire Happiness.
things. Therefore all do not desire Happiness.
Objection 2. Further, the essence of Happiness is the
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3):
vision of the Divine Essence, as stated above (q. 3, a. 8).
“If that actor had said: ‘You all wish to be happy; you
628
do not wish to be unhappy,’ he would have said that of necessity tends thereto, as stated above. Again it can
which none would have failed to acknowledge in his will.”
be considered under other special aspects, either on the
Therefore everyone desires to be happy.
part of the operation itself, or on the part of the operating
I answer that, Happiness can be considered in two
power, or on the part of the object; and thus the will does
ways. First according to the general notion of happiness:
not tend thereto of necessity.
and thus, of necessity, every man desires happiness. For
Reply to Objection 3. This definition of Happiness
the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect
given by some—“Happy is the man that has all he de-
good, as stated above (Aa. 3,4). But since good is the
sires,” or, “whose every wish is fulfilled” is a good and
object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which
adequate definition; but an inadequate definition if under-
entirely satisfies his will. Consequently to desire happi-
stood in another. For if we understand it simply of all that
ness is nothing else than to desire that one’s will be satis-
man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that he
fied. And this everyone desires. Secondly we may speak
who has all that he desires, is happy: since nothing sat-
of Happiness according to its specific notion, as to that in
isfies man’s natural desire, except the perfect good which
which it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness;
is Happiness. But if we understand it of those things that
because they know not in what thing the general notion of
man desires according to the apprehension of the reason,
happiness is found. And consequently, in this respect, not
thus it does not belong to Happiness, to have certain things
all desire it. Wherefore the reply to the first Objection is
that man desires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in
clear.
so far as the possession of such things hinders man from
Reply to Objection 2. Since the will follows the ap-
having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that reason
prehension of the intellect or reason; just as it happens
sometimes accepts as true things that are a hindrance to
that where there is no real distinction, there may be a dis-
the knowledge of truth. And it was through taking this
tinction according to the consideration of reason; so does
into consideration that Augustine added so as to include
it happen that one and the same thing is desired in one
perfect Happiness—that he “desires nothing amiss”: al-
way, and not desired in another. So that happiness may be
though the first part suffices if rightly understood, to wit,
considered as the final and perfect good, which is the gen-
that “happy is he who has all he desires.”
eral notion of happiness: and thus the will naturally and
629
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 6
Of the Voluntary and the Involuntary
(In Eight Articles)
Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we must in due sequence consider human acts, in order to know by what acts we may obtain Happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from obtaining it. But because operations and acts are concerned with things singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account of things in detail. The study of Morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider first the general principles; and secondly matters of detail.
In treating of the general principles, the points that offer themselves for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves; (2) their principles. Now of human acts some are proper to man; others are common to man and animals.
And since Happiness is man’s proper good, those acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with Happiness than have those which are common to man and the other animals. First, then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly, those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are called Passions. The first of these points offers a twofold consideration: (1) What makes a human act? (2) What distinguishes human acts?
And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary, because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man; we must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary.
First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general; secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited by the will, and as issuing from the will immediately; thirdly, those acts which are voluntary, as being commanded by the will, which issue from the will through the medium of the other powers.
And because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first consider the voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circumstances of those acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?
(2) Whether in irrational animals?
(3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any action?
(4) Whether violence can be done to the will?
(5) Whether violence causes involuntariness?
(6) Whether fear causes involuntariness?
(7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?
(8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?
Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?
Ia IIae q. 6 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there is nothing vol-
15:5): “Without Me you can do nothing.” Therefore there
untary in human acts. For that is voluntary “which has its
is nothing voluntary in human acts.
principle within itself.” as Gregory of Nyssa∗, Damascene
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii)
(De Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare.
that “the voluntary is an act consisting in a rational op-
But the principle of human acts is not in man himself, but
eration.” Now such are human acts. Therefore there is
outside him: since man’s appetite is moved to act, by the
something voluntary in human acts.
appetible object which is outside him, and is as a “mover
I answer that, There must needs be something volun-
unmoved” (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore there is nothing
tary in human acts. In order to make this clear, we must
voluntary in human acts.
take note that the principle of some acts or movements is
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2)
within the agent, or that which is moved; whereas the prin-
proves that in animals no new movement arises that is not
ciple of some movements or acts is outside. For when a
preceded by a motion from without. But all human acts
stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement
are new, since none is eternal. Consequently, the principle
is outside the stone: whereas when it is moved down-
of all human acts is from without: and therefore there is
wards, the principle of this movement is in the stone. Now
nothing voluntary in them.
of those things that are moved by an intrinsic principle,
Objection 3. Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act
some move themselves, some not. For since every agent
of himself. But this is not true of man; for it is written (Jn.
or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end, as stated
∗ Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii.
630
above (q. 1, a. 2); those are perfectly moved by an ingenus of things subject to alteration, the first principle of
trinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only
alteration is a heavenly body, which is nevertheless, is not
of movement but of movement for an end. Now in order
the first mover simply, but is moved locally by a higher
for a thing to be done for an end, some knowledge of the
mover. And so the intrinsic principle of the voluntary act,
end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or is moved
i.e. the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first prin-
by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of
ciple in the genus of appetitive movement, although it is
the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that
moved by an extrinsic principle according to other species
it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand,
of movement.
if a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it
Reply to Objection 2. New movements in animals
have an intrinsic principle of action or movement, never-
are indeed preceded by a motion from without; and this
theless the principle of acting or being moved for an end
in two respects. First, in so far as by means of an extrin-
is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the
sic motion an animal’s senses are confronted with some-
principle of its action towards an end is not in that thing,
thing sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the
but in something else, by which the principle of its action
appetite. Thus a lion, on seeing a stag in movement and
towards an end is imprinted on it. Wherefore such like
coming towards him, begins to be moved towards the stag.
things are not said to move themselves, but to be moved
Secondly, in so far as some extrinsic motion produces a
by others. But those things which have a knowledge of
physical change in an animal’s body, as in the case of cold
the end are said to move themselves because there is in
or heat; and through the body being affected by the mo-
them a principle by which they not only act but also act
tion of an outward body, the sensitive appetite which is the
for an end. And consequently, since both are from an in-
power of a bodily organ, is also moved indirectly; thus it
trinsic principle, to wit, that they act and that they act for
happens that through some alteration in the body the ap-
an end, the movements of such things are said to be vol-
petite is roused to the desire of something. But this is not
untary: for the word “voluntary” implies that their move-
contrary to the nature of voluntariness, as stated above (ad
ments and acts are from their own inclination. Hence it
1), for such movements caused by an extrinsic principle
is that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory
are of another genus of movement.
of Nyssa, and Damascene†, the voluntary is defined not
Reply to Objection 3. God moves man to act, not
only as having “a principle within” the agent, but also as
only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by ef-
implying “knowledge.” Therefore, since man especially
fecting a change in his body, but also by moving the will
knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts
itself; because every movement either of the will or of na-
especially is the voluntary to be found.
ture, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as
Reply to Objection 1. Not every principle is a first
it is not incompatible with nature that the natural move-
principle. Therefore, although it is essential to the volun-
ment be from God as the First Mover, inasmuch as nature
tary act that its principle be within the agent, nevertheless
is an instrument of God moving it: so it is not contrary to
it is not contrary to the nature of the voluntary act that
the essence of a voluntary act, that it proceed from God,
this intrinsic principle be caused or moved by an extrinsic
inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless both
principle: because it is not essential to the voluntary act
natural and voluntary movements have this in common,
that its intrinsic principle be a first principle. Yet again it that it is essential that they should proceed from a princi-must be observed that a principle of movement may hap-
ple within the agent.
pen to be first in a genus, but not first simply: thus in the
Whether there is anything voluntary in irrational animals?
Ia IIae q. 6 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there is nothing vol-
a voluntary act in irrational animals.
untary in irrational animals. For a thing is called “volun-
Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
tary” from “voluntas” [will]. Now since the will is in the
24) that “voluntary acts lead to praise and blame.” But
reason (De Anima iii, 9), it cannot be in irrational animals.
neither praise nor blame is due to the acts of irrational
Therefore neither is there anything voluntary in them.
minds. Therefore such acts are not voluntary.
Objection 2. Further, according as human acts are
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
voluntary, man is said to be master of his actions. But ir-
2) that “both children and irrational animals participate in
rational animals are not masters of their actions; for “they
the voluntary.” The same is said by Damascene (De Fide
act not; rather are they acted upon,” as Damascene says
Orth. 24) and Gregory of Nyssa∗.
(De Fide Orth. ii, 27). Therefore there is no such thing as
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), it is essential
† See Objection 1
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxii.
631
to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, Wherefore the voluntary in its perfection belongs to none
together with some knowledge of the end. Now knowl-
but the rational nature: whereas the imperfect voluntary is
edge of the end is twofold; perfect and imperfect. Perfect
within the competency of even irrational animals.
knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending
Reply to Objection 1. The will is the name of the ra-
the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under
tional appetite; and consequently it cannot be in things de-
the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that
void of reason. But the word “voluntary” is derived from
end. And such knowledge belongs to none but the ratio-
“voluntas” [will], and can be extended to those things in
nal nature. But imperfect knowledge of the end consists
which there is some participation of will, by way of like-
in mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it un-
ness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to der the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the
irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end,
end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational
through some kind of knowledge.
animals, through their senses and their natural estimative
Reply to Objection 2. The fact that man is master
power.
of his actions, is due to his being able to deliberate about
Consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to
them: for since the deliberating reason is indifferently dis-
the perfect voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended
posed to opposite things, the will can be inclined to either.
the end, a man can, from deliberating about the end and
But it is not thus that voluntariness is in irrational animals, the means thereto, be moved, or not, to gain that end.
as stated above.
But imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the imper-
Reply to Objection 3. Praise and blame are the result
fect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end,
of the voluntary act, wherein is the perfect voluntary; such
but does not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once.
as is not to be found in irrational animals.
Whether there can be voluntariness without any act?
Ia IIae q. 6 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that voluntariness cannot
the ship or if the ship’s helm be not entrusted to him, the
be without any act. For that is voluntary which proceeds
sinking of the ship would not be set down to him, although
from the will. But nothing can proceed from the will, ex-
it might be due to his absence from the helm.
cept through some act, at least an act of the will. Therefore
Since, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and
there cannot be voluntariness without act.
sometimes ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting;
Objection 2. Further, just as one is said to wish by an
this not-willing and not-acting is imputed to, as though
act of the will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is
proceeding from, the will. And thus it is that we can have
said not to wish. But not to wish implies involuntariness,
the voluntary without an act; sometimes without outward
which is contrary to voluntariness. Therefore there can be
act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills
nothing voluntary when the act of the will ceases.
not to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as
Objection 3. Further, knowledge is essential to the
when one does not will to act.
voluntary, as stated above (Aa. 1,2). But knowledge in-
Reply to Objection 1. We apply the word “voluntary”
volves an act. Therefore voluntariness cannot be without
not only to that which proceeds from the will directly, as
some act.
from its action; but also to that which proceeds from it
On the contrary, The word “voluntary” is applied to
indirectly as from its inaction.
that of which we are masters. Now we are masters in re-
Reply to Objection 2. “Not to wish” is said in two
spect of to act and not to act, to will and not to will. There-
senses. First, as though it were one word, and the infini-
fore just as to act and to will are voluntary, so also are not
tive of “I-do-not-wish.” Consequently just as when I say
to act and not to will.
“I do not wish to read,” the sense is, “I wish not to read”;
I answer that, Voluntary is what proceeds from the
so “not to wish to read” is the same as “to wish not to
will. Now one thing proceeds from another in two ways.
read,” and in this sense “not to wish” implies involuntari-
First, directly; in which sense something proceeds from
ness. Secondly it is taken as a sentence: and then no act of
another inasmuch as this other acts; for instance, heating
the will is affirmed. And in this sense “not to wish” does
from heat. Secondly, indirectly; in which sense something
not imply involuntariness.
proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus
Reply to Objection 3. Voluntariness requires an act
the sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman, from
of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will;
his having ceased to steer. But we must take note that the
namely, in order that it be in one’s power to consider, to
cause of what follows from want of action is not always
wish and to act. And then, just as not to wish, and not to
the agent as not acting; but only then when the agent can
act, when it is time to wish and to act, is voluntary, so is it and ought to act. For if the helmsman were unable to steer
voluntary not to consider.
632
Whether violence can be done to the will?
Ia IIae q. 6 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that violence can be done
principle of knowledge: just as the natural appetite is an
to the will. For everything can be compelled by that which
inclination proceeding from an interior principle without
is more powerful. But there is something, namely, God,
knowledge. Now what is compelled or violent is from
that is more powerful than the human will. Therefore it
an exterior principle. Consequently it is contrary to the
can be compelled, at least by Him.
nature of the will’s own act, that it should be subject to
Objection 2. Further, every passive subject is com-
compulsion and violence: just as it is also contrary to the
pelled by its active principle, when it is changed by it. But
nature of a natural inclination or movement. For a stone
the will is a passive force: for it is a “mover moved” (De
may have an upward movement from violence, but that
Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is sometimes moved
this violent movement be from its natural inclination is
by its active principle, it seems that sometimes it is com-
impossible. In like manner a man may be dragged by
pelled.
force: but it is contrary to the very notion of violence,
Objection 3. Further, violent movement is that which
that he be dragged of his own will.
is contrary to nature. But the movement of the will is
Reply to Objection 1. God Who is more powerful
sometimes contrary to nature; as is clear of the will’s
than the human will, can move the will of man, accord-
movement to sin, which is contrary to nature, as Dama-
ing to Prov. 21:1: “The heart of the king is in the hand
scene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore the move-
of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it.” But
ment of the will can be compelled.
if this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10)
act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved, but
that what is done by the will is not done of necessity. Now,
something else against the will.
whatever is done under compulsion is done of necessity:
Reply to Objection 2. It is not always a violent move-
consequently what is done by the will, cannot be com-
ment, when a passive subject is moved by its active prin-
pelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to act.
ciple; but only when this is done against the interior incli-
I answer that, The act of the will is twofold: one is its nation of the passive subject. Otherwise every alteration
immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, “to wish”;
and generation of simply bodies would be unnatural and
the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and put
violent: whereas they are natural by reason of the natural
into execution by means of some other power, such as “to
interior aptitude of the matter or subject to such a disposi-
walk” and “to speak,” which are commanded by the will
tion. In like manner when the will is moved, according to
to be executed by means of the motive power.
its own inclination, by the appetible object, this movement
As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the
is not violent but voluntary.
will can suffer violence, in so far as violence can prevent
Reply to Objection 3. That to which the will tends
the exterior members from executing the will’s command.
by sinning, although in reality it is evil and contrary to
But as to the will’s own proper act, violence cannot be
the rational nature, nevertheless is apprehended as some-
done to the will.
thing good and suitable to nature, in so far as it is suitable
The reason of this is that the act of the will is noth-
to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some
ing else than an inclination proceeding from the interior
vicious habit.
Whether violence causes involuntariness?
Ia IIae q. 6 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that violence does not
upwards; or when a man contorts his limbs in a way con-
cause involuntariness. For we speak of voluntariness and
trary to their natural flexibility. Therefore violence does
involuntariness in respect of the will. But violence can-
not cause involuntariness.
not be done to the will, as shown above (a. 4). Therefore
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) and
violence cannot cause involuntariness.
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) say that “things done
Objection 2. Further, that which is done involuntar-
under compulsion are involuntary.”
ily is done with grief, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
I answer that, Violence is directly opposed to the vol-
24) and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 5) say. But sometimes
untary, as likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and
a man suffers compulsion without being grieved thereby.
the natural have this in common, that both are from an
Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness.
intrinsic principle; whereas violence is from an extrinsic
Objection 3. Further, what is from the will cannot be
principle. And for this reason, just as in things devoid of
involuntary. But some violent actions proceed from the
knowledge, violence effects something against nature: so
will: for instance, when a man with a heavy body goes
in things endowed with knowledge, it effects something
633
against the will. Now that which is against nature is said to be natural, by reason of the natural aptitude in a heav-to be “unnatural”; and in like manner that which is against
enly body to receive such movement; although the cause
the will is said to be “involuntary.” Therefore violence
of that movement is a voluntary agent. In like manner an
causes involuntariness.
act is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, in regard
Reply to Objection 1. The involuntary is opposed to
to action, for instance, when one wishes to be passive to
the voluntary. Now it has been said (a. 4) that not only the
another. Hence when action is brought to bear on some-
act, which proceeds immediately from the will, is called
thing, by an extrinsic agent, as long as the will to suffer
voluntary, but also the act commanded by the will. Con-
that action remains in the passive subject, there is not vi-
sequently, as to the act which proceeds immediately from
olence simply: for although the patient does nothing by
the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as stated
way of action, he does something by being willing to suf-
above (a. 4): wherefore violence cannot make that act
fer. Consequently this cannot be called involuntary.
involuntary. But as to the commanded act, the will can
Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Phys.
suffer violence: and consequently in this respect violence
viii, 4) the movement of an animal, whereby at times
causes involuntariness.
an animal is moved against the natural inclination of the
Reply to Objection 2. As that is said to be natural,
body, although it is not natural to the body, is neverthe-
which is according to the inclination of nature; so that is
less somewhat natural to the animal, to which it is natural
said to be voluntary, which is according to the inclination
to be moved according to its appetite. Accordingly this
of the will. Now a thing is said to be natural in two ways.
is violent, not simply but in a certain respect. The same
First, because it is from nature as from an active princi-
remark applies in the case of one who contorts his limbs
ple: thus it is natural for fire to produce heat. Secondly,
in a way that is contrary to their natural disposition. For
according to a passive principle; because, to wit, there is
this is violent in a certain respect, i.e. as to that particular in nature an inclination to receive an action from an ex-limb; but not simply, i.e. as to the man himself.
trinsic principle: thus the movement of the heavens is said
Whether fear causes involuntariness simply?
Ia IIae q. 6 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that fear causes involun-
likewise Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Neme-
tariness simply. For just as violence regards that which is
sius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such things are done through
contrary to the will at the time, so fear regards a future
fear “are of a mixed character,” being partly voluntary and
evil which is repugnant to the will. But violence causes
partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear,
involuntariness simply. Therefore fear too causes invol-
considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes vol-
untariness simply.
untary in this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid
Objection 2. Further, that which is such of itself, re-
the evil feared.
mains such, whatever be added to it: thus what is hot of
But if the matter be considered aright, such things are
itself, as long as it remains, is still hot, whatever be added
voluntary rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary
to it. But that which is done through fear, is involuntary
simply, but involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is
in itself. Therefore, even with the addition of fear, it is
said to be simply, according as it is in act; but according
involuntary.
as it is only in apprehension, it is not simply, but in a cer-
Objection 3. Further, that which is such, subject to
tain respect. Now that which is done through fear, is in act
a condition, is such in a certain respect; whereas what is
in so far as it is done. For, since acts are concerned with
such, without any condition, is such simply: thus what is
singulars; and the singular, as such, is here and now; that
necessary, subject to a condition, is necessary in some re-
which is done is in act, in so far as it is here and now and
spect: but what is necessary absolutely, is necessary sim-
under other individuating circumstances. And that which
ply. But that which is done through fear, is absolutely
is done through fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here
involuntary; and is not voluntary, save under a condi-
and now, that is to say, in so far as, under the circum-
tion, namely, in order that the evil feared may be avoided.
stances, it hinders a greater evil which was feared; thus
Therefore that which is done through fear, is involuntary
the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary
simply.
during the storm, through fear of the danger: wherefore
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ and the Philoso-
it is clear that it is voluntary simply. And hence it is that
pher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that such things as are done through
what is done out of fear is essentially voluntary, because
fear are “voluntary rather than involuntary.”
its principle is within. But if we consider what is done
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and
through fear, as outside this particular case, and inasmuch
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.
634
as it is repugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration
“the principal whereof is from without,” but with the ad-
of the mind. And consequently what is done through fear
dition, “in which he that suffers violence concurs not at
is involuntary, considered in that respect, that is to say,
all”; because the will of him that is in fear, does concur
outside the actual circumstances of the case.
somewhat in that which he does through fear.
Reply to Objection 1. Things done through fear and
Reply to Objection 2. Things that are such abso-
compulsion differ not only according to present and future
lutely, remain such, whatever be added to them; for in-
time, but also in this, that the will does not consent, but is
stance, a cold thing, or a white thing: but things that are
moved entirely counter to that which is done through com-
such relatively, vary according as they are compared with
pulsion: whereas what is done through fear, becomes vol-
different things. For what is big in comparison with one
untary, because the will is moved towards it, albeit not for
thing, is small in comparison with another. Now a thing
its own sake, but on account of something else, that is, in
is said to be voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it
order to avoid an evil which is feared. For the conditions
were absolutely; but also for the sake of something else, as
of a voluntary act are satisfied, if it be done on account
it were relatively. Accordingly, nothing prevents a thing
of something else voluntary: since the voluntary is not
which was not voluntary in comparison with one thing,
only what we wish, for its own sake, as an end, but also
from becoming voluntary when compared with another.
what we wish for the sake of something else, as an end.
Reply to Objection 3. That which is done through
It is clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion,
fear, is voluntary without any condition, that is to say, ac-
the will does nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done
cording as it is actually done: but it is involuntary, under
through fear, the will does something. Accordingly, as
a certain condition, that is to say, if such a fear were not
Gregory of Nyssa∗ says, in order to exclude things done
threatening. Consequently, this argument proves rather
through fear, a violent action is defined as not only one,
the opposite.
Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?
Ia IIae q. 6 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that concupiscence causes
will, whereas good harmonizes with the will. Therefore
involuntariness. For just as fear is a passion, so is con-
fear has a greater tendency than concupiscence to cause
cupiscence. But fear causes involuntariness to a certain
involuntariness.
extent. Therefore concupiscence does so too.
Reply to Objection 2. He who acts from fear retains
Objection 2. Further, just as the timid man through
the repugnance of the will to that which he does, consid-
fear acts counter to that which he proposed, so does the
ered in itself. But he that acts from concupiscence, e.g. an
incontinent, through concupiscence. But fear causes in-
incontinent man, does not retain his former will whereby
voluntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence
he repudiated the object of his concupiscence; for his will
does so also.
is changed so that he desires that which previously he re-
Objection 3. Further, knowledge is necessary for vol-
pudiated. Accordingly, that which is done out of fear is
untariness. But concupiscence impairs knowledge; for the
involuntary, to a certain extent, but that which is done
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “delight,” or the lust of
from concupiscence is nowise involuntary. For the man
pleasure, “destroys the judgment of prudence.” Therefore
who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he
concupiscence causes involuntariness.
purposed at first, but not counter to that which he desires
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in
24): “The involuntary act deserves mercy or indulgence,
itself he desires now.
and is done with regret.” But neither of these can be said
Reply to Objection 3. If concupiscence were to de-
of that which is done out of concupiscence. Therefore
stroy knowledge altogether, as happens with those whom
concupiscence does not cause involuntariness.
concupiscence has rendered mad, it would follow that
I answer that, Concupiscence does not cause involun-
concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And yet
tariness, but on the contrary makes something to be vol-
properly speaking it would not result in the act being in-
untary. For a thing is said to be voluntary, from the fact
voluntary, because in things bereft of reason, there is nei-
that the will is moved to it. Now concupiscence inclines
ther voluntary nor involuntary. But sometimes in those
the will to desire the object of concupiscence. Therefore
actions which are done from concupiscence, knowledge
the effect of concupiscence is to make something to be
is not completely destroyed, because the power of know-
voluntary rather than involuntary.
ing is not taken away entirely, but only the actual consid-
Reply to Objection 1. Fear regards evil, but concu-
eration in some particular possible act. Nevertheless, this
piscence regards good. Now evil of itself is counter to the
itself is voluntary, according as by voluntary we mean that
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.
635
which is in the power of the will, for example “not to act”
the will can resist the passion, as we shall state later on
or “not to will,” and in like manner “not to consider”; for
(q. 10, a. 3; q. 77, a. 7).
Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?
Ia IIae q. 6 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance does not
sequent” to the act of the will, in so far as ignorance it-
cause involuntariness. For “the involuntary act deserves
self is voluntary: and this happens in two ways, in accor-
pardon,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But
dance with the two aforesaid modes of voluntary (a. 3).
sometimes that which is done through ignorance does not
First, because the act of the will is brought to bear on the
deserve pardon, according to 1 Cor. 14:38: “If any man
ignorance: as when a man wishes not to know, that he
know not, he shall not be known.” Therefore ignorance
may have an excuse for sin, or that he may not be with-
does not cause involuntariness.
held from sin; according to Job 21:14: “We desire not
Objection 2. Further, every sin implies ignorance;
the knowledge of Thy ways.” And this is called “affected
according to Prov. 14: 22: “They err, that work evil.”
ignorance.” Secondly, ignorance is said to be voluntary,
If, therefore, ignorance causes involuntariness, it would
when it regards that which one can and ought to know:
follow that every sin is involuntary: which is opposed to
for in this sense “not to act” and “not to will” are said to
the saying of Augustine, that “every sin is voluntary” (De
be voluntary, as stated above (a. 3). And ignorance of this
Vera Relig. xiv).
kind happens, either when one does not actually consider
Objection 3. Further, “involuntariness is not without
what one can and ought to consider; this is called “ig-
sadness,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But
norance of evil choice,” and arises from some passion or
some things are done out of ignorance, but without sad-
habit: or when one does not take the trouble to acquire the
ness: for instance, a man may kill a foe, whom he wishes
knowledge which one ought to have; in which sense, igno-
to kill, thinking at the time that he is killing a stag. There-
rance of the general principles of law, which one to know,
fore ignorance does not cause involuntariness.
is voluntary, as being due to negligence. Accordingly, if
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24)
in either of these ways, ignorance is voluntary, it cannot
and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that “what is done
cause involuntariness simply. Nevertheless it causes in-
through ignorance is involuntary.”
voluntariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as it precedes
I answer that, If ignorance causes involuntariness, it
the movement of the will towards the act, which move-
is in so far as it deprives one of knowledge, which is a nec-
ment would not be, if there were knowledge. Ignorance is
essary condition of voluntariness, as was declared above
“antecedent” to the act of the will, when it is not volun-
(a. 1). But it is not every ignorance that deprives one of
tary, and yet is the cause of man’s willing what he would
this knowledge. Accordingly, we must take note that igno-
not will otherwise. Thus a man may be ignorant of some
rance has a threefold relationship to the act of the will: in
circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know,
one way, “concomitantly”; in another, “consequently”; in
the result being that he does that which he would not do,
a third way, “antecedently.” “Concomitantly,” when there
if he knew of that circumstance; for instance, a man, af-
is ignorance of what is done; but, so that even if it were
ter taking proper precaution, may not know that someone
known, it would be done. For then, ignorance does not
is coming along the road, so that he shoots an arrow and
induce one to wish this to be done, but it just happens that
slays a passer-by. Such ignorance causes involuntariness
a thing is at the same time done, and not known: thus
simply.
in the example given (obj. 3) a man did indeed wish to
From this may be gathered the solution of the objec-
kill his foe, but killed him in ignorance, thinking to kill
tions. For the first objection deals with ignorance of what
a stag. And ignorance of this kind, as the Philosopher
a man is bound to know. The second, with ignorance of
states (Ethic. iii, 1), does not cause involuntariness, since
choice, which is voluntary to a certain extent, as stated
it is not the cause of anything that is repugnant to the
above. The third, with that ignorance which is concomi-
will: but it causes “non-voluntariness,” since that which
tant with the act of the will.
is unknown cannot be actually willed. Ignorance is “con-
636
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 7
Of the Circumstances of Human Acts
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the circumstances of human acts: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is a circumstance?
(2) Whether a theologian should take note of the circumstances of human acts?
(3) How many circumstances are there?
(4) Which are the most important of them?
Whether a circumstance is an accident of a human act?
Ia IIae q. 7 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that a circumstance is not
stance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act,
an accident of a human act. For Tully says (De Invent.
are called circumstances. Now what is outside a thing’s
Rhetor. i) that a circumstance is that from “which an or-
substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called its acci-
ator adds authority and strength to his argument.” But
dent. Wherefore the circumstances of human acts should
oratorical arguments are derived principally from things
be called their accidents.
pertaining to the essence of a thing, such as the definition,
Reply to Objection 1. The orator gives strength to his
the genus, the species, and the like, from which also Tully
argument, in the first place, from the substance of the act;
declares that an orator should draw his arguments. There-
and secondly, from the circumstances of the act. Thus
fore a circumstance is not an accident of a human act.
a man becomes indictable, first, through being guilty of
Objection 2. Further, “to be in” is proper to an acci-
murder; secondly, through having done it fraudulently, or
dent. But that which surrounds [circumstat] is rather out
from motives of greed or at a holy time or place, and so
than in. Therefore the circumstances are not accidents of
forth. And so in the passage quoted, it is said pointedly
human acts.
that the orator “adds strength to his argument,” as though
Objection 3. Further, an accident has no accident. But
this were something secondary.
human acts themselves are accidents. Therefore the cir-
Reply to Objection 2. A thing is said to be an acci-
cumstances are not accidents of acts.
dent of something in two ways. First, from being in that
On the contrary, The particular conditions of any sin-
thing: thus, whiteness is said to be an accident of Socrates.
gular thing are called its individuating accidents. But the
Secondly, because it is together with that thing in the same
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) calls the circumstances partic-
subject: thus, whiteness is an accident of the art of music,
ular things∗, i.e. the particular conditions of each act.
inasmuch as they meet in the same subject, so as to touch
Therefore the circumstances are individual accidents of
one another, as it were. And in this sense circumstances
human acts.
are said to be the accidents of human acts.
I answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (ad 2), an acci-
(Peri Herm. i), “words are the signs of what we under-
dent is said to be the accident of an accident, from the fact
stand,” it must needs be that in naming things we follow
that they meet in the same subject. But this happens in
the process of intellectual knowledge. Now our intellec-
two ways. First, in so far as two accidents are both related
tual knowledge proceeds from the better known to the
to the same subject, without any relation to one another;
less known. Accordingly with us, names of more obvious
as whiteness and the art of music in Socrates. Secondly,
things are transferred so as to signify things less obvious:
when such accidents are related to one another; as when
and hence it is that, as stated in Metaph. x, 4, “the no-
the subject receives one accident by means of the other;
tion of distance has been transferred from things that are
for instance, a body receives color by means of its sur-
apart locally, to all kinds of opposition”: and in like man-
face. And thus also is one accident said to be in another;
ner words that signify local movement are employed to
for we speak of color as being in the surface.
designate all other movements, because bodies which are
Accordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both
circumscribed by place, are best known to us. And hence
these ways. For some circumstances that have a relation
it is that the word “circumstance” has passed from located
to acts, belong to the agent otherwise than through the act;
things to human acts.
as place and condition of person; whereas others belong
Now in things located, that is said to surround some-
to the agent by reason of the act, as the manner in which
thing, which is outside it, but touches it, or is placed near
the act is done.
it. Accordingly, whatever conditions are outside the sub-
∗ ta kath’ ekasta
637
Whether theologians should take note of the circumstances of human acts?
Ia IIae q. 7 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that theologians should
be voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be volun-
not take note of the circumstances of human acts. Because
tary or involuntary, according to knowledge or ignorance
theologians do not consider human acts otherwise than ac-
of circumstances, as stated above (q. 6, a. 8). Therefore
cording to their quality of good or evil. But it seems that
the theologian has to consider circumstances.
circumstances cannot give quality to human acts; for a
Reply to Objection 1. Good directed to the end is
thing is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which
said to be useful; and this implies some kind of relation:
is outside it; but by that which is in it. Therefore theolo-
wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that “the good
gians should not take note of the circumstances of acts.
in the genus ‘relation’ is the useful.” Now, in the genus
Objection 2. Further, circumstances are the accidents
“relation” a thing is denominated not only according to
of acts. But one thing may be subject to an infinity of ac-
that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to
cidents; hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 2) that
that which is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the ex-
“no art or science considers accidental being, except only
pressions “right” and “left,” “equal” and “unequal,” and
the art of sophistry.” Therefore the theologian has not to
such like. Accordingly, since the goodness of acts con-
consider circumstances.
sists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders their being
Objection 3. Further, the consideration of circum-
called good or bad according to their proportion to extrin-
stances belongs to the orator. But oratory is not a part
sic things that are adjacent to them.
of theology. Therefore it is not a theologian’s business to
Reply to Objection 2. Accidents which are altogether
consider circumstances.
accidental are neglected by every art, by reason of their
On the contrary, Ignorance of circumstances causes
uncertainty and infinity. But such like accidents are not
an act to be involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide
what we call circumstances; because circumstances al-
Orth. ii, 24) and Gregory of Nyssa∗. But involuntariness
though, as stated above (a. 1), they are extrinsic to the
excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to
act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being
the theologian. Therefore circumstances also should be
related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the
considered by the theologian.
consideration of art.
I answer that, Circumstances come under the consid-
Reply to Objection 3. The consideration of circum-
eration of the theologian, for a threefold reason. First,
stances belongs to the moralist, the politician, and the or-
because the theologian considers human acts, inasmuch
ator. To the moralist, in so far as with respect to circum-
as man is thereby directed to Happiness. Now, everything
stances we find or lose the mean of virtue in human acts
that is directed to an end should be proportionate to that
and passions. To the politician and to the orator, in so
end. But acts are made proportionate to an end by means
far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or
of a certain commensurateness, which results from the
blame, of excuse or indictment. In different ways, how-
due circumstances. Hence the theologian has to consider
ever: because where the orator persuades, the politician
the circumstances. Secondly, because the theologian con-
judges. To the theologian this consideration belongs, in
siders human acts according as they are found to be good
all the aforesaid ways: since to him all the other arts are
or evil, better or worse: and this diversity depends on cir-
subservient: for he has to consider virtuous and vicious
cumstances, as we shall see further on (q. 18, Aa. 10,11;
acts, just as the moralist does; and with the orator and
q. 73, a. 7). Thirdly, because the theologian considers hu-
politician he considers acts according as they are deserv-
man acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is
ing of reward or punishment.
proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they
Whether the circumstances are properly set forth in the third book of Ethics?
Ia IIae q. 7 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the circumstances are
stances are included under one, which is the “mode of
not properly set forth in Ethic. iii, 1. For a circumstance
acting.”
of an act is described as something outside the act. Now
Objection 3. Further, circumstances are not part of the
time and place answer to this description. Therefore there
substance of an act. But the causes of an act seem to be-
are only two circumstances, to wit, “when” and “where.”
long to its substance. Therefore no circumstance should
Objection 2.
Further, we judge from the circum-
be taken from the cause of the act itself. Accordingly,
stances whether a thing is well or ill done. But this be-
neither “who,” nor “why,” nor “about what,” are circum-
longs to the mode of an act. Therefore all the circum-
stances: since “who” refers to the efficient cause, “why”
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.
638
to the final cause, and “about what” to the material cause.
stance “by what aids.”
On the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in
Reply to Objection 1. Time and place surround [cir-
Ethic. iii, 1.
cumstant] the act by way of measure; but the others sur-
I answer that, Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent.
round the act by touching it in any other way, while they
Rhetor. i), gives seven circumstances, which are con-
are extrinsic to the substance of the act.
tained in this verse:
Reply to Objection 2. This mode “well” or “ill” is
“Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo,
not a circumstance, but results from all the circumstances.
quando—
But the mode which refers to a quality of the act is a spe-
Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and
cial circumstance; for instance, that a man walk fast or
when.”
slowly; that he strike hard or gently, and so forth.
For in acts we must take note of “who” did it, “by what
Reply to Objection 3. A condition of the cause, on
aids” or “instruments” he did it, “what” he did, “where” he
which the substance of the act depends, is not a circum-
did it, “why” he did it, “how” and “when” he did it. But
stance; it must be an additional condition. Thus, in regard
Aristotle in Ethic. iii, 1 adds yet another, to wit, “about
to the object, it is not a circumstance of theft that the ob-
what,” which Tully includes in the circumstance “what.”
ject is another’s property, for this belongs to the substance
The reason of this enumeration may be set down as
of the act; but that it be great or small. And the same
follows. For a circumstance is described as something
applies to the other circumstances which are considered
outside the substance of the act, and yet in a way touch-
in reference to the other causes. For the end that speci-
ing it. Now this happens in three ways: first, inasmuch as
fies the act is not a circumstance, but some additional end.
it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as it touches
Thus, that a valiant man act “valiantly for the sake of” the
the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the
good of the virtue or fortitude, is not a circumstance; but
effect. It touches the act itself, either by way of mea-
if he act valiantly for the sake of the delivery of the state,
sure, as “time” and “place”; or by qualifying the act as the
or of Christendom, or some such purpose. The same is to
“mode of acting.” It touches the effect when we consider
be said with regard to the circumstance “what”; for that a
“what” is done. It touches the cause of the act, as to the
man by pouring water on someone should happen to wash
final cause, by the circumstance “why”; as to the material
him, is not a circumstance of the washing; but that in do-
cause, or object, in the circumstance “about what”; as to
ing so he give him a chill, or scald him; heal him or harm
the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance “who”;
him, these are circumstances.
and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the circum-
Whether the most important circumstances are “why” and “in what the act consists”?
Ia IIae q. 7 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that these are not the
properly called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary.
most important circumstances, namely, “why” and those
Now, the motive and object of the will is the end. There-
“in which the act is,∗” as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. For those
fore that circumstance is the most important of all which
in which the act is seem to be place and time: and these do
touches the act on the part of the end, viz. the circum-
not seem to be the most important of the circumstances,
stance “why”: and the second in importance, is that which
since, of them all, they are the most extrinsic to the act.
touches the very substance of the act, viz. the circum-
Therefore those things in which the act is are not the most
stance “what he did.” As to the other circumstances, they
important circumstances.
are more or less important, according as they more or less
Objection 2. Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to approach to these.
it. Therefore it is not the most important circumstance.
Reply to Objection 1. By those things “in which the
Objection 3. Further, that which holds the foremost
act is” the Philosopher does not mean time and place,
place in regard to each thing, is its cause and its form. But
but those circumstances that are affixed to the act itself.
the cause of an act is the person that does it; while the
Wherefore Gregory of Nyssa‡, as though he were explain-
form of an act is the manner in which it is done. There-
ing the dictum of the Philosopher, instead of the latter’s
fore these two circumstances seem to be of the greatest
term—“in which the act is”—said, “what is done.”
importance.
Reply to Objection 2. Although the end is not part
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa† says that “the
of the substance of the act, yet it is the most important
most important circumstances” are “why it is done” and
cause of the act, inasmuch as it moves the agent to act.
“what is done.”
Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by the end.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 1, a. 1), acts are
Reply to Objection 3. The person that does the act is
∗ hen ois e praxis
† Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.
‡ Nemesius,
De Nat. Hom. xxxi
639
the cause of that act, inasmuch as he is moved thereto by not the substantial form of the act, for in an act the sub-the end; and it is chiefly in this respect that he is directed
stantial form depends on the object and term or end; but it
to the act; while other conditions of the person have not
is, as it were, a certain accidental quality of the act.
such an important relation to the act. As to the mode, it is
640
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 8
Of the Will, in Regard to What It Wills
(In Three Articles)
We must now consider the different acts of the will; and in the first place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately, as being elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded by the will.
Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end; we must therefore consider: (1) those acts of the will whereby it is moved to the end; and (2) those whereby it is moved to the means. And since it seems that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end; viz. “volition,” “enjoyment,” and “intention”; we must consider: (1) volition; (2) enjoyment; (3) intention. Concerning the first, three things must be considered: (1) Of what things is the will? (2) By what is the will moved? (3) How is it moved?
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is of good only?
(2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means?
(3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end and to the means, by the same movement?
Whether the will is of good only?
Ia IIae q. 8 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not of good
sults from a form, the natural appetite results from a
only. For the same power regards opposites; for instance,
form existing in the nature of things: while the sensi-
sight regards white and black. But good and evil are op-
tive appetite, as also the intellective or rational appetite,
posites. Therefore the will is not only of good, but also of
which we call the will, follows from an apprehended form.
evil.
Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good exist-
Objection 2.
Further, rational powers can be di-
ing in a thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends
rected to opposite purposes, according to the Philosopher
to a good which is apprehended. Consequently, in order
(Metaph. ix, 2). But the will is a rational power, since it is
that the will tend to anything, it is requisite, not that this
“in the reason,” as is stated in De Anima iii, 9. Therefore
be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended as good.
the will can be directed to opposites; and consequently its
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that “the end
volition is not confined to good, but extends to evil.
is a good, or an apparent good.”
Objection 3. Further, good and being are convertible.
Reply to Objection 1. The same power regards oppo-
But volition is directed not only to beings, but also to non-
sites, but it is not referred to them in the same way. Ac-
beings. For sometimes we wish “not to walk,” or “not
cordingly, the will is referred both to good and evil: but
to speak”; and again at times we wish for future things,
to good by desiring it: to evil, by shunning it. Wherefore
which are not actual beings. Therefore the will is not of
the actual desire of good is called “volition”∗, meaning
good only.
thereby the act of the will; for it is in this sense that we
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
are now speaking of the will. On the other hand, the shun-
“evil is outside the scope of the will,” and that “all things
ning of evil is better described as “nolition”: wherefore,
desire good.”
just as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil.
I answer that, The will is a rational appetite. Now
Reply to Objection 2. A rational power is not to be di-
every appetite is only of something good. The reason of
rected to all opposite purposes, but to those which are con-
this is that the appetite is nothing else than an inclination
tained under its proper object; for no power seeks other
of a person desirous of a thing towards that thing. Now
than its proper object. Now, the object of the will is good.
every inclination is to something like and suitable to the
Wherefore the will can be directed to such opposite pur-
thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch as
poses as are contained under good, such as to be moved
it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be that
or to be at rest, to speak or to be silent, and such like: for
every inclination is to something good. And hence it is
the will can be directed to either under the aspect of good.
that the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1) that “the good is
Reply to Objection 3. That which is not a being in
that which all desire.”
nature, is considered as a being in the reason, wherefore
But it must be noted that, since every inclination re-
negations and privations are said to be “beings of reason.”
∗ In Latin, ‘voluntas’. To avoid confusion with “voluntas” (the will) St.
Thomas adds a word of explanation, which in the translation may appear superfluous
641
In this way, too, future things, in so far as they are appre-and it is thus that the will is directed to them. Where-
hended, are beings. Accordingly, in so far as such like are
fore the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that “to lack evil is
beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good;
considered as a good.”
Whether volition is of the end only, or also of the means?
Ia IIae q. 8 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that volition is not of
simple act of that power: thus “to understand” designates
the means, but of the end only. For the Philosopher says
the simple act of the understanding. Now the simple act
(Ethic. iii, 2) that “volition is of the end, while choice is
of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object
of the means.”
of that power. But that which is good and willed in it-
Objection 2. Further, “For objects differing in genus
self is the end. Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is
there are corresponding different powers of the soul”
of the end itself. On the other hand, the means are good
(Ethic. vi, 1). Now, the end and the means are in dif-
and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end.
ferent genera of good: because the end, which is a good
Wherefore the will is directed to them, only in so far as it
either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus “quality,”
is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the
or “action,” or “passion”; whereas the good which is use-
end. Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things
ful, and is directed to and end, is in the genus “relation”
that are known in themselves, i.e. first principles: but
(Ethic. i, 6). Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is not
we do not speak of understanding with regard to things
of the means.
known through first principles, except in so far as we see
Objection 3. Further, habits are proportionate to pow-
the principles in those things. For in morals the end is
ers, since they are perfections thereof. But in those habits
what principles are in speculative science (Ethic. viii, 8).
which are called practical arts, the end belongs to one, and
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking of
the means to another art; thus the use of a ship, which is
the will in reference to the simple act of the will; not in
its end, belongs to the (art of the) helmsman; whereas the
reference to the power of the will.
building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs
Reply to Objection 2. There are different powers for
to the art of the shipwright. Therefore, since volition is of
objects that differ in genus and are on an equality; for in-
the end, it is not of the means.
stance, sound and color are different genera of sensibles,
On the contrary, In natural things, it is by the same
to which are referred hearing and sight. But the useful and
power that a thing passes through the middle space, and
the righteous are not on an equality, but are as that which
arrives at the terminus. But the means are a kind of middle
is of itself, and that which is in relation to another. Now
space, through which one arrives at the end or terminus.
such like objects are always referred to the same power;
Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is also of the means.
for instance, the power of sight perceives both color and
I answer that, The word “voluntas” sometimes des-
light by which color is seen.
ignates the power of the will, sometimes its act∗. Accord-
Reply to Objection 3. Not everything that diversifies
ingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends
habits, diversifies the powers: since habits are certain de-
both to the end and to the means. For every power extends
terminations of powers to certain special acts. Moreover,
to those things in which may be considered the aspect of
every practical art considers both the end and the means.
the object of that power in any way whatever: thus the
For the art of the helmsman does indeed consider the end,
sight extends to all things whatsoever that are in any way
as that which it effects; and the means, as that which it
colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the object of
commands. On the other hand, the ship-building art con-
the power of the will, may be found not only in the end,
siders the means as that which it effects; but it considers
but also in the means.
that which is the end, as that to which it refers what it
If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act,
effects. And again, in every practical art there is an end
then, properly speaking, volition is of the end only. Be-
proper to it and means that belong properly to that art.
cause every act denominated from a power, designates the
∗ See note: above a. 1, Reply obj. 1
642
Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means?
Ia IIae q. 8 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the will is moved by
have health, and afterwards deliberating by what means
the same act, to the end and to the means. Because accord-
to be healed, wills to send for the doctor to heal him. The
ing to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 2) “where one thing is
same happens in regard to the intellect: for at first a man
on account of another there is only one.” But the will does
understands the principles in themselves; but afterwards
not will the means save on account of the end. Therefore
he understands them in the conclusions, inasmuch as he
it is moved to both by the same act.
assents to the conclusions on account of the principles.
Objection 2. Further, the end is the reason for willing
Reply to Objection 1. This argument holds in respect
the means, just as light is the reason of seeing colors. But
of the will being moved to the end as the reason for willing
light and colors are seen by the same act. Therefore it is
the means.
the same movement of the will, whereby it wills the end
Reply to Objection 2. Whenever color is seen, by the
and the means.
same act the light is seen; but the light can be seen with-
Objection 3. Further, it is one and the same natural
out the color being seen. In like manner whenever a man
movement which tends through the middle space to the
wills the means, by the same act he wills the end; but not
terminus. But the means are in comparison to the end, as
the conversely.
the middle space is to the terminus. Therefore it is the
Reply to Objection 3. In the execution of a work, the
same movement of the will whereby it is directed to the
means are as the middle space, and the end, as the termi-
end and to the means.
nus. Wherefore just as natural movement sometimes stops
On the contrary, Acts are diversified according to
in the middle and does not reach the terminus; so some-
their objects. But the end is a different species of good
times one is busy with the means, without gaining the end.
from the means, which are a useful good. Therefore the
But in willing it is the reverse: the will through (willing)
will is not moved to both by the same act.
the end comes to will the means; just as the intellect ar-
I answer that, Since the end is willed in itself,
rives at the conclusions through the principles which are
whereas the means, as such, are only willed for the end, it
called “means.” Hence it is that sometimes the intellect
is evident that the will can be moved to the end, without
understands a mean, and does not proceed thence to the
being moved to the means; whereas it cannot be moved
conclusion. And in like manner the will sometimes wills
to the means, as such, unless it is moved to the end. Ac-
the end, and yet does not proceed to will the means.
cordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first,
The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is
to the end absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the reason
clear from what has been said above (a. 2, ad 2). For
for willing the means. Hence it is evident that the will
the useful and the righteous are not species of good in an
is moved by one and the same movement, to the end, as
equal degree, but are as that which is for its own sake and
the reason for willing the means; and to the means them-
that which is for the sake of something else: wherefore
selves. But it is another act whereby the will is moved
the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the
to the end absolutely. And sometimes this act precedes
other; but not conversely.
the other in time; for example when a man first wills to
643
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 9
Of That Which Moves the Will
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider what moves the will: and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
(2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite?
(3) Whether the will moves itself?
(4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle?
(5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body?
(6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle?
Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
Ia IIae q. 9 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not moved
The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent.
by the intellect. For Augustine says on Ps. 118:20: “My
And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above
soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications: The intel-
(q. 1, a. 2), the principle of this motion lies in the end. And lect flies ahead, the desire follows sluggishly or not at all:
hence it is that the art which is concerned with the end,
we know what is good, but deeds delight us not.” But it
by its command moves the art which is concerned with
would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect:
the means; just as the “art of sailing commands the art of
because movement of the movable results from motion of
shipbuilding” (Phys. ii, 2). Now good in general, which
the mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Conse-
Objection 2. Further, the intellect in presenting the
quently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of
appetible object to the will, stands in relation to the will,
the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers
as the imagination in representing the appetible will to the
when we will. For the end and perfection of every other
sensitive appetite. But the imagination, does not remove
power, is included under the object of the will as some
the sensitive appetite: indeed sometimes our imagination
particular good: and always the art or power to which the
affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture,
universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or pow-
and moves us not at all (De Anima ii, 3). Therefore nei-
ers to which belong the particular ends included in the
ther does the intellect move the will.
universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends
Objection 3.
Further, the same is not mover and
the common good—i.e. the order of the whole army—by
moved in respect of the same thing. But the will moves
his command moves one of the captains, who intends the
the intellect; for we exercise the intellect when we will.
order of one company.
Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
On the other hand, the object moves, by determining
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima
the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in
iii, 10) that “the appetible object is a mover not moved,
natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat.
whereas the will is a mover moved.”
Now the first formal principle is universal “being” and
I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by some-
“truth,” which is the object of the intellect. And there-
thing in so far as it is in potentiality to several things; for fore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as
that which is in potentiality needs to be reduced to act by
presenting its object to it.
something actual; and to do this is to move. Now a power
Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted proves, not
of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things in that the intellect does not move, but that it does not move
two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; sec-
of necessity.
ondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight
Reply to Objection 2. Just as the imagination of a
sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and
form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does
sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs
not move the sensitive appetite; so neither does the ap-
therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise
prehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and
or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act.
desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that
The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is
moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).
sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other
Reply to Objection 3. The will moves the intellect as
is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is
to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is specified.
the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal
644
good, as a particular good. But as to the determination of a special aspect as contained in the universal true. It is
the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect
therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in
moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under
the same respect.
Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite?
Ia IIae q. 9 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the will cannot be
various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as
moved by the sensitive appetite. For “to move and to act
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): “According as a man
is more excellent than to be passive,” as Augustine says
is, such does the end seem to him.”
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the sensitive appetite is less
Now it is evident that according to a passion of the
excellent than the will which is the intellectual appetite;
sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposi-
just as sense is less excellent than intellect. Therefore the
tion. Wherefore according as man is affected by a pas-
sensitive appetite does not move the will.
sion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem
Objection 2. Further, no particular power can produce
so when he is not so affected: thus that seems good to a
a universal effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particu-
man when angered, which does not seem good when he
lar power, because it follows the particular apprehension
is calm. And in this way, the sensitive appetite moves the
of sense. Therefore it cannot cause the movement of the
will, on the part of the object.
will, which movement is universal, as following the uni-
Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders that which is
versal apprehension of the intellect.
better simply and in itself, from being less excellent in a
Objection 3. Further, as is proved in Phys. viii, 5,
certain respect. Accordingly the will is simply more ex-
the mover is not moved by that which it moves, in such a
cellent than the sensitive appetite: but in respect of the
way that there be reciprocal motion. But the will moves
man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he
the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite
is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more
obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite does
excellent.
not move the will.
Reply to Objection 2. Men’s acts and choices are in
On the contrary, It is written (James 1:14): “Every
reference to singulars. Wherefore from the very fact that
man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn
the sensitive appetite is a particular power, it has great in-
away and allured.” But man would not be drawn away by
fluence in disposing man so that something seems to him
his concupiscence, unless his will were moved by the sen-
such or otherwise, in particular cases.
sitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore
Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Polit.
the sensitive appetite moves the will.
i, 2), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), that which is
command, the irascible and concupiscible powers, not, in-
apprehended as good and fitting, moves the will by way
deed, “by a despotic sovereignty,” as a slave is moved by
of object. Now, that a thing appear to be good and fitting,
his master, but by a “royal and politic sovereignty,” as
happens from two causes: namely, from the condition, ei-
free men are ruled by their governor, and can neverthe-
ther of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is pro-
less act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible
posed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence
and concupiscible can move counter to the will: and ac-
it depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste,
cordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by
according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in
them at times.
Whether the will moves itself?
Ia IIae q. 9 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the will does not
itself. If, therefore, it moved itself, it would always be
move itself. For every mover, as such, is in act: whereas
moving itself, which is clearly false.
what is moved, is in potentiality; since “movement is the
Objection 3. Further, the will is moved by the in-
act of that which is in potentiality, as such”∗. Now the
tellect, as stated above (a. 1). If, therefore, the will move
same is not in potentiality and in act, in respect of the
itself, it would follow that the same thing is at once moved
same. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore,
immediately by two movers; which seems unreasonable.
can the will move itself.
Therefore the will does not move itself.
Objection 2. Further, the movable is moved on the
On the contrary, The will is mistress of its own act,
mover being present. But the will is always present to
and to it belongs to will and not to will. But this would not
∗ Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1
645
be so, had it not the power to move itself to will. Therether is it in act and in potentiality in respect of the same.
fore it moves itself.
But forasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), it belongs to the from potentiality to act, in respect of the means, so as, in
will to move the other powers, by reason of the end which
a word, to will them actually.
is the will’s object. Now, as stated above (q. 8, a. 2), the
Reply to Objection 2. The power of the will is always
end is in things appetible, what the principle is in things
actually present to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it intelligible. But it is evident that the intellect, through its wills an end, is not always in the will. But it is by this act
knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from potential-
that it moves itself. Accordingly it does not follow that it
ity to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and thus
is always moving itself.
it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its
Reply to Objection 3. The will is moved by the intel-
volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.
lect, otherwise than by itself. By the intellect it is moved
Reply to Objection 1. It is not in respect of the same
on the part of the object: whereas it is moved by itself, as
that the will moves itself and is moved: wherefore nei-
to the exercise of its act, in respect of the end.
Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle?
Ia IIae q. 9 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not moved
reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed
by anything exterior. For the movement of the will is vol-
by a physician: and this he wills. But since he did not al-
untary. But it is essential to the voluntary act that it be
ways actually will to have health, he must, of necessity,
from an intrinsic principle, just as it is essential to the nathave begun, through something moving him, to will to be
ural act. Therefore the movement of the will is not from
healed. And if the will moved itself to will this, it must, of
anything exterior.
necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel follow-
Objection 2. Further, the will cannot suffer violence,
ing some previous volition. But this process could not go
as was shown above (q. 6, a. 4). But the violent act is one
on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose
“the principle of which is outside the agent”∗. Therefore
that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the
the will cannot be moved by anything exterior.
instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes
Objection 3. Further, that which is sufficiently moved
in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14).
by one mover, needs not to be moved by another. But the
Reply to Objection 1. It is essential to the volun-
will moves itself sufficiently. Therefore it is not moved by
tary act that its principle be within the agent: but it is not
anything exterior.
necessary that this inward principle be the first principle
On the contrary, The will is moved by the object, as
unmoved by another. Wherefore though the voluntary act
stated above (a. 1 ). But the object of the will can be some-
has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its first
thing exterior, offered to the sense. Therefore the will can
principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of
be moved by something exterior.
the natural movement is from without, that, to wit, which
I answer that, As far as the will is moved by the ob-
moves nature.
ject, it is evident that it can be moved by something ex-
Reply to Objection 2. For an act to be violent it is
terior. But in so far as it is moved in the exercise of its
not enough that its principle be extrinsic, but we must add
act, we must again hold it to be moved by some exterior
“without the concurrence of him that suffers violence.”
principle.
This does not happen when the will is moved by an exte-
For everything that is at one time an agent actually,
rior principle: for it is the will that wills, though moved by
and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be
another. But this movement would be violent, if it were
moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins
counter to the movement of the will: which in the present
to will something, whereas previously it did not will it.
case is impossible; since then the will would will and not
Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to
will the same thing.
will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above (a. 3),
Reply to Objection 3. The will moves itself suffi-
in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the
ciently in one respect, and in its own order, that is to say
act of willing the means. Now it cannot do this without
as proximate agent; but it cannot move itself in every re-
the aid of counsel: for when a man wills to be healed, he
spect, as we have shown. Wherefore it needs to be moved
begins to reflect how this can be attained, and through this
by another as first mover.
∗ Aristotle, Ethic. iii, 1
646
Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body?
Ia IIae q. 9 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the human will is
For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily
moved by a heavenly body. For all various and multiform
organs, can be moved accidentally, by the heavenly bod-
movements are reduced, as to their cause, to a uniform
ies, i.e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts
movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved in
they are.
Phys. viii, 9. But human movements are various and mul-
But since it has been stated (a. 2) that the intellectual
tiform, since they begin to be, whereas previously they
appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite,
were not. Therefore they are reduced, as to their cause, to
the movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect
the movement of the heavens, which is uniform according
bearing on the will; in so far as the will happens to be
to its nature.
moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite.
Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De
Reply to Objection 1. The multiform movements of
Trin. iii, 4) “the lower bodies are moved by the higher.”
the human will are reduced to some uniform cause, which,
But the movements of the human body, which are caused
however, is above the intellect and will. This can be said,
by the will, could not be reduced to the movement of the
not of any body, but of some superior immaterial sub-
heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were moved
stance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of
by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human
the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as
will.
to its cause.
Objection 3. Further, by observing the heavenly bod-
Reply to Objection 2. The movements of the human
ies astrologers foretell the truth about future human acts,
body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of
which are caused by the will. But this would not be so, if
a heavenly body, in so far as the disposition suitable to a
the heavenly bodies could not move man’s will. Therefore
particular movement, is somewhat due to the influence of
the human will is moved by a heavenly body.
heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive appetite
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again,
7) that “the heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts.”
in so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with
But they would be, if the will, which is the principle of hu-
the movement of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the
man acts, were moved by the heavenly bodies. Therefore
will begins to will or not to will something; for instance,
the will is not moved by the heavenly bodies.
when the body is chilled, we begin to wish to make the
I answer that, It is evident that the will can be moved
fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of the
by the heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved
object offered from without: not on the part of an inward
by its object; that is to say, in so far as exterior bodies,
instigation.
which move the will, through being offered to the senses,
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (Cf. Ia, q. 84,
and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers,
Aa. 6,7) the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily or-
are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.
gan. Wherefore there is no reason why man should not
But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have
be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like passion,
an influence on the human will, in the same way as some
by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by
exterior agent moves the will, as to the exercise of its act.
reason of his natural complexion. But the majority of men
But this is impossible. For the “will,” as stated in De An-
are led by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Con-
ima iii, 9, “is in the reason.” Now the reason is a power of
sequently, in the majority of cases predictions about hu-
the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows
man acts, gathered from the observation of heavenly bod-
that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and imma-
ies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says (Centil-
terial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is
oquium v), “the wise man governs the stars”; which is a
incorporeal, but rather the reverse: because things incor-
though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his
poreal and immaterial have a power more formal and more
will, which is free and nowise subject to the movement of
universal than any corporeal things whatever. Therefore it
the heavens, to such like effects of the heavenly bodies.
is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the in-
Or, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): “We must
tellect or will. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3)
confess that when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this
ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from
is due to some most hidden inspiration, to which the hu-
sense, the theory that “such is the will of men, as is the day
man mind is subject without knowing it. And since this is
which the father of men and of gods bring on”∗ (referring
done in order to deceive man, it must be the work of the
to Jupiter, by whom they understand the entire heavens).
lying spirits.”
∗ Odyssey xviii. 135
647
Whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle?
Ia IIae q. 9 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not moved
times moved by something that is not his cause; but that
by God alone as exterior principle. For it is natural that
his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle that
the inferior be moved by its superior: thus the lower bod-
is not the cause of his will, is impossible.
ies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But there is some-
Now the cause of the will can be none other than God.
thing which is higher than the will of man and below God,
And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will
namely, the angel. Therefore man’s will can be moved by
is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God
an angel also, as exterior principle.
alone, by creation, as was stated in the Ia, q. 90, a. 2. Sec-
Objection 2. Further, the act of the will follows the
ondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained
act of the intellect. But man’s intellect is reduced to act,
to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else can be the
not by God alone, but also by the angel who enlightens it,
cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the univer-
as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). For the same reason,
sal good: while every other good is good by participation,
therefore, the will also is moved by an angel.
and is some particular good, and a particular cause does
Objection 3. Further, God is not the cause of other
not give a universal inclination. Hence neither can pri-
than good things, according to Gn. 1:31: “God saw all the
mary matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be created
things that He had made, and they were very good.” If,
by some particular agent.
therefore man’s will were moved by God alone, it would
Reply to Objection 1. An angel is not above man in
never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby “we
such a way as to be the cause of his will, as the heavenly
sin and whereby we do right,” as Augustine says (Retract.
bodies are the causes of natural forms, from which result
i, 9).
the natural movements of natural bodies.
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:13): “It is God
Reply to Objection 2. Man’s intellect is moved by
Who worketh in us” [Vulg.‘you’] “both to will and to ac-
an angel, on the part of the object, which by the power of
complish.”
the angelic light is proposed to man’s knowledge. And in
I answer that, The movement of the will is from
this way the will also can be moved by a creature from
within, as also is the movement of nature. Now although it
without, as stated above (a. 4).
is possible for something to move a natural thing, without
Reply to Objection 3. God moves man’s will, as the
being the cause of the thing moved, yet that alone, which
Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which
is in some way the cause of a thing’s nature, can cause
is good. And without this universal motion, man cannot
a natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved
will anything. But man determines himself by his reason
upwards by a man, who is not the cause of the stone’s
to will this or that, which is true or apparent good. Never-
nature, but this movement is not natural to the stone; but
theless, sometimes God moves some specially to the will-
the natural movement of the stone is caused by no other
ing of something determinate, which is good; as in the
than the cause of its nature. Wherefore it is said in Phys.
case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state
vii, 4, that the generator moves locally heavy and light
later on (q. 109, a. 2).
things. Accordingly man endowed with a will is some-
648
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 10
Of the Manner in Which the Will Is Moved
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
(2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object?
(3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite?
(4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?
Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
Ia IIae q. 10 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not moved
intelligible: and, speaking generally, it is all those things
to anything naturally. For the natural agent is condivided
which belong to the willer according to his nature. For it
with the voluntary agent, as stated at the beginning of
is not only things pertaining to the will that the will de-
Phys. ii, 1. Therefore the will is not moved to anything
sires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to
naturally.
the entire man. Wherefore man wills naturally not only
Objection 2. Further, that which is natural is in a thing the object of the will, but also other things that are ap-always: as “being hot” is in fire. But no movement is al-
propriate to the other powers; such as the knowledge of
ways in the will. Therefore no movement is natural to the
truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live and
will.
other like things which regard the natural well-being; all
Objection 3. Further, nature is determinate to one
of which are included in the object of the will, as so many
thing: whereas the will is referred to opposites. There-
particular goods.
fore the will wills nothing naturally.
Reply to Objection 1. The will is distinguished from
On the contrary, The movement of the will follows
nature as one kind of cause from another; for some things
the movement of the intellect. But the intellect under-
happen naturally and some are done voluntarily. There
stands some things naturally. Therefore the will, too, wills
is, however, another manner of causing that is proper to
some things naturally.
the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the manner
I answer that, As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.)
proper to nature, which is determinate to one thing. But
and the Philosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word “nature”
since the will is founded on some nature, it is necessary
is used in a manifold sense. For sometimes it stands for
that the movement proper to nature be shared by the will,
the intrinsic principle in movable things. In this sense na-
to some extent: just as what belongs to a previous cause is
ture is either matter or the material form, as stated in Phys.
shared by a subsequent cause. Because in every thing, be-
ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance,
ing itself, which is from nature, precedes volition, which
or even for any being. And in this sense, that is said to
is from the will. And hence it is that the will wills some-
be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of its sub-
thing naturally.
stance. And this is that which of itself is in a thing. Now
Reply to Objection 2. In the case of natural things,
all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in
that which is natural, as a result of the form only, is al-
which they are, are reduced to something which belongs
ways in them actually, as heat is in fire. But that which is
of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, tak-
natural as a result of matter, is not always in them actu-
ing nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of ally, but sometimes only in potentiality: because form is
whatever belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is
act, whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is “the
evident in regard to the intellect: for the principles of in-
act of that which is in potentiality” (Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1).
tellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like manner
Wherefore that which belongs to, or results from, move-
the principle of voluntary movements must be something
ment, in regard to natural things, is not always in them.
naturally willed.
Thus fire does not always move upwards, but only when
Now this is good in general, to which the will tends
it is outside its own place.∗ And in like manner it is not
naturally, as does each power to its object; and again it is
necessary that the will (which is reduced from potentiality
the last end, which stands in the same relation to things ap-
to act, when it wills something), should always be in the
petible, as the first principles of demonstrations to things
act of volition; but only when it is in a certain determinate
∗ The Aristotelian theory was that fire’s proper place is the fiery heaven, i.e. the Empyrean.
649
disposition. But God’s will, which is pure act, is always individual. Since, therefore, the will is an immaterial
in the act of volition.
power like the intellect, some one general thing corre-
Reply to Objection 3. To every nature there is one
sponds to it, naturally which is the good; just as to the
thing corresponding, proportionate, however, to that na-
intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which
ture.
For to nature considered as a genus, there cor-
is the true, or being, or “what a thing is.” And under good
responds something one generically; and to nature as
in general are included many particular goods, to none of
species there corresponds something one specifically; and
which is the will determined.
to the individualized nature there corresponds some one
Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object?
Ia IIae q. 10 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that the will is moved, of neces-
some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would
sity, by its object. For the object of the will is compared
not of necessity see such an object: for it might look at
to the will as mover to movable, as stated in De Anima iii,
that part of the object which is not actually colored, and
10. But a mover, if it be sufficient, moves the movable of
thus it would not see it. Now just as the actually colored
necessity. Therefore the will can be moved of necessity
is the object of sight, so is good the object of the will.
by its object.
Wherefore if the will be offered an object which is good
Objection 2. Further, just as the will is an immaterial
universally and from every point of view, the will tends to
power, so is the intellect: and both powers are ordained
it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will to a universal object, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). But the
the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered an
intellect is moved, of necessity, by its object: therefore the
object that is not good from every point of view, it will not
will also, by its object.
tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good what-
Objection 3. Further, whatever one wills, is either the
ever, is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which
end, or something ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one
is perfect and lacking in nothing, is such a good that the
wills an end necessarily: because it is like the principle in
will cannot not-will it: and this is Happiness. Whereas
speculative matters, to which principle one assents of ne-
any other particular goods, in so far as they are lacking
cessity. Now the end is the reason for willing the means;
in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from
and so it seems that we will the means also necessarily.
this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by
Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object.
the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from
On the contrary, The rational powers, according to
various points of view.
the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites.
Reply to Objection 1.
The sufficient mover of a
But the will is a rational power, since it is in the reason,
power is none but that object that in every respect presents
as stated in De Anima iii, 9. Therefore the will is directed
the aspect of the mover of that power. If, on the other
to opposites. Therefore it is not moved, of necessity, to
hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not move of ne-
either of the opposites.
cessity, as stated above.
I answer that, The will is moved in two ways: first,
Reply to Objection 2. The intellect is moved, of ne-
as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specifica-
cessity, by an object which is such as to be always and
tion of its act, derived from the object. As to the first way,
necessarily true: but not by that which may be either true
no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what
or false—viz. by that which is contingent: as we have said
the object be, it is in man’s power not to think of it, and
of the good.
consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second
Reply to Objection 3. The last end moves the will
manner of motion, the will is moved by one object neces-
necessarily, because it is the perfect good. In like man-
sarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by
ner whatever is ordained to that end, and without which
its object, we must consider under what aspect the object
the end cannot be attained, such as “to be” and “to live,”
moves the power. For the visible moves the sight, under
and the like. But other things without which the end can
the aspect of color actually visible. Wherefore if color be
be gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills
offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily: unless
the end: just as he who assents to the principle, does not
one turns one’s eyes away; which belongs to the exercise
necessarily assent to the conclusions, without which the
of the act. But if the sight were confronted with some-
principles can still be true.
thing not in all respects colored actually, but only so in
650
Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the lower appetite?
Ia IIae q. 10 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the will is moved of
movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will.
necessity by a passion of the lower appetite. For the Apos-
Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely en-
tle says (Rom. 7:19): “The good which I will I do not; but
grossed by the passion, so that the judgment of reason
the evil which I will not, that I do”: and this is said by
retains, to a certain extent, its freedom: and thus the move-
reason of concupiscence, which is a passion. Therefore
ment of the will remains in a certain degree. Accordingly
the will is moved of necessity by a passion.
in so far as the reason remains free, and not subject to the
Objection 2. Further, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, “ac-
passion, the will’s movement, which also remains, does
cording as a man is, such does the end seem to him.” But it
not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines
is not in man’s power to cast aside a passion once. There-
it. Consequently, either there is no movement of the will
fore it is not in man’s power not to will that to which the
in that man, and the passion alone holds its sway: or if
passion inclines him.
there be a movement of the will, it does not necessarily
Objection 3. Further, a universal cause is not ap-
follow the passion.
plied to a particular effect, except by means of a particular
Reply to Objection 1. Although the will cannot pre-
cause: wherefore the universal reason does not move save
vent the movement of concupiscence from arising, of
by means of a particular estimation, as stated in De Anima
which the Apostle says: “The evil which I will not, that
iii, 11. But as the universal reason is to the particular es-
I do—i.e. I desire”; yet it is in the power of the will not
timation, so is the will to the sensitive appetite. Therefore
to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence. And
the will is not moved to will something particular, except
thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of con-
through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the sensitive
cupiscence.
appetite happen to be disposed to something, by reason of
Reply to Objection 2. Since there is in man a twofold
a passion, the will cannot be moved in a contrary sense.
nature, intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 4:7): “Thy lust
and such uniformly in respect of his whole soul: either be-
[Vulg. ‘The lust thereof’] shall be under thee, and thou
cause the sensitive part is wholly subject to this reason, as
shalt have dominion over it.” Therefore man’s will is
in the virtuous; or because reason is entirely engrossed by
moved of necessity by the lower appetite.
passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although rea-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 9, a. 2), the pas-
son is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason
sion of the sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as
remains free. And in respect of this, man can either repel
the will is moved by its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man
the passion entirely, or at least hold himself in check so
through being disposed in such and such a way by a pas-
as not to be led away by the passion. For when thus dis-
sion, judges something to be fitting and good, which he
posed, since man is variously disposed according to the
would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now
various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise
this influence of a passion on man occurs in two ways.
according to his reason, than it does according to a pas-
First, so that his reason is wholly bound, so that he has
sion.
not the use of reason: as happens in those who through a
Reply to Objection 3. The will is moved not only by
violent access of anger or concupiscence become furious
the universal good apprehended by the reason, but also by
or insane, just as they may from some other bodily dis-
good apprehended by sense. Wherefore he can be moved
order; since such like passions do not take place without
to some particular good independently of a passion of the
some change in the body. And of such the same is to be
sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things with-
said as of irrational animals, which follow, of necessity,
out passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident
the impulse of their passions: for in them there is neither
in those cases wherein reason resists passion.
Whether the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?
Ia IIae q. 10 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the will is moved of
But “whatever God does in a thing is natural to it,” as Au-
necessity by God. For every agent that cannot be resisted
gustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3). Therefore the will
moves of necessity. But God cannot be resisted, because
wills of necessity everything to which God moves it.
His power is infinite; wherefore it is written (Rom. 9:19):
Objection 3. Further, a thing is possible, if nothing
“Who resisteth His will?” Therefore God moves the will
impossible follows from its being supposed. But some-
of necessity.
thing impossible follows from the supposition that the will
Objection 2. Further, the will is moved of necessity
does not will that to which God moves it: because in that
to whatever it wills naturally, as stated above (a. 2, ad 3).
case God’s operation would be ineffectual. Therefore it
651
is not possible for the will not to will that to which God only to the doing of something by the thing which He
moves it. Therefore it wills it of necessity.
moves, but also to its being done in a way which is fit-
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): “God
ting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it would be
made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand
more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be
of his own counsel.” Therefore He does not of necessity
moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than
move man’s will.
for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.
I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
Reply to Objection 2. That is natural to a thing,
“it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to
which God so works in it that it may be natural to it: for
preserve the nature of things.” Wherefore it moves all
thus is something becoming to a thing, according as God
things in accordance with their conditions; so that from
wishes it to be becoming. Now He does not wish that
necessary causes through the Divine motion, effects fol-
whatever He works in things should be natural to them,
low of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects fol-
for instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He
low contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active
does wish to be natural to each thing—that it be subject to
principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an in-
the Divine power.
different relation to many things, God so moves it, that
Reply to Objection 3. If God moves the will to any-
He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its
thing, it is incompatible with this supposition, that the will
movement remains contingent and not necessary, except
be not moved thereto. But it is not impossible simply.
in those things to which it is moved naturally.
Consequently it does not follow that the will is moved by
Reply to Objection 1. The Divine will extends not
God necessarily.
652
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 11
Of Enjoyment∗, Which Is an Act of the Will
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider enjoyment: concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?
(2) Whether it belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals?
(3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?
(4) Whether it is only of the end possessed?
Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?
Ia IIae q. 11 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that to enjoy belongs not
from sensible fruits. But sensible fruit is that which we
only to the appetitive power. For to enjoy seems noth-
expect the tree to produce in the last place, and in which a
ing else than to receive the fruit. But it is the intellect, in certain sweetness is to be perceived. Hence fruition seems
whose act Happiness consists, as shown above (q. 3, a. 4),
to have relation to love, or to the delight which one has in
that receives the fruit of human life, which is Happiness.
realizing the longed-for term, which is the end. Now the
Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive power,
end and the good is the object of the appetitive power.
but of the intellect.
Wherefore it is evident that fruition is the act of the appet-
Objection 2. Further, each power has its proper end,
itive power.
which is its perfection: thus the end of sight is to know the
Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders one and the
visible; of the hearing, to perceive sounds; and so forth.
same thing from belonging, under different aspects, to dif-
But the end of a thing is its fruit. Therefore to enjoy be-
ferent powers. Accordingly the vision of God, as vision,
longs to each power, and not only to the appetite.
is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an end, is the
Objection 3. Further, enjoyment implies a certain de-
object of the will. And as such is the fruition thereof: so
light. But sensible delight belongs to sense, which de-
that the intellect attains this end, as the executive power,
lights in its object: and for the same reason, intellectual
but the will as the motive power, moving (the powers) to-
delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore enjoyment be-
wards the end and enjoying the end attained.
longs to the apprehensive, and not to the appetitive power.
Reply to Objection 2. The perfection and end of ev-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i,
ery other power is contained in the object of the appetitive
4; and De Trin. x, 10,11): “To enjoy is to adhere lovingly
power, as the proper is contained in the common, as stated
to something for its own sake.” But love belongs to the
above (q. 9, a. 1). Hence the perfection and end of each
appetitive power. Therefore also to enjoy is an act of the
power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive
appetitive power.
power. Wherefore the appetitive power moves the other
I answer that, “Fruitio” [enjoyment] and “fructus”
powers to their ends; and itself realizes the end, when each
[fruit] seem to refer to the same, one being derived from
of them reaches the end.
the other; which from which, matters not for our pur-
Reply to Objection 3. In delight there are two things:
pose; though it seems probable that the one which is more
perception of what is becoming; and this belongs to the
clearly known, was first named. Now those things are
apprehensive power; and complacency in that which is
most manifest to us which appeal most to the senses:
offered as becoming: and this belongs to the appetitive
wherefore it seems that the word “fruition” is derived
power, in which power delight is formally completed.
Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals?
Ia IIae q. 11 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that to enjoy belongs to
fore it is not for them to enjoy.
men alone. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22)
Objection 3. Further, just as the sensitive appetite is
that “it is given to us men to enjoy and to use.” Therefore
beneath the intellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite
other animals cannot enjoy.
beneath the sensitive. If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to
Objection 2. Further, to enjoy relates to the last end.
the sensitive appetite, it seems that for the same reason it
But irrational animals cannot obtain the last end. There-
can belong to the natural appetite. But this is evidently
∗ or, Fruition
653
false, since the latter cannot delight in anything. There-the universal formality of the end and the good; and such
fore the sensitive appetite cannot enjoy: and accordingly
knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. On the
enjoyment is not possible for irrational animals.
other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30):
and the good are known in the particular. Such knowledge
“It is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their
is in irrational animals: whose appetitive powers do not
food and any bodily pleasure.”
command with freedom, but are moved according to a nat-
I answer that, As was stated above (a. 1) to enjoy is
ural instinct to whatever they apprehend. Consequently,
not the act of the power that achieves the end as execu-
enjoyment belongs to the rational nature, in a perfect de-
tor, but of the power that commands the achievement; for
gree; to irrational animals, imperfectly; to other creatures,
it has been said to belong to the appetitive power. Now
not at all.
things void of reason have indeed a power of achieving
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking there of
an end by way of execution, as that by which a heavy
perfect enjoyment.
body has a downward tendency, whereas a light body has
Reply to Objection 2. Enjoyment need not be of the
an upward tendency. Yet the power of command in re-
last end simply; but of that which each one chooses for his
spect of the end is not in them, but in some higher nature,
last end.
which moves all nature by its command, just as in things
Reply to Objection 3. The sensitive appetite follows
endowed with knowledge, the appetite moves the other
some knowledge; not so the natural appetite, especially in
powers to their acts. Wherefore it is clear that things void
things void of knowledge.
of knowledge, although they attain an end, have no enjoy-
Reply to Objection 4. Augustine is speaking there of
ment of the end: this is only for those that are endowed
imperfect enjoyment. This is clear from his way of speak-
with knowledge.
ing: for he says that “it is not so absurd to suppose that
Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and im-
even beasts enjoy,” that is, as it would be, if one were to
perfect. Perfect knowledge of the end, is that whereby not
say that they “use.”
only is that known which is the end and the good, but also
Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?
Ia IIae q. 11 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that enjoyment is not only
atively; simply, if it be referred to nothing else; relatively, of the last end. For the Apostle says (Philem. 20): “Yea,
if it is the last in a particular series. Therefore that which
brother, may I enjoy thee in the Lord.” But it is evident
is last simply, and in which one delights as in the last end,
that Paul had not placed his last end in a man. Therefore
is properly called fruit; and this it is that one is properly
to enjoy is not only of the last end.
said to enjoy. But that which is delightful not in itself,
Objection 2. Further, what we enjoy is the fruit. But
but is desired, only as referred to something else, e.g. a
the Apostle says (Gal. 5:22): “The fruit of the Spirit is
bitter potion for the sake of health, can nowise be called
charity, joy, peace,” and other like things, which are not
fruit. And that which has something delightful about it,
in the nature of the last end. Therefore enjoyment is not
to which a number of preceding things are referred, may
only of the last end.
indeed by called fruit in a certain manner; but we cannot
Objection 3. Further, the acts of the will reflect on
be said to enjoy it properly or as though it answered per-
one another; for I will to will, and I love to love. But to
fectly to the notion of fruit. Hence Augustine says (De
enjoy is an act of the will: since “it is the will with which
Trin. x, 10) that “we enjoy what we know, when the de-
we enjoy,” as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10). Therefore a
lighted will is at rest therein.” But its rest is not absolute
man enjoys his enjoyment. But the last end of man is not
save in the possession of the last end: for as long as some-
enjoyment, but the uncreated good alone, which is God.
thing is looked for, the movement of the will remains in
Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end.
suspense, although it has reached something. Thus in lo-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): “A
cal movement, although any point between the two terms
man does not enjoy that which he desires for the sake of
is a beginning and an end, yet it is not considered as an
something else.” But the last end alone is that which man
actual end, except when the movement stops there.
does not desire for the sake of something else. Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Doctr.
enjoyment is of the last end alone.
Christ. i, 33), “if he had said, ‘May I enjoy thee,’ without
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) the notion of
adding ‘in the Lord,’ he would seem to have set the end
fruit implies two things: first that it should come last; sec-
of his love in him. But since he added that he set his end
ond, that it should calm the appetite with a certain sweet-
in the Lord, he implied his desire to enjoy Him”: as if we
ness and delight. Now a thing is last either simply or rel-
were to say that he expressed his enjoyment of his brother
654
not as a term but as a means.
ought to find pleasure in them.
Reply to Objection 2. Fruit bears one relation to the
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 1, a. 8; q. 2, tree that bore it, and another to man that enjoys it. To the
a. 7), we speak of an end in a twofold sense: first, as being
tree indeed that bore it, it is compared as effect to cause;
the thing itself; secondly, as the attainment thereof. These
to the one enjoying it, as the final object of his longing
are not, of course, two ends, but one end, considered in
and the consummation of his delight. Accordingly these
itself, and in its relation to something else. Accordingly
fruits mentioned by the Apostle are so called because they
God is the last end, as that which is ultimately sought for:
are certain effects of the Holy Ghost in us, wherefore they
while the enjoyment is as the attainment of this last end.
are called “fruits of the spirit”: but not as though we are to
And so, just as God is not one end, and the enjoyment of
enjoy them as our last end. Or we may say with Ambrose
God, another: so it is the same enjoyment whereby we
that they are called fruits because “we should desire them
enjoy God, and whereby we enjoy our enjoyment of God.
for their own sake”: not indeed as though they were not
And the same applies to created happiness which consists
ordained to the last end; but because they are such that we
in enjoyment.
Whether enjoyment is only of the end possessed?
Ia IIae q. 11 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that enjoyment is only of
sessed not only in intention but also in reality; imperfectly,
the end possessed. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that
when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect enjoyment,
“to enjoy is to use joyfully, with the joy, not of hope, but
therefore, is of the end already possessed: but imperfect
of possession.” But so long as a thing is not had, there is
enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only
joy, not of possession, but of hope. Therefore enjoyment
in intention.
is only of the end possessed.
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine speaks there of per-
Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a. 3), enjoy-
fect enjoyment.
ment is not properly otherwise than of the last end: be-
Reply to Objection 2. The will is hindered in two
cause this alone gives rest to the appetite. But the appetite
ways from being at rest. First on the part of the object; by
has no rest save in the possession of the end. Therefore en-
reason of its not being the last end, but ordained to some-
joyment, properly speaking, is only of the end possessed.
thing else: secondly on the part of the one who desires
Objection 3. Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the
the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession of it.
fruit. But one does not lay hold of the fruit until one is in
Now it is the object that specifies an act: but on the agent
possession of the end. Therefore enjoyment is only of the
depends the manner of acting, so that the act be perfect or
end possessed.
imperfect, as compared with the actual circumstances of
On the contrary, “to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to
the agent. Therefore enjoyment of anything but the last
something for its own sake,” as Augustine says (De Doctr.
end is not enjoyment properly speaking, as falling short
Christ. i, 4). But this is possible, even in regard to a thing
of the nature of enjoyment. But enjoyment of the last
which is not in our possession. Therefore it is possible to
end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly speaking,
enjoy the end even though it be not possessed.
but imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which
I answer that, To enjoy implies a certain relation of
it is possessed.
the will to the last end, according as the will has some-
Reply to Objection 3. One is said to lay hold of or to
thing by way of last end. Now an end is possessed in two
have an end, not only in reality, but also in intention, as
ways; perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly, when it is pos-
stated above.
655
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 12
Of Intention
(In Five Articles)
We must now consider Intention: concerning which there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will?
(2) Whether it is only of the last end?
(3) Whether one can intend two things at the same time?
(4) Whether intention of the end is the same act as volition of the means?
(5) Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?
Whether intention is an act of the intellect or of the will?
Ia IIae q. 12 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that intention is an act of
anyone who is in authority, by his command moves others
the intellect, and not of the will. For it is written (Mat.
to that which he intends. Now the will moves all the other
6:22): “If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be light-
powers of the soul to the end, as shown above (q. 9, a. 1).
some”: where, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom.
Wherefore it is evident that intention, properly speaking,
in Monte ii, 13) the eye signifies intention. But since
is an act of the will.
the eye is the organ of sight, it signifies the apprehensive
Reply to Objection 1. The eye designates intention
power. Therefore intention is not an act of the appetitive
figuratively, not because intention has reference to knowl-
but of the apprehensive power.
edge, but because it presupposes knowledge, which pro-
Objection 2.
Further, Augustine says (De Serm.
poses to the will the end to which the latter moves; thus
Dom. in Monte ii, 13) that Our Lord spoke of intention
we foresee with the eye whither we should tend with our
as a light, when He said (Mat. 6:23): “If the light that is
bodies.
in thee be darkness,” etc. But light pertains to knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2. Intention is called a light be-
Therefore intention does too.
cause it is manifest to him who intends. Wherefore works
Objection 3. Further, intention implies a kind of or-
are called darkness because a man knows what he intends,
daining to an end. But to ordain is an act of reason. There-
but knows not what the result may be, as Augustine ex-
fore intention belongs not to the will but to the reason.
pounds (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13).
Objection 4. Further, an act of the will is either of
Reply to Objection 3.
The will does not ordain,
the end or of the means. But the act of the will in respect
but tends to something according to the order of reason.
of the end is called volition, or enjoyment; with regard to
Consequently this word “intention” indicates an act of
the means, it is choice, from which intention is distinct.
the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason orders
Therefore it is not an act of the will.
something to the end.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4,8,9)
Reply to Objection 4. Intention is an act of the will
that “the intention of the will unites the sight to the ob-
in regard to the end. Now the will stands in a threefold
ject seen; and the images retained in the memory, to the
relation to the end. First, absolutely; and thus we have
penetrating gaze of the soul’s inner thought.” Therefore
“volition,” whereby we will absolutely to have health, and
intention is an act of the will.
so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its place of
I answer that, Intention, as the very word denotes,
rest; and thus “enjoyment” regards the end. Thirdly, it
signifies, “to tend to something.” Now both the action
considers the end as the term towards which something is
of the mover and the movement of thing moved, tend to
ordained; and thus “intention” regards the end. For when
something. But that the movement of the thing moved
we speak of intending to have health, we mean not only
tends to anything, is due to the action of the mover. Con-
that we have it, but that we will have it by means of some-
sequently intention belongs first and principally to that
thing else.
which moves to the end: hence we say that an architect or
656
Whether intention is only of the last end?
Ia IIae q. 12 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that intention is only of
to a stop; this is the terminus of the whole movement.
the last end. For it is said in the book of Prosper’s Sen-
Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of
tences (Sent. 100): “The intention of the heart is a cry to
one part of the movement, and the end or terminus of the
God.” But God is the last end of the human heart. There-
other. Thus in the movement from A to C through B, C is
fore intention is always regards the last end.
the last terminus, while B is a terminus, but not the last.
Objection 2. Further, intention regards the end as the
And intention can be both. Consequently though intention
terminus, as stated above (a. 1, ad 4). But a terminus is
is always of the end, it need not be always of the last end.
something last. Therefore intention always regards the
Reply to Objection 1. The intention of the heart is
last end.
called a cry to God, not that God is always the object of
Objection 3. Further, just as intention regards the end, intention, but because He sees our intention. Or because,
so does enjoyment. But enjoyment is always of the last
when we pray, we direct our intention to God, which in-
end. Therefore intention is too.
tention has the force of a cry.
On the contrary, There is but one last end of human
Reply to Objection 2. A terminus is something last,
wills, viz. Happiness, as stated above (q. 1, a. 7). If, there-
not always in respect of the whole, but sometimes in re-
fore, intentions were only of the last end, men would not
spect of a part.
have different intentions: which is evidently false.
Reply to Objection 3. Enjoyment implies rest in the
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 4), intention
end; and this belongs to the last end alone. But intention
regards the end as a terminus of the movement of the will.
implies movement towards an end, not rest. Wherefore
Now a terminus of movement may be taken in two ways.
the comparison proves nothing.
First, the very last terminus, when the movement comes
Whether one can intend two things at the same time?
Ia IIae q. 12 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that one cannot intend
of an intermediary end. Now a man intends at the same
several things at the same time. For Augustine says (De
time, both the proximate and the last end; as the mixing
Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 14,16,17) that man’s intention
of a medicine and the giving of health.
cannot be directed at the same time to God and to bodily
But if we take two things that are not ordained to one
benefits. Therefore, for the same reason, neither to any
another, thus also a man can intend several things at the
other two things.
same time. This is evident from the fact that a man prefers
Objection 2. Further, intention designates a move-
one thing to another because it is the better of the two.
ment of the will towards a terminus. Now there cannot
Now one of the reasons for which one thing is better than
be several termini in the same direction of one movement.
another is that it is available for more purposes: wherefore
Therefore the will cannot intend several things at the same
one thing can be chosen in preference to another, because
time.
of the greater number of purposes for which it is avail-
Objection 3. Further, intention presupposes an act of
able: so that evidently a man can intend several things at
reason or of the intellect. But “it is not possible to un-
the same time.
derstand several things at the same time,” according to the
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine means to say that
Philosopher (Topic. ii, 10). Therefore neither is it possible
man cannot at the same time direct his attention to God
to intend several things at the same time.
and to bodily benefits, as to two last ends: since, as stated
On the contrary, Art imitates nature. Now nature in-
above (q. 1, a. 5), one man cannot have several last ends.
tends two purposes by means of one instrument: thus “the
Reply to Objection 2. There can be several termini
tongue is for the purpose of taste and speech” (De Anima
ordained to one another, of the same movement and in
ii, 8). Therefore, for the same reason, art or reason can
the same direction; but not unless they be ordained to one
at the same time direct one thing to two ends: so that one
another. At the same time it must be observed that what
can intend several ends at the same time.
is not one in reality may be taken as one by the reason.
I answer that, The expression “two things” may be
Now intention is a movement of the will to something al-
taken in two ways: they may be ordained to one another
ready ordained by the reason, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3).
or not so ordained. And if they be ordained to one an-
Wherefore where we have many things in reality, we may
other, it is evident, from what has been said, that a man
take them as one term of intention, in so far as the rea-
can intend several things at the same time. For intention
son takes them as one: either because two things concur
is not only of the last end, as stated above (a. 2), but also
in the integrity of one whole, as a proper measure of heat
657
and cold conduce to health; or because two things are in-both the others.
cluded in one which may be intended. For instance, the
Reply to Objection 3. As stated in the Ia, q. 12, a. 10; acquiring of wine and clothing is included in wealth, as
Ia, q. 58, a. 2; Ia, q. 85, a. 4 it is possible to understand
in something common to both; wherefore nothing hinders
several things at the same time, in so far as, in some way,
the man who intends to acquire wealth, from intending
they are one.
Whether intention of the end is the same act as the volition of the means?
Ia IIae q. 12 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the intention of the
and its movement to the means are one and the same thing.
end and the volition of the means are not one and the same
For when I say: “I wish to take medicine for the sake of
movement. For Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 6) that “the
health,” I signify no more than one movement of my will.
will to see the window, has for its end the seeing of the
And this is because the end is the reason for willing the
window; and is another act from the will to see, through
means. Now the object, and that by reason of which it is
the window, the passersby.” But that I should will to see
an object, come under the same act; thus it is the same
the passersby, through the window, belongs to intention;
act of sight that perceives color and light, as stated above
whereas that I will to see the window, belongs to the voli-
(q. 8, a. 3, ad 2). And the same applies to the intellect;
tion of the means. Therefore intention of the end and the
for if it consider principle and conclusion absolutely, it
willing of the means are distinct movements of the will.
considers each by a distinct act; but when it assents to the
Objection 2. Further, acts are distinct according to
conclusion on account of the principles, there is but one
their objects. But the end and the means are distinct ob-
act of the intellect.
jects. Therefore the intention of the end and the willing of
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of see-
the means are distinct movements of the will.
ing the window and of seeing, through the window, the
Objection 3.
Further, the willing of the means is
passersby, according as the will is moved to either abso-
called choice. But choice and intention are not the same.
lutely.
Therefore intention of the end and the willing of the
Reply to Objection 2. The end, considered as a thing,
means are not the same movement of the will.
and the means to that end, are distinct objects of the will.
On the contrary, The means in relation to the end, are
But in so far as the end is the formal object in willing the
as the mid-space to the terminus. Now it is all the same
means, they are one and the same object.
movement that passes through the mid-space to the termi-
Reply to Objection 3. A movement which is one as
nus, in natural things. Therefore in things pertaining to
to the subject, may differ, according to our way of looking
the will, the intention of the end is the same movement as
at it, as to its beginning and end, as in the case of ascent
the willing of the means.
and descent (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly, in so far as the
I answer that, The movement of the will to the end
movement of the will is to the means, as ordained to the
and to the means can be considered in two ways. First,
end, it is called “choice”: but the movement of the will
according as the will is moved to each of the aforesaid ab-
to the end as acquired by the means, it is called “inten-
solutely and in itself. And thus there are really two move-
tion.” A sign of this is that we can have intention of the
ments of the will to them. Secondly, it may be considered
end without having determined the means which are the
accordingly as the will is moved to the means for the sake
object of choice.
of the end: and thus the movement of the will to the end
Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?
Ia IIae q. 12 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that irrational animals in-
Objection 3. Further, to intend an end belongs to one
tend the end. For in things void of reason nature stands
who acts for an end; since to intend is nothing else than to
further apart from the rational nature, than does the sen-
tend to something. But irrational animals act for an end;
sitive nature in irrational animals. But nature intends the
for an animal is moved either to seek food, or to do some-
end even in things void of reason, as is proved in Phys. ii,
thing of the kind. Therefore irrational animals intend an
8. Much more, therefore, do irrational animals intend the
end.
end.
On the contrary, Intention of an end implies ordain-
Objection 2. Further, just as intention is of the end,
ing something to an end: which belongs to reason. Since
so is enjoyment. But enjoyment is in irrational animals,
therefore irrational animals are void of reason, it seems
as stated above (q. 11, a. 2). Therefore intention is too.
that they do not intend an end.
658
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), to intend is to to intend properly and principally, as stated above (a. 1).
tend to something; and this belongs to the mover and to
Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes intention
the moved. According, therefore, as that which is moved
in the sense of being moved to an end.
to an end by another is said to intend the end, thus nature
Reply to Objection 2. Enjoyment does not imply the
is said to intend an end, as being moved to its end by God,
ordaining of one thing to another, as intention does, but
as the arrow is moved by the archer. And in this way, irra-
absolute repose in the end.
tional animals intend an end, inasmuch as they are moved
Reply to Objection 3. Irrational animals are moved to
to something by natural instinct. The other way of intend-
an end, not as though they thought that they can gain the
ing an end belongs to the mover; according as he ordains
end by this movement; this belongs to one that intends;
the movement of something, either his own or another’s,
but through desiring the end by natural instinct, they are
to an end. This belongs to reason alone. Wherefore irra-
moved to an end, moved, as it were, by another, like other
tional animals do not intend an end in this way, which is
things that are moved naturally.
659
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 13
Of Choice, Which Is an Act of the Will with Regard to the Means (In Six Articles)
We must now consider the acts of the will with regard to the means. There are three of them: to choose, to consent, and to use. And choice is preceded by counsel. First of all, then, we must consider choice: secondly, counsel; thirdly, consent; fourthly, use.
Concerning choice there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Of what power is it the act; of the will or of the reason?
(2) Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?
(3) Whether choice is only the means, or sometimes also of the end?
(4) Whether choice is only of things that we do ourselves?
(5) Whether choice is only of possible things?
(6) Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?
Whether choice is an act of will or of reason?
Ia IIae q. 13 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that choice is an act,
receives a form or species from a higher power or habit,
not of will but of reason. For choice implies compari-
according as an inferior is ordained by a superior: for if
son, whereby one is given preference to another. But to
a man were to perform an act of fortitude for the love of
compare is an act of reason. Therefore choice is an act of
God, that act is materially an act of fortitude, but formally,
reason.
an act of charity. Now it is evident that, in a sense, reason
Objection 2. Further, it is for the same faculty to form precedes the will and ordains its act: in so far as the will
a syllogism, and to draw the conclusion. But, in practical
tends to its object, according to the order of reason, since
matters, it is the reason that forms syllogisms. Since there-
the apprehensive power presents the object to the appetite.
fore choice is a kind of conclusion in practical matters, as
Accordingly, that act whereby the will tends to something
stated in Ethic. vii, 3, it seems that it is an act of reason.
proposed to it as being good, through being ordained to
Objection 3. Further, ignorance does not belong to
the end by the reason, is materially an act of the will, but
the will but to the cognitive power. Now there is an “ig-
formally an act of the reason. Now in such like matters
norance of choice,” as is stated in Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore
the substance of the act is as the matter in comparison to
it seems that choice does not belong to the will but to the
the order imposed by the higher power. Wherefore choice
reason.
is substantially not an act of the reason but of the will:
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3)
for choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the
that choice is “the desire of things in our power.” But de-
soul towards the good which is chosen. Consequently it is
sire is an act of will. Therefore choice is too.
evidently an act of the appetitive power.
I answer that, The word choice implies something
Reply to Objection 1.
Choice implies a previous
belonging to the reason or intellect, and something be-
comparison; not that it consists in the comparison itself.
longing to the will: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2)
Reply to Objection 2. It is quite true that it is for the that choice is either “intellect influenced by appetite or ap-reason to draw the conclusion of a practical syllogism;
petite influenced by intellect.” Now whenever two things
and it is called “a decision” or “judgment,” to be followed
concur to make one, one of them is formal in regard to
by “choice.” And for this reason the conclusion seems to
the other. Hence Gregory of Nyssa∗ says that choice “is
belong to the act of choice, as to that which results from
neither desire only, nor counsel only, but a combination
it.
of the two. For just as we say that an animal is composed
Reply to Objection 3. In speaking “of ignorance of
of soul and body, and that it is neither a mere body, nor a
choice,” we do not mean that choice is a sort of knowl-
mere soul, but both; so is it with choice.”
edge, but that there is ignorance of what ought to be cho-
Now we must observe, as regards the acts of the soul,
sen.
that an act belonging essentially to some power or habit,
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.
660
Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?
Ia IIae q. 13 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that irrational animals
less indeterminate in respect of particular goods. Conse-
are able to choose. For choice “is the desire of certain
quently choice belongs properly to the will, and not to the
things on account of an end,” as stated in Ethic. iii, 2,3.
sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals have.
But irrational animals desire something on account of an
Wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose.
end: since they act for an end, and from desire. Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. Not every desire of one thing
choice is in irrational animals.
on account of an end is called choice: there must be a cer-
Objection 2. Further, the very word “electio” [choice]
tain discrimination of one thing from another. And this
seems to signify the taking of something in preference to
cannot be except when the appetite can be moved to sev-
others. But irrational animals take something in prefer-
eral things.
ence to others: thus we can easily see for ourselves that
Reply to Objection 2. An irrational animal takes one
a sheep will eat one grass and refuse another. Therefore
thing in preference to another, because its appetite is nat-
choice is in irrational animals.
urally determinate to that thing. Wherefore as soon as an
Objection 3. Further, according to Ethic. vi, 12, “it is animal, whether by its sense or by its imagination, is of-from prudence that a man makes a good choice of means.”
fered something to which its appetite is naturally inclined,
But prudence is found in irrational animals: hence it is
it is moved to that alone, without making any choice. Just
said in the beginning of Metaph. i, 1 that “those animals
as fire is moved upwards and not downwards, without its
which, like bees, cannot hear sounds, are prudent by in-
making any choice.
stinct.” We see this plainly, in wonderful cases of sagacity
Reply to Objection 3.
As stated in Phys.
iii, 3
manifested in the works of various animals, such as bees,
“movement is the act of the movable, caused by a mover.”
spiders, and dogs. For a hound in following a stag, on
Wherefore the power of the mover appears in the move-
coming to a crossroad, tries by scent whether the stag has
ment of that which it moves. Accordingly, in all things
passed by the first or the second road: and if he find that
moved by reason, the order of reason which moves them
the stag has not passed there, being thus assured, takes to
is evident, although the things themselves are without rea-
the third road without trying the scent; as though he were
son: for an arrow through the motion of the archer goes
reasoning by way of exclusion, arguing that the stag must
straight towards the target, as though it were endowed
have passed by this way, since he did not pass by the oth-
with reason to direct its course. The same may be seen
ers, and there is no other road. Therefore it seems that
in the movements of clocks and all engines put together
irrational animals are able to choose.
by the art of man. Now as artificial things are in compar-
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ says that “chil-
ison to human art, so are all natural things in comparison
dren and irrational animals act willingly but not from
to the Divine art. And accordingly order is to be seen in
choice.” Therefore choice is not in irrational animals.
things moved by nature, just as in things moved by reason,
I answer that, Since choice is the taking of one thing
as is stated in Phys. ii. And thus it is that in the works of
in preference to another it must of necessity be in respect
irrational animals we notice certain marks of sagacity, in
of several things that can be chosen. Consequently in
so far as they have a natural inclination to set about their
those things which are altogether determinate to one there
actions in a most orderly manner through being ordained
is no place for choice. Now the difference between the
by the Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals
sensitive appetite and the will is that, as stated above (q. 1, are called prudent or sagacious; and not because they rea-a. 2, ad 3), the sensitive appetite is determinate to one par-
son or exercise any choice about things. This is clear from
ticular thing, according to the order of nature; whereas
the fact that all that share in one nature, invariably act in
the will, although determinate to one thing in general, viz.
the same way.
the good, according to the order of nature, is neverthe-
Whether choice is only of the means, or sometimes also of the end?
Ia IIae q. 13 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that choice is not only
choice is of the end.
of the means. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12)
Objection 2. Further, choice implies preference of
that “virtue makes us choose aright; but it is not the part
one thing to another. But just as there can be preference
of virtue, but of some other power to direct aright those
of means, so can there be preference of ends. Therefore
things which are to be done for its sake.” But that for the
choice can be of ends, just as it can be of means.
sake of which something is done is the end. Therefore
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2)
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.
661
that “volition is of the end, but choice of the means.”
in the work of a physician health is the end: wherefore it
I answer that, As already stated (a. 1, ad 2), choice
is not a matter of choice for a physician, but a matter of
results from the decision or judgment which is, as it were,
principle. Now the health of the body is ordained to the
the conclusion of a practical syllogism. Hence that which
good of the soul, consequently with one who has charge
is the conclusion of a practical syllogism, is the matter of
of the soul’s health, health or sickness may be a matter of
choice. Now in practical things the end stands in the posi-
choice; for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:10): “For when I
tion of a principle, not of a conclusion, as the Philosopher
am weak, then am I powerful.” But the last end is nowise
says (Phys. ii, 9). Wherefore the end, as such, is not a
a matter of choice.
matter of choice.
Reply to Objection 1. The proper ends of virtues are
But just as in speculative knowledge nothing hinders
ordained to Happiness as to their last end. And thus it is
the principle of one demonstration or of one science, from
that they can be a matter of choice.
being the conclusion of another demonstration or science;
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 1, a. 5),
while the first indemonstrable principle cannot be the con-
there is but one last end. Accordingly wherever there are
clusion of any demonstration or science; so too that which
several ends, they can be the subject of choice, in so far as
is the end in one operation, may be ordained to something
they are ordained to a further end.
as an end. And in this way it is a matter of choice. Thus
Whether choice is of those things only that are done by us?
Ia IIae q. 13 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that choice is not only
or enjoys the thing which is the end; thus for the miser,
in respect of human acts. For choice regards the means.
money or the possession of money is the end. The same
Now, not only acts, but also the organs, are means (Phys.
is to be said of the means. For the means must needs be
ii, 3). Therefore choice is not only concerned with human
either an action; or a thing, with some action intervening
acts.
whereby man either makes the thing which is the means,
Objection 2. Further, action is distinct from contem-
or puts it to some use. And thus it is that choice is always
plation. But choice has a place even in contemplation; in
in regard to human acts.
so far as one opinion is preferred to another. Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. The organs are ordained to the
choice is not concerned with human acts alone.
end, inasmuch as man makes use of them for the sake of
Objection 3.
Further, men are chosen for certain
the end.
posts, whether secular or ecclesiastical, by those who ex-
Reply to Objection 2. In contemplation itself there
ercise no action in their regard. Therefore choice is not
is the act of the intellect assenting to this or that opinion.
concerned with human acts alone.
It is exterior action that is put in contradistinction to con-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2)
templation.
that “no man chooses save what he can do himself.”
Reply to Objection 3. When a man chooses some-
I answer that, Just as intention regards the end, so
one for a bishopric or some high position in the state, he
does choice regard the means. Now the end is either an ac-
chooses to name that man to that post. Else, if he had no
tion or a thing. And when the end is a thing, some human
right to act in the appointment of the bishop or official, he
action must intervene; either in so far as man produces the
would have no right to choose. Likewise, whenever we
thing which is the end, as the physician produces health
speak of one thing being chosen in preference to another,
(wherefore the production of health is said to be the end of
it is in conjunction with some action of the chooser.
the physician); or in so far as man, in some fashion, uses
Whether choice is only of possible things?
Ia IIae q. 13 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that choice in not only of
to the chooser. Now it often happens that we are unable
possible things. For choice is an act of the will, as stated
to accomplish what we choose: so that this proves to be
above (a. 1). Now there is “a willing of impossibilities”
impossible to us. Therefore choice is of the impossible.
(Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore there is also a choice of impossi-
Objection 3. Further, to try to do a thing is to choose
bilities.
to do it. But the Blessed Benedict says (Regula lxviii) that
Objection 2. Further, choice is of things done by us,
if the superior command what is impossible, it should be
as stated above (a. 4). Therefore it matters not, as far as
attempted. Therefore choice can be of the impossible.
the act of choosing is concerned, whether one choose that
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2)
which is impossible in itself, or that which is impossible
that “there is no choice of impossibilities.”
662
I answer that, As stated above (a. 4), our choice is al-under the universal notion of good: but the term or per-
ways concerned with our actions. Now whatever is done
fection of the will’s act is to be observed in its relation
by us, is possible to us. Therefore we must needs say that
to the action whereby a man tends to the attainment of a
choice is only of possible things.
thing; for the movement of the will is from the soul to the
Moreover, the reason for choosing a thing is that it
thing. Consequently the perfect act of the will is in respect
conduces to an end. But what is impossible cannot con-
of something that is good for one to do. Now this cannot
duce to an end. A sign of this is that when men in taking
be something impossible. Wherefore the complete act of
counsel together come to something that is impossible to
the will is only in respect of what is possible and good for
them, they depart, as being unable to proceed with the
him that wills. But the incomplete act of the will is in re-
business.
spect of the impossible; and by some is called “velleity,”
Again, this is evident if we examine the previous pro-
because, to wit, one would will [vellet] such a thing, were
cess of the reason. For the means, which are the object of
it possible. But choice is an act of the will, fixed on some-
choice, are to the end, as the conclusion is to the principle.
thing to be done by the chooser. And therefore it is by no
Now it is clear that an impossible conclusion does not fol-
means of anything but what is possible.
low from a possible principle. Wherefore an end cannot
Reply to Objection 2. Since the object of the will is
be possible, unless the means be possible. Now no one
the apprehended good, we must judge of the object of the
is moved to the impossible. Consequently no one would
will according as it is apprehended. And so, just as some-
tend to the end, save for the fact that the means appear to
times the will tends to something which is apprehended
be possible. Therefore the impossible is not the object of
as good, and yet is not really good; so is choice some-
choice.
times made of something apprehended as possible to the
Reply to Objection 1. The will stands between the
chooser, and yet impossible to him.
intellect and the external action: for the intellect proposes
Reply to Objection 3. The reason for this is that the
to the will its object, and the will causes the external ac-
subject should not rely on his own judgment to decide
tion. Hence the principle of the movement in the will is
whether a certain thing is possible; but in each case should
to be found in the intellect, which apprehends something
stand by his superior’s judgment.
Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?
Ia IIae q. 13 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that man chooses of ne-
place is chosen of necessity. But every act of choosing
cessity. For the end stands in relation to the object of
is in regard to something that seems in some way better.
choice, as the principle of that which follows from the
Therefore every choice is made necessarily.
principles, as declared in Ethic. vii, 8. But conclusions
On the contrary, Choice is an act of a rational power;
follow of necessity from their principles. Therefore man
which according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) stands
is moved of necessity from (willing) the end of the choice
in relation to opposites.
(of the means).
I answer that, Man does not choose of necessity. And
Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2),
this is because that which is possible not to be, is not of ne-
choice follows the reason’s judgment of what is to be
cessity. Now the reason why it is possible not to choose,
done. But reason judges of necessity about some things:
or to choose, may be gathered from a twofold power in
on account of the necessity of the premises. Therefore it
man. For man can will and not will, act and not act; again,
seems that choice also follows of necessity.
he can will this or that, and do this or that. The reason of
Objection 3. Further, if two things are absolutely
this is seated in the very power of the reason. For the will
equal, man is not moved to one more than to the other;
can tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as good.
thus if a hungry man, as Plato says (Cf. De Coelo ii,
Now the reason can apprehend as good, not only this, viz.
13), be confronted on either side with two portions of
“to will” or “to act,” but also this, viz. “not to will” or
food equally appetizing and at an equal distance, he is not
“not to act.” Again, in all particular goods, the reason can
moved towards one more than to the other; and he finds
consider an aspect of some good, and the lack of some
the reason of this in the immobility of the earth in the mid-
good, which has the aspect of evil: and in this respect,
dle of the world. Now, if that which is equally (eligible)
it can apprehend any single one of such goods as to be
with something else cannot be chosen, much less can that
chosen or to be avoided. The perfect good alone, which
be chosen which appears as less (eligible). Therefore if
is Happiness, cannot be apprehended by the reason as an
two or more things are available, of which one appears
evil, or as lacking in any way. Consequently man wills
to be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose any of
Happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to be happy,
the others. Therefore that which appears to hold the first
or to be unhappy. Now since choice is not of the end, but
663
of the means, as stated above (a. 3); it is not of the perfect Reply to Objection 2. The reason’s decision or judg-good, which is Happiness, but of other particular goods.
ment of what is to be done is about things that are contin-
Therefore man chooses not of necessity, but freely.
gent and possible to us. In such matters the conclusions
Reply to Objection 1. The conclusion does not al-
do not follow of necessity from principles that are abso-
ways of necessity follow from the principles, but only
lutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally; as,
when the principles cannot be true if the conclusion is not
for instance, “If he runs, he is in motion.”
true. In like manner, the end does not always necessi-
Reply to Objection 3. If two things be proposed as
tate in man the choosing of the means, because the means
equal under one aspect, nothing hinders us from consid-
are not always such that the end cannot be gained without
ering in one of them some particular point of superiority,
them; or, if they be such, they are not always considered
so that the will has a bent towards that one rather than
in that light.
towards the other.
664
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 14
Of Counsel, Which Precedes Choice
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider counsel; concerning which there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether counsel is an inquiry?
(2) Whether counsel is of the end or of the means?
(3) Whether counsel is only of things that we do?
(4) Whether counsel is of all things that we do?
(5) Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?
(6) Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?
Whether counsel is an inquiry?
Ia IIae q. 14 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that counsel is not an in-
and the act of the will tending to these means according to
quiry. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
the reason’s direction, are ordained to one another. Conse-
counsel is “an act of the appetite.” But inquiry is not an
quently there is to be found something of the reason, viz.
act of the appetite. Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.
order, in that act of the will, which is choice: and in coun-
Objection 2. Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the sel, which is an act of reason, something of the will—both
intellect: for which reason it is not found in God, Whose
as matter (since counsel is of what man wills to do)—and
knowledge is not discursive, as we have shown in the Ia,
as motive (because it is from willing the end, that man
q. 14, a. 7. But counsel is ascribed to God: for it is written
is moved to take counsel in regard to the means). And
(Eph. 1:11) that “He worketh all things according to the
therefore, just as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that
counsel of His will.” Therefore counsel is not inquiry.
choice “is intellect influenced by appetite,” thus pointing
Objection 3. Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters.
out that both concur in the act of choosing; so Damascene
But counsel is given in matters that are certainly good;
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is “appetite based
thus the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:25): “Now concerning
on inquiry,” so as to show that counsel belongs, in a way,
virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give
both to the will, on whose behalf and by whose impulsion
counsel.” Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.
the inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes the
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ says: “Every
inquiry.
counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a counsel.”
Reply to Objection 2. The things that we say of God
I answer that, Choice, as stated above (q. 13, a. 1, ad
must be understood without any of the defects which are
2; a. 3), follows the judgment of the reason about what
to be found in us: thus in us science is of conclusions
is to be done. Now there is much uncertainty in things
derived by reasoning from causes to effects: but science
that have to be done; because actions are concerned with
when said of God means sure knowledge of all effects in
contingent singulars, which by reason of their vicissitude,
the First Cause, without any reasoning process. In like
are uncertain. Now in things doubtful and uncertain the
manner we ascribe counsel to God, as to the certainty of
reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous
His knowledge or judgment, which certainty in us arises
inquiry: wherefore the reason must of necessity institute
from the inquiry of counsel. But such inquiry has no place
an inquiry before deciding on the objects of choice; and
in God; wherefore in this respect it is not ascribed to God:
this inquiry is called counsel. Hence the Philosopher says
in which sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22):
(Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is the “desire of what has been
“God takes not counsel: those only take counsel who lack
already counselled.”
knowledge.”
Reply to Objection 1. When the acts of two powers
Reply to Objection 3.
It may happen that things
are ordained to one another, in each of them there is some-
which are most certainly good in the opinion of wise
thing belonging to the other power: consequently each act
and spiritual men are not certainly good in the opinion
can be denominated from either power. Now it is evident
of many, or at least of carnal-minded men. Consequently
that the act of the reason giving direction as to the means,
in such things counsel may be given.
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.
665
Whether counsel is of the end, or only of the means?
Ia IIae q. 14 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that counsel is not only of
means. Nevertheless it may happen that what is the end
the means but also of the end. For whatever is doubtful,
in regard to some things, is ordained to something else;
can be the subject of inquiry. Now in things to be done by
just as also what is the principle of one demonstration, is
man there happens sometimes a doubt as to the end and
the conclusion of another: and consequently that which
not only as to the means. Since therefore inquiry as to
is looked upon as the end in one inquiry, may be looked
what is to be done is counsel, it seems that counsel can be
upon as the means in another; and thus it will become an
of the end.
object of counsel.
Objection 2. Further, the matter of counsel is human
Reply to Objection 1. That which is looked upon as
actions. But some human actions are ends, as stated in
an end, is already fixed: consequently as long as there
Ethic. i, 1. Therefore counsel can be of the end.
is any doubt about it, it is not looked upon as an end.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ says that “coun-
Wherefore if counsel is taken about it, it will be counsel
sel is not of the end, but of the means.”
not about the end, but about the means.
I answer that, The end is the principle in practical
Reply to Objection 2. Counsel is about operations, in
matters: because the reason of the means is to be found in
so far as they are ordained to some end. Consequently if
the end. Now the principle cannot be called in question,
any human act be an end, it will not, as such, be the matter
but must be presupposed in every inquiry. Since therefore
of counsel.
counsel is an inquiry, it is not of the end, but only of the
Whether counsel is only of things that we do?
Ia IIae q. 14 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that counsel is not only
since what one takes note of, escapes the notice of an-
of things that we do. For counsel implies some kind of
other; whereas in necessary and universal things, our view
conference. But it is possible for many to confer about
is brought to bear on matters much more absolute and sim-
things that are not subject to movement, and are not the
ple, so that one man by himself may be sufficient to con-
result of our actions, such as the nature of various things.
sider these things. Wherefore the inquiry of counsel is
Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
concerned, properly speaking, with contingent singulars.
Objection 2. Further, men sometimes seek counsel
Now the knowledge of the truth in such matters does not
about things that are laid down by law; hence we speak
rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is the knowl-
of counsel at law. And yet those who seek counsel thus,
edge of things universal and necessary; but it is desired
have nothing to do in making the laws. Therefore counsel
as being useful towards action, because actions bear on
is not only of things that we do.
things singular and contingent. Consequently, properly
Objection 3. Further, some are said to take consulta-
speaking, counsel is about things done by us.
tion about future events; which, however, are not in our
Reply to Objection 1. Counsel implies conference,
power. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
not of any kind, but about what is to be done, for the rea-
Objection 4. Further, if counsel were only of things
son given above.
that we do, no would take counsel about what another
Reply to Objection 2. Although that which is laid
does. But this is clearly untrue. Therefore counsel is not
down by the law is not due to the action of him who seeks
only of things that we do.
counsel, nevertheless it directs him in his action: since the
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa† says: “We take
mandate of the law is one reason for doing something.
counsel of things that are within our competency and that
Reply to Objection 3. Counsel is not only about what
we are able to do.”
is done, but also about whatever has relation to what is
I answer that, Counsel properly implies a conference
done. And for this reason we speak of consulting about
held between several; the very word [consilium] denotes
future events, in so far as man is induced to do or omit
this, for it means a sitting together [considium], from the
something, through the knowledge of future events.
fact that many sit together in order to confer with one an-
Reply to Objection 4. We seek counsel about the ac-
other. Now we must take note that in contingent partic-
tions of others, in so far as they are, in some way, one
ular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it
with us; either by union of affection—thus a man is so-
is necessary to take several conditions or circumstances
licitous about what concerns his friend, as though it con-
into consideration, which it is not easy for one to con-
cerned himself; or after the manner of an instrument, for
sider, but are considered by several with greater certainty,
the principal agent and the instrument are, in a way, one
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv. † Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.
666
cause, since one acts through the other; thus the master takes counsel about what he would do through his servant.
Whether counsel is about all things that we do?
Ia IIae q. 14 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that counsel is about all
tion; thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his
things that we have to do. For choice is the “desire of what
letters, for this is determined by art. Secondly, from the
is counselled” as stated above (a. 1). But choice is about
fact that it little matters whether it is done this or that way; all things that we do. Therefore counsel is too.
this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder but
Objection 2. Further, counsel implies the reason’s in-
little with regard to the end aimed at; and reason looks
quiry. But, whenever we do not act through the impulse of
upon small things as mere nothings. Consequently there
passion, we act in virtue of the reason’s inquiry. Therefore
are two things of which we do not take counsel, although
there is counsel about everything that we do.
they conduce to the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
iii, 3): namely, minute things, and those which have a
3) that “if it appears that something can be done by more
fixed way of being done, as in works produced by art,
means than one, we take counsel by inquiring whereby
with the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture
it may be done most easily and best; but if it can be ac-
such as medicine, commerce, and the like, as Gregory of
complished by one means, how it can be done by this.”
Nyssa says‡.
But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several.
Reply to Objection 1. Choice presupposes counsel
Therefore counsel takes place in all things that we do.
by reason of its judgment or decision. Consequently when
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ says that “coun-
the judgment or decision is evident without inquiry, there
sel has no place in things that are done according to sci-
is no need for the inquiry of counsel.
ence or art.”
Reply to Objection 2. In matters that are evident,
I answer that, Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated
the reason makes no inquiry, but judges at once. Con-
above (a. 1). But we are wont to inquire about things that
sequently there is no need of counsel in all that is done by
admit of doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is
reason.
called an argument, “is a reason that attests something
Reply to Objection 3. When a thing can be accom-
that admitted of doubtӠ.
Now, that something in re-
plished by one means, but in different ways, doubt may
lation to human acts admits of no doubt, arises from a
arise, just as when it can be accomplished by several
twofold source. First, because certain determinate ends
means: hence the need of counsel. But when not only
are gained by certain determinate means: as happens in
the means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed,
the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of ac-
then there is no need of counsel.
Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?
Ia IIae q. 14 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the process of coun-
on what we are able or unable to do, in order to gain such
sel is not one of analysis. For counsel is about things that
and such an end. Therefore the inquiry of counsel should
we do. But the process of our actions is not one of analy-
begin from things present.
sis, but rather one of synthesis, viz. from the simple to the
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3)
composite. Therefore counsel does not always proceed by
that “he who takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze.”
way of analysis.
I answer that, In every inquiry one must begin from
Objection 2. Further, counsel is an inquiry of the
some principle. And if this principle precedes both in
reason. But reason proceeds from things that precede to
knowledge and in being, the process is not analytic, but
things that follow, according to the more appropriate or-
synthetic: because to proceed from cause to effect is to
der. Since then, the past precedes the present, and the
proceed synthetically, since causes are more simple than
present precedes the future, it seems that in taking coun-
effects. But if that which precedes in knowledge is later
sel one should proceed from the past and present to the
in the order of being, the process is one of analysis, as
future: which is not an analytical process. Therefore the
when our judgment deals with effects, which by analy-
process of counsel is not one of analysis.
sis we trace to their simple causes. Now the principle in
Objection 3. Further, counsel is only of such things as
the inquiry of counsel is the end, which precedes indeed
are possible to us, according to Ethic. iii, 3. But the ques-
in intention, but comes afterwards into execution. Hence
tion as to whether a certain thing is possible to us, depends
the inquiry of counsel must needs be one of analysis, be-
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.
† Cicero, Topic. ad Trebat.
‡ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxiv.
667
ginning that is to say, from that which is intended in the is first according to reason; but not always with that which
future, and continuing until it arrives at that which is to be
is first in point of time.
done at once.
Reply to Objection 3. We should not want to know
Reply to Objection 1. Counsel is indeed about ac-
whether something to be done for an end be possible, if
tion. But actions take their reason from the end; and con-
it were not suitable for gaining that end. Hence we must
sequently the order of reasoning about actions is contrary
first inquire whether it be conducive to the end, before
to the order of actions.
considering whether it be possible.
Reply to Objection 2. Reason begins with that which
Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?
Ia IIae q. 14 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the process of coun-
another, without inquiring into them. Now these princi-
sel is indefinite. For counsel is an inquiry about the partic-
ples which are taken for granted in the inquiry of counsel
ular things with which action is concerned. But singulars
are any facts received through the senses—for instance,
are infinite. Therefore the process of counsel is indefinite.
that this is bread or iron: and also any general statements
Objection 2. Further, the inquiry of counsel has to
known either through speculative or through practical sci-
consider not only what is to be done, but how to avoid ob-
ence; for instance, that adultery is forbidden by God, or
stacles. But every human action can be hindered, and an
that man cannot live without suitable nourishment. Of
obstacle can be removed by some human reason. There-
such things counsel makes no inquiry. But the term of
fore the inquiry about removing obstacles can go on in-
inquiry is that which we are able to do at once. For just
definitely.
as the end is considered in the light of a principle, so the
Objection 3. Further, the inquiry of demonstrative
means are considered in the light of a conclusion. Where-
science does not go on indefinitely, because one can come
fore that which presents itself as to be done first, holds
to principles that are self-evident, which are absolutely
the position of an ultimate conclusion whereat the inquiry
certain. But such like certainty is not to be had in contin-
comes to an end. Nothing however prevents counsel from
gent singulars, which are variable and uncertain. There-
being infinite potentially, for as much as an infinite num-
fore the inquiry of counsel goes on indefinitely.
ber of things may present themselves to be inquired into
On the contrary, “No one is moved to that which he
by means of counsel.
cannot possibly reach” (De Coelo i, 7). But it is impos-
Reply to Objection 1. Singulars are infinite; not ac-
sible to pass through the infinite. If therefore the inquiry
tually, but only potentially.
of counsel is infinite, no one would begin to take counsel.
Reply to Objection 2. Although human action can
Which is clearly untrue.
be hindered, the hindrance is not always at hand. Conse-
I answer that, The inquiry of counsel is actually fi-
quently it is not always necessary to take counsel about
nite on both sides, on that of its principle and on that of its removing the obstacle.
term. For a twofold principle is available in the inquiry of
Reply to Objection 3. In contingent singulars, some-
counsel. One is proper to it, and belongs to the very genus
thing may be taken for certain, not simply, indeed, but for
of things pertaining to operation: this is the end which is
the time being, and as far as it concerns the work to be
not the matter of counsel, but is taken for granted as its
done. Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a necessary state-
principle, as stated above (a. 2). The other principle is
ment; but that he is sitting, as long as he continues to sit,
taken from another genus, so to speak; thus in demonstra-
is necessary; and this can be taken for a certain fact.
tive sciences one science postulates certain things from
668
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 15
Of Consent, Which Is an Act of the Will in Regard to the Means (In Four Articles)
We must now consider consent; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?
(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?
(3) Whether it is directed to the end or to the means?
(4) Whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul only?
Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?
Ia IIae q. 15 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that consent belongs only
similitude, the name of sense, since, as it were, it acquires
to the apprehensive part of the soul. For Augustine (De
direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves, in so
Trin. xii, 12) ascribes consent to the higher reason. But
far as it takes complacency in it. Hence it is written (Wis.
the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent
1:1): “Think of [Sentite] the Lord in goodness.” And on
belongs to an apprehensive power.
these grounds consent is an act of the appetitive power.
Objection 2. Further, consent is “co-sense.” But sense
Reply to Objection 1. As stated in De Anima iii, 9,
is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent is the act of
“the will is in the reason.” Hence, when Augustine as-
an apprehensive power.
cribes consent to the reason, he takes reason as including
Objection 3. Further, just as assent is an application
the will.
of the intellect to something, so is consent. But assent
Reply to Objection 2. Sense, properly speaking, be-
belongs to the intellect, which is an apprehensive power.
longs to the apprehensive faculty; but by way of simili-
Therefore consent also belongs to an apprehensive power.
tude, in so far as it implies seeking acquaintance, it be-
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
longs to the appetitive power, as stated above.
22) that “if a man judge without affection for that of which
Reply to Objection 3. “Assentire” [to assent] is, to
he judges, there is no sentence,” i.e. consent. But affec-
speak, “ad aliud sentire” [to feel towards something]; and
tion belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore consent
thus it implies a certain distance from that to which assent
does also.
is given. But “consentire” [to consent] is “to feel with,”
I answer that, Consent implies application of sense to
and this implies a certain union to the object of consent.
something. Now it is proper to sense to take cognizance of
Hence the will, to which it belongs to tend to the thing
things present; for the imagination apprehends the simili-
itself, is more properly said to consent: whereas the intel-
tude of corporeal things, even in the absence of the things
lect, whose act does not consist in a movement towards
of which they bear the likeness; while the intellect ap-
the thing, but rather the reverse, as we have stated in the
prehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend indif-
Ia, q. 16, a. 1; Ia, q. 27, a. 4; Ia, q. 59, a. 2, is more prop-ferently, whether the singulars be present or absent. And
erly said to assent: although one word is wont to be used
since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination
for the other∗. We may also say that the intellect assents,
to the thing itself, the application of the appetitive power
in so far as it is moved by the will.
to the thing, in so far as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of
Whether consent is to be found in irrational animals?
Ia IIae q. 15 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that consent is to be found
animals, there would be no act accomplished; which is
in irrational animals. For consent implies a determination
clearly false.
of the appetite to one thing. But the appetite of irrational
Objection 3. Further, men are sometimes said to con-
animals is determinate to one thing. Therefore consent is
sent to do something, through some passion; desire, for
to be found in irrational animals.
instance, or anger. But irrational animals act through pas-
Objection 2. Further, if you remove what is first, you
sion. Therefore they consent.
remove what follows. But consent precedes the accom-
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
plished act. If therefore there were no consent in irrational
22) that “after judging, man approves and embraces the
∗ In Latin rather than in English.
669
judgment of his counselling, and this is called the sen-apply or not to apply it to this or that thing.
tence,” i.e. consent. But counsel is not in irrational ani-
Reply to Objection 1. In irrational animals the de-
mals. Therefore neither is consent.
termination of the appetite to a particular thing is merely
I answer that, Consent, properly speaking, is not in ir-
passive: whereas consent implies a determination of the
rational animals. The reason of this is that consent implies
appetite, which is active rather than merely passive.
an application of the appetitive movement to something
Reply to Objection 2. If the first be removed, then
as to be done. Now to apply the appetitive movement to
what follows is removed, provided that, properly speak-
the doing of something, belongs to the subject in whose
ing, it follow from that only. But if something can follow
power it is to move the appetite: thus to touch a stone
from several things, it is not removed by the fact that one
is an action suitable to a stick, but to apply the stick so
of them is removed; thus if hardening is the effect of heat
that it touch the stone, belongs to one who has the power
and of cold (since bricks are hardened by the fire, and
of moving the stick. But irrational animals have not the
frozen water is hardened by the cold), then by removing
command of the appetitive movement; for this is in them
heat it does not follow that there is no hardening. Now the
through natural instinct. Hence in the irrational animal,
accomplishment of an act follows not only from consent,
there is indeed the movement of the appetite, but it does
but also from the impulse of the appetite, such as is found
not apply that movement to some particular thing. And
in irrational animals.
hence it is that the irrational animal is not properly said
Reply to Objection 3. The man who acts through pas-
to consent: this is proper to the rational nature, which has
sion is able not to follow the passion: whereas irrational
the command of the appetitive movement, and is able to
animals have not that power. Hence the comparison fails.
Whether consent is directed to the end or to the means?
Ia IIae q. 15 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that consent is directed to
in so far as they are directed to the end, they come un-
the end. Because that on account of which a thing is such
der counsel: and so counsel can be applied to them, in so
is still more such. But it is on account of the end that we
far as the appetitive movement is applied to the judgment
consent to the means. Therefore, still more do we consent
resulting from counsel. But the appetitive movement to
to the end.
the end is not applied to counsel: rather is counsel applied
Objection 2. Further, the act of the intemperate man is
to it, because counsel presupposes the desire of the end.
his end, just as the act of the virtuous man is his end. But
On the other hand, the desire of the means presupposes
the intemperate man consents to his own act. Therefore
the decision of counsel. And therefore the application of
consent can be directed to the end.
the appetitive movement to counsel’s decision is consent,
Objection 3. Further, desire of the means is choice, as
properly speaking. Consequently, since counsel is only
stated above (q. 13, a. 1). If therefore consent were only
about the means, consent, properly speaking, is of noth-
directed to the means it would nowise differ from choice.
ing else but the means.
And this is proved to be false by the authority of Dama-
Reply to Objection 1. Just as the knowledge of con-
scene who says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that “after the ap-
clusions through the principles is science, whereas the
proval” which he calls “the sentence,” “comes the choice.”
knowledge of the principles is not science, but something
Therefore consent is not only directed to the means.
higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent to the
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
means on account of the end, in respect of which our act
22) that the “sentence,” i.e. the consent, takes place “when
is not consent but something greater, namely, volition.
a man approves and embraces the judgment of his coun-
Reply to Objection 2. Delight in his act, rather than
sel.” But counsel is only about the means. Therefore the
the act itself, is the end of the intemperate man, and for
same applies to consent.
sake of this delight he consents to that act.
I answer that, Consent is the application of the appet-
Reply to Objection 3. Choice includes something
itive movement to something that is already in the power
that consent has not, namely, a certain relation to some-
of him who causes the application. Now the order of ac-
thing to which something else is preferred: and therefore
tion is this: First there is the apprehension of the end; then
after consent there still remains a choice. For it may hap-
the desire of the end; then the counsel about the means;
pen that by aid of counsel several means have been found
then the desire of the means. Now the appetite tends to
conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting
the last end naturally: wherefore the application of the
with approval, consent has been given to each: but af-
appetitive movement to the apprehended end has not the
ter approving of many, we have given our preference to
nature of consent, but of simple volition. But as to those
one by choosing it. But if only one meets with approval,
things which come under consideration after the last end,
then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only
670
in our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according as we prefer it to those that do not meet with
according as we approve of doing that thing; but choice
our approval.
Whether consent to the act belongs only to the higher part of the soul?
Ia IIae q. 15 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that consent to the act
which is the function of the higher reason. Wherefore as
does not always belong to the higher reason. For “de-
long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or not, ac-
light follows action, and perfects it, just as beauty perfects
cording to Divine principles, no judgment of the reason
youth”∗ (Ethic. x, 4). But consent to delight belongs to
can be considered in the light of a final decision. Now the
the lower reason, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12).
final decision of what is to be done is consent to the act.
Therefore consent to the act does not belong only to the
Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher reason;
higher reason.
but in that sense in which the reason includes the will, as
Objection 2. Further, an act to which we consent is
stated above (a. 1, ad 1).
said to be voluntary. But it belongs to many powers to
Reply to Objection 1. Consent to delight in the work
produce voluntary acts. Therefore the higher reason is not
done belongs to the higher reason, as also does consent
alone in consenting to the act.
to the work; but consent to delight in thought belongs to
Objection 3. Further, “the higher reason is that which
the lower reason, just as to the lower reason it belongs to
is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things
think. Nevertheless the higher reason exercises judgment
eternal,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7). But man
on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an
often consents to an act not for eternal, but for temporal
action; and in like manner on the delight that results. But
reasons, or even on account of some passion of the soul.
in so far as the act of thinking is considered as ordained
Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher
to a further act, it belongs to the lower reason. For that
reason alone.
which is ordained to something else, belongs to a lower
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12):
art or power than does the end to which it is ordained:
“It is impossible for man to make up his mind to commit
hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the
a sin, unless that mental faculty which has the sovereign
master or principal art.
power of urging his members to, or restraining them from,
Reply to Objection 2. Since actions are called vol-
act, yield to the evil deed and become its slave.”
untary from the fact that we consent to them, it does not
I answer that, The final decision belongs to him who
follow that consent is an act of each power, but of the will
holds the highest place, and to whom it belongs to judge
which is in the reason, as stated above (a. 1, ad 1), and
of the others; for as long as judgment about some mat-
from which the voluntary act is named.
ter remains to be pronounced, the final decision has not
Reply to Objection 3. The higher reason is said to
been given. Now it is evident that it belongs to the higher
consent not only because it always moves to act, accord-
reason to judge of all: since it is by the reason that we
ing to the eternal reasons; but also because it fails to dis-
judge of sensible things; and of things pertaining to hu-
sent according to those same reasons.
man principles we judge according to Divine principles,
∗ oion tois akmaiois he hora;—as youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime 671
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 16
Of Use, Which Is an Act of the Will in Regard to the Means
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider use; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether use is an act of the will?
(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?
(3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also?
(4) Of the relation of use to choice.
Whether use is an act of the will?
Ia IIae q. 16 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that use is not an act of
body; as the intellect, to understand; and the eye, to see;
the will. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4) that
but also external things, as a stick, to strike. But it is ev-
“to use is to refer that which is the object of use to the
ident that we do not apply external things to an operation
obtaining of something else.” But “to refer” something to
save through the interior principles which are either the
another is an act of the reason to which it belongs to com-
powers of the soul, or the habits of those powers, or the
pare and to direct. Therefore use is an act of the reason
organs which are parts of the body. Now it has been shown
and not of the will.
above (q. 9, a. 1) that it is the will which moves the soul’s
Objection 2. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
powers to their acts, and this is to apply them to operation.
ii, 22) that man “goes forward to the operation, and this
Hence it is evident that first and principally use belongs to
is called impulse; then he makes use (of the powers) and
the will as first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to
this is called use.” But operation belongs to the executive
the other powers as executing the operation, which pow-
power; and the act of the will does not follow the act of
ers are compared to the will which applies them to act, as
the executive power, on the contrary execution comes last.
the instruments are compared to the principal agent. Now
Therefore use is not an act of the will.
action is properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu.
the principal agent, as building is ascribed to the builder,
30): “All things that were made were made for man’s use,
not to his tools. Hence it is evident that use is, properly
because reason with which man is endowed uses all things
speaking, an act of the will.
by its judgment of them.” But judgment of things created
Reply to Objection 1. Reason does indeed refer one
by God belongs to the speculative reason; which seems to
thing to another; but the will tends to that which is referred
be altogether distinct from the will, which is the principle
by the reason to something else. And in this sense to use
of human acts. Therefore use is not an act of the will.
is to refer one thing to another.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11):
Reply to Objection 2. Damascene is speaking of use
“To use is to apply to something to purpose of the will.”
in so far as it belongs to the executive powers.
I answer that, The use of a thing implies the applica-
Reply to Objection 3. Even the speculative reason is
tion of that thing to an operation: hence the operation to
applied by the will to the act of understanding or judging.
which we apply a thing is called its use; thus the use of
Consequently the speculative reason is said to use, in so
a horse is to ride, and the use of a stick is to strike. Now
far as it is moved by the will, in the same way as the other
we apply to an operation not only the interior principles of
powers.
action, viz. the powers of the soul or the members of the
Whether use is to be found in irrational animals?
Ia IIae q. 16 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that use is to be found in
Objection 2. Further, to apply the members to action
irrational animals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, be-
is to use them. But irrational animals apply their mem-
cause, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10): “We use things
bers to action; for instance, their feet, to walk; their horns, by referring them to something else which we are to en-to strike. Therefore it is possible for irrational animals to
joy.” But enjoyment is to be found in irrational animals,
use.
as stated above (q. 11, a. 2). Much more, therefore, is it
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30):
possible for them to use.
“None but a rational animal can make use of a thing.”
672
I answer that, as stated above (a. 1), to use is to apply ter than use; because that which is appetible absolutely
an active principle to action: thus to consent is to apply the
is better than that which is appetible only as directed to
appetitive movement to the desire of something, as stated
something else. But if we compare them in respect of
above (q. 15, Aa. 1,2,3). Now he alone who has the dis-
the apprehensive power that precedes them, greater excel-
posal of a thing, can apply it to something else; and this
lence is required on the part of use: because to direct one
belongs to him alone who knows how to refer it to some-
thing to another is an act of reason; whereas to apprehend
thing else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore
something absolutely is within the competency even of
none but a rational animal consents and uses.
sense.
Reply to Objection 1. To enjoy implies the absolute
Reply to Objection 2. Animals by means of their
movement of the appetite to the appetible: whereas to use
members do something from natural instinct; not through
implies a movement of the appetite to something as di-
knowing the relation of their members to these opera-
rected to something else. If therefore we compare use and
tions. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not apply
enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is bet-
their members to action, nor do they use them.
Whether use regards also the last end?
Ia IIae q. 16 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that use can regard also
sometimes the attainment or possession of that thing (thus
the last end. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): “Who-
the miser’s end is either money or the possession of it); it
ever enjoys, uses.” But man enjoys the last end. Therefore
is evident that, simply speaking, the last end is the thing
he uses the last end.
itself; for the possession of money is good only inasmuch
Objection 2. Further, “to use is to apply something
as there is some good in money. But in regard to the in-
to the purpose of the will” (De Trin. x, 11). But the last
dividual, the obtaining of money is the last end; for the
end, more than anything else, is the object of the will’s
miser would not seek for money, save that he might have
application. Therefore it can be the object of use.
it. Therefore, simply and properly speaking, a man enjoys
Objection 3. Further, Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that
money, because he places his last end therein; but in so far
“Eternity is in the Father, Likeness in the Image,” i.e. in
as he seeks to possess it, he is said to use it.
the Son, “Use in the Gift,” i.e. in the Holy Ghost. But the
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of use
Holy Ghost, since He is God, is the last end. Therefore
in general, in so far as it implies the relation of an end to
the last end can be the object of use.
the enjoyment which a man seeks in that end.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30):
Reply to Objection 2. The end is applied to the pur-
“No one rightly uses God, but one enjoys Him.” But God
pose of the will, that the will may find rest in it. Con-
alone is the last end. Therefore we cannot use the last end.
sequently this rest in the end, which is the enjoyment
I answer that, Use, as stated above (a. 1), implies the
thereof, is in this sense called use of the end. But the
application of one thing to another. Now that which is
means are applied to the will’s purpose, not only in being
applied to another is regarded in the light of means to an
used as means, but as ordained to something else in which
end; and consequently use always regards the means. For
the will finds rest.
this reason things that are adapted to a certain end are said
Reply to Objection 3. The words of Hilary refer to
to be “useful”; in fact their very usefulness is sometimes
use as applicable to rest in the last end; just as, speaking
called use.
in a general sense, one may be said to use the end for the
It must, however, be observed that the last end may
purpose of attaining it, as stated above. Hence Augustine
be taken in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in respect
says (De Trin. vi, 10) that “this love, delight, felicity, or
of an individual. For since the end, as stated above (q. 1,
happiness, is called use by him.”
a. 8; q. 2, a. 7), signifies sometimes the thing itself, and
Whether use precedes choice?
Ia IIae q. 16 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that use precedes choice.
But choice implies two relations: one, of the thing chosen,
For nothing follows after choice, except execution. But
in relation to the end; the other, of the thing chosen, in re-
use, since it belongs to the will, precedes execution.
spect of that to which it is preferred; whereas use implies
Therefore it precedes choice also.
relation to the end only. Therefore use precedes choice.
Objection 2. Further, the absolute precedes the rela-
Objection 3. Further, the will uses the other powers
tive. Therefore the less relative precedes the more relative.
in so far as it removes them. But the will moves itself,
673
too, as stated above (q. 9, a. 3). Therefore it uses itself, willed. Wherefore it is evident that use follows choice;
by applying itself to act. But it does this when it consents.
provided that by use we mean the will’s use of the exec-
Therefore there is use in consent. But consent precedes
utive power in moving it. But since the will, in a way,
choice as stated above (q. 15, a. 3, ad 3). Therefore use
moves the reason also, and uses it, we may take the use
does also.
of the means, as consisting in the consideration of the rea-
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
son, whereby it refers the means to the end. In this sense
22) that “the will after choosing has an impulse to the op-
use precedes choice.
eration, and afterwards it uses (the powers).” Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. The motion of the will to the
use follows choice.
execution of the work, precedes execution, but follows
I answer that, The will has a twofold relation to the
choice. And so, since use belongs to that very motion
thing willed. One, according as the thing willed is, in a
of the will, it stands between choice and execution.
way, in the willing subject, by a kind of proportion or or-
Reply to Objection 2. What is essentially relative is
der to the thing willed. Wherefore those things that are
after the absolute; but the thing to which relation is re-
naturally proportionate to a certain end, are said to desire
ferred need not come after. Indeed, the more a cause pre-
that end naturally. Yet to have an end thus is to have it im-
cedes, the more numerous the effects to which it has rela-
perfectly. Now every imperfect thing tends to perfection.
tion.
And therefore both the natural and the voluntary appetite
Reply to Objection 3. Choice precedes use, if they be
tend to have the end in reality; and this is to have it per-
referred to the same object. But nothing hinders the use of
fectly. This is the second relation of the will to the thing
one thing preceding the choice of another. And since the
willed.
acts of the will react on one another, in each act of the will
Now the thing willed is not only the end, but also the
we can find both consent and choice and use; so that we
means. And the last act that belongs to the first relation of
may say that the will consents to choose, and consents to
the will to the means, is choice; for there the will becomes
consent, and uses itself in consenting and choosing. And
fully proportionate, by willing the means fully. Use, on
such acts as are ordained to that which precedes, precede
the other hand, belongs to the second relation of the will,
also.
in respect of which it tends to the realization of the thing
674
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 17
Of the Acts Commanded by the Will
(In Nine Articles)
We must now consider the acts commanded by the will; under which head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason?
(2) Whether command belongs to irrational animals?
(3) Of the order between command and use
(4) Whether command and the commanded act are one act or distinct?
(5) Whether the act of the will is commanded?
(6) Whether the act of the reason is commanded?
(7) Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?
(8) Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?
(9) Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?
Whether command is an act of the reason or of the will?
Ia IIae q. 17 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that command is not an
Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the rea-
act of the reason but of the will. For command is a kind
son: for the commander orders the one commanded to
of motion; because Avicenna says that there are four ways
do something, by way of intimation or declaration; and
of moving, “by perfecting, by disposing, by commanding,
to order thus by intimating or declaring is an act of the
and by counselling.” But it belongs to the will to move all
reason. Now the reason can intimate or declare some-
the other powers of the soul, as stated above (q. 9, a. 1).
thing in two ways. First, absolutely: and this intimation
Therefore command is an act of the will.
is expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as when
Objection 2. Further, just as to be commanded be-
one person says to another: “This is what you should do.”
longs to that which is subject, so, seemingly, to command
Sometimes, however, the reason intimates something to
belongs to that which is most free. But the root of liberty
a man by moving him thereto; and this intimation is ex-
is especially in the will. Therefore to command belongs
pressed by a verb in the imperative mood; as when it is
to the will.
said to someone: “Do this.” Now the first mover, among
Objection 3. Further, command is followed at once
the powers of the soul, to the doing of an act is the will, as
by act. But the act of the reason is not followed at once by
stated above (q. 9, a. 1). Since therefore the second mover
act: for he who judges that a thing should be done, does
does not move, save in virtue of the first mover, it follows
not do it at once. Therefore command is not an act of the
that the very fact that the reason moves by commanding,
reason, but of the will.
is due to the power of the will. Consequently it follows
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ and the Philoso-
that command is an act of the reason, presupposing an act
pher (Ethic. i, 13) say that “the appetite obeys reason.”
of the will, in virtue of which the reason, by its command,
Therefore command is an act of the reason.
moves (the power) to the execution of the act.
I answer that, Command is an act of the reason pre-
Reply to Objection 1. To command is to move, not
supposing, however, an act of the will. In proof of this,
anyhow, but by intimating and declaring to another; and
we must take note that, since the acts of the reason and of
this is an act of the reason.
the will can be brought to bear on one another, in so far
Reply to Objection 2. The root of liberty is the will
as the reason reasons about willing, and the will wills to
as the subject thereof; but it is the reason as its cause. For
reason, the result is that the act of the reason precedes the
the will can tend freely towards various objects, precisely
act of the will, and conversely. And since the power of the
because the reason can have various perceptions of good.
preceding act continues in the act that follows, it happens
Hence philosophers define the free-will as being “a free
sometimes that there is an act of the will in so far as it
judgment arising from reason,” implying that reason is the
retains in itself something of an act of the reason, as we
root of liberty.
have stated in reference to use and choice; and conversely,
Reply to Objection 3. This argument proves that
that there is an act of the reason in so far as it retains in
command is an act of reason not absolutely, but with a
itself something of an act of the will.
kind of motion as stated above.
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.
675
Whether command belongs to irrational animals?
Ia IIae q. 17 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that command belongs
fore it is impossible that irrational animals should com-
to irrational animals. Because, according to Avicenna,
mand in any way, since they are devoid of reason.
“the power that commands movement is the appetite; and
Reply to Objection 1. The appetitive power is said
the power that executes movement is in the muscles and
to command movement, in so far as it moves the com-
nerves.” But both powers are in irrational animals. There-
manding reason. But this is only in man. In irrational
fore command is to be found in irrational animals.
animals the appetitive power is not, properly speaking, a
Objection 2. Further, the condition of a slave is that of commanding faculty, unless command be taken loosely
one who receives commands. But the body is compared
for motion.
to the soul as a slave to his master, as the Philosopher says
Reply to Objection 2. The body of the irrational an-
(Polit. i, 2). Therefore the body is commanded by the
imal is competent to obey; but its soul is not competent
soul, even in irrational animals, since they are composed
to command, because it is not competent to direct. Con-
of soul and body.
sequently there is no ratio there of commander and com-
Objection 3. Further, by commanding, man has an
manded; but only of mover and moved.
impulse towards an action. But impulse to action is to be
Reply to Objection 3. Impulse to action is in irra-
found in irrational animals, as Damascene says (De Fide
tional animals otherwise than in man. For the impulse
Orth. ii, 22). Therefore command is to be found in irra-
of man to action arises from the directing reason; where-
tional animals.
fore his impulse is one of command. On the other hand,
On the contrary, Command is an act of reason, as
the impulse of the irrational animal arises from natural in-
stated above (a. 1). But in irrational animals there is no
stinct; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the
reason. Neither, therefore, is there command.
unfitting, their appetite is moved naturally to pursue or to
I answer that, To command is nothing else than to di-
avoid. Wherefore they are directed by another to act; and
rect someone to do something, by a certain motion of inti-
they themselves do not direct themselves to act. Conse-
mation. Now to direct is the proper act of reason. Where-
quently in them is impulse but not command.
Whether use precedes command?
Ia IIae q. 17 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that use precedes com-
the user is united to the act of the thing used; for one does
mand. For command is an act of the reason presupposing
not use a stick before doing something with the stick. But
an act of the will, as stated above (a. 1). But, as we have
command is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to
already shown (q. 16, a. 1), use is an act of the will. There-
which the command is given: for it naturally precedes its
fore use precedes command.
fulfilment, sometimes, indeed, by priority of time. Conse-
Objection 2. Further, command is one of those things
quently it is evident that command precedes use.
that are ordained to the end. But use is of those things
Reply to Objection 1. Not every act of the will pre-
that are ordained to the end. Therefore it seems that use
cedes this act of the reason which is command; but an act
precedes command.
of the will precedes, viz. choice; and an act of the will
Objection 3. Further, every act of a power moved by
follows, viz. use. Because after counsel’s decision, which
the will is called use; because the will uses the other pow-
is reason’s judgment, the will chooses; and after choice,
ers, as stated above (q. 16, a. 1). But command is an act
the reason commands that power which has to do what
of the reason as moved by the will, as stated above (a. 1).
was chosen; and then, last of all, someone’s will begins to
Therefore command is a kind of use. Now the common
use, by executing the command of reason; sometimes it is
precedes the proper. Therefore use precedes command.
another’s will, when one commands another; sometimes
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
the will of the one that commands, when he commands
22) that impulse to action precedes use. But impulse to
himself to do something.
operation is given by command. Therefore command pre-
Reply to Objection 2. Just as act ranks before power,
cedes use.
so does the object rank before the act. Now the object
I answer that, use of that which is directed to the end, of use is that which is directed to the end. Consequently,
in so far as it is in the reason referring this to the end, prefrom the fact that command precedes, rather than that it
cedes choice, as stated above (q. 16, a. 4). Wherefore still
follows use.
more does it precede command. On the other hand, use of
Reply to Objection 3. Just as the act of the will in us-
that which is directed to the end, in so far as it is subject
ing the reason for the purpose of command, precedes the
to the executive power, follows command; because use in
command; so also we may say that this act whereby the
676
will uses the reason, is preceded by a command of reason; since the acts of these powers react on one another.
Whether command and the commanded act are one act, or distinct?
Ia IIae q. 17 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the commanded act
parts are being and substances in the whole. But those
is not one with the command itself. For the acts of differ-
things which are distinct in substance, and one according
ent powers are themselves distinct. But the commanded
to an accident, are distinct simply, and one in a certain
act belongs to one power, and the command to another;
respect: thus many men are one people, and many stones
since one is the power that commands, and the other is
are one heap; which is unity of composition or order. In
the power that receives the command. Therefore the com-
like manner also many individuals that are one in genus
manded act is not one with the command.
or species are many simply, and one in a certain respect:
Objection 2. Further, whatever things can be separate
since to be one in genus or species is to be one according
from one another, are distinct: for nothing is severed from
to the consideration of the reason.
itself. But sometimes the commanded act is separate from
Now just as in the genus of natural things, a whole is
the command: for sometimes the command is given, and
composed of matter and form (e.g. man, who is one natu-
the commanded act follows not. Therefore command is a
ral being, though he has many parts, is composed of soul
distinct act from the act commanded.
and body); so, in human acts, the act of a lower power is
Objection 3. Further, whatever things are related to
in the position of matter in regard to the act of a higher
one another as precedent and consequent, are distinct. But
power, in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the
command naturally precedes the commanded act. There-
higher power moving it: for thus also the act of the first
fore they are distinct.
mover is as the form in regard to the act of its instrument.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2)
Hence it is evident that command and the commanded act
that “where one thing is by reason of another, there is but
are one human act, just as a whole is one, yet in its parts,
one.” But there is no commanded act unless by reason of
many.
the command. Therefore they are one.
Reply to Objection 1. If the distinct powers are not
I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being
ordained to one another, their acts are diverse simply. But
distinct in one respect, and one in another respect. Indeed,
when one power is the mover of the other, then their acts
every multitude is one in some respect, as Dionysius says
are, in a way, one: since “the act of the mover and the act
(Div. Nom. xiii). But a difference is to be observed in
of the thing moved are one act” (Phys. iii, 3).
this, that some are simply many, and one in a particular
Reply to Objection 2. The fact that command and the
aspect: while with others it is the reverse. Now “one” is
commanded act can be separated from one another shows
predicated in the same way as “being.” And substance is
that they are different parts. Because the parts of a man
being simply, whereas accident or being “of reason” is a
can be separated from one another, and yet they form one
being only in a certain respect. Wherefore those things
whole.
that are one in substance are one simply, though many in
Reply to Objection 3. In those things that are many
a certain respect. Thus, in the genus substance, the whole
in parts, but one as a whole, nothing hinders one part from
composed of its integral or essential parts, is one simply:
preceding another. Thus the soul, in a way, precedes the
because the whole is being and substance simply, and the
body; and the heart, the other members.
Whether the act of the will is commanded?
Ia IIae q. 17 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the act of the will is
manded, for the same reason all are commanded. But if
not commanded. For Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9):
all the acts of the will are commanded, we must needs
“The mind commands the mind to will, and yet it does
proceed to infinity; because the act of the will precedes
not.” But to will is the act of the will. Therefore the act of
the act of reason commanding, as stated above (a. 1); for
the will is not commanded.
if that act of the will be also commanded, this command
Objection 2. Further, to receive a command belongs
will be precedes by another act of the reason, and so on to
to one who can understand the command. But the will
infinity. But to proceed to infinity is not possible. There-
cannot understand the command; for the will differs from
fore the act of the will is not commanded.
the intellect, to which it belongs to understand. Therefore
On the contrary, Whatever is in our power, is subject
the act of the will is not commanded.
to our command. But the acts of the will, most of all, are
Objection 3. Further, if one act of the will is com-
in our power; since all our acts are said to be in our power,
677
in so far as they are voluntary. Therefore the acts of the fails to command perfectly.
will are commanded by us.
Reply to Objection 2. Just as each of the members of
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), command is
the body works not for itself alone but for the whole body;
nothing else than the act of the reason directing, with a
thus it is for the whole body that the eye sees; so is it with
certain motion, something to act. Now it is evident that
the powers of the soul. For the intellect understands, not
the reason can direct the act of the will: for just as it can
for itself alone, but for all the powers; and the will wills
judge it to be good to will something, so it can direct by
not only for itself, but for all the powers too. Wherefore
commanding man to will. From this it is evident that an
man, in so far as he is endowed with intellect and will,
act of the will can be commanded.
commands the act of the will for himself.
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Confess.
Reply to Objection 3. Since command is an act of
viii, 9) when the mind commands itself perfectly to will,
reason, that act is commanded which is subject to reason.
then already it wills: but that sometimes it commands and
Now the first act of the will is not due to the direction of
wills not, is due to the fact that it commands imperfectly.
the reason but to the instigation of nature, or of a higher
Now imperfect command arises from the fact that the rea-
cause, as stated above (q. 9, a. 4). Therefore there is no
son is moved by opposite motives to command or not to
need to proceed to infinity.
command: wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and
Whether the act of the reason is commanded?
Ia IIae q. 17 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the act of the reason
which two acts of the reason have to be noticed. One is
cannot be commanded. For it seems impossible for a thing
the act whereby it apprehends the truth about something.
to command itself. But it is the reason that commands, as
This act is not in our power: because it happens in virtue
stated above (a. 1). Therefore the act of the reason is not
of a natural or supernatural light. Consequently in this
commanded.
respect, the act of the reason is not in our power, and can-
Objection 2. Further, that which is essential is dif-
not be commanded. The other act of the reason is that
ferent from that which is by participation. But the power
whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If, therefore,
whose act is commanded by reason, is rational by partic-
that which the reason apprehends is such that it naturally
ipation, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the act of that
assents thereto, e.g. the first principles, it is not in our
power, which is essentially rational, is not commanded.
power to assent or dissent to the like: assent follows natu-
Objection 3. Further, that act is commanded, which
rally, and consequently, properly speaking, is not subject
is in our power. But to know and judge the truth, which
to our command. But some things which are apprehended
is the act of reason, is not always in our power. Therefore
do not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to
the act of the reason cannot be commanded.
leave it free to assent or dissent, or at least suspend its as-
On the contrary, That which we do of our free-will,
sent or dissent, on account of some cause or other; and in
can be done by our command. But the acts of the reason
such things assent or dissent is in our power, and is subject
are accomplished through the free-will: for Damascene
to our command.
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that “by his free-will man in-
Reply to Objection 1. Reason commands itself, just
quires, considers, judges, approves.” Therefore the acts of
as the will moves itself, as stated above (q. 9, a. 3), that is the reason can be commanded.
to say, in so far as each power reacts on its own acts, and
I answer that, Since the reason reacts on itself, just as from one thing tends to another.
it directs the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own
Reply to Objection 2. On account of the diversity of
act. Consequently its act can be commanded.
objects subject to the act of the reason, nothing prevents
But we must take note that the act of the reason may
the reason from participating in itself: thus the knowledge
be considered in two ways. First, as to the exercise of the
of principles is participated in the knowledge of the con-
act. And considered thus, the act of the reason can always
clusions.
be commanded: as when one is told to be attentive, and to
The reply to the third object is evident from what has
use one’s reason. Secondly, as to the object; in respect of
been said.
678
Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?
Ia IIae q. 17 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the act of the sen-
the command of reason: and consequently in this respect,
sitive appetite is not commanded. For the Apostle says
the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from
(Rom. 7:15): “For I do not that good which I will”: and
being wholly subject to the command of reason.
a gloss explains this by saying that man lusts, although
Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of
he wills not to lust. But to lust is an act of the sensitive
the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence
appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not
of an apprehension of the imagination of sense. And then
subject to our command.
such movement occurs without the command of reason:
Objection 2. Further, corporeal matter obeys God
although reason could have prevented it, had it foreseen.
alone, to the effect of formal transmutation, as was shown
Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the reason
in the Ia, q. 65, a. 4; Ia, q. 91, a. 2; Ia, q. 110, a. 2. But
governs the irascible and concupiscible not by a “despotic
the act of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a for-
supremacy,” which is that of a master over his slave; but
mal transmutation of the body, consisting in heat or cold.
by a “politic and royal supremacy,” whereby the free are
Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to
governed, who are not wholly subject to command.
man’s command.
Reply to Objection 1. That man lusts, although he
Objection 3. Further, the proper motive principle of
wills not to lust, is due to a disposition of the body,
the sensitive appetite is something apprehended by sense
whereby the sensitive appetite is hindered from perfect
or imagination. But it is not always in our power to appre-
compliance with the command of reason.
Hence the
hend something by sense or imagination. Therefore the
Apostle adds (Rom. 7:15): “I see another law in my mem-
act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command.
bers, fighting against the law of my mind.” This may also
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ says: “That
happen through a sudden movement of concupiscence, as
which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible and the
stated above.
irascible,” which belong to the sensitive appetite. There-
Reply to Objection 2. The condition of the body
fore the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the com-
stands in a twofold relation to the act of the sensitive ap-
mand of reason.
petite. First, as preceding it: thus a man may be disposed
I answer that, An act is subject to our command, in
in one way or another, in respect of his body, to this or
so far as it is in our power, as stated above (a. 5). Con-
that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it: thus a man
sequently in order to understand in what manner the act
becomes heated through anger. Now the condition that
of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of rea-
precedes, is not subject to the command of reason: since
son, we must consider in what manner it is in our power.
it is due either to nature, or to some previous movement,
Now it must be observed that the sensitive appetite differs
which cannot cease at once. But the condition that is con-
from the intellective appetite, which is called the will, in
sequent, follows the command of reason: since it results
the fact that the sensitive appetite is a power of a corpo-
from the local movement of the heart, which has various
real organ, whereas the will is not. Again, every act of a
movements according to the various acts of the sensitive
power that uses a corporeal organ, depends not only on a
appetite.
power of the soul, but also on the disposition of that cor-
Reply to Objection 3. Since the external sensible is
poreal organ: thus the act of vision depends on the power
necessary for the apprehension of the senses, it is not in
of sight, and on the condition of the eye, which condition
our power to apprehend anything by the senses, unless the
is a help or a hindrance to that act. Consequently the act
sensible be present; which presence of the sensible is not
of the sensitive appetite depends not only on the appetitive
always in our power. For it is then that man can use his
power, but also on the disposition of the body.
senses if he will so to do; unless there be some obstacle
Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the
on the part of the organ. On the other hand, the appre-
act, follows apprehension. And the apprehension of the
hension of the imagination is subject to the ordering of
imagination, being a particular apprehension, is regulated
reason, in proportion to the strength or weakness of the
by the apprehension of reason, which is universal; just as
imaginative power. For that man is unable to imagine the
a particular active power is regulated by a universal active
things that reason considers, is either because they cannot
power. Consequently in this respect the act of the sensitive
be imagined, such as incorporeal things; or because of the
appetite is subject to the command of reason. On the other
weakness of the imaginative power, due to some organic
hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to
indisposition.
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.
679
Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?
Ia IIae q. 17 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that the acts of the veg-
fore those acts that proceed from the intellective or the an-
etal soul are subject to the command of reason. For the
imal appetite, can be commanded by reason: but not those
sensitive powers are of higher rank than the vegetal pow-
acts that proceed from the natural appetite. And such are
ers. But the powers of the sensitive soul are subject to
the acts of the vegetal soul; wherefore Gregory of Nyssa
the command of reason. Much more, therefore, are the
(Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says “that generation and
powers of the vegetal soul.
nutrition belong to what are called natural powers.” Con-
Objection 2. Further, man is called a “little world”∗,
sequently the acts of the vegetal soul are not subject to the
because the soul is in the body, as God is in the world. But
command of reason.
God is in the world in such a way, that everything in the
Reply to Objection 1. The more immaterial an act
world obeys His command. Therefore all that is in man,
is, the more noble it is, and the more is it subject to the
even the powers of the vegetal soul, obey the command of
command of reason. Hence the very fact that the acts of
reason.
the vegetal soul do not obey reason, shows that they rank
Objection 3. Further, praise and blame are awarded
lowest.
only to such acts as are subject to the command of rea-
Reply to Objection 2. The comparison holds in a cer-
son. But in the acts of the nutritive and generative power,
tain respect: because, to wit, as God moves the world, so
there is room for praise and blame, virtue and vice: as in
the soul moves the body. But it does not hold in every re-
the case of gluttony and lust, and their contrary virtues.
spect: for the soul did not create the body out of nothing,
Therefore the acts of these powers are subject to the com-
as God created the world; for which reason the world is
mand of reason.
wholly subject to His command.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa† sats that “the nu-
Reply to Objection 3. Virtue and vice, praise and
tritive and generative power is one over which the reason
blame do not affect the acts themselves of the nutritive
has no control.”
and generative power, i.e. digestion, and formation of the
I answer that, Some acts proceed from the natural
human body; but they affect the acts of the sensitive part,
appetite, others from the animal, or from the intellectual
that are ordained to the acts of generation and nutrition;
appetite: for every agent desires an end in some way. Now
for example the desire for pleasure in the act of taking
the natural appetite does not follow from some apprehen-
food or in the act of generation, and the right or wrong
sion, as to the animal and the intellectual appetite. But the
use thereof.
reason commands by way of apprehensive power. Where-
Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?
Ia IIae q. 17 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that the members of the
members are not obedient to reason.
body do not obey reason as to their acts. For it is evident
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9):
that the members of the body are more distant from the
“The mind commands a movement of the hand, and so
reason, than the powers of the vegetal soul. But the pow-
ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely can one discern
ers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, as stated above
obedience from command.”
(a. 8). Therefore much less do the members of the body
I answer that, The members of the body are organs of
obey.
the soul’s powers. Consequently according as the powers
Objection 2. Further, the heart is the principle of an-
of the soul stand in respect of obedience to reason, so do
imal movement. But the movement of the heart is not
the members of the body stand in respect thereof. Since
subject to the command of reason: for Gregory of Nyssa‡
then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of
says that “the pulse is not controlled by reason.” There-
reason, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all
fore the movement of the bodily members is not subject
movements of members, that are moved by the sensitive
to the command of reason.
powers, are subject to the command of reason; whereas
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
those movements of members, that arise from the natural
xiv, 16) that “the movement of the genital members is
powers, are not subject to the command of reason.
sometimes inopportune and not desired; sometimes when
Reply to Objection 1. The members do not move
sought it fails, and whereas the heart is warm with desire,
themselves, but are moved through the powers of the soul;
the body remains cold.” Therefore the movements of the
of which powers, some are in closer contact with the rea-
∗ Aristotle, Phys. viii. 2 † Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii. ‡ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.
680
son than are the powers of the vegetal soul.
God, by the insubmission of that member whereby origi-
Reply to Objection 2. In things pertaining to intellect
nal sin is transmitted to posterity.
and will, that which is according to nature stands first,
But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of
whence all other things are derived: thus from the knowl-
the sin of our first parent was that his nature was left
edge of principles that are naturally known, is derived
to itself, through the withdrawal of the supernatural gift
knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition of the
which God had bestowed on man, we must consider the
end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means.
natural cause of this particular member’s insubmission to
So also in bodily movements the principle is according
reason. This is stated by Aristotle (De Causis Mot. An-
to nature. Now the principle of bodily movements begins
imal.) who says that “the movements of the heart and of
with the movement of the heart. Consequently the move-
the organs of generation are involuntary,” and that the rea-
ment of the heart is according to nature, and not according
son of this is as follows. These members are stirred at the
to the will: for like a proper accident, it results from life,
occasion of some apprehension; in so far as the intellect
which follows from the union of soul and body. Thus the
and imagination represent such things as arouse the pas-
movement of heavy and light things results from their sub-
sions of the soul, of which passions these movements are
stantial form: for which reason they are said to be moved
a consequence. But they are not moved at the command
by their generator, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii,
of the reason or intellect, because these movements are
4). Wherefore this movement is called “vital.” For which
conditioned by a certain natural change of heat and cold,
reason Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii)
which change is not subject to the command of reason.
says that, just as the movement of generation and nutrition
This is the case with these two organs in particular, be-
does not obey reason, so neither does the pulse which is a
cause each is as it were a separate animal being, in so far
vital movement. By the pulse he means the movement of
as it is a principle of life; and the principle is virtually the the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins.
whole. For the heart is the principle of the senses; and
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Civ.
from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue,
Dei xiv, 17,20) it is in punishment of sin that the move-
which is virtually the entire animal. Consequently they
ment of these members does not obey reason: in this
have their proper movements naturally: because princi-
sense, that the soul is punished for its rebellion against
ples must needs be natural, as stated above (Reply obj. 2).
681
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 18
Of the Good and Evil of Human Acts, in General
(In Eleven Articles)
We must now consider the good and evil of human acts. First, how a human act is good or evil; secondly, what results from the good or evil of a human act, as merit or demerit, sin and guilt.
Under the first head there will be a threefold consideration: the first will be of the good and evil of human acts, in general; the second, of the good and evil of internal acts; the third, of the good and evil of external acts.
Concerning the first there are eleven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?
(2) Whether the good or evil of a human action is derived from its object?
(3) Whether it is derived from a circumstance?
(4) Whether it is derived from the end?
(5) Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?
(6) Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?
(7) Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?
(8) Whether any action is indifferent in its species?
(9) Whether an individual action can be indifferent?
(10) Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil?
(11) Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places the moral action in the species of good or evil?
Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?
Ia IIae q. 18 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that every human action
happens with some things, that they have being in some
is good, and that none is evil. For Dionysius says (Div.
respect, and yet they are lacking in the fulness of being
Nom. iv) that evil acts not, save in virtue of the good. But
due to them. Thus the fulness of human being requires a
no evil is done in virtue of the good. Therefore no action
compound of soul and body, having all the powers and in-
is evil.
struments of knowledge and movement: wherefore if any
Objection 2. Further, nothing acts except in so far as
man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something
it is in act. Now a thing is evil, not according as it is in act, due to the fulness of his being. So that as much as he has
but according as its potentiality is void of act; whereas in
of being, so much has he of goodness: while so far as he
so far as its potentiality is perfected by act, it is good, as
is lacking in goodness, and is said to be evil: thus a blind
stated in Metaph. ix, 9. Therefore nothing acts in so far as
man is possessed of goodness inasmuch as he lives; and
it is evil, but only according as it is good. Therefore every
of evil, inasmuch as he lacks sight. That, however, which
action is good, and none is evil.
has nothing of being or goodness, could not be said to be
Objection 3. Further, evil cannot be a cause, save ac-
either evil or good. But since this same fulness of being
cidentally, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But ev-
is of the very essence of good, if a thing be lacking in its
ery action has some effect which is proper to it. Therefore
due fulness of being, it is not said to be good simply, but
no action is evil, but every action is good.
in a certain respect, inasmuch as it is a being; although
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 3:20): “Every
it can be called a being simply, and a non-being in a cer-
one that doth evil, hateth the light.” Therefore some ac-
tain respect, as was stated in the Ia, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1. We
tions of man are evil.
must therefore say that every action has goodness, in so
I answer that, We must speak of good and evil in ac-
far as it has being; whereas it is lacking in goodness, in so
tions as of good and evil in things: because such as ev-
far as it is lacking in something that is due to its fulness
erything is, such is the act that it produces. Now in things,
of being; and thus it is said to be evil: for instance if it
each one has so much good as it has being: since good and
lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due place,
being are convertible, as was stated in the Ia, q. 5, Aa. 1,3.
or something of the kind.
But God alone has the whole plenitude of His Being in
Reply to Objection 1. Evil acts in virtue of deficient
a certain unity: whereas every other thing has its proper
goodness. For it there were nothing of good there, there
fulness of being in a certain multiplicity. Wherefore it
would be neither being nor possibility of action. On the
682
other hand if good were not deficient, there would be no of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when
evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient good,
he walks.
which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil.
Reply to Objection 3. An evil action can have a
Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders a thing from
proper effect, according to the goodness and being that
being in act in a certain respect, so that it can act; and in
it has. Thus adultery is the cause of human generation,
a certain respect deficient in act, so as to cause a deficient
inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, but not
act. Thus a blind man has in act the power of walking,
inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason.
whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is deprived
Whether the good or evil of a man’s action is derived from its object?
Ia IIae q. 18 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the good or evil of an
not realize its specific form (for instance, if instead of a
action is not derived from its object. For the object of any
man, something else be generated); so the primary evil in
action is a thing. But “evil is not in things, but in the sin-
moral actions is that which is from the object, for instance,
ner’s use of them,” as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
“to take what belongs to another.” And this action is said
iii, 12). Therefore the good or evil of a human action is
to be “evil in its genus,” genus here standing for species,
not derived from their object.
just as we apply the term “mankind” to the whole human
Objection 2. Further, the object is compared to the
species.
action as its matter. But the goodness of a thing is not
Reply to Objection 1. Although external things are
from its matter, but rather from the form, which is an act.
good in themselves, nevertheless they have not always a
Therefore good and evil in actions is not derived from
due proportion to this or that action. And so, inasmuch as
their object.
they are considered as objects of such actions, they have
Objection 3. Further, the object of an active power is
not the quality of goodness.
compared to the action as effect to cause. But the good-
Reply to Objection 2. The object is not the matter “of
ness of a cause does not depend on its effect; rather is it
which” (a thing is made), but the matter “about which”
the reverse. Therefore good or evil in actions is not de-
(something is done); and stands in relation to the act as its
rived from their object.
form, as it were, through giving it its species.
On the contrary, It is written (Osee 9:10): “They be-
Reply to Objection 3. The object of the human ac-
came abominable as those things which they loved.” Now
tion is not always the object of an active power. For the
man becomes abominable to God on account of the mal-
appetitive power is, in a way, passive; in so far as it is
ice of his action. Therefore the malice of his action is ac-
moved by the appetible object; and yet it is a principle of
cording to the evil objects that man loves. And the same
human actions. Nor again have the objects of the active
applies to the goodness of his action.
powers always the nature of an effect, but only when they
I answer that, as stated above (a. 1) the good or evil
are already transformed: thus food when transformed is
of an action, as of other things, depends on its fulness of
the effect of the nutritive power; whereas food before be-
being or its lack of that fulness. Now the first thing that
ing transformed stands in relation to the nutritive power
belongs to the fulness of being seems to be that which
as the matter about which it exercises its operation. Now
gives a thing its species. And just as a natural thing has its
since the object is in some way the effect of the active
species from its form, so an action has its species from its
power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and con-
object, as movement from its term. And therefore just as
sequently that it gives it its form and species, since move-
the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its
ment derives its species from its term. Moreover, although
form, which gives it its species, so the primary goodness
the goodness of an action is not caused by the goodness
of a moral action is derived from its suitable object: hence
of its effect, yet an action is said to be good from the fact
some call such an action “good in its genus”; for instance,
that it can produce a good effect. Consequently the very
“to make use of what is one’s own.” And just as, in natu-
proportion of an action to its effect is the measure of its
ral things, the primary evil is when a generated thing does
goodness.
683
Whether man’s action is good or evil from a circumstance?
Ia IIae q. 18 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that an action is not good
I answer that, In natural things, it is to be noted that or evil from a circumstance.
For circumstances stand
the whole fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from
around [circumstant] an action, as being outside it, as
the mere substantial form, that gives it its species; since
stated above (q. 7, a. 1). But “good and evil are in things
a thing derives much from supervening accidents, as man
themselves,” as is stated in Metaph. vi, 4. Therefore an
does from shape, color, and the like; and if any one of
action does not derive goodness or malice from a circum-
these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the result.
stance.
So it is with action. For the plenitude of its goodness does
Objection 2. Further, the goodness or malice of an
not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain ad-
action is considered principally in the doctrine of morals.
ditions which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents:
But since circumstances are accidents of actions, it seems
and such are its due circumstances. Wherefore if some-
that they are outside the scope of art: because “no art takes
thing be wanting that is requisite as a due circumstance
notice of what is accidental” (Metaph. vi, 2). Therefore
the action will be evil.
the goodness or malice of an action is not taken from a
Reply to Objection 1. Circumstances are outside an
circumstance.
action, inasmuch as they are not part of its essence; but
Objection 3. Further, that which belongs to a thing,
they are in an action as accidents thereof. Thus, too, acci-
in respect of its substance, is not ascribed to it in respect
dents in natural substances are outside the essence.
of an accident. But good and evil belong to an action in
Reply to Objection 2. Every accident is not acciden-
respect of its substance; because an action can be good or
tally in its subject; for some are proper accidents; and of
evil in its genus as stated above (a. 2). Therefore an action
these every art takes notice. And thus it is that the cir-
is not good or bad from a circumstance.
cumstances of actions are considered in the doctrine of
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3)
morals.
that a virtuous man acts as he should, and when he should,
Reply to Objection 3. Since good and being are con-
and so on in respect of the other circumstances. Therefore,
vertible; according as being is predicated of substance and
on the other hand, the vicious man, in the matter of each
of accident, so is good predicated of a thing both in respect
vice, acts when he should not, or where he should not,
of its essential being, and in respect of its accidental be-
and so on with the other circumstances. Therefore human
ing; and this, both in natural things and in moral actions.
actions are good or evil according to circumstances.
Whether a human action is good or evil from its end?
Ia IIae q. 18 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the good and evil in
in these it suffices to consider their being absolutely. But
human actions are not from the end. For Dionysius says
there are things the being of which depends on something
(Div. Nom. iv) that “nothing acts with a view to evil.”
else, and hence in their regard we must consider their be-
If therefore an action were good or evil from its end, no
ing in its relation to the cause on which it depends. Now
action would be evil. Which is clearly false.
just as the being of a thing depends on the agent, and
Objection 2. Further, the goodness of an action is
the form, so the goodness of a thing depends on its end.
something in the action. But the end is an extrinsic cause.
Hence in the Divine Persons, Whose goodness does not
Therefore an action is not said to be good or bad according
depend on another, the measure of goodness is not taken
to its end.
from the end. Whereas human actions, and other things,
Objection 3. Further, a good action may happen to
the goodness of which depends on something else, have a
be ordained to an evil end, as when a man gives an alms
measure of goodness from the end on which they depend,
from vainglory; and conversely, an evil action may hap-
besides that goodness which is in them absolutely.
pen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft committed in
Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered
order to give something to the poor. Therefore an action
in a human action. First, that which, as an action, it de-
is not good or evil from its end.
rives from its genus; because as much as it has of action
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Differ. Topic. ii)
and being so much has it of goodness, as stated above
that “if the end is good, the thing is good, and if the end
(a. 1). Secondly, it has goodness according to its species;
be evil, the thing also is evil.”
which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has
I answer that, The disposition of things as to good-
goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of
ness is the same as their disposition as to being. Now in
its accidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to
some things the being does not depend on another, and
which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness.
684
Reply to Objection 1. The good in view of which is good in one of the way mentioned above, from lacking
one acts is not always a true good; but sometimes it is a
goodness in another way. And thus it may happen that an
true good, sometimes an apparent good. And in the latter
action which is good in its species or in its circumstances
event, an evil action results from the end in view.
is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa. However, an ac-
Reply to Objection 2. Although the end is an ex-
tion is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways:
trinsic cause, nevertheless due proportion to the end, and
since “evil results from any single defect, but good from
relation to the end, are inherent to the action.
the complete cause,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Reply to Objection 3. Nothing hinders an action that
Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?
Ia IIae q. 18 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that good and evil in
the intellect.
moral actions do not make a difference of species. For the
Now in human actions, good and evil are predicated in
existence of good and evil in actions is in conformity with
reference to the reason; because as Dionysius says (Div.
their existence in things, as stated above (a. 1). But good
Nom. iv), “the good of man is to be in accordance with
and evil do not make a specific difference in things; for a
reason,” and evil is “to be against reason.” For that is good
good man is specifically the same as a bad man. Therefore
for a thing which suits it in regard to its form; and evil,
neither do they make a specific difference in actions.
that which is against the order of its form. It is therefore
Objection 2. Further, since evil is a privation, it is a evident that the difference of good and evil considered in
non-being. But non-being cannot be a difference, accord-
reference to the object is an essential difference in relation
ing to the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, 3). Since therefore the
to reason; that is to say, according as the object is suitable
difference constitutes the species, it seems that an action
or unsuitable to reason. Now certain actions are called hu-
is not constituted in a species through being evil. Con-
man or moral, inasmuch as they proceed from the reason.
sequently good and evil do not diversify the species of
Consequently it is evident that good and evil diversify the
human actions.
species in human actions; since essential differences cause
Objection 3. Further, acts that differ in species pro-
a difference of species.
duce different effects. But the same specific effect results
Reply to Objection 1. Even in natural things, good
from a good and from an evil action: thus a man is born
and evil, inasmuch as something is according to na-
of adulterous or of lawful wedlock. Therefore good and
ture, and something against nature, diversify the natural
evil actions do not differ in species.
species; for a dead body and a living body are not of the
Objection 4. Further, actions are sometimes said to be
same species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is in
good or bad from a circumstance, as stated above (a. 3).
accord with reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against rea-
But since a circumstance is an accident, it does not give an
son, diversify the moral species.
action its species. Therefore human actions do not differ
Reply to Objection 2. Evil implies privation, not ab-
in species on account of their goodness or malice.
solute, but affecting some potentiality. For an action is
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic
said to be evil in its species, not because it has no object at ii. 1) “like habits produce like actions.” But a good and
all; but because it has an object in disaccord with reason,
a bad habit differ in species, as liberality and prodigality.
for instance, to appropriate another’s property. Wherefore
Therefore also good and bad actions differ in species.
in so far as the object is something positive, it can consti-
I answer that, Every action derives its species from
tute the species of an evil act.
its object, as stated above (a. 2). Hence it follows that
Reply to Objection 3. The conjugal act and adul-
a difference of object causes a difference of species in
tery, as compared to reason, differ specifically and have
actions. Now, it must be observed that a difference of
effects specifically different; because the other deserves
objects causes a difference of species in actions, accord-
praise and reward, the other, blame and punishment. But
ing as the latter are referred to one active principle, which
as compared to the generative power, they do not differ in
does not cause a difference in actions, according as they
species; and thus they have one specific effect.
are referred to another active principle. Because nothing
Reply to Objection 4. A circumstance is sometimes
accidental constitutes a species, but only that which is es-
taken as the essential difference of the object, as compared
sential; and a difference of object may be essential in ref-
to reason; and then it can specify a moral act. And it must
erence to one active principle, and accidental in reference
needs be so whenever a circumstance transforms an action
to another. Thus to know color and to know sound, differ
from good to evil; for a circumstance would not make an
essentially in reference to sense, but not in reference to
action evil, except through being repugnant to reason.
685
Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?
Ia IIae q. 18 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the good and evil
the object of the interior act of the will: while the ob-
which are from the end do not diversify the species of ac-
ject of the external action, is that on which the action is
tions. For actions derive their species from the object. But
brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action takes
the end is altogether apart from the object. Therefore the
its species from the object on which it bears; so the inte-
good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the
rior act of the will takes its species from the end, as from
species of an action.
its own proper object.
Objection 2. Further, that which is accidental does
Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in
not constitute the species, as stated above (a. 5). But it is
regard to that which is on the part of the external action:
accidental to an action to be ordained to some particular
because the will uses the limbs to act as instruments; nor
end; for instance, to give alms from vainglory. Therefore
have external actions any measure of morality, save in so
actions are not diversified as to species, according to the
far as they are voluntary. Consequently the species of a
good and evil which are from the end.
human act is considered formally with regard to the end,
Objection 3. Further, acts that differ in species, can be but materially with regard to the object of the external ac-ordained to the same end: thus to the end of vainglory, ac-
tion. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that “he
tions of various virtues and vices can be ordained. There-
who steals that he may commit adultery, is strictly speak-
fore the good and evil which are taken from the end, do
ing, more adulterer than thief.”
not diversify the species of action.
Reply to Objection 1. The end also has the character
On the contrary, It has been shown above (q. 1,
of an object, as stated above.
a. 3) that human actions derive their species from the end.
Reply to Objection 2. Although it is accidental to the
Therefore good and evil in respect of the end diversify the
external action to be ordained to some particular end, it is
species of actions.
not accidental to the interior act of the will, which act is
I answer that, Certain actions are called human, inas-
compared to the external act, as form to matter.
much as they are voluntary, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1).
Reply to Objection 3. When many actions, differing
Now, in a voluntary action, there is a twofold action, viz.
in species, are ordained to the same end, there is indeed a
the interior action of the will, and the external action: and
diversity of species on the part of the external actions; but
each of these actions has its object. The end is properly
unity of species on the part of the internal action.
Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from Ia IIae q. 18 a. 7
the object, as under its genus, or conversely?
Objection 1. It would seem that the species of good-
derived from the end, is more formal than that which is
ness derived from the end is contained under the species
derived from the object, as stated above (a. 6). There-
of goodness derived from the object, as a species is con-
fore the species derived from the end is contained under
tained under its genus; for instance, when a man commits
the species derived from the object, as the most specific
a theft in order to give alms. For an action takes its species
species is contained under the subaltern genus.
from its object, as stated above (Aa. 2,6). But it is impos-
On the contrary, Each genus has its determinate dif-
sible for a thing to be contained under another species, if
ferences. But an action of one same species on the part of
this species be not contained under the proper species of
its object, can be ordained to an infinite number of ends:
that thing; because the same thing cannot be contained in
for instance, theft can be ordained to an infinite number
different species that are not subordinate to one another.
of good and bad ends. Therefore the species derived from
Therefore the species which is taken from the end, is con-
the end is not contained under the species derived from
tained under the species which is taken from the object.
the object, as under its genus.
Objection 2. Further, the last difference always con-
I answer that, The object of the external act can stand
stitutes the most specific species. But the difference de-
in a twofold relation to the end of the will: first, as be-
rived from the end seems to come after the difference de-
ing of itself ordained thereto; thus to fight well is of itself rived from the object: because the end is something last.
ordained to victory; secondly, as being ordained thereto
Therefore the species derived from the end, is contained
accidentally; thus to take what belongs to another is or-
under the species derived from the object, as its most spe-
dained accidentally to the giving of alms. Now the dif-
cific species.
ferences that divide a genus, and constitute the species of
Objection 3. Further, the more formal a difference
that genus, must, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii,
is compared to genus, as form to matter. But the species
12), divide that genus essentially: and if they divide it
686
accidentally, the division is incorrect: as, if one were to this it follows that the specific difference derived from the
say: “Animals are divided into rational and irrational; and
end, is more general; and that the difference derived from
the irrational into animals with wings, and animals with-
an object which of itself is ordained to that end, is a spe-
out wings”; for “winged” and “wingless” are not essential
cific difference in relation to the former. For the will, the
determinations of the irrational being. But the following
proper object of which is the end, is the universal mover
division would be correct: “Some animals have feet, some
in respect of all the powers of the soul, the proper objects
have no feet: and of those that have feet, some have two
of which are the objects of their particular acts.
feet, some four, some many”: because the latter division
Reply to Objection 1. One and the same thing, con-
is an essential determination of the former. Accordingly
sidered in its substance, cannot be in two species, one of
when the object is not of itself ordained to the end, the
which is not subordinate to the other. But in respect of
specific difference derived from the object is not an essen-
those things which are superadded to the substance, one
tial determination of the species derived from the end, nor
thing can be contained under different species. Thus one
is the reverse the case. Wherefore one of these species is
and the same fruit, as to its color, is contained under one
not under the other; but then the moral action is contained
species, i.e. a white thing: and, as to its perfume, un-
under two species that are disparate, as it were. Conse-
der the species of sweet-smelling things. In like man-
quently we say that he that commits theft for the sake of
ner an action which, as to its substance, is in one natural
adultery, is guilty of a twofold malice in one action. On
species, considered in respect to the moral conditions that
the other hand, if the object be of itself ordained to the
are added to it, can belong to two species, as stated above
end, one of these differences is an essential determination
(q. 1, a. 3, ad 3).
of the other. Wherefore one of these species will be con-
Reply to Objection 2. The end is last in execution;
tained under the other.
but first in the intention of the reason, in regard to which
It remains to be considered which of the two is con-
moral actions receive their species.
tained under the other. In order to make this clear, we
Reply to Objection 3.
Difference is compared to
must first of all observe that the more particular the form
genus as form to matter, inasmuch as it actualizes the
is from which a difference is taken, the more specific is
genus. On the other hand, the genus is considered as more
the difference. Secondly, that the more universal an agent
formal than the species, inasmuch as it is something more
is, the more universal a form does it cause. Thirdly, that
absolute and less contracted. Wherefore also the parts of
the more remote an end is, the more universal the agent
a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as
to which it corresponds; thus victory, which is the last
is stated in Phys. ii, 3. And in this sense the genus is the
end of the army, is the end intended by the commander in
formal cause of the species; and so much the more formal,
chief; while the right ordering of this or that regiment is
as it is more universal.
the end intended by one of the lower officers. From all
Whether any action is indifferent in its species?
Ia IIae q. 18 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that no action is indiffer-
and none is indifferent.
ent in its species. For evil is the privation of good, ac-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
cording to Augustine (Enchiridion xi). But privation and
in Monte ii, 18) that “there are certain deeds of a mid-
habit are immediate contraries, according to the Philoso-
dle kind, which can be done with a good or evil mind,
pher (Categor. viii). Therefore there is not such thing as
of which it is rash to form a judgment.” Therefore some
an action that is indifferent in its species, as though it were actions are indifferent according to their species.
between good and evil.
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 2,5), every ac-
Objection 2.
Further, human actions derive their
tion takes its species from its object; while human action,
species from their end or object, as stated above (a. 6; q. 1,
which is called moral, takes its species from the object,
a. 3). But every end and every object is either good or bad.
in relation to the principle of human actions, which is
Therefore every human action is good or evil according to
the reason. Wherefore if the object of an action includes
its species. None, therefore, is indifferent in its species.
something in accord with the order of reason, it will be
Objection 3. Further, as stated above (a. 1), an ac-
a good action according to its species; for instance, to
tion is said to be good, when it has its due complement of
give alms to a person in want. On the other hand, if it
goodness; and evil, when it lacks that complement. But
includes something repugnant to the order of reason, it
every action must needs either have the entire plenitude
will be an evil act according to its species; for instance, to
of its goodness, or lack it in some respect. Therefore ev-
steal, which is to appropriate what belongs to another. But
ery action must needs be either good or bad in its species,
it may happen that the object of an action does not include
687
something pertaining to the order of reason; for instance, as Simplicius says in his commentary on the Categories:
to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields,
because it does not take away all good, but leaves some.
and the like: and such actions are indifferent according to
Consequently there can be something between good and
their species.
evil.
Reply to Objection 1. Privation is twofold. One is
Reply to Objection 2. Every object or end has some
privation “as a result” [privatum esse], and this leaves
goodness or malice, at least natural to it: but this does not
nothing, but takes all away: thus blindness takes away
imply moral goodness or malice, which is considered in
sight altogether; darkness, light; and death, life.
Be-
relation to the reason, as stated above. And it is of this
tween this privation and the contrary habit, there can be
that we are here treating.
no medium in respect of the proper subject. The other
Reply to Objection 3. Not everything belonging to an
is privation “in process” [privari]: thus sickness is priva-
action belongs also to its species. Wherefore although an
tion of health; not that it takes health away altogether, but
action’s specific nature may not contain all that belongs to
that it is a kind of road to the entire loss of health, occa-
the full complement of its goodness, it is not therefore an
sioned by death. And since this sort of privation leaves
action specifically bad; nor is it specifically good. Thus a
something, it is not always the immediate contrary of the
man in regard to his species is neither virtuous nor wicked.
opposite habit. In this way evil is a privation of good,
Whether an individual action can be indifferent?
Ia IIae q. 18 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that an individual action
as something belongs to a man by reason of his individ-
can be indifferent. For there is no species that does not,
ual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason of
cannot, contain an individual. But an action can be indif-
his species. And every individual action must needs have
ferent in its species, as stated above (a. 8). Therefore an
some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in
individual action can be indifferent.
respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to
Objection 2. Further, individual actions cause like
the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from delib-
habits, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a habit can be in-
erate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that
different: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those
fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of
who are of an even temper and prodigal disposition are
evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with
not evil; and yet it is evident that they are not good, since
reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it
they depart from virtue; and thus they are indifferent in
must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end.
respect of a habit. Therefore some individual actions are
Consequently every human action that proceeds from de-
indifferent.
liberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must
Objection 3. Further, moral good belongs to virtue,
be good or bad.
while moral evil belongs to vice. But it happens some-
If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate rea-
times that a man fails to ordain a specifically indifferent
son, but from some act of the imagination, as when a man
action to a vicious or virtuous end. Therefore an individ-
strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot; such an ac-
ual action may happen to be indifferent.
tion, properly speaking, is not moral or human; since this
On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily (vi in
depends on the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as
Evang.): “An idle word is one that lacks either the useful-
standing apart from the genus of moral actions.
ness of rectitude or the motive of just necessity or pious
Reply to Objection 1. For an action to be indifferent
utility.” But an idle word is an evil, because “men. . . shall
in its species can be understood in several ways. First in
render an account of it in the day of judgment” (Mat.
such a way that its species demands that it remain indif-
12:36): while if it does not lack the motive of just ne-
ferent; and the objection proceeds along this line. But no
cessity or pious utility, it is good. Therefore every word
action can be specifically indifferent thus: since no ob-
is either good or bad. For the same reason every other ac-
ject of human action is such that it cannot be directed to
tion is either good or bad. Therefore no individual action
good or evil, either through its end or through a circum-
is indifferent.
stance. Secondly, specific indifference of an action may
I answer that, It sometimes happens that an action is
be due to the fact that as far as its species is concerned, it
indifferent in its species, but considered in the individual
is neither good nor bad. Wherefore it can be made good
it is good or evil. And the reason of this is because a moral
or bad by something else. Thus man, as far as his species
action, as stated above (a. 3), derives its goodness not only
is concerned, is neither white nor black; nor is it a con-
from its object, whence it takes its species; but also from
dition of his species that he should not be black or white;
the circumstances, which are its accidents, as it were; just
but blackness or whiteness is superadded to man by other
688
principles than those of his species.
Reply to Objection 3. Whenever an end is intended
Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher states that a
by deliberate reason, it belongs either to the good of some
man is evil, properly speaking, if he be hurtful to oth-
virtue, or to the evil of some vice. Thus, if a man’s action
ers. And accordingly, because he hurts none save himself.
is directed to the support or repose of his body, it is also
And the same applies to all others who are not hurtful to
directed to the good of virtue, provided he direct his body
other men. But we say here that evil, in general, is all
itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly applies to
that is repugnant to right reason. And in this sense every
other actions.
individual action is either good or bad, as stated above.
Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil?
Ia IIae q. 18 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that a circumstance can-
object that determines the action’s species. Thus to ap-
not place a moral action in the species of good or evil.
propriate another’s property is specified by reason of the
For the species of an action is taken from its object. But
property being “another’s,” and in this respect it is placed
circumstances differ from the object. Therefore circum-
in the species of theft; and if we consider that action also
stances do not give an action its species.
in its bearing on place or time, then this will be an ad-
Objection 2. Further, circumstances are as accidents
ditional circumstance. But since the reason can direct as
in relation to the moral action, as stated above (q. 7, a. 1).
to place, time, and the like, it may happen that the condi-
But an accident does not constitute the species. Therefore
tion as to place, in relation to the object, is considered as
a circumstance does not constitute a species of good or
being in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason for-
evil.
bids damage to be done to a holy place. Consequently to
Objection 3.
Further, one thing is not in several
steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to
species. But one action has several circumstances. There-
the order of reason. And thus place, which was first of
fore a circumstance does not place a moral action in a
all considered as a circumstance, is considered here as the
species of good or evil.
principal condition of the object, and as itself repugnant
On the contrary, Place is a circumstance. But place
to reason. And in this way, whenever a circumstance has
makes a moral action to be in a certain species of evil; for
a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must
theft of a thing from a holy place is a sacrilege. There-
needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.
fore a circumstance makes a moral action to be specifi-
Reply to Objection 1. A circumstance, in so far as
cally good or bad.
it specifies an action, is considered as a condition of the
I answer that, Just as the species of natural things are object, as stated above, and as being, as it were, a specific
constituted by their natural forms, so the species of moral
difference thereof.
actions are constituted by forms as conceived by the rea-
Reply to Objection 2. A circumstance, so long as it
son, as is evident from what was said above (a. 5). But
is but a circumstance, does not specify an action, since
since nature is determinate to one thing, nor can a process
thus it is a mere accident: but when it becomes a principal
of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some ul-
condition of the object, then it does specify the action.
timate form, giving a specific difference, after which no
Reply to Objection 3. It is not every circumstance
further specific difference is possible. Hence it is that in
that places the moral action in the species of good or evil;
natural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot
since not every circumstance implies accord or disaccord
be taken as a difference constituting the species. But the
with reason. Consequently, although one action may have
process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, for
many circumstances, it does not follow that it is in many
at any point it can still proceed further. And consequently
species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one action
that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added
should not be in several, even disparate, moral species, as
to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken
said above (a. 7, ad 1; q. 1, a. 3, ad 3).
by the directing reason, as the principal condition of the
Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places a moral Ia IIae q. 18 a. 11
action in a species of good or evil?
Objection 1. It would seem that every circumstance
of a moral action, causes a specific difference, which is
relating to good or evil, specifies an action. For good and
the same as to make it differ in species. Now that which
evil are specific differences of moral actions. Therefore
makes an action better or worse, makes it differ in good-
that which causes a difference in the goodness or malice
ness and malice. Therefore it causes it to differ in species.
689
Therefore every circumstance that makes an action better take something in a large or small quantity, does not re-or worse, constitutes a species.
gard the order of reason in respect of good or evil, except
Objection 2. Further, an additional circumstance ei-
a certain other condition be presupposed, from which the
ther has in itself the character of goodness or malice, or it
action takes its malice or goodness; for instance, if what
has not. If not, it cannot make the action better or worse;
is taken belongs to another, which makes the action to be
because what is not good, cannot make a greater good;
discordant with reason. Wherefore to take what belongs
and what is not evil, cannot make a greater evil. But if
to another in a large or small quantity, does not change the
it has in itself the character of good or evil, for this very
species of the sin. Nevertheless it can aggravate or dimin-
reason it has a certain species of good or evil. Therefore
ish the sin. The same applies to other evil or good actions.
every circumstance that makes an action better or worse,
Consequently not every circumstance that makes a moral
constitutes a new species of good or evil.
action better or worse, changes its species.
Objection 3. Further, according to Dionysius (Div.
Reply to Objection 1. In things which can be more or
Nom. iv), “evil is caused by each single defect.” Now
less intense, the difference of more or less does not change
every circumstance that increases malice, has a special
the species: thus by differing in whiteness through being
defect. Therefore every such circumstance adds a new
more or less white a thing is not changed in regard to its
species of sin.
And for the same reason, every cir-
species of color. In like manner that which makes an ac-
cumstance that increases goodness, seems to add a new
tion to be more or less good or evil, does not make the
species of goodness: just as every unity added to a number
action differ in species.
makes a new species of number; since the good consists
Reply to Objection 2. A circumstance that aggravates
in “number, weight, and measure” ( Ia, q. 5, a. 5).
a sin, or adds to the goodness of an action, sometimes has
On the contrary, More and less do not change a
no goodness or malice in itself, but in regard to some other
species. But more and less is a circumstance of addi-
condition of the action, as stated above. Consequently it
tional goodness or malice. Therefore not every circum-
does not add a new species, but adds to the goodness or
stance that makes a moral action better or worse, places it
malice derived from this other condition of the action.
in a species of good or evil.
Reply to Objection 3. A circumstance does not al-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 10), a circumstance
ways involve a distinct defect of its own; sometimes it
gives the species of good or evil to a moral action, in so
causes a defect in reference to something else. In like
far as it regards a special order of reason. Now it happens
manner a circumstance does not always add further per-
sometimes that a circumstance does not regard a special
fection, except in reference to something else. And, for as
order of reason in respect of good or evil, except on the
much as it does, although it may add to the goodness or
supposition of another previous circumstance, from which
malice, it does not always change the species of good or
the moral action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to
evil.
690
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 19
Of the Goodness and Malice of the Interior Act of the Will
(In Ten Articles)
We must now consider the goodness of the interior act of the will; under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether the goodness of the will depends on the subject?
(2) Whether it depends on the object alone?
(3) Whether it depends on reason?
(4) Whether it depends on the eternal law?
(5) Whether erring reason binds?
(6) Whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against the law of God?
(7) Whether the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depends on the intention of the end?
(8) Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention?
(9) Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine Will?
(10) Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine Will, as regards the thing willed?
Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object?
Ia IIae q. 19 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the goodness of the
is from the fact that a man wills that which is good.
will does not depend on the object. For the will cannot be
I answer that, Good and evil are essential differences
directed otherwise than to what is good: since “evil is out-
of the act of the will. Because good and evil of themselves
side the scope of the will,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
regard the will; just as truth and falsehood regard reason;
iv). If therefore the goodness of the will depended on the
the act of which is divided essentially by the difference
object, it would follow that every act of the will is good,
of truth and falsehood, for as much as an opinion is said
and none bad.
to be true or false. Consequently good and evil will are
Objection 2. Further, good is first of all in the end:
acts differing in species. Now the specific difference in
wherefore the goodness of the end, as such, does not de-
acts is according to objects, as stated above (q. 18, a. 5).
pend on any other. But, according to the Philosopher
Therefore good and evil in the acts of the will is derived
(Ethic. vi, 5), “goodness of action is the end, but good-
properly from the objects.
ness of making is never the end”: because the latter is
Reply to Objection 1. The will is not always directed
always ordained to the thing made, as to its end. There-
to what is truly good, but sometimes to the apparent good;
fore the goodness of the act of the will does not depend
which has indeed some measure of good, but not of a good
on any object.
that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence it is that the
Objection 3. Further, such as a thing is, such does it
act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil.
make a thing to be. But the object of the will is good, by
Reply to Objection 2. Although an action can, in a
reason of the goodness of nature. Therefore it cannot give
certain way, be man’s last end; nevertheless such action is
moral goodness to the will. Therefore the moral goodness
not an act of the will, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1, ad 2).
of the will does not depend on the object.
Reply to Objection 3. Good is presented to the will
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1)
as its object by the reason: and in so far as it is in accord
that justice is that habit “from which men wish for just
with reason, it enters the moral order, and causes moral
things”: and accordingly, virtue is a habit from which men
goodness in the act of the will: because the reason is the
wish for good things. But a good will is one which is in
principle of human and moral acts, as stated above (q. 18,
accordance with virtue. Therefore the goodness of the will
a. 5).
691
Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone?
Ia IIae q. 19 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the goodness of the
depend on several things.
will does not depend on the object alone. For the end has
Now that one thing which is the principle in each
a closer relationship to the will than to any other power.
genus, is not something accidental to that genus, but
But the acts of the other powers derive goodness not only
something essential thereto: because whatever is acciden-
from the object but also from the end, as we have shown
tal is reduced to something essential, as to its principle.
above (q. 18 , a. 4). Therefore the act also of the will de-
Therefore the goodness of the will’s act depends on that
rives goodness not only from the object but also from the
one thing alone, which of itself causes goodness in the act;
end.
and that one thing is the object, and not the circumstances,
Objection 2. Further, the goodness of an action is
which are accidents, as it were, of the act.
derived not only from the object but also from the circum-
Reply to Objection 1. The end is the object of the
stances, as stated above (q. 18, a. 3). But according to
will, but not of the other powers. Hence, in regard to the
the diversity of circumstances there may be diversity of
act of the will, the goodness derived from the object, does
goodness and malice in the act of the will: for instance,
not differ from that which is derived from the end, as they
if a man will, when he ought, where he ought, as much
differ in the acts of the other powers; except perhaps acci-
as he ought, and how he ought, or if he will as he ought
dentally, in so far as one end depends on another, and one
not. Therefore the goodness of the will depends not only
act of the will on another.
on the object, but also on the circumstances.
Reply to Objection 2. Given that the act of the will
Objection 3. Further, ignorance of circumstances ex-
is fixed on some good, no circumstances can make that
cuses malice of the will, as stated above (q. 6, a. 8). But it
act bad. Consequently when it is said that a man wills
would not be so, unless the goodness or malice of the will
a good when he ought not, or where he ought not, this
depended on the circumstances. Therefore the goodness
can be understood in two ways. First, so that this circum-
and malice of the will depend on the circumstances, and
stance is referred to the thing willed. And thus the act of
not only on the object.
the will is not fixed on something good: since to will to
On the contrary, An action does not take its species
do something when it ought not to be done, is not to will
from the circumstances as such, as stated above (q. 18,
something good. Secondly, so that the circumstance is re-
a. 10, ad 2). But good and evil are specific differences
ferred to the act of willing. And thus, it is impossible to
of the act of the will, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore
will something good when one ought not to, because one
the goodness and malice of the will depend, not on the
ought always to will what is good: except, perhaps, ac-
circumstances, but on the object alone.
cidentally, in so far as a man by willing some particular
I answer that, In every genus, the more a thing is first, good, is prevented from willing at the same time another
the more simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which
good which he ought to will at that time. And then evil
it consists: thus primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to
results, not from his willing that particular good, but from
be observed that the first things in every genus, are, in
his not willing the other. The same applies to the other
some way, simple and consist of one principle. Now the
circumstances.
principle of the goodness and malice of human actions is
Reply to Objection 3. Ignorance of circumstances
taken from the act of the will. Consequently the good-
excuses malice of the will, in so far as the circumstance
ness and malice of the act of the will depend on some one
affects the thing willed: that is to say, in so far as a man
thing; while the goodness and malice of other acts may
ignores the circumstances of the act which he wills.
Whether the goodness of the will depends on reason?
Ia IIae q. 19 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the goodness of the
reason depends on the goodness of the will, rather than
will does not depend on reason. For what comes first does
conversely.
not depend on what follows. But the good belongs to the
Objection 3. Further, the mover does not depend on
will before it belongs to reason, as is clear from what has
that which is moved, but vice versa. But the will moves
been said above (q. 9, a. 1). Therefore the goodness of the
the reason and the other powers, as stated above (q. 9,
will does not depend on reason.
a. 1). Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
on reason.
2) that the goodness of the practical intellect is “a truth
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. x): “It is an
that is in conformity with right desire.” But right desire
unruly will that persists in its desires in opposition to rea-
is a good will. Therefore the goodness of the practical
son.” But the goodness of the will consists in not being
692
unruly. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its the reason. But considered as true it pertains to the rea-being subject to reason.
son, before, under the aspect of goodness, pertaining to
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2), the goodness
the will: because the will cannot desire a good that is not
of the will depends properly on the object. Now the will’s
previously apprehended by reason.
object is proposed to it by reason. Because the good un-
Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher speaks here
derstood is the proportionate object of the will; while sen-
of the practical intellect, in so far as it counsels and rea-
sitive or imaginary good is proportionate not to the will
sons about the means: for in this respect it is perfected by
but to the sensitive appetite: since the will can tend to
prudence. Now in regard to the means, the rectitude of
the universal good, which reason apprehends; whereas the
the reason depends on its conformity with the desire of a
sensitive appetite tends only to the particular good, appre-
due end: nevertheless the very desire of the due end pre-
hended by the sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of
supposes on the part of reason a right apprehension of the
the will depends on reason, in the same way as it depends
end.
on the object.
Reply to Objection 3. The will moves the reason in
Reply to Objection 1. The good considered as such,
one way: the reason moves the will in another, viz. on the
i.e. as appetible, pertains to the will before pertaining to
part of the object, as stated above (q. 9, a. 1).
Whether the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law?
Ia IIae q. 19 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the goodness of the
only in virtue of the first. Now it is from the eternal law,
human will does not depend on the eternal law. Because
which is the Divine Reason, that human reason is the rule
to one thing there is one rule and one measure. But the
of the human will, from which the human derives its good-
rule of the human will, on which its goodness depends, is
ness. Hence it is written (Ps. 4:6,7): “Many say: Who
right reason. Therefore the goodness of the will does not
showeth us good things? The light of Thy countenance,
depend on the eternal law.
O Lord, is signed upon us”: as though to say: “The light
Objection 2. Further, “a measure is homogeneous
of our reason is able to show us good things, and guide
with the thing measured” (Metaph. x, 1). But the eter-
our will, in so far as it is the light (i.e. derived from) Thy
nal law is not homogeneous with the human will. There-
countenance.” It is therefore evident that the goodness
fore the eternal law cannot be the measure on which the
of the human will depends on the eternal law much more
goodness of the human will depends.
than on human reason: and when human reason fails we
Objection 3. Further, a measure should be most cer-
must have recourse to the Eternal Reason.
tain. But the eternal law is unknown to us. Therefore it
Reply to Objection 1. To one thing there are not sev-
cannot be the measure on which the goodness of our will
eral proximate measures; but there can be several mea-
depends.
sures if one is subordinate to the other.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii,
Reply to Objection 2. A proximate measure is ho-
27) that “sin is a deed, word or desire against the eternal
mogeneous with the thing measured; a remote measure is
law.” But malice of the will is the root of sin. Therefore,
not.
since malice is contrary to goodness, the goodness of the
Reply to Objection 3. Although the eternal law is un-
will depends on the eternal law.
known to us according as it is in the Divine Mind: never-
I answer that, Wherever a number of causes are sub-
theless, it becomes known to us somewhat, either by natu-
ordinate to one another, the effect depends more on the
ral reason which is derived therefrom as its proper image;
first than on the second cause: since the second cause acts
or by some sort of additional revelation.
Whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason?
Ia IIae q. 19 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not evil
command of a lower authority does not bind if it be con-
when it is at variance with erring reason. Because the rea-
trary to the command of a higher authority: for instance, if
son is the rule of the human will, in so far as it is derived
a provincial governor command something that is forbid-
from the eternal law, as stated above (a. 4). But erring rea-
den by the emperor. But erring reason sometimes pro-
son is not derived from the eternal law. Therefore erring
poses what is against the command of a higher power,
reason is not the rule of the human will. Therefore the will
namely, God Whose power is supreme. Therefore the de-
is not evil, if it be at variance with erring reason.
cision of an erring reason does not bind. Consequently the
Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine, the
will is not evil if it be at variance with erring reason.
693
Objection 3. Further, every evil will is reducible to proposed by the reason as being evil, the will by tending
some species of malice. But the will that is at variance
thereto becomes evil. And this is the case not only in in-
with erring reason is not reducible to some species of mal-
different matters, but also in those that are good or evil in
ice. For instance, if a man’s reason err in telling him to
themselves. For not only indifferent matters can received
commit fornication, his will in not willing to do so, can-
the character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also
not be reduced to any species of malice. Therefore the
that which is good, can receive the character of evil, or
will is not evil when it is at variance with erring reason.
that which is evil, can receive the character of goodness,
On the contrary, As stated in the Ia, q. 79, a. 13, con-
on account of the reason apprehending it as such. For
science is nothing else than the application of knowledge
instance, to refrain from fornication is good: yet the will
to some action. Now knowledge is in the reason. There-
does not tend to this good except in so far as it is proposed
fore when the will is at variance with erring reason, it is
by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose it as
against conscience. But every such will is evil; for it is
an evil, the will tends to it as to something evil. Conse-
written (Rom. 14:23): “All that is not of faith”—i.e. all
quently the will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed
that is against conscience—“is sin.” Therefore the will is
that which is evil in itself, but that which is evil acciden-
evil when it is at variance with erring reason.
tally, through being apprehended as such by the reason.
I answer that, Since conscience is a kind of dictate of
In like manner, to believe in Christ is good in itself, and
the reason (for it is an application of knowledge to action,
necessary for salvation: but the will does not tend thereto,
as was stated in the Ia, q. 19, a. 13), to inquire whether the
except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason. Conse-
will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason, is the
quently if it be proposed by the reason as something evil,
same as to inquire “whether an erring conscience binds.”
the will tends to it as to something evil: not as if it were
On this matter, some distinguished three kinds of actions:
evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the for some are good generically; some are indifferent; some
apprehension of the reason. Hence the Philosopher says
are evil generically. And they say that if reason or con-
(Ethic. vii, 9) that “properly speaking the incontinent man
science tell us to do something which is good generically,
is one who does not follow right reason; but accidentally,
there is no error: and in like manner if it tell us not to do
he is also one who does not follow false reason.” We must
something which is evil generically; since it is the same
therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at
reason that prescribes what is good and forbids what is
variance with reason, whether right or erring, is always
evil. On the other hand if a man’s reason or conscience
evil.
tells him that he is bound by precept to do what is evil in
Reply to Objection 1. Although the judgment of an
itself; or that what is good in itself, is forbidden, then his
erring reason is not derived from God, yet the erring rea-
reason or conscience errs. In like manner if a man’s rea-
son puts forward its judgment as being true, and conse-
son or conscience tell him, that what is indifferent in itself, quently as being derived from God, from Whom is all
for instance to raise a straw from the ground, is forbidden
truth.
or commanded, his reason or conscience errs. They say,
Reply to Objection 2. The saying of Augustine holds
therefore, that reason or conscience when erring in mat-
good when it is known that the inferior authority pre-
ters of indifference, either by commanding or by forbid-
scribes something contrary to the command of the higher
ding them, binds: so that the will which is at variance with
authority. But if a man were to believe the command
that erring reason is evil and sinful. But they say that when
of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in
reason or conscience errs in commanding what is evil in
scorning the command of the proconsul he would scorn
itself, or in forbidding what is good in itself and necessary
the command of the emperor. In like manner if a man
for salvation, it does not bind; wherefore in such cases the
were to know that human reason was dictating something
will which is at variance with erring reason or conscience
contrary to God’s commandment, he would not be bound
is not evil.
to abide by reason: but then reason would not be entirely
But this is unreasonable. For in matters of indiffer-
erroneous. But when erring reason proposes something
ence, the will that is at variance with erring reason or con-
as being commanded by God, then to scorn the dictate of
science, is evil in some way on account of the object, on
reason is to scorn the commandment of God.
which the goodness or malice of the will depends; not in-
Reply to Objection 3. Whenever reason apprehends
deed on account of the object according as it is in its own
something as evil, it apprehends it under some species of
nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by
evil; for instance, as being something contrary to a divine
reason as something evil to do or to avoid. And since the
precept, or as giving scandal, or for some such like reason.
object of the will is that which is proposed by the reason,
And then that evil is reduced to that species of malice.
as stated above (a. 3), from the very fact that a thing is
694
Whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason?
Ia IIae q. 19 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the will is good when
untary, which is due to negligence, by reason of a man not
it abides by erring reason. For just as the will, when
wishing to know what he ought to know, as stated above
at variance with the reason, tends to that which reason
(q. 6, a. 8).
judges to be evil; so, when in accord with reason, it tends
If then reason or conscience err with an error that is
to what reason judges to be good. But the will is evil when
involuntary, either directly, or through negligence, so that
it is at variance with reason, even when erring. Therefore
one errs about what one ought to know; then such an er-
even when it abides by erring reason, the will is good.
ror of reason or conscience does not excuse the will, that
Objection 2. Further, the will is always good, when
abides by that erring reason or conscience, from being
it abides by the commandment of God and the eternal
evil. But if the error arise from ignorance of some circum-
law. But the eternal law and God’s commandment are pro-
stance, and without any negligence, so that it cause the act
posed to us by the apprehension of the reason, even when
to be involuntary, then that error of reason or conscience
it errs. Therefore the will is good, even when it abides by
excuses the will, that abides by that erring reason, from
erring reason.
being evil. For instance, if erring reason tell a man that
Objection 3. Further, the will is evil when it is at vari-he should go to another man’s wife, the will that abides
ance with erring reason. If, therefore, the will is evil also
by that erring reason is evil; since this error arises from
when it abides by erring reason, it seems that the will is
ignorance of the Divine Law, which he is bound to know.
always evil when in conjunction with erring reason: so
But if a man’s reason, errs in mistaking another for his
that in such a case a man would be in a dilemma, and, of
wife, and if he wish to give her her right when she asks for
necessity, would sin: which is unreasonable. Therefore
it, his will is excused from being evil: because this error
the will is good when it abides by erring reason.
arises from ignorance of a circumstance, which ignorance
On the contrary, The will of those who slew the apos-
excuses, and causes the act to be involuntary.
tles was evil. And yet it was in accord with the erring
Reply to Objection 1. As Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
reason, according to Jn. 16:2: “The hour cometh, that
iv), “good results from the entire cause, evil from each
whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a service to
particular defect.” Consequently in order that the thing to
God.” Therefore the will can be evil, when it abides by
which the will tends be called evil, it suffices, either that
erring reason.
it be evil in itself, or that it be apprehended as evil. But in I answer that, Whereas the previous question is the
order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways.
same as inquiring “whether an erring conscience binds”;
Reply to Objection 2. The eternal law cannot err, but
so this question is the same as inquiring “whether an
human reason can. Consequently the will that abides by
erring conscience excuses.” Now this question depends
human reason, is not always right, nor is it always in ac-
on what has been said above about ignorance. For it was
cord with the eternal law.
said (q. 6, a. 8) that ignorance sometimes causes an act to
Reply to Objection 3. Just as in syllogistic argu-
be involuntary, and sometimes not. And since moral good
ments, granted one absurdity, others must needs follow;
and evil consist in action in so far as it is voluntary, as
so in moral matters, given one absurdity, others must fol-
was stated above (a. 2); it is evident that when ignorance
low too. Thus suppose a man to seek vainglory, he will
causes an act to be involuntary, it takes away the character
sin, whether he does his duty for vainglory or whether he
of moral good and evil; but not, when it does not cause
omit to do it. Nor is he in a dilemma about the matter: be-
the act to be involuntary. Again, it has been stated above
cause he can put aside his evil intention. In like manner,
(q. 6, a. 8) that when ignorance is in any way willed, either
suppose a man’s reason or conscience to err through inex-
directly or indirectly, it does not cause the act to be invol-
cusable ignorance, then evil must needs result in the will.
untary. And I call that ignorance “directly” voluntary, to
Nor is this man in a dilemma: because he can lay aside
which the act of the will tends: and that, “indirectly” vol-
his error, since his ignorance is vincible and voluntary.
Whether the goodness of the will, as regards the means, depends on the intention of Ia IIae q. 19 a. 7
the end?
Objection 1. It would seem that the goodness of the
is another. Therefore in such matters the goodness of the
will does not depend on the intention of the end. For it
will does not depend on the intention of the end.
has been stated above (a. 2) that the goodness of the will
Objection 2. Further, to wish to keep God’s com-
depends on the object alone. But as regards the means,
mandment, belongs to a good will. But this can be re-
the object of the will is one thing, and the end intended
ferred to an evil end, for instance, to vainglory or cov-
695
etousness, by willing to obey God for the sake of temporal when it is added to a preceding act of the will; for in-gain. Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend
stance, a man may will to do something, and may after-
on the intention of the end.
wards refer it to God. And then the goodness of the pre-
Objection 3. Further, just as good and evil diversify
vious act of the will does not depend on the subsequent
the will, so do they diversify the end. But malice of the
intention, except in so far as that act is repeated with the
will does not depend on the malice of the end intended;
subsequent intention.
since a man who wills to steal in order to give alms, has
Reply to Objection 1. When the intention is the cause
an evil will, although he intends a good end. Therefore
of the act of willing, the order to the end is considered as
neither does the goodness of the will depend on the good-
the reason of the goodness of the object, as stated above.
ness of the end intended.
Reply to Objection 2. The act of the will cannot be
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ix, 3) that
said to be good, if an evil intention is the cause of will-
God rewards the intention. But God rewards a thing be-
ing. For when a man wills to give an alms for the sake
cause it is good. Therefore the goodness of the will de-
of vainglory, he wills that which is good in itself, under a
pends on the intention of the end.
species of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it is evil.
I answer that, The intention may stand in a twofold
Wherefore his will is evil. If, however, the intention is
relation to the act of the will; first, as preceding it, sec-
subsequent to the act of the will, then the latter may be
ondly as following∗ it. The intention precedes the act of
good: and the intention does not spoil that act of the will
the will causally, when we will something because we in-
which preceded, but that which is repeated.
tend a certain end. And then the order to the end is con-
Reply to Objection 3. As we have already stated (a. 6,
sidered as the reason of the goodness of the thing willed:
ad 1), “evil results from each particular defect, but good
for instance, when a man wills to fast for God’s sake; be-
from the whole and entire cause.” Hence, whether the
cause the act of fasting is specifically good from the very
will tend to what is evil in itself, even under the species of
fact that it is done for God’s sake. Wherefore, since the
good; or to the good under the species of evil, it will be
goodness of the will depends on the goodness of the thing
evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good, it
willed, as stated above (Aa. 1,2), it must, of necessity, de-
must tend to the good under the species of good; in other
pend on the intention of the end.
words, it must will the good for the sake of the good.
On the other hand, intention follows the act of the will,
Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good Ia IIae q. 19 a. 8
or evil in the intention?
Objection 1. It would seem that the degree of good-
I answer that, In regard to both the act, and the in-
ness in the will depends on the degree of good in the in-
tention of the end, we may consider a twofold quantity:
tention. Because on Mat. 12:35, “A good man out of
one, on the part of the object, by reason of a man will-
the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is
ing or doing a good that is greater; the other, taken from
good,” a gloss says: “A man does as much good as he in-
the intensity of the act, according as a man wills or acts
tends.” But the intention gives goodness not only to the
intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.
external action, but also to the act of the will, as stated
If then we speak of these respective quantities from
above (a. 7). Therefore the goodness of a man’s will is
the point of view of the object, it is evident that the quan-
according to the goodness of his intention.
tity in the act does not depend on the quantity in the in-
Objection 2. Further, if you add to the cause, you
tention. With regard to the external act this may happen
add to the effect. But the goodness of the intention is the
in two ways. First, through the object that is ordained to
cause of the good will. Therefore a man’s will is good,
the intended end not being proportionate to that end; for
according as his intention is good.
instance, if a man were to give ten pounds, he could not
Objection 3. Further, in evil actions, a man sins in
realize his intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth
proportion to his intention: for if a man were to throw a
a hundred pounds. Secondly, on account of the obstacles
stone with a murderous intention, he would be guilty of
that may supervene in regard to the exterior action, which
murder. Therefore, for the same reason, in good actions,
obstacles we are unable to remove: for instance, a man in-
the will is good in proportion to the good intended.
tends to go to Rome, and encounters obstacles, which pre-
On the contrary, The intention can be good, while the
vent him from going. On the other hand, with regard to the
will is evil. Therefore, for the same reason, the intention
interior act of the will, this happens in only one way: be-
can be better, and the will less good.
cause the interior acts of the will are in our power, whereas
∗ Leonine edn.: ‘accompanying’
696
the external actions are not. But the will can will an object its object: as when a man intends to will intensely, or to
that is not proportionate to the intended end: and thus the
do something intensely. And yet it does not follow that he
will that tends to that object considered absolutely, is not
wills or acts intensely; because the quantity of goodness
so good as the intention. Yet because the intention also
in the interior or exterior act does not depend on the quan-
belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, inasmuch, to wit,
tity of the good intended, as is shown above. And hence
as it is the reason thereof; it comes to pass that the quan-
it is that a man does not merit as much as he intends to
tity of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act of
merit: because the quantity of merit is measured by the
the will; that is to say, in so far as the will wills some great intensity of the act, as we shall show later on (q. 20 , a. 4;
good for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so
q. 114, a. 4).
great a good, is not proportionate to that good.
Reply to Objection 1. This gloss speaks of good as
But if we consider the quantity in the intention and in
in the estimation of God, Who considers principally the
the act, according to their respective intensity, then the in-
intention of the end. Wherefore another gloss says on the
tensity of the intention redounds upon the interior act and
same passage that “the treasure of the heart is the inten-
the exterior act of the will: since the intention stands in
tion, according to which God judges our works.” For the
relation to them as a kind of form, as is clear from what
goodness of the intention, as stated above, redounds, so to
has been said above (q. 12, a. 4; q. 18, a. 6). And yet
speak, upon the goodness of the will, which makes even
considered materially, while the intention is intense, the
the external act to be meritorious in God’s sight.
interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially
Reply to Objection 2. The goodness of the intention
speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with
is not the whole cause of a good will. Hence the argument
as much intensity to take medicine as he wills to regain
does not prove.
health. Nevertheless the very fact of intending health in-
Reply to Objection 3. The mere malice of the inten-
tensely, redounds, as a formal principle, upon the intense
tion suffices to make the will evil: and therefore too, the
volition of medicine.
will is as evil as the intention is evil. But the same reason-
We must observe, however, that the intensity of the in-
ing does not apply to goodness, as stated above (ad 2).
terior or exterior act, may be referred to the intention as
Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will?
Ia IIae q. 19 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that the goodness of the
will depends on its conformity to the Divine will.
human will does not depend on its conformity to the Di-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 7), the goodness
vine will. Because it is impossible for man’s will to be
of the will depends on the intention of the end. Now the
conformed to the Divine will; as appears from the word of
last end of the human will is the Sovereign Good, namely,
Isa. 55:9: “As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so
God, as stated above (q. 1, a. 8; q. 3, a. 1). Therefore the
are My ways exalted above your ways, and My thoughts
goodness of the human will requires it to be ordained to
above your thoughts.” If therefore goodness of the will de-
the Sovereign Good, that is, to God.
pended on its conformity to the Divine will, it would fol-
Now this Good is primarily and essentially compared
low that it is impossible for man’s will to be good. Which
to the Divine will, as its proper object. Again, that which
is inadmissible.
is first in any genus is the measure and rule of all that be-
Objection 2. Further, just as our wills arise from the
longs to that genus. Moreover, everything attains to rec-
Divine will, so does our knowledge flow from the Divine
titude and goodness, in so far as it is in accord with its
knowledge. But our knowledge does not require to be
proper measure. Therefore, in order that man’s will be
conformed to God’s knowledge; since God knows many
good it needs to be conformed to the Divine will.
things that we know not. Therefore there is no need for
Reply to Objection 1. The human will cannot be con-
our will to be conformed to the Divine will.
formed to the will of God so as to equal it, but only so as to
Objection 3. Further, the will is a principle of action.
imitate it. In like manner human knowledge is conformed
But our action cannot be conformed to God’s. Therefore
to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it knows truth: and
neither can our will be conformed to His.
human action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as it is
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 26:39): “Not as
becoming to the agent: and this by way of imitation, not
I will, but as Thou wilt”: which words He said, because
by way of equality.
“He wishes man to be upright and to tend to God,” as Au-
From the above may be gathered the replies to the Sec-
gustine expounds in the Enchiridion∗. But the rectitude
ond and Third Objections.
of the will is its goodness. Therefore the goodness of the
∗ Enarr. in Ps. 32, serm. i.
697
Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to Ia IIae q. 19 a. 10
the Divine will, as regards the thing willed?
Objection 1. It would seem that the human will need
justice, and therefore he wishes the thief’s death, which
not always be conformed to the Divine will, as regards
has the aspect of good in relation to the common estate;
the thing willed. For we cannot will what we know not:
whereas the thief’s wife has to consider the private, the
since the apprehended good is the object of the will. But
good of the family, and from this point of view she wishes
in many things we know not what God wills. Therefore
her husband, the thief, not to be put to death. Now the
the human will cannot be conformed to the Divine will as
good of the whole universe is that which is apprehended
to the thing willed.
by God, Who is the Maker and Governor of all things:
Objection 2. Further, God wills to damn the man
hence whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect of
whom He foresees about to die in mortal sin. If therefore
the common good; this is His own Goodness, which is the
man were bound to conform his will to the Divine will, in
good of the whole universe. On the other hand, the appre-
the point of the thing willed, it would follow that a man is
hension of a creature, according to its nature, is of some
bound to will his own damnation. Which is inadmissible.
particular good, proportionate to that nature. Now a thing
Objection 3. Further, no one is bound to will what
may happen to be good under a particular aspect, and yet
is against filial piety. But if man were to will what God
not good under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as stated
wills, this would sometimes be contrary to filial piety: for
above. And therefore it comes to pass that a certain will
instance, when God wills the death of a father: if his son
is good from willing something considered under a partic-
were to will it also, it would be against filial piety. There-
ular aspect, which thing God wills not, under a universal
fore man is not bound to conform his will to the Divine
aspect, and vice versa. And hence too it is, that various
will, as to the thing willed.
wills of various men can be good in respect of opposite
On the contrary, (1) On Ps. 32:1, “Praise becometh
things, for as much as, under various aspects, they wish a
the upright,” a gloss says: “That man has an upright heart,
particular thing to be or not to be.
who wills what God wills.” But everyone is bound to have
But a man’s will is not right in willing a particular
an upright heart. Therefore everyone is bound to will what
good, unless he refer it to the common good as an end:
God wills.
since even the natural appetite of each part is ordained to
(2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object,
the common good of the whole. Now it is the end that
as does every act. If therefore man is bound to conform
supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever
his will to the Divine will, it follows that he is bound to
is directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man
conform it, as to the thing willed.
will some particular good with a right will, he must will
(3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men
that particular good materially, and the Divine and univer-
willing different things. But whoever has a will in op-
sal good, formally. Therefore the human will is bound to
position to the Divine will, has an evil will. Therefore
be conformed to the Divine will, as to that which is willed
whoever does not conform his will to the Divine will, as
formally, for it is bound to will the Divine and universal
to the thing willed, has an evil will.
good; but not as to that which is willed materially, for the
I answer that, As is evident from what has been said
reason given above.
above (Aa. 3,5), the will tends to its object, according as
At the same time in both these respects, the human
it is proposed by the reason. Now a thing may be consid-
will is conformed to the Divine, in a certain degree. Be-
ered in various ways by the reason, so as to appear good
cause inasmuch as it is conformed to the Divine will in
from one point of view, and not good from another point
the common aspect of the thing willed, it is conformed
of view. And therefore if a man’s will wills a thing to be,
thereto in the point of the last end. While, inasmuch as it
according as it appears to be good, his will is good: and
is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed ma-
the will of another man, who wills that thing not to be, ac-
terially, it is conformed to that will considered as efficient
cording as it appears evil, is also good. Thus a judge has
cause; since the proper inclination consequent to nature,
a good will, in willing a thief to be put to death, because
or to the particular apprehension of some particular thing,
this is just: while the will of another—e.g. the thief’s wife
comes to a thing from God as its efficient cause. Hence
or son, who wishes him not to be put to death, inasmuch
it is customary to say that a man’s will, in this respect, is
as killing is a natural evil, is also good.
conformed to the Divine will, because it wills what God
Now since the will follows the apprehension of the
wishes him to will.
reason or intellect; the more universal the aspect of the
There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of
apprehended good, the more universal the good to which
the formal cause, consisting in man’s willing something
the will tends. This is evident in the example given above:
from charity, as God wills it. And this conformity is also
because the judge has care of the common good, which is
reduced to the formal conformity, that is in respect of the
698
last end, which is the proper object of charity.
to such things it suffices for man to will the upholding of
Reply to Objection 1. We can know in a general way
God’s justice and of the natural order.
what God wills. For we know that whatever God wills,
Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
He wills it under the aspect of good. Consequently who-
To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it
ever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a will
should be said that a man who conforms his will to God’s,
conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing
in the aspect of reason of the thing willed, wills what God
willed. But we know not what God wills in particular: and
wills, more than the man, who conforms his will to God’s,
in this respect we are not bound to conform our will to the
in the point of the very thing willed; because the will tends
Divine will.
more to the end, than to that which is on account of the
But in the state of glory, every one will see in each
end.
thing that he wills, the relation of that thing to what God
To the second, it must be replied that the species and
wills in that particular matter. Consequently he will con-
form of an act are taken from the object considered for-
form his will to God in all things not only formally, but
mally, rather than from the object considered materially.
also materially.
To the third, it must be said that there is no opposi-
Reply to Objection 2. God does not will the damna-
tion of wills when several people desire different things,
tion of a man, considered precisely as damnation, nor a
but not under the same aspect: but there is opposition of
man’s death, considered precisely as death, because, “He
wills, when under one and the same aspect, one man wills
wills all men to be saved” (1 Tim. 2:4); but He wills such
a thing which another wills not. But there is no question
things under the aspect of justice. Wherefore in regard
of this here.
699
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 20
Of Goodness and Malice in External Human Affairs
(In Six Articles)
We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will, or in the external action?
(2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the goodness of the will?
(3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same as those of the external action?
(4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?
(5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its goodness or malice?
(6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?
Whether goodness or malice is first in the action of the will, or in the external action?
Ia IIae q. 20 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that good and evil are in
proper object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil,
the external action prior to being in the act of the will. For
which the external action derives from its relation to the
the will derives goodness from its object, as stated above
end, is to be found first of all in the act of the will, whence (q. 19, Aa. 1,2). But the external action is the object of the
it passes to the external action. On the other hand, the
interior act of the will: for a man is said to will to commit
goodness or malice which the external action has of itself,
a theft, or to will to give an alms. Therefore good and evil
on account of its being about due matter and its being at-
are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the
tended by due circumstances, is not derived from the will,
will.
but rather from the reason. Consequently, if we consider
Objection 2. Further, the aspect of good belongs first
the goodness of the external action, in so far as it comes
to the end: since what is directed to the end receives the
from reason’s ordination and apprehension, it is prior to
aspect of good from its relation to the end. Now whereas
the goodness of the act of the will: but if we consider it in
the act of the will cannot be an end, as stated above (q. 1,
so far as it is in the execution of the action done, it is sub-
a. 1, ad 2), the act of another power can be an end. There-
sequent to the goodness of the will, which is its principle.
fore good is in the act of some other power prior to being
Reply to Objection 1. The exterior action is the ob-
in the act of the will.
ject of the will, inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by
Objection 3. Further, the act of the will stands in a forthe reason, as good apprehended and ordained by the rea-
mal relation to the external action, as stated above (q. 18,
son: and thus it is prior to the good in the act of the will.
a. 6). But that which is formal is subsequent; since form
But inasmuch as it is found in the execution of the action,
is something added to matter. Therefore good and evil are
it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will.
in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will.
Reply to Objection 2. The end precedes in the order
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that
of intention, but follows in the order of execution.
“it is by the will that we sin, and that we behave aright.”
Reply to Objection 3. A form as received into mat-
Therefore moral good and evil are first in the will.
ter, is subsequent to matter in the order of generation, al-
I answer that, External actions may be said to be
though it precedes it in the order of nature: but inasmuch
good or bad in two ways. First, in regard to their genus,
as it is in the active cause, it precedes in every way. Now
and the circumstances connected with them: thus the giv-
the will is compared to the exterior action, as its efficient
ing of alms, if the required conditions be observed, is said
cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as
to be good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil,
existing in the active cause, is the form of the exterior ac-
from its relation to the end: thus the giving of alms for
tion.
vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the end is the will’s
Whether the whole goodness and malice of the external action depends on the good-Ia IIae q. 20 a. 2
ness of the will?
Objection 1. It would seem that the whole goodness
cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring
and malice of the external action depend on the goodness
forth good fruit.” But, according to the gloss, the tree sig-
of the will. For it is written (Mat. 7:18): “A good tree
nifies the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it is
700
impossible for the interior act of the will to be good, and towards it.
the external action evil, or vice versa.
Now it must be observed, as was noted above (q. 19,
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9)
a. 6, ad 1), that for a thing to be evil, one single defect suf-that there is no sin without the will. If therefore there is
fices, whereas, for it to be good simply, it is not enough
no sin in the will, there will be none in the external ac-
for it to be good in one point only, it must be good in every
tion. And so the whole goodness or malice of the external
respect. If therefore the will be good, both from its proper
action depends on the will.
object and from its end, if follows that the external action
Objection 3. Further, the good and evil of which we
is good. But if the will be good from its intention of the
are speaking now are differences of the moral act. Now
end, this is not enough to make the external action good:
differences make an essential division in a genus, accord-
and if the will be evil either by reason of its intention of
ing to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 12). Since therefore
the end, or by reason of the act willed, it follows that the
an act is moral from being voluntary, it seems that good-
external action is evil.
ness and malice in an act are derived from the will alone.
Reply to Objection 1. If the good tree be taken to sig-
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mendac.
nify the good will, it must be in so far as the will derives
vii), that “there are some actions which neither a good
goodness from the act willed and from the end intended.
end nor a good will can make good.”
Reply to Objection 2. A man sins by his will, not
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), we may con-
only when he wills an evil end; but also when he wills an
sider a twofold goodness or malice in the external action:
evil act.
one in respect of due matter and circumstances; the other
Reply to Objection 3. Voluntariness applies not only
in respect of the order to the end. And that which is in
to the interior act of the will, but also to external actions,
respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on the
inasmuch as they proceed from the will and the reason.
will: while that which is in respect of due matter or cir-
Consequently the difference of good and evil is applica-
cumstances, depends on the reason: and on this goodness
ble to both the interior and external act.
depends the goodness of the will, in so far as the will tends
Whether the goodness and malice of the external action are the same as those of the Ia IIae q. 20 a. 3
interior act?
Objection 1. It would seem that the goodness and
tion. Now that which results from the material and formal
malice of the interior act of the will are not the same as
element is one thing. Therefore there is but one goodness
those of the external action. For the principle of the inte-
of the internal and external act.
rior act is the interior apprehensive or appetitive power of
I answer that, As stated above (q. 17, a. 4), the in-
the soul; whereas the principle of the external action is the
terior act of the will, and the external action, considered
power that accomplishes the movement. Now where the
morally, are one act. Now it happens sometimes that one
principles of action are different, the actions themselves
and the same individual act has several aspects of good-
are different. Moreover, it is the action which is the sub-
ness or malice, and sometimes that it has but one. Hence
ject of goodness or malice: and the same accident cannot
we must say that sometimes the goodness or malice of the
be in different subjects. Therefore the goodness of the in-
interior act is the same as that of the external action, and
terior act cannot be the same as that of the external action.
sometimes not. For as we have already said (Aa. 1,2),
Objection 2. Further, “A virtue makes that, which has
these two goodnesses or malices, of the internal and ex-
it, good, and renders its action good also” (Ethic. ii, 6).
ternal acts, are ordained to one another. Now it may hap-
But the intellective virtue in the commanding power is dis-
pen, in things that are subordinate to something else, that a
tinct from the moral virtue in the power commanded, as
thing is good merely from being subordinate; thus a bitter
is declared in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the goodness of the
draught is good merely because it procures health. Where-
interior act, which belongs to the commanding power, is
fore there are not two goodnesses, one the goodness of
distinct from the goodness of the external action, which
health, and the other the goodness of the draught; but one
belongs to the power commanded.
and the same. On the other hand it happens sometimes
Objection 3. Further, the same thing cannot be cause
that that which is subordinate to something else, has some
and effect; since nothing is its own cause. But the good-
aspect of goodness in itself, besides the fact of its being
ness of the interior act is the cause of the goodness of the
subordinate to some other good: thus a palatable medicine
external action, or vice versa, as stated above (Aa. 1,2).
can be considered in the light of a pleasurable good, be-
Therefore it is not the same goodness in each.
sides being conducive to health.
On the contrary, It was shown above (q. 18, a. 6) that
We must therefore say that when the external action
the act of the will is the form, as it were, of the external ac-derives goodness or malice from its relation to the end
701
only, then there is but one and the same goodness of the the end. For this reason various virtues are necessary. But
act of the will which of itself regards the end, and of
right reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has no
the external action, which regards the end through the
other goodness than the goodness of that virtue, in so far
medium of the act of the will. But when the external ac-
as the goodness of the reason is participated in each virtue.
tion has goodness or malice of itself, i.e. in regard to its
Reply to Objection 3. When a thing is derived by
matter and circumstances, then the goodness of the exter-
one thing from another, as from a univocal efficient cause,
nal action is distinct from the goodness of the will in re-
then it is not the same in both: thus when a hot thing heats,
garding the end; yet so that the goodness of the end passes
the heat of the heater is distinct from the heat of the thing
into the external action, and the goodness of the matter
heated, although it be the same specifically. But when a
and circumstances passes into the act of the will, as stated
thing is derived from one thing from another, according
above (Aa. 1,2).
to analogy or proportion, then it is one and the same in
Reply to Objection 1. This argument proves that the
both: thus the healthiness which is in medicine or urine
internal and external actions are different in the physical
is derived from the healthiness of the animal’s body; nor
order: yet distinct as they are in that respect, they com-
is health as applied to urine and medicine, distinct from
bine to form one thing in the moral order, as stated above
health as applied to the body of an animal, of which health
(q. 17, a. 4).
medicine is the cause, and urine the sign. It is in this way
Reply to Objection 2. As stated in Ethic. vi, 12, a
that the goodness of the external action is derived from the
moral virtue is ordained to the act of that virtue, which act
goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz. according to the
is the end, as it were, of that virtue; whereas prudence,
order of one to the other.
which is in the reason, is ordained to things directed to
Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?
Ia IIae q. 20 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the external action
external action derives from the will tending to the end,
does not add any goodness or malice to that of the inte-
then the external action adds nothing to this goodness,
rior action. For Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Mat.): “It
unless it happens that the will in itself is made better in
is the will that is rewarded for doing good, or punished
good things, or worse in evil things. This, seemingly, may
for doing evil.” Now works are the witnesses of the will.
happen in three ways. First in point of number; if, for
Therefore God seeks for works not on His own account,
instance, a man wishes to do something with a good or
in order to know how to judge; but for the sake of others,
an evil end in view, and does not do it then, but after-
that all may understand how just He is. But good or evil is
wards wills and does it, the act of his will is doubled and
to be estimated according to God’s judgment rather than
a double good, or a double evil is the result. Secondly, in
according to the judgment of man. Therefore the external
point of extension: when, for instance, a man wishes to
action adds no goodness or malice to that of the interior
do something for a good or an evil end, and is hindered
act.
by some obstacle, whereas another man perseveres in the
Objection 2. Further, the goodness and malice of the
movement of the will until he accomplish it in deed; it is
interior and external acts are one and the same, as stated
evident that the will of the latter is more lasting in good
above (a. 3). But increase is the addition of one thing to
or evil, and in this respect, is better or worse. Thirdly, in
another. Therefore the external action does not add to the
point of intensity: for these are certain external actions,
goodness or malice of the interior act.
which, in so far as they are pleasurable, or painful, are
Objection 3. Further, the entire goodness of created
such as naturally to make the will more intense or more
things does not add to the Divine Goodness, because it
remiss; and it is evident that the more intensely the will
is entirely derived therefrom. But sometimes the entire
tends to good or evil, the better or worse it is.
goodness of the external action is derived from the good-
On the other hand, if we speak of the goodness which
ness of the interior act, and sometimes conversely, as
the external action derives from its matter and due circum-
stated above (Aa. 1,2). Therefore neither of them adds
stances, thus it stands in relation to the will as its term and to the goodness or malice of the other.
end. And in this way it adds to the goodness or malice
On the contrary, Every agent intends to attain good
of the will; because every inclination or movement is per-
and avoid evil. If therefore by the external action no fur-
fected by attaining its end or reaching its term. Wherefore
ther goodness or malice be added, it is to no purpose that
the will is not perfect, unless it be such that, given the
he who has a good or an evil will, does a good deed or
opportunity, it realizes the operation. But if this prove im-
refrains from an evil deed. Which is unreasonable.
possible, as long as the will is perfect, so as to realize the
I answer that, If we speak of the goodness which the
operation if it could; the lack of perfection derived from
702
the external action, is simply involuntary. Now just as the Reply to Objection 2. This argument applies to that
involuntary deserves neither punishment nor reward in the
goodness which the external action derives from the will
accomplishment of good or evil deeds, so neither does it
as tending to the end. But the goodness which the external
lessen reward or punishment, if a man through simple in-
action takes from its matter and circumstances, is distinct
voluntariness fail to do good or evil.
from that which it derives from the end; but it is not dis-
Reply to Objection 1. Chrysostom is speaking of the
tinct from that which it has from the very act willed, to
case where a man’s will is complete, and does not refrain
which it stands in the relation of measure and cause, as
from the deed save through the impossibility of achieve-
stated above (Aa. 1,2).
ment.
From this the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
Whether the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice?
Ia IIae q. 20 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the consequences of
like manner, if a man bear patiently a wrong done to him,
the external action increase its goodness or malice. For
the wrongdoer is not thereby excused. Therefore the con-
the effect pre-exists virtually in its cause. But the conse-
sequences of an action doe not increase its goodness or
quences result from the action as an effect from its cause.
malice.
Therefore they pre-exist virtually in actions. Now a thing
I answer that, The consequences of an action are ei-
is judged to be good or bad according to its virtue, since
ther foreseen or not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that
a virtue “makes that which has it to be good” (Ethic. ii,
they increase the goodness or malice. For when a man
6). Therefore the consequences increase the goodness or
foresees that many evils may follow from his action, and
malice of an action.
yet does not therefore desist therefrom, this shows his will
Objection 2. Further, the good actions of his hearers
to be all the more inordinate.
are consequences resulting from the words of a preacher.
But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must
But such goods as these redound to the merit of the
make a distinction. Because if they follow from the nature
preacher, as is evident from Phil. 4:1: “My dearly beloved
of the action and in the majority of cases, in this respect,
brethren, my joy and my crown.” Therefore the conse-
the consequences increase the goodness or malice of that
quences of an action increase its goodness or malice.
action: for it is evident that an action is specifically better, Objection 3. Further, punishment is not increased,
if better results can follow from it; and specifically worse,
unless the fault increases: wherefore it is written (Dt.
if it is of a nature to produce worse results. On the other
25:2): “According to the measure of the sin shall the mea-
hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom,
sure also of the stripes be.” But the punishment is in-
then they do not increase the goodness or malice of the
creased on account of the consequences; for it is written
action: because we do not judge of a thing according to
(Ex. 21:29): “But if the ox was wont to push with his horn
that which belongs to it by accident, but only according to
yesterday and the day before, and they warned his master,
that which belongs to it of itself.
and he did not shut him up, and he shall kill a man or a
Reply to Objection 1. The virtue of a cause is mea-
woman, then the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also
sured by the effect that flows from the nature of the cause,
shall be put to death.” But he would not have been put
not by that which results by accident.
to death, if the ox, although he had not been shut up, had
Reply to Objection 2. The good actions done by the
not killed a man. Therefore the consequences increase the
hearers, result from the preacher’s words, as an effect that
goodness or malice of an action.
flows from their very nature. Hence they redound to the
Objection 4. Further, if a man do something which
merit of the preacher: especially when such is his inten-
may cause death, by striking, or by sentencing, and if
tion.
death does not ensue, he does not contract irregularity:
Reply to Objection 3. The consequences for which
but he would if death were to ensue. Therefore the conse-
that man is ordered to be punished, both follow from the
quence of an action increase its goodness or malice.
nature of the cause, and are supposed to be foreseen. For
On the contrary, The consequences do not make an
this reason they are reckoned as punishable.
action that was evil, to be good; nor one that was good,
Reply to Objection 4. This argument would prove if
to be evil. For instance, if a man give an alms to a poor
irregularity were the result of the fault. But it is not the
man who makes bad use of the alms by committing a sin,
result of the fault, but of the fact, and of the obstacle to
this does not undo the good done by the giver; and, in
the reception of a sacrament.
703
Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?
Ia IIae q. 20 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that one and the same ex-
face is one, considered as in the genus of quantity; and yet
ternal action can be both good and evil. For “movement,
it is manifold, considered as to the genus of color, if it be
if continuous, is one and the same” (Phys. v, 4). But one
partly white, and partly black. And accordingly, nothing
continuous movement can be both good and bad: for in-
hinders an action from being one, considered in the nat-
stance, a man may go to church continuously, intending at
ural order; whereas it is not one, considered in the moral
first vainglory, and afterwards the service of God. There-
order; and vice versa, as we have stated above (a. 3, ad
fore one and the same action can be both good and bad.
1; q. 18, a. 7, ad 1). For continuous walking is one ac-
Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher
tion, considered in the natural order: but it may resolve
(Phys. iii, 3), action and passion are one act. But the pas-
itself into many actions, considered in the moral order, if
sion may be good, as Christ’s was; and the action evil, as
a change take place in the walker’s will, for the will is
that of the Jews. Therefore one and the same act can be
the principle of moral actions. If therefore we consider
both good and evil.
one action in the moral order, it is impossible for it to be
Objection 3. Further, since a servant is an instrument,
morally both good and evil. Whereas if it be one as to
as it were, of his master, the servant’s action is his mas-
natural and not moral unity, it can be both good and evil.
ter’s, just as the action of a tool is the workman’s action.
Reply to Objection 1.
This continual movement
But it may happen that the servant’s action result from his
which proceeds from various intentions, although it is one
master’s good will, and is therefore good: and from the
in the natural order, is not one in the point of moral unity.
evil will of the servant, and is therefore evil. Therefore
Reply to Objection 2. Action and passion belong to
the same action can be both good and evil.
the moral order, in so far as they are voluntary. And there-
On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the sub-
fore in so far as they are voluntary in respect of wills that
ject of contraries. But good and evil are contraries. There-
differ, they are two distinct things, and good can be in one
fore the same action cannot be both good and evil.
of them while evil is in the other.
On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the sub-
Reply to Objection 3. The action of the servant, in so
ject of contraries. But good and evil are contraries. There-
far as it proceeds from the will of the servant, is not the
fore the same action cannot be both good and evil.
master’s action: but only in so far as it proceeds from the
I answer that, Nothing hinders a thing from being
master’s command. Wherefore the evil will of the servant
one, in so far as it is in one genus, and manifold, in so far
does not make the action evil in this respect.
as it is referred to another genus. Thus a continuous sur-
704
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 21
Of the Consequences of Human Actions by Reason of Their Goodness and Malice (In Four Articles)
We have now to consider the consequences of human actions by reason of their goodness and malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil?
(2) Whether it thereby deserves praise or blame?
(3) Whether accordingly, it is meritorious or demeritorious?
(4) Whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God?
Whether a human action is right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil?
Ia IIae q. 21 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that a human action is not right
its, viz. the action does not swerve from the order of its
or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil. For “monsters are
active principle to the end. But when an action strays from
the sins of nature” (Phys. ii, 8). But monsters are not ac-
this rectitude, it comes under the notion of sin.
tions, but things engendered outside the order of nature.
Now in those things that are done by the will, the prox-
Now things that are produced according to art and reason
imate rule is the human reason, while the supreme rule is
imitate those that are produced according to nature (Phys.
the Eternal Law. When, therefore, a human action tends to
ii, 8). Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its
the end, according to the order of reason and of the Eter-
being inordinate and evil.
nal Law, then that action is right: but when it turns aside
Objection 2. Further, sin, as stated in Phys. ii, 8 oc-
from that rectitude, then it is said to be a sin. Now it is ev-
curs in nature and art, when the end intended by nature or
ident from what has been said (q. 19, Aa. 3,4) that every
art is not attained. But the goodness or malice of a human
voluntary action that turns aside from the order of reason
action depends, before all, on the intention of the end, and
and of the Eternal Law, is evil, and that every good action
on its achievement. Therefore it seems that the malice of
is in accord with reason and the Eternal Law. Hence it
an action does not make it sinful.
follows that a human action is right or sinful by reason of
Objection 3. Further, if the malice of an action makes
its being good or evil.
it sinful, it follows that wherever there is evil, there is sin.
Reply to Objection 1. Monsters are called sins, inas-
But this is false: since punishment is not a sin, although
much as they result from a sin in nature’s action.
it is an evil. Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of
Reply to Objection 2. The end is twofold; the last
its being evil.
end, and the proximate end. In the sin of nature, the ac-
On the contrary, As shown above (q. 19, a. 4), the
tion does indeed fail in respect of the last end, which is
goodness of a human action depends principally on the
the perfection of the thing generated; but it does not fail
Eternal Law: and consequently its malice consists in its
in respect of any proximate end whatever; since when na-
being in disaccord with the Eternal Law. But this is the
ture works it forms something. In like manner, the sin
very nature of sin; for Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii,
of the will always fails as regards the last end intended,
27) that “sin is a word, deed, or desire, in opposition to
because no voluntary evil action can be ordained to hap-
the Eternal Law.” Therefore a human action is sinful by
piness, which is the last end: and yet it does not fail in
reason of its being evil.
respect of some proximate end: intended and achieved by
I answer that, Evil is more comprehensive than sin,
the will. Wherefore also, since the very intention of this
as also is good than right. For every privation of good, in
end is ordained to the last end, this same intention may be
whatever subject, is an evil: whereas sin consists properly
right or sinful.
in an action done for a certain end, and lacking due order
Reply to Objection 3. Each thing is ordained to its
to that end. Now the due order to an end is measured by
end by its action: and therefore sin, which consists in
some rule. In things that act according to nature, this rule
straying from the order to the end, consists properly in
is the natural force that inclines them to that end. When
an action. On the other hand, punishment regards the per-
therefore an action proceeds from a natural force, in ac-
son of the sinner, as was stated in the Ia, q. 48, a. 5, ad 4;
cord with the natural inclination to an end, then the action
a. 6, ad 3.
is said to be right: since the mean does not exceed its lim-
705
Whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by reason of its being good or evil?
Ia IIae q. 21 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that a human action does
follows that good or evil, in voluntary actions alone, ren-
not deserve praise or blame by reason of its being good
ders them worthy of praise or blame: and in such like
or evil. For “sin happens even in things done by nature”
actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing.
(Phys. ii, 8). And yet natural things are not deserving of
Reply to Objection 1. Natural actions are not in the
praise or blame (Ethic. iii, 5). Therefore a human action
power of the natural agent: since the action of nature is
does not deserve blame, by reason of its being evil or sin-
determinate. And, therefore, although there be sin in nat-
ful; and, consequently, neither does it deserve praise, by
ural actions, there is no blame.
reason of its being good.
Reply to Objection 2. Reason stands in different re-
Objection 2. Further, just as sin occurs in moral ac-
lations to the productions of art, and to moral actions. In
tions, so does it happen in the productions of art: because
matters of art, reason is directed to a particular end, which
as stated in Phys. ii, 8 “it is a sin in a grammarian to write
is something devised by reason: whereas in moral matters,
badly, and in a doctor to give the wrong medicine.” But
it is directed to the general end of all human life. Now a
the artist is not blamed for making something bad: be-
particular end is subordinate to the general end. Since
cause the artist’s work is such, that he can produce a good
therefore sin is a departure from the order to the end, as
or a bad thing, just as he lists. Therefore it seems that nei-
stated above (a. 1), sin may occur in two ways, in a pro-
ther is there any reason for blaming a moral action, in the
duction of art. First, by a departure from the particular
fact that it is evil.
end intended by the artist: and this sin will be proper to
Objection 3. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
the art; for instance, if an artist produce a bad thing, while
that evil is “weak and incapable.” But weakness or in-
intending to produce something good; or produce some-
ability either takes away or diminishes guilt. Therefore a
thing good, while intending to produce something bad.
human action does not incur guilt from being evil.
Secondly, by a departure from the general end of human
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Virt. et
life: and then he will be said to sin, if he intend to produce
Vit. i) that “virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds
a bad work, and does so in effect, so that another is taken
that are opposed to virtue deserve censure and blame.”
in thereby. But this sin is not proper to the artist as such,
But good actions are virtuous; because “virtue makes that
but as man. Consequently for the former sin the artist is
which has it, good, and makes its action good” (Ethic. ii,
blamed as an artist; while for the latter he is blamed as
6): wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil. There-
a man. On the other hand, in moral matters, where we
fore a human action deserves praise or blame, through be-
take into consideration the order of reason to the general
ing good or evil.
end of human life, sin and evil are always due to a depar-
I answer that, Just as evil is more comprehensive than
ture from the order of reason to the general end of human
sin, so is sin more comprehensive than blame. For an ac-
life. Wherefore man is blamed for such a sin, both as man
tion is said to deserve praise or blame, from its being im-
and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
puted to the agent: since to praise or to blame means noth-
vi, 5) that “in art, he who sins voluntarily is preferable;
ing else than to impute to someone the malice or goodness
but in prudence, as in the moral virtues,” which prudence
of his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent, when
directs, “he is the reverse.”
it is in his power, so that he has dominion over it: because
Reply to Objection 3. Weakness that occurs in volun-
it is through his will that man has dominion over his ac-
tary evils, is subject to man’s power: wherefore it neither
tions, as was made clear above (q. 1, Aa. 1,2). Hence it
takes away nor diminishes guilt.
Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious in so far as it is good or evil?
Ia IIae q. 21 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that a human action is not
master: thus if a man destroys what belongs to him, he is
meritorious or demeritorious on account of its goodness
not punished, as if he had destroyed what belongs to an-
or malice. For we speak of merit or demerit in relation to
other. But man is master of his own actions. Therefore a
retribution, which has no place save in matters relating to
man does not merit punishment or reward, through putting
another person. But good or evil actions are not all related
his action to a good or evil purpose.
to another person, for some are related to the person of the
Objection 3. Further, if a man acquire some good for
agent. Therefore not every good or evil human action is
himself, he does not on that account deserve to be bene-
meritorious or demeritorious.
fited by another man: and the same applies to evil. Now a
Objection 2. Further, no one deserves punishment or
good action is itself a kind of good and perfection of the
reward for doing as he chooses with that of which he is
agent: while an inordinate action is his evil. Therefore a
706
man does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does advantage, then again is retribution owed to him, in so far
a good or an evil deed.
as this too affects the community, forasmuch as he is a
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 3:10,11): “Say to
part of society: although retribution is not due to him, in
the just man that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his so far as it conduces to the good or harm of an individual,
doings. Woe to the wicked unto evil; for the reward of his
who is identical with the agent: unless, perchance, he owe
hands shall be given him.”
retribution to himself, by a sort of resemblance, in so far
I answer that, We speak of merit and demerit, in re-
as man is said to be just to himself.
lation to retribution, rendered according to justice. Now,
It is therefore evident that a good or evil action de-
retribution according to justice is rendered to a man, by
serves praise or blame, in so far as it is in the power of the
reason of his having done something to another’s advan-
will: that it is right or sinful, according as it is ordained
tage or hurt. It must, moreover, be observed that every
to the end; and that its merit or demerit depends on the
individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and
recompense for justice or injustice towards another.
member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or
Reply to Objection 1. A man’s good or evil actions,
evil, done to the member of a society, redounds on the
although not ordained to the good or evil of another in-
whole society: thus, who hurts the hand, hurts the man.
dividual, are nevertheless ordained to the good or evil of
When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to another in-
another, i.e. the community.
dividual, there is a twofold measure of merit or demerit
Reply to Objection 2. Man is master of his actions;
in his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to
and yet, in so far as he belongs to another, i.e. the com-
him by the individual to whom he has done good or harm;
munity, of which he forms part, he merits or demerits,
secondly, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the
inasmuch as he disposes his actions well or ill: just as if
whole of society. Now when a man ordains his action di-
he were to dispense well or ill other belongings of his, in
rectly for the good or evil of the whole society, retribution
respect of which he is bound to serve the community.
is owed to him, before and above all, by the whole soci-
Reply to Objection 3. This very good or evil, which
ety; secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas when
a man does to himself by his action, redounds to the com-
a man does that which conduces to his own benefit or dis-
munity, as stated above.
Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious before God, according as it Ia IIae q. 21 a. 4
is good or evil?
Objection 1. It would seem that man’s actions, good
in God’s sight.
or evil, are not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles.
12:14):
of God. Because, as stated above (a. 3), merit and demerit
“All things that are done, God will bring into judg-
imply relation to retribution for good or harm done to an-
ment. . . whether it be good or evil.” Now judgment im-
other. But a man’s action, good or evil, does no good or
plies retribution, in respect of which we speak of merit
harm to God; for it is written (Job 35:6,7): “If thou sin,
and demerit. Therefore every human action, both good
what shalt thou hurt Him?. . . And if thou do justly, what
and evil, acquires merit or demerit in God’s sight.
shalt thou give Him?” Therefore a human action, good
I answer that, A human action, as stated above (a. 3),
or evil, is not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of
acquires merit or demerit, through being ordained to
God.
someone else, either by reason of himself, or by reason
Objection 2. Further, an instrument acquires no merit
of the community: and in each way, our actions, good and
or demerit in the sight of him that uses it; because the
evil, acquire merit or demerit, in the sight of God. On the
entire action of the instrument belongs to the user. Now
part of God Himself, inasmuch as He is man’s last end;
when man acts he is the instrument of the Divine power
and it is our duty to refer all our actions to the last end, as which is the principal cause of his action; hence it is writ-stated above (q. 19, a. 10). Consequently, whoever does
ten (Is. 10:15): “Shall the axe boast itself against him that
an evil deed, not referable to God, does not give God the
cutteth with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against him
honor due to Him as our last end. On the part of the whole
by whom it is drawn?” where man while acting is evi-
community of the universe, because in every community,
dently compared to an instrument. Therefore man merits
he who governs the community, cares, first of all, for the
or demerits nothing in God’s sight, by good or evil deeds.
common good; wherefore it is his business to award retri-
Objection 3. Further, a human action acquires merit
bution for such things as are done well or ill in the com-
or demerit through being ordained to someone else. But
munity. Now God is the governor and ruler of the whole
not all human actions are ordained to God. Therefore
universe, as stated in the Ia, q. 103, a. 5: and especially
not every good or evil action acquires merit or demerit
of rational creatures. Consequently it is evident that hu-
707
man actions acquire merit or demerit in reference to Him: Consequently, by his action, he acquires merit or demerit
else it would follow that human actions are no business of
in God’s sight.
God’s.
Reply to Objection 3. Man is not ordained to the
Reply to Objection 1. God in Himself neither gains
body politic, according to all that he is and has; and so
nor losses anything by the action of man: but man, for
it does not follow that every action of his acquires merit
his part, takes something from God, or offers something
or demerit in relation to the body politic. But all that man
to Him, when he observes or does not observe the order
is, and can, and has, must be referred to God: and there-
instituted by God.
fore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires
Reply to Objection 2. Man is so moved, as an instru-
merit or demerit in the sight of God, as far as the action
ment, by God, that, at the same time, he moves himself
itself is concerned.
by his free-will, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 6, ad 3).
708
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 22
Of the Subject of the Soul’s Passions
(In Three Articles)
We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in general; secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there are four things to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference between them: (3) Their mutual relationship: (4) Their malice and goodness.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is any passion in the soul?
(2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?
(3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?
Whether any passion is in the soul?
Ia IIae q. 22 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no passion
else. Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated that when
in the soul. Because passivity belongs to matter. But the
a more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent,
soul is not composed of matter and form, as stated in the
we have generation simply, and corruption in a particu-
Ia, q. 75, a. 5. Therefore there is no passion in the soul.
lar respect: whereas the reverse is the case, when from
Objection 2.
Further, passion is movement, as is
a more excellent thing, a less excellent is generated. In
stated in Phys. iii, 3. But the soul is not moved, as is
these three ways it happens that passions are in the soul.
proved in De Anima i, 3. Therefore passion is not in the
For in the sense of mere reception, we speak of “feeling
soul.
and understanding as being a kind of passion” (De Anima
Objection 3. Further, passion is the road to corrup-
i, 5). But passion, accompanied by the loss of something,
tion; since “every passion, when increased, alters the sub-
is only in respect of a bodily transmutation; wherefore
stance,” as is stated in Topic. vi, 6. But the soul is incor-
passion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save ac-
ruptible. Therefore no passion is in the soul.
cidentally, in so far, to wit, as the “composite” is passive.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom.
7:5):
But here again we find a difference; because when this
“When we were in the flesh, the passions of sins which
transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature of
were by the law, did the work in our members.” Now sins
a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is
are, properly speaking, in the soul. Therefore passions
more properly a passion than joy.
also, which are described as being “of sins,” are in the
Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to matter to be pas-
soul.
sive in such a way as to lose something and to be trans-
I answer that, The word “passive” is used in three
muted: hence this happens only in those things that are
ways.
First, in a general way, according as whatever
composed of matter and form. But passivity, as implying
receives something is passive, although nothing is taken
mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be in any-
from it: thus we may say that the air is passive when it is
thing that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not
lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than to be passive.
composed of matter and form, yet it has something of po-
Secondly, the word “passive” is employed in its proper
tentiality, in respect of which it is competent to receive or
sense, when something is received, while something else
to be passive, according as the act of understanding is a
is taken away: and this happens in two ways. For some-
kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4.
times that which is lost is unsuitable to the thing: thus
Reply to Objection 2. Although it does not belong
when an animal’s body is healed, and loses sickness. At
to the soul in itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it
other times the contrary occurs: thus to ail is to be pas-
belongs accidentally as stated in De Anima i, 3.
sive; because the ailment is received and health is lost.
Reply to Objection 3. This argument is true of pas-
And here we have passion in its most proper acceptation.
sion accompanied by transmutation to something worse.
For a thing is said to be passive from its being drawn to the
And passion, in this sense, is not found in the soul, ex-
agent: and when a thing recedes from what is suitable to
cept accidentally: but the composite, which is corruptible,
it, then especially does it appear to be drawn to something
admits of it by reason of its own nature.
709
Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?
Ia IIae q. 22 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that passion is in the ap-
intensity is in proportion to the approach to one first prin-
prehensive part of the soul rather than in the appetitive.
ciple; to which the nearer a thing approaches, the more
Because that which is first in any genus, seems to rank
intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing possessed of
first among all things that are in that genus, and to be their
light depends on its approach to something endowed with
cause, as is stated in Metaph. ii, 1. Now passion is found
light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing ap-
to be in the apprehensive, before being in the appetitive
proaches the more light it possesses. But in things that
part: for the appetitive part is not affected unless there
relate to defect, intensity depends, not on approach to
be a previous passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore
something supreme, but in receding from that which is
passion is in the apprehensive part more than in the appet-
perfect; because therein consists the very notion of priva-
itive.
tion and defect. Wherefore the less a thing recedes from
Objection 2. Further, what is more active is less pas-
that which stands first, the less intense it is: and the result sive; for action is contrary to passion. Now the appetitive
is that at first we always find some small defect, which
part is more active than the apprehensive part. Therefore
afterwards increases as it goes on. Now passion pertains
it seems that passion is more in the apprehensive part.
to defect, because it belongs to a thing according as it is
Objection 3. Further, just as the sensitive appetite is
in potentiality. Wherefore in those things that approach to
the power of a corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive
the Supreme Perfection, i.e. to God, there is but little po-
apprehension. But passion in the soul occurs, properly
tentiality and passion: while in other things, consequently,
speaking, in respect of a bodily transmutation. Therefore
there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i.e. the appre-
passion is not more in the sensitive appetitive than in the
hensive, power of the soul, passion is found less than in
sensitive apprehensive part.
the other powers.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4)
Reply to Objection 2. The appetitive power is said
that “the movement of the soul, which the Greeks called
to be more active, because it is, more than the apprehen-
pathe, are styled by some of our writers, Cicero∗ for insive power, the principle of the exterior action: and this
stance, disturbances; by some, affections or emotions;
for the same reason that it is more passive, namely, its be-
while others rendering the Greek more accurately, call
ing related to things as existing in themselves: since it is
them passions.” From this it is evident that the passions of
through the external action that we come into contact with
the soul are the same as affections. But affections mani-
things.
festly belong to the appetitive, and not to the apprehensive
Reply to Objection 3. As stated in the Ia, q. 78, a. 3
part. Therefore the passions are in the appetitive rather
the organs of the soul can be changed in two ways. First,
than in the apprehensive part.
by a spiritual change, in respect of which the organ re-
I answer that, As we have already stated (a. 1) the
ceives an “intention” of the object. And this is essential
word “passion” implies that the patient is drawn to that
to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is the eye
which belongs to the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a
changed by the object visible, not by being colored, but
thing by the appetitive power rather than by the appre-
by receiving an intention of color. But the organs are re-
hensive power: because the soul has, through its appeti-
ceptive of another and natural change, which affects their
tive power, an order to things as they are in themselves:
natural disposition; for instance, when they become hot
hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that “good
or cold, or undergo some similar change. And whereas
and evil,” i.e. the objects of the appetitive power, “are in
this kind of change is accidental to the act of the sensitive
things themselves.” On the other hand the apprehensive
apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied through
power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows
gazing intently at something or be overcome by the in-
it by reason of an “intention” of the thing, which “inten-
tensity of the object: on the other hand, it is essential to
tion” it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we
the act of the sensitive appetite; wherefore the material
find it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that “the true and the false,”
element in the definitions of the movements of the appet-
which pertain to knowledge, “are not in things, but in the
itive part, is the natural change of the organ; for instance,
mind.” Consequently it is evident that the nature of pas-
“anger is” said to be “a kindling of the blood about the
sion is consistent with the appetitive, rather than with the
heart.” Hence it is evident that the notion of passion is
apprehensive part.
more consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than
Reply to Objection 1. In things relating to perfec-
with that of the sensitive apprehension, although both are
tion the case is the opposite, in comparison to things that
actions of a corporeal organ.
pertain to defect. Because in things relating to perfection,
∗ Those things which the Greeks call pathe, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5) 710
Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, Ia IIae q. 22 a. 3
which is called the will?
Objection 1. It would seem that passion is not more in
sitive appetite, and is not only spiritual, as in the sensitive the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite. For Diony-apprehension, but also natural. Now there is no need for
sius declares (Div. Nom. ii) Hierotheus “to be taught by
corporeal transmutation in the act of the intellectual ap-
a kind of yet more Godlike instruction; not only by learn-
petite: because this appetite is not exercised by means of
ing Divine things, but also by suffering [patiens] them.”
a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident that passion is
But the sensitive appetite cannot “suffer” Divine things,
more properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in
since its object is the sensible good. Therefore passion is
that of the intellectual appetite; and this is again evident
in the intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive from the definitions of Damascene quoted above.
appetite.
Reply to Objection 1. By “suffering” Divine things
Objection 2. Further, the more powerful the active
is meant being well affected towards them, and united to
force, the more intense the passion. But the object of the
them by love: and this takes place without any alteration
intellectual appetite, which is the universal good, is a more
in the body.
powerful active force than the object of the sensitive ap-
Reply to Objection 2. Intensity of passion depends
petite, which is a particular good. Therefore passion is
not only on the power of the agent, but also on the pas-
more consistent with the intellectual than with the sensi-
sibility of the patient: because things that are disposed to
tive appetite.
passion, suffer much even from petty agents. Therefore
Objection 3. Further, joy and love are said to be pas-
although the object of the intellectual appetite has greater
sions. But these are to be found in the intellectual and
activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the
not only in the sensitive appetite: else they would not be
sensitive appetite is more passive.
ascribed by the Scriptures to God and the angels. There-
Reply to Objection 3. When love and joy and the like
fore the passions are not more in the sensitive than in the
are ascribed to God or the angels, or to man in respect
intellectual appetite.
of his intellectual appetite, they signify simple acts of the
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
will having like effects, but without passion. Hence Au-
22), while describing the animal passions: “Passion is a
gustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): “The holy angels feel no
movement of the sensitive appetite when we imagine good
anger while they punish. . . no fellow-feeling with misery
or evil: in other words, passion is a movement of the irra-
while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary human
tional soul, when we think of good or evil.”
speech is wont to ascribe to them also these passions by
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) passion is prop-
name, because, although they have none of our weakness,
erly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation.
their acts bear a certain resemblance to ours.”
This corporeal transmutation is found in the act of the sen-
711
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 23
How the Passions Differ From One Another
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?
(2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based on the contrariety of good and evil?
(3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary?
(4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in species, but not contrary to one another?
Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible Ia IIae q. 23 a. 1
part?
Objection 1. It would seem that the same passions are
order, diversity of genus arises from diversity in the po-
in the irascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philoso-
tentiality of matter, while diversity of species arises from
pher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that the passions of the soul are
diversity of form in the same matter; so in the acts of the
those emotions “which are followed by joy or sorrow.”
soul, those that belong to different powers, differ not only
But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part. There-
in species but also in genus, while acts and passions re-
fore all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not
garding different specific objects, included under the one
some in the irascible, others in the concupiscible part.
common object of a single power, differ as the species of
Objection 2. Further, on the words of Mat. 13:33,
that genus.
“The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven,” etc., Jerome’s
In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the
gloss says: “We should have prudence in the reason; ha-
irascible, and which in the concupiscible, we must take
tred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire of virtue, in
the object of each of these powers. For we have stated
the concupiscible part.” But hatred is in the concupiscible
in the Ia, q. 81, a. 2, that the object of the concupisci-
faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary, as is
ble power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended
stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the
as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since the
concupiscible and irascible faculties.
soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at
Objection 3.
Further, passions and actions differ
times, in acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some
specifically according to their objects. But the objects of
such evil, in so far as such good or evil is more than our
the irascible and concupiscible passions are the same, viz.
animal nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this
good and evil. Therefore the same passions are in the iras-
very good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or diffi-
cible and concupiscible faculties.
cult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty. Therefore
On the contrary, The acts of the different powers dif-
whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely, belong
fer in species; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the
to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love,
irascible and the concupiscible are two powers into which
hatred, and such like: whereas those passions which re-
the sensitive appetite is divided, as stated in the Ia, q. 81,
gard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to
a. 2. Therefore, since the passions are movements of the
obtain or avoid, belong to the irascible faculty; such are
sensitive appetite, as stated above (q. 22, a. 3), the pas-
daring, fear, hope and the like.
sions of the irascible faculty are specifically distinct from
Reply to Objection 1. As stated in the Ia, q. 81, a. 2,
those of the concupiscible part.
the irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to
I answer that, The passions of the irascible part dif-
remove the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power
fer in species from those of the concupiscible faculty. For
from tending towards its object, either by making some
since different powers have different objects, as stated in
good difficult to obtain, or by making some evil hard to
the Ia, q. 77, a. 3, the passions of different powers must
avoid. The result is that all the irascible passions termi-
of necessity be referred to different objects. Much more,
nate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even
therefore, do the passions of different faculties differ in
the passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed
species; since a greater difference in the object is required
by joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty.
to diversify the species of the powers, than to diversify the
Reply to Objection 2. Jerome ascribes hatred of vice
species of passions or actions. For just as in the physical
to the irascible faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is
712
properly a concupiscible passion; but on account of the trariety to the concupiscible power: and hence the need of
struggle, which belongs to the irascible power.
another power tending to that good. The same applies to
Reply to Objection 3. Good, inasmuch as it is de-
evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently
lightful, moves the concupiscible power. But if it prove
the concupiscible passions are specifically different from
difficult to obtain, from this very fact it has a certain con-
the irascible passions.
Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the contrariety of good Ia IIae q. 23 a. 2
and evil?
Objection 1. It would seem that the contrariety of the
Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the pas-
irascible passions is based on no other contrariety than
sions of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects,
that of good and evil. For the irascible passions are or-
i.e. of good and evil; the other, according to approach
dained to the concupiscible passions, as stated above (a. 1,
and withdrawal in respect of the same term. In the con-
ad 1). But the contrariety of the concupiscible passions is
cupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to be
no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance, love
found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas
and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore the same applies to
in the irascible passions, we find both forms of contrari-
the irascible passions.
ety. The reason of this is that the object of the concupisci-
Objection 2. Further, passions differ according to
ble faculty, as stated above (a. 1), is sensible good or evil
their objects; just as movements differ according to their
considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a
termini. But there is no other contrariety of movements,
term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, since nothing
except that of the termini, as is stated in Phys. v, 3. There-
shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In
fore there is no other contrariety of passions, save that of
like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but all things
the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil.
shun it: wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term
Therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety
whereto, but only of a term wherefrom. Accordingly ev-
of passions other than that of good and evil.
ery concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it,
Objection 3. Further, “every passion of the soul is by
as love, desire and joy; while every concupiscible passion
way of approach and withdrawal,” as Avicenna declares in
in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or
his sixth book of Physics. Now approach results from the
dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible pas-
apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the apprehension
sions, there can be no contrariety of approach and with-
of evil: since just as “good is what all desire” (Ethic. i, 1), drawal in respect of the same object.
so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the
On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty
soul, there can be no other contrariety than that of good
is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but un-
and evil.
der the aspect of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good
On the contrary, Fear and daring are contrary to one
which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, is of
another, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do
such a nature as to produce in us a tendency to it, which
not differ in respect of good and evil: because each re-
tendency pertains to the passion of “hope”; whereas, con-
gards some kind of evil. Therefore not every contrariety
sidered as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it;
of the irascible passions is that of good and evil.
and this pertains to the passion of “despair.” In like man-
I answer that, Passion is a kind of movement, as
ner the arduous evil, considered as an evil, has the as-
stated in Phys. iii, 3. Therefore contrariety of passions
pect of something to be shunned; and this belongs to the
is based on contrariety of movements or changes. Now
passion of “fear”: but it also contains a reason for tend-
there is a twofold contrariety in changes and movements,
ing to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to
as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach
escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is called
and withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this con-
“daring.” Consequently, in the irascible passions we find
trariety belongs properly to changes, i.e. to generation,
contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope
which is a change “to being,” and to corruption, which is
and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and
a change “from being.” The other contrariety is according
withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring
to opposition of termini, and belongs properly to move-
and fear).
ments: thus whitening, which is movement from black to
From what has been said the replies to the objections
white, is contrary to blackening, which is movement from
are evident.
white to black.
713
Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?
Ia IIae q. 23 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that every passion of the
must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond
soul has a contrary. For every passion of the soul is either
the limits of “sadness,” which is a concupiscible passion;
in the irascible or in the concupiscible faculty, as stated
or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil,
above (a. 1). But both kinds of passion have their respec-
which movement is that of “anger.” But it cannot have a
tive modes of contrariety. Therefore every passion of the
movement of withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to
soul has its contrary.
be already present or past. Thus no passion is contrary
Objection 2. Further, every passion of the soul has ei-
to anger according to contrariety of approach and with-
ther good or evil for its object; for these are the common
drawal.
objects of the appetitive part. But a passion having good
In like manner neither can there be according to con-
for its object, is contrary to a passion having evil for its
trariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present
object. Therefore every passion has a contrary.
evil is good obtained, which can be no longer have the as-
Objection 3. Further, every passion of the soul is in
pect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor, when once good is
respect of approach or withdrawal, as stated above (a. 2).
obtained, does there remain any other movement, except
But every approach has a corresponding contrary with-
the appetite’s repose in the good obtained; which repose
drawal, and vice versa. Therefore every passion of the
belongs to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible
soul has a contrary.
faculty.
On the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul. But
Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary
no passion is set down as being contrary to anger, as stated
to the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation
in Ethic. iv, 5. Therefore not every passion has a contrary.
from its movement is contrary thereto; thus the Philoso-
I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, pher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that “calm is contrary to anger,” by
that it cannot have a contrary, either according to approach
opposition not of contrariety but of negation or privation.
and withdrawal, or according to the contrariety of good
From what has been said the replies to the objections
and evil. For anger is caused by a difficult evil already
are evident.
present: and when such an evil is present, the appetite
Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different, but not Ia IIae q. 23 a. 4
contrary to one another?
Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be, in
passions of the same power to differ in species, without
the same power, specifically different passions that are not
being contrary to one another.
contrary to one another. For the passions of the soul differ
On the contrary, Love and joy differ in species, and
according to their objects. Now the objects of the soul’s
are in the concupiscible power; and yet they are not con-
passions are good and evil; and on this distinction is based
trary to one another; rather, in fact, one causes the other.
the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no passions of
Therefore in the same power there are passions that differ
the same power, that are not contrary to one another, differ
in species without being contrary to one another.
specifically.
I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their
Objection 2. Further, difference of species implies
active causes, which, in the case of the passions of the
a difference of form. But every difference of form is in
soul, are their objects. Now, the difference in active causes
respect of some contrariety, as stated in Metaph. x, 8.
may be considered in two ways: first, from the point of
Therefore passions of the same power, that are not con-
view of their species or nature, as fire differs from water;
trary to one another, do not differ specifically.
secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their
Objection 3. Further, since every passion of the soul
active power. In the passions of the soul we can treat the
consists in approach or withdrawal in respect of good or
difference of their active or motive causes in respect of
evil, it seems that every difference in the passions of the
their motive power, as if they were natural agents. For ev-
soul must needs arise from the difference of good and
ery mover, in a fashion, either draws the patient to itself,
evil; or from the difference of approach and withdrawal;
or repels it from itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does
or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first
three things in the patient. Because, in the first place, it
two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the
gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to the
soul, as stated above (a. 2): whereas the third difference
mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows light-
does not diversify the species; else the species of the soul’s
ness on the body generated, so that it has an inclination or
passions would be infinite. Therefore it is not possible for
aptitude to be above. Secondly, if the generated body be
714
outside its proper place, the mover gives it movement to-On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the apti-
wards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it shall
tude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is pre-
have come to its proper place: since to the same cause are
supposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which
due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place.
regards good or evil absolutely. And in respect of good not
The same applies to the cause of repulsion.
yet obtained, we have “hope” and “despair.” In respect of
Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good
evil not yet present we have “fear” and “daring.” But in
has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force
respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: be-
of repulsion. In the first place, therefore, good causes,
cause it is no longer considered in the light of something
in the appetitive power, a certain inclination, aptitude or
arduous, as stated above (a. 3). But evil already present
connaturalness in respect of good: and this belongs to the
gives rise to the passion of “anger.”
passion of “love”: the corresponding contrary of which
Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty
is “hatred” in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be
there are three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred,
not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement
desire and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there
towards the attainment of the good beloved: and this be-
are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and de-
longs to the passion of “desire” or “concupiscence”: and
spair, fear and daring, and anger which has not contrary
contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion of “aver-
passion.
sion” or “dislike.” Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it
Consequently there are altogether eleven passions dif-
causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained:
fering specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and
and this belongs to the passion of “delight” or “joy”; the
five in the irascible; and under these all the passions of
contrary of which, in respect of evil, is “sorrow” or “sad-
the soul are contained.
ness.”
From this the replies to the objections are evident.
715
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 24
Of Good and Evil in the Passions of the Soul
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?
(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?
(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice of an act?
(4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?
Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?
Ia IIae q. 24 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that no passion of the
good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as
soul is morally good or evil. For moral good and evil are
stated above (q. 18 , a. 5). If, however, they be considered
proper to man: since “morals are properly predicated of
as subject to the command of the reason and will, then
man,” as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog.). But pas-
moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive
sions are not proper to man, for he has them in common
appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason
with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is
and will; and yet the movements and actions of the out-
morally good or evil.
ward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they
Objection 2. Further, the good or evil of man con-
are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions,
sists in “being in accord, or in disaccord with reason,” as
in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Now the passions of the
evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being
soul are not in the reason, but in the sensitive appetite, as
commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the
stated above (q. 22, a. 3). Therefore they have no connec-
will.
tion with human, i.e. moral, good or evil.
Reply to Objection 1. These passions, considered in
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii,
themselves, are common to man and other animals: but,
5) that “we are neither praised nor blamed for our pas-
as commanded by the reason, they are proper to man.
sions.” But we are praised and blamed for moral good
Reply to Objection 2. Even the lower appetitive pow-
and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally good or
ers are called rational, in so far as “they partake of reason
evil.
in some sort” (Ethic. i, 13).
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7)
Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher says that we
while speaking of the passions of the soul: “They are evil
are neither praised nor blamed for our passions consid-
if our love is evil; good if our love is good.”
ered absolutely; but he does not exclude their becoming
I answer that, We may consider the passions of the
worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are subordi-
soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being
nate to reason. Hence he continues: “For the man who
subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the
fears or is angry, is not praised. . . or blamed, but the man
passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as move-
who is angry in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against
ments of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral
reason.”
Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?
Ia IIae q. 24 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that all the passions of the
ii, 22) that “movement in accord with nature is an ac-
soul are morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix,
tion, but movement contrary to nature is passion.” But
4) that “some call the soul’s passions diseases or distur-
in movements of the soul, what is against nature is sinful
bances of the soul”∗. But every disease or disturbance of
and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide Orth.
the soul is morally evil. Therefore every passion of the
ii, 4) that “the devil turned from that which is in accord
soul is evil morally.
with nature to that which is against nature.” Therefore
Objection 2. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
these passions are morally evil.
∗ Those things which the Greeks call pathe, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)
716
Objection 3. Further, whatever leads to sin, has an as-are unsound are wanting in sense.” Hence we speak of
pect of evil. But these passions lead to sin: wherefore they
those who are wanting in sense of being “unsound.”
are called “the passions of sins” (Rom. 7:5). Therefore it
On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of
seems that they are morally evil.
“passions” to all the movements of the sensitive appetite.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9)
Wherefore they esteem them good, when they are con-
that “all these emotions are right in those whose love is
trolled by reason; and evil when they are not controlled
rightly placed. . . For they fear to sin, they desire to perse-
by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong in
vere; they grieve for sin, they rejoice in good works.”
disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic
I answer that, On this question the opinion of the Sto-
theory of a mean in the passions, when he says that “ev-
ics differed from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics
ery evil, though moderate, should be shunned; for, just as
held that all passions are evil, while the Peripatetics main-
a body, though it be moderately ailing, is not sound; so,
tained that moderate passions are good. This difference,
this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is not
although it appears great in words, is nevertheless, in re-
sound.” For passions are not called “diseases” or “distur-
ality, none at all, or but little, if we consider the intent of bances” of the soul, save when they are not controlled by
either school. For the Stoics did not discern between sense
reason.
and intellect; and consequently neither between the intel-
Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.
lectual and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discrim-
Reply to Objection 2. In every passion there is an in-
inate the passions of the soul from the movements of the
crease or decrease in the natural movement of the heart,
will, in so far as the passions of the soul are in the sensitive according as the heart is moved more or less intensely by
appetite, while the simple movements of the will are in the
contraction and dilatation; and hence it derives the charac-
intellectual appetite: but every rational movement of the
ter of passion. But there is no need for passion to deviate
appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a
always from the order of natural reason.
movement that exceeds the limits of reason. Wherefore
Reply to Objection 3. The passions of the soul, in so
Cicero, following their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4)
far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us
calls all passions “diseases of the soul”: whence he argues
to sin: but in so far as they are controlled by reason, they
that “those who are diseased are unsound; and those who
pertain to virtue.
Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?
Ia IIae q. 24 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that every passion de-
5) that “the passion of pity is obedient to reason, when
creases the goodness of a moral action. For anything
pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor
that hinders the judgment of reason, on which depends
are relieved, or the penitent forgiven.” But nothing that
the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the
is obedient to reason lessens the moral good. Therefore a
goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders the
passion of the soul does not lessen moral good.
judgment of reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): “All those
I answer that, As the Stoics held that every passion of
that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free
the soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion
from hatred, anger, friendship and pity.” Therefore pas-
of the soul lessens the goodness of an act; since the ad-
sion decreases the goodness of a moral act.
mixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes
Objection 2. Further, the more a man’s action is like
it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by passions
to God, the better it is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:1):
we understand none but the inordinate movements of the
“Be ye followers of God, as most dear children.” But
sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments.
“God and the holy angels feel no anger when they pun-
But if we give the name of passions to all the movements
ish. . . no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve the
of the sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection
unhappy,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). There-
of man’s good that his passions be moderated by reason.
fore it is better to do such like deeds without than with a
For since man’s good is founded on reason as its root,
passion of the soul.
that good will be all the more perfect, according as it ex-
Objection 3. Further, just as moral evil depends on
tends to more things pertaining to man. Wherefore no
its relation to reason, so also does moral good. But moral
one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of
evil is lessened by passion: for he sins less, who sins from
moral good, that the actions of the outward members be
passion, than he who sins deliberately. Therefore he does
controlled by the law of reason. Hence, since the sensitive
a better deed, who does well without passion, than he who
appetite can obey reason, as stated above (q. 17, a. 7), it
does with passion.
belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix,
passions themselves also should be controlled by reason.
717
Accordingly just as it is better that man should both part also follows that movement: and thus the passion that
will good and do it in his external act; so also does it be-
results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign
long to the perfection of moral good, that man should be
of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral
moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also
goodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a
in respect of his sensitive appetite; according to Ps. 83:3:
man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected
“My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God”:
by a passion in order to work more promptly with the co-
where by “heart” we are to understand the intellectual ap-
operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a passion of
petite, and by “flesh” the sensitive appetite.
the soul increases the goodness of an action.
Reply to Objection 1. The passions of the soul may
Reply to Objection 2. In God and the angels there
stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason.
is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members: and
First, antecedently: and thus, since they obscure the judg-
so in them good does not depend on the right ordering of
ment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act
passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us.
depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is
Reply to Objection 3. A passion that tends to evil,
more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judg-
and precedes the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but
ment of reason than from the mere passion of pity. In the
if it be consequent in either of the ways mentioned above
second place, consequently: and this in two ways. First,
(Reply obj. 1), it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of
by way of redundance: because, to wit, when the higher
its being more grievous.
part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower
Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?
Ia IIae q. 24 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that no passion of the soul
view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral
is good or evil morally according to its species. Because
good and evil have no connection with the species of an
moral good and evil depend on reason. But the passions
act or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus,
are in the sensitive appetite; so that accordance with rea-
inasmuch as it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In
son is accidental to them. Since, therefore, nothing acci-
this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of
dental belongs to a thing’s species, it seems that no pas-
a passion, in so far as the object to which a passion tends,
sion is good or evil according to its species.
is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is
Objection 2. Further, acts and passions take their
clear in the case of “shame” which is base fear; and of
species from their object. If, therefore, any passion were
“envy” which is sorrow for another’s good: for thus pas-
good or evil, according to its species, it would follow that
sions belong to the same species as the external act.
those passions the object of which is good, are specifically
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the
good, such as love, desire and joy: and that those passions,
passions in their natural species, in so far as the sensitive
the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as hatred,
appetite is considered in itself. But in so far as the sen-
fear and sadness. But this is clearly false. Therefore no
sitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil of reason are
passion is good or evil according to its species.
no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite, but
Objection 3. Further, there is no species of passion
essentially.
that is not to be found in other animals. But moral good is
Reply to Objection 2. Passions having a tendency
in man alone. Therefore no passion of the soul is good or
to good, are themselves good, if they tend to that which
evil according to its species.
is truly good, and in like manner, if they turn away from
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix,
that which is truly evil. On the other hand, those passions
5) that “pity is a kind of virtue.” Moreover, the Philoso-
which consist in aversion from good, and a tendency to
pher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy pas-
evil, are themselves evil.
sion. Therefore some passions are good or evil according
Reply to Objection 3. In irrational animals the sen-
to their species.
sitive appetite does not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so
I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to pas-
far as they are led by a kind of estimative power, which is
sions what has been said in regard to acts (q. 18, Aa. 5,6;
subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine reason, there is a cer-
q. 20, a. 1)—viz. that the species of a passion, as the
tain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the soul’s
species of an act, can be considered from two points of
passions.
718
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 25
Of the Order of the Passions to One Another
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible passions; (2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;
(3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another;
(4) The four principal passions.
Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions, or vice versa?
Ia IIae q. 25 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the irascible passions
good, it is evident that in the order of execution, the iras-
precede the concupiscible passions. For the order of the
cible passions take precedence of such like passions of the
passions is that of their objects. But the object of the iras-
concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and hence
cible faculty is the difficult good, which seems to be the
causes it, according to the Apostle (Rom. 12:12): “Re-
highest good. Therefore the irascible passions seem to
joicing in hope.” But the concupiscible passion which de-
precede the concupiscible passions.
notes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes between two iras-
Objection 2. Further, the mover precedes that which
cible passions: because it follows fear; since we become
is moved. But the irascible faculty is compared to the
sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared:
concupiscible, as mover to that which is moved: since it
while it precedes the movement of anger; since the move-
is given to animals, for the purposed of removing the ob-
ment of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the
stacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from enjoy-
movement of anger. And because it is looked upon as a
ing its object, as stated above (q. 23, a. 1, ad 1; Ia, q. 81,
good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the an-
a. 2 ). Now “that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of
gry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it is evident
mover” (Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible passions
that every passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a
precede the concupiscible passions.
concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz. either in joy or
Objection 3. Further, joy and sadness are concupis-
in sadness.
cible passions. But joy and sadness succeed to the iras-
But if we compare the irascible passions to those con-
cible passions: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5)
cupiscible passions that denote movement, then it is clear
that“retaliation causes anger to cease, because it produces
that the latter take precedence: because the passions of
pleasure instead of the previous pain.” Therefore the con-
the irascible faculty add something to those of the con-
cupiscible passions follow the irascible passions.
cupiscible faculty; just as the object of the irascible adds
On the contrary, The concupiscible passions regard
the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of the
the absolute good, while the irascible passions regard a
concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a certain
restricted, viz. the difficult, good. Since, therefore, the
effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization absolute good precedes the restricted good, it seems that
of the arduous good. In like manner fear adds to aversion
the concupiscible passions precede the irascible.
or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of
I answer that, In the concupiscible passions there is
difficulty in shunning the evil.
more diversity than in the passions of the irascible fac-
Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand
ulty. For in the former we find something relating to
between those concupiscible passions that denote move-
movement—e.g. desire; and something belonging to re-
ment towards good or evil, and those concupiscible pas-
pose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible passions
sions that denote rest in good or evil. And it is therefore
there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which
evident that the irascible passions both arise from and ter-
belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we
minate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.
find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as some-
Reply to Objection 1. This argument would prove, if
thing difficult or arduous; whereas such is the object of
the formal object of the concupiscible faculty were some-
the irascible faculty.
thing contrary to the arduous, just as the formal object
Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in
of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But be-
the order of intention, but last in the order of execution.
cause the object of the concupiscible faculty is good abso-
If, therefore, we compare the passions of the irascible fac-
lutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as
ulty with those concupiscible passions that denote rest in
the common precedes the proper.
719
Reply to Objection 2.
The remover of an obsta-
stacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its
cle is not a direct but an accidental mover: and here we
object. Wherefore it only follows that the irascible pas-
are speaking of passions as directly related to one an-
sions precede those concupiscible passions that connote
other. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the ob-
rest. The third object leads to the same conclusion.
Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions?
Ia IIae q. 25 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that love is not the first
tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or pro-
of the concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible fac-
portion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate
ulty is so called from concupiscence, which is the same
end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in
passion as desire. But “things are named from their chief
the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or
characteristic” (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore desire takes
proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is com-
precedence of love.
placency in good; while movement towards good is desire
Objection 2. Further, love implies a certain union;
or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Ac-
since it is a “uniting and binding force,” as Dionysius
cordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire
says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence or desire is a
precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the
movement towards union with the thing coveted or de-
reverse: because the pleasure intended causes desire and
sired. Therefore desire precedes love.
love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which
Objection 3. Further, the cause precedes its effect.
enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is,
But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some
as stated above (q. 11, a. 3, ad 3).
love on account of pleasure (Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. We name a thing as we under-
pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the
stand it, for “words are signs of thoughts,” as the Philoso-
first of the concupiscible passions.
pher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now in most cases we
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when
7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since “love
the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is
yearning for the beloved object, is desire; and, having and
not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Au-
enjoying it, is joy.” Therefore love is the first of the con-
gustine says (De Trin. x, 12), “we are more sensible to
cupiscible passions.
love, when we lack that which we love.” Consequently of
I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the
all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most;
concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil;
and for this reason the power is named after it.
since evil is privation of good. Wherefore all the passions,
Reply to Objection 2. The union of lover and beloved
the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the
is twofold. There is real union, consisting in the conjunc-
object of which is evil—that is to say, each precedes its
tion of one with the other. This union belongs to joy or
contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the rea-
pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective
son for shunning the opposite evil.
union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so far as
Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is in-
one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for
deed first in the order of intention, but last in the order
and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love be-
of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible
tokens such a union. This union precedes the movement
passions can be considered either in the order of intention
of desire.
or in the order of execution. In the order of execution,
Reply to Objection 3. Pleasure causes love, in so far
the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the
as it precedes love in the order of intention.
thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever
Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions?
Ia IIae q. 25 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that hope is not the first
strive to overcome a contrary evil that threatens soon to
of the irascible passions. Because the irascible faculty
overtake us, which pertains to daring; or an evil actually
is denominated from anger. Since, therefore, “things are
present, which pertains to anger; than to strive simply to
names from their chief characteristic” (cf. a. 2, obj. 1), it
obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive
seems that anger precedes and surpasses hope.
to overcome a present evil, than a future evil. Therefore
Objection 2. Further, the object of the irascible fac-
anger seems to be a stronger passion than daring, and dar-
ulty is something arduous. Now it seems more arduous to
ing, than hope. And consequently it seems that hope does
720
not precede them.
naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this—
Objection 3. Further, when a thing is moved towards
that as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil,
an end, the movement of withdrawal precedes the move-
so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring:
ment of approach. But fear and despair imply withdrawal
because daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear
from something; while daring and hope imply approach
arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises
towards something. Therefore fear and despair precede
from daring: for no one is angry while seeking vengeance,
hope and daring.
unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in
On the contrary, The nearer a thing is to the first, the the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, it is evident
more it precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which
that hope is the first of all the irascible passions.
is the first of the passions. Therefore hope is the first of
And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in
the passions in the irascible faculty.
the way of generation, love and hatred are first; desire and
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) all irascible
aversion, second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring,
passions imply movement towards something. Now this
fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which
movement of the irascible faculty towards something may
follow from all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so be due to two causes: one is the mere aptitude or propor-that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope
tion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred, those
precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and joy precedes
whose object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness
sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated
or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces
above.
no passion in the irascible, as stated above (q. 23, Aa. 3,4);
Reply to Objection 1. Because anger arises from the
but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger.
other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede
Since then in order of generation or execution, propor-
it, it is from anger, as being more manifest than the other
tion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the
passions, that the power takes its name.
end; it follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is
Reply to Objection 2. It is not the arduousness but
the last in the order of generation. And among the other
the good that is the reason for approach or desire. Con-
passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a movement
sequently hope, which regards good more directly, takes
arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose
precedence: although at times daring or even anger re-
object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally pre-
gards something more arduous.
cede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet
Reply to Objection 3. The movement of the appetite
so that hope precedes despair; since hope is a movement
is essentially and directly towards the good as towards its
towards good as such, which is essentially attractive, so
proper object; its movement from evil results from this.
that hope tends to good directly; whereas despair is a
For the movement of the appetitive part is in proportion,
movement away from good, a movement which is con-
not to natural movement, but to the intention of nature,
sistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something
which intends the end before intending the removal of a
else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as
contrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of
it were. In like manner fear, through being a movement
obtaining the end.
from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair
Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear?
Ia IIae q. 25 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that joy, sadness, hope
so fear is caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and
and fear are not the four principal passions. For Augus-
despair should be reckoned as principal passions, since
tine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7] sqq.) omits hope and puts
they cause others: or hope and daring, from being akin to
desire in its place.
one another.
Objection 2. Further, there is a twofold order in the
On the contrary, Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumer-
passions of the soul: the order of intention, and the order
ating the four principal passions, says:
of execution or generation. The principal passions should
“Banish joys: banish fears:
therefore be taken, either in the order of intention; and
Away with hope: away with tears.”
thus joy and sadness, which are the final passions, will be
I answer that, These four are commonly called the
the principal passions; or in the order of execution or gen-
principal passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are
eration, and thus love will be the principal passion. There-
said to be principal because in them all the other passions
fore joy and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be
have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from
called the four principal passions.
all the other passions, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Fear and
Objection 3. Further, just as daring is caused by hope,
hope are principal passions, not because they complete the
721
others simply, but because they complete them as regards the same object, viz. some future good.
the movement of the appetite towards something: for in
Reply to Objection 2.
These are called principal
respect of good, movement begins in love, goes forward
passions, in the order of intention and completion. And
to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it
though fear and hope are not the last passions simply, yet
begins in hatred, goes on to aversion, and ends in fear.
they are the last of those passions that tend towards some-
Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions
thing as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any fur-
in relation to the present and the future: for movement
ther except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be
regards the future, while rest is in something present: so
reckoned a principal passion, because it is an effect of dar-
that joy relates to present good, sadness relates to present
ing, which cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state
evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil.
further on (Reply obj. 3).
As to the other passions that regard good or evil,
Reply to Objection 3. Despair implies movement
present or future, they all culminate in these four. For
away from good; and this is, as it were, accidental: and
this reason some have said that these four are the princi-
daring implies movement towards evil; and this too is
pal passions, because they are general passions; and this
accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal pas-
is true, provided that by hope and fear we understand the
sions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to
appetite’s common tendency to desire or shun something.
be principal. And so neither can anger be called a princi-
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine puts desire or cov-
pal passion, because it arises from daring.
etousness in place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard
722
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 26
Of the Passions of the Soul in Particular: And First, of Love (In Four Articles)
We have now to consider the soul’s passions in particular, and (1) the passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions of the irascible faculty.
The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; (3) Pleasure and sadness.
Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; (2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?
(2) Whether love is a passion?
(3) Whether love is the same as dilection?
(4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence?
Whether love is in the concupiscible power?
Ia IIae q. 26 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that love is not in the
but from necessity and not from free-will. Such is, in ir-
concupiscible power. For it is written (Wis. 8:2): “Her,”
rational animals, the “sensitive appetite,” which, however,
namely wisdom, “have I loved, and have sought her out
in man, has a certain share of liberty, in so far as it obeys
from my youth.”
But the concupiscible power, being
reason. Again, there is another appetite following freely
a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom,
from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite. And
which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is
this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called
not in the concupiscible power.
the “will.”
Objection 2. Further, love seems to be identified with
Now in each of these appetites, the name “love” is
every passion: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7):
given to the principle movement towards the end loved. In
“Love, yearning for the object beloved, is desire; having
the natural appetite the principle of this movement is the
and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is contrary to it, is
appetitive subject’s connaturalness with the thing to which
fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is sadness.” But
it tends, and may be called “natural love”: thus the con-
not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed,
naturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of
fear, which is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible
its weight and may be called “natural love.” In like man-
power. Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is
ner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to
in the concupiscible power.
some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is
Objection 3. Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) men-
called “sensitive love,” or “intellectual” or “rational love.”
tions a “natural love.” But natural love seems to pertain
So that sensitive love is in the sensitive appetite, just as
rather to the natural powers, which belong to the vegetal
intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite. And it be-
soul. Therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible
longs to the concupiscible power, because it regards good
power.
absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7)
the object of the irascible faculty.
that “love is in the concupiscible power.”
Reply to Objection 1. The words quoted refer to in-
I answer that, Love is something pertaining to the
tellectual or rational love.
appetite; since good is the object of both. Wherefore love
Reply to Objection 2. Love is spoken of as being fear,
differs according to the difference of appetites. For there
joy, desire and sadness, not essentially but causally.
is an appetite which arises from an apprehension existing,
Reply to Objection 3. Natural love is not only in the
not in the subject of the appetite, but in some other: and
powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul’s powers,
this is called the “natural appetite.” Because natural things
and also in all the parts of the body, and universally in
seek what is suitable to them according to their nature, by
all things: because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv),
reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the
“Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things”; since
Author of their nature, as stated in the Ia, q. 6, a. 1, ad 2;
each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is
Ia, q. 103, a. 1, ad 1,3. And there is another appetite aris-
naturally suitable to it.
ing from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite,
723
Whether love is a passion?
Ia IIae q. 26 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that love is not a passion.
ject moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, into
For no power is a passion. But every love is a power, as
its intention; while the appetite moves towards the real-
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore love is not a
ization of the appetible object, so that the movement ends
passion.
where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in
Objection 2. Further, love is a kind of union or bond,
the appetite by the appetible object is called “love,” and
as Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond
is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from
is not a passion, but rather a relation. Therefore love is not
this complacency results a movement towards that same
a passion.
object, and this movement is “desire”; and lastly, there
Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
is rest which is “joy.” Since, therefore, love consists in
ii, 22) that passion is a movement. But love does not imply
a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object,
the movement of the appetite; for this is desire, of which
it is evident that love is a passion: properly so called, ac-
movement love is the principle. Therefore love is not a
cording as it is in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and
passion.
extended sense, according as it is in the will.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii,
Reply to Objection 1. Since power denotes a princi-
5) that “love is a passion.”
ple of movement or action, Dionysius calls love a power,
I answer that, Passion is the effect of the agent on
in so far as it is a principle of movement in the appetite.
the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect
Reply to Objection 2. Union belongs to love in so far
on the patient: for in the first place it gives it the form;
as by reason of the complacency of the appetite, the lover
and secondly it gives it the movement that results from
stands in relation to that which he loves, as though it were
the form. Thus the generator gives the generated body
himself or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is
both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so
not the very relation of union, but that union is a result of
that weight, from being the principle of movement to the
love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that “love is a unitive
place, which is connatural to that body by reason of its
force” (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii,
weight, can, in a way, be called “natural love.” In the same
1) that union is the work of love.
way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain
Reply to Objection 3. Although love does not denote
adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that
the movement of the appetite in tending towards the ap-
object; and from this follows movement towards the ap-
petible object, yet it denotes that movement whereby the
petible object. For “the appetitive movement is circular,”
appetite is changed by the appetible object, so as to have
as stated in De Anima iii, 10; because the appetible ob-
complacency therein.
Whether love is the same as dilection?
Ia IIae q. 26 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that love is the same as
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
dilection. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love
that “some holy men have held that love means something
is to dilection, “as four is to twice two, and as a rectilin-
more Godlike than dilection does.”
ear figure is to one composed of straight lines.” But these
I answer that, We find four words referring in a way,
have the same meaning. Therefore love and dilection de-
to the same thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friend-
note the same thing.
ship. They differ, however, in this, that “friendship,” ac-
Objection 2. Further, the movements of the appetite
cording to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5), “is like a habit,”
differ by reason of their objects. But the objects of dilec-
whereas “love” and “dilection” are expressed by way of
tion and love are the same. Therefore these are the same.
act or passion; and “charity” can be taken either way.
Objection 3. Further, if dilection and love differ, it
Moreover these three express act in different ways.
seems that it is chiefly in the fact that “dilection refers to
For love has a wider signification than the others, since
good things, love to evil things, as some have maintained,”
every dilection or charity is love, but not vice versa. Be-
according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7). But they do
cause dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [elec-
not differ thus; because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
tionem] made beforehand, as the very word denotes: and
xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in reference to
therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but
either good or bad things. Therefore love and dilection
only in the will, and only in the rational nature. Charity
do not differ: thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ.
denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love,
Dei xiv, 7) that “it is not one thing to speak of love, and
in so far as that which is loved is held to be of great price,
another to speak of dilection.”
724
as the word itself implies∗.
love.” However, the fact that love, which is concupisci-
Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius is speaking of love
ble passion, inclines many to evil, is the reason why some
and dilection, in so far as they are in the intellectual ap-
assigned the difference spoken of.
petite; for thus love is the same as dilection.
Reply to Objection 4. The reason why some held
Reply to Objection 2. The object of love is more gen-
that, even when applied to the will itself, the word “love”
eral than the object of dilection: because love extends to
signifies something more Godlike than “dilection,” was
more than dilection does, as stated above.
because love denotes a passion, especially in so far as it
Reply to Objection 3. Love and dilection differ, not
is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes
in respect of good and evil, but as stated. Yet in the in-
the judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend
tellectual faculty love is the same as dilection. And it
to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him,
is in this sense that Augustine speaks of love in the pas-
more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason,
sage quoted: hence a little further on he adds that “a right
which pertains to the nature of dilection, as stated above.
will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed
And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection.
Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence?
Ia IIae q. 26 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that love is not properly
and towards that to which he wishes some good. Accord-
divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence.
ingly, man has love of concupiscence towards the good
For “love is a passion, while friendship is a habit,” accord-
that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards
ing to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). But habit cannot be
him to whom he wishes good.
the member of a division of passions. Therefore love is
Now the members of this division are related as pri-
not properly divided into love of concupiscence and love
mary and secondary: since that which is loved with the
of friendship.
love of friendship is loved simply and for itself; whereas
Objection 2. Further, a thing cannot be divided by an-
that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is
other member of the same division; for man is not a mem-
loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else.
ber of the same division as “animal.” But concupiscence
For just as that which has existence, is a being simply,
is a member of the same division as love, as a passion dis-
while that which exists in another is a relative being; so,
tinct from love. Therefore concupiscence is not a division
because good is convertible with being, the good, which
of love.
itself has goodness, is good simply; but that which is an-
Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher
other’s good, is a relative good. Consequently the love
(Ethic.
viii, 3) friendship is threefold, that which is
with which a thing is loved, that it may have some good,
founded on “usefulness,” that which is founded on “plea-
is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved,
sure,” and that which is founded on “goodness.” But use-
that it may be another’s good, is relative love.
ful and pleasant friendship are not without concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 1. Love is not divided into friend-
Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with
ship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and
friendship.
love of concupiscence. For a friend is, properly speaking,
On the contrary, We are said to love certain things,
one to whom we wish good: while we are said to desire,
because we desire them: thus “a man is said to love wine,
what we wish for ourselves.
on account of its sweetness which he desires”; as stated
Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.
in Topic. ii, 3. But we have no friendship for wine and
Reply to Objection 3. When friendship is based on
suchlike things, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. Therefore love
usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend
of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship.
some good: and in this respect the character of friendship
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4),
is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his
“to love is to wish good to someone.” Hence the move-
own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the
ment of love has a twofold tendency: towards the good
useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of
which a man wishes to someone (to himself or to another)
concupiscence, loses the character to true friendship.
∗ Referring to the Latin “carus” (dear)
725
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 27
Of the Cause of Love
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the cause of love: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether good is the only cause of love?
(2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love?
(3) Whether likeness is a cause of love?
(4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?
Whether good is the only cause of love?
Ia IIae q. 27 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that good is not the only
in some respect, and is considered as being good simply.
cause of love. For good does not cause love, except be-
And thus a certain love is evil, in so far as it tends to that
cause it is loved. But it happens that evil also is loved,
which is not simply a true good. It is in this way that man
according to Ps. 10:6: “He that loveth iniquity, hateth his
“loves iniquity,” inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some
own soul”: else, every love would be good. Therefore
good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or money, or such
good is not the only cause of love.
like.
Objection 2.
Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet.
Reply to Objection 2. Those who acknowledge their
ii, 4) that “we love those who acknowledge their evils.”
evils, are beloved, not for their evils, but because they
Therefore it seems that evil is the cause of love.
acknowledge them, for it is a good thing to acknowl-
Objection 3. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
edge one’s faults, in so far as it excludes insincerity or
that not “the good” only but also “the beautiful is beloved
hypocrisy.
by all.”
Reply to Objection 3. The beautiful is the same as
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3):
the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good
“Assuredly the good alone is beloved.” Therefore good
is what all seek, the notion of good is that which calms
alone is the cause of love.
the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which
I answer that, As stated above (q. 26, a. 1), Love be-
calms the desire, by being seen or known. Consequently
longs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty.
those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the
Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause
most cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering
of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must
to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful
needs be love’s object. Now the proper object of love is
sounds. But in reference to the other objects of the other
the good; because, as stated above (q. 26, Aa. 1,2), love
senses, we do not use the expression “beautiful,” for we
implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the
do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful odors. Thus
lover for the thing beloved, and to everything, that thing
it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the
is a good, which is akin and proportionate to it. It follows,
cognitive faculty: so that “good” means that which simply
therefore, that good is the proper cause of love.
pleases the appetite; while the “beautiful” is something
Reply to Objection 1. Evil is never loved except un-
pleasant to apprehend.
der the aspect of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good Whether knowledge is a cause of love?
Ia IIae q. 27 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that knowledge is not a
things are loved more than they are known: thus in this
cause of love. For it is due to love that a thing is sought.
life God can be loved in Himself, but cannot be known in
But some things are sought without being known, for in-
Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
stance, the sciences; for since “to have them is the same
Objection 3. Further, if knowledge were the cause of
as to know them,” as Augustine says (Qq. 83, qu. 35), if
love, there would be no love, where there is no knowl-
we knew them we should have them, and should not seek
edge. But in all things there is love, as Dionysius says
them. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
(Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not knowledge in all
Objection 2. Further, to love what we know not seems
things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
like loving something more than we know it. But some
On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2)
726
that “none can love what he does not know.”
ity are united, and to unite together, after a fashion, things
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), good is the
that are distinct, by comparing one with another. Con-
cause of love, as being its object. But good is not the
sequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man
object of the appetite, except as apprehended. And there-
should know distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its
fore love demands some apprehension of the good that is
parts, powers, and properties. On the other hand, love
loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5,12)
is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing as it is
says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love:
in itself: wherefore it suffices, for the perfection of love,
and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty
that a thing be loved according as it is known in itself.
or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love. Accord-
Hence it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more than it is
ingly knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason
known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being
as good is, which can be loved only if known.
perfectly known. This is most evident in regard to the sci-
Reply to Objection 1. He who seeks science, is not
ences, which some love through having a certain general
entirely without knowledge thereof: but knows something
knowledge of them: for instance, they know that rhetoric
about it already in some respect, either in a general way,
is a science that enables man to persuade others; and this
or in some one of its effects, or from having heard it com-
is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to the love
mended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But to have
of God.
it is not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly.
Reply to Objection 3. Even natural love, which is
Reply to Objection 2. Something is required for the
in all things, is caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed
perfection of knowledge, that is not requisite for the per-
existing in natural things themselves, but in Him Who cre-
fection of love. For knowledge belongs to the reason,
ated their nature, as stated above (q. 26, a. 1; cf. Ia, q. 6,
whose function it is to distinguish things which in real-
a. 1, ad 2).
Whether likeness is a cause of love?
Ia IIae q. 27 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that likeness is not a
thing having the same quality actually: for example, two
cause of love. For the same thing is not the cause of con-
things possessing the quality of whiteness are said to be
traries. But likeness is the cause of hatred; for it is writ-
alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing hav-
ten (Prov. 13:10) that “among the proud there are always
ing potentially and by way of inclination, a quality which
contentions”; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that
the other has actually: thus we may say that a heavy body
“potters quarrel with one another.” Therefore likeness is
existing outside its proper place is like another heavy body
not a cause of love.
that exists in its proper place: or again, according as po-
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv,
tentiality bears a resemblance to its act; since act is con-
14) that “a man loves in another that which he would not
tained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself.
be himself: thus he loves an actor, but would not himself
Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of
be an actor.” But it would not be so, if likeness were the
friendship or well-being. For the very fact that two men
proper cause of love; for in that case a man would love in
are alike, having, as it were, one form, makes them to be,
another, that which he possesses himself, or would like to
in a manner, one in that form: thus two men are one thing
possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.
in the species of humanity, and two white men are one
Objection 3. Further, everyone loves that which he
thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to
needs, even if he have it not: thus a sick man loves health,
the other, as being one with him; and he wishes good to
and a poor man loves riches. But in so far as he needs
him as to himself. But the second kind of likeness causes
them and lacks them, he is unlike them. Therefore not
love of concupiscence, or friendship founded on useful-
only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of love.
ness or pleasure: because whatever is in potentiality, as
Objection 4.
Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet.
such, has the desire for its act; and it takes pleasure in its
ii, 4) that “we love those who bestow money and health
realization, if it be a sentient and cognitive being.
on us; and also those who retain their friendship for the
Now it has been stated above (q. 26, a. 4), that in the
dead.” But all are not such. Therefore likeness is not a
love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves
cause of love.
himself, in willing the good that he desires. But a man
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 13:19): “Every
loves himself more than another: because he is one with
beast loveth its like.”
himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only
I answer that, Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause
in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other’s
of love. But it must be observed that likeness between
likeness to him arising from the participation of a form,
things is twofold. One kind of likeness arises from each
hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he be-
727
comes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hin-bears a likeness to what he loves, as potentiality bears a
dering him from gaining his own good. This is why “pot-
likeness to its act, as stated above.
ters quarrel among themselves,” because they hinder one
Reply to Objection 4. According to the same likeness
another’s gain: and why “there are contentions among the
of potentiality to its act, the illiberal man loves the man
proud,” because they hinder one another in attaining the
who is liberal, in so far as he expects from him something
position they covet.
which he desires. The same applies to the man who is
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
constant in his friendship as compared to one who is in-
Reply to Objection 2. Even when a man loves in an-
constant. For in either case friendship seems to be based
other what he loves not in himself, there is a certain like-
on usefulness. We might also say that although not all
ness of proportion: because as the latter is to that which
men have these virtues in the complete habit, yet they have
is loved in him, so is the former to that which he loves in
them according to certain seminal principles in the reason,
himself: for instance, if a good singer love a good writer,
in force of which principles the man who is not virtuous
we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one
loves the virtuous man, as being in conformity with his
has that which is becoming to him in respect of his art.
own natural reason.
Reply to Objection 3. He that loves what he needs,
Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?
Ia IIae q. 27 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that some other passion
this does love consist. Therefore it is not possible for any
can be the cause of love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii,
other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of ev-
3) says that some are loved for the sake of the pleasure
ery love. But it may happen that some other passion is
they give. But pleasure is a passion. Therefore another
the cause of some particular love: just as one good is the
passion is a cause of love.
cause of another.
Objection 2. Further, desire is a passion. But we
Reply to Objection 1. When a man loves a thing for
love some because we desire to receive something from
the pleasure it affords, his love is indeed caused by plea-
them: as happens in every friendship based on usefulness.
sure; but that very pleasure is caused, in its turn, by an-
Therefore another passion is a cause of love.
other preceding love; for none takes pleasure save in that
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1):
which is loved in some way.
“When we have no hope of getting a thing, we love it but
Reply to Objection 2. Desire for a thing always pre-
half-heartedly or not at all, even if we see how beautiful it
supposes love for that thing. But desire of one thing can
is.” Therefore hope too is a cause of love.
be the cause of another thing’s being loved; thus he that
On the contrary, All the other emotions of the soul
desires money, for this reason loves him from whom he
are caused by love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
receives it.
7,9).
Reply to Objection 3. Hope causes or increases love;
I answer that, There is no other passion of the soul
both by reason of pleasure, because it causes pleasure; and
that does not presuppose love of some kind. The reason is
by reason of desire, because hope strengthens desire, since
that every other passion of the soul implies either move-
we do not desire so intensely that which we have no hope
ment towards something, or rest in something. Now ev-
of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself is of a good that is
ery movement towards something, or rest in something,
loved.
arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in
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FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 28
Of the Effects of Love
(In Six Articles)
We now have to consider the effects of love: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether union is an effect of love?
(2) Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?
(3) Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?
(4) Whether zeal is an effect of love?
(5) Whether love is a passion that is hurtful to the lover?
(6) Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?
Whether union is an effect of love?
Ia IIae q. 28 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that union is not an effect
did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul.”
of love. For absence is incompatible with union. But love
The first of these unions is caused “effectively” by
is compatible with absence; for the Apostle says (Gal.
love; because love moves man to desire and seek the pres-
4:18): “Be zealous for that which is good in a good thing
ence of the beloved, as of something suitable and belong-
always” (speaking of himself, according to a gloss), “and
ing to him. The second union is caused “formally” by
not only when I am present with you.” Therefore union is
love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense
not an effect of love.
Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that “love is a vital prin-
Objection 2. Further, every union is either according
ciple uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover,
to essence, thus form is united to matter, accident to sub-
to wit, and the beloved.” For in describing it as “uniting”
ject, and a part to the whole, or to another part in order
he refers to the union of affection, without which there is
to make up the whole: or according to likeness, in genus,
no love: and in saying that “it seeks to unite,” he refers to
species, or accident. But love does not cause union of
real union.
essence; else love could not be between things essentially
Reply to Objection 1. This argument is true of real
distinct. On the other hand, love does not cause union of
union. That is necessary to pleasure as being its cause;
likeness, but rather is caused by it, as stated above (q. 27,
desire implies the real absence of the beloved: but love
a. 3). Therefore union is not an effect of love.
remains whether the beloved be absent or present.
Objection 3. Further, the sense in act is the sensible
Reply to Objection 2. Union has a threefold relation
in act, and the intellect in act is the thing actually under-
to love. There is union which causes love; and this is sub-
stood. But the lover in act is not the beloved in act. There-
stantial union, as regards the love with which one loves
fore union is the effect of knowledge rather than of love.
oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above
every love is a “unitive love.”
(q. 27, a. 3). There is also a union which is essentially
I answer that, The union of lover and beloved is
love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection,
twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the
and is likened to substantial union, inasmuch as the lover
beloved is present with the lover. The second is union
stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love
of affection: and this union must be considered in rela-
of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, if it
tion to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the
be love of concupiscence. Again there is a union, which is
appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold,
the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks
viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each
with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keep-
of these arises from a kind of apprehension of the one-
ing with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher re-
ness of the thing loved with the lover. For when we love
lates (Polit. ii, 1), “Aristophanes stated that lovers would
a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to
wish to be united both into one,” but since “this would
our well-being. In like manner when a man loves another
result in either one or both being destroyed,” they seek a
with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as
suitable and becoming union—to live together, speak to-
he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends him as
gether, and be united together in other like things.
his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills good to him as
Reply to Objection 3. Knowledge is perfected by
to himself. Hence a friend is called a man’s “other self”
the thing known being united, through its likeness, to the
(Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), “Well
knower. But the effect of love is that the thing itself which
729
is loved, is, in a way, united to the lover, as stated above.
which is caused by knowledge.
Consequently the union caused by love is closer than that
Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?
Ia IIae q. 28 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that love does not cause
from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on
mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and
account of another, or wish good to another on account
vice versa. For that which is in another is contained in it.
of something else), but because the complacency in the
But the same cannot be container and contents. Therefore
beloved is rooted in the lover’s heart. For this reason we
love cannot cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be
speak of love as being “intimate”; and “of the bowels of
in the beloved and vice versa.
charity.” On the other hand, the lover is in the beloved,
Objection 2. Further, nothing can penetrate within a
by the love of concupiscence and by the love of friend-
whole, except by means of a division of the whole. But it
ship, but not in the same way. For the love of concupis-
is the function of the reason, not of the appetite where love
cence is not satisfied with any external or superficial pos-
resides, to divide things that are really united. Therefore
session or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess
mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.
the beloved perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it
Objection 3. Further, if love involves the lover being
were. Whereas, in the love of friendship, the lover is in
in the beloved and vice versa, it follows that the beloved is
the beloved, inasmuch as he reckons what is good or evil
united to the lover, in the same way as the lover is united
to his friend, as being so to himself; and his friend’s will
to the beloved. But the union itself is love, as stated above
as his own, so that it seems as though he felt the good or
(a. 1). Therefore it follows that the lover is always loved
suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is
by the object of his love; which is evidently false. There-
proper to friends “to desire the same things, and to grieve
fore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.
and rejoice at the same,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:16): “He that
ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4). Consequently in so far as he reck-
abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him.” Now
ons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover
charity is the love of God. Therefore, for the same reason,
seems to be in the beloved, as though he were become one
every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice
with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills and
versa.
acts for his friend’s sake as for his own sake, looking on
I answer that, This effect of mutual indwelling may
his friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in
be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and
the lover.
to the appetitive power. Because, as to the apprehensive
In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of
power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as
friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love:
the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover, ac-
inasmuch as friends return love for love, and both desire
cording to Phil. 1:7, “For that I have you in my heart”:
and do good things for one another.
while the lover is said to be in the beloved, according to
Reply to Objection 1. The beloved is contained in the
apprehension, inasmuch as the lover is not satisfied with
lover, by being impressed on his heart and thus becoming
a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to
the object of his complacency. On the other hand, the
gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to
lover is contained in the beloved, inasmuch as the lover
the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus it
penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved. For nothing hin-
is written concerning the Holy Ghost, Who is God’s Love,
ders a thing from being both container and contents in dif-
that He “searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God”
ferent ways: just as a genus is contained in its species, and
(1 Cor. 2:10).
vice versa.
As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be
Reply to Objection 2. The apprehension of the reason
in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind
precedes the movement of love. Consequently, just as the
of complacency: causing him either to take pleasure in
reason divides, so does the movement of love penetrate
it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the
into the beloved, as was explained above.
object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it with the
Reply to Objection 3. This argument is true of the
love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills
third kind of mutual indwelling, which is not to be found
to the beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed
in every kind of love.
730
Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?
Ia IIae q. 28 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that ecstasy is not an
thus a man may be said to suffer ecstasy, when he is over-
effect of love. For ecstasy seems to imply loss of rea-
come by violent passion or madness. As to the appetitive
son. But love does not always result in loss of reason: for
power, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power
lovers are masters of themselves at times. Therefore love
is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out
does not cause ecstasy.
from itself, as it were.
Objection 2. Further, the lover desires the beloved to
The first of these ecstasies is caused by love disposi-
be united to him. Therefore he draws the beloved to him-
tively in so far, namely, as love makes the lover dwell on
self, rather than betakes himself into the beloved, going
the beloved, as stated above (a. 2), and to dwell intently
forth out from himself as it were.
on one thing draws the mind from other things. The sec-
Objection 3. Further, love unites the beloved to the
ond ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love of friend-
lover, as stated above (a. 1).
If, therefore, the lover
ship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in
goes out from himself, in order to betake himself into the
a restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the
beloved, it follows that the lover always loves the beloved
lover is carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, more than himself: which is evidently false. Therefore
namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that
ecstasy is not an effect of love.
he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. But
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
since he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself, he
“the Divine love produces ecstasy,” and that “God Himself
does not go out from himself simply, and this movement
suffered ecstasy through love.” Since therefore according
remains finally within him. On the other hand, in the love
to the same author (Div. Nom. iv), every love is a partici-
of friendship, a man’s affection goes out from itself sim-
pated likeness of the Divine Love, it seems that every love
ply; because he wishes and does good to his friend, by
causes ecstasy.
caring and providing for him, for his sake.
I answer that, To suffer ecstasy means to be placed
Reply to Objection 1. This argument is true of the
outside oneself.
This happens as to the apprehensive
first kind of ecstasy.
power and as to the appetitive power. As to the appre-
Reply to Objection 2. This argument applies to love
hensive power, a man is said to be placed outside himself,
of concupiscence, which, as stated above, does not cause
when he is placed outside the knowledge proper to him.
ecstasy simply.
This may be due to his being raised to a higher knowl-
Reply to Objection 3. He who loves, goes out from
edge; thus, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, inasmuch as
himself, in so far as he wills the good of his friend and
he is placed outside the connatural apprehension of his
works for it. Yet he does not will the good of his friend
sense and reason, when he is raised up so as to compre-
more than his own good: and so it does not follow that he
hend things that surpass sense and reason: or it may be
loves another more than himself.
due to his being cast down into a state of debasement;
Whether zeal is an effect of love?
Ia IIae q. 28 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that zeal is not an effect
should not be set down as an effect of love any more than
of love. For zeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it
of hatred.
is written (1 Cor. 3:3): “Whereas there is among you zeal
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
[Douay: ‘envying’] and contention,” etc. But contention
“God is said to be a zealot, on account of his great love
is incompatible with love. Therefore zeal is not an effect
for all things.”
of love.
I answer that, Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises
Objection 2. Further, the object of love is the good,
from the intensity of love. For it is evident that the more
which communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed
intensely a power tends to anything, the more vigorously it
to communication; since it seems an effect of zeal, that a
withstands opposition or resistance. Since therefore love
man refuses to share the object of his love with another:
is “a movement towards the object loved,” as Augustine
thus husbands are said to be jealous of [zelare] their wives,
says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove
because they will not share them with others. Therefore
everything that opposes it.
zeal is not an effect of love.
But this happens in different ways according to love of
Objection 3. Further, there is no zeal without hatred,
concupiscence, and love of friendship. For in love of con-
as neither is there without love: for it is written (Ps. 72:3): cupiscence he who desires something intensely, is moved
“I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked.” Therefore it
against all that hinders his gaining or quietly enjoying the
731
object of his love. It is thus that husbands are said to be laments it.”
jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking in this
hindrance to their exclusive individual rights. In like man-
passage of the zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of
ner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who
contention, not against the object of love, but for it, and
seem to excel, as though these were a hindrance to their
against that which is opposed to it.
excelling. And this is the zeal of envy, of which it is writ-
Reply to Objection 2. Good is loved inasmuch as it
ten (Ps. 36:1): “Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy
can be communicated to the lover. Consequently what-
[zelaveris] them that work iniquity.”
ever hinders the perfection of this communication, be-
On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend’s
comes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But
good: wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be
through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small
moved against everything that opposes the friend’s good.
goods cannot, in their entirety, be possessed by many at
In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his
the same time: and from the love of such things arises the
friend, when he makes a point of repelling whatever may
zeal of envy. But it does not arise, properly speaking, in
be said or done against the friend’s good. In this way,
the case of those things which, in their entirety, can be
too, a man is said to be zealous on God’s behalf, when
possessed by many: for no one envies another the knowl-
he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever
edge of truth, which can be known entirely by many; ex-
is contrary to the honor or will of God; according to 3
cept perhaps one may envy another his superiority in the
Kings 19:14: “With zeal I have been zealous for the Lord
knowledge of it.
of hosts.” Again on the words of Jn. 2:17: “The zeal of
Reply to Objection 3. The very fact that a man hates
Thy house hath eaten me up,” a gloss says that “a man is
whatever is opposed to the object of his love, is the effect
eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy what-
of love. Hence zeal is set down as an effect of love rather
ever evil he perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and
than of hatred.
Whether love is a passion that wounds the lover?
Ia IIae q. 28 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that love wounds the
thereby. Consequently love of a suitable good perfects
lover. For languor denotes a hurt in the one that lan-
and betters the lover; but love of a good which is unsuit-
guishes. But love causes languor: for it is written (Cant
able to the lover, wounds and worsens him. Wherefore
2:5): “Stay me up with flowers, compass me about with
man is perfected and bettered chiefly by the love of God:
apples; because I languish with love.” Therefore love is a
but is wounded and worsened by the love of sin, according
wounding passion.
to Osee 9:10: “They became abominable, as those things
Objection 2. Further, melting is a kind of dissolution.
which they loved.”
But love melts that in which it is: for it is written (Cant
And let this be understood as applying to love in re-
5:6): “My soul melted when my beloved spoke.” There-
spect of its formal element, i.e. in regard to the appetite.
fore love is a dissolvent: therefore it is a corruptive and a
But in respect of the material element in the passion of
wounding passion.
love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it happens that love is
Objection 3. Further, fervor denotes a certain excess
hurtful, by reason of this change being excessive: just as
of heat; which excess has a corruptive effect. But love
it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the
causes fervor: for Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) in reckoning
soul that is exercised through the change of some bodily
the properties belonging to the Seraphim’s love, includes
organ.
“hot” and “piercing” and “most fervent.” Moreover it is
In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four
said of love (Cant 8:6) that “its lamps are fire and flames.”
proximate effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting,
Therefore love is a wounding and corruptive passion.
enjoyment, languor, and fervor. Of these the first is “melt-
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
ing,” which is opposed to freezing. For things that are
“everything loves itself with a love that holds it together,”
frozen, are closely bound together, so as to be hard to
i.e. that preserves it. Therefore love is not a wounding
pierce. But it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted
passion, but rather one that preserves and perfects.
to receive the good which is loved, inasmuch as the object
I answer that, As stated above (q. 26, Aa. 1,2; q. 27,
loved is in the lover, as stated above (a. 2). Consequently
a. 1), love denotes a certain adapting of the appetitive
the freezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition in-
power to some good.
Now nothing is hurt by being
compatible with love: while melting denotes a softening
adapted to that which is suitable to it; rather, if possible,
of the heart, whereby the heart shows itself to be ready for
it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing be adapted to
the entrance of the beloved. If, then, the beloved is present
that which is not suitable to it, it is hurt and made worse
and possessed, pleasure or enjoyment ensues. But if the
732
beloved be absent, two passions arise; viz. sadness at its love considered formally, according to the relation of the
absence, which is denoted by “languor” (hence Cicero in
appetitive power to its object. But in the passion of love,
De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 11 applies the term “ailment” chiefly
other effects ensue, proportionate to the above, in respect
to sadness); and an intense desire to possess the beloved,
of a change in the organ.
which is signified by “fervor.” And these are the effects of
Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?
Ia IIae q. 28 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the lover does not
above (q. 1, a. 2 ). Now the end is the good desired and
do everything from love. For love is a passion, as stated
loved by each one. Wherefore it is evident that every
above (q. 26, a. 2). But man does not do everything from
agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of some
passion: but some things he does from choice, and some
kind.
things from ignorance, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. This objection takes love as
not everything that a man does, is done from love.
a passion existing in the sensitive appetite. But here we
Objection 2. Further, the appetite is a principle of
are speaking of love in a general sense, inasmuch as it in-
movement and action in all animals, as stated in De An-
cludes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love: for
ima iii, 10. If, therefore, whatever a man does is done
it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks of love in chapter
from love, the other passions of the appetitive faculty are
iv of De Divinis Nominibus.
superfluous.
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (a. 5; q. 27,
Objection 3. Further, nothing is produced at one and
a. 4) desire, sadness and pleasure, and consequently all
the same time by contrary causes. But some things are
the other passions of the soul, result from love. Where-
done from hatred. Therefore all things are not done from
fore every act proceeds from any passion, proceeds also
love.
from love as from a first cause: and so the other passions,
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.
that “all things, whatever they do, they do for the love
Reply to Objection 3. Hatred also is a result of love,
of good.”
as we shall state further on (q. 29, a. 2).
I answer that, Every agent acts for an end, as stated
733
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 29
Of Hatred
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider hatred: concerning which there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether evil is the cause and the object of hatred?
(2) Whether love is the cause of hatred?
(3) Whether hatred is stronger than love?
(4) Whether a man can hate himself?
(5) Whether a man can hate the truth?
(6) Whether a thing can be the object of universal hatred?
Whether evil is the cause and object of hatred?
Ia IIae q. 29 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that evil is not the object
opposes and destroys it; and this is natural hatred. So,
and cause of hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is
therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual ap-
good. If therefore evil be the object of hatred, it follows
petite, love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that
that nothing but the lack of something can be the object of
which is apprehended as suitable; while hatred is disso-
hatred: which is clearly untrue.
nance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as
Objection 2. Further, hatred of evil is praise-worthy;
repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable,
hence (2 Macc 3:1) some are praised for that “the laws
as such, bears the aspect of good; so whatever is repug-
were very well kept, because of the godliness of Onias
nant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just
the high-priest, and the hatred of their souls [Douay: ‘his
as good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred.
soul’] had no evil.” If, therefore, nothing but evil be the
Reply to Objection 1. Being, as such, has not the as-
object of hatred, it would follow that all hatred is com-
pect of repugnance but only of fittingness; because being
mendable: and this is clearly false.
is common to all things. But being, inasmuch as it is this
Objection 3. Further, the same thing is not at the same
determinate being, has an aspect of repugnance to some
time both good and evil. But the same thing is lovable and
determinate being. And in this way, one being is hateful
hateful to different subjects. Therefore hatred is not only
to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by compar-
of evil, but also of good.
ison with something else.
On the contrary, Hatred is the opposite of love. But
Reply to Objection 2. Just as a thing may be appre-
the object of love is good, as stated above (q. 26, a. 1;
hended as good, when it is not truly good; so a thing may
q. 27, a. 1). Therefore the object of hatred is evil.
be apprehended as evil, whereas it is not truly evil. Hence
I answer that, Since the natural appetite is the result
it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love
of apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the
of good is good.
same subject as the natural appetite), it seems that what
Reply to Objection 3. To different things the same
applies to the inclination of the natural appetite, applies
thing may be lovable or hateful: in respect of the natural
also to the animal appetite, which does result from an ap-
appetite, owing to one and the same thing being naturally
prehension in the same subject, as stated above (q. 26,
suitable to one thing, and naturally unsuitable to another:
a. 1).
Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is
thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming to water:
evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and
and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and
adapted to that which is suitable to it, wherein consists
the same thing being apprehended by one as good, by an-
natural love; so has it a natural dissonance from that which
other as bad.
Whether love is a cause of hatred?
Ia IIae q. 29 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that love is not a cause of
Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
hatred. For “the opposite members of a division are natu-
Objection 2. Further, of two contraries, one is not
rally simultaneous” (Praedic. x). But love and hatred are
the cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries.
opposite members of a division, since they are contrary to
Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
one another. Therefore they are naturally simultaneous.
Objection 3. Further, that which follows is not the
734
cause of that which precedes. But hatred precedes love, species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes
seemingly: since hatred implies a turning away from evil,
they are not simultaneous either really or logically; e.g.
whereas love implies a turning towards good. Therefore
substance and accident; for substance is in reality the
love is not the cause of hatred.
cause of accident; and being is predicated of substance
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
before it is predicated of accident, by a priority of reason,
7,9) that all emotions are caused by love. Therefore ha-
because it is not predicated of accident except inasmuch
tred also, since it is an emotion of the soul, is caused by
as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred are nat-
love.
urally simultaneous, logically but not really. Wherefore
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), love consists in a nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred.
certain agreement of the lover with the object loved, while
Reply to Objection 2. Love and hatred are contraries
hatred consists in a certain disagreement or dissonance.
if considered in respect of the same thing. But if taken in
Now we should consider in each thing, what agrees with
respect of contraries, they are not themselves contrary, but
it, before that which disagrees: since a thing disagrees
consequent to one another: for it amounts to the same that
with another, through destroying or hindering that which
one love a certain thing, or that one hate its contrary. Thus
agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede ha-
love of one thing is the cause of one’s hating its contrary.
tred; and nothing is hated, save through being contrary to
Reply to Objection 3. In the order of execution, the
a suitable thing which is loved. And hence it is that every
turning away from one term precedes the turning towards
hatred is caused by love.
the other. But the reverse is the case in the order of inten-
Reply to Objection 1. The opposite members of a di-
tion: since approach to one term is the reason for turning
vision are sometimes naturally simultaneous, both really
away from the other. Now the appetitive movement be-
and logically; e.g. two species of animal, or two species of
longs rather to the order of intention than to that of execu-
color. Sometimes they are simultaneous logically, while,
tion. Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each is an
in reality, one precedes, and causes the other; e.g. the
appetitive movement.
Whether hatred is stronger than love?
Ia IIae q. 29 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that hatred is stronger
speaking, stronger than hatred. Because a thing is moved
than love. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): “There is
to the end more strongly than to the means. Now turning
no one who does not flee from pain, more than he desires
away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining of
pleasure.” But flight from pain pertains to hatred; while
good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, the soul’s move-
desire for pleasure belongs to love. Therefore hatred is
ment in respect of good is stronger than its movement in
stronger than love.
respect of evil.
Objection 2. Further, the weaker is overcome by the
Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger
stronger. But love is overcome by hatred: when, that is to
than love, for two reasons. First, because hatred is more
say, love is turned into hatred. Therefore hatred is stronger
keenly felt than love. For, since the sensitive perception
than love.
is accompanied by a certain impression; when once the
Objection 3. Further, the emotions of the soul are
impression has been received it is not felt so keenly as
shown by their effects. But man insists more on repelling
in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a hec-
what is hateful, than on seeking what is pleasant: thus
tic fever, though greater, is nevertheless not felt so much
also irrational animals refrain from pleasure for fear of the
as the heat of tertian fever; because the heat of the hectic
whip, as Augustine instances (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore
fever is habitual and like a second nature. For this rea-
hatred is stronger than love.
son, love is felt more keenly in the absence of the object
On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil; because
loved; thus Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12) that “love is
“evil does nothing except in virtue of good,” as Dionysius
felt more keenly when we lack what we love.” And for the
says (Div. Nom. iv). But hatred and love differ accord-
same reason, the unbecomingness of that which is hated
ing to the difference of good and evil. Therefore love is
is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is
stronger than hatred.
loved. Secondly, because comparison is made between a
I answer that, It is impossible for an effect to be
hatred and a love which are not mutually corresponding.
stronger than its cause. Now every hatred arises from
Because, according to different degrees of good there are
some love as its cause, as above stated (a. 2). Therefore
different degrees of love to which correspond different de-
it is impossible for hatred to be stronger than love abso-
grees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred that corresponds to a
lutely.
greater love, moves us more than a lesser love.
But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely
Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objec-
735
tion. For the love of pleasure is less than the love of Wherefore we flee from pain more than we love pleasure.
self-preservation, to which corresponds flight from pain.
Whether a man can hate himself?
Ia IIae q. 29 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that a man can hate him-
ply evil; and in this way, a man accidentally wills evil to
self. For it is written (Ps. 10:6): “He that loveth iniquity,
himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly, in regard to
hateth his own soul.” But many love iniquity. Therefore
himself, to whom he wills good. For each thing is that
many hate themselves.
which is predominant in it; wherefore the state is said to
Objection 2. Further, him we hate, to whom we wish
do what the king does, as if the king were the whole state.
and work evil. But sometimes a man wishes and works
Now it is clear that man is principally the mind of man.
evil to himself, e.g. a man who kills himself. Therefore
And it happens that some men account themselves as be-
some men hate themselves.
ing principally that which they are in their material and
Objection 3. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii)
sensitive nature. Wherefore they love themselves accord-
that “avarice makes a man hateful”; whence we may con-
ing to what they take themselves to be, while they hate
clude that everyone hates a miser. But some men are mis-
that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to
ers. Therefore they hate themselves.
reason. And in both these ways, “he that loveth iniquity
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:29) that
hateth” not only “his own soul,” but also himself.
“no man ever hated his own flesh.”
Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.
I answer that, Properly speaking, it is impossible for
Reply to Objection 2. No man wills and works evil to
a man to hate himself. For everything naturally desires
himself, except he apprehend it under the aspect of good.
good, nor can anyone desire anything for himself, save
For even they who kill themselves, apprehend death itself
under the aspect of good: for “evil is outside the scope of
as a good, considered as putting an end to some unhappi-
the will,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Now to love
ness or pain.
a man is to will good to him, as stated above (q. 26, a. 4).
Reply to Objection 3. The miser hates something ac-
Consequently, a man must, of necessity, love himself; and
cidental to himself, but not for that reason does he hate
it is impossible for a man to hate himself, properly speak-
himself: thus a sick man hates his sickness for the very
ing.
reason that he loves himself. Or we may say that avarice
But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself:
makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. In fact, it
and this in two ways. First, on the part of the good which
is caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man
a man wills to himself. For it happens sometimes that
desires temporal goods for himself more than he should.
what is desired as good in some particular respect, is sim-
Whether a man can hate the truth?
Ia IIae q. 29 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that a man cannot hate
I answer that, Good, true and being are the same in
the truth. For good, true, and being are convertible. But a
reality, but differ as considered by reason. For good is
man cannot hate good. Neither, therefore, can he hate the
considered in the light of something desirable, while be-
truth.
ing and true are not so considered: because good is “what
Objection 2. Further, “All men have a natural desire
all things seek.” Wherefore good, as such, cannot be the
for knowledge,” as stated in the beginning of the Meta-
object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular. Be-
physics i, 1. But knowledge is only of truth. Therefore
ing and truth in general cannot be the object of hatred: be-
truth is naturally desired and loved. But that which is in a
cause disagreement is the cause of hatred, and agreement
thing naturally, is always in it. Therefore no man can hate
is the cause of love; while being and truth are common to
the truth.
all things. But nothing hinders some particular being or
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
some particular truth being an object of hatred, in so far
4) that “men love those who are straightforward.” But
as it is considered as hurtful and repugnant; since hurtful-
there can be no other motive for this save truth. Therefore
ness and repugnance are not incompatible with the notion
man loves the truth naturally. Therefore he cannot hate it.
of being and truth, as they are with the notion of good.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 4:16): “Am
Now it may happen in three ways that some particular
I become your enemy because I tell you the truth?”∗
truth is repugnant or hurtful to the good we love. First,
∗ St. Thomas quotes the passage, probably from memory, as though it were an assertion: “I am become,” etc.
736
according as truth is in things as in its cause and origin.
gustine says (Confess. x, 23) that men “love truth when
And thus man sometimes hates a particular truth, when he
it enlightens, they hate it when it reproves.” This suffices
wishes that what is true were not true. Secondly, accord-
for the Reply to the First Objection.
ing as truth is in man’s knowledge, which hinders him
Reply to Objection 2. The knowledge of truth is lov-
from gaining the object loved: such is the case of those
able in itself: hence Augustine says that men love it when
who wish not to know the truth of faith, that they may
it enlightens. But accidentally, the knowledge of truth
sin freely; in whose person it is said (Job 21:14): “We
may become hateful, in so far as it hinders one from ac-
desire not the knowledge of Thy ways.” Thirdly, a partic-
complishing one’s desire.
ular truth is hated, as being repugnant, inasmuch as it is in
Reply to Objection 3. The reason why we love those
the intellect of another man: as, for instance, when a man
who are straightforward is that they make known the truth,
wishes to remain hidden in his sin, he hates that anyone
and the knowledge of the truth, considered in itself, is a
should know the truth about his sin. In this respect, Au-
desirable thing.
Whether anything can be an object of universal hatred?
Ia IIae q. 29 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that a thing cannot be an
sion and of appetite, can tend to something universally.
object of universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of
Thus we say that the object of sight is color considered
the sensitive appetite, which is moved by an apprehension
generically; not that the sight is cognizant of universal
in the senses. But the senses cannot apprehend the uni-
color, but because the fact that color is cognizant by the
versal. Therefore a thing cannot be an object of universal
sight, is attributed to color, not as being this particular
hatred.
color, but simply because it is color. Accordingly hatred
Objection 2. Further, hatred is caused by disagree-
in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally:
ment; and where there is disagreement, there is nothing
because this thing, by reason of its common nature, and
in common. But the notion of universality implies some-
not merely as an individual, is hostile to the animal—for
thing in common. Therefore nothing can be the object of
instance, a wolf in regard to a sheep. Hence a sheep hates
universal hatred.
the wolf universally. On the other hand, anger is always
Objection 3. Further, the object of hatred is evil. But
caused by something in particular: because it is caused
“evil is in things, and not in the mind” (Metaph. vi, 4).
by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions pro-
Since therefore the universal is in the mind only, which
ceed from individuals. For this reason the Philosopher
abstracts the universal from the particular, it would seem
says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “anger is always directed to some-
that hatred cannot have a universal object.
thing singular, whereas hatred can be directed to a thing
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4)
in general.”
that “anger is directed to something singular, whereas ha-
But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since
tred is also directed to a thing in general; for everybody
it arises from the universal apprehension of the intellect,
hates the thief and the backbiter.”
it can regard the universal in both ways.
I answer that, There are two ways of speaking of the
Reply to Objection 1. The senses do not apprehend
universal: first, as considered under the aspect of univer-
the universal, as such: but they apprehend something to
sality; secondly, as considered in the nature to which it
which the character of universality is given by abstraction.
is ascribed: for it is one thing to consider the universal
Reply to Objection 2. That which is common to all
man, and another to consider a man as man. If, therefore,
cannot be a reason of hatred. But nothing hinders a thing
we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive power,
from being common to many, and at variance with others,
whether of apprehension or of appetite, can attain the uni-
so as to be hateful to them.
versal: because the universal is obtained by abstraction
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the
from individual matter, on which every sensitive power is
universal under the aspect of universality: and thus it does
based.
not come under the sensitive apprehension or appetite.
Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehen-
737
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 30
Of Concupiscence
(In Four Articles)
We have now to consider concupiscence: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?
(2) Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?
(3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?
(4) Whether concupiscence is infinite?
Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?
Ia IIae q. 30 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that concupiscence is not
body: because the sense is a power seated in a bodily or-
only in the sensitive appetite. For there is a concupiscence
gan: wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole
of wisdom, according to Wis. 6:21: “The concupiscence
composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving
[Douay: ‘desire’] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting
for this latter pleasure, since it belongs to the united soul
kingdom.” But the sensitive appetite can have no ten-
and body, as is implied by the Latin word “concupiscen-
dency to wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only
tia.” Therefore, properly speaking, concupiscence is in the
in the sensitive appetite.
sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible faculty, which
Objection 2. Further, the desire for the command-
takes its name from it.
ments of God is not in the sensitive appetite: in fact the
Reply to Objection 1. The craving for wisdom, or
Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): “There dwelleth not in me, that
other spiritual goods, is sometimes called concupiscence;
is to say, in my flesh, that which is good.” But desire for
either by reason of a certain likeness; or on account of the
God’s commandments is an act of concupiscence, accord-
craving in the higher part of the soul being so vehement
ing to Ps. 118:20: “My soul hath coveted [concupivit]
that it overflows into the lower appetite, so that the latter
to long for thy justifications.” Therefore concupiscence is
also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good, following
not only in the sensitive appetite.
the lead of the higher appetite, the result being that the
Objection 3. Further, to each power, its proper good
body itself renders its service in spiritual matters, accord-
is a matter of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is
ing to Ps. 83:3: “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in
in each power of the soul, and not only in the sensitive
the living God.”
appetite.
Reply to Objection 2. Properly speaking, desire may
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
be not only in the lower, but also in the higher appetite.
12) that “the irrational part which is subject and amenable
For it does not imply fellowship in craving, as concupis-
to reason, is divided into the faculties of concupiscence
cence does; but simply movement towards the thing de-
and anger. This is the irrational part of the soul, passive
sired.
and appetitive.” Therefore concupiscence is in the sensi-
Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to each power of
tive appetite.
the soul to seek its proper good by the natural appetite,
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet.
i,
which does not arise from apprehension. But the craving
11), “concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleas-
for good, by the animal appetite, which arises from ap-
ant.” Now pleasure is twofold, as we shall state later on
prehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone. And
(q. 31, Aa. 3,4): one is in the intelligible good, which
to crave a thing under the aspect of something delightful
is the good of reason; the other is in good perceptible
to the senses, wherein concupiscence properly consists,
to the senses. The former pleasure seems to belong to
belongs to the concupiscible power.
soul alone: whereas the latter belongs to both soul and
Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?
Ia IIae q. 30 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that concupiscence is not
senses; and this is also the object of concupiscence, as
a specific passion of the concupiscible power. For pas-
the Philosopher declares (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore con-
sions are distinguished by their objects. But the object
cupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible
of the concupiscible power is something delightful to the
faculty.
738
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu.
sent: because, according as it is present, it causes the
33) that “covetousness is the love of transitory things”: so
faculty to find rest in it; whereas, according as it is ab-
that it is not distinct from love. But all specific passions
sent, it causes the faculty to be moved towards it. Where-
are distinct from one another. Therefore concupiscence is
fore the object of sensible pleasure causes love, inasmuch
not a specific passion in the concupiscible faculty.
as, so to speak, it attunes and conforms the appetite to it-
Objection 3. Further, to each passion of the concupis-
self; it causes concupiscence, inasmuch as, when absent,
cible faculty there is a specific contrary passion in that fac-
it draws the faculty to itself; and it causes pleasure, inas-
ulty, as stated above (q. 23, a. 4). But no specific passion
much as, when present, it makes the faculty to find rest in
of the concupiscible faculty is contrary to concupiscence.
itself. Accordingly, concupiscence is a passion differing
For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that “good
“in species” from both love and pleasure. But concupis-
when desired gives rise to concupiscence; when present,
cences of this or that pleasurable object differ “in num-
it gives joy: in like manner, the evil we apprehend makes
ber.”
us fear, the evil that is present makes us sad”: from which
Reply to Objection 1. Pleasurable good is the object
we gather that as sadness is contrary to joy, so is fear con-
of concupiscence, not absolutely, but considered as ab-
trary to concupiscence. But fear is not in the concupisci-
sent: just as the sensible, considered as past, is the object
ble, but in the irascible part. Therefore concupiscence is
of memory. For these particular conditions diversify the
not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty.
species of passions, and even of the powers of the sensi-
On the contrary, Concupiscence is caused by love,
tive part, which regards particular things.
and tends to pleasure, both of which are passions of the
Reply to Objection 2. In the passage quoted we have
concupiscible faculty. Hence it is distinguished from the
causal, not essential predication: for covetousness is not
other concupiscible passions, as a specific passion.
essentially love, but an effect of love. We may also say
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1; q. 23, a. 1), the
that Augustine is taking covetousness in a wide sense, for
good which gives pleasure to the senses is the common
any movement of the appetite in respect of good to come:
object of the concupiscible faculty. Hence the various
so that it includes both love and hope.
concupiscible passions are distinguished according to the
Reply to Objection 3. The passion which is directly
differences of that good. Now the diversity of this object
contrary to concupiscence has no name, and stands in rela-
can arise from the very nature of the object, or from a di-
tion to evil, as concupiscence in regard to good. But since,
versity in its active power. The diversity, derived from the
like fear, it regards the absent evil; sometimes it goes by
nature of the active object, causes a material difference of
the name of fear, just as hope is sometimes called cov-
passions: while the difference in regard to its active power
etousness. For a small good or evil is reckoned as though
causes a formal diversity of passions, in respect of which
it were nothing: and consequently every movement of the
the passions differ specifically.
appetite in future good or evil is called hope or fear, which
Now the nature of the motive power of the end or of
regard good and evil as arduous.
the good, differs according as it is really present, or ab-
Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?
Ia IIae q. 30 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that concupiscences are
cupiscence which is not natural, it must needs be rational.
not divided into those which are natural and those which
But this is impossible: because, since concupiscence is a
are not. For concupiscence belongs to the animal appetite,
passion, it belongs to the sensitive appetite, and not to the
as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). But the natural appetite is
will, which is the rational appetite. Therefore there are no
contrasted with the animal appetite. Therefore no concu-
concupiscences which are not natural.
piscence is natural.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11 and
Objection 2. Further, material differences makes no
Rhetor. i, 11) distinguishes natural concupiscences from
difference of species, but only numerical difference; a dif-
those that are not natural.
ference which is outside the purview of science. But if
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), concupiscence
some concupiscences are natural, and some not, they dif-
is the craving for pleasurable good. Now a thing is plea-
fer only in respect of their objects; which amounts to a
surable in two ways. First, because it is suitable to the
material difference, which is one of number only. There-
nature of the animal; for example, food, drink, and the
fore concupiscences should not be divided into those that
like: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said
are natural and those that are not.
to be natural. Secondly, a thing is pleasurable because it is
Objection 3. Further, reason is contrasted with nature,
apprehended as suitable to the animal: as when one appre-
as stated in Phys. ii, 5. If therefore in man there is a con-
hends something as good and suitable, and consequently
739
takes pleasure in it: and concupiscence of such pleasur-Reply to Objection 2. The difference between those
able things is said to be not natural, and is more wont to
concupiscences that are natural and those that are not,
be called “cupidity.”
is not merely a material difference; it is also, in a way,
Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or nat-
formal, in so far as it arises from a difference in the ac-
ural concupiscences, are common to men and other an-
tive object. Now the object of the appetite is the appre-
imals: because to both is there something suitable and
hended good. Hence diversity of the active object follows
pleasurable according to nature: and in these all men
from diversity of apprehension: according as a thing is
agree; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) calls
apprehended as suitable, either by absolute apprehension,
them “common” and “necessary.” But concupiscences of
whence arise natural concupiscences, which the Philoso-
the second kind are proper to men, to whom it is proper to
pher calls “irrational” (Rhet. i, 11); or by apprehension
devise something as good and suitable, beyond that which
together with deliberation, whence arise those concupis-
nature requires. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11)
cences that are not natural, and which for this very reason
that the former concupiscences are “irrational,” but the lat-
the Philosopher calls “rational” (Rhet. i, 11).
ter, “rational.” And because different men reason differ-
Reply to Objection 3. Man has not only universal
ently, therefore the latter are also called (Ethic. iii, 11)
reason, pertaining to the intellectual faculty; but also par-
“peculiar and acquired,” i.e. in addition to those that are
ticular reason pertaining to the sensitive faculty, as stated
natural.
in the Ia, q. 78, a. 4; Ia, q. 81, a. 3: so that even ratio-
Reply to Objection 1. The same thing that is the ob-
nal concupiscence may pertain to the sensitive appetite.
ject of the natural appetite, may be the object of the an-
Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved by the uni-
imal appetite, once it is apprehended. And in this way
versal reason also, through the medium of the particular
there may be an animal concupiscence of food, drink, and
imagination.
the like, which are objects of the natural appetite.
Whether concupiscence is infinite?
Ia IIae q. 30 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that concupiscence is not
Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria (Jn. 4:13): “Who-
infinite. For the object of concupiscence is good, which
sever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again.”
has the aspect of an end. But where there is infinity there
But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite.
is no end (Metaph. ii, 2). Therefore concupiscence cannot
Because, as stated above (a. 3), it follows from the reason,
be infinite.
and it belongs to the reason to proceed to infinity. Hence
Objection 2. Further, concupiscence is of the fitting
he that desires riches, may desire to be rich, not up to a
good, since it proceeds from love. But the infinite is with-
certain limit, but to be simply as rich as possible.
out proportion, and therefore unfitting. Therefore concu-
Another reason may be assigned, according to the
piscence cannot be infinite.
Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), why a certain concupiscence
Objection 3. Further, there is no passing through infi-
is finite, and another infinite. Because concupiscence of
nite things: and thus there is no reaching an ultimate term
the end is always infinite: since the end is desired for its
in them. But the subject of concupiscence is not delighted
own sake, e.g. health: and thus greater health is more
until he attain the ultimate term. Therefore, if concupis-
desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of
cence were infinite, no delight would ever ensue.
itself dilates the sight, that which is more white dilates yet
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3)
more. On the other hand, concupiscence of the means is
that “since concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infi-
not infinite, because the concupiscence of the means is in
nite number of things.”
suitable proportion to the end. Consequently those who
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), concupiscence
place their end in riches have an infinite concupiscence of
is twofold; one is natural, the other is not natural. Natu-
riches; whereas those who desire riches, on account of the
ral concupiscence cannot be actually infinite: because it
necessities of life, desire a finite measure of riches, suf-
is of that which nature requires; and nature ever tends to
ficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says
something finite and fixed. Hence man never desires infi-
(Polit. i, 3). The same applies to the concupiscence of any
nite meat, or infinite drink. But just as in nature there is
other things.
potential successive infinity, so can this kind of concupis-
Reply to Objection 1. Every object of concupiscence
cence be infinite successively; so that, for instance, after
is taken as something finite: either because it is finite in regetting food, a man may desire food yet again; and so of
ality, as being once actually desired; or because it is finite
anything else that nature requires: because these bodily
as apprehended. For it cannot be apprehended as infinite,
goods, when obtained, do not last for ever, but fail. Hence
since the infinite is that “from which, however much we
740
may take, there always remains something to be taken”
reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense, inasmuch as it
(Phys. iii, 6).
contains potentially an infinite number of singulars.
Reply to Objection 2. The reason is possessed of infi-
Reply to Objection 3. In order that a man be de-
nite power, in a certain sense, in so far as it can consider a
lighted, there is no need for him to realize all that he de-
thing infinitely, as appears in the addition of numbers and
sires: for he delights in the realization of each object of
lines. Consequently, the infinite, taken in a certain way,
his concupiscence.
is proportionate to reason. In fact the universal which the
741
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 31
Of Delight Considered in Itself∗
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning delight four things must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The causes of delight; (3) Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether delight is a passion?
(2) Whether delight is subject to time?
(3) Whether it differs from joy?
(4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite?
(5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight of the lower; (6) Of sensible delights compared with one another;
(7) Whether any delight is non-natural?
(8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another?
Whether delight is a passion?
Ia IIae q. 31 a. 1
Objection 1.
It would seem that delight is not a
once. Now there is this difference between animals and
passion. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distin-
other natural things, that when these latter are established
guishes operation from passion, and says that “operation
in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it,
is a movement in accord with nature, while passion is a
whereas animals do. And from this perception there arises
movement contrary to nature.” But delight is an opera-
a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite;
tion, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5).
which movement is called delight. Accordingly by say-
Therefore delight is not a passion.
ing that delight is “a movement of the soul,” we designate
Objection 2. Further, “To be passive is to be moved,”
its genus. By saying that it is “an establishing in keeping
as stated in Phys. iii, 3. But delight does not consist in
with the thing’s nature,” i.e. with that which exists in the
being moved, but in having been moved; for it arises from
thing, we assign the cause of delight, viz. the presence of
good already gained. Therefore delight is not a passion.
a becoming good. By saying that this establishing is “all
Objection 3. Further, delight is a kind of a perfection
at once,” we mean that this establishing is to be under-
of the one who is delighted; since it “perfects operation,”
stood not as in the process of establishment, but as in the
as stated in Ethic. x, 4,5. But to be perfected does not
fact of complete establishment, in the term of the move-
consist in being passive or in being altered, as stated in
ment, as it were: for delight is not a “becoming” as Plato†
Phys. vii, 3 and De Anima ii, 5. Therefore delight is not a
maintained, but a “complete fact,” as stated in Ethic. vii,
passion.
12. Lastly, by saying that this establishing is “sensible,”
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv,
we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein
5 seqq) reckons delight, joy, or gladness among the other
there is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since de-
passions of the soul.
light is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an
I answer that, The movements of the sensitive ap-
apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the soul.
petite, are properly called passions, as stated above (q. 22,
Reply to Objection 1. Connatural operation, which
a. 3). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive ap-
is unhindered, is a second perfection, as stated in De An-
prehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite: and
ima ii, 1: and therefore when a thing is established in its
this must needs be said of delight, since, according to the
proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight fol-
Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) “delight is a certain movement
lows, which consists in a state of completion, as observed
of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once,
above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an opera-
in keeping with the nature of the thing.”
tion, we designate, not its essence, but its cause.
In order to understand this, we must observe that just
Reply to Objection 2. A twofold movement is to be
as in natural things some happen to attain to their natural
observed in an animal: one, according to the intention of
perfections, so does this happen in animals. And though
the end, and this belongs to the appetite; the other, accord-
movement towards perfection does not occur all at once,
ing to the execution, and this belongs to the external op-
yet the attainment of natural perfection does occur all at
eration. And so, although in him who has already gained
∗ or, Pleasure
† Phileb. 32,33
742
the good in which he delights, the movement of execution by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of move-ceases, by which the tends to the end; yet the movement
ment.
of the appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as be-
Reply to Objection 3. Although the name of passion
fore it desired that which it had not, so afterwards does it
is more appropriate to those passions which have a cor-
delight in that which is possesses. For though delight is a
ruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily ailments, as also
certain repose of the appetite, if we consider the presence
sadness and fear in the soul; yet some passions have a ten-
of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite, never-
dency to something good, as stated above (q. 23, Aa. 1,4):
theless there remains the impression made on the appetite
and in this sense delight is called a passion.
Whether delight is in time?
Ia IIae q. 31 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that delight is in time.
being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to
For “delight is a kind of movement,” as the Philosopher
be a man is in time.
says (Rhet. i, 11). But all movement is in time. Therefore
Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed,
delight is in time.
is not in time: for it regards good already gained, which
Objection 2. Further, a thing is said to last long and
is, as it were, the term of the movement. But if this good
to be morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are
gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in
called morose. Therefore pleasure is in time.
time accidentally: whereas if it be altogether unchange-
Objection 3. Further, the passions of the soul are of
able, the delight therein will not be in time, either by rea-
one same genus. But some passions of the soul are in
son of itself or accidentally.
time. Therefore delight is too.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated in De Anima iii,
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4)
7, movement is twofold. One is “the act of something
that “no one takes pleasure according to time.”
imperfect, i.e. of something existing in potentiality, as
I answer that, A thing may be in time in two ways:
such”: this movement is successive and is in time. An-
first, by itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and
other movement is “the act of something perfect, i.e. of
accidentally as it were. For since time is the measure of
something existing in act,” e.g. to understand, to feel, and
successive things, those things are of themselves said to
to will and such like, also to have delight. This movement
be in time, to which succession or something pertaining
is not successive, nor is it of itself in time.
to succession is essential: such are movement, repose,
Reply to Objection 2. Delight is said to be long last-
speech and such like. On the other hand, those things are
ing or morose, according as it is accidentally in time.
said to be in time, by reason of something else and not
Reply to Objection 3. Other passions have not for
of themselves, to which succession is not essential, but
their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore
which are subject to something successive. Thus the fact
there is more of the movement of the imperfect in them
of being a man is not essentially something successive;
than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to de-
since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or
light not to be in time.
change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, because human
Whether delight differs from joy?
Ia IIae q. 31 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that delight is altogether
they would all be various passions of the soul. But this
the same as joy. Because the passions of the soul differ
seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not differ from
according to their objects. But delight and joy have the
delight.
same object, namely, a good obtained. Therefore joy is
On the contrary, We do not speak of joy in irrational
altogether the same as delight.
animals; whereas we do speak of delight in them. There-
Objection 2. Further, one movement does not end in
fore joy is not the same as delight.
two terms. But one and the same movement, that of de-
I answer that, Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv),
sire, ends in joy and delight. Therefore delight and joy are
is a kind of delight. For we must observe that, just as
altogether the same.
some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural,
Objection 3. Further, if joy differs from delight, it
but consequent to reason, as stated above (q. 30, a. 3), so
seems that there is equal reason for distinguishing glad-
also some delights are natural, and some are not natural
ness, exultation, and cheerfulness from delight, so that
but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13)
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.
743
and Gregory of Nyssa∗ put it, “some delights are of the from bodily delights, which are not called otherwise than
body, some are of the soul”; which amounts to the same.
delights: as we have observed above in regard to concu-
For we take delight both in those things which we desire
piscences (q. 30, a. 3, ad 2).
naturally, when we get them, and in those things which
Reply to Objection 2.
A like difference is to be
we desire as a result of reason. But we do not speak of
observed in concupiscences also: so that delight corre-
joy except when delight follows reason; and so we do not
sponds to concupiscence, while joy corresponds to desire,
ascribe joy to irrational animals, but only delight.
which seems to pertain more to concupiscence of the soul.
Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the ob-
Hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to the
ject of reasoned desire and delight, but not vice versa.
difference of movement.
Consequently whatever can be the object of delight, can
Reply to Objection 3. These other names pertain-
also be the object of joy in rational beings. And yet ev-
ing to delight are derived from the effects of delight; for
erything is not always the object of joy; since sometimes
“laetitia” [gladness] is derived from the “dilation” of the
one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing
heart, as if one were to say “latitia”; “exultation” is de-
thereat according to reason. And accordingly delight ex-
rived from the exterior signs of inward delight, which ap-
tends to more things than does joy.
pear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks forth
Reply to Objection 1. Since the object of the appetite
from its bounds; and “cheerfulness” is so called from cer-
of the soul is an apprehended good, diversity of apprehen-
tain special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these
sion pertains, in a way, to diversity of the object. And so
names seem to belong to joy; for we do not employ them
delights of the soul, which are also called joys, are distinct
save in speaking of rational beings.
Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite?
Ia IIae q. 31 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that delight is not in the
the will. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that
intellectual appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet.
“desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent
i, 11) that “delight is a sensible movement.” But sensi-
to the things we wish.”
ble movement is not in an intellectual power. Therefore
Reply to Objection 1.
In this definition of the
delight is not in the intellectual appetite.
Philosopher, he uses the word “sensible” in its wide ac-
Objection 2. Further, delight is a passion. But every
ceptation for any kind of perception. For he says (Ethic.
passion is in the sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is
x, 4) that “delight is attendant upon every sense, as it is
only in the sensitive appetite.
also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation.”
Objection 3. Further, delight is common to us and to
Or we may say that he is defining delight of the sensitive
the irrational animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than
appetite.
in that power which we have in common with irrational
Reply to Objection 2. Delight has the character of
animals.
passion, properly speaking, when accompanied by bodily
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): “Delight in
transmutation. It is not thus in the intellectual appetite,
the Lord.” But the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God;
but according to simple movement: for thus it is also in
only the intellectual appetite can. Therefore delight can
God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
be in the intellectual appetite.
vii, 14) that “God rejoices by one simple act”: and Diony-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), a certain de-
sius says at the end of De Coel. Hier., that “the angels are
light arises from the apprehension of the reason. Now on
not susceptible to our passible delight, but rejoice together
the reason apprehending something, not only the sensi-
with God with the gladness of incorruption.”
tive appetite is moved, as regards its application to some
Reply to Objection 3. In us there is delight, not only
particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which
in common with dumb animals, but also in common with
is called the will. And accordingly in the intellectual ap-
angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De Coel. Hier.) that
petite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but
“holy men often take part in the angelic delights.” Ac-
not bodily delight.
cordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive ap-
However, there is this difference of delight in either
petite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but
power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompa-
also in the intellectual appetite, which we have in common
nied by a bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the in-
with the angels.
tellectual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of
744
Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intellectual plea-Ia IIae q. 31 a. 5
sures?
Objection 1. It would seem that bodily and sensible
And this appears from the consideration of the three things
pleasures are greater than spiritual and intelligible plea-
needed for pleasure, viz. the good which is brought into
sures. For all men seek some pleasure, according to the
conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the con-
Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more seek sensible plea-
junction itself. For spiritual good is both greater and more
sures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures. Therefore bod-
beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men ab-
ily pleasures are greater.
stain from even the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than
Objection 2.
Further, the greatness of a cause is
suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good. Like-
known by its effect. But bodily pleasures have greater
wise the intellectual faculty is much more noble and more
effects; since “they alter the state of the body, and in some
knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction
they cause madness” (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore bodily
is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More inti-
pleasures are greater.
mate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of
Objection 3. Further, bodily pleasures need to be
a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence; for
tempered and checked, by reason of their vehemence:
the object of the intellect is “what a thing is.” More per-
whereas there is no need to check spiritual pleasures.
fect, because the conjunction of the sensible to the sense
Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
implies movement, which is an imperfect act: wherefore
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:103): “How
sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some
sweet are Thy words to my palate; more than honey to
part of them is passing away, while some other part is
my mouth!” And the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7) that
looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in
“the greatest pleasure is derived from the operation of wis-
pleasures of the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas in-
dom.”
telligible things are without movement: hence pleasures
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), pleasure arises
of this kind are realized all at once. More firm; because
from union with a suitable object perceived or known.
the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon
Now, in the operations of the soul, especially of the sen-
pass away; whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible.
sitive and intellectual soul, it must be noted that, since
On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures
they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts or per-
are more vehement, for three reasons. First, because sen-
fections of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to will
sible things are more known to us, than intelligible things.
and the like: because actions which pass into outward
Secondly, because sensible pleasures, through being pas-
matter, are actions and perfections rather of the matter
sions of the sensitive appetite, are accompanied by some
transformed; for “movement is the act produced by the
alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur in
mover in the thing moved” (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly
spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction
the aforesaid actions of the sensitive and intellectual soul,
of the superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because
are themselves a certain good of the agent, and are known
bodily pleasures are sought as remedies for bodily de-
by sense and intellect. Wherefore from them also does
fects or troubles, whence various griefs arise. Wherefore
pleasure arise, and not only from their objects.
bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding griefs of
If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with
this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are wel-
sensible pleasures, according as we delight in the very ac-
comed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no con-
tions, for instance in sensitive and in intellectual knowl-
trary griefs, as we shall state farther on (q. 35, a. 5).
edge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are much
Reply to Objection 1. The reason why more seek
greater than sensible pleasures. For man takes much more
bodily pleasures is because sensible goods are known bet-
delight in knowing something, by understanding it, than in
ter and more generally: and, again, because men need
knowing something by perceiving it with his sense. Be-
pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sad-
cause intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because
ness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual plea-
it is better known, since the intellect reflects on its own
sures, which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that
act more than sense does. Moreover intellectual knowl-
they turn aside to seek those of the body.
edge is more beloved: for there is no one who would not
Reply to Objection 2. Bodily transmutation arises
forfeit his bodily sight rather than his intellectual vision,
more from bodily pleasures, inasmuch as they are pas-
as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as Augustine says
sions of the sensitive appetite.
in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14).
Reply to Objection 3. Bodily pleasures are realized in
If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be com-
the sensitive faculty which is governed by reason: where-
pared with sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves
fore they need to be tempered and checked by reason. But
and absolutely speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater.
spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which is itself the rule:
745
wherefore they are in themselves both sober and moderate.
Whether the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by the other Ia IIae q. 31 a. 6
senses?
Objection 1. It would seem that the pleasures of touch
and cold and the like. Wherefore in this respect, the plea-
are not greater than the pleasures afforded by the other
sures of touch are greater as being more closely related
senses. Because the greatest pleasure seems to be that
to the end. For this reason, too, other animals which do
without which all joy is at an end. But such is the pleasure
not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of use-
afforded by the sight, according to the words of Tob. 5:12:
fulness, derive no pleasure from the other senses except
“What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness,
as subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: “for
and see not the light of heaven?” Therefore the pleasure
dogs do not take delight in the smell of hares, but in eating
afforded by the sight is the greatest of sensible pleasures.
them;. . . nor does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an
Objection 2. Further, “every one finds treasure in
ox, but in devouring it” (Ethic. iii, 10).
what he loves,” as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But
Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the great-
“of all the senses the sight is loved most”∗. Therefore the
est in respect of usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by
greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight.
sight the greatest in respect of knowledge; if anyone wish
Objection 3.
Further, the beginning of friendship
to compare these two, he will find that the pleasure of
which is for the sake of the pleasant is principally sight.
touch is, absolutely speaking, greater than the pleasure of
But pleasure is the cause of such friendship. Therefore the
sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits of sensi-
greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight.
ble pleasure. Because it is evident that in everything, that
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
which is natural is most powerful: and it is to these plea-
10), that the greatest pleasures are those which are af-
sures of the touch that the natural concupiscences, such
forded by the touch.
as those of food, sexual union, and the like, are ordained.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 25, a. 2, ad 1; q. 27, If, however, we consider the pleasures of sight, inasmuch
a. 4, ad 1), everything gives pleasure according as it is
sight is the handmaid of the mind, then the pleasures of
loved. Now, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, the senses are loved
sight are greater, forasmuch as intellectual pleasures are
for two reasons: for the purpose of knowledge, and on
greater than sensible.
account of their usefulness. Wherefore the senses afford
Reply to Objection 1. Joy, as stated above (a. 3), de-
pleasure in both these ways. But because it is proper to
notes pleasure of the soul; and this belongs principally to
man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good, it
the sight. But natural pleasure belongs principally to the
follows that the former pleasures of the senses, i.e. those
touch.
which arise from knowledge, are proper to man: whereas
Reply to Objection 2. The sight is loved most, “on
pleasures of the senses, as loved for their usefulness, are
account of knowledge, because it helps us to distinguish
common to all animals.
many things,” as is stated in the same passage (Metaph. i,
If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure by
1).
which reason of knowledge, it is evident that the sight af-
Reply to Objection 3. Pleasure causes carnal love
fords greater pleasure than any other sense. On the other
in one way; the sight, in another. For pleasure, especially
hand, if we speak of that sensible pleasure which is by rea-
that which is afforded by the touch, is the final cause of the
son of usefulness, then the greatest pleasure is afforded by
friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant: whereas
the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is gauged
the sight is a cause like that from which a movement has
by their relation to the preservation of the animal’s nature.
its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the lov-
Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation
able object receives an impression of its image, which en-
to this usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those
tices him to love it and to seek its delight.
things which are vital to an animal, namely, of things hot
Whether any pleasure is not natural?
Ia IIae q. 31 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that no pleasure is not
can the repose of the animal appetite, which is pleasure,
natural. For pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what
be elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no
repose is to bodies. But the appetite of a natural body does
pleasure is non-natural.
not repose save in a connatural place. Neither, therefore,
Objection 2. Further, what is against nature is vio-
∗ Metaph. i, 1
746
lent. But “whatever is violent causes grief” (Metaph. v, which pertains to the preservation of the body, either as re-5). Therefore nothing which is unnatural can give plea-
gards the individual, as food, drink, sleep, and the like, or
sure.
as regards the species, as sexual intercourse, are said to af-
Objection 3. Further, the fact of being established in
ford man natural pleasure. Under each kind of pleasures,
one’s own nature, if perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as
we find some that are “not natural” speaking absolutely,
is evident from the Philosopher’s definition quoted above
and yet “connatural” in some respect. For it happens in
(a. 1). But it is natural to every thing to be established
an individual that some one of the natural principles of
in its nature; because natural movement tends to a natural
the species is corrupted, so that something which is con-
end. Therefore every pleasure is natural.
trary to the specific nature, becomes accidentally natural
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,
to this individual: thus it is natural to this hot water to
5,6) that some things are pleasant “not from nature but
give heat. Consequently it happens that something which
from disease.”
is not natural to man, either in regard to reason, or in re-
I answer that, We speak of that as being natural,
gard to the preservation of the body, becomes connatural
which is in accord with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1.
to this individual man, on account of there being some
Now, in man, nature can be taken in two ways. First, inas-
corruption of nature in him. And this corruption may be
much as intellect and reason is the principal part of man’s
either on the part of the body—from some ailment; thus
nature, since in respect thereof he has his own specific
to a man suffering from fever, sweet things seem bitter,
nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be called
and vice versa—or from an evil temperament; thus some
natural to man, which are derived from things pertaining
take pleasure in eating earth and coals and the like; or on
to man in respect of his reason: for instance, it is natural to the part of the soul; thus from custom some take pleasure
man to take pleasure in contemplating the truth and in do-
in cannibalism or in the unnatural intercourse of man and
ing works of virtue. Secondly, nature in man may be taken
beast, or other such things, which are not in accord with
as contrasted with reason, and as denoting that which is
human nature.
common to man and other animals, especially that part of
This suffices for the answers to the objections.
man which does not obey reason. And in this sense, that
Whether one pleasure can be contrary to another?
Ia IIae q. 31 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that one pleasure can-
place is contrary to repose in a low place” (Phys. v, 6).
not be contrary to another. Because the passions of the
Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul that one
soul derive their species and contrariety from their ob-
pleasure is contrary to another.
jects. Now the object of pleasure is the good. Since there-
Reply to Objection 1. This saying of the Philosopher
fore good is not contrary to good, but “good is contrary to
is to be understood of good and evil as applied to virtues
evil, and evil to good,” as stated in Praedic. viii; it seems
and vices: because one vice may be contrary to another
that one pleasure is not contrary to another.
vice, whereas no virtue can be contrary to another virtue.
Objection 2. Further, to one thing there is one con-
But in other things nothing prevents one good from being
trary, as is proved in Metaph. x, 4. But sadness is contrary
contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the
to pleasure. Therefore pleasure is not contrary to pleasure.
former is good in relation to fire, the latter, in relation to
Objection 3. Further, if one pleasure is contrary to
water. And in this way one pleasure can be contrary to
another, this is only on account of the contrariety of the
another. That this is impossible with regard to the good
things which give pleasure. But this difference is mate-
of virtue, is due to the fact that virtue’s good depends on
rial: whereas contrariety is a difference of form, as stated
fittingness in relation to some one thing—i.e. the reason.
in Metaph. x, 4. Therefore there is no contrariety between
Reply to Objection 2. Pleasure, in the emotions of
one pleasure and another.
the soul, is likened to natural repose in bodies: because its
On the contrary, Things of the same genus that im-
object is something suitable and connatural, so to speak.
pede one another are contraries, as the Philosopher states
But sadness is like a violent repose; because its object
(Phys. viii, 8). But some pleasures impede one another,
is disagreeable to the animal appetite, just as the place
as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore some pleasures are
of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite.
contrary to one another.
Now natural repose is contrary both to violent repose of
I answer that, Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is the same body, and to the natural repose of another, as
likened to repose in natural bodies, as stated above (q. 23,
stated in Phys. v, 6. Wherefore pleasure is contrary to
a. 4). Now one repose is said to be contrary to another
both to another pleasure and to sadness.
when they are in contrary termini; thus, “repose in a high
Reply to Objection 3. The things in which we take
747
pleasure, since they are the objects of pleasure, cause not the formal object causes a specific difference in acts and
only a material, but also a formal difference, if the formal-
passions, as stated above (q. 23, Aa. 1,4; q. 30, a. 2).
ity of pleasurableness be different. Because difference in
748
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 32
Of the Cause of Pleasure
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
(2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
(3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?
(4) Whether sadness causes pleasure?
(5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
(6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?
(7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?
(8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
Ia IIae q. 32 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that operation is not the
not pleasurable save inasmuch as they are united to us;
proper and first cause of pleasure. For, as the Philoso-
either by knowledge alone, as when we take pleasure
pher says (Rhet. i, 11), “pleasure consists in a perception
in thinking of or looking at certain things; or in some
of the senses,” since knowledge is requisite for pleasure,
other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man takes
as stated above (q. 31, a. 1). But the objects of operations
pleasure in knowing that he has something good–riches,
are knowable before the operations themselves. Therefore
honor, or the like; which would not be pleasurable unless
operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.
they were apprehended as possessed. For as the Philoso-
Objection 2. Further, pleasure consists especially in
pher observes (Polit. ii, 2) “we take great pleasure in look-
an end gained: since it is this that is chiefly desired. But
ing upon a thing as our own, by reason of the natural love
the end is not always an operation, but is sometimes the ef-
we have for ourselves.” Now to have such like things is
fect of the operation. Therefore operation is not the proper
nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them:
and direct cause of pleasure.
and this is through some operation. Wherefore it is evi-
Objection 3. Further, leisure and rest consist in ces-
dent that every pleasure is traced to some operation as its
sation from work: and they are objects of pleasure (Rhet.
cause.
i, 11). Therefore operation is not the proper cause of plea-
Reply to Objection 2. Even when it is not an oper-
sure.
ation, but the effect of an operation, that is the end, this
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,
effect is pleasant in so far as possessed or effected: and
12,13; x, 4) that “pleasure is a connatural and uninter-
this implies use or operation.
rupted operation.”
Reply to Objection 3. Operations are pleasant, in so
I answer that, As stated above (q. 31, a. 1), two things far as they are proportionate and connatural to the agent.
are requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the
Now, since human power is finite, operation is proportion-
suitable good, and knowledge of this attainment. Now
ate thereto according to a certain measure. Wherefore if it
each of these consists in a kind of operation: because ac-
exceed that measure, it will be no longer proportionate or
tual knowledge is an operation; and the attainment of the
pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome. And
suitable good is by means of an operation. Moreover, the
in this sense, leisure and play and other things pertaining
proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore every
to repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness
pleasure must needs be the result of some operation.
which results from labor.
Reply to Objection 1. The objects of operations are
Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
Ia IIae q. 32 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that movement is not a
(Ethic. vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared with gen-
cause of pleasure. Because, as stated above (q. 31, a. 1),
eration, but with the operation of a thing already in exis-
the good which is obtained and is actually possessed, is
tence. Now that which is being moved towards something
the cause of pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says
has it not as yet; but, so to speak, is being generated in its
749
regard, forasmuch as generation or corruption are united man desires to know something whole and perfect: when
to every movement, as stated in Phys. viii, 3. Therefore
therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all at once as a
movement is not a cause of pleasure.
whole, change in such a thing is pleasant, so that one part
Objection 2. Further, movement is the chief cause of
may pass and another succeed, and thus the whole be per-
toil and fatigue in our works. But operations through be-
ceived. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11): “Thou
ing toilsome and fatiguing are not pleasant but disagree-
wouldst not have the syllables stay, but fly away, that oth-
able. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.
ers may come, and thou hear the whole. And so whenever
Objection 3. Further, movement implies a certain in-
any one thing is made up of many, all of which do not ex-
novation, which is the opposite of custom. But things
ist together, all would please collectively more than they
“which we are accustomed to, are pleasant,” as the
do severally, if all could be perceived collectively.”
Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement is
If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is un-
not a cause of pleasure.
changeable; the natural mode of whose being cannot be
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3):
exceeded by the continuation of any pleasing object; and
“What means this, O Lord my God, whereas Thou art ev-
which can behold the whole object of its delight at once—
erlasting joy to Thyself, and some things around Thee ev-
to such a one change will afford no delight. And the more
ermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, that this portion
any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable
of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased and recon-
of being continual.
ciled?” From these words we gather that man rejoices and
Reply to Objection 1. Although the subject of move-
takes pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore
ment has not yet perfectly that to which it is moved, nev-
movement seems to cause pleasure.
ertheless it is beginning to have something thereof: and
I answer that, Three things are requisite for pleasure;
in this respect movement itself has something of pleasure.
two, i.e. the one that is pleased and the pleasurable ob-
But it falls short of the perfection of pleasure; because the
ject conjoined to him; and a third, which is knowledge
more perfect pleasures regard things that are unchange-
of this conjunction: and in respect of these three, move-
able. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure,
ment is pleasant, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14
in so far as thereby something which previously was un-
and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are
suitable, becomes suitable or ceases to be, as stated above.
concerned, change is pleasant to us because our nature is
Reply to Objection 2. Movement causes toil and fa-
changeable: for which reason that which is suitable to us
tigue, when it exceeds our natural aptitude. It is not thus
at one time is not suitable at another; thus to warm him-
that it causes pleasure, but by removing the obstacles to
self at a fire is suitable to man in winter but not in summer.
our natural aptitude.
Again, on the part of the pleasing good which is united to
Reply to Objection 3. What is customary becomes
us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an
pleasant, in so far as it becomes natural: because custom
agent increases its effect: thus the longer a person remains
is like a second nature. But the movement which gives
near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the
pleasure is not that which departs from custom, but rather
natural mode of being consists in a certain measure; and
that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode of
therefore when the continued presence of a pleasant object
being, that might result from continued operation. And
exceeds the measure of one’s natural mode of being, the
thus from the same cause of connaturalness, both custom
removal of that object becomes pleasant. On the part of
and movement become pleasant.
the knowledge itself (change becomes pleasant), because
Whether hope and memory causes pleasure?
Ia IIae q. 32 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that memory and hope do
sure in regarding good, so also do desire and love. There-
not cause pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by present
fore hope should not be assigned as a cause of pleasure,
good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). But hope
any more than desire or love.
and memory regard what is absent: since memory is of
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 12:12): “Rejoic-
the past, and hope of the future. Therefore memory and
ing in hope”; and (Ps. 76:4): “I remembered God, and
hope do not cause pleasure.
was delighted.”
Objection 2. Further, the same thing is not the cause
I answer that, Pleasure is caused by the presence of
of contraries. But hope causes affliction, according to
suitable good, in so far as it is felt, or perceived in any
Prov. 13:12: “Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul.”
way. Now a thing is present to us in two ways. First,
Therefore hope does not cause pleasure.
in knowledge—i.e. according as the thing known is in
Objection 3. Further, just as hope agrees with plea-
the knower by its likeness; secondly, in reality—i.e. ac-
750
cording as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind possibility, at least supposed, of attainment.
with another, either actually or potentially. And since real
Reply to Objection 2. Nothing prevents the same
conjunction is greater than conjunction by likeness, which
thing, in different ways, being the cause of contraries.
is the conjunction of knowledge; and again, since actual
And so hope, inasmuch as it implies a present apprais-
is greater than potential conjunction: therefore the great-
ing of a future good, causes pleasure; whereas, inasmuch
est pleasure is that which arises from sensation which re-
as it implies absence of that good, it causes affliction.
quires the presence of the sensible object. The second
Reply to Objection 3. Love and concupiscence also
place belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein there is
cause pleasure.
For everything that is loved becomes
pleasurable conjunction, not only in respect of apprehen-
pleasing to the lover, since love is a kind of union or con-
sion, but also in respect of the faculty or power of obtain-
naturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner every
ing the pleasurable object. The third place belongs to the
object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires, since
pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction of
desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as
apprehension.
implying a certainty of the real presence of the pleasing
Reply to Objection 1. Hope and memory are indeed
good, that is not implied either by love or by concupis-
of things which, absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet
cence, is reckoned in preference to them as causing plea-
those are, after a fashion, present, i.e. either according
sure; and also in preference to memory, which is of that
to apprehension only; or according to apprehension and
which has already passed away.
Whether sadness causes pleasure?
Ia IIae q. 32 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that sadness does not
ensued: because absence of evil is looked upon as some-
cause pleasure. For nothing causes its own contrary. But
thing good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has
sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore it does not
been delivered from that which caused him sorrow and
cause it.
pain, so much reason has he to rejoice. Hence Augus-
Objection 2. Further, contraries have contrary ef-
tine says in De Civ. Dei xxii, 31∗ that “oftentimes in joy
fects. But pleasures, when called to mind, cause plea-
we call to mind sad things. . . and in the season of health
sure. Therefore sad things, when remembered, cause sor-
we recall past pains without feeling pain. . . and in propor-
row and not pleasure.
tion are the more filled with joy and gladness”: and again
Objection 3. Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is
(Confess. viii, 3) he says that “the more peril there was
hatred to love. But hatred does not cause love, but rather
in the battle, so much the more joy will there be in the
the other way about, as stated above (q. 29, a. 2). There-
triumph.”
fore sadness does not cause pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1. Sometimes accidentally a thing
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 41:4): “My tears
is the cause of its contrary: thus “that which is cold some-
have been my bread day and night”: where bread denotes
times causes heat,” as stated in Phys. viii, 1. In like man-
the refreshment of pleasure. Therefore tears, which arise
ner sadness is the accidental cause of pleasure, in so far as
from sadness, can give pleasure.
it gives rise to the apprehension of something pleasant.
I answer that, Sadness may be considered in two
Reply to Objection 2. Sad things, called to mind,
ways: as existing actually, and as existing in the mem-
cause pleasure, not in so far as they are sad and contrary
ory: and in both ways sadness can cause pleasure. Be-
to pleasant things; but in so far as man is delivered from
cause sadness, as actually existing, causes pleasure, inas-
them. In like manner the recollection of pleasant things,
much as it brings to mind that which is loved, the absence
by reason of these being lost, may cause sadness.
of which causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it
Reply to Objection 3. Hatred also can be the acci-
gives pleasure. The recollection of sadness becomes a
dental cause of love: i.e. so far as some love one another,
cause of pleasure, on account of the deliverance which
inasmuch as they agree in hating one and the same thing.
Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
Ia IIae q. 32 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the actions of others
are not a cause of pleasure to us.
are not a cause of pleasure to us. Because the cause of
Objection 2. Further, the action is the agent’s own
pleasure is our own good when conjoined to us. But the
good. If, therefore, the actions of others are a cause of
actions of others are not conjoined to us. Therefore they
pleasure to us, for the same reason all goods belonging to
∗ Gregory, Moral. iv.
751
others will be pleasing to us: which is evidently untrue.
hence men take greater pleasure in being praised and hon-
Objection 3. Further, action is pleasant through pro-
ored by them. And because a flatterer appears to praise,
ceeding from an innate habit; hence it is stated in Ethic.
therefore flattery is pleasing to some. And as love is for
ii, 3 that “we must reckon the pleasure which follows af-
something good, while admiration is for something great,
ter action, as being the sign of a habit existing in us.” But
so it is pleasant to be loved and admired by others, inas-
the actions of others do not proceed from habits existing
much as a man thus becomes aware of his own good-
in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the agents.
ness or greatness, through their giving pleasure to others.
Therefore the actions of others are not pleasing to us, but
Thirdly, from the fact that another’s actions, if they be
to the agents themselves.
good, are reckoned as one’s own good, by reason of the
On the contrary, It is written in the second canoni-
power of love, which makes a man to regard his friend as
cal epistle of John (verse 4): “I was exceeding glad that I
one with himself. And on account of hatred, which makes
found thy children walking in truth.”
one to reckon another’s good as being in opposition to
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1; q. 31, a. 1), two
oneself, the evil action of an enemy becomes an object of
things are requisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment of
pleasure: whence it is written (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity
one’s proper good, and the knowledge of having obtained
“rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth.”
it. Wherefore the action of another may cause pleasure
Reply to Objection 1. Another’s action may be con-
to us in three ways. First, from the fact that we obtain
joined to me, either by its effect, as in the first way, or by
some good through the action of another. And in this way,
knowledge, as in the second way; or by affection, as in the
the actions of those who do some good to us, are pleas-
third way.
ing to us: since it is pleasant to be benefited by another.
Reply to Objection 2. This argument avails for the
Secondly, from the fact that another’s action makes us to
third mode, but not for the first two.
know or appreciate our own good: and for this reason men
Reply to Objection 3. Although the actions of an-
take pleasure in being praised or honored by others, be-
other do not proceed from habits that are in me, yet they
cause, to wit, they thus become aware of some good ex-
either produce in me something that gives pleasure; or
isting in themselves. And since this appreciation receives
they make me appreciate or know a habit of mind; or they
greater weight from the testimony of good and wise men,
proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by love.
Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?
Ia IIae q. 32 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that doing good to another
sure in three ways. First, in consideration of the effect,
is not a cause of pleasure. Because pleasure is caused
which is the good conferred on another. In this respect,
by one’s obtaining one’s proper good, as stated above
inasmuch as through being united to others by love, we
(Aa. 1,5; q. 31, a. 1). But doing good pertains not to
look upon their good as being our own, we take pleasure
the obtaining but to the spending of one’s proper good.
in the good we do to others, especially to our friends, as
Therefore it seems to be the cause of sadness rather than
in our own good. Secondly, in consideration of the end;
of pleasure.
as when a man, from doing good to another, hopes to get
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
some good for himself, either from God or from man: for
1) that “illiberality is more connatural to man than prodi-
hope is a cause of pleasure. Thirdly, in consideration of
gality.” Now it is a mark of prodigality to do good to oth-
the principle: and thus, doing good to another, can give
ers; while it is a mark of illiberality to desist from doing
pleasure in respect of a threefold principle. One is the
good. Since therefore everyone takes pleasure in a con-
faculty of doing good: and in this regard, doing good to
natural operation, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14 and x, 4, it
another becomes pleasant, in so far as it arouses in man an
seems that doing good to others is not a cause of pleasure.
imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof he
Objection 3. Further, contrary effects proceed from
is able to give others a share. Wherefore men take plea-
contrary causes. But man takes a natural pleasure in cer-
sure in their children, and in their own works, as being
tain kinds of ill-doing, such as overcoming, contradicting
things on which they bestow a share of their own good.
or scolding others, or, if he be angry, in punishing them, as
Another principle is man’s habitual inclination to do good,
the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore doing good
by reason of which doing good becomes connatural to
to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure.
him: for which reason the liberal man takes pleasure in
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2)
giving to others. The third principle is the motive: for in-
that “it is most pleasant to give presents or assistance to
stance when a man is moved by one whom he loves, to
friends and strangers.”
do good to someone: for whatever we do or suffer for a
I answer that, Doing good to another may give plea-
friend is pleasant, because love is the principal cause of
752
pleasure.
generally all contests, in so far as they admit hope of vic-
Reply to Objection 1. Spending gives pleasure as
tory. To contradict and to scold can give pleasure in two
showing forth one’s good. But in so far as it empties us of
ways. First, as making man imagine himself to be wise
our own good it may be a cause of sadness; for instance
and excellent; since it belongs to wise men and elders to
when it is excessive.
reprove and to scold. Secondly, in so far as by scolding
Reply to Objection 2. Prodigality is an excessive
and reproving, one does good to another: for this gives
spending, which is unnatural: wherefore prodigality is
one pleasure, as stated above. It is pleasant to an angry
said to be contrary to nature.
man to punish, in so far as he thinks himself to be remov-
Reply to Objection 3. To overcome, to contradict,
ing an apparent slight, which seems to be due to a previous
and to punish, give pleasure, not as tending to another’s
hurt: for when a man is hurt by another, he seems to be
ill, but as pertaining to one’s own good, which man loves
slighted thereby; and therefore he wishes to be quit of this
more than he hates another’s ill. For it is naturally pleas-
slight by paying back the hurt. And thus it is clear that
ant to overcome, inasmuch as it makes a man to appre-
doing good to another may be of itself pleasant: whereas
ciate his own superiority. Wherefore all those games in
doing evil to another is not pleasant, except in so far as it
which there is a striving for the mastery, and a possibility
seems to affect one’s own good.
of winning it, afford the greatest pleasure: and speaking
Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?
Ia IIae q. 32 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that likeness is not a cause
his own excellence or profits, which he seeks as his own
of pleasure. Because ruling and presiding seem to imply
good.
a certain unlikeness. But “it is natural to take pleasure in
Reply to Objection 1. Since ruler and subject are in
ruling and presiding,” as stated in Rhetor. i, 11. Therefore
communion with one another, there is a certain likeness
unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a cause of pleasure.
between them: but this likeness is conditioned by a cer-
Objection 2. Further, nothing is more unlike pleasure
tain superiority, since ruling and presiding pertain to the
than sorrow. But those who are burdened by sorrow are
excellence of a man’s own good: because they belong to
most inclined to seek pleasures, as the Philosopher says
men who are wise and better than others; the result being
(Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore unlikeness, rather than like-
that they give man an idea of his own excellence. Another
ness, is a cause of pleasure.
reason is that by ruling and presiding, a man does good to
Objection 3. Further, those who are satiated with cer-
others, which is pleasant.
tain delights, derive not pleasure but disgust from them;
Reply to Objection 2. That which gives pleasure to
as when one is satiated with food. Therefore likeness is
the sorrowful man, though it be unlike sorrow, bears some
not a cause of pleasure.
likeness to the man that is sorrowful: because sorrows are
On the contrary, Likeness is a cause of love, as above
contrary to his own good. Wherefore the sorrowful man
stated (q. 27, a. 3): and love is the cause of pleasure.
seeks pleasure as making for his own good, in so far as
Therefore likeness is a cause of pleasure.
it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily
I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity; hence that
pleasures, which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more
which is like us, as being one with us, causes pleasure;
sought than intellectual pleasures, which have no contrary
just at it causes love, as stated above (q. 27, a. 3). And
sorrow, as we shall state later on (q. 35, a. 5). And this
if that which is like us does not hurt our own good, but
explains why all animals naturally desire pleasure: be-
increase it, it is pleasurable simply; for instance one man
cause animals ever work through sense and movement.
in respect of another, one youth in relation to another. But
For this reason also young people are most inclined to
if it be hurtful to our own good, thus accidentally it causes
seek pleasures; on account of the many changes to which
disgust or sadness, not as being like and one with us, but
they are subject, while yet growing. Moreover this is why
as hurtful to that which is yet more one with us.
the melancholic has a strong desire for pleasures, in order
Now it happens in two ways that something like is
to drive away sorrow: because his “body is corroded by a
hurtful to our own good. First, by destroying the measure
base humor,” as stated in Ethic. vii, 14.
of our own good, by a kind of excess; because good, espe-
Reply to Objection 3. Bodily goods are conditioned
cially bodily good, as health, is conditioned by a certain
by a certain fixed measure: wherefore surfeit of such
measure: wherefore superfluous good or any bodily plea-
things destroys the proper good, and consequently gives
sure, causes disgust. Secondly, by being directly contrary
rise to disgust and sorrow, through being contrary to the
to one’s own good: thus a potter dislikes other potters, not
proper good of man.
because they are potters, but because they deprive him of
753
Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
Ia IIae q. 32 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that wonder is not a cause
pleasing, for instance things that are scarce. Also, repre-
of pleasure. Because wonder is the act of one who is igno-
sentations of things, even of those which are not pleasant
rant of the nature of something, as Damascene says. But
in themselves, give rise to pleasure; for the soul rejoices in
knowledge, rather than ignorance, is a cause of pleasure.
comparing one thing with another, because comparison of
Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
one thing with another is the proper and connatural act of
Objection 2. Further, wonder is the beginning of wis-
the reason, as the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). This again
dom, being as it were, the road to the search of truth, as
is why “it is more delightful to be delivered from great
stated in the beginning of Metaph. i, 2. But “it is more
danger, because it is something wonderful,” as stated in
pleasant to think of what we know, than to seek what we
Rhetor. i, 11.
know not,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7): since
Reply to Objection 1. Wonder gives pleasure, not be-
in the latter case we encounter difficulties and hindrances,
cause it implies ignorance, but in so far as it includes the
in the former not; while pleasure arises from an operation
desire of learning the cause, and in so far as the wonderer
which is unhindered, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13. There-
learns something new, i.e. that the cause is other than he
fore wonder hinders rather than causes pleasure.
had thought it to be.∗
Objection 3. Further, everyone takes pleasure in what
Reply to Objection 2. Pleasure includes two things;
he is accustomed to: wherefore the actions of habits ac-
rest in the good, and perception of this rest. As to the
quired by custom, are pleasant. But “we wonder at what
former therefore, since it is more perfect to contemplate
is unwonted,” as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.).
the known truth, than to seek for the unknown, the con-
Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of pleasure.
templation of what we know, is in itself more pleasing
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11)
than the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless,
that wonder is the cause of pleasure.
as to the second, it happens that research is sometimes
I answer that, It is pleasant to get what one desires,
more pleasing accidentally, in so far as it proceeds from
as stated above (q. 23, a. 4): and therefore the greater the
a greater desire: for greater desire is awakened when we
desire for the thing loved, the greater the pleasure when
are conscious of our ignorance. This is why man takes the
it is attained: indeed the very increase of desire brings
greatest pleasure in finding or learning things for the first
with it an increase of pleasure, according as it gives rise
time.
to the hope of obtaining that which is loved, since it was
Reply to Objection 3. It is pleasant to do what we
stated above (a. 3, ad 3) that desire resulting from hope is
are wont to do, inasmuch as this is connatural to us, as it
a cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a kind of desire for
were. And yet things that are of rare occurrence can be
knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees
pleasant, either as regards knowledge, from the fact that
an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him,
we desire to know something about them, in so far as they
or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of understanding.
are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that “the
Consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as
mind is more inclined by desire to act intensely in things
it includes a hope of getting the knowledge which one de-
that are new,” as stated in Ethic. x, 4, since more perfect
sires to have. For this reason whatever is wonderful is
operation causes more perfect pleasure.
∗ According to another reading:—that he is other than he thought himself to be.
754
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 33
Of the Effects of Pleasure
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
(2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
(3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
(4) Whether pleasure perfects operation?
Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
Ia IIae q. 33 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that expansion is not an
ceives that he has attained a certain perfection, which is a
effect of pleasure. For expansion seems to pertain more to
magnitude of the spiritual order: and in this respect man’s
love, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 6:11): “Our heart is
mind is said to be magnified or expanded by pleasure. The
enlarged.” Wherefore it is written (Ps. 118:96) concern-
other requisite for pleasure is on the part of the appetitive
ing the precept of charity: “Thy commandment is exceed-
power, which acquiesces in the pleasurable object, and
ing broad.” But pleasure is a distinct passion from love.
rests therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within it-
Therefore expansion is not an effect of pleasure.
self. And thus man’s affection is expanded by pleasure, as
Objection 2. Further, when a thing expands it is en-
though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the object
abled to receive more. But receiving pertains to desire,
of its pleasure.
which is for something not yet possessed. Therefore ex-
Reply to Objection 1. In metaphorical expressions
pansion seems to belong to desire rather than to pleasure.
nothing hinders one and the same thing from being at-
Objection 3. Further, contraction is contrary to ex-
tributed to different things according to different like-
pansion. But contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for
nesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by
the hand closes on that which we wish to grasp firmly:
reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection
and such is the affection of appetite in regard to that which
of the lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only
pleases it. Therefore expansion does not pertain to plea-
for his own interests, but also for what concerns others.
sure.
On the other hand expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far
On the contrary, In order to express joy, it is written
as a thing becomes more ample in itself so as to become
(Is. 60:5): “Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall
more capacious.
wonder and be enlarged.” Moreover pleasure is called by
Reply to Objection 2. Desire includes a certain ex-
the name of “laetitia” as being derived from “dilatatio”
pansion arising from the imagination of the thing desired;
[expansion], as stated above (q. 31, a. 3, ad 3).
but this expansion increases at the presence of the plea-
I answer that, Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of
surable object: because the mind surrenders itself more to
bodily magnitude: hence it is not applied to the emo-
that object when it is already taking pleasure in it, than
tions of the soul, save metaphorically. Now expansion
when it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is
denotes a kind of movement towards breadth; and it be-
the end of desire.
longs to pleasure in respect of the two things requisite for
Reply to Objection 3. He that takes pleasure in a
pleasure. One of these is on the part of the apprehensive
thing holds it fast, by clinging to it with all his might:
power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some
but he opens his heart to it that he may enjoy it perfectly.
suitable good. As a result of this apprehension, man per-
Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
Ia IIae q. 33 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that pleasure does not
cause desire.
cause desire for itself. Because all movement ceases when
Objection 2. Further, a thing does not cause its con-
repose is reached. But pleasure is, as it were, a certain re-
trary. But pleasure is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the
pose of the movement of desire, as stated above (q. 23,
part of the object: since desire regards a good which is
a. 4; q. 25, a. 2). Therefore the movement of desire ceases
not yet possessed, whereas pleasure regards the good that
when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure does not
is possessed. Therefore pleasure does not cause desire for
755
itself.
the mere intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste,
Objection 3. Further, distaste is incompatible with de-
thus more than all others spiritual pleasures cause thirst
sire. But pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does
or desire for themselves. Because bodily pleasures be-
not cause desire.
come distasteful by reason of their causing an excess in
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:13): “Whoso-
the natural mode of being, when they are increased or
ever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again”: where, ac-
even when they are protracted; as is evident in the case
cording to Augustine (Tract. xv in Joan.), water denotes
of pleasures of the table. This is why, when a man arrives
pleasures of the body.
at the point of perfection in bodily pleasures, he wearies of
I answer that, Pleasure can be considered in two
them, and sometimes desires another kind. Spiritual plea-
ways; first, as existing in reality; secondly, as existing in
sures, on the contrary, do not exceed the natural mode of
the memory. Again thirst, or desire, can be taken in two
being, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of per-
ways; first, properly, as denoting a craving for something
fection is reached, then do they afford the greatest delight:
not possessed; secondly, in general, as excluding distaste.
except, perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of
Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of
contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the
itself cause thirst or desire for itself, but only acciden-
bodily powers, which tire from protracted activity. And in
tally; provided we take thirst or desire as denoting a crav-
this sense also we may understand those words of Ecclus.
ing for some thing not possessed: because pleasure is an
24:29: “They that drink me shall yet thirst”: for, even of
emotion of the appetite in respect of something actually
the angels, who know God perfectly, and delight in Him,
present. But it may happen that what is actually present
it is written (1 Pet. 1:12) that they “desire to look at Him.”
is not perfectly possessed: and this may be on the part of
Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in re-
the thing possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On
ality, but as existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a
the part of the thing possessed, this happens through the
natural tendency to cause thirst and desire for itself: when,
thing possessed not being a simultaneous whole; where-
to wit, man returns to that disposition, in which he was
fore one obtains possession of it successively, and while
when he experienced the pleasure that is past. But if he be
taking pleasure in what one has, one desires to possess
changed from that disposition, the memory of that plea-
the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with the first part
sure does not give him pleasure, but distaste: for instance,
of a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augus-
the memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to
tine says (Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all bodily
repletion.
pleasures cause thirst for themselves, until they are fully
Reply to Objection 1. When pleasure is perfect, then
realized, because pleasures of this kind arise from some
it includes complete rest; and the movement of desire,
movement: as is evident in pleasures of the table. On the
tending to what was not possessed, ceases. But when it
part of the possessor, this happens when a man possesses
is imperfect, then the desire, tending to what was not pos-
a thing which is perfect in itself, yet does not possess it
sessed, does not cease altogether.
perfectly, but obtains possession of it little by little. Thus
Reply to Objection 2. That which is possessed imper-
in this life, a faint perception of Divine knowledge affords
fectly, is possessed in one respect, and in another respect
us delight, and delight sets up a thirst or desire for perfect
is not possessed. Consequently it may be the object of
knowledge; in which sense we may understand the words
desire and pleasure at the same time.
of Ecclus. 24:29: “They that drink me shall yet thirst.”
Reply to Objection 3. Pleasures cause distaste in one
On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand
way, desire in another, as stated above.
Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
Ia IIae q. 33 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that pleasure does not
other. But pleasure is in the appetitive faculty, while the
hinder the use of reason. Because repose facilitates very
use of reason is in the apprehensive power. Therefore
much the due use of reason: wherefore the Philosopher
pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
says (Phys. vii, 3) that “while we sit and rest, the soul
Objection 3. Further, that which is hindered by an-
is inclined to knowledge and prudence”; and it is written
other, seems to be moved, as it were, thereby. But the use
(Wis. 8:16): “When I go into my house, I shall repose
of an apprehensive power moves pleasure rather than is
myself with her,” i.e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of
moved by it: because it is the cause of pleasure. There-
repose. Therefore it helps rather than hinders the use of
fore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5),
Objection 2. Further, things which are not in the same
that “pleasure destroys the estimate of prudence.”
subject though they be contraries, do not hinder one an-
I answer that, As is stated in Ethic. x, 5, “appropri-
756
ate pleasures increase activity. . . whereas pleasures arising they hinder both estimates. Thirdly, by fettering the rea-from other sources are impediments to activity.” Accord-
son: in so far as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain
ingly there is a certain pleasure that is taken in the very act alteration in the body, greater even than in the other pas-of reason, as when one takes pleasure in contemplating or
sions, in proportion as the appetite is more vehemently
in reasoning: and such pleasure does not hinder the act
affected towards a present than towards an absent thing.
of reason, but helps it; because we are more attentive in
Now such bodily disturbances hinder the use of reason; as
doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters
may be seen in the case of drunkards, in whom the use of
activity.
reason is fettered or hindered.
On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of
Reply to Objection 1. Bodily pleasure implies indeed
reason in three ways. First, by distracting the reason. Be-
repose of the appetite in the object of pleasure; which re-
cause, as we have just observed, we attend much to that
pose is sometimes contrary to reason; but on the part of
which pleases us. Now when the attention is firmly fixed
the body it always implies alteration. And in respect of
on one thing, it is either weakened in respect of other
both points, it hinders the use of reason.
things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and thus
Reply to Objection 2. The powers of the appetite and
if the bodily pleasure be great, either it entirely hinders
of apprehension are indeed distinct parts, but belonging
the use of reason, by concentrating the mind’s attention
to the one soul. Consequently when the soul is very intent
on itself; or else it hinders it considerably. Secondly, by
on the action of one part, it is hindered from attending to
being contrary to reason. Because some pleasures, espe-
a contrary act of the other part.
cially those that are in excess, are contrary to the order of
Reply to Objection 3. The use of reason requires the
reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says that “bod-
due use of the imagination and of the other sensitive pow-
ily pleasures destroy the estimate of prudence, but not the
ers, which are exercised through a bodily organ. Conse-
speculative estimate,” to which they are not opposed, “for
quently alteration in the body hinders the use of reason,
instance that the three angles of a triangle are together
because it hinders the act of the imagination and of the
equal to two right angles.” In the first sense, however,
other sensitive powers.
Whether pleasure perfects operation?
Ia IIae q. 33 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that pleasure does not per-
end added to it”: that is to say, inasmuch as to this good,
fect operation. For every human operation depends on the
which is operation, there is added another good, which is
use of reason. But pleasure hinders the use of reason, as
pleasure, denoting the repose of the appetite in a good that
stated above (a. 3). Therefore pleasure does not perfect,
is presupposed. Secondly, as agent; not indeed directly,
but weakens human operation.
for the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that “pleasure per-
Objection 2. Further, nothing perfects itself or its
fects operation, not as a physician makes a man healthy,
cause. But pleasure is an operation (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 4),
but as health does”: but it does so indirectly; inasmuch as
i.e. either in its essence or in its cause. Therefore pleasure
the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more
does not perfect operation.
eagerly intent on it, and carries it out with greater care.
Objection 3. Further, if pleasure perfects operation,
And in this sense it is said in Ethic. x, 5 that “pleasures
it does so either as end, or as form, or as agent. But
increase their appropriate activities, and hinder those that
not as end; because operation is not sought for the sake
are not appropriate.”
of pleasure, but rather the reverse, as stated above (q. 4,
Reply to Objection 1. It is not every pleasure that
a. 2): nor as agent, because rather is it the operation that
hinders the act of reason, but only bodily pleasure; for
causes pleasure: nor again as form, because, according to
this arises, not from the act of reason, but from the act of
the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 4), “pleasure does not perfect
the concupiscible faculty, which act is intensified by plea-
operation, as a habit does.” Therefore pleasure does not
sure. On the contrary, pleasure that arises from the act of
perfect operation.
reason, strengthens the use of reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4)
Reply to Objection 2. As stated in Phys. ii, 3 two
that “pleasure perfects operation.”
things may be causes of one another, if one be the effi-
I answer that, Pleasure perfects operation in two
cient, the other the final cause. And in this way, operation
ways. First, as an end: not indeed according as an end
is the efficient cause of pleasure, while pleasure perfects
is that on “account of which a thing is”; but according as
operation by way of final cause, as stated above.
every good which is added to a thing and completes it, can
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what
be called its end. And in this sense the Philosopher says
has been said.
(Ethic. x, 4) that “pleasure perfects operation. . . as some
757
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 34
Of the Goodness and Malice of Pleasures
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether every pleasure is evil?
(2) If not, whether every pleasure is good?
(3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?
(4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good and evil?
Whether every pleasure is evil?
Ia IIae q. 34 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that every pleasure is evil.
that man, being prone to immoderate pleasures, arrives at
For that which destroys prudence and hinders the use of
the mean of virtue by abstaining from pleasure. But they
reason, seems to be evil in itself: since man’s good is to
were wrong in holding this opinion. Because, since none
be “in accord with reason,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure, if they
iv). But pleasure destroys prudence and hinders the use of
who teach that all pleasures are evil, are found in the act of
reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is greater:
taking pleasure; men will be more inclined to pleasure by
wherefore “in sexual pleasures,” which are the greatest of
following the example of their works instead of listening
all, “it is impossible to understand anything,” as stated in
to the doctrine of their words: since, in human actions and
Ethic. vii, 11. Moreover, Jerome says in his commentary
passions, wherein experience is of great weight, example
on Matthew∗ that “at the time of conjugal intercourse, the
moves more than words.
presence of the Holy Ghost is not vouchsafed, even if it be
We must therefore say that some pleasures are good,
a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty.” Therefore plea-
and that some are evil. For pleasure is a repose of the
sure is evil in itself; and consequently every pleasure is
appetitive power in some loved good, and resulting from
evil.
some operation; wherefore we assign a twofold reason for
Objection 2. Further, that which the virtuous man
this assertion. The first is in respect of the good in which a
shuns, and the man lacking in virtue seeks, seems to be
man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral
evil in itself, and should be avoided; because, as stated
order depend on agreement or disagreement with reason,
in Ethic. x, 5 “the virtuous man is a kind of measure
as stated above (q. 18, a. 5): just as in the order of nature, a and rule of human actions”; and the Apostle says (1 Cor.
thing is said to be natural, if it agrees with nature, and un-
2:15): “The spiritual man judgeth all things.” But children
natural, if it disagrees. Accordingly, just as in the natural
and dumb animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek plea-
order there is a certain natural repose, whereby a thing
sure: whereas the man who is master of himself does not.
rests in that which agrees with its nature, for instance,
Therefore pleasures are evil in themselves and should be
when a heavy body rests down below; and again an unnat-
avoided.
ural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which disagrees
Objection 3. Further, “virtue and art are concerned
with its nature, as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so,
about the difficult and the good” (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art
in the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the
is ordained to pleasure. Therefore pleasure is not some-
higher or lower appetite rests in that which is in accord
thing good.
with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): “Delight in
rests in that which is discordant from reason and the law
the Lord.” Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no
of God.
evil, it seems that not every pleasure is evil.
The second reason can be found by considering the ac-
I answer that, As stated in Ethic. x, 2,[3] some have
tions, some of which are good, some evil. Now pleasures
maintained that all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to
which are conjoined to actions are more akin to those ac-
have been that they took account only of sensible and bod-
tions, than desires, which precede them in point of time.
ily pleasures which are more manifest; since, also in other
Wherefore, since the desires of good actions are good, and
respects, the ancient philosophers did not discriminate be-
of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of good
tween the intelligible and the sensible, nor between in-
actions good, and those of evil actions evil.
tellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they held that
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 33, a. 3),
all bodily pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus
it is not the pleasures which result from an act of reason,
∗ Origen, Hom. vi in Num.
758
that hinder the reason or destroy prudence, but extraneous malice, namely, from the sin of our first parent; because,
pleasures, such as the pleasures of the body. These indeed
as stated in the Ia, q. 98, a. 2 the case was different in the
hinder the use of reason, as stated above (q. 33, a. 3), ei-
state of innocence.
ther by contrariety of the appetite that rests in something
Reply to Objection 2. The temperate man does not
repugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure morally
shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and con-
bad; or by fettering the reason: thus in conjugal inter-
trary to reason. The fact that children and dumb animals
course, though the pleasure be in accord with reason, yet
seek pleasures, does not prove that all pleasures are evil:
it hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompa-
because they have from God their natural appetite, which
nying bodily change. But in this case the pleasure is not
is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them.
morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason is
Reply to Objection 3. Art is not concerned with all
fettered, morally evil, if it be taken according to reason:
kinds of good, but with the making of external things, as
for reason itself demands that the use of reason be inter-
we shall state further on (q. 57, a. 3). But actions and
rupted at times. We must add, however, that although this
passions, which are within us, are more the concern of
fettering of the reason through the pleasure of conjugal
prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there is an
intercourse has no moral malice, since it is neither a mor-
art of making pleasure, namely, “the art of cookery and
tal nor a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a kind of moral
the art of making arguments,” as stated in Ethic. vii, 12.
Whether every pleasure is good?
Ia IIae q. 34 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that every pleasure is
him by reason of a disposition in which he is now, which
good. Because as stated in the Ia, q. 5, a. 6 there are three
disposition, however, is not natural: thus it is sometimes
kinds of good: the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant.
good for a leper to eat things that are poisonous, which
But everything virtuous is good; and in like manner ev-
are not suitable simply to the human temperament. In an-
erything useful is good. Therefore also every pleasure is
other way, through something unsuitable being esteemed
good.
suitable. And since pleasure is the repose of the appetite
Objection 2. Further, that which is not sought for the
in some good, if the appetite reposes in that which is good
sake of something else, is good in itself, as stated in Ethic.
simply, the pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good
i, 6,7. But pleasure is not sought for the sake of some-
simply. But if a man’s appetite repose in that which is
thing else; for it seems absurd to ask anyone why he seeks
good, not simply, but in respect of that particular man,
to be pleased. Therefore pleasure is good in itself. Now
then his pleasure will not be pleasure simply, but a plea-
that which is predicated to a thing considered in itself, is
sure to him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain
predicated thereof universally. Therefore every pleasure
respect, or an apparent good.
is good.
Reply to Objection 1. The virtuous and the useful de-
Objection 3. Further, that which is desired by all,
pend on accordance with reason, and consequently noth-
seems to be good of itself: because good is “what all
ing is virtuous or useful, without being good. But the
things seek,” as stated in Ethic. i, 1. But everyone seeks
pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite, which
some kind of pleasure, even children and dumb animals.
tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason.
Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and consequently all
Consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the
pleasure is good.
moral order which depends on the order of reason.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 2:14): “Who are
Reply to Objection 2. The reason why pleasure is not
glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked
sought for the sake of something else is because it is re-
things.”
pose in the end. Now the end may be either good or evil;
I answer that, While some of the Stoics maintained
although nothing can be an end except in so far as it is
that all pleasures are evil, the Epicureans held that plea-
good in respect of such and such a man: and so too with
sure is good in itself, and that consequently all pleasures
regard to pleasure.
are good. They seem to have thus erred through not dis-
Reply to Objection 3. All things seek pleasure in the
criminating between that which is good simply, and that
same way as they seek good: since pleasure is the repose
which is good in respect of a particular individual. That
of the appetite in good. But, just as it happens that not
which is good simply, is good in itself. Now that which
every good which is desired, is of itself and verily good;
is not good in itself, may be good in respect of some indi-
so not every pleasure is of itself and verily good.
vidual in two ways. In one way, because it is suitable to
759
Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?
Ia IIae q. 34 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that no pleasure is the
one takes pleasure, not only in the “becoming” of knowl-
greatest good. Because nothing generated is the greatest
edge, for instance, when one learns or wonders, as stated
good: since generation cannot be the last end. But plea-
above (q. 32, a. 8, ad 2); but also in the act of contempla-
sure is a consequence of generation: for the fact that a
tion, by making use of knowledge already acquired.
thing takes pleasure is due to its being established in its
Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that
own nature, as stated above (q. 31, a. 1). Therefore no
which is the supreme good simply, i.e. the good as exist-
pleasure is the greatest good.
ing apart from, and unparticipated by, all else, in which
Objection 2. Further, that which is the greatest good
sense God is the Supreme Good; whereas we are speak-
cannot be made better by addition. But pleasure is made
ing of the greatest good in human things. Now the greatest
better by addition; since pleasure together with virtue is
good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated
better than pleasure without virtue. Therefore pleasure is
above (q. 1, a. 8; q. 2, a. 7) is twofold; namely, the thing itnot the greatest good.
self, and the use of that thing; thus the miser’s end is either Objection 3. Further, that which is the greatest good
money or the possession of money. Accordingly, man’s
is universally good, as being good of itself: since that
last end may be said to be either God Who is the Supreme
which is such of itself is prior to and greater than that
Good simply; or the enjoyment of God, which implies a
which is such accidentally. But pleasure is not universally
certain pleasure in the last end. And in this sense a cer-
good, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore pleasure is not the
tain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among
greatest good.
human goods.
On the contrary, Happiness is the greatest good:
Reply to Objection 1. Not every pleasure arises from
since it is the end of man’s life. But Happiness is not
a “becoming”; for some pleasures result from perfect op-
without pleasure: for it is written (Ps. 15:11): “Thou shalt
erations, as stated above. Accordingly nothing prevents
fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy right hand
some pleasure being the greatest good, although every
are delights even to the end.”
pleasure is not such.
I answer that, Plato held neither with the Stoics, who
Reply to Objection 2.
This argument is true of
asserted that all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicure-
the greatest good simply, by participation of which all
ans, who maintained that all pleasures are good; but he
things are good; wherefore no addition can make it better:
said that some are good, and some evil; yet, so that no
whereas in regard to other goods, it is universally true that
pleasure be the sovereign or greatest good. But, judging
any good becomes better by the addition of another good.
from his arguments, he fails in two points. First, because,
Moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something
from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure consists
extraneous to the operation of virtue, but that it accompa-
in a certain movement and “becoming,” as is evident in
nies it, as stated in Ethic. i, 8.
satiety from eating and the like; he concluded that all plea-
Reply to Objection 3. That pleasure is the greatest
sure arises from some “becoming” and movement: and
good is due not to the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to
from this, since “becoming” and movement are the acts of
the fact that it is perfect repose in the perfect good. Hence
something imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is not
it does not follow that every pleasure is supremely good,
of the nature of ultimate perfection. But this is seen to be
or even good at all. Thus a certain science is supremely
evidently false as regards intellectual pleasures: because
good, but not every science is.
Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or evil?
Ia IIae q. 34 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that pleasure is not the
them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not
measure or rule of moral good and evil. Because “that
the measure and rule of morals.
which is first in a genus is the measure of all the rest”
Objection 3. Further, judgment of the effect from its
(Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first thing in the
cause is more certain than judgment of cause from effect.
moral genus, for it is preceded by love and desire. There-
Now goodness or malice of operation is the cause of good-
fore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral
ness or malice of pleasure: because “those pleasures are
matters.
good which result from good operations, and those are
Objection 2. Further, a measure or rule should be uni-
evil which arise from evil operations,” as stated in Ethic.
form; hence that movement which is the most uniform, is
x, 5. Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of
the measure and rule of all movements (Metaph. x, 1).
moral goodness and malice.
But pleasures are various and multiform: since some of
On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 7:10
760
“The searcher of hearts and reins is God,” says: “The end good and of evil men. But the will of the good man takes
of care and thought is the pleasure which each one aims
pleasure in them in accordance with reason, to which the
at achieving.” And the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11)
will of the evil man gives no heed.
that “pleasure is the architect,” i.e. the principal, “end∗,
Reply to Objection 1. Love and desire precede plea-
in regard to which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and
sure in the order of generation. But pleasure precedes
that, good.”
them in the order of the end, which serves a principle in
I answer that, Moral goodness or malice depends
actions; and it is by the principle, which is the rule and
chiefly on the will, as stated above (q. 20, a. 1); and it
measure of such matters, that we form our judgment.
is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is
Reply to Objection 2. All pleasures are uniform in
good or evil. Now the end is taken to be that in which the
the point of their being the repose of the appetite in some-
will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every ap-
thing good: and in this respect pleasure can be a rule or
petite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reck-
measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in
oned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure
the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.
of the human will; since that man is good and virtuous,
Reply to Objection 3. Since pleasure perfects opera-
who takes pleasure in the works of virtue; and that man
tion as its end, as stated above (q. 33, a. 4); an operation
evil, who takes pleasure in evil works.
cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in
On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite
good: because the goodness of a thing depends on its end.
are not the rule of moral goodness and malice; since food
And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is the
is universally pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of
cause of goodness in the operation.
∗ St. Thomas took “finis” as being the nominative, whereas it is the genitive— tou telous; and the Greek reads “He” (i.e. the political philosopher),
“is the architect of the end.”
761
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 35
Of Pain or Sorrow, in Itself
(In Eight Articles)
We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; (3) Its effects; (4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary in pleasure?
(4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
(5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?
(6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
(7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?
(8) Of the species of sorrow.
Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
Ia IIae q. 35 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that pain is not a passion
evident that something under the aspect of good or evil is
of the soul. Because no passion of the soul is in the body.
the object of the pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as
But pain can be in the body, since Augustine says (De
such, are objects of the appetite. Consequently it is clear
Vera Relig. xii), that “bodily pain is a sudden corruption
that pleasure and pain belong to the appetite.
of the well-being of that thing which the soul, by making
Now every appetitive movement or inclination conse-
evil use of it, made subject to corruption.” Therefore pain
quent to apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sen-
is not a passion of the soul.
sitive appetite: since the inclination of the natural appetite
Objection 2. Further, every passion of the soul be-
is not consequent to an apprehension of the subject of that
longs to the appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to
appetite, but to the apprehension of another, as stated in
the appetitive, but rather to the apprehensive part: for Au-
the Ia, q. 103, Aa. 1,3. Since then pleasure and pain pre-
gustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that “bodily pain is caused
suppose some sense or apprehension in the same subject,
by the sense resisting a more powerful body.” Therefore
it is evident that pain, like pleasure, is in the intellective
pain is not a passion of the soul.
or sensitive appetite.
Objection 3. Further, every passion of the soul be-
Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is
longs to the animal appetite. But pain does not belong to
called a passion, as stated above (q. 22, Aa. 1,3): and es-
the animal appetite, but rather to the natural appetite; for
pecially those which tend to some defect. Consequently
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): “Had not some
pain, according as it is in the sensitive appetite, is most
good remained in nature, we should feel no pain in be-
properly called a passion of the soul: just as bodily ail-
ing punished by the loss of good.” Therefore pain is not a
ments are properly called passions of the body. Hence
passion of the soul.
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,[8]∗) reckons pain espe-
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reck-
cially as being a kind of ailment.
ons pain among the passions of the soul; quoting Vir-
Reply to Objection 1. We speak of the body, because
gil (Aeneid, vi, 733): “hence wild desires and grovelling
the cause of pain is in the body: as when we suffer some-
fears/And human laughter, human tears.” [Translation:
thing hurtful to the body. But the movement of pain is al-
Conington.]
ways in the soul; since “the body cannot feel pain unless
I answer that, Just as two things are requisite for pleathe soul feel it,” as Augustine says (Super Psalm 87:4).
sure; namely, conjunction with good and perception of
Reply to Objection 2. We speak of pain of the senses,
this conjunction; so also two things are requisite for pain:
not as though it were an act of the sensitive power; but be-
namely, conjunction with some evil (which is in so far evil
cause the senses are required for bodily pain, in the same
as it deprives one of some good), and perception of this
way as for bodily pleasure.
conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have not the
Reply to Objection 3. Pain at the loss of good proves
aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it
the goodness of the nature, not because pain is an act of
is conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is
the natural appetite, but because nature desires something
∗ Quoting Cicero
762
as good, the removal of which being perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive appetite.
Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
Ia IIae q. 35 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is not pain.
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking there
For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that “pain is used
of the use of the word: because “pain” is more generally
to express bodily suffering.” But sorrow is used more in
used in reference to bodily pains, which are better known,
reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is not pain.
than in reference to spiritual pains.
Objection 2. Further, pain is only in respect of present Reply to Objection 2. External sense perceives only
evil. But sorrow can refer to both past and future evil: thus
what is present; but the interior cognitive power can per-
repentance is sorrow for the past, and anxiety for the fu-
ceive the present, past and future. Consequently sorrow
ture. Therefore sorrow is quite different from pain.
can regard present, past and future: whereas bodily pain,
Objection 3. Further, pain seems not to follow save
which follows apprehension of the external sense, can
from the sense of touch. But sorrow can arise from all the
only regard something present.
senses. Therefore sorrow is not pain, and extends to more
Reply to Objection 3. The sensibles of touch are
objects.
painful, not only in so far as they are disproportionate to
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 9:2): “I
the apprehensive power, but also in so far as they are con-
have great sorrow [Douay: ‘sadness’] and continual pain
trary to nature: whereas the objects of the other senses can
[Douay: ‘sorrow’] in my heart,” thus denoting the same
indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but
thing by sorrow and pain.
they are not contrary to nature, save as they are subordi-
I answer that, Pleasure and pain can arise from a
nate to the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone,
twofold apprehension, namely, from the apprehension of
who is a perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the
an exterior sense; and from the interior apprehension of
objects of the other senses for their own sake; whereas
the intellect or of the imagination. Now the interior appre-
other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable
hension extends to more objects than the exterior appre-
to the sensibles of touch, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Ac-
hension: because whatever things come under the exterior
cordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses,
apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely.
we do not speak of pain in so far as it is contrary to natu-
Consequently that pleasure alone which is caused by an
ral pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy.
interior apprehension is called joy, as stated above (q. 31,
So then if pain be taken as denoting bodily pain, which
a. 3): and in like manner that pain alone which is caused
is its more usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sor-
by an interior apprehension, is called sorrow. And just
row, according to the distinction of interior and exterior
as that pleasure which is caused by an exterior apprehen-
apprehension; although, on the part of the objects, plea-
sion, is called pleasure but not joy; so too that pain which
sure extends further than does bodily pain. But if pain be
is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain in-
taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as
deed but not sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of
stated above.
pain, as joy is a species of pleasure.
Whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure?
Ia IIae q. 35 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is not contrary
the other; because contraries cannot co-exist together. But
to pleasure. For one of two contraries is not the cause of
sorrow can be the matter of pleasure; for Augustine says
the other. But sorrow can be the cause of pleasure; for it
(De Poenit. xiii): “The penitent should ever sorrow, and
is written (Mat. 5:5): “Blessed are they that mourn, for
rejoice in his sorrow.” The Philosopher too says (Ethic.
they shall be comforted.” Therefore they are not contrary
ix, 4) that, on the other hand, “the evil man feels pain at
to one another.
having been pleased.” Therefore pleasure and pain are not
Objection 2. Further, one contrary does not denomi-
contrary to one another.
nate the other. But to some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure:
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6)
thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 2) that in stage-plays
that “joy is the volition of consent to the things we wish:
sorrow itself gives pleasure: and (Confess. iv, 5) that
and that sorrow is the volition of dissent from the things
“weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it sometimes pleases
we do not wish.” But consent and dissent are contraries.
us.” Therefore pain is not contrary to pleasure.
Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary to one another.
Objection 3. Further, one contrary is not the matter of
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x,
763
4), contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now hardships and straits in order to obtain it.
the form or species of a passion or movement is taken
Reply to Objection 2. Pain itself can be pleasurable
from the object or term. Consequently, since the objects of
accidentally in so far as it is accompanied by wonder, as
pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz. present good and present
in stage-plays; or in so far as it recalls a beloved object
evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain and
to one’s memory, and makes one feel one’s love for the
pleasure are contrary to one another.
thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently, since
Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders one contrary
love is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from
causing the other accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the
love, forasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleas-
cause of pleasure. In one way, in so far as from sorrow
ant. And, for this reason, we derive pleasure even from
at the absence of something, or at the presence of its con-
pains depicted on the stage: in so far as, in witnessing
trary, one seeks the more eagerly for something pleasant:
them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain love for
thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a
those who are there represented.
drink, as a remedy for the pain he suffers. In another way,
Reply to Objection 3. The will and the reason reflect
in so far as, from a strong desire for a certain pleasure,
on their own acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the
one does not shrink from undergoing pain, so as to obtain
will and reason are considered under the aspect of good
that pleasure. In each of these ways, the sorrows of the
or evil. In this way sorrow can be the matter of pleasure,
present life lead us to the comfort of the future life. Be-
or vice versa, not essentially but accidentally: that is, in
cause by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins, or for
so far as either of them is considered under the aspect of
the delay of glory, he merits the consolation of eternity.
good or evil.
In like manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from
Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
Ia IIae q. 35 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that all sorrow is contrary
species from their terms or objects. Accordingly in those
to all pleasure. Because, just as whiteness and blackness
things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that
are contrary species of color, so pleasure and sorrow are
species contained under contrary genera are not contrary
contrary species of the soul’s passions. But whiteness and
as to their specific nature: but it does not happen for them
blackness are universally contrary to one another. There-
to have any affinity or fittingness to one another. For in-
fore pleasure and sorrow are so too.
temperance and justice, which are in the contrary genera
Objection 2. Further, remedies are made of things
of virtue and vice, are not contrary to one another in re-
contrary (to the evil). But every pleasure is a remedy for
spect of their specific nature; and yet they have no affinity
all manner of sorrow, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
or fittingness to one another. On the other hand, in those
vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is contrary to every sor-
things that are specified in relation to something extrin-
row.
sic, it happens that species belonging to contrary genera,
Objection 3. Further, contraries are hindrances to one
are not only not contrary to one another, but also that they
another. But every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure:
have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness. The reason of
as is evident from Ethic. x, 5. Therefore every sorrow is
this is that where there is one same relation to two con-
contrary to every pleasure.
traries, there is contrariety; e.g. to approach to a white
On the contrary, The same thing is not the cause of
thing, and to approach to a black thing, are contraries;
contraries. But joy for one thing, and sorrow for the oppo-
whereas contrary relations to contrary things, implies a
site thing, proceed from the same habit: thus from charity
certain likeness, e.g. to recede from something white, and
it happens that we “rejoice with them that rejoice,” and
to approach to something black. This is most evident in
“weep with them that weep” (Rom. 12:15). Therefore not
the case of contradiction, which is the principle of oppo-
every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.
sition: because opposition consists in affirming and deny-
I answer that, As stated in Metaph. x, 4 contrari-
ing the same thing, e.g. “white” and “non-white”; while
ety is a difference in respect of a form. Now a form may
there is fittingness and likeness in the affirmation of one
be generic or specific. Consequently things may be con-
contrary and the denial of the other, as, if I were to say
traries in respect of a generic form, as virtue and vice; or
“black” and “not white.”
in respect of a specific form, as justice and injustice.
Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are speci-
Now we must observe that some things are specified
fied by their objects. According to their respective gen-
by absolute forms, e.g. substances and qualities; whereas
era, they are contrary to one another: since one is a kind
other things are specified in relation to something extrin-
of “pursuit,” the other a kind of “avoidance,” which “are
sic, e.g.
passions and movements, which derive their
to the appetite, what affirmation and denial are to the in-
764
tellect” (Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and pleasure ject takes the place of matter. Now it has been said above
in respect of the same object, are specifically contrary to
that pleasure and sorrow are generically contrary to one
one another: whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of
another. Consequently in every sorrow the subject has a
objects that are not contrary but disparate, are not specif-
disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of
ically contrary to one another, but are also disparate; for
pleasure: because in every pleasure the appetite is viewed
instance, sorrow at the death of a friend, and pleasure in
as accepting what it possesses, and in every sorrow, as
contemplation. If, however, those diverse objects be con-
avoiding it. And therefore on the part of the subject every
trary to one another, then pleasure and sorrow are not only
pleasure is a remedy for any kind of sorrow, and every sor-
specifically contrary, but they also have a certain mutual
row is a hindrance of all manner of pleasure: but chiefly
fittingness and affinity: for instance to rejoice in good and
when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically.
to sorrow for evil.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 1. Whiteness and blackness do
Or we may say that, although not every sorrow is specif-
not take their species from their relationship to something
ically contrary to every pleasure, yet they are contrary to
extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow do: wherefore the com-
one another in regard to their effects: since one has the
parison does not hold.
effect of strengthening the animal nature, while the other
Reply to Objection 2. Genus is taken from matter,
results in a kind of discomfort.
as is stated in Metaph. viii, 2; and in accidents the sub-
Whether there is any sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?
Ia IIae q. 35 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that there is a sorrow that
templation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the
is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apos-
pleasure of contemplation.
tle says (2 Cor. 7:10): “The sorrow that is according to
I answer that, The pleasure of contemplation can be
God, worketh penance steadfast unto salvation.” Now to
understood in two ways. In one way, so that contempla-
look at God belongs to the higher reason, whose act is to
tion is the cause, but not the object of pleasure: and then
give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De
pleasure is taken not in contemplating but in the thing con-
Trin. xii, 3,4). Therefore there is a sorrow contrary to the
templated. Now it is possible to contemplate something
pleasure of contemplation.
harmful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something
Objection 2. Further, contrary things have contrary
suitable and pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of con-
effects. If therefore the contemplation of one contrary
templation be taken in this way, nothing hinders some sor-
gives pleasure, the other contrary will give sorrow: and
row being contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.
so there will be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of con-
In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is un-
templation.
derstood, so that contemplation is its object and cause; as
Objection 3. Further, as the object of pleasure is good, when one takes pleasure in the very act of contemplating.
so the object of sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be
And thus, according to Gregory of Nyssa∗, “no sorrow is
an evil: since the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that “it
contrary to that pleasure which is about contemplation”:
is unfitting to think of certain things.” Therefore sorrow
and the Philosopher says the same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x,
can be contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.
3). This, however, is to be understood as being the case
Objection 4. Further, any work, so far as it is unhin-
properly speaking. The reason is because sorrow is of it-
dered, can be a cause of pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii,
self contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus pleasure
12,13; x, 4. But the work of contemplation can be hin-
in heat is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is
dered in many ways, either so as to destroy it altogether,
no contrary to the object of contemplation: because con-
or as to make it difficult. Therefore in contemplation there
traries, as apprehended by the mind, are not contrary, but
can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure.
one is the means of knowing the other. Wherefore, prop-
Objection 5. Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause erly speaking, there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the
of sorrow. But, as it is written (Eccles. 12:12) “much
pleasure of contemplation. Nor has it any sorrow annexed
study is an affliction of the flesh.” Therefore contempla-
to it, as bodily pleasures have, which are like remedies
tion admits of sorrow contrary to its pleasure.
against certain annoyances; thus a man takes pleasure in
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:16): “Her,” i.e.
drinking through being troubled with thirst, but when the
wisdom’s, “conversation hath no bitterness nor her com-
thirst is quite driven out, the pleasure of drinking ceases
pany any tediousness; but joy and gladness.” Now the
also. Because the pleasure of contemplation is not caused
conversation and company of wisdom are found in con-
by one’s being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.
765
contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a is evident from what has been said above (a. 4): while pain
“becoming” but a perfect operation, as stated above (q. 31,
or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to
a. 1).
the same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate. Ac-
Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the
cordingly it is evident that no sorrow is contrary to plea-
pleasure of contemplation; and this in two ways: first,
sure taken in the very act of contemplation; nor is any
on the part of an organ, secondly, through some impedi-
sorrow connected with it save accidentally.
ment in the apprehension. On the part of an organ, sorrow
Reply to Objection 1. The “sorrow which is accord-
or pain is mingled with apprehension, directly, as regards
ing to God,” is not caused by the very act of intellectual
the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have
contemplation, but by something which the mind contem-
a bodily organ; either from the sensible object disagree-
plates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as contrary
ing with the normal condition of the organ, as the taste of
to the love of God.
something bitter, and the smell of something foul; or from
Reply to Objection 2. Things which are contrary ac-
the sensible object, though agreeable, being so continu-
cording to nature are not contrary according as they exist
ous in its action on the sense, that it exceeds the normal
in the mind: for things that are contrary in reality are not
condition of the organ, as stated above (q. 33, a. 2), the re-
contrary in the order of thought; indeed rather is one con-
sult being that an apprehension which at first was pleasant
trary the reason for knowing the other. Hence one and the
becomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur di-
same science considers contraries.
rectly in the contemplation of the mind; because the mind
Reply to Objection 3. Contemplation, in itself, is
has no corporeal organ: wherefore it was said in the au-
never evil, since it is nothing else than the consideration
thority quoted above that intellectual contemplation has
of truth, which is the good of the intellect: it can, however,
neither “bitterness,” nor “tediousness.” Since, however,
be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far as the contemplation of
the human mind, in contemplation, makes use of the sen-
a less noble object hinders the contemplation of a more
sitive powers of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is
noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to
incidental; therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly
which the appetite is inordinately attached.
mingled with contemplation.
Reply to Objection 4. Sorrow caused by a hindrance
Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus
to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of con-
accidentally mingled with contemplation, contrary to the
templation, but is in harmony with it, as stated above.
pleasure thereof. Because pain caused by a hindrance to
Reply to Objection 5. Affliction of the flesh affects
contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contem-
contemplation accidentally and indirectly, as stated above.
plation, but rather is in affinity and in harmony with it, as
Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
Ia IIae q. 35 a. 6
Objection 1.
It would seem that sorrow is to be
is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists the
shunned more than pleasure is to be sought. For Augus-
movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher
tine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): “There is nobody that does
says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “the brave and the just are chiefly
not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure.” Now that
praised.” Therefore the movement of shunning sorrow is
which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. Therefore
more eager than the movement of seeking pleasure.
it is natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than
On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil, as
pleasure is sought.
Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desir-
Objection 2. Further, the action of a contrary con-
able for the sake of the good which is its object; whereas
duces to rapidity and intensity of movement: for “hot wa-
the shunning of sorrow is on account of evil. Therefore
ter freezes quicker and harder,” as the Philosopher says
the desire for pleasure is more eager than the shunning of
(Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is due to the
sorrow.
contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas the desire for
I answer that, The desire for pleasure is of itself more pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather
eager than the shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is
from the suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore
that the cause of pleasure is a suitable good; while the
sorrow is shunned more eagerly than pleasure is sought.
cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable evil. Now it
Objection 3. Further, the stronger the passion which a
happens that a certain good is suitable without any re-
man resists according to reason, the more worthy is he of
pugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be
praise, and the more virtuous: since “virtue is concerned
so unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. Where-
with the difficult and the good” (Ethic. ii, 3). But the
fore pleasure can be entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is
brave man who resists the movement of shunning sorrow,
always partial. Therefore desire for pleasure is naturally
766
greater than the shunning of sorrow. Another reason is be-Reply to Objection 1. The saying of Augustine that
cause the good, which is the object of pleasure, is sought
“sorrow is shunned more than pleasure is sought” is true
for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the object of
accidentally but not simply. And this is clear from what
sorrow, is to be shunned as being a privation of good: and
he says after: “Since we see that the most savage animals
that which is by reason of itself is stronger than that which
are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pain,”
is by reason of something else. Moreover we find a con-
which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all.
firmation of this in natural movements. For every natural
Reply to Objection 2. It is not the same with move-
movement is more intense in the end, when a thing ap-
ment from within and movement from without. For move-
proaches the term that is suitable to its nature, than at the
ment from within tends to what is suitable more than it
beginning, when it leaves the term that is unsuitable to its
recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we remarked
nature: as though nature were more eager in tending to
above in regard to natural movement. But movement from
what is suitable to it, than in shunning what is unsuitable.
without is intensified by the very opposition: because each
Therefore the inclination of the appetitive power is, of it-
thing strives in its own way to resist anything contrary to
self, more eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning
it, as aiming at its own preservation. Hence violent move-
sorrow.
ment is intense at first, and slackens towards the end. Now
But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow
the movement of the appetitive faculty is from within:
more eagerly than he seeks pleasure: and this for three
since it tends from the soul to the object. Consequently
reasons. First, on the part of the apprehension. Because,
pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is to
as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), “love is felt more
be shunned. But the movement of the sensitive faculty
keenly, when we lack that which we love.” Now from the
is from without, as it were from the object of the soul.
lack of what we love, sorrow results, which is caused ei-
Consequently the more contrary a thing is the more it is
ther by the loss of some loved good, or by the presence
felt. And then too, accidentally, in so far as the senses are
of some contrary evil. But pleasure suffers no lack of the
requisite for pleasure and pain, pain is shunned more than
good loved, for it rests in possession of it. Since then love
pleasure is sought.
is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, the latter is more the
Reply to Objection 3. A brave man is not praised
shunned, according as love is the more keenly felt on ac-
because, in accordance with reason, he is not overcome
count of that which is contrary to it. Secondly, on the part
by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever, but because he is
of the cause of sorrow or pain, which cause is repugnant
not overcome by that which is concerned with the dangers
to a good that is more loved than the good in which we
of death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, than
take pleasure. For we love the natural well-being of the
pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are sought,
body more than the pleasure of eating: and consequently
which latter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus
we would leave the pleasure of eating and the like, from
life is loved more than food and sexual pleasure. But the
fear of the pain occasioned by blows or other such causes,
temperate man is praised for refraining from pleasures of
which are contrary to the well-being of the body. Thirdly,
touch, more than for not shunning the pains which are
on the part of the effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hin-
contrary to them, as is stated in Ethic. iii, 11.
ders not only one pleasure, but all.
Whether outward pain is greater than interior sorrow?
Ia IIae q. 35 a. 7
Objection 1.
It would seem that outward pain is
But outward pain has more striking effects: since man dies
greater than interior sorrow of the heart. Because outward
sooner of outward pain than of interior sorrow. Therefore
pain arises from a cause repugnant to the well-being of the
outward pain is greater and is shunned more than interior
body in which is life: whereas interior sorrow is caused by
sorrow.
some evil in the imagination. Since, therefore, life is loved
On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 25:17): “The
more than an imagined good, it seems that, according to
sadness of the heart is every wound [Douay: ‘plague’],
what has been said above (a. 6), outward pain is greater
and the wickedness of a woman is all evil.” Therefore, just
than interior sorrow.
as the wickedness of a woman surpasses all other wicked-
Objection 2. Further, the reality moves more than its
ness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart surpasses
likeness does. But outward pain arises from the real con-
every outward wound.
junction of some contrary; whereas inward sorrow arises
I answer that, Interior and exterior pain agree in one
from the apprehended likeness of a contrary. Therefore
point and differ in two. They agree in this, that each is a
outward pain is greater than inward sorrow.
movement of the appetitive power, as stated above (a. 1).
Objection 3. Further, a cause is known by its effect.
But they differ in respect of those two things which are
767
requisite for pain and pleasure; namely, in respect of the whatever is apprehended by sense may be apprehended
cause, which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect
by imagination and reason, but not conversely. Hence in
of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a
the passage quoted above it is said expressively: “Sadness
conjoined evil repugnant to the body; while the cause of
of the heart is every wound,” because even the pains of
inward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant to the appetite.
outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of
Again, outward pain arises from an apprehension of sense,
the heart.
chiefly of touch; while inward pain arises from an interior
Reply to Objection 1. Inward pain can also arise from
apprehension, of the imagination or of the reason.
things that are destructive of life. And then the compari-
If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the
son of inward to outward pain must not be taken in refer-
cause of outward pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the
ence to the various evils that cause pain; but in regard to
appetite to which both these pains belong: while the lat-
the various ways in which this cause of pain is compared
ter belongs to the appetite directly. Because inward pain
to the appetite.
arises from something being repugnant to the appetite it-
Reply to Objection 2. Inward pain is not caused by
self, while outward pain arises from something being re-
the apprehended likeness of a thing: for a man is not in-
pugnant to the appetite, through being repugnant to the
wardly pained by the apprehended likeness itself, but by
body. Now, that which is of itself is always prior to that
the thing which the likeness represents. And this thing
which is by reason of another. Wherefore, from this point
is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its
of view, inward pain surpasses outward pain. In like man-
likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract.
ner also on the part of apprehension: because the appre-
Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being
hension of reason and imagination is of a higher order
caused by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known
than the apprehension of the sense of touch. Consequently
by an inward apprehension.
inward pain is, simply and of itself, more keen than out-
Reply to Objection 3. Bodily changes are more liable
ward pain: a sign whereof is that one willingly undergoes
to be caused by outward pain, both from the fact that out-
outward pain in order to avoid inward pain: and in so far
ward pain is caused by a corruptive conjoined corporally,
as outward pain is not repugnant to the interior appetite,
which is a necessary condition of the sense of touch; and
it becomes in a manner pleasant and agreeable by way of
from the fact that the outward sense is more material than
inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is accom-
the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more ma-
panied by inward pain, and then the pain is increased. Be-
terial than the intellective. For this reason, as stated above
cause inward pain is not only greater than outward pain,
(q. 22, a. 3; q. 31, a. 5 ), the body undergoes a greater
it is also more universal: since whatever is repugnant to
change from the movement of the sensitive appetite: and,
the body, can be repugnant to the interior appetite; and
in like manner, from outward than from inward pain.
Whether there are only four species of sorrow?
Ia IIae q. 35 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that Damascene’s (De
it is possible for one to sorrow for another’s wrongs, and
Fide Orth. ii, 14) division of sorrow into four species is
for another’s good, and at the same time to be weighed
incorrect; viz. into “torpor, distress,” which Gregory of
down inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. There-
Nyssa∗ calls “anxiety,”—“pity,” and “envy.” For sorrow
fore this division is correct.
is contrary to pleasure. But there are not several species
On the contrary, stands the twofold authority of Gre-
of pleasure. Therefore it is incorrect to assign different
gory of Nyssa‡ and of Damascene.
species of sorrow.
I answer that, It belongs to the notion of a species
Objection 2. Further, “Repentance” is a species of
that it is something added to the genus. But a thing can be
sorrow; and so are “indignation” and “jealousy,” as the
added to a genus in two ways. First, as something belong-
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9,11). But these are not in-
ing of itself to the genus, and virtually contained therein:
cluded in the above species. Therefore this division is in-
thus “rational” is added to “animal.” Such an addition
sufficient.
makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher says
Objection 3.
Further, the members of a division
(Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2,3). But, secondly, a thing may be
should be things that are opposed to one another. But
added to a genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion
these species are not opposed to one another. For accord-
conveyed by that genus: thus “white” or something of the
ing to Gregory† “torpor is sorrow depriving of speech;
kind may be added to “animal.” Such an addition does
anxiety is the sorrow that weighs down; envy is sorrow for
not make true species of the genus, according to the usual
another’s good; pity is sorrow for another’s wrongs.” But
sense in which we speak of genera and species. But some-
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.
† Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.
‡ Nemesius
768
times a thing is said to be a species of a certain genus, which weighs on the mind, so as to make escape seem im-through having something foreign to that genus indeed,
possible: hence it is also called “perplexity.” If, however,
but to which the notion of that genus is applicable: thus a
the mind be weighed down so much, that even the limbs
live coal or a flame is said to be a species of fire, because
become motionless, which belongs to “torpor,” then we
in each of them the nature of fire is applied to a foreign
have the foreign element affecting both, since there is nei-
matter. In like manner we speak of astronomy and per-
ther flight, nor is the effect in the appetite. And the reason
spective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch as the
why torpor especially is said to deprive one of speech is
principles of mathematics are applied to natural matter.
because of all the external movements the voice is the best
In accordance with this manner of speaking, the
expression of the inward thought and desire, not only in
species of sorrow are reckoned by an application of the
men, but also in other animals, as is stated in Polit. i, 1.
notion of sorrow to something foreign to it. This foreign
Reply to Objection 1. Pleasure is caused by good,
matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the ob-
which has only one meaning: and so pleasure is not di-
ject, or of the effect. For the proper object of sorrow is
vided into several species as sorrow is; for the latter is
“one’s own evil.” Hence sorrow may be concerned for an
caused by evil, which “happens in many ways,” as Diony-
object foreign to it either through one’s being sorry for
sius says (Div. Nom. iv).
an evil that is not one’s own; and thus we have “pity”
Reply to Objection 2. Repentance is for one’s own
which is sorrow for another’s evil, considered, however,
evil, which is the proper object of sorrow: wherefore it
as one’s own: or through one’s being sorry for something
does not belong to these species. Jealousy and indigna-
that is neither evil nor one’s own, but another’s good, con-
tion are included in envy, as we shall explain later ( IIa
sidered, however, as one’s own evil: and thus we have
IIae, q. 36, a. 2).
“envy.” The proper effect of sorrow consists in a certain
Reply to Objection 3. This division is not according
“flight of the appetite.” Wherefore the foreign element in
to opposite species; but according to the diversity of for-
the effect of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first
eign matter to which the notion of sorrow is applied, as
part only, by excluding flight: and thus we have “anxiety”
stated above.
769
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 36
Of the Causes of Sorrow or Pain
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the presence of an evil?
(2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?
(3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?
(4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?
Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or by the presence of evil?
Ia IIae q. 36 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is caused by
is to be found by considering natural movements. For
the loss of a good rather than by the presence of an evil.
if, in natural movements, we observe those of approach
For Augustine says (De viii QQ. Dulcit. qu. 1) that sor-
and withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to some-
row is caused by the loss of temporal goods. Therefore,
thing suitable to nature; while withdrawal is of itself di-
in like manner, every sorrow is caused by the loss of some
rected to something contrary to nature; thus a heavy body,
good.
of itself, withdraws from a higher place, and approaches
Objection 2. Further, it was said above (q. 35, a. 4)
naturally to a lower place. But if we consider the cause
that the sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure, has the
of both these movements, viz. gravity, then gravity itself
same object as that pleasure. But the object of pleasure is
inclines towards the lower place more than it withdraws
good, as stated above (q. 23, a. 4; q. 31, a. 1; q. 35, a. 3).
from the higher place, since withdrawal from the latter is
Therefore sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good.
the reason for its downward tendency.
Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine (De
Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite,
Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the cause of sorrow, as of the
sorrow is a kind of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is
other emotions of the soul. But the object of love is good.
a kind of pursuit or approach; just as pleasure regards first
Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the loss of good rather
the good possessed, as its proper object, so sorrow regards
than for an evil that is present.
the evil that is present. On the other hand love, which is
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards good rather than
12) that “the dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present
evil: and therefore, forasmuch as the object is the cause
evil is the cause of sorrow.”
of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of
I answer that, If privations, as considered by the
sorrow or pain, than the good which is lost.
mind, were what they are in reality, this question would
Reply to Objection 1. The loss itself of good is appre-
seem to be of no importance. For, as stated in the Ia,
hended as an evil, just as the loss of evil is apprehended as
q. 14, a. 10 and Ia, q. 48, a. 3, evil is the privation of
a good: and in this sense Augustine says that pain results
good: and privation is in reality nothing else than the lack
from the loss of temporal goods.
of the contrary habit; so that, in this respect, to sorrow for
Reply to Objection 2. Pleasure and its contrary pain
the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the
have the same object, but under contrary aspects: because
presence of evil. But sorrow is a movement of the appetite
if the presence of a particular thin be the object of plea-
in consequence of an apprehension: and even a privation,
sure, the absence of that same thing is the object of sor-
as apprehended, has the aspect of a being, wherefore it is
row. Now one contrary includes the privation of the other,
called “a being of reason.” And in this way evil, being a
as stated in Metaph. x, 4: and consequently sorrow in re-
privation, is regarded as a “contrary.” Accordingly, so far
spect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the same
as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a
thing under a contrary aspect.
difference which of the two it regards chiefly, the present
Reply to Objection 3. When many movements arise
evil or the good which is lost.
from one cause, it does not follow that they all regard
Again, since the movement of the animal appetite
chiefly that which the cause regards chiefly, but only the
holds the same place in the actions of the soul, as nat-
first of them. And each of the others regards chiefly that
ural movement in natural things; the truth of the matter
which is suitable to it according to its own nature.
770
Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?
Ia IIae q. 36 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that desire is not a cause
evil. Hence the first principle of this appetitive movement
of pain or sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as
is love, which is the first inclination of the appetite to-
stated above (a. 1): whereas desire is a movement of the
wards the possession of good: while the second principle
appetite towards good. Now movement towards one con-
is hatred, which is the first inclination of the appetite to-
trary is not a cause of movement towards the other con-
wards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or
trary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
desire is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the
Objection 2. Further, pain, according to Damascene
greatest pleasure, as stated above (q. 32, a. 6); hence it
(De Fide Orth. ii, 12), is caused by something present;
is that Augustine often speaks of desire or concupiscence
whereas the object of desire is something future. There-
in the sense of love, as was also stated (q. 30, a. 2, ad
fore desire is not a cause of pain.
2): and in this sense he says that desire is the universal
Objection 3. Further, that which is pleasant in itself
cause of sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in its
is not a cause of pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as
proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. Because whatever
the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not
hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to
a cause of pain or sorrow.
that movement. Now that which is contrary to the move-
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv):
ment of the appetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently,
“When ignorance of things necessary to be done, and de-
desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow
sire of things hurtful, found their way in: error and pain
for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal.
stole an entrance in their company.” But ignorance is the
But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sor-
cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause of sorrow.
row more for the loss of present good, in which we have
I answer that, Sorrow is a movement of the animal
already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future
appetite. Now, as stated above (a. 1), the appetitive move-
good which we desire to have.
ment is likened to the natural appetite; a likeness, that may
Reply to Objection 1. The inclination of the appetite
be assigned to a twofold cause; one, on the part of the end,
to the possession of good causes the inclination of the ap-
the other, on the part of the principle of movement. Thus,
petite to fly from evil, as stated above. And hence it is that
on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy body’s down-
the appetitive movements that regard good, are reckoned
ward movement is the lower place; while the principle of
as causing the appetitive movements that regard evil.
that movement is a natural inclination resulting from grav-
Reply to Objection 2. That which is desired, though
ity.
really future, is, nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch
Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part
as it is hoped for. Or we may say that although the de-
of the end, is the object of that movement. And thus, it
sired good itself is future, yet the hindrance is reckoned
has been said above (a. 1) that the cause of pain or sor-
as present, and so gives rise to sorrow.
row is a present evil. On the other hand, the cause, by
Reply to Objection 3. Desire gives pleasure, so long
way or principle, of that movement, is the inward inclina-
as there is hope of obtaining that which is desired. But,
tion of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of all,
when hope is removed through the presence of an obsta-
the good, and in consequence, the rejection of a contrary
cle, desire causes sorrow.
Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?
Ia IIae q. 36 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the craving for unity
unity, no separation would be pleasant: and this is clearly
is not a cause of sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
untrue as regards the separation of whatever is superflu-
x, 3) that “this opinion,” which held repletion to be the
ous.
cause of pleasure, and division∗, the cause of sorrow,
Objection 3. Further, for the same reason we desire
“seems to have originated in pains and pleasures con-
the conjunction of good and the removal of evil. But as
nected with food.” But not every pleasure or sorrow is
conjunction regards unity, since it is a kind of union; so
of this kind. Therefore the craving for unity is not the uni-
separation is contrary to unity. Therefore the craving for
versal cause of sorrow; since repletion pertains to unity,
unity should not be reckoned, rather than the craving for
and division is the cause of multitude.
separation, as causing sorrow.
Objection 2. Further, every separation is opposed to
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii,
unity. If therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for
23), that “from the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite
∗ Aristotle wrote endeian, ‘want’; St. Thomas, in the Latin version, read ‘incisionem’; should he have read ‘indigentiam’?
771
evident how their souls desire unity, in ruling and quick-tained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher from
ening their bodies. For what else is pain but a feeling of
the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance,
impatience of division or corruption?”
when a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further
I answer that, Forasmuch as the desire or craving for
pleasure in eating; because repletion or union of this kind,
good is reckoned as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving
is repugnant rather than conducive to perfect being. Con-
for unity, and love, be accounted as causing sorrow. Be-
sequently sorrow is caused by the craving, not for any kind
cause the good of each thing consists in a certain unity,
of unity, but for that unity in which the perfection of na-
inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, the elements
ture consists.
of which its perfection consists: wherefore the Platonists
Reply to Objection 2. Separation can be pleasant, ei-
held that “one” is a principle, just as “good” is. Hence
ther because it removes something contrary to a thing’s
everything naturally desires unity, just as it desires good-
perfection, or because it has some union connected with
ness: and therefore, just as love or desire for good is a
it, such as union of the sense to its object.
cause of sorrow, so also is the love or craving for unity.
Reply to Objection 3. Separation from things hurtful
Reply to Objection 1. Not every kind of union causes
and corruptive is desired, in so far as they destroy the unity
perfect goodness, but only that on which the perfect being
which is due. Wherefore the desire for such like separa-
of a thing depends. Hence neither does the desire of any
tion is not the first cause of sorrow, whereas the craving
kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as some have main-
for unity is.
Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?
Ia IIae q. 36 a. 4
Objection 1.
It would seem that a greater power
But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so
should not be reckoned a cause of sorrow. For that which
far as to transform the contrary inclination into its own in-
is in the power of the agent is not present but future. But
clination there will be no longer repugnance or violence:
sorrow is for present evil. Therefore a greater power is not
thus if a stronger agent, by its action on a heavy body, de-
a cause of sorrow.
prives it of its downward tendency, its consequent upward
Objection 2. Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of
tendency is not violent but natural to it.
sorrow. But hurt can be inflicted even by a lesser power.
Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to
Therefore a greater power should not be reckoned as a
take away from the will or the sensitive appetite, their re-
cause of sorrow.
spective inclinations, pain or sorrow will not result there-
Objection 3. Further, the interior inclinations of the
from; such is the result only when the contrary inclination
soul are the causes of the movements of appetite. But a
of the appetite remains. And hence Augustine says (De
greater power is something external. Therefore it should
Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will “resisting
not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
a stronger power”: for were it not to resist, but to yield by
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat.
Boni
consenting, the result would be not sorrow but pleasure.
xx): “Sorrow in the soul is caused by the will resisting a
Reply to Objection 1. A greater power causes sorrow,
stronger power: while pain in the body is caused by sense
as acting not potentially but actually, i.e. by causing the
resisting a stronger body.”
actual presence of the corruptive evil.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), a present evil,
Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders a power which
is cause of sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore
is not simply greater, from being greater in some respect:
that which is the cause of the evil being present, should
and accordingly it is able to inflict some harm. But if it
be reckoned as causing pain or sorrow. Now it is evident
be nowise stronger, it can do no harm at all: wherefore it
that it is contrary to the inclination of the appetite to be
cannot bring about that which causes sorrow.
united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary to a
Reply to Objection 3. External agents can be the
thing’s inclination does not happen to it save by the ac-
causes of appetitive movements, in so far as they cause
tion of something stronger. Wherefore Augustine reckons
the presence of the object: and it is thus that a greater
a greater power as being the cause of sorrow.
power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow.
772
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 37
Of the Effects of Pain or Sorrow
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the effects of pain or of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?
(2) Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?
(4) Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than all the other passions of the soul?
Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?
Ia IIae q. 37 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that pain does not deprive
thing to tend wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as
one of the power to learn. For it is written (Is. 26:9):
may be observed even in natural things. It is likewise evi-
“When Thou shalt do Thy judgments on the earth, the in-
dent that in order to learn anything new, we require study
habitants of the world shall learn justice”: and further on
and effort with a strong intention, as is clearly stated in
(verse 16): “In the tribulation of murmuring Thy instruc-
Prov. 2:4,5: “If thou shalt seek wisdom as money, and
tion was with them.” But the judgments of God and tribu-
shall dig for her as for a treasure, then shalt thou under-
lation cause sorrow in men’s hearts. Therefore pain or
stand learning” [Vulg: ‘the fear of the Lord’]. Conse-
sorrow, far from destroying, increases the power of learn-
quently if the pain be acute, man is prevented at the time
ing.
from learning anything: indeed it can be so acute, that, as
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Is. 28:9): “Whom
long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention even
shall He teach knowledge? And whom shall He make to
to that which he knew already. However a difference is to
understand the hearing? Them that are weaned from the
be observed according to the difference of love that a man
milk, that are drawn away from the breasts,” i.e. from
has for learning or for considering: because the greater his
pleasures. But pain and sorrow are most destructive of
love, the more will he retain the intention of his mind so
pleasure; since sorrow hinders all pleasure, as stated in
as to prevent it from turning entirely to the pain.
Ethic. vii, 14: and (Ecclus. 11:29) it is stated that “the
Reply to Objection 1. Moderate sorrow, that does not
affliction of an hour maketh one forget great delights.”
cause the mind to wander, can conduce to the acquisition
Therefore pain, instead of taking away, increases the fac-
of learning especially in regard to those things by which
ulty of learning.
a man hopes to be freed from sorrow. And thus, “in the
Objection 3. Further, inward sorrow surpasses out-
tribulation of murmuring,” men are more apt to be taught
ward pain, as stated above (q. 35, a. 7). But man can
by God.
learn while sorrowful. Much more, therefore, can he learn
Reply to Objection 2. Both pleasure and pain, in so
while in bodily pain.
far as they draw upon themselves the soul’s intention, hin-
On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): “Al-
der the reason from the act of consideration, wherefore it
though during those days I was tormented with a violent
is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that “in the moment of sexual
tooth-ache, I was not able to turn over in my mind other
pleasure, a man cannot understand anything.” Neverthe-
things than those I had already learnt; and as to learning
less pain attracts the soul’s intention more than pleasure
anything, I was quite unequal to it, because it required un-
does: thus we observe in natural things that the action of
divided attention.”
a natural body is more intense in regard to its contrary;
I answer that, Since all the powers of the soul are
for instance, hot water is more accessible to the action of
rooted in the one essence of the soul, it must needs hap-
cold, and in consequence freezes harder. If therefore pain
pen, when the intention of the soul is strongly drawn to-
or sorrow be moderate, it can conduce accidentally to the
wards the action of one power, that it is withdrawn from
facility of learning, in so far as it takes away an excess
the action of another power: because the soul, being one,
of pleasure. But, of itself, it is a hindrance; and if it be
can only have one intention. The result is that if one thing
intense, it prevents it altogether.
draws upon itself the entire intention of the soul, or a great
Reply to Objection 3. External pain arises from hurt
portion thereof, anything else requiring considerable at-
done to the body, so that it involves bodily transmutation
tention is incompatible therewith.
more than inward sorrow does: and yet the latter is greater
Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws
in regard to the formal element of pain, which belongs to
the soul’s attention to itself; because it is natural for each
the soul. Consequently bodily pain is a greater hindrance
773
to contemplation which requires complete repose, than in-learn anything for the first time: wherefore on account of
ward sorrow is. Nevertheless if inward sorrow be very
sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary on Ezechiel
intense, it attracts the intention, so that man is unable to
(Hom. xxii in Ezechiel).
Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?
Ia IIae q. 37 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not an effect of
has been said above (q. 23, a. 4; q. 25, a. 4; q. 36, a. 1) that sorrow to burden the soul. For the Apostle says (2 Cor.
sorrow is caused by a present evil: and this evil, from the
7:11): “Behold this self-same thing, that you were made
very fact that it is repugnant to the movement of the will,
sorrowful according to God, how great carefulness it wor-
depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it from enjoying
keth in you: yea, defence, yea indignation,” etc. Now
that which it wishes to enjoy. And if the evil which is the
carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted,
cause of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive one of the
which is contrary to being depressed. Therefore depres-
hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed in so
sion is not an effect of sorrow.
far as, for the present, it fails to grasp that which it craves Objection 2. Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure.
for; yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that
But the effect of pleasure is expansion: the opposite of
evil. If, on the other hand, the strength of the evil be such
which is not depression but contraction. Therefore de-
as to exclude the hope of evasion, then even the interior
pression should not be reckoned as an effect of sorrow.
movement of the afflicted soul is absolutely hindered, so
Objection 3. Further, sorrow consumes those who are
that it cannot turn aside either this way or that. Sometimes
inflicted therewith, as may be gathered from the words of
even the external movement of the body is paralyzed, so
the Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7): “Lest perhaps such an one be
that a man becomes completely stupefied.
swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.” But that which is
Reply to Objection 1. That uplifting of the soul en-
depressed is not consumed; nay, it is weighed down by
sues from the sorrow which is according to God, because
something heavy, whereas that which is consumed enters
it brings with it the hope of the forgiveness of sin.
within the consumer. Therefore depression should not be
Reply to Objection 2. As far as the movement of the
reckoned an effect of sorrow.
appetite is concerned, contraction and depression amount
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ and Damascene
to the same: because the soul, through being depressed so
(De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of “depressing sorrow.”
as to be unable to attend freely to outward things, with-
I answer that, The effects of the soul’s passions are
draws to itself, closing itself up as it were.
sometimes named metaphorically, from a likeness to sen-
Reply to Objection 3. Sorrow is said to consume
sible bodies: for the reason that the movements of the an-
man, when the force of the afflicting evil is such as to shut
imal appetite are like the inclinations of the natural ap-
out all hope of evasion: and thus also it both depresses
petite. And in this way fervor is ascribed to love, expan-
and consumes at the same time. For certain things, taken
sion to pleasure, and depression to sorrow. For a man is
metaphorically, imply one another, which taken literally,
said to be depressed, through being hindered in his own
appear to exclude one another.
movement by some weight. Now it is evident from what
Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?
Ia IIae q. 37 a. 3
Objection 1.
It would seem that sorrow does not
the joyful, so are others proper to the sorrowful; for in-
weaken all activity. Because carefulness is caused by sor-
stance, to mourn. Now a thing is improved by that which
row, as is clear from the passage of the Apostle quoted
is suitable to it. Therefore certain actions are not hindered
above (a. 2, obj. 1). But carefulness conduces to good
but improved by reason of sorrow.
work: wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:15): “Care-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4)
fully study to present thyself. . . a workman that needeth
that “pleasure perfects action,” whereas on the other hand,
not to be ashamed.” Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance
“sorrow hinders it” (Ethic. x, 5).
to work, but helps one to work well.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), sorrow at times
Objection 2. Further, sorrow causes desire in many
does not depress or consume the soul, so as to shut out
cases, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14. But desire causes inten-
all movement, internal or external; but certain movements
sity of action. Therefore sorrow does too.
are sometimes caused by sorrow itself. Accordingly ac-
Objection 3. Further, as some actions are proper to
tion stands in a twofold relation to sorrow. First, as being
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.
774
the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow hinders any action: its principle and cause: and such action must needs be im-for we never do that which we do with sorrow, so well as
proved by sorrow: thus the more one sorrows on account
that which we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The
of a certain thing, the more one strives to shake off sor-
reason for this is that the will is the cause of human ac-
row, provided there is a hope of shaking it off: otherwise
tions: and consequently when we do something that gives
no movement or action would result from that sorrow.
pain, the action must of necessity be weakened in conse-
From what has been said the replies to the objections
quence. Secondly, action stands in relation to sorrow, as to
are evident.
Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul?
Ia IIae q. 37 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is not most
Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the
harmful to the body. For sorrow has a spiritual existence
soul, the bodily transmutation which is their material el-
in the soul. But those things which have only a spiritual
ement, is in conformity with and in proportion to the ap-
existence do not cause a transmutation in the body: as is
petitive movement, which is the formal element: just as in
evident with regard to the images of colors, which images
everything matter is proportionate to form. Consequently
are in the air and do not give color to bodies. Therefore
those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in
sorrow is not harmful to the body.
pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital move-
Objection 2. Further if it be harmful to the body, this
ment as regards its species, but they may be repugnant
can only be due to its having a bodily transmutation in
thereto as regards its measure: such are love, joy, de-
conjunction with it. But bodily transmutation takes place
sire and the like; wherefore these passions conduce to the
in all the passions of the soul, as stated above (q. 22,
well-being of the body; though, if they be excessive, they
Aa. 1,3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the
may be harmful to it. On the other hand, those passions
body than the other passions of the soul.
which denote in the appetite a movement of flight or con-
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,
traction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as
3) that “anger and desire drive some to madness”: which
regards its measure, but also as regards its species; where-
seems to be a very great harm, since reason is the most ex-
fore they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair,
cellent thing in man. Moreover, despair seems to be more
and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by reason
harmful than sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow. There-
of a present evil, which makes a stronger impression than
fore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other
future evil.
passions of the soul.
Reply to Objection 1. Since the soul naturally moves
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 17:22): “A joyful
the body, the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally
mind maketh age flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up
the cause of bodily transmutation. Nor is there any par-
the bones”: and (Prov. 25:20): “As a moth doth by a gar-
allel with spiritual images, because they are not naturally
ment, and a worm by the wood: so the sadness of a man
ordained to move such other bodies as are not naturally
consumeth the heart”: and (Ecclus. 38:19): “Of sadness
moved by the soul.
cometh death.”
Reply to Objection 2. Other passions imply a bodily
I answer that, Of all the soul’s passions, sorrow is
transmutation which is specifically in conformity with the
most harmful to the body. The reason of this is because
vital movement: whereas sorrow implies a transmutation
sorrow is repugnant to man’s life in respect of the species
that is repugnant thereto, as stated above.
of its movement, and not merely in respect of its mea-
Reply to Objection 3. A lesser cause suffices to hin-
sure or quantity, as is the case with the other passions of
der the use of reason, than to destroy life: since we ob-
the soul. For man’s life consists in a certain movement,
serve that many ailments deprive one of the use of reason,
which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body:
before depriving one of life. Nevertheless fear and anger
and this movement is befitting to human nature according
cause very great harm to the body, by reason of the sor-
to a certain fixed measure. Consequently if this move-
row which they imply, and which arises from the absence
ment goes beyond the right measure, it will be repugnant
of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes de-
to man’s life in respect of the measure of quantity; but not
prives man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those
in respect of its specific character: whereas if this move-
who through sorrow become a prey to melancholy or mad-
ment be hindered in its progress, it will be repugnant to
ness.
life in respect of its species.
775
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 38
Of the Remedies of Sorrow or Pain
(In Five Articles)
We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?
(2) Whether it is assuaged by weeping?
(3) Whether it is assuaged by the sympathy of friends?
(4) Whether it is assuaged by contemplating the truth?
(5) Whether it is assuaged by sleep and baths?
Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?
Ia IIae q. 38 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that not every pleasure
transmutation; for sorrow itself implies a certain weari-
assuages every pain or sorrow. For pleasure does not as-
ness or ailing of the appetitive faculty. Therefore just as
suage sorrow, save in so far as it is contrary to it: for
all repose of the body brings relief to any kind of weari-
“remedies work by contraries” (Ethic. ii, 3). But not ev-
ness, ensuing from any non-natural cause; so every plea-
ery pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; as stated above
sure brings relief by assuaging any kind of sorrow, due to
(q. 35, a. 4 ). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every
any cause whatever.
sorrow.
Reply to Objection 1. Although not every pleasure is
Objection 2. Further, that which causes sorrow does
specifically contrary to every sorrow, yet it is generically,
not assuage it. But some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as
as stated above (q. 35, a. 4). And consequently, on the
stated in Ethic. ix, 4, “the wicked man feels pain at hav-
part of the disposition of the subject, any sorrow can be
ing been pleased.” Therefore not every pleasure assuages
assuaged by any pleasure.
sorrow.
Reply to Objection 2. The pleasures of wicked men
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv,
are not a cause of sorrow while they are enjoyed, but af-
7) that he fled from his country, where he had been wont
terwards: that is to say, in so far as wicked men repent of
to associate with his friend, now dead: “for so should his
those things in which they took pleasure. This sorrow is
eyes look for him less, where they were not wont to see
healed by contrary pleasures.
him.” Hence we may gather that those things which united
Reply to Objection 3. When there are two causes in-
us to our dead or absent friends, become burdensome to
clining to contrary movements, each hinders the other; yet
us when we mourn their death or absence. But nothing
the one which is stronger and more persistent, prevails in
united us more than the pleasures we enjoyed in common.
the end. Now when a man is made sorrowful by those
Therefore these very pleasures become burdensome to us
things in which he took pleasure in common with a de-
when we mourn. Therefore not every pleasure assuages
ceased or absent friend, there are two causes producing
every sorrow.
contrary movements. For the thought of the friend’s death
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,
or absence, inclines him to sorrow: whereas the present
14) that “sorrow is driven forth by pleasure, both by a con-
good inclines him to pleasure. Consequently each is mod-
trary pleasure and by any other, provided it be intense.”
ified by the other. And yet, since the perception of the
I answer that, As is evident from what has been said
present moves more strongly than the memory of the past,
above (q. 23, a. 4 ), pleasure is a kind of repose of the ap-
and since love of self is more persistent than love of an-
petite in a suitable good; while sorrow arises from some-
other; hence it is that, in the end, the pleasure drives out
thing unsuited to the appetite. Consequently in move-
the sorrow. Wherefore a little further on (Confess. iv, 8)
ments of the appetite pleasure is to sorrow, what, in bod-
Augustine says that his “sorrow gave way to his former
ies, repose is to weariness, which is due to a non-natural
pleasures.”
776
Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by tears?
Ia IIae q. 38 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that tears do not assuage
(a. 1), every pleasure assuages sorrow or pain somewhat,
sorrow. Because no effect diminishes its cause. But tears
it follows that sorrow is assuaged by weeping and groans.
or groans are an effect of sorrow. Therefore they do not
Reply to Objection 1. This relation of the cause to ef-
diminish sorrow.
fect is opposed to the relation existing between the cause
Objection 2. Further, just as tears or groans are an ef-
of sorrow and the sorrowing man. For every effect is
fect of sorrow, so laughter is an effect of joy. But laughter
suited to its cause, and consequently is pleasant to it; but
does not lessen joy. Therefore tears do not lessen sorrow.
the cause of sorrow is disagreeable to him that sorrows.
Objection 3. Further, when we weep, the evil that
Hence the effect of sorrow is not related to him that sor-
saddens us is present to the imagination. But the image of
rows in the same way as the cause of sorrow is. For this
that which saddens us increases sorrow, just as the image
reason sorrow is assuaged by its effect, on account of the
of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore it seems that
aforesaid contrariety.
tears do not assuage sorrow.
Reply to Objection 2. The relation of effect to cause
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that
is like the relation of the object of pleasure to him that
when he mourned the death of his friend, “in groans and
takes pleasure in it: because in each case the one agrees
in tears alone did he find some little refreshment.”
with the other. Now every like thing increases its like.
I answer that, Tears and groans naturally assuage sor-
Therefore joy is increased by laughter and the other ef-
row: and this for two reasons. First, because a hurtful
fects of joy: except they be excessive, in which case, ac-
thing hurts yet more if we keep it shut up, because the
cidentally, they lessen it.
soul is more intent on it: whereas if it be allowed to es-
Reply to Objection 3. The image of that which sad-
cape, the soul’s intention is dispersed as it were on out-
dens us, considered in itself, has a natural tendency to in-
ward things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened. This
crease sorrow: yet from the very fact that a man imagines
is why men, burdened with sorrow, make outward show
himself to be doing that which is fitting according to his
of their sorrow, by tears or groans or even by words, their
actual state, he feels a certain amount of pleasure. For the
sorrow is assuaged. Secondly, because an action, that be-
same reason if laughter escapes a man when he is so dis-
fits a man according to his actual disposition, is always
posed that he thinks he ought to weep, he is sorry for it,
pleasant to him. Now tears and groans are actions befit-
as having done something unbecoming to him, as Cicero
ting a man who is in sorrow or pain; and consequently
says (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 27).
they become pleasant to him. Since then, as stated above
Whether pain or sorrow are assuaged by the sympathy of friends?
Ia IIae q. 38 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the sorrow of sym-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11)
pathizing friends does not assuage our own sorrow. For
that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends
contraries have contrary effects. Now as Augustine says
sympathize with them.
(Confess. viii, 4), “when many rejoice together, each one
I answer that, When one is in pain, it is natural
has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled and inflamed
that the sympathy of a friend should afford consola-
one by the other.” Therefore, in like manner, when many
tion: whereof the Philosopher indicates a twofold reason
are sorrowful, it seems that their sorrow is greater.
(Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because, since sorrow has a
Objection 2.
Further, friendship demands mutual
depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof we strive to
love, as Augustine declares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sym-
unburden ourselves: so that when a man sees others sad-
pathizing friend is pained at the sorrow of his friend with
dened by his own sorrow, it seems as though others were
whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain of a sym-
bearing the burden with him, striving, as it were, to lessen
pathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, a further
its weight; wherefore the load of sorrow becomes lighter
cause of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sor-
for him: something like what occurs in the carrying of
row seems to increase.
bodily burdens. The second and better reason is because
Objection 3. Further, sorrow arises from every evil
when a man’s friends condole with him, he sees that he
affecting a friend, as though it affected oneself: since “a
is loved by them, and this affords him pleasure, as stated
friend is one’s other self” (Ethic. ix, 4,9). But sorrow is
above (q. 32, a. 5). Consequently, since every pleasure as-
an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the sympathizing friend
suages sorrow, as stated above (a. 1), it follows that sorrow
increases the sorrow of the friend with whom he sympa-
is mitigated by a sympathizing friend.
thizes.
Reply to Objection 1. In either case there is a proof
777
of friendship, viz. when a man rejoices with the joyful, would be a cause of sorrow: but consideration of its cause,
and when he sorrows with the sorrowful. Consequently
viz. his love, gives rise rather to pleasure.
each becomes an object of pleasure by reason of its cause.
And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.
Reply to Objection 2.
The friend’s sorrow itself
Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by the contemplation of truth?
Ia IIae q. 38 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the contemplation of
dom. And therefore in the midst of tribulations men re-
truth does not assuage sorrow. For it is written (Eccles.
joice in the contemplation of Divine things and of future
1:18): “He that addeth knowledge addeth also sorrow”
Happiness, according to James 1:2: “My brethren, count
[Vulg.: ‘labor’]. But knowledge pertains to the contem-
it all joy, when you shall fall into divers temptations”: and,
plation of truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth does
what is more, even in the midst of bodily tortures this joy
not assuage sorrow.
is found; as the “martyr Tiburtius, when he was walking
Objection 2. Further, the contemplation of truth be-
barefoot on the burning coals, said: Methinks, I walk on
longs to the speculative intellect. But “the speculative in-
roses, in the name of Jesus Christ.”∗
tellect is not a principle of movement”; as stated in De
Reply to Objection 1. “He that addeth knowledge,
Anima iii, 11. Therefore, since joy and sorrow are move-
addeth sorrow,” either on account of the difficulty and dis-
ments of the soul, it seems that the contemplation of truth
appointment in the search for truth; or because knowledge
does not help to assuage sorrow.
makes man acquainted with many things that are contrary
Objection 3.
Further, the remedy for an ailment
to his will. Accordingly, on the part of the things known,
should be applied to the part which ails. But contem-
knowledge causes sorrow: but on the part of the contem-
plation of truth is in the intellect. Therefore it does not
plation of truth, it causes pleasure.
assuage bodily pain, which is in the senses.
Reply to Objection 2. The speculative intellect does
On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): “It
not move the mind on the part of the thing contemplated:
seemed to me that if the light of that truth were to dawn
but on the part of contemplation itself, which is man’s
on our minds, either I should not feel that pain, or at least
good and naturally pleasant to him.
that pain would seem nothing to me.”
Reply to Objection 3. In the powers of the soul there
I answer that, As stated above (q. 3, a. 5), the great-
is an overflow from the higher to the lower powers: and
est of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth.
accordingly, the pleasure of contemplation, which is in
Now every pleasure assuages pain as stated above (a. 1):
the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate even that pain
hence the contemplation of truth assuages pain or sorrow,
which is in the senses.
and the more so, the more perfectly one is a lover of wis-
Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by sleep and baths?
Ia IIae q. 38 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that sleep and baths do
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ix, 12):
not assuage sorrow. For sorrow is in the soul: whereas
“I had heard that the bath had its name†. . . from the fact
sleep and baths regard the body. Therefore they do not
of its driving sadness from the mind.” And further on, he
conduce to the assuaging of sorrow.
says: “I slept, and woke up again, and found my grief not
Objection 2. Further, the same effect does not seem
a little assuaged”: and quotes the words from the hymn
to ensue from contrary causes. But these, being bodily
of Ambrose‡, in which it is said that “Sleep restores the
things, are incompatible with the contemplation of truth
tired limbs to labor, refreshes the weary mind, and ban-
which is a cause of the assuaging of sorrow, as stated
ishes sorrow.”
above (a. 4). Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the
I answer that, As stated above (q. 37, a. 4), sorrow,
like.
by reason of its specific nature, is repugnant to the vi-
Objection 3. Further, sorrow and pain, in so far as
tal movement of the body; and consequently whatever
they affect the body, denote a certain transmutation of the
restores the bodily nature to its due state of vital move-
heart. But such remedies as these seem to pertain to the
ment, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it. Moreover
outward senses and limbs, rather than to the interior dispo-
such remedies, from the very fact that they bring nature
sition of the heart. Therefore they do not assuage sorrow.
back to its normal state, are causes of pleasure; for this is
∗ Cf.
Dominican Breviary, August 11th, commemoration of St.
Tiburtius.
† Balneum, from the Greek balaneion
‡ Cf. Sarum
Breviary: First Sunday after the octave of the Epiphany, Hymn for first Vespers
778
precisely in what pleasure consists, as stated above (q. 31, suages sorrow. Consequently it is not unreasonable that
a. 1). Therefore, since every pleasure assuages sorrow,
sorrow should be assuaged by causes which hinder one
sorrow is assuaged by such like bodily remedies.
another.
Reply to Objection 1. The normal disposition of the
Reply to Objection 3. Every good disposition of the
body, so far as it is felt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and
body reacts somewhat on the heart, which is the beginning
consequently assuages sorrow.
and end of bodily movements, as stated in De Causa Mot.
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 31, a. 8),
Animal. xi.
one pleasure hinders another; and yet every pleasure as-
779
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 39
Of the Goodness and Malice of Sorrow or Pain
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the goodness and malice of pain or sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all sorrow is evil?
(2) Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?
(3) Whether it can be a useful good?
(4) Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?
Whether all sorrow is evil?
Ia IIae q. 39 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that all sorrow is evil. For
dening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in
Gregory of Nyssa∗ says: “All sorrow is evil, from its very
sorrow or pain on account of this present evil. For if he
nature.” Now what is naturally evil, is evil always and
were not to be in sorrow or pain, this could only be either
everywhere. Therefore, all sorrow is evil.
because he feels it not, or because he does not reckon it as
Objection 2. Further, that which all, even the virtu-
something unbecoming, both of which are manifest evils.
ous, avoid, is evil. But all avoid sorrow, even the virtuous,
Consequently it is a condition of goodness, that, suppos-
since as stated in Ethic. vii, 11, “though the prudent man
ing an evil to be present, sorrow or pain should ensue.
does not aim at pleasure, yet he aims at avoiding sorrow.”
Wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): “It is
Therefore sorrow is evil.
also a good thing that he sorrows for the good he has lost:
Objection 3. Further, just as bodily evil is the object
for had not some good remained in his nature, he could not
and cause of bodily pain, so spiritual evil is the object and
be punished by the loss of good.” Because, however, in
cause of sorrow in the soul. But every bodily pain is a
the science of Morals, we consider things individually—
bodily evil. Therefore every spiritual sorrow is an evil of
for actions are concerned about individuals—that which is
the soul.
good on some supposition, should be considered as good:
On the contrary, Sorrow for evil is contrary to plea-
just as that which is voluntary on some supposition, is
sure in evil. But pleasure in evil is evil: wherefore in
judged to be voluntary, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, and like-
condemnation of certain men, it is written (Prov. 2:14),
wise above (q. 6, a. 6).
that “they were glad when they had done evil.” Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. Gregory of Nyssa† is speaking
sorrow for evil is good.
of sorrow on the part of the evil that causes it, but not on
I answer that, A thing may be good or evil in two
the part of the subject that feels and rejects the evil. And
ways: first considered simply and in itself; and thus all
from this point of view, all shun sorrow, inasmuch as they
sorrow is an evil, because the mere fact of a man’s appetite
shun evil: but they do not shun the perception and rejec-
being uneasy about a present evil, is itself an evil, because
tion of evil. The same also applies to bodily pain: because
it hinders the response of the appetite in good. Secondly,
the perception and rejection of bodily evil is the proof of
a thing is said to be good or evil, on the supposition of
the goodness of nature.
something else: thus shame is said to be good, on the sup-
This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third
position of a shameful deed done, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9.
Objections.
Accordingly, supposing the presence of something sad-
Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?
Ia IIae q. 39 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is not a vir-
sorrow is not a virtuous good.
tuous good. For that which leads to hell is not a virtuous
Objection 2. Further, the virtuous good is praisewor-
good. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 33), “Jacob
thy and meritorious. But sorrow lessens praise or merit:
seems to have feared lest he should be troubled overmuch
for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 9:7): “Everyone, as he hath
by sorrow, and so, instead of entering into the rest of the
determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity.”
blessed, be consigned to the hell of sinners.” Therefore
Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.
† Nemesius
780
Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei results from these two things, the rectitude of the reason
xiv, 15), “sorrow is concerned about those things which
and the will. Wherefore it is evident that sorrow may be a
happen against our will.” But not to will those things
virtuous good.
which are actually taking place, is to have a will opposed
Reply to Objection 1. All the passions of the soul
to the decree of God, to Whose providence whatever is
should be regulated according to the rule of reason, which
done is subject. Since, then, conformity of the human to
is the root of the virtuous good; but excessive sorrow,
the Divine will is a condition of the rectitude of the will,
of which Augustine is speaking, oversteps this rule, and
as stated above (q. 19, a. 9), it seems that sorrow is incom-
therefore it fails to be a virtuous good.
patible with rectitude of the will, and that consequently it
Reply to Objection 2. Just as sorrow for an evil arises
is not virtuous.
from a right will and reason, which detest the evil, so sor-
On the contrary, Whatever merits the reward of eter-
row for a good is due to a perverse reason and will, which
nal life is virtuous. But such is sorrow; as is evident from
detest the good. Consequently such sorrow is an obstacle
Mat. 5:5: “Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be
to the praise and merit of the virtuous good; for instance,
comforted.” Therefore sorrow is a virtuous good.
when a man gives an alms sorrowfully.
I answer that, In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a
Reply to Objection 3. Some things do actually hap-
virtuous good. For it has been said above (a. 1) that sorrow
pen, not because God wills, but because He permits them
is a good inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection
to happen—such as sins. Consequently a will that is op-
of evil. These two things, as regards bodily pain, are a
posed to sin, whether in oneself or in another, is not dis-
proof of the goodness of nature, to which it is due that the
cordant from the Divine will. Penal evils happen actually,
senses perceive, and that nature shuns, the harmful thing
even by God’s will. But it is not necessary for the rectitude
that causes pain. As regards interior sorrow, perception of
of his will, that man should will them in themselves: but
the evil is sometimes due to a right judgment of reason;
only that he should not revolt against the order of Divine
while the rejection of the evil is the act of the will, well
justice, as stated above (q. 19, a. 10).
disposed and detesting that evil. Now every virtuous good
Whether sorrow can be a useful good?
Ia IIae q. 39 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow cannot be a
trary to good; for instance, sin. Wherefore sorrow for sin
useful good. For it is written (Ecclus. 30:25): “Sadness
is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin: hence the Apos-
hath killed many, and there is no profit in it.”
tle says (2 Cor. 7:9): “I am glad: not because you were
Objection 2. Further, choice is of that which is useful
made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful
to an end. But sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, “a
unto penance.” Secondly, a thing is to be avoided, not as
thing without sorrow is to be chosen rather than the same
though it were evil in itself, but because it is an occasion
thing with sorrow” (Topic. iii, 2). Therefore sorrow is not
of evil; either through one’s being attached to it, and lov-
a useful good.
ing it too much, or through one’s being thrown headlong
Objection 3. Further, “Everything is for the sake of
thereby into an evil, as is evident in the case of temporal
its own operation,” as stated in De Coel. ii, 3. But “sor-
goods. And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods
row hinders operation,” as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore
may be useful; according to Eccles. 7:3: “It is better to go
sorrow is not a useful good.
to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting:
On the contrary, The wise man seeks only that which
for in that we are put in mind of the end of all.”
is useful. But according to Eccles. 7:5, “the heart of the
Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided
wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools
is always useful, since it adds another motive for avoiding
where there is mirth.” Therefore sorrow is useful.
it. Because the very evil is in itself a thing to be avoided:
I answer that, A twofold movement of the appetite
while everyone avoids sorrow for its own sake, just as ev-
ensues from a present evil. One is that whereby the ap-
eryone seeks the good, and pleasure in the good. There-
petite is opposed to the present evil; and, in this respect,
fore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good
sorrow is of no use; because that which is present, cannot
more earnestly, so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil
be not present. The other movement arises in the appetite
more eagerly.
to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening evil:
Reply to Objection 1. This passage is to be taken as
and, in this respect, sorrow is of use, if it be for something
referring to excessive sorrow, which consumes the soul:
which ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons
for such sorrow paralyzes the soul, and hinders it from
for which it may be right to avoid a thing. First, because
shunning evil, as stated above (q. 37, a. 2).
it should be avoided in itself, on account of its being con-
Reply to Objection 2. Just as any object of choice
781
becomes less eligible by reason of sorrow, so that which Reply to Objection 3. Sorrow caused by an action
ought to be shunned is still more to be shunned by reason
hinders that action: but sorrow for the cessation of an ac-
of sorrow: and, in this respect, sorrow is useful.
tion, makes one do it more earnestly.
Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?
Ia IIae q. 39 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that pain is the greatest
for something that is truly evil, or for something that is
evil. Because “the worst is contrary to the best” (Ethic.
apparently evil, but good in reality. Now pain or sorrow
viii, 10). But a certain pleasure is the greatest good, viz.
for that which is truly evil cannot be the greatest evil: for
the pleasure of bliss. Therefore a certain pain is the great-
there is something worse, namely, either not to reckon as
est evil.
evil that which is really evil, or not to reject it. Again, sor-Objection 2.
Further, happiness is man’s greatest
row or pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really
good, because it is his last end. But man’s Happiness con-
good, cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be worse
sists in his “having whatever he will, and in willing naught
to be altogether separated from that which is truly good.
amiss,” as stated above (q. 3, a. 4, obj. 5; q. 5, a. 8, obj. 3).
Hence it is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man’s
Therefore man’s greatest good consists in the fulfilment
greatest evil.
of his will. Now pain consists in something happening
Reply to Objection 1. Pleasure and sorrow have two
contrary to the will, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei
good points in common: namely, a true judgment con-
xiv, 6,15). Therefore pain is man’s greatest evil.
cerning good and evil; and the right order of the will in
Objection 3. Further, Augustine argues thus (Soliloq.
approving of good and rejecting evil. Thus it is clear that
i, 12): “We are composed of two parts, i.e. of a soul and a
in pain or sorrow there is a good, by the removal of which
body, whereof the body is the inferior. Now the sovereign
they become worse: and yet there is not an evil in every
good is the greatest good of the better part: while the
pleasure, by the removal of which the pleasure is better.
supreme evil is the greatest evil of the inferior part. But
Consequently, a pleasure can be man’s highest good, in
wisdom is the greatest good of the soul; while the worst
the way above stated (q. 34, a. 3): whereas sorrow cannot
thing in the body is pain. Therefore man’s greatest good
be man’s greatest evil.
is to be wise: while his greatest evil is to suffer pain.”
Reply to Objection 2. The very fact of the will being
On the contrary, Guilt is a greater evil than punish-
opposed to evil is a good. And for this reason, sorrow or
ment, as was stated in the Ia, q. 48, a. 6. But sorrow or pain
pain cannot be the greatest evil; because it has an admix-
belongs to the punishment of sin, just as the enjoyment of
ture of good.
changeable things is an evil of guilt. For Augustine says
Reply to Objection 3. That which harms the better
(De Vera Relig. xii): “What is pain of the soul, except for
thing is worse than that which harms the worse. Now a
the soul to be deprived of that which it was wont to enjoy,
thing is called evil “because it harms,” as Augustine says
or had hoped to enjoy? And this is all that is called evil,
(Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an evil to the
i.e. sin, and the punishment of sin.” Therefore sorrow or
soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil to the body.
pain is not man’s greatest evil.
Therefore this argument does not prove: nor does Augus-
I answer that, It is impossible for any sorrow or pain
tine give it as his own, but as taken from another∗.
to be man’s greatest evil. For all sorrow or pain is either
∗ Cornelius Celsus
782
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 40
Of the Irascible Passions, and First, of Hope and Despair
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the irascible passions: (1) Hope and despair; (2) Fear and daring; (3) Anger. Under first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity?
(2) Whether hope is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive faculty?
(3) Whether hope is in dumb animals?
(4) Whether despair is contrary to hope?
(5) Whether experience is a cause of hope?
(6) Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?
(7) Concerning the order of hope to love;
(8) Whether love conduces to action?
Whether hope is the same as desire of cupidity?
Ia IIae q. 40 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that hope is the same as
from desire or cupidity, which regards the future good ab-
desire or cupidity. Because hope is reckoned as one of the
solutely: wherefore it belongs to the concupiscible, while
four principal passions. But Augustine in setting down
hope belongs to the irascible faculty. Fourthly, that this
the four principal passions puts cupidity in the place of
difficult thing is something possible to obtain: for one
hope (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,7). Therefore hope is the same
does not hope for that which one cannot get at all: and,
as cupidity or desire.
in this respect, hope differs from despair. It is therefore
Objection 2. Further, passions differ according to
evident that hope differs from desire, as the irascible pas-
their objects. But the object of hope is the same as the
sions differ from the concupiscible. For this reason, more-
object of cupidity or desire, viz. the future good. There-
over, hope presupposes desire: just as all irascible pas-
fore hope is the same as cupidity or desire.
sions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible fac-
Objection 3. If it be said that hope, in addition to de-
ulty, as stated above (q. 25, a. 1).
sire, denotes the possibility of obtaining the future good;
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine mentions desire in-
on the contrary, whatever is accidental to the object does
stead of hope, because each regards future good; and be-
not make a different species of passion. But possibility
cause the good which is not arduous is reckoned as noth-
of acquisition is accidental to a future good, which is the
ing: thus implying that desire seems to tend chiefly to the
object of cupidity or desire, and of hope. Therefore hope
arduous good, to which hope tends likewise.
does not differ specifically from desire or cupidity.
Reply to Objection 1. The object of hope is the fu-
On the contrary, To different powers belong different
ture good considered, not absolutely, but as arduous and
species of passions. But hope is in the irascible power;
difficult of attainment, as stated above.
whereas desire or cupidity is in the concupiscible. There-
Reply to Objection 3. The object of hope adds not
fore hope differs specifically from desire or cupidity.
only possibility to the object of desire, but also difficulty:
I answer that, The species of a passion is taken from
and this makes hope belong to another power, viz. the
the object. Now, in the object of hope, we may note four
irascible, which regards something difficult, as stated in
conditions. First, that it is something good; since, prop-
the Ia, q. 81, a. 2. Moreover, possibility and impossibility
erly speaking, hope regards only the good; in this respect,
are not altogether accidental to the object of the appeti-
hope differs from fear, which regards evil. Secondly, that
tive power: because the appetite is a principle of move-
it is future; for hope does not regard that which is present
ment; and nothing is moved to anything except under the
and already possessed: in this respect, hope differs from
aspect of being possible; for no one is moved to that which
joy which regards a present good. Thirdly, that it must
he reckons impossible to get. Consequently hope differs
be something arduous and difficult to obtain, for we do
from despair according to the difference of possible and
not speak of any one hoping for trifles, which are in one’s
impossible.
power to have at any time: in this respect, hope differs
783
Whether hope is in the apprehensive or in the appetitive power?
Ia IIae q. 40 a. 2
Objection 1.
It would seem that hope belongs to
and of something impossible. And accordingly hope is a
the cognitive power. Because hope, seemingly, is a kind
movement of the appetitive power ensuing from the appre-
of awaiting; for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:25): “If we
hension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain;
hope for that which we see not; we wait for it with pa-
namely, a stretching forth of the appetite to such a good.
tience.” But awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive
Reply to Objection 1. Since hope regards a possible
power, which we exercise by “looking out.” Therefore
good, there arises in man a twofold movement of hope;
hope belongs to the cognitive power.
for a thing may be possible to him in two ways, viz. by
Objection 2. Further, apparently hope is the same as
his own power, or by another’s. Accordingly when a man
confidence; hence when a man hopes he is said to be con-
hopes to obtain something by his own power, he is not
fident, as though to hope and to be confident were the
said to wait for it, but simply to hope for it. But, properly
same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems to belong
speaking, he is said to await that which he hopes to get
to the cognitive power. Therefore hope does too.
by another’s help as though to await [exspectare] implied
Objection 3. Further, certainty is a property of the
keeping one’s eyes on another [ex alio spectare], in so far
cognitive power. But certainty is ascribed to hope. There-
as the apprehensive power, by going ahead, not only keeps
fore hope belongs to the cognitive power.
its eye on the good which man intends to get, but also
On the contrary, Hope regards good, as stated above
on the thing by whose power he hopes to get it; accord-
(a. 1). Now good, as such, is not the object of the cogni-
ing to Ecclus. 51:10, “I looked for the succor of men.”
tive, but of the appetitive power. Therefore hope belongs,
Wherefore the movement of hope is sometimes called ex-
not to the cognitive, but to the appetitive power.
pectation, on account of the preceding inspection of the
I answer that, Since hope denotes a certain stretch-
cognitive power.
ing out of the appetite towards good, it evidently belongs
Reply to Objection 2. When a man desires a thing
to the appetitive power; since movement towards things
and reckons that he can get it, he believes that he can get
belongs properly to the appetite: whereas the action of
it, he believes that he will get it; and from this belief which the cognitive power is accomplished not by the move-precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement in
ment of the knower towards things, but rather according
the appetite is called confidence. Because the movement
as the things known are in the knower. But since the cog-
of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that pre-
nitive power moves the appetite, by presenting its object
cedes it, as an effect from a cause which is better known;
to it; there arise in the appetite various movements ac-
for the apprehensive power knows its own act better than
cording to various aspects of the apprehended object. For
that of the appetite.
the apprehension of good gives rise to one kind of move-
Reply to Objection 3. Certainty is ascribed to the
ment in the appetite, while the apprehension of evil gives
movement, not only of the sensitive, but also of the natural
rise to another: in like manner various movements arise
appetite; thus we say that a stone is certain to tend down-
from the apprehension of something present and of some-
wards. This is owing to the inerrancy which the movement
thing future; of something considered absolutely, and of
of the sensitive or even natural appetite derives from the
something considered as arduous; of something possible,
certainty of the knowledge that precedes it.
Whether hope is in dumb animals?
Ia IIae q. 40 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no hope in
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix,
dumb animals. Because hope is for some future good, as
14) that “animals are moved by the things that they see.”
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). But knowledge
But hope is of things unseen: “for what a man seeth, why
of the future is not in the competency of dumb animals,
doth he hope for?” (Rom. 8:24). Therefore there is no
whose knowledge is confined to the senses and does not
hope in dumb animals.
extend to the future. Therefore there is no hope in dumb
On the contrary, Hope is an irascible passion. But
animals.
the irascible faculty is in dumb animals. Therefore hope
Objection 2. Further, the object of hope is a future
is also.
good, possible of attainment. But possible and impossible
I answer that, The internal passions of animals can
are differences of the true and the false, which are only in
be gathered from their outward movements: from which
the mind, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vi, 4). There-
it is clear that hope is in dumb animals. For if a dog see a
fore there is no hope in dumb animals, since they have no
hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far off, it makes no move-
mind.
ment towards it, as having no hope to catch it: whereas,
784
if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in Reply to Objection 1. Although dumb animals do not
hopes of catching it. Because as stated above (q. 1, a. 2;
know the future, yet an animal is moved by its natural in-
q. 26, a. 1; q. 35, a. 1), the sensitive appetite of dumb
stinct to something future, as though it foresaw the future.
animals, and likewise the natural appetite of insensible
Because this instinct is planted in them by the Divine In-
things, result from the apprehension of an intellect, just as
tellect that foresees the future.
the appetite of the intellectual nature, which is called the
Reply to Objection 2. The object of hope is not the
will. But there is a difference, in that the will is moved
possible as differentiating the true, for thus the possible
by an apprehension of the intellect in the same subject;
ensues from the relation of a predicate to a subject. The
whereas the movement of the natural appetite results from
object of hope is the possible as compared to a power. For
the apprehension of the separate Intellect, Who is the Au-
such is the division of the possible given in Metaph. v, 12,
thor of nature; as does also the sensitive appetite of dumb
i.e. into the two kinds we have just mentioned.
animals, who act from a certain natural instinct. Conse-
Reply to Objection 3. Although the thing which is fu-
quently, in the actions of irrational animals and of other
ture does not come under the object of sight; nevertheless
natural things, we observe a procedure which is similar to
through seeing something present, an animal’s appetite is
that which we observe in the actions of art: and in this
moved to seek or avoid something future.
way hope and despair are in dumb animals.
Whether despair is contrary to hope?
Ia IIae q. 40 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that despair is not con-
it be considered in the light of something attainable; and
trary to hope. Because “to one thing there is one contrary”
thus hope tends thereto, for it denotes a kind of approach.
(Metaph. x, 5). But fear is contrary to hope. Therefore de-
But in so far as it is considered as unobtainable, it has the
spair is not contrary to hope.
character of a principle of repulsion, because, as stated in
Objection 2. Further, contraries seem to bear on the
Ethic. iii, 3, “when men come to an impossibility they
same thing. But hope and despair do not bear on the
disperse.” And this is how despair stands in regard to this
same thing: since hope regards the good, whereas despair
object, wherefore it implies a movement of withdrawal:
arises from some evil that is in the way of obtaining good.
and consequently it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is
Therefore hope is not contrary to despair.
to approach.
Objection 3. Further, movement is contrary to move-
Reply to Objection 1. Fear is contrary to hope, be-
ment: while repose is in opposition to movement as a
cause their objects, i.e. good and evil, are contrary: for
privation thereof. But despair seems to imply immobil-
this contrariety is found in the irascible passions, accord-
ity rather than movement. Therefore it is not contrary to
ing as they ensue from the passions of the concupiscible.
hope, which implies movement of stretching out towards
But despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety of ap-
the hoped-for good.
proach and withdrawal.
On the contrary, The very name of despair [despera-
Reply to Objection 2. Despair does not regard evil as
tio] implies that it is contrary to hope [spes].
such; sometimes however it regards evil accidentally, as
I answer that, As stated above (q. 23, a. 2), there is
making the difficult good impossible to obtain. But it can
a twofold contrariety of movements. One is in respect
arise from the mere excess of good.
of approach to contrary terms: and this contrariety alone
Reply to Objection 3. Despair implies not only pri-
is to be found in the concupiscible passions, for instance
vation of hope, but also a recoil from the thing desired,
between love and hatred. The other is according to ap-
by reason of its being esteemed impossible to get. Hence
proach and withdrawal with regard to the same term; and
despair, like hope, presupposes desire; because we nei-
is to be found in the irascible passions, as stated above
ther hope for nor despair of that which we do not desire to
(q. 23, a. 2). Now the object of hope, which is the ardu-
have. For this reason, too, each of them regards the good,
ous good, has the character of a principle of attraction, if
which is the object of desire.
Whether experience is a cause of hope?
Ia IIae q. 40 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that experience is not a
hope is not in the cognitive power, but in the appetite, as
cause of hope. Because experience belongs to the cogni-
stated above (a. 2). Therefore experience is not a cause of
tive power; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1)
hope.
that “intellectual virtue needs experience and time.” But
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
785
13) that “the old are slow to hope, on account of their makes man think that he can obtain something: and thus
experience”; whence it seems to follow that experience
both teaching and persuasion may be a cause of hope.
causes want of hope. But the same cause is not productive
And then again experience is a cause of hope, in so far
of opposites. Therefore experience is not a cause of hope.
as it makes him reckon something possible, which before
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (De Coel.
his experience he looked upon as impossible. However,
ii, 5) that “to have something to say about everything,
in this way, experience can cause a lack of hope: be-
without leaving anything out, is sometimes a proof of
cause just as it makes a man think possible what he had
folly.” But to attempt everything seems to point to great
previously thought impossible; so, conversely, experience
hopes; while folly arises from inexperience. Therefore in-
makes a man consider as impossible that which hitherto
experience, rather than experience, seems to be a cause of
he had thought possible. Accordingly experience causes
hope.
hope in two ways, despair in one way: and for this reason
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8)
we may say rather that it causes hope.
“some are hopeful, through having been victorious often
Reply to Objection 1. Experience in matters pertain-
and over many opponents”: which seems to pertain to ex-
ing to action not only produces knowledge; it also causes
perience. Therefore experience is a cause of hope.
a certain habit, by reason of custom, which renders the ac-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the object of
tion easier. Moreover, the intellectual virtue itself adds to
hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Con-
the power of acting with ease: because it shows something
sequently a thing may be a cause of hope, either because it
to be possible; and thus is a cause of hope.
makes something possible to a man: or because it makes
Reply to Objection 2. The old are wanting in hope
him think something possible. In the first way hope is
because of their experience, in so far as experience makes
caused by everything that increases a man’s power; e.g.
them think something impossible. Hence he adds (Rhet.
riches, strength, and, among others, experience: since by
ii, 13) that “many evils have befallen them.”
experience man acquires the faculty of doing something
Reply to Objection 3. Folly and inexperience can be
easily, and the result of this is hope. Wherefore Vegetius
a cause of hope accidentally as it were, by removing the
says (De Re Milit. i): “No one fears to do that which he
knowledge which would help one to judge truly a thing to
is sure of having learned well.”
be impossible. Wherefore inexperience is a cause of hope,
In the second way, hope is caused by everything that
for the same reason as experience causes lack of hope.
Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?
Ia IIae q. 40 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that youth and drunken-
past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope
ness are not causes of hope. Because hope implies cer-
of the future, it has little to remember and lives very much
tainty and steadiness; so much so that it is compared to
in hope. Again, youths, on account of the heat of their
an anchor (Heb. 6:19). But young men and drunkards
nature, are full of spirit; so that their heart expands: and it are wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily
is owing to the heart being expanded that one tends to that
changed. Therefore youth and drunkenness are not causes
which is arduous; wherefore youths are spirited and hope-
of hope.
ful. Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had
Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a. 5), the cause
experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count
of hope is chiefly whatever increases one’s power. But
a thing possible to them. Wherefore youths, through inex-
youth and drunkenness are united to weakness. Therefore
perience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, eas-
they are not causes of hope.
ily count a thing possible; and consequently are of good
Objection 3. Further, experience is a cause of hope, as
hope. Two of these causes are also in those who are in
stated above (a. 5). But youth lacks experience. Therefore
drink—viz. heat and high spirits, on account of wine, and
it is not a cause of hope.
heedlessness of dangers and shortcomings. For the same
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8)
reason all foolish and thoughtless persons attempt every-
that “drunken men are hopeful”: and (Rhet. ii, 12) that
thing and are full of hope.
“the young are full of hope.”
Reply to Objection 1. Although youths and men in
I answer that, Youth is a cause of hope for three rea-
drink lack steadiness in reality, yet they are steady in their
sons, as the Philosopher states in Rhet. ii, 12: and these
own estimation, for they think that they will steadily ob-
three reasons may be gathered from the three conditions
tain that which they hope for.
of the good which is the object of hope—namely, that it
In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we
is future, arduous and possible, as stated above (a. 1). For
must observe that young people and men in drink are in-
youth has much of the future before it, and little of the
deed unsteady in reality: but, in their own estimation, they
786
are capable, for they know not their shortcomings.
lack of experience, is, in some way, a cause of hope, as
Reply to Objection 3. Not only experience, but also
explained above (a. 5, ad 3).
Whether hope is a cause of love?
Ia IIae q. 40 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that hope is not a cause
sible to obtain; and since it happens sometimes that what
of love. Because, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei
is difficult becomes possible to us, not through ourselves
xiv, 7,9), love is the first of the soul’s emotions. But hope
but through others; hence it is that hope regards also that
is an emotion of the soul. Therefore love precedes hope,
by which something becomes possible to us.
and consequently hope does not cause love.
In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to
Objection 2. Further, desire precedes hope. But de-
get, it is caused by love: since we do not hope save for
sire is caused by love, as stated above (q. 25, a. 2). There-
that which we desire and love. But in so far as hope re-
fore hope, too, follows love, and consequently is not its
gards one through whom something becomes possible to
cause.
us, love is caused by hope, and not vice versa. Because
Objection 3. Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated
by the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us
above (q. 32, a. 3). But pleasure is only of the good that is
through someone, we are moved towards him as to our
loved. Therefore love precedes hope.
own good; and thus we begin to love him. Whereas from
On the contrary, The gloss commenting on Mat. 1:2,
the fact that we love someone we do not hope in him,
“Abraham begot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob,” says, i.e.
except accidentally, that is, in so far as we think that he
“faith begets hope, and hope begets charity.” But charity
returns our love. Wherefore the fact of being loved by an-
is love. Therefore love is caused by hope.
other makes us hope in him; but our love for him is caused
I answer that, Hope can regard two things. For it re-
by the hope we have in him.
gards as its object, the good which one hopes for. But
Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident.
since the good we hope for is something difficult but pos-
Whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action?
Ia IIae q. 40 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that hope is not a help but
is intent on his action. Secondly, on account of its effect.
a hindrance to action. Because hope implies security. But
Because hope, as stated above (q. 32, a. 3), causes plea-
security begets negligence which hinders action. There-
sure; which is a help to action, as stated above (q. 33, a. 4).
fore hope is a hindrance to action.
Therefore hope is conducive to action.
Objection 2. Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated
Reply to Objection 1. Hope regards a good to be ob-
above (q. 37, a. 3). But hope sometimes causes sorrow:
tained; security regards an evil to be avoided. Wherefore
for it is written (Prov. 13:12): “Hope that is deferred af-
security seems to be contrary to fear rather than to belong
flicteth the soul.” Therefore hope hinders action.
to hope. Yet security does not beget negligence, save in
Objection 3. Further, despair is contrary to hope, as
so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty: whereby it also
stated above (a. 4). But despair, especially in matters of
lessens the character of hope: for the things in which a
war, conduces to action; for it is written (2 Kings 2:26),
man fears no hindrance, are no longer looked upon as dif-
that “it is dangerous to drive people to despair.” Therefore
ficult.
hope has a contrary effect, namely, by hindering action.
Reply to Objection 2. Hope of itself causes plea-
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 9:10) that “he
sure; it is by accident that it causes sorrow, as stated above
that plougheth should plough in hope. . . to receive fruit”:
(q. 32, a. 3, ad 2).
and the same applies to all other actions.
Reply to Objection 3. Despair threatens danger in
I answer that, Hope of its very nature is a help to ac-
war, on account of a certain hope that attaches to it. For
tion by making it more intense: and this for two reasons.
they who despair of flight, strive less to fly, but hope to
First, by reason of its object, which is a good, difficult but
avenge their death: and therefore in this hope they fight
possible. For the thought of its being difficult arouses our
the more bravely, and consequently prove dangerous to
attention; while the thought that it is possible is no drag
the foe.
on our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man
787
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 41
Of Fear, in Itself
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring. With regard to fear, four things must be considered: (1) Fear, in itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether fear is a special passion?
(3) Whether there is a natural fear?
(4) Of the species of fear.
Whether fear is a passion of the soul?
Ia IIae q. 41 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that fear is not a pas-
tation. And, again, most properly those movements are
sion of the soul. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
called passions, which imply some deterioration. Now it
iii, 23) that “fear is a power, by way of systole”—i.e.
is evident that fear, since it regards evil, belongs to the
of contraction—“desirous of vindicating nature.” But no
appetitive power, which of itself regards good and evil.
virtue is a passion, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 5. Therefore
Moreover, it belongs to the sensitive appetite: for it is ac-
fear is not a passion.
companied by a certain transmutation—i.e. contraction—
Objection 2. Further, every passion is an effect due
as Damascene says (Cf. obj. 1). Again, it implies relation
to the presence of an agent. But fear is not of something
to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some particular good.
present, but of something future, as Damascene declares
Wherefore it has most properly the character of passion;
(De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is not a passion.
less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil:
Objection 3. Further, every passion of the soul is a
because fear regards future evil, which is not so strong a
movement of the sensitive appetite, in consequence of an
motive as present evil.
apprehension of the senses. But sense apprehends, not the
Reply to Objection 1. Virtue denotes a principle of
future but the present. Since, then, fear is of future evil, it action: wherefore, in so far as the interior movements
seems that it is not a passion of the soul.
of the appetitive faculty are principles of external action,
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5,
they are called virtues. But the Philosopher denies that
seqq.) reckons fear among the other passions of the soul.
passion is a virtue by way of habit.
I answer that, Among the other passions of the soul,
Reply to Objection 2. Just as the passion of a natural
after sorrow, fear chiefly has the character of passion. For
body is due to the bodily presence of an agent, so is the
as we have stated above (q. 22 ), the notion of passion
passion of the soul due to the agent being present to the
implies first of all a movement of a passive power—i.e.
soul, although neither corporally nor really present: that is
of a power whose object is compared to it as its active
to say, in so far as the evil which is really future, is present principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In this
in the apprehension of the soul.
way, both “to feel” and “to understand” are passions. Sec-
Reply to Objection 3. The senses do not apprehend
ondly, more properly speaking, passion is a movement
the future: but from apprehending the present, an animal
of the appetitive power; and more properly still, it is a
is moved by natural instinct to hope for a future good, or
movement of an appetitive power that has a bodily organ,
to fear a future evil.
such movement being accompanied by a bodily transmu-
Whether fear is a special passion?
Ia IIae q. 41 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that fear is not a spe-
removed. Therefore fear is not a special but a general pas-
cial passion. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that
sion.
“the man who is not distraught by fear, is neither harassed
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
by desire, nor wounded by sickness”—i.e. sorrow—“nor
2) that “pursuit and avoidance in the appetite are what
tossed about in transports of empty joys.” Wherefore it
affirmation and denial are in the intellect.” But denial
seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other passions are
is nothing special in the intellect, as neither is affirma-
788
tion, but something common to many. Therefore neither nected with one another. By reason of this connection,
is avoidance anything special in the appetite. But fear is
when fear is put aside, the other passions of the soul are
nothing but a kind of avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not
dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general pas-
a special passion.
sion.
Objection 3. Further, if fear were a special passion, it Reply to Objection 2. Not every avoidance in the ap-would be chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in
petite is fear, but avoidance of a special object, as stated.
the concupiscible: since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5)
Wherefore, though avoidance be something common, yet
that “fear is a kind of sorrow”; and Damascene says (De
fear is a special passion.
Fide Orth. iii, 23) that fear is “a power of desire”: and
Reply to Objection 3. Fear is nowise in the concu-
both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty, as
piscible: for it regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult stated above (q. 23, a. 4). Therefore fear is not a special
or arduous, so as to be almost unavoidable. But since the
passion, since it belongs to different powers.
irascible passions arise from the passions of the concupis-
On the contrary, Fear is condivided with the other
cible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated above (q. 25,
passions of the soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide
a. 1); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is
Orth. ii, 12,15).
ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far as
I answer that, The passions of the soul derive their
the object of fear causes sorrow when present: wherefore
species from their objects: hence that is a special passion,
the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises “from the
which has a special object. Now fear has a special object,
representation of a future evil which is either corruptive or
as hope has. For just as the object of hope is a future good,
painful.” In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene
difficult but possible to obtain; so the object of fear is a fu-to fear, because just as hope arises from the desire of good,
ture evil, difficult and irresistible. Consequently fear is a
so fear arises from avoidance of evil; while avoidance of
special passion of the soul.
evil arises from the desire of good, as is evident from what
Reply to Objection 1. All the passions of the soul
has been said above (q. 25, a. 2; q. 29, a. 2; q. 36, a. 2).
arise from one source, viz. love, wherein they are con-
Whether there is a natural fear?
Ia IIae q. 41 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that there is a natural fear.
of the apprehensive power, such as understanding, feeling,
For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that “there is a
and remembering, as well as the movements of the animal
natural fear, through the soul refusing to be severed from
appetite, are sometimes said to be natural.
the body.”
And in this sense we may say that there is a natural
Objection 2. Further, fear arises from love, as stated
fear; and it is distinguished from non-natural fear, by rea-
above (a. 2, ad 1). But there is a natural love, as Dionysius
son of the diversity of its object. For, as the Philosopher
says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is also a natural fear.
says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a fear of “corruptive evil,” which Objection 3. Further, fear is opposed to hope, as
nature shrinks from on account of its natural desire to ex-
stated above (q. 40, a. 4, ad 1). But there is a hope of
ist; and such fear is said to be natural. Again, there is a
nature, as is evident from Rom. 4:18, where it is said of
fear of “painful evil,” which is repugnant not to nature, but
Abraham that “against hope” of nature, “he believed in
to the desire of the appetite; and such fear is not natural.
hope” of grace. Therefore there is also a fear of nature.
In this sense we have stated above (q. 26, a. 1; q. 30, a. 3;
On the contrary, That which is natural is common to
q. 31, a. 7) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into things animate and inanimate. But fear is not in things
natural and non-natural.
inanimate. Therefore there is no natural fear.
But in the first sense of the word “natural,” we must
I answer that, A movement is said to be natural, be-
observe that certain passions of the soul are sometimes
cause nature inclines thereto. Now this happens in two
said to be natural, as love, desire, and hope; whereas the
ways. First, so that it is entirely accomplished by nature,
others cannot be called natural. The reason of this is be-
without any operation of the apprehensive faculty: thus to
cause love and hatred, desire and avoidance, imply a cer-
have an upward movement is natural to fire, and to grow is
tain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what
the natural movement of animals and plants. Secondly, a
is evil; which inclination is to be found in the natural ap-
movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines thereto,
petite also. Consequently there is a natural love; while we
though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty
may also speak of desire and hope as being even in natural
alone: since, as stated above (q. 10, a. 1), the movements
things devoid of knowledge. On the other hand the other
of the cognitive and appetitive faculties are reducible to
passions of the soul denote certain movements, whereto
nature as to their first principle. In this way, even the acts
the natural inclination is nowise sufficient. This is due ei-
789
ther to the fact that perception or knowledge is essential ture of natural inclination: for instance, despair flies from
to these passions (thus we have said, q. 31, Aa. 1,3; q. 35,
good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from
a. 1, that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure
repelling a contrary evil; both of which are contrary to the
and sorrow), wherefore things devoid of knowledge can-
inclination of nature. Wherefore such like passions are in
not be said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is
no way ascribed to inanimate beings.
because such like movements are contrary to the very na-
Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident.
Whether the species of fear is suitably assigned?
Ia IIae q. 41 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that six species of fear
to say, a man considers some great evil the outcome of
are unsuitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
which he is unable to gauge: and then there is “amaze-
15); namely, “laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amaze-
ment.” Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; be-
ment, stupor, and anxiety.” Because, as the Philosopher
cause, to wit, some unwonted evil arises before us, and on
says (Rhet. ii, 5), “fear regards a saddening evil.” There-
that account is great in our estimation: and then there is
fore the species of fear should correspond to the species
“stupor,” which is caused by the representation of some-
of sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated
thing unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of its being unfore-
above (q. 35, a. 8). Therefore there should only be four
seen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of this
species of fear corresponding to them.
kind is called “anxiety.”
Objection 2. Further, that which consists in an ac-
Reply to Objection 1. Those species of sorrow given
tion of our own is in our power. But fear regards an evil
above are not derived from the diversity of objects, but
that surpasses our power, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore
from the diversity of effects, and for certain special rea-
laziness, shamefacedness, and shame, which regard our
sons. Consequently there is no need for those species of
own actions, should not be reckoned as species of fear.
sorrow to correspond with these species of fear, which are
Objection 3. Further, fear is of the future, as stated
derived from the proper division of the object of fear it-
above (Aa. 1, 2). But “shame regards a disgraceful deed
self.
already done,” as Gregory of Nyssa∗ says.
Therefore
Reply to Objection 2. A deed considered as being ac-
shame is not a species of fear.
tually done, is in the power of the doer. But it is possible
Objection 4.
Further, fear is only of evil.
But
to take into consideration something connected with the
amazement and stupor regard great and unwonted things,
deed, and surpassing the faculty of the doer, for which rea-
whether good or evil. Therefore amazement and stupor
son he shrinks from the deed. It is in this sense that lazi-
are not species of fear.
ness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species
Objection 5. Further, Philosophers have been led by
of fear.
amazement to seek the truth, as stated in the beginning of
Reply to Objection 3. The past deed may be the oc-
Metaphysics. But fear leads to flight rather than to search.
casion of fear of future reproach or disgrace: and in this
Therefore amazement is not a species of fear.
sense shame is a species of fear.
On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene
Reply to Objection 4. Not every amazement and
and Gregory of Nyssa† (Cf. obj. 1,3).
stupor are species of fear, but that amazement which is
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), fear regards a
caused by a great evil, and that stupor which arises from
future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so
an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that, just as laziness
that it is irresistible. Now man’s evil, like his good, may
shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement and
be considered either in his action or in external things. In
stupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and
his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, there is the
unwonted thing, whether good or evil: so that amazement
toil that burdens his nature: and hence arises “laziness,”
and stupor stand in relation to the act of the intellect, as
as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much
laziness does to external work.
toil. Secondly, there is the disgrace which damages him
Reply to Objection 5. He who is amazed shrinks at
in the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in
present from forming a judgment of that which amazes
a deed that is yet to be done, there is “shamefacedness”;
him, fearing to fall short of the truth, but inquires after-
if, however, it be a deed already done, there is “shame.”
wards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor fears both
On the other hand, the evil that consists in external
to judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Where-
things may surpass man’s faculty of resistance in three
fore amazement is a beginning of philosophical research:
ways. First by reason of its magnitude; when, that is
whereas stupor is a hindrance thereto.
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx.
† Nemesius
790
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 42
Of the Object of Fear
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear?
(2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear?
(3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?
(4) Whether fear itself can be feared?
(5) Whether sudden things are especially feared?
(6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no remedy?
Whether the object of fear is good or evil?
Ia IIae q. 42 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that good is the object of
an evil causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from
fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that “we fear
the very fact that it is a privation of some good. Where-
nothing save to lose what we love and possess, or not to
fore, since evil is shunned because it is evil, it follows that obtain that which we hope for.” But that which we love is
it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one
good. Therefore fear regards good as its proper object.
pursues through love thereof. And in this sense Augustine
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good
5) that “power and to be above another is a thing to be
we love.
feared.” But this is a good thing. Therefore good is the
In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause:
object of fear.
in so far as some good can by its power bring harm to
Objection 3. Further, there can be no evil in God. But
the good we love: and so, just as hope, as stated above
we are commanded to fear God, according to Ps. 33:10:
(q. 40, a. 7), regards two things, namely, the good to which
“Fear the Lord, all ye saints.” Therefore even the good is
it tends, and the thing through which there is a hope of
an object of fear.
obtaining the desired good; so also does fear regard two
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
things, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that
12) that fear is of future evil.
good which, by its power, can inflict that evil. In this way
I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive
God is feared by man, inasmuch as He can inflict punish-
power. Now it belongs to the appetitive power to pur-
ment, spiritual or corporal. In this way, too, we fear the
sue and to avoid, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2: and pursuit is
power of man; especially when it has been thwarted, or
of good, while avoidance is of evil. Consequently what-
when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do us a
ever movement of the appetitive power implies pursuit,
harm.
has some good for its object: and whatever movement
In like manner one fears “to be over another,” i.e. to
implies avoidance, has an evil for its object. Wherefore,
lean on another, so that it is in his power to do us a harm:
since fear implies an avoidance, in the first place and of
thus a man fears another, who knows him to be guilty of a
its very nature it regards evil as its proper object.
crime lest he reveal it to others.
It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
to evil. This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as
Whether evil of nature is an object of fear?
Ia IIae q. 42 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that evil of nature is not
like evils were an object of fear, man would needs be al-
an object of fear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5)
ways in fear.
that “fear makes us take counsel.” But we do not take
Objection 3. Further, nature does not move to con-
counsel about things which happen naturally, as stated in
traries. But evil of nature is an effect of nature. Therefore
Ethic. iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature is not an object of
if a man shrinks from such like evils through fear thereof,
fear.
this is not an effect of nature. Therefore natural fear is not
Objection 2. Further, natural defects such as death
of the evil of nature; and yet it seems that it should be.
and the like are always threatening man. If therefore such
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6)
791
that “the most terrible of all things is death,” which is an they heed it not.” Secondly, a future evil is considered as
evil of nature.
though it were not to be, on account of its being inevitable,
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5),
wherefore we look upon it as already present. Hence the
fear is caused by the “imagination of a future evil which
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that “those who are already
is either corruptive or painful.” Now just as a painful evil
on the scaffold, are not afraid,” seeing that they are on the
is that which is contrary to the will, so a corruptive evil
very point of a death from which there is no escape; “but
is that which is contrary to nature: and this is the evil of
in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of
nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the object of
escape for him.”
fear.
Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not
But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes
apprehended as future: but if evil of nature, that is corrup-
arises from a natural cause; and then it is called evil of
tive, be apprehended as near at hand, and yet with some
nature, not merely from being a privation of the good of
hope of escape, then it will be feared.
nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are
Reply to Objection 1. The evil of nature sometimes
natural death and other like defects. But sometimes evil
is not an effect of nature, as stated above. But in so far as
of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent
it is an effect of nature, although it may be impossible to
death inflicted by an assailant. In either case evil of na-
avoid it entirely, yet it may be possible to delay it. And
ture is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent
with this hope one may take counsel about avoiding it.
not. For since fear arises “from the imagination of fu-
Reply to Objection 2. Although evil of nature ever
ture evil,” as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever
threatens, yet it does not always threaten from near at
removes the imagination of the future evil, removes fear
hand: and consequently it is not always feared.
also. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not
Reply to Objection 3. Death and other defects of na-
appear as about to be. First, through being remote and far
ture are the effects of the common nature; and yet the indi-
off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is con-
vidual nature rebels against them as far as it can. Accord-
sidered as though it were not to be. Hence we either do
ingly, from the inclination of the individual nature arise
not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says pain and sorrow for such like evils, when present; fear
(Rhet. ii, 5), “we do not fear things that are very far off;
when threatening in the future.
since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near,
Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?
Ia IIae q. 42 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the evil of sin can
unjust or slow.”
be an object of fear. For Augustine says on the canonical
I answer that, As stated above (q. 40, a. 1; q. 41, a. 2), Epistle of John (Tract. ix), that “by chaste fear man fears
as the object of hope is a future good difficult but possible
to be severed from God.” Now nothing but sin severs us
to obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, arduous and
from God; according to Is. 59:2: “Your iniquities have
not to be easily avoided. From this we may gather that
divided between you and your God.” Therefore the evil of
whatever is entirely subject to our power and will, is not
sin can be an object of fear.
an object of fear; and that nothing gives rise to fear save
Objection 2. Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv,
what is due to an external cause. Now human will is the
4,6) that “we fear when they are yet to come, those things
proper cause of the evil of sin: and consequently evil of
which give us pain when they are present.” But it is pos-
sin, properly speaking, is not an object of fear.
sible for one to be pained or sorrowful on account of the
But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an
evil of sin. Therefore one can also fear the evil of sin.
extrinsic cause; if this cause have a strong power of incli-
Objection 3. Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the
nation, in that respect a man may fear the evil of sin, in so
good of virtue can be the object of hope, as the Philoso-
far as it arises from that extrinsic cause: as when he fears
pher declares (Ethic. ix, 4): and the Apostle says (Gal.
to dwell in the company of wicked men, lest he be led by
5:10): “I have confidence in you in the Lord, that you will
them to sin. But, properly speaking, a man thus disposed,
not be of another mind.” Therefore fear can regard evil of
fears the being led astray rather than the sin considered in
sin.
its proper nature, i.e. as a voluntary act; for considered in
Objection 4. Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated this light it is not an object of fear to him.
above (q. 41, a. 4). But shame regards a disgraceful deed,
Reply to Objection 1. Separation from God is a pun-
which is an evil of sin. Therefore fear does so likewise.
ishment resulting from sin: and every punishment is, in
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5)
some way, due to an extrinsic cause.
that “not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be
Reply to Objection 2. Sorrow and fear agree in one
792
point, since each regards evil: they differ, however, in able. Now one may obtain a good either of oneself, or
two points. First, because sorrow is about present evil,
through another: and so, hope may be of an act of virtue,
whereas fear is future evil. Secondly, because sorrow, be-
which lies within our own power. On the other hand, fear
ing in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil absolutely;
is of an evil that does not lie in our own power: and conse-
wherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas
quently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic
fear, being in the irascible part, regards evil with the addi-
cause; while the good that is hoped for may be both from
tion of a certain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty
an intrinsic and from an extrinsic cause.
ceases in so far as a thing is subject to the will. Con-
Reply to Objection 4. As stated above (q. 41, a. 4,
sequently not all things that give us pain when they are
ad 2,3), shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the
present, make us fear when they are yet to come, but only
disgrace or ignominy which arises therefrom, and which
some things, namely, those that are difficult.
is due to an extrinsic cause.
Reply to Objection 3. Hope is of good that is obtain-
Whether fear itself can be feared?
Ia IIae q. 42 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that fear cannot be feared.
fear, i.e. a man may fear lest he should be threatened by
For whatever is feared, is prevented from being lost,
the necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some
through fear thereof: thus a man who fears to lose his
great evil. It is subject to the will, in so far as the lower
health, keeps it, through fearing its loss. If therefore a
appetite obeys reason; wherefore man is able to drive fear
man be afraid of fear, he will keep himself from fear by
away. In this sense fear cannot be the object of fear, as
being afraid: which seems absurd.
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33). Lest, however, anyone
Objection 2. Further, fear is a kind of flight. But noth-make use of his arguments, in order to prove that fear can-
ing flies from itself. Therefore fear cannot be the object
not be at all be the object of fear, we must add a solution
of fear.
to the same.
Objection 3. Further, fear is about the future. But
Reply to Objection 1. Not every fear is identically the
fear is present to him that fears. Therefore it cannot be the
same; there are various fears according to the various ob-
object of his fear.
jects of fear. Nothing, then, prevents a man from keeping
On the contrary, A man can love his own love, and
himself from fearing one thing, by fearing another, so that
can grieve at his own sorrow. Therefore, in like manner,
the fear which he has preserves him from the fear which
he can fear his own fear.
he has not.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), nothing can be
Reply to Objection 2. Since fear of an imminent evil
an object of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause;
is not identical with the fear of the fear of imminent evil;
but not that which ensues from our own will. Now fear
it does not follow that a thing flies from itself, or that it is partly arises from an extrinsic cause, and is partly subject
the same flight in both cases.
to the will. It is due to an extrinsic cause, in so far as it is Reply to Objection 3. On account of the various
a passion resulting from the imagination of an imminent
kinds of fear already alluded to (ad 2) a man’s present
evil. In this sense it is possible for fear to be the object of fear may have a future fear for its object.
Whether sudden things are especially feared?
Ia IIae q. 42 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that unwonted and sud-
happen suddenly. But the more we think about a thing,
den things are not especially feared. Because, as hope is
the more we fear it; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
about good things, so fear is about evil things. But ex-
8) that “some appear to be courageous through ignorance,
perience conduces to the increase of hope in good things.
but as soon as they discover that the case is different from
Therefore it also adds to fear in evil things.
what they expected, they run away.” Therefore sudden
Objection 2.
Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet.
things are feared less.
ii, 5) that “those are feared most, not who are quick-
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6):
tempered, but who are gentle and cunning.” Now it is
“Fear is startled at things unwonted and sudden, which
clear that those who are quick-tempered are more subject
endanger things beloved, and takes forethought for their
to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are less to
safety.”
be feared.
I answer that, As stated about (a. 3; q. 41, a. 2), the
Objection 3. Further, we think less about things that
object of fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled,
793
but with difficulty. Now this is due to one of two causes: Reply to Objection 2. Those who are quick-tempered
to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him
do not hide their anger; wherefore the harm they do others
that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce
is not so sudden, as not to be foreseen. On the other hand,
to both of these causes. First, it helps an imminent evil to
those who are gentle or cunning hide their anger; where-
seem greater. Because all material things, whether good
fore the harm which may be impending from them, cannot
or evil, the more we consider them, the smaller they seem.
be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the
Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated
Philosopher says that such men are feared more than oth-
in course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. iii,
ers.
30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking
Reply to Objection 3. Bodily good or evil, consid-
about it beforehand. Secondly, unwontedness and sudden-
ered in itself, seems greater at first. The reason for this
ness increase the weakness of him that fears, in so far as
is that a thing is more obvious when seen in juxtaposition
they deprive him of the remedies with which he might oth-
with its contrary. Hence, when a man passes unexpectedly
erwise provide himself to forestall the coming evil, were
from penury to wealth, he thinks more of his wealth on
it not for the evil taking him by surprise.
account of his previous poverty: while, on the other hand,
Reply to Objection 1. The object of hope is a good
the rich man who suddenly becomes poor, finds poverty
that is possible to obtain.
Consequently whatever in-
all the more disagreeable. For this reason sudden evil is
creases a man’s power, is of a nature to increase hope, and,
feared more, because it seems more to be evil. However,
for the same reason, to diminish fear, since fear is about
it may happen through some accident that the greatness of
an evil which cannot be easily repelled. Since, therefore,
some evil is hidden; for instance if the foe hides himself
experience increases a man’s power of action, therefore,
in ambush: and then it is true that evil inspires greater fear
as it increases hope, so does it diminish fear.
through being much thought about.
Whether those things are more feared, for which there is no remedy?
Ia IIae q. 42 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that those things are not
(q. 18, a. 3). And of all the circumstances, longlasting-
more to be feared, for which there is no remedy. Because
ness, or even everlastingness, seems to have the greatest
it is a condition of fear, that there be some hope of safety,
bearing on the increase of evil. Because things that exist
as stated above (a. 2). But an evil that cannot be remedied
in time are measured, in a way, according to the duration
leaves no hope of escape. Therefore such things are not
of time: wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for
feared at all.
a certain length of time, we should reckon the evil dou-
Objection 2. Further, there is no remedy for the evil
bled, if it be suffered for twice that length of time. And
of death: since, in the natural course of things, there is no
accordingly, to suffer the same thing for an infinite length
return from death to life. And yet death is not the most
of time, i.e. for ever, implies, so to speak, an infinite in-
feared of all things, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
crease. Now those evils which, after they have come, can-
5). Therefore those things are not feared most, for which
not be remedied at all, or at least not easily, are considered
there is no remedy.
as lasting for ever or for a long time: for which reason they
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i,
inspire the greatest fear.
6) that “a thing which lasts long is no better than that
Reply to Objection 1. Remedy for an evil is twofold.
which lasts but one day: nor is that which lasts for ever
One, by which a future evil is warded off from coming.
any better than that which is not everlasting”: and the
If such a remedy be removed, there is an end to hope and
same applies to evil. But things that cannot be remedied
consequently to fear; wherefore we do not speak now of
seem to differ from other things, merely in the point of
remedies of that kind. The other remedy is one by which
their lasting long or for ever. Consequently they are not
an already present evil is removed: and of such a remedy
therefore any worse or more to be feared.
we speak now.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5)
Reply to Objection 2. Although death be an evil with-
that “those things are most to be feared which when done
out remedy, yet, since it threatens not from near, it is not
wrong cannot be put right. . . or for which there is no help,
feared, as stated above (a. 2).
or which are not easy.”
Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher is speaking
I answer that, The object of fear is evil: consequently
there of things that are good in themselves, i.e. good
whatever tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase
specifically. And such like good is no better for lasting
of fear. Now evil is increased not only in its species of
long or for ever: its goodness depends on its very nature.
evil, but also in respect of circumstances, as stated above
794
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 43
Of the Cause of Fear
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the cause of fear: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether love is the cause of fear?
(2) Whether defect is the cause of fear?
Whether love is the cause of fear?
Ia IIae q. 43 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that love is not the cause
its cause by way of material disposition, is a habit or any
of fear. For that which leads to a thing is its cause. But
sort of disposition by reason of which this conjoined good
“fear leads to the love of charity” as Augustine says on the
becomes suitable or is apprehended as such.
canonical epistle of John (Tract. ix). Therefore fear is the
Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object
cause of love, and not conversely.
of fear is something reckoned as an evil to come, near at
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
hand and difficult to avoid. Therefore that which can in-
5) that “those are feared most from whom we dread the
flict such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, advent of some evil.” But the dread of evil being caused
and, consequently, of fear itself. While that which renders
by someone, makes us hate rather than love him. There-
a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him, is a
fore fear is caused by hate rather than by love.
cause of fear and of its object, by way of material disposi-
Objection 3. Further, it has been stated above (q. 42,
tion. And thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through a. 3) that those things which occur by our own doing are
his loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of
not fearful. But that which we do from love, is done from
that good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears
our inmost heart. Therefore fear is not caused by love.
it as an evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33):
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 42, a. 1),
“There can be no doubt that there is no cause for fear save
fear, of itself and in the first place, regards the evil from
the loss of what we love, when we possess it, or the failure
which it recoils as being contrary to some loved good:
to obtain what we hope for.” Therefore all fear is caused
and thus fear, of itself, is born of love. But, in the second
by our loving something: and consequently love is the
place, it regards the cause from which that evil ensues: so
cause of fear.
that sometimes, accidentally, fear gives rise to love; in so
I answer that, The objects of the soul’s passions stand
far as, for instance, through fear of God’s punishments,
in relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artifi-
man keeps His commandments, and thus begins to hope,
cial: because the passions of the soul take their species
while hope leads to love, as stated above (q. 40 , a. 7).
from their objects, as the aforesaid things do from their
Reply to Objection 2. He, from whom evil is ex-
forms. Therefore, just as whatever is a cause of the form,
pected, is indeed hated at first; but afterwards, when once
is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so what-
we begin to hope for good from him, we begin to love
ever is a cause, in any way whatever, of the object, is a
him. But the good, the contrary evil of which is feared,
cause of the passion. Now a thing may be a cause of the
was loved from the beginning.
object, either by way of efficient cause, or by way of mate-
Reply to Objection 3.
This argument is true of
rial disposition. Thus the object of pleasure is good appre-
that which is the efficient cause of the evil to be feared:
hended as suitable and conjoined: and its efficient cause
whereas love causes fear by way of material disposition,
is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitableness,
as stated above.
or goodness, or apprehension of that good thing; while
Whether defect is the cause of fear?
Ia IIae q. 43 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that defect is not a cause
ready being executed is extreme. But such like do not fear
of fear. Because those who are in power are very much
as stated in Rhet. ii, 5. Therefore defect is not a cause of
feared. But defect is contrary to power. Therefore defect
fear.
is not a cause of fear.
Objection 3. Further, contests arise from strength not
Objection 2. Further, the defect of those who are al-
from defect. But “those who contend fear those who con-
795
tend with them” (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore defect is not a But as to the second, power and strength are, of them-cause of fear.
selves, the cause of fear: because it is owing to the fact
On the contrary, Contraries ensue from contrary
that the cause apprehended as harmful is powerful, that its
causes. But “wealth, strength, a multitude of friends, and
effect cannot be repulsed. It may happen, however, in this
power drive fear away” (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore fear is
respect, that some defect causes fear accidentally, in so far
caused by lack of these.
as owing to some defect someone wishes to hurt another;
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), fear may be set
for instance, by reason of injustice, either because that
down to a twofold cause: one is by way of a material dis-
other has already done him a harm, or because he fears to
position, on the part of him that fears; the other is by way
be harmed by him.
of efficient cause, on the part of the person feared. As to
Reply to Objection 1. This argument is true of the
the first then, some defect is, of itself, the cause of fear:
cause of fear, on the part of the efficient cause.
for it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable
Reply to Objection 2. Those who are already be-
easily to repulse a threatening evil. And yet, in order to
ing executed, are actually suffering from a present evil;
cause fear, this defect must be according to a measure.
wherefore their defect exceeds the measure of fear.
For the defect which causes fear of a future evil, is less
Reply to Objection 3. Those who contend with one
than the defect caused by evil present, which is the object
another are afraid, not on account of the power which
of sorrow. And still greater would be the defect, if per-
enables them to contend: but on account of the lack of
ception of the evil, or love of the good whose contrary is
power, owing to which they are not confident of victory.
feared, were entirely absent.
796
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 44
Of the Effects of Fear
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the effects of fear: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether fear causes contraction?
(2) Whether it makes men suitable for counsel?
(3) Whether it makes one tremble?
(4) Whether it hinders action?
Whether fear causes contraction?
Ia IIae q. 44 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that fear does not cause
when seized with fear, leave the outskirts, and, as far as
contraction. For when contraction takes place, the heat
possible, make for the inner quarters. It is in resemblance
and vital spirits are withdrawn inwardly. But accumula-
to this contraction, which pertains to the appetite of the
tion of heat and vital spirits in the interior parts of the
soul, that in fear a similar contraction of heat and vital
body, dilates the heart unto endeavors of daring, as may be
spirits towards the inner parts takes place in regard to the
seen in those who are angered: while the contrary happens
body.
in those who are afraid. Therefore fear does not cause
Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (De
contraction.
Problem. xxvii, 3), although in those who fear, the vital
Objection 2. Further, when, as a result of contraction,
spirits recede from outer to the inner parts of the body,
the vital spirits and heat are accumulated in the interior
yet the movement of vital spirits is not the same in those
parts, man cries out, as may be seen in those who are in
who are angry and those who are afraid. For in those who
pain. But those who fear utter nothing: on the contrary
are angry, by reason of the heat and subtlety of the vital
they lose their speech. Therefore fear does not cause con-
spirits, which result from the craving for vengeance, the
traction.
inward movement has an upward direction: wherefore the
Objection 3. Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated vital spirits and heat concentrate around the heart: the re-above (q. 41, a. 4). But “those who are ashamed blush,”
sult being that an angry man is quick and brave in attack-
as Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8), and the Philosopher
ing. But in those who are afraid, on account of the conden-
(Ethic. iv, 9) observe. But blushing is an indication, not
sation caused by cold, the vital spirits have a downward
of contraction, but of the reverse. Therefore contraction is
movement; the said cold being due to the imagined lack
not an effect of fear.
of power. Consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
the heart instead of concentrating around it: the result be-
23) that “fear is a power according to systole,” i.e. con-ing that a man who is afraid is not quick to attack, but is
traction.
more inclined to run away.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 28, a. 5), in the pasReply to Objection 2. To everyone that is in pain,
sions of the soul, the formal element is the movement of
whether man or animal, it is natural to use all possible
the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation is the
means of repelling the harmful thing that causes pain but
material element. Both of these are mutually proportion-
its presence: thus we observe that animals, when in pain,
ate; and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes a
attack with their jaws or with their horns. Now the greatest
resemblance to and the very nature of the appetitive move-
help for all purposes, in animals, is heat and vital spirits:
ment. Now, as to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear
wherefore when they are in pain, their nature stores up
implies a certain contraction: the reason of which is that
the heat and vital spirits within them, in order to make
fear arises from the imagination of some threatening evil
use thereof in repelling the harmful object. Hence the
which is difficult to repel, as stated above (q. 41, a. 2). But Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 9) when the vital
that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as
spirits and heat are concentrated together within, they re-
stated above (q. 43, a. 2): and the weaker a power is, the
quire to find a vent in the voice: for which reason those
fewer the things to which it extends. Wherefore from the
who are in pain can scarcely refrain from crying aloud. On
very imagination that causes fear there ensues a certain
the other hand, in those who are afraid, the internal heat
contraction in the appetite. Thus we observe in one who
and vital spirits move from the heart downwards, as stated
is dying that nature withdraws inwardly, on account of the
above (ad 1): wherefore fear hinders speech which ensues
lack of power: and again we see the inhabitants of a city,
from the emission of the vital spirits in an upward direc-
797
tion through the mouth: the result being that fear makes the body, as though it were threatened by a natural death.
its subject speechless. For this reason, too, fear “makes
Hence it is that “those who are in fear of death turn pale”
its subject tremble,” as the Philosopher says (De Problem.
(Ethic. iv, 9). But the evil that shame fears, is contrary,
xxvii, 1,6,7).
not to nature, but only to the appetite of the soul. Conse-
Reply to Objection 3. Mortal perils are contrary not
quently there results a contraction in this appetite, but not
only to the appetite of the soul, but also to nature. Con-
in the corporeal nature; in fact, the soul, as though con-
sequently in such like fear, there is contraction not only
tracted in itself, is free to set the vital spirits and heat in in the appetite, but also in the corporeal nature: for when
movement, so that they spread to the outward parts of the
an animal is moved by the imagination of death, it ex-
body: the result being that those who are ashamed blush.
periences a contraction of heat towards the inner parts of
Whether fear makes one suitable for counsel?
Ia IIae q. 44 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that fear does not make
Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for
one suitable for counsel. For the same thing cannot be
giving good counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor
conducive to counsel, and a hindrance thereto. But fear
any passion makes men of counsel. Because when a man
hinders counsel: because every passion disturbs repose,
is affected by a passion, things seem to him greater or
which is requisite for the good use of reason. Therefore
smaller than they really are: thus to a lover, what he loves
fear does not make a man suitable for counsel.
seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more
Objection 2. Further, counsel is an act of reason, in
dreadful. Consequently owing to the want of right judg-
thinking and deliberating about the future. But a certain
ment, every passion, considered in itself, hinders the fac-
fear “drives away all thought, and dislocates the mind,” as
ulty of giving good counsel.
Cicero observes (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8). Therefore fear
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
does not conduce to counsel, but hinders it.
Reply to Objection 2. The stronger a passion is, the
Objection 3. Further, just as we have recourse to
greater the hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it.
counsel in order to avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain
Consequently, when fear is intense, man does indeed wish
good things. But whereas fear is of evil to be avoided, so
to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that he
is hope of good things to be obtained. Therefore fear is
can find no counsel. If, however, the fear be slight, so as
not more conducive to counsel, than hope is.
to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely dis-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5)
turbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him to
that “fear makes men of counsel.”
take good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness.
I answer that, A man of counsel may be taken in two
Reply to Objection 3. Hope also makes man a good
ways. First, from his being willing or anxious to take
counsellor: because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
counsel. And thus fear makes men of counsel. Because,
5), “no man takes counsel in matters he despairs of,” nor
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), “we take counsel
about impossible things, as he says in Ethic. iii, 3. But
on great matters, because therein we distrust ourselves.”
fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because hope
Now things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but
is of good things, as being possible of attainment; whereas
have a certain magnitude, both because they seem diffi-
fear is of evil things, as being difficult to repel, so that fear cult to repel, and because they are apprehended as near to
regards the aspect of difficulty more than hope does. And
us, as stated above (q. 42, a. 2). Wherefore men seek for
it is in matters of difficulty, especially when we distrust
counsel especially when they are afraid.
ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated above.
Whether fear makes one tremble?
Ia IIae q. 44 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that trembling is not an
Objection 2. Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned
effect of fear. Because trembling is occasioned by cold;
by heat; hence laxative medicines are generally warm.
thus we observe that a cold person trembles. Now fear
But these evacuations are often caused by fear. There-
does not seem to make one cold, but rather to cause a
fore fear apparently causes heat; and consequently does
parching heat: a sign whereof is that those who fear are
not cause trembling.
thirsty, especially if their fear be very great, as in the case Objection 3. Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn
of those who are being led to execution. Therefore fear
from the outer to the inner parts of the body. If, therefore,
does not cause trembling.
man trembles in his outward parts, through the heat being
798
withdrawn thus; it seems that fear should cause this trem-or even seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations
bling in all the external members. But such is not the case.
are due to contraction of the abdomen and testicles, as the
Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear.
Philosopher says (De Problem. xxii, 11).
On the contrary, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8)
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
that “fear is followed by trembling, pallor and chattering
Reply to Objection 3. In fear, heat abandons the
of the teeth.”
heart, with a downward movement: hence in those who
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), in fear there
are afraid the heart especially trembles, as also those
takes place a certain contraction from the outward to the
members which are connected with the breast where the
inner parts of the body, the result being that the outer parts
heart resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially in
become cold; and for this reason trembling is occasioned
their speech, on account of the tracheal artery being near
in these parts, being caused by a lack of power in control-
the heart. The lower lip, too, and the lower jaw trem-
ling the members: which lack of power is due to the want
ble, through their connection with the heart; which ex-
of heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves
plains the chattering of the teeth. For the same reason the
those members, as stated in De Anima ii, 4.
arms and hands tremble. Or else because the aforesaid
Reply to Objection 1. When the heat withdraws from
members are more mobile. For which reason the knees
the outer to the inner parts, the inward heat increases, es-
tremble in those who are afraid, according to Is. 35:3:
pecially in the inferior or nutritive parts. Consequently
“Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and confirm the trem-
the humid element being spent, thirst ensues; sometimes
bling [Vulg.: ‘weak’] knees.”
indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, and urinary
Whether fear hinders action?
Ia IIae q. 44 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that fear hinders action.
On the part of the bodily instruments, fear, considered in
For action is hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the rea-
itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, on account
son, which directs action. But fear disturbs reason, as
of the outward members being deprived, through fear, of
stated above (a. 2). Therefore fear hinders action.
their heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be mod-
Objection 2. Further, those who fear while doing any-
erate, without much disturbance of the reason, it conduces
thing, are more apt to fail: thus a man who walks on a
to working well, in so far as it causes a certain solicitude,
plank placed aloft, easily falls through fear; whereas, if
and makes a man take counsel and work with greater at-
he were to walk on the same plank down below, he would
tention. If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb
not fall, through not being afraid. Therefore fear hinders
the reason, it hinders action even on the part of the soul.
action.
But of such a fear the Apostle does not speak.
Objection 3. Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
fear. But laziness hinders action. Therefore fear does too.
Reply to Objection 2. He that falls from a plank
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil.
2:12):
placed aloft, suffers a disturbance of his imagination,
“With fear and trembling work out your salvation”: and
through fear of the fall that is pictured to his imagination.
he would not say this if fear were a hindrance to a good
Reply to Objection 3. Everyone in fear shuns that
work. Therefore fear does not hinder a good action.
which he fears: and therefore, since laziness is a fear of
I answer that, Man’s exterior actions are caused by
work itself as being toilsome, it hinders work by with-
the soul as first mover, but by the bodily members as in-
drawing the will from it. But fear of other things conduces
struments. Now action may be hindered both by defect
to action, in so far as it inclines the will to do that whereby of the instrument, and by defect of the principal mover.
a man escapes from what he fears.
799
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 45
Of Daring
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether daring is contrary to fear?
(2) How is daring related to hope?
(3) Of the cause of daring;
(4) Of its effect.
Whether daring is contrary to fear?
Ia IIae q. 45 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that daring is not contrary
names of the passions can be taken in two ways. First, as
to fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that “daring
denoting absolutely movements of the sensitive appetite
is a vice.” Now vice is contrary to virtue. Since, therefore,
in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus they
fear is not a virtue but a passion, it seems that daring is not are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides this
contrary to fear.
movement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus
Objection 2. Further, to one thing there is one con-
they are names of vices. It is in this sense that Augus-
trary. But hope is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not
tine speaks of daring: but we are speaking of it in the first
contrary to fear.
sense.
Objection 3. Further, every passion excludes its op-
Reply to Objection 2. To one thing, in the same
posite. But fear excludes safety; for Augustine says (Con-
respect, there are not several contraries; but in different
fess. ii, 6) that “fear takes forethought for safety.” There-
respects nothing prevents one thing having several con-
fore safety is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not con-
traries. Accordingly it has been said above (q. 23, a. 2;
trary to fear.
q. 40, a. 4) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5)
contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and
that “daring is contrary to fear.”
evil, and thus fear is contrary to hope: the other, according
I answer that, It is of the essence of contraries to be
to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus
“farthest removed from one another,” as stated in Metaph.
daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope.
x, 4. Now that which is farthest removed from fear, is
Reply to Objection 3. Safety does not denote some-
daring: since fear turns away from the future hurt, on ac-
thing contrary to fear, but merely the exclusion of fear:
count of its victory over him that fears it; whereas daring
for he is said to be safe, who fears not. Wherefore safety
turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over
is opposed to fear, as a privation: while daring is opposed
that same danger. Consequently it is evident that daring is
thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety implies privation,
contrary to fear.
so daring implies safety.
Reply to Objection 1.
Anger, daring and all the
Whether daring ensues from hope?
Ia IIae q. 45 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that daring does not ensue
good, viz. victory. But it belongs to hope to tend to that
from hope. Because daring regards evil and fearful things,
which is good and difficult. Therefore daring is the same
as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But hope regards good things, as
as hope; and consequently does not result from it.
stated above (q. 40, a. 1). Therefore they have different
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8)
objects and are not in the same order. Therefore daring
that “those are hopeful are full of daring.” Therefore it
does not ensue from hope.
seems that daring ensues from hope.
Objection 2. Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, I answer that, As we have often stated (q. 22, a. 2;
so is despair contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue
q. 35, a. 1; q. 41, a. 1), all these passions belong to the
from despair: in fact, despair excludes fear, as the Philoso-
appetitive power. Now every movement of the appetitive
pher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore daring does not result
power is reducible to one either of pursuit or of avoidance.
from hope.
Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something either by rea-
Objection 3. Further, daring is intent on something
son of itself or by reason of something else. By reason
800
of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the ob-good, as privation comes after habit; consequently daring
ject of avoidance: but by reason of something else, evil
which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues good.
can be the object of pursuit, through some good attaching
Reply to Objection 2. Although good, absolutely
to it; and good can be the object of avoidance, through
speaking, is prior to evil, yet avoidance of evil precedes
some evil attaching to it. Now that which is by reason of
avoidance of good; just as the pursuit of good precedes
something else, follows that which is by reason of itself.
the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope precedes
Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and
daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear does
avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil. Now these
not always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so
four things belong to four passions, since pursuit of good
hope does not always lead to daring, save only when it is
belongs to hope, avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of
strong.
the fearful evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of
Reply to Objection 3. Although the object of daring
good to despair. It follows, therefore, that daring results
is an evil to which, in the estimation of the daring man,
from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming the threat-
the good of victory is conjoined; yet daring regards the
ening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. But despair
evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In like man-
results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs
ner despair regards directly the good which it turns away
is because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he
from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, prop-
should hope for.
erly speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect:
Reply to Objection 1. This argument would hold, if
just as despair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this
good and evil were not co-ordinate objects. But because
reason, too, daring cannot be a principal passion.
evil has a certain relation to good, since it comes after
Whether some defect is a cause of daring?
Ia IIae q. 45 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that some defect is a cause
the bodily transmutation.
of daring. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii,
On the part of the appetitive movement which fol-
4) that “lovers of wine are strong and daring.” But from
lows apprehension, hope that leads to daring is roused by
wine ensues the effect of drunkenness. Therefore daring
those things that make us reckon victory as possible. Such
is caused by a defect.
things regard either our own power, as bodily strength, ex-
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
perience of dangers, abundance of wealth, and the like; or
5) that “those who have no experience of danger are bold.”
they regard the powers of others, such as having a great
But want of experience is a defect. Therefore daring is
number of friends or any other means of help, especially
caused by a defect.
if a man trust in the Divine assistance: wherefore “those
Objection 3. Further, those who have suffered wrongs
are more daring, with whom it is well in regard to godlike
are wont to be daring; “like the beasts when beaten,” as
things,” as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Fear is ban-
stated in Ethic. iii, 5. But the suffering of wrongs pertains
ished, in this way, by the removal of threatening causes of
to defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
fear; for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies,
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5)
through having harmed nobody, so that he is not aware of
that the cause of daring “is the presence in the imagination
any imminent danger; since those especially appear to be
of the hope that the means of safety are nigh, and that the
threatened by danger, who have harmed others.
things to be feared are either non-existent or far off.” But
On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is
anything pertaining to defect implies either the removal of
caused through the incitement of hope and the banish-
the means of safety, or the proximity of something to be
ment of fear, by those things which raise the temperature
feared. Therefore nothing pertaining to defect is a cause
about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Part.
of daring.
Animal. iii, 4) that “those whose heart is small in size,
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2) daring results
are more daring; while animals whose heart is large are
from hope and is contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is
timid; because the natural heat is unable to give the same
naturally apt to cause hope or banish fear, is a cause of
degree of temperature to a large as to a small heart; just
daring. Since, however, fear and hope, and also daring,
as a fire does not heat a large house as well as it does a
being passions, consist in a movement of the appetite, and
small house.” He says also (De Problem. xxvii, 4), that
in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be consid-
“those whose lungs contain much blood, are more dar-
ered as the cause of daring in two ways, whether by rais-
ing, through the heat in the heart that results therefrom.”
ing hope, or by banishing fear; in one way, in the part of
He says also in the same passage that “lovers of wine are
the appetitive movement; in another way, on the part of
more daring, on account of the heat of the wine”: hence
801
it has been said above (q. 40, a. 6) that drunkenness con-they do not know their own failings, nor the dangers that
duces to hope, since the heat in the heart banishes fear and
threaten. Hence it is that the removal of the cause of fear
raises hope, by reason of the dilatation and enlargement of
gives rise to daring.
the heart.
Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Rhet.
Reply to Objection 1. Drunkenness causes daring,
ii, 5) “those who have been wronged are courageous, be-
not through being a defect, but through dilating the heart:
cause they think that God comes to the assistance of those
and again through making a man think greatly of himself.
who suffer unjustly.”
Reply to Objection 2. Those who have no experience
Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring ex-
of dangers are more daring, not on account of a defect, but
cept accidentally, i.e. in so far as some excellence attaches
accidentally, i.e. in so far as through being inexperienced
thereto, real or imaginary, either in oneself or in another.
Whether the brave are more eager at first than in the midst of danger?
Ia IIae q. 45 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the daring are not
ties of a situation. Consequently men of fortitude who
more eager at first than in the midst of danger. Because
face danger according to the judgment of reason, at first
trembling is caused by fear, which is contrary to daring,
seem slack, because they face the danger not from passion
as stated above (a. 1; q. 44, a. 3). But the daring some-
but with due deliberation. Yet when they are in the midst
times tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De Prob-
of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but some-
lem. xxvii, 3). Therefore they are not more eager at first
times the difficulty turns out to be less than they antici-
than in the midst of danger.
pated; wherefore they are more persevering. Moreover,
Objection 2. Further, passion is intensified by an in-
it may be because they face the danger on account of the
crease in its object: thus since a good is lovable, what
good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will,
is better is yet more lovable. But the object of daring is
however great the danger may prove: whereas men of dar-
something difficult. Therefore the greater the difficulty,
ing face the danger on account of a mere thought giving
the greater the daring. But danger is more arduous and
rise to hope and banishing fear, as stated above (a. 3).
difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is
Reply to Objection 1. Trembling does occur in men
greatest.
of daring, on account of the heat being withdrawn from
Objection 3. Further, anger is provoked by the inflic-
the outer to the inner parts of the body, as occurs also in
tion of wounds. But anger causes daring; for the Philoso-
those who are afraid. But in men of daring the heat with-
pher says (Rhet.
ii, 5) that “anger makes man bold.”
draws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, it
Therefore when man is in the midst of danger and when
withdraws to the inferior parts.
he is being beaten, then is he most daring.
Reply to Objection 2. The object of love is good sim-
On the contrary, It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that “the dar-ply, wherefore if it be increased, love is increased simply.
ing are precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger,
But the object of daring is a compound of good and evil;
yet in the midst of dangers they stand aloof.”
and the movement of daring towards evil presupposes the
I answer that, Daring, being a movement of the sen-
movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, so much
sitive appetite, follows an apprehension of the sensitive
difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope,
faculty. But the sensitive faculty cannot make compar-
the movement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if
isons, nor can it inquire into circumstances; its judgment
the movement of daring does ensue, the greater the dan-
is instantaneous. Now it happens sometimes that it is im-
ger, the greater is the daring considered to be.
possible for a man to take note in an instant of all the
Reply to Objection 3. Hurt does not give rise to anger
difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises the
unless there be some kind of hope, as we shall see later on
movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he
(q. 46, a. 1). Consequently if the danger be so great as to
comes to experience the danger, he feels the difficulty to
banish all hope of victory, anger does not ensue. It is true,
be greater than he expected, and so gives way.
however, that if anger does ensue, there will be greater
On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficul-
daring.
802
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 46
Of Anger, in Itself
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether anger is a special passion?
(2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
(3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
(4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?
(5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?
(6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?
(7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of justice?
(8) Of the species of anger.
Whether anger is a special passion?
Ia IIae q. 46 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that anger is not a special
Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general pas-
passion. For the irascible power takes its name from anger
sion but is condivided with the other passions, as stated
[ira]. But there are several passions in this power, not only
above (q. 23, a. 4). In like manner, neither is it in the
one. Therefore anger is not one special passion.
second way: since it is not a cause of the other passions.
Objection 2. Further, to every special passion there is
But in this way, love may be called a general passion, as
a contrary passion; as is evident by going through them
Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because love is
one by one. But no passion is contrary to anger, as stated
the primary root of all the other passions, as stated above
above (q. 23, a. 3). Therefore anger is not a special pas-
(q. 27, a. 4 ). But, in a third way, anger may be called
sion.
a general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concur-
Objection 3. Further, one special passion does not in-
rence of several passions. Because the movement of anger
clude another. But anger includes several passions: since
does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and
it accompanies sorrow, pleasure, and hope, as the Philoso-
unless there be desire and hope of revenge: for, as the
pher states (Rhet. ii, 2). Therefore anger is not a special
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), “the angry man hopes to
passion.
punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible.”
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16)
Consequently if the person, who inflicted the injury, ex-
calls anger a special passion: and so does Cicero (De
cel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as
Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7).
Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).
I answer that, A thing is said to be general in two
Reply to Objection 1. The irascible power takes its
ways. First, by predication; thus “animal” is general in
name from “ira” [anger], not because every movement of
respect of all animals. Secondly, by causality; thus the
that power is one of anger; but because all its movements
sun is the general cause of all things generated here be-
terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements,
low, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Because just
anger is the most patent.
as a genus contains potentially many differences, accord-
Reply to Objection 2. From the very fact that anger
ing to a likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains
is caused by contrary passions, i.e. by hope, which is of
many effects according to its active power. Now it hap-
good, and by sorrow, which is of evil, it includes in itself
pens that an effect is produced by the concurrence of vari-
contrariety: and consequently it has no contrary outside
ous causes; and since every cause remains somewhat in its
itself. Thus also in mixed colors there is no contrariety,
effect, we may say that, in yet a third way, an effect which
except that of the simple colors from which they are made.
is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain
Reply to Objection 3. Anger includes several pas-
generality, inasmuch as several causes are, in a fashion,
sions, not indeed as a genus includes several species; but
actually existing therein.
rather according to the inclusion of cause and effect.
803
Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
Ia IIae q. 46 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the object of anger is
recoils from evil: and such movements are desire, hope,
evil. For Gregory of Nyssa says∗ that anger is “the sword-
pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex ob-
bearer of desire,” inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever
ject, as when the appetite is concerned with some good
obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has
or evil being in, or being done to, another, either seeking
the character of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its
this or recoiling from it. This is evident in the case of love
object.
and hatred: for we love someone, in so far as we wish
Objection 2. Further, anger and hatred agree in their
some good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far
effect, since each seeks to inflict harm on another. But ha-
as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same with
tred regards evil as its object, as stated above (q. 29, a. 1).
anger; for when a man is angry, he wishes to be avenged
Therefore anger does also.
on someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold
Objection 3.
Further, anger arises from sorrow;
tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it desires and
wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 6) that “anger
hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in
acts with sorrow.” But evil is the object of sorrow. There-
it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to
fore it is also the object of anger.
something contrary and hurtful, which bears the character
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that
of evil.
“anger craves for revenge.” But the desire for revenge is a
We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this
desire for something good: since revenge belongs to jus-
respect, between anger on the one side, and hatred and
tice. Therefore the object of anger is good.
love on the other. The first difference is that anger always
Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope,
regards two objects: whereas love and hatred sometimes
wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says
regard but one object, as when a man is said to love wine
(Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope and of pleasure is
or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second dif-
good. Therefore good is also the object of anger.
ference is, that both the objects of love are good: since
I answer that, The movement of the appetitive power
the lover wishes good to someone, as to something agree-
follows an act of the apprehensive power. Now the appre-
able to himself: while both the objects of hatred bear the
hensive power apprehends a thing in two ways. First, by
character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to
way of an incomplex object, as when we understand what
someone, as to something disagreeable to him. Whereas
a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as when
anger regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the
we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently
noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. Con-
in each of these ways the appetitive power can tend to both
sequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary
good and evil: by way of a simple and incomplex object,
passions.
when the appetite simply follows and adheres to good, or
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
Ia IIae q. 46 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that anger is in the con-
cupiscible power, the irascible would not take its name
cupiscible faculty. For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv,
from it.
9) that anger is a kind of “desire.” But desire is in the
I answer that, As stated above (q. 23, a. 1), the pas-
concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is too.
sions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that
concupiscible faculty, in that the objects of the concupis-
“anger grows into hatred”: and Cicero says (De Quaest.
cible passions are good and evil absolutely considered,
Tusc. iv, 9) that “hatred is inveterate anger.” But hatred,
whereas the objects of the irascible passions are good and
like love, is a concupiscible passion. Therefore anger is in
evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has
the concupiscible faculty.
been stated (a. 2) that anger regards two objects: viz. the
Objection 3. Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks
16) and Gregory of Nyssa† say that “anger is made up of
vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain
sorrow and desire.” Both of these are in the concupiscible
arduousness: for the movement of anger does not arise,
faculty. Therefore anger is a concupiscible passion.
unless there be some magnitude about both these objects;
On the contrary, The concupiscible is distinct from
since “we make no ado about things that are naught or
the irascible faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the con-
very minute,” as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.
† Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.
804
is therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, tred, not as though the same passion which at first was
but in the irascible faculty.
anger, afterwards becomes hatred by becoming inveter-
Reply to Objection 1. Cicero gives the name of de-
ate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it lasts
sire to any kind of craving for a future good, without dis-
a long time engenders hatred.
criminating between that which is arduous and that which
Reply to Objection 3. Anger is said to be composed
is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind of desire,
of sorrow and desire, not as though they were its parts,
inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this sense, how-
but because they are its causes: and it has been said above
ever, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible
(q. 25, a. 2) that the concupiscible passions are the causes
faculties.
of the irascible passions.
Reply to Objection 2. Anger is said to grow into ha-
Whether anger requires an act of reason?
Ia IIae q. 46 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that anger does not re-
commands: and thus the will follows reason, wherefore it
quire an act of reason. For, since anger is a passion, it
is called the rational appetite. In another way, it follows
is in the sensitive appetite. But the sensitive appetite fol-
reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger
lows an apprehension, not of reason, but of the sensitive
follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem.
faculty. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.
xxviii, 3) that “anger follows reason, not in obedience to
Objection 2. Further, dumb animals are devoid of rea-
reason’s command, but as a result of reason’s denouncing
son: and yet they are seen to be angry. Therefore anger
the injury.” Because the sensitive appetite is subject to the
does not require an act of reason.
reason, not immediately but through the will.
Objection 3. Further, drunkenness fetters the reason;
Reply to Objection 2. Dumb animals have a natu-
whereas it is conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not
ral instinct imparted to them by the Divine Reason, in
require an act of reason.
virtue of which they are gifted with movements, both
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6)
internal and external, like unto rational movements, as
that “anger listens to reason somewhat.”
stated above (q. 40, a. 3).
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), anger is a de-
Reply to Objection 3. As stated in Ethic. vii, 6,
sire for vengeance. Now vengeance implies a compari-
“anger listens somewhat to reason” in so far as reason de-
son between the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt
nounces the injury inflicted, “but listens not perfectly,” be-
done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
cause it does not observe the rule of reason as to the mea-
“anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to
sure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an act of
quarrel with such a person, is therefore immediately exas-
reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore
perated.” Now to compare and to draw an inference is an
the Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose
act of reason. Therefore anger, in a fashion, requires an
who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of
act of reason.
reason, do not get angry: but those who are slightly drunk,
Reply to Objection 1. The movement of the appeti-
do get angry, through being still able, though hampered,
tive power may follow an act of reason in two ways. In
to form a judgment of reason.
the first way, it follows the reason in so far as the reason
Whether anger is more natural than desire?
Ia IIae q. 46 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that anger is not more nat-
vengeance: while desire is a craving for those things es-
ural than desire. Because it is proper to man to be by na-
pecially which are pleasant to the touch, viz. for pleasures
ture a gentle animal. But “gentleness is contrary to anger,”
of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these things are
as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger is
more natural to man than vengeance. Therefore desire is
no more natural than desire, in fact it seems to be alto-
more natural than anger.
gether unnatural to man.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6)
Objection 2. Further, reason is contrasted with na-
that “anger is more natural than desire.”
ture: since those things that act according to reason, are
I answer that, By “natural” we mean that which is
not said to act according to nature. Now “anger requires
caused by nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently
an act of reason, but desire does not,” as stated in Ethic.
the question as to whether a particular passion is more
vii, 6. Therefore desire is more natural than anger.
or less natural cannot be decided without reference to the
Objection 3.
Further, anger is a craving for
cause of that passion. Now the cause of a passion, as
805
stated above (q. 36, a. 2), may be considered in two ways: cause disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament;
first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of
and of all the humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like
the subject. If then we consider the cause of anger and
fire. Consequently he that is temperamentally disposed to
of desire, on the part of the object, thus desire, especially
anger is sooner incensed with anger, than he that is tem-
of pleasures of the table, and of sexual pleasures, is more
peramentally disposed to desire, is inflamed with desire:
natural than anger; in so far as these pleasures are more
and for this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
natural to man than vengeance.
a disposition to anger is more liable to be transmitted from
If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part
parent to child, than a disposition to desire.
of the subject, thus anger, in a manner, is more natural;
Reply to Objection 1. We may consider in man both
and, in a manner, desire is more natural. Because the na-
the natural temperament on the part of the body, and the
ture of an individual man may be considered either as to
reason. On the part of the bodily temperament, a man,
the generic, or as to the specific nature, or again as to the
considered specifically, does not naturally excel others ei-
particular temperament of the individual. If then we con-
ther in anger or in any other passion, on account of the
sider the generic nature, i.e. the nature of this man consid-
moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for
ered as an animal; thus desire is more natural than anger;
as much as their temperament recedes from this moder-
because it is from this very generic nature that man is in-
ation and approaches to an extreme disposition, are nat-
clined to desire those things which tend to preserve in him
urally disposed to some excess of passion, such as the
the life both of the species and of the individual. If, how-
lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and
ever, we consider the specific nature, i.e. the nature of this
so forth. On the part of reason, however, it is natural to
man as a rational being; then anger is more natural to man
man, both to be angry and to be gentle: in so far as reason
than desire, in so far as anger follows reason more than
somewhat causes anger, by denouncing the injury which
desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5)
causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger, in so far as
that “revenge” which pertains to anger “is more natural to
the angry man “does not listen perfectly to the command
man than meekness”: for it is natural to everything to rise
of reason,” as stated above (a. 4, ad 3).
up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider
Reply to Objection 2. Reason itself belongs to the
the nature of the individual, in respect of his particular
nature of man: wherefore from the very fact that anger re-
temperament, thus anger is more natural than desire; for
quires an act of reason, it follows that it is, in a manner,
the reason that anger is prone to ensue from the natural
natural to man.
tendency to anger, more than desire, or any other passion,
Reply to Objection 3. This argument regards anger
is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which ten-
and desire on the part of the object.
dencies result from a man’s individual temperament. Be-
Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?
Ia IIae q. 46 a. 6
Objection 1.
It would seem that anger is more
On the contrary, Augustine, in his Rule, compares
grievous than hatred. For it is written (Prov. 27:4) that
hatred to “a beam,” but anger to “a mote.”
“anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth.”
I answer that, The species and nature of a passion are
But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore anger is more
taken from its object. Now the object of anger is the same
grievous than hatred.
in substance as the object of hatred; since, just as the hater
Objection 2. Further, it is worse to suffer evil and
wishes evil to him whom he hates, so does the angry man
to grieve for it, than merely to suffer it. But when a man
wish evil to him with whom he is angry. But there is a
hates, he is contented if the object of his hatred suffer evil: difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his en-whereas the angry man is not satisfied unless the object of
emy, as evil, whereas the angry man wishes evil to him
his anger know it and be aggrieved thereby, as the Philoso-
with whom he is angry, not as evil but in so far as it has
pher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is more grievous
an aspect of good, that is, in so far as he reckons it as just, than hatred.
since it is a means of vengeance. Wherefore also it has
Objection 3. Further, a thing seems to be so much the
been said above (a. 2) that hatred implies application of
more firm according as more things concur to set it up:
evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to
thus a habit is all the more settled through being caused
evil. Now it is evident that to seek evil under the aspect of
by several acts. But anger is caused by the concurrence
justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek evil to some-
of several passions, as stated above (a. 1): whereas hatred
one. Because to wish evil to someone under the aspect
is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous
of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it
than hatred.
be in conformity with the order of reason; and anger fails
806
only in this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in wishes evil to someone, in so far as this evil is a means of
taking vengeance. Consequently it is evident that hatred
just vengeance. Now vengeance is wrought by the inflic-
is far worse and graver than anger.
tion of a punishment: and the nature of punishment con-
Reply to Objection 1. In anger and hatred two points
sists in being contrary to the will, painful, and inflicted
may be considered: namely, the thing desired, and the in-
for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this,
tensity of the desire. As to the thing desired, anger has
that the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and be in
more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred desires an-
pain, and know that this has befallen him on account of the
other’s evil for evil’s sake, it is satisfied with no particu-
harm he has done the other. The hater, on the other hand,
lar measure of evil: because those things that are desired
cares not for all this, since he desires another’s evil as
for their own sake, are desired without measure, as the
such. It is not true, however, that an evil is worse through
Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with re-
giving pain: because “injustice and imprudence, although
gard to riches. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 12:16): “An
evil,” yet, being voluntary, “do not grieve those in whom
enemy. . . if he find an opportunity, will not be satisfied
they are,” as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4).
with blood.” Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil only un-
Reply to Objection 3. That which proceeds from sev-
der the aspect of a just means of vengeance. Consequently
eral causes, is more settled when these causes are of one
when the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice
kind: but it may be that one cause prevails over many oth-
according to the estimate of the angry man, then he has
ers. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than
mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that
anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion of
“the angry man is appeased if many evils befall, whereas
the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred en-
the hater is never appeased.”
sues from a disposition in a man, by reason of which he
As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy
considers that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful
more than hatred does; because the movement of anger
to him. Consequently, as passion is more transitory than
is more impetuous, through the heating of the bile. Hence
disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred;
the passage quoted continues: “Who can bear the violence
although hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this dis-
of one provoked?”
position. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, an angry man
“hatred is more incurable than anger.”
Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice?
Ia IIae q. 46 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that anger is not only
evil as being a means of just vengeance. Consequently,
towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice.
anger is towards those to whom we are just or unjust:
For there is no justice between man and irrational beings.
since vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing is
And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational beings;
an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of the
thus, out of anger, a writer throws away his pen, or a
cause, viz. the harm done by another, and on the part of
rider strikes his horse. Therefore anger is not only towards
the vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that
those to whom one has an obligation of justice.
anger concerns those to whom one is just or unjust.
Objection 2. Further, “there is no justice towards one-
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 4, ad 2),
self. . . nor is there justice towards one’s own” (Ethic. v, 6).
anger, though it follows an act of reason, can nevertheless
But sometimes a man is angry with himself; for instance,
be in dumb animals that are devoid of reason, in so far
a penitent, on account of his sin; hence it is written (Ps.
as through their natural instinct they are moved by their
4:5): “Be ye angry and sin not.” Therefore anger is not
imagination to something like rational action. Since then
only towards those with whom one has a relation of jus-
in man there is both reason and imagination, the move-
tice.
ment of anger can be aroused in man in two ways. First,
Objection 3. Further, justice and injustice can be of
when only his imagination denounces the injury: and, in
one man towards an entire class, or a whole community:
this way, man is aroused to a movement of anger even
for instance, when the state injures an individual. But
against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement
anger is not towards a class but only towards an individual,
is like that which occurs in animals against anything that
as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore properly
injures them. Secondly, by the reason denouncing the in-
speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one is in
jury: and thus, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii,
relation of justice or injustice.
3), “it is impossible to be angry with insensible things, or
The contrary, however, may be gathered from the
with the dead”: both because they feel no pain, which is,
Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2,3).
above all, what the angry man seeks in those with whom
I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), anger desires
he is angry: and because there is no question of vengeance
807
on them, since they can do us no harm.
“hatred may be felt towards a class, as we hate the entire
Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
class of thieves; whereas anger is directed only towards
v, 11), “metaphorically speaking there is a certain justice
an individual.” The reason is that hatred arises from our
and injustice between a man and himself,” in so far as the
considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition;
reason rules the irascible and concupiscible parts of the
and this may refer to a thing in general or in particular.
soul. And in this sense a man is said to be avenged on
Anger, on the other hand, ensues from someone having
himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself. But
injured us by his action. Now all actions are the deeds of
properly, and in accordance with the nature of things, a
individuals: and consequently anger is always pointed at
man is never angry with himself.
an individual. When the whole state hurts us, the whole
Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4)
state is reckoned as one individual∗.
assigns as one difference between hatred and anger, that
Whether the species of anger are suitably assigned?
Ia IIae q. 46 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that Damascene (De Fide
scene and Gregory of Nyssa are taken from those things
Orth. ii, 16) unsuitably assigns three species of anger—
which give increase to anger. This happens in three ways.
“wrath,” “ill-will” and “rancor.” For no genus derives its
First from facility of the movement itself, and he calls this
specific differences from accidents. But these three are di-
kind of anger cholos [bile] because it quickly aroused.
versified in respect of an accident: because “the beginning
Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and
of the movement of anger is called wrath cholos, if anger which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs to
continue it is called ill-will menis; while rancor kotos is menis [ill-will] which is derived from menein [to dwell].
anger waiting for an opportunity of vengeance.” There-
Thirdly, on the part of that which the angry man seeks, viz.
fore these are not different species of anger.
vengeance; and this pertains to kotos [rancor] which never Objection 2. Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc.
rests until it is avenged‡. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic.
iv, 9) that “excandescentia [irascibility] is what the Greeks
iv, 5) calls some angry persons akrocholoi [choleric], be-call thymosis, and is a kind of anger that arises and sub-cause they are easily angered; some he calls pikroi [bitter], sides intermittently”; while according to Damascene thy-because they retain their anger for a long time; and some
mosis, is the same as the Greek kotos [rancor]. Therefore he calls chalepoi [ill-tempered], because they never rest kotos does not bide its time for taking vengeance, but in until they have retaliated§.
course of time spends itself.
Reply to Objection 1. All those things which give
Objection 3. Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives
anger some kind of perfection are not altogether acciden-
three degrees of anger, namely, “anger without utter-
tal to anger; and consequently nothing prevents them from
ance, anger with utterance, and anger with perfection of
causing a certain specific difference thereof.
speech,” corresponding to the three degrees mentioned by
Reply to Objection 2. Irascibility, which Cicero men-
Our Lord (Mat. 5:22): “Whosoever is angry with his
tions, seems to pertain to the first species of anger, which
brother” [thus implying “anger without utterance”], and
consists in a certain quickness of temper, rather than to
then, “whosoever shall say to his brother, ‘Raca’ ” [im-
rancor [furor]. And there is no reason why the Greek thy-
plying “anger with utterance yet without full expression”],
mosis, which is denoted by the Latin “furor,” should not and lastly, “whosoever shall say ‘Thou fool’ ” [where we
signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose
have “perfection of speech”]. Therefore Damascene’s di-
in being avenged.
vision is imperfect, since it takes no account of utterance.
Reply to Objection 3.
These degrees are distin-
On the contrary, stands the authority of Damascene
guished according to various effects of anger; and not ac-
(De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa†.
cording to degrees of perfection in the very movement of
I answer that, The species of anger given by Dama-
anger.
∗ Cf. q. 29, a. 6
† Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.
‡ Eph. 4:31: “Let all bitterness and anger and indignation. . . be put away from you.”
§ Cf.
IIa IIae, q. 158, a. 5
808
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 47
Of the Cause That Provokes Anger, and of the Remedies of Anger∗
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?
(2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?
(3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person;
(4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is angry.
Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?
Ia IIae q. 47 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the motive of anger is
vengeance. Now unless some injury has been done, there
not always something done against the one who is angry.
is no question of vengeance: nor does any injury provoke
Because man, by sinning, can do nothing against God;
one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the per-
since it is written (Job 35:6): “If thy iniquities be multi-
son who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally
plied, what shalt thou do against Him?” And yet God is
seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil.
spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin, ac-
But injury done by anyone does not affect a man unless
cording to Ps. 105:40: “The Lord was exceedingly angry
in some way it be something done against him. Conse-
with His people.” Therefore it is not always on account of
quently the motive of a man’s anger is always something
something done against him, that a man is angry.
done against him.
Objection 2. Further, anger is a desire for vengeance.
Reply to Objection 1. We speak of anger in God, not
But one may desire vengeance for things done against oth-
as of a passion of the soul but as of judgment of justice,
ers. Therefore we are not always angry on account of
inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance on sin. Because
something done against us.
the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm:
Objection 3. Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet.
but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God
ii, 2) man is angry especially with those “who despise
in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His
what he takes a great interest in; thus men who study phi-
commandments. Secondly, in so far as he harms himself
losophy are angry with those who despise philosophy,”
or another; which injury redounds to God, inasmuch as
and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm
the person injured is an object of God’s providence and
the philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to
protection.
us that makes us angry.
Reply to Objection 2. If we are angry with those who
Objection 4. Further, he that holds his tongue when
harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because
another insults him, provokes him to greater anger, as
those who are injured belong in some way to us: either by
Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.). But
some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the na-
by holding his tongue he does the other no harm. There-
ture we have in common.
fore a man is not always provoked to anger by something
Reply to Objection 3. When we take a very great in-
done against him.
terest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4)
if anyone despise it, it seems as though we ourselves were
that “anger is always due to something done to oneself:
despised and injured.
whereas hatred may arise without anything being done to
Reply to Objection 4. Silence provokes the insulter
us, for we hate a man simply because we think him such.”
to anger when he thinks it is due to contempt, as though
I answer that, As stated above (q. 46, a. 6), anger
his anger were slighted: and a slight is an action.
is the desire to hurt another for the purpose of just
∗ There Is No Further Mention of These Remedies in the Text, Except in A. 4.
809
Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or contempt?
Ia IIae q. 47 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that slight or contempt
all angry with those who, in our opinion, have hurt us on
is not the sole motive of anger. For Damascene says (De
purpose. For if we think that some one has done us an in-
Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we are angry “when we suffer, or
jury through ignorance or through passion, either we are
think that we are suffering, an injury.” But one may suffer
not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to
an injury without being despised or slighted. Therefore a
do anything through ignorance or through passion takes
slight is not the only motive of anger.
away from the notion of injury, and to a certain extent
Objection 2. Further, desire for honor and grief for
calls for mercy and forgiveness. Those, on the other hand,
a slight belong to the same subject. But dumb animals
who do an injury on purpose, seem to sin from contempt;
do not desire honor. Therefore they are not grieved by
wherefore we are angry with them most of all. Hence the
being slighted. And yet “they are roused to anger, when
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that “we are either not an-
wounded,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8). There-
gry at all, or not very angry with those who have acted
fore a slight is not the sole motive of anger.
through anger, because they do not seem to have acted
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2)
slightingly.”
gives many other causes of anger, for instance, “being for-
The second reason is because a slight is opposed to
gotten by others; that others should rejoice in our misfor-
a man’s excellence: because “men think little of things
tunes; that they should make known our evils; being hin-
that are not worth much ado” (Rhet. ii, 2). Now we seek
dered from doing as we like.” Therefore being slighted is
for some kind of excellence from all our goods. Conse-
not the only motive for being angry.
quently whatever injury is inflicted on us, in so far as it is
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2)
derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight.
that anger is “a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on ac-
Reply to Objection 1. Any other cause, besides con-
count of a seeming slight done unbecomingly.”
tempt, through which a man suffers an injury, takes away
I answer that, All the causes of anger are reduced to
from the notion of injury: contempt or slight alone adds
slight. For slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, to the motive of anger, and consequently is of itself the
viz. “contempt,” “despiteful treatment,” i.e. hindering one
cause of anger.
from doing one’s will, and “insolence”: and all motives of
Reply to Objection 2. Although a dumb animal does
anger are reduced to these three. Two reasons may be as-
not seek honor as such, yet it naturally seeks a certain su-
signed for this. First, because anger seeks another’s hurt
periority, and is angry with anything derogatory thereto.
as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks
Reply to Objection 3. Each of those causes amounts
vengeance in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance
to some kind of slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign
is taken only for that which is done unjustly; hence that
of slight esteem, for the more we think of a thing the more
which provokes anger is always something considered in
is it fixed in our memory. Again if a man does not hesitate
the light of an injustice. Wherefore the Philosopher says
by his remarks to give pain to another, this seems to show
(Rhet. ii, 3) that “men are not angry—if they think they
that he thinks little of him: and those too who show signs
have wronged some one and are suffering justly on that
of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem to care lit-
account; because there is no anger at what is just.” Now
tle about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another
injury is done to another in three ways: namely, through
from carrying out his will, without deriving thereby any
ignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then,
profit to himself, seems not to care much for his friend-
most of all, a man does an injustice, when he does an
ship. Consequently all those things, in so far as they are
injury from choice, on purpose, or from deliberate mal-
signs of contempt, provoke anger.
ice, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most of
Whether a man’s excellence is the cause of his being angry?
Ia IIae q. 47 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that a man’s excellence
2) that “some are very much inclined to be angry when
is not the cause of his being more easily angry. For the
they are despised for some failing or weakness of the ex-
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that “some are angry es-
istence of which there are grounds for suspicion; but if
pecially when they are grieved, for instance, the sick, the
they think they excel in those points, they do not trouble.”
poor, and those who are disappointed.” But these things
But a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. There-
seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than ex-
fore defect rather than excellence is a cause of a man being
cellence makes one prone to anger.
angry.
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
Objection 3. Further, whatever savors of excellence
810
makes a man agreeable and hopeful. But the Philosopher in him by the motive aforesaid. Now it is evident that
says (Rhet. ii, 3) that “men are not angry when they play,
nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves
make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor when they are pros-
him: while whatever savors of defect is above all a cause
perous or successful, nor in moderate pleasures and well-
of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more
founded hope.” Therefore excellence is not a cause of
easily hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject
anger.
to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9)
are more easily grieved.
that excellence makes men prone to anger.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
I answer that, The cause of anger, in the man who
Reply to Objection 2. If a man be despised in a matter
is angry, may be taken in two ways. First in respect of
in which he evidently excels greatly, he does not consider
the motive of anger: and thus excellence is the cause of
himself the loser thereby, and therefore is not grieved: and
a man being easily angered. Because the motive of anger
in this respect he is less angered. But in another respect,
is an unjust slight, as stated above (a. 2). Now it is evi-
in so far as he is more undeservedly despised, he has more
dent that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a
reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks that he
slight offered him in the matter in which he excels. Con-
is envied or insulted not through contempt but through ig-
sequently those who excel in any matter, are most of all
norance, or some other like cause.
angry, if they be slighted in that matter; for instance, a
Reply to Objection 3. All these things hinder anger in
wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his eloquence,
so far as they hinder sorrow. But in another respect they
and so forth.
are naturally apt to provoke anger, because they make it
Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry,
more unseemly to insult anyone.
may be considered on the part of the disposition produced
Whether a person’s defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him?
Ia IIae q. 47 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that a person’s defect is
For just as the higher a man’s position is, the more unde-
not a reason for being more easily angry with him. For the
servedly he is despised; so the lower it is, the less reason
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that “we are not angry with
he has for despising. Thus a nobleman is angry if he be
those who confess and repent and humble themselves; on
insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if by a fool; a master,
the contrary, we are gentle with them. Wherefore dogs
if by a servant.
bite not those who sit down.” But these things savor of
If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the un-
littleness and defect. Therefore littleness of a person is a
merited contempt, then it does not increase but lessens
reason for being less angry with him.
anger. In this way those who repent of their ill-deeds, and
Objection 2. Further, there is no greater defect than
confess that they have done wrong, who humble them-
death. But anger ceases at the sight of death. Therefore
selves and ask pardon, mitigate anger, according to Prov.
defect of a person does not provoke anger against him.
15:1: “A mild answer breaketh wrath”: because, to wit,
Objection 3. Further, no one thinks little of a man
they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those
through his being friendly towards him. But we are more
before whom they humble themselves.
angry with friends, if they offend us or refuse to help us;
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
hence it is written (Ps. 54:13): “If my enemy had reviled
Reply to Objection 2. There are two reasons why
me I would verily have borne with it.” Therefore a per-
anger ceases at the sight of death. One is because the dead
son’s defect is not a reason for being more easily angry
are incapable of sorrow and sensation; and this is chiefly
with him.
what the angry seek in those with whom they are angered.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2)
Another reason is because the dead seem to have attained
that “the rich man is angry with the poor man, if the latter
to the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all
despise him; and in like manner the prince is angry with
who are grievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses the
his subject.”
measure of just retaliation.
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 2,3) unmerited
Reply to Objection 3. To be despised by one’s friends
contempt more than anything else is a provocative of
seems also a greater indignity. Consequently if they de-
anger. Consequently deficiency or littleness in the per-
spise us by hurting or by failing to help, we are angry
son with whom we are angry, tends to increase our anger,
with them for the same reason for which we are angry
in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised.
with those who are beneath us.
811
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 48
Of the Effects of Anger
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether anger causes pleasure?
(2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart?
(3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason?
(4) Whether it causes taciturnity?
Whether anger causes pleasure?
Ia IIae q. 48 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that anger does not cause
sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently
pleasure. Because sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger
as soon as vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so
is never without sorrow, since, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6,
much the greater according as the sorrow was greater.
“everyone that acts from anger, acts with pain.” Therefore
Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure
anger does not cause pleasure.
ensues, entirely excluding sorrow, so that the movement
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
of anger ceases. But before vengeance is really present,
5) that “vengeance makes anger to cease, because it sub-
it becomes present to the angry man in two ways: in one
stitutes pleasure for pain”: whence we may gather that
way, by hope; because none is angry except he hopes for
the angry man derives pleasure from vengeance, and that
vengeance, as stated above (q. 46, a. 1); in another way,
vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the advent of
by thinking of it continually, for to everyone that desires
pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an
a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought of what he
effect united with pleasure.
desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleas-
Objection 3. Further, no effect hinders its cause, since ant. Accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in think-it is conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as
ing much about vengeance. This pleasure, however, is not
stated in Rhet. ii, 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of
perfect, so as to banish sorrow and consequently anger.
anger.
Reply to Objection 1. The angry man does not grieve
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic.
iv, 5)
and rejoice at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong
quotes the saying that anger is “Sweet to the soul as honey
done, while he takes pleasure in the thought and hope of
to the taste” (Iliad, xviii, 109 [trl. Pope]).
vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as its begin-
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,
ning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger.
14), pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are
Reply to Objection 2. This argument holds in re-
remedies against sorrow: and therefore the greater the sor-
gard to pleasure caused by the real presence of vengeance,
row or anxiety, the more sensible are we to the pleasure
which banishes anger altogether.
which heals it, as is evident in the case of thirst which in-
Reply to Objection 3. Pleasure that precedes hinders
creases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what
sorrow from ensuing, and consequently is a hindrance to
has been said (q. 47, Aa. 1,3), that the movement of anger
anger. But pleasure felt in taking vengeance follows from
arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which
anger.
Whether anger above all causes fervor in the heart?
Ia IIae q. 48 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that heat is not above all
anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3)
the effect of anger. For fervor, as stated above (q. 28, a. 5;
that “time puts an end to anger.” Therefore fervor is not
q. 37, a. 2), belongs to love. But love, as above stated, is
the proper effect of anger.
the beginning and cause of all the passions. Since then the
Objection 3.
Further, fervor added to fervor pro-
cause is more powerful than its effect, it seems that anger
duces greater fervor. But “the addition of a greater anger
is not the chief cause of fervor.
banishes already existing anger,” as the Philosopher says
Objection 2. Further, those things which, of them-
(Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause fervor.
selves, arouse fervor, increase as time goes on; thus love
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
grows stronger the longer it lasts. But in course of time
16) that “anger is fervor of the blood around the heart,
812
resulting from an exhalation of the bile.”
reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love;
I answer that, As stated above (q. 44, a. 1), the bod-
and hence the saying that “love springs from the liver,” be-
ily transmutation that occurs in the passions of the soul is
cause of the blood being formed there. On the other hand,
proportionate to the movement of the appetite. Now it is
the fervor of anger has a certain bitterness with a tendency
evident that every appetite, even the natural appetite, tends
to destroy, for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil:
with greater force to repel that which is contrary to it, if it whence it is likened to the heat of fire and of the bile, and
be present: hence we see that hot water freezes harder, as
for this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that
though the cold acted with greater force on the hot object.
it “results from an exhalation of the bile whence it takes
Since then the appetitive movement of anger is caused by
its name chole.”
some injury inflicted, as by a contrary that is present; it
Reply to Objection 2.
Time, of necessity, weak-
follows that the appetite tends with great force to repel the
ens all those things, the causes of which are impaired by
injury by the desire of vengeance; and hence ensues great
time. Now it is evident that memory is weakened by time;
vehemence and impetuosity in the movement of anger.
for things which happened long ago easily slip from our
And because the movement of anger is not one of recoil,
memory. But anger is caused by the memory of a wrong
which corresponds to the action of cold, but one of prose-
done. Consequently the cause of anger is impaired little
cution, which corresponds to the action of heat, the result
by little as time goes on, until at length it vanishes alto-
is that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood
gether. Moreover a wrong seems greater when it is first
and vital spirits around the heart, which is the instrument
felt; and our estimate thereof is gradually lessened the
of the soul’s passions. And hence it is that, on account
further the sense of present wrong recedes into the past.
of the heart being so disturbed by anger, those chiefly
The same applies to love, so long as the cause of love is in
who are angry betray signs thereof in their outer mem-
the memory alone; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
bers. For, as Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) “the heart that
viii, 5) that “if a friend’s absence lasts long, it seems to
is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick,
make men forget their friendship.” But in the presence of
the body trembles, the tongue stammers, the countenance
a friend, the cause of friendship is continually being mul-
takes fire, the eyes grow fierce, they that are well known
tiplied by time: wherefore the friendship increases: and
are not recognized. With the mouth indeed he shapes a
the same would apply to anger, were its cause continually
sound, but the understanding knows not what it says.”
multiplied.
Reply to Objection 1.
“Love itself is not felt so
Nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends it-
keenly as in the absence of the beloved,” as Augustine
self proves the strength of its fervor: for as a great fire is
observes (De Trin. x, 12). Consequently when a man suf-
soon spent having burnt up all the fuel; so too anger, by
fers from a hurt done to the excellence that he loves, he
reason of its vehemence, soon dies away.
feels his love thereof the more: the result being that his
Reply to Objection 3. Every power that is divided in
heart is moved with greater heat to remove the hindrance
itself is weakened. Consequently if a man being already
to the object of his love; so that anger increases the fervor
angry with one, becomes angry with another, by this very
of love and makes it to be felt more.
fact his anger with the former is weakened. Especially
Nevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs ac-
is this so if his anger in the second case be greater: be-
cording as it is to be referred to love or to anger. Be-
cause the wrong done which aroused his former anger,
cause the fervor of love has a certain sweetness and gen-
will, in comparison with the second wrong, which is reck-
tleness; for it tends to the good that one loves: whence it is
oned greater, seem to be of little or no account.
likened to the warmth of the air and of the blood. For this
Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason?
Ia IIae q. 48 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that anger does not hin-
also states (Ethic. vii, 6.).
der the use of reason. Because that which presupposes an
Objection 3. Further, the judgment of reason becomes
act of reason, does not seem to hinder the use of reason.
more evident by juxtaposition of the contrary: because
But “anger listens to reason,” as stated in Ethic. vii, 6.
contraries stand out more clearly when placed beside one
Therefore anger does not hinder reason.
another. But this also increases anger: for the Philoso-
Objection 2. Further, the more the reason is hindered,
pher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that “men are more angry if they
the less does a man show his thoughts. But the Philoso-
receive unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable men,
pher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “an angry man is not cunning
if they be dishonored”: and so forth. Therefore the same
but is open.” Therefore anger does not seem to hinder the
cause increases anger, and facilitates the judgment of rea-
use of reason, as desire does; for desire is cunning, as he
son. Therefore anger does not hinder the judgment of rea-
813
son.
but because he acts openly, without thought of hiding him-
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that
self. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so
anger “withdraws the light of understanding, while by ag-
as not to discern what should be hidden and what done
itating it troubles the mind.”
openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to
I answer that, Although the mind or reason makes no
the dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanim-
use of a bodily organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs
ity which is an effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher
certain sensitive powers for the execution of its act, the
says of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv, 3) that “he is
acts of which powers are hindered when the body is dis-
open in his hatreds and his friendships. . . and speaks and
turbed, it follows of necessity that any disturbance in the
acts openly.” Desire, on the other hand, is said to lie low
body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is clear in
and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasur-
the case of drunkenness or sleep. Now it has been stated
able things that are desired, savor of shame and volup-
(a. 2) that anger, above all, causes a bodily disturbance in
tuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in
the region of the heart, so much as to effect even the out-
those things that savor of manliness and excellence, such
ward members. Consequently, of all the passions, anger
as matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open.
is the most manifest obstacle to the judgment of reason,
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (ad 1), the
according to Ps. 30:10: “My eye is troubled with wrath.”
movement of anger begins in the reason, wherefore the
Reply to Objection 1. The beginning of anger is in
juxtaposition of one contrary with another facilitates the
the reason, as regards the appetitive movement, which is
judgment of reason, on the same grounds as it increases
the formal element of anger. But the passion of anger fore-
anger.
For when a man who is possessed of honor
stalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though it listened
or wealth, suffers a loss therein, the loss seems all the
but imperfectly to reason, on account of the commotion
greater, both on account of the contrast, and because it was
of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is
unforeseen. Consequently it causes greater grief: just as a
the material element of anger. In this respect it hinders the
great good, through being received unexpectedly, causes
judgment of reason.
greater delight. And in proportion to the increase of the
Reply to Objection 2. An angry man is said to be
grief that precedes, anger is increased also.
open, not because it is clear to him what he ought to do,
Whether anger above all causes taciturnity?
Ia IIae q. 48 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that anger does not cause
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3; q. 46, a. 4), anger taciturnity. Because taciturnity is opposed to speech. But
both follows an act of reason, and hinders the reason: and
increase in anger conduces to speech; as is evident from
in both respects it may cause taciturnity. On the part of the
the degrees of anger laid down by Our Lord (Mat. 5:22):
reason, when the judgment of reason prevails so far, that
where He says: “Whosoever is angry with his brother”;
although it does not curb the appetite in its inordinate de-
and ”. . . whosoever shall say to his brother, ‘Raca’ ”; and
sire for vengeance, yet it curbs the tongue from unbridled
”. . . whosoever shall say to his brother, ‘Thou fool.’ ”
speech. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 30): “Some-
Therefore anger does not cause taciturnity.
times when the mind is disturbed, anger, as if in judg-
Objection 2. Further, through failing to obey reason,
ment, commands silence.” On the part of the impediment
man sometimes breaks out into unbecoming words: hence
to reason because, as stated above (a. 2), the disturbance
it is written (Prov. 25:28): “As a city that lieth open and is
of anger reaches to the outward members, and chiefly to
not compassed with walls, so is a man that cannot refrain
those members which reflect more distinctly the emotions
his own spirit in speaking.” But anger, above all, hinders
of the heart, such as the eyes, face and tongue; wherefore,
the judgment of reason, as stated above (a. 3). Conse-
as observed above (a. 2), “the tongue stammers, the coun-
quently above all it makes one break out into unbecoming
tenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce.” Consequently
words. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity.
anger may cause such a disturbance, that the tongue is al-
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Mat. 12:34): “Out
together deprived of speech; and taciturnity is the result.
of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh.” But
Reply to Objection 1. Anger sometimes goes so far
anger, above all, causes a disturbance in the heart, as
as to hinder the reason from curbing the tongue: but some-
stated above (a. 2). Therefore above all it conduces to
times it goes yet farther, so as to paralyze the tongue and
speech. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity.
other outward members.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that
And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objec-
“when anger does not vent itself outwardly by the lips,
tion.
inwardly it burns the more fiercely.”
Reply to Objection 3. The disturbance of the heart
814
may sometimes superabound to the extend that the move-even death. If, however, the disturbance be not so great,
ments of the outward members are hindered by the inor-
then “out of the abundance of the heart” thus disturbed,
dinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue taciturnity
the mouth proceeds to speak.
and immobility of the outward members; and sometimes
815
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 49
Of Habits in General, As to Their Substance
(In Four Articles)
After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly of intrinsic principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle is power and habit; but as we have treated of powers in the Ia, q. 77, seqq., it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second place we shall consider virtues and vices and other like habits, which are the principles of human acts.
Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First, the substance of habits; second, their subject; third, the cause of their generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are distinguished from one another.
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether habit is a quality?
(2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?
(3) Whether habit implies an order to an act?
(4) Of the necessity of habit.
Whether habit is a quality?
Ia IIae q. 49 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that habit is not a qual-
is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity.
ity. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): “this word
Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only
‘habit’ is derived from the verb ‘to have.’ ” But “to have”
a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a com-
belongs not only to quality, but also to the other cate-
panion or a friend. And, further, there are some in which
gories: for we speak of ourselves as “having” quantity
there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but
and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a
something after the manner of action or passion: thus, for
quality.
instance, something adorns or covers, and something else
Objection 2. Further, habit is reckoned as one of the
is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says
predicaments; as may be clearly seen in the Book of the
(Metaph. v, text. 25) that “a habit is said to be, as it
Predicaments (Categor. vi). But one predicament is not
were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is
contained under another. Therefore habit is not a quality.
had”; as is the case in those things which we have about
Objection 3. Further, “every habit is a disposition,”
ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus
as is stated in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi).
of things, which are comprised under the predicament of
Now disposition is “the order of that which has parts,” as
“habit”: of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text.
stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But this belongs to the
25) that “there is a habit between clothing and the man
predicament Position. Therefore habit is not a quality.
who is clothed.”
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of
But if “to have” be taken according as a thing has a re-
Predicaments (Categor. vi) that “habit is a quality which
lation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case
is difficult to change.”
habit is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of
I answer that, This word “habitus” [habit] is derived
some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v,
from “habere” [to have]. Now habit is taken from this
text. 25) that “habit is a disposition whereby that which is
word in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as man, or any
disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard
other thing, is said to “have” something; in another way,
to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a habit.”
inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet] ei-
And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we
ther in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.
must say that habit is a quality.
Concerning the first, we must observe that “to have,”
Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes “to have”
as said in regard to anything that is “had,” is common to
in the general sense: for thus it is common to many
the various predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts “to
predicaments, as we have said.
have” among the “post-predicaments,” so called because
Reply to Objection 2. This argument takes habit in
they result from the various predicaments; as, for instance,
the sense in which we understand it to be a medium be-
opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among
tween the haver, and that which is had: and in this sense
things which are had, there seems to be this distinction,
it is a predicament, as we have said.
that there are some in which there is no medium between
Reply to Objection 3. Disposition does always, in-
the “haver” and that which is had: as, for instance, there
deed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this hap-
816
pens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to he says ‘as to power,’ he includes all those dispositions
says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, “either as to place, or
which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at
as to power, or as to species.” “In saying this,” as Sim-
perfect usefulness,” such as inchoate science and virtue:
plicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments,
“and when he says, ‘as to species,’ he includes perfect
“he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he
dispositions, which are called habits,” such as perfected
says ‘as to place,’ ” and this belongs to the predicament
science and virtue.
“Position,” which is the order of parts in a place: “when
Whether habit is a distinct species of quality?
Ia IIae q. 49 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that habit is not a distinct
like qualities, which are not natural but adventitious: and
species of quality. Because, as we have said (a. 1), habit,
there are also many dispositions which are not adventi-
in so far as it is a quality, is “a disposition whereby that
tious but natural, as health, beauty, and the like. More-
which is disposed is disposed well or ill.” But this happens
over, it does not suit the order of the species, since that
in regard to any quality: for a thing happens to be well or
which is the more natural is always first.
ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like manner, in
Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of
regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such things.
dispositions and habits from other qualities. For quality,
Therefore habit is not a distinct species of quality.
properly speaking, implies a certain mode of substance.
Objection 2.
Further, the Philosopher says in the
Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), “is
Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi), that heat and
that which a measure determines”: wherefore it implies
cold are dispositions or habits, just as sickness and health.
a certain determination according to a certain measure.
Therefore habit or disposition is not distinct from the other
Therefore, just as that in accordance with which the ma-
species of quality.
terial potentiality [potentia materiae] is determined to its
Objection 3. Further, “difficult to change” is not a dif-substantial being, is called quality, which is a difference
ference belonging to the predicament of quality, but rather
affecting the substance, so that, in accordance with the
to movement or passion. Now, no genus should be con-
potentiality of the subject is determined to its accidental
tracted to a species by a difference of another genus; but
being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind
“differences should be proper to a genus,” as the Philoso-
of difference, as is clear from the Philosopher (Metaph. v,
pher says in Metaph. vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit
text. 19).
is “a quality difficult to change,” it seems not to be a dis-
Now the mode of determination of the subject to ac-
tinct species of quality.
cidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of
of the subject, or in regard to action, and passion resulting
the Predicaments (Categor. vi) that “one species of quality
from its natural principles, which are matter and form; or
is habit and disposition.”
again in regard to quantity. If we take the mode or deter-
I answer that, The Philosopher in the Book of
mination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then
Predicaments (Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit
have the fourth species of quality. And because quantity,
as the first species of quality. Now Simplicius, in his Com-
considered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not
mentary on the Predicaments, explains the difference of
imply the notion of good or evil, so it does not concern
these species as follows. He says “that some qualities are
the fourth species of quality whether a thing be well or ill
natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and
disposed, nor quickly or slowly transitory.
are always there: but some are adventitious, being caused
But the mode of determination of the subject, in re-
from without, and these can be lost. Now the latter,” i.e.
gard to action or passion, is considered in the second and
those which are adventitious, “are habits and dispositions,
third species of quality. And therefore in both, we take
differing in the point of being easily or difficultly lost. As
into account whether a thing be done with ease or diffi-
to natural qualities, some regard a thing in the point of its
culty; whether it be transitory or lasting. But in them, we
being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the sec-
do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good
ond species of quality: while others regard a thing which
or evil: because movements and passions have not the as-
is in act; and this either deeply rooted therein or only on
pect of an end, whereas good and evil are said in respect
its surface. If deeply rooted, we have the third species of
of an end.
quality: if on the surface, we have the fourth species of
On the other hand, the mode or determination of the
quality, as shape, and form which is the shape of an ani-
subject, in regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the
mated being.” But this distinction of the species of quality
first species of quality, which is habit and disposition: for
seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes, and passion-
the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17), when speak-
817
ing of habits of the soul and of the body, that they are disposition is included in the definition of habit (Metaph.
“dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I
v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is divided
mean that which is disposed in accordance with its na-
against habit. Again, disposition, properly so called, can
ture.” And since the form itself and the nature of a thing
be divided against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and
is the end and the cause why a thing is made (Phys. ii,
imperfect within the same species; and thus we call it a
text. 25), therefore in the first species we consider both
disposition, retaining the name of the genus, when it is
evil and good, and also changeableness, whether easy or
had imperfectly, so as to be easily lost: whereas we call
difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of gener-
it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost
ation and movement. And so the Philosopher (Metaph. v,
easily. And thus a disposition becomes a habit, just as a
text. 25) defines habit, a “disposition whereby someone
boy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished
is disposed, well or ill”; and in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that
as diverse species of the one subaltern genus: so that
by “habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the
we call dispositions, those qualities of the first species,
passions.” For when the mode is suitable to the thing’s
which by reason of their very nature are easily lost, be-
nature, it has the aspect of good: and when it is unsuit-
cause they have changeable causes; e.g. sickness and
able, it has the aspect of evil. And since nature is the first
health: whereas we call habits those qualities which, by
object of consideration in anything, for this reason habit
reason of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that
is reckoned as the first species of quality.
they have unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences and virtues.
Reply to Objection 1. Disposition implies a certain
And in this sense, disposition does not become habit. The
order, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). Wherefore a man is not
latter explanation seems more in keeping with the inten-
said to be disposed by some quality except in relation to
tion of Aristotle: for in order to confirm this distinction
something else. And if we add “well or ill,” which belongs
he adduces the common mode of speaking, according to
to the essential notion of habit, we must consider the qual-
which, when a quality is, by reason of its nature, easily
ity’s relation to the nature, which is the end. So in regard
changeable, and, through some accident, becomes diffi-
to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said to be well or ill cultly changeable, then it is called a habit: while the con-disposed, except by reason of a relation to the nature of a
trary happens in regard to qualities, by reason of their na-
thing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability. Conse-
ture, difficultly changeable: for supposing a man to have a
quently even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as
science imperfectly, so as to be liable to lose it easily, we
they are considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the na-
say that he is disposed to that science, rather than that he
ture of a thing, belong to habits or dispositions: for shape
has the science. From this it is clear that the word “habit”
and color, according to their suitability to the nature of
implies a certain lastingness: while the word “disposition”
thing, concern beauty; while heat and cold, according to
does not.
their suitability to the nature of a thing, concern health.
Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult
And in this way heat and cold are put, by the Philosopher,
to change are specific differences (of a quality), although
in the first species of quality.
they belong to passion and movement, and not the genus
Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second ob-
of quality. For these differences, though apparently acci-
jection: though some give another solution, as Simplicius
dental to quality, nevertheless designate differences which
says in his Commentary on the Predicaments.
are proper and essential to quality. In the same way, in
Reply to Objection 3. This difference, “difficult to
the genus of substance we often take accidental instead of
change,” does not distinguish habit from the other species
substantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential
of quality, but from disposition. Now disposition may be
principles are designated.
taken in two ways; in one way, as the genus of habit, for
Whether habit implies order to an act?
Ia IIae q. 49 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that habit does not imply
principle of action, is put in the definition of power, as we
order to an act. For everything acts according as it is in
read in Metaph. v, text. 17. Therefore to be the principle
act. But the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text 8), that
of an act belongs to power essentially. Now that which is
“when one is become knowing by habit, one is still in a
essential is first in every genus. If therefore, habit also is
state of potentiality, but otherwise than before learning.”
a principle of act, it follows that it is posterior to power.
Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle
And so habit and disposition will not be the first species
to an act.
of quality.
Objection 2. Further, that which is put in the defi-
Objection 3. Further, health is sometimes a habit, and
nition of a thing, belongs to it essentially. But to be a
so are leanness and beauty. But these do not indicate rela-
818
tion to an act. Therefore it is not essential to habit to be a pally relation to an act. For, as we have said, habit primar-principle of act.
ily and of itself implies a relation to the thing’s nature. If
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug.
therefore the nature of a thing, in which the habit is, con-
xxi) that “habit is that whereby something is done when
sists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the habit necessary.” And the Commentator says (De Anima iii)
principally implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that
that “habit is that whereby we act when we will.”
the nature and the notion of power is that it should be a
I answer that, To have relation to an act may belong
principle of act. Wherefore every habit is subjected in a
to habit, both in regard to the nature of habit, and in re-
power, implies principally relation to an act.
gard to the subject in which the habit is. In regard to the
Reply to Objection 1. Habit is an act, in so far as it
nature of habit, it belongs to every habit to have relation
is a quality: and in this respect it can be a principle of op-
to an act. For it is essential to habit to imply some relation
eration. It is, however, in a state of potentiality in respect
to a thing’s nature, in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable
to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and oper-
thereto. But a thing’s nature, which is the end of gener-
ation, second act; as it is explained in De Anima ii, text.
ation, is further ordained to another end, which is either
5.
an operation, or the product of an operation, to which one
Reply to Objection 2. It is not the essence of habit to
attains by means of operation. Wherefore habit implies
be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as na-
relation not only to the very nature of a thing, but also,
ture precedes action, to which power is related, therefore
consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of
habit is put before power as a species of quality.
nature, or conducive to the end. Whence also it is stated
Reply to Objection 3. Health is said to be a habit, or a (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a
habitual disposition, in relation to nature, as stated above.
disposition whereby that which is disposed, is well or ill
But in so far as nature is a principle of act, it consequently
disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or
implies a relation to act. Wherefore the Philosopher says
in regard to something else, that is to the end.
(De Hist. Animal. x, 1), that man, or one of his members,
But there are some habits, which even on the part of
is called healthy, “when he can perform the operation of a
the subject in which they are, imply primarily and princi-
healthy man.” And the same applies to other habits.
Whether habits are necessary?
Ia IIae q. 49 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that habits are not neces-
it should be related to it as potentiality is to act. Whence,
sary. For by habits we are well or ill disposed in respect
if there is a being whose nature is not composed of poten-
of something, as stated above. But a thing is well or ill
tiality and act, and whose substance is its own operation,
disposed by its form: for in respect of its form a thing is
which itself is for itself, there we can find no room for
good, even as it is a being. Therefore there is no necessity
habit and disposition, as is clearly the case in God.
for habits.
The second condition is, that that which is in a state of
Objection 2. Further, habit implies relation to an act.
potentiality in regard to something else, be capable of de-
But power implies sufficiently a principle of act: for even
termination in several ways and to various things. Whence
the natural powers, without any habits, are principles of
if something be in a state of potentiality in regard to some-
acts. Therefore there was no necessity for habits.
thing else, but in regard to that only, there we find no room
Objection 3. Further, as power is related to good and
for disposition and habit: for such a subject from its own
evil, so also is habit: and as power does not always act,
nature has the due relation to such an act. Wherefore if
so neither does habit. Given, therefore, the powers, habits
a heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since
become superfluous.
that matter is not in a state of potentiality to another form,
On the contrary, Habits are perfections (Phys. vii,
as we said in the Ia, q. 56, a. 2, there is no need for dispo-
text. 17). But perfection is of the greatest necessity to a
sition or habit in respect of the form, or even in respect of
thing: since it is in the nature of an end. Therefore it is
operation, since the nature of the heavenly body is not in
necessary that there should be habits.
a state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement.
I answer that, As we have said above (Aa. 2,3), habit
The third condition is that in disposing the subject to
implies a disposition in relation to a thing’s nature, and to
one of those things to which it is in potentiality, several
its operation or end, by reason of which disposition a thing
things should occur, capable of being adjusted in vari-
is well or ill disposed thereto. Now for a thing to need to
ous ways: so as to dispose the subject well or ill to its
be disposed to something else, three conditions are neces-
form or to its operation. Wherefore the simple qualities
sary. The first condition is that which is disposed should
of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in
be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so, that
one single fixed way, are not called dispositions or habits,
819
but “simple qualities”: but we call dispositions or habits, to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the
such things as health, beauty, and so forth, which imply
form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form
the adjustment of several things which may vary in their
be such that it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it
relative adjustability. For this reason the Philosopher says
needs to be disposed to its operations by means of habits.
(Metaph. v, text. 24,25) that “habit is a disposition”:
Reply to Objection 2. Power sometimes has a rela-
and disposition is “the order of that which has parts ei-
tion to many things: and then it needs to be determined
ther as to place, or as to potentiality, or as to species,” as
by something else. But if a power has not a relation to
we have said above (a. 1, ad 3). Wherefore, since there
many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as
are many things for whose natures and operations several
we have said. For this reason the natural forces do not
things must concur which may vary in their relative ad-
perform their operations by means of habits: because they
justability, it follows that habit is necessary.
are of themselves determined to one mode of operation.
Reply to Objection 1. By the form the nature of a
Reply to Objection 3. The same habit has not a re-
thing is perfected: yet the subject needs to be disposed
lation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on
in regard to the form by some disposition. But the form
(q. 54, a. 3): whereas the same power has a relation to
itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the
good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that
end, or the means to the end. And if the form is limited
the powers be determined to good.
820
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 50
Of the Subject of Habits
(In Six Articles)
We consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is a habit in the body?
(2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?
(3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit?
(4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect?
(5) Whether there is a habit in the will?
(6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances?
Whether there is a habit in the body?
Ia IIae q. 50 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a habit in
to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body,
the body. For, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii),
which is related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And
“a habit is that whereby we act when we will.” But bodily
in this way health and beauty and such like are called ha-
actions are not subject to the will, since they are natural.
bitual dispositions. Yet they have not the nature of habit
Therefore there can be no habit in the body.
perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are
Objection 2. Further, all bodily dispositions are easy
easily changeable.
to change.
But habit is a quality, difficult to change.
On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Com-
Therefore no bodily disposition can be a habit.
mentary on the Predicaments, Alexander denied abso-
Objection 3. Further, all bodily dispositions are sub-
lutely that habits or dispositions of the first species are
ject to change. But change can only be in the third species
in the body: and held that the first species of quality be-
of quality, which is divided against habit. Therefore there
longed to the soul alone. And he held that Aristotle men-
is no habit in the body.
tions health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book
not as though they belonged to the first species of quality,
of Predicaments (De Categor. vi) that health of the body
but by way of example: so that he would mean that just
and incurable disease are called habits.
as health and sickness may be easy or difficult to change,
I answer that, As we have said above (q. 49, Aa. 2
so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are
seqq.), habit is a disposition of a subject which is in a state called habits and dispositions. But this is clearly contrary
of potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore in
to the intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in
so far as habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is
the same way of health and sickness as examples, as of
principally in the body as its subject. For every operation
virtue and science; and because in Phys. vii, text. 17, he
of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the
expressly mentions beauty and health among habits.
body or from the soul moving the body. Consequently,
Reply to Objection 1. This objection runs in the sense
as to those operations which proceed from its nature, the
of habit as a disposition to operation, and of those actions
body is not disposed by a habit: because the natural forces
of the body which are from nature: but not in the sense of
are determined to one mode of operation; and we have al-
those actions which proceed from the soul, and the prin-
ready said (q. 49, a. 4) that it is when the subject is in
ciple of which is the will.
potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is
Reply to Objection 2. Bodily dispositions are not
required. As to the operations which proceed from the
simply difficult to change on account of the changeable-
soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul,
ness of their bodily causes. But they may be difficult to
and secondarily to the body. Now habits are in proportion
change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit,
to their operations: whence “by like acts like habits are
as long as such a subject endures, they cannot be removed;
formed” (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to
or because they are difficult to change, by comparison to
such operations are principally in the soul. But they can
other dispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply
be secondarily in the body: to wit, in so far as the body
difficult to change, on account of the unchangeableness
is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the
of the subject. And therefore he does not say that health
operations of the soul.
which is difficult to change is a habit simply: but that it is
If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject
“as a habit,” as we read in the Greek∗. On the other hand,
∗ isos hexin (Categor. viii)
821
the qualities of the soul are called habits simply.
the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a
Reply to Objection 3. Bodily dispositions which are
disposition; and if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and
in the first species of quality, as some maintained, differ
to become difficult to change, then it will be a habit: so
from qualities of the third species, in this, that the quali-
that disposition would be a certain intensity of passion or
ties of the third species consist in some “becoming” and
passion-like quality, and habit an intensity or disposition.
movement, as it were, wherefore they are called passions
But Simplicius disapproves of this, for such intensity and
or passible qualities. But when they have attained to per-
remissness do not imply diversity on the part of the form
fection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then
itself, but on the part of the diverse participation thereof
passed into the first species of quality. But Simplicius
by the subject; so that there would be no diversity among
in his Commentary disapproves of this; for in this way
the species of quality. And therefore we must say oth-
heating would be in the third species, and heat in the first
erwise that, as was explained above (q. 49, a. 2, ad 1),
species of quality; whereas Aristotle puts heat in the third.
the adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves,
Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Com-
according to their suitability to nature, implies the no-
mentary), says that passion or passion-like quality, dispo-
tion of disposition: and so, when a change takes place in
sition and habit, differ in bodies by way of intensity and
these same passion-like qualities, which are heat and cold,
remissness. For when a thing receives heat in this only
moisture and dryness, there results a change as to sickness
that it is being heated, and not so as to be able to give heat, and health. But change does not occur in regard to like
then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like
habits and dispositions, primarily and of themselves.
quality if it is permanent. But when it has been brought to
Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence or in respect of its Ia IIae q. 50 a. 2
power?
Objection 1. It would seem that habit is in the soul
of which man may become a partaker, according to 2 Pet.
in respect of its essence rather than in respect of its pow-
1, “that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature”: thus
ers. For we speak of dispositions and habits in relation to
nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in
nature, as stated above (q. 49, a. 2). But nature regards
the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on
the essence of the soul rather than the powers; because it
(q. 110, a. 4).
is in respect of its essence that the soul is the nature of
On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to op-
such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in
eration, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul:
the soul in respect of its essence and not in respect of its
in so far as the soul is not determined to one operation,
powers.
but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit,
Objection 2. Further, accident is not the subject of
as we have said above (q. 49, a. 4). And since the soul
accident. Now habit is an accident. But the powers of the
is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore,
soul are in the genus of accident, as we have said in the
regarded in this sense, habits are in the soul in respect of
Ia, q. 77, a. 1, ad 5. Therefore habit is not in the soul in
its powers.
respect of its powers.
Reply to Objection 1. The essence of the soul be-
Objection 3. Further, the subject is prior to that which longs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be
is in the subject.
But since habit belongs to the first
disposed to something further, but as a form and nature to
species of quality, it is prior to power, which belongs to
which someone is disposed.
the second species. Therefore habit is not in a power of
Reply to Objection 2. Accident is not of itself the
the soul as its subject.
subject of accident. But since among accidents them-
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts
selves there is a certain order, the subject, according as it
various habits in the various powers of the soul.
is under one accident, is conceived as the subject of a fur-
I answer that, As we have said above (q. 49, Aa. 2,3),
ther accident. In this way we say that one accident is the
habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or
subject of another; as superficies is the subject of color, in
to operation. If therefore we take habit as having a rela-
which sense power is the subject of habit.
tion to nature, it cannot be in the soul—that is, if we speak
Reply to Objection 3.
Habit takes precedence of
of human nature: for the soul itself is the form completing
power, according as it implies a disposition to nature:
the human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or
whereas power always implies a relation to operation,
disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of
which is posterior, since nature is the principle of oper-
its relation to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its
ation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does not
relation to the body. But if we speak of a higher nature,
imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is
822
posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes prece-For act is naturally prior to potentiality, though potential-
dence of power, as the complete takes precedence of the
ity is prior in order of generation and time, as stated in
incomplete, and as act takes precedence of potentiality.
Metaph. vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13.
Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts?
Ia IIae q. 50 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be any
are left to themselves, such animals act from natural in-
habits in the powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutri-
stinct: and so in them there are no habits ordained to op-
tive power is an irrational part, so is the sensitive power.
erations. There are in them, however, certain dispositions
But there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive
in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas by
part. Therefore we ought not to put any habit in the pow-
man’s reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom to
ers of the sensitive part.
do things in this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain
Objection 2. Further, the sensitive parts are common
extent, we can admit the existence of habits in dumb an-
to us and the brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes:
imals: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36):
for in them there is no will, which is put in the definition
“We find the most untamed beasts, deterred by fear of
of habit, as we have said above (q. 49, a. 3). Therefore
pain, from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure;
there are no habits in the sensitive powers.
and when this has become a custom in them, we say that
Objection 3. Further, the habits of the soul are sci-
they are tame and gentle.” But the habit is incomplete, as
ences and virtues: and just as science is related to the
to the use of the will, for they have not that power of us-
apprehensive power, so it virtue related to the appetitive
ing or of refraining, which seems to belong to the notion
power. But in the sensitive powers there are no sciences:
of habit: and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no
since science is of universals, which the sensitive powers
habits in them.
cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits
Reply to Objection 3. The sensitive appetite has an
of virtue in the sensitive part.
inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
stated in De Anima iii, text. 57: but the rational powers
10) that “some virtues,” namely, temperance and fortitude,
of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from
“belong to the irrational part.”
the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable
I answer that, The sensitive powers can be consid-
that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite
ered in two ways: first, according as they act from natural
than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the
instinct: secondly, according as they act at the command
powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except ac-
of reason. According as they act from natural instinct,
cording as they act at the command of the reason. And
they are ordained to one thing, even as nature is; but ac-
yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension,
cording as they act at the command of reason, they can be
we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facil-
ordained to various things. And thus there can be habits
ity of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the
in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard
Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that “custom
to something.
conduces much to a good memory”: the reason of which
Reply to Objection 1. The powers of the nutritive
is that these powers also are moved to act at the command
part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of
of the reason.
reason, and therefore there are no habits in them. But the
On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers,
sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the com-
as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptible of habits,
mand of reason; and therefore habits can be in them: for
but are ordained to their fixed acts, according to the dispo-
in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are
sition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for
said to be rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.
there are no habits in them, but rather in the powers which
Reply to Objection 2. The sensitive powers of dumb
command their movements.
animals do not act at the command of reason; but if they
Whether there is any habit in the intellect?
Ia IIae q. 50 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that there are no habits in
Therefore also are habits. But the intellect is not an act of
the intellect. For habits are in conformity with operations,
the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the intellect is
as stated above (a. 1). But the operations of man are com-
not the subject of a habit.
mon to soul and body, as stated in De Anima i, text. 64.
Objection 2. Further, whatever is in a thing, is there
823
according to the mode of that in which it is. But that which sidering: “and even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but
is form without matter, is act only: whereas what is com-
not in the same way as before learning and discovering.”
posed of form and matter, has potentiality and act at the
Therefore the “possible” intellect itself is the subject of
same time. Therefore nothing at the same time potential
the habit of science, by which the intellect, even though it
and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in
be not actually considering, is able to consider. In the sec-
that which is composed of matter and form. Now the in-
ond place, this supposition is contrary to the truth. For as
tellect is form without matter. Therefore habit, which has
to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power to
potentiality at the same time as act, being a sort of medium
operate, belongs also the habit. But to understand and to
between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only in the
consider is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also
“conjunction,” which is composed of soul and body.
the habit whereby one considers is properly in the intellect
Objection 3. Further, habit is a disposition whereby
itself.
we are well or ill disposed in regard to something, as is
Reply to Objection 1. Some said, as Simplicius re-
said (Metaph. v, text. 25). But that anyone should be
ports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that, since
well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is due to some
every operation of man is to a certain extent an operation
disposition of the body: wherefore also it is stated (De
of the “conjunctum,” as the Philosopher says (De Anima
Anima ii, text. 94) that “we observe men with soft flesh to
i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the soul only, but in
be quick witted.” Therefore the habits of knowledge are
the “conjunctum.” And from this it follows that no habit
not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power
is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, as ran the ar-which is the act of some part of the body.
gument, given above. But the argument is no cogent. For
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10)
habit is not a disposition of the object to the power, but
puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the
rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore
habit of first principles, in the intellective part of the soul.
the habit needs to be in that power which is principle of
I answer that, concerning intellective habits there
the act, and not in that which is compared to the power as
have been various opinions. Some, supposing that there
its object.
was only one “possible”∗ intellect for all men, were bound
Now the act of understanding is not said to be com-
to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect it-
mon to soul and body, except in respect of the phantasm,
self, but in the interior sensitive powers. For it is manifest
as is stated in De Anima, text. 66. But it is clear that
that men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put
the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intel-
the habits of knowledge directly in that, which, being only
lect (De Anima iii, text. 3,39). Whence it follows that
one, would be common to all men. Wherefore if there
the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect
were but one single “possible” intellect of all men, the
itself; and not on the part of the phantasm, which is com-
habits of science, in which men differ from one another,
mon to soul and body. And therefore we must say that
could not be in the “possible” intellect as their subject, but
the “possible” intellect is the subject of habit, which is in
would be in the interior sensitive powers, which differ in
potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all, to the
various men.
“possible” intellect. Wherefore the “possible” intellect is
Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to
the subject of intellectual habits.
the mind of Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensi-
Reply to Objection 2. As potentiality to sensible be-
tive powers are rational, not by their essence, but only by
ing belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellec-
participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now the Philosopher puts the
tual being belongs to the “possible” intellect. Wherefore
intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, science and under-
nothing forbids habit to be in the “possible” intellect, for
standing, in that which is rational by its essence. Where-
it is midway between pure potentiality and perfect act.
fore they are not in the sensitive powers, but in the in-
Reply to Objection 3.
Because the apprehensive
tellect itself. Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii,
powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the “pos-
text. 8,18) that when the “possible” intellect “is thus iden-
sible intellect,” therefore it is by the good disposition of
tified with each thing,” that is, when it is reduced to act in
these powers, to which the good disposition of the body
respect of singulars by the intelligible species, “then it is
cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And
said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these
happens when the intellect can act of itself,” i.e. by con-
powers. But principally it is in the “possible” intellect.
∗ Ia, q. 79, a. 2, ad 2
824
Whether any habit is in the will?
Ia IIae q. 50 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a habit
above (a. 1).
in the will. For the habit which is in the intellect is the
Reply to Objection 1. Even as in the intellect there
intelligible species, by means of which the intellect actu-
is a species which is the likeness of the object; so in the
ally understands. But the will does not act by means of
will, and in every appetitive power there must be some-
species. Therefore the will is not the subject of habit.
thing by which the power is inclined to its object; for the
Objection 2. Further, no habit is allotted to the active act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain incli-intellect, as there is to the “possible” intellect, because the nation, as we have said above (q. 6, a. 4; q. 22, a. 2). And
former is an active power. But the will is above all an ac-
therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined
tive power, because it moves all the powers to their acts,
sufficiently by the nature of the power itself, the power
as stated above (q. 9, a. 1). Therefore there is no habit in
needs no quality to incline it. But since it is necessary,
the will.
for the end of human life, that the appetitive power be in-
Objection 3. Further, in the natural powers there is no
clined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the
habit, because, by reason of their nature, they are determi-
nature of the power, which has a relation to many and var-
nate to one thing. But the will, by reason of its nature, is
ious things, therefore it is necessary that, in the will and
ordained to tend to the good which reason directs. There-
in the other appetitive powers, there be certain qualities to
fore there is no habit in the will.
incline them, and these are called habits.
On the contrary, Justice is a habit. But justice is in
Reply to Objection 2. The active intellect is active
the will; for it is “a habit whereby men will and do that
only, and in no way passive. But the will, and every ap-
which is just” (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the will is the sub-
petitive power, is both mover and moved (De Anima iii,
ject of a habit.
text. 54). And therefore the comparison between them
I answer that, Every power which may be variously
does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs to
directed to act, needs a habit whereby it is well disposed
that which is somehow in potentiality.
to its act. Now since the will is a rational power, it may
Reply to Objection 3. The will from the very nature
be variously directed to act. And therefore in the will we
of the power inclined to the good of the reason. But be-
must admit the presence of a habit whereby it is well dis-
cause this good is varied in many ways, the will needs to
posed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit,
be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the
it is clear that it is principally related to the will; inasmuch reason, in order that action may follow more promptly.
as habit “is that which one uses when one wills,” as stated
Whether there are habits in the angels?
Ia IIae q. 50 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that there are no habits
Objection 3. Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph.
in the angels. For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius
v, text. 25). But disposition, as is said in the same book,
(Coel. Hier. vii), says: “It is not proper to suppose that
is “the order of that which has parts.” Since, therefore,
there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers in the divine
angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no
intelligences (i.e. in the angels) after the manner of ac-
dispositions and habits in them.
cidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii)
subject: for accident of any kind is foreign to them.” But
that the angels are of the first hierarchy are called: “Fire-
every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits
bearers and Thrones and Outpouring of Wisdom, by
in the angels.
which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits.”
Objection 2. Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
I answer that, Some have thought that there are no
iv): “The holy dispositions of the heavenly essences par-
habits in the angels, and that whatever is said of them, is
ticipate, above all other things, in God’s goodness.” But
said essentially. Whence Maximus, after the words which
that which is of itself [per se] is prior to and more power
we have quoted, says: “Their dispositions, and the pow-
than that which is by another [per aliud]. Therefore the
ers which are in them, are essential, through the absence
angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto confor-
of matter in them.” And Simplicius says the same in his
mity with God, and therefore not by means of habits. And
Commentary on the Predicaments: “Wisdom which is in
this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in
the soul is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its the same passage adds: “For if this were the case, surely
substance. For everything divine is sufficient of itself, and
their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it have
exists in itself.”
been as far as possible deified of itself.”
Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error.
825
For it is manifest from what we have said (q. 49, a. 4) that ual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to
only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit. So
its proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its
the above-mentioned commentators considered that an-
own essence it can understand some things, at least itself,
gels are immaterial substances, and that there is no ma-
and other things according to the mode of its substance, as
terial potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded
stated in De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more
from them habit and any kind of accident.
Yet since
perfectly will it understand.
though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is
But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but
still some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs
all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in or-
to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found
der to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will,
to be in them, so far may habits be found in them. But
the angels need some habits, being as it were in potential-
because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of
ity in regard to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says
intellectual substance are not of the same kind. Whence,
(Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are “godlike,” that is to
Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments
say, that by them they are made like to God.
that: “The habits of the intellectual substance are not like
But those habits that are dispositions to the natural be-
the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and
ing are not in angels, since they are immaterial.
immaterial images which it contains in itself.”
Reply to Objection 1. This saying of Maximus must
However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect
be understood of material habits and accidents.
differ with regard to this habit. For the human intellect,
Reply to Objection 2. As to that which belongs to
being the lowest in the intellectual order, is in potential-
angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as
ity as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter
they are not so far beings of themselves, as not to partake
is in respect of all sensible forms; and therefore for the
of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they
understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But the
need to partake of something from without, so far do they
angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order
need to have habits.
of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act
Reply to Objection 3. In angels there are no essential
(for this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of
parts: but there are potential parts, in so far as their intel-
some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potential-
lect is perfected by several species, and in so far as their
ity it has. And therefore, as we said in the Ia, q. 55, a. 1,
will has a relation to several things.
so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habit-
826
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 51
Of the Cause of Habits, As to Their Formation
(In Four Articles)
We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as to their diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether any habit is from nature?
(2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?
(3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?
(4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?
Whether any habit is from nature?
Ia IIae q. 51 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that no habit is from na-
has a certain latitude, it happens that different grades of
ture. For the use of those things which are from nature
this disposition are becoming to different men in respect
does not depend on the will. But habit “is that which we
of the individual nature. And this disposition may be ei-
use when we will,” as the Commentator says on De Anima
ther entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly
iii. Therefore habit is not from nature.
from an extrinsic principle, as we have said of those who
Objection 2. Further, nature does not employ two
are healed by means of art.
where one is sufficient. But the powers of the soul are
But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and
from nature. If therefore the habits of the powers were
whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above
from nature, habit and power would be one.
(q. 50, a. 2), may be natural whether in respect of the
Objection 3. Further, nature does not fail in neces-
specific nature or in respect of the individual nature: in
saries. But habits are necessary in order to act well, as we
respect of the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself, have stated above (q. 49, a. 4). If therefore any habits were
which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific prin-
from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause
ciple; but in respect of the individual nature, on the part
all necessary habits: but this is clearly false. Therefore
of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither
habits are not from nature.
way does it happen that there are natural habits in man, so
On the contrary, In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits,
that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed,
place is given to understanding of first principles, which
this does happen, since they have intelligible species nat-
habit is from nature: wherefore also first principles are
urally impressed on them, which cannot be said of the
said to be known naturally.
human soul, as we have said in the Ia, q. 55, a. 2; Ia, q. 84,
I answer that, One thing can be natural to another
a. 3.
in two ways. First in respect of the specific nature, as
There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, ow-
the faculty of laughing is natural to man, and it is natu-
ing their existence, partly to nature, and partly to some ex-
ral to fire to have an upward tendency. Secondly, in re-
trinsic principle: in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive
spect of the individual nature, as it is natural to Socrates
powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in
or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in
the apprehensive powers there may be a natural habit by
accordance with their respective temperaments. Again, in
way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature,
respect of both natures, something may be called natural
and in respect of the individual nature. This happens with
in two ways: first, because it entirely is from the nature;
regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself:
secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from
thus the understanding of first principles is called a natural
an extrinsic principle. For instance, when a man is healed
habit. For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual
by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but when a
soul that man, having once grasped what is a whole and
man is healed by means of medicine, health is partly from
what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole
nature, partly from an extrinsic principle.
is larger than its part: and in like manner with regard to
Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the
other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is
subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in
a part—this he cannot know except through the intelligi-
either of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natu-
ble species which he has received from phantasms: and
ral disposition demanded by the human species, so that no
for this reason, the Philosopher at the end of the Posterior
man can be without it. And this disposition is natural in
Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us
respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition
from the senses.
827
But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of naturally to the nature of a power, while it cannot belong
knowledge is natural as to its beginning, in so far as one
to the power itself. For instance, with regard to the angels,
man, from the disposition of his organs of sense, is more
it cannot belong to the intellective power itself capable of
apt than another to understand well, since we need the
knowing all things: for thus it would have to be the act of
sensitive powers for the operation of the intellect.
all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by
In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natu-
which something is known, must needs be the actual like-
ral in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to
ness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the
the substance of the habit; but only as to certain principles
power of the angel knew all things by itself, that it was the
thereof, as, for instance, the principles of common law are
likeness and act of all things. Wherefore there must needs
called the “nurseries of virtue.” The reason of this is be-
be added to the angels’ intellective power, some intelli-
cause the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to
gible species, which are likenesses of things understood:
be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit,
for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and not by
but rather to the very nature of the powers.
their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those
But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual
things which they understand. And so it is clear that not
nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural
everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the
beginnings. For some are disposed from their own bodily
power.
temperament to chastity or meekness or such like.
Reply to Objection 3. Nature is not equally inclined
Reply to Objection 1. This objection takes nature as
to cause all the various kinds of habits: since some can be
divided against reason and will; whereas reason itself and
caused by nature, and some not, as we have said above.
will belong to the nature of man.
And so it does not follow that because some habits are
Reply to Objection 2. Something may be added even
natural, therefore all are natural.
Whether any habit is caused by acts?
Ia IIae q. 51 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that no habit is caused by
passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For
acts. For habit is a quality, as we have said above (q. 49,
the acts of the appetitive power proceed from that same
a. 1). Now every quality is caused in a subject, according
power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power
to the latter’s receptivity. Since then the agent, inasmuch
presenting the object: and further, the intellective power,
as it acts, does not receive but rather gives: it seems im-
according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were,
possible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own
an active principle in a self-evident proposition. Where-
acts.
fore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not
Objection 2. Further, the thing wherein a quality is
indeed with regard to the first active principle, but with re-
caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in
gard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover
that which is heated or cooled: whereas that which pro-
moved. For everything that is passive and moved by an-
duces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be
other, is disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore
seen in that which heats or cools. If therefore habits were
if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the
caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that
power which is passive and moved, which quality is called
the same would be mover and moved, active and passive:
a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the
which is impossible, as stated in Physics iii, 8.
appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the rea-
Objection 3. Further, the effect cannot be more noble
son, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect,
than its cause. But habit is more noble than the act which
according as it is moved by first propositions.
precedes the habit; as is clear from the fact that the lat-
Reply to Objection 1. The agent, as agent, does not
ter produces more noble acts. Therefore habit cannot be
receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being
caused by an act which precedes the habit.
moved by another, it receives something from that which
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2)
moves it: and thus is a habit caused.
teaches that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts.
Reply to Objection 2. The same thing, and in the
I answer that, In the agent there is sometimes only
same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing
the active principle of its act: for instance in fire there
prevents a thing from being moved by itself as to different
is only the active principle of heating. And in such an
respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. 28,29.
agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act: for which
Reply to Objection 3. The act which precedes the
reason natural things cannot become accustomed or unac-
habit, in so far as it comes from an active principle, pro-
customed, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent
ceeds from a more excellent principle than is the habit
is to be found, in which there is both the active and the
caused thereby: just as the reason is a more excellent prin-
828
ciple than the habit of moral virtue produced in the appet-first principles is a more excellent principle than the sci-
itive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of
ence of conclusions.
Whether a habit can be caused by one act?
Ia IIae q. 51 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that a habit can be caused
is inclined variously, and to many things; while the rea-
by one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But
son judges in a single act, what should be willed in regard
science, which is the habit of one conclusion, is caused by
to various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the ap-
one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one
petitive power is not thereby entirely overcome, so as to
act.
be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the majority
Objection 2. Further, as acts happen to increase by
of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue.
multiplication so do they happen to increase by intensity.
Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act,
But a habit is caused by multiplication of acts. There-
but only by many.
fore also if an act be very intense, it can be the generating
But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that
cause of a habit.
there are two passive principles: one is the “possible”∗ in-
Objection 3. Further, health and sickness are habits.
tellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De
But it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one
Anima iii, text. 20) calls “passive,” and is the “particu-
act. Therefore one act can cause a habit.
lar reason,” that is the cogitative power, with memory and
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): “As
imagination. With regard then to the former passive prin-
neither does one swallow nor one day make spring: so
ciple, it is possible for a certain active principle to entirely neither does one day nor a short time make a man blessed
overcome, by one act, the power of its passive principle:
and happy.” But “happiness is an operation in respect of
thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect,
a habit of perfect virtue” (Ethic. i, 7,10,13). Therefore a
so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion, but a proba-
habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is
ble proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opin-
not caused by one act.
ion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason, even
I answer that, As we have said already (a. 2), habit
on the part of the “possible” intellect: whereas a habit of
is caused by act, because a passive power is moved by
science can be caused by a single act of the reason, so far
an active principle. But in order that some quality be
as the “possible” intellect is concerned. But with regard to
caused in that which is passive the active principle must
the lower apprehensive powers, the same acts need to be
entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that be-
repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed
cause fire cannot at once overcome the combustible, it
on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor.
does not enkindle at once; but it gradually expels con-
et Remin. 1) that “meditation strengthens memory.” Bod-
trary dispositions, so that by overcoming it entirely, it may
ily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the ac-
impress its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the active
tive principle is of great power: sometimes, for instance,
principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the
a strong dose of medicine restores health at once.
appetitive power in one act: because the appetitive power
Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.
Whether any habits are infused in man by God?
Ia IIae q. 51 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that no habit is infused in
“from those acts a like habit is caused” (Ethic. ii, 1,2).
man by God. For God treats all equally. If therefore He
Consequently there will be two habits of the same species
infuses habits into some, He would infuse them into all:
in the same man, one acquired, the other infused. Now
which is clearly untrue.
this seems impossible: for the two forms of the same
Objection 2. Further, God works in all things accord-
species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a habit
ing to the mode which is suitable to their nature: for “it be-
is not infused into man by God.
longs to Divine providence to preserve nature,” as Diony-
On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 15:5): “God
sius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are naturally caused
filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding.”
in man by acts, as we have said above (a. 2). Therefore
Now wisdom and understanding are habits. Therefore
God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts.
some habits are infused into man by God.
Objection 3. Further, if any habit be infused into man
I answer that, Some habits are infused by God into
by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But
man, for two reasons.
∗ See Ia, q. 79, a. 2 ad 2
829
The first reason is because there are some habits by by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the sci-which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the pro-
ence of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can
portion of human nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect
acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly.
happiness of man, as stated above (q. 5, a. 5). And since
Reply to Objection 1. God, in respect of His Nature,
habits need to be in proportion with that to which man
is the same to all, but in respect of the order of His Wis-
is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those
dom, for some fixed motive, gives certain things to some,
habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion
which He does not give to others.
of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in
Reply to Objection 2. That God works in all accord-
man except by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gra-
ing to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what
tuitous virtues.
nature cannot do: but it follows from this that He does
The other reason is, because God can produce the ef-
nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature.
fects of second causes, without these second causes, as we
Reply to Objection 3. Acts produced by an infused
have said in the Ia, q. 105, a. 6. Just as, therefore, some-
habit, do not cause a habit, but strengthen the already ex-
times, in order to show His power, He causes health, with-
isting habit; just as the remedies of medicine given to a
out its natural cause, but which nature could have caused,
man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind of health,
so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He
but give new strength to the health he had before.
infuses into man even those habits which can be caused
830
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 52
Of the Increase of Habits
(In Three Articles)
We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether habits increase?
(2) Whether they increase by addition?
(3) Whether each act increases the habit?
Whether habits increase?
Ia IIae q. 52 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that habits cannot in-
cording to its specific nature, and another to consider it in
crease. For increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18).
respect of its participation by a subject.
But habits are not in the genus quantity, but in that of qual-
In this way, then, there were four opinions among
ity. Therefore there can be no increase of habits.
philosophers concerning intensity and remission of habits
Objection 2. Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii,
and forms, as Simplicius relates in his Commentary on the
text. 17,18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end
Predicaments. For Plotinus and the other Platonists held
and term, it seems that it cannot be more or less. There-
that qualities and habits themselves were susceptible of
fore a habit cannot increase.
more or less, for the reason that they were material and
Objection 3. Further, those things which can be more
so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the
or less are subject to alteration: for that which from being
infinity of matter. Others, on the contrary, held that quali-
less hot becomes more hot, is said to be altered. But in
ties and habits of themselves were not susceptible of more
habits there is no alteration, as is proved in Phys. vii, text.
or less; but that the things affected by them [qualia] are
15,17. Therefore habits cannot increase.
said to be more or less, in respect of the participation of
On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: the subject: that, for instance, justice is not more or less,
wherefore the disciples said to our Lord (Lk.
17:5):
but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion in the
“Lord, increase our faith.” Therefore habits increase.
Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of
I answer that, Increase, like other things pertaining to the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions.
quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligi-
For they held that some habits are of themselves suscepti-
ble spiritual things, on account of the natural connection
ble of more and less, for instance, the arts; and that some
of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under
are not, as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by
the imagination. Now in corporeal quantities, a thing is
some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not
said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of
susceptible of more or less, but that material forms are.
quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is reputed
In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we
great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant.
must observe that, in respect of which a thing receives its
And so also in forms, we say a thing is great because it
species, must be something fixed and stationary, and as
is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection,
it were indivisible: for whatever attains to that thing, is
therefore “in things which are great, but not in quantity, to
contained under the species, and whatever recedes from
be greater is the same as to be better,” as Augustine says
it more or less, belongs to another species, more or less
(De Trin. vi, 8).
perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii,
Now the perfection of a form may be considered in
text. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which
two ways: first, in respect of the form itself: secondly, in
addition or subtraction changes the species. If, therefore,
respect of the participation of the form by its subject. In
a form, or anything at all, receives its specific nature in
so far as we consider the perfections of a form in respect
respect of itself, or in respect of something belonging to
of the form itself, thus the form is said to be “little” or
it, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something
“great”: for instance great or little health or science. But
of a definite nature, which can be neither more nor less.
in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in re-
Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are
spect of the participation thereof by the subject, it is said
not denominated from a relation to something else: and
to be “more” or “less”: for instance more or less white or
much more so, substance, which is “per se” being. But
healthy. Now this distinction is not to be understood as
those things which receive their species from something
implying that the form has a being outside its matter or
to which they are related, can be diversified, in respect
subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form ac-
of themselves, according to more or less: and nonethe-
831
less they remain in the same species, on account of the Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form
oneness of that to which they are related, and from which
is essentially indivisible: wherefore if anything partici-
they receive their species. For example, movement is in
pate that form, it must needs participate it in respect of
itself more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in
its indivisibility. For this reason we do not speak of the
the same species, on account of the oneness of the term by
species of number as varying in respect of more or less;
which it is specified. We may observe the same thing in
because each species thereof is constituted by an indivis-
health; for a body attains to the nature of health, accord-
ible unity. The same is to be said of the species of con-
ing as it has a disposition suitable to an animal’s nature,
tinuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers,
to which various dispositions may be suitable; which dis-
as two-cubits-long, three-cubits-long, and of relations of
position is therefore variable as regards more or less, and
quantity, as double and treble, and of figures of quantity,
withal the nature of health remains. Whence the Philoso-
as triangle and tetragon.
pher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): “Health itself may be more or
This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the
less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it always
Predicaments (Categor. vi), where in explaining why fig-
the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it
ures are not susceptible of more or less, he says: “Things
may decrease and still remain health.”
which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle, are ac-
Now these various dispositions and measures of health
cordingly triangles and circles”: to wit, because indivisi-
are by way of excess and defect: wherefore if the name of
bility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore what-
health were given to the most perfect measure, then we
ever participates their nature must participate it in its indi-
should not speak of health as greater or less. Thus there-
visibility.
fore it is clear how a quality or form may increase or de-
It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dis-
crease of itself, and how it cannot.
positions in respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii,
But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its
text. 17), that in two ways intensity and remission may
participation by the subject, thus again we find that some
be observed in habits and dispositions. First, in respect of
qualities and forms are susceptible of more or less, and
the habit itself: thus, for instance, we speak of greater or
some not. Now Simplicius assigns the cause of this di-
less health; greater or less science, which extends to more
versity to the fact that substance in itself cannot be sus-
or fewer things. Secondly, in respect of participation by
ceptible of more or less, because it is “per se” being. And
the subject: in so far as equal science or health is partici-
therefore every form which is participated substantially by
pated more in one than in another, according to a diverse
its subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: where-
aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For
fore in the genus of substance nothing is said to be more
habit and disposition do not give species to the subject:
or less. And because quantity is nigh to substance, and be-
nor again do they essentially imply indivisibility.
cause shape follows on quantity, therefore is it that neither
We shall say further on (q. 66, a. 1) how it is with the
in these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence
virtues.
the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 15) that when a thing
Reply to Objection 1. As the word “great” is taken
receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to
from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible
be made. But other qualities which are further removed
perfections of forms; so also is the word “growth,” the
from quantity, and are connected with passions and ac-
term of which is something great.
tions, are susceptible of more or less, in respect of their
Reply to Objection 2. Habit is indeed a perfection,
participation by the subject.
but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; for
Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason
instance, a term giving the subject its specific being. Nor
of this diversity. For, as we have said, that from which
again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term,
a thing receives its species must remain indivisibly fixed
as do the species of numbers. Wherefore there is nothing
and constant in something indivisible. Wherefore in two
to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less.
ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated
Reply to Objection 3. Alteration is primarily indeed
more or less. First because the participator has its species
in the qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may
in respect of that form. And for this reason no substantial
be in the qualities of the first species: for, supposing an
form is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philoso-
alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal
pher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that, “as a number can-
an alteration as to health and sickness. In like manner,
not be more or less, so neither can that which is in the
if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive
species of substance,” that is, in respect of its participa-
appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an al-
tion of the specific form: “but in so far as substance may
teration follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text.
be with matter,” i.e. in respect of material dispositions,
20).
“more or less are found in substance.”
832
Whether habits increases by addition?
Ia IIae q. 52 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the increase of habits
after being cold in one part of his body, is cold in several
is by way of addition. For the word “increase,” as we
parts), or because some other subject is added sharing in
have said, is transferred to forms, from corporeal quanti-
the same form (as when a hot thing is added to another,
ties. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase with-
or one white thing to another). But in either of these two
out addition: wherefore (De Gener. i, text. 31) it is said
ways we have not a more white or a more hot thing, but a
that “increase is an addition to a magnitude already exist-
greater white or hot thing.
ing.” Therefore in habits also there is no increase without
Since, however, as stated above (a. 1), certain acci-
addition.
dents are of themselves susceptible of more or less, in
Objection 2. Further, habit is not increased except by
some of these we may find increase by addition. For
means of some agent. But every agent does something in
movement increases by an addition either to the time it
the passive subject: for instance, that which heats, causes
lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species re-
heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no increase
mains the same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet
without addition.
movement increases the intensity as to participation in its
Objection 3. Further, as that which is not white, is
subject: i.e. in so far as the same movement can be exe-
in potentiality to be white: so that which is less white, is
cuted more or less speedily or readily. In like manner, sci-
in potentiality to be more white. But that which is not
ence can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone
white, is not made white except by the addition of white-
learns several conclusions of geometry, the same specific
ness. Therefore that which is less white, is not made more
habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man’s sci-
white, except by an added whiteness.
ence increases, as to the subject’s participation thereof, in
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text.
intensity, in so far as one man is quicker and readier than
84): “That which is hot is made hotter, without making,
another in considering the same conclusions.
in the matter, something hot, that was not hot, when the
As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that
thing was less hot.” Therefore, in like manner, neither is
they receive increase by way of addition. For an animal
any addition made in other forms when they increase.
is not said to be simply healthy or beautiful, unless it be
I answer that, The solution of this question depends
such in all its parts. And if it be brought to a more perfect
on what we have said above (a. 1). For we said that in-
measure, this is the result of a change in the simple quali-
crease and decrease in forms which are capable of inten-
ties, which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity
sity and remissness, happen in one way not on the part of
on the part of the subject partaking of them.
the very form considered in itself, through the diverse par-
How this question affects virtues we shall state further
ticipation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase
on (q. 66, a. 1 ).
of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of
Reply to Objection 1. Even in bodily bulk increase
form to form; but by the subject participating more or less
is twofold. First, by addition of one subject to another;
perfectly, one and the same form. And just as, by an agent
such is the increase of living things. Secondly, by mere
which is in act, something is made actually hot, beginning,
intensity, without any addition at all; such is the case with
as it were, to participate a form, not as though the form it-
things subject to rarefaction, as is stated in Phys. iv, text.
self were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text. 32, so,
63.
by an intense action of the agent, something is made more
Reply to Objection 2. The cause that increases a
hot, as it were participating the form more perfectly, not
habit, always effects something in the subject, but not a
as though something were added to the form.
new form. But it causes the subject to partake more per-
For if this increase in forms were understood to be by
fectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form to ex-
way of addition, this could only be either in the form it-
tend further.
self or in the subject. If it be understood of the form itself, Reply to Objection 3. What is not already white, is
it has already been stated (a. 1) that such an addition or
potentially white, as not yet possessing the form of white-
subtraction would change the species; even as the species
ness: hence the agent causes a new form in the subject.
of color is changed when a thing from being pale becomes
But that which is less hot or white, is not in potentiality to
white. If, on the other hand, this addition be understood as
those forms, since it has them already actually: but it is in
applying to the subject, this could only be either because
potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it
one part of the subject receives a form which it had not
receives through the agent’s action.
previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man who,
833
Whether every act increases its habit?
Ia IIae q. 52 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that every act increases
For it is not only black that is unlike white, but also less
its habit. For when the cause is increased the effect is in-
white is unlike more white, since there is movement from
creased. Now acts are causes of habits, as stated above
less white to more white, even as from one opposite to
(q. 51, a. 2). Therefore a habit increases when its acts are
another, as stated in Phys. v, text. 52.
multiplied.
But since use of habits depends on the will, as was
Objection 2. Further, of like things a like judgment
shown above (q. 50, a. 5); just as one who has a habit may
should be formed. But all the acts proceeding from one
fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to
and the same habit are alike (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if
use the habit by performing an act that is not in proportion
some acts increase a habit, every act should increase it.
to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the intensity
Objection 3. Further, like is increased by like. But
of the act correspond in proportion to the intensity of the
any act is like the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore
habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases
every act increases the habit.
the habit or disposes to an increase thereof, if we may
On the contrary, Opposite effects do not result from
speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of
the same cause. But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts
an animal. For not every morsel of food actually increases
lessen the habit whence they proceed, for instance if they
the animal’s size as neither does every drop of water hol-
be done carelessly. Therefore it is not every act that in-
low out the stone: but the multiplication of food results
creases a habit.
at last in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts
I answer that, “Like acts cause like habits” (Ethic. ii, cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls short of
1,2). Now things are like or unlike not only in respect
the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to
of their qualities being the same or various, but also in
an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.
respect of the same or a different mode of participation.
From this it is clear how to solve the objections.
834
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 53
How Habits Are Corrupted or Diminished
(In Three Articles)
We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?
(2) Whether it can be diminished?
(3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?
Whether a habit can be corrupted?
Ia IIae q. 53 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that a habit cannot be cor-
an incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted indirectly.
rupted. For habit is within its subject like a second nature;
There are, however, some habits which, while residing
wherefore it is pleasant to act from habit. Now so long as
chiefly in an incorruptible subject, reside nevertheless sec-
a thing is, its nature is not corrupted. Therefore neither
ondarily in a corruptible subject; such is the habit of sci-
can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject remains.
ence which is chiefly indeed in the “possible” intellect,
Objection 2. Further, whenever a form is corrupted,
but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension,
this is due either to corruption of its subject, or to its con-
as stated above (q. 50, a. 3, ad 3). Consequently the habit
trary: thus sickness ceases through corruption of the ani-
of science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of
mal, or through the advent of health. Now science, which
the “possible” intellect, but only on the part of the lower
is a habit, cannot be lost through corruption of its subject:
sensitive powers.
since “the intellect,” which is its subject, “is a substance
We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind
that is incorruptible” (De Anima i, text. 65). In like man-
can be corrupted directly. If then there be a habit having
ner, neither can it be lost through the action of its contrary: a contrary, either on the part of itself or on the part of its
since intelligible species are not contrary to one another
cause, it can be corrupted directly: but if it has no con-
(Metaph. vii, text. 52). Therefore the habit of science can
trary, it cannot be corrupted directly. Now it is evident
nowise be lost.
that an intelligible species residing in the “possible” intel-
Objection 3. Further, all corruption results from some
lect, has no contrary; nor can the active intellect, which
movement. But the habit of science, which is in the soul,
is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if
cannot be corrupted by a direct movement of the soul it-
in the “possible” intellect there be a habit caused immedi-
self, since the soul is not moved directly. It is, however,
ately by the active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible
moved indirectly through the movement of the body: and
both directly and indirectly. Such are the habits of the first
yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the in-
principles, both speculative and practical, which cannot
telligible species residing in the intellect: since the intel-
be corrupted by any forgetfulness or deception whatever:
lect independently of the body is the proper abode of the
even as the Philosopher says about prudence (Ethic. vi,
species; for which reason it is held that habits are not lost
5) that “it cannot be lost by being forgotten.” There is,
either through old age or through death. Therefore sci-
however, in the “possible” intellect a habit caused by the
ence cannot be corrupted. For the same reason neither
reason, to wit, the habit of conclusions, which is called
can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are in the
science, to the cause of which something may be contrary
rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i,
in two ways. First, on the part of those very propositions
10), “virtue is more lasting than learning.”
which are the starting point of the reason: for the assertion
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et
“Good is not good” is contrary to the assertion “Good is
Brev. Vitae ii) that “forgetfulness and deception are the
good” (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the pro-
corruption of science.” Moreover, by sinning a man loses
cess of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is
a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are engendered and
contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Where-
corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2).
fore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of
I answer that, A form is said to be corrupted directly
a true opinion or even of science. Hence the Philosopher,
by its contrary; indirectly, through its subject being cor-
as stated above, says that “deception is the corruption of
rupted. When therefore a habit has a corruptible subject,
science.” As to virtues, some of them are intellectual, re-
and a cause that has a contrary, it can be corrupted both
siding in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and to
ways. This is clearly the case with bodily habits—for in-
these applies what we have said of science and opinion.
stance, health and sickness. But those habits that have
Some, however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appet-
835
itive part of the soul; and the same may be said of the tions and to the process of reason, as stated above.
contrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are
Reply to Objection 3. Science is not taken away by
caused therein because it is natural to it to be moved by
movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the
the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice,
habit, but only as it may prove an obstacle to the act of
may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its
science; in so far as the intellect, in its act, has need of the motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through
sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal transmu-
ignorance, passion or deliberate choice.
tation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can
Reply to Objection 1. As stated in Ethic. vii, 10,
corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root
a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of
of the habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be cor-
it. And so it is that while the nature of a thing cannot in
rupted. Nevertheless when it is said that “virtue is more
any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed,
lasting than learning,” this must be understood in respect,
though with difficulty.
not of the subject or cause, but of the act: because the use
Reply to Objection 2. Although there is no contrary
of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the
to intelligible species, yet there can be a contrary to asser-
use of learning does not.
Whether a habit can diminish?
Ia IIae q. 53 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that a habit cannot dimin-
participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject’s
ish. Because a habit is a simple quality and form. Now
potentiality is indeterminate, through its being able to par-
a simple thing is possessed either wholly or not at all.
ticipate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater
Therefore although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish.
or a smaller number of things.
Objection 2. Further, if a thing is befitting an acci-
Reply to Objection 2. This argument would hold, if
dent, this is by reason either of the accident or of its sub-
the essence itself of a habit were nowise subject to de-
ject. Now a habit does not become more or less intense by
crease. This we do not say; but that a certain decrease in
reason of itself; else it would follow that a species might
the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in be predicated of its individuals more or less. And if it can
its subject.
become less intense as to its participation by its subject,
Reply to Objection 3. No matter how we take an ac-
it would follow that something is accidental to a habit,
cident, its very notion implies dependence on a subject,
proper thereto and not common to the habit and its sub-
but in different ways. For if we take an accident in the
ject. Now whenever a form has something proper to it
abstract, it implies relation to a subject, which relation
besides its subject, that form can be separate, as stated in
begins in the accident and terminates in the subject: for
De Anima i, text. 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a
“whiteness is that whereby a thing is white.” Accordingly
separable form; which is impossible.
in defining an accident in the abstract, we do not put the
Objection 3. Further, the very notion and nature of a
subject as though it were the first part of the definition,
habit as of any accident, is inherence in a subject: where-
viz. the genus; but we give it the second place, which
fore any accident is defined with reference to its subject.
is that of the difference; thus we say that “simitas” is “a
Therefore if a habit does not become more or less intense
curvature of the nose.” But if we take accidents in the con-
in itself, neither can it in its inherence in its subject: and
crete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in
consequently it will be nowise less intense.
the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and termi-
On the contrary, It is natural for contraries to be ap-
nates at the accident: for “a white thing” is “something
plicable to the same thing. Now increase and decrease are
that has whiteness.” Accordingly in defining this kind
contraries. Since therefore a habit can increase, it seems
of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is
that it can also diminish.
the first part of a definition; for we say that a “simum” is
I answer that, Habits diminish, just as they increase,
a “snub-nose.” Accordingly whatever is befitting an ac-
in two ways, as we have already explained (q. 52, a. 1).
cident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very
And since they increase through the same cause as that
essence of the accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in
which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same
the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and de-
cause as that which corrupts them: since the diminishing
crease in certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less
of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even
white is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing.
as, on the other hand, the engendering of a habit is a foun-
The same applies to habits and other qualities; save that
dation of its increase.
certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits
Reply to Objection 1. A habit, considered in itself, is
increase or diminish by a kind of addition, as we have al-
a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease;
ready clearly explained (q. 52, a. 2).
but according to the different ways in which its subject
836
Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act?
Ia IIae q. 53 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that a habit is not cor-
habits that are gradually undermined by contrary agencies
rupted or diminished through mere cessation from act.
which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from
For habits are more lasting than passion-like qualities, as
those habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether
we have explained above (q. 49, a. 2, ad 3; q. 50, a. 1).
by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case
But passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor dimin-
both of science and of virtue. For it is evident that a habit
ished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not lessened
of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose the mean in
through not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing
deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use
to make something hot. Therefore neither are habits di-
of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own pas-
minished or corrupted through cessation from act.
sions or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions
Objection 2. Further, corruption and diminution are
and deeds fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of
changes.
Now nothing is changed without a moving
the inclination of the sensitive appetite and of other exter-
cause. Since therefore cessation from act does not im-
nal agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened
ply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be
through cessation from act. The same applies to the intel-
diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.
lectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of
Objection 3. Further, the habits of science and virtue
those things that are pictured by his imagination. Hence
are in the intellectual soul which is above time. Now those
when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits,
things that are above time are neither destroyed nor di-
strange fancies, sometimes in opposition to them, arise
minished by length of time. Neither, therefore, are such
in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it
habits destroyed or diminished through length of time, if
were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his intel-
one fails for long to exercise them.
lectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et
sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and
Brev. Vitae ii) that not only “deception,” but also “forget-
thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly
fulness, is the corruption of science.” Moreover he says
destroyed by cessation from act.
(Ethic. viii, 5) that “want of intercourse has dissolved
Reply to Objection 1. Even heat would be destroyed
many a friendship.” In like manner other habits of virtue
through ceasing to give heat, if, for this same reason, cold
are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act.
which is destructive of heat were to increase.
I answer that, As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a
Reply to Objection 2. Cessation from act is a moving
thing is a cause of movement in two ways. First, directly;
cause, conducive of corruption or diminution, by remov-
and such a thing causes movement by reason of its proper
ing the obstacles, thereto, as explained above.
form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly, indirectly; for in-
Reply to Objection 3. The intellectual part of the
stance, that which removes an obstacle. It is in this lat-
soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive
ter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit re-
part is subject to time, and therefore in course of time it
sults through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, as we
undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part,
cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes
and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the
that destroyed or weakened that habit. For it has been
Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes
stated (a. 1) that habits are destroyed or diminished di-
us forget.
rectly through some contrary agency. Consequently all
837
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 54
Of the Distinction of Habits
(In Four Articles)
We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether many habits can be in one power?
(2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?
(3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?
(4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?
Whether many habits can be in one power?
Ia IIae q. 54 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be many
reason for this is that the subject of a habit is a passive
habits in one power. For when several things are distin-
power, as stated above (q. 51, a. 2): for it is only an active
guished in respect of the same thing, if one of them be
power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly
multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and powers are
shown above (q. 51, a. 2). Now a passive power is com-
distinguished in respect of the same thing, viz. their acts
pared to the determinate act of any species, as matter to
and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner.
form: because, just as matter is determinate to one form
Therefore there cannot be many habits in one power.
by one agent, so, too, is a passive power determined by
Objection 2. Further, a power is a simple force. Now
the nature of one active object to an act specifically one.
in one simple subject there cannot be diversity of acci-
Wherefore, just as several objects can move one passive
dents; for the subject is the cause of its accidents; and it
power, so can one passive power be the subject of several
does not appear how diverse effects can proceed from one
acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits are
simple cause. Therefore there cannot be many habits in
qualities or forms adhering to a power, and inclining that
one power.
power to acts of a determinate species. Consequently sev-
Objection 3. Further, just as the body is informed by
eral habits, even as several specifically different acts, can
its shape, so is a power informed by a habit. But one body
belong to one power.
cannot be informed at the same time by various shapes.
Reply to Objection 1. Even as in natural things, di-
Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same
versity of species is according to the form, and diversity
time by many habits. Therefore several habits cannot be
of genus, according to matter, as stated in Metaph. v,
at the same time in one power.
text. 33 (since things that differ in matter belong to dif-
On the contrary, The intellect is one power; wherein,
ferent genera): so, too, generic diversity of objects entails
nevertheless, are the habits of various sciences.
a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in
I answer that, As stated above (q. 49, a. 4), habits are Ethic. vi, 1, that “those objects that differ generically be-dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something,
long to different departments of the soul”); while specific
either to nature, or to operation, which is the end of na-
difference of objects entails a specific difference of acts,
ture. As to those habits which are dispositions to nature,
and consequently of habits also. Now things that differ in
it is clear that several can be in one same subject: since in
genus differ in species, but not vice versa. Wherefore the
one subject we may take parts in various ways, according
acts and habits of different powers differ in species: but it
to the various dispositions of which parts there are var-
does not follow that different habits are in different pow-
ious habits. Thus, if we take the humors as being parts
ers, for several can be in one power. And even as several
of the human body, according to their disposition in re-
genera may be included in one genus, and several species
spect of human nature, we have the habit or disposition of
be contained in one species; so does it happen that there
health: while, if we take like parts, such as nerves, bones,
are several species of habits and powers.
and flesh, the disposition of these in respect of nature is
Reply to Objection 2. Although a power is simple as
strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i.e.
to its essence, it is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it ex-
the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in pro-
tends to many specifically different acts. Consequently
portion to nature, is beauty: and thus there are several
there is nothing to prevent many superficially different
habits or dispositions in the same subject.
habits from being in one power.
If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispo-
Reply to Objection 3. A body is informed by its
sitions to operation, and belong properly to the powers;
shape as by its own terminal boundaries: whereas a habit
thus, again, there may be several habits in one power. The
is not the terminal boundary of a power, but the disposi-
838
tion of a power to an act as to its ultimate term. Conse-three-sided in a four-sided figure. For the intellect cannot
quently one same power cannot have several acts at the
understand several things at the same time “actually”; and
same time, except in so far as perchance one act is com-
yet it can know several things at the same time “habitu-
prised in another; just as neither can a body have several
ally.”
shapes, save in so far as one shape enters into another, as a
Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?
Ia IIae q. 54 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that habits are not distin-
nature and to an operation consequent to nature.
guished by their objects. For contraries differ in species.
Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect
Now the same habit of science regards contraries: thus
of three things. First, in respect of the active principles of
medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy. There-
such dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly,
fore habits are not distinguished by objects specifically
in respect of specifically different objects, as will appear
distinct.
from what follows.
Objection 2. Further, different sciences are different
Reply to Objection 1. In distinguishing powers, or
habits. But the same scientific truth belongs to different
also habits, we must consider the object not in its mate-
sciences: thus both the physicist and the astronomer prove
rial but in its formal aspect, which may differ in species
the earth to be round, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 17. There-
or even in genus. And though the distinction between
fore habits are not distinguished by their objects.
specific contraries is a real distinction yet they are both
Objection 3. Further, wherever the act is the same, the
known under one aspect, since one is known through the
object is the same. But the same act can belong to differ-
other. And consequently in so far as they concur in the
ent habits of virtue, if it be directed to different ends; thus one aspect of cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive
to give money to anyone, if it be done for God’s sake, is
habit.
an act of charity; while, if it be done in order to pay a debt, Reply to Objection 2. The physicist proves the earth
it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also
to be round by one means, the astronomer by another: for
belong to different habits. Therefore diversity of habits
the latter proves this by means of mathematics, e.g. by the
does not follow diversity of objects.
shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the for-
On the contrary, Acts differ in species according to
mer proves it by means of physics, e.g. by the movement
the diversity of their objects, as stated above (q. 18, a. 5).
of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now
But habits are dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also
the whole force of a demonstration, which is “a syllogism
are distinguished according to the diversity of objects.
producing science,” as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends
I answer that, A habit is both a form and a habit.
on the mean. And consequently various means are as so
Hence the specific distinction of habits may be taken in
many active principles, in respect of which the habits of
the ordinary way in which forms differ specifically; or
science are distinguished.
according to that mode of distinction which is proper to
Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Phys.
habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished from one an-
ii, text. 89; Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical mat-
other in reference to the diversity of their active princi-
ters, what the principle is in speculative matters. Conse-
ples, since every agent produces its like in species. Habits,
quently diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues,
however, imply order to something: and all things that im-
even as diversity of active principles does. Moreover the
ply order to something, are distinguished according to the
ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above
distinction of the things to which they are ordained. Now
all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has
a habit is a disposition implying a twofold order: viz. to
been said (q. 18, a. 6; q. 19, a. 2, ad 1; q. 34, a. 4).
Whether habits are divided into good and bad?
Ia IIae q. 54 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that habits are not divided
a specific difference, as the Philosopher declares (Topic.
into good and bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now
iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being,
the same habit regards contraries, as was stated above
cannot differentiate any being. Therefore habits cannot
(a. 2, obj. 1). Therefore habits are not divided into good
be specifically divided into good and evil.
and bad.
Objection 3. Further, there can be different evil habits Objection 2. Further, good is convertible with being;
about one same object; for instance, intemperance and in-
so that, since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted
sensibility about matters of concupiscence: and in like
839
manner there can be several good habits; for instance, hu-tinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an
man virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as the Philoso-
act befitting some higher nature.
pher clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are
Reply to Objection 1. The same habit may be about
not divided into good and bad.
contraries in so far as contraries agree in one common as-
On the contrary, A good habit is contrary to a bad
pect. Never, however, does it happen that contrary habits
habit, as virtue to vice. Now contraries are divided specif-
are in one species: since contrariety of habits follows con-
ically into good and bad habits.
trariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are divided into
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), habits are
good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and
specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and
another bad; but not by reason of one habit being some-
active principles, but also in their relation to nature. Now,
thing good, and another about something bad.
this happens in two ways. First, by reason of their suit-
Reply to Objection 2. It is not the good which is com-
ableness or unsuitableness to nature. In this way a good
mon to every being, that is a difference constituting the
habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since a good
species of a habit; but some determinate good by reason
habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent’s
of suitability to some determinate, viz. the human, na-
nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act
ture. In like manner the evil that constitutes a difference
unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to
of habits is not a pure privation, but something determi-
human nature, since they are according to reason, whereas
nate repugnant to a determinate nature.
acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they
Reply to Objection 3. Several good habits about one
are against reason. Hence it is clear that habits are distin-
same specific thing are distinct in reference to their suit-
guished specifically by the difference of good and bad.
ability to various natures, as stated above. But several bad
Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to na-
habits in respect of one action are distinct in reference to
ture, from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is
their diverse repugnance to that which is in keeping with
suitable to a lower nature, while another habit disposes to
nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are con-
an act befitting a higher nature. And thus human virtue,
trary to one virtue.
which disposes to an act befitting human nature, is dis-
Whether one habit is made up of many habits?
Ia IIae q. 54 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that one habit is made up
are related to one, for instance, to some specific objective
of many habits. For whatever is engendered, not at once,
aspect, or to one nature, or to one principle, as was clearly
but little by little, seems to be made up of several parts.
stated above (Aa. 2,3).
But a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by little
If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object,
out of several acts, as stated above (q. 51, a. 3). Therefore
we shall find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this
one habit is made up of several.
multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is
Objection 2. Further, a whole is made up of its parts.
chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality,
Now many parts are assigned to one habit: thus Tully
not composed to several habits, even though it extend to
assigns many parts of fortitude, temperance, and other
many things. For a habit does not extend to many things
virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many.
save in relation to one, whence it derives its unity.
Objection 3. Further, one conclusion suffices both for
Reply to Objection 1. That a habit is engendered lit-
an act and for a habit of scientific knowledge. But many
tle by little, is due, not to one part being engendered after
conclusions belong to but one science, to geometry, for
another, but to the fact that the subject does not acquire all
instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one habit is made up
at once a firm and difficultly changeable disposition; and
of many.
also to the fact that it begins by being imperfectly in the
On the contrary, A habit, since it is a quality, is a
subject, and is gradually perfected. The same applies to
simple form. But nothing simple is made up of many.
other qualities.
Therefore one habit is not made up of many.
Reply to Objection 2. The parts which are assigned
I answer that, A habit directed to operation, such as
to each cardinal virtue, are not integral parts that combine
we are chiefly concerned with at present, is a perfection
to form a whole; but subjective or potential parts, as we
of a power. Now every perfection should be in proportion
shall explain further on (q. 57, a. 6, ad 4; IIa IIae, q. 48).
with that which it perfects. Hence, just as a power, while
Reply to Objection 3. In any science, he who ac-
it is one, extends to many things, in so far as they have
quires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one
something in common, i.e. some general objective aspect,
conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly. And
so also a habit extends to many things, in so far as they
when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowl-
840
edge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engen-cause the conclusions and demonstrations of one science
dered in him: but the habit which was in him previously
are coordinate, and one flows from another.
is perfected, forasmuch as it has increased in extent; be-
841
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 55
Of the Virtues, As to Their Essence
(In Four Articles)
We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since habits, as we have said (q. 54, a. 3), are divided into good and bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, and of other matters connected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of vices and sins. Now five things must be considered about virtues: (1) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division of virtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue.
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human virtue is a habit?
(2) Whether it is an operative habit?
(3) Whether it is a good habit?
(4) Of the definition of virtue.
Whether human virtue is a habit?
Ia IIae q. 55 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that human virtue is not a
determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural
habit: For virtue is “the limit of power” (De Coelo i, text.
powers. And therefore these natural powers are in them-
116). But the limit of anything is reducible to the genus of
selves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are
that of which it is the limit; as a point is reducible to the
proper to man, are not determinate to one particular ac-
genus of line. Therefore virtue is reducible to the genus
tion, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are
of power, and not to the genus of habit.
determinate to acts by means of habits, as is clear from
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb.
what we have said above (q. 49, a. 4 ). Therefore human
ii)∗ that “virtue is good use of free-will.” But use of free-
virtues are habits.
will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act.
Reply to Objection 1. Sometimes we give the name
Objection 3. Further, we do not merit by our habits,
of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely,
but by our actions: otherwise a man would merit contin-
either to its object, or to its act: for instance, we give the
ually, even while asleep. But we do merit by our virtues.
name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of be-
Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts.
lieving, as also to the habit by which we believe. When
Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (De Moribus
therefore we say that “virtue is the limit of power,” virtue
Eccl. xv) that “virtue is the order of love,” and (QQ.
is taken for the object of virtue. For the furthest point to
lxxxiii, qu. 30) that “the ordering which is called virtue
which a power can reach, is said to be its virtue; for in-
consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using
stance, if a man can carry a hundredweight and not more,
what we ought to use.” Now order, or ordering, denomi-
his virtue† is put at a hundredweight, and not at sixty. But
nates either an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not
the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of
a habit, but an action or a relation.
power.
Objection 5. Further, just as there are human virtues,
Reply to Objection 2. Good use of free-will is said
so are there natural virtues. But natural virtues are not
to be a virtue, in the same sense as above (ad 1); that is to
habits, but powers. Neither therefore are human virtues
say, because it is that to which virtue is directed as to its
habits.
proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else than the
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Categor. vi)
good use of free-will.
that science and virtue are habits.
Reply to Objection 3. We are said to merit by some-
I answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfection of
thing in two ways. First, as by merit itself, just as we are
a power. Now a thing’s perfection is considered chiefly in
said to run by running; and thus we merit by acts. Sec-
regard to its end. But the end of power is act. Wherefore
ondly, we are said to merit by something as by the princi-
power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate
ple whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive
to its act.
power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits.
Now there are some powers which of themselves are
Reply to Objection 4. When we say that virtue is the
∗ Retract. ix; cf. De Lib. Arb. ii, 19
† In English we should
say ‘strength,’ which is the original signification of the Latin ‘virtus’: thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to indicate its
‘strength’
842
order or ordering of love, we refer to the end to which Reply to Objection 5. Natural powers are of them-virtue is ordered: because in us love is set in order by
selves determinate to one act: not so the rational powers.
virtue.
And so there is no comparison, as we have said.
Whether human virtue is an operative habit?
Ia IIae q. 55 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not essential
Now man is so constituted that the body holds the
to human virtue to be an operative habit. For Tully says
place of matter, the soul that of form. The body, indeed,
(Tuscul. iv) that as health and beauty belong to the body,
man has in common with other animals; and the same is
so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty are
to be said of the forces which are common to the soul and
not operative habits. Therefore neither is virtue.
body: and only those forces which are proper to the soul,
Objection 2. Further, in natural things we find virtue
namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And
not only in reference to act, but also in reference to being:
therefore, human virtue, of which we are speaking now,
as is clear from the Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some
cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which
have a virtue to be always, while some have a virtue to
is proper to the soul. Wherefore human virtue does not
be not always, but at some definite time. Now as natural
imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently
virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational
it is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit.
beings. Therefore also human virtue is referred not only
Reply to Objection 1. Mode of action follows on the
to act, but also to being.
disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii,
act. And therefore, since virtue is the principle of some
text. 17) that virtue “is the disposition of a perfect thing
kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the oper-
to that which is best.” Now the best thing to which man
ator in respect of virtue some corresponding disposition.
needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as Au-
Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue
gustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. 3,6, 14) to Whom the
itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so far as, to
soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it
wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to
seems that virtue is a quality of the soul in reference to
one another, and to that which is outside. Hence virtue,
God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in reference
inasmuch as it is a suitable disposition of the soul, is like
to operation. It is not, therefore, an operative habit.
health and beauty, which are suitable dispositions of the
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says
body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a princi-
that “virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good.”
ple of operation.
I answer that, Virtue, from the very nature of the
Reply to Objection 2. Virtue which is referred to be-
word, implies some perfection of power, as we have said
ing is not proper to man; but only that virtue which is
above (a. 1). Wherefore, since power∗ is of two kinds,
referred to works of reason, which are proper to man.
namely, power in reference to being, and power in refer-
Reply to Objection 3. As God’s substance is His act,
ence to act; the perfection of each of these is called virtue.
the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some
But power in reference to being is on the part of matter,
operation. Wherefore, as we have said above (q. 3, a. 2),
which is potential being, whereas power in reference to
happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly
act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of
conformed to God, and which is the end of human life,
action, since everything acts in so far as it is in act.
consists in an operation.
Whether human virtue is a good habit?
Ia IIae q. 55 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not essential to
wine, and stout men at drunkenness.” Therefore virtue
virtue that it should be a good habit. For sin is always
also is referred to good and evil.
taken in a bad sense. But there is a virtue even of sin; ac-
Objection 3. Further, according to the Apostle (2 Cor.
cording to 1 Cor. 15:56: “The virtue [Douay: ‘strength’]
12:9): “Virtue [Douay: ‘power’] is made perfect in infir-
of sin is the Law.” Therefore virtue is not always a good
mity.” But infirmity is an evil. Therefore virtue is referred
habit.
not only to good, but also to evil.
Objection 2. Further, Virtue corresponds to power.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl.
But power is not only referred to good, but also to evil:
vi): “No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceed-
according to Is. 5: “Woe to you that are mighty to drink
ing good”: and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): “Virtue
∗ The one Latin word ‘potentia’ is rendered ‘potentiality’ in the first case, and ‘power’ in the second
843
is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good to attain to the limit of its possibility.
likewise.”
Reply to Objection 2. The evil of drunkenness and
I answer that, As we have said above (a. 1), virtue
excessive drink, consists in a falling away from the or-
implies a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a
der of reason. Now it happens that, together with this
thing is fixed by the limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now
falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect
the limit of any power must needs be good: for all evil im-
in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even
plies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Hom. ii) that
in direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away
every evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue of
therefrom. But the perfection of that power, since it is
a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore
compatible with a falling away from reason, cannot be
human virtue which is an operative habit, is a good habit,
called a human virtue.
productive of good works.
Reply to Objection 3. Reason is shown to be so much
Reply to Objection 1. Just as bad things are said
the more perfect, according as it is able to overcome or
metaphorically to be perfect, so are they said to be good:
endure more easily the weakness of the body and of the
for we speak of a perfect thief or robber; and of a good
lower powers. And therefore human virtue, which is at-
thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. v,
tributed to reason, is said to be “made perfect in infirmity,”
text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is applied to evil
not of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the lower
things: so that the “virtue” of sin is said to be law, in so
powers.
far as occasionally sin is aggravated through the law, so as
Whether virtue is suitably defined?
Ia IIae q. 55 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the definition, usu-
things than these,” says∗: “He who created thee without
ally given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: “Virtue is a
thee, will not justify thee without thee.” It is therefore un-
good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of
suitable to say that “God works virtue in us, without us.”
which no one can make bad use, which God works in us,
On the contrary, We have the authority of Augustine
without us.” For virtue is man’s goodness, since virtue it is
from whose words this definition is gathered, and princi-
that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem
pally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, 19.
to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is therefore
I answer that, This definition comprises perfectly the
unsuitable to describe virtue as a “good quality.”
whole essential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential
Objection 2. Further, no difference is more common
notion of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now
than its genus; since it is that which divides the genus. But
the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue.
good is more common than quality, since it is convertible
For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gath-
with being. Therefore “good” should not be put in the
ered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as
definition of virtue, as a difference of quality.
“a good quality”: for “quality” is the genus of virtue, and
Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii,
the difference, “good.” But the definition would be more
3): “When we come across anything that is not common
suitable if for “quality” we substitute “habit,” which is the
to us and the beasts of the field, it is something appertain-
proximate genus.
ing to the mind.” But there are virtues even of the irra-
Now virtue has no matter “out of which” it is formed,
tional parts; as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10). Every
as neither has any other accident; but it has matter “about
virtue, therefore, is not a good quality “of the mind.”
which” it is concerned, and matter “in which” it exits,
Objection 4. Further, righteousness seems to belong
namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is con-
to justice; whence the righteous are called just. But jus-
cerned is its object, and this could not be included in the
tice is a species of virtue. It is therefore unsuitable to put
above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a
“righteous” in the definition of virtue, when we say that
certain species, and here we are giving the definition of
virtue is that “by which we live righteously.”
virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the
Objection 5. Further, whoever is proud of a thing,
subject, which is mentioned when we say that virtue is a
makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtue, for Au-
good quality “of the mind.”
gustine says in his Rule, that “pride lies in wait for good
The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is
works in order to slay them.” It is untrue, therefore, “that
operation. But it must be observed that some operative
no one can make bad use of virtue.”
habits are always referred to evil, as vicious habits: oth-
Objection 6. Further, man is justified by virtue. But
ers are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil;
Augustine commenting on Jn. 15:11: “He shall do greater
for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to
∗ Tract. xxvii in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. Ap. 11
844
the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always re-Reply to Objection 2. Good, which is put in the defi-
ferred to good: and so the distinction of virtue from those
nition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible
habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in
with being, and which extends further than quality, but the
the words “by which we live righteously”: and its distinc-
good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius
tion from those habits which are sometimes directed unto
says (Div. Nom. iv) “that the good of the soul is to be in
good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, “of which no one
accord with reason.”
makes bad use.”
Reply to Objection 3. Virtue cannot be in the irra-
Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to
tional part of the soul, except in so far as this participates
which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the
in the reason (Ethic. i, 13). And therefore reason, or the
words “which God works in us without us.” If we omit
mind, is the proper subject of virtue.
this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to
Reply to Objection 4. Justice has a righteousness of
all virtues in general, whether acquired or infused.
its own by which it puts those outward things right which
Reply to Objection 1. That which is first seized by
come into human use, and are the proper matter of justice,
the intellect is being: wherefore everything that we appre-
as we shall show further on (q. 60, a. 2; IIa IIae, q. 58,
hend we consider as being, and consequently as gone, and
a. 8). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due
as good, which are convertible with being. Wherefore we
end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human
say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that
will, as stated above (q. 19, a. 4), is common to all virtues.
oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner
Reply to Objection 5. One can make bad use of a
goodness. But this is not the case with specific forms, as
virtue objectively, for instance by having evil thoughts
whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend,
about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or by being proud of
is not apprehended with the notion of white and healthy.
it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of
We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-
action, so that an act of virtue be evil.
subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they them-
Reply to Objection 6. Infused virtue is caused in us
selves had being, but because things are by them; so also
by God without any action on our part, but not without
are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness
our consent. This is the sense of the words, “which God
or oneness, but because by them something is good or one.
works in us without us.” As to those things which are done
So also is virtue called good, because by it something is
by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on
good.
our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.
845
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 56
Of the Subject of Virtue
(In Six Articles)
We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?
(2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers?
(3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?
(4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the subject of virtue?
(5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue?
(6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?
Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?
Ia IIae q. 56 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the subject of virtue
from the soul through a power. Thirdly, from the fact that
is not a power of the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib.
virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the
Arb. ii, 19) that “virtue is that by which we live righ-
end, which is either a thing’s operation, or something ac-
teously.” But we live by the essence of the soul, and not
quired by an operation proceeding from the thing’s power.
by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue is not a power,
Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue.
but in the essence of the soul.
Reply to Objection 1. “To live” may be taken in two
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii,
ways. Sometimes it is taken for the very existence of the
6) that “virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and
living thing: in this way it belongs to the essence of the
his work good likewise.” But as work is set up by power,
soul, which is the principle of existence in the living thing.
so he that has a virtue is set up by the essence of the soul.
But sometimes “to live” is taken for the operation of the
Therefore virtue does not belong to the power, any more
living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live righteously,
than to the essence of the soul.
inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous actions.
Objection 3. Further, power is in the second species
Reply to Objection 2. Good is either the end, or
of quality. But virtue is a quality, as we have said above
something referred to the end. And therefore, since the
(q. 55, a. 4): and quality is not the subject of quality.
good of the worker consists in the work, this fact also, that
Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue.
virtue makes the worker good, is referred to the work, and
On the contrary, “Virtue is the limit of power” (De
consequently, to the power.
Coelo ii). But the limit is in that of which it is the limit.
Reply to Objection 3. One accident is said to be
Therefore virtue is in a power of the soul.
the subject of another, not as though one accident could
I answer that, It can be proved in three ways that
uphold another; but because one accident inheres to sub-
virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the no-
stance by means of another, as color to the body by means
tion of the very essence of virtue, which implies perfec-
of the surface; so that surface is said to be the subject of
tion of a power; for perfection is in that which it perfects.
color. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the
Secondly, from the fact that virtue is an operative habit, as
subject of virtue.
we have said above (q. 55, a. 2): for all operation proceeds
Whether one virtue can be in several powers?
Ia IIae q. 56 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that one virtue can be in
belongs to the intellect, and “to will” belongs to the will.
several powers. For habits are known by their acts. But
Therefore virtue can be in several powers.
one act proceeds in various way from several powers: thus
Objection 3. Further, prudence is in the reason since
walking proceeds from the reason as directing, from the
it is “the right reason of things to be done” (Ethic. vi, 5).
will as moving, and from the motive power as executing.
And it is also in the will: for it cannot exist together with
Therefore also one habit can be in several powers.
a perverse will (Ethic. vi, 12). Therefore one virtue can
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii,
be in two powers.
4) that three things are required for virtue, namely: “to
On the contrary, The subject of virtue is a power of
know, to will, and to work steadfastly.” But “to know”
the soul. But the same accident cannot be in several sub-
846
jects. Therefore one virtue cannot be in several powers of of diffusion, or by way of a disposition, in so far as one
the soul.
power is moved by another, and one power receives from
I answer that, It happens in two ways that one thing
another.
is subjected in two. First, so that it is in both on an equal
Reply to Objection 1. One act cannot belong to sev-
footing. In this way it is impossible for one virtue to be in
eral powers equally, and in the same degree; but only from
two powers: since diversity of powers follows the generic
different points of view, and in various degrees.
conditions of the objects, while diversity of habits follows
Reply to Objection 2. “To know” is a condition re-
the specific conditions thereof: and so wherever there is
quired for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works
diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits; but not
according to right reason. But moral virtue is essentially
vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in
in the appetite.
two or more, not on an equal footing, but in a certain or-
Reply to Objection 3. Prudence is really subjected in
der. And thus one virtue can belong to several powers, so
reason: but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of
that it is in one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind the will, as we shall see further on (a. 3; q. 57, a. 4).
Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?
Ia IIae q. 56 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect is not the in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since
subject of virtue. For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl.
virtue is that “which makes its possessor good, and his
xv) that all virtue is love. But the subject of love is not
work good likewise,” these latter habits are called virtuous
the intellect, but the appetitive power alone. Therefore no
simply: because they make the work to be actually good,
virtue is in the intellect.
and the subject good simply. But the first kind of habits
Objection 2. Further, virtue is referred to good, as is
are not called virtues simply: because they do not make
clear from what has been said above (q. 55, a. 3). Now
the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor
good is not the object of the intellect, but of the appetitive
do they make their possessor good simply. For through
power. Therefore the subject of virtue is not the intellect,
being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not
but the appetitive power.
simply, but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian or
Objection 3. Further, virtue is that “which makes its
a good smith. And for this reason science and art are often
possessor good,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6).
divided against virtue; while at other times they are called
But the habit which perfects the intellect does not make
virtues (Ethic. vi, 2).
its possessor good: since a man is not said to be a good
Hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in
man on account of his science or his art. Therefore the
a relative sense, can be the intellect, and not only the prac-
intellect is not the subject of virtue.
tical intellect, but also the speculative, without any refer-
On the contrary, The mind is chiefly called the in-
ence to the will: for thus the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3)
tellect. But the subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear
holds that science, wisdom and understanding, and also
from the definition, above given, of virtue (q. 55, a. 4).
art, are intellectual virtues. But the subject of a habit
Therefore the intellect is the subject of virtue.
which is called a virtue simply, can only be the will, or
I answer that, As we have said above (q. 55, a. 3), a
some power in so far as it is moved by the will. And the
virtue is a habit by which we work well. Now a habit may
reason of this is, that the will moves to their acts all those
be directed to a good act in two ways. First, in so far as
other powers that are in some way rational, as we have
by the habit a man acquires an aptness to a good act; for
said above (q. 9, a. 1; q. 17, Aa. 1,5; Ia, q. 82, a. 4): and
instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to
therefore if man do well actually, this is because he has
speak correctly. But grammar does not make a man al-
a good will. Therefore the virtue which makes a man to
ways speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of
do well actually, and not merely to have the aptness to do
a barbarism or make a solecism: and the case is the same
well, must be either in the will itself; or in some power as
with other sciences and arts. Secondly, a habit may confer
moved by the will.
not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that apt-
Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will,
ness: for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt
just as are the other powers: for a man considers some-
will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly.
thing actually, because he wills to do so. And therefore
And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said
the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the will, can
of a thing simply, in respect, not of what it is potentially,
be the subject of virtue absolutely so called. And in this
but of what it is actually: therefore from having habits of
way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the sub-
the latter sort, man is said simply to do good, and to be
ject of Faith: for the intellect is moved by the command
good; for instance, because he is just, or temperate; and
of the will to assent to what is of faith: for “no man be-
847
lieveth, unless he will”∗. But the practical intellect is the be understood of virtue simply so called: not that every
subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right rea-
virtue is love simply: but that it depends in some way
son of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man
on love, in so far as it depends on the will, whose first
be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this rea-
movement consists in love, as we have said above (q. 25,
son of things to be done, that is in regard to their ends, to
Aa. 1,2,3; q. 27, a. 4; Ia, q. 20, a. 1).
which man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will,
Reply to Objection 2. The good of each thing is its
just as to the principles of speculative truth he is rightly
end: and therefore, as truth is the end of the intellect, so
disposed by the natural light of the active intellect. And
to know truth is the good act of the intellect. Whence the
therefore as the subject of science, which is the right rea-
habit, which perfects the intellect in regard to the knowl-
son of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect in its
edge of truth, whether speculative or practical, is a virtue.
relation to the active intellect, so the subject of prudence
Reply to Objection 3. This objection considers virtue
is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will.
simply so called.
Reply to Objection 1. The saying of Augustine is to
Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers are the subject of virtue?
Ia IIae q. 56 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the irascible and con-
virtues belong to the irrational part of the soul.”
cupiscible powers cannot be the subject of virtue. For
I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible pow-
these powers are common to us and dumb animals. But
ers can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves,
we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since for
in so far as they are parts of the sensitive appetite: and
this reason it is called human virtue. It is therefore impos-
in this way they are not competent to be the subject of
sible for human virtue to be in the irascible and concupis-
virtue. Secondly, they can be considered as participat-
cible powers which are parts of the sensitive appetite, as
ing in the reason, from the fact that they have a natural
we have said in the Ia, q. 81, a. 2.
aptitude to obey reason. And thus the irascible or concu-
Objection 2. Further, the sensitive appetite is a power
piscible power can be the subject of human virtue: for, in
which makes use of a corporeal organ. But the good
so far as it participates in the reason, it is the principle of of virtue cannot be in man’s body: for the Apostle says
a human act. And to these powers we must needs assign
(Rom. 7): “I know that good does not dwell in my flesh.”
virtues.
Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of
For it is clear that there are some virtues in the iras-
virtue.
cible and concupiscible powers. Because an act, which
Objection 3. Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus
proceeds from one power according as it is moved by an-
Eccl. v) that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, for
other power, cannot be perfect, unless both powers be well
the reason that the body is ruled by the soul: wherefore it
disposed to the act: for instance, the act of a craftsman
is entirely due to his soul that a man make good use of his
cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his in-
body: “For instance, if my coachman, through obedience
strument be well disposed to act. Therefore in the matter
to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving;
of the operations of the irascible and concupiscible pow-
this is all due to me.” But just as the soul rules the body,
ers, according as they are moved by reason, there must
so also does the reason rule the sensitive appetite. There-
needs be some habit perfecting in respect of acting well,
fore that the irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly
not only the reason, but also the irascible and concupisci-
ruled, is entirely due to the rational powers. Now “virtue
ble powers. And since the good disposition of the power
is that by which we live rightly,” as we have said above
which moves through being moved, depends on its con-
(q. 55, a. 4). Therefore virtue is not in the irascible and
formity with the power that moves it: therefore the virtue
concupiscible powers, but only in the rational powers.
which is in the irascible and concupiscible powers is noth-
Objection 4.
Further, “the principal act of moral
ing else but a certain habitual conformity of these powers
virtue is choice” (Ethic. viii, 13). Now choice is not an
to reason.
act of the irascible and concupiscible powers, but of the
Reply to Objection 1. The irascible and concupisci-
rational power, as we have said above (q. 13, a. 2). There-
ble powers considered in themselves, as parts of the sen-
fore moral virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible
sitive appetite, are common to us and dumb animals. But
powers, but in the reason.
in so far as they are rational by participation, and are obe-
On the contrary, Fortitude is assigned to the irasci-
dient to the reason, they are proper to man. And in this
ble power, and temperance to the concupiscible power.
way they can be the subject of human virtue.
Whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 10) says that “these
Reply to Objection 2. Just as human flesh has not
∗ Augustine: Tract. xxvi in Joan.
848
of itself the good of virtue, but is made the instrument their own proper movements, by which, at times, they go
of a virtuous act, inasmuch as being moved by reason, we
against reason, whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3)
“yield our members to serve justice”; so also, the irascible
that the “reason rules the irascible and concupiscible pow-
and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed, have not
ers by a political command” such as that by which free
the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the “fomes”:
men are ruled, who have in some respects a will of their
whereas, inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason,
own. And for this reason also must there be some virtues
the good of reason is begotten in them.
in the irascible and concupiscible powers, by which these
Reply to Objection 3. The body is ruled by the soul,
powers are well disposed to act.
and the irascible and concupiscible powers by the reason,
Reply to Objection 4. In choice there are two things,
but in different ways. For the body obeys the soul blindly
namely, the intention of the end, and this belongs to the
without any contradiction, in those things in which it has
moral virtue; and the preferential choice of that which
a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul: whence the
is unto the end, and this belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi,
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the “soul rules the body
2,5). But that the irascible and concupiscible powers have
with a despotic command” as the master rules his slave:
a right intention of the end in regard to the passions of the
wherefore the entire movement of the body is referred to
soul, is due to the good disposition of these powers. And
the soul. For this reason virtue is not in the body, but in
therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with
the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible powers do
the passions are in the irascible and concupiscible pow-
not obey the reason blindly; on the contrary, they have
ers, but prudence is in the reason.
Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension are the subject of virtue?
Ia IIae q. 56 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that it is possible for
in his Rhetoric that “it is a habit like a second nature in ac-
virtue to be in the interior sensitive powers of apprehen-
cord with reason.” Yet, in man, that which he acquires by
sion. For the sensitive appetite can be the subject of virtue,
use, in his memory and other sensitive powers of appre-
in so far as it obeys reason. But the interior sensitive pow-
hension, is not a habit properly so called, but something
ers of apprehension obey reason: for the powers of imagi-
annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty, as we have
nation, of cogitation, and of memory∗ act at the command
said above (q. 50, a. 4, ad 3).
of reason. Therefore in these powers there can be virtue.
Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers,
Objection 2. Further, as the rational appetite, which
they cannot be virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by
is the will, can be hindered or helped in its act, by the
which it never happens that anything but good is done:
sensitive appetite, so also can the intellect or reason be
and so virtue must needs be in that power which consum-
hindered or helped by the powers mentioned above. As,
mates the good act. But the knowledge of truth is not con-
therefore, there can be virtue in the interior powers of ap-
summated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for
petite, so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of
such powers prepare the way to the intellective knowl-
apprehension.
edge. And therefore in these powers there are none of
Objection 3. Further, prudence is a virtue, of which
the virtues, by which we know truth: these are rather in
Cicero (De Invent. Rhetor. ii) says that memory is a part.
the intellect or reason.
Therefore also in the power of memory there can be a
Reply to Objection 1. The sensitive appetite is re-
virtue: and in like manner, in the other interior sensitive
lated to the will, which is the rational appetite, through
powers of apprehension.
being moved by it. And therefore the act of the appetitive
On the contrary, All virtues are either intellectual or
power is consummated in the sensitive appetite: and for
moral (Ethic. ii, 1). Now all the moral virtues are in the
this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtue.
appetite; while the intellectual virtues are in the intellect
Whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related
or reason, as is clear from Ethic. vi, 1. Therefore there is
to the intellect rather through moving it; for the reason
no virtue in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension.
that the phantasms are related to the intellective soul, as
I answer that, In the interior sensitive powers of ap-
colors to sight (De Anima iii, text. 18). And therefore the
prehension there are some habits. And this is made clear
act of knowledge is terminated in the intellect; and for this
principally from what the Philosopher says (De Memo-
reason the cognoscitive virtues are in the intellect itself, or ria ii), that “in remembering one thing after another, we
the reason.
become used to it; and use is a second nature.” Now a
And thus is made clear the Reply to the Second Ob-
habit of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use,
jection.
which is like unto nature. Wherefore Tully says of virtue
Reply to Objection 3. Memory is not a part of pru-
∗ Cf. Ia, q. 78, a. 4
849
dence, as species is of a genus, as though memory were quired for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a fash-a virtue properly so called: but one of the conditions re-
ion, it is after the manner of an integral part.
Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?
Ia IIae q. 56 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not the
power’s own proper nature does not suffice for the pur-
subject of virtue. Because no habit is required for that
pose.
which belongs to a power by reason of its very nature. But
Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its rela-
since the will is in the reason, it is of the very essence of
tion to its object. Since, therefore, as we have said above
the will, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text.
(q. 19, a. 3), the object of the will is the good of reason
42), to tend to that which is good, according to reason.
proportionate to the will, in respect of this the will does
And to this good every virtue is ordered, since everything
not need a virtue perfecting it. But if man’s will is con-
naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as Tully
fronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as
says in his Rhetoric, is a “habit like a second nature in ac-
regards the whole human species, such as Divine good,
cord with reason.” Therefore the will is not the subject of
which transcends the limits of human nature, or as re-
virtue.
gards the individual, such as the good of one’s neighbor,
Objection 2. Further, every virtue is either intellectual then does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues
or moral (Ethic. i, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is sub-
as those which direct man’s affections to God or to his
jected in the intellect and reason, and not in the will: while
neighbor are subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and
moral virtue is subjected in the irascible and concupisci-
such like.
ble powers which are rational by participation. Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. This objection is true of those
no virtue is subjected in the will.
virtues which are ordained to the willer’s own good; such
Objection 3. Further, all human acts, to which virtues
as temperance and fortitude, which are concerned with the
are ordained, are voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue
human passions, and the like, as is clear from what we
in the will in respect of some human acts, in like manner
have said (q. 35, a. 6).
there will be a virtue in the will in respect of all human
Reply to Objection 2. Not only the irascible and con-
acts. Either, therefore, there will be no virtue in any other
cupiscible powers are rational by participation but “the ap-
power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same
petitive power altogether,” i.e. in its entirety (Ethic. i, 13).
act, which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will cannot
Now the will is included in the appetitive power. And
be the subject of virtue.
therefore whatever virtue is in the will must be a moral
On the contrary, Greater perfection is required in the
virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on
mover than in the moved. But the will moves the irascible
(q. 62, a. 3).
and concupiscible powers. Much more therefore should
Reply to Objection 3. Some virtues are directed to
there be virtue in the will than in the irascible and concu-
the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good
piscible powers.
of this or that man: and in these cases there is no need for
I answer that, Since the habit perfects the power in
virtue in the will, for the nature of the power suffices for
reference to act, then does the power need a habit perfect-
the purpose, as we have said. This need exists only in the
ing it unto doing well, which habit is a virtue, when the
case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good.
850
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 57
Of the Intellectual Virtues
(In Six Articles)
We now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological virtues. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?
(2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding?
(3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue?
(4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art?
(5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?
(6) Whether “eubulia,” “synesis” and “gnome” are virtues annexed to prudence?
Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?
Ia IIae q. 57 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the habits of the spec-
virtues in so far as they confer aptness for a good work,
ulative intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative
viz. the consideration of truth (since this is the good work
habit, as we have said above (q. 55, a. 2). But speculative
of the intellect): yet they are not called virtues in the sec-
habits are not operative: for speculative matter is distinct
ond way, as though they conferred the right use of a power
from practical, i.e. operative matter. Therefore the habits
or habit. For if a man possess a habit of speculative sci-
of the speculative intellect are not virtues.
ence, it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of
Objection 2. Further, virtue is about those things by
it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those mat-
which man is made happy or blessed: for “happiness is the
ters of which he has scientific knowledge: that he make
reward of virtue” (Ethic. i, 9). Now intellectual habits do
use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion
not consider human acts or other human goods, by which
of his will. Consequently a virtue which perfects the will,
man acquires happiness, but rather things pertaining to na-
as charity or justice, confers the right use of these specu-
ture or to God. Therefore such like habits cannot be called
lative habits. And in this way too there can be merit in the
virtues.
acts of these habits, if they be done out of charity: thus
Objection 3. Further, science is a speculative habit.
Gregory says (Moral. vi) that the “contemplative life has
But science and virtue are distinct from one another as
greater merit than the active life.”
genera which are not subalternate, as the Philosopher
Reply to Objection 1. Work is of two kinds, exterior
proves in Topic. iv. Therefore speculative habits are not
and interior. Accordingly the practical or active faculty
virtues.
which is contrasted with the speculative faculty, is con-
On the contrary, The speculative habits alone con-
cerned with exterior work, to which the speculative habit
sider necessary things which cannot be otherwise than
is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the interior act of the
they are. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) places certain
intellect which is to consider the truth. And in this way it
intellectual virtues in that part of the soul which consid-
is an operative habit.
ers necessary things that cannot be otherwise than they
Reply to Objection 2. Virtue is about certain things
are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are
in two ways. In the first place a virtue is about its ob-
virtues.
ject. And thus these speculative virtues are not about those
I answer that, Since every virtue is ordained to some
things whereby man is made happy; except perhaps, in
good, as stated above (q. 55, a. 3), a habit, as we have al-
so far as the word “whereby” indicates the efficient cause
ready observed (q. 56, a. 3), may be called a virtue for two
or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the
reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good;
supreme object of contemplation. Secondly, a virtue is
secondly, because besides aptness, it confers the right use
said to be about its acts: and in this sense the intellec-
of it. The latter condition, as above stated (q. 55, a. 3),
tual virtues are about those things whereby a man is made
belongs to those habits alone which affect the appetitive
happy; both because the acts of these virtues can be mer-
part of the soul: since it is the soul’s appetitive power that
itorious, as stated above, and because they are a kind of
puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses.
beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contem-
Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do
plation of truth, as we have already stated (q. 3, a. 7).
not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way,
Reply to Objection 3. Science is contrasted with
but only the intellective part; they may indeed be called
virtue taken in the second sense, wherein it belongs to the
851
appetitive faculty.
Whether there are only three habits of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science Ia IIae q. 57 a. 2
and understanding?
Objection 1. It would seem unfitting to distinguish
judges all things and sets them in order, because there can
three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom,
be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on
science and understanding. Because a species is a kind
the first causes. But in regard to that which is last in this
of science, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Therefore wisdom
or that genus of knowable matter, it is “science” which
should not be condivided with science among the intel-
perfects the intellect. Wherefore according to the differ-
lectual virtues.
ent kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of
Objection 2. Further, in differentiating powers, habits
scientific knowledge; whereas there is but one wisdom.
and acts in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly
Reply to Objection 1. Wisdom is a kind of science,
the formal aspect of these objects, as we have already ex-
in so far as it has that which is common to all the sci-
plained ( Ia, q. 77, a. 3). Therefore diversity of habits is
ences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions from principles.
taken, not from their material objects, but from the formal
But since it has something proper to itself above the other
aspect of those objects. Now the principle of a demon-
sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as
stration is the formal aspect under which the conclusion is
to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles,
known. Therefore the understanding of principles should
therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science.
not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the
Reply to Objection 2. When the formal aspect of the
knowledge of conclusions.
object is referred to a power or habit by one same act,
Objection 3. Further, an intellectual virtue is one
there is no distinction of habit or power in respect of the
which resides in the essentially rational faculty. Now even
formal aspect and of the material object: thus it belongs to
the speculative reason employs the dialectic syllogism for
the same power of sight to see both color, and light, which
the sake of argument, just as it employs the demonstrative
is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is seen
syllogism. Therefore as science, which is the result of
at the same time as the color. On the other hand, the prin-
a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual
ciples of a demonstration can be considered apart, without
virtue, so also should opinion be.
the conclusion being considered at all. Again they can be
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reck-
considered together with the conclusions, since the con-
ons these three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz.
clusions can be deduced from them. Accordingly, to con-
wisdom, science and understanding.
sider the principles in this second way, belongs to science,
I answer that, As already stated (a. 1), the virtues of
which considers the conclusions also: while to consider
the speculative intellect are those which perfect the spec-
the principles in themselves belongs to understanding.
ulative intellect for the consideration of truth: for this
Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these
is its good work. Now a truth is subject to a twofold
three virtues are distinct, not as being on a par with one
consideration—as known in itself, and as known through
another, but in a certain order. The same is to be observed
another. What is known in itself, is as a “principle,” and is
in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than
at once understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit
another; for instance, the rational soul is more perfect than
that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such
the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the vegetal. For
truth is called “understanding,” which is the habit of prin-
it is thus that science depends on understanding as on a
ciples.
virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wis-
On the other hand, a truth which is known through an-
dom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing be-
other, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by
neath itself both understanding and science, by judging
means of the reason’s inquiry, and is as a “term.” This
both of the conclusions of science, and of the principles
may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in
on which they are based.
some particular genus; secondly, so that it is the ultimate
Reply to Objection 3.
As stated above (q. 55,
term of all human knowledge. And, since “things that
Aa. 3,4), a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and
are knowable last from our standpoint, are knowable first
is nowise referable to evil. Now the good of the intellect
and chiefly in their nature” (Phys. i, text. 2, 3); hence
is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits
that which is last with respect to all human knowledge,
alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell the
is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature.
truth and never tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspi-
And about these is “wisdom,” which considers the high-
cion can be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as
est causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it rightly
stated in Ethic. vi, 3, they are not intellectual virtues.
852
Whether the intellectual habit, art, is a virtue?
Ia IIae q. 57 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that art is not an intellec-
habit, which is the property of a virtue that perfects the
tual virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19)
appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well.
that “no one makes bad use of virtue.” But one may make
Reply to Objection 1. When anyone endowed with
bad use of art: for a craftsman can work badly according
an art produces bad workmanship, this is not the work of
to the knowledge of his art. Therefore art is not a virtue.
that art, in fact it is contrary to the art: even as when a man Objection 2. Further, there is no virtue of a virtue.
lies, while knowing the truth, his words are not in accord
But “there is a virtue of art,” according to the Philosopher
with his knowledge, but contrary thereto. Wherefore, just
(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore art is not a virtue.
as science has always a relation to good, as stated above
Objection 3. Further, the liberal arts excel the me-
(a. 2, ad 3), so it is with art: and it is for this reason that chanical arts. But just as the mechanical arts are practical,
it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a per-
so the liberal arts are speculative. Therefore, if art were
fect virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use
an intellectual virtue, it would have to be reckoned among
it well; for which purpose something further is requisite:
the speculative virtues.
although there cannot be a good use without the art.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,4)
Reply to Objection 2. In order that man may make
says that art is a virtue; and yet he does not reckon it
good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is
among the speculative virtues, which, according to him,
perfected by moral virtue; and for this reason the Philoso-
reside in the scientific part of the soul.
pher says that there is a virtue of art; namely, a moral
I answer that, Art is nothing else but “the right rea-
virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires a moral
son about certain works to be made.” And yet the good of
virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by
these things depends, not on man’s appetitive faculty be-
justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully.
ing affected in this or that way, but on the goodness of the
Reply to Objection 3. Even in speculative matters
work done. For a craftsman, as such, is commendable, not
there is something by way of work: e.g. the making of
for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality
a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or the work of count-
of the work. Art, therefore, properly speaking, is an op-
ing or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to
erative habit. And yet it has something in common with
such like works of the speculative reason, are, by a kind
the speculative habits: since the quality of the object con-
of comparison, called arts indeed, but “liberal” arts, in or-
sidered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also,
der to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained
but not how the human appetite may be affected towards
to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion,
that object. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates
servile, inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to
the truth, it matters not how his appetitive faculty may be
the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber]. On
affected, whether he be joyful or angry: even as neither
the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to
does this matter in a craftsman, as we have observed. And
any such like work, are called sciences simply, and not
so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the
arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent, does it fol-
speculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither art nor spec-
low that the notion of art is more applicable to them.
ulative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the
Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art?
Ia IIae q. 57 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not a
Objection 3. Further, it belongs to prudence, “to be of
distinct virtue from art. For art is the right reason about
good counsel” (Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place
certain works. But diversity of works does not make a
in certain arts also, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, e.g. in the arts habit cease to be an art; since there are various arts about
of warfare, of seamanship, and of medicine. Therefore
works widely different. Since therefore prudence is also
prudence is not distinct from art.
right reason about works, it seems that it too should be
On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes pru-
reckoned a virtue.
dence from art (Ethic. vi, 5).
Objection 2. Further, prudence has more in common
I answer that, Where the nature of virtue differs, there with art than the speculative habits have; for they are both
is a different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above
“about contingent matters that may be otherwise than they
(a. 1; q. 56, a. 3) that some habits have the nature of virtue, are” (Ethic. vi, 4,5). Now some speculative habits are
through merely conferring aptness for a good work: while
called arts. Much more, therefore, should prudence be
some habits are virtues, not only through conferring apt-
called an art.
ness for a good work, but also through conferring the use.
853
But art confers the mere aptness for good work; since it good of man’s appetite, but the good of those things them-does not regard the appetite; whereas prudence confers
selves: wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of the
not only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for
appetite. The consequence is that more praise is given to
it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude
a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than to one who is
thereof.
unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence to
The reason for this difference is that art is the “right
sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will
reason of things to be made”; whereas prudence is the
is essential to prudence, but not to art. Accordingly it is
“right reason of things to be done.” Now “making” and
evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art.
“doing” differ, as stated in Metaph. ix, text. 16, in that
Reply to Objection 1. The various kinds of things
“making” is an action passing into outward matter, e.g.
made by art are all external to man: hence they do not
“to build,” “to saw,” and so forth; whereas “doing” is an
cause a different kind of virtue. But prudence is right rea-
action abiding in the agent, e.g. “to see,” “to will,” and the
son about human acts themselves: hence it is a distinct
like. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to
kind of virtue, as stated above.
such like human actions, consisting in the use of powers
Reply to Objection 2. Prudence has more in common
and habits, as art does to outward making: since each is
with art than a speculative habit has, if we consider their
the perfect reason about the things with which it is con-
subject and matter: for they are both in the thinking part
cerned. But perfection and rectitude of reason in specula-
of the soul, and about things that may be otherwise than
tive matters, depend on the principles from which reason
they are. But if we consider them as virtues, then art has
argues; just as we have said above (a. 2, ad 2) that sci-
more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear
ence depends on and presupposes understanding, which
from what has been said.
is the habit of principles. Now in human acts the end is
Reply to Objection 3. Prudence is of good counsel
what the principles are in speculative matters, as stated in
about matters regarding man’s entire life, and the end of
Ethic. vii, 8. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence,
human life. But in some arts there is counsel about mat-
which is right reason about things to be done, that man be
ters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some
well disposed with regard to the ends: and this depends
men, in so far as they are good counselors in matters of
on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence
warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or
there is need of a moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite.
pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply pru-
On the other hand the good things made by art is not the
dent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life.
Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?
Ia IIae q. 57 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not a
otherwise than they are. Hence it is written (Wis. 9:14):
virtue necessary to lead a good life. For as art is to things
“The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels
that are made, of which it is the right reason, so is pru-
uncertain.” Therefore it seems that prudence should not
dence to things that are done, in respect of which we judge
be reckoned an intellectual virtue.
of a man’s life: for prudence is the right reason about these
On the contrary, It is reckoned with other virtues nec-
things, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. Now art is not necessary
essary for human life, when it is written (Wis. 8:7) of
in things that are made, save in order that they be made,
Divine Wisdom: “She teacheth temperance and prudence
but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore is
and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men
prudence necessary to man in order to lead a good life, af-
can have nothing more profitable in life.”
ter he has become virtuous; but perhaps only in order that
I answer that, Prudence is a virtue most necessary
he may become virtuous.
for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds.
Objection 2. Further, “It is by prudence that we are
Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not only what
of good counsel,” as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. But man can
a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that he do
act not only from his own, but also from another’s good
it from right choice and not merely from impulse or pas-
counsel. Therefore man does not need prudence in or-
sion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the
der to lead a good life, but it is enough that he follow the
end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, the
counsels of prudent men.
due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end.
Objection 3. Further, an intellectual virtue is one by
Now man is suitably directed to his due end by a virtue
which one always tells the truth, and never a falsehood.
which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object
But this does not seem to be the case with prudence: for it
of which is the good and the end. And to that which is
is not human never to err in taking counsel about what is to
suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly
be done; since human actions are about things that may be
disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and
854
choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are man.
acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is
Reply to Objection 2. When a man does a good deed,
needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it
not of his own counsel, but moved by that of another, his
suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and
deed is not yet quite perfect, as regards his reason in di-
this virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue
recting him and his appetite in moving him. Wherefore,
necessary to lead a good life.
if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; and yet
Reply to Objection 1. The good of an art is to be
this is required in order that he may lead a good life.
found, not in the craftsman, but in the product of the art,
Reply to Objection 3. As stated in Ethic. vi, 2, truth
since art is right reason about things to be made: for since
is not the same for the practical as for the speculative in-
the making of a thing passes into external matter, it is a
tellect. Because the truth of the speculative intellect de-
perfection not of the maker, but of the thing made, even
pends on conformity between the intellect and the thing.
as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art is con-
And since the intellect cannot be infallibly in conformity
cerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the
with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary
good of prudence is in the active principle, whose activ-
matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent
ity is its perfection: for prudence is right reason about
things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about
things to be done, as stated above (a. 4). Consequently art
necessary things. On the other hand, the truth of the prac-
does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good
tical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite.
act, but that his work be good. Rather would it be neces-
This conformity has no place in necessary matters, which
sary for the thing made to act well (e.g. that a knife should
are not affected by the human will; but only in contingent
carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it were proper
matters which can be effected by us, whether they be mat-
to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, because
ters of interior action, or the products of external work.
they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the
Hence it is only about contingent matters that an intellec-
craftsman needs art, not that he may live well, but that he
tual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as may produce a good work of art, and have it in good keep-regards things to be made, and prudence, as regards things
ing: whereas prudence is necessary to man, that he may
to be done.
lead a good life, and not merely that he may be a good
Whether “eubulia, synesis, and gnome” are virtues annexed to prudence? ∗
Ia IIae q. 57 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that ” euboulia, synesis, Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues
and gnome” are unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed
annexed to prudence.
to prudence. For ” euboulia” is “a habit whereby we take On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philoso-good counsel” (Ethic. vi, 9). Now it “belongs to prudence
pher (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11), who assigns these three virtues
to take good counsel,” as stated (Ethic. vi, 9). Therefore
as being annexed to prudence.
” euboulia” is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather I answer that, Wherever several powers are subordi-is prudence itself.
nate to one another, that power is the highest which is or-
Objection 2. Further, it belongs to the higher to judge
dained to the highest act. Now there are three acts of rea-
the lower. The highest virtue would therefore seem to be
son in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is
the one whose act is judgment. Now ” synesis” enables us counsel; the second, judgment; the third, command. The
to judge well. Therefore ” synesis” is not a virtue annexed first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intel-to prudence, but rather is a principal virtue.
lect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is a kind
Objection 3. Further, just as there are various matters
of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which
in so far as this is ordained to operation; for reason does
one has to take counsel. But there is one virtue referring
not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now
to all matters of counsel. Therefore, in order to judge well
it is evident that in things done by man, the chief act is
of what has to be done, there is no need, besides ” synesis”
that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate.
of the virtue of ” gnome.”
Consequently, that virtue which perfects the command,
Objection 4. Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii)
viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has other
mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. “memory of
secondary virtues annexed to it, viz. ” eustochia,” which the past, understanding of the present, and foresight of
perfects counsel; and ” synesis” and ” gnome,” which are the future.” Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1)
parts of prudence in relation to judgment, and of whose
mentions yet others: viz. “caution, docility,” and the like.
distinction we shall speak further on (ad 3).
∗ euboulia, synesis, gnome
855
Reply to Objection 1. Prudence makes us be of good science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters;
counsel, not as though its immediate act consisted in be-
whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judg-
ing of good counsel, but because it perfects the latter act
ment, differ according to their different objects. ” Syne-
by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. ” euboulia.”
sis” and ” gnome” differ in respect of the different rules Reply to Objection 2. Judgment about what is to be
on which judgment is based: for ” synesis” judges of ac-done is directed to something further: for it may happen
tions according to the common law; while ” gnome” bases in some matter of action that a man’s judgment is sound,
its judgment on the natural law, in those cases where the
while his execution is wrong. The matter does not attain
common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on
to its final complement until the reason has commanded
( IIa IIae, q. 51, a. 4).
aright in the point of what has to be done.
Reply to Objection 4. Memory, understanding and
Reply to Objection 3. Judgment of anything should
foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not
be based on that thing’s proper principles. But inquiry
virtues distinct from prudence: but are, as it were, integral
does not reach to the proper principles: because, if we
parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect
were in possession of these, we should need no more to in-
prudence. There are, moreover, subjective parts or species
quire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence only
of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, and the
one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres
like. But the three first names are, in a fashion, potential
there are two virtues for good judgment: because differ-
parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as
ence is based not on common but on proper principles.
secondary virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak
Consequently, even in speculative matters, there is one
of them later ( IIa IIae, q. 48, seqq.).
856
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 58
Of the Difference Between Moral and Intellectual Virtues
(In Five Articles)
We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues and the others.
Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?
(2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?
(3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue?
(4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?
(5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral virtue?
Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?
Ia IIae q. 58 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that every virtue is a
Thus we read (2 Macc. 1:2) that “rushing violently upon
moral virtue. Because moral virtue is so called from the
the enemy, like lions∗, they slew them”: and the word
Latin “mos,” i.e. custom. Now, we can accustom our-
is used in the same sense in Ps. 67:7, where we read:
selves to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore every virtue
“Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a
is a moral virtue.
house.” For both these significations there is but one word
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii,
in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each,
6) that moral virtue is “a habit of choosing the rational
for the word “ethos” is written sometimes with a long, and
mean.” But every virtue is a habit of choosing: since
sometimes a short “e”.
the acts of any virtue can be done from choice. And,
Now “moral” virtue is so called from “mos” in the
moreover, every virtue consists in following the rational
sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some
mean in some way, as we shall explain further on (q. 64,
particular action. And the other meaning of “mos,” i.e.
Aa. 1,2,3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.
“custom,” is akin to this: because custom becomes a sec-
Objection 3. Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet.
ond nature, and produces an inclination similar to a natu-
ii) that “virtue is a habit like a second nature, in accord
ral one. But it is evident that inclination to an action be-
with reason.” But since every human virtue is directed to
longs properly to the appetitive power, whose function it
man’s good, it must be in accord with reason: since man’s
is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above
good “consists in that which agrees with his reason,” as
(q. 9, a. 1). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue,
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue
but only those that are in the appetitive faculty.
is a moral virtue.
Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes “mos” in
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic.
i, 13):
the sense of “custom.”
“When we speak of a man’s morals, we do not say that he
Reply to Objection 2. Every act of virtue can be done
is wise or intelligent, but that he is gentle or sober.” Ac-
from choice: but no virtue makes us choose aright, save
cordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral
that which is in the appetitive part of the soul: for it has
virtues: and yet they are virtues, as stated above (q. 57,
been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive
a. 2). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue.
faculty (q. 13, a. 1). Wherefore a habit of choosing, i.e.
I answer that, In order to answer this question clearly, a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that
we must consider the meaning of the Latin word “mos”;
habit alone which perfects the appetitive faculty: although
for thus we shall be able to discover what a “moral” virtue
the acts of other habits also may be a matter of choice.
is. Now “mos” has a twofold meaning. For sometimes
Reply to Objection 3. “Nature is the principle of
it means custom, in which sense we read (Acts 15:1):
movement” (Phys. ii, text. 3). Now to move the facul-
“Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of
ties to act is the proper function of the appetitive power.
Moses, you cannot be saved.” Sometimes it means a nat-
Consequently to become as a second nature by consenting
ural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular ac-
to the reason, is proper to those virtues which are in the
tion, in which sense the word is applied to dumb animals.
appetitive faculty.
∗ Leonum more, i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing
857
Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?
Ia IIae q. 58 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue does not
kind of prudence,” as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he
differ from intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De
maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowl-
Civ. Dei iv, 21) “that virtue is the art of right conduct.”
edge, he cannot sin; and that every one who sins, does so
But art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral and in-
through ignorance.
tellectual virtue do not differ.
Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the
Objection 2. Further, some authors put science in
appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with
the definition of virtues: thus some define perseverance
a certain power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher
as a “science or habit regarding those things to which we
says (Polit. i, 3) that “reason commands the appetitive
should hold or not hold”; and holiness as “a science which
faculty by a politic power,” whereby a man rules over sub-
makes man to be faithful and to do his duty to God.” Now
jects that are free, having a certain right of opposition.
science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue
Hence Augustine says on Ps. 118 (Serm. 8) that “some-
should not be distinguished from intellectual virtue.
times we understand [what is right] while desire is slow,
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6)
or follows not at all,” in so far as the habits or passions
that “virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason.” But
of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be im-
this belongs to the intellectual virtues, as stated in Ethic.
peded in some particular action. And in this way, there is
vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intel-
some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man
lectual.
is in possession of knowledge he does not sin: provided,
Objection 4. Further, a thing does not differ from
however, that this knowledge is made to include the use
that which is included in its definition. But intellectual
of reason in this individual act of choice.
virtue is included in the definition of moral virtue: for the
Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requi-
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “moral virtue is a habit
site not only that his reason be well disposed by means of
of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent
a habit of intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be
man would appoint it.” Now this right reason that fixes
well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue. And so
the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual virtue,
moral differs from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite
as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not
differs from the reason. Hence just as the appetite is the
differ from intellectual.
principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of reason,
On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. i, 13 that “there so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as
are two kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some
they are in conformity with reason.
moral.”
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine usually applies the
I answer that, Reason is the first principle of all hu-
term “art” to any form of right reason; in which sense art
man acts; and whatever other principles of human acts
includes prudence which is the right reason about things
may be found, they obey reason somewhat, but in vari-
to be done, even as art is the right reason about things to
ous ways. For some obey reason blindly and without any
be made. Accordingly, when he says that “virtue is the art
contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the body,
of right conduct,” this applies to prudence essentially; but
provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as
to other virtues, by participation, for as much as they are
reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to ac-
directed by prudence.
tion. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that “the
Reply to Objection 2. All such definitions, by whom-
soul rules the body like a despot,” i.e. as a master rules
soever given, were based on the Socratic theory, and
his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly some
should be explained according to what we have said about
held that all the active principles in man are subordinate
art (ad 1).
to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well
The same applies to the Third Objection.
it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently,
Reply to Objection 4. Right reason which is in ac-
since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing
cord with prudence is included in the definition of moral
good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason,
virtue, not as part of its essence, but as something belong-
so that there would be none but intellectual virtues. This
ing by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so
was the opinion of Socrates, who said “every virtue is a
far as they are all under the direction of prudence.
858
Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual?
Ia IIae q. 58 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that virtue is not ade-
Reply to Objection 1. Prudence is essentially an in-
quately divided into moral and intellectual. For prudence
tellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter,
seems to be a mean between moral and intellectual virtue,
it has something in common with the moral virtues: for
since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues (Ethic.
it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above
vi, 3,5); and again is placed by all among the four cardinal
(q. 57, a. 4). It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further
moral virtues.
on (q. 61, a. 1). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided
Reply to Objection 2. Contingency and perseverance
into intellectual and moral, as though there were no mean
are not perfections of the sensitive appetite. This is clear
between them.
from the fact that passions abound in the continent and
Objection 2. Further, contingency, perseverance, and
persevering man, which would not be the case if his sen-
patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet
sitive appetite were perfected by a habit making it con-
neither are they moral virtues; since they do not reduce the
formable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are,
passions to a mean, and are consistent with an abundance
however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand
of passion. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into
the passions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of
intellectual and moral.
being virtues: since intellectual virtue, which makes rea-
Objection 3. Further, faith, hope, and charity are
son to hold itself well in respect of moral matters, presup-
virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues: for there
poses a right appetite of the end, so that it may hold itself
are only five of these, viz. science, wisdom, understand-
aright in respect of principles, i.e. the ends, on which it
ing, prudence, and art, as stated above (q. 57, Aa. 2 ,3,5).
builds its argument: and this is wanting in the continent
Neither are they moral virtues; since they are not about
and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceed-
the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue.
ing from two principles be perfect, unless each principle
Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual
be perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation:
and moral.
thus, however perfect be the principal agent employing
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1)
an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if the
that “virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral.”
instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sen-
I answer that, Human virtue is a habit perfecting man
sitive faculty, which is moved by the rational faculty, is
in view of his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are
not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be,
but two principles of human actions, viz. the intellect or
the resulting action will be imperfect: and consequently
reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of
the principle of that action will not be a virtue. And for
movement in man as stated in De Anima iii, text. 48. Con-
this reason, contingency, desisting from pleasures, and
sequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection
perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but
of one of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects man’s
something less than a virtue, as the Philosopher maintains
speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may
(Ethic. vii, 1,9).
be good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it
Reply to Objection 3. Faith, hope, and charity are su-
perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows
perhuman virtues: for they are virtues of man as sharing
therefore that every human virtue is either intellectual or
in the grace of God.
moral.
Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?
Ia IIae q. 58 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that moral can be without
man obtains perfect use of reason. But it happens at times
intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says
that men are virtuous and acceptable to God, without be-
(De Invent. Rhet. ii) is “a habit like a second nature in
ing vigorous in the use of reason. Therefore it seems that
accord with reason.” Now though nature may be in ac-
moral virtue can be without intellectual.
cord with some sovereign reason that moves it, there is no
Objection 3. Further moral virtue makes us inclined
need for that reason to be united to nature in the same sub-
to do good works. But some, without depending on the
ject, as is evident of natural things devoid of knowledge.
judgment of reason, have a natural inclination to do good
Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a sec-
works. Therefore moral virtues can be without intellectual
ond nature, inclining him to consent to his reason, without
virtues.
his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that “the
Objection 2. Further, by means of intellectual virtue
other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to
859
do, cannot be real virtues.” But prudence is an intellec-things devoid of reason is without choice: wherefore such
tual virtue, as stated above (q. 57, a. 5). Therefore moral
an inclination does not of necessity require reason. But
virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues.
the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and con-
I answer that, Moral virtue can be without some of
sequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that
the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art;
reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.
but not without understanding and prudence. Moral virtue
Reply to Objection 2. A man may be virtuous with-
cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choos-
out having full use of reason as to everything, provided he
ing, i.e. making us choose well. Now in order that a
have it with regard to those things which have to be done
choice be good, two things are required. First, that the in-
virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have full use of
tention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral
reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through lack
virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good
of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according
that is in accord with reason, which is a due end. Sec-
to Mat. 10:16: “Be ye therefore prudent [Douay: ‘wise’]
ondly, that man take rightly those things which have ref-
as serpents, and simple as doves.”
erence to the end: and this he cannot do unless his reason
Reply to Objection 3. The natural inclination to a
counsel, judge and command aright, which is the func-
good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not
tion of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as stated
perfect virtue. For the stronger this inclination is, the more
above (q. 57, Aa. 5,6). Wherefore there can be no moral
perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by
virtue without prudence: and consequently neither can
right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting means to-
there be without understanding. For it is by the virtue of
wards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the
understanding that we know self-evident principles both
faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more
in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just
grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although
as right reason in speculative matters, in so far as it pro-
moral virtue be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not
ceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the
only is it “according to right reason,” in so far as it in-
understanding of those principles, so also does prudence,
clines man to that which is, according to right reason, as
which is the right reason about things to be done.
the Platonists maintained∗; but also it needs to be “joined
Reply to Objection 1. The inclination of nature in
with right reason,” as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13).
Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?
Ia IIae q. 58 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that there can be intel-
dence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for
lectual without moral virtue. Because perfection of what
this is that prudence is the right reason about things to be
precedes does not depend on the perfection of what fol-
done (and this, not merely in general, but also in partic-
lows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive ap-
ular); about which things actions are. Now right reason
petite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a perfection
demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue.
of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a
And when reason argues about particular cases, it needs
perfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be without it.
not only universal but also particular principles. As to
Objection 2. Further, morals are the matter of pru-
universal principles of action, man is rightly disposed by
dence, even as things makeable are the matter of art. Now
the natural understanding of principles, whereby he un-
art can be without its proper matter, as a smith without
derstands that he should do no evil; or again by some
iron. Therefore prudence can be without the moral virtue,
practical science. But this is not enough in order that man
although of all the intellectual virtues, it seems most akin
may reason aright about particular cases. For it happens
to the moral virtues.
sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known
Objection 3. Further, prudence is “a virtue whereby
by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a
we are of good counsel” (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of
particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed
good counsel without having the moral virtues. Therefore
by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the ob-
prudence can be without a moral virtue.
ject of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the
On the contrary, To wish to do evil is directly op-
universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the
posed to moral virtue; and yet it is not opposed to any-
habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made
thing that can be without moral virtue. Now it is contrary
to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles
to prudence “to sin willingly” (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore
of action; so, in order that he be rightly disposed with re-
prudence cannot be without moral virtue.
gard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends,
I answer that, Other intellectual virtues can, but pru-
he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it be-
∗ Cf. Plato, Meno xli.
860
comes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the Reply to Objection 2. It does not depend on the dis-end. This is done by moral virtue: for the virtuous man
position of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of
judges aright of the end of virtue, because “such a man
the principles of art, as it does, when we judge of the end
is, such does the end seem to him” (Ethic. iii, 5). Con-
which is the principle in moral matters: in the former case
sequently the right reason about things to be done, viz.
our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does
prudence, requires man to have moral virtue.
not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence
Reply to Objection 1. Reason, as apprehending the
does.
end, precedes the appetite for the end: but appetite for the
Reply to Objection 3. Prudence not only helps us to
end precedes the reason, as arguing about the choice of
be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well.
the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even so, in
This is not possible unless the impediment of the passions,
speculative matters the understanding of principles is the
destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be re-
foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based.
moved; and this is done by moral virtue.
861
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 59
Of Moral Virtue in Relation to the Passions
(In Five Articles)
We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another. And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, differ accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different kinds of moral virtue in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?
(2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?
(3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?
(4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion?
(5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?
Whether moral virtue is a passion?
Ia IIae q. 59 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue is a pas-
movement of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite,
sion. Because the mean is of the same genus as the ex-
and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to confor-
tremes. But moral virtue is a mean between two passions.
mity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of
Therefore moral virtue is a passion.
virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends
Objection 2. Further, virtue and vice, being contrary
in the appetite, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason.
to one another, are in the same genus. But some passions
Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states
are reckoned to be vices, such as envy and anger. There-
that it is “a habit of choosing the mean appointed by rea-
fore some passions are virtues.
son as a prudent man would appoint it.”
Objection 3. Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorReply to Objection 1. Virtue is a mean between pas-
row for another’s ills, as stated above (q. 35, a. 8). Now
sions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its
“Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a
effect; because, to wit, it establishes the mean between
virtue,” as Augustine states in De Civ. Dei ix, 5. There-
passions.
fore a passion may be a moral virtue.
Reply to Objection 2. If by vice we understand a
On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that “pas-
habit of doing evil deeds, it is evident that no passion is a
sions are neither virtues nor vices.”
vice. But if vice is taken to mean sin which is a vicious
I answer that, Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This
act, nothing hinders a passion from being a vice, or, on the
is clear for three reasons. First, because a passion is a
other hand, from concurring in an act of virtue; in so far
movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (q. 22,
as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance
a. 3): whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather
with reason.
a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind
Reply to Objection 3. Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e.
of habit. Secondly, because passions are not in them-
an act of virtue, in so far as “that movement of the soul is
selves good or evil. For man’s good or evil is something
obedient to reason”; viz. “when pity is bestowed without
in reference to reason: wherefore the passions, consid-
violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the peni-
ered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil,
tent forgiven,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). But
for as much as they may accord or disaccord with rea-
if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that
son. Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue
he bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders pity, in this
is referable to good alone, as stated above (q. 55, a. 3).
sense, from being a virtue. The same applies to similar
Thirdly, because, granted that some passions are, in some
passions.
way, referable to good only, or to evil only; even then the
862
Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?
Ia IIae q. 59 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue cannot
other emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are
be with passion. For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that
movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in
“a gentle man is one who is not passionate; but a patient
the point of the passions being, as they maintained, any
man is one who is passionate but does not give way.” The
emotions in disaccord with reason. These emotions could
same applies to all the moral virtues. Therefore all moral
not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose deliberately:
virtues are without passion.
while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if
Objection 2. Further, virtue is a right affection of the they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus Gel-soul, as health is to the body, as stated Phys. vii, text. 17:
lius∗, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), “it is not in
wherefore “virtue is a kind of health of the soul,” as Ci-
our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its
cero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv). But the soul’s passions are
fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they
“the soul’s diseases,” as he says in the same book. Now
must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is
health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is
slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow,” in so
passion compatible with virtue.
far as “these passions forestall the use of reason without
Objection 3. Further, moral virtue requires perfect
his approving of such things or consenting thereto.”
use of reason even in particular matters. But the passions
Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate
are an obstacle to this: for the Philosopher says (Ethic.
emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he con-
vi, 5) that “pleasures destroy the judgment of prudence”:
sent to them deliberately; as the Stoics maintained. But if
and Sallust says (Catilin.) that “when they,” i.e. the soul’s
the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive
passions, “interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp
appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, in so far as they
the truth.” Therefore passion is incompatible with moral
are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii,
virtue.
3) that “some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because
6): “If the will is perverse, these movements,” viz. the
the assertion should be qualified”: they should have said
passions, “are perverse also: but if it is upright, they are
virtue is freedom from those passions “that are not as they
not only blameless, but even praiseworthy.” But nothing
should be as to manner and time.”
praiseworthy is incompatible with moral virtue. Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher quotes this,
moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consis-
as well as many other examples in his books on Logic, in
tent with them.
order to illustrate, not his own mind, but that of others.
I answer that, The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed
It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the
on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4).
soul were incompatible with virtue: and the Philosopher
For the Stoics held that the soul’s passions cannot be in a
rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue
wise or virtuous man: whereas the Peripatetics, who were
is not freedom from passion. It may be said, however, that
founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix,
when he says “a gentle man is not passionate,” we are to
4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral
understand this of inordinate passion.
virtue, if they be reduced to the mean.
Reply to Objection 2. This and all similar arguments
This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei
which Tully brings forward in De Tusc. Quaest. iv take
ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because
the passions in the execution of reason’s command.
the Stoics, through not discriminating between the intel-
Reply to Objection 3. When a passion forestalls the
lective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite,
judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give
which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, did not,
its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of rea-
as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the
son. But when it follows that judgment, as through being
other affections of the human soul, in the point of their
commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of
being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the
reason’s command.
Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?
Ia IIae q. 59 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is incompati-
tude.” Now the “conversation” of wisdom “hath no bitter-
ble with virtue. Because the virtues are effects of wisdom,
ness,” as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow
according to Wis. 8:7: “She,” i.e. Divine wisdom, “tea-
is incompatible with virtue also.
cheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and forti-
Objection 2. Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work,
∗ Noct. Attic. xix, 1
863
as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hin-sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the same way
drance to good works is incompatible with virtue. There-
as the other passions are when moderated by reason.
fore sorrow is incompatible with virtue.
Their second reason for holding this opinion was that
Objection 3. Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of
sorrow is about evil present, whereas fear is for evil to
the mind (De Tusc. Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind
come: even as pleasure is about a present good, while de-
is incompatible with virtue, which is a good condition of
sire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a good
the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is
possessed, or the desire to have good that one possesses
incompatible with it.
not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the
On the contrary, Christ was perfect in virtue. But
mind resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is alto-
there was sorrow in Him, for He said (Mat. 26:38): “My
gether contrary to reason: wherefore it is incompatible
soul is sorrowful even unto death.” Therefore sorrow is
with virtue. But this is unreasonable. For there is an evil
compatible with virtue.
which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8),
stated; which evil is rejected by reason. Wherefore the
the Stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are
sensitive appetite follows reason’s rejection by sorrowing
three eupatheiai, i.e. “three good passions,” in place of the for that evil; yet moderately, according as reason dictates.
three disturbances: viz. instead of covetousness, “desire”;
Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be con-
instead of mirth, “joy”; instead of fear, “caution.” But
formed to reason, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2). Wherefore
they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could
moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us
be in the mind of a wise man, for two reasons.
sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher says
First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already
(Ethic. ii, 6,7). Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding
present. Now they held that no evil can happen to a wise
evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the
man: for they thought that, just as man’s only good is
sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on
virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so man’s
account of sorrow.
only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous man. But
Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things per-
this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul
taining to virtue is incompatible with virtue: since virtue
and body, whatever conduces to preserve the life of the
rejoices in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows
body, is some good to man; yet not his supreme good,
moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how.
because he can abuse it. Consequently the evil which is
Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted proves that
contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause
the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he
him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous man
sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom. Consequently
can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live
there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there
without committing slight sins, according to 1 Jn. 1:8: “If
can be no hindrance to wisdom.
we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” A third
Reply to Objection 2. Sorrow hinders the work that
reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in
makes us sorrowful: but it helps us to do more readily
a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is
whatever banishes sorrow.
to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to
Reply to Objection 3. Immoderate sorrow is a dis-
2 Cor. 7:10: “The sorrow that is according to God wor-
ease of the mind: but moderate sorrow is the mark of a
keth penance steadfast unto salvation.” Fourthly, because
well-conditioned mind, according to the present state of
he may praiseworthily sorrow for another’s sin. Therefore
life.
Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions?
Ia IIae q. 59 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that all the moral virtues
Objection 3. Further, some passion is to be found in
are about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
every moral virtue: and so either all are about the pas-
ii, 3) that “moral virtue is about objects of pleasure and
sions, or none are. But some are about the passions, as
sorrow.” But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated
fortitude and temperance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10.
above (q. 23, a. 4; q. 31, a. 1; q. 35, Aa. 1, 2). Therefore
Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.
all the moral virtues are about the passions.
On the contrary, Justice, which is a moral virtue, is
Objection 2. Further, the subject of the moral virtues
not about the passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq.
is a faculty which is rational by participation, as the
I answer that, Moral virtue perfects the appetitive
Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 13). But the passions are in
part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by rea-
this part of the soul, as stated above (q. 22, a. 3). There-
son. Now good as defined by reason is that which is
fore every moral virtue is about the passions.
moderated or directed by reason. Consequently there are
864
moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason’s words quoted, adds, “if virtues are about actions and pas-direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only
sions; now every action and passion is followed by plea-
the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the oper-
sure or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures
ations of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is
and sorrows,” viz. as about something that results from
not the subject of a passion, as stated above (q. 22, a. 3).
virtue.
Therefore not all the moral virtues are about passions, but
Reply to Objection 2. Not only the sensitive appetite
some are about passions, some about operations.
which is the subject of the passions, is rational by partic-
Reply to Objection 1. The moral virtues are not all
ipation, but also the will, where there are no passions, as
about pleasures and sorrows, as being their proper matter;
stated above.
but as being something resulting from their proper acts.
Reply to Objection 3. Some virtues have passions as
For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and sor-
their proper matter, but some virtues not. Hence the com-
rows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, after the
parison does not hold for all cases.
Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?
Ia IIae q. 59 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue can be
activities, but to make them execute the commands of rea-
without passion. For the more perfect moral virtue is, the
son, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as
more does it overcome the passions. Therefore at its high-
virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due external acts,
est point of perfection it is altogether without passion.
so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regu-
Objection 2. Further, then is a thing perfect, when it
lated movements.
is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines
Those moral virtues, however, which are not about
to its contrary. Now the passions incline us to sin which
the passions, but about operations, can be without pas-
is contrary to virtue: hence (Rom. 7:5) they are called
sions. Such a virtue is justice: because it applies the will
“passions of sins.” Therefore perfect virtue is altogether
to its proper act, which is not a passion. Nevertheless,
without passion.
joy results from the act of justice; at least in the will, in
Objection 3. Further, it is by virtue that we are con-
which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased
formed to God, as Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl.
through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the
vi, xi, xiii). But God does all things without passion at all.
sensitive appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the
Therefore the most perfect virtue is without any passion.
movement of the higher, as stated above (q. 17, a. 7; q. 24,
On the contrary, “No man is just who rejoices not in
a. 3). Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the
his deeds,” as stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion.
more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion.
Therefore justice cannot be without passion; and still less
Reply to Objection 1. Virtue overcomes inordinate
can the other virtues be.
passion; it produces ordinate passion.
I answer that, If we take the passions as being in-
Reply to Objection 2. It is inordinate, not ordinate,
ordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in
passion that leads to sin.
this sense perfect virtue is without the passions. But if
Reply to Objection 3. The good of anything depends
by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive
on the condition of its nature. Now there is no sensitive
appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the
appetite in God and the angels, as there is in man. Conse-
passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without
quently good operation in God and the angels is altogether
passions. The reason for this is that otherwise it would
without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the good
follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite al-
operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced
together idle: whereas it is not the function of virtue to
with the body’s help.
deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper
865
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 60
How the Moral Virtues Differ From One Another
(In Five Articles)
We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another: under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?
(2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are distinct from those which are about passions?
(3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?
(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?
(5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?
Whether there is only one moral virtue?
Ia IIae q. 60 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there is only one
matter must of necessity receive a form specifically one:
moral virtue. Because just as the direction of moral ac-
thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something
tions belongs to reason which is the subject of the intel-
in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, the matter re-
lectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the ap-
ceives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind
petite which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is
specifically as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal
only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz.
causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the
prudence. Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to
sun. In this case the forms received into matter are not
give all moral acts their respective inclinations.
of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of
Objection 2. Further, habits differ, not in respect of
the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance,
their material objects, but according to the formal aspect
we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of
of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the good to
various species are produced by putrefaction according to
which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz. the mean
the various adaptability of matter.
defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there is but one
Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds
moral virtue.
the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive
Objection 3. Further, things pertaining to morals are
power is commanded and moved. But the appetite does
specified by their end, as stated above (q. 1, a. 3). Now
not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say;
there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. hap-
because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation
piness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite in
(Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by
number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite
the direction of reason belong to various species, accord-
in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.
ing to their various relations to reason: so that it follows
On the contrary, One habit cannot be in several pow-
that moral virtues are of various species and are not one
ers, as stated above (q. 56, a. 2). But the subject of the
only.
moral virtues is the appetitive part of the soul, which is
Reply to Objection 1. The object of the reason is
divided into several powers, as stated in the Ia, q. 80, a. 2;
truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent
Ia, q. 81, a. 2. Therefore there cannot be only one moral
matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Conse-
virtue.
quently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters,
I answer that, As stated above (q. 58, Aa. 1,2,3), the
viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of the ap-
moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now
petitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind
habits differ specifically according to the specific differ-
according to its various relations to reason, the directing
ences of their objects, as stated above (q. 54, a. 2). Again,
power.
the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing,
Reply to Objection 2. This formal element is one
depends on its specific form which it receives from the
generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it
agent. But we must observe that the matter of the passive
varies in species, on account of the various relations of
subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For some-
the receiving matter, as explained above.
times it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind
Reply to Objection 3. Moral matters do not receive
specifically as the agent has that form, as happens with all
their species from the last end, but from their proximate
univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the
ends: and these, although they be infinite in number, are
866
not infinite in species.
Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are about pas-Ia IIae q. 60 a. 2
sions?
Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtues are not
taken from the very nature of those operations, no mat-
divided into those which are about operations and those
ter how man may be affected towards them: viz. in so
which are about passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
far as good and evil in them depend on their being com-
ii, 3) that moral virtue is “an operative habit whereby we
mensurate with someone else. In operations of this kind
do what is best in matters of pleasure or sorrow.” Now
there needs to be some power to regulate the operations
pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (q. 31,
in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such
a. 1; q. 35, a. 1). Therefore the same virtue which is about
operations in which there is an element of something due
passions is also about operations, since it is an operative
or undue to another. For this reason justice and its parts
habit.
are properly about operations as their proper matter. On
Objection 2. Further, the passions are principles of
the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend
external action. If therefore some virtues regulate the pas-
only on commensuration with the agent. Consequently
sions, they must, as a consequence, regulate operations
good and evil in these operations depend on the way in
also. Therefore the same moral virtues are about both pas-
which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such
sions and operations.
like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal
Objection 3. Further, the sensitive appetite is moved
emotions which are called the passions of the soul, as is
well or ill towards every external operation. Now move-
evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like.
ments of the sensitive appetite are passions. Therefore the
It happens, however, in operations which are directed
same virtues that are about operations are also about pas-
to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked by reason
sions.
of some inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases jus-
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons justice to
tice is destroyed in so far as the due measure of the exter-
be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gen-
nal act is destroyed: while some other virtue is destroyed
tleness, about passions (Ethic. ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.).
in so far as the internal passions exceed their due mea-
I answer that, Operation and passion stand in a
sure. Thus when through anger, one man strikes another,
twofold relation to virtue. First, as its effects; and in this
justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness
way every moral virtue has some good operations as its
is destroyed by the immoderate anger. The same may be
product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow which are pas-
clearly applied to other virtues.
sions, as stated above (q. 59, a. 4, ad 1).
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the
Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue
first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the
as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this
other two consider operation and passion as concurring in
sense those moral virtues which are about operations must
the same effect. But in some cases virtue is chiefly about
needs differ from those which are about passions. The rea-
operations, in others, about passions, for the reason given
son for this is that good and evil, in certain operations, are
above.
Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?
Ia IIae q. 60 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that there is but one moral
of operations does not cause a diversity of moral virtues.
virtue about operations. Because the rectitude of all exter-
Objection 3.
Further, if there are various moral
nal operations seems to belong to justice. Now justice is
virtues about various operations, diversity of moral virtues
but one virtue. Therefore there is but one virtue about op-
would needs follow diversity of operations. But this is
erations.
clearly untrue: for it is the function of justice to establish
Objection 2. Further, those operations seem to differ
rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and again in
most, which are directed on the one side to the good of the
distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2. Therefore there
individual, and on the other to the good of the many. But
are not different virtues about different operations.
this diversity does not cause diversity among the moral
On the contrary, Religion is a moral virtue distinct
virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that legal
from piety, both of which are about operations.
justice, which directs human acts to the common good,
I answer that, All the moral virtues that are about op-
does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which di-
erations agree in one general notion of justice, which is in
rects a man’s actions to one man only. Therefore diversity
respect of something due to another: but they differ in re-
867
spect of various special notions. The reason for this is that extended also to all cases in which something due is ren-in external operations, the order of reason is established,
dered: in this sense it is not as a special virtue.
as we have stated (a. 2), not according as how man is af-
Reply to Objection 2. That justice which seeks the
fected towards such operations, but according to the be-
common good is another virtue from that which is directed
comingness of the thing itself; from which becomingness
to the private good of an individual: wherefore common
we derive the notion of something due which is the formal
right differs from private right; and Tully (De Inv. ii) reck-
aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice that
ons as a special virtue, piety which directs man to the good
a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as
of his country. But that justice which directs man to the
are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of
common good is a general virtue through its act of com-
justice. But the thing due is not of the same kind in all
mand: since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own
these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way,
end, viz. the common good. And the virtues, in so far as
to a superior, in another way, to an inferior, in yet another;
they are commanded by that justice, receive the name of
and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from
justice: so that virtue does not differ, save logically, from
a contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred. And
legal justice; just as there is only a logical difference be-
corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are var-
tween a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue that is
ious virtues: e.g. “Religion” whereby we pay our debt to
active through the command of another virtue.
God; “Piety,” whereby we pay our debt to our parents or
Reply to Objection 3. There is the same kind of due
to our country; “Gratitude,” whereby we pay our debt to
in all the operations belonging to special justice. Con-
our benefactors, and so forth.
sequently, there is the same virtue of justice, especially
Reply to Objection 1. Justice properly so called is
in regard to commutations. For it may be that distributive
one special virtue, whose object is the perfect due, which
justice is of another species from commutative justice; but
can be paid in the equivalent. But the name of justice is
about this we shall inquire later on ( IIa IIae, q. 61, a. 1).
Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?
Ia IIae q. 60 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that there are not differ-
as stated above (q. 23, a. 1).
ent moral virtues about different passions. For there is but
On the other hand, neither does every diversity of pas-
one habit about things that concur in their source and end:
sions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues.
as is evident especially in the case of sciences. But the
First, because some passions are in contrary opposition
passions all concur in one source, viz. love; and they all
to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear and daring,
terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated
and so on. About such passions as are thus in opposition
above (q. 25, Aa. 1,2,4; q. 27, a. 4). Therefore there is but
to one another there must needs be one same virtue. Be-
one moral virtue about all the passions.
cause, since moral virtue consists in a kind of mean, the
Objection 2. Further, if there were different moral
mean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both,
virtues about different passions, it would follow that there
even as in the natural order there is but one mean between
are as many moral virtues as passions. But this clearly is
contraries, e.g. between black and white. Secondly, be-
not the case: since there is one moral virtue about con-
cause there are different passions contradicting reason in
trary passions; namely, fortitude, about fear and daring;
the same manner, e.g. by impelling to that which is con-
temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there
trary to reason, or by withdrawing from that which is in
is no need for different moral virtues about different pas-
accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of
sions.
the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral
Objection 3. Further, love, desire, and pleasure are
virtues, because their movements follow one another in a
passions of different species, as stated above (q. 23, a. 4).
certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz.
Now there is but one virtue about all these three, viz. tem-
the attainment of some good or the avoidance of some
perance. Therefore there are not different moral virtues
evil: thus from love proceeds desire, and from desire we
about different passions.
arrive at pleasure; and it is the same with the opposite
On the contrary, Fortitude is about fear and daring;
passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this
temperance about desire; meekness about anger; as stated
leads to sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible passions
in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5.
are not all of one order, but are directed to different things: I answer that, It cannot be said that there is only one
for daring and fear are about some great danger; hope
moral virtue about all the passions: since some passions
and despair are about some difficult good; while anger
are not in the same power as other passions; for some be-
seeks to overcome something contrary which has wrought
long to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty,
harm. Consequently there are different virtues about such
868
like passions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible same principle causes movement from one extreme and
passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity,
movement towards the other; and as in the intellectual
about hope and despair; meekness, about anger.
order contraries have one common ratio; so too between
Reply to Objection 1. All the passions concur in one
contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like
common principle and end; but not in one proper principle
a second nature, consents to reason’s dictates.
or end: and so this does not suffice for the unity of moral
Reply to Objection 3. Those three passions are di-
virtue.
rected to the same object in a certain order, as stated
Reply to Objection 2. Just as in the natural order the
above: and so they belong to the same virtue.
Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?
Ia IIae q. 60 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the moral virtues do
movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensi-
not differ according to the objects of the passions. For
tive appetite. Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of
just as there are objects of passions, so are there objects
objects from causing diversity of passions, without caus-
of operations. Now those moral virtues that are about op-
ing diversity of virtues, as when one virtue is about several
erations, do not differ according to the objects of those
passions, as stated above (a. 4); and again, a difference of
operations: for the buying and selling either of a house or
objects from causing different virtues, without causing a
of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice. There-
difference of passions, since several virtues are directed
fore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions
about one passion, e.g. pleasure.
differ according to the objects of those passions.
And because diverse passions belonging to diverse
Objection 2. Further, the passions are acts or move-
powers, always belong to diverse virtues, as stated above
ments of the sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater
(a. 4); therefore a difference of objects that corresponds
difference to differentiate habits than acts. Hence diverse
to a difference of powers always causes a specific differ-
objects which do not diversify the species of passions, do
ence of virtues—for instance the difference between that
not diversify the species of moral virtue: so that there is
which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good
but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the
and difficult to obtain. Moreover since the reason rules
same applies to the other passions.
man’s lower powers in a certain order, and even extends
Objection 3. Further, more or less do not change a
to outward things; hence, one single object of the pas-
species. Now various objects of pleasure differ only by
sions, according as it is apprehended by sense, imagina-
reason of being more or less pleasurable. Therefore all
tion, or reason, and again, according as it belongs to the
objects of pleasure belong to one species of virtue: and
soul, body, or external things, has various relations to rea-
for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the same
son, and consequently is of a nature to cause a difference
applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified
of virtues. Consequently man’s good which is the object
according to the objects of the passions.
of love, desire and pleasure, may be taken as referred ei-
Objection 4. Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it
ther to a bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the
produces good. But there are various virtues about the de-
mind: and this same good may be directed to man’s good
sires for good things: thus temperance is about desires for
in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man’s
the pleasure of touch, and “eutrapelia”∗ about pleasures in
good in relation to other men. And every such difference,
games. Therefore there should be different virtues about
being differently related to reason, differentiates virtues.
fears of evils.
Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something
On the contrary, Chastity is about sexual pleasures,
discerned by the sense of touch, and something pertaining
abstinence about pleasures of the table, and “eutrapelia”
to the upkeep of human life either in the individual or in
about pleasures in games.
the species, such as the pleasures of the table or of sexual
I answer that, The perfection of a virtue depends on
intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of “temperance.”
the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on
As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are not
the sensitive appetite. Consequently virtues must needs be
intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the rea-
differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the
son: hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for
passions according to their relation to the appetite. Hence
virtue, “like art, is about difficult things” (Ethic. ii, 3).
the objects of the passions, according as they are variously
On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses,
related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different species
but by an inner power, and belonging to man in himself,
of passions: while, according as they are related to rea-
is like money and honor; the former, by its very nature,
son, they cause the different species of virtues. Now the
being employable for the good of the body, while the lat-
∗ eutrapelia
869
ter is based on the apprehension of the mind. These goods another virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he calls “truthfulness”†.
again may be considered either absolutely, in which way
For frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and
they concern the concupiscible faculty, or as being diffi-
serious matters than play. Hence there is another virtue
cult to obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible
about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher “eu-
part: which distinction, however, has no place in pleasur-
trapelia”‡ (Ethic. iv, 8).
able objects of touch; since such are of base condition,
It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle,
and are becoming to man in so far as he has something
there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. for-
in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in refer-
titude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanim-
ence to money considered as a good absolutely, as an ob-
ity, “philotimia,” gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and
ject of desire, pleasure, or love, there is “liberality”: but if
“eutrapelia,” all of which differ in respect of their diverse
we consider this good as difficult to get, and as being the
matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add “justice,”
object of our hope, there is “magnificence”†. With regard
which is about operations, there will be eleven in all.
to that good which we call honor, taken absolutely, as the
Reply to Objection 1. All objects of the same specific
object of love, we have a virtue called “philotimia”‡, i.e.
operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the
“love of honor”: while if we consider it as hard to attain,
objects of the same specific passion; because operations
and as an object of hope, then we have “magnanimity.”
do not thwart reason as the passions do.
Wherefore liberality and “philotimia” seem to be in the
Reply to Objection 2. Passions are not differentiated
concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity
by the same rule as virtues are, as stated above.
are in the irascible.
Reply to Objection 3. More and less do not cause a
As regards man’s good in relation to other men, it does
difference of species, unless they bear different relations
not seem hard to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as
to reason.
the object of the concupiscible passions. This good may
Reply to Objection 4. Good is a more potent mover
be pleasurable to a man in his behavior towards another
than evil: because evil does not cause movement save in
either in some serious matter, in actions, to wit, that are
virtue of good, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence
directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions, viz.
an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason, so as to re-
that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand in
quire virtues unless that evil be great; there being, seem-
the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man
ingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion.
behaves towards another in serious matters, in two ways.
Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of
First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech
anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms
and deeds: and this belongs to a virtue which Aristotle
of daring. On the other hand, good involves difficulty,
(Ethic. ii, 7) calls “friendship”∗, and may be rendered “af-
which requires virtue, even if it be not a great good in that
fability.” Secondly, one man behaves towards another by
particular kind of passion. Consequently there are various
being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to
moral virtues about desires, as stated above.
† megaloprepeia
‡ philotimia
∗ philia
† aletheia
‡ eutrapelia
870
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 61
Of the Cardinal Virtues
(In Five Articles)
We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?
(2) Of their number;
(3) Which are they?
(4) Whether they differ from one another?
(5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?
Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?
Ia IIae q. 61 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtues should
quire rectitude of the appetite: because it merely confers
not be called cardinal or principal virtues. For “the op-
the faculty of doing well without causing the good deed
posite members of a division are by nature simultaneous”
to be done. Now it is evident that the perfect is principal
(Categor. x), so that one is not principal rather than an-
as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues which
other. Now all the virtues are opposite members of the
imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues.
division of the genus “virtue.” Therefore none of them
Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the in-
should be called principal.
tellectual virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, Objection 2. Further, the end is principal as compared
as was clearly shown above (q. 57, a. 4). Consequently,
to the means. But the theological virtues are about the
those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fit-
end; while the moral virtues are about the means. There-
tingly placed among the moral virtues.
fore the theological virtues, rather than the moral virtues,
Reply to Objection 1. When a univocal genus is di-
should be called principal or cardinal.
vided into its species, the members of the division are on
Objection 3. Further, that which is essentially so is
a par in the point of the generic idea; although considered
principal in comparison with that which is so by partici-
in their nature as things, one species may surpass another
pation. But the intellectual virtues belong to that which
in rank and perfection, as man in respect of other animals.
is essentially rational: whereas the moral virtues belong
But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied
to that which is rational by participation, as stated above
to several things, but to one before it is applied to another,
(q. 58 , a. 3). Therefore the intellectual virtues are princi-
nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in
pal, rather than the moral virtues.
the point of the generic idea; as the notion of being is ap-
On the contrary, Ambrose in explaining the words,
plied to substance principally in relation to accident. Such
“Blessed are the poor in spirit” (Lk. 6:20) says: “We know
is the division of virtue into various kinds of virtue: since
that there are four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, jus-
the good defined by reason is not found in the same way
tice, prudence, and fortitude.” But these are moral virtues.
in all things.
Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.
Reply to Objection 2. The theological virtues are
I answer that, When we speak of virtue simply, we
above man, as stated above (q. 58, a. 3, ad 3). Hence they
are understood to speak of human virtue. Now human
should properly be called not human, but “super-human”
virtue, as stated above (q. 56, a. 3), is one that answers
or godlike virtues.
to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires rectitude of
Reply to Objection 3.
Although the intellectual
the appetite: for such like virtue not only confers the fac-
virtues, except in prudence, rank before the moral virtues,
ulty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done.
in the point of their subject, they do not rank before them
On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that
as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the
answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not re-
object of the appetite.
871
Whether there are four cardinal virtues?
Ia IIae q. 61 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there are not four
der into something else; either into operations, and then
cardinal virtues. For prudence is the directing principle
we have “Justice”; or into passions, and then we need two
of the other moral virtues, as is clear from what has been
virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into
said above (q. 58, a. 4). But that which directs other things
the passions is due to their thwarting reason: and this oc-
ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a princi-
curs in two ways. First, by the passions inciting to some-
pal virtue.
thing against reason, and then the passions need a curb,
Objection 2. Further, the principal virtues are, in a
which we call “Temperance.” Secondly, by the passions
way, moral virtues. Now we are directed to moral works
withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g.
both by the practical reason, and by a right appetite, as
through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be
stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore there are only two cardi-
strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn
nal virtues.
back; and to this end there is “Fortitude.”
Objection 3. Further, even among the other virtues
In like manner, we find the same number if we con-
one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue
sider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of
be principal, it needs not to rank above all the others, but
the virtue we speak of now: viz. the power which is ratio-
above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more
nal in its essence, and this is perfected by “Prudence”; and
principal virtues.
that which is rational by participation, and is threefold, the
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii): “The en-
will, subject of “Justice,” the concupiscible faculty, sub-
tire structure of good works is built on four virtues.”
ject of “Temperance,” and the irascible faculty, subject of
I answer that, Things may be numbered either in re-
“Fortitude.”
spect of their formal principles, or according to the sub-
Reply to Objection 1. Prudence is the principal of all
jects in which they are: and either way we find that there
the virtues simply. The others are principal, each in its
are four cardinal virtues.
own genus.
For the formal principle of the virtue of which we
Reply to Objection 2. That part of the soul which is
speak now is good as defined by reason; which good is
rational by participation is threefold, as stated above.
considered in two ways. First, as existing in the very act
Reply to Objection 3. All the other virtues among
of reason: and thus we have one principal virtue, called
which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above
“Prudence.” Secondly, according as the reason puts its or-
four, both as to the subject and as to the formal principle.
Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?
Ia IIae q. 61 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that other virtues should
principles are found chiefly in certain acts and passions.
be called principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the
Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is found
greatest is the principal in any genus. Now “magnanim-
chiefly in reason’s command, but not in its counsel or its
ity has a great influence on all the virtues” (Ethic. iv, 3).
judgment, as stated above (q. 57, a. 6). Again, good as
Therefore magnanimity should more than any be called a
defined by reason and put into our operations as some-
principal virtue.
thing right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and
Objection 2. Further, that which strengthens the other
distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis
virtues should above all be called a principal virtue. But
of equality. The good of curbing the passions is found
such is humility: for Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that
chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb,
“he who gathers the other virtues without humility is as
viz. in the pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in
one who carries straw against the wind.” Therefore hu-
holding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse
mility seems above all to be a principal virtue.
of passion, is found chiefly in perils of death, which are
Objection 3. Further, that which is most perfect seems
most difficult to withstand.
to be principal. But this applies to patience, according to
Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered
James 1:4: “Patience hath a perfect work.” Therefore pa-
in two ways. First, in respect of their common formal
tience should be reckoned a principal virtue.
principles. In this way they are called principal, being
On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to
general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues:
these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii).
so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in rea-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), these four are
son’s act of consideration, may be called prudence; every
reckoned as cardinal virtues, in respect of the four for-
virtue that causes the good of right and due in operation,
mal principles of virtue as we understand it now. These
be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses
872
the passions, be called temperance; and every virtue that principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account
strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be
of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is
called fortitude. Many, both holy doctors, as also philoso-
the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue which is
phers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this
about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue
way the other virtues are contained under them. Where-
which suppresses desires for the pleasures of touch; and
fore all the objections fail.
fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of
Secondly, they may be considered in point of their
death. Thus again do the objections fail: because the other
being denominated, each one from that which is fore-
virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are
most in its respective matter, and thus they are specific
called principal by reason of their matter, as stated above.
virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called
Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another?
Ia IIae q. 61 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the above four virtues
are distinct from one another.
are not diverse and distinct from one another. For Gregory
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), these four
says (Moral. xxii, 1): “There is no true prudence, unless it
virtues are understood differently by various writers. For
be just, temperate and brave; no perfect temperance, that
some take them as signifying certain general conditions
is not brave, just and prudent; no sound fortitude, that is
of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so that,
not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice, without
to wit, prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discre-
prudence, fortitude and temperance.” But this would not
tion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a cer-
be so, if the above virtues were distinct from one another:
tain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he
since the different species of one genus do not qualify one
ought in any matters; temperance, a disposition of the
another. Therefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct
mind, moderating any passions or operations, so as to
from one another.
keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a disposition
Objection 2. Further, among things distinct from one
whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in ac-
another the function of one is not attributed to another.
cord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or
But the function of temperance is attributed to fortitude:
the toil involved by any operations. To distinguish these
for Ambrose says (De Offic. xxxvi): “Rightly do we call it
four virtues in this way does not imply that justice, tem-
fortitude, when a man conquers himself, and is not weak-
perance and fortitude are distinct virtuous habits: because
ened and bent by any enticement.” And of temperance
it is fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it
he says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it “safeguards the man-
is a “habit,” should be accompanied by a certain firmness
ner and order in all things that we decide to do and say.”
so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have
Therefore it seems that these virtues are not distinct from
said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as it is a
one another.
“virtue,” it is directed to good which involves the notion
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii,
of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to justice.
4) that the necessary conditions of virtue are first of all
Again, owing to the fact that it is a “moral virtue” partak-
“that a man should have knowledge; secondly, that he
ing of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things,
should exercise choice for a particular end; thirdly, that he
and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to
should possess the habit and act with firmness and stead-
belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having dis-
fastness.” But the first of these seems to belong to pru-
cretion, which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems
dence which is rectitude of reason in things to be done;
to be a distinction from the other three, inasmuch as dis-
the second, i.e. choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a
cretion belongs essentially to reason; whereas the other
man, holding his passions on the curb, acts, not from pas-
three imply a certain share of reason by way of a kind
sion but from choice; the third, that a man should act for
of application (of reason) to passions or operations. Ac-
the sake of a due end, implies a certain rectitude, which
cording to the above explanation, then, prudence would
seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness
be distinct from the other three virtues: but these would
and steadfastness, belongs to fortitude. Therefore each
not be distinct from one another; for it is evident that one
of these virtues is general in comparison to other virtues.
and the same virtue is both habit, and virtue, and moral
Therefore they are not distinct from one another.
virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl.
Others, however, with better reason, take these four
xi) that “there are four virtues, corresponding to the var-
virtues, according as they have their special determinate
ious emotions of love,” and he applies this to the four
matter; each of its own matter, in which special commen-
virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same four virtues
dation is given to that general condition from which the
873
virtue’s name is taken as stated above (a. 3). In this way titude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very
it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits, dif-great difficulty, is more able to remain firm against the on-
ferentiated in respect of their diverse objects.
slaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), “it
Reply to Objection 1. Gregory is speaking of these
would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear,
four virtues in the first sense given above. It may also be
and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be con-
said that these four virtues qualify one another by a kind
quered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered
of overflow. For the qualities of prudence overflow on to
by toil.”
the other virtues in so far as they are directed by prudence.
From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.
And each of the others overflows on to the rest, for the rea-
For temperance observes the mean in all things, and for-
son that whoever can do what is harder, can do what is less
titude keeps the mind unbent by the enticements of plea-
difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the
sures, either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote
pleasures of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which
certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense that
is a very hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able
they overflow on to one another, as explained above.
to check his daring in dangers of death, so as not to go
Reply to Objection 3. These four general conditions
too far, which is much easier; and in this sense fortitude
of virtue set down by the Philosopher, are not proper to the
is said to be temperate. Again, temperance is said to be
aforesaid virtues. They may, however, be appropriated to
brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance:
them, in the way above stated.
in so far, to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened by for-
Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues, perfecting, perIa IIae q. 61 a. 5
fect, and exemplar virtues?
Objection 1. It would seem that these four virtues
“whereby good men work for the good of their country
are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting
and for the safety of the city.” But it is only legal justice
virtues, perfect virtues, and social virtues. For as Macro-
that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher
bius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the “exemplar virtues
states (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be
are such as exist in the mind of God.” Now the Philoso-
called “social.”
pher says (Ethic. x, 8) that “it is absurd to ascribe justice,
On the contrary, Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip.
fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God.” Therefore
1): “Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teach-
these virtues cannot be exemplar.
ers of philosophy, says: ‘The four kinds of virtue are four-
Objection 2. Further, the “perfect” virtues are those
fold: In the first place there are social∗ virtues; secondly,
which are without any passion: for Macrobius says (Su-
there are perfecting virtues ; thirdly, there are perfect†
per Somn. Scip. 1) that “in a soul that is cleansed, tem-
virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.’ ”‡
perance has not to check worldly desires, for it has for-
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl.
gotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the
vi), “the soul needs to follow something in order to give
passions; it does not have to conquer them.” Now it was
birth to virtue: this something is God: if we follow Him
stated above (q. 59, a. 5) that the aforesaid virtues cannot
we shall live aright.” Consequently the exemplar of hu-
be without passions. Therefore there is no such thing as
man virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him
“perfect” virtue.
pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may
Objection 3.
Further, he says (Macrobius: Super
be considered as existing originally in God, and thus we
Somn. Scip. 1) that the “perfecting” virtues are those of
speak of “exemplar” virtues: so that in God the Divine
the man “who flies from human affairs and devotes him-
Mind itself may be called prudence; while temperance is
self exclusively to the things of God.” But it seems wrong
the turning of God’s gaze on Himself, even as in us it is
to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): “I reckon that it is that which conforms the appetite to reason. God’s for-not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say
titude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the obser-
that he despises what most men admire, viz. power and
vance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states
office.” Therefore there are no “perfecting” virtues.
(Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).
Objection 4.
Further, he says (Macrobius: Super
Again, since man by his nature is a social§ animal,
Somn.
Scip.
1) that the “social” virtues are those
these virtues, in so far as they are in him according to the
∗ Virtutes purgatoriae: literally meaning, cleansing virtues † Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean soul
‡ Cf. Chrysostom’s
fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: “The gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his good deeds within himself. . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives for the common weal.”
§ See above note
on Chrysostom
874
condition of his nature, are called “social” virtues; since it Reply to Objection 2. Human virtues, that is to say,
is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the
virtues of men living together in this world, are about the
conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have
passions. But the virtues of those who have attained to
been speaking of these virtues until now.
perfect bliss are without passions. Hence Plotinus says
But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive
(Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that “the social
onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher de-
virtues check the passions,” i.e. they bring them to the rel-
clares in Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes
ative mean; “the second kind,” viz. the perfecting virtues,
us—for instance: “Be ye. . . perfect, as your heavenly Fa-
“uproot them”; “the third kind,” viz. the perfect virtues,
ther is perfect” (Mat. 5:48), we must needs place some
“forget them; while it is impious to mention them in con-
virtues between the social or human virtues, and the ex-
nection with virtues of the fourth kind,” viz. the exemplar
emplar virtues which are Divine. Now these virtues differ
virtues. It may also be said that here he is speaking of
by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that
passions as denoting inordinate emotions.
some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending
Reply to Objection 3.
To neglect human affairs
towards the Divine similitude; and these are called “per-
when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous.
fecting” virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the
Hence Cicero says a little earlier: “Perhaps one should
things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world,
make allowances for those who by reason of their ex-
and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone: tem-
ceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as
perance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the
also to those who have retired from public life on account
body; fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of ne-
of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive;
glecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and jus-
when such men yielded to others the power and renown
tice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to
of authority.” This agrees with what Augustine says (De
follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the
Civ. Dei xix, 19): “The love of truth demands a hollowed
virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine
leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays
similitude: these are called the “perfect virtues.” Thus
this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study
prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temper-
and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid on us
ance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge
it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity.”
of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is
Reply to Objection 4. Legal justice alone regards
united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such as the
the common weal directly: but by commanding the other
virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some
virtues it draws them all into the service of the common
who are at the summit of perfection.
weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking
must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we
of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs;
understand them here, to do well not only towards the
for instance, justice, about buying and selling; fortitude,
community, but also towards the parts of the community,
about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this sense it
viz. towards the household, or even towards one individ-
is absurd to attribute them to God.
ual.
875
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 62
Of the Theological Virtues
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are any theological virtues?
(2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?
(3) How many, and which are they?
(4) Of their order.
Whether there are any theological virtues?
Ia IIae q. 62 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there are not any the-
vine nature.” And because such happiness surpasses the
ological virtues. For according to Phys. vii, text. 17,
capacity of human nature, man’s natural principles which
“virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is
enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not
best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed accord-
suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is
ing to nature.” But that which is Divine is above man’s
necessary for man to receive from God some additional
nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of
principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural
a man.
happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end,
Objection 2. Further, theological virtues are quasi-
by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Di-
Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as
vine assistance. Such like principles are called “theolog-
stated above (q. 61, a. 5), which are not in us but in God.
ical virtues”: first, because their object is God, inasmuch
Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man.
as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are
Objection 3. Further, the theological virtues are so
infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues
called because they direct us to God, Who is the first be-
are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, con-
ginning and last end of all things. But by the very nature
tained in Holy Writ.
of his reason and will, man is directed to his first begin-
Reply to Objection 1. A certain nature may be as-
ning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any habits
cribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially:
of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God.
and thus these theological virtues surpass the nature of
On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about
man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood par-
acts of virtue. Now the Divine Law contains precepts
takes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man
about the acts of faith, hope, and charity: for it is writ-
becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above:
ten (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq.): “Ye that fear the Lord believe
so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of
Him,” and again, “hope in Him,” and again, “love Him.”
the Nature of which he is made a partaker.
Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us
Reply to Objection 2. These virtues are called Di-
to God. Therefore they are theological virtues.
vine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them,
I answer that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those
but because of them God makes us virtuous, and directs
actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was ex-
us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate
plained above (q. 5, a. 7).
Now man’s happiness is
virtues.
twofold, as was also stated above (q. 5, a. 5). One is pro-
Reply to Objection 3. The reason and will are natu-
portionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which
rally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and
man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The
end of nature, but in proportion to nature. But the reason
other is a happiness surpassing man’s nature, and which
and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently di-
man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of
rected to Him in so far as He is the object of supernatural
participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2
happiness.
Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made “partakers of the Di-
876
Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?
Ia IIae q. 62 a. 2
Objection 1.
It would seem that the theological
the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end
virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual
of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the
virtues. For the theological virtues, if they be in a human
other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues
soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective, or
is something comprehensible to human reason. Where-
as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues which perfect
fore the theological virtues are specifically distinct from
the intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues
the moral and intellectual virtues.
which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral. There-
Reply to Objection 1. The intellectual and moral
fore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral
virtues perfect man’s intellect and appetite according to
and intellectual virtues.
the capacity of human nature; the theological virtues, su-
Objection 2. Further, the theological virtues are those
pernaturally.
which direct us to God.
Now, among the intellectual
Reply to Objection 2.
The wisdom which the
virtues there is one which directs us to God: this is wis-
Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7) reckons as an intellectual
dom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the
virtue, considers Divine things so far as they are open to
highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not
the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the
distinct from the intellectual virtues.
other hand, is about those same things so far as they sur-
Objection 3. Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl.
pass human reason.
xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the “order of
Reply to Objection 3. Though charity is love, yet love
love.” Now love is charity, which is a theological virtue.
is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every
Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theo-
virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either
logical.
of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If
On the contrary, That which is above man’s nature
it be understood of love, commonly so called, then each
is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But
virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each
the theological virtues are above man’s nature; while the
cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the
intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his na-
root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (q. 27,
ture, as clearly shown above (q. 58, a. 3). Therefore they
a. 4; q. 28, a. 6, ad 2; q. 41, a. 2, ad 1). If, however, it
are distinct from one another.
be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that
I answer that, As stated above (q. 54, a. 2, ad 1),
every other virtue is charity essentially: but that all other
habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect
virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show
of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object of
further on (q. 65, Aa. 2,5; IIa IIae, q. 23, a. 7).
Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological virtues?
Ia IIae q. 62 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that faith, hope, and char-
intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two the-
ity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues.
ological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other, the
For the theological virtues are in relation to Divine hap-
will.
piness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13):
connatural end. Now among the virtues directed to the
“Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three.”
connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. the un-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the theological
derstanding of principles. Therefore there should be but
virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same
one theological virtue.
way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his
Objection 2. Further, the theological virtues are more
connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two
perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith
things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so
is not reckoned among the intellectual virtues, but is
far as it contains the first universal principles which are
something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowl-
known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which
edge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral
are reason’s starting-point, both in speculative and in prac-
virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a
tical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will
passion. Much less therefore should they be reckoned as
which tends naturally to good as defined by reason.
theological virtues.
But these two fall short of the order of supernatural
Objection 3. Further, the theological virtues direct
happiness, according to 1 Cor. 2:9: “The eye hath not
man’s soul to God. Now man’s soul cannot be directed
seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart
to God, save through the intellective part, wherein are the
of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love
877
Him.” Consequently in respect of both the above things to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power
man needed to receive in addition something supernatu-
is insufficient in either of these respects, for the will to be ral to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards
directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently
the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles,
there was need for an additional supernatural habit in both
which are held by means of a Divine light: these are the
respects.
articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will
Reply to Objection 2. Faith and hope imply a certain
is directed to this end, both as to that end as something
imperfection: since faith is of things unseen, and hope,
attainable—and this pertains to hope—and as to a certain
of things not possessed. Hence faith and hope, in things
spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, trans-
that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion of
formed into that end—and this belongs to charity. For the
virtue. But faith and hope in things which are above the
appetite of a thing is moved and tends towards its connat-
capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in pro-
ural end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain
portion to man, according to 1 Cor. 1:25: “The weakness
conformity of the thing with its end.
of God is stronger than men.”
Reply to Objection 1. The intellect requires intelligi-
Reply to Objection 3. Two things pertain to the ap-
ble species whereby to understand: consequently there is
petite, viz. movement to the end, and conformity with the
need of a natural habit in addition to the power. But the
end by means of love. Hence there must needs be two the-
very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed natu-
ological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and
rally to the end, both as to the intention of the end and as
charity.
Whether faith precedes hope, and hope charity?
Ia IIae q. 62 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the order of the the-
through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes
ological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope
as a good of his own. Hence for the very reason that a man
charity. For the root precedes that which grows from it.
hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so that in the
Now charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Eph.
order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards their
3:17: “Being rooted and founded in charity.” Therefore
respective acts.
charity precedes the others.
But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith
Objection 2.
Further, Augustine says (De Doctr.
and hope: because both faith and hope are quickened by
Christ. i): “A man cannot love what he does not believe to
charity, and receive from charity their full complement as
exist. But if he believes and loves, by doing good works
virtues. For thus charity is the mother and the root of all
he ends in hoping.” Therefore it seems that faith precedes
the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all, as we
charity, and charity hope.
shall state further on ( IIa IIae, q. 23, a. 8).
Objection 3. Further, love is the principle of all our
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
emotions, as stated above (a. 2, ad 3). Now hope is a kind
Reply to Objection 2. Augustine is speaking of that
of emotion, since it is a passion, as stated above (q. 25,
hope whereby a man hopes to obtain bliss through the
a. 2). Therefore charity, which is love, precedes hope.
merits which he has already: this belongs to hope quick-
On the contrary, The Apostle enumerates them thus
ened by and following charity. But it is possible for a man
(1 Cor. 13:13): “Now there remain faith, hope, charity.”
before having charity, to hope through merits not already
I answer that, Order is twofold: order of generation,
possessed, but which he hopes to possess.
and order of perfection. By order of generation, in re-
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 40, a. 7),
spect of which matter precedes form, and the imperfect
in treating of the passions, hope regards two things. One
precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith precedes
as its principal object, viz. the good hoped for. With re-
hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: because habits
gard to this, love always precedes hope: for good is never
are all infused together. For the movement of the appetite
hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope also re-
cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving, unless
gards the person from whom a man hopes to be able to
that thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect.
obtain some good. With regard to this, hope precedes love
Now it is by faith that the intellect apprehends the object
at first; though afterwards hope is increased by love. Be-
of hope and love. Hence in the order of generation, faith
cause from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a
precedes hope and charity. In like manner a man loves a
good through someone, he begins to love him: and from
thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the
the fact that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in
very fact that a man hopes to be able to obtain some good
him.
878
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 63
Of the Cause of Virtues
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether virtue is in us by nature?
(2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?
(3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?
(4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species as infused virtue?
Whether virtue is in us by nature?
Ia IIae q. 63 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that virtue is in us by na-
ists. Others said that they are wholly from without, being
ture. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): “Virtues
due to the inflow of the active intellect, as Avicenna main-
are natural to us and are equally in all of us.” And Antony
tained. Others said that sciences and virtues are within us
says in his sermon to the monks: “If the will contradicts
by nature, so far as we are adapted to them, but not in their
nature it is perverse, if it follow nature it is virtuous.”
perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher (Ethic.
Moreover, a gloss on Mat. 4:23, “Jesus went about,” etc.,
ii, 1), and is nearer the truth.
says: “He taught them natural virtues, i.e. chastity, jus-
To make this clear, it must be observed that there are
tice, humility, which man possesses naturally.”
two ways in which something is said to be natural to a
Objection 2. Further, the virtuous good consists in
man; one is according to his specific nature, the other ac-
accord with reason, as was clearly shown above (q. 55,
cording to his individual nature. And, since each thing de-
a. 4, ad 2). But that which accords with reason is natural
rives its species from its form, and its individuation from
to man; since reason is part of man’s nature. Therefore
matter, and, again, since man’s form is his rational soul,
virtue is in man by nature.
while his matter is his body, whatever belongs to him in
Objection 3. Further, that which is in us from birth is
respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of
said to be natural to us. Now virtues are in some from
his specific nature; while whatever belongs to him in re-
birth: for it is written (Job 31:18): “From my infancy
spect of the particular temperament of his body, is natural
mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from my
to him in respect of his individual nature. For whatever is
mother’s womb.” Therefore virtue is in man by nature.
natural to man in respect of his body, considered as part
On the contrary, Whatever is in man by nature is
of his species, is to be referred, in a way, to the soul, in
common to all men, and is not taken away by sin, since
so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular
even in the demons natural gifts remain, as Dionysius
soul.
states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all men; and is
In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoat-
cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature.
ively. This is so in respect of the specific nature, in so
I answer that, With regard to corporeal forms, it
far as in man’s reason are to be found instilled by nature
has been maintained by some that they are wholly from
certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and
within, by those, for instance, who upheld the theory of
action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral
“latent forms”∗. Others held that forms are entirely from
virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural ap-
without, those, for instance, who thought that corporeal
petite for good in accordance with reason. Again, this is
forms originated from some separate cause. Others, how-
so in respect of the individual nature, in so far as by reason
ever, esteemed that they are partly from within, in so far as
of a disposition in the body, some are disposed either well
they pre-exist potentially in matter; and partly from with-
or ill to certain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive
out, in so far as they are brought into act by the agent.
powers are acts of certain parts of the body, according to
In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues,
the disposition of which these powers are helped or hin-
some held that they are wholly from within, so that all
dered in the exercise of their acts, and, in consequence, the
virtues and sciences would pre-exist in the soul naturally,
rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers
but that the hindrances to science and virtue, which are
assist. In this way one man has a natural aptitude for sci-
due to the soul being weighed down by the body, are re-
ence, another for fortitude, another for temperance: and in
moved by study and practice, even as iron is made bright
these ways, both intellectual and moral virtues are in us by
by being polished. This was the opinion of the Platon-
way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly,
∗ Anaxagoras; Cf. Ia, q. 45, a. 8; q. 65, a. 4
879
since nature is determined to one, while the perfection of entirely from without.
these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the
action, but on various modes, in respect of the various
first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us
matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue’s action, and
by nature, inasmuch as we are rational beings. The third
according to various circumstances.
objection must be taken in the sense that, owing to the nat-
It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by na-
ural disposition which the body has from birth, one has an
ture, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not accord-
aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another
ing to perfection, except the theological virtues, which are
for some other virtue.
Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?
Ia IIae q. 63 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that virtues can not be
is defined according to the rule of human reason can be
caused in us by habituation. Because a gloss of Augus-
caused by human acts: inasmuch as such acts proceed
tine∗ commenting on Rom. 14:23, “All that is not of faith
from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good
is sin,” says: “The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin:
is established. On the other hand, virtue which directs
and there is no good without the Sovereign Good. Where
man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by hu-
knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery even
man reason, cannot be caused by human acts, the principle
in the best behaved people.” Now faith cannot be acquired
of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine op-
by means of works, but is caused in us by God, accord-
eration alone. Hence Augustine in giving the definition of
ing to Eph. 2:8: “By grace you are saved through faith.”
the latter virtue inserts the words, “which God works in
Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation.
us without us” (Super Ps. 118, Serm. xxvi). It is also of
Objection 2. Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so
these virtues that the First Objection holds good.
that they are incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin ex-
Reply to Objection 2. Mortal sin is incompatible with
cept by the grace of God, according to Wis. 8:21: “I knew
divinely infused virtue, especially if this be considered in
that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave
its perfect state. But actual sin, even mortal, is compatible
it.” Therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us by
with humanly acquired virtue; because the use of a habit
habituation, but only by the gift of God.
in us is subject to our will, as stated above (q. 49, a. 3): and Objection 3.
Further, actions which lead toward
one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue,
virtue, lack the perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot
since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly contrary
be more perfect than its cause. Therefore a virtue cannot
to a habit. Wherefore, though man cannot avoid mortal
be caused by actions that precede it.
sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he
good is more efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are
may abstain from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly
caused by evil acts. Much more, therefore, can virtuous
in matters most opposed to reason. There are also certain
habits be caused by good acts.
mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without grace,
I answer that, We have spoken above (q. 51, Aa. 2,3)
those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theologi-
in a general way about the production of habits from acts;
cal virtues, which are in us through the gift of grace. This,
and speaking now in a special way of this matter in re-
however, will be more fully explained later (q. 109, a. 4).
lation to virtue, we must take note that, as stated above
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (a. 1; q. 51,
(q. 55, Aa. 3,4), man’s virtue perfects him in relation to
a. 1), certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue pre-
good. Now since the notion of good consists in “mode,
exist in us by nature. These principles are more excellent
species, and order,” as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii)
than the virtues acquired through them: thus the under-
or in “number, weight, and measure,” as expressed in Wis.
standing of speculative principles is more excellent than
11:21, man’s good must needs be appraised with respect
the science of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the
to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as stated above
reason is more excellent than the rectification of the ap-
(q. 19, Aa. 3,4), viz. human reason and Divine Law. And
petite which results through the appetite partaking of rea-
since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more
son, which rectification belongs to moral virtue. Accord-
things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason, is ruled
ingly human acts, in so far as they proceed from higher
by the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold.
principles, can cause acquired human virtues.
It follows that human virtue directed to the good which
∗ Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.
880
Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?
Ia IIae q. 63 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that no virtues besides the
tain natural principles pre-existing in us, as above stated
theological virtues are infused in us by God. Because God
(a. 1; q. 51, a. 1): instead of which natural principles, God
does not do by Himself, save perhaps sometimes miracu-
bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are di-
lously, those things that can be done by second causes;
rected to a supernatural end, as stated (q. 62, a. 1). Where-
for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), “it is God’s rule
fore we need to receive from God other habits correspond-
to bring about extremes through the mean.” Now intellec-
ing, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which
tual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our acts, as
habits are to the theological virtues, what the moral and
stated above (a. 2). Therefore it is not reasonable that they
intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue.
should be caused in us by infusion.
Reply to Objection 1. Some moral and intellectual
Objection 2. Further, much less superfluity is found
virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such
in God’s works than in the works of nature. Now the the-
are not proportionate to the theological virtues. Therefore
ological virtues suffice to direct us to supernatural good.
it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately,
Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing
others that are proportionate to these virtues.
to be caused in us by God.
Reply to Objection 2. The theological virtues direct
Objection 3. Further, nature does not employ two
us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e.
means where one suffices: much less does God. But God
to God Himself immediately. But the soul needs further
sowed the seeds of virtue in our souls, according to a gloss
to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things,
on Heb. 1∗. Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in
yet in relation to God.
us other virtues by means of infusion.
Reply to Objection 3. The power of those naturally
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:7): “She tea-
instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity
cheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude.”
of nature. Consequently man needs in addition to be per-
I answer that, Effects must needs be proportionate to
fected by other principles in relation to his supernatural
their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual
end.
and moral, that are acquired by our actions, arise from cer-
Whether virtue by habituation belongs to the same species as infused virtue?
Ia IIae q. 63 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that infused virtue does
words, “which God works in us without us,” as stated
not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because ac-
above (q. 55, a. 4). Therefore acquired virtue, to which
quired and infused virtues, according to what has been
these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as
said (a. 3), do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the
infused virtue.
last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by
I answer that, There is a twofold specific difference
their last, but by their proximate end. Therefore the in-
among habits. The first, as stated above (q. 54, a. 2; q. 56,
fused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the
a. 2; q. 60, a. 1), is taken from the specific and formal as-
acquired virtue.
pects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a
Objection 2. Further, habits are known by their acts.
good considered as in that virtue’s proper matter: thus the
But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the
object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures
same, viz. to moderate desires of touch. Therefore they
connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal
do not differ in species.
aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean
Objection 3. Further, acquired and infused virtue dif-
in these concupiscences: while the material element is
fer as that which is wrought by God immediately, from
something on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is
that which is wrought by a creature. But the man whom
evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concu-
God made, is of the same species as a man begotten nat-
piscences according to the rule of human reason, is seen
urally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind,
under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed ac-
as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it
cording to Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption
seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to the same
of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food
species.
should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the
On the contrary, Any change introduced into the dif-
use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it
ference expressed in a definition involves a difference of
behooves man to “chastise his body, and bring it into sub-
species. But the definition of infused virtue contains the
jection” (1 Cor. 9:27), by abstinence in food, drink and
∗ Cf. Jerome on Gal. 1: 15,16
881
the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired respect of human affairs.
temperance differ in species; and the same applies to the
Reply to Objection 1. Infused and acquired virtue
other virtues.
differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in
The other specific differences among habits is taken
relation to their proper objects, as stated.
from the things to which they are directed: for a man’s
Reply to Objection 2. Both acquired and infused
health and a horse’s are not of the same species, on ac-
temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but
count of the difference between the natures to which their
for different reasons, as stated: wherefore their respective
respective healths are directed. In the same sense, the
acts are not identical.
Philosopher says (Polit.
iii, 3) that citizens have di-
Reply to Objection 3. God gave the man born blind
verse virtues according as they are well directed to diverse
an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are
forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused
formed naturally: consequently it was of the same species.
moral virtues, whereby men behave well in respect of their
It would be the same if God wished to give a man miracu-
being “fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the house-
lously virtues, such as those that are acquired by acts. But
hold [Douay: ‘domestics’] of God” (Eph. 2:19), differ
the case is not so in the question before us, as stated.
from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in
882
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 64
Of the Mean of Virtue
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality of virtues, (4) the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean?
(2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational mean?
(3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?
(4) Whether the theological virtues do?
Whether moral virtues observe the mean?
Ia IIae q. 64 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue does not
evident that moral virtue observes the mean.
observe the mean. For the nature of a mean is incompat-
Reply to Objection 1. Moral virtue derives goodness
ible with that which is extreme. Now the nature of virtue
from the rule of reason, while its matter consists in pas-
is to be something extreme; for it is stated in De Coelo i
sions or operations. If therefore we compare moral virtue
that “virtue is the limit of power.” Therefore moral virtue
to reason, then, if we look at that which is has of reason, it
does not observe the mean.
holds the position of one extreme, viz. conformity; while
Objection 2. Further, the maximum is not a mean.
excess and defect take the position of the other extreme,
Now some moral virtues tend to a maximum: for instance,
viz. deformity. But if we consider moral virtue in respect
magnanimity to very great honors, and magnificence to
of its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as very large expenditure, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2,3. There-it makes the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence
fore not every moral virtue observes the mean.
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “virtue, as to its
Objection 3. Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue essence, is a mean state,” in so far as the rule of virtue
to observe the mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not
is imposed on its proper matter: “but it is an extreme in
perfected, but the contrary corrupted, through tending to
reference to the ‘best’ and the ‘excellent,’ ” viz. as to its
something extreme. Now some moral virtues are per-
conformity with reason.
fected by tending to something extreme; thus virginity,
Reply to Objection 2. In actions and passions the
which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the ex-
mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances:
treme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give all to
hence nothing hinders something from being extreme in
the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. There-
a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the same
fore it seems that it is not essential to moral virtue that it
thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through
should observe the mean.
being in conformity with reason. This is the case with
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6)
magnanimity and magnificence. For if we look at the ab-
that “moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean.”
solute quantity of the respective objects of these virtues,
I answer that, As already explained (q. 55, a. 3), the
we shall call it an extreme and a maximum: but if we
nature of virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now
consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances,
moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive part
then it has the character of a mean: since these virtues
of the soul in regard to some determinate matter: and the
tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of rea-
measure or rule of the appetitive movement in respect of
son, i.e. “where” it is right, “when” it is right, and for an
appetible objects is the reason. But the good of that which
“end” that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to
is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its
this maximum “when” it is not right, or “where” it is not
rule: thus the good things made by art is that they fol-
right, or for an undue “end”; and there will be deficiency
low the rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort,
if one fails to tend thereto “where” one ought, and “when”
evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure.
one aught. This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher
Now this may happen either by their exceeding the mea-
(Ethic. iv, 3) that the “magnanimous man observes the
sure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly the case in extreme in quantity, but the mean in the right mode of his
all things ruled or measured. Hence it is evident that the
action.”
good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule
Reply to Objection 3. The same is to be said of
of reason. Now it is clear that between excess and defi-
virginity and poverty as of magnanimity. For virginity
ciency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is
abstains from all sexual matters, and poverty from all
883
wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e. accord-if it be not done when it ought to be done, or as it ought to
ing to God’s word, and for the sake of eternal life. But if
be done, it is a vice by deficiency: for instance, in those
this be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful su-
who break their vows of virginity or poverty.
perstition, or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And
Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, or the rational mean?
Ia IIae q. 64 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the mean of moral
that which the reason puts into some particular matter. In
virtue is not the rational mean, but the real mean. For the
this sense every mean of moral virtue is a rational mean,
good of moral virtue consists in its observing the mean.
since, as above stated (a. 1), moral virtue is said to observe
Now, good, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8, is in things
the mean, through conformity with right reason.
themselves. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is a real
But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also
mean.
the real mean: in which case the mean of moral virtue is
Objection 2. Further, the reason is a power of ap-
the real mean, for instance, in justice. On the other hand,
prehension. But moral virtue does not observe a mean
sometimes the rational mean is not the real mean, but is
between apprehensions, but rather a mean between oper-
considered in relation to us: and such is the mean in all
ations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is
the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that jus-
not the rational, but the real mean.
tice is about operations, which deal with external things,
Objection 3. Further, a mean that is observed ac-
wherein the right has to be established simply and abso-
cording to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real
lutely, as stated above (q. 60, a. 2): wherefore the ratio-
mean. Now such is the mean of justice, as stated in Ethic.
nal mean in justice is the same as the real mean, in so
v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational,
far, to wit as justice gives to each one his due, neither
but the real mean.
more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with in-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6)
terior passions wherein the right cannot be established in
that “moral virtue observes the mean fixed, in our regard,
the same way, since men are variously situated in relation
by reason.”
to their passions; hence the rectitude of reason has to be
I answer that, The rational mean can be understood
established in the passions, with due regard to us, who are
in two ways. First, according as the mean is observed in
moved in respect of the passions.
the act itself of reason, as though the very act of reason
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the
were made to observe the mean: in this sense, since moral
first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the
virtue perfects not the act of reason, but the act of the ap-
very act of reason, while the third argues from the mean
petitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the rational
of justice.
mean. Secondly, the mean of reason may be considered as
Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?
Ia IIae q. 64 a. 3
Objection 1.
It would seem that the intellectual
the intellect, are not in opposition to one another, but are
virtues do not observe the mean. Because moral virtue
understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick.
observes the mean by conforming to the rule of reason.
Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual virtues.
But the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so that they On the contrary, Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet
seem to have no higher rule. Therefore the intellectual
there is a mean in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intel-
virtues do not observe the mean.
lectual virtue observes the mean.
Objection 2. Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed
I answer that, The good of anything consists in its
by an intellectual virtue: for it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6,
observing the mean, by conforming with a rule or mea-
that “virtue observes the mean appointed by reason, as a
sure in respect of which it may happen to be excessive or
prudent man would appoint it.” If therefore intellectual
deficient, as stated above (a. 1). Now intellectual virtue,
virtue also observe the mean, this mean will have to be
like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as stated above
appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would
(q. 56, a. 3). Hence the good of an intellectual virtue con-
be an indefinite series of virtues.
sists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a
Objection 3. Further, a mean is, properly speaking,
measure. Now the good of intellectual virtue is the true;
between contraries, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph.
in the case of contemplative virtue, it is the true taken ab-
x, text. 22,23). But there seems to be no contrariety in
solutely (Ethic. vi, 2); in the case of practical virtue, it is the intellect; since contraries themselves, as they are in
the true in conformity with a right appetite.
884
Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider is to be applied in both cases.
it absolutely, is measured by things; since things are the
Reply to Objection 1. Intellectual virtues also have
measure of our intellect, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5;
their measure, as stated, and they observe the mean ac-
because there is truth in what we think or say, according
cording as they conform to that measure.
as the thing is so or not. Accordingly the good of spec-
Reply to Objection 2. There is no need for an indef-
ulative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, by
inite series of virtues: because the measure and rule of
way of conformity with things themselves, in so far as the
intellectual virtue is not another kind of virtue, but things
intellect expresses them as being what they are, or as not
themselves.
being what they are not: and it is in this that the nature
Reply to Objection 3. The things themselves that are
of truth consists. There will be excess if something false
contrary have no contrariety in the mind, because one is
is affirmed, as though something were, which in reality it
the reason for knowing the other: nevertheless there is in
is not: and there will be deficiency if something is falsely
the intellect contrariety of affirmation and negation, which
denied, and declared not to be, whereas in reality it is.
are contraries, as stated at the end of Peri Hermenias. For
The truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider
though “to be” and “not to be” are not in contrary, but
it in relation to things, is by way of that which is mea-
in contradictory opposition to one another, so long as we
sured; so that both in practical and in speculative intellec-
consider their signification in things themselves, for on
tual virtues, the mean consists in conformity with things.
the one hand we have “being” and on the other we have
But if we consider it in relation to the appetite, it has the
simply “non-being”; yet if we refer them to the act of the
character of a rule and measure. Consequently the recti-
mind, there is something positive in both cases. Hence “to
tude of reason is the mean of moral virtue, and also the
be” and “not to be” are contradictory: but the opinion stat-
mean of prudence—of prudence as ruling and measuring,
ing that “good is good” is contrary to the opinion stating
of moral virtue, as ruled and measured by that mean. In
that “good is not good”: and between two such contraries
like manner the difference between excess and deficiency
intellectual virtue observes the mean.
Whether the theological virtues observe the mean?
Ia IIae q. 64 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that theological virtue ob-
observe the mean.
serves the mean. For the good of other virtues consists in
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the mean of
their observing the mean. Now the theological virtues sur-
virtue depends on conformity with virtue’s rule or mea-
pass the others in goodness. Therefore much more does
sure, in so far as one may exceed or fall short of that rule.
theological virtue observe the mean.
Now the measure of theological virtue may be twofold.
Objection 2. Further, the mean of moral virtue de-
One is taken from the very nature of virtue, and thus the
pends on the appetite being ruled by reason; while the
measure and rule of theological virtue is God Himself:
mean of intellectual virtue consists in the intellect being
because our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; char-
measured by things. Now theological virtue perfects both
ity, according to His goodness; hope, according to the im-
intellect and appetite, as stated above (q. 62, a. 3). There-
mensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness. This
fore theological virtue also observes the mean.
measure surpasses all human power: so that never can we
Objection 3. Further, hope, which is a theological
love God as much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and
virtue, is a mean between despair and presumption. Like-
hope in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore
wise faith holds a middle course between contrary here-
can there be excess in such things. Accordingly the good
sies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii): thus,
of such virtues does not consist in a mean, but increases
by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, we
the more we approach to the summit.
observe the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who
The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by
maintained the existence of two persons and two natures,
comparison with us: for although we cannot be borne to-
and the heresy of Eutyches, who held to one person and
wards God as much as we ought, yet we should approach
one nature.
Therefore theological virtue observes the
to Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to the
mean.
measure of our condition. Consequently it is possible to
On the contrary, Wherever virtue observes the mean
find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, acciden-
it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But
tally and in reference to us.
there is no sinning by excess against God, Who is the ob-
Reply to Objection 1. The good of intellectual and
ject of theological virtue: for it is written (Ecclus. 43:33):
moral virtues consists in a mean of reason by conformity
“Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can: for He
with a measure that may be exceeded: whereas this is not
is above all praise.” Therefore theological virtue does not
so in the case of theological virtue, considered in itself, as
885
stated above.
dition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which
Reply to Objection 2. Moral and intellectual virtues
according to his condition he might hope for. But there
perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created
can be no excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose
measure and rule; whereas the theological virtues perfect
goodness is infinite. In like manner faith holds a middle
them in relation to an uncreated rule and measure. Where-
course between contrary heresies, not by comparison with
fore the comparison fails.
its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe too
Reply to Objection 3. Hope observes the mean be-
much; but in so far as human opinion itself takes a mid-
tween presumption and despair, in relation to us, in so
dle position between contrary opinions, as was explained
far, to wit, as a man is said to be presumptuous, through
above.
hoping to receive from God a good in excess of his con-
886
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 65
Of the Connection of Virtues
(In Five Articles)
We must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?
(2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity?
(3) Whether charity can be without them?
(4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity?
(5) Whether charity can be without them?
Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?
Ia IIae q. 65 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the moral virtues are
says (Quaest. Tusc. ii): “If you confess to not having one
not connected with one another. Because moral virtues are
particular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at
sometimes caused by the exercise of acts, as is proved in
all.”
Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can exercise himself in the acts of
I answer that, Moral virtue may be considered either
one virtue, without exercising himself in the acts of some
as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, tem-
other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral
perance for instance, or fortitude, is nothing but an incli-
virtue without another.
nation in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such
Objection 2. Further, magnificence and magnanim-
inclination be in us by nature or by habituation. If we take
ity are moral virtues. Now a man may have other moral
the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since
virtues without having magnificence or magnanimity: for
we find men who, by natural temperament or by being ac-
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2,3) that “a poor man can-
customed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are
not be magnificent,” and yet he may have other virtues;
not prompt in doing deeds of chastity.
and (Ethic. iv) that “he who is worthy of small things, and
But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us
so accounts his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous.”
to do a good deed well; and if we take moral virtues in
Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one
this way, we must say that they are connected, as nearly
another.
as all are agreed in saying. For this two reasons are given,
Objection 3. Further, as the moral virtues perfect the
corresponding to the different ways of assigning the dis-
appetitive part of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues
tinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above
perfect the intellective part. But the intellectual virtues
(q. 61, Aa. 3,4), some distinguish them according to cer-
are not mutually connected: since we may have one sci-
tain general properties of the virtues: for instance, by say-
ence, without having another. Neither, therefore, are the
ing that discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to jus-
moral virtues connected with one another.
tice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to
Objection 4. Further, if the moral virtues are mutually
fortitude, in whatever matter we consider these properties
connected, this can only be because they are united to-
to be. In this way the reason for the connection is evident:
gether in prudence. But this does not suffice to connect the
for strength of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it
moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one may be pru-
be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so
dent about things to be done in relation to one virtue, with-
forth. This, too, is the reason assigned for the connection
out being prudent in those that concern another virtue:
by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that “a virtue can-
even as one may have the art of making certain things,
not be perfect” as a virtue, “if isolated from the others: for
without the art of making certain others. Now prudence is
there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice
right reason about things to be done. Therefore the moral
and fortitude”: and he continues to speak in like manner
virtues are not necessarily connected with one another.
of the other virtues (cf. q. 61, a. 4, obj. 1). Augustine also
On the contrary, Ambrose says on Lk. 6:20: “The
gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4).
virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever
Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect
has one, is seen to have several”: and Augustine says (De
of their matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns
Trin. vi, 4) that “the virtues that reside in the human mind
the reason for their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because,
are quite inseparable from one another”: and Gregory says
as stated above (q. 58, a. 4), no moral virtue can be with-
(Moral. xxii, 1) that “one virtue without the other is either
out prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a
of no account whatever, or very imperfect”: and Cicero
right choice, for it is an elective habit. Now right choice
887
requires not only the inclination to a due end, which incli-been presented to his mind before. Now we speak of hav-
nation is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also cor-
ing a thing when we are on the point of having it, accord-
rect choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is
ing to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56):
made by prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands
“That which is scarcely lacking is not lacking at all.”
in those things that are directed to the end. In like man-
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
ner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral
Reply to Objection 3. The intellectual virtues are
virtues: since prudence is “right reason about things to be
about divers matters having no relation to one another,
done,” and the starting point of reason is the end of the
as is clearly the case with the various sciences and arts.
thing to be done, to which end man is rightly disposed by
Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to
moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative
be found among the moral virtues, which are about pas-
science unless we have the understanding of the princi-
sions and operations, that are clearly related to one an-
ples, so neither can we have prudence without the moral
other. For all the passions have their rise in certain initial
virtues: and from this it follows clearly that the moral
passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain
virtues are connected with one another.
others, viz. pleasure and sorrow. In like manner all the
Reply to Objection 1. Some moral virtues perfect
operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related
man as regards his general state, in other words, with re-
to one another, and to the passions. Hence the whole mat-
gard to those things which have to be done in every kind
ter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence.
of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at
Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first
the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. And if
principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues de-
he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters,
pend on the understanding of principles; even as prudence
he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if
depends on the moral virtues, as stated. On the other hand,
he exercise himself by good deeds in regard to one matter,
the universal principles which are the object of the virtue
but not in regard to another, for instance, by behaving well
of understanding of principles, do not depend on the con-
in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence;
clusions, which are the objects of the other intellectual
he will indeed acquire a certain habit of restraining his
virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence, be-
anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through
cause the appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the
the absence of prudence, which is wanting in matters of
reason the appetite, as stated above (q. 9, a. 1; q. 58, a. 5,
concupiscence. In the same way, natural inclinations fail
ad 1).
to have the complete character of virtue, if prudence be
Reply to Objection 4. Those things to which the
lacking.
moral virtues incline, are as the principles of prudence:
But there are some moral virtues which perfect man
whereas the products of art are not the principles, but the
with regard to some eminent state, such as magnificence
matter of art. Now it is evident that, though reason may
and magnanimity; and since it does not happen to all in
be right in one part of the matter, and not in another, yet
common to be exercised in the matter of such virtues, it is
in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient
possible for a man to have the other moral virtues, with-
in any principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong about
out actually having the habits of these virtues—provided
the principle, “A whole is greater than its part,” he cannot
we speak of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, when once a
acquire the science of geometry, because he must neces-
man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in
sarily wander from the truth in his conclusion. Moreover,
proximate potentiality. Because when, by practice, a man
things “done” are related to one another, but not things
has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if
“made,” as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of
he were to come in for a large sum of money, he would
prudence in one department of things to be done, would
acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice:
result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done:
even as a geometrician, by dint of little study, acquires sci-
whereas this does not occur in things to be made.
entific knowledge about some conclusion which had never
Whether moral virtues can be without charity?
Ia IIae q. 65 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtues can be
Objection 2. Further, moral virtues can be acquired
without charity. For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Pros-
by means of human acts, as stated in Ethic.
ii, 1,2,
peri vii, that “every virtue save charity may be common
whereas charity cannot be had otherwise than by infusion,
to the good and bad.” But “charity can be in none except
according to Rom. 5:5: “The charity of God is poured
the good,” as stated in the same book. Therefore the other
forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us.”
virtues can be had without charity.
Therefore it is possible to have the other virtues without
888
charity.
wards his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than
Objection 3. Further, the moral virtues are connected
that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which
together, through depending on prudence. But charity
is the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters
does not depend on prudence; indeed, it surpasses pru-
right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable
dence, according to Eph. 3:19: “The charity of Christ,
principle, that “contradictories cannot both be true at the
which surpasseth all knowledge.” Therefore the moral
same time.” It is therefore evident that neither can infused
virtues are not connected with charity, and can be with-
prudence be without charity; nor, consequently, the other
out it.
moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 3:14): “He that
It is therefore clear from what has been said that only
loveth not, abideth in death.” Now the spiritual life is per-
the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called
fected by the virtues, since it is “by them” that “we lead
virtues simply: since they direct man well to the ultimate
a good life,” as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19).
end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are ac-
Therefore they cannot be without the love of charity.
quired, are virtues in a restricted sense, but not simply:
I answer that, As stated above (q. 63, a. 2), it is possi-for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some
ble by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in
particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last end
so far as they produce good works that are directed to an
simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine∗ on the words, “All
end not surpassing the natural power of man: and when
that is not of faith is sin” (Rom. 14:23), says: “He that
they are acquired thus, they can be without charity, even
fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if
as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as
his conduct be good.”
they produce good works in proportion to a supernatu-
Reply to Objection 1. Virtue, in the words quoted,
ral last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly
denotes imperfect virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in
and perfectly; and cannot be acquired by human acts, but
its perfect state, “it makes its possessor good,” and conse-
are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be
quently cannot be in the wicked.
without charity. For it has been stated above (a. 1; q. 58,
Reply to Objection 2. This argument holds good of
Aa. 4,5) that the other moral virtues cannot be without
virtue in the sense of acquired virtue.
prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral
Reply to Objection 3. Though charity surpasses sci-
virtues, because these latter make man well disposed to
ence and prudence, yet prudence depends on charity, as
certain ends, which are the starting-point of the proce-
stated: and consequently so do all the infused moral
dure of prudence. Now for prudence to proceed aright,
virtues.
it is much more necessary that man be well disposed to-
Whether charity can be without moral virtue?
Ia IIae q. 65 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem possible to have charity
virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have. Therefore,
without the moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for
if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that he
a certain purpose, it is superfluous to employ others. Now
has all the moral virtues.
charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works
On the contrary, The whole Law is fulfilled through
of virtue, as is clear from 1 Cor. 13:4, seqq.: “Charity is
charity, for it is written (Rom. 13:8): “He that loveth his
patient, is kind,” etc. Therefore it seems that if one has
neighbor, hath fulfilled the Law.” Now it is not possible to
charity, other virtues are superfluous.
fulfil the whole Law, without having all the moral virtues:
Objection 2. Further, he that has a habit of virtue eas-
since the law contains precepts about all acts of virtue,
ily performs the works of that virtue, and those works are
as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2. Therefore he that has charity,
pleasing to him for their own sake: hence “pleasure taken
has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a
in a work is a sign of habit” (Ethic. ii, 3). Now many have
letter (Epis. clxvii)† that charity contains all the cardinal
charity, being free from mortal sin, and yet they find it dif-
virtues.
ficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing
I answer that, All the moral virtues are infused to-
to them for their own sake, but only for the sake of charity.
gether with charity. The reason for this is that God oper-
Therefore many have charity without the other virtues.
ates no less perfectly in works of grace than in works of
Objection 3. Further, charity is to be found in every
nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find that when-
saint: and yet there are some saints who are without cer-
ever a thing contains a principle of certain works, it has
tain virtues. For Bede says (on Lk. 17:10) that the saints
also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus an-
are more humbled on account of their not having certain
imals are provided with organs whereby to perform the
∗ Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.
† Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi de
Temp.
889
actions that their souls empower them to do. Now it is gards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect
evident that charity, inasmuch as it directs man to his last
of those things that are referred to the end. Therefore it is
end, is the principle of all the good works that are refer-
necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity.
able to his last end. Wherefore all the moral virtues must
Reply to Objection 2. It happens sometimes that a
needs be infused together with charity, since it is through
man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accor-
them that man performs each different kind of good work.
dance with the habit, and consequently feels no pleasure
It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are
and complacency in the act, on account of some imped-
connected, not only through prudence, but also on account
iment supervening from without: thus a man who has a
of charity: and, again, that whoever loses charity through
habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through
mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral virtues.
being sleepy or unwell. In like manner sometimes the
Reply to Objection 1. In order that the act of a lower
habits of moral virtue experience difficulty in their works,
power be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the
by reason of certain ordinary dispositions remaining from
higher, but also in the lower power: for if the principal
previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of
agent were well disposed, perfect action would not fol-
acquired moral virtue: because the repeated acts by which
low, if the instrument also were not well disposed. Con-
they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions.
sequently, in order that man work well in things referred
Reply to Objection 3. Certain saints are said not to
to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well
have certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty
to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well
in the acts of those virtues, for the reason stated; although
to whatever is referred to the end: for the virtue which re-
they have the habits of all the virtues.
Whether faith and hope can be without charity?
Ia IIae q. 65 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that faith and hope are
cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence.
never without charity. Because, since they are theological
Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fash-
virtues, they seem to be more excellent than even the in-
ion without charity: but they have not the perfect char-
fused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot
acter of virtue without charity. For, since the act of faith
be without charity. Neither therefore can faith and hope
is to believe in God; and since to believe is to assent to
be without charity.
someone of one’s own free will: to will not as one ought,
Objection 2. Further, “no man believes unwillingly”
will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought
as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is
is the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since
in the will as a perfection thereof, as stated above (q. 62,
every right movement of the will proceeds from a right
a. 3). Therefore faith cannot be without charity.
love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion
may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as
viii) that “there can be no hope without love.” But love
temperance and fortitude can be without prudence. The
is charity: for it is of this love that he speaks. Therefore
same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in
hope cannot be without charity.
looking to God for future bliss. This act is perfect, if it
On the contrary, A gloss on Mat. 1:2 says that “faith
is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be
begets hope, and hope, charity.” Now the begetter pre-
without charity. But to expect future bliss through merits
cedes the begotten, and can be without it. Therefore faith
which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire
can be without hope; and hope, without charity.
at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is
I answer that, Faith and hope, like the moral virtues,
possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope
can be considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state;
can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not
secondly, as complete virtues. For since virtue is directed
virtues properly so-called; because the nature of virtue re-
to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which
quires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but
gives the faculty of doing a perfectly good work, and this
also that we should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6).
consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing
Reply to Objection 1. Moral virtue depends on pru-
it well. Else, if what is done is good, but not well done,
dence: and not even infused prudence has the character
it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the
of prudence without charity; for this involves the absence
habit that is the principle of such an act, have the perfect
of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end.
character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just,
On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not depend
what he does is good: but it will not be the work of a per-
either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without
fect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly,
charity, although they are not virtues without charity, as
which is the result of prudence; for which reason justice
stated.
890
Reply to Objection 2. This argument is true of faith that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through
considered as a perfect virtue.
merits which we have already; and this is not without
Reply to Objection 3. Augustine is speaking here of
charity.
Whether charity can be without faith and hope?
Ia IIae q. 65 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that charity can be with-
faithful, by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of
out faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it
His Son.” Now this fellowship of man with God, which
is possible for us to love God naturally, without already
consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is be-
having faith, or hope in future bliss. Therefore charity can
gun here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in
be without faith and hope.
the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold
Objection 2. Further, charity is the root of all the
by faith and hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a
virtues, according to Eph. 3:17: “Rooted and founded
person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or de-
in charity.” Now the root is sometimes without branches.
spaired of, the possibility of their fellowship or familiar
Therefore charity can sometimes be without faith and
colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is
hope, and the other virtues.
impossible without faith, so as to believe in this fellow-
Objection 3. Further, there was perfect charity in
ship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this
Christ. And yet He had neither faith nor hope: because
fellowship. Therefore charity is quite impossible without
He was a perfect comprehensor, as we shall explain fur-
faith and hope.
ther on ( IIIa, q. 7, Aa. 3,4). Therefore charity can be
Reply to Objection 1. Charity is not any kind of love
without faith and hope.
of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb.
11:6):
object of bliss, to which object we are directed by faith
“Without faith it is impossible to please God”; and this ev-
and hope.
idently belongs most to charity, according to Prov. 8:17:
Reply to Objection 2. Charity is the root of faith and
“I love them that love me.” Again, it is by hope that we are
hope, in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue.
brought to charity, as stated above (q. 62, a. 4). Therefore
But faith and hope as such are the precursors of charity,
it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope.
as stated above (q. 62, a. 4), and so charity is impossible
I answer that, Charity signifies not only the love of
without them.
God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which im-
Reply to Objection 3. In Christ there was neither faith
plies, besides love, a certain mutual return of love, to-
nor hope, on account of their implying an imperfection.
gether with mutual communion, as stated in Ethic. viii,
But instead of faith, He had manifest vision, and instead
2. That this belongs to charity is evident from 1 Jn. 4:16:
of hope, full comprehension∗: so that in Him was perfect
“He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in
charity.
him,” and from 1 Cor. 1:9, where it is written: “God is
∗ See above, q. 4, a. 3
891
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 66
Of Equality Among the Virtues
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?
(2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal?
(3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue;
(4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another;
(5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another; (6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.
Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?
Ia IIae q. 66 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that one virtue cannot
of reason. And among these, one is better than another,
be greater or less than another. For it is written (Apoc.
according as it approaches nearer to the reason. Conse-
21:16) that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal;
quently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining
and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues. There-
moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part,
fore all virtues are equal; and consequently one cannot be
stands before temperance, which is in the concupiscible,
greater than another.
which has a smaller share of reason, as stated in Ethic. vii,
Objection 2. Further, a thing that, by its nature, con-
6.
sists in a maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the na-
The question can be taken in another way, as referring
ture of virtue consists in a maximum, for virtue is “the
to virtues of the same species. In this way, according to
limit of power,” as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i,
what was said above (q. 52, a. 1 ), when we were treat-
text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that
ing of the intensity of habits, virtue may be said to be
“virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to
greater or less in two ways: first, in itself; secondly with
evil purpose.” Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot
regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider it
be greater or less than another.
in itself, we shall call it greater or little, according to the Objection 3. Further, the quantity of an effect is mea-things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a virtue,
sured by the power of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused
e.g. temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance
virtues, are from God Whose power is uniform and infi-
extends to. But this does not apply to science and art:
nite. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater
for every grammarian does not know everything relating
than another.
to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as
On the contrary, Wherever there can be increase and
Simplicius states in his Commentary on the Predicaments,
greater abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues
that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can;
admit of greater abundance and increase: for it is written
because the nature of virtue consists in a maximum.
(Mat. 5:20): “Unless your justice abound more than that
If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the sub-
of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the
ject, it may then be greater or less, either in relation to
kingdom of heaven”: and (Prov. 15:5): “In abundant jus-
different times, or in different men. Because one man is
tice there is the greatest strength [virtus].” Therefore it
better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue
seems that a virtue can be greater or less than another.
which is defined by right reason; and this, on account
I answer that, When it is asked whether one virtue
of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposi-
can be greater than another, the question can be taken
tion, or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again a
in two senses. First, as applying to virtues of different
greater gift of grace, which is given to each one “accord-
species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater
ing to the measure of the giving of Christ,” as stated in
than another; since a cause is always more excellent than
Eph. 4:9. And here the Stoics erred, for they held that
its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause
no man should be deemed virtuous, unless he were, in the
are the most excellent. Now it is clear from what has been
highest degree, disposed to virtue. Because the nature of
said (q. 18, a. 5; q. 61, a. 2) that the cause and root of hu-
virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of
man good is the reason. Hence prudence which perfects
right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the
the reason, surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues
Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach
which perfect the appetitive power, in so far as it partakes
the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Moreover, one same in-
892
divisible mark is reached more nearly and more readily by
“less” good, in the ways explained above: since, as stated,
one than by another: as may be seen when several arches
it is not an indivisible limit.
aim at a fixed target.
Reply to Objection 3. God does not work by neces-
Reply to Objection 1. This equality is not one of ab-
sity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom,
solute quantity, but of proportion: because all virtues grow
whereby He bestows on men various measures of virtue,
in a man proportionately, as we shall see further on (a. 2).
according to Eph. 4:7: “To every one of you [Vulg.: ‘us’]
Reply to Objection 2. This “limit” which belongs
is given grace according to the measure of the giving of
to virtue, can have the character of something “more” or
Christ.”
Whether all the virtues that are together in one man, are equal?
Ia IIae q. 66 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the virtues in one
in proportion to one another.
same man are not all equally intense. For the Apostle says
Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in
(1 Cor. 7:7): “Everyone hath his proper gift from God;
the same way as the connection of virtues; for equality
one after this manner, and another after that.” Now one
among virtues is their connection as to greatness. Now
gift would not be more proper than another to a man, if
it has been stated above (q. 65, a. 1) that a twofold con-
God infused all the virtues equally into each man. There-
nection of virtues may be assigned. The first is according
fore it seems that the virtues are not all equal in one and
to the opinion of those who understood these four virtues
the same man.
to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is
Objection 2. Further, if all the virtues were equally
found together with the other in any matter. In this way
intense in one and the same man, it would follow that
virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter unless
whoever surpasses another in one virtue, would surpass
they have all these properties equal. Augustine alludes to
him in all the others. But this is clearly not the case: since
this kind of equality (De Trin. vi, 4) when he says: “If
various saints are specially praised for different virtues;
you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that one is
e.g. Abraham for faith (Rom. 4), Moses for his meek-
more prudent than the other; it follows that the fortitude
ness (Num. 7:3), Job for his patience (Tob. 2:12). This
of the latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not re-
is why of each Confessor the Church sings: “There was
ally equal in fortitude, since the former’s fortitude is more
not found his like in keeping the law of the most High,”∗,
prudent. You will find that this applies to the other virtues
since each one was remarkable for some virtue or other.
if you run over them all in the same way.”
Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same
The other kind of connection among virtues followed
man.
the opinion of those who hold these virtues to have their
Objection 3. Further, the more intense a habit is, the
own proper respective matters (q. 65 , Aa. 1,2). In this
greater one’s pleasure and readiness in making use of it.
way the connection among moral virtues results from pru-
Now experience shows that a man is more pleased and
dence, and, as to the infused virtues, from charity, and not
ready to make use of one virtue than of another. There-
from the inclination, which is on the part of the subject,
fore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.
as stated above (q. 65, a. 1). Accordingly the nature of
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that
the equality among virtues can also be considered on the
“those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence
part of prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all
and temperance,” and so on. Now it would not be so, un-
the moral virtues: for in one and the same man, so long
less all the virtues in one man were equal. Therefore all
as his reason has the same degree of perfection, the mean
virtues are equal in one man.
will be proportionately defined according to right reason
I answer that, As explained above (a. 1), the compar-
in each matter of virtue.
ative greatness of virtues can be understood in two ways.
But in regard to that which is material in the moral
First, as referring to their specific nature: and in this way
virtues, viz. the inclination to the virtuous act, one may
there is no doubt that in a man one virtue is greater than
be readier to perform the act of one virtue, than the act of
another, for example, charity, than faith and hope. Sec-
another virtue, and this either from nature, or from habit-
ondly, it may be taken as referring to the degree of par-
uation, or again by the grace of God.
ticipation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes
Reply to Objection 1. This saying of the Apostle may
intense or remiss in its subject. In this sense all the virtues be taken to refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are
in one man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so
not common to all, nor are all of them equal in the one
far as their growth in man is equal: thus the fingers are
same subject. We might also say that it refers to the mea-
unequal in size, but equal in proportion, since they grow
sure of sanctifying grace, by reason of which one man has
∗ See Lesson in the Mass Statuit (Dominican Missal)
893
all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of
account of his greater abundance of prudence, or also of
his more admirable readiness for the act of one virtue than
charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected.
for the act of another virtue.
Reply to Objection 2. One saint is praised chiefly for
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
Whether the moral virtues are better than the intellectual virtues?
Ia IIae q. 66 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the moral virtues are
ply, the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are
better than the intellectual. Because that which is more
more excellent than the moral virtues, which perfect the
necessary, and more lasting, is better. Now the moral
appetite.
virtues are “more lasting even than the sciences” (Ethic.
But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then
i) which are intellectual virtues: and, moreover, they are
moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, whose function
more necessary for human life. Therefore they are prefer-
it is to move the other powers to act, as stated above
able to the intellectual virtues.
(q. 9, a. 1), is more excellent. And since virtue is so
Objection 2. Further, virtue is defined as “that which
called from its being a principle of action, for it is the
makes its possessor good.” Now man is said to be good
perfection of a power, it follows again that the nature
in respect of moral virtue, and art in respect of intellec-
of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual
tual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence alone.
virtue, though the intellectual virtues are more excellent
Therefore moral is better than intellectual virtue.
habits, simply speaking.
Objection 3. Further, the end is more excellent than
Reply to Objection 1. The moral virtues are more
the means. But according to Ethic. vi, 12, “moral virtue
lasting than the intellectual virtues, because they are prac-
gives right intention of the end; whereas prudence gives
tised in matters pertaining to the life of the community.
right choice of the means.” Therefore moral virtue is more
Yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which are
excellent than prudence, which is the intellectual virtue
necessary and invariable, are more lasting than the objects
that regards moral matters.
of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters of ac-
On the contrary, Moral virtue is in that part of the
tion. That the moral virtues are more necessary for hu-
soul which is rational by participation; while intellectual
man life, proves that they are more excellent, not simply,
virtue is in the essentially rational part, as stated in Ethic.
but relatively. Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues,
i, 13. Now rational by essence is more excellent than ra-
from the very fact that they are not referred to something
tional by participation. Therefore intellectual virtue is bet-
else, as a useful thing is referred to an end, are more excel-
ter than moral virtue.
lent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of
I answer that, A thing may be said to be greater or
beginning of that happiness which consists in the knowl-
less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For
edge of truth, as stated above (q. 3, a. 6).
nothing hinders something from being better simply, e.g.
Reply to Objection 2. The reason why man is said to
“learning than riches,” and yet not better relatively, i.e.
be good simply, in respect of moral virtue, but not in re-
“for one who is in want”∗. Now to consider a thing sim-
spect of intellectual virtue, is because the appetite moves
ply is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Ac-
the other powers to their acts, as stated above (q. 56, a. 3).
cordingly, a virtue takes its species from its object, as ex-
Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral
plained above (q. 54, a. 2; q. 60, a. 1). Hence, speaking
virtue is better relatively.
simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more
Reply to Objection 3. Prudence directs the moral
excellent object. Now it is evident that the object of the
virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in
reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite:
appointing the end. Now the end of each moral virtue
since the reason apprehends things in the universal, while
is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue;
the appetite tends to things themselves, whose being is
which mean is appointed according to the right ruling of
restricted to the particular. Consequently, speaking sim-
prudence, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6; vi, 13.
∗ Aristotle, Topic. iii.
894
Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?
Ia IIae q. 66 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that justice is not the chief i.e. fortitude, “is useful in war, and the latter,” i.e. justice, of the moral virtues. For it is better to give of one’s own
“both in war and in peace.” After fortitude comes tem-
than to pay what is due. Now the former belongs to liber-
perance, which subjects the appetite to reason in matters
ality, the latter to justice. Therefore liberality is apparently directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one a greater virtue than justice.
species, viz. in matters of food and of sex. And so these
Objection 2. Further, the chief quality of a thing is,
three virtues, together with prudence, are called principal
seemingly, that in which it is most perfect. Now, accord-
virtues, in excellence also.
ing to Jam. 1:4, “Patience hath a perfect work.” Therefore
A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its
it would seem that patience is greater than justice.
helping or adorning a principal virtue: even as substance
Objection 3. Further, “Magnanimity has a great influ-
is more excellent simply than accident: and yet relatively
ence on every virtue,” as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore it
some particular accident is more excellent than substance
magnifies even justice. Therefore it is greater than justice.
in so far as it perfects substance in some accidental mode
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1)
of being.
that “justice is the most excellent of the virtues.”
Reply to Objection 1. The act of liberality needs to
I answer that, A virtue considered in its species may
be founded on an act of justice, for “a man is not liberal
be greater or less, either simply or relatively. A virtue
in giving, unless he gives of his own” (Polit. ii, 3). Hence
is said to be greater simply, whereby a greater rational
there could be no liberality apart from justice, which dis-
good shines forth, as stated above (a. 1). In this way jus-
cerns between “meum” and “tuum”: whereas justice can
tice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being
be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than
most akin to reason. This is made evident by considering
liberality, as being more universal, and as being its foun-
its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the
dation: while liberality is greater relatively since it is an
will, and the will is the rational appetite, as stated above
ornament and an addition to justice.
(q. 8, a. 1; q. 26, a. 1): its object or matter, because it
Reply to Objection 2. Patience is said to have “a
is about operations, whereby man is set in order not only
perfect work,” by enduring evils, wherein it excludes not
in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence “justice
only unjust revenge, which is also excluded by justice; not
is the most excellent of virtues” (Ethic. v, 1). Among
only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only
the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, the
anger, which is calmed by gentleness; but also inordinate
more excellent the matter in which the appetitive move-
sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is
ment is subjected to reason, so much the more does the
more perfect and excellent through plucking up the root
rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touch-
in this matter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the
ing man, the chief of all is life, on which all other things
other virtues simply. Because fortitude not only endures
depend. Consequently fortitude which subjects the ap-
trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it
petitive movement to reason in matters of life and death,
if necessary. Hence whoever is brave is patient; but the
holds the first place among those moral virtues that are
converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude.
about the passions, but is subordinate to justice. Hence the
Reply to Objection 3. There can be no magnanimity
Philosopher says (Rhet. 1) that “those virtues must needs
without the other virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Hence
be greatest which receive the most praise: since virtue is
it is compared to them as their ornament, so that relatively
a power of doing good. Hence the brave man and the just
it is greater than all the others, but not simply.
man are honored more than others; because the former,”
Whether wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues?
Ia IIae q. 66 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that wisdom is not the
Objection 2. Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the comman-to direct man to happiness: because virtue is “the dispo-
der is greater than the one commanded. Now prudence
sition of a perfect thing to that which is best,” as stated in
seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethic. i, 2
Phys. vii, text. 17. Now prudence is “right reason about
that political science, which belongs to prudence (Ethic.
things to be done,” whereby man is brought to happiness:
vi, 8), “orders that sciences should be cultivated in states,
whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby
and to which of these each individual should devote him-
man attains happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater
self, and to what extent.” Since, then, wisdom is one of the
virtue than wisdom.
sciences, it seems that prudence is greater than wisdom.
Objection 3. Further, the more perfect knowledge is,
895
the greater it seems to be. Now we can have more perject of happiness, viz. the Supreme Intelligible. And if in-
fect knowledge of human affairs, which are the subject
deed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect
of science, than of Divine things, which are the object
of its object, there would be perfect happiness in the act of
of wisdom, which is the distinction given by Augustine
wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect
(De Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incompre-
in respect of its principal object, which is God, it follows
hensible, according to Job 26:26: “Behold God is great,
that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of
exceeding our knowledge.” Therefore science is a greater
future happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence
virtue than wisdom.
to happiness.
Objection 4. Further, knowledge of principles is more
Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (De
excellent than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom
Anima i, text. 1), “one knowledge is preferable to another,
draws conclusions from indemonstrable principles which
either because it is about a higher object, or because it is
are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as other
more certain.” Hence if the objects be equally good and
sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater virtue
sublime, that virtue will be greater which possesses more
than wisdom.
certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
a higher and better object, is preferable to that which is
7) that wisdom is “the head” among “the intellectual
more certain about an object of inferior degree. Where-
virtues.”
fore the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that “it is
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), the greatness of
a great thing to be able to know something about celestial
a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now
beings, though it be based on weak and probable reason-
the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of all the in-
ing”; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that “it is better to
tellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the Supreme
know a little about sublime things, than much about mean
Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning of the
things.” Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about
Metaphysics. And since it is by the cause that we judge
God pertains, is beyond the reach of man, especially in
of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the
this life, so as to be his possession: for this “belongs to
lower effects; hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment
God alone” (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this little knowledge
over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and
about God which we can have through wisdom is prefer-
is the architect of them all.
able to all other knowledge.
Reply to Objection 1. Since prudence is about human
Reply to Objection 4. The truth and knowledge of
affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is im-
indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the
possible for prudence to be a greater virtue than wisdom,
terms: for as soon as we know what is a whole, and what
“unless,” as stated in Ethic. vi, 7, “man were the greatest
is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than
thing in the world.” Wherefore we must say, as stated in
its part. Now to know the meaning of being and non-
the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not com-
being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to
mand wisdom, but vice versa: because “the spiritual man
being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable prin-
judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man” (1
ciples are constituted, is the function of wisdom: since
Cor. 2:15). For prudence has no business with supreme
universal being is the proper effect of the Supreme Cause,
matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command
which is God. And so wisdom makes use of indemon-
covers things directed to wisdom, viz. how men are to ob-
strable principles which are the object of understanding,
tain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is,
not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sci-
in this way, the servant of wisdom; for it leads to wisdom,
ences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and
preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king.
by vindicating them against those who deny them. Hence
Reply to Objection 2. Prudence considers the means
it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understand-
of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very ob-
ing.
Whether charity is the greatest of the theological virtues?
Ia IIae q. 66 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not the
and charity.
greatest of the theological virtues. Because, since faith
Objection 2. Further, when two things are added to-
is in the intellect, while hope and charity are in the appet-
gether, the result is greater than either one. Now hope re-
itive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and
sults from something added to charity; for it presupposes
charity, as intellectual to moral virtue. Now intellectual
love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), and it adds a
virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident
certain movement of stretching forward to the beloved.
above (q. 62, a. 3). Therefore faith is greater than hope
Therefore hope is greater than charity.
896
Objection 3. Further, a cause is more noble than its man. Now in things that are above man, to love them is
effect. Now faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a
more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge
gloss on Mat. 1:3 says that “faith begets hope, and hope
is perfected by the known being in the knower: whereas
charity.” Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity.
love is perfected by the lover being drawn to the beloved.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13):
Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself
“Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but
than in man: since a thing is contained according to the
the greatest of these is charity.”
mode of the container. But it is the other way about in
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), the greatness of
things beneath man. Secondly, because prudence mod-
a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now,
erates the appetitive movements pertaining to the moral
since the three theological virtues look at God as their
virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive
proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is
movement tending to God, which movement belongs to
greater than another by reason of its having a greater ob-
the theological virtues: it only shows the object. And
ject, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than
this appetitive movement towards its object surpasses hu-
another to that object; and in this way charity is greater
man knowledge, according to Eph. 3:19: “The charity of
than the others. Because the others, in their very nature,
Christ which surpasseth all knowledge.”
imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of
Reply to Objection 2. Hope presupposes love of that
what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. But
which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of con-
the love of charity is of that which is already possessed:
cupiscence, whereby he who desires good, loves himself
since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again,
rather than something else. On the other hand, charity im-
the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved;
plies love of friendship, to which we are led by hope, as
hence it is written (1 Jn. 4:16): “He that abideth in char-
stated above (q. 62, a. 4).
ity, abideth in God, and God in him.”
Reply to Objection 3. An efficient cause is more no-
Reply to Objection 1. Faith and hope are not re-
ble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. For other-
lated to charity in the same way as prudence to moral
wise the heat of fire would be more noble than the soul, to
virtue; and for two reasons. First, because the theological
which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that
virtues have an object surpassing the human soul: whereas
faith begets hope, and hope charity: in the sense, to wit,
prudence and the moral virtues are about things beneath
that one is a disposition to the other.
897
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 67
Of the Duration of Virtues After This Life
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?
(2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain?
(3) Whether faith remains?
(4) Whether hope remains?
(5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope?
(6) Whether charity remains?
Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?
Ia IIae q. 67 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the moral virtues doe
ement. For in the future life there will be no concupis-
not remain after this life. For in the future state of glory
cences and pleasures in matters of food and sex; nor fear
men will be like angels, according to Mat. 22:30. But it
and daring about dangers of death; nor distributions and
is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels∗, as stated in
commutations of things employed in this present life. But,
Ethic. x, 8. Therefore neither in man will there be moral
as regards the formal element, they will remain most per-
virtues after this life.
fect, after this life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one’s Objection 2. Further, moral virtues perfect man in
reason will have most perfect rectitude in regard to things
the active life. But the active life does not remain after
concerning him in respect of that state of life: and his
this life: for Gregory says (Moral. iv, 18): “The works of
appetitive power will be moved entirely according to the
the active life pass away from the body.” Therefore moral
order of reason, in things pertaining to that same state.
virtues do not remain after this life.
Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9) that “prudence
Objection 3.
Further, temperance and fortitude,
will be there without any danger of error; fortitude, with-
which are moral virtues, are in the irrational parts of the
out the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance, without
soul, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Now the
the rebellion of the desires: so that prudence will neither
irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, when the body is
prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere to
corrupted: since they are acts of bodily organs. Therefore
Him most steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him
it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life.
Who knows no imperfection.” As to justice, it is yet more
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:15) that “justice evident what will be its act in that life, viz. “to be subject
is perpetual and immortal.”
to God”: because even in this life subjection to a superior
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9),
is part of justice.
Cicero held that the cardinal virtues do not remain after
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking
this life; and that, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9),
there of these moral virtues, as to their material element;
“in the other life men are made happy by the mere knowl-
thus he speaks of justice, as regards “commutations and
edge of that nature, than which nothing is better or more
distributions”; of fortitude, as to “matters of terror and
lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all others.” Af-
danger”; of temperance, in respect of “lewd desires.”
terwards he concludes that these four virtues remain in the
The same applies to the Second Objection. For those
future life, but after a different manner.
things that concern the active life, belong to the material
In order to make this evident, we must note that in
element of the virtues.
these virtues there is a formal element, and a quasi-
Reply to Objection 3. There is a twofold state af-
material element. The material element in these virtues is
ter this life; one before the resurrection, during which the
a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the passions
soul will be separate from the body; the other, after the
and operations according to a certain mode: and since this
resurrection, when the souls will be reunited to their bod-
mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely
ies. In this state of resurrection, the irrational powers will
this order of reason.
be in the bodily organs, just as they now are. Hence it will
Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do
be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible, and temper-
not remain in the future life, as regards their material el-
ance in the concupiscible part, in so far as each power will
∗ “Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy of the gods”
(Ethic. x, 8)
898
be perfectly disposed to obey the reason. But in the state stated above (q. 63, a. 1). Justice, however, will remain
preceding the resurrection, the irrational parts will not be
because it is in the will. Hence of justice it is specially
in the soul actually, but only radically in its essence, as
said that it is “perpetual and immortal”; both by reason of
stated in the Ia, q. 77, a. 8. Wherefore neither will these
its subject, since the will is incorruptible; and because its
virtues be actually, but only in their root, i.e. in the reason act will not change, as stated.
and will, wherein are certain nurseries of these virtues, as
Whether the intellectual virtues remain after this life?
Ia IIae q. 67 a. 2
Objection 1.
It would seem that the intellectual
ther science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain
virtues do not remain after this life. For the Apostle says
after this life when once the body is corrupted.
(1 Cor. 13:8,9) that “knowledge shall be destroyed,” and
But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle,
he states the reason to be because “we know in part.” Now
who states (De Anima iii, text. 8) that “the possible in-
just as the knowledge of science is in part, i.e. imperfect;
tellect is in act when it is identified with each thing as
so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues,
knowing it; and yet, even then, it is in potentiality to con-
as long as this life lasts. Therefore all the intellectual
sider it actually.” It is also contrary to reason, because
virtues will cease after this life.
intelligible species are contained by the “possible” intel-
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Categor.
lect immovably, according to the mode of their container.
vi) that since science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to Hence the “possible” intellect is called “the abode of the
remove: for it is not easily lost, except by reason of some
species” (De Anima iii) because it preserves the intelligi-
great change or sickness. But no bodily change is so great
ble species.
as that of death. Therefore science and the other intellec-
And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man un-
tual virtues do not remain after death.
derstands in this life, by applying the intelligible species
Objection 3. Further, the intellectual virtues perfect
to them as stated in the Ia, q. 84, a. 7; Ia, q. 85, a. 1,
the intellect so that it may perform its proper act well.
ad 5, cease as soon as the body is corrupted. Hence, so
Now there seems to be no act of the intellect after this life,
far as the phantasms are concerned, which are the quasi-
since “the soul understands nothing without a phantasm”
material element in the intellectual virtues, these latter
(De Anima iii, text. 30); and, after this life, the phantasms
cease when the body is destroyed: but as regards the in-
do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of the
telligible species, which are in the “possible” intellect, the
body. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not remain af-
intellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi-
ter this life.
formal element of the intellectual virtues. Therefore these
On the contrary, The knowledge of what is univer-
remain after this life, as regards their formal element, just
sal and necessary is more constant than that of particular
as we have stated concerning the moral virtues (a. 1).
and contingent things. Now the knowledge of contingent
Reply to Objection 1. The saying of the Apostle is
particulars remains in man after this life; for instance, the
to be understood as referring to the material element in
knowledge of what one has done or suffered, according to
science, and to the mode of understanding; because, to
Lk. 16:25: “Son, remember that thou didst receive good
it, neither do the phantasms remain, when the body is
things in thy life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things.”
destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the
Much more, therefore, does the knowledge of universal
phantasms.
and necessary things remain, which belong to science and
Reply to Objection 2. Sickness destroys the habit of
the other intellectual virtues.
science as to its material element, viz. the phantasms, but
I answer that, As stated in the Ia, q. 79, a. 6 some
not as to the intelligible species, which are in the “possi-
have held that the intelligible species do not remain in the
ble” intellect.
passive intellect except when it actually understands; and
Reply to Objection 3. As stated in the Ia, q. 89, a. 1
that so long as actual consideration ceases, the species are
the separated soul has a mode of understanding, other than
not preserved save in the sensitive powers which are acts
by turning to the phantasms. Consequently science re-
of bodily organs, viz. in the powers of imagination and
mains, yet not as to the same mode of operation; as we
memory. Now these powers cease when the body is cor-
have stated concerning the moral virtues (a. 1).
rupted: and consequently, according to this opinion, nei-
899
Whether faith remains after this life?
Ia IIae q. 67 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that faith remains after
evident, that if such an imperfection be removed, the thing
this life. Because faith is more excellent than science.
remains substantially.
Now science remains after this life, as stated above (a. 2).
Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to
Therefore faith remains also.
the very nature of faith: for it is included in its definition; Objection 2. Further, it is written (1 Cor. 3:11):
faith being defined as “the substance of things to be hoped
“Other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid;
for, the evidence of things that appear not” (Heb. 11:1).
which is Christ Jesus,” i.e. faith in Jesus Christ. Now if
Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.): “Where is
the foundation is removed, that which is built upon it re-
faith? Believing without seeing.” But it is an imperfect
mains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not after this
knowledge that is of things unapparent or unseen. Con-
life, no other virtue remains.
sequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature
Objection 3. Further, the knowledge of faith and the
of faith: therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith
knowledge of glory differ as perfect from imperfect. Now
cannot be perfect and remain identically the same.
imperfect knowledge is compatible with perfect knowl-
But we must also consider whether it is compatible
edge: thus in an angel there can be “evening” and “morn-
with perfect knowledge: for there is nothing to prevent
ing” knowledge∗; and a man can have science through a
some kind of imperfect knowledge from being sometimes
demonstrative syllogism, together with opinion through a
with perfect knowledge. Accordingly we must observe
probable syllogism, about one same conclusion. There-
that knowledge can be imperfect in three ways: first, on
fore after this life faith also is compatible with the knowl-
the part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of
edge of glory.
the medium; thirdly, on the part of the subject. The differ-
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6,7):
ence of perfect and imperfect knowledge on the part of the
“While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord:
knowable object is seen in the “morning” and “evening”
for we walk by faith and not by sight.” But those who are
knowledge of the angels: for the “morning” knowledge
in glory are not absent from the Lord, but present to Him.
is about things according to the being which they have in
Therefore after this life faith does not remain in the life of
the Word, while the “evening” knowledge is about things
glory.
according as they have being in their own natures, which
I answer that, Opposition is of itself the proper cause
being is imperfect in comparison with the First Being. On
of one thing being excluded from another, in so far, to wit,
the part of the medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge
as wherever two things are opposite to one another, we
are exemplified in the knowledge of a conclusion through
find opposition of affirmation and negation. Now in some
a demonstrative medium, and through a probable medium.
things we find opposition in respect of contrary forms;
On the part of the subject the difference of perfect and im-
thus in colors we find white and black. In others we
perfect knowledge applies to opinion, faith, and science.
find opposition in respect of perfection and imperfection:
For it is essential to opinion that we assent to one of two
wherefore in alterations, more and less are considered to
opposite assertions with fear of the other, so that our adhe-
be contraries, as when a thing from being less hot is made
sion is not firm: to science it is essential to have firm ad-
more hot (Phys. v, text. 19). And since perfect and im-
hesion with intellectual vision, for science possesses cer-
perfect are opposite to one another, it is impossible for
titude which results from the understanding of principles:
perfection and imperfection to affect the same thing at the
while faith holds a middle place, for it surpasses opinion
same time.
in so far as its adhesion is firm, but falls short of science
Now we must take note that sometimes imperfection
in so far as it lacks vision.
belongs to a thing’s very nature, and belongs to its species:
Now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and im-
even as lack of reason belongs to the very specific nature
perfect in the same respect; yet the things which differ as
of a horse and an ox. And since a thing, so long as it re-
perfect and imperfect can be together in the same respect
mains the same identically, cannot pass from one species
in one and the same other thing. Accordingly, knowledge
to another, it follows that if such an imperfection be re-
which is perfect on the part of the object is quite incom-
moved, the species of that thing is changed: even as it
patible with imperfect knowledge about the same object;
would no longer be an ox or a horse, were it to be ra-
but they are compatible with one another in respect of the
tional. Sometimes, however, the imperfection does not
same medium or the same subject: for nothing hinders a
belong to the specific nature, but is accidental to the in-
man from having at one and the same time, through one
dividual by reason of something else; even as sometimes
and the same medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge
lack of reason is accidental to a man, because he is asleep,
about two things, one perfect, the other imperfect, e.g.
or because he is drunk, or for some like reason; and it is
about health and sickness, good and evil. In like manner
∗ Cf. Ia, q. 58, a. 6
900
knowledge that is perfect on the part of the medium is in-ifest that faith and bliss are incompatible in one and the
compatible with imperfect knowledge through one and the
same subject.
same medium: but nothing hinders them being about the
Reply to Objection 1. Faith is more excellent than
same subject or in the same subject: for one man can know
science, on the part of the object, because its object is
the same conclusions through a probable and through a
the First Truth. Yet science has a more perfect mode of
demonstrative medium. Again, knowledge that is perfect
knowing its object, which is not incompatible with vision
on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect
which is the perfection of happiness, as the mode of faith
knowledge in the same subject. Now faith, of its very na-
is incompatible.
ture, contains an imperfection on the part of the subject,
Reply to Objection 2. Faith is the foundation in as
viz. that the believer sees not what he believes: whereas
much as it is knowledge: consequently when this knowl-
bliss, of its very nature, implies perfection on the part of
edge is perfected, the foundation will be perfected also.
the subject, viz. that the Blessed see that which makes
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what
them happy, as stated above (q. 3, a. 8). Hence it is man-
has been said.
Whether hope remains after death, in the state of glory?
Ia IIae q. 67 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that hope remains after
Reply to Objection 1.
Hope surpasses the moral
death, in the state of glory. Because hope perfects the hu-
virtues as to its object, which is God. But the acts of the
man appetite in a more excellent manner than the moral
moral virtues are not incompatible with the perfection of
virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this life, as
happiness, as the act of hope is; except perhaps, as regards
Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9). Much more
their matter, in respect of which they do not remain. For
then does hope remain.
moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect of
Objection 2. Further, fear is opposed to hope. But
what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something
fear remains after this life: in the Blessed, filial fear,
which is in our actual possession.
which abides for ever—in the lost, the fear of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2. Fear is twofold, servile and
Therefore, in a like manner, hope can remain.
filial, as we shall state further on ( IIa IIae, q. 19, a. 2).
Objection 3. Further, just as hope is of future good,
Servile fear regards punishment, and will be impossible in
so is desire. Now in the Blessed there is desire for future
the life of glory, since there will no longer be possibility
good; both for the glory of the body, which the souls of
of being punished. Filial fear has two acts: one is an act of
the Blessed desire, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii,
reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains:
35); and for the glory of the soul, according to Ecclus.
the other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God,
24:29: “They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that
and as regards this act, it does not remain. Because sepa-
drink me, shall yet thirst,” and 1 Pet. 1:12: “On Whom
ration from God is in the nature of an evil: and no evil will
the angels desire to look.” Therefore it seems that there
be feared there, according to Prov. 1:33: “He. . . shall en-
can be hope in the Blessed after this life is past.
joy abundance without fear of evils.” Now fear is opposed
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom.
8:24):
to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated above
“What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?” But the
(q. 23, a. 2; q. 40, a. 1 ), and therefore the fear which will
Blessed see that which is the object of hope, viz. God.
remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there
Therefore they do not hope.
can be fear of punishment, rather than hope of glory in
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), that which, in its the Blessed. Because in the lost there will be a succession
very nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incom-
of punishments, so that the notion of something future re-
patible with the opposite perfection in that subject. Thus
mains there, which is the object of fear: but the glory of
it is evident that movement of its very nature implies im-
the saints has no succession, by reason of its being a kind
perfection of its subject, since it is “the act of that which is of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither past
in potentiality as such” (Phys. iii): so that as soon as this
nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly speak-
potentiality is brought into act, the movement ceases; for
ing, neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above
a thing does not continue to become white, when once it is
(q. 42, a. 2), fear is never without some hope of escape:
made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that
and the lost have no such hope. Consequently neither will
which is not possessed, as is clear from what we have said
there be fear in them; except speaking in a general way, in
above about the passion of hope (q. 40, Aa. 1,2). There-
so far as any expectation of future evil is called fear.
fore when we possess that which we hope for, viz. the
Reply to Objection 3. As to the glory of the soul,
enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to have
there can be no desire in the Blessed, in so far as desire
hope.
looks for something future, for the reason already given
901
(ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in them be-something difficult, as stated above (q. 40, a. 1): while
cause they never weary, and for the same reason desire is
a good whose unerring cause we already possess, is not
said to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the
compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has
body, there can be desire in the souls of the saints, but not
money is not, properly speaking, said to hope for what he
hope, properly speaking; neither as a theological virtue,
can buy at once. In like manner those who have the glory
for thus its object is God, and not a created good; nor in
of the soul are not, properly speaking, said to hope for the
its general signification. Because the object of hope is
glory of the body, but only to desire it.
Whether anything of faith or hope remains in glory?
Ia IIae q. 67 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that something of faith
absolutely impossible. Because when you remove a spe-
and hope remains in glory. For when that which is proper
cific difference, the substance of the genus does not re-
to a thing is removed, there remains what is common; thus
main identically the same: thus if you remove the differ-
it is stated in De Causis that “if you take away rational,
ence constituting whiteness, the substance of color does
there remains living, and when you remove living, there
not remain identically the same, as though the identical
remains being.” Now in faith there is something that it has
color were at one time whiteness, and, at another, black-
in common with beatitude, viz. knowledge: and there is
ness. The reason is that genus is not related to differ-
something proper to it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowl-
ence as matter to form, so that the substance of the genus
edge in a dark manner. Therefore, the darkness of faith
remains identically the same, when the difference is re-
removed, the knowledge of faith still remains.
moved, as the substance of matter remains identically the
Objection 2. Further, faith is a spiritual light of the
same, when the form is changed: for genus and difference
soul, according to Eph. 1:17,18: “The eyes of your heart
are not the parts of a species, else they would not be pred-
enlightened. . . in the knowledge of God”; yet this light is
icated of the species. But even as the species denotes the
imperfect in comparison with the light of glory, of which
whole, i.e. the compound of matter and form in material
it is written (Ps. 35:10): “In Thy light we shall see light.”
things, so does the difference, and likewise the genus; the
Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light su-
genus denotes the whole by signifying that which is mate-
pervenes: for a candle is not extinguished when the sun’s
rial; the difference, by signifying that which is formal; the
rays appear. Therefore it seems that the light of faith itself
species, by signifying both. Thus, in man, the sensitive
remains with the light of glory.
nature is as matter to the intellectual nature, and animal
Objection 3. Further, the substance of a habit does
is predicated of that which has a sensitive nature, rational
not cease through the withdrawal of its matter: for a man
of that which has an intellectual nature, and man of that
may retain the habit of liberality, though he have lost his
which has both. So that the one same whole is denoted by
money: yet he cannot exercise the act. Now the object
these three, but not under the same aspect.
of faith is the First Truth as unseen. Therefore when this
It is therefore evident that, since the signification of
ceases through being seen, the habit of faith can still re-
the difference is confined to the genus if the difference
main.
be removed, the substance of the genus cannot remain the
On the contrary, Faith is a simple habit. Now a sim-
same: for the same animal nature does not remain, if an-
ple thing is either withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely.
other kind of soul constitute the animal. Hence it is impos-
Since therefore faith does not remain entirely, but is taken
sible for the identical knowledge, which was previously
away as stated above (a. 3), it seems that it is withdrawn
obscure, to become clear vision. It is therefore evident
entirely.
that, in heaven, nothing remains of faith, either identically
I answer that, Some have held that hope is taken away
or specifically the same, but only generically.
entirely: but that faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its
Reply to Objection 1. If “rational” be withdrawn, the
obscurity, and remains in part, viz. as to the substance of
remaining “living” thing is the same, not identically, but
its knowledge. And if this be understood to mean that it
generically, as stated.
remains the same, not identically but generically, it is ab-
Reply to Objection 2. The imperfection of candle-
solutely true; since faith is of the same genus, viz. knowl-
light is not opposed to the perfection of sunlight, since
edge, as the beatific vision. On the other hand, hope is not
they do not regard the same subject: whereas the imper-
of the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is com-
fection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to
pared to the enjoyment of bliss, as movement is to rest in
one another and regard the same subject. Consequently
the term of movement.
they are incompatible with one another, just as light and
But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the
darkness in the air.
knowledge of faith remains identically the same, this is
Reply to Objection 3. He that loses his money does
902
not therefore lose the possibility of having money, and possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heav-therefore it is reasonable for the habit of liberality to re-
enly bliss: and so such a habit would remain to no pur-
main. But in the state of glory not only is the object of
pose.
faith, which is the unseen, removed actually, but even its
Whether charity remains after this life, in glory?
Ia IIae q. 67 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that charity does not re-
growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now charity is love,
main after this life, in glory. Because according to 1 Cor.
the nature of which does not include imperfection, since it
13:10, “when that which is perfect is come, that which is
may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed,
in part,” i.e. that which is imperfect, “shall be done away.”
either seen or not seen. Therefore charity is not done
Now the charity of the wayfarer is imperfect. Therefore it
away by the perfection of glory, but remains identically
will be done away when the perfection of glory is attained.
the same.
Objection 2. Further, habits and acts are differenti-
Reply to Objection 1. The imperfection of charity is
ated by their objects. But the object of love is good appre-
accidental to it; because imperfection is not included in
hended. Since therefore the apprehension of the present
the nature of love. Now although that which is accidental
life differs from the apprehension of the life to come, it
to a thing be withdrawn, the substance remains. Hence
seems that charity is not the same in both cases.
the imperfection of charity being done away, charity itself
Objection 3. Further, things of the same kind can ad-
is not done away.
vance from imperfection to perfection by continuous in-
Reply to Objection 2. The object of charity is not
crease. But the charity of the wayfarer can never attain
knowledge itself; if it were, the charity of the wayfarer
to equality with the charity of heaven, however much it
would not be the same as the charity of heaven: its ob-
be increased. Therefore it seems that the charity of the
ject is the thing known, which remains the same, viz. God
wayfarer does not remain in heaven.
Himself.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:8):
Reply to Objection 3. The reason why charity of the
“Charity never falleth away.”
wayfarer cannot attain to the perfection of the charity of
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), when the im-
heaven, is a difference on the part of the cause: for vision
perfection of a thing does not belong to its specific nature,
is a cause of love, as stated in Ethic. ix, 5: and the more
there is nothing to hinder the identical thing passing from
perfectly we know God, the more perfectly we love Him.
imperfection to perfection, even as man is perfected by
903
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 68
Of the Gifts
(In Eight Articles)
We now come to consider the Gifts; under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?
(2) Of the necessity of the Gifts?
(3) Whether the Gifts are habits?
(4) Which, and how many are they?
(5) Whether the Gifts are connected?
(6) Whether they remain in heaven?
(7) Of their comparison with one another;
(8) Of their comparison with the virtues.
Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?
Ia IIae q. 68 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts do not dif-
says, are signified by Job’s three daughters. He also dis-
fer from the virtues. For Gregory commenting on Job
tinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same seven gifts from the
1:2, “There were born to him seven sons,” says (Moral.
four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the
i, 12): “Seven sons were born to us, when through the
four corners of the house.
conception of heavenly thought, the seven virtues of the
I answer that, If we speak of gift and virtue with
Holy Ghost take birth in us”: and he quotes the words
regard to the notion conveyed by the words themselves,
of Is. 11:2,3: “And the Spirit. . . of understanding. . . shall there is no opposition between them. Because the word
rest upon him,” etc. where the seven gifts of the Holy
“virtue” conveys the notion that it perfects man in relation
Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the seven gifts of the
to well-doing, while the word “gift” refers to the cause
Holy Ghost are virtues.
from which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why
Objection 2. Further, Augustine commenting on Mat.
that which proceeds from one as a gift should not per-
12:45, “Then he goeth and taketh with him seven other
fect another in well-doing: especially as we have already
spirits,” etc., says (De Quaest. Evang. i, qu. 8): “The
stated (q. 63, a. 3) that some virtues are infused into us
seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues of the Holy
by God. Wherefore in this respect we cannot differenti-
Ghost,” i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are
ate gifts from virtues. Consequently some have held that
opposed to the seven virtues, commonly so called. There-
the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues. But
fore the gifts do not differ from the virtues commonly so
there remains no less a difficulty for them to solve; for
called.
they must explain why some virtues are called gifts and
Objection 3. Further, things whose definitions are the
some not; and why among the gifts there are some, fear,
same, are themselves the same. But the definition of virtue
for instance, that are not reckoned virtues.
applies to the gifts; for each gift is “a good quality of the
Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should
mind, whereby we lead a good life,” etc.∗. Likewise the
be held as being distinct from the virtues; yet they have
definition of a gift can apply to the infused virtues: for a
not assigned a suitable reason for this distinction, a rea-
gift is “an unreturnable giving,” according to the Philoso-
son, to wit, which would apply either to all the virtues,
pher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the virtues and gifts do not
and to none of the gifts, or vice versa. For, seeing that of
differ from one another.
the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom,
Objection 4. Several of the things mentioned among
knowledge, understanding and counsel, and three to the
the gifts, are virtues: for, as stated above (q. 57, a. 2),
appetite, viz. fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the
wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are intellectual
gifts perfect the free-will according as it is a faculty of
virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, piety to a kind of
the reason, while the virtues perfect it as a faculty of the
justice, and fortitude is a moral virtue. Therefore it seems
will: since they observed only two virtues in the reason or
that the gifts do not differ from the virtues.
intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others being in the
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes
appetitive power or the affections. If this distinction were
seven gifts, which he states to be denoted by the seven
true, all the virtues would have to be in the appetite, and
sons of Job, from the three theological virtues, which, he
all the gifts in the reason.
∗ Cf. q. 55, a. 4
904
Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that der to receive a higher teaching from his master. Now it is
“the gift of the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul en-
manifest that human virtues perfect man according as it is
dows it with prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude,
natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior
and at the same time strengthens it against every kind of
and exterior actions. Consequently man needs yet higher
temptation by His sevenfold gift,” said that the virtues are
perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God.
given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we
These perfections are called gifts, not only because they
may resist temptation. But neither is this distinction suf-
are infused by God, but also because by them man is dis-
ficient. Because the virtues also resist those temptations
posed to become amenable to the Divine inspiration, ac-
which lead to the sins that are contrary to the virtues; for
cording to Is. 50:5: “The Lord. . . hath opened my ear, and
everything naturally resists its contrary: which is espe-
I do not resist; I have not gone back.” Even the Philoso-
cially clear with regard to charity, of which it is written
pher says in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem.,
(Cant 8:7): “Many waters cannot quench charity.”
vii, 8) that for those who are moved by Divine instinct,
Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down
there is no need to take counsel according to human rea-
in Holy Writ as having been in Christ, according to Is.
son, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they
11:2,3, said that the virtues are given simply that we may
are moved by a principle higher than human reason. This
do good works, but the gifts, in order to conform us to
then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for
Christ, chiefly with regard to His Passion, for it was then
acts which are higher than acts of virtue.
that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor. Yet nei-
Reply to Objection 1.
Sometimes these gifts are
ther does this appear to be a satisfactory distinction. Be-
called virtues, in the broad sense of the word. Never-
cause Our Lord Himself wished us to be conformed to
theless, they have something over and above the virtues
Him, chiefly in humility and meekness, according to Mat.
understood in this broad way, in so far as they are Di-
11:29: “Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of
vine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence
heart,” and in charity, according to Jn. 15:12: “Love one
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so
another, as I have loved you.” Moreover, these virtues
called, places a kind of “heroic” or “divine virtue∗,” in
were especially resplendent in Christ’s Passion.
respect of which some men are called “divine.”
Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the
Reply to Objection 2. The vices are opposed to the
virtues, we must be guided by the way in which Scrip-
virtues, in so far as they are opposed to the good as ap-
ture expresses itself, for we find there that the term em-
pointed by reason; but they are opposed to the gifts, in as
ployed is “spirit” rather than “gift.” For thus it is written
much as they are opposed to the Divine instinct. For the
(Is. 11:2,3): “The spirit. . . of wisdom and of understand-
same thing is opposed both to God and to reason, whose
ing. . . shall rest upon him,” etc.: from which words we
light flows from God.
are clearly given to understand that these seven are there
Reply to Objection 3. This definition applies to virtue
set down as being in us by Divine inspiration. Now in-
taken in its general sense. Consequently, if we wish to re-
spiration denotes motion from without. For it must be
strict it to virtue as distinguished from the gifts, we must
noted that in man there is a twofold principle of move-
explain the words, “whereby we lead a good life” as re-
ment, one within him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic
ferring to the rectitude of life which is measured by the
to him, viz. God, as stated above (q. 9, Aa. 4,6): moreover
rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused
the Philosopher says this in the chapter On Good Fortune
virtue, may be defined as something given by God in rela-
(Ethic. Eudem. vii, 8).
tion to His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to
Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be pro-
follow well the promptings of God.
portionate to its mover: and the perfection of the mobile
Reply to Objection 4. Wisdom is called an intellec-
as such, consists in a disposition whereby it is disposed to
tual virtue, so far as it proceeds from the judgment of rea-
be well moved by its mover. Hence the more exalted the
son: but it is called a gift, according as its work proceeds
mover, the more perfect must be the disposition whereby
from the Divine prompting. The same applies to the other
the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we
virtues.
see that a disciple needs a more perfect disposition in or-
∗ arete heroike kai theia
905
Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation?
Ia IIae q. 68 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts are not nec-
of itself work, unless it be moved by another. Thus the
essary to man for salvation. Because the gifts are or-
sun which possesses light perfectly, can shine by itself;
dained to a perfection surpassing the ordinary perfection
whereas the moon which has the nature of light imper-
of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man’s salvation that
fectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician,
he should attain to a perfection surpassing the ordinary
who knows the medical art perfectly, can work by him-
standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not un-
self; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot
der the precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the gifts
work by himself, but needs to receive instructions from
are not necessary to man for salvation.
him.
Objection 2. Further, it is enough, for man’s salva-
Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and
tion, that he behave well in matters concerning God and
directed to man’s connatural end, man can work through
matters concerning man. Now man’s behavior to God is
the judgment of his reason. If, however, even in these
sufficiently directed by the theological virtues; and his be-
things man receive help in the shape of special promptings
havior towards men, by the moral virtues. Therefore gifts
from God, this will be out of God’s superabundant good-
are not necessary to man for salvation.
ness: hence, according to the philosophers, not every one
Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26)
that had the acquired moral virtues, had also the heroic or
that “the Holy Ghost gives wisdom against folly, under-
divine virtues. But in matters directed to the supernatural
standing against dullness, counsel against rashness, for-
end, to which man’s reason moves him, according as it is,
titude against fears, knowledge against ignorance, piety
in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theologi-
against hardness of our heart, and fear against pride.” But
cal virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless
a sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in
it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy
the virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man
Ghost, according to Rom. 8:14,17: “Whosoever are led
for salvation.
by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God. . . and if sons,
On the contrary, Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to
heirs also”: and Ps. 142:10: “Thy good Spirit shall lead
be the highest, and fear the lowest. Now each of these
me into the right land,” because, to wit, none can receive
is necessary for salvation: since of wisdom it is written
the inheritance of that land of the Blessed, except he be
(Wis. 7:28): “God loveth none but him that dwelleth with
moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in
wisdom”; and of fear (Ecclus. 1:28): “He that is without
order to accomplish this end, it is necessary for man to
fear cannot be justified.” Therefore the other gifts that are
have the gift of the Holy Ghost.
placed between these are also necessary for salvation.
Reply to Objection 1. The gifts surpass the ordinary
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the gifts are
perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kind of works
perfections of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be
(as the counsels surpass the commandments), but as re-
amenable to the promptings of God. Wherefore in those
gards the manner of working, in respect of man being
matters where the prompting of reason is not sufficient,
moved by a higher principle.
and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost,
Reply to Objection 2. By the theological and moral
there is, in consequence, need for a gift.
virtues, man is not so perfected in respect of his last end,
Now man’s reason is perfected by God in two ways:
as not to stand in continual need of being moved by the
first, with its natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for the reason
reason; secondly, with a supernatural perfection, to wit,
already given.
the theological virtues, as stated above (q. 62, a. 1). And,
Reply to Objection 3. Whether we consider human
though this latter perfection is greater than the former, yet
reason as perfected in its natural perfection, or as per-
the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner
fected by the theological virtues, it does not know all
than the latter: because man has the former in his full pos-
things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable
session, whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since
to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the objec-
we love and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident
tion. God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all
that anything that has a nature or a form or a virtue per-
things are subject, by His motion safeguards us from all
fectly, can of itself work according to them: not, however,
folly, ignorance, dullness of mind and hardness of heart,
excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly in
and the rest. Consequently the gifts of the Holy Ghost,
every nature and in every will. On the other hand, that
which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to
which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot
be given as remedies to these defects.
906
Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits?
Ia IIae q. 68 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts of the Holy
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the gifts are
Ghost are not habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding
perfections of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the
in man, being defined as “a quality difficult to remove,”
promptings of the Holy Ghost. Now it is evident from
as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now it is
what has been already said (q. 56, a. 4; q. 58, a. 2), that
proper to Christ that the gifts of the Holy Ghost rest in
the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according
Him, as stated in Is. 11:2,3: “He upon Whom thou shalt
as it partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as
see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it
it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of
is that baptizeth”; on which words Gregory comments as
reason. Accordingly the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as com-
follows (Moral. ii, 27): “The Holy Ghost comes upon all
pared with the Holy Ghost Himself, are related to man,
the faithful; but, in a singular way, He dwells always in
even as the moral virtues, in comparison with the reason,
the Mediator.” Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are
are related to the appetitive power. Now the moral virtues
not habits.
are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are disposed
Objection 2. Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost per-
to obey reason promptly. Therefore the gifts of the Holy
fect man according as he is moved by the Spirit of God,
Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily
as stated above (Aa. 1,2). But in so far as man is moved
the Holy Ghost.
by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an instrument in
Reply to Objection 1. Gregory solves this objec-
His regard. Now to be perfected by a habit is befitting, not
tion (Moral. ii, 27) by saying that “by those gifts with-
an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the gifts of
out which one cannot obtain life, the Holy Ghost ever
the Holy Ghost are not habits.
abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts.” Now
Objection 3. Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost
the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated above
are due to Divine inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy.
(a. 2). Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost
Now prophecy is not a habit: for “the spirit of prophecy
ever abides in holy men.
does not always reside in the prophets,” as Gregory states
Reply to Objection 2. This argument holds, in the
(Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, therefore, are the gifts of
case of an instrument which has no faculty of action, but
the Holy Ghost.
only of being acted upon. But man is not an instrument
On the contrary, Our Lord in speaking of the Holy
of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy Ghost,
Ghost said to His disciples (Jn. 14:17): “He shall abide
that he also acts himself, in so far as he has a free-will.
with you, and shall be in you.” Now the Holy Ghost is not
Therefore he needs a habit.
in a man without His gifts. Therefore His gifts abide in
Reply to Objection 3. Prophecy is one of those gifts
man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but
which are for the manifestation of the Spirit, not for the
abiding habits.
necessity of salvation: hence the comparison fails.
Whether the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are suitably enumerated?
Ia IIae q. 68 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that seven gifts of the
fect man according as he is moved by God, it seems
Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. For in that enu-
that some gifts, corresponding to the theological virtues,
meration four are set down corresponding to the intellec-
should have been included.
tual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and
Objection 4. Further, even as God is an object of fear,
counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing
so is He of love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and
is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellec-
joy are passions condivided with fear. Therefore, as fear
tual virtue. Moreover, something is included correspond-
is set down as a gift, so ought the other three.
ing to justice, viz. piety, and something corresponding to
Objection 5. Further, wisdom is added in order to
fortitude, viz. the gift of fortitude; while there is noth-
direct understanding; counsel, to direct fortitude; knowl-
ing to correspond to temperance. Therefore the gifts are
edge, to direct piety. Therefore, some gift should have
enumerated insufficiently.
been added for the purpose of directing fear. Therefore
Objection 2. Further, piety is a part of justice. But no the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumer-part of fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but for-
ated.
titude itself. Therefore justice itself, and not piety, ought
On the contrary, stands the authority of Holy Writ
to have been set down.
(Is. 11:2,3).
Objection 3. Further, the theological virtues, more
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), the gifts are
than any, direct us to God. Since, then, the gifts per-
habits perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the
907
promptings of the Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by rea-perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the reason.
son, so does it belong to the gift of fear, to withdraw man
Now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be
from evil pleasures through fear of God.
moved by the command of reason, so it is natural for all
Reply to Objection 2. Justice is so called from the
the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by
rectitude of the reason, and so it is more suitably called
a superior power. Therefore whatever powers in man can
a virtue than a gift. But the name of piety denotes the
be the principles of human actions, can also be the sub-
reverence which we give to our father and to our country.
jects of gifts, even as they are virtues; and such powers
And since God is the Father of all, the worship of God is
are the reason and appetite.
also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).
Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in
Therefore the gift whereby a man, through reverence for
both we find the apprehension of truth (which pertains to
God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety.
the discovery of truth), and judgment concerning the truth.
Reply to Objection 3. The mind of man is not moved
Accordingly, for the apprehension of truth, the speculative
by the Holy Ghost, unless in some way it be united to
reason is perfected by “understanding”; the practical rea-
Him: even as the instrument is not moved by the crafts-
son, by “counsel.” In order to judge aright, the speculative
man, unless there by contact or some other kind of union
reason is perfected by “wisdom”; the practical reason by
between them. Now the primal union of man with God
“knowledge.” The appetitive power, in matters touching a
is by faith, hope and charity: and, consequently, these
man’s relations to another, is perfected by “piety”; in mat-
virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being their roots.
ters touching himself, it is perfected by “fortitude” against
Therefore all the gifts correspond to these three virtues, as
the fear of dangers; and against inordinate lust for plea-
being derived therefrom.
sures, by “fear,” according to Prov. 15:27: “By the fear of
Reply to Objection 4. Love, hope and joy have good
the Lord every one declineth from evil,” and Ps. 118:120:
for their object. Now God is the Sovereign Good: where-
“Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid of
fore the names of these passions are transferred to the the-
Thy judgments.” Hence it is clear that these gifts extend
ological virtues which unite man to God. On the other
to all those things to which the virtues, both intellectual
hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise ap-
and moral, extend.
ply to God: hence fear does not denote union with God,
Reply to Objection 1. The gifts of the Holy Ghost
but withdrawal from certain things through reverence for
perfect man in matters concerning a good life: whereas
God. Hence it does not give its name to a theological
art is not directed to such matters, but to external things
virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws us from evil, for
that can be made, since art is the right reason, not about
higher motives than moral virtue does.
things to be done, but about things to be made (Ethic. vi,
Reply to Objection 5. Wisdom directs both the in-
4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of
tellect and the affections of man. Hence two gifts are set
the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who is
down as corresponding to wisdom as their directing prin-
the principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are
ciple; on the part of the intellect, the gift of understanding; His organs when He moves them. The gift of fear corre-on the part of the affections, the gift of fear. Because the
sponds, in a manner, to temperance: for just as it belongs
principal reason for fearing God is taken from a consider-
to temperance, properly speaking, to restrain man from
ation of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers.
Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected?
Ia IIae q. 68 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts are not con-
man.
nected, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): “To one. . . by
Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that
the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom, and to another, the
wisdom “is of small account if it lack understanding, and
word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit.” Now
understanding is wholly useless if it be not based upon
wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of
wisdom. . . Counsel is worthless, when the strength of for-
the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are
titude is lacking thereto. . . and fortitude is very weak if it given to divers men, and are not connected together in the
be not supported by counsel. . . Knowledge is nought if it
same man.
hath not the use of piety. . . and piety is very useless if it
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv,
lack the discernment of knowledge. . . and assuredly, un-
1) that “many of the faithful have not knowledge, though
less it has these virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the
they have faith.” But some of the gifts, at least the gift
doing of no good action”: from which it seems that it is
of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems that the gifts
possible to have one gift without another. Therefore the
are not necessarily connected together in one and the same
gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected.
908
On the contrary, Gregory prefaces the passage above in another way for the gifts of the Holy Ghost: and thus
quoted, with the following remark: “It is worthy of note
wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of
in this feast of Job’s sons, that by turns they fed one an-
the human mind, rendering it amenable to the promptings
other.” Now the sons of Job, of whom he is speaking,
of the Holy Ghost in the knowledge of things Divine and
denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of
human. Consequently it is clear that these gifts are in all
the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening
who are possessed of charity.
one another.
Reply to Objection 2. Augustine is speaking there of
I answer that, The true answer to this question is eas-
knowledge, while expounding the passage of the Apos-
ily gathered from what has been already set down. For it
tle quoted above (obj. 1): hence he is referring to knowl-
has been stated (a. 3) that as the powers of the appetite are
edge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous grace.
disposed by the moral virtues as regards the governance
This is clear from the context which follows: “For it is
of reason, so all the powers of the soul are disposed by
one thing to know only what a man must believe in or-
the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now
der to gain the blissful life, which is no other than eter-
the Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, according to Rom.
nal life; and another, to know how to impart this to godly
5:5: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by
souls, and to defend it against the ungodly, which latter
the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us,” even as our reason
the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper name of
is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, just as the moral
knowledge.”
virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of
Reply to Objection 3. Just as the connection of the
the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: so that
cardinal virtues is proved in one way from the fact that
whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost,
one is, in a manner, perfected by another, as stated above
none of which can one possess without charity.
(q. 65, a. 1); so Gregory wishes to prove the connection
Reply to Objection 1. Wisdom and knowledge can
of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that one can-
be considered in one way as gratuitous graces, in so far,
not be perfect without the other. Hence he had already
to wit, as man so far abounds in the knowledge of things
observed that “each particular virtue is to the last degree
Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct the be-
destitute, unless one virtue lend its support to another.”
liever and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense that
We are therefore not to understand that one gift can be
the Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and
without another; but that if understanding were without
knowledge: hence he mentions pointedly the “word” of
wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as temperance, with-
wisdom and the “word” of knowledge. They may be taken
out justice, would not be a virtue.
Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?
Ia IIae q. 68 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts of the Holy
and some in the active life, e.g. piety and fortitude. Now
Ghost do not remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral.
the active life ends with this as Gregory states (Moral. vi).
ii, 26) that by means of His sevenfold gift the “Holy Ghost
Therefore not all the gifts of the Holy Ghost will be in the
instructs the mind against all temptations.” Now there will
state of glory.
be no temptations in heaven, according to Is. 11:9: “They
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto
shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy moun-
i, 20): “The city of God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not
tain.” Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost
washed with the waters of an earthly river: it is the Holy
in heaven.
Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who, proceed-
Objection 2. Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost
ing from the Fount of life, seems to flow more abundantly
are habits, as stated above (a. 3).
But habits are
in those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold
of no use, where their acts are impossible.
Now
heavenly virtue.”
the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven;
I answer that, We may speak of the gifts in two ways:
for Gregory says (Moral.
i, 15) that “understand-
first, as to their essence; and thus they will be most per-
ing. . . penetrates the truths heard. . . counsel. . . stays us fectly in heaven, as may be gathered from the passage of
from acting rashly. . . fortitude. . . has no fear of adver-
Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for this is that the gifts
sity. . . piety satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of
of the Holy Ghost render the human mind amenable to
mercy,” all of which are incompatible with the heavenly
the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially
state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state of
realized in heaven, where God will be “all in all” (1 Cor.
glory.
15:28), and man entirely subject unto Him. Secondly, they
Objection 3. Further, some of the gifts perfect man
may be considered as regards the matter about which their
in the contemplative life, e.g. wisdom and understanding:
operations are: and thus, in the present life they have an
909
operation about a matter, in respect of which they will it “fears not adversity,” which is necessary in the present
have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this
life; and further, that it “sets before us the viands of con-
way, they will not remain in the state of glory; just as
fidence,” which remains also in the future life. With re-
we have stated to be the case with regard to the cardinal
gard to knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that
virtues (q. 67, a. 1).
“she overcomes the void of ignorance,” which refers to the
Reply to Objection 1. Gregory is speaking there of
present state. When, however, he adds “in the womb of the
the gifts according as they are compatible with the present
mind,” this may refer figuratively to the fulness of knowl-
state: for it is thus that they afford us protection against
edge, which belongs to the future state. Of piety he says
evil temptations. But in the state of glory, where all evil
that “it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy.”
will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good by the gifts
These words taken literally refer only to the present state:
of the Holy Ghost.
yet the inward regard for our neighbor, signified by “the
Reply to Objection 2. Gregory, in almost every gift,
inmost heart,” belongs also to the future state, when piety
includes something that passes away with the present
will achieve, not works of mercy, but fellowship of joy.
state, and something that remains in the future state.
Of fear he say that “it oppresses the mind, lest it pride it-
For he says that “wisdom strengthens the mind with the
self in present things,” which refers to the present state,
hope and certainty of eternal things”; of which two, hope
and that “it strengthens it with the meat of hope for the
passes, and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says
future,” which also belongs to the present state, as regards
“that it penetrates the truths heard, refreshing the heart
hope, but may also refer to the future state, as regards be-
and enlightening its darkness,” of which, hearing passes
ing “strengthened” for things we hope are here, and obtain
away, since “they shall teach no more every man. . . his
there.
brother” (Jer. 31:3,4); but the enlightening of the mind
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the
remains. Of counsel he says that it “prevents us from be-
gifts as to their matter. For the matter of the gifts will
ing impetuous,” which is necessary in the present life; and
not be the works of the active life; but all the gifts will
also that “it makes the mind full of reason,” which is nec-
have their respective acts about things pertaining to the
essary even in the future state. Of fortitude he says that
contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly bliss.
Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity?
Ia IIae q. 68 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts are not set
knowledge is a more excellent gift than fortitude; and yet
down by Isaias in their order of dignity. For the principal
the latter is given the precedence. Therefore the gifts are
gift is, seemingly, that which, more than the others, God
not set down in their order of dignity.
requires of man. Now God requires of man fear, more
On the contrary, Augustine says∗: “It seems to me
than the other gifts: for it is written (Dt. 10:12): “And
that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which
now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee,
Isaias speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these
but that thou fear the Lord thy God?” and (Malachi 1:6):
[of which we read in Mat. 5:3]: but there is a difference
“If. . . I be a master, where is My fear?” Therefore it seems
of order, for there [viz. in Isaias] the enumeration begins
that fear, which is mentioned last, is not the lowest but the
with the more excellent gifts, here, with the lower gifts.”
greatest of the gifts.
I answer that, The excellence of the gifts can be mea-
Objection 2. Further, piety seems to be a kind of com-
sured in two ways: first, simply, viz. by comparison to
mon good; since the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:8): “Piety
their proper acts as proceeding from their principles; sec-
[Douay: ‘Godliness’] is profitable to all things.” Now a
ondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to their matter. If
common good is preferable to particular goods. There-
we consider the excellence of the gifts simply, they fol-
fore piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to
low the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison
be the most excellent gift.
one with another; because the gifts perfect man for all the
Objection 3. Further, knowledge perfects man’s judg-
acts of the soul’s powers, even as the virtues do, as stated
ment, while counsel pertains to inquiry. But judgment is
above (a. 4). Hence, as the intellectual virtues have the
more excellent than inquiry. Therefore knowledge is a
precedence of the moral virtues, and among the intellec-
more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it is set down as
tual virtues, the contemplative are preferable to the active,
being below it.
viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and
Objection 4. Further, fortitude pertains to the appet-
art (yet so that wisdom stands before understanding, and
itive power, while science belongs to reason. But reason
understanding before science, and prudence and synesis
is a more excellent power than the appetite. Therefore
before eubulia): so also among the gifts, wisdom, un-
∗ De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4
910
derstanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent Reply to Objection 2. In the words quoted from the
than piety, fortitude, and fear; and among the latter, piety
Apostle, piety is not compared with all God’s gifts, but
excels fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice sur-
only with “bodily exercise,” of which he had said it “is
passes fortitude, and fortitude temperance. But in regard
profitable to little.”
to their matter, fortitude and counsel precede knowledge
Reply to Objection 3. Although knowledge stands
and piety: because fortitude and counsel are concerned
before counsel by reason of its judgment, yet counsel is
with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge re-
more excellent by reason of its matter: for counsel is
gard ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of the
only concerned with matters of difficulty (Ethic. iii, 3),
gifts corresponds with the order in which they are enumer-
whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters.
ated; but so far as wisdom and understanding are given
Reply to Objection 4. The directive gifts which per-
the preference to the others, their excellence is considered
tain to the reason are more excellent than the executive
simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are preferred
gifts, if we consider them in relation to their acts as pro-
to knowledge and piety, it is considered with regard to
ceeding from their powers, because reason transcends the
their matter.
appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. But on the
Reply to Objection 1. Fear is chiefly required as be-
part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the di-
ing the foundation, so to speak, of the perfection of the
rective power to the executive, and so is knowledge united
other gifts, for “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of
to piety: because counsel and fortitude are concerned with
wisdom” (Ps. 110:10; Ecclus. 1:16), and not as though
matters of difficulty, while knowledge and piety are con-
it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the
cerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel together
order of generation, man departs from evil on account of
with fortitude, by reason of their matter, are given the
fear (Prov. 16:16), before doing good works, and which
preference to knowledge and piety.
result from the other gifts.
Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts?
Ia IIae q. 68 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that the virtues are more
while it knows and yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest
excellent than the gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv,
piety, while it swerves from the right line, may become
18) while speaking of charity: “No gift of God is more
distorted; and lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may
excellent than this. It is this alone which divides the chil-
plunge us into the pit of despair.” Therefore the virtues
dren of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal
are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost,
On the contrary, The gifts are bestowed to assist the
but, without charity, they avail nothing.” But charity is a
virtues and to remedy certain defects, as is shown in the
virtue. Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts
passage quoted (obj. 2), so that, seemingly, they accom-
of the Holy Ghost.
plish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the gifts are more
Objection 2. Further, that which is first naturally,
excellent than the virtues.
seems to be more excellent. Now the virtues precede
I answer that, As was shown above (q. 58, a. 3; q. 62,
the gifts of the Holy Ghost; for Gregory says (Moral. ii,
a. 1), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are the-
26) that “the gift of the Holy Ghost in the mind it works
ological, some intellectual, and some moral. The theo-
on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude, temper-
logical virtues are those whereby man’s mind is united to
ance. . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven
God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason it-
virtues” [viz. the gifts], so “as against folly to bestow wis-
self is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which
dom; against dullness, understanding; against rashness,
perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason.
counsel; against fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowl-
On the other hand the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose all
edge; against hardness of heart, piety; against piety, fear.”
the powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine mo-
Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts.
tion.
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii,
Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the the-
19) that “the virtues cannot be used to evil purpose.” But
ological virtues, by which man is united to the Holy Ghost
it is possible to make evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says
his Mover, in the same way as the moral virtues are com-
(Moral. i, 18): “We offer up the sacrifice of prayer. . . lest
pared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason,
wisdom may uplift; or understanding, while it runs nim-
the moving principle of the moral virtues. Wherefore as
bly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it mul-
the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral
tiplies itself, grow into confusion; that fortitude, while it
virtues and control them, so the theological virtues are
gives confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge,
more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and reg-
911
ulate them. Hence Gregory says (Moral. i, 12) that “the and dignity, as love of God precedes love of our neighbor:
seven sons,” i.e. the seven gifts, “never attain the perfec-
and in this way the gifts precede the intellectual and moral
tion of the number ten, unless all they do be done in faith,
virtues, but follow the theological virtues. The other is
hope, and charity.”
the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one’s
But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intel-
neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: and in
lectual and moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the
this way moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts,
virtues. Because the gifts perfect the soul’s powers in re-
since man, through being well subordinate to his own rea-
lation to the Holy Ghost their Mover; whereas the virtues
son, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to God.
perfect, either the reason itself, or the other powers in re-
Reply to Objection 3. Wisdom and understanding
lation to reason: and it is evident that the more exalted
and the like are gifts of the Holy Ghost, according as they
the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the
are quickened by charity, which “dealeth not perversely”
thing moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts
(1 Cor. 13:4). Consequently wisdom and understanding
are more perfect than the virtues.
and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as
Reply to Objection 1. Charity is a theological virtue;
they are gifts of the Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from
and such we grant to be more perfect than the gifts.
the perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is
Reply to Objection 2. There are two ways in which
what Gregory means to say.
one thing precedes another. One is in order of perfection
912
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 69
Of the Beatitudes
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?
(2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?
(3) Of the number of the beatitudes;
(4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.
Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts?
Ia IIae q. 69 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the beatitudes do
the Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): “We are saved by hope.”
not differ from the virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De
Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably
Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns the beatitudes recited
moved towards that end, and approach thereto; and this
by Matthew (v 3, seqq.) to the gifts of the Holy Ghost;
implies some action. And a man is moved towards, and
and Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, seqq., as-
approaches the happy end by works of virtue, and above
cribes the beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal
all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal hap-
virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the
piness, for which our reason is not sufficient, since we
virtues and gifts.
need to be moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected
Objection 2. Further, there are but two rules of the hu-
with His gifts that we may obey and follow him. Conse-
man will: the reason and the eternal law, as stated above
quently the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts, not
(q. 19, a. 3; q. 21, a. 1). Now the virtues perfect man
as habit, but as act from habit.
in relation to reason; while the gifts perfect him in rela-
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine and Ambrose as-
tion to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost, as is clear from
sign the beatitudes to the gifts and virtues, as acts are as-
what has been said (q. 68, Aa. 1,3, seqq.). Therefore there
cribed to habits. But the gifts are more excellent than the
cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of the
cardinal virtues, as stated above (q. 68, a. 8). Wherefore
human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the
Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the
beatitudes do not differ from them.
throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas Au-
Objection 3. Further, among the beatitudes are in-
gustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the
cluded meekness, justice, and mercy, which are said to be
disciples on the mountain, and so to those who were more
virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the
perfect, ascribes them to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
virtues and gifts.
Reply to Objection 2. This argument proves that no
On the contrary, Certain things are included among
other habits, besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human
the beatitudes, that are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g.
conduct.
poverty, mourning, and peace. Therefore the beatitudes
Reply to Objection 3. Meekness is to be taken as de-
differ from the virtues and gifts.
noting the act of meekness: and the same applies to justice
I answer that, As stated above (q. 2, a. 7; q. 3, a. 1), and mercy. And though these might seem to be virtues,
happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said
they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts, because the gifts
to possess the end already, when one hopes to possess it;
perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues perfect him,
wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that “children
as stated above (q. 68, a. 2).
are said to be happy because they are full of hope”; and
Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life?
Ia IIae q. 69 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the rewards assigned
down in opposition to the beatitudes, Lk. 6:25, where we
to the beatitudes do not refer to this life. Because some are
read: “Woe to you that are filled; for you shall hunger.
said to be happy because they hope for a reward, as stated
Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn and
above (a. 1). Now the object of hope is future happiness.
weep.” Now these punishments do not refer to this life,
Therefore these rewards refer to the life to come.
because frequently men are not punished in this life, ac-
Objection 2.
Further, certain punishments are set
cording to Job 21:13: “They spend their days in wealth.”
913
Therefore neither do the rewards of the beatitudes refer to the virtues and gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive
this life.
at perfection, both as a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the
Objection 3. Further, the kingdom of heaven which
heavenly kingdom.
is set down as the reward of poverty is the happiness of
Reply to Objection 1. Hope regards future happiness
heaven, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix)∗. Again,
as the last end: yet it may also regard the assistance of
abundant fullness is not to be had save in the life to come,
grace as that which leads to that end, according to Ps.
according to Ps. 16:15: “I shall be filled [Douay: ‘satis-
27:7: “In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have been
fied’] when Thy glory shall appear.” Again, it is only in
helped.”
the future life that we shall see God, and that our Divine
Reply to Objection 2.
Although sometimes the
sonship will be made manifest, according to 1 Jn. 3:2:
wicked do not undergo temporal punishment in this life,
“We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared
yet they suffer spiritual punishment. Hence Augustine
what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear,
says (Confess. i): “Thou hast decreed, and it is so, Lord—
we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He
that the disordered mind should be its own punishment.”
is.” Therefore these rewards refer to the future life.
The Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4)
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
that “their soul is divided against itself. . . one part pulls
Monte i, 4): “These promises can be fulfilled in this life,
this way, another that”; and afterwards he concludes, say-
as we believe them to have been fulfilled in the apostles.
ing: “If wickedness makes a man so miserable, he should
For no words can express that complete change into the
strain every nerve to avoid vice.” In like manner, although,
likeness even of an angel, which is promised to us after
on the other hand, the good sometimes do not receive ma-
this life.”
terial rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual re-
I answer that, Expounders of Holy Writ are not
wards, even in this life, according to Mat. 19:29, and Mk.
agreed in speaking of these rewards. For some, with Am-
10:30: “Ye shall receive a hundred times as much” even
brose (Super Luc. v), hold that all these rewards refer to
“in this time.”
the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in
Reply to Objection 3. All these rewards will be fully
Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present life; and
consummated in the life to come: but meanwhile they are,
Chrysostom in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some
in a manner, begun, even in this life. Because the “king-
refer to the future, and some to the present life.
dom of heaven,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv)†, can
In order to make the matter clear we must take note
denote the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as “the
that hope of future happiness may be in us for two rea-
spirit” begins to reign in men. The “possession” of the
sons. First, by reason of our having a preparation for, or
land denotes the well-ordered affections of the soul that
a disposition to future happiness; and this is by way of
rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation of the eternal
merit; secondly, by a kind of imperfect inchoation of fu-
inheritance, signified by “the land.” They are “comforted”
ture happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one
in this life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is called
thing to hope that the tree will bear fruit, when the leaves
the “Paraclete,” i.e. the Comforter. They “have their fill,”
begin to appear, and another, when we see the first signs
even in this life, of that food of which Our Lord said (Jn.
of the fruit.
4:34): “My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me.”
Accordingly, those things which are set down as mer-
Again, in this life, men “obtain” God’s “Mercy.” Again,
its in the beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or dispo-
the eye being cleansed by the gift of understanding, we
sition to happiness, either perfect or inchoate: while those
can, so to speak, “see God.” Likewise, in this life, those
that are assigned as rewards, may be either perfect happi-
who are the “peacemakers” of their own movements, ap-
ness, so as to refer to the future life, or some beginning
proach to likeness to God, and are called “the children of
of happiness, such as is found in those who have attained
God.” Nevertheless these things will be more perfectly
perfection, in which case they refer to the present life. Be-
fulfilled in heaven.
cause when a man begins to make progress in the acts of
Whether the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?
Ia IIae q. 69 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the beatitudes are un-
contemplation, for all are assigned to matters connected
suitably enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to
with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes are insuffi-
the gifts, as stated above (a. 1, ad 1). Now some of the
ciently enumerated.
gifts, viz. wisdom and understanding, belong to the con-
Objection 2. Further, not only do the executive gifts
templative life: yet no beatitude is assigned to the act of
belong to the active life, but also some of the directive
∗ Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1
† Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte,
i, 1
914
gifts, e.g. knowledge and counsel: yet none of the beat-meek.” From following the concupiscible passions, man
itudes seems to be directly connected with the acts of
is withdrawn—by a virtue, so that man uses these pas-
knowledge or counsel. Therefore the beatitudes are in-
sions in moderation—and by gift, so that, if necessary, he
sufficiently indicated.
casts them aside altogether; nay more, so that, if need be,
Objection 3. Further, among the executive gifts con-
he makes a deliberate choice of sorrow†; hence the third
nected with the active life, fear is said to be connected
beatitude is: “Blessed are they that mourn.”
with poverty, while piety seems to correspond to the beat-
Active life consists chiefly in man’s relations with his
itude of mercy: yet nothing is included directly connected
neighbor, either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous
with justice. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently
gratuity. To the former we are disposed—by a virtue,
enumerated.
so that we do not refuse to do our duty to our neighbor,
Objection 4. Further, many other beatitudes are men-
which pertains to justice—and by a gift, so that we do the
tioned in Holy Writ.
Thus, it is written (Job 5:17):
same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of jus-
“Blessed is the man whom God correcteth”; and (Ps. i,
tice with an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty
1): “Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the coun-
man eats and drinks with eager appetite. Hence the fourth
sel of the ungodly”; and (Prov. 3:13): “Blessed is the man
beatitude is: “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst af-
that findeth wisdom.” Therefore the beatitudes are insuf-
ter justice.” With regard to spontaneous favors we are
ficiently enumerated.
perfected—by a virtue, so that we give where reason dic-
Objection 5. On the other hand, it seems that too
tates we should give, e.g. to our friends or others united
many are mentioned. For there are seven gifts of the Holy
to us; which pertains to the virtue of liberality–and by a
Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes are indicated.
gift, so that, through reverence for God, we consider only
Objection 6. Further, only four beatitudes are indi-
the needs of those on whom we bestow our gratuitous
cated in the sixth chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or
bounty: hence it is written (Lk. 14:12,13): “When thou
eight mentioned in Matthew 5 are too many.
makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, nor thy
I answer that, These beatitudes are most suitably enu-
brethren,” etc. . . “but. . . call the poor, the maimed,” etc.; merated. To make this evident it must be observed that
which, properly, is to have mercy: hence the fifth beati-
beatitude has been held to consist in one of three things:
tude is: “Blessed are the merciful.”
for some have ascribed it to a sensual life, some, to an ac-
Those things which concern the contemplative life, are
tive life, and some, to a contemplative life∗. Now these
either final beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof:
three kinds of happiness stand in different relations to
wherefore they are included in the beatitudes, not as mer-
future beatitude, by hoping for which we are said to be
its, but as rewards. Yet the effects of the active life, which
happy. Because sensual happiness, being false and con-
dispose man for the contemplative life, are included in the
trary to reason, is an obstacle to future beatitude; while
beatitudes. Now the effect of the active life, as regards
happiness of the active life is a disposition of future beat-
those virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in him-
itude; and contemplative happiness, if perfect, is the very
self, is the cleansing of man’s heart, so that it is not defiled essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is a begin-by the passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: “Blessed are
ning thereof.
the clean of heart.” But as regards the virtues and gifts
And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain
whereby man is perfected in relation to his neighbor, the
beatitudes as removing the obstacle of sensual happiness.
effect of the active life is peace, according to Is. 32:17:
For a life of pleasure consists of two things. First, in
“The work of justice shall be peace”: hence the seventh
the affluence of external goods, whether riches or honors;
beatitude is “Blessed are the peacemakers.”
from which man is withdrawn—by a virtue so that he uses
Reply to Objection 1. The acts of the gifts which
them in moderation—and by a gift, in a more excellent
belong to the active life are indicated in the merits: but
way, so that he despises them altogether. Hence the first
the acts of the gifts pertaining to the contemplative life
beatitude is: “Blessed are the poor in spirit,” which may
are indicated in the rewards, for the reason given above.
refer either to the contempt of riches, or to the contempt
Because to “see God” corresponds to the gift of under-
of honors, which results from humility. Secondly, the sen-
standing; and to be like God by being adoptive “children
sual life consists in following the bent of one’s passions,
of God,” corresponds to the gift of wisdom.
whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the
Reply to Objection 2. In things pertaining to the ac-
irascible passions man is withdrawn—by a virtue, so that
tive life, knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but
they are kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of
for the sake of operation, as even the Philosopher states
reason—and by a gift, in a more excellent manner, so that
(Ethic.
ii, 2).
And therefore, since beatitude implies
man, according to God’s will, is altogether undisturbed
something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include the acts
by them: hence the second beatitude is: “Blessed are the
of those gifts which direct man in the active life, such acts,
∗ See q. 3
† Cf. q. 35, a. 3
915
to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e.g. to counsel is when we read, “Blessed is the man whom the Lord cor-the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge:
recteth,” we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning:
but, on the other hand, they include those operative acts
when we read, “Blessed is the man that hath not walked
of which the gifts have the direction, as, e.g. mourning in
in the counsel of the ungodly,” we must refer it to clean-
respect of knowledge, and mercy in respect of counsel.
ness of heart: and when we read, “Blessed is the man that
Reply to Objection 3. In applying the beatitudes to
findeth wisdom,” this must be referred to the reward of the
the gifts we may consider two things. One is likeness of
seventh beatitude. The same applies to all others that can
matter. In this way all the first five beatitudes may be
be adduced.
assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their directing
Reply to Objection 5. The eighth beatitude is a con-
principles: whereas they must be distributed among the
firmation and declaration of all those that precede. Be-
executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for jus-
cause from the very fact that a man is confirmed in poverty
tice, and mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects
of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it follows that no per-
man in his relations to others; meekness to fortitude, for
secution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the
Ambrose says on Lk. 6:22: “It is the business of fortitude
eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preced-
to conquer anger, and to curb indignation,” fortitude being
ing seven.
about the irascible passions: poverty and mourning to the
Reply to Objection 6. Luke relates Our Lord’s ser-
gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and
mon as addressed to the multitude (Lk. 6:17). Hence he
pleasures of the world.
sets down the beatitudes according to the capacity of the
Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beati-
multitude, who know no other happiness than pleasure,
tudes: and, in this way, some of them will have to be as-
temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes
signed differently. Because the principal motive for meek-
Our Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to
ness is reverence for God, which belongs to piety. The
such happiness. The first of these is abundance of exter-
chief motive for mourning is knowledge, whereby man
nal goods, which he sets aside by saying: “Blessed are ye
knows his failings and those of worldly things, according
poor.” The second is that man be well off as to his body, in
to Eccles. 1:18: “He that addeth knowledge, addeth also
food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying in
sorrow [Vulg: labor].” The principal motive for hunger-
the second place: “Blessed are ye that hunger.” The third
ing after the works of justice is fortitude of the soul: and
is that it should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart,
the chief motive for being merciful is God’s counsel, ac-
and this he puts aside by saying: “Blessed are ye that weep
cording to Dan. 4:24: “Let my counsel be acceptable to
now.” The fourth is the outward favor of man; and this he
the king [Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins
excludes, saying, fourthly: “Blessed shall you be, when
with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the
men shall hate you.” And as Ambrose says on Lk. 6:20,
poor.” It is thus that Augustine assigns them (De Serm.
“poverty corresponds to temperance, which is unmoved
Dom. in Monte i, 4).
by delights; hunger, to justice, since who hungers is com-
Reply to Objection 4. All the beatitudes mentioned in
passionate and, through compassion gives; mourning, to
Holy Writ must be reduced to these, either as to the merits
prudence, which deplores perishable things; endurance of
or as to the rewards: because they must all belong either
men’s hatred belongs to fortitude.”
to the active or to the contemplative life. Accordingly,
Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?
Ia IIae q. 69 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the rewards of the
is less than to possess “the kingdom of heaven.” Therefore
beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. Because the king-
these rewards are unsuitably enumerated.
dom of heaven, which is eternal life, contains all good
On the contrary, stands the authority of Our Lord
things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of heaven, no
Who propounded these rewards.
other rewards should be mentioned.
I answer that, These rewards are most suitably as-
Objection 2. Further, the kingdom of heaven is as-
signed, considering the nature of the beatitudes in rela-
signed as the reward, both of the first and of the eighth
tion to the three kinds of happiness indicated above (a. 3).
beatitude. Therefore, on the same ground it should have
For the first three beatitudes concerned the withdrawal of
been assigned to all.
man from those things in which sensual happiness con-
Objection 3.
Further, the beatitudes are arranged
sists: which happiness man desires by seeking the object
in the ascending order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm.
of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in
Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas the rewards seem to be
God, but in temporal and perishable things. Wherefore the
placed in the descending order, since to “possess the land”
rewards of the first three beatitudes correspond to these
916
things which some men seek to find in earthly happiness.
to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a
For men seek in external things, viz. riches and honors, a
man to be a follower of God, Who is the God of unity and
certain excellence and abundance, both of which are im-
peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of
plied in the kingdom of heaven, whereby man attains to
the Divine sonship, consisting in perfect union with God
excellence and abundance of good things in God. Hence
through consummate wisdom.
Our Lord promised the kingdom of heaven to the poor in
Reply to Objection 1. As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv
spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by wrangling
in Matth.), all these rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal
and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain secu-
happiness, which the human intellect cannot grasp. Hence
rity for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek
it was necessary to describe it by means of various boons
a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the liv-
known to us, while observing due proportion to the merits
ing, whereby the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted.
to which those rewards are assigned.
Again, men seek consolation for the toils of the present
Reply to Objection 2. Just as the eighth beatitude is
life, in the lusts and pleasures of the world. Hence Our
a confirmation of all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the
Lord promises comfort to those that mourn.
rewards of the beatitudes. Hence it returns to the first, that
Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active
we may understand all the other rewards to be attributed to
happiness, which are the works of virtues directing man
it in consequence. Or else, according to Ambrose (Super
in his relations to his neighbor: from which operations
Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor
some men withdraw through inordinate love of their own
in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but to those who
good. Hence Our Lord assigns to these beatitudes rewards
suffer persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards
in correspondence with the motives for which men recede
the glory of the body.
from them. For there are some who recede from acts of
Reply to Objection 3. The rewards are also arranged
justice, and instead of rendering what is due, lay hands
in ascending order. For it is more to possess the land of the
on what is not theirs, that they may abound in temporal
heavenly kingdom than simply to have it: since we have
goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger
many things without possessing them firmly and peace-
after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some, again, refully. Again, it is more to be comforted in the kingdom
cede from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other
than to have and possess it, for there are many things the
people’s misery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful
possession of which is accompanied by sorrow. Again, it
that they should obtain mercy, and be delivered from all
is more to have one’s fill than simply to be comforted, be-
misery.
cause fulness implies abundance of comfort. And mercy
The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happi-
surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more than he
ness or beatitude: hence the rewards are assigned in corre-
merited or was able to desire. And yet more is it to see
spondence with the dispositions included in the merit. For
God, even as he is a greater man who not only dines at
cleanness of the eye disposes one to see clearly: hence the
court, but also sees the king’s countenance. Lastly, the
clean of heart are promised that they shall see God. Again,
highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king’s son.
917
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 70
Of the Fruits of the Holy Ghost
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts?
(2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes?
(3) Of their number?
(4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh.
Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost which the Apostle enumerates (Gal. 5) are acts?
Ia IIae q. 70 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the fruits of the Holy
If, however, by man’s fruit we understand a product of
Ghost, enumerated by the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23), are not
man, then human actions are called fruits: because oper-
acts. For that which bears fruit, should not itself be called
ation is the second act of the operator, and gives pleasure
a fruit, else we should go on indefinitely. But our actions
if it is suitable to him. If then man’s operation proceeds
bear fruit: for it is written (Wis. 3:15): “The fruit of good
from man in virtue of his reason, it is said to be the fruit
labor is glorious,” and (Jn. 4:36): “He that reapeth re-
of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a
ceiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting.”
higher power, which is the power of the Holy Ghost, then
Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits.
man’s operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as
Objection 2. Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x,
of a Divine seed, for it is written (1 Jn. 3:9): “Whosoever
10), “we enjoy∗ the things we know, when the will rests
is born of God, committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in
by rejoicing in them.” But our will should not rest in our
him.”
actions for their own sake. Therefore our actions should
Reply to Objection 1. Since fruit is something last
not be called fruits.
and final, nothing hinders one fruit bearing another fruit,
Objection 3. Further, among the fruits of the Holy
even as one end is subordinate to another. And so our
Ghost, the Apostle numbers certain virtues, viz. charity,
works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy Ghost
meekness, faith, and chastity. Now virtues are not actions
working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as they are re-
but habits, as stated above (q. 55, a. 1). Therefore the
ferred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather
fruits are not actions.
be called flowers: hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:23): “My
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 12:33): “By the
flowers are the fruits of honor and riches.”
fruit the tree is known”; that is to say, man is known by his
Reply to Objection 2. When the will is said to de-
works, as holy men explain the passage. Therefore human
light in a thing for its own sake, this may be understood
actions are called fruits.
in two ways. First, so that the expression “for the sake
I answer that, The word “fruit” has been transferred
of” be taken to designate the final cause; and in this way,
from the material to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among
man delights in nothing for its own sake, except the last
material things, is the product of a plant when it comes to
end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and
perfection, and has a certain sweetness. This fruit has a
in this way, a man may delight in anything that is delight-
twofold relation: to the tree that produces it, and to the
ful by reason of its form. Thus it is clear that a sick man
man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly,
delights in health, for its own sake, as in an end; in a nice
in spiritual matters, we may take the word “fruit” in two
medicine, not as in an end, but as in something tasty; and
ways: first, so that the fruit of man, who is likened to the
in a nasty medicine, nowise for its own sake, but only for
tree, is that which he produces; secondly, so that man’s
the sake of something else. Accordingly we must say that
fruit is what he gathers.
man must delight in God for His own sake, as being his
Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which
last end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but
is last and gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a
for the sake of their inherent goodness which is delight-
tree, and yet these are not called fruits; but that only which
ful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De Parad. xiii)
is last, to wit, that which man intends to derive from the
that virtuous deeds are called fruits because “they refresh
field and from the tree. In this sense man’s fruit is his last
those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight.”
end which is intended for his enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 3. Sometimes the names of the
∗ ‘Fruimur’, from which verb we have the Latin ‘fructus’ and the English ‘fruit’
918
virtues are applied to their actions: thus Augustine writes ment of the soul in loving God and our neighbor.” It is
(Tract. xl in Joan.): “Faith is to believe what thou seest
thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning
not”; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): “Charity is the move-
the fruits.
Whether the fruits differ from the beatitudes?
Ia IIae q. 70 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the fruits do not dif-
from the beatitudes.
fer from the beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to
I answer that, More is required for a beatitude than
the gifts, as stated above (q. 69, a. 1, ad 1). But the gifts
for a fruit. Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be some-
perfect man in so far as he is moved by the Holy Ghost.
thing ultimate and delightful; whereas for a beatitude, it
Therefore the beatitudes themselves are fruits of the Holy
must be something perfect and excellent. Hence all the
Ghost.
beatitudes may be called fruits, but not vice versa. For
Objection 2. Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights:
future beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are
whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, and
the fruits of the present life to the beatitudes of the present which, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to the
life, which are based on hope. Now the fruit of eternal life
gifts rather than to the virtues, as already stated (q. 69,
is identified with future beatitude. Therefore the fruits of
a. 1, ad 1).
the present life are the beatitudes.
Reply to Objection 1. This argument proves the beat-
Objection 3. Further, fruit is essentially something
itudes to be fruits, but not that all the fruits are beatitudes.
ultimate and delightful. Now this is the very nature of
Reply to Objection 2. The fruit of eternal life is ulti-
beatitude, as stated above (q. 3, a. 1; q. 4, a. 1). Therefore
mate and perfect simply: hence it nowise differs from fu-
fruit and beatitude have the same nature, and consequently
ture beatitude. On the other hand the fruits of the present
should not be distinguished from one another.
life are not simply ultimate and perfect; wherefore not all
On the contrary, Things divided into different
the fruits are beatitudes.
species, differ from one another. But fruits and beatitudes
Reply to Objection 3. More is required for a beati-
are divided into different parts, as is clear from the way
tude than for a fruit, as stated.
in which they are enumerated. Therefore the fruits differ
Whether the fruits are suitably enumerated by the Apostle?
Ia IIae q. 70 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the fruits are un-
fruits; yet not all are mentioned here. Nor is there any-
suitably enumerated by the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23). Be-
thing corresponding to the acts of wisdom, and of many
cause, elsewhere, he says that there is only one fruit of
other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are insuf-
the present life; according to Rom.
6:22: “You have
ficiently enumerated.
your fruit unto sanctification.”
Moreover it is written
I answer that, The number of the twelve fruits enu-
(Is. 27:9): “This is all the fruit. . . that the sin. . . be taken merated by the Apostle is suitable, and that there may be
away.” Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits.
a reference to them in the twelve fruits of which it is writ-
Objection 2. Further, fruit is the product of spiri-
ten (Apoc. 22:2): “On both sides of the river was the tree
tual seed, as stated (a. 1 ). But Our Lord mentions (Mat.
bearing twelve fruits.” Since, however, a fruit is some-
13:23) a threefold fruit as growing from a spiritual seed in
thing that proceeds from a source as from a seed or root,
a good ground, viz. “hundredfold, sixtyfold,” and “thirty-
the difference between these fruits must be gathered from
fold.” Therefore one should not reckon twelve fruits.
the various ways in which the Holy Ghost proceeds in us:
Objection 3. Further, the very nature of fruit is to be
which process consists in this, that the mind of man is set
something ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply
in order, first of all, in regard to itself; secondly, in regard to all the fruits mentioned by the Apostle: for patience and
to things that are near it; thirdly, in regard to things that
long-suffering seem to imply a painful object, while faith
are below it.
is not something ultimate, but rather something primary
Accordingly man’s mind is well disposed in regard to
and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are enumer-
itself when it has a good disposition towards good things
ated.
and towards evil things. Now the first disposition of the
Objection 4. On the other hand, It seems that they
human mind towards the good is effected by love, which
are enumerated insufficiently and incompletely. For it has
is the first of our emotions and the root of them all, as
been stated (a. 2) that all the beatitudes may be called
stated above (q. 27, a. 4). Wherefore among the fruits of
919
the Holy Ghost, we reckon “charity,” wherein the Holy Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below
Ghost is given in a special manner, as in His own like-
him, as regards external action, by “modesty,” whereby
ness, since He Himself is love. Hence it is written (Rom.
we observe the “mode” in all our words and deeds: as
5:5): “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts
regards internal desires, by “contingency” and “chastity”:
by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us.” The necessary
whether these two differ because chastity withdraws man
result of the love of charity is joy: because every lover re-
from unlawful desires, contingency also from lawful de-
joices at being united to the beloved. Now charity has
sires: or because the continent man is subject to concu-
always actual presence in God Whom it loves, accord-
piscence, but is not led away; whereas the chaste man is
ing to 1 Jn. 4:16: “He that abideth in charity, abideth in
neither subject to, nor led away from them.
God, and God in Him”: wherefore the sequel of charity is
Reply to Objection 1. Sanctification is effected by
“joy.” Now the perfection of joy is peace in two respects.
all the virtues, by which also sins are taken away. Conse-
First, as regards freedom from outward disturbance; for
quently fruit is mentioned there in the singular, on account
it is impossible to rejoice perfectly in the beloved good,
of its being generically one, though divided into many
if one is disturbed in the enjoyment thereof; and again,
species which are spoken of as so many fruits.
if a man’s heart is perfectly set at peace in one object,
Reply to Objection 2. The hundredfold, sixtyfold,
he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he accounts
and thirtyfold fruits do not differ as various species of vir-
all others as nothing; hence it is written (Ps. 118:165):
tuous acts, but as various degrees of perfection, even in
“Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them
the same virtue. Thus contingency of the married state is
there is no stumbling-block,” because, to wit, external
said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit; the contingency
things do not disturb them in their enjoyment of God.
of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal contingency,
Secondly, as regards the calm of the restless desire: for
by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other ways
he does not perfectly rejoice, who is not satisfied with the
in which holy men distinguish three evangelical fruits ac-
object of his joy. Now peace implies these two things,
cording to the three degrees of virtue: and they speak of
namely, that we be not disturbed by external things, and
three degrees, because the perfection of anything is con-
that our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore
sidered with respect to its beginning, its middle, and its
after charity and joy, “peace” is given the third place. In
end.
evil things the mind has a good disposition, in respect of
Reply to Objection 3. The fact of not being disturbed
two things. First, by not being disturbed whenever evil
by painful things is something to delight in. And as to
threatens: which pertains to “patience”; secondly, by not
faith, if we consider it as the foundation, it has the aspect
being disturbed, whenever good things are delayed; which
of being ultimate and delightful, in as much as it contains
belongs to “long suffering,” since “to lack good is a kind
certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: “Faith, which is
of evil” (Ethic. v, 3).
certainly about the unseen.”
Man’s mind is well disposed as regards what is near
Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine says on Gal.
him, viz. his neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and
5:22,23, “the Apostle had no intention of teaching us how
to this belongs “goodness.” Secondly, as to the execution
many [either works of the flesh, or fruits of the Spirit]
of well-doing; and to this belongs “benignity,” for the be-
there are; but to show how the former should be avoided,
nign are those in whom the salutary flame [bonus ignis]
and the latter sought after.” Hence either more or fewer
of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to their neigh-
fruits might have been mentioned. Nevertheless, all the
bor. Thirdly, as to his suffering with equanimity the evils
acts of the gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by
his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs “meekness,”
a certain kind of fittingness, in so far as all the virtues
which curbs anger. Fourthly, in the point of our refraining
and gifts must needs direct the mind in one of the above-
from doing harm to our neighbor not only through anger,
mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of wisdom and of
but also through fraud or deceit. To this pertains “faith,” if
any gifts directing to good, are reduced to charity, joy and
we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we take it for the faith peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than oth-whereby we believe in God, then man is directed thereby
ers, is that these imply either enjoyment of good things,
to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect
or relief from evils, which things seem to belong to the
and, consequently, all that is his, to God.
notion of fruit.
920
Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the flesh?
Ia IIae q. 70 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the fruits of the Holy
nature. And in this they are not of necessity contrary each
Ghost are not contrary to the works of the flesh, which
to each: because, as stated above (a. 3, ad 4), the Apostle
the Apostle enumerates (Gal. 5:19, seqq.). Because con-
did not intend to enumerate all the works, whether spir-
traries are in the same genus. But the works of the flesh
itual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation, Au-
are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are
gustine, commenting on Gal. 5:22,23, contrasts the fruits
not contrary to them.
with the carnal works, each to each. Thus “to fornication,
Objection 2. Further, one thing has a contrary. Now
which is the love of satisfying lust outside lawful wed-
the Apostle mentions more works of the flesh than fruits
lock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul is wed-
of the Spirit. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit and the
ded to God: wherein also is true chastity. By uncleanness
works of the flesh are not contrary to one another.
we must understand whatever disturbances arise from for-
Objection 3. Further, among the fruits of the Spirit,
nication: and to these the joy of tranquillity is opposed.
the first place is given to charity, joy, and peace: to which,
Idolatry, by reason of which war was waged against the
fornication, uncleanness, and immodesty, which are the
Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against witchcrafts,
first of the works of the flesh are not opposed. Therefore
enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels,
the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary to the works of the
there is longsuffering, which helps us to bear the evils
flesh.
inflicted on us by those among whom we dwell; while
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 5:17) that
kindness helps us to cure those evils; and goodness, to
“the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against
forgive them. In contrast to heresy there is faith; to envy,
the flesh.”
mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, contingency.”
I answer that, The works of the flesh and the fruits
Reply to Objection 1. That which proceeds from a
of the Spirit may be taken in two ways. First, in general:
tree against the tree’s nature, is not called its fruit, but
and in this way the fruits of the Holy Ghost considered
rather its corruption. And since works of virtue are con-
in general are contrary to the works of the flesh. Because
natural to reason, while works of vice are contrary to na-
the Holy Ghost moves the human mind to that which is in
ture, therefore it is that works of virtue are called fruits,
accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses rea-
but not so works of vice.
son: whereas the fleshly, viz. the sensitive, appetite draws
Reply to Objection 2. “Good happens in one way,
man to sensible goods which are beneath him. Wherefore,
evil in all manner of ways,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
since upward and downward are contrary movements in
iv): so that to one virtue many vices are contrary. Conse-
the physical order, so in human actions the works of the
quently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh
flesh are contrary to the fruits of the Spirit.
are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit.
Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what
may be considered singly, each according to its specific
has been said.
921
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 71
Of Vice and Sin Considered in Themselves
(In Six Articles)
We have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered in themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; (6) the effect of sin.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue?
(2) Whether vice is contrary to nature?
(3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act?
(4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue?
(5) Whether every sin includes action?
(6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii): “Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law.”
Whether vice is contrary to virtue?
Ia IIae q. 71 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that vice is not contrary
respect of that to which virtue is ordained: since, properly
to virtue. For one thing has one contrary, as proved in
speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act; even as an act of
Metaph. x, text. 17. Now sin and malice are contrary
virtue is an ordinate and due act: in respect of that which
to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it: since vice
virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of good-
applies also to undue disposition of bodily members or of
ness, the contrary of virtue is “malice”: while in respect
any things whatever.
of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its
Objection 2. Further, virtue denotes a certain perfec-
contrary is “vice”: because the vice of a thing seems to
tion of power. But vice does not denote anything relative
consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its na-
to power. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.
ture: hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): “Whatever
Objection 3. Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv)
is lacking for a thing’s natural perfection may be called a
says that “virtue is the soul’s health.” Now sickness or
vice.”
disease, rather than vice, is opposed to health. Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. These three things are contrary
vice is not contrary to virtue.
to virtue, but not in the same respect: for sin is opposed
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit.
to virtue, according as the latter is productive of a good
ii) that “vice is a quality in respect of which the soul is
work; malice, according as virtue is a kind of goodness;
evil.” But “virtue is a quality which makes its subject
while vice is opposed to virtue properly as such.
good,” as was shown above (q. 55, Aa. 3,4). Therefore
Reply to Objection 2. Virtue implies not only per-
vice is contrary to virtue.
fection of power, the principle of action; but also the due
I answer that, Two things may be considered in
disposition of its subject. The reason for this is because
virtue—the essence of virtue, and that to which virtue
a thing operates according as it is in act: so that a thing
is ordained. In the essence of virtue we may consider
needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a good work.
something directly, and we may consider something con-
It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue.
sequently. Virtue implies “directly” a disposition whereby
Reply to Objection 3. As Cicero says (De Quaest.
the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its
Tusc. iv), “disease and sickness are vicious qualities,” for
nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text.
in speaking of the body “he calls it” disease “when the
17) that “virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that
whole body is infected,” for instance, with fever or the
which is best; and by perfect I mean that which is dis-
like; he calls it sickness “when the disease is attended
posed according to its nature.” That which virtue implies
with weakness”; and vice “when the parts of the body
“consequently” is that it is a kind of goodness: because
are not well compacted together.” And although at times
the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed
there may be disease in the body without sickness, for in-
according to the mode of its nature. That to which virtue
stance, when a man has a hidden complaint without being
is directed is a good act, as was shown above (q. 56, a. 3).
hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; “yet,
Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to
in the soul,” as he says, “these two things are indistin-
virtue. One of these is “sin,” which is opposed to virtue in
guishable, except in thought.” For whenever a man is ill-
922
disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, he when a man sins from weakness or passion. Consequently
is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since “a
vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even as
tree is known by its fruit,” i.e. man by his works, accord-
virtue extends to more things than health; for health it-
ing to Mat. 12:33. But “vice of the soul,” as Cicero says
self is reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17).
(De Quaest. Tusc. iv), “is a habit or affection of the soul
Consequently vice is reckoned as contrary to virtue, more
discordant and inconsistent with itself through life”: and
fittingly than sickness or disease.
this is to be found even without disease and sickness, e.g.
Whether vice is contrary to nature?
Ia IIae q. 71 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that vice is not contrary to
be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against rea-
nature. Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above
son,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore hu-
(a. 1). Now virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or
man virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good,
habituation, as stated above (q. 63, Aa. 1 ,2,3). Therefore
is in accord with man’s nature, for as much as it accords
vice is not contrary to nature.
with his reason: while vice is contrary to man’s nature, in
Objection 2. Further, it is impossible to become ha-
so far as it is contrary to the order of reason.
bituated to that which is contrary to nature: thus “a stone
Reply to Objection 1. Although the virtues are not
never becomes habituated to upward movement” (Ethic.
caused by nature as regards their perfection of being, yet
ii, 1). But some men become habituated to vice. There-
they incline us to that which accords with reason, i.e. with
fore vice is not contrary to nature.
the order of reason. For Cicero says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that
Objection 3. Further, anything contrary to a nature, is
“virtue is a habit in accord with reason, like a second na-
not found in the greater number of individuals possessed
ture”: and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in
of that nature. Now vice is found in the greater number
accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is con-
of men; for it is written (Mat. 7:13): “Broad is the way
trary to nature.
that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in
Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher is speaking
thereat.” Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
there of a thing being against nature, in so far as “being
Objection 4. Further, sin is compared to vice, as act
against nature” is contrary to “being from nature”: and not
to habit, as stated above (a. 1). Now sin is defined as “a
in so far as “being against nature” is contrary to “being in
word, deed, or desire, contrary to the Law of God,” as
accord with nature,” in which latter sense virtues are said
Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). But the Law of
to be in accord with nature, in as much as they incline us
God is above nature. Therefore we should say that vice is
to that which is suitable to nature.
contrary to the Law, rather than to nature.
Reply to Objection 3. There is a twofold nature in
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii,
man, rational nature, and the sensitive nature. And since
13): “Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary
it is through the operation of his senses that man accom-
to nature.”
plishes acts of reason, hence there are more who follow
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), vice is contrary
the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than who follow
to virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being
the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of
well disposed in a manner befitting its nature, as stated
a business than achieve its completion. Now the presence
above (a. 1). Hence the vice of any thing consists in its
of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows
being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and
the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of
for this reason is that thing “vituperated,” which word is
his reason.
derived from “vice” according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb.
Reply to Objection 4. Whatever is irregular in a work
iii, 14).
of art, is unnatural to the art which produced that work.
But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is
Now the eternal law is compared to the order of human
chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species.
reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to the
Now man derives his species from his rational soul: and
same that vice and sin are against the order of human rea-
consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason
son, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence
is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man, as
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that “every nature, as
man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord
such, is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it
with the nature of man, as man. Now “man’s good is to
fails from the Divine art whereby it was made.”
923
Whether vice is worse than a vicious act?
Ia IIae q. 71 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit,
save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore
is worse than a sin, i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting
a habit is called good or bad by reason of the goodness
a good is, the better it is, so the longer an evil lasts, the
or badness of its act: so that an act surpasses its habit in
worse it is. Now a vicious habit is more lasting than vi-
goodness or badness, since “the cause of a thing being
cious acts, that pass forthwith. Therefore a vicious habit
such, is yet more so.”
is worse than a vicious act.
Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders one thing
Objection 2. Further, several evils are more to be
from standing above another simply, and below it in some
shunned than one. But a bad habit is virtually the cause of
respect. Now a thing is deemed above another simply if
many bad acts. Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a
it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both; while it
vicious act.
is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses it in
Objection 3. Further, a cause is more potent than its
something which is accidental to both. Now it has been
effect. But a habit produces its actions both as to their
shown from the very nature of act and habit, that act sur-
goodness and as to their badness. Therefore a habit is
passes habit both in goodness and in badness. Whereas
more potent than its act, both in goodness and in badness.
the fact that habit is more lasting than act, is accidental to
On the contrary, A man is justly punished for a vi-
them, and is due to the fact that they are both found in a
cious act; but not for a vicious habit, so long as no act
nature such that it cannot always be in action, and whose
ensues. Therefore a vicious action is worse than a vicious
action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act
habit.
simply excels in goodness and badness, but habit excels in
I answer that, A habit stands midway between power
a certain respect.
and act. Now it is evident that both in good and in evil, act
Reply to Objection 2. A habit is several acts, not
precedes power, as stated in Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better
simply, but in a certain respect, i.e. virtually. Wherefore
to do well than to be able to do well, and in like manner,
this does not prove that habit precedes act simply, both in
it is more blameworthy to do evil, than to be able to do
goodness and in badness.
evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in
Reply to Objection 3. Habit causes act by way of
badness, habit stands midway between power and act, so
efficient causality: but act causes habit, by way of final
that, to wit, even as a good or evil habit stands above the
causality, in respect of which we consider the nature of
corresponding power in goodness or in badness, so does
good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit both in
it stand below the corresponding act. This is also made
goodness and in badness.
clear from the fact that a habit is not called good or bad,
Whether sin is compatible with virtue?
Ia IIae q. 71 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that a vicious act, i.e.
causes.” Now one virtuous act does not cause a virtue, as
sin, is incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be
stated above (q. 51, a. 3): and, consequently, one sinful act
together in the same subject. Now sin is, in some way,
does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they can be together in
contrary to virtue, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore sin is
the same subject.
incompatible with virtue.
I answer that, Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act
Objection 2. Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil
to good habit. Now the position of a habit in the soul is
act than evil habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject
not the same as that of a form in a natural thing. For the
with virtue: neither, therefore, can sin.
form of a natural thing produces, of necessity, an opera-
Objection 3. Further, sin occurs in natural things,
tion befitting itself; wherefore a natural form is incompat-
even as in voluntary matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now
ible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompat-
sin never happens in natural things, except through some
ible with the act of cooling, and lightness with downward
corruption of the natural power; thus monsters are due to
movement (except perhaps violence be used by some ex-
corruption of some elemental force in the seed, as stated
trinsic mover): whereas the habit that resides in the soul,
in Phys. ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary matters,
does not, of necessity, produce its operation, but is used
except through the corruption of some virtue in the soul:
by man when he wills. Consequently man, while possess-
so that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same sub-
ing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a
ject.
contrary act; and so a man having a virtue may produce
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii,
an act of sin. And this sinful act, so long as there is but
2,3) that “virtue is engendered and corrupted by contrary
one, cannot corrupt virtue, if we compare the act to the
924
virtue itself as a habit: since, just as habit is not engen-Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the in-
dered by one act, so neither is it destroyed by one act as
fused virtues, but is consistent with acquired virtue: while
stated above (q. 63, a. 2, ad 2). But if we compare the
venial sin is compatible with virtues, whether infused or
sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for acquired.
some virtues to be destroyed by one sinful act. For every
Reply to Objection 1. Sin is contrary to virtue, not
mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all
by reason of itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is
the infused virtues, as virtues; and consequently, charity
incompatible with the act, but not with the habit, of virtue.
being banished by one act of mortal sin, it follows that all
Reply to Objection 2. Vice is directly contrary to
the infused virtues are expelled “as virtues.” And I say on
virtue, even as sin to virtuous act: and so vice excludes
account of faith and hope, whose habits remain unquick-
virtue, just as sin excludes acts of virtue.
ened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues.
Reply to Objection 3. The natural powers act of ne-
On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary to
cessity, and hence so long as the power is unimpaired, no
charity, nor banishes it, as a consequence, neither does it
sin can be found in the act. On the other hand, the virtues
expel the other virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they
of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity; hence
are not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin.
the comparison fails.
Whether every sin includes an action?
Ia IIae q. 71 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that every sin includes an
of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin
action. For as merit is compared with virtue, even so is
of omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the
sin compared with vice. Now there can be no merit with-
mere fact of not doing what one is bound to do is a sin.
out an action. Neither, therefore, can there be sin without
Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For
action.
if in the sin of omission we look merely at that in which
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb.
the essence of the sin consists, the sin of omission will be
iii, 18)∗: So “true is it that every sin is voluntary, that, un-sometimes with an interior act, as when a man wills “not
less it be voluntary, it is no sin at all.” Now nothing can
to go to church”: while sometimes it will be without any
be voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore
act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at
every sin implies an act.
the time that he is bound to go to church, does not think
Objection 3. Further, if sin could be without act, it
of going or not going to church.
would follow that a man sins as soon as he ceases doing
If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also
what he ought. Now he who never does something that
the causes, or occasions of the omission, then the sin of
he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he ought.
omission must of necessity include some act. For there is
Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and
no sin of omission, unless we omit what we can do or not
this is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act.
do: and that we turn aside so as not to do what we can do
On the contrary, It is written (James 4:17): “To
or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion,
him. . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him
either united with the omission or preceding it. Now if
it is a sin.” Now “not to do” does not imply an act. There-
this cause be not in man’s power, the omission will not be
fore sin can be without act.
sinful, as when anyone omits going to church on account
I answer that, The reason for urging this question has
of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be subject to the
reference to the sin of omission, about which there have
will, the omission is sinful; and such cause, in so far as it
been various opinions. For some say that in every sin of
is voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least
omission there is some act, either interior or exterior—
the interior act of the will: which act sometimes bears di-
interior, as when a man wills “not to go to church,” when
rectly on the omission, as when a man wills “not to go to
he is bound to go—exterior, as when a man, at the very
church,” because it is too much trouble; and in this case
hour that he is bound to go to church (or even before),
this act, of its very nature, belongs to the omission, be-
occupies himself in such a way that he is hindered from
cause the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of itself,
going. This seems, in a way, to amount to the same as
to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin. Some-
the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompati-
times, however, the act of the will bears directly on some-
ble with this other, wills, consequently, to go without this
thing else which hinders man from doing what he ought,
other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him, that
whether this something else be united with the omission,
what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that which he
as when a man wills to play at the time he ought to go
is bound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty
to church—or, precede the omission, as when a man wills
∗ Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.
925
to sit up late at night, the result being that he does not go as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that sin may arise
to church in the morning. In this case the act, interior or
from a man doing what he ought not, or by his not doing
exterior, is accidental to the omission, since the omission
what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man
follows outside the intention, and that which is outside the
do willingly what he ought to do: wherefore there can be
intention is said to be accidental (Phys. ii, text. 49,50).
no merit without act, whereas there can be sin without act.
Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission has
Reply to Objection 2. The term “voluntary” is ap-
indeed an act united with, or preceding the omission, but
plied not only to that on which the act of the will is
that this act is accidental to the sin of omission.
brought to bear, but also to that which we have the power
Now in judging about things, we must be guided by
to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence even
that which is proper to them, and not by that which is ac-
not to will may be called voluntary, in so far as man has it
cidental: and consequently it is truer to say that a sin can
in his power to will, and not to will.
be without any act; else the circumstantial acts and occa-
Reply to Objection 3. The sin of omission is contrary
sions would be essential to other actual sins.
to an affirmative precept which binds always, but not for
Reply to Objection 1. More things are required for
always. Hence, by omitting to act, a man sins only for the
good than for evil, since “good results from a whole and
time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act.
entire cause, whereas evil results from each single defect,”
Whether sin is fittingly defined as a word, deed, or desire contrary to the eternal law?
Ia IIae q. 71 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that sin is unfittingly de-
On the contrary, the authority of Augustine suffices
fined by saying: “Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary
(Contra Faust. xxii, 27).
to the eternal law.” Because “Word,” “deed,” and “de-
I answer that, As was shown above (a. 1), sin is noth-
sire” imply an act; whereas not every sin implies an act,
ing else than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human
as stated above (a. 5). Therefore this definition does not
act is due to its being voluntary, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1), include every sin.
whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g.
Objection 2.
Further, Augustine says (De Duab.
to will or to choose, or as being commanded by the will,
Anim. xii): “Sin is the will to retain or obtain what jus-
e.g. the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a
tice forbids.” Now will is comprised under desire, in so
human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due
far as desire denotes any act of the appetite. Therefore it
measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends
was enough to say: “Sin is a desire contrary to the eternal
on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommen-
law,” nor was there need to add “word” or “deed.”
surate. Now there are two rules of the human will: one
Objection 3. Further, sin apparently consists properly
is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason;
in aversion from the end: because good and evil are mea-
the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is
sured chiefly with regard to the end as explained above
God’s reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine (Con-
(q. 1, a. 3; q. 18, Aa. 4,6; q. 20, Aa. 2,3): wherefore Au-
tra Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the definition
gustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference to the end,
of sin; one, pertaining to the substance of a human act,
by saying that “sin is nothing else than to neglect eternal
and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says
things, and seek after temporal things”: and again he says
“word,” “deed,” or “desire”; the other, pertaining to the
(Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that “all human wickedness consists
nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin,
in using what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we
when he says, “contrary to the eternal law.”
should use.” Now the definition is question contains no
Reply to Objection 1. Affirmation and negation are
mention of aversion from our due end: therefore it is an
reduced to one same genus: e.g. in Divine things, begot-
insufficient definition of sin.
ten and unbegotten are reduced to the genus “relation,” as
Objection 4. Further, a thing is said to be forbidden,
Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6,7): and so “word” and
because it is contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil
“deed” denote equally what is said and what is not said,
through being forbidden, but some are forbidden because
what is done and what is not done.
they are evil. Therefore sin in general should not be de-
Reply to Objection 2. The first cause of sin is in the
fined as being against the law of God.
will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which alone
Objection 5. Further, a sin denotes a bad human act,
is sin to be found: and hence it is that Augustine some-
as was explained above (a. 1). Now man’s evil is to be
times defines sin in reference to the will alone. But since
against reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). There-
external acts also pertain to the substance of sin, through
fore it would have been better to say that sin is against
being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in
reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law.
defining sin to include something referring to external ac-
926
tion.
code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through
Reply to Objection 3. The eternal law first and fore-
being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural law, pre-
most directs man to his end, and in consequence, makes
cisely because it is inordinate.
man to be well disposed in regard to things which are di-
Reply to Objection 5. The theologian considers sin
rected to the end: hence when he says, “contrary to the
chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philoso-
eternal law,” he includes aversion from the end and all
pher, as something contrary to reason. Hence Augustine
other forms of inordinateness.
defines sin with reference to its being “contrary to the eter-
Reply to Objection 4. When it is said that not every
nal law,” more fittingly than with reference to its being
sin is evil through being forbidden, this must be under-
contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs
stood of prohibition by positive law. If, however, the pro-
us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. in mat-
hibition be referred to the natural law, which is contained
ters of faith.
primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily in the natural
927
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 72
Of the Distinction of Sins
(In Nine Articles)
We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects?
(2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins;
(3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes?
(4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against?
(5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment?
(6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission?
(7) Whether they differ according to their various stages?
(8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency?
(9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?
Whether sins differ in species according to their objects?
Ia IIae q. 72 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that sins do not differ in
is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for
species, according to their objects. For acts are said to be
“no one acts intending evil,” as Dionysius declares (Div.
good or evil, in relation, chiefly, to their end, as shown
Nom. iv). Now it is evident that a thing derives its species
above (q. 1, a. 3; q. 18, Aa. 4,6). Since then sin is nothing
from that which is essential and not from that which is
else than a bad human act, as stated above (q. 71, a. 1),
accidental: because what is accidental is outside the spe-
it seems that sins should differ specifically according to
cific nature. Consequently sins differ specifically on the
their ends rather than according to their objects.
part of the voluntary acts rather than of the inordinateness
Objection 2. Further, evil, being a privation, differs
inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species ac-
specifically according to the different species of oppo-
cording to their objects, as was proved above (q. 18, a. 2).
sites. Now sin is an evil in the genus of human acts.
Therefore it follows that sins are properly distinguished in
Therefore sins differ specifically according to their oppo-
species by their objects.
sites rather than according to their objects.
Reply to Objection 1. The aspect of good is found
Objection 3. Further, if sins differed specifically ac-
chiefly in the end: and therefore the end stands in the re-
cording to their objects, it would be impossible to find the
lation of object to the act of the will which is at the root of same specific sin with diverse objects: and yet such sins
every sin. Consequently it amounts to the same whether
are to be found. For pride is about things spiritual and
sins differ by their objects or by their ends.
material as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 18); and avarice
Reply to Objection 2. Sin is not a pure privation but
is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not
an act deprived of its due order: hence sins differ specifi-
differ in species according to their objects.
cally according to their objects of their acts rather than ac-
On the contrary, “Sin is a word, deed, or desire
cording to their opposites, although, even if they were dis-
against God’s law.” Now words, deeds, and desires dif-
tinguished in reference to their opposite virtues, it would
fer in species according to their various objects: since acts
come to the same: since virtues differ specifically accord-
differ by their objects, as stated above (q. 18, a. 2 ). There-
ing to their objects, as stated above (q. 60, a. 5).
fore sins, also differ in species according to their objects.
Reply to Objection 3. In various things, differing in
I answer that, As stated above (q. 71, a. 6), two things species or genus, nothing hinders our finding one formal
concur in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its
aspect of the object, from which aspect sin receives its
inordinateness, which consists in departing from God’s
species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence in reference
law. Of these two, one is referred essentially to the sin-
to various things; and avarice seeks abundance of things
ner, who intends such and such an act in such and such
adapted to human use.
matter; while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the act,
928
Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins?
Ia IIae q. 72 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that spiritual sins are un-
pleasure is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and is con-
fittingly distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle
summated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed
says (Gal. 5:19): “The works of the flesh are manifest,
in accordance with desire; this can also be called spiritual
which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury,
pleasure, e.g. when one takes pleasure in human praise
idolatry, witchcrafts,” etc. from which it seems that all
or the like. The other pleasure is bodily or natural, and is
kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are
realized in bodily touch, and this can also be called carnal
called works of the flesh. Therefore carnal sins should not
pleasure.
be distinguished from spiritual sins.
Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual plea-
Objection 2. Further, whosoever sins, walks accord-
sure, are called spiritual sins; while those which consist in
ing to the flesh, as stated in Rom. 8:13: “If you live ac-
carnal pleasure, are called carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which
cording to the flesh, you shall die. But if by the spirit you
consists in the pleasures of the table; and lust, which con-
mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live.” Now to
sists in sexual pleasures. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor.
live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to the
7:1): “Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the
nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not be
flesh and of the spirit.”
distinguished from spiritual sins.
Reply to Objection 1. As a gloss says on the same
Objection 3.
Further, the higher part of the soul,
passage, these vices are called works of the flesh, not as
which is the mind or reason, is called the spirit, accord-
though they consisted in carnal pleasure; but flesh here de-
ing to Eph. 4:23: “Be renewed in the spirit of your mind,”
notes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when
where spirit stands for reason, according to a gloss. Now
he lives according to himself, as Augustine says (De Civ.
every sin, which is committed in accordance with the
Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in
flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent
the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense.
in a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as we shall
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
state further on (q. 74, a. 7). Therefore the same sins are
Reply to Objection 3. Even in the carnal sins there is
both carnal and spiritual, and consequently they should
a spiritual act, viz. the act of reason: but the end of these
not be distinguished from one another.
sins, from which they are named, is carnal pleasure.
Objection 4. Further, if some sins are carnal specif-
Reply to Objection 4. As the gloss says, “in the sin of
ically, this, seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins
fornication the soul is the body’s slave in a special sense,
whereby man sins against his own body. But, according
because at the moment of sinning it can think of nothing
to the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), “every sin that a man doth, is
else”: whereas the pleasure of gluttony, although carnal,
without the body: but he that committeth fornication, sin-
does not so utterly absorb the reason. It may also be said
neth against his own body.” Therefore fornication would
that in this sin, an injury is done to the body also, for it
be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle (Eph. 5:3)
is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin alone is man
reckons covetousness with the carnal sins.
said specifically to sin against his body. While covetous-
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that
ness, which is reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here
“of the seven capital sins five are spiritual, and two car-
for adultery, which is the unjust appropriation of another’s
nal.”
wife. Again, it may be said that the thing in which the cov-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), sins take their
etous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and in this
species from their objects. Now every sin consists in the
respect covetousness is numbered with the carnal sins: but
desire for some mutable good, for which man has an in-
the pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the
ordinate desire, and the possession of which gives him
spirit, wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it is
inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained above (q. 31, a. 3),
a spiritual sin.
Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes?
Ia IIae q. 72 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that sins differ specif-
cause seems to have least reference to the species. Now
ically in reference to their causes. For a thing takes its
the object in a sin is like its material cause. Since, there-
species from that whence it derives its being. Now sins
fore, sins differ specifically according to their objects, it
derive their being from their causes. Therefore they take
seems that much more do they differ in reference to their
their species from them also. Therefore they differ specif-
other causes.
ically in reference to their causes.
Objection 3. Further, Augustine, commenting on Ps.
Objection 2. Further, of all the causes the material
79:17, “Things set on fire and dug down,” says that “every
929
sin is due either to fear inducing false humility, or to love ing are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold.
enkindling us to undue ardor.” For it is written (1 Jn. 2:16)
On the other hand, the active principles in voluntary acts,
that “all that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the
such as the acts of sins, are not determined, of necessity,
flesh, or [Vulg.: ‘and’] the concupiscence of the eyes, or
to one act, and consequently from one active or motive
[Vulg.: ‘and’] the pride of life.” Now a thing is said to be
principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from
in the world on account of sin, in as much as the world de-
fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft,
notes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii
or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his care;
in Joan.). Gregory, too (Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all
and these same things may proceed from love enkindling
sins according to the seven capital vices. Now all these di-
to undue ardor. Hence it is evident that sins do not dif-
visions refer to the causes of sins. Therefore, seemingly,
fer specifically according to their various active or motive
sins differ specifically according to the diversity of their
causes, but only in respect of diversity in the final cause,
causes.
which is the end and object of the will. For it has been
On the contrary, If this were the case all sins would
shown above (q. 1, a. 3; q. 18, Aa. 4,6) that human acts
belong to one species, since they are due to one cause. For
take their species from the end.
it is written (Ecclus. 10:15) that “pride is the beginning of
Reply to Objection 1. The active principles in volun-
all sin,” and (1 Tim. 6:10) that “the desire of money is the
tary acts, not being determined to one act, do not suffice
root of all evils.” Now it is evident that there are various
for the production of human acts, unless the will be deter-
species of sins. Therefore sins do not differ specifically
mined to one by the intention of the end, as the Philoso-
according to their different causes.
pher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16), and consequently
I answer that, Since there are four kinds of causes,
sin derives both its being and its species from the end.
they are attributed to various things in various ways. Be-
Reply to Objection 2. Objects, in relation to exter-
cause the “formal” and the “material” cause regard prop-
nal acts, have the character of matter “about which”; but,
erly the substance of a thing; and consequently substances
in relation to the interior act of the will, they have the
differ in respect of their matter and form, both in species
character of end; and it is owing to this that they give the
and in genus. The “agent” and the “end” regard directly
act its species. Nevertheless, even considered as the mat-
movement and operation: wherefore movements and op-
ter “about which,” they have the character of term, from
erations differ specifically in respect of these causes; in
which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic.
different ways, however, because the natural active prin-
x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in
ciples are always determined to the same acts; so that the
so far as term has the character of end.
different species of natural acts are taken not only from
Reply to Objection 3. These distinctions of sins are
the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but
given, not as distinct species of sins, but to show their var-
also from their active principles: thus heating and cool-
ious causes.
Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself, and against one’s Ia IIae q. 72 a. 4
neighbor?
Objection 1. It would seem that sin is unfittingly di-
according to these three.
vided into sin against God, against one’s neighbor, and
On the contrary, Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giv-
against oneself. For that which is common to all sins
ing the division of sins, says that “man is said to sin
should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin.
against himself, against God, and against his neighbor.”
But it is common to all sins to be against God: for it is
I answer that, As stated above (q. 71, Aa. 1,6), sin
stated in the definition of sin that it is “against God’s law,”
is an inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold or-
as stated above (q. 66, a. 6). Therefore sin against God
der in man: one in relation to the rule of reason, in so far
should not be reckoned a part of the division of sin.
as all our actions and passions should be commensurate
Objection 2. Further, every division should consist
with the rule of reason: another order is in relation to the
of things in opposition to one another. But these three
rule of the Divine Law, whereby man should be directed
kinds of sin are not opposed to one another: for whoever
in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal,
sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against
this twofold order would suffice. But since man is natu-
God. Therefore sin is not fittingly divided into these three.
rally a civic and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2,
Objection 3. Further, specification is not taken from
hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed
things external. But God and our neighbor are external to
in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of
us. Therefore sins are not distinguished specifically with
these orders the second contains the first and surpasses it.
regard to them: and consequently sin is unfittingly divided
For whatever things are comprised under the order of rea-
930
son, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet to which sins are opposed, differ specifically in respect
some things are comprised under the order of God, which
of these three. For it is evident from what has been said
surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and
(q. 62, Aa. 1,2,3) that by the theological virtues man is
things due to God alone. Hence he that sins in such mat-
directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to himself;
ters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is
and by justice to his neighbor.
said to sin against God. In like manner, the first order
Reply to Objection 1. To sin against God is common
includes the third and surpasses it, because in all things
to all sins, in so far as the order to God includes every
wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor, we
human order; but in so far as order to God surpasses the
need to be directed according to the order of reason. Yet
other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin.
in some things we are directed according to reason, in re-
Reply to Objection 2. When several things, of which
lation to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neigh-
one includes another, are distinct from one another, this
bor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin
distinction is understood to refer, not to the part contained
against himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and
in another, but to that in which one goes beyond another.
the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his
This may be seen in the division of numbers and figures:
neighbor, he is said to sin against his neighbor, as appears
for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not
in the thief and murderer. Now the things whereby man
in respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of
is directed to God, his neighbor, and himself are diverse.
that in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies
Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their ob-
to the numbers three and four.
jects, according to which the species of sins are diversi-
Reply to Objection 3. Although God and our neigh-
fied: and consequently this distinction of sins is properly
bor are external to the sinner himself, they are not external
one of different species of sins: because the virtues also,
to the act of sin, but are related to it as to its object.
Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their Ia IIae q. 72 a. 5
species?
Objection 1. It would seem that the division of sins
But punishment follows sin as the effect thereof. There-
according to their debt of punishment diversifies their
fore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of
species; for instance, when sin is divided into “mortal”
punishment.
and “venial.” For things which are infinitely apart, cannot
I answer that, In things that differ specifically we
belong to the same species, nor even to the same genus.
find a twofold difference: the first causes the diversity of
But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since tem-
species, and is not to be found save in different species,
poral punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punish-
e.g. “rational” and “irrational,” “animate,” and “inani-
ment to mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment
mate”: the other difference is consequent to specific di-
corresponds to the gravity of the fault, according to Dt.
versity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent
25:2: “According to the measure of the sin shall the mea-
to specific diversity, yet, in others, it may be found within
sure be also of the stripes be.” Therefore venial and mortal
the same species; thus “white” and “black” are consequent
sins are not of the same genus, nor can they be said to be-
to the specific diversity of crow and swan, and yet this dif-
long to the same species.
ference is found within the one species of man.
Objection 2. Further, some sins are mortal in virtue
We must therefore say that the difference between ve-
of their species∗, as murder and adultery; and some are
nial and mortal sin, or any other difference is respect of
venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and
the debt of punishment, cannot be a difference constitut-
excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal sins dif-
ing specific diversity. For what is accidental never consti-
fer specifically.
tutes a species; and what is outside the agent’s intention is
Objection 3. Further, just as a virtuous act stands in
accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that pun-
relation to its reward, so does sin stand in relation to pun-
ishment is outside the intention of the sinner, wherefore
ishment. But the reward is the end of the virtuous act.
it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner.
Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ
Nevertheless it is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle,
specifically in relation to their ends, as stated above (a. 1,
viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punish-
ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct accord-
ments according to the various manners of sin. Therefore
ing to the debt of punishment.
the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may
On the contrary, Those things that constitute a
be consequent to the specific diversity of sins, but cannot
species are prior to the species, e.g. specific differences.
constitute it.
∗ “Ex genere,” genus in this case denoting the species
931
Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider the
consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which
nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to
constitutes the notion of sin.
For inordinateness is
sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas
twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and an-
when a man sins without turning away from God, by the
other which, without destroying the principle of order, im-
very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired, be-
plies inordinateness in the things which follow the princi-
cause the principle of the order is not destroyed; where-
ple: thus, in an animal’s body, the frame may be so out
fore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not
of order that the vital principle is destroyed; this is the
sin so as to deserve to be punished eternally.
inordinateness of death; while, on the other hand, saving
Reply to Objection 1. Mortal and venial sins are in-
the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily hu-
finitely apart as regards what they “turn away from,” not as
mors; and then there is sickness. Now the principle of
regards what they “turn to,” viz. the object which specifies
the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the
them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from in-
same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable
cluding mortal and venial sins; for instance, in the species
principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8).
“adultery” the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle
Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn
word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may even be a
away from its last end, viz. God, to Whom it is united
mortal sin.
by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered
Reply to Objection 2. From the fact that one sin is
without turning away from God, there is venial sin. For
mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by rea-
even as in the body, the disorder of death which results
son of its species, it follows that this difference is conse-
from the destruction of the principle of life, is irreparable
quent to the specific difference of sins, not that it is the
according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be
cause thereof. And this difference may be found even in
repaired by reason of the vital principle being preserved,
things of the same species, as stated above.
so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in spec-
Reply to Objection 3. The reward is intended by him
ulative matters, it is impossible to convince one who errs
that merits or acts virtually; whereas the punishment is not
in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the
intended by the sinner, but, on the contrary, is against his
principles, can be brought back to the truth by means of
will. Hence the comparison fails.
the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by
Whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically?
Ia IIae q. 72 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that sins of commission
same species.
and omission differ specifically. For “offense” and “sin”
On the contrary, Omission and commission are
are condivided with one another (Eph. 2:1), where it is
found in the same species of sin. For the covetous man
written: “When you were dead in your offenses and sins,”
both takes what belongs to others, which is a sin of com-
which words a gloss explains, saying: “ ‘Offenses,’ by
mission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give,
omitting to do what was commanded, and ‘sins,’ by doing
which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and com-
what was forbidden.” Whence it is evident that “offenses”
mission do not differ specifically.
here denotes sins of omission; while “sin” denotes sins of
I answer that, There is a twofold difference in sins; a
commission. Therefore they differ specifically, since they
material difference and a formal difference: the material
are contrasted with one another as different species.
difference is to be observed in the natural species of the
Objection 2. Further, it is essential to sin to be against sinful act; while the formal difference is gathered from
God’s law, for this is part of its definition, as is clear from their relation to one proper end, which is also their proper
what has been said (q. 71, a. 6). Now in God’s law, the
object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one an-
affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission,
other in the material specific difference, which are never-
are different from the negative precepts, against which is
theless formally in the same species of sin, because they
the sin of omission. Therefore sins of omission and com-
are directed to the one same end: thus strangling, ston-
mission differ specifically.
ing, and stabbing come under the one species of murder,
Objection 3. Further, omission and commission differ
although the actions themselves differ specifically accord-
as affirmation and negation. Now affirmation and nega-
ing to the natural species. Accordingly, if we refer to the
tion cannot be in the same species, since negation has
material species in sins of omission and commission, they
no species; for “there is neither species nor difference of
differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far
non-being,” as the Philosopher states (Phys. iv, text. 67).
as negation and privation may have a species. But if we
Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the
refer to the formal species of sins of omission and com-
932
mission, they do not differ specifically, because they are evil, being induced to this by the negative precepts, and
directed to the same end, and proceed from the same mo-
afterwards by doing good, to which we are induced by the
tive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money, both
affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and neg-
robs, and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner,
ative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but to
the glutton, to satiate his appetite, both eats too much and
different degrees of virtue; and consequently they are not
omits the prescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins:
of necessity, opposed to sins of different species. More-
for in things, negation is always founded on affirmation,
over sin is not specified by that from which it turns away,
which, in a manner, is its cause. Hence in the physical
because in this respect it is a negation or privation, but
order it comes under the same head, that fire gives forth
by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act. Con-
heat, and that it does not give forth cold.
sequently sins do not differ specifically according to the
Reply to Objection 1. This division in respect of
various precepts of the Law.
commission and omission, is not according to different
Reply to Objection 3. This objection considers the
formal species, but only according to material species, as
material diversity of sins.
It must be observed, how-
stated.
ever, that although, properly speaking, negation is not in
Reply to Objection 2. In God’s law, the necessity for
a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the
various affirmative and negative precepts, was that men
affirmation on which it is based.
might be gradually led to virtue, first by abstaining from
Whether sins are fittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed?
Ia IIae q. 72 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that sins are unfittingly
divided into these three, viz. sins of thought, word, and
divided into sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augus-
deed, not as into various complete species: for the con-
tine (De Trin. xii, 12) describes three stages of sin, of
summation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed
which the first is “when the carnal sense offers a bait,”
have the complete species; but the first beginning of sin is
which is the sin of thought; the second stage is reached
its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the sec-
“when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought”;
ond degree is the sin of word, in so far as man is ready to
and the third stage, “when consent is given to the deed.”
break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third
Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it
degree consists in the consummation of the deed. Conse-
is unfitting to reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin.
quently these three differ in respect of the various degrees
Objection 2. Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons
of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three belong to
four degrees of sin; the first of which is “a fault hidden in
the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from
the heart”; the second, “when it is done openly”; the third,
the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of
“when it is formed into a habit”; and the fourth, “when
vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks
man goes so far as to presume on God’s mercy or to give
out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful
himself up to despair”: where no distinction is made be-
deeds; and the same applies to lust and to any other sin.
tween sins of deed and sins of word, and two other degrees
Reply to Objection 1. All sins of thought have the
of sin are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting.
common note of secrecy, in respect of which they form
Objection 3. Further, there can be no sin of word or
one degree, which is, however, divided into three stages,
deed unless there precede sin of thought. Therefore these
viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent.
sins do not differ specifically. Therefore they should not
Reply to Objection 2. Sins of words and deed are
be condivided with one another.
both done openly, and for this reason Gregory (Moral.
On the contrary, Jerome in commenting on Ezech.
iv, 25) reckons them under one head: whereas Jerome
43:23: “The human race is subject to three kinds of sin,
(in commenting on Ezech. 43:23) distinguishes between
for when we sin, it is either by thought, or word, or deed.”
them, because in sins of word there is nothing but man-
I answer that, Things differ specifically in two ways:
ifestation which is intended principally; while in sins of
first, when each has the complete species; thus a horse and
deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which
an ox differ specifically: secondly, when the diversity of
is principally intended, and the outward manifestation is
species is derived from diversity of degree in generation
by way of sequel. Habit and despair are stages following
or movement: thus the building is the complete genera-
the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth
tion of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and
follow the complete generation of a man.
the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, as the
Reply to Objection 3. Sin of thought and sin of word
Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can ap-
are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united
ply to the generation of animals. Accordingly sins are
together with it, but when each is found by itself: even
933
as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole when there is a break in the movement.
movement, when the movement is continuous, but only
Whether excess and deficiency diversify the species of sins?
Ia IIae q. 72 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that excess and deficiency
of deficiency; in fact, they are contrary to one another, just
do not diversify the species of sins. For excess and defi-
as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bod-
ciency differ in respect of more and less. Now “more”
ily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of insensibility
and “less” do not diversify a species. Therefore excess
is hatred of the same. Therefore these sins not only differ
and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.
specifically, but are contrary to one another.
Objection 2. Further, just as sin, in matters of action, Reply to Objection 1. Although “more” and “less”
is due to straying from the rectitude of reason, so false-
do not cause diversity of species, yet they are sometimes
hood, in speculative matters, is due to straying from the
consequent to specific difference, in so far as they are the
truth of the reality. Now the species of falsehood is not di-
result of diversity of form; thus we may say that fire is
versified by saying more or less than the reality. Therefore
lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii,
neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or
1) that “those who held that there are no different species
less from the rectitude of reason.
of friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree, were
Objection 3. Further, “one species cannot be made
led by insufficient proof.” In this way to exceed reason or
out of two,” as Porphyry declares∗. Now excess and defi-
to fall short thereof belongs to sins specifically different,
ciency are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal
in so far as they result from different motives.
and wasteful—illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and
Reply to Objection 2. It is not the sinner’s intention
prodigality, by excess. Therefore excess and deficiency
to depart from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency
do not diversify the species of sins.
do not become of one kind through departing from the one
On the contrary, Contraries differ specifically, for
rectitude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes he who
“contrariety is a difference of form,” as stated in Metaph.
utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth, wherefore in
x, text. 13,14. Now vices that differ according to excess
this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less.
and deficiency are contrary to one another, as illiberality
If, however, departure from the truth be not outside the
to wastefulness. Therefore they differ specifically.
intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different
I answer that, While there are two things in sin, viz.
causes to tell more or less; and in this respect there are
the act itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a
different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the “boaster,”
departure from the order of reason and the Divine law,
who exceeds in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and
the species of sin is gathered, not from its inordinateness,
the “cheat,” who tells less than the truth, in order to escape
which is outside the sinner’s intention, as stated above
from paying his debts. This also explains how some false
(a. 1), but one the contrary, from the act itself as terminat-
opinions are contrary to one another.
ing in the object to which the sinner’s intention is directed.
Reply to Objection 3. One may be prodigal and il-
Consequently wherever we find a different motive inclin-
liberal with regard to different objects: for instance one
ing the intention to sin, there will be a different species of
may be illiberal† in taking what one ought not: and noth-
sin. Now it is evident that the motive for sinning, in sins
ing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in
by excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins
different respects.
Whether sins differ specifically in respect of different circumstances?
Ia IIae q. 72 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that vices and sins differ
cally according as different circumstances are corrupted.
in respect of different circumstances. For, as Dionysius
Objection 3. Further, diverse species are assigned to
says (Div. Nom. iv), “evil results from each single de-
gluttony, according to the words contained in the follow-
fect.” Now individual defects are corruptions of individ-
ing verse:
ual circumstances. Therefore from the corruption of each
‘Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.’
circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin.
Now these pertain to various circumstances, for “hastily”
Objection 2. Further, sins are human acts. But human
means sooner than is right; “too much,” more than is right,
acts sometimes take their species from circumstances, as
and so on with the others. Therefore the species of sin is
stated above (q. 18, a. 10). Therefore sins differ specifi-
diversified according to the various circumstances.
∗ Isagog.; cf. Arist. Metaph. i
† Cf. IIa IIae, q. 119, a. 1, ad 1
934
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; that a man eat hastily, may be due to the fact that he can-iv, 1) that “every vice sins by doing more than one ought,
not brook the delay in taking food, on account of a rapid
and when one ought not”; and in like manner as to the
exhaustion of the digestive humors; and that he desire too
other circumstances. Therefore the species of sins are not
much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion;
diversified in this respect.
that he desire choice meats, is due to his desire for plea-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 8), wherever there
sure in taking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption
is a special motive for sinning, there is a different species
of different circumstances entails different species of sins.
of sin, because the motive for sinning is the end and ob-
Reply to Objection 1. Evil, as such, is a privation,
ject of sin. Now it happens sometimes that although dif-
and so it has different species in respect of the thing which
ferent circumstances are corrupted, there is but one mo-
the subject is deprived, even as other privations. But sin
tive: thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes
does not take its species from the privation or aversion, as
when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he
stated above (a. 1), but from turning to the object of the
ought, and so on with the circumstances, since he does this
act.
through an inordinate desire of hoarding money: and in
Reply to Objection 2. A circumstance never trans-
such cases the corruption of different circumstances does
fers an act from one species to another, save when there is
not diversify the species of sins, but belongs to one and
another motive.
the same species.
Reply to Objection 3. In the various species of glut-
Sometimes, however, the corruption of different cir-
tony there are various motives, as stated.
cumstances arises from different motives: for instance
935
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 73
Of the Comparison of One Sin with Another
(In Ten Articles)
We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another?
(2) Whether all are equal?
(3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object?
(4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is opposed?
(5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins?
(6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes?
(7) Whether it depends on their circumstances?
(8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues?
(9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against?
(10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning?
Whether all sins are connected with one another?
Ia IIae q. 73 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that all sins are connected.
that all the virtues are connected together in the right rea-
For it is written (James 2:10): “Whosoever shall keep the
son of things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above
whole Law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of
(q. 65, a. 1). But the intention of the sinner is not directed
all.” Now to be guilty of transgressing all the precepts of
to the point of straying from the path of reason; rather is
Law, is the same as to commit all sins, because, as Am-
it directed to tend to some appetible good whence it de-
brose says (De Parad. viii), “sin is a transgression of the
rives its species. Now these goods, to which the sinner’s
Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly command-
intention is directed when departing from reason, are of
ments.” Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of
various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact they
all.
are sometimes contrary to one another. Since, therefore,
Objection 2. Further, each sin banishes its opposite
vices and sins take their species from that to which they
virtue. Now whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all, as
turn, it is evident that, in respect of that which completes
was shown above (q. 65, a. 1). Therefore whoever com-
a sin’s species, sins are not connected with one another.
mits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues. Therefore who-
For sin does not consist in passing from the many to the
ever commits one sin, is guilty of all sins.
one, as is the case with virtues, which are connected, but
Objection 3. Further, all virtues are connected, be-
rather in forsaking the one for the many.
cause they have a principle in common, as stated above
Reply to Objection 1. James is speaking of sin, not
(q. 65, Aa. 1,2). Now as the virtues have a common prin-
as regards the thing to which it turns and which causes the
ciple, so have sins, because, as the love of God, which
distinction of sins, as stated above (q. 72 , a. 1), but as re-
builds the city of God, is the beginning and root of all the
gards that from which sin turns away, in as much as man,
virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is
by sinning, departs from a commandment of the law. Now
the root of all sins, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei
all the commandments of the law are from one and the
xiv, 28). Therefore all vices and sins are also connected
same, as he also says in the same passage, so that the same
so that whoever has one, has them all.
God is despised in every sin; and in this sense he says that
On the contrary, Some vices are contrary to one an-
whoever “offends in one point, is become guilty of all,”
other, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But con-
for as much as, by committing one sin, he incurs the debt
traries cannot be together in the same subject. Therefore
of punishment through his contempt of God, which is the
it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with
origin of all sins.
one another.
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 71, a. 4),
I answer that, The intention of the man who acts ac-
the opposite virtue is not banished by every act of sin; be-
cording to virtue in pursuance of his reason, is different
cause venial sin does not destroy virtue; while mortal sin
from the intention of the sinner in straying from the path
destroys infused virtue, by turning man away from God.
of reason. For the intention of every man acting accord-
Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit
ing to virtue is to follow the rule of reason, wherefore the
of acquired virtue; though if such acts be repeated so as
intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so
to engender a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue
936
is destroyed, the destruction of which entails the loss of virtue, as regards the virtue’s inclination to act, as stated
prudence, since when man acts against any virtue what-
above (q. 71, a. 1). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous
ever, he acts against prudence, without which no moral
inclinations remain, it cannot be said that man has the op-
virtue is possible, as stated above (q. 58, a. 4; q. 65, a. 1).
posite vices or sins.
Consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the
Reply to Objection 3. The love of God is unitive, in
perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so
as much as it draws man’s affections from the many to the
far as they partake of prudence, yet there remain the in-
one; so that the virtues, which flow from the love of God,
clinations to virtuous acts, which inclinations, however,
are connected together. But self-love disunites man’s af-
are not virtues. Nevertheless it does not follow that for
fections among different things, in so far as man loves
this reason man contracts all vices of sins—first, because
himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which
several vices are opposed to one virtue, so that a virtue
are various and of many kinds: hence vices and sins,
can be destroyed by one of them, without the others be-
which arise from self-love, are not connected together.
ing present; secondly, because sin is directly opposed to
Whether all sins are equal?
Ia IIae q. 73 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that all sins are equal.
manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with
Because sin is to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is
several shades, than if it were covered by a single shade
unlawful is reproved in one and the same way in all things.
shutting out all the light. There is, however, another pri-
Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way. There-
vation which is not simple, but retains something of the
fore one sin is not graver than another.
opposite habit; it consists in “becoming” corrupted rather
Objection 2. Further, every sin is a transgression of
than in “being” corrupted, like sickness which is a pri-
the rule of reason, which is to human acts what a linear
vation of the due commensuration of the humors, yet so
rule is in corporeal things. Therefore to sin is the same as
that something remains of that commensuration, else the
to pass over a line. But passing over a line occurs equally
animal would cease to live: and the same applies to defor-
and in the same way, even if one go a long way from it or
mity and the like. Such privations admit of more or less on
stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less.
the part of what remains or the contrary habit. For it mat-
Therefore all sins are equal.
ters much in sickness or deformity, whether one departs
Objection 3. Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But
more or less from the due commensuration of humors or
all virtues are equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). There-
members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in
fore all sins are equal.
them the privation of the due commensuration of reason
On the contrary, Our Lord said to Pilate (Jn. 19:11):
is such as not to destroy the order of reason altogether;
“He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin,”
else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5.
and yet it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin.
For the substance of the act, or the affection of the agent
Therefore one sin is greater than another.
could not remain, unless something remained of the order
I answer that, The opinion of the Stoics, which Ci-
of reason. Therefore it matters much to the gravity of a
cero adopts in the book on Paradoxes (Paradox. iii), was
sin whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of
that all sins are equal: from which opinion arose the error
reason: and accordingly we must say that sins are not all
of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins to be equal,
equal.
but also maintain that all the pains of hell are equal. So
Reply to Objection 1. To commit sin is lawful on
far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Sto-
account of some inordinateness therein: wherefore those
ics arrived at their conclusion through looking at sin on
which contain a greater inordinateness are more unlawful,
the side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a
and consequently graver sins.
departure from reason; wherefore considering simply that
Reply to Objection 2. This argument looks upon sin
no privation admits of more or less, they held that all sins
as though it were a pure privation.
are equal. Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, we
Reply to Objection 3. Virtues are proportionately
shall see that there are two kinds of privation. For there is
equal in one and the same subject: yet one virtue sur-
a simple and pure privation, which consists, so to speak,
passes another in excellence according to its species; and
in “being” corrupted; thus death is privation of life, and
again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the same
darkness is privation of light. Such like privations do not
species of virtue, as stated above (q. 66, Aa. 1,2). More-
admit of more or less, because nothing remains of the op-
over, even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that
posite habit; hence a man is not less dead on the first day
vices are equal, since virtues are connected, and vices or
after his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after
sins are not.
a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and, in like
937
Whether the gravity of sins varies according to their objects?
Ia IIae q. 73 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the gravity of sins
of action the reason directs all things in view of the end:
does not vary according to their objects. Because the grav-
wherefore the higher the end which attaches to sins in hu-
ity of a sin pertains to its mode or quality: whereas the
man acts, the graver the sin. Now the object of an act is its
object is the matter of the sin. Therefore the gravity of
end, as stated above (q. 72, a. 3, ad 2); and consequently
sins does not vary according to their various objects.
the difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects.
Objection 2. Further, the gravity of a sin is the in-
Thus it is clear that external things are directed to man
tensity of its malice. Now sin does not derive its malice
as their end, while man is further directed to God as his
from its proper object to which it turns, and which is some
end. Wherefore a sin which is about the very substance
appetible good, but rather from that which it turns away
of man, e.g. murder, is graver than a sin which is about
from. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary accord-
external things, e.g. theft; and graver still is a sin com-
ing to their various objects.
mitted directly against God, e.g. unbelief, blasphemy, and
Objection 3. Further, sins that have different objects
the like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin will
are of different kinds. But things of different kinds can-
be graver than another according as it is about a higher or
not be compared with one another, as is proved in Phys.
lower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species
vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one sin is not graver than
from their objects, the difference of gravity which is de-
another by reason of the difference of objects.
rived from the objects is first and foremost, as resulting
On the contrary, Sins take their species from their ob-
from the species.
jects, as was shown above (q. 72, a. 1). But some sins are
Reply to Objection 1. Although the object is the mat-
graver than others in respect of their species, as murder
ter about which an act is concerned, yet it has the character
is graver than theft. Therefore the gravity of sins varies
of an end, in so far as the intention of the agent is fixed on
according to their objects.
it, as stated above (q. 72, a. 3, ad 2). Now the form of a
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said
moral act depends on the end, as was shown above (q. 72,
(q. 71, a. 5), the gravity of sins varies in the same way as
a. 6; q. 18, a. 6).
one sickness is graver than another: for just as the good
Reply to Objection 2. From the very fact that man
of health consists in a certain commensuration of the hu-
turns unduly to some mutable good, it follows that he
mors, in keeping with an animal’s nature, so the good of
turns away from the immutable Good, which aversion
virtue consists in a certain commensuration of the human
completes the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees
act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that
of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those
the higher the principle the disorder of which causes the
things to which man turns.
disorder in the humors, the graver is the sickness: thus a
Reply to Objection 3. All the objects of human acts
sickness which comes on the human body from the heart,
are related to one another, wherefore all human acts are
which is the principle of life, or from some neighboring
somewhat of one kind, in so far as they are directed to the
part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must needs be
last end. Therefore nothing prevents all sins from being
so much the graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle
compared with one another.
which is higher in the order of reason. Now in matters
Whether the gravity of sins depends on the excellence of the virtues to which they are Ia IIae q. 73 a. 4
opposed?
Objection 1. It would seem that the gravity of sins
more difficult. But it is a less grievous sin to fail in what
does not vary according to the excellence of the virtues to
is more difficult, than in what is less difficult. Therefore
which they are opposed, so that, to wit, the graver the sin
the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.
is opposed to the greater virtue. For, according to Prov.
Objection 3. Further, charity is a greater virtue than
15:5, “In abundant justice there is the greatest strength.”
faith or hope (1 Cor. 13:13). Now hatred which is op-
Now, as Our Lord says (Mat. 5:20, seqq.) abundant justice
posed to charity is a less grievous sin than unbelief or de-
restrains anger, which is a less grievous sin than murder,
spair which are opposed to faith and hope. Therefore the
which less abundant justice restrains. Therefore the least
less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.
grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. 8:10)
Objection 2. Further, it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that
that the “worst is opposed to the best.” Now in morals
“virtue is about the difficult and the good”: whence it
the best is the greatest virtue; and the worst is the most
seems to follow that the greater virtue is about what is
grievous sin. Therefore the most grievous sin is opposed
938
to the greatest virtue.
man also from less grievous sins: even as the more perfect
I answer that, A sin is opposed to a virtue in two
health is, the more does it ward off even minor ailments.
ways: first, principally and directly; that sin, to with,
And in this way the less grievous sin is opposed to the
which is about the same object: because contraries are
greater virtue, on the part of the latter’s effect.
about the same thing. In this way, the more grievous sin
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the
must needs be opposed to the greater virtue: because, just
opposition which consists in restraining from sin; for thus
as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object,
abundant justice checks even minor sins.
so also does the greatness of a virtue, since both sin and
Reply to Objection 2. The greater virtue that is about
virtue take their species from the object, as shown above
a more difficult good is opposed directly to the sin which
(q. 60, a. 5; q. 72, a. 1). Wherefore the greatest sin must
is about a more difficult evil. For in each case there is a
needs be directly opposed to the greatest virtue, as being
certain superiority, in that the will is shown to be more
furthest removed from it in the same genus. Secondly, the
intent on good or evil, through not being overcome by the
opposition of virtue to sin may be considered in respect
difficulty.
of a certain extension of the virtue in checking sin. For
Reply to Objection 3. Charity is not any kind of love,
the greater a virtue is, the further it removes man from
but the love of God: hence not any kind of hatred is op-
the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man not only from
posed to it directly, but the hatred of God, which is the
that sin, but also from whatever leads to it. And thus it is
most grievous of all sins.
evident that the greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws
Whether carnal sins are of less guilt than spiritual sins?
Ia IIae q. 73 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that carnal sins are not of
to turn away from Him; whereas carnal sins are consum-
less guilt than spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more
mated in the carnal pleasure of the appetite, to which it
grievous sin than theft: for it is written (Prov. 6:30,32):
chiefly belongs to turn to goods of the body; so that carnal
“The fault is not so great when a man has stolen. . . but he
sin, as such, denotes more a “turning to” something, and
that is an adulterer, for the folly of his heart shall destroy
for that reason, implies a closer cleaving; whereas spiri-
his own soul.” Now theft belongs to covetousness, which
tual sin denotes more a “turning from” something, whence
is a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to lust, which is
the notion of guilt arises; and for this reason it involves
a carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins are of greater guilt than
greater guilt. A second reason may be taken on the part of
spiritual sins.
the person against whom sin is committed: because car-
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says in his commen-
nal sin, as such, is against the sinner’s own body, which
tary on Leviticus∗ that “the devil rejoices chiefly in lust
he ought to love less, in the order of charity, than God and
and idolatry.” But he rejoices more in the greater sin.
his neighbor, against whom he commits spiritual sins, and
Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it seems that the car-
consequently spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt.
nal sins are of most guilt.
A third reason may be taken from the motive, since the
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher proves (Ethic.
stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous the sin, as
vii, 6) that “it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust
we shall state further on (a. 6). Now carnal sins have a
than in anger.” But anger is a spiritual sin, according to
stronger impulse, viz. our innate concupiscence of the
Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17); while lust pertains to carnal
flesh. Therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt.
sins. Therefore carnal sin is more grievous than spiritual
Reply to Objection 1. Adultery belongs not only to
sin.
the sin of lust, but also to the sin of injustice, and in this
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 11)
respect may be brought under the head of covetousness, as
that carnal sins are of less guilt, but of more shame than
a gloss observes on Eph. 5:5. “No fornicator, or unclean,
spiritual sins.
or covetous person,” etc.; so that adultery is so much more
I answer that, Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than
grievous than theft, as a man loves his wife more than his
carnal sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is
chattels.
of greater guilt than each carnal sin; but that, considering
Reply to Objection 2. The devil is said to rejoice
the sole difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual
chiefly in the sin of lust, because it is of the greatest ad-
sins are more grievous than carnal sins, other things be-
hesion, and man can with difficulty be withdrawn from it.
ing equal. Three reasons may be assigned for this. The
“For the desire of pleasure is insatiable,” as the Philoso-
first is on the part of the subject: because spiritual sins be-
pher states (Ethic. iii, 12).
long to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to God, and
Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher himself
∗ The quotation is from De Civ. Dei ii, 4 and iv, 31.
939
says (Ethic. vii, 6), the reason why it is more shameful common to us and irrational minds”: hence, by these sins
to be incontinent in lust than in anger, is that lust par-
man is, so to speak, brutalized; for which same reason
takes less of reason; and in the same sense he says (Ethic.
Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that they are more shame-
iii, 10) that “sins of intemperance are most worthy of re-
ful.
proach, because they are about those pleasures which are
Whether the gravity of a sin depends on its cause?
Ia IIae q. 73 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the gravity of a sin
Among these causes we must make a distinction; for some
does not depend on its cause. Because the greater a sin’s
of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very na-
cause, the more forcibly it moves to sin, and so the more
ture of the will: such is the end, which is the proper object
difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more
it is difficult to resist; for it denotes weakness in the sin-
grievous, because a man sins more grievously if his will is
ner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that is due to
induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other
weakness is deemed less grievous. Therefore sin does not
causes incline the will to sin, against the nature and order
derive its gravity from its cause.
of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely
Objection 2.
Further, concupiscence is a general
of itself in accord with the judgment of reason. Wherefore
cause of sin; wherefore a gloss on Rom. 7:7, “For I had
those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g.
not known concupiscence,” says: “The law is good, since
ignorance), or which weaken the free movement of the
by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils.” Now
will, (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish
the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome,
the gravity of sin, even as they diminish its voluntariness;
the less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is
and so much so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it
diminished by the greatness of its cause.
is no longer sinful.
Objection 3. Further, as rectitude of the reason is the
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the
cause of a virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be
extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness.
the cause of sin. Now the greater the defect in the reason,
The increase of such a cause diminishes the sin, as stated.
the less grievous the sin: so much so that he who lacks
Reply to Objection 2. If concupiscence be under-
the use of reason, is altogether excused from sin, and he
stood to include the movement of the will, then, where
who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. There-
there is greater concupiscence, there is a greater sin. But
fore the gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness
if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which is a
of its cause.
movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater con-
On the contrary, If the cause be increased, the effect
cupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the
is increased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the
movement of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man
more grievous the sin.
who sins, being stimulated by a greater concupiscence,
I answer that, In the genus of sin, as in every other
falls through a more grievous temptation, wherefore he is
genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct
less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence be
and proper cause of sin, and is the will to sin: for it is
taken in this sense follows the judgment of reason, and the
compared to the sinful act, as a tree to its fruit, as a gloss
movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence, the
observes on Mat. 7:18, “A good tree cannot bring forth
graver the sin: because sometimes the movement of con-
evil fruit”: and the greater this cause is, the more grievous
cupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly
will the sin be, since the greater the will to sin, the more
to its object.
grievously does man sin.
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the
The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as
cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause
it were, being those whereby the will is inclined to sin.
diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated.
Whether a circumstance aggravates a sin?
Ia IIae q. 73 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that a circumstance does
Objection 2. Further, a circumstance is either evil or
not aggravate a sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its
not: if it is evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and species. Now a circumstance does not specify a sin, for it
if it is not evil, it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a
is an accident thereof. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not
circumstance nowise aggravates a sin.
taken from a circumstance.
Objection 3. Further, the malice of a sin is derived
940
from its turning away (from God). But circumstances affed him, who educated him, to whom he owes his lands,
fect sin on the part of the object to which it turns. There-
his house, his position in the republic.” Thirdly, a circum-
fore they do not add to the sin’s malice.
stance aggravates a sin by adding to the deformity which
On the contrary, Ignorance of a circumstance dimin-
the sin derives from another circumstance: thus, taking
ishes sin: for he who sins through ignorance of a circum-
another’s property constitutes the sin of theft; but if to this stance, deserves to be forgiven (Ethic. iii, 1). Now this
be added the circumstance that much is taken of another’s
would not be the case unless a circumstance aggravated a
property, the sin will be more grievous; although in itself,
sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin more grievous.
to take more or less has not the character of a good or of
I answer that, As the Philosopher says in speaking of
an evil act.
habits of virtue (Ethic. ii, 1,2), “it is natural for a thing to Reply to Objection 1. Some circumstances do spec-be increased by that which causes it.” Now it is evident
ify a moral act, as stated above (q. 18, a. 10). Nevertheless
that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance: be-
a circumstance which does not give the species, may ag-
cause the fact that a man departs from the order of reason
gravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a thing is
is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his
weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in
action. Wherefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin
reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is mea-
to be aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This hap-
sured, not only according to the species of that act, but
pens in three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws
also according to a circumstance.
a sin from one kind to another: thus fornication is the in-
Reply to Objection 2. A circumstance may aggravate
tercourse of a man with one who is not his wife: but if to
a sin either way. For if it is evil, it does not follow that it this be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of
constitutes the sin’s species; because it may multiply the
another, the sin is drawn to another kind of sin, viz. injus-
ratio of evil within the same species, as stated above. And
tice, in so far as he usurps another’s property; and in this
if it be not evil, it may aggravate a sin in relation to the
respect adultery is a more grievous sin than fornication.
malice of another circumstance.
Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not by draw-
Reply to Objection 3. Reason should direct the action
ing it into another genus, but only by multiplying the ratio
not only as regards the object, but also as regards every
of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought
circumstance. Therefore one may turn aside from the rule
not, and to whom he ought not to give, he commits the
of reason through corruption of any single circumstance;
same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely
for instance, by doing something when one ought not or
to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason his
where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of
sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the graver
reason suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside
which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says
from the rule of reason results from man’s turning away
(Paradox. iii) that “in taking his father’s life a man com-
from God, to Whom man ought to be united by right rea-
mits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who
son.
Whether sin is aggravated by reason of its causing more harm?
Ia IIae q. 73 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that a sin is not aggra-
than the life of nature, so far that man ought to despise his
vated by reason of its causing more harm. Because the
natural life lest he lose the life of grace. Now, speaking
harm done is an issue consequent to the sinful act. But the
absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornica-
issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as
tion deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into
stated above (q. 20, a. 5). Therefore a sin is not aggravated
mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on ac-
on account of its causing more harm.
count of its causing a greater harm, it would follow that
Objection 2. Further, harm is inflicted by sins against
fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin
our neighbor. Because no one wishes to harm himself:
than murder, which is evidently untrue. Therefore a sin
and no one can harm God, according to Job 35:6,8: “If
is not more grievous on account of its causing a greater
thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against
harm.
Him?. . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee.”
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii,
If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more
14): “Since vice is contrary to nature, a vice is the more
harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are
grievous according as it diminishes the integrity of na-
more grievous than sins against God or oneself.
ture.” Now the diminution of the integrity of nature is a
Objection 3. Further, greater harm is inflicted on a
harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as it does more
man by depriving him of the life of grace, than by taking
harm.
away his natural life; because the life of grace is better
I answer that, Harm may bear a threefold relation to
941
sin. Because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin an unbeliever who has heard nothing about the pains of
is foreseen and intended, as when a man does something
hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder
with a mind to harm another, e.g. a murderer or a thief.
than for a sin of theft: but his sin is not aggravated on
In this case the quantity of harm aggravates the sin di-
account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it
rectly, because then the harm is the direct object of the
would be in the case of a believer, who, seemingly, sins
sin. Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; for
more grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater
instance, when a man takes a short cut through a field, the
punishment, that he may satisfy his desire to sin; but the
result being that he knowingly injures the growing crops,
gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of sin.
although his intention is not to do this harm, but to com-
Reply to Objection 1. As we have already stated
mit fornication. In this case again the quantity of the harm
(q. 20, a. 5), in treating of the goodness and malice of
done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in so far, to
external actions, the result of an action if foreseen and in-
wit, as it is owing to his will being strongly inclined to
tended adds to the goodness and malice of an act.
sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself
Reply to Objection 2. Although the harm done ag-
or to another, a harm which he would not wish simply.
gravates a sin, it does not follow that this alone renders
Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor in-
a sin more grievous: in fact, it is inordinateness which
tended: and then if this harm is connected with the sin
of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm itself that
accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on
ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the
account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might
act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing
ensue, a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of
harm to be inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor,
his action if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm
that such sins are the most grievous, since a much greater
follow directly from the sinful act, although it be neither
inordinateness is to be found against which man commits
foreseen nor intended, it aggravates the sin directly, be-
against God, and in some which he commits against him-
cause whatever is directly consequent to a sin, belongs, in
self. Moreover we might say that although no man can
a manner, to the very species of that sin: for instance, if
do God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor
a man is a notorious fornicator, the result is that many are
to do so in things concerning Him, e.g. by destroying
scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor
faith, by outraging holy things, which are most grievous
was it perhaps foreseen by him, yet it aggravates his sin
sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely in-
directly.
flicts harm on himself, as in the case of suicide, though
But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which
this be referred finally to some apparent good, for exam-
the sinner himself incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally
ple, delivery from some anxiety.
connected with the sinful act, and if neither foreseen nor
Reply to Objection 3. This argument does not prove,
intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor does it correspond
for two reasons: first, because the murderer intends di-
with the gravity of the sin: for instance, if a man in run-
rectly to do harm to his neighbors; whereas the fornicator
ning to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand,
who solicits the woman intends not to harm but pleasure;
this harm is directly consequent to the sinful act, although
secondly, because murder is the direct and sufficient cause
perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater
of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the suf-
harm does not make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a
ficient cause of another’s spiritual death, because no man
graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus,
dies spiritually except by sinning of his own will.
Whether a sin is aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it Ia IIae q. 73 a. 9
is committed?
Objection 1. It would seem that sin is not aggravated
aggravated the sin, this would be still more the case if
by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is
the person be near of kin, because, as Cicero says (Para-
committed. For if this were the case a sin would be aggra-
dox. iii): “The man who kills his slave sins once: he that
vated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy
takes his father’s life sins many times.” But the kinship
man. But this does not aggravate a sin: because a virtuous
of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate
man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed
a sin, because every man is most akin to himself; and yet
by the wrong done him, than others, who, through being
it is less grievous to harm oneself than another, e.g. to
scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condi-
kill one’s own, than another’s horse, as the Philosopher
tion of the person against whom a sin is committed does
declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore kinship of the person
not aggravate the sin.
sinned against does not aggravate the sin.
Objection 2. Further, if the condition of the person
Objection 3. Further, the condition of the person who
942
sins aggravates a sin chiefly on account of his position the more grievous, according as it is committed against a
or knowledge, according to Wis. 6:7: “The mighty shall
person more closely united to God by reason of personal
be mightily tormented,” and Lk. 12:47: “The servant
sanctity, or official station. On the part of man himself,
who knew the will of his lord. . . and did it not. . . shall
it is evident that he sins all the more grievously, accord-
be beaten with many stripes.” Therefore, in like man-
ing as the person against whom he sins, is more united to
ner, on the part of the person sinned against, the sin is
him, either through natural affinity or kindness received or
made more grievous by reason of his position and knowl-
any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself
edge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous sin to
rather than the other, and, for this very reason, sins all the
inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a
more grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5: “He that is
poor man, since “there is no respect of persons with God”
evil to himself, to whom will he be good?” On the part of
(Col. 3:25), according to Whose judgment the gravity of
his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously, according
a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the person
as his sin affects more persons: so that a sin committed
sinned against does not aggravate the sin.
against a public personage, e.g. a sovereign prince who
On the contrary, Holy Writ censures especially those
stands in the place of the whole people, is more grievous
sins that are committed against the servants of God. Thus
than a sin committed against a private person; hence it is
it is written (3 Kings 19:14): “They have destroyed Thy
expressly prohibited (Ex. 22:28): “The prince of thy peo-
altars, they have slain Thy prophets with the sword.”
ple thou shalt not curse.” In like manner it would seem
Moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed
that an injury done to a person of prominence, is all the
by a man against those who are akin to him, accord-
more grave, on account of the scandal and the disturbance
ing to Micah 7:6: “the son dishonoreth the father, and
it would cause among many people.
the daughter riseth up against her mother.” Furthermore
Reply to Objection 1. He who inflicts an injury on a
sins committed against persons of rank are expressly con-
virtuous person, so far as he is concerned, disturbs him in-
demned: thus it is written (Job 34:18): “Who saith to the
ternally and externally; but that the latter is not disturbed
king: ‘Thou art an apostate’; who calleth rulers ungodly.”
internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenu-
Therefore the condition of the person sinned against ag-
ate the sin of the injurer.
gravates the sin.
Reply to Objection 2. The injury which a man in-
I answer that, The person sinned against is, in a man-
flicts on himself in those things which are subject to the
ner, the object of the sin. Now it has been stated above
dominion of his will, for instance his possessions, is less
(a. 3) that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its
sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because he does
object; so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more
it of his own will; but in those things that are not subject
grave, as its object is a more principal end. But the prin-
to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual
cipal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his
goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury on oneself: for
neighbor: for whatever we do, it is on account of one of
it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another.
these that we do it; although one of them is subordinate to
Since, however, things belonging to our neighbor are not
the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin,
subject to the dominion of our will, the argument fails to
in respect of the person sinned against, may be considered
prove, in respect of injuries done to such like things, that
on the part of these three.
it is less grievous to sin in their regard, unless indeed our
First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more
neighbor be willing, or give his approval.
closely united, as he is more virtuous or more sacred to
Reply to Objection 3. There is no respect for per-
God: so that an injury inflicted on such a person redounds
sons if God punishes more severely those who sin against
on to God according to Zech. 2:8: “He that toucheth
a person of higher rank; for this is done because such an
you, toucheth the apple of My eye.” Wherefore a sin is
injury redounds to the harm of many.
Whether the excellence of the person sinning aggravates the sin?
Ia IIae q. 73 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that the excellence of the
with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fa-
person sinning does not aggravate the sin. For man be-
thers; and will not impute it to them that they are not sanc-
comes great chiefly by cleaving to God, according to Ec-
tified.” Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence
clus. 25:13: “How great is he that findeth wisdom and
of the person sinning.
knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the
Objection 2. Further, “there is no respect of persons
Lord.” Now the more a man cleaves to God, the less is a
with God” (Rom. 2:11). Therefore He does not punish
sin imputed to him: for it is written (2 Paral. 30: 18,19):
one man more than another, for one and the same sin.
“The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all them, who
Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the
943
person sinning.
in which a man excels, is a gift of God, to Whom man
Objection 3. Further, no one should reap disadvan-
is ungrateful when he sins: and in this respect any excel-
tage from good. But he would, if his action were the more
lence, even in temporal goods, aggravates a sin, according
blameworthy on account of his goodness. Therefore a sin
to Wis. 6:7: “The mighty shall be mightily tormented.”
is not aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person
Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being specially in-
sinning.
consistent with the excellence of the person sinning: for
On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii,
instance, if a prince were to violate justice, whereas he
18): “A sin is deemed so much the more grievous as the
is set up as the guardian of justice, or if a priest were to
sinner is held to be a more excellent person.”
be a fornicator, whereas he has taken the vow of chastity.
I answer that, Sin is twofold. There is a sin which
Fourthly, on account of the example or scandal; because,
takes us unawares on account of the weakness of human
as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 2): “Sin becomes much more
nature: and such like sins are less imputable to one who
scandalous, when the sinner is honored for his position”:
is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in check-
and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men
ing those sins, which nevertheless human weakness does
are wont to bear them with more indignation.
not allow us to escape altogether. But there are other sins
Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted alludes
which proceed from deliberation: and these sins are all the
to those things which are done negligently when we are
more imputed to man according as he is more excellent.
taken unawares through human weakness.
Four reasons may be assigned for this. First, because a
Reply to Objection 2. God does not respect persons
more excellent person, e.g. one who excels in knowledge
in punishing the great more severely, because their excel-
and virtue, can more easily resist sin; hence Our Lord said
lence conduces to the gravity of their sin, as stated.
(Lk. 12:47) that the “servant who knew the will of his
Reply to Objection 3. The man who excels in any-
lord. . . and did it not. . . shall be beaten with many stripes.”
thing reaps disadvantage, not from the good which he has,
Secondly, on account of ingratitude, because every good
but from his abuse thereof.
944
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 74
Of the Subject of Sin
(In Ten Articles)
We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin?
(2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?
(3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin?
(4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin?
(5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin?
(6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected in the higher reason?
(7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the higher reason?
(8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin?
(9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin?
(10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to its proper object?
Whether the will is a subject of sin?
Ia IIae q. 74 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the will cannot be a
matter, but remain in the agent, e.g. “to desire” and “to
subject of sin. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
know”: and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or
“evil is outside the will and the intention.” But sin has the
sinful. Consequently the proper subject of sin must needs
character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in the will.
be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since
Objection 2. Further, the will is directed either to the it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as stated
good or to what seems good. Now from the fact that will
above (q. 1, a. 1 ; q. 18, a. 6), it follows that the will, which wishes the good, it does not sin: and that it wishes what
is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts, and
seems good but is not truly good, points to a defect in the
of evil acts or sins, is the principle of sins. Therefore it
apprehensive power rather than in the will. Therefore sin
follows that sin is in the will as its subject.
is nowise in the will.
Reply to Objection 1. Evil is said to be outside the
Objection 3. Further, the same thing cannot be both
will, because the will does not tend to it under the aspect
subject and efficient cause of sin: because “the efficient
of evil. But since some evil is an apparent good, the will
and the material cause do not coincide” (Phys. 2, text.
sometimes desires an evil, and in this sense is in the will.
70). Now the will is the efficient cause of sin: because the
Reply to Objection 2. If the defect in the apprehen-
first cause of sinning is the will, as Augustine states (De
sive power were nowise subject to the will, there would
Duabus Anim. x, 10,11). Therefore it is not the subject of
be no sin, either in the will, or in the apprehensive power,
sin.
as in the case of those whose ignorance is invincible. It
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that
remains therefore that when there is in the apprehensive
“it is by the will that we sin, and live righteously.”
power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect also
I answer that, Sin is an act, as stated above (q. 71,
is deemed a sin.
Aa. 1,6). Now some acts pass into external matter, e.g.
Reply to Objection 3. This argument applies to those
“to cut” and “to burn”: and such acts have for their matter
efficient causes whose actions pass into external matter,
and subject, the thing into which the action passes: thus
and which do not move themselves, but move other things;
the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18) that “movement
the contrary of which is to be observed in the will; hence
is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover.” On the
the argument does not prove.
other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external
Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?
Ia IIae q. 74 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the will alone is the
alone is the subject of sin.
subject of sin. For Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x,
Objection 2. Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason.
10) that “no one sins except by the will.” Now the subject
Now good and evil pertaining to reason are the object of
of sin is the power by which we sin. Therefore the will
the will alone. Therefore the will alone is the subject of
945
sin.
also all those powers which can be moved to their acts,
Objection 3. Further, every sin is a voluntary act, be-
or restrained from their acts, by the will; and these same
cause, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18)∗, “so true
powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, be-
is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, cause act and habit belong to the same subject.
it is no sin at all.” Now the acts of the other powers are
Reply to Objection 1. We do not sin except by the
not voluntary, except in so far as those powers are moved
will as first mover; but we sin by the other powers as
by the will; nor does this suffice for them to be the sub-
moved by the will.
ject of sin, because then even the external members of the
Reply to Objection 2. Good and evil pertain to the
body, which are moved by the will, would be a subject of
will as its proper objects; but the other powers have cer-
sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is
tain determinate goods and evils, by reason of which they
the subject of sin.
can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in so far as they
On the contrary, Sin is contrary to virtue: and con-
partake of will and reason.
traries are about one same thing. But the other powers
Reply to Objection 3. The members of the body are
of the soul, besides the will, are the subject of virtues, as
not principles but merely organs of action: wherefore they
stated above (q. 56). Therefore the will is not the only
are compared to the soul which moves them, as a slave
subject of sin.
who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand,
I answer that, As was shown above (a. 1), whatever is
the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as
the a principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now
free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as
voluntary acts are not only those which are elicited by the
is made clear in Polit. i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the ex-
will, but also those which are commanded by the will, as
ternal members are actions that pass into external matter,
we stated above (q. 6, a. 4) in treating of voluntariness.
as may be seen in the blow that is inflicted in the sin of
Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but
murder. Consequently there is no comparison.
Whether there can be sin in the sensuality?
Ia IIae q. 74 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be sin
found in any power whose act can be voluntary and in-
in the sensuality. For sin is proper to man who is praised
ordinate, wherein consists the nature of sin. Now it is
or blamed for his actions. Now sensuality is common to
evident that the act of the sensuality, or sensitive appetite,
us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot be in the
is naturally inclined to be moved by the will. Wherefore
sensuality.
it follows that sin can be in the sensuality.
Objection 2. Further, “no man sins in what he cannot
Reply to Objection 1. Although some of the powers
avoid,” as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But
of the sensitive part are common to us and irrational an-
man cannot prevent the movement of the sensuality from
imals, nevertheless, in us, they have a certain excellence
being inordinate, since “the sensuality ever remains cor-
through being united to the reason; thus we surpass other
rupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; wherefore
animals in the sensitive part for as much as we have the
it is signified by the serpent,” as Augustine declares (De
powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the Ia,
Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the inordinate movement of
q. 78, a. 4. In the same way our sensitive appetite sur-
the sensuality is not a sin.
passes that of other animals by reason of a certain excel-
Objection 3. Further, that which man himself does
lence consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the reason;
not do is not imputed to him as a sin. Now “that alone
and in this respect it can be the principle of a voluntary
do we seem to do ourselves, which we do with the delib-
action, and, consequently, the subject of sin.
eration of reason,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8).
Reply to Objection 2. The continual corruption of the
Therefore the movement of the sensuality, which is with-
sensuality is to be understood as referring to the “fomes,”
out the deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as
which is never completely destroyed in this life, since,
a sin.
though the stain of original sin passes, its effect remains.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 7:19): “The good
However, this corruption of the “fomes” does not hinder
which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I
man from using his rational will to check individual in-
do”: which words Augustine explains (Contra Julian. iii,
ordinate movements, if he be presentient to them, for in-
26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as referring to the evil of
stance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while
concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the sensu-
he is turning his thoughts to something else, an inordinate
ality. Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality.
movement may arise about this also: thus when a man,
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 2,3), sin may be
in order to avoid the movements of concupiscence, turns
∗ Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.
946
his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considera-self what he does without the deliberation of reason, since
tions of science, sometimes an unpremeditated movement
the principal part of man does nothing therein: wherefore
of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid
such is not perfectly a human act; and consequently it can-
all such movements, on account of the aforesaid corrup-
not be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is something
tion: but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin,
imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the
that he be able to avoid each single one.
sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, which is
Reply to Objection 3. Man does not do perfectly him-
something imperfect in the genus of sin.
Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality?
Ia IIae q. 74 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that mortal sin can be in
the end. Wherefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality,
the sensuality. Because an act is discerned by its object.
but only in the reason.
Now it is possible to commit a mortal sin about the objects
Reply to Objection 1. The act of the sensuality can
of the sensuality, e.g. about carnal pleasures. Therefore
concur towards a mortal sin: yet the fact of its being a
the act of the sensuality can be a mortal sin, so that mortal
mortal sin is due, not to its being an act of the sensuality,
sin can be found in the sensuality.
but to its being an act of reason, to whom the ordering to
Objection 2. Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue.
the end belongs. Consequently mortal sin is imputed, not
But virtue can be in the sensuality; for temperance and
to the sensuality, but to reason.
fortitude are virtues of the irrational parts, as the Philoso-
Reply to Objection 2. An act of virtue is perfected
pher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Therefore, since it is natural to not only in that it is an act of the sensuality, but still more contraries to be about the same subject, sensuality can be
in the fact of its being an act of reason and will, whose
the subject of mortal sin.
function it is to choose: for the act of moral virtue is not
Objection 3. Further, venial sin is a disposition to
without the exercise of choice: wherefore the act of moral
mortal sin. Now disposition and habit are in the same sub-
virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always ac-
ject. Since therefore venial sin may be in the sensuality,
companied by an act of prudence, which perfects the ra-
as stated above (a. 3, ad 3), mortal sin can be there also.
tional power; and the same applies to mortal sin, as stated
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 23):
(ad 1).
“The inordinate movement of concupiscence, which is the
Reply to Objection 3. A disposition may be related
sin of the sensuality, can even be in those who are in a
in three ways to that to which it disposes: for sometimes it
state of grace,” in whom, however, mortal sin is not to be
is the same thing and is in the same subject; thus inchoate
found. Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensual-
science is a disposition to perfect science: sometimes it is
ity is not a mortal sin.
in the same subject, but is not the same thing; thus heat
I answer that, Just as a disorder which destroys the
is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it is neither
principle of the body’s life causes the body’s death, so too
the same thing, nor in the same subject, as in those things
a disorder which destroys the principle of spiritual life,
which are subordinate to one another in such a way that
viz. the last end, causes spiritual death, which is mortal
we can arrive at one through the other, e.g. goodness of
sin, as stated above (q. 72, a. 5). Now it belongs to the
the imagination is a disposition to science which is in the
reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order anything
intellect. In this way the venial sin that is in the sensuality, to the end: and disorder in respect of the end can only be-may be a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason.
long to the power whose function it is to order others to
Whether sin can be in the reason?
Ia IIae q. 74 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that sin cannot be in the
things which are under our control. Now perfection and
reason. For the sin of any power is a defect thereof. But
defect of reason are not among those things which are un-
the fault of the reason is not a sin, on the contrary, it ex-
der our control: since by nature some are mentally defi-
cuses sin: for a man is excused from sin on account of
cient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore no sin is in the
ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.
reason.
Objection 2. Further, the primary object of sin is the
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12)
will, as stated above (a. 1). Now reason precedes the will,
that sin is in the lower and in the higher reason.
since it directs it. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.
I answer that, The sin of any power is an act of that
Objection 3. Further, there can be no sin except about
power, as we have clearly shown (Aa. 1,2,3). Now rea-
947
son has a twofold act: one is its proper act in respect of thing which a man is able and ought to know, he is not
its proper object, and this is the act of knowing the truth;
altogether excused from sin, and the defect is imputed to
the other is the act of reason as directing the other powers.
him as a sin. The defect which belongs only to the act of
Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the reason.
directing the other powers, is always imputed to reason as
First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which
a sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means
error is imputed to the reason as a sin, when it is in ig-
of its proper act.
norance or error about what it is able and ought to know:
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 17, a. 1),
secondly, when it either commands the inordinate move-
when we were treating of the acts of the will and reason,
ments of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to check
the will moves and precedes the reason, in one way, and
them.
the reason moves and precedes the will in another: so that
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the
both the movement of the will can be called rational, and
defect in the proper act of the reason in respect of its
the act of the reason, voluntary. Accordingly sin is found
proper object, and with regard to the case when it is a de-
in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of
fect of knowledge about something which one is unable
the reason, or through the reason being the principle of
to know: for then this defect of reason is not a sin, and ex-
the will’s act.
cuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what
madmen. If, however, the defect of reason be about some-
has been said (ad 1).
Whether the sin of morose delectation is in the reason?
Ia IIae q. 74 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of morose
in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the
delectation is not in the reason. For delectation denotes a
reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions.
movement of the appetitive power, as stated above (q. 31,
Now it fails, in two ways, in directing internal passions:
a. 1). But the appetitive power is distinct from the rea-
first, when it commands unlawful passions; for instance,
son, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore morose
when a man deliberately provokes himself to a movement
delectation is not in the reason.
of anger, or of lust: secondly, when it fails to check the un-
Objection 2.
Further, the object shows to which
lawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man,
power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the
having deliberately considered that a rising movement of
power is directed to its object. Now a morose delecta-
passion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell
tion is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the
[immoratur] upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this
goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose delecta-
sense the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the
tion is not in the reason.
reason.
Objection 3. Further, a thing is said to be morose∗
Reply to Objection 1. Delectation is indeed in the
through taking a length of time. But length of time is no
appetitive power as its proximate principle; but it is in the
reason why an act should belong to a particular power.
reason as its first mover, in accordance with what has been
Therefore morose delectation does not belong to the rea-
stated above (a. 1), viz. that actions which do not pass into
son.
external matter are subjected in their principles.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12)
Reply to Objection 2. Reason has its proper elicited
that “if the consent to a sensual delectation goes no fur-
act about its proper object; but it exercises the direction of
ther than the mere thought of the pleasure, I deem this
all the objects of those lower powers that can be directed
to be like as though the woman alone had partaken of the
by the reason: and accordingly delectation about sensible
forbidden fruit.” Now “the woman” denotes the lower rea-
objects comes also under the direction of reason.
son, as he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore
Reply to Objection 3. Delectation is said to be mo-
the sin of morose delectation is in the reason.
rose not from a delay of time, but because the reason in de-
I answer that, As stated (a. 5), sin may be in the rea-
liberating dwells [immoratur] thereon, and fails to drive it
son, not only in respect of reason’s proper act, but some-
away, “deliberately holding and turning over what should
times in respect of its directing human actions. Now it
have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind,” as
is evident that reason directs not only external acts, but
Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12).
also internal passions. Consequently when the reason fails
∗ From the Latin ‘mora’—delay
948
Whether the sin of consent to the act is in the higher reason?
Ia IIae q. 74 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of consent to
naturally; and further still, from the rule of the Divine
the act is not in the higher reason. For consent is an act of
law, as stated above (q. 19, a. 4). Consequently, since
the appetitive power, as stated above (q. 15, a. 1): whereas
the rule of the Divine law is the higher rule, it follows
the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of
that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment is finally
consent to the act is not in the higher reason.
pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent
Objection 2. Further, “the higher reason is intent on
on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pro-
contemplating and consulting the eternal law,” as Augus-
nounced on several points, the final judgment deals with
tine states (De Trin. xii, 7).∗. But sometimes consent is
that which comes last; and, in human acts, the action itself
given to an act, without consulting the eternal law: since
comes last, and the delectation which is the inducement to
man does not always think about Divine things, whenever
the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent to
he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the
an action belongs properly to the higher reason, while the
act is not always in the higher reason.
preliminary judgment which is about the delectation be-
Objection 3. Further, just as man can regulate his ex-
longs to the lower reason, which delivers judgment in a
ternal actions according to the eternal law, so can he regu-
lower court: although the higher reason can also judge of
late his internal pleasures or other passions. But “consent
the delectation, since whatever is subject to the judgment
to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs
of the lower court, is subject also to the judgment of the
to the lower reason,” as Augustine states (De Trin. xii,
higher court, but not conversely.
2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be
Reply to Objection 1. Consent is an act of the appet-
sometimes ascribed to the lower reason.
itive power, not absolutely, but in consequence of an act
Objection 4. Further, just as the higher reason excels
of reason deliberating and judging, as stated above (q. 15,
the lower, so does the reason excel the imagination. Now
a. 3). Because the fact that the consent is finally given to
sometimes man proceeds to act through the apprehension
a thing is due to the fact that the will tends to that upon
of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of
which the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence
his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves his
consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason.
hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason
Reply to Objection 2. The higher reason is said to
may consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher
consent, from the very fact that it fails to direct the human
reason.
act according to the Divine law, whether or not it advert
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12):
to the eternal law. For if it thinks of God’s law, it holds it
“If the consent to the evil use of things that can be per-
in actual contempt: and if not, it neglects it by a kind of
ceived by the bodily senses, so far approves of any sin, as
omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always pro-
to point, if possible, to its consummation by deed, we are
ceeds from the higher reason: because, as Augustine says
to understand that the woman has offered the forbidden
(De Trin. xii, 12), “the mind cannot effectively decide on
fruit to her husband.”
the commission of a sin, unless by its consent, whereby
I answer that, Consent implies a judgment about the
it wields its sovereign power of moving the members to
thing to which consent is given. For just as the specula-
action, or of restraining them from action, it become the
tive reason judges and delivers its sentence about intel-
servant or slave of the evil deed.”
ligible matters, so the practical reason judges and pro-
Reply to Objection 3. The higher reason, by con-
nounces sentence on matters of action. Now we must
sidering the eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal
observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the
delectation, even as it can direct or restrain the external
final sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we
action: nevertheless, before the judgment of the higher
see that in speculative matters the final sentence touch-
reason is pronounced the lower reason, while deliberating
ing any proposition is delivered by referring it to the first
the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes
principles; since, so long as there remains a yet higher
approves of this delectation: and then the consent to the
principle, the question can yet be submitted to it: where-
delectation belongs to the lower reason. If, however, af-
fore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence
ter considering the eternal law, man persists in giving the
not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that human
same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher
acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which
reason.
rule is derived from the created things that man knows
Reply to Objection 4. The apprehension of the power
∗ ‘Rationes aeternae,’ cf. Ia, q. 15, Aa. 2,[3] where as in similar passages ‘ratio’ has been rendered by the English ‘type,’ because St.
Thomas was speaking of the Divine ‘idea’ as the archetype of the creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is identified with the eternal law, (cf. a. 8, obj. 1; a. 9)
949
of imagination is sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliber-can cause an act before the higher or lower reason has
ation it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly
time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower reason is
by imputed to it.
deliberate, and so requires time, during which the higher
Whether consent to delectation is a mortal sin?
Ia IIae q. 74 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that consent to delecta-
sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by tion is not a mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs
deed: wherefore we ought to ask pardon for such thoughts
to the lower reason, which does not consider the eternal
also, and we should strike our breasts and say: ‘Forgive us
types, i.e. the eternal law, and consequently does not turn
our trespasses.’ ” Therefore consent to delectation is a ve-
away from them. Now every mortal sin consists in turn-
nial sin.
ing away from Augustine’s definition of mortal sin, which
On the contrary, Augustine adds after a few words:
was quoted above (q. 71, a. 6). Therefore consent to delec-
“Man will be altogether lost unless, through the grace
tation is not a mortal sin.
of the Mediator, he be forgiven those things which are
Objection 2. Further, consent to a thing is not evil, un-deemed mere sins of thought, since without the will to do
less the thing to which consent is given be evil. Now “the
them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them.” But no man
cause of anything being such is yet more so,” or at any
is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to
rate not less. Consequently the thing to which a man con-
delectation is a mortal sin.
sents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent. But delec-
I answer that, There have been various opinions on
tation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial
this point, for some have held that consent to delectation
sin. Therefore neither is the consent to the delectation a
is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin, while others have
mortal sin.
held it to be a mortal sin, and this opinion is more com-
Objection 3. Further, delectations differ in goodness
mon and more probable. For we must take note that since
and malice, according to the difference of the deeds, as
every delectation results from some action, as stated in
the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 3,5). Now the inward
Ethic. x, 4, and again, that since every delectation may be
thought is one thing, and the outward deed, e.g. fornica-
compared to two things, viz. to the operation from which
tion, is another. Therefore the delectation consequent to
it results, and to the object in which a person takes de-
the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice
light. Now it happens that an action, just as a thing, is
from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward
an object of delectation, because the action itself can be
thought differs from the outward deed; and consequently
considered as a good and an end, in which the person who
there is a like difference of consent on either hand. But
delights in it, rests. Sometimes the action itself, which re-
the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent
sults in delectation, is the object of delectation, in so far
to that thought: and therefore neither is the consent to the
as the appetitive power, to which it belongs to take delight
delectation.
in anything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a
Objection 4. Further, the external act of fornication or good: for instance, when a man thinks and delights in his
adultery is a mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation,
thought, in so far as his thought pleases him; while at other
since this is found also in the marriage act, but by reason
times the delight consequent to an action, e.g. a thought,
of an inordinateness in the act itself. Now he that consents
has for its object another action, as being the object of his
to the delectation does not, for this reason, consent to the
thought; and then his thought proceeds from the inclina-
inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems not to sin
tion of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to the
mortally.
action thought of. Accordingly a man who is thinking of
Objection 5.
Further, the sin of murder is more
fornication, may delight in either of two things: first, in
grievous than simple fornication. Now it is not a mortal
the thought itself, secondly, in the fornication thought of.
sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought
Now the delectation in the thought itself results from the
of murder. Much less therefore is it a mortal sin to con-
inclination of the appetite to the thought; and the thought
sent to the delectation resulting from the thought of forni-
itself is not in itself a mortal sin; sometimes indeed it is
cation.
only a venial sin, as when a man thinks of such a thing for
Objection 6. Further, the Lord’s prayer is recited ev-
no purpose; and sometimes it is no sin at all, as when a
ery day for the remission of venial sins, as Augustine as-
man has a purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he may
serts (Enchiridion lxxviii). Now Augustine teaches that
wish to preach or dispute about it. Consequently such af-
consent to delectation may be driven away by means of
fection or delectation in respect of the thought of fornica-
the Lord’s Prayer: for he says (De Trin. xii, 12) that “this
tion is not a mortal sin in virtue of its genus, but is some-
950
times a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all: wherefore Reply to Objection 2. Consent to a sin that is ve-neither is it a mortal sin to consent to such a thought. In
nial in its genus, is itself a venial sin, and accordingly one
this sense the first opinion is true.
may conclude that the consent to take pleasure in a useless
But that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure
thought about fornication, is a venial sin. But delectation
in the act thought of, is due to his desire being inclined to
in the act itself of fornication is, in its genus, a mortal sin: this act. Wherefore the fact that a man consents to such
and that it be a venial sin before the consent is given, is ac-
a delectation, amounts to nothing less than a consent to
cidental, viz. on account of the incompleteness of the act:
the inclination of his appetite to fornication: for no man
which incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent
takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with
has been given, so that therefore it has its complete nature
his appetite. Now it is a mortal sin, if a man deliberately
and is a mortal sin.
chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in itself
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the
a mortal sin. Wherefore such a consent to delectation in
delectation which has the thought for its object.
a mortal sin, is itself a mortal sin, as the second opinion
Reply to Objection 4. The delectation which has an
maintains.
external act for its object, cannot be without complacency
Reply to Objection 1. Consent to delectation may be
in the external act as such, even though there be no de-
not only in the lower reason, but also in the higher rea-
cision to fulfil it, on account of the prohibition of some
son, as stated above (a. 7). Nevertheless the lower reason
higher authority: wherefore the act is inordinate, and con-
may turn away from the eternal types, for, though it is not
sequently the delectation will be inordinate also.
intent on them, as regulating according to them, which is
Reply to Objection 5. The consent to delectation, re-
proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on them, as
sulting from complacency in an act of murder thought of,
being regulated according to them: and by turning from
is a mortal sin also: but not the consent to delectation re-
them in this sense, it may sin mortally; since even the acts
sulting from complacency in the thought of murder.
of the lower powers and of the external members may be
Reply to Objection 6. The Lord’s Prayer is to be said
mortal sins, in so far as the direction of the higher reason
in order that we may be preserved not only from venial
fails in directing them according to the eternal types.
sin, but also from mortal sin.
Whether there can be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers?
Ia IIae q. 74 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be ve-
ing the eternal law”; it contemplates it by considering its
nial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower pow-
truth; it consults it by judging and directing other things
ers, i.e. as consenting to a sinful act. For Augustine says
according to it: and to this pertains the fact that by delib-
(De Trin. xii, 7) that the “higher reason is intent on con-
erating through the eternal types, it consents to an act or
sidering and consulting the eternal law.” But mortal sin
dissents from it. Now it may happen that the inordinate-
consists in turning away from the eternal law. Therefore
ness of the act to which it consents, is not contrary to the
it seems that there can be no other than mortal sin in the
eternal law, in the same way as mortal sin is, because it
higher reason.
does not imply aversion from the last end, but is beside
Objection 2. Further, the higher reason is the princi-
that law, as an act of venial sin is. Therefore when the
ple of the spiritual life, as the heart is of the body’s life.
higher reason consents to the act of a venial sin, it does
But the diseases of the heart are deadly. Therefore the sins
not turn away from the eternal law: wherefore it sins, not
of the higher reason are mortal.
mortally, but venially.
Objection 3. Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
sin if it be done out of contempt. But it would seem im-
Reply to Objection 2. Disease of the heart is twofold:
possible to commit even a venial sin, deliberately, with-
one which is in the very substance of the heart, and affects
out contempt. Since then the consent of the higher reason
its natural consistency, and such a disease is always mor-
is always accompanied by deliberate consideration of the
tal: the other is a disease of the heart consisting in some
eternal law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin,
disorder either of the movement or of the parts surround-
on account of the contempt of the Divine law.
ing the heart, and such a disease is not always mortal. In
On the contrary, Consent to a sinful act belongs to
like manner there is mortal sin in the higher reason when-
the higher reason, as stated above (a. 7). But consent to
ever the order itself of the higher reason to its proper ob-
an act of venial sin is itself a venial sin. Therefore a venial ject which is the eternal law, is destroyed; but when the
sin can be in the higher reason.
disorder leaves this untouched, the sin is not mortal but
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7),
venial.
the higher reason “is intent on contemplating or consult-
Reply to Objection 3. Deliberate consent to a sin
951
does not always amount to contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the Divine law.
Whether venial sin can be in the higher reason as such?
Ia IIae q. 74 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin cannot be
in respect of simple intuition, it can have an inordinate
in the higher reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal
movement about Divine things, as when a man suffers a
law. For the act of a power is not found to fail except that
sudden movement of unbelief. And although unbelief, in
power be inordinately disposed with regard to its object.
its genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden movement of un-
Now the object of the higher reason is the eternal law, in
belief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless
respect of which there can be no disorder without mor-
it be contrary to the law of God. Now it is possible for
tal sin. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher
one of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason
reason as such.
suddenly under some other aspect, before the eternal law,
Objection 2. Further, since the reason is a delibera-
i.e. the law of God, is consulted, or can be consulted, on
tive power, there can be no act of reason without delib-
the matter; as, for instance, when a man suddenly appre-
eration. Now every inordinate movement in things con-
hends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally,
cerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal sin. Therefore
and rejects it, as soon as he had thus apprehended it, be-
venial sin is never in the higher reason as such.
fore he has had time to deliberate and consider that this
Objection 3. Further, it happens sometimes that a sin
is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine
which takes us unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliber-
law. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after
ate sin is a mortal sin, through the reason, in deliberating,
this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden
having recourse to some higher good, by acting against
movements, the higher reason may sin venially in respect
which, man sins more grievously; just as when the reason
of its proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus;
in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, con-
or it may sin mortally in giving a deliberate consent; but in
siders that it is contrary to the law of God, it sins more
things pertaining to the lower powers, it always sins mor-
grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it
tally, in things which are mortal sins in their genus, but
is contrary to moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot
not in those which are venial sins in their genus.
have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object.
Reply to Objection 1. A sin which is against the eter-
Therefore if a movement that takes us unawares is not a
nal law, though it be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless
mortal sin, neither will the subsequent deliberation make
be venial, on account of the incompleteness of a sudden
it a mortal sin; which is clearly false. Therefore there can
action, as stated.
be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.
Reply to Objection 2. In matters of action, the simple
On the contrary, A sudden movement of unbelief is
intuition of the principles from which deliberation pro-
a venial sin. But it belongs to the higher reason as such.
ceeds, belongs to the reason, as well as the act of delib-
Therefore there can be a venial sin in the higher reason as
eration: even as in speculative matters it belongs to the
such.
reason both to syllogize and to form propositions: conse-
I answer that, The higher reason regards its own ob-
quently the reason also can have a sudden movement.
ject otherwise than the objects of the lower powers that
Reply to Objection 3. One and the same thing may
are directed by the higher reason. For it does not regard
be the subject of different considerations, of which one
the objects of the lower powers, except in so far as it con-
is higher than the other; thus the existence of God may
sults the eternal law about them, and so it does not regard
be considered, either as possible to be known by the hu-
them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent
man reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation,
to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself a mortal sin;
which is a higher consideration. And therefore, although
and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally,
the object of the higher reason is, in its nature, something
if the acts of the lower powers to which it consents are
sublime, yet it is reducible to some yet higher considera-
mortal sins.
tion: and in this way, that which in the sudden movement
With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz.
was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of
simple “intuition,” and “deliberation,” in respect of which
the deliberation which brought it into the light of a higher
it again consults the eternal law about its own object. But
consideration, as was explained above.
952
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 75
Of the Causes of Sin, in General
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in particular. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sin has a cause?
(2) Whether it has an internal cause?
(3) Whether it has an external cause?
(4) Whether one sin is the cause of another?
Whether sin has a cause?
Ia IIae q. 75 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that sin has no cause. For
ficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought to be
sin has the nature of evil, as stated above (q. 71, a. 6).
in a thing, is never lacking except on account of some im-
But evil has no cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
peding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say that
Therefore sin has no cause.
evil, which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient
Objection 2.
Further, a cause is that from which
cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every acci-
something follows of necessity. Now that which is of
dental cause is reducible to the direct cause. Since then
necessity, seems to be no sin, for every sin is voluntary.
sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental ef-
Therefore sin has no cause.
ficient cause, and on the part of the act, a direct efficient
Objection 3. Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is
cause, it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result
either good or evil. It is not a good, because good pro-
of the cause of the act. Accordingly then, the will lacking
duces nothing but good, for “a good tree cannot bring
the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law,
forth evil fruit” (Mat. 7:18). Likewise neither can evil be
and intent on some mutable good, causes the act of sin
the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a sequel
directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and
to sin, and the evil of guilt is the same as sin. Therefore
beside the intention: for the lack of order in the act results
sin has no cause.
from the lack of direction in the will.
On the contrary, Whatever is done has a cause, for,
Reply to Objection 1. Sin signifies not only the pri-
according to Job 5:6, “nothing upon earth is done with-
vation of good, which privation is its inordinateness, but
out a cause.” But sin is something done; since it a “word,
also the act which is the subject of that privation, which
deed, or desire contrary to the law of God.” Therefore sin
has the nature of evil: and how this evil has a cause, has
has a cause.
been explained.
I answer that, A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly,
Reply to Objection 2. If this definition is to be ver-
so far as it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any ified in all cases, it must be understood as applying to a
other act; but, so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in
cause which is sufficient and not impeded. For it happens
the same way as a negation or privation can have a cause.
that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else, and
Now two causes may be assigned to a negation: in the
that the effect does not follow of necessity, on account of
first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i.e. the
some supervening impediment: else it would follow that
negation of the cause itself, is the cause of the negation
all things happen of necessity, as is proved in Metaph. vi,
in itself; since the result of the removing the cause is the
text. 5. Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not
removal of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the
follow that this is a necessary cause, since its effect can be
cause of darkness. In the second place, the cause of an
impeded.
affirmation, of which a negation is a sequel, is the acci-
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, the will in
dental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by caus-
failing to apply the rule of reason or of the Divine law, is
ing heat in virtue of its principal tendency, consequently
the cause of sin. Now the fact of not applying the rule of
causes a privation of cold. The first of these suffices to
reason or of the Divine law, has not in itself the nature of
cause a simple negation. But, since the inordinateness of
evil, whether of punishment or of guilt, before it is applied
sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the pri-
to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of
vation of that which something ought naturally to have,
the first sin, but some good lacking some other good.
such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental ef-
953
Whether sin has an internal cause?
Ia IIae q. 75 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that sin has no internal
of sin is some apparent good as motive, yet lacking the
cause. For that which is within a thing is always in it. If
due motive, viz. the rule of reason or the Divine law, this
therefore sin had an internal cause, man would always be
motive which is an apparent good, appertains to the appre-
sinning, since given the cause, the effect follows.
hension of the senses and to the appetite; while the lack of
Objection 2. Further, a thing is not its own cause. But
the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is to
the internal movements of a man are sins. Therefore they
consider this rule; and the completeness of the voluntary
are not the cause of sin.
sinful act appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, Objection 3. Further, whatever is within man is either
given the conditions we have just mentioned, is already a
natural or voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be
sin.
the cause of sin, for sin is contrary to nature, as Dama-
Reply to Objection 1. That which is within a thing
scene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3; iv, 21); while that which
as its natural power, is always in it: but that which is
is voluntary, if it be inordinate, is already a sin. Therefore
within it, as the internal act of the appetitive or apprehen-
nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin.
sive power, is not always in it. Now the power of the will
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Duabus Anim.
is the potential cause of sin, but is made actual by the pre-
x, 10,11; Retract. i, 9) that “the will is the cause of sin.”
ceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the direct cause
place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is because a
of sin must be considered on the part of the act. Now we
thing is proposed as appetible to the senses, and because
may distinguish a twofold internal cause of human acts,
the appetite is inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to
one remote, the other proximate. The proximate internal
consider the due rule, so that the will produces the act of
cause of the human act is the reason and will, in respect of
sin. Since therefore the movements that precede it are not
which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the
always actual, neither is man always actually sinning.
apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive
Reply to Objection 2. It is not true that all the internal appetite. For just as it is due to the judgment of reason,
acts belong to the substance of sin, for this consists prin-
that the will is moved to something in accord with rea-
cipally in the act of the will; but some precede and some
son, so it is due to an apprehension of the senses that the
follow the sin itself.
sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which inclina-
Reply to Objection 3. That which causes sin, as a
tion sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall
power produces its act, is natural; and again, the move-
explain further on (q. 77, a. 1). Accordingly a double in-
ment of the sensitive part, from which sin follows, is natu-
terior cause of sin may be assigned; one proximate, on the
ral sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins through
part of the reason and will; and the other remote, on the
appetite for food. Yet sin results in being unnatural from
part of the imagination or sensitive appetite.
the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in ac-
But since we have said above (a. 1, ad 3) that the cause
cord with his nature, ought to observe.
Whether sin has an external cause?
Ia IIae q. 75 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that sin has no external
On the contrary, It is written (Num. 21:16): “Are not
cause. For sin is a voluntary act. Now voluntary acts be-
these they, that deceived the children of Israel by the coun-
long to principles that are within us, so that they have no
sel of Balaam, and made you transgress against the Lord
external cause. Therefore sin has no external cause.
by the sin of Phogor?” Therefore something external can
Objection 2. Further, as nature is an internal princi-
be a cause of sin.
ple, so is the will. Now in natural things sin can be due to
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the internal
no other than an internal cause; for instance, the birth of
cause of sin is both the will, as completing the sinful act,
a monster is due to the corruption of some internal prin-
and the reason, as lacking the due rule, and the appetite,
ciple. Therefore in the moral order, sin can arise from no
as inclining to sin. Accordingly something external might
other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external
be a cause of sin in three ways, either by moving the will
cause.
itself immediately, or by moving the reason, or by mov-
Objection 3. Further, if the cause is multiplied, the
ing the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (q. 9, a. 6;
effect is multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty
q. 10, a. 4), none can move the will inwardly save God
the external inducements to sin are, the less is a man’s in-
alone, who cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove fur-
ordinate act imputed to him as a sin. Therefore nothing
ther on (q. 79, a. 1). Hence it follows that nothing external
external is a cause of sin.
can be a cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a
954
man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving the sensitive and necessarily, it follows that it remains in our power to
appetite, as certain external sensibles move it. Yet neither
sin or not to sin.
does external enticement move the reason, of necessity,
Reply to Objection 2. The fact that sin has an inter-
in matters of action, nor do things proposed externally, of
nal cause does not prevent its having an external cause;
necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be
for nothing external is a cause of sin, except through the
disposed thereto in a certain way; and even the sensitive
medium of the internal cause, as stated.
appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will.
Reply to Objection 3. If the external causes inclining
Therefore something external can be a cause moving to
to sin be multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because
sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the
they incline to the sinful act in both greater numbers and
will alone is the sufficient completive cause of sin being
greater frequency. Nevertheless the character of guilt is
accomplished.
lessened, since this depends on the act being voluntary
Reply to Objection 1. From the very fact that the ex-
and in our power.
ternal motive causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently
Whether one sin is a cause of another?
Ia IIae q. 75 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that one sin cannot be the
first sin is the accidental cause of the second. Directly,
cause of another. For there are four kinds of cause, none
as when, by one sinful act, man is disposed to commit
of which will fit in with one sin causing another. Because
more readily another like act: because acts cause dispo-
the end has the character of good; which is inconsistent
sitions and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly, after
with sin, which has the character of evil. In like manner
the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of an-
neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since “evil is not an
other, by preparing its matter: thus covetousness prepares
efficient cause, but is weak and powerless,” as Dionysius
the matter for strife, which is often about the wealth a man
declares (Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause
has amassed together. Thirdly, after the manner of a final
seems to have no place except in natural bodies, which are
cause, one sin causes another, in so far as a man commits
composed of matter and form. Therefore sin cannot have
one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when
either a material or a formal cause.
a man is guilty of simony for the end of ambition, or for-
Objection 2. Further, “to produce its like belongs to a
nication for the purpose of theft. And since the end gives
perfect thing,” as stated in Meteor. iv, 2∗. But sin is essen-
the form to moral matters, as stated above (q. 1, a. 3; q. 18,
tially something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a
Aa. 4,6), it follows that one sin is also the formal cause of
cause of another.
another: because in the act of fornication committed for
Objection 3. Further, if one sin is the cause of a sec-
the purpose of theft, the former is material while the latter
ond sin, in the same way, yet another sin will be the cause
is formal.
of the first, and thus we go on indefinitely, which is ab-
Reply to Objection 1. Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, surd. Therefore one sin is not the cause of another.
has the character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it
On the contrary, Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom.
has some good, at least apparent, for its end: so that, as an
xi): “A sin is not quickly blotted out by repentance, is
act, but not as being inordinate, it can be the cause, both
both a sin and a cause of sin.”
final and efficient, of another sin. A sin has matter, not “of
I answer that, Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the
which” but “about which” it is: and it has its form from
part of the act of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the
its end. Consequently one sin can be the cause of another,
cause of another, in the same way as one human act is the
in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated above.
cause of another. Hence it happens that one sin may be
Reply to Objection 2. Sin is something imperfect on
the cause of another in respect of the four kinds of causes.
account of its moral imperfection on the part of its in-
First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause,
ordinateness. Nevertheless, as an act it can have natural
both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, as that which re-
perfection: and thus it can be the cause of another sin.
moves an impediment is called an indirect cause of move-
Reply to Objection 3. Not every cause of one sin is
ment: for when man, by one sinful act, loses grace, or
another sin; so there is no need to go on indefinitely: for
charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him
one may come to one sin which is not caused by another
from sin, he thereby falls into another sin, so that the
sin.
∗ Cf. De Anima ii.
955
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 76
Of the Causes of Sin, in Particular
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3) sins which are the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above (a. 2), the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the first place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of sin on the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite; thirdly, of malice, which is the cause of sin on the part of the will.
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin?
(2) Whether ignorance is a sin?
(3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether?
(4) Whether it diminishes sin?
Whether ignorance can be a cause of sin?
Ia IIae q. 76 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance cannot be
a practical syllogism is a singular proposition. But a sin-
a cause of sin: because a non-being is not the cause of
gular proposition does not follow from a universal propo-
anything. Now ignorance is a non-being, since it is a pri-
sition, except through the medium of a particular propo-
vation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is not a cause
sition: thus a man is restrained from an act of parricide,
of sin.
by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one’s father, and
Objection 2. Further, causes of sin should be reck-
that this man is his father. Hence ignorance about either
oned in respect of sin being a “turning to” something,
of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle
as was stated above (q. 75, a. 1). Now ignorance seems
which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance,
to savor of “turning away” from something. Therefore it
could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not
should not be reckoned a cause of sin.
every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone
Objection 3. Further, every sin is seated in the will.
which removes the knowledge which would prevent the
Now the will does not turn to that which is not known,
sinful act. Consequently if a man’s will be so disposed
because its object is the good apprehended. Therefore ig-
that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide,
norance cannot be a cause of sin.
even though he recognized his father, his ignorance about
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat.
his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is
lxvii) “that some sin through ignorance.”
concomitant with the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys.
“through ignorance” but “in ignorance,” as the Philoso-
viii, 27) a moving cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A
pher states (Ethic. iii, 1).
direct cause is one that moves by its own power, as the
Reply to Objection 1. Non-being cannot be the direct
generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things.
cause of anything: but it can be an accidental cause, as
An indirect cause, is either one that removes an impedi-
being the removal of an impediment.
ment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in
Reply to Objection 2. As knowledge, which is re-
this way that ignorance can be the cause of a sinful act;
moved by ignorance, regards sin as turning towards some-
because it is a privation of knowledge perfecting the rea-
thing, so too, ignorance of this respect of a sin is the cause
son that forbids the act of sin, in so far as it directs human
of that sin, as removing its impediment.
acts.
Reply to Objection 3. The will cannot turn to that
Now we must observe that the reason directs human
which is absolutely unknown: but if something be known
acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge, universal
in one respect, and unknown in another, the will can will
and particular: because in conferring about what is to be
it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin: for instance, done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which is
when a man knows that what he is killing is a man, but not
an act of judgment, or of choice, or an operation. Now
that it is his own father; or when one knows that a certain
actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of
act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin.
956
Whether ignorance is a sin?
Ia IIae q. 76 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance is not a
as the geometrical theorems, and contingent particulars,
sin. For sin is “a word, deed or desire contrary to God’s
except in some individual case. Now it is evident that
law,” as stated above (q. 71, a. 5). Now ignorance does
whoever neglects to have or do what he ought to have or
not denote an act, either internal or external. Therefore
do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negli-
ignorance is not a sin.
gence, ignorance of what one is bound to know, is a sin;
Objection 2. Further, sin is more directly opposed to
whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to
grace than to knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a
know what he is unable to know. Consequently ignorance
sin, but a punishment resulting from sin. Therefore igno-
of such like things is called “invincible,” because it cannot
rance which is privation of knowledge is not a sin.
be overcome by study. For this reason such like ignorance,
Objection 3. Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can
not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid
only be in so far as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is
of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no invincible a sin, through being voluntary, it seems that the sin will
ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance
consist in the act itself of the will, rather than in the igno-
is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; but
rance. Therefore the ignorance will not be a sin, but rather
not, if it be about things one is not bound to know.
a result of sin.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 71, a. 6, ad
Objection 4. Further, every sin is taken away by re-
1), when we say that sin is a “word, deed or desire,” we
pentance, nor does any sin, except only original sin, pass
include the opposite negations, by reason of which omis-
as to guilt, yet remain in act. Now ignorance is not re-
sions have the character of sin; so that negligence, in as
moved by repentance, but remains in act, all its guilt being
much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the above defi-
removed by repentance. Therefore ignorance is not a sin,
nition of sin; in so far as one omits to say what one ought,
unless perchance it be original sin.
or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in
Objection 5. Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man
order to acquire the knowledge which we ought to have.
will be sinning, as long as he remains in ignorance. But ig-
Reply to Objection 2. Although privation of grace is
norance is continual in the one who is ignorant. Therefore
not a sin in itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing
a person in ignorance would be continually sinning, which
oneself for grace, it may have the character of sin, even
is clearly false, else ignorance would be a most grievous
as ignorance; nevertheless even here there is a difference,
sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.
since man can acquire knowledge by his acts, whereas
On the contrary, Nothing but sin deserves punish-
grace is not acquired by acts, but by God’s favor.
ment. But ignorance deserves punishment, according to 1
Reply to Objection 3. Just as in a sin of transgres-
Cor. 14:38: “If any man know not, he shall not be known.”
sion, the sin consists not only in the act of the will, but
Therefore ignorance is a sin.
also in the act willed, which is commanded by the will; so
I answer that, Ignorance differs from nescience,
in a sin of omission not only the act of the will is a sin,
in that nescience denotes mere absence of knowledge;
but also the omission, in so far as it is in some way volun-
wherefore whoever lacks knowledge about anything, can
tary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack of
be said to be nescient about it: in which sense Dionysius
consideration is a sin.
puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii). On the other
Reply to Objection 4. Although when the guilt has
hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack
passed away through repentance, the ignorance remains,
of knowledge of those things that one has a natural apti-
according as it is a privation of knowledge, nevertheless
tude to know. Some of these we are under an obligation to
the negligence does not remain, by reason of which the
know, those, to wit, without the knowledge of which we
ignorance is said to be a sin.
are unable to accomplish a due act rightly. Wherefore all
Reply to Objection 5. Just as in other sins of omis-
are bound in common to know the articles of faith, and the
sion, man sins actually only at the time at which the af-
universal principles of right, and each individual is bound
firmative precept is binding, so is it with the sin of igno-
to know matters regarding his duty or state. Meanwhile
rance. For the ignorant man sins actually indeed, not con-
there are other things which a man may have a natural ap-
tinually, but only at the time for acquiring the knowledge
titude to know, yet he is not bound to know them, such
that he ought to have.
957
Whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether?
Ia IIae q. 76 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance excuses
which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in
from sin altogether. For as Augustine says (Retract. i,
so far as something is not known to be a sin. Now it may
9), every sin is voluntary. Now ignorance causes involun-
happen that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin,
tariness, as stated above (q. 6, a. 8). Therefore ignorance
the knowledge of which circumstance would prevent him
excuses from sin altogether.
from sinning, whether it belong to the substance of the
Objection 2. Further, that which is done beside the
sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge is sufficient
intention, is done accidentally. Now the intention cannot
for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if
be about what is unknown. Therefore what a man does
a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man (which
through ignorance is accidental in human acts. But what
suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact
is accidental does not give the species. Therefore nothing
that it is his father, (which is a circumstance constitut-
that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be
ing another species of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware
deemed sinful or virtuous.
that this man will defend himself and strike him back, and
Objection 3. Further, man is the subject of virtue and
that if he had known this, he would not have struck him
sin, inasmuch as he is partaker of reason. Now ignorance
(which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Where-
excludes knowledge which perfects the reason. Therefore
fore, though this man sins through ignorance, yet he is
ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
not altogether excused, because, not withstanding, he has
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii,
knowledge of the sin. Secondly, this may happen on the
18) that “some things done through ignorance are rightly
part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance
reproved.” Now those things alone are rightly reproved
is voluntary, either directly, as when a man wishes of set
which are sins. Therefore some things done through ig-
purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin
norance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether
the more freely; or indirectly, as when a man, through
excuse from sin.
stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the
I answer that, Ignorance, by its very nature, renders
knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For such
the act which it causes involuntary. Now it has already
like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and
been stated (Aa. 1,2) that ignorance is said to cause the act
sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and able
which the contrary knowledge would have prevented; so
to know. Consequently this ignorance does not altogether
that this act, if knowledge were to hand, would be contrary
excuse from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to
to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary.
be entirely involuntary, either through being invincible, or
If, however, the knowledge, which is removed by igno-
through being of matters one is not bound to know, then
rance, would not have prevented the act, on account of
such like ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
the inclination of the will thereto, the lack of this knowl-
Reply to Objection 1. Not every ignorance causes in-
edge does not make that man unwilling, but not willing,
voluntariness, as stated above (q. 6, a. 8). Hence not every
as stated in Ethic. iii, 1: and such like ignorance which is
ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
not the cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it
Reply to Objection 2. So far as voluntariness remains
does not make the act to be involuntary, does not excuse
in the ignorant person, the intention of sin remains in him:
from sin. The same applies to any ignorance that does not
so that, in this respect, his sin is not accidental.
cause, but follows or accompanies the sinful act.
Reply to Objection 3. If the ignorance be such as to
On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of
exclude the use of reason entirely, it excuses from sin al-
the act, since it makes it to be involuntary, of its very na-
together, as is the case with madmen and imbeciles: but
ture excuses from sin, because voluntariness is essential
such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin; and
to sin. But it may fail to excuse altogether from sin, and
so it does not always excuse from sin altogether.
this for two reasons. First, on the part of the thing itself
Whether ignorance diminishes a sin?
Ia IIae q. 76 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance does not
Objection 2. Further, one sin added to another makes
diminish a sin. For that which is common to all sins does
a greater sin. But ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above
not diminish sin. Now ignorance is common to all sins,
(a. 2). Therefore it does not diminish a sin.
for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that “every evil
Objection 3. Further, the same thing does not both ag-
man is ignorant.” Therefore ignorance does not diminish
gravate and diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin;
sin.
for Ambrose commenting on Rom. 2:4, “Knowest thou
958
not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?”
and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntari-
says: “Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not.”
ness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing
Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.
is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to con-
Objection 4. Further, if any kind of ignorance dimin-
sent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore,
ishes a sin, this would seem to be chiefly the case as re-
in that case there is less contempt, and therefore less sin.
gards the ignorance which removes the use of reason al-
Reply to Objection 1. The ignorance whereby “every
together. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish
evil man is ignorant,” is not the cause of sin being com-
sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
mitted, but something resulting from that cause, viz. of
5) that the “punishment is doubled for a drunken man.”
the passion or habit inclining to sin.
Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.
Reply to Objection 2. One sin is added to another
On the contrary, Whatever is a reason for sin to be
makes more sins, but it does not always make a sin greater,
forgiven, diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is
since, perchance, the two sins do not coincide, but are sep-
clear from 1 Tim. 1:13: “I obtained. . . mercy. . . because I
arate. It may happen, if the first diminishes the second,
did it ignorantly.” Therefore ignorance diminishes or alle-
that the two together have not the same gravity as one of
viates sin.
them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous
I answer that, Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance
sin if committed by a man when sober, than if committed
can diminish sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntari-
by a man when drunk, although in the latter case there are
ness; and if it does not render it less voluntary, it nowise
two sins: because drunkenness diminishes the sinfulness
alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance
of the resulting sin more than its own gravity implies.
which excuses from sin altogether (through making it al-
Reply to Objection 3. The words of Ambrose may be
together involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does
understood as referring to simply affected ignorance; or
away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance
they may have reference to a species of the sin of ingrati-
which is not the cause of the sin being committed, but is
tude, the highest degree of which is that man even ignores
concomitant with it, neither diminishes nor increases the
the benefits he has received; or again, they may be an al-
sin.
lusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the
Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance,
foundation of the spiritual edifice.
but only by such as is a cause of the sin being commit-
Reply to Objection 4. The drunken man deserves
ted, and yet does not excuse from the sin altogether. Now
a “double punishment” for the two sins which he com-
it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is directly
mits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results from
and essentially voluntary, as when a man is purposely ig-
his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the
norant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this
ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting
kind seems rather to make the act more voluntary and
sin, and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunken-
more sinful, since it is through the will’s intention to sin
ness implies, as stated above (ad 2). It might also be said
that he is willing to bear the hurt of ignorance, for the
that the words quoted refer to an ordinance of the legis-
sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however, the ig-
lator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to be more
norance which is the cause of a sin being committed, is not
severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye,
directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a
not to the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but
man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result be-
to expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than
ing that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks
by the sober, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii).
too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk
959
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 77
Of the Cause of Sin, On the Part of the Sensitive Appetite
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be a cause of sin: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the will?
(2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter’s knowledge?
(3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness?
(4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin?
(5) Of three causes mentioned in 1 Jn. 2:16: “Concupiscence of the eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh,”
and “Pride of life.”
(6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it?
(7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?
(8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?
Whether the will is moved by a passion of the senstive appetite?
Ia IIae q. 77 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not moved
or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both because all
by a passion of the sensitive appetite. For no passive
energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the
power is moved except by its object. Now the will is a
contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less
power both passive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and
able to be directed to several; and because, in the oper-
moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive power in
ations of the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if
general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the ob-
this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given
ject of the will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite,
to another. In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the
but good defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of
movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect
the sensitive appetite does not move the will.
of any passion whatever, the proper movement of the ra-
Objection 2. Further, the higher mover is not moved
tional appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss
by the lower; thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now
or altogether impeded.
the will, which is the rational appetite, is compared to the
Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will’s ob-
sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a lower: for the
ject, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 57) that “the ratio-
judgment and apprehension of reason is impeded on ac-
nal appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the
count of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the
heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another.” Therefore
imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as ap-
the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive ap-
pears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident
petite.
that the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment
Objection 3.
Further, nothing immaterial can be
of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensi-
moved by that which is material. Now the will is an im-
tive appetite, even as the verdict of the taste follows the
material power, because it does not use a corporeal organ,
disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe
since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42: that those who are in some kind of passion, do not easily
whereas the sensitive appetite is a material force, since it
turn their imagination away from the object of their emo-
is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion
tion, the result being that the judgment of the reason often
of the sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective ap-
follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and conse-
petite.
quently the will’s movement follows it also, since it has
On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 13:56): “Lust
a natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the
hath perverted thy heart.”
reason.
I answer that, A passion of the sensitive appetite can-
Reply to Objection 1. Although the passion of the
not draw or move the will directly; but it can do so indi-
sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet
rectly, and this in two ways. First, by a kind of distraction:
it occasions a certain change in the judgment about the
because, since all the soul’s powers are rooted in the one
object of the will, as stated.
essence of the soul, it follows of necessity that, when one
Reply to Objection 2. The higher mover is not di-
power is intent in its act, another power becomes remiss,
rectly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be
960
moved by it indirectly, as stated.
The Third Objection is solved in like manner.
Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge?
Ia IIae q. 77 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the reason cannot be
the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of which
overcome by a passion, against its knowledge. For the
he had been speaking previously. Since then concupis-
stronger is not overcome by the weaker. Now knowledge,
cence is a passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason
on account of its certitude, is the strongest thing in us.
counter to its knowledge.
Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion, which is
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii,
weak and soon passes away.
2), the opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never
Objection 2. Further, the will is not directed save to
be overcome by passion; wherefore he held every virtue
the good or the apparent good. Now when a passion draws
to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of igno-
the will to that which is really good, it does not influence
rance. In this he was somewhat right, because, since the
the reason against its knowledge; and when it draws it to
object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never
that which is good apparently, but not really, it draws it to
moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear
that which appears good to the reason. But what appears
good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would
to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason. Therefore
never tend to evil, unless there were ignorance or error in
a passion never influences the reason against its knowl-
the reason. Hence it is written (Prov. 14:22): “They err
edge.
that work evil.”
Objection 3. Further, if it be said that it draws the
Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to
reason from its knowledge of something in general, to
the knowledge that they have, and this is confirmed by
form a contrary judgment about a particular matter—on
Divine authority, according to the words of Lk. 12:47:
the contrary, if a universal and a particular proposition be
“The servant who knew that the will of his lord. . . and did
opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e.g. “Every
not. . . shall be beaten with many stripes,” and of James
man,” and “Not every man.” Now if two opinions con-
4:17: “To him. . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it
tradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as
not, to him it is a sin.” Consequently he was not altogether
stated in Peri Herm. ii. If therefore anyone, while know-
right, and it is necessary, with the Philosopher (Ethic. vii,
ing something in general, were to pronounce an opposite
3) to make a distinction. Because, since man is directed
judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary
to right action by a twofold knowledge, viz. universal and
opinions at the same time, which is impossible.
particular, a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the
Objection 4. Further, whoever knows the universal,
rectitude of the will and of the deed, as stated above (q. 76,
knows also the particular which he knows to be contained
a. 1). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowl-
in the universal: thus who knows that every mule is ster-
edge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, and yet
ile, knows that this particular animal is sterile, provided
he does not know in particular that this act, which is forni-
he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from Poster. i, text.
cation, must not be done; and this suffices for the will not
2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that “no
to follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again,
fornication is lawful,” knows this general proposition to
it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is
contain, for example, the particular proposition, “This is
known habitually from not being considered actually: so
an act of fornication.” Therefore it seems that his knowl-
that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not
edge extends to the particular.
only in general but also in particular, and yet not to con-
Objection 5. Further, according to the Philosopher
sider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it does
(Peri Herm. i), “words express the thoughts of the mind.”
not seem difficult for a man to act counter to what he does
Now it often happens that man, while in a state of pas-
not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to
sion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even in
consider in particular what he knows habitually, may hap-
that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even in
pen through mere lack of attention: for instance, a man
particular.
who knows geometry, may not attend to the consideration
Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the
of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to consider
reason against its universal knowledge; because it is im-
at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually
possible for it to have universal knowledge together with
what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance
an opposite particular judgment.
supervening, e.g. some external occupation, or some bod-
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): “I
ily infirmity; and, in this way, a man who is in a state of
see another law in my members, fighting against the law
passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in
of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin.” Now
general, in so far as the passions hinder him from consid-
961
ering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of opinion about a particular negative proposition, or vice
distraction, as explained above (a. 1). Secondly, by way of
versa: but it may well happen that a man has true habitual
opposition, because a passion often inclines to something
knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and
contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, by way
actually a false opinion about a particular negative: be-
of bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the rea-
cause an act is directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an
son is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely;
act.
even as sleep or drunkenness, on account of some change
Reply to Objection 4. He that has knowledge in a uni-
wrought on the body, fetters the use of reason. That this
versal, is hindered, on account of a passion, from reason-
takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that
ing about that universal, so as to draw the conclusion: but
sometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses
he reasons about another universal proposition suggested
the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of
by the inclination of the passion, and draws his conclusion
their minds through excess of love or anger. It is in this
accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3)
way that passion draws the reason to judge in particular,
that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propo-
against the knowledge which it has in general.
sitions, two particular and two universal, of which one is
Reply to Objection 1. Universal knowledge, which is
of the reason, e.g. No fornication is lawful, and the other,
most certain, does not hold the foremost place in action,
of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence pas-
but rather particular knowledge, since actions are about
sion fetters the reason, and hinders it from arguing and
singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing that, in matters
concluding under the first proposition; so that while the
of action, passion acts counter to universal knowledge, if
passions lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the
the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking.
second.
Reply to Objection 2. The fact that something ap-
Reply to Objection 5. Even as a drunken man some-
pears good in particular to the reason, whereas it is not
times gives utterance to words of deep signification, of
good, is due to a passion: and yet this particular judgment
which, however, he is incompetent to judge, his drunk-
is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason.
enness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state of
Reply to Objection 3. It is impossible for anyone to
passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do
have an actual knowledge or true opinion about a univer-
so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as
sal affirmative proposition, and at the same time a false
stated in Ethic. vii, 3.
Whether a sin committed through passion, should be called a sin of weakness?
Ia IIae q. 77 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that a sin committed
other name for disease. Therefore a sin that arises from
through passion should not be called a sin of weakness.
passion should be called a sin of weakness.
For a passion is a vehement movement of the sensitive
I answer that, The cause of sin is on the part of the
appetite, as stated above (a. 1). Now vehemence of move-
soul, in which, chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be
ments is evidence of strength rather than of weakness.
applied to the soul by way of likeness to weakness of the
Therefore a sin committed through passion, should not be
body. Accordingly, man’s body is said to be weak, when
called a sin of weakness.
it is disabled or hindered in the execution of its proper ac-
Objection 2. Further, weakness in man regards that
tion, through some disorder of the body’s parts, so that
which is most fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence
the humors and members of the human body cease to be
it is written (Ps. 77:39): “He remembered that they are
subject to its governing and motive power. Hence a mem-
flesh.” Therefore sins of weakness should be those which
ber is said to be weak, when it cannot do the work of a
result from bodily defects, rather than those which are due
healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see
to a passion.
clearly, as the Philosopher states (De Hist. Animal. x,
Objection 3. Further, man does not seem to be weak
1). Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul is
in respect of things which are subject to his will. Now it is
hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account of a
subject to man’s will, whether he do or do not the things
disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said
to which his passions incline him, according to Gn. 4:7:
to be out of order, when they fail to comply with the or-
“Thy appetite shall be under thee∗, and thou shalt have do-
der of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be
minion over it.” Therefore sin committed through passion
inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of rea-
is not a sin of weakness.
son, for the reason is the ruling power of the soul’s parts.
On the contrary, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls
Accordingly, when the concupiscible or irascible power is
the passions diseases of the soul. Now weakness is an-
affected by any passion contrary to the order of reason,
∗ Vulg.: ‘The lust thereof shall be under thee.’
962
the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid tion, and yet be hindered by a passion, as stated above
manner to the due action of man, it is said to be a sin of
(a. 1). Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we re-
weakness. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares
fer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even
the incontinent man to an epileptic, whose limbs move in
weakness of soul is called weakness of the flesh, in so far
a manner contrary to his intention.
as it is owing to a condition of the flesh that the passions
Reply to Objection 1. Just as in the body the stronger
of the soul arise in us through the sensitive appetite being
the movement against the order of nature, the greater the
a power using a corporeal organ.
weakness, so likewise, the stronger the movement of pas-
Reply to Objection 3. It is in the will’s power to give
sion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness
or refuse its consent to what passion inclines us to do, and
of the soul.
it is in this sense that our appetite is said to be under us;
Reply to Objection 2. Sin consists chiefly in an act of
and yet this consent or dissent of the will is hindered in
the will, which is not hindered by weakness of the body:
the way already explained (a. 1).
for he that is weak in body may have a will ready for ac-
Whether self-love is the source of every sin?
Ia IIae q. 77 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that self-love is not the
and direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of
source of every sin. For that which is good and right in
the adherence to a mutable good; in which respect every
itself is not the proper cause of sin. Now love of self is
sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some tem-
a good and right thing in itself: wherefore man is com-
poral good. Now the fact that anyone desires a temporal
manded to love his neighbor as himself (Lev. 19:18).
good inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves him-
Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin.
self inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:8):
him. Therefore it is evident that inordinate love of self is
“Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me
the cause of every sin.
all manner of concupiscence”; on which words a gloss
Reply to Objection 1.
Well ordered self-love,
says that “the law is good, since by forbidding concupis-
whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right
cence, it forbids all evils,” the reason for which is that
and natural; but it is inordinate self-love, leading to con-
concupiscence is the cause of every sin. Now concupis-
tempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) reck-
cence is a distinct passion from love, as stated above (q. 3,
ons to be the cause of sin.
a. 2; q. 23, a. 4). Therefore self-love is not the cause of
Reply to Objection 2. Concupiscence, whereby a
every sin.
man desires good for himself, is reduced to self-love as
Objection 3. Further, Augustine in commenting on
to its cause, as stated.
Ps. 79:17, “Things set on fire and dug down,” says that
Reply to Objection 3. Man is said to love both the
“every sin is due either to love arousing us to undue ardor
good he desires for himself, and himself to whom he de-
or to fear inducing false humility.” Therefore self-love is
sires it. Love, in so far as it is directed to the object of
not the only cause of sin.
desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or money) ad-
Objection 4. Further, as man sins at times through
mits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance of evil:
inordinate love of self, so does he sometimes through in-
for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some
ordinate love of his neighbor. Therefore self-love is not
good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But each
the cause of every sin.
of these is reduced to self-love, since it is through loving
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
himself that man either desires good things, or avoids evil
28) that “self-love, amounting to contempt of God, builds
things.
up the city of Babylon.” Now every sin makes man a citi-
Reply to Objection 4. A friend is like another self
zen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of every
(Ethic. ix): wherefore the sin which is committed through
sin.
love for a friend, seems to be committed through self-love.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 75, a. 1), the proper Whether concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life are Ia IIae q. 77 a. 5
fittingly described as causes of sin?
Objection 1. It would seem that “concupiscence of
unfittingly described as causes of sin. Because, accord-
the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life” are
ing to the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:10), “covetousness∗ is the
∗ Douay: ‘The desire of money’
963
root of all evils.” Now pride of life is not included in cov-concupiscence, and is directed to those things which do
etousness. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the
not afford sustentation or pleasure in respect of the fleshly
causes of sin.
senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension
Objection 2. Further, concupiscence of the flesh is
or imagination, or some similar mode of perception; such
aroused chiefly by what is seen by the eyes, according
are money, apparel, and the like; and this spiritual con-
to Dan. 13:56: “Beauty hath deceived thee.” Therefore
cupiscence is called “concupiscence of the eyes,” whether
concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with
this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the
concupiscence of the flesh.
eyes are the organ, so as to denote curiosity according to
Objection 3.
Further, concupiscence is desire for
Augustine’s exposition (Confess. x); or to the concupis-
pleasure, as stated above (q. 30, a. 2). Now objects of
cence of things which are proposed outwardly to the eyes,
pleasure are perceived not only by the sight, but also by
so as to denote covetousness, according to the explanation
the other senses. Therefore “concupiscence of the hear-
of others.
ing” and of the other senses should also have been men-
The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains
tioned.
to the “pride of life”; for pride is the inordinate appetite
Objection 4. Further, just as man is induced to sin,
of excellence, as we shall state further on (q. 84, a. 2; IIa
through inordinate desire of good things, so is he also,
IIae, q. 162, a. 1).
through inordinate avoidance of evil things, as stated
It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause
above (a. 4, ad 3). But nothing is mentioned here per-
of sin can be reduced to these three: since all the passions
taining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the causes of sin
of the concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two,
are insufficiently described.
and all the irascible passions to the third, which is not di-
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 2:16): “All that
vided into two because all the irascible passions conform
is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.:
to spiritual concupiscence.
‘and’] pride of life.” Now a thing is said to be “in the
Reply to Objection 1. “Pride of life” is included in
world” by reason of sin: wherefore it is written (1 Jn.
covetousness according as the latter denotes any kind of
5:19): “The whole world is seated in wickedness.” There-
appetite for any kind of good. How covetousness, as a
fore these three are causes of sin.
special vice, which goes by the name of “avarice,” is the
I answer that, As stated above (a. 4), inordinate self-
root of all sins, shall be explained further on (q. 84, a. 1).
love is the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inor-
Reply to Objection 2. “Concupiscence of the eyes”
dinate desire of good: for a man desires good for the one
does not mean here the concupiscence for all things which
he loves. Hence it is evident that inordinate desire of good
can be seen by the eyes, but only for such things as afford,
is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in two ways, the
not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in respect of
object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the passions
the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power.
which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as
Reply to Objection 3. The sense of sight is the most
it is the object of the concupiscible part; secondly, under
excellent of all the senses, and covers a larger ground, as
the aspect of difficulty, according as it is the object of the
stated in Metaph. i: and so its name is transferred to all
irascible part, as stated above (q. 23, a. 1). Again, con-
the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as
cupiscence is twofold, as stated above (q. 30, a. 3). One
Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm. xxxiii).
is natural, and is directed to those things which sustain
Reply to Objection 4. Avoidance of evil is caused by
the nature of the body, whether as regards the preserva-
the appetite for good, as stated above (q. 25, a. 2; q. 39,
tion of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like,
a. 2); and so those passions alone are mentioned which
or as regards the preservation of the species, such as sex-
incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause
ual matters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is
inordinately the avoidance of evil.
called “concupiscence of the flesh.” The other is spiritual
Whether sin is alleviated on account of a passion?
Ia IIae q. 77 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that sin is not alleviated
Objection 2. Further, a good passion stands in the
on account of passion. For increase of cause adds to the
same relation to merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now
effect: thus if a hot thing causes something to melt, a hot-
a good passion increases merit: for a man seems to merit
ter will do so yet more. Now passion is a cause of sin, as
the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to
stated (a. 5). Therefore the more intense the passion, the
help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion also increases
greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin,
rather than diminishes a sin.
but increases it.
Objection 3. Further, a man seems to sin the more
964
grievously, according as he sins with a more intense will.
of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our con-
But the passion that impels the will makes it tend with
trol. In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it
greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore passion ag-
diminishes its voluntariness.
gravates a sin.
On the other hand, a consequent passion does not di-
On the contrary, The passion of concupiscence is
minish a sin, but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its
called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temp-
gravity, in so far, to wit, as it shows the intensity of the
tation that overcomes a man, the less grievous his sin, as
will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12).
the pleasure or the concupiscence with which anyone sins,
I answer that, Sin consists essentially in an act of the the greater the sin.
free will, which is a faculty of the will and reason; while
Reply to Objection 1. Passion is the cause of sin on
passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite. Now
the part of that to which the sinner turns. But the grav-
the sensitive appetite can be related to the free-will, an-
ity of a sin is measured on the part of that from which he
tecedently and consequently: antecedently, according as
turns, which results accidentally from his turning to some-
a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the
thing else—accidentally, i.e. beside his intention. Now an
reason or will, as stated above (Aa. 1,2; q. 10, a. 3); and
effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental
consequently, in so far as the movements of the higher
cause, but of its direct cause.
powers redound on to the lower, since it is not possible
Reply to Objection 2. A good passion consequent to
for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a
the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede,
passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite.
so that a man is moved to do well, rather by his passion
Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful
than by the judgment of his reason, such a passion dimin-
act, it must needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin
ishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action.
in so far as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a
Reply to Objection 3. Although the movement of the
thing is said to be under our control, through the reason
will incited by the passion is more intense, yet it is not so
and will: and therefore the more the reason and will do
much the will’s own movement, as if it were moved to sin
anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse
by the reason alone.
Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?
Ia IIae q. 77 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that passion excuses from
it entirely excuses from sin; otherwise, it does not excuse
sin altogether. For whatever causes an act to be involun-
entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be
tary, excuses from sin altogether. But concupiscence of
observed: first, that a thing may be voluntary either “in
the flesh, which is a passion, makes an act to be involun-
itself,” as when the will tends towards it directly; or “in
tary, according to Gal. 5:17: “The flesh lusteth against
its cause,” when the will tends towards that cause and not
the spirit. . . so that you do not the things that you would.”
towards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully
Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether.
gets drunk, for in that case he is considered to do volun-
Objection 2. Further, passion causes a certain igno-
tarily whatever he does through being drunk. Secondly,
rance of a particular matter, as stated above (a. 2; q. 76,
we must observe that a thing is said to be voluntary “di-
a. 3). But ignorance of a particular matter excuses from
rectly” or “indirectly”; directly, if the will tends towards
sin altogether, as stated above (q. 6, a. 8). Therefore pas-
it; indirectly, if the will could have prevented it, but did
sion excuses from sin altogether.
not.
Objection 3. Further, disease of the soul is graver
Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: be-
than disease of the body. But bodily disease excuses from
cause a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away
sin altogether, as in the case of mad people. Much more,
the use of reason altogether, as in the case of those who
therefore, does passion, which is a disease of the soul.
are mad through love or anger; and then if such a passion
On the contrary, The Apostle (Rom. 7:5) speaks of
were voluntary from the beginning, the act is reckoned a
the passions as “passions of sins,” for no other reason than
sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated
that they cause sin: which would not be the case if they
with regard to drunkenness. If, however, the cause be not
excused from sin altogether. Therefore passion does not
voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sick-
excuse from sin altogether.
ness or some such cause fall into such a passion as de-
I answer that, An act which, in its genus, is evil, can-
prives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly
not be excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered
involuntary, and he is entirely excused from sin. Some-
altogether involuntary. Consequently, if the passion be
times, however, the passion is not such as to take away
such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary,
the use of reason altogether; and then reason can drive
965
the passion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can of their concupiscence.
prevent it from having its full effect; since the members
Reply to Objection 2. The particular ignorance which
are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as
excuses altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance, which
stated above (q. 17, a. 9): wherefore such a passion does
a man is unable to know even after taking due precautions.
not excuse from sin altogether.
But passion causes ignorance of law in a particular case,
Reply to Objection 1. The words, “So that you do not
by preventing universal knowledge from being applied to
the things that you would” are not to be referred to out-
a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive
ward deeds, but to the inner movement of concupiscence;
away, as stated.
for a man would wish never to desire evil, in which sense
Reply to Objection 3. Bodily disease is involuntary:
we are to understand the words of Rom. 7:19: “The evil
there would be a comparison, however, if it were volun-
which I will not, that I do.” Or again they may be referred
tary, as we have stated about drunkenness, which is a kind
to the will as preceding the passion, as is the case with the
of bodily disease.
incontinent, who act counter to their resolution on account
Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?
Ia IIae q. 77 a. 8
Objection 1.
It would seem that sin committed
movements. Now when anyone proceeds from passion to
through passion cannot be mortal. Because venial sin
a sinful act, or to a deliberate consent, this does not hap-
is condivided with mortal sin. Now sin committed from
pen suddenly: and so the deliberating reason can come
weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for par-
to the rescue here, since it can drive the passion away, or
don [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through pas-
at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated above:
sion is a sin of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal.
wherefore if it does not come to the rescue, there is a mor-
Objection 2. Further, the cause is more powerful than
tal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and
its effect. But passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there
adulteries are committed through passion.
is no mortal sin in the sensuality, as stated above (q. 74,
Reply to Objection 1. A sin may be venial in three
a. 4). Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot
ways. First, through its cause, i.e. through having cause
be mortal.
to be forgiven, which cause lessens the sin; thus a sin
Objection 3. Further, passion is a hindrance to rea-
that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said
son, as explained above (Aa. 1,2). Now it belongs to the
to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus every sin,
reason to turn to God, or to turn away from Him, which
through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon
is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore a sin committed
[veniam]. Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This is
through passion cannot be mortal.
the only kind of venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin:
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5) that
whereas the objection regards the first kind.
“the passions of the sins. . . work [Vulg.: ‘did work’] in
Reply to Objection 2. Passion causes sin as regards
our members to bring forth fruit unto death.” Now it is
the adherence to something. But that this be a mortal sin
proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto death. There-
regards the aversion, which follows accidentally from the
fore sin committed through passion may be mortal.
adherence, as stated above (a. 6, ad 1): hence the argu-
I answer that, Mortal sin, as stated above (q. 72, a. 5), ment does not prove.
consists in turning away from our last end which is God,
Reply to Objection 3. Passion does not always hin-
which aversion pertains to the deliberating reason, whose
der the act of reason altogether: consequently the reason
function it is also to direct towards the end. Therefore
remains in possession of its free-will, so as to turn away
that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to
from God, or turn to Him. If, however, the use of reason
be a mortal sin, only when the deliberating reason is un-
be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer either mortal
able to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden
or venial.
966
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 78
Of That Cause of Sin Which Is Malice
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz. malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice, i.e. purposely?
(2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?
(3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through habit?
(4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than through passion?
Whether anyone sins through certain malice?
Ia IIae q. 78 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that no one sins pur-
the loss of a limb, that he may save his life which he loves
posely, or through certain malice. Because ignorance is
more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some
opposed to purpose or certain malice. Now “every evil
temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, more than the or-
man is ignorant,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
der of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some
1); and it is written (Prov. 14:22): “They err that work
such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss
evil.” Therefore no one sins through certain malice.
of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession
Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation
that “no one works intending evil.” Now to sin through
of some good; and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual
malice seems to denote the intention of doing evil∗ in sin-
evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spir-
ning, because an act is not denominated from that which
itual good, in order to possess a temporal good: wherefore
is unintentional and accidental. Therefore no one sins
he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, be-
through malice.
cause he chooses evil knowingly.
Objection 3. Further, malice itself is a sin. If there-
Reply to Objection 1. Ignorance sometimes excludes
fore malice is a cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on
the simple knowledge that a particular action is evil, and
causing sin indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore no
then man is said to sin through ignorance: sometimes it
one sins through malice.
excludes the knowledge that a particular action is evil at
On the contrary, It is written (Job 34:27): ”[Who]
this particular moment, as when he sins through passion:
as it were on purpose have revolted from God [Vulg.:
and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particu-
‘Him’], and would not understand all His ways.” Now to
lar evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a
revolt from God is to sin. Therefore some sin purposely
particular good, but not the simple knowledge that it is an
or through certain malice.
evil: it is thus that a man is ignorant, when he sins through
I answer that, Man like any other being has naturally
certain malice.
an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite incline away
Reply to Objection 2. Evil cannot be intended by
to evil, this is due to corruption or disorder in some one of
anyone for its own sake; but it can be intended for the
the principles of man: for it is thus that sin occurs in the
sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining another good,
actions of natural things. Now the principles of human
as stated above: and in this case anyone would choose to
acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e.
obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering
the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin occurs in
loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish
human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect,
to enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the
as when anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes
two set before him to choose from, he prefers sinning and
through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone
thereby incurring God’s anger, to being deprived of the
sins through passion, so too does it occur through a defect
pleasure.
consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out
Reply to Objection 3. The malice through which any-
of order when it loves more the lesser good. Again, the
one sins, may be taken to denote habitual malice, in the
consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to
sense in which the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) calls an evil
suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that
habit by the name of malice, just as a good habit is called
one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers
virtue: and in this way anyone is said to sin through mal-
∗ Alluding to the derivation of “malitia” (malice) from “malum” (evil) 967
ice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may pugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this
also denote actual malice, whether by malice we mean the
imply that a thing is its own cause: for the interior act is
choice itself of evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through
the cause of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of an-
malice, in so far as he sins through making a choice of
other; not indefinitely, however, since we can trace it back
evil), or whether by malice we mean some previous fault
to some previous sin, which is not caused by any previous
that gives rise to a subsequent fault, as when anyone im-
sin, as was explained above (q. 75, a. 4, ad 3).
Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?
Ia IIae q. 78 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that not every one who
remains unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does
sins through habit, sins through certain malice. Because
some works which are generically good; so too it may
sin committed through certain malice, seems to be most
happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit, acts,
grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man commits
not from that habit, but through the uprising of a passion,
a slight sin through habit, as when he utters an idle word.
or again through ignorance. But whenever he uses the
Therefore sin committed from habit is not always com-
vicious habit he must needs sin through certain malice:
mitted through certain malice.
because to anyone that has a habit, whatever is befitting to
Objection 2. Further, “Acts proceeding from habits
him in respect of that habit, has the aspect of something
are like the acts by which those habits were formed”
lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to
(Ethic. ii, 1,2). But the acts which precede a vicious habit
him, according as custom and habit are a second nature.
are not committed through certain malice. Therefore the
Now the very thing which befits a man in respect of a vi-
sins that arise from habit are not committed through cer-
cious habit, is something that excludes a spiritual good:
tain malice.
the result being that a man chooses a spiritual evil, that he
Objection 3. Further, when a man commits a sin
may obtain possession of what befits him in respect of that
through certain malice, he is glad after having done it,
habit: and this is to sin through certain malice. Wherefore
according to Prov. 2:14: “Who are glad when they have
it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through
done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things”: and this,
certain malice.
because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire, and to
Reply to Objection 1. Venial sin does not exclude
do those actions which are connatural to us by reason of
spiritual good, consisting in the grace of God or charity.
habit. But those who sin through habit, are sorrowful after
Wherefore it is an evil, not simply, but in a relative sense:
committing a sin: because “bad men,” i.e. those who have
and for that reason the habit thereof is not a simple but a
a vicious habit, “are full of remorse” (Ethic. ix, 4). There-
relative evil.
fore sins that arise from habit are not committed through
Reply to Objection 2. Acts proceeding from habits
certain malice.
are of like species as the acts from which those habits
On the contrary, A sin committed through certain
were formed: but they differ from them as perfect from
malice is one that is done through choice of evil. Now
imperfect. Such is the difference between sin committed
we make choice of those things to which we are inclined
through certain malice and sin committed through pas-
by habit, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2 with regard to virtuous
sion.
habits. Therefore a sin that arises from habit is committed
Reply to Objection 3. He that sins through habit is
through certain malice.
always glad for what he does through habit, as long as he
I answer that, There is a difference between a sin
uses the habit. But since he is able not to use the habit, and
committed by one who has the habit, and a sin com-
to think of something else, by means of his reason, which
mitted by habit: for it is not necessary to use a habit,
is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that while not
since it is subject to the will of the person who has that
using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through
habit. Hence habit is defined as being “something we use
the habit. And so it often happens that such a man is sorry
when we will,” as stated above (q. 50, a. 1). And thus,
for his sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him,
even as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit
but on account of his reaping some disadvantage from the
may break forth into a virtuous act, because a bad habit
sin.
does not corrupt reason altogether, something of which
968
Whether one who sins through certain malice, sins through habit?
Ia IIae q. 78 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that whoever sins through
amounts to a sin through certain malice; for then alone
certain malice, sins through habit. For the Philosopher
does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is
says (Ethic. v, 9) that “an unjust action is not done as
moved to evil of its own accord. This may happen in two
an unjust man does it,” i.e. through choice, “unless it be
ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition in-
done through habit.” Now to sin through certain malice
clining him to evil, so that, in respect of that disposition,
is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above
some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to
(a. 1). Therefore no one sins through certain malice, un-
this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will tends, as
less he has the habit of sin.
to something good, because everything tends, of its own
Objection 2. Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii)
accord, to that which is suitable to it. Moreover this cor-
that “a man is not suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs
rupt disposition is either a habit acquired by custom, or a
fall away little by little.” But the greatest fall seems to be
sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case of a
that of the man who sins through certain malice. There-
man who is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of
fore a man comes to sin through certain malice, not from
some natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the will, of
the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engen-
its own accord, may tend to an evil, through the removal
der a habit.
of some obstacle: for instance, if a man be prevented from
Objection 3. Further, whenever a man sins through
sinning, not through sin being in itself displeasing to him,
certain malice, his will must needs be inclined of itself to
but through hope of eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope
the evil he chooses. But by the nature of that power man is
give place to despair, or fear to presumption, he will end
inclined, not to evil but to good. Therefore if he chooses
in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the
evil, this must be due to something supervening, which is
bridle, as it were.
passion or habit. Now when a man sins through passion,
It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through cer-
he sins not through certain malice, but through weakness,
tain malice, always presupposes some inordinateness in
as stated (q. 77, a. 3). Therefore whenever anyone sins
man, which, however, is not always a habit: so that it does
through certain malice, he sins through habit.
not follow of necessity, if a man sins through certain mal-
On the contrary, The good habit stands in the same
ice, that he sins through habit.
relation to the choice of something good, as the bad habit
Reply to Objection 1. To do an action as an unjust
to the choice of something evil. But it happens sometimes
man does, may be not only to do unjust things through cer-
that a man, without having the habit of a virtue, chooses
tain malice, but also to do them with pleasure, and without
that which is good according to that virtue. Therefore
any notable resistance on the part of reason, and this oc-
sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice,
curs only in one who has a habit.
may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice.
Reply to Objection 2. It is true that a man does not
I answer that, The will is related differently to good
fall suddenly into sin from certain malice, and that some-
and to evil. Because from the very nature of the power,
thing is presupposed; but this something is not always a
it is inclined to the rational good, as its proper object;
habit, as stated above.
wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature.
Reply to Objection 3. That which inclines the will
Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, to some evil,
to evil, is not always a habit or a passion, but at times
this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in
is something else. Moreover, there is no comparison be-
fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the reason,
tween choosing good and choosing evil: because evil is
as when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes
never without some good of nature, whereas good can be
this arises through the impulse of the sensitive appetite, as
perfect without the evil of fault.
when anyone sins through passion. Yet neither of these
Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion?
Ia IIae q. 78 a. 4
Objection 1.
It would seem that it is not more
Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for
grievous to sin through certain malice than through pas-
he has a false estimation of the end, which is the princi-
sion. Because ignorance excuses from sin either alto-
ple in matters of action. Therefore there is more excuse
gether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who
for one who sins through certain malice, than for one who
sins through certain malice, than in one who sins through
sins through passion.
passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers
Objection 2. Further, the more a man is impelled to
from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the
sin, the less grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a
969
man who is thrown headlong into sin by a more impetuous nent quality, so that he who sins through malice, abides
passion. Now he that sins through certain malice, is im-
longer in his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic.
pelled by habit, the impulse of which is stronger than that
vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through
of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous
malice, to a sick man who suffers from a chronic disease,
than to sin through passion.
while he compares the incontinent man, who sins through
Objection 3. Further, to sin through certain malice is
passion, to one who suffers intermittently. Thirdly, be-
to sin through choosing evil. Now he that sins through
cause he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed
passion, also chooses evil. Therefore he does not sin less
in respect of the end itself, which is the principle in mat-
than the man who sins through certain malice.
ters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than
On the contrary, A sin that is committed on purpose,
in the case of the man who sins through passion, whose
for this very reason deserves heavier punishment, accord-
purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is in-
ing to Job 34:26: “He hath struck them as being wicked,
terrupted on account of the passion, for the time being.
in open sight, who, as it were, on purpose, have revolted
Now the worst of all defects is defect of principle. There-
from Him.” Now punishment is not increased except for a
fore it is evident that a sin committed through malice is
graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being
more grievous than one committed through passion.
done on purpose, i.e. through certain malice.
Reply to Objection 1. Ignorance of choice, to which
I answer that, A sin committed through malice is
the objection refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin,
more grievous than a sin committed through passion, for
as stated above (q. 76, a. 4). Therefore neither does a
three reasons. First, because, as sin consists chiefly in an
greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave.
act of the will, it follows that, other things being equal, a
Reply to Objection 2. The impulse due to passion,
sin is all the more grievous, according as the movement of
is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will:
the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is com-
whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined from within.
mitted through malice, the movement of sin belongs more
Hence the comparison fails.
to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord,
Reply to Objection 3. It is one thing to sin while
than when a sin is committed through passion, when the
choosing, and another to sin through choosing. For he that
will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were.
sins through passion, sins while choosing, but not through
Wherefore a sin is aggravated by the very fact that it is
choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first
committed through certain malice, and so much the more,
principle of his sin; for he is induced through the passion,
as the malice is greater; whereas it is diminished by being
to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the
committed through passion, and so much the more, as the
passion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain
passion is stronger. Secondly, because the passion which
malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already
incites the will to sin, soon passes away, so that man re-
explained (Aa. 2,3), so that his choosing, of which he has
pents of his sin, and soon returns to his good intentions;
full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason
whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a perma-
he is said to sin “through” choosing.
970
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 79
Of the External Causes of Sin
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part of God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part of man.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is a cause of sin?
(2) Whether the act of sin is from God?
(3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?
(4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded or hardened?
Whether God is a cause of sin?
Ia IIae q. 79 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that God is a cause of
(Ezech. 3:18) it is said to the watchman: “If thou say not
sin. For the Apostle says of certain ones (Rom. 1:28):
to the wicked: ‘Thou shalt surely die’∗. . . I will require
“God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those
his blood at thy hand.” Now God cannot be directly the
things which are not right [Douay: ‘convenient’],” and
cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every
a gloss comments on this by saying that “God works in
sin is a departure from the order which is to God as the
men’s hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills,
end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself
whether to good or to evil.” Now sin consists in doing
as to their last end, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i):
what is not right, and in having a will inclined to evil.
so that it is impossible that He should be either to Him-
Therefore God is to man a cause of sin.
self or to another the cause of departing from the order
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Wis. 14:11): “The
which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the
creatures of God are turned to an abomination; and a
cause of sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin in-
temptation to the souls of men.” But a temptation usu-
directly. For it happens that God does not give some the
ally denotes a provocation to sin. Since therefore crea-
assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance
tures were made by God alone, as was established in the
were He to give, they would not sin. But He does all this
Ia, q. 44, a. 1, it seems that God is a cause of sin, by pro-
according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since
voking man to sin.
He Himself is Wisdom and Justice: so that if someone sin
Objection 3. Further, the cause of the cause is the
it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of
cause of the effect. Now God is the cause of the free-will,
that sin; even as a pilot is not said to cause the wrecking of
which itself is the cause of sin. Therefore God is the cause
the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to
of sin.
steer while able and bound to steer. It is therefore evident
Objection 4. Further, every evil is opposed to good.
that God is nowise a cause of sin.
But it is not contrary to God’s goodness that He should
Reply to Objection 1. As to the words of the Apos-
cause the evil of punishment; since of this evil it is written
tle, the solution is clear from the text. For if God delivered
(Is. 45:7) that God creates evil, and (Amos 3:6): “Shall
some up to a reprobate sense, it follows that they already
there be evil in the city which God [Vulg.: ‘the Lord’] hath
had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was not right.
not done?” Therefore it is not incompatible with God’s
Accordingly He is said to deliver them up to a reprobate
goodness that He should cause the evil of fault.
sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from follow-
On the contrary, It is written (Wis.
11:25):
ing that reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose a
“Thou. . . hatest none of the things which Thou hast
person to danger if we do not protect him. The saying of
made.” Now God hates sin, according to Wis. 14:9: “To
Augustine (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xxi, whence the gloss
God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful.” There-
quoted is taken) to the effect that “God inclines men’s
fore God is not a cause of sin.
wills to good and evil,” is to be understood as meaning
I answer that, Man is, in two ways, a cause either
that He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so
of his own or of another’s sin. First, directly, namely be
far as He does not hinder it, as stated above. And yet even
inclining his or another’s will to sin; secondly, indirectly,
this is due as being deserved through a previous sin.
namely be not preventing someone from sinning. Hence
Reply to Objection 2. When it is said the “creatures
∗ Vulg.: “If, when I say to the wicked, ‘Thou shalt surely die,’ thou declare it not to him.”
971
of God are turned ‘to’ an abomination, and a temptation the order of the first cause, it is not reduced to that first
to the souls of men,” the preposition “to” does not denote
cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his mas-
causality but sequel†; for God did not make the creatures
ter’s orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though he
that they might be an evil to man; this was the result of
were the cause thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-
man’s folly, wherefore the text goes on to say, “and a snare
will commits against the commandment of God, is not at-
to the feet of the unwise,” who, to wit, in their folly, use
tributed to God as being its cause.
creatures for a purpose other than that for which they were
Reply to Objection 4. Punishment is opposed to the
made.
good of the person punished, who is thereby deprived of
Reply to Objection 3. The effect which proceeds
some good or other: but fault is opposed to the good of
from the middle cause, according as it is subordinate to
subordination to God; and so it is directly opposed to the
the first cause, is reduced to that first cause; but if it pro-
Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison be-
ceed from the middle cause, according as it goes outside
tween fault and punishment.
Whether the act of sin is from God?
Ia IIae q. 79 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the act of sin is not
is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with
from God. For Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that
a defect: and this defect is from the created cause, viz.
“the act of sin is not a thing.” Now whatever is from God
the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First
is a thing. Therefore the act of sin is not from God.
Agent, viz. God. Consequently this defect is not reduced
Objection 2. Further, man is not said to be the cause
to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect
of sin, except because he is the cause of the sinful act: for
of limping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not
“no one works, intending evil,” as Dionysius states (Div.
to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever
Nom. iv). Now God is not a cause of sin, as stated above
there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly God is
(a. 1). Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin.
the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of
Objection 3. Further, some actions are evil and sinful
sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect.
in their species, as was shown above (q. 18, Aa. 2,8). Now
Reply to Objection 1. In this passage Augustine calls
whatever is the cause of a thing, causes whatever belongs
by the name of “thing,” that which is a thing simply, viz.
to it in respect of its species. If therefore God caused the
substance; for in this sense the act of sin is not a thing.
act of sin, He would be the cause of sin, which is false, as
Reply to Objection 2. Not only the act, but also the
was proved above (a. 1). Therefore God is not the cause
defect, is reduced to man as its cause, which defect con-
of the act of sin.
sists in man not being subject to Whom he ought to be,
On the contrary, The act of sin is a movement of
although he does not intend this principally. Wherefore
the free-will. Now “the will of God is the cause of ev-
man is the cause of the sin: while God is the cause of the
ery movement,” as Augustine declares (De Trin. iii, 4,9).
act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the de-
Therefore God’s will is the cause of the act of sin.
fect accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause of
I answer that, The act of sin is both a being and an
the sin.
act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 72, a. 1),
being, whatever the mode of its being, must be derived
acts and habits do not take their species from the priva-
from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom.
tion itself, wherein consists the nature of evil, but from
v). Again every action is caused by something existing
some object, to which that privation is united: and so this
in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as
defect which consists in not being from God, belongs to
it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the First
the species of the act consequently, and not as a specific
Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence.
difference.
Therefore God is the cause of every action, in so far as it
† This is made clear by the Douay Version: the Latin “factae sunt in abominationem” admits of the translation “were made to be an abomination,”
which might imply causality.
972
Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?
Ia IIae q. 79 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that God is not the cause
sal cause of the enlightening of bodies, though not in the
of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. For Augus-
same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature,
tine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 3) that God is not the cause of
whereas God works freely, through the order of His wis-
that which makes man worse. Now man is made worse
dom. Now although the sun, so far as it is concerned, en-
by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore
lightens all bodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle
God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of
in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as happens to a house
heart.
whose window-shutters are closed, although the sun is in
Objection 2.
Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl.
no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it
Praedest. i, 19): “God does not punish what He causes.”
does not act of its own accord in failing to light up the
Now God punishes the hardened heart, according to Ec-
interior of the house; and the cause of this is the person
clus. 3:27: “A hard heart shall fear evil at the last.” There-
who closed the shutters. On the other hand, God, of His
fore God is not the cause of hardness of heart.
own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He
Objection 3. Further, the same effect is not put down
finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being with-
to contrary causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is
held is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace;
said to be the malice of man, according to Wis. 2:21: “For
but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace. In
their own malice blinded them,” and again, according to 2
this way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness
Cor. 4:4: “The god of this world hath blinded the minds
of ear, and hardness of heart.
of unbelievers”: which causes seem to be opposed to God.
These differ from one another in respect of the effects
Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and
of grace, which both perfects the intellect by the gift of
hardness of heart.
wisdom, and softens the affections by the fire of charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 6:10): “Blind the
And since two of the senses excel in rendering service to
heart of this people, and make their ears heavy,” and Rom.
the intellect, viz. sight and hearing, of which the former
9:18: “He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He
assists “discovery,” and the latter, “teaching,” hence it is
will He hardeneth.”
that spiritual “blindness” corresponds to sight, “heaviness
I answer that, Spiritual blindness and hardness of
of the ears” to hearing, and “hardness of heart” to the af-
heart imply two things. One is the movement of the hu-
fections.
man mind in cleaving to evil, and turning away from the
Reply to Objection 1. Blindness and hardhearted-
Divine light; and as regards this, God is not the cause
ness, as regards the withholding of grace, are punish-
of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, just as He is
ments, and therefore, in this respect, they make man no
not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of
worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he
grace, the result of which is that the mind is not enlight-
incurs them, even as other punishments.
ened by God to see aright, and man’s heart is not softened
Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers hard-
to live aright; and as regards this God is the cause of spir-
heartedness in so far as it is a sin.
itual blindness and hardness of heart.
Reply to Objection 3. Malice is the demeritorious
Now we must consider that God is the universal cause
cause of blindness, just as sin is the cause of punishment:
of the enlightening of souls, according to Jn. 1:9: “That
and in this way too, the devil is said to blind, in so far as
was the true light which enlighteneth every man that
he induces man to sin.
cometh into this world,” even as the sun is the univer-
Whether blindness and hardness of heart are directed to the salvation of those who Ia IIae q. 79 a. 4
are blinded and hardened?
Objection 1. It would seem that blindness and hard-
ness of heart, as stated above (a. 3). Therefore they are di-
ness of heart are always directed to the salvation of
rected to the salvation of those who are blinded and hard-
those who are blinded and hardened.
For Augustine
ened.
says (Enchiridion xi) that “as God is supremely good, He
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Wis. 1:13) that
would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could draw
“God hath no pleasure in the destruction of the ungodly∗.”
some good from every evil.” Much more, therefore, does
Now He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction,
He direct to some good, the evil of which He Himself is
if He did not turn their blindness to their profit: just as
the cause. Now God is the cause of blindness and hard-
a physician would seem to take pleasure in torturing the
∗ Vulg.: ‘God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living.’
973
invalid, if he did not intend to heal the invalid when he spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy,
prescribes a bitter medicine for him. Therefore God turns
however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are blinded,
blindness to the profit of those who are blinded.
but only to the predestinated, to whom “all things work
Objection 3. Further, “God is not a respecter of per-
together unto good” (Rom. 8:28). Therefore as regards
sons” (Acts 10:34). Now He directs the blinding of some,
some, blindness is directed to their healing; but as regards
to their salvation, as in the case of some of the Jews, who
others, to their damnation; as Augustine says (De Quaest.
were blinded so as not to believe in Christ, and, through
Evang. iii).
not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized
Reply to Objection 1. Every evil that God does, or
with compunction, and converted, as related by Augustine
permits to be done, is directed to some good; yet not al-
(De Quaest. Evang. iii). Therefore God turns all blind-
ways to the good of those in whom the evil is, but some-
ness to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded.
times to the good of others, or of the whole universe: thus
Objection 4. On the other hand, according to Rom.
He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of the martyrs,
3:8, evil should not be done, that good may ensue. Now
and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice.
blindness is an evil. Therefore God does not blind some
Reply to Objection 2. God does not take pleasure in
for the sake of their welfare.
the loss of man, as regards the loss itself, but by reason of
I answer that, Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin.
His justice, or of the good that ensues from the loss.
Now sin has a twofold relation—to one thing directly,
Reply to Objection 3. That God directs the blindness
viz. to the sinner’s damnation—to another, by reason of
of some to their spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but
God’s mercy or providence, viz. that the sinner may be
that the blindness of others is directed to their loss is due
healed, in so far as God permits some to fall into sin, that
to His justice: and that He vouchsafes His mercy to some,
by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and
and not to all, does not make God a respecter of persons,
converted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii).
as explained in the Ia, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3.
Therefore blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the
Reply to Objection 4. Evil of fault must not be done,
damnation of those who are blinded; for which reason it
that good may ensue; but evil of punishment must be in-
is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through God’s
flicted for the sake of good.
mercy, temporary blindness is directed medicinally to the
974
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 80
Of the Cause of Sin, As Regards the Devil
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin?
(2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly?
(3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity?
(4) Whether all sins are due to the devil’s suggestion?
Whether the devil is directly the cause of man’s sinning?
Ia IIae q. 80 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the devil is directly
follows that in this respect, a man’s will alone is directly
the cause of man’s sinning. For sin consists directly in an
the cause of his sin.
act of the appetite. Now Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12)
As regards the object, a thing may be understood as
that “the devil inspires his friends with evil desires”; and
moving the will in three ways. First, the object itself
Bede, commenting on Acts 5:3, says that the devil “draws
which is proposed to the will: thus we say that food
the mind to evil desires”; and Isidore says (De Summo
arouses man’s desire to eat. Secondly, he that proposes
Bono ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil “fills men’s hearts with
or offers this object. Thirdly, he that persuades the will
secret lusts.” Therefore the devil is directly the cause of
that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he
sin.
also, in a fashion, offers the will its proper object, which
Objection 2. Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii,
is a real or apparent good of reason. Accordingly, in the
2) that “as God is the perfecter of good, so is the devil
first way the sensible things, which approach from with-
the perfecter of evil.” But God is directly the cause of our
out, move a man’s will to sin. In the second and third
good. Therefore the devil is directly the cause of our sins.
ways, either the devil or a man may incite to sin, either
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says in a chap-
by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by per-
ter of the Eudemein Ethics (vii, 18): “There must needs
suading the reason. But in none of these three ways can
be some extrinsic principle of human counsel.” Now hu-
anything be the direct cause of sin, because the will is not,
man counsel is not only about good things but also about
of necessity, moved by any object except the last end, as
evil things. Therefore, as God moves man to take good
stated above (q. 10, Aa. 1,2). Consequently neither the
counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves
thing offered from without, nor he that proposes it, nor he
him to take evil counsel, and consequently is directly the
that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it
cause of sin.
follows that the devil is a cause of sin, neither directly nor
On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i,
sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the
11) that “nothing else than his own will makes man’s mind
object of appetite.
the slave of his desire.” Now man does not become a slave
Reply to Objection 1. All these, and other like au-
to his desires, except through sin. Therefore the cause of
thorities, if we meet with them, are to be understood as
sin cannot be the devil, but man’s own will alone.
denoting that the devil induces man to affection for a sin,
I answer that, Sin is an action: so that a thing can
either by suggesting to him, or by offering him objects of
be directly the cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is
appetite.
directly the cause of an action; and this can only happen
Reply to Objection 2. This comparison is true in so
by moving that action’s proper principle to act. Now the
far as the devil is somewhat the cause of our sins, even as
proper principle of a sinful action is the will, since every
God is in a certain way the cause of our good actions, but
sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be directly the
does not extend to the mode of causation: for God causes
cause of sin, except that which can move the will to act.
good things in us by moving the will inwardly, whereas
Now the will, as stated above (q. 9, Aa. 3,4,6), can
the devil cannot move us in this way.
be moved by two things: first by its object, inasmuch as
Reply to Objection 3. God is the universal principle
the apprehended appetible is said to move the appetite:
of all inward movements of man; but that the human will
secondly by that agent which moves the will inwardly to
be determined to an evil counsel, is directly due to the hu-
will, and this is no other than the will itself, or God, as
man will, and to the devil as persuading or offering the
was shown above (q. 9, Aa. 3,4,6). Now God cannot be
object of appetite.
the cause of sin, as stated above (q. 79, a. 1). Therefore it
975
Whether the devil can induce man to sin, by internal instigations?
Ia IIae q. 80 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the devil cannot in-
a. 3, the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be
duce man to sin, by internal instigations. Because the in-
moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can
ternal movements of the soul are vital functions. Now
produce all those effects which can result from the local
no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic
movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained
principle, not even those of the vegetal soul, which are
by the Divine power. Now the representation of forms
the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot
to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement:
instigate man to evil through his internal movements.
for the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil.)∗ that “when
Objection 2. Further, all the internal movements arise
an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the
from the external senses according to the order of na-
sensitive principle, and the movements descend with it,
ture. Now it belongs to God alone to do anything beside
viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects,
the order of nature, as was stated in the Ia, q. 110, a. 4.
which impressions are preserved by means of sensible
Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man’s in-
species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle,
ternal movements, except in respect of things which are
so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles
perceived by the external senses.
were being affected by them at the time.” Hence such a
Objection 3. Further, the internal acts of the soul are
local movement of the vital spirits or humors can be pro-
to understand and to imagine. Now the devil can do noth-
cured by the demons, whether man sleep or wake: and so
ing in connection with either of these, because, as stated
it happens that man’s imagination is brought into play.
in the Ia, q. 111, Aa. 2,3, ad 2, the devil cannot impress
In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to cer-
species on the human intellect, nor does it seem possi-
tain passions according to certain fixed movements of the
ble for him to produce imaginary species, since imagi-
heart and the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can coop-
nary forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than
erate in this also. And through certain passions being
those which are in sensible matter, which, nevertheless,
aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result is that man
the devil is unable to produce, as is clear from what we
more easily perceives the movement or sensible image
have said in the Ia, q. 110, a. 2; Ia, q. 111, Aa. 2,3, ad 2.
which is brought in the manner explained, before the ap-
Therefore the devil cannot through man’s internal move-
prehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes
ments induce him to sin.
(De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn. iii, iv), “lovers are
On the contrary, In that case, the devil would never
moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of
tempt man, unless he appeared visibly; which is evidently
the beloved.” It also happens, through the rousing of a
false.
passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged,
I answer that, The interior part of the soul is intel-
as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is
lective and sensitive; and the intellective part contains the
held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to,
intellect and the will. As regards the will, we have already
seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly
stated (a. 1; Ia, q. 111, a. 1) what is the devil’s relation
to sin.
thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by
Reply to Objection 1. Although vital functions are
that which enlightens it in the knowledge of truth, which
always from an intrinsic principle, yet an extrinsic agent
the devil has no intention of doing in man’s regard; rather
can cooperate with them, even as external heat cooperates
does he darken man’s reason so that it may consent to sin,
with the functions of the vegetal soul, that food may be
which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive ap-
more easily digested.
petite. Consequently the operation of the devil seems to
Reply to Objection 2. This apparition of imaginary
be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by
forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, nor is
moving either of which he can induce man to sin. For
it due to a command alone, but according to local move-
his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the
ment, as explained above.
imagination; and he is able to incite the sensitive appetite
Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is
to some passion or other.
clear, because these forms are received originally from the
The reason of this is, that as stated in the Ia, q. 110,
senses.
∗ De Insomn. iii, iv.
976
Whether the devil can induce man to sin of necessity?
Ia IIae q. 80 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the devil can induce
you,” which would be said neither rightly nor truly, if the
man to sin of necessity. Because the greater can compel
devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin;
the lesser. Now it is said of the devil (Job 41:24) that
for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor
“there is no power on earth that can compare with him.”
would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not
Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on
compel to sin.
the earth.
I answer that, The devil, by his own power, unless
Objection 2. Further, man’s reason cannot be moved
he be restrained by God, can compel anyone to do an act
except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to
which, in its genus, is a sin; but he cannot bring about
the senses, or are represented to the imagination: because
the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the fact that
“all our knowledge arises from the senses, and we cannot
man does not resist that which moves him to sin, except
understand without a phantasm” (De Anima iii, text. 30.
by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede
39). Now the devil can move man’s imagination, as stated
altogether, by moving the imagination and the sensitive
above (a. 2); and also the external senses, for Augustine
appetite; as is the case with one who is possessed. But
says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 12) that “this evil,” of which, to wit,
then, the reason being thus fettered, whatever man may
the devil is the cause, “extends gradually through all the
do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the rea-
approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes, blends
son is not altogether fettered, then, in so far as it is free,
with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor.”
it can resist sin, as stated above (q. 77, a. 7). It is conse-
Therefore it can incline man’s reason to sin of necessity.
quently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
sin.
xix, 4) that “there is some sin when the flesh lusteth
Reply to Objection 1. Not every power that is greater
against the spirit.” Now the devil can cause concupiscence
than man, can move man’s will; God alone can do this, as
of the flesh, even as other passions, in the way explained
stated above (q. 9, a. 6).
above (a. 2). Therefore he can induce man to sin of neces-
Reply to Objection 2. That which is apprehended by
sity.
the senses or the imagination does not move the will, of
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 5:8): “Your ad-
necessity, so long as man has the use of reason; nor does
versary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking
such an apprehension always fetter the reason.
whom he may devour.” Now it would be useless to ad-
Reply to Objection 3. The lusting of the flesh against
monish thus, if it were true that man were under the ne-
the spirit, when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin,
cessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot
but is matter for the exercise of virtue. That reason does
induce man to sin of necessity.
not resist, is not in the devil’s power; wherefore he cannot
Further, it is likewise written (Jam. 4:7): “Be sub-
bring about the necessity of sinning.
ject. . . to God, but resist the devil, and he will fly from
Whether all the sins of men are due to the devil’s suggestion?
Ia IIae q. 80 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that all the sins of men
suggestion.
are due to the devil’s suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div.
On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl.
Dogm.
Nom. iv) that the “crowd of demons are the cause of all
lxxxii): “Not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil;
evils, both to themselves and to others.”
sometimes they are due to a movement of the free-will.”
Objection 2. Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes
I answer that, the devil is the occasional and indirect
the slave of the devil, according to Jn. 8:34: “Whoso-
cause of all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man
ever committeth sin is the slave [Douay: ‘servant’] of sin.”
to sin, by reason of whose sin human nature is so infected,
Now “by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he
that we are all prone to sin: even as the burning of wood
is the slave” (2 Pet. 2:19). Therefore whoever commits a
might be imputed to the man who dried the wood so as
sin, has been overcome by the devil.
to make it easily inflammable. He is not, however, the di-
Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10)
rect cause of all the sins of men, as though each were the
the sin of the devil is irreparable, because he sinned at
result of his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon
no other’s suggestion. Therefore, if any men were to sin
iii, 2) from the fact that even if the devil were no more,
of their own free-will and without suggestion from any
men would still have the desire for food, sexual pleasures
other, their sin would be irremediable: which is clearly
and the like; which desire might be inordinate, unless it
false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil’s
were subordinate to reason, a matter that is subject to the
977
free-will.
one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of the
Reply to Objection 1. The crowd of demons are the
devil.
cause of all our evils, as regards their original cause, as
Reply to Objection 3. The devil’s sin was irremedia-
stated.
ble, not only because he sinned without another’s sugges-
Reply to Objection 2.
A man becomes another’s
tion; but also because he was not already prone to sin, on
slave not only by being overcome by him, but also by
account of any previous sin; which can be said of no sin
subjecting himself to him spontaneously: it is thus that
of man.
978
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 81
Of the Cause of Sin, On the Part of Man
(In Five Articles)
We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while man, like the devil, is the cause of another’s sin, by outward suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of origin. Wherefore we must speak about original sin, the consideration of which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its essence; (3) of its subject.
Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man’s first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his descendants?
(2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other parents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way of origin?
(3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten of Adam by way of seminal generation?
(4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from some part of the human body?
(5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and not the man, had sinned?
Whether the first sin of our first parent is contracted by his descendants, by way of Ia IIae q. 81 a. 1
origin?
Objection 1. It would seem that the first sin of our
one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.”
first parent is not contracted by others, by way of origin.
Nor can this be understood as denoting imitation or sug-
For it is written (Ezech. 18:20): “The son shall not bear
gestion, since it is written (Wis. 2:24): “By the envy of
the iniquity of the father.” But he would bear the iniquity
the devil, death came into this world.” It follows therefore
if he contracted it from him. Therefore no one contracts
that through origin from the first man sin entered into the
any sin from one of his parents by way of origin.
world.
Objection 2. Further, an accident is not transmitted by
I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we are
way of origin, unless its subject be also transmitted, since
bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmit-
accidents do not pass from one subject to another. Now
ted to his descendants, by way of origin. For this reason
the rational soul which is the subject of sin, is not trans-
children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, to
mitted by way of origin, as was shown in the Ia, q. 118,
show that they have to be washed from some uncleanness.
a. 2. Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by way
The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear from
of origin.
Augustine in many of his books∗
Objection 3. Further, whatever is transmitted by way
In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first par-
of human origin, is caused by the semen. But the semen
ent could be transmitted by way of origin to his descen-
cannot cause sin, because it lacks the rational part of the
dants, various writers have gone about it in various ways.
soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore no sin
For some, considering that the subject of sin is the rational
can be contracted by way of origin.
soul, maintained that the rational soul is transmitted with
Objection 4. Further, that which is more perfect in
the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to
nature, is more powerful in action. Now perfect flesh can-
produce other infected souls. Others, rejecting this as er-
not infect the soul united to it, else the soul could not be
roneous, endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent’s
cleansed of original sin, so long as it is united to the body.
soul can be transmitted to the children, even though the
Much less, therefore, can the semen infect the soul.
soul be not transmitted, from the fact that defects of the
Objection 5. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
body are transmitted from parent to child—thus a leper
5): “No one finds fault with those who are ugly by nature,
may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the father of
but only those who are so through want of exercise and
a gouty son, on account of some seminal corruption, al-
through carelessness.” Now those are said to be “naturally
though this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since
ugly,” who are so from their origin. Therefore nothing
the body is proportionate to the soul, and since the soul’s
which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful.
defects redound into the body, and vice versa, in like man-
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): “By
ner, say they, a culpable defect of the soul is passed on to
∗ For instance, Retract. i, 9; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. ix; Contra Julian. iii, 1; De Dono Persev. xi, xii.
979
the child, through the transmission of the semen, albeit just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily
the semen itself is not the subject of the guilt.
members is called “actual.” And just as the actual sin that
But all these explanations are insufficient. Because,
is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of
granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by way
that member, except inasmuch as that member is a part of
of origin from parent to child, and granted that even some
the man, for which reason it is called a “human sin”; so
defects of the soul are transmitted in consequence, on ac-
original sin is not the sin of this person, except inasmuch
count of a defect in the bodily habit, as in the case of id-
as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for
iots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a de-
which reason it is called the “sin of nature,” according to
fect by the way of origin seems to exclude the notion of
Eph. 2:3: “We. . . were by nature children of wrath.”
guilt, which is essentially something voluntary. Where-
Reply to Objection 1. The son is said not to bear the
fore granted that the rational soul were transmitted, from
iniquity of his father, because he is not punished for his
the very fact that the stain on the child’s soul is not in its
father’s sin, unless he share in his guilt. It is thus in the
will, it would cease to be a guilty stain binding its subject
case before us: because guilt is transmitted by the way of
to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5),
origin from father to son, even as actual sin is transmitted
“no one reproaches a man born blind; one rather takes pity
through being imitated.
on him.”
Reply to Objection 2. Although the soul is not trans-
Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by
mitted, because the power in the semen is not able to cause
saying that all men born of Adam may be considered
the rational soul, nevertheless the motion of the semen is
as one man, inasmuch as they have one common nature,
a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul: so
which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil
that the semen by its own power transmits the human na-
matters, all who are members of one community are re-
ture from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain
puted as one body, and the whole community as one man.
which infects it: for he that is born is associated with his
Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that “by shar-
first parent in his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his ing the same species, many men are one man.” Accord-nature from him by a kind of movement which is that of
ingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so many
generation.
members of one body. Now the action of one member
Reply to Objection 3. Although the guilt is not ac-
of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not
tually in the semen, yet human nature is there virtually
by the will of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the
accompanied by that guilt.
first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which
Reply to Objection 4. The semen is the principle of
the hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the
generation, which is an act proper to nature, by helping
hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is
it to propagate itself. Hence the soul is more infected by
imputed to it as something belonging to man and moved
the semen, than by the flesh which is already perfect, and
by man’s first moving principle. In this way, then, the
already affixed to a certain person.
disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is voluntary,
Reply to Objection 5. A man is not blamed for that
not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who,
which he has from his origin, if we consider the man born,
by the movement of generation, moves all who originate
in himself. But it we consider him as referred to a prin-
from him, even as the soul’s will moves all the members
ciple, then he may be reproached for it: thus a man may
to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted
from his birth be under a family disgrace, on account of a
by the first parent to his descendants is called “original,”
crime committed by one of his forbears.
Whether also other sins of the first parent or of nearer ancestors are transmitted to Ia IIae q. 81 a. 2
their descendants?
Objection 1.
It would seem that also other sins,
transmitted to their descendants.
whether of the first parent or of nearer ancestors, are trans-
Objection 2. Further, a man can better transmit to an-
mitted to their descendants. For punishment is never due
other, that which he has of himself, than that which he
unless for fault. Now some are punished by the judgment
has received from another: thus fire heats better than hot
of God for the sin of their immediate parents, according
water does. Now a man transmits to his children, by the
to Ex. 20:5: “I am. . . God. . . jealous, visiting the iniquity way, of origin, the sin which he has from Adam. Much
of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth
more therefore should he transmit the sin which he has
generation.” Furthermore, according to human law, the
contracted of himself.
children of those who are guilty of high treason are dis-
Objection 3. Further, the reason why we contract
inherited. Therefore the guilt of nearer ancestors is also
original sin from our first parent is because we were in
980
him as in the principle of our nature, which he corrupted.
such, and also something through the gift of grace, so
But we were likewise in our nearer ancestors, as in prin-
may something belong to the nature as such, viz. what-
ciples of our nature, which however it be corrupt, can be
ever is caused by the principles of nature, and something
corrupted yet more by sin, according to Apoc. 22:11: “He
too through the gift of grace. In this way original jus-
that is filthy, let him be filthier still.” Therefore children
tice, as stated in the Ia, q. 100, a. 1, was a gift of grace,
contract, by the way of origin, the sins of their nearer an-
conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent.
cestors, even as they contract the sin of their first parent.
This gift the first man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as
On the contrary, Good is more self-diffusive than
that original justice together with the nature was to have
evil. But the merits of the nearer ancestors are not trans-
been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder.
mitted to their descendants. Much less therefore are their
Other actual sins, however, whether of the first parent or
sins.
of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as
I answer that, Augustine puts this question in the
the nature of that person, i.e. in respect of the proneness
Enchiridion xlvi, xlvii, and leaves it unsolved. Yet if we
to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted.
look into the matter carefully we shall see that it is im-
Reply to Objection 1. According to Augustine in his
possible for the sins of the nearer ancestors, or even any
letter to Avitus∗, children are never inflicted with spiri-
other but the first sin of our first parent to be transmit-
tual punishment on account of their parents, unless they
ted by way of origin. The reason is that a man begets his
share in their guilt, either in their origin, or by imita-
like in species but not in individual. Consequently those
tion, because every soul is God’s immediate property, as
things that pertain directly to the individual, such as per-
stated in Ezech. 18:4. Sometimes, however, by Divine
sonal actions and matters affecting them, are not transmit-
or human judgment, children receive bodily punishment
ted by parents to their children: for a grammarian does
on their parents’ account, inasmuch as the child, as to its
not transmit to his son the knowledge of grammar that he
body, is part of its father.
has acquired by his own studies. On the other hand, those
Reply to Objection 2. A man can more easily trans-
things that concern the nature of the species, are transmit-
mit that which he has of himself, provided it be transmis-
ted by parents to their children, unless there be a defect
sible. But the actual sins of our nearer ancestors are not
of nature: thus a man with eyes begets a son having eyes,
transmissible, because they are purely personal, as stated
unless nature fails. And if nature be strong, even certain
above.
accidents of the individual pertaining to natural disposi-
Reply to Objection 3. The first sin infects nature with
tion, are transmitted to the children, e.g. fleetness of body,
a human corruption pertaining to nature; whereas other
acuteness of intellect, and so forth; but nowise those that
sins infect it with a corruption pertaining only to the per-
are purely personal, as stated above.
son.
Now just as something may belong to the person as
Whether the sin of the first parent is transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men?
Ia IIae q. 81 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of the first
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom.
5:12):
parent is not transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men.
“Death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned.”
Because death is a punishment consequent upon original
I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we
sin. But not all those, who are born of the seed of Adam,
must firmly believe that, Christ alone excepted, all men
will die: since those who will be still living at the com-
descended from Adam contract original sin from him; else
ing of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may be
all would not need redemption† which is through Christ;
gathered from 1 Thess. 4:14: “We who are alive. . . unto
and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gath-
the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them who have
ered from what has been stated (a. 1), viz. that original
slept.” Therefore they do not contract original sin.
sin, in virtue of the sin of our first parent, is transmitted
Objection 2. Further, no one gives another what he
to his posterity, just as, from the soul’s will, actual sin is
has not himself. Now a man who has been baptized has
transmitted to the members of the body, through their be-
not original sin. Therefore he does not transmit it to his
ing moved by the will. Now it is evident that actual sin
children.
can be transmitted to all such members as have an inborn
Objection 3. Further, the gift of Christ is greater than aptitude to be moved by the will. Therefore original sin
the sin of Adam, as the Apostle declares (Rom. 5:15,
is transmitted to all those who are moved by Adam by the
seqq). But the gift of Christ is not transmitted to all men:
movement of generation.
neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam.
Reply to Objection 1. It is held with greater proba-
∗ Ep. ad Auxilium ccl.
† Cf. Translator’s note inserted before IIIa,
q. 27
981
bility and more commonly that all those that are alive at its effect as regards the “fomes,” which is the disorder of
the coming of our Lord, will die, and rise again shortly,
the lower parts of the soul and of the body itself, in respect
as we shall state more fully in the IIIa ( Suppl., q. 78,
of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his power of
a. 1, obj. 1). If, however, it be true, as others hold, that
generation. Consequently those who are baptized trans-
they will never die, (an opinion which Jerome mentions
mit original sin: since they do not beget as being renewed
among others in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrection
in Baptism, but as still retaining something of the oldness
of the Body—Ep. cxix), then we must say in reply to the
of the first sin.
objection, that although they are not to die, the debt of
Reply to Objection 3. Just as Adam’s sin is trans-
death is none the less in them, and that the punishment of
mitted to all who are born of Adam corporally, so is the
death will be remitted by God, since He can also forgive
grace of Christ transmitted to all that are begotten of Him
the punishment due for actual sins.
spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this, not only unto
Reply to Objection 1. Original sin is taken away by
the removal of sin of their first parent, but also unto the
Baptism as to the guilt, in so far as the soul recovers grace
removal of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory.
as regards the mind. Nevertheless original sin remains in
Whether original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from hu-Ia IIae q. 81 a. 4
man flesh?
Objection 1. It would seem that original sin would be
as the members are moved by the soul to actual sin. Now
contracted by a person formed miraculously from human
there is no movement to generation except by the active
flesh. For a gloss on Gn. 4:1 says that “Adam’s entire pos-
power of generation: so that those alone contract origi-
terity was corrupted in his loins, because they were not
nal sin, who are descended from Adam through the active
severed from him in the place of life, before he sinned,
power of generation originally derived from Adam, i.e.
but in the place of exile after he had sinned.” But if a
who are descended from him through seminal power; for
man were to be formed in the aforesaid manner, his flesh
the seminal power is nothing else than the active power of
would be severed in the place of exile. Therefore it would
generation. But if anyone were to be formed by God out
contract original sin.
of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would
Objection 2. Further, original sin is caused in us by
not be derived from Adam. Consequently he would not
the soul being infected through the flesh. But man’s flesh
contract original sin: even as a hand would have no part
is entirely corrupted. Therefore a man’s soul would con-
in a human sin, if it were moved, not by the man’s will,
tract the infection of original sin, from whatever part of
but by some external power.
the flesh it was formed.
Reply to Objection 1. Adam was not in the place of
Objection 3. Further, original sin comes upon all from
exile until after his sin. Consequently it is not on account
our first parent, in so far as we were all in him when he
of the place of exile, but on account of the sin, that original sinned. But those who might be formed out of human
sin is transmitted to those to whom his active generation
flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore they would
extends.
contract original sin.
Reply to Objection 2. The flesh does not corrupt the
On the contrary, They would not have been in Adam
soul, except in so far as it is the active principle in gener-
“according to seminal virtue,” which alone is the cause of
ation, as we have stated.
the transmission of original sin, as Augustine states (Gen.
Reply to Objection 3. If a man were to be formed
ad lit. x, 18, seqq.).
from human flesh, he would have been in Adam, “by way
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,3), original sin
of bodily substance”∗, but not according to seminal virtue,
is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inas-
as stated above. Therefore he would not contract original
much as they are moved by him through generation, even
sin.
Whether if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted Ia IIae q. 81 a. 5
original sin?
Objection 1. It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam,
in so far as we were once in them, according to the word
had sinned, their children would have contracted original
of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12): “In whom all have sinned.”
sin. Because we contract original sin from our parents,
Now a man pre-exist in his mother as well as in his father.
∗ The expression is St. Augustine’s (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica IIIa, q. 31, a. 6, Reply to obj. 1
982
Therefore a man would have contracted original sin from philosophers, the active principle of generation is from the
his mother’s sin as well as from his father’s.
father, while the mother provides the matter. Therefore
Objection 2. Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had
original sin, is contracted, not from the mother, but from
sinned, their children would have been born liable to suf-
the father: so that, accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam,
fering and death, since it is “the mother” that “provides the
had sinned, their children would not contract original sin:
matter in generation” as the Philosopher states (De Gener.
whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they would
Animal. ii, 1,4), when death and liability to suffering are
contract it.
the necessary results of matter. Now liability to suffering
Reply to Objection 1. The child pre-exists in its fa-
and the necessity of dying are punishments of original sin.
ther as in its active principle, and in its mother, as in its
Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children
material and passive principle. Consequently the compar-
would contract original sin.
ison fails.
Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
Reply to Objection 2. Some hold that if Eve, and not
iii, 3) that “the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin,” (of
Adam, had sinned, their children would be immune from
whom Christ was to be born without original sin) “puri-
the sin, but would have been subject to the necessity of
fying her.” But this purification would not have been nec-
dying and to other forms of suffering that are a necessary
essary, if the infection of original sin were not contracted
result of the matter which is provided by the mother, not as
from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is
punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems
contracted from the mother: so that if Eve had sinned, her
unreasonable. Because, as stated in the Ia, q. 97, Aa. 1, 2,
children would have contracted original sin, even if Adam
ad 4, immortality and impassibility, in the original state,
had not sinned.
were a result, not of the condition of matter, but of origi-
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): “By
nal justice, whereby the body was subjected to the soul, so
one man sin entered into this world.” Now if the woman
long as the soul remained subject to God. Now privation
would have transmitted original sin to her children, he
of original justice is original sin. If, therefore, supposing
should have said that it entered by two, since both of them
Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been
sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she
transmitted to posterity on account of Eve’s sin; it is ev-
sinned first. Therefore original sin is transmitted to the
ident that the children would not have been deprived of
children, not by the mother, but by the father.
original justice: and consequently they would not have
I answer that, The solution of this question is made
been liable to suffer and subject to the necessity of dying.
clear by what has been said. For it has been stated (a. 1)
Reply to Objection 3. This prevenient purification in
that original sin is transmitted by the first parent in so
the Blessed Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmis-
far as he is the mover in the begetting of his children:
sion of original sin, but because it behooved the Mother
wherefore it has been said (a. 4) that if anyone were begot-
of God “to shine with the greatest purity”∗. For nothing is
ten materially only, of human flesh, they would not con-
worthy to receive God unless it be pure, according to Ps.
tract original sin. Now it is evident that in the opinion of
92:5: “Holiness becometh Thy House, O Lord.”
∗ Cf. Anselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii.
983
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 82
Of Original Sin, As to Its Essence
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether original sin is a habit?
(2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man?
(3) Whether original sin is concupiscence?
(4) Whether original sin is equally in all?
Whether original sin is a habit?
Ia IIae q. 82 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that original sin is not a
disposition of the body, by reason of the destruction of
habit. For original sin is the absence of original justice, as
that equilibrium which is essential to health. Hence it is
Anselm states (De Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that orig-
that original sin is called the “languor of nature”∗.
inal sin is a privation. But privation is opposed to habit.
Reply to Objection 1. As bodily sickness is partly a
Therefore original sin is not a habit.
privation, in so far as it denotes the destruction of the equi-
Objection 2. Further, actual sin has the nature of fault librium of health, and partly something positive, viz. the
more than original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary.
very humors that are inordinately disposed, so too orig-
Now the habit of actual sin has not the nature of a fault,
inal sin denotes the privation of original justice, and be-
else it would follow that a man while asleep, would be
sides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of the
guilty of sin. Therefore no original habit has the nature of
soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupt
a fault.
habit.
Objection 3. Further, in wickedness act always pre-
Reply to Objection 2. Actual sin is an inordinateness
cedes habit, because evil habits are not infused, but ac-
of an act: whereas original sin, being the sin of nature, is
quired. Now original sin is not preceded by an act. There-
an inordinate disposition of nature, and has the character
fore original sin is not a habit.
of fault through being transmitted from our first parent, as
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the
stated above (q. 81, a. 1). Now this inordinate disposition
Baptism of infants (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that
of nature is a kind of habit, whereas the inordinate dispo-
on account of original sin little children have the aptitude
sition of an act is not: and for this reason original sin can
of concupiscence though they have not the act. Now apti-
be a habit, whereas actual sin cannot.
tude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore original sin is
Reply to Objection 3. This objection considers the
a habit.
habit which inclines a power to an act: but original sin
I answer that, As stated above (q. 49, a. 4; q. 50, a. 1), is not this kind of habit. Nevertheless a certain inclina-habit is twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is in-
tion to an inordinate act does follow from original sin, not
clined to an act: thus science and virtue are called habits.
directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal of the obsta-
In this way original sin is not a habit. The second kind
cle, i.e. original justice, which hindered inordinate move-
of habit is the disposition of a complex nature, whereby
ments: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily move-
that nature is well or ill disposed to something, chiefly
ments results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it
when such a disposition has become like a second nature,
necessary to says that original sin is a habit “infused,” or
as in the case of sickness or health. In this sense original
a habit “acquired” (except by the act of our first parent,
sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising
but not by our own act): but it is a habit “inborn” due to
from the destruction of the harmony which was essential
our corrupt origin.
to original justice, even as bodily sickness is an inordinate
∗ Cf. Augustine, In Ps. 118, serm. iii
984
Whether there are several original sins in one man?
Ia IIae q. 82 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there are many orig-
from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung
inal sins in one man. For it is written (Ps. 1:7): “Behold
or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be
I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother
one in number. Now the cause of this corrupt disposition
conceive me.” But the sin in which a man is conceived
that is called original sin, is one only, viz. the privation of is original sin. Therefore there are several original sins in
original justice, removing the subjection of man’s mind to
man.
God. Consequently original sin is specifically one, and, in
Objection 2. Further, one and the same habit does
one man, can be only one in number; while, in different
not incline its subject to contraries: since the inclination
men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is numeri-
of habit is like that of nature which tends to one thing.
cally many.
Now original sin, even in one man, inclines to various and
Reply to Objection 1.
The employment of the
contrary sins. Therefore original sin is not one habit; but
plural—“in sins”—may be explained by the custom of the
several.
Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of the plural for the
Objection 3. Further, original sin infects every part of singular, e.g. “They are dead that sought the life of the
the soul. Now the different parts of the soul are different
child”; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually pre-exist subjects of sin, as shown above (q. 74). Since then one sin
in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; cannot be in different subjects, it seems that original sin is
or by the fact of there being many deformities in the sin
not one but several.
of our first parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): “Behold the
so forth; or by several parts of the soul being infected by
Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the
original sin.
world”: and the reason for the employment of the singu-
Reply to Objection 2. Of itself and directly, i.e. by
lar is that the “sin of the world” is original sin, as a gloss
its own form, one habit cannot incline its subject to con-
expounds this passage.
traries. But there is no reason why it should not do so, in-
I answer that, In one man there is one original sin.
directly and accidentally, i.e. by the removal of an obsta-
Two reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the
cle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed body is destroyed,
part of the cause of original sin. For it has been stated
the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like man-
(q. 81, a. 2), that the first sin alone of our first parent was ner, when the harmony of original justice is destroyed, the
transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore in one man origi-
various powers of the soul have various opposite tenden-
nal sin is one in number; and in all men, it is one in pro-
cies.
portion, i.e. in relation to its first principle. The second
Reply to Objection 3. Original sin infects the differ-
reason may be taken from the very essence of original sin.
ent parts of the soul, in so far as they are the parts of one
Because in every inordinate disposition, unity of species
whole; even as original justice held all the soul’s parts to-
depends on the cause, while the unity of number is derived
gether in one. Consequently there is but one original sin:
from the subject. For example, take bodily sickness: vari-
just as there is but one fever in one man, although the var-
ous species of sickness proceed from different causes, e.g.
ious parts of the body are affected.
Whether original sin is concupiscence?
Ia IIae q. 82 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that original sin is not
Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7). Therefore original sin is
concupiscence. For every sin is contrary to nature, accord-
ignorance rather than concupiscence.
ing to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30). But concupis-
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 15):
cence is in accordance with nature, since it is the proper
“Concupiscence is the guilt of original sin.”
act of the concupiscible faculty which is a natural power.
I answer that, Everything takes its species from its
Therefore concupiscence is not original sin.
form: and it has been stated (a. 2) that the species of orig-
Objection 2. Further, through original sin “the pas-
inal sin is taken from its cause. Consequently the for-
sions of sins” are in us, according to the Apostle (Rom.
mal element of original sin must be considered in respect
7:5). Now there are several other passions besides concu-
of the cause of original sin. But contraries have contrary
piscence, as stated above (q. 23, a. 4). Therefore original
causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be con-
sin is not concupiscence any more than another passion.
sidered with respect to the cause of original justice, which
Objection 3. Further, by original sin, all the parts
is opposed to it. Now the whole order of original justice
of the soul are disordered, as stated above (a. 2, obj. 3).
consists in man’s will being subject to God: which subjec-
But the intellect is the highest of the soul’s parts, as the
tion, first and chiefly, was in the will, whose function it is
985
to move all the other parts to the end, as stated above (q. 9, beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man, contrary to
a. 1 ), so that the will being turned away from God, all
reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin.
the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accord-
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 25, a. 1), all ingly the privation of original justice, whereby the will
the irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible pas-
was made subject to God, is the formal element in origi-
sions, as holding the principle place: and of these, con-
nal sin; while every other disorder of the soul’s powers, is
cupiscence is the most impetuous in moving, and is felt
a kind of material element in respect of original sin. Now
most, as stated above (q. 25, a. 2, ad 1). Therefore orig-
the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul con-
inal sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief
sists chiefly in their turning inordinately to mutable good;
passion, and as including all the others, in a fashion.
which inordinateness may be called by the general name
Reply to Objection 3. As, in good things, the intel-
of concupiscence. Hence original sin is concupiscence,
lect and reason stand first, so conversely in evil things,
materially, but privation of original justice, formally.
the lower part of the soul is found to take precedence, for
Reply to Objection 1. Since, in man, the concupis-
it clouds and draws the reason, as stated above (q. 77,
cible power is naturally governed by reason, the act of
Aa. 1,2; q. 80, a. 2). Hence original sin is called con-
concupiscence is so far natural to man, as it is in accord
cupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance is
with the order of reason; while, in so far as it trespasses
comprised among the material defects of original sin.
Whether original sin is equally in all?
Ia IIae q. 82 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that original sin is not
nature of guilt; for relations cannot be more or less. Con-
equally in all. Because original sin is inordinate concu-
sequently it is evident that original sin cannot be more in
piscence, as stated above (a. 3). Now all are not equally
one than in another.
prone to acts of concupiscence. Therefore original sin is
Reply to Objection 1. Through the bond of original
not equally in all.
justice being broken, which held together all the powers
Objection 2. Further, original sin is an inordinate dis-
of the soul in a certain order, each power of the soul tends
position of the soul, just as sickness is an inordinate dis-
to its own proper movement, and the more impetuously, as
position of the body. But sickness is subject to degrees.
it is stronger. Now it happens that some of the soul’s pow-
Therefore original sin is subject to degrees.
ers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et
the different bodily temperaments. Consequently if one
Concep. i, 23) that “lust transmits original sin to the
man is more prone than another to acts of concupiscence,
child.” But the act of generation may be more lustful in
this is not due to original sin, because the bond of original
one than in another. Therefore original sin may be greater
justice is equally broken in all, and the lower parts of the
in one than in another.
soul are, in all, left to themselves equally; but it is due to
On the contrary, Original sin is the sin of nature, as
the various dispositions of the powers, as stated.
stated above (q. 81, a. 1). But nature is equally in all.
Reply to Objection 2. Sickness of the body, even
Therefore original sin is too.
sickness of the same species, has not an equal cause in
I answer that, There are two things in original sin:
all; for instance if a fever be caused by corruption of the
one is the privation of original justice; the other is the re-
bile, the corruption may be greater or less, and nearer to,
lation of this privation to the sin of our first parent, from
or further from a vital principle. But the cause of original
whom it is transmitted to man through his corrupt origin.
sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison.
As to the first, original sin has no degrees, since the gift
Reply to Objection 3. It is not the actual lust that
of original justice is taken away entirely; and privations
transmits original sin: for, supposing God were to grant
that remove something entirely, such as death and dark-
to a man to feel no inordinate lust in the act of generation,
ness, cannot be more or less, as stated above (q. 73, a. 2).
he would still transmit original sin; we must understand
In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the second:
this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive appetite is
since all are related equally to the first principle of our
not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original justice.
corrupt origin, from which principle original sin takes the
This lust is equally in all.
986
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 83
Of the Subject of Original Sin
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the soul?
(2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through its powers?
(3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of original sin?
(4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible part, and the sense of touch?
Whether original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul?
Ia IIae q. 83 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that original sin is more
I answer that, One thing can be in another in two
in the flesh than in the soul. Because the rebellion of the
ways. First, as in its cause, either principal, or instru-
flesh against the mind arises from the corruption of orig-
mental; secondly, as in its subject. Accordingly the origi-
inal sin. Now the root of this rebellion is seated in the
nal sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as in its principal
flesh: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): “I see another
cause, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12):
law in my members fighting against the law of my mind.”
“In whom all have sinned”: whereas it is in the bodily se-
Therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the flesh.
men, as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active
Objection 2. Further, a thing is more in its cause than
power of the semen that original sin together with human
in its effect: thus heat is in the heating fire more than in
nature is transmitted to the child. But original sin can no-
the hot water. Now the soul is infected with the corruption
wise be in the flesh as its subject, but only in the soul.
of original sin by the carnal semen. Therefore original sin
The reason for this is that, as stated above (q. 81, a. 1),
is in the flesh rather than in the soul.
original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent
Objection 3. Further, we contract original sin from
to this posterity by a certain movement of generation, in
our first parent, in so far as we were in him by reason of
the same way as actual sin is transmitted from any man’s
seminal virtue. Now our souls were not in him thus, but
will to his other parts. Now in this transmission it is to
only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul,
be observed, that whatever accrues from the motion of
but in the flesh.
the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can in
Objection 4. Further, the rational soul created by God
any way share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its
is infused into the body. If therefore the soul were infected
instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will
with original sin, it would follow that it is corrupted in its
consenting to gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues to
creation or infusion: and thus God would be the cause of
the concupiscible faculty, and partaking of food accrues
sin, since He is the author of the soul’s creation and fu-
to the hand and the mouth, which, in so far as they are
sion.
moved by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin. But
Objection 5. Further, no wise man pours a precious
that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the
liquid into a vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt
internal members, which have no natural aptitude for be-
the liquid. But the rational soul is more precious than any
ing moved by the will, does not bear the character of guilt.
liquid. If therefore the soul, by being united with the body,
Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt,
could be corrupted with the infection of original sin, God,
while the flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt;
Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul into
whatever accrues to the soul from the corruption of the
such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is not cor-
first sin, has the character of guilt, while whatever accrues
rupted by the flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the
to the flesh, has the character, not of guilt but of punish-
soul but in the flesh.
ment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of original
On the contrary, The same is the subject of a virtue
sin, and not the flesh.
and of the vice or sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Retract.
cannot be the subject of virtue: for the Apostle says (Rom.
i, 27)∗, the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man
7:18): “I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say,
already redeemed, who is delivered from guilt, but is still
in my flesh, that which is good.” Therefore the flesh can-
liable to punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to
not be the subject of original sin, but only the soul.
dwell “in the flesh.” Consequently it follows that the flesh
∗ Cf. QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 66
987
is the subject, not of guilt, but of punishment.
said that the soul is tainted through being created. On the
Reply to Objection 2. Original sin is caused by the
other hand, infusion implies relation both to God infusing
semen as instrumental cause. Now there is no need for
and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. And so,
anything to be more in the instrumental cause than in the
with regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul
effect; but only in the principal cause: and, in this way,
is stained through being infused; but only with regard to
original sin was in Adam more fully, since in him it had
the body into which it is infused.
the nature of actual sin.
Reply to Objection 5. The common good takes prece-
Reply to Objection 3. The soul of any individual
dence of private good. Wherefore God, according to His
man was in Adam, in respect of his seminal power, not
wisdom, does not overlook the general order of things
indeed as in its effective principle, but as in a dispositive
(which is that such a soul be infused into such a body),
principle: because the bodily semen, which is transmit-
lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the more
ted from Adam, does not of its own power produce the
that the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist
rational soul, but disposes the matter for it.
prior to its infusion into the body, as stated in the Ia, q. 90, Reply to Objection 4. The corruption of original sin
a. 4; Ia, q. 118, a. 3. And it is better for the soul to be thus, is nowise caused by God, but by the sin alone of our first
according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially
parent through carnal generation. And so, since creation
since it can avoid damnation, by means of grace.
implies a relation in the soul to God alone, it cannot be
Whether original sin is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers?
Ia IIae q. 83 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that original sin is not
power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is evi-
in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers. For
dent that original sin is caused through our origin. Con-
the soul is naturally apt to be the subject of sin, in respect
sequently that part of the soul which is first reached by
of those parts which can be moved by the will. Now the
man’s origin, is the primary subject of original sin. Now
soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence but only
the origin reaches the soul as the term of generation, ac-
as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not
cording as it is the form of the body: and this belongs to
according to its essence, but only according to the powers.
the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the Ia,
Objection 2. Further, original sin is opposed to orig-
q. 76, a. 6. Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence, is
inal justice. Now original justice was in a power of the
the primary subject of original sin.
soul, because power is the subject of virtue. Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. As the motion of the will of
original sin also is in a power of the soul, rather than in its an individual reaches to the soul’s powers and not to its
essence.
essence, so the motion of the will of the first generator,
Objection 3. Further, just as original sin is derived
through the channel of generation, reaches first of all to
from the soul as from the flesh, so is it derived by the
the essence of the soul, as stated.
powers from the essence. But original sin is more in the
Reply to Objection 2. Even original justice pertained
soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is more in the powers
radically to the essence of the soul, because it was God’s
than in the essence of the soul.
gift to human nature, to which the essence of the soul is
Objection 4. Further, original sin is said to be concu-
related before the powers. For the powers seem to regard
piscence, as stated (q. 82, a. 3). But concupiscence is in
the person, in as much as they are the principles of per-
the powers of the soul. Therefore original sin is also.
sonal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual
On the contrary, Original sin is called the sin of na-
sins, which are the sins of the person.
ture, as stated above (q. 81, a. 1). Now the soul is the
Reply to Objection 3. The body is related to the soul
form and nature of the body, in respect of its essence and
as matter to form, which though it comes second in order
not in respect of its powers, as stated in the Ia, q. 76, a. 6.
of generation, nevertheless comes first in the order of per-
Therefore the soul is the subject of original sin chiefly in
fection and nature. But the essence of the soul is related
respect of its essence.
to the powers, as a subject to its proper accidents, which
I answer that, The subject of a sin is chiefly that part follow their subject both in the order of generation and in
of the soul to which the motive cause of that sin primar-
that of perfection. Consequently the comparison fails.
ily pertains: thus if the motive cause of a sin is sensual
Reply to Objection 4. Concupiscence, in relation to
pleasure, which regards the concupiscible power through
original sin, holds the position of matter and effect, as
being its proper object, it follows that the concupiscible
stated above (q. 82, a. 3).
988
Whether original sin infects the will before the other powers?
Ia IIae q. 83 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that original sin does not
as stated above (a. 2). In the second place we must con-
infect the will before the other powers. For every sin be-
sider its inclination to act; and in this way it regards the
longs chiefly to that power by whose act it was caused.
powers of the soul. It must therefore regard first of all that
Now original sin is caused by an act of the generative
power in which is seated the first inclination to commit a
power. Therefore it seems to belong to the generative
sin, and this is the will, as stated above (q. 74, Aa. 1,2).
power more than to the others.
Therefore original sin regards first of all the will.
Objection 2.
Further, original sin is transmitted
Reply to Objection 1. Original sin, in man, is not
through the carnal semen. But the other powers of the
caused by the generative power of the child, but by the act
soul are more akin to the flesh than the will is, as is evi-
of the parental generative power. Consequently, it does
dent with regard to all the sensitive powers, which use a
not follow that the child’s generative power is the subject
bodily organ. Therefore original sin is in them more than
of original sin.
in the will.
Reply to Objection 2. Original sin spreads in two
Objection 3. Further, the intellect precedes the will,
ways; from the flesh to the soul, and from the essence
for the object of the will is only the good understood. If
of the soul to the powers. The former follows the order
therefore original sin infects all the powers of the soul, it
of generation, the latter follows the order of perfection.
seems that it must first of all infect the intellect, as pre-
Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive powers,
ceding the others.
are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the
On the contrary, Original justice has a prior relation
higher power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, the
to the will, because it is “rectitude of the will,” as Anselm
infection of original sin reaches it first.
states (De Concep. Virg. iii). Therefore original sin,
Reply to Objection 3. The intellect precedes the will,
which is opposed to it, also has a prior relation to the will.
in one way, by proposing its object to it. In another way,
I answer that, Two things must be considered in the
the will precedes the intellect, in the order of motion to
infection of original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; act, which motion pertains to sin.
and in this respect it regards first the essence of the soul,
Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others?
Ia IIae q. 83 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the aforesaid powers
the generative power, the concupiscible faculty and the
are not more infected than the others. For the infection of
sense of touch.
original sin seems to pertain more to that part of the soul
I answer that, Those corruptions especially are said
which can be first the subject of sin. Now this is the ra-
to be infectious, which are of such a nature as to be trans-
tional part, and chiefly the will. Therefore that power is
mitted from one subject to another: hence contagious dis-
most infected by original sin.
eases, such as leprosy and murrain and the like, are said to
Objection 2. Further, no power of the soul is infected
be infectious. Now the corruption of original sin is trans-
by guilt, except in so far as it can obey reason. Now the
mitted by the act of generation, as stated above (q. 81,
generative power cannot obey reason, as stated in Ethic.
a. 1). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are
i, 13. Therefore the generative power is not the most in-
chiefly said to be infected. Now this act serves the genera-
fected by original sin.
tive power, in as much as it is directed to generation; and it
Objection 3. Further, of all the senses the sight is the includes delectation of the touch, which is the most pow-most spiritual and the nearest to reason, in so far “as it
erful object of the concupiscible faculty. Consequently,
shows us how a number of things differ” (Metaph. i). But
while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted by
the infection of guilt is first of all in the reason. Therefore original sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted
the sight is more infected than touch.
and infected.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
Reply to Objection 1. Original sin, in so far as it in-
16, seqq., 24) that the infection of original sin is most
clines to actual sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated
apparent in the movements of the members of genera-
above (a. 3). But in so far as it is transmitted to the off-
tion, which are not subject to reason. Now those mem-
spring, it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately, and
bers serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes,
to the will, remotely.
wherein there is the delectation of touch, which is the
Reply to Objection 2. The infection of actual sin be-
most powerful incentive to concupiscence. Therefore the
longs only to the powers which are moved by the will of
infection of original sin regards these three chiefly, viz.
the sinner. But the infection of original sin is not derived
989
from the will of the contractor, but through his natural ori-far as the concupiscible species is seen through the sight.
gin, which is effected by the generative power. Hence it is
But the delectation is completed in the touch. Wherefore
this power that is infected by original sin.
the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch rather than
Reply to Objection 3. Sight is not related to the act
to the sight.
of generation except in respect of remote disposition, in so
990
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 84
Of the Cause of Sin, in Respect of One Sin Being the Cause of Another (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the cause of another. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?
(2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?
(3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides pride and covetousness?
(4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they?
Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?
Ia IIae q. 84 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that covetousness is not
he is speaking of covetousness as denoting the inordinate
the root of all sins. For covetousness, which is immoder-
desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that covetous-
ate desire for riches, is opposed to the virtue of liberality.
ness, as denoting a special sin, is called the root of all sins, But liberality is not the root of all virtues. Therefore cov-in likeness to the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance
etousness is not the root of all sins.
to the whole tree. For we see that by riches man acquires
Objection 2. Further, the desire for the means pro-
the means of committing any sin whatever, and of sating
ceeds from desire for the end. Now riches, the desire for
his desire for any sin whatever, since money helps man to
which is called covetousness, are not desired except as be-
obtain all manner of temporal goods, according to Eccles.
ing useful for some end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore
10:19: “All things obey money”: so that in this desire for
covetousness is not the root of all sins, but proceeds from
riches is the root of all sins.
some deeper root.
Reply to Objection 1. Virtue and sin do not arise from
Objection 3. Further, it often happens that avarice,
the same source. For sin arises from the desire of muta-
which is another name for covetousness, arises from other
ble good; and consequently the desire of that good which
sins; as when a man desires money through ambition, or
helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is called the root
in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it is not the root of
of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire for the im-
all sins.
mutable God; and consequently charity, which is the love
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:10):
of God, is called the root of the virtues, according to Eph.
“The desire of money is the root of all evil.”
3:17: “Rooted and founded in charity.”
I answer that, According to some, covetousness may
Reply to Objection 2. The desire of money is said to
be understood in different ways. First, as denoting in-
be the root of sins, not as though riches were sought for
ordinate desire for riches: and thus it is a special sin.
their own sake, as being the last end; but because they are
Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for any temporal
much sought after as useful for any temporal end. And
good: and thus it is a genus comprising all sins, because
since a universal good is more desirable than a particu-
every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good,
lar good, they move the appetite more than any individual
as stated above (q. 72, a. 2). Thirdly, as denoting an in-
goods, which along with many others can be procured by
clination of a corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods
means of money.
inordinately: and they say that in this sense covetousness
Reply to Objection 3. Just as in natural things we do
is the root of all sins, comparing it to the root of a tree,
not ask what always happens, but what happens most fre-
which draws its sustenance from earth, just as every sin
quently, for the reason that the nature of corruptible things
grows out of the love of temporal things.
can be hindered, so as not always to act in the same way;
Now, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain
so also in moral matters, we consider what happens in the
the mind of the Apostle when he states that covetousness
majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the rea-
is the root of all sins. For in that passage he clearly speaks
son that the will does not act of necessity. So when we say
against those who, because they “will become rich, fall
that covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert
into temptation, and into the snare of the devil. . . for cov-
that no other evil can be its root, but that other evils more
etousness is the root of all evils.” Hence it is evident that
frequently arise therefrom, for the reason given.
991
Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?
Ia IIae q. 84 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that pride is not the be-
overturned the thrones of proud princes”; indeed this is
ginning of every sin. For the root is a beginning of a tree,
the point of nearly the whole chapter. We must therefore
so that the beginning of a sin seems to be the same as the
say that pride, even as denoting a special sin, is the begin-
root of sin. Now covetousness is the root of every sin, as
ning of every sin. For we must take note that, in voluntary
stated above (a. 1). Therefore it is also the beginning of
actions, such as sins, there is a twofold order, of intention,
every sin, and not pride.
and of execution. In the former order, the principle is the
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14):
end, as we have stated many times before (q. 1, a. 1, ad
“The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay:
1; q. 18, a. 7, ad 2; q. 15, a. 1, ad 2; q. 25, a. 2). Now
‘to fall off’] from God.” But apostasy from God is a sin.
man’s end in acquiring all temporal goods is that, through
Therefore another sin is the beginning of pride, so that the
their means, he may have some perfection and excellence.
latter is not the beginning of every sin.
Therefore, from this point of view, pride, which is the de-
Objection 3.
Further, the beginning of every sin
sire to excel, is said to be the “beginning” of every sin. On
would seem to be that which causes all sins. Now this is
the other hand, in the order of execution, the first place be-
inordinate self-love, which, according to Augustine (De
longs to that which by furnishing the opportunity of ful-
Civ. Dei xiv), “builds up the city of Babylon.” Therefore
filling all desires of sin, has the character of a root, and
self-love and not pride, is the beginning of every sin.
such are riches; so that, from this point of view, covetous-
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): “Pride
ness is said to be the “root” of all evils, as stated above
is the beginning of all sin.”
(a. 1).
I answer that, Some say pride is to be taken in three
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire to excel; and
Reply to Objection 2. Apostasy from God is stated to
thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting actual con-
be the beginning of pride, in so far as it denotes a turning
tempt of God, to the effect of not being subject to His
away from God, because from the fact that man wishes
commandment; and thus, they say, it is a generic sin.
not to be subject to God, it follows that he desires inordi-
Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, ow-
nately his own excellence in temporal things. Wherefore,
ing to the corruption of nature; and in this sense they
in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote
say that it is the beginning of every sin, and that it dif-
the special sin, but rather that general condition of every
fers from covetousness, because covetousness regards sin
sin, consisting in its turning away from God. It may also
as turning towards the mutable good by which sin is, as
be said that apostasy from God is said to be the begin-
it were, nourished and fostered, for which reason cov-
ning of pride, because it is the first species of pride. For
etousness is called the “root”; whereas pride regards sin
it is characteristic of pride to be unwilling to be subject to
as turning away from God, to Whose commandment man
any superior, and especially to God; the result being that
refuses to be subject, for which reason it is called the “be-
a man is unduly lifted up, in respect of the other species
ginning,” because the beginning of evil consists in turning
of pride.
away from God.
Reply to Objection 3. In desiring to excel, man loves
Now though all this is true, nevertheless it does not ex-
himself, for to love oneself is the same as to desire some
plain the mind of the wise man who said (Ecclus. 10:15):
good for oneself. Consequently it amounts to the same
“Pride is the beginning of all sin.” For it is evident that he
whether we reckon pride or self-love as the beginning of
is speaking of pride as denoting inordinate desire to ex-
every evil.
cel, as is clear from what follows (verse 17): “God hath
Whether any other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital?
Ia IIae q. 84 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that no other special sins,
movement follow from the head. But sin implies privation
besides pride and avarice, should be called capital. Be-
of order. Therefore sin has not the character of head: so
cause “the head seems to be to an animal, what the root
that no sins should be called capital.
is to a plant,” as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38: for the
Objection 3. Further, capital crimes are those which
roots are like a mouth. If therefore covetousness is called
receive capital punishment. But every kind of sin com-
the “root of all evils,” it seems that it alone, and no other
prises some that are punished thus. Therefore the capital
sin, should be called a capital vice.
sins are not certain specific sins.
Objection 2. Further, the head bears a certain relation
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumer-
of order to the other members, in so far as sensation and
ates certain special vices under the name of capital.
992
I answer that, The word capital is derived from “ca-vices to the “leaders of an army.”
put” [a head]. Now the head, properly speaking, is that
Reply to Objection 1. The term “capital” is taken
part of an animal’s body, which is the principle and direc-
from “caput” and applied to something connected with,
tor of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking,
or partaking of the head, as having some property thereof,
every principle is called a head, and even men who direct
but not as being the head taken literally. And therefore
and govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital
the capital vices are not only those which have the char-
vice is so called, in the first place, from “head” taken in
acter of primary origin, as covetousness which is called
the proper sense, and thus the name “capital” is given to
the “root,” and pride which is called the beginning, but
a sin for which capital punishment is inflicted. It is not in
also those which have the character of proximate origin in
this sense that we are now speaking of capital sins, but in
respect of several sins.
another sense, in which the term “capital” is derived from
Reply to Objection 2. Sin lacks order in so far as it
head, taken metaphorically for a principle or director of
turns away from God, for in this respect it is an evil, and
others. In this way a capital vice is one from which other
evil, according to Augustine (De Natura Boni iv), is “the
vices arise, chiefly by being their final cause, which ori-
privation of mode, species and order.” But in so far as
gin is formal, as stated above (q. 72, a. 6). Wherefore a
sin implies a turning to something, it regards some good:
capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also
wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin.
their director and, in a way, their leader: because the art
Reply to Objection 3. This objection considers cap-
or habit, to which the end belongs, is always the princi-
ital sin as so called from the punishment it deserves, in
ple and the commander in matters concerning the means.
which sense we are not taking it here.
Hence Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) compares these capital
Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned?
Ia IIae q. 84 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), the capital vices reckon seven capital vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger,
are those which give rise to others, especially by way of
sloth, covetousness, gluttony, lust. For sins are opposed
final cause. Now this kind of origin may take place in
to virtues. But there are four principal virtues, as stated
two ways. First, on account of the condition of the sinner,
above (q. 61, a. 2). Therefore there are only four principal
who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for one
or capital vices.
particular end, the result being that he frequently goes for-
Objection 2. Further, the passions of the soul are
ward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come
causes of sin, as stated above (q. 77). But there are four
under the consideration of art, because man’s particular
principal passions of the soul; two of which, viz. hope and
dispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account
fear, are not mentioned among the above sins, whereas
of a natural relationship of the ends to one another: and
certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sad-
it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from
ness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust,
another, so that this kind of origin can come under the
and sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins
consideration of art.
are unfittingly enumerated.
Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital,
Objection 3. Further, anger is not a principal pas-
whose ends have certain fundamental reasons for moving
sion. Therefore it should not be placed among the princi-
the appetite; and it is in respect of these fundamental rea-
pal vices.
sons that the capital vices are differentiated. Now a thing
Objection 4. Further, just as covetousness or avarice
moves the appetite in two ways. First, directly and of its
is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek it, while
above (a. 2). But avarice is reckoned to be one of the cap-
evil, for the same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it.
ital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among
Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as
the capital vices.
it were: thus one seeks an evil on account of some atten-
Objection 5. Further, some sins are committed which
dant good, or avoids a good on account of some attendant
cannot be caused through any of these: as, for instance,
evil.
when one sins through ignorance, or when one commits
Again, man’s good is threefold. For, in the first place,
a sin with a good intention, e.g. steals in order to give an
there is a certain good of the soul, which derives its as-
alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently enu-
pect of appetibility, merely through being apprehended,
merated.
viz. the excellence of honor and praise, and this good is
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory who
sought inordinately by “vainglory.” Secondly, there is the
enumerates them in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17).
good of the body, and this regards either the preservation
993
of the individual, e.g. meat and drink, which good is pur-passions. Now all the passions of the irascible part arise
sued inordinately by “gluttony,” or the preservation of the
from passions of the concupiscible part; and these are all,
species, e.g. sexual intercourse, which good is sought in-
in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow. Hence plea-
ordinately by “lust.” Thirdly, there is external good, viz.
sure and sorrow have a prominent place among the capital
riches, to which “covetousness” is referred. These same
sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated
four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils.
above (q. 25, a. 4).
Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through
Reply to Objection 3. Although anger is not a prin-
possessing some property of happiness, which all men
cipal passion, yet it has a distinct place among the capital
seek naturally.
Now in the first place happiness im-
vices, because it implies a special kind of movement in
plies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good, to
the appetite, in so far as recrimination against another’s
which belongs excellence or renown, which is desired by
good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e. of the right to
“pride” or “vainglory.” Secondly, it implies satiety, which
vengeance.
“covetousness” seeks in riches that give promise thereof.
Reply to Objection 4. Pride is said to be the begin-
Thirdly, it implies pleasure, without which happiness is
ning of every sin, in the order of the end, as stated above
impossible, as stated in Ethic. i, 7; x, 6,7,[8] and this
(a. 2): and it is in the same order that we are to consider
“gluttony” and “lust” pursue.
the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore pride, like
On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an
a universal vice, is not counted along with the others, but
attendant evil occurs in two ways. For this happens either
is reckoned as the “queen of them all,” as Gregory states
in respect of one’s own good, and thus we have “sloth,”
(Moral. xxxi, 27). But covetousness is said to be the root
which is sadness about one’s spiritual good, on account of
from another point of view, as stated above (Aa. 1,2).
the attendant bodily labor: or else it happens in respect of
Reply to Objection 5. These vices are called capi-
another’s good, and this, if it be without recrimination, be-
tal because others, most frequently, arise from them: so
longs to “envy,” which is sadness about another’s good as
that nothing prevents some sins from arising out of other
being a hindrance to one’s own excellence, while if it be
causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the sins which
with recrimination with a view to vengeance, it is “anger.”
are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, to which
Again, these same vices seek the contrary evils.
pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire
Reply to Objection 1. Virtue and vice do not origi-
spiritual goods on account of the attendant labor; for the
nate in the same way: since virtue is caused by the sub-
ignorance that can cause sin, is due to negligence, as
ordination of the appetite to reason, or to the immutable
stated above (q. 76, a. 2). That a man commit a sin with
good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the appetite
a good intention, seems to point to ignorance, in so far as
for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the prin-
he knows not that evil should not be done that good may
cipal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues.
come of it.
Reply to Objection 2. Fear and hope are irascible
994
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 85
Of the Effects of Sin, and, First, of the Corruption of the Good of Nature (In Six Articles)
We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the debt of punishment.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin?
(2) Whether it can be taken away altogether?
(3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is stricken in consequence of sin.
(4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin?
(5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?
(6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man?
Whether sin diminishes the good of nature?
Ia IIae q. 85 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that sin does not diminish
ture. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the
the good of nature. For man’s sin is no worse than the
whole of human nature in the person of the first man, may
devil’s. But natural good remains unimpaired in devils af-
be called a good of nature.
ter sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore
Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is nei-
neither does sin diminish the good of human nature.
ther destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of
Objection 2.
Further, when that which follows
nature was entirely destroyed through the sin of our first
is changed, that which precedes remains unchanged,
parent. But the second good of nature, viz. the natu-
since substance remains the same when its accidents are
ral inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin. Because
changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action.
human acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated
Therefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary
above (q. 50, a. 1). Now from the very fact that thing
act, nature is not changed on that account, so that the good
becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination
of nature be diminished.
to the other contrary must needs be diminished. Where-
Objection 3. Further, sin is an action, while diminu-
fore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact that a
tion is a passion. Now no agent is passive by the very
man sins, there results a diminution of that good of nature,
reason of its acting, although it is possible for it to act on
which is the inclination to virtue.
one thing, and to be passive as regards another. Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius is speaking of the
he who sins, does not, by his sin, diminish the good of his
first-mentioned good of nature, which consists in “being,
nature.
living and understanding,” as anyone may see who reads
Objection 4. Further, no accident acts on its subject:
the context.
because that which is patient is a potential being, while
Reply to Objection 2. Although nature precedes the
that which is subjected to an accident, is already an actual
voluntary action, it has an inclination to a certain volun-
being as regards that accident. But sin is in the good of
tary action. Wherefore nature is not changed in itself,
nature as an accident in a subject. Therefore sin does not
through a change in the voluntary action: it is the incli-
diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act.
nation that is changed in so far as it is directed to its term.
On the contrary, “A certain man going down from
Reply to Objection 3. A voluntary action proceeds
Jerusalem to Jericho (Lk. 10:30), i.e. to the corruption of
from various powers, active and passive. The result is that
sin, was stripped of his gifts, and wounded in his nature,”
through voluntary actions something is caused or taken
as Bede∗ expounds the passage. Therefore sin diminishes
away in the man who acts, as we have stated when treat-
the good of nature.
ing of the production of habits (q. 51, a. 2).
I answer that, The good of human nature is threefold.
Reply to Objection 4. An accident does not act effec-
First, there are the principles of which nature is consti-
tively on its subject, but it acts on it formally, in the same
tuted, and the properties that flow from them, such as the
sense as when we say that whiteness makes a thing white.
powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, since man has
In this way there is nothing to hinder sin from diminish-
from nature an inclination to virtue, as stated above (q. 60,
ing the good of nature; but only in so far as sin is itself
a. 1; q. 63, a. 1), this inclination to virtue is a good of na-
a diminution of the good of nature, through being an in-
∗ The quotation is from the Glossa Ordinaria of Strabo
995
ordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness clines the reason and will, as stated above (q. 77, Aa. 1,
of the agent, we must say that such like inordinateness
2). The result of this is the inordinateness, not as though
is caused by the fact that in the acts of the soul, there is
an accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the
an active, and a passive element: thus the sensible object
object acts on the power, and one power acts on another
moves the sensitive appetite, and the sensitive appetite in-
and puts it out of order.
Whether the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin?
Ia IIae q. 85 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the entire good of
quantity be halved, and one half be diminished by half, it
human nature can be destroyed by sin. For the good of
will be possible to go on thus indefinitely, provided that
human nature is finite, since human nature itself is finite.
what is subtracted in each case be less than what was sub-
Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if the subtrac-
tracted before. But this does not apply to the question at
tion be continuous. Since therefore the good of nature can
issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good
be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end
of nature less than a previous sin, but perhaps more, if it
it can be entirely taken away.
be a more grievous sin.
Objection 2. Further, in a thing of one nature, the
We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by
whole and the parts are uniform, as is evidently the case
saying that the aforesaid inclination is to be considered as
with air, water, flesh and all bodies with similar parts. But
a middle term between two others: for it is based on the ra-
the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since therefore a
tional nature as on its root, and tends to the good of virtue,
part thereof can be taken away by sin, it seems that the
as to its term and end. Consequently its diminution may
whole can also be taken away by sin.
be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its rood,
Objection 3. Further, the good of nature, that is weak-
secondly, on the part of its term. In the first way, it is not
ened by sin, is aptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is
diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature,
destroyed entirely in some on account of sin: thus the lost
as stated above (a. 1). But it is diminished in the second
cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind can
way, in so far as an obstacle is placed against its attain-
to sight. Therefore sin can take away the good of nature
ing its term. Now if it were diminished in the first way,
entirely.
it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv)
nature being entirely destroyed. Since, however, it is di-
that “evil does not exist except in some good.” But the
minished on the part of the obstacle which is place against
evil of sin cannot be in the good of virtue or of grace,
its attaining its term, it is evident that it can be diminished because they are contrary to it. Therefore it must be in
indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed indefinitely,
the good of nature, and consequently it does not destroy it
inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin:
entirely.
and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the good of na-
this inclination always remains. An example of this may
ture, that is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to
be seen in a transparent body, which has an inclination
virtue, which is befitting to man from the very fact that he
to receive light, from the very fact that it is transparent;
is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs
yet this inclination or aptitude is diminished on the part of
actions in accord with reason, which is to act virtuously.
supervening clouds, although it always remains rooted in
Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that
the nature of the body.
he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be ca-
Reply to Objection 1. This objection avails when
pable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of
diminution is made by subtraction. But here the diminu-
nature to be destroyed entirely.
tion is made by raising obstacles, and this neither dimin-
Since, however, this same good of nature may be con-
ishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as stated
tinually diminished by sin, some, in order to illustrate this,
above.
have made use of the example of a finite thing being di-
Reply to Objection 2. The natural inclination is in-
minished indefinitely, without being entirely destroyed.
deed wholly uniform: nevertheless it stands in relation
For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from
both to its principle and to its term, in respect of which
a finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the
diversity of relation, it is diminished on the one hand, and
same quantity, it will at last be entirely destroyed, for in-
not on the other.
stance if from any finite length I continue to subtract the
Reply to Objection 3. Even in the lost the natural
length of a span. If, however, the subtraction be made
inclination to virtue remains, else they would have no re-
each time in the same proportion, and not in the same
morse of conscience. That it is not reduced to act is owing
quantity, it may go on indefinitely, as, for instance, if a
to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. Thus
996
even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains in the very for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming
root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally
the organ requisite for sight.
endowed with sight: yet this aptitude is not reduced to act,
Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably reckoned as the Ia IIae q. 85 a. 3
wounds of nature consequent upon sin?
Objection 1. It would seem that weakness, ignorance,
wound of ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of its
malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as
order of good, there is the wound of malice; in so far as
the wounds of nature consequent upon sin. For one same
the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there
thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But
is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupis-
these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as appears from
cible is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated
what has been said above (q. 76, a. 1; q. 77, Aa. 3,5; q. 78,
by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.
a. 1). Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of
Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the
sin.
whole of human nature as a result of our first parent’s sin.
Objection 2. Further, malice is the name of a sin.
But since the inclination to the good of virtue is dimin-
Therefore it should have no place among the effects of
ished in each individual on account of actual sin, as was
sin.
explained above (Aa. 1, 2), these four wounds are also
Objection 3.
Further, concupiscence is something
the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the rea-
natural, since it is an act of the concupiscible power. But
son is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will
that which is natural should not be reckoned a wound of
hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult and
nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned
concupiscence more impetuous.
a wound of nature.
Reply to Objection 1. There is no reason why the ef-
Objection 4. Further, it has been stated (q. 77, a. 3)
fect of one sin should not be the cause of another: because
that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from pas-
the soul, through sinning once, is more easily inclined to
sion. But concupiscence is a passion. Therefore it should
sin again.
not be condivided with weakness.
Reply to Objection 2. Malice is not to be taken here
Objection 5. Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat.
as a sin, but as a certain proneness of the will to evil, ac-
lxvii, 67) reckons “two things to be punishments inflicted
cording to the words of Gn. 8:21: “Man’s senses are prone
on the soul of the sinner, viz. ignorance and difficulty,”
to evil from his youthӠ.
from which arise “error and vexation,” which four do not
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 82, a. 3,
coincide with the four in question. Therefore it seems that
ad 1), concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is
one or the other reckoning is incomplete.
subject to reason: whereas, in so far as it is goes beyond
On the contrary, The authority of Bede suffices∗.
the bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man.
I answer that, As a result of original justice, the rea-
Reply to Objection 4. Speaking in a general way,
son had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while
every passion can be called a weakness, in so far as it
reason itself was perfected by God, and was subject to
weakens the soul’s strength and clogs the reason. Bede,
Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through
however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to
the sin of our first parent, as already stated (q. 81, a. 2); so fortitude which pertains to the irascible.
that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute Reply to Objection 5.
The “difficulty” which is
of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed
mentioned in this book of Augustine, includes the three
to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of nature.
wounds affecting the appetitive powers, viz. “malice,”
Again, there are four of the soul’s powers that can be
“weakness” and “concupiscence,” for it is owing to these
subject of virtue, as stated above (q. 61, a. 2), viz. the
three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good. “Er-
reason, where prudence resides, the will, where justice is,
ror” and “vexation” are consequent wounds, since a man
the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and the concupis-
is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects
cible, the subject of temperance. Therefore in so far as
of his concupiscence.
the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the
∗ Reference not known
† Vulgate: ‘The imagination and thought of man’s heart are prone to evil from his youth.’
997
Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin?
Ia IIae q. 85 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that privation of mode,
form, whether substantial or accidental, of anything what-
species and order is not the effect of sin. For Augustine
ever, is according to some measure, wherefore it is stated
says (De Natura Boni iii) that “where these three abound,
in Metaph. viii, that “the forms of things are like num-
the good is great; where they are less, there is less good;
bers,” so that a form has a certain “mode” corresponding
where they are not, there is no good at all.” But sin does
to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has a
not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not de-
relation of “order” to something else.
stroy mode, species and order.
Accordingly there are different grades of mode,
Objection 2. Further, nothing is its own cause. But
species and order, corresponding to the different degrees
sin itself is the “privation of mode, species and order,” as
of good. For there is a good belonging to the very sub-
Augustine states (De Natura Boni iv). Therefore privation
stance of nature, which good has its mode, species and or-
of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin.
der, and is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. There
Objection 3. Further, different effects result from dif-
is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has
ferent sins. Now since mode, species and order are di-
its mode, species and order; and this is diminished by sin,
verse, their corresponding privations must be diverse also,
as stated above (Aa. 1 ,2), but is not entirely destroyed.
and, consequently, must be the result of different sins.
Again, there is the good of virtue and grace: this too has
Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the
its mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by
effect of each sin.
sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act
On the contrary, Sin is to the soul what weakness is
itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the pri-
to the body, according to Ps. 6:3, “Have mercy on me, O
vation of which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both
Lord, for I am weak.” Now weakness deprives the body
how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how
of mode, species and order.
it destroys or diminishes mode, species and order.
I answer that, As stated in the Ia, q. 5, a. 5, mode,
This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.
species and order are consequent upon every created
Reply to Objection 3. Mode, species and order fol-
good, as such, and also upon every being. Because ev-
low one from the other, as explained above: and so they
ery being and every good as such depends on its form
are destroyed or diminished together.
from which it derives its “species.” Again, any kind of
Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?
Ia IIae q. 85 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that death and other bod-
sult being that the effect is directly intended by the cause.
ily defects are not the result of sin. Because equal causes
Consequently, as death and such like defects are beside
have equal effects. Now these defects are not equal in all,
the intention of the sinner, it is evident that sin is not, of
but abound in some more than in others, whereas original
itself, the cause of these defects. Accidentally, one thing
sin, from which especially these defects seem to result, is
is the cause of another if it causes it by removing an ob-
equal in all, as stated above (q. 82, a. 4). Therefore death
stacle: thus it is stated in Phys. viii, text. 32, that “by disand suchlike defects are not the result of sin.
placing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting
Objection 2. Further, if the cause is removed, the ef-
thereon.” In this way the sin of our first parent is the cause
fect is removed. But these defects are not removed, when
of death and all such like defects in human nature, in so
all sin is removed by Baptism or Penance. Therefore they
far as by the sin of our first parent original justice was
are not the effect of sin.
taken away, whereby not only were the lower powers of
Objection 3. Further, actual sin has more of the char-
the soul held together under the control of reason, with-
acter of guilt than original sin has. But actual sin does
out any disorder whatever, but also the whole body was
not change the nature of the body by subjecting it to some
held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect,
defect. Much less, therefore, does original sin. Therefore
as stated in the Ia, q. 97, a. 1. Wherefore, original jus-
death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin.
tice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; just
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12), “By
as human nature was stricken in the soul by the disorder
one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.”
among the powers, as stated above (a. 3; q. 82, a. 3), so
I answer that, One thing causes another in two ways:
also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder
first, by reason of itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason
in the body.
of itself, one thing is the cause of another, if it produces its Now the withdrawal of original justice has the char-effect by reason of the power of its nature or form, the re-
acter of punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has.
998
Consequently, death and all consequent bodily defects are are removed by the same cause that removes these de-punishments of original sin. And although the defects are
fects, according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:11): “He. . . shall
not intended by the sinner, nevertheless they are ordered
quicken. . . your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that
according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as pun-
dwelleth in you”: but each is done according to the order
ishments.
of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right
Reply to Objection 1. Causes that produce their ef-
that we should first of all be conformed to Christ’s suffer-
fects of themselves, if equal, produce equal effects: for if
ings, before attaining to the immortality and impassibility
such causes be increased or diminished, the effect is in-
of glory, which was begun in Him, and by Him acquired
creased or diminished. But equal causes of an obstacle
for us. Hence it behooves that our bodies should remain,
being removed, do not point to equal effects. For suppos-
for a time, subject to suffering, in order that we may merit
ing a man employs equal force in displacing two columns,
the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ.
it does not follow that the movements of the stones resting
Reply to Objection 3. Two things may be considered
on them will be equal; but that one will move with greater
in actual sin, the substance of the act, and the aspect of
velocity, which has the greater weight according to the
fault. As regards the substance of the act, actual sin can
property of its nature, to which it is left when the obsta-
cause a bodily defect: thus some sicken and die through
cle to its falling is removed. Accordingly, when original
eating too much. But as regards the fault, it deprives us of
justice is removed, the nature of the human body is left to
grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts
itself, so that according to diverse natural temperaments,
of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects of the
some men’s bodies are subject to more defects, some to
body, as original justice did. Wherefore actual sin does
fewer, although original sin is equal in all.
not cause those defects, as original sin does.
Reply to Objection 2. Both original and actual sin
Whether death and other defects are natural to man?
Ia IIae q. 85 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that death and such like
I answer that, We may speak of any corruptible thing
defects are natural to man. For “the corruptible and the in-
in two ways; first, in respect of its universal nature, sec-
corruptible differ generically” (Metaph. x, text. 26). But
ondly, as regards its particular nature. A thing’s particular
man is of the same genus as other animals which are nat-
nature is its own power of action and self-preservation.
urally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally corruptible.
And in respect of this nature, every corruption and defect
Objection 2. Further, whatever is composed of con-
is contrary to nature, as stated in De Coelo ii, text. 37,
traries is naturally corruptible, as having within itself the
since this power tends to the being and preservation of the
cause of corruption. But such is the human body. There-
thing to which it belongs.
fore it is naturally corruptible.
On the other hand, the universal nature is an active
Objection 3. Further, a hot thing naturally consumes
force in some universal principle of nature, for instance
moisture. Now human life is preserved by hot and moist
in some heavenly body; or again belonging to some supe-
elements. Since therefore the vital functions are fulfilled
rior substance, in which sense God is said by some to be
by the action of natural heat, as stated in De Anima ii, text.
“the Nature Who makes nature.” This force intends the
50, it seems that death and such like defects are natural to
good and the preservation of the universe, for which alter-
man.
nate generation and corruption in things are requisite: and
On the contrary, (1) God made in man whatever is
in this respect corruption and defect in things are natural,
natural to him. Now “God made not death” (Wis. 1:13).
not indeed as regards the inclination of the form which is
Therefore death is not natural to man.
the principle of being and perfection, but as regards the in-
(2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called ei-
clination of matter which is allotted proportionately to its
ther a punishment or an evil: since what is natural to a
particular form according to the discretion of the universal
thing is suitable to it. But death and such like defects
agent. And although every form intends perpetual being
are the punishment of original sin, as stated above (a. 5).
as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being can
Therefore they are not natural to man.
achieve its own perpetuity, except the rational soul; for
(3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and every-
the reason that the latter is not entirely subject to matter,
thing to its end. Now man’s end is everlasting happiness,
as other forms are; indeed it has an immaterial operation
as stated above (q. 2, a. 7; q. 5 , Aa. 3,4): and the form
of its own, as stated in the Ia, q. 75, a. 2. Consequently as
of the human body is the rational soul, as was proved in
regards his form, incorruption is more natural to man than
the Ia, q. 75, a. 6. Therefore the human body is naturally
to other corruptible things. But since that very form has
incorruptible.
a matter composed of contraries, from the inclination of
999
that matter there results corruptibility in the whole. In this clined to rust, results from the natural disposition of iron,
respect man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature
nor does the workman choose this in the iron, indeed he
of his matter left to itself, but not as regards the nature of
would do without it if he could: wherefore this disposi-
his form.
tion of matter is not adapted to the workman’s intention,
The first three objections argue on the side of the mat-
nor to the purpose of his art. In like manner the human
ter; while the other three argue on the side of the form.
body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of its be-
Wherefore in order to solve them, we must observe that
ing of a mixed temperament, in order that it may be most
the form of man which is the rational soul, in respect of
suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive
its incorruptibility is adapted to its end, which is everlast-
and motive powers. Whereas the fact that it is corruptible
ing happiness: whereas the human body, which is cor-
is due to a condition of matter, and is not chosen by na-
ruptible, considered in respect of its nature, is, in a way,
ture: indeed nature would choose an incorruptible matter
adapted to its form, and, in another way, it is not. For we
if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in
may note a twofold condition in any matter, one which
forming man supplied the defect of nature, and by the gift
the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen by the
of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility,
agent, and is a natural condition of matter. Thus, a smith
as was stated in the Ia, q. 97, a. 1. It is in this sense that
in order to make a knife, chooses a matter both hard and
it is said that “God made not death,” and that death is the
flexible, which can be sharpened so as to be useful for
punishment of sin.
cutting, and in respect of this condition iron is a matter
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
adapted for a knife: but that iron be breakable and in-
1000
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 86
Of the Stain of Sin
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul?
(2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?
Whether sin causes a stain on the soul?
Ia IIae q. 86 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that sin causes no stain
through contact with another body, e.g. a garment, gold
on the soul. For a higher nature cannot be defiled by con-
or silver, or the like. Accordingly a stain is ascribed to
tact with a lower nature: hence the sun’s ray is not defiled
spiritual things in like manner. Now man’s soul has a
by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says (Contra
twofold comeliness; one from the refulgence of the nat-
Quinque Haereses v). Now the human soul is of a much
ural light of reason, whereby he is directed in his actions;
higher nature than mutable things, to which it turns by sin-
the other, from the refulgence of the Divine light, viz. of
ning. Therefore it does not contract a stain from them by
wisdom and grace, whereby man is also perfected for the
sinning.
purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now, when the
Objection 2. Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as
soul cleaves to things by love, there is a kind of contact in
stated above (q. 74, Aa. 1,2). Now the will is in the rea-
the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things,
son, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42. But the reason or
against the light of reason and of the Divine law, as shown
intellect is not stained by considering anything whatever;
above (q. 71, a. 6). Wherefore the loss of comeliness oc-
rather indeed is it perfected thereby. Therefore neither is
casioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a stain
the will stained by sin.
on the soul.
Objection 3. Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain
Reply to Objection 1. The soul is not defiled by in-
is either something positive, or a pure privation. If it be
ferior things, by their own power, as though they acted on
something positive, it can only be either a disposition or a
the soul: on the contrary, the soul, by its own action, de-
habit: for it seems that nothing else can be caused by an
files itself, through cleaving to them inordinately, against
act. But it is neither disposition nor habit: for it happens
the light of reason and of the Divine law.
that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition
Reply to Objection 2. The action of the intellect is
or habit; for instance, in a man who after committing a
accomplished by the intelligible thing being in the intel-
mortal sin of prodigality, is so changed as to fall into a sin
lect, according to the mode of the intellect, so that the
of the opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote
intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by them. On the
anything positive in the soul. Again, neither is it a pure
other hand, the act of the will consists in a movement to-
privation. Because all sins agree on the part of aversion
wards things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to
and privation of grace: and so it would follow that there is
the thing loved. Thus it is that the soul is stained, when
but one stain caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is not
it cleaves inordinately, according to Osee 9:10: “They .
the effect of sin.
. . became abominable as those things were which they
On the contrary, It was said to Solomon (Ecclus.
loved.”
47:22): “Thou hast stained thy glory”: and it is written
Reply to Objection 3. The stain is neither something
(Eph. 5:27): “That He might present it to Himself a glori-
positive in the soul, nor does it denote a pure privation:
ous church not having spot or wrinkle”: and in each case
it denotes a privation of the soul’s brightness in relation
it is question of the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is the
to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins occasion
effect of sin.
diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which is the privation of
I answer that, A stain is properly ascribed to cor-
light through the interposition of a body, and which varies
poreal things, when a comely body loses its comeliness
according to the diversity of the interposed bodies.
1001
Whether the stain remains in the soul after the act of sin?
Ia IIae q. 86 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the stain does not re-
he returns to the Divine light and to the light of reason,
main in the soul after the act of sin. For after an action,
the stain is removed. For although the act of sin ceases,
nothing remains in the soul except habit or disposition.
whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of
But the stain is not a habit or disposition, as stated above
the Divine law, man does not at once return to the state
(a. 1, obj. 3). Therefore the stain does not remain in the
in which he was before, and it is necessary that his will
soul after the act of sin.
should have a movement contrary to the previous move-
Objection 2. Further, the stain is to the sin what the
ment. Thus if one man be parted from another on account
shadow is to the body, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). But
of some kind of movement, he is not reunited to him as
the shadow does not remain when the body has passed by.
soon as the movement ceases, but he needs to draw nigh
Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when the
to him and to return by a contrary movement.
act of sin is past.
Reply to Objection 1. Nothing positive remains in the
Objection 3.
Further, every effect depends on its
soul after the act of sin, except the disposition or habit; but cause. Now the cause of the stain is the act of sin. There-there does remain something private, viz. the privation of
fore when the act of sin is no longer there, neither is the
union with the Divine light.
stain in the soul.
Reply to Objection 2. After the interposed body has
On the contrary, It is written (Jos. 22:17): “Is it a
passed by, the transparent body remains in the same posi-
small thing to you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and
tion and relation as regards the illuminating body, and so
the stain of that crime remaineth in you [Vulg.: ‘us’] to
the shadow passes at once. But when the sin is past, the
this day?”
soul does not remain in the same relation to God: and so
I answer that, The stain of sin remains in the soul
there is no comparison.
even when the act of sin is past. The reason for this is
Reply to Objection 3. The act of sin parts man from
that the stain, as stated above (a. 1 ), denotes a blemish in
God, which parting causes the defect of brightness, just as
the brightness of the soul, on account of its withdrawing
local movement causes local parting. Wherefore, just as
from the light of reason or of the Divine law. And there-
when movement ceases, local distance is not removed, so
fore so long as man remains out of this light, the stain
neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain removed.
of sin remains in him: but as soon as, moved by grace,
1002
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 87
Of the Debt of Punishment
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ in respect of the punishment due to them.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?
(2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another?
(3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?
(4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity?
(5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?
(6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin?
(7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?
(8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another’s sin?
Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?
Ia IIae q. 87 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the debt of punish-
an offense against an order: wherefore he is put down,
ment is not an effect of sin. For that which is accidentally
in consequence, by that same order, which repression is
related to a thing, does not seem to be its proper effect.
punishment.
Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related to sin,
Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold
for it is beside the intention of the sinner. Therefore the
punishment corresponding to the three orders to which
debt of punishment is not an effect of sin.
the human will is subject. In the first place a man’s na-
Objection 2. Further, evil is not the cause of good.
ture is subjected to the order of his own reason; secondly,
But punishment is good, since it is just, and is from God.
it is subjected to the order of another man who governs
Therefore it is not an effect of sin, which is evil.
him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a mem-
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that
ber either of the state or of the household; thirdly, it is
“every inordinate affection is its own punishment.” But
subjected to the universal order of the Divine government.
punishment does not incur a further debt of punishment,
Now each of these orders is disturbed by sin, for the sin-
because then it would go on indefinitely. Therefore sin
ner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine
does not incur the debt of punishment.
law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold punishment; one, in-
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 2:9): “Tribu-
flicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another,
lation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh
inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God.
evil.” But to work evil is to sin. Therefore sin incurs a
Reply to Objection 1. Punishment follows sin, inas-
punishment which is signified by the words “tribulation
much as this is an evil by reason of its being inordinate.
and anguish.”
Wherefore just as evil is accidental to the sinner’s act, be-
I answer that, It has passed from natural things to hu-
ing beside his intention, so also is the debt of punishment.
man affairs that whenever one thing rises up against an-
Reply to Objection 2. Further, a just punishment may
other, it suffers some detriment therefrom. For we ob-
be inflicted either by God or by man: wherefore the pun-
serve in natural things that when one contrary supervenes,
ishment itself is the effect of sin, not directly but disposi-
the other acts with greater energy, for which reason “hot
tively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of punishment,
water freezes more rapidly,” as stated in Meteor. i, 12.
and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
Wherefore we find that the natural inclination of man is to
“punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is.”
repress those who rise up against him. Now it is evident
Consequently the debt of punishment is considered to be
that all things contained in an order, are, in a manner, one,
directly the effect of sin.
in relation to the principle of that order. Consequently,
Reply to Objection 3. This punishment of the “in-
whatever rises up against an order, is put down by that
ordinate affection” is due to sin as overturning the order
order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an
of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a further punishment,
inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins, commits
through disturbing the order of the Divine or human law.
1003
Whether sin can be the punishment of sin?
Ia IIae q. 87 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that sin cannot be the
stated above (q. 79, a. 3), the result is that the sin which
punishment of sin. For the purpose of punishment is to
ensues from this is also a punishment accidentally. It is
bring man back to the good of virtue, as the Philosopher
in this sense that the Apostle speaks (Rom. 1:24) when
declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not bring man back to
he says: “Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of
the good of virtue, but leads him in the opposite direction.
their heart,” i.e. to their passions; because, to wit, when
Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin.
men are deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are
Objection 2. Further, just punishments are from God,
overcome by their passions. In this way sin is always said
as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not
to be the punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by rea-
from God, and is an injustice. Therefore sin cannot be the
son of the substance of the act, which is such as to cause
punishment of sin.
pain, whether it be an interior act, as is clearly the case
Objection 3. Further, the nature of punishment is to
with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with
be something against the will. But sin is something from
one who endures considerable trouble and loss in order to
the will, as shown above (q. 74, Aa. 1 ,2). Therefore sin
achieve a sinful act, according to Wis. 5:7: “We wearied
cannot be the punishment of sin.
ourselves in the way of iniquity.” Thirdly, on the part of
On the contrary, Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.)
the effect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment by
that some sins are punishments of others.
reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punish-
I answer that, We may speak of sin in two ways: first,
ment not only in respect of a preceding sin, but also with
in its essence, as such; secondly, as to that which is acci-
regard to itself.
dental thereto. Sin as such can nowise be the punishment
Reply to Objection 1. Even when God punishes men
of another. Because sin considered in its essence is some-
by permitting them to fall into sin, this is directed to the
thing proceeding from the will, for it is from this that it
good of virtue. Sometimes indeed it is for the good of
derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is es-
those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise from sin,
sentially something against the will, as stated in the Ia,
more humble and more cautious. But it is always for the
q. 48, a. 5. Consequently it is evident that sin regarded in
amendment of others, who seeing some men fall from sin
its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin.
to sin, are the more fearful of sinning. With regard to
On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin ac-
the other two ways, it is evident that the punishment is
cidentally in three ways. First, when one sin is the cause
intended for the sinner’s amendment, since the very fact
of another, by removing an impediment thereto. For pas-
that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of a nature to
sions, temptations of the devil, and the like are causes of
withdraw man from sin.
sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine grace which is
Reply to Objection 2. This objection considers sin
withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the with-
essentially as such: and the same answer applies to the
drawal of grace is a punishment, and is from God, as
Third Objection.
Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?
Ia IIae q. 87 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of
Objection 4. Further, nothing accidental is infinite.
eternal punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the
But punishment is accidental, for it is not natural to the
fault, since justice is equality: wherefore it is written (Is.
one who is punished. Therefore it cannot be of infinite
27:8): “In measure against measure, when it shall be cast
duration.
off, thou shalt judge it.” Now sin is temporal. Therefore it
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46): “These
does not incur a debt of eternal punishment.
shall go into everlasting punishment”; and (Mk. 3:29):
Objection 2.
Further, “punishments are a kind of
“He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, shall
medicine” (Ethic. ii, 3). But no medicine should be infi-
never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlast-
nite, because it is directed to an end, and “what is directed
ing sin.”
to an end, is not infinite,” as the Philosopher states (Polit.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), sin incurs a debt i, 6). Therefore no punishment should be infinite.
of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect
Objection 3. Further, no one does a thing always un-
remains so long as the cause remains. Wherefore so long
less he delights in it for its own sake. But “God hath not
as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of pun-
pleasure in the destruction of men” [Vulg.: ‘of the liv-
ishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an
ing’]. Therefore He will not inflict eternal punishment on
order is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: be-
man.
cause a defect which destroys the principle is irreparable,
1004
whereas if the principle be saved, defects can be repaired in his own eternity should be punished in God’s eternity.
by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of
A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only
sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by Di-
as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life, but
vine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved,
also because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin,
while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight,
he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory
these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every
says (Dial. iv, 44) that the “wicked would wish to live
order there is a principle whereby one takes part in that
without end, that they might abide in their sins for ever.”
order. Consequently if a sin destroys the principle of the
Reply to Objection 2. Even the punishment that is
order whereby man’s will is subject to God, the disorder
inflicted according to human laws, is not always intended
will be such as to be considered in itself, irreparable, al-
as a medicine for the one who is punished, but sometimes
though it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now
only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not
the principle of this order is the last end, to which man ad-
for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, that
heres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away
at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of
from God, so as to destroy charity, considered in them-
the punishment, according to Prov. 19:25: “The wicked
selves, incur a debt of eternal punishment.
man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser.” Accordingly
Reply to Objection 1. Punishment is proportionate to
the eternal punishments inflicted by God on the reprobate,
sin in point of severity, both in Divine and in human judg-
are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin
ments. In no judgment, however, as Augustine says (De
through the thought of those punishments, according to
Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for punishment to equal
Ps. 59:6: “Thou hast given a warning to them that fear
fault in point of duration. For the fact that adultery or
Thee, that they may flee from before the bow, that Thy
murder is committed in a moment does not call for a mo-
beloved may be delivered.”
mentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes
Reply to Objection 3. God does not delight in pun-
by imprisonment or banishment for life—sometimes even
ishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the
by death; wherein account is not taken of the time oc-
order of His justice, which requires them.
cupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of remov-
Reply to Objection 4. Although punishment is re-
ing the murderer from the fellowship of the living, so that
lated indirectly to nature, nevertheless it is essentially re-
this punishment, in its own way, represents the eternity of
lated to the disturbance of the order, and to God’s justice.
punishment inflicted by God. Now according to Gregory
Wherefore, so long as the disturbance lasts, the punish-
(Dial. iv, 44) it is just that he who has sinned against God
ment endures.
Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity?
Ia IIae q. 87 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that sin incurs a debt
ways, in duration, and in quantity. Now the punishment
of punishment infinite in quantity. For it is written (Jer.
is infinite in duration. Therefore it is infinite in quantity
10:24): “Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment:
also.
and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing.”
On the contrary, If this were the case, the punish-
Now God’s anger or fury signifies metaphorically the
ments of all mortal sins would be equal; because one infi-
vengeance of Divine justice: and to be brought to noth-
nite is not greater than another.
ing is an infinite punishment, even as to make a thing out
I answer that, Punishment is proportionate to sin.
of nothing denotes infinite power. Therefore according to
Now sin comprises two things. First, there is the turning
God’s vengeance, sin is awarded a punishment infinite in
away from the immutable good, which is infinite, where-
quantity.
fore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there is the
Objection 2. Further, quantity of punishment corre-
inordinate turning to mutable good. In this respect sin is
sponds to quantity of fault, according to Dt. 25:2: “Ac-
finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and
cording to the measure of the sin shall the measure also
because the movement of turning towards it is finite, since
of the stripes be.” Now a sin which is committed against
the acts of a creature cannot be infinite. Accordingly, in so
God, is infinite: because the gravity of a sin increases ac-
far as sin consists in turning away from something, its cor-
cording to the greatness of the person sinned against (thus
responding punishment is the “pain of loss,” which also is
it is a more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a pri-
infinite, because it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God.
vate individual), and God’s greatness is infinite. Therefore
But in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its
an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed against
corresponding punishment is the “pain of sense,” which is
God.
also finite.
Objection 3. Further, a thing may be infinite in two
Reply to Objection 1. It would be inconsistent with
1005
Divine justice for the sinner to be brought to nothing abso-Reply to Objection 3. Duration of punishment corre-
lutely, because this would be incompatible with the perpe-
sponds to duration of fault, not indeed as regards the act,
tuity of punishment that Divine justice requires, as stated
but on the part of the stain, for as long as this remains, the
above (a. 3). The expression “to be brought to nothing” is
debt of punishment remains. But punishment corresponds
applied to one who is deprived of spiritual goods, accord-
to fault in the point of severity. And a fault which is ir-
ing to 1 Cor. 13:2: “If I. . . have not charity, I am nothing.”
reparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; wherefore Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers sin as
it incurs an everlasting punishment. But it is not infinite
turning away from something, for it is thus that man sins
as regards the thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect,
against God.
it does not incur punishment of infinite quantity.
Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?
Ia IIae q. 87 a. 5
Objection 1.
It would seem that every sin incurs
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), a sin incurs a
a debt of eternal punishment. Because punishment, as
debt of eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an ir-
stated above (a. 4), is proportionate to the fault. Now eter-
reparable disorder in the order of Divine justice, through
nal punishment differs infinitely from temporal punish-
being contrary to the very principle of that order, viz. the
ment: whereas no sin, apparently, differs infinitely from
last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is disor-
another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot be
der indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect
infinite. Since therefore some sins incur a debt of ever-
of the last end, but only in respect of things referable to
lasting punishment, as stated above (a. 4), it seems that no
the end, in so far as one is too much or too little intent on
sin incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment.
them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for
Objection 2. Further, original sin is the least of all
instance, when a man is too fond of some temporal thing,
sins, wherefore Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that
yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of
“the lightest punishment is incurred by those who are pun-
His commandments. Consequently such sins do not incur
ished for original sin alone.” But original sin incurs ever-
everlasting, but only temporal punishment.
lasting punishment, since children who have died in origi-
Reply to Objection 1. Sins do not differ infinitely
nal sin through not being baptized, will never see the king-
from one another in respect of their turning towards mu-
dom of God, as shown by our Lord’s words (Jn. 3:3): ”
table good, which constitutes the substance of the sinful
Unless a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom
act; but they do differ infinitely in respect of their turn-
of God.” Much more, therefore, will the punishments of
ing away from something. Because some sins consist in
all other sins be everlasting.
turning away from the last end, and some in a disorder af-
Objection 3. Further, a sin does not deserve greater
fecting things referable to the end: and the last end differs
punishment through being united to another sin; for Di-
infinitely from the things that are referred to it.
vine justice has allotted its punishment to each sin. Now a
Reply to Objection 2. Original sin incurs everlasting
venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to a
punishment, not on account of its gravity, but by reason of
mortal sin in a lost soul, because in hell there is no remis-
the condition of the subject, viz. a human being deprived
sion of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal
of grace, without which there is no remission of sin.
punishment. Therefore temporal punishment is not due
The same answer applies to the Third Objection about
for any sin.
venial sin. Because eternity of punishment does not cor-
On the contrary, Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that cer-
respond to the quantity of the sin, but to its irremissibility, tain slighter sins are remitted after this life. Therefore all
as stated above (a. 3).
sins are not punished eternally.
Whether the debt of punishment remains after sin?
Ia IIae q. 87 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that there remains no debt
but reward. Therefore, when sin is removed, the debt of
of punishment after sin. For if the cause be removed the
punishment no longer remains.
effect is removed. But sin is the cause of the debt of pun-
Objection 3. Further, “Punishments are a kind of
ishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt of
medicine” (Ethic. ii, 3). But a man is not given medicine
punishment ceases also.
after being cured of his disease. Therefore, when sin is
Objection 2. Further, sin is removed by man returning
removed the debt of punishment does not remain.
to virtue. Now a virtuous man deserves, not punishment,
On the contrary, It is written (2 Kings xii. 13,14):
1006
“David said to Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord.
the punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both
And Nathan said to David: The Lord also hath taken away
ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when pun-
thy sin; thou shalt not die. Nevertheless because thou
ishment is satisfactory, it loses somewhat of the nature of
hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blas-
punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against
pheme. . . the child that is born to thee shall die.” There-
the will; and although satisfactory punishment, absolutely
fore a man is punished by God even after his sin is for-
speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular
given: and so the debt of punishment remains, when the
case and for this particular purpose, it is voluntary. Conse-
sin has been removed.
quently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain
I answer that, Two things may be considered in sin:
respect, as we have explained when speaking of the volun-
the guilty act, and the consequent stain. Now it is evi-
tary and the involuntary (q. 6, a. 6). We must, therefore,
dent that in all actual sins, when the act of sin has ceased,
say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, there
the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes man de-
may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed of punish-
serving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the or-
ment simply, but of satisfactory punishment.
der of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he
Reply to Objection 1. Just as after the act of sin has
pay some sort of penal compensation, which restores him
ceased, the stain remains, as stated above (q. 86, a. 2), so
to the equality of justice; so that, according to the order
the debt of punishment also can remain. But when the
of Divine justice, he who has been too indulgent to his
stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not
will, by transgressing God’s commandments, suffers, ei-
remain in the same way, as stated.
ther willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what
Reply to Objection 2. The virtuous man does not de-
he would wish. This restoration of the equality of justice
serve punishment simply, but he may deserve it as satis-
by penal compensation is also to be observed in injuries
factory: because his very virtue demands that he should
done to one’s fellow men. Consequently it is evident that
do satisfaction for his offenses against God or man.
when the sinful or injurious act has ceased there still re-
Reply to Objection 3. When the stain is removed,
mains the debt of punishment.
the wound of sin is healed as regards the will. But pun-
But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain,
ishment is still requisite in order that the other powers of
it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from
the soul be healed, since they were so disordered by the
the soul, without the soul being united to God, since it
sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be reme-
was through being separated from Him that it suffered the
died by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover
loss of its brightness, in which the stain consists, as stated
punishment is requisite in order to restore the equality of
above (q. 86, a. 1). Now man is united to God by his
justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so that
will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from
those who were scandalized at the sin many be edified by
man, unless his will accept the order of Divine justice,
the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David
that is to say, unless either of his own accord he take upon
quoted above.
himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear patiently
Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?
Ia IIae q. 87 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that not every punishment
72:5): “They are not in the labor of men: neither shall they
is inflicted for a sin. For it is written (Jn. 9:3,2) about the be scourged like other men”; and (Job 21:7): ”[Why then
man born blind: “Neither hath this man sinned, nor his
do] the wicked live, are [they] advanced, and strength-
parents. . . that he should be born blind.” In like manner
ened with riches” (?)∗; and (Hab. 1:13): “Why lookest
we see that many children, those also who have been bap-
Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.: ‘them that do un-
tized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance,
just things’], and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked
diabolical possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin
man oppresseth [Vulg.: ‘devoureth’], the man that is more
in them after they have been baptized. Moreover before
just than himself?” Therefore not every punishment is in-
they are baptized, there is no more sin in them than in the
flicted for a sin.
other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore
Objection 3. Further, it is written of Christ (1 Pet.
not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.
2:22) that “He did no sin, nor was guile found in His
Objection 2. Further, that sinners should thrive and
mouth.” And yet it is said (1 Pet. 2:21) that “He suffered
that the innocent should be punished seem to come under
for us.” Therefore punishment is not always inflicted by
the same head. Now each of these is frequently observed
God for sin.
in human affairs, for it is written about the wicked (Ps.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 4:7, seqq.): “Who
∗ The words in brackets show the readings of the Vulgate
1007
ever perished innocent?
Or when were the just de-
medicinal punishment, because a medical man prescribes
stroyed? On the contrary, I have seen those who work
bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to
iniquity. . . perishing by the blast of God”; and Augustine
health. And since such like are not punishments prop-
writes (Retract. i) that “all punishment is just, and is in-
erly speaking, they are not referred to sin as their cause,
flicted for a sin.”
except in a restricted sense: because the very fact that hu-
I answer that, As already stated (a. 6), punishment
man nature needs a treatment of penal medicines, is due
can be considered in two ways—simply, and as being sat-
to the corruption of nature which is itself the punishment
isfactory. A satisfactory punishment is, in a way, volun-
of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of in-
tary. And since those who differ as to the debt of punish-
nocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in
ment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens
virtue; so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue,
that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the punish-
is reduced to original sin as its cause.
ment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men
Reply to Objection 1. Such like defects of those who
take the debts of another upon themselves. If, however,
are born with them, or which children suffer from, are
we speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being
the effects and the punishments of original sin, as stated
something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the
above (q. 85, a. 5); and they remain even after baptism,
one punished. Sometimes this is a relation to actual sin, as
for the cause stated above (q. 85, a. 5, ad 2): and that
when a man is punished by God or man for a sin commit-
they are not equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, ted by him. Sometimes it is a relation to original sin: and
which is left to itself, as stated above (q. 85, a. 5, ad 1).
this, either principally or consequently—principally, the
Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine providence, to
punishment of original sin is that human nature is left to
the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of oth-
itself, and deprived of original justice: and consequently,
ers who are admonished by their means—and also to the
all the penalties which result from this defect in human
glory of God.
nature.
Reply to Objection 2. Temporal and bodily goods
Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing
are indeed goods of man, but they are of small account:
seems penal, and yet is not so simply. Because punish-
whereas spiritual goods are man’s chief goods. Conse-
ment is a species of evil, as stated in the Ia, q. 48, a. 5.
quently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual goods
Now evil is privation of good. And since man’s good is
to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal
manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body, and
goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says
external goods, it happens sometimes that man suffers
(Div. Nom. viii), “Divine justice does not enfeeble the
the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater
fortitude of the virtuous man, by material gifts.” The very
good, as when he suffers loss of money for the sake of
fact that others receive temporal goods, is detrimental
bodily health, or loss of both of these, for the sake of his
to their spiritual good; wherefore the psalm quoted con-
soul’s health and the glory of God. In such cases the loss
cludes (verse 6): “Therefore pride hath held them fast.”
is an evil to man, not simply but relatively; wherefore it
Reply to Objection 3. Christ bore a satisfactory pun-
does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of
ishment, not for His, but for our sins.
Whether anyone is punished for another’s sin?
Ia IIae q. 87 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that one may be pun-
not be said of the children rather than of outsiders, who
ished for another’s sin. For it is written (Ex. 20:5): “I
are punished in like manner as those whose crimes they
am. . . God. . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers
imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished,
upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of
not for their own sins, but for those of their parents.
them that hate Me”; and (Mat. 23:35): “That upon you
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:20): “The
may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the
son shall not bear the iniquity of the father.”
earth.”
I answer that, If we speak of that satisfactory punish-
Objection 2. Further, human justice springs from Di-
ment, which one takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may
vine justice. Now, according to human justice, children
bear another’s punishment, in so far as they are, in some
are sometimes punished for their parents, as in the case of
way, one, as stated above (a. 7). If, however, we speak of
high treason. Therefore also according to Divine justice,
punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch as it is
one is punished for another’s sin.
penal, then each one is punished for his own sin only, be-
Objection 3. Further, if it be replied that the son is
cause the sinful act is something personal. But if we speak
punished, not for the father’s sin, but for his own, inas-
of a punishment that is medicinal, in this way it does hap-
much as he imitates his father’s wickedness; this would
pen that one is punished for another’s sin. For it has been
1008
stated (a. 7) that ills sustained in bodily goods or even in these words are added, “Of them that hate Me,” and in the
the body itself, are medicinal punishments intended for
chapter quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we read: “Fill
the health of the soul. Wherefore there is no reason why
ye up then the measure of your fathers.” The sins of the
one should not have such like punishments inflicted on
fathers are said to be punished in their children, because
one for another’s sin, either by God or by man; e.g. on
the latter are the more prone to sin through being brought
children for their parents, or on servants for their masters,
up amid their parents’ crimes, both by becoming accus-
inasmuch as they are their property so to speak; in such
tomed to them, and by imitating their parents’ example,
a way, however, that, if the children or the servants take
conforming to their authority as it were. Moreover they
part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of punish-
deserve heavier punishment if, seeing the punishment of
ment in regard to both the one punished and the one he is
their parents, they fail to mend their ways. The text adds,
punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has
“to the third and fourth generation,” because men are wont
the character of punishment in regard to the one for whom
to live long enough to see the third and fourth generation,
the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who
so that both the children can witness their parents’ sins so
is punished, it is merely medicinal (except accidentally, if
as to imitate them, and the parents can see their children’s
he consent to the other’s sin), since it is intended for the
punishments so as to grieve for them.
good of his soul, if he bears it patiently.
Reply to Objection 2. The punishments which human
With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not
justice inflicts on one for another’s sin are bodily and tem-
merely medicinal, because the good of the soul is not di-
poral. They are also remedies or medicines against future
rected to a yet higher good. Consequently no one suffers
sins, in order that either they who are punished, or others
loss in the goods of the soul without some fault of his
may be restrained from similar faults.
own. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Avit.)∗, such like
Reply to Objection 3. Those who are near of kin are
punishments are not inflicted on one for another’s sin, be-
said to be punished, rather than outsiders, for the sins of
cause, as regards the soul, the son is not the father’s prop-
others, both because the punishment of kindred redounds
erty. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying
somewhat upon those who sinned, as stated above, in so
(Ezech. 18:4): “All souls are Mine.”
far as the child is the father’s property, and because the
Reply to Objection 1.
Both the passages quoted
examples and the punishments that occur in one’s own
should, seemingly, be referred to temporal or bodily pun-
household are more moving. Consequently when a man
ishments, in so far as children are the property of their
is brought up amid the sins of his parents, he is more ea-
parents, and posterity, of their forefathers. Else, if they be
ger to imitate them, and if he is not deterred by their pun-
referred to spiritual punishments, they must be understood
ishments, he would seem to be the more obstinate, and,
in reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus
therefore, to deserve more severe punishment.
∗ Ep. ad Auxilium, ccl.
1009
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 88
Of Venial and Mortal Sin
(In Six Articles)
In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the debt of punishment, we must consider them.
First, we shall consider venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider venial sin in itself.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?
(2) Whether they differ generically?
(3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
(4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
(5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating circumstance?
(6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?
Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?
Ia IIae q. 88 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin is unfit-
sin.
tingly condivided with mortal sin. For Augustine says
I answer that, Certain terms do not appear to be mu-
(Contra Faust. xxii, 27): “Sin is a word, deed or desire
tually opposed, if taken in their proper sense, whereas they
contrary to the eternal law.” But the fact of being against
are opposed if taken metaphorically: thus “to smile” is
the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. Consequently
not opposed to “being dry”; but if we speak of the smil-
every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided
ing meadows when they are decked with flowers and fresh
with mortal sin.
with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31):
if mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of the
“Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do; do
body, it does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to
all to the glory of God.” Now whoever sins breaks this
the same genus. But if mortal be taken metaphorically, as
commandment, because sin is not done for God’s glory.
applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is venial.
Consequently, since to break a commandment is to com-
For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above
mit a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.
(q. 71, a. 1, ad 3; q. 72, a. 5; q. 74, a. 9, ad 2), is said
Objection 3. Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by
to be mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said
love, cleaves either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Au-
to be mortal, through causing an irreparable defect con-
gustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). But no person,
sisting in the corruption of a principle, as stated above
in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good as using it: because
(q. 72, a. 5). Now the principle of the spiritual life, which
he does not refer it to that good which gives us happiness,
is a life in accord with virtue, is the order to the last end,
which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augus-
as stated above (q. 72, a. 5; q. 87, a. 3): and if this or-
tine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). Therefore whoever sins
der be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic
enjoys a mutable good. Now “to enjoy what we should
principle, but by the power of God alone, as stated above
use is human perverseness,” as Augustine again says (Qq.
(q. 87, a. 3), because disorders in things referred to the
lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since “perverseness”∗ denotes
end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about
a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.
conclusions can be repaired through the truth of the prin-
Objection 4. Further, whoever approaches one term,
ciples. Hence the defect of order to the last end cannot
from that very fact turns away from the opposite. Now
be repaired through something else as a higher principle,
whoever sins, approaches a mutable good, and, conse-
as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such
quently turns away from the immutable good, so that he
sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other
sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly condi-
hand, sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the
vided with mortal sin.
end, the order to the end itself being preserved, are repara-
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.),
ble. These sins are called venial: because a sin receives its
that “a crime is one that merits damnation, and a venial
acquittal [veniam] when the debt of punishment is taken
sin, one that does not.” But a crime denotes a mortal sin.
away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as explained
Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal
above (q. 87, a. 6).
∗ The Latin ‘pervertere’ means to overthrow, to destroy, hence ‘perversion’ of God’s law is a mortal sin.
1010
Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed Reply to Objection 2. This precept of the Apostle is
as reparable and irreparable: and I say this with refer-
affirmative, and so it does not bind for all times. Conse-
ence to the intrinsic principle, but not to the Divine power,
quently everyone who does not actually refer all his ac-
which can repair all diseases, whether of the body or of
tions to the glory of God, does not therefore act against
the soul. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with
this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal sin each
mortal sin.
time that one fails actually to refer an action to God’s
Reply to Objection 1. The division of sin into ve-
glory, it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has
nial and mortal is not a division of a genus into its species
to God habitually. Now venial sin excludes only actual
which have an equal share of the generic nature: but it is
reference of the human act to God’s glory, and not habit-
the division of an analogous term into its parts, of which it
ual reference: because it does not exclude charity, which
is predicated, of the one first, and of the other afterwards.
refers man to God habitually. Therefore it does not follow
Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine
that he who sins venially, sins mortally.
gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other hand, venial sin
Reply to Objection 3. He that sins venially, cleaves
is called a sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin,
to temporal good, not as enjoying it, because he does not
and in relation to mortal sin: even as an accident is called
fix his end in it, but as using it, by referring it to God, not a being, in relation to substance, in reference to the im-actually but habitually.
perfect notion of being. For it is not “against” the law,
Reply to Objection 4. Mutable good is not consid-
since he who sins venially neither does what the law for-
ered to be a term in contraposition to the immutable good,
bids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he
unless one’s end is fixed therein: because what is referred
acts “beside” the law, through not observing the mode of
to the end has not the character of finality.
reason, which the law intends.
Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?
Ia IIae q. 88 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that venial and mortal sin
I answer that, Venial sin is so called from “venia”
do not differ generically, so that some sins be generically
[pardon]. Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of
mortal, and some generically venial. Because human acts
all, because it has been pardoned: thus Ambrose says that
are considered to be generically good or evil according to
“penance makes every sin venial”: and this is called venial
their matter or object, as stated above (q. 18, a. 2). Now
“from the result.” Secondly, a sin is called venial because
either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard
it does not contain anything either partially or totally, to
to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable
prevent its being pardoned: partially, as when a sin con-
good, either less than God, which may be a venial sin, or
tains something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin committed
more than God, which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial
through weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial
and mortal sin do not differ generically.
“from the cause”: totally, through not destroying the order
Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a. 1; q. 72, a. 5; to the last end, wherefore it deserves temporal, but not ev-q. 87, a. 3), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, ve-erlasting punishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish
nial when it can be repaired. Now irreparability belongs to
to speak now.
sin committed out of malice, which, according to some, is
For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have
irremissible: whereas reparability belongs to sins commit-
no determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the
ted through weakness or ignorance, which are remissible.
third sense, can have a determinate genus, so that one sin
Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed
may be venial generically, and another generically mortal,
through malice differs from sin committed through weak-
according as the genus or species of an act is determined
ness or ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in
by its object. For, when the will is directed to a thing that
genus but in cause, as stated above (q. 77, a. 8, ad 1).
is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is directed
Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically.
to his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object.
Objection 3. Further, it was stated above (q. 74, a. 3,
Consequently it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be
ad 3; a. 10) that sudden movements both of the sensuality
contrary to the love of God, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and
and of the reason are venial sins. But sudden movements
the like, or against the love of one’s neighbor, e.g. murder,
occur in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins are generi-
adultery, and such like: wherefore such sins are mortal by
cally venial.
reason of their genus. Sometimes, however, the sinner’s
On the contrary, Augustine, in a sermon on Purga-
will is directed to a thing containing a certain inordinate-
tory (De Sanctis, serm. xli), enumerates certain generic
ness, but which is not contrary to the love of God and
venial sins, and certain generic mortal sins.
one’s neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and
1011
so forth: and such sins are venial by reason of their genus.
reference to sudden movements of unbelief.
Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character
Reply to Objection 1.
The very fact that any-
of goodness and malice, not only from their objects, but
one chooses something that is contrary to divine charity,
also from some disposition of the agent, as stated above
proves that he prefers it to the love of God, and conse-
(q. 18, Aa. 4,6), it happens sometimes that a sin which is
quently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence
venial generically by reason of its object, becomes mortal
it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of them-
on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his last
selves contrary to charity, that something is loved more
end therein, or because he directs it to something that is
than God; so that they are mortal by reason of their genus.
a mortal sin in its own genus; for example, if a man di-
Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers those
rect an idle word to the commission of adultery. In like
sins which are venial from their cause.
manner it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a sin
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers those
generically mortal because venial, by reason of the act be-
sins which are venial by reason of the imperfection of the
ing imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, which is the
act.
proper principle of an evil act, as we have said above in
Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
Ia IIae q. 88 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin is not a dis-
of its nature, dispose to a sin generically mortal, for they
position to mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose
differ in species. Nevertheless, in this same way, a venial
to another. But venial and mortal sin are condivided as
sin can dispose, by way of consequence, to a sin which
contrary to one another, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore
is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition
venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin.
or habit may be so far strengthened by acts of venial sin,
Objection 2. Further, an act disposes to something
that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his
of like species, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2,
end in that venial sin: since the end for one who has a
that “from like acts like dispositions and habits are en-
habit, as such, is to work according to that habit; and the
gendered.” But mortal and venial sin differ in genus or
consequence will be that, by sinning often venially, he be-
species, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore venial sin does
comes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act
not dispose to mortal sin.
disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto.
Objection 3. Further, if a sin is called venial because
In this way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin
it disposes to mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes
generically mortal. Because he that commits a sin gener-
to mortal sin is a venial sin. Now every good work dis-
ically venial, turns aside from some particular order; and
poses to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine says in his Rule
through accustoming his will not to be subject to the due
(Ep. ccxi) that “pride lies in wait for good works that it
order in lesser matters, is disposed not to subject his will
may destroy them.” Therefore even good works would be
even to the order of the last end, by choosing something
venial sins, which is absurd.
that is a mortal sin in its genus.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 19:1): “He
Reply to Objection 1. Venial and mortal sin are not
that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little.”
condivided in contrariety to one another, as though they
Now he that sins venially seems to contemn small things.
were species of one genus, as stated above (a. 1, ad 1), but
Therefore by little and little he is disposed to fall away
as an accident is condivided with substance. Wherefore
together into mortal sin.
an accident can be a disposition to a substantial form, so
I answer that, A disposition is a kind of cause; where-
can a venial sin dispose to mortal.
fore as there is a twofold manner of cause, so is there a
Reply to Objection 2. Venial sin is not like mortal sin
twofold manner of disposition. For there is a cause which
in species; but it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply
moves directly to the production of the effect, as a hot
a defect of due order, albeit in different ways, as stated
thing heats: and there is a cause which moves indirectly,
(Aa. 1,2).
by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is
Reply to Objection 3. A good work is not, of itself,
said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly an
a disposition to mortal sin; but it can be the matter or oc-
act of sin disposes to something in two ways. First, di-
casion of mortal sin accidentally; whereas a venial sin, of
rectly, and thus it disposes to an act of like species. In
its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as stated.
this way, a sin generically venial does not, primarily and
1012
Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
Ia IIae q. 88 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that a venial sin can be-
world cannot incur a debt of punishment equal to that of
come a mortal sin. For Augustine in explaining the words
one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the duration
of Jn. 3:36: “He that believeth not the Son, shall not see
of the punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eter-
life,” says (Tract. xii in Joan.): “The slightest,” i.e. ve-
nal punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal
nial, “sins kill if we make little of them.” Now a sin is
punishment, as stated above (q. 87, Aa. 3,5). It is also
called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the
evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal sins
soul. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.
deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing God,
Objection 2. Further, a movement in the sensuality
to which no other punishment is comparable, as Chrysos-
before the consent of reason, is a venial sin, but after con-
tom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth.). It is also evident as
sent, is a mortal sin, as stated above (q. 74, a. 8, ad 2).
regards the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience;
Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.
although as to the pain of fire, the punishments may per-
Objection 3. Further, venial and mortal sin differ as
haps not be improportionate to one another.
curable and incurable disease, as stated above (a. 1). But a
If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial
curable disease may become incurable. Therefore a venial
sins make one mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was
sin may become mortal.
shown above (a. 3) with regard to the two different man-
Objection 4. Further, a disposition may become a
ners of disposition, whereby venial sin disposes to mortal
habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated
sin.
(a. 3). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is referring to the
I answer that, The fact of a venial sin becoming a
fact of many venial sins making one mortal sin disposi-
mortal sin may be understood in three ways. First, so that
tively.
the same identical act be at first a venial, and then a mor-
Reply to Objection 2. The same movement of the
tal sin. This is impossible: because a sin, like any moral
sensuality which preceded the consent of reason can never
act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so that an act
become a mortal sin; but the movement of the reason in
is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the
consenting is a mortal sin.
act be continuous physically. If, however, the will be not
Reply to Objection 3. Disease of the body is not an
changed, it is not possible for a venial sin to become mor-
act, but an abiding disposition; wherefore, while remain-
tal.
ing the same disease, it may undergo change. On the other
Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin gener-
hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be taken
ically venial, becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far
up again: so that in this respect the comparison fails.
as one may fix one’s end in that venial sin, or direct it to
Reply to Objection 4. A disposition that becomes a
some mortal sin as end, as stated above (a. 2).
habit, is like an imperfect thing in the same species; thus
Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many
imperfect science, by being perfected, becomes a habit.
venial sins constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as
On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to something
meaning that many venial sins added together make one
differing generically, even as an accident which disposes
mortal sin, it is false, because all the venial sins in the
to a substantial form, into which it is never changed.
Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?
Ia IIae q. 88 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that a circumstance can
sin to be mortal.
make a venial sin mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon
Objection 3. Further, evil and good differ more than
on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli) that “if anger con-
venial and mortal sin, both of which are generically evil.
tinue for a long time, or if drunkenness be frequent, they
But a circumstance makes a good act to be evil, as when
become mortal sins.” But anger and drunkenness are not
a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much more, therefore,
mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always
can it make a venial sin to be mortal.
be mortal sins. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial
On the contrary, Since a circumstance is an accident,
sin to be mortal.
its quantity cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived
Objection 2. Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D,
from the act’s genus, because the subject always excels its
24) that delectation, if morose∗, is a mortal sin, but that
accident. If, therefore, an act be venial by reason of its
if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is
genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of an accident:
a circumstance. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial
since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity
∗ See q. 74, a. 6
1013
of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said (q. 72, which is a mortal sin generically, such as murder or roba. 5, ad 1; q. 87, a. 5, ad 1).
bery, that anger will be a mortal sin generically: and if it
I answer that, As stated above (q. 7, a. 1; q. 18,
be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the
a. 5, ad 4; Aa. 10 ,11), when we were treating of cir-
act, in so far as it is a sudden movement of the sensual-
cumstances, a circumstance, as such, is an accident of the
ity: whereas, if it last a long time, it returns to its generic moral act: and yet a circumstance may happen to be taken
nature, through the consent of reason. If, on the other
as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses
hand, the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a
its nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species of
sin generically venial, for instance, if a man be angry with
the moral act. This happens in sins when a circumstance
someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest
adds the deformity of another genus; thus when a man
that would hurt him a little, the anger will not be mortal
has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the de-
sin, however long it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for
formity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this other
instance, if it were to give rise to great scandal or some-
be another man’s wife, there is an additional deformity
thing of the kind.
opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs
With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mor-
to another; and accordingly this circumstance constitutes
tal sin by reason of its genus; for, that a man, without
a new species of sin known as adultery.
necessity, and through the mere lust of wine, make him-
It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make
self unable to use his reason, whereby he is directed to
a venial sin become mortal, unless it adds the deformity
God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly con-
of another species. For it has been stated above (a. 1) that
trary to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort
the deformity of a venial sin consists in a disorder affect-
of ignorance or weakness, as when a man is ignorant of
ing things that are referred to the end, whereas the defor-
the strength of the wine, or of his own unfitness, so that
mity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last
he has no thought of getting drunk, for in that case the
end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance can-
drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the
not make a venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a
excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk frequently,
circumstance, but only when it transfers the sin to another
this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his will
species, and becomes, as it were, the specific difference
seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than to
of the moral act.
refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin returns to
Reply to Objection 1. Length of time is not a cir-
its specific nature.
cumstance that draws a sin to another species, nor is fre-
Reply to Objection 2. Morose delectation is not a
quency or custom, except perhaps by something acciden-
mortal sin except in those matters which are mortal sins
tal supervening. For an action does not acquire a new
generically. In such matters, if the delectation be not mo-
species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by
rose, there is a venial sin through imperfection of the act,
chance something supervene in the repeated or prolonged
as we have said with regard to anger (ad 1): because anger
act to change its species, e.g. disobedience, contempt, or
is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on ac-
the like.
count of the approval of the deliberating reason.
We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that
Reply to Objection 3. A circumstance does not make
since anger is a movement of the soul tending to the hurt
a good act to be evil, unless it constitute the species of a
of one’s neighbor, if the angry movement tend to a hurt
sin, as we have stated above (q. 18, a. 5 , ad 4).
Whether a mortal sin can become venial?
Ia IIae q. 88 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that a mortal sin can be-
God, commits the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready,
come venial. Because venial sin is equally distant from
for the love of God, to refrain from that sin if he knew
mortal, as mortal sin is from venial. But a venial sin can
that by committing it he was acting counter to the love of
become mortal, as stated above (a. 5). Therefore also a
God. Therefore his will be a venial sin; and accordingly a
mortal sin can become venial.
mortal sin can become venial.
Objection 2. Further, venial and mortal sin are said
Objection 3. Further, as stated above (a. 5, obj. 3),
to differ in this, that he who sins mortally loves a creature
good is more distant from evil, than venial from mortal
more than God, while he who sins venially loves the crea-
sin. But an act which is evil in itself, can become good;
ture less than God. Now it may happen that a person in
thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, as when a
committing a sin generically mortal, loves a creature less
judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore
than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that sim-
can a mortal sin become venial.
ple fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary to the love of
On the contrary, An eternal thing can never become
1014
temporal. But mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, liberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the
whereas venial sin deserves temporal punishment. There-
species of the act is destroyed.
fore a mortal sin can never become venial.
Reply to Objection 1. Venial differs from mortal as
I answer that, Venial and mortal differ as perfect and
imperfect from perfect, even as a boy differs from a man.
imperfect in the genus of sin, as stated above (a. 1, ad
But the boy becomes a man and not vice versa. Hence the
1). Now the imperfect can become perfect, by some sort
argument does not prove.
of addition: and, consequently, a venial sin can become
Reply to Objection 2. If the ignorance be such as to
mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining to
excuse sin altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or
the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word
an imbecile, then he that commits fornication in a state
for the purpose of fornication. On the other hand, the
of such ignorance, commits no sin either mortal or venial.
perfect cannot become imperfect, by addition; and so a
But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the ignorance
mortal sin cannot become venial, by the addition of a de-
itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the love formity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for the sin
of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things
is not diminished if a man commit fornication in order to
whereby he can safeguard himself in the love of God.
utter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Contra
deformity.
Mendacium vii), “those things which are evil in them-
Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can be-
selves, cannot be well done for any good end.” Now mur-
come venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, be-
der is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be
cause then it does not completely fulfil the conditions of
well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5),
a moral act, since it is not a deliberate, but a sudden act,
the judge who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier
as is evident from what we have said above (a. 2). This
who slays the enemy of the common weal, are not mur-
happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate
derers.
reason. And since a moral act takes its species from de-
1015
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 89
Of Venial Sin in Itself
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?
(2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by “wood,” “hay,” “stubble” (1 Cor. 3:12); (3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?
(4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
(5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?
(6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?
Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?
Ia IIae q. 89 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin causes a
and colors, the other resulting from outward refulgence
stain in the soul. For Augustine says (De Poenit.)∗, that
supervening, so too, in the soul, there is a twofold come-
if venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our
liness, one habitual and, so to speak, intrinsic, the other
souls so as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly
actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a
spouse. But the stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of
hindrance to actual comeliness, but not to habitual come-
the soul’s beauty. Therefore venial sins cause a stain in
liness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit
the soul.
of charity and of the other virtues, as we shall show fur-
Objection 2. Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the
ther on ( IIa IIae, q. 24, a. 10; q. 133, a. 1, ad 2), but only soul, on account of the inordinateness of the act and of the
hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain denotes some-
sinner’s affections. But, in venial sin, there is an inordi-
thing permanent in the thing stained, wherefore it seems
nateness of the act and of the affections. Therefore venial
in the nature of a loss of habitual rather than of actual
sin causes a stain in the soul.
comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial sin does
Objection 3. Further, the stain on the soul is caused
not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, we find it stated
by contact with a temporal thing, through love thereof as
anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted
stated above (q. 86, a. 1). But, in venial sin, the soul is
sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness that results
in contact with a temporal thing through inordinate love.
from acts of virtue.
therefore, venial sin brings a stain on the soul.
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of the
On the contrary, it is written, (Eph. 5:27): “That He
case in which many venial sins lead to mortal sin dispos-
might present it to Himself a glorious church, not hav-
itively: because otherwise they would not sever the soul
ing spot or wrinkle,” on which the gloss says: “i.e., some
from its heavenly spouse.
grievous sin.” Therefore it seems proper to mortal sin to
Reply to Objection 2. In mortal sin the inordinateness
cause a stain on the soul.
of the act destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin.
I answer that as stated above (q. 86, a. 1), a stain de-
Reply to Objection 3. In mortal sin the soul comes
notes a loss of comeliness due to contact with something,
into contact with a temporal thing as its end, so that the
as may be seen in corporeal matters, from which the term
shedding of the light of grace, which accrues to those who,
has been transferred to the soul, by way of similitude.
by charity, cleave to God as their last end, is entirely cut
Now, just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness,
off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man does not cleave to
one resulting from the inward disposition of the members
a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison.
Whether venial sins are suitably designated as “wood, hay, and stubble”?
Ia IIae q. 89 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that venial sins are unsuit-
outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not
ably designated as “wood,” “hay,” and “stubble.” Because
suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble.
wood hay and stubble are said ( 1 Cor. 3:12) to be built
Objection 2. Further, he who builds wood, hay and
on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are something
stubble, “shall be saved yet so as by fire” (1 Cor. 3:15).
outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions are
But sometimes the man who commits a venial sin, will not
∗ Hom. 50, inter. L., 2
1016
be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man dies in mortal sin
“silver,” and “precious stones,” and consequently not by
to which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial sins
“wood,” “hay,” and “stubble.”
are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble.
We must therefore say that the very venial sins that in-
Objection 3. Further, according to the Apostle (1 Cor.
sinuate themselves into those who have a care for earthly
3:12) those who build “gold, silver, precious stones,” i.e.
things, are designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just
love of God and our neighbor, and good works, are oth-
as these are stored in a house, without belonging to the
ers from those who build wood, hay, and stubble. But
substance of the house, and can be burnt, while the house
those even who love God and their neighbor, and do good
is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while
works, commit venial sins: for it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): “If
the spiritual edifice remains, and for them, man suffers
we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” There-
fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory
fore venial sins are not suitably designated by these three.
after this life, and yet he is saved for ever.
Objection 4. Further, there are many more than three
Reply to Objection 1. Venial sins are not said to be
differences and degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are
built upon the spiritual foundation, as though they were
unsuitably comprised under these three.
laid directly upon it, but because they are laid beside it; in
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:15) that
the same sense as it is written (Ps. 136:1): “Upon the wa-
the man who builds up wood, hay and stubble, “shall be
ters of Babylon,” i.e. “beside the waters”: because venial
saved yet so as by fire,” so that he will suffer punishment,
sins do not destroy the edifice.
but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal punishment
Reply to Objection 2. It is not said that everyone
belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above (q. 87, a. 5).
who builds wood, hay and stubble, shall be saved as by
Therefore these three signify venial sins.
fire, but only those who build “upon” the “foundation.”
I answer that, Some have understood the “founda-
And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have es-
tion” to be dead faith, upon which some build good works,
teemed, but faith quickened by charity, according to Eph.
signified by gold, silver, and precious stones, while others
3:17: “Rooted and founded in charity.” Accordingly, he
build mortal sins, which according to them are designated
that dies in mortal sin with venial sins, has indeed wood,
by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine disapproves of
hay, and stubble, but not built upon the spiritual edifice;
this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the
and consequently he will not be saved so as by fire.
Apostle says (Gal. 5:21), he who does the works of the
Reply to Objection 3. Although those who are with-
flesh, “shall not obtain the kingdom of God,” which sig-
drawn from the care of temporal things, sin venially some-
nifies to be saved; whereas the Apostle says that he who
times, yet they commit but slight venial sins, and in most
builds wood, hay, and stubble “shall be saved yet so as by
cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity: where-
fire.” Consequently wood, hay, stubble cannot be under-
fore they do not build up venial sins, because these do not
stood to denote mortal sins.
remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are
Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good
busy about earthly remain longer, because they are unable
works, which are indeed built upon the spiritual edifice,
to have such frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in
but are mixed with venial sins: as, when a man is charged
order to remove them.
with the care of a family, which is a good thing, exces-
Reply to Objection 4. As the Philosopher says (De
sive love of his wife or of his children or of his posses-
Coelo i, text. 2), “all things are comprised under three,
sions insinuates itself into his life, under God however,
the beginning, the middle, the end.” Accordingly all de-
so that, to wit, for the sake of these things he would be
grees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz. to “wood,”
unwilling to do anything in opposition to God. But nei-
which remains longer in the fire; “stubble,” which is burnt
ther does this seem to be reasonable. For it is evident
up at once; and “hay,” which is between these two: be-
that all good works are referred to the love of God, and
cause venial sins are removed by fire, quickly or slowly,
one’s neighbor, wherefore they are designated by “gold,”
according as man is more or less attached to them.
Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?
Ia IIae q. 89 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that man could commit
commit a venial sin without sinning mortally.
a venial sin in the state of innocence. Because on 1 Tim.
Objection 2. Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
2:14, “Adam was not seduced,” a gloss says: “Having had
xi, 5): “We must not suppose that the tempter would
no experience of God’s severity, it was possible for him
have overcome man, unless first of all there had arisen in
to be so mistaken as to think that what he had done was
man’s soul a movement of vainglory which should have
a venial sin.” But he would not have thought this unless
been checked.” Now the vainglory which preceded man’s
he could have committed a venial sin. Therefore he could
defeat, which was accomplished through his falling into
1017
mortal sin, could be nothing more than a venial sin. In each of these happens on account of some defect of order,
like manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5) that “man
by reason of the lower powers not being checked by the
was allured by a certain desire of making the experiment,
higher. Because the sudden rising of a movement of the
when he saw that the woman did not die when she had
sensuality in us is due to the sensuality not being perfectly
taken the forbidden fruit.” Again there seems to have been
subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a movement of
a certain movement of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted
reason itself is due, in us, to the fact that the execution
what the Lord had said, as appears from her saying (Gn.
of the act of reason is not subject to the act of delibera-
3:3): “Lest perhaps we die.” Now these apparently were
tion which proceeds from a higher good, as stated above
venial sins. Therefore man could commit a venial sin be-
(q. 74, a. 10); and that the human mind be out of order
fore he committed a mortal sin.
as regards things directed to the end, the due order of the
Objection 3. Further, mortal sin is more opposed to
end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things re-
the integrity of the original state, than venial sin is. Now
ferred to the end are not infallibly directed under the end,
man could sin mortally notwithstanding the integrity of
which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it
the original state. Therefore he could also sin venially.
were, in matters concerning the appetite, as stated above
On the contrary, Every sin deserves some punish-
(q. 10, Aa. 1,2, ad 3; q. 72, a. 5). Now, in the state of inno-
ment. But nothing penal was possible in the state of inno-
cence, as stated in the Ia, q. 95, a. 1, there was an unerring
cence, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). There-
stability of order, so that the lower powers were always
fore he could commit a sin that would not deprive him
subjected to the higher, so long as man remained subject
of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not change
to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13). Hence
man’s state. Therefore he could not sin venially.
there can be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all
I answer that, It is generally admitted that man could
the highest part of man were not subject to God, which
not commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. This,
constitutes a mortal sin. From this it is evident that, in
however, is not to be understood as though on account of
the state of innocence, man could not commit a venial sin,
the perfection of his state, the sin which is venial for us
before committing a mortal sin.
would have been mortal for him, if he had committed it.
Reply to Objection 1. In the passage quoted, venial
Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that ag-
is not taken in the same sense as we take it now; but by
gravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another species, venial sin we mean that which is easily forgiven.
unless there be an additional deformity by reason of dis-
Reply to Objection 2. This vainglory which preceded
obedience, or vow or the like, which does not apply to the
man’s downfall, was his first mortal sin, for it is stated to
question in point. Consequently what is venial in itself
have preceded his downfall into the outward act of sin.
could not be changed into mortal by reason of the excel-
This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the desire to
lence of the original state. We must therefore understand
make and experiment, and in the woman, by doubt, for she
this to mean that he could not sin venially, because it was
gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent
impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in
mention the precept, as though she refused to be held in
itself, before losing the integrity of the original state by
check by the precept.
sinning mortally.
Reply to Objection 3. Mortal sin is opposed to the
The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us,
integrity of the original state in the fact of its destroying
either through the imperfection of the act, as in the case
that state: this a venial sin cannot do. And because the in-
of sudden movements, in a genus of mortal sin or through
tegrity of the primitive state is incompatible with any inor-
some inordinateness in respect of things referred to the
dinateness whatever, the result is that the first man could
end, the due order of the end being safeguarded. Now
not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin.
Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
Ia IIae q. 89 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that a good or wicked angel can
God, and he did, by sinning mortally. Therefore he could
sin venially. Because man agrees with the angels in the
also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning
higher part of his soul which is called the mind, according
venially.
to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in Evang.) that “man
Objection 3. Further, wicked angels seem to do things
understands in common with the angels.” But man can
which are venial sins generically, by provoking men to
commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. There-
laughter, and other like frivolities. Now the circumstance
fore an angel can commit a venial sin also.
of the person does not make a mortal sin to be venial as
Objection 2. Further, He that can do more can do
stated above (a. 3), unless there is a special prohibition,
less. But an angel could love a created good more than
which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel can sin
1018
venially.
due end which is God: wherefore all their acts are acts of
On the contrary, The perfection of an angel is greater
charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the other
than that of man in the primitive state. But man could not
hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in sub-
sin venially in the primitive state, and much less, there-
ordination to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore
fore, can an angel.
they sin mortally in everything that they do of their own
I answer that, An angel’s intellect, as stated above in
will. This does not apply to the appetite for the natural
the Ia, q. 58, a. 3; Ia, q. 79, a. 8, is not discursive, i.e.
good, which appetite we have stated to be in them ( Ia,
it does not proceed from principles to conclusions, so as
q. 63, a. 4; q. 64, a. 2, ad 5).
to understand both separately, as we do. Consequently,
Reply to Objection 1. Man does indeed agree with
whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion, it
the angels in the mind or intellect, but he differs in his
must, of necessity, consider it in its principles. Now in
mode of understanding, as stated above.
matters of appetite, as we have often stated (q. 8, a. 2;
Reply to Objection 2. An angel could not love a crea-
q. 10, a. 1; q. 72, a. 5), ends are like principles, while the
ture less than God, without, at the same time, either refer-
means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel’s mind is
ring it to God, as the last end, or to some inordinate end,
not directed to the means, except as they stand under the
for the reason given above.
order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature,
Reply to Objection 3. The demons incite man to all
they can have no inordinateness in respect of the means,
such things which seem venial, that he may become used
unless at the same time they have an inordinateness in re-
to them, so as to lead him on to mortal sin. Consequently
spect of the end, and this is a mortal sin. Now good angels
in all such things they sin mortally, on account of the end
are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the
they have in view.
Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sin?
Ia IIae q. 89 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the first movements
pute to one unto condemnation, what He does not impute
of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the
to another. But he does not impute first movements to
Apostle says (Rom. 8:1) that “there is. . . no condemnation
believers, unto condemnation. Neither therefore does He
to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to
impute them to unbelievers.
the flesh”: and he is speaking there of the concupiscence
I answer that, It is unreasonable to say that the first
of the sensuality, as appears from the context (Rom. 7).
movements of unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do
Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter
not consent to them. This is evident for two reasons. First,
of condemnation to those who walk not according to the
because the sensuality itself could not be the subject of
flesh, i.e. by consenting to concupiscence, is because they
mortal sin, as stated above (q. 79, a. 4). Now the sen-
are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus.
suality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believ-
Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation.
ers. Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements
Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal
of the sensuality in unbelievers, to be mortal sins. Sec-
sins.
ondly, from the state of the sinner. Because excellence
Objection 2. Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib.
of the person of the person never diminishes sin, but, on
Arb. vii): “Those who are not in Christ, when they feel
the contrary, increases it, as stated above (q. 73, a. 10).
the sting of the flesh, follow the road of damnation, even
Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in
if they walk not according to the flesh.” But damnation is
an unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of an un-
not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, since man feels the
believer are more deserving of forgiveness, on account of
sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupis-
their ignorance, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: “I obtained the
cence, it seems that the first movements of concupiscence
mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in my unbelief”:
in unbelievers are mortal sins.
whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on ac-
Objection 3. Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib.
count of the sacraments of grace, according to Heb. 10:29:
Arb. vii): “Man was so made that he was not liable to
“How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse pun-
feel concupiscence.” Now this liability seems to be remit-
ishments. . . who hath esteemed the blood of the testament
ted to man by the grace of Baptism, which the unbeliever
unclean, by which he was sanctified?”
has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence in an unbe-
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking of
liever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because
the condemnation due to original sin, which condemna-
he acts against his duty.
tion is remitted by the grace of Jesus Christ, although the
On the contrary, It is stated in Acts 10:34 that “God
“fomes” of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the fact that
is not a respecter of persons.” Therefore he does not im-
believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a sign
1019
of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbe-Reply to Objection 3. This freedom from liability to
lievers.
concupiscence was a result of original justice. Wherefore
In this way also is to be understood the saying of
that which is opposed to such liability pertains, not to ac-
Anselm, wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is
tual but to original sin.
evident.
Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone?
Ia IIae q. 89 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin can be in
more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does any-
a man with original sin alone. For disposition precedes
thing which is such generically. But when he begins to
habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin, as
have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the
stated above (q. 88, a. 3). Therefore in an unbeliever, in
guilt of venial or mortal sin. Now the first thing that oc-
whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin exists before
curs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate about
mortal sin: and so sometimes unbelievers have venial to-
himself. And if he then direct himself to the due end, he
gether with original sin, and without mortal sins.
will, by means of grace, receive the remission of original
Objection 2. Further, venial sin has less in common,
sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself to the due
and less connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin
end, and as far as he is capable of discretion at that partic-
has with another. But an unbeliever in the state of original
ular age, he will sin mortally, for through not doing that
sin, can commit one mortal sin without committing an-
which is in his power to do. Accordingly thenceforward
other. Therefore he can also commit a venial sin without
there cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until af-
committing a mortal sin.
terwards all sin shall have been remitted to him through
Objection 3. Further, it is possible to fix the time at
grace.
which a child is first able to commit an actual sin: and
Reply to Objection 1. Venial sin always precedes
when the child comes to that time, it can stay a short
mortal sin not as a necessary, but as a contingent dispo-
time at least, without committing a mortal sin, because
sition, just as work sometimes disposes to fever, but not
this happens in the worst criminals. Now it is possible for
as heat disposes to the form of fire.
the child to sin venially during that space of time, however
Reply to Objection 2. Venial sin is prevented from
short it may be. Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with
being with original sin alone, not on account of its want
original sin alone and without mortal sin.
of connection or likeness, but on account of the lack of
On the contrary, Man is punished for original sin in
use of reason, as stated above.
the children’s limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we
Reply to Objection 3. The child that is beginning to
shall state further on ( IIa IIae, q. 69, a. 6): whereas men
have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins
are punished in hell for no other than mortal sin. There-
for a time, but it is not free from the aforesaid sin of omis-
fore there will be no place where a man can be punished
sion, unless it turns to God as soon as possible. For the
for venial sin with no other than original sin.
first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion, is to
I answer that, It is impossible for venial sin to be in
think of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to
anyone with original sin alone, and without mortal sin.
their end, since the end is the first thing in the intention.
The reason for this is because before a man comes to the
Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God’s
age of discretion, the lack of years hinders the use of rea-
affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying
son and excuses him from mortal sin, wherefore, much
(Zech. 1:3): “Turn ye to Me. . . and I will turn to you.”
1020
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 90
Of the Essence of Law
(In Four Articles)
We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of whose temptations we have spoken in the Ia, q. 114. But the extrinsic principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace: wherefore in the first place we must speak of law; in the second place, of grace.
Concerning law, we must consider: (1) Law itself in general; (2) its parts. Concerning law in general three points offer themselves for our consideration: (1) Its essence; (2) The different kinds of law; (3) The effects of law.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether law is something pertaining to reason?
(2) Concerning the end of law;
(3) Its cause;
(4) The promulgation of law.
Whether law is something pertaining to reason?
Ia IIae q. 90 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that law is not something
the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure of that
pertaining to reason. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): “I
genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the
see another law in my members,” etc. But nothing pertain-
first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently
ing to reason is in the members; since the reason does not
it follows that law is something pertaining to reason.
make use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not some-
Reply to Objection 1. Since law is a kind of rule and
thing pertaining to reason.
measure, it may be in something in two ways. First, as
Objection 2. Further, in the reason there is nothing
in that which measures and rules: and since this is proper
else but power, habit, and act. But law is not the power
to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason
itself of reason. In like manner, neither is it a habit of
alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled.
reason: because the habits of reason are the intellectual
In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to
virtues of which we have spoken above (q. 57). Nor again
something by reason of some law: so that any inclination
is it an act of reason: because then law would cease, when
arising from a law, may be called a law, not essentially
the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep.
but by participation as it were. And thus the inclination
Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason.
of the members to concupiscence is called “the law of the
Objection 3. Further, the law moves those who are
members.”
subject to it to act aright. But it belongs properly to the
Reply to Objection 2. Just as, in external action, we
will to move to act, as is evident from what has been said
may consider the work and the work done, for instance
above (q. 9, a. 1). Therefore law pertains, not to the rea-
the work of building and the house built; so in the acts
son, but to the will; according to the words of the Jurist
of reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e.
(Lib. i, ff., De Const. Prin. leg. i): “Whatsoever pleaseth
to understand and to reason, and something produced by
the sovereign, has force of law.”
this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first
On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command
of all the definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the
and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to command, as
syllogism or argument. And since also the practical rea-
stated above (q. 17, a. 1). Therefore law is something per-
son makes use of a syllogism in respect of the work to be
taining to reason.
done, as stated above (q. 13, a. 3; q. 76, a. 1) and since
I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts,
as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii, 3); hence we find
whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting:
in the practical reason something that holds the same po-
for “lex” [law] is derived from “ligare” [to bind], because
sition in regard to operations, as, in the speculative intel-
it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human
lect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such
acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human
like universal propositions of the practical intellect that
acts, as is evident from what has been stated above (q. 1,
are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these
a. 1, ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the
propositions are sometimes under our actual considera-
end, which is the first principle in all matters of action, ac-
tion, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by
cording to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is
means of a habit.
1021
Reply to Objection 3. Reason has its power of mov-have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some
ing from the will, as stated above (q. 17, a. 1): for it is
rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the
due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason is-
saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of law;
sues its commands as regards things ordained to the end.
otherwise the sovereign’s will would savor of lawlessness
But in order that the volition of what is commanded may
rather than of law.
Whether the law is always something directed to the common good?
Ia IIae q. 90 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the law is not always
above definition of legal matters mentions both happiness
directed to the common good as to its end. For it belongs
and the body politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call
to law to command and to forbid. But commands are di-
those legal matters “just, which are adapted to produce
rected to certain individual goods. Therefore the end of
and preserve happiness and its parts for the body politic”:
the law is not always the common good.
since the state is a perfect community, as he says in Polit.
Objection 2. Further, the law directs man in his ac-
i, 1.
tions. But human actions are concerned with particular
Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly
matters. Therefore the law is directed to some particular
is the principle of the others, and the others belong to that
good.
genus in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is
Objection 3. Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): “If the chief among hot things, is the cause of heat in mixed bod-law is based on reason, whatever is based on reason will
ies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they have a
be a law.” But reason is the foundation not only of what
share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly or-
is ordained to the common good, but also of that which
dained to the common good, any other precept in regard
is directed private good. Therefore the law is not only di-
to some individual work, must needs be devoid of the na-
rected to the good of all, but also to the private good of an
ture of a law, save in so far as it regards the common good.
individual.
Therefore every law is ordained to the common good.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that “laws
Reply to Objection 1. A command denotes an appli-
are enacted for no private profit, but for the common ben-
cation of a law to matters regulated by the law. Now the
efit of the citizens.”
order to the common good, at which the law aims, is ap-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the law belongs
plicable to particular ends. And in this way commands are
to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is
given even concerning particular matters.
their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle of
Reply to Objection 2. Actions are indeed concerned
human acts, so in reason itself there is something which
with particular matters: but those particular matters are
is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to this
referable to the common good, not as to a common genus
principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred.
or species, but as to a common final cause, according as
Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the
the common good is said to be the common end.
object of the practical reason, is the last end: and the last
Reply to Objection 3. Just as nothing stands firm
end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above
with regard to the speculative reason except that which is
(q. 2, a. 7; q. 3, a. 1). Consequently the law must needs re-
traced back to the first indemonstrable principles, so noth-
gard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover,
ing stands firm with regard to the practical reason, unless
since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to
it be directed to the last end which is the common good:
perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect commu-
and whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the nature
nity, the law must needs regard properly the relationship
of a law.
to universal happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the
Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws?
Ia IIae q. 90 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the reason of any man
ii, 1), “the intention of the lawgiver is to lead men to
is competent to make laws. For the Apostle says (Rom.
virtue.” But every man can lead another to virtue. There-
2:14) that “when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do
fore the reason of any man is competent to make laws.
by nature those things that are of the law. . . they are a law
Objection 3. Further, just as the sovereign of a state
to themselves.” Now he says this of all in general. There-
governs the state, so every father of a family governs his
fore anyone can make a law for himself.
household. But the sovereign of a state can make laws
Objection 2. Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
for the state. Therefore every father of a family can make
1022
laws for his household.
Reply to Objection 2. A private person cannot lead
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 10): “A law
another to virtue efficaciously: for he can only advise, and
is an ordinance of the people, whereby something is sanc-
if his advice be not taken, it has no coercive power, such
tioned by the Elders together with the Commonalty.”
as the law should have, in order to prove an efficacious
I answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first
inducement to virtue, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x,
and foremost the order to the common good. Now to order
9). But this coercive power is vested in the whole people
anything to the common good, belongs either to the whole
or in some public personage, to whom it belongs to inflict
people, or to someone who is the viceregent of the whole
penalties, as we shall state further on (q. 92, a. 2, ad 3;
people. And therefore the making of a law belongs either
IIa IIae, q. 64, a. 3). Wherefore the framing of laws
to the whole people or to a public personage who has care
belongs to him alone.
of the whole people: since in all other matters the direct-
Reply to Objection 3. As one man is a part of the
ing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end
household, so a household is a part of the state: and the
belongs.
state is a perfect community, according to Polit. i, 1. And
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 1, ad 1), a
therefore, as the good of one man is not the last end, but
law is in a person not only as in one that rules, but also by
is ordained to the common good; so too the good of one
participation as in one that is ruled. In the latter way each
household is ordained to the good of a single state, which
one is a law to himself, in so far as he shares the direction
is a perfect community. Consequently he that governs a
that he receives from one who rules him. Hence the same
family, can indeed make certain commands or ordinances,
text goes on: “Who show the work of the law written in
but not such as to have properly the force of law.
their hearts.”
Whether promulgation is essential to a law?
Ia IIae q. 90 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that promulgation is not
must needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by
essential to a law. For the natural law above all has the
it. Such application is made by its being notified to them
character of law. But the natural law needs no promul-
by promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is necessary
gation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that it be
for the law to obtain its force.
promulgated.
Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of
Objection 2. Further, it belongs properly to a law to
law may be gathered; and it is nothing else than an ordi-
bind one to do or not to do something. But the obligation
nance of reason for the common good, made by him who
of fulfilling a law touches not only those in whose pres-
has care of the community, and promulgated.
ence it is promulgated, but also others. Therefore promul-
Reply to Objection 1. The natural law is promulgated
gation is not essential to a law.
by the very fact that God instilled it into man’s mind so as
Objection 3. Further, the binding force of a law ex-
to be known by him naturally.
tends even to the future, since “laws are binding in matters
Reply to Objection 2. Those who are not present
of the future,” as the jurists say (Cod. 1, tit. De lege et
when a law is promulgated, are bound to observe the law,
constit. leg. vii). But promulgation concerns those who
in so far as it is notified or can be notified to them by oth-
are present. Therefore it is not essential to a law.
ers, after it has been promulgated.
On the contrary, It is laid down in the Decretals, dist.
Reply to Objection 3. The promulgation that takes
4, that “laws are established when they are promulgated.”
place now, extends to future time by reason of the dura-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), a law is im-
bility of written characters, by which means it is continu-
posed on others by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule
ally promulgated. Hence Isidore says (Etym. v, 3; ii, 10)
or measure is imposed by being applied to those who are
that “lex [law] is derived from legere [to read] because it
to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore, in order that
is written.”
a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it
1023
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 91
Of the Various Kinds of Law
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the various kinds of law: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is an eternal law?
(2) Whether there is a natural law?
(3) Whether there is a human law?
(4) Whether there is a Divine law?
(5) Whether there is one Divine law, or several?
(6) Whether there is a law of sin?
Whether there is an eternal law?
Ia IIae q. 91 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no eternal
according to Prov. 8:23, therefore it is that this kind of
law. Because every law is imposed on someone. But there
law must be called eternal.
was not someone from eternity on whom a law could be
Reply to Objection 1. Those things that are not in
imposed: since God alone was from eternity. Therefore
themselves, exist with God, inasmuch as they are fore-
no law is eternal.
known and preordained by Him, according to Rom. 4:17:
Objection 2. Further, promulgation is essential to law.
“Who calls those things that are not, as those that are.”
But promulgation could not be from eternity: because
Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears
there was no one to whom it could be promulgated from
the character of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained
eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal.
by God to the government of things foreknown by Him.
Objection 3. Further, a law implies order to an end.
Reply to Objection 2. Promulgation is made by word
But nothing ordained to an end is eternal: for the last end
of mouth or in writing; and in both ways the eternal law is
alone is eternal. Therefore no law is eternal.
promulgated: because both the Divine Word and the writ-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6):
ing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation
“That Law which is the Supreme Reason cannot be under-
cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that
stood to be otherwise than unchangeable and eternal.”
hears or reads.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 90, a. 1, ad 2;
Reply to Objection 3. The law implies order to the
Aa. 3,4), a law is nothing else but a dictate of practical
end actively, in so far as it directs certain things to the
reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect
end; but not passively—that is to say, the law itself is not
community. Now it is evident, granted that the world is
ordained to the end—except accidentally, in a governor
ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the Ia, q. 22,
whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which end his law
Aa. 1,2, that the whole community of the universe is gov-
must needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine gov-
erned by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the
ernment is God Himself, and His law is not distinct from
government of things in God the Ruler of the universe,
Himself. Wherefore the eternal law is not ordained to an-
has the nature of a law. And since the Divine Reason’s
other end.
conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal,
Whether there is in us a natural law?
Ia IIae q. 91 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no natural law
directing of human acts to their end is not a function of
in us. Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal
nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which act for
law: for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i) that “the eternal
an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts
law is that by which it is right that all things should be
for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law is
most orderly.” But nature does not abound in superfluities
natural to man.
as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore no law is
Objection 3. Further, the more a man is free, the less
natural to man.
is he under the law. But man is freer than all the animals,
Objection 2. Further, by the law man is directed, in
on account of his free-will, with which he is endowed
his acts, to the end, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2). But the
above all other animals. Since therefore other animals are
1024
not subject to a natural law, neither is man subject to a countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us”: thus implying
natural law.
that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what
On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 2:14: “When
is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natu-
the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those
ral law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine
things that are of the law,” comments as follows: “Al-
light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing
though they have no written law, yet they have the natural
else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal
law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what
law.
is good and what is evil.”
Reply to Objection 1. This argument would hold, if
I answer that, As stated above (q. 90, a. 1, ad 1), law, the natural law were something different from the eternal
being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways:
law: whereas it is nothing but a participation thereof, as
in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another
stated above.
way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing
Reply to Objection 2. Every act of reason and will in
is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule
us is based on that which is according to nature, as stated
or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine
above (q. 10, a. 1): for every act of reasoning is based on
providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as
principles that are known naturally, and every act of ap-
was stated above (a. 1); it is evident that all things partake
petite in respect of the means is derived from the natural
somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from
appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly the first
its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective
direction of our acts to their end must needs be in virtue
inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among
of the natural law.
all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine prov-
Reply to Objection 3. Even irrational animals partake
idence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes
in their own way of the Eternal Reason, just as the rational
of a share of providence, by being provident both for it-
creature does. But because the rational creature partakes
self and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal
thereof in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore
Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper
the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature
act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in
is properly called a law, since a law is something pertain-
the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the
ing to reason, as stated above (q. 90, a. 1). Irrational crea-
Psalmist after saying (Ps. 4:6): “Offer up the sacrifice of
tures, however, do not partake thereof in a rational man-
justice,” as though someone asked what the works of jus-
ner, wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law
tice are, adds: “Many say, Who showeth us good things?”
in them, except by way of similitude.
in answer to which question he says: “The light of Thy
Whether there is a human law?
Ia IIae q. 91 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a human
poral, which he calls human.
law. For the natural law is a participation of the eternal
I answer that, As stated above (q. 90, a. 1, ad 2),
law, as stated above (a. 2). Now through the eternal law
a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to
“all things are most orderly,” as Augustine states (De Lib.
be observed that the same procedure takes place in the
Arb. i, 6). Therefore the natural law suffices for the or-
practical and in the speculative reason: for each proceeds
dering of all human affairs. Consequently there is no need
from principles to conclusions, as stated above (De Lib.
for a human law.
Arb. i, 6). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the
Objection 2. Further, a law bears the character of a
speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable
measure, as stated above (q. 90, a. 1). But human rea-
principles, we draw the conclusions of the various sci-
son is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as stated in
ences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by
Metaph. x, text. 5. Therefore no law can emanate from
nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is
human reason.
from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and
Objection 3. Further, a measure should be most cer-
indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs
tain, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3. But the dictates of
to proceed to the more particular determination of certain
human reason in matters of conduct are uncertain, accord-
matters. These particular determinations, devised by hu-
ing to Wis. 9:14: “The thoughts of mortal men are fear-
man reason, are called human laws, provided the other
ful, and our counsels uncertain.” Therefore no law can
essential conditions of law be observed, as stated above
emanate from human reason.
(q. 90, Aa. 2,3,4). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric
On the contrary, Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distin-
(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “justice has its source in na-
guishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other tem-
ture; thence certain things came into custom by reason of
1025
their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from law.
nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by
Reply to Objection 2. Human reason is not, of itself,
fear and reverence for the law.”
the rule of things: but the principles impressed on it by
Reply to Objection 1. The human reason cannot have
nature, are general rules and measures of all things relat-
a full participation of the dictate of the Divine Reason,
ing to human conduct, whereof the natural reason is the
but according to its own mode, and imperfectly. Con-
rule and measure, although it is not the measure of things
sequently, as on the part of the speculative reason, by a
that are from nature.
natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is in us the
Reply to Objection 3. The practical reason is con-
knowledge of certain general principles, but not proper
cerned with practical matters, which are singular and con-
knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in
tingent: but not with necessary things, with which the
the Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part of the practical
speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws
reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal law,
cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demon-
according to certain general principles, but not as regards
strated conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for
the particular determinations of individual cases, which
every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but
are, however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need
according as it is possible in its own particular genus.
for human reason to proceed further to sanction them by
Whether there was any need for a Divine law?
Ia IIae q. 91 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that there was no need for
be directed to his end by a law given by God.
a Divine law. Because, as stated above (a. 2), the natu-
Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of
ral law is a participation in us of the eternal law. But the
human judgment, especially on contingent and particular
eternal law is a Divine law, as stated above (a. 1). There-
matters, different people form different judgments on hu-
fore there was no need for a Divine law in addition to the
man acts; whence also different and contrary laws result.
natural law, and human laws derived therefrom.
In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:14)
what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was
that “God left man in the hand of his own counsel.” Now
necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a
counsel is an act of reason, as stated above (q. 14, a. 1).
law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot
Therefore man was left to the direction of his reason. But
err.
a dictate of human reason is a human law as stated above
Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters
(a. 3). Therefore there is no need for man to be governed
of which he is competent to judge. But man is not compe-
also by a Divine law.
tent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden, but
Objection 3.
Further, human nature is more self-
only of exterior acts which appear: and yet for the per-
sufficing than irrational creatures. But irrational creatures
fection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct him-
have no Divine law besides the natural inclination im-
self aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law
pressed on them. Much less, therefore, should the rational
could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it
creature have a Divine law in addition to the natural law.
was necessary for this purpose that a Divine law should
On the contrary, David prayed God to set His law
supervene.
before him, saying (Ps. 118:33): “Set before me for a law
Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i,
the way of Thy justifications, O Lord.”
5,6), human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds:
I answer that, Besides the natural and the human law
since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would
it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to
do away with many good things, and would hinder the ad-
have a Divine law. And this for four reasons. First, be-
vance of the common good, which is necessary for human
cause it is by law that man is directed how to perform his
intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain
proper acts in view of his last end. And indeed if man
unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the Di-
were ordained to no other end than that which is propor-
vine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden.
tionate to his natural faculty, there would be no need for
And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. 118:8,
man to have any further direction of the part of his reason,
where it is said: “The law of the Lord is unspotted,” i.e.
besides the natural law and human law which is derived
allowing no foulness of sin; “converting souls,” because it
from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal
directs not only exterior, but also interior acts; “the testi-
happiness which is inproportionate to man’s natural fac-
mony of the Lord is faithful,” because of the certainty of
ulty, as stated above (q. 5, a. 5), therefore it was necessary
what is true and right; “giving wisdom to little ones,” by
that, besides the natural and the human law, man should
directing man to an end supernatural and Divine.
1026
Reply to Objection 1. By the natural law the eter-enough for it to proceed from principles imparted by na-
nal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of
ture, which are the precepts of the natural law, for the rea-
human nature. But to his supernatural end man needs to
sons given above: but there is need for certain additional
be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law
principles, namely, the precepts of the Divine law.
given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the
Reply to Objection 3. Irrational creatures are not or-
eternal law.
dained to an end higher than that which is proportionate to
Reply to Objection 2. Counsel is a kind of inquiry:
their natural powers: consequently the comparison fails.
hence it must proceed from some principles. Nor is it
Whether there is but one Divine law?
Ia IIae q. 91 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that there is but one Di-
this, man was directly ordained by the Old Law: where-
vine law. Because, where there is one king in one king-
fore, at the very outset of the law, the people were invited
dom there is but one law. Now the whole of mankind is
to the earthly kingdom of the Chananaeans (Ex. 3:8,17).
compared to God as to one king, according to Ps. 46:8:
Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good: and
“God is the King of all the earth.” Therefore there is but
to this, man is ordained by the New Law. Wherefore, at
one Divine law.
the very beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to
Objection 2. Further, every law is directed to the end
the kingdom of heaven, saying (Mat. 4:17): “Do penance,
which the lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes
for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.” Hence Augustine
the law. But God intends one and the same thing for all
says (Contra Faust. iv) that “promises of temporal goods
men; since according to 1 Tim. 2:4: “He will have all men
are contained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is
to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.”
called old; but the promise of eternal life belongs to the
Therefore there is but one Divine law.
New Testament.”
Objection 3. Further, the Divine law seems to be more
Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts ac-
akin to the eternal law, which is one, than the natural law,
cording to the order of righteousness (a. 4): wherein also
according as the revelation of grace is of a higher order
the New Law surpasses the Old Law, since it directs our
than natural knowledge. Therefore much more is the Di-
internal acts, according to Mat. 5:20: “Unless your justice
vine law but one.
abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12): “The
shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.” Hence the
priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a trans-
saying that “the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New
lation also be made of the law.” But the priesthood is
Law controls the mind” ( Sentent. iii, D, xl).
twofold, as stated in the same passage, viz. the levitical
Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe
priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore the
its commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of
Divine law is twofold, namely the Old Law and the New
punishment: but the New Law, by love, which is poured
Law.
into our hearts by the grace of Christ, bestowed in the New
I answer that, As stated in the Ia, q. 30, a. 3, distincLaw, but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence Augustine says
tion is the cause of number. Now things may be distin-
(Contra Adimant. Manich. discip. xvii) that “there is lit-
guished in two ways. First, as those things that are alto-
tle difference∗ between the Law and the Gospel—fear and
gether specifically different, e.g. a horse and an ox. Sec-
love.”
ondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g. a
Reply to Objection 1. As the father of a family is-
boy and a man: and in this way the Divine law is divided
sues different commands to the children and to the adults,
into Old and New. Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24,25) com-
so also the one King, God, in His one kingdom, gave one
pares the state of man under the Old Law to that of a child
law to men, while they were yet imperfect, and another
“under a pedagogue”; but the state under the New Law,
more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, they had
to that of a full grown man, who is “no longer under a
been led to a greater capacity for Divine things.
pedagogue.”
Reply to Objection 2. The salvation of man could
Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws
not be achieved otherwise than through Christ, according
is to be taken in connection with the three conditions per-
to Acts 4:12: “There is no other name. . . given to men,
taining to law, as stated above. For, in the first place, it
whereby we must be saved.” Consequently the law that
belongs to law to be directed to the common good as to
brings all to salvation could not be given until after the
its end, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2). This good may be
coming of Christ. But before His coming it was neces-
twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to
sary to give to the people, of whom Christ was to be born,
∗ The ‘little difference’ refers to the Latin words ‘timor’ and
‘amor’—‘fear’ and ‘love.’
1027
a law containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto for all. But the Divine law directs man also in certain par-salvation, in order to prepare them to receive Him.
ticular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect do not
Reply to Objection 3. The natural law directs man by
stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the
way of certain general precepts, common to both the per-
Divine law to be twofold, as already explained.
fect and the imperfect: wherefore it is one and the same
Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?
Ia IIae q. 91 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no law of the
was so effective in the primitive state, that nothing either
“fomes” of sin. For Isidore says (Etym. v) that the “law
beside or against reason could take man unawares. But
is based on reason.” But the “fomes” of sin is not based
when man turned his back on God, he fell under the influ-
on reason, but deviates from it. Therefore the “fomes” has
ence of his sensual impulses: in fact this happens to each
not the nature of a law.
one individually, the more he deviates from the path of
Objection 2. Further, every law is binding, so that
reason, so that, after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts
those who do not obey it are called transgressors. But
that are led by the impulse of sensuality, according to Ps.
man is not called a transgressor, from not following the
48:21: “Man, when he was in honor, did not understand:
instigations of the “fomes”; but rather from his following
he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like
them. Therefore the “fomes” has not the nature of a law.
to them.”
Objection 3. Further, the law is ordained to the com-
So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is
mon good, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2). But the “fomes”
called the “fomes,” in other animals has simply the nature
inclines us, not to the common, but to our own private
of a law (yet only in so far as a law may be said to be
good. Therefore the “fomes” has not the nature of sin.
in such things), by reason of a direct inclination. But in
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): “I
man, it has not the nature of law in this way, rather is it
see another law in my members, fighting against the law
a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the just
of my mind.”
sentence of God, man is destitute of original justice, and
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2; q. 90, a. 1, ad
his reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality,
1), the law, as to its essence, resides in him that rules and
whereby he is led, in so far as it is a penalty following
measures; but, by way of participation, in that which is
from the Divine law depriving man of his proper dignity,
ruled and measured; so that every inclination or ordination
has the nature of a law.
which may be found in things subject to the law, is called
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the
a law by participation, as stated above (a. 2; q. 90, a. 1 ,
“fomes” in itself, as an incentive to evil. It is not thus that ad 1). Now those who are subject to a law may receive a
it has the nature of a law, as stated above, but according
twofold inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as
as it results from the justice of the Divine law: it is as
he directly inclines his subjects to something; sometimes
though we were to say that the law allows a nobleman to
indeed different subjects to different acts; in this way we
be condemned to hard labor for some misdeed.
may say that there is a military law and a mercantile law.
Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers law
Secondly, indirectly; thus by the very fact that a lawgiver
in the light of a rule or measure: for it is in this sense that deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter passes into
those who deviate from the law become transgressors. But
another order, so as to be under another law, as it were:
the “fomes” is not a law in this respect, but by a kind of
thus if a soldier be turned out of the army, he becomes a
participation, as stated above.
subject of rural or of mercantile legislation.
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the
Accordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various crea-
“fomes” as to its proper inclination, and not as to its ori-
tures have various natural inclinations, so that what is, as
gin. And yet if the inclination of sensuality be considered
it were, a law for one, is against the law for another: thus I
as it is in other animals, thus it is ordained to the common
might say that fierceness is, in a way, the law of a dog, but
good, namely, to the preservation of nature in the species
against the law of a sheep or another meek animal. And
or in the individual. And this is in man also, in so far as
so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance, is al-
sensuality is subject to reason. But it is called “fomes” in
lotted to him, according to his proper natural condition, is
so far as it strays from the order of reason.
that he should act in accordance with reason: and this law
1028
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 92
Of the Effects of Law
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the effects of law; under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether an effect of law is to make men good?
(2) Whether the effects of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish, as the Jurist states?
Whether an effect of law is to make men good?
Ia IIae q. 92 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that it is not an effect of law to good simply. If, however, the intention of the lawgiver is
make men good. For men are good through virtue, since
fixed on that which is not simply good, but useful or plea-
virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6 is “that which makes its
surable to himself, or in opposition to Divine justice; then
subject good.” But virtue is in man from God alone, be-
the law does not make men good simply, but in respect
cause He it is Who “works it in us without us,” as we
to that particular government. In this way good is found
stated above (q. 55, a. 4) in giving the definition of virtue.
even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man is
Therefore the law does not make men good.
called a good robber, because he works in a way that is
Objection 2. Further, Law does not profit a man un-
adapted to his end.
less he obeys it. But the very fact that a man obeys a law
Reply to Objection 1. Virtue is twofold, as explained
is due to his being good. Therefore in man goodness is
above (q. 63, a. 2), viz. acquired and infused. Now the fact
presupposed to the law. Therefore the law does not make
of being accustomed to an action contributes to both, but
men good.
in different ways; for it causes the acquired virtue; while
Objection 3. Further, Law is ordained to the com-
it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves and fosters it
mon good, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2). But some behave
when it already exists. And since law is given for the pur-
well in things regarding the community, who behave ill in
pose of directing human acts; as far as human acts con-
things regarding themselves. Therefore it is not the busi-
duce to virtue, so far does law make men good. Wherefore
ness of the law to make men good.
the Philosopher says in the second book of the Politics
Objection 4. Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the
(Ethic. ii) that “lawgivers make men good by habituating
Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 6). But a tyrant does not in-
them to good works.”
tend the good of his subjects, but considers only his own
Reply to Objection 2. It is not always through perfect
profit. Therefore law does not make men good.
goodness of virtue that one obeys the law, but sometimes
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1)
it is through fear of punishment, and sometimes from the
that the “intention of every lawgiver is to make good citi-
mere dictates of reason, which is a beginning of virtue, as
zens.”
stated above (q. 63, a. 1).
I answer that, as stated above (q. 90, a. 1, ad 2;
Reply to Objection 3. The goodness of any part is
Aa. 3,4), a law is nothing else than a dictate of reason
considered in comparison with the whole; hence Augus-
in the ruler by whom his subjects are governed. Now the
tine says (Confess. iii) that “unseemly is the part that har-
virtue of any subordinate thing consists in its being well
monizes not with the whole.” Since then every man is a
subordinated to that by which it is regulated: thus we see
part of the state, it is impossible that a man be good, un-
that the virtue of the irascible and concupiscible faculties
less he be well proportionate to the common good: nor
consists in their being obedient to reason; and accordingly
can the whole be well consistent unless its parts be pro-
“the virtue of every subject consists in his being well sub-
portionate to it. Consequently the common good of the
jected to his ruler,” as the Philosopher says (Polit. i). But
state cannot flourish, unless the citizens be virtuous, at
every law aims at being obeyed by those who are subject
least those whose business it is to govern. But it is enough
to it. Consequently it is evident that the proper effect of
for the good of the community, that the other citizens be so
law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue: and since
far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers.
virtue is “that which makes its subject good,” it follows
Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that “the virtue
that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it
of a sovereign is the same as that of a good man, but the
is given, good, either simply or in some particular respect.
virtue of any common citizen is not the same as that of a
For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on true good,
good man.”
which is the common good regulated according to Divine
Reply to Objection 4. A tyrannical law, through not
justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men
being according to reason, is not a law, absolutely speak-
1029
ing, but rather a perversion of law; and yet in so far as it jects, and aims at being obeyed by them, which is to make
is something in the nature of a law, it aims at the citizens’
them good, not simply, but with respect to that particular
being good. For all it has in the nature of a law consists
government.
in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his sub-
Whether the acts of law are suitably assigned?
Ia IIae q. 92 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the acts of law are
acts, in which the law directs, as stated above (q. 90,
not suitably assigned as consisting in “command,” “prohi-
Aa. 1,2; q. 91, a. 4). Again there are three kinds of human
bition,” “permission” and “punishment.” For “every law
acts: for, as stated above (q. 18, a. 8), some acts are good
is a general precept,” as the jurist states. But command
generically, viz. acts of virtue; and in respect of these the
and precept are the same. Therefore the other three are
act of the law is a precept or command, for “the law com-
superfluous.
mands all acts of virtue” (Ethic. v, 1). Some acts are evil
Objection 2. Further, the effect of a law is to induce
generically, viz. acts of vice, and in respect of these the
its subjects to be good, as stated above (a. 1). But counsel
law forbids. Some acts are generically indifferent, and in
aims at a higher good than a command does. Therefore it
respect of these the law permits; and all acts that are either
belongs to law to counsel rather than to command.
not distinctly good or not distinctly bad may be called in-
Objection 3. Further, just as punishment stirs a man
different. And it is the fear of punishment that law makes
to good deeds, so does reward. Therefore if to punish is
use of in order to ensure obedience: in which respect pun-
reckoned an effect of law, so also is to reward.
ishment is an effect of law.
Objection 4. Further, the intention of a lawgiver is
Reply to Objection 1. Just as to cease from evil is a
to make men good, as stated above (a. 1). But he that
kind of good, so a prohibition is a kind of precept: and
obeys the law, merely through fear of being punished, is
accordingly, taking precept in a wide sense, every law is a
not good: because “although a good deed may be done
kind of precept.
through servile fear, i.e. fear of punishment, it is not done
Reply to Objection 2. To advise is not a proper act of
well,” as Augustine says (Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii).
law, but may be within the competency even of a private
Therefore punishment is not a proper effect of law.
person, who cannot make a law. Wherefore too the Apos-
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): “Every
tle, after giving a certain counsel (1 Cor. 7:12) says: “I
law either permits something, as: ‘A brave man may de-
speak, not the Lord.” Consequently it is not reckoned as
mand his reward’ ”: or forbids something, as: “No man
an effect of law.
may ask a consecrated virgin in marriage”: or punishes,
Reply to Objection 3. To reward may also pertain to
as: “Let him that commits a murder be put to death.”
anyone: but to punish pertains to none but the framer of
I answer that, Just as an assertion is a dictate of rea-
the law, by whose authority the pain is inflicted. Where-
son asserting something, so is a law a dictate of reason,
fore to reward is not reckoned an effect of law, but only to
commanding something. Now it is proper to reason to
punish.
lead from one thing to another. Wherefore just as, in
Reply to Objection 4. From becoming accustomed to
demonstrative sciences, the reason leads us from certain
avoid evil and fulfill what is good, through fear of pun-
principles to assent to the conclusion, so it induces us by
ishment, one is sometimes led on to do so likewise, with
some means to assent to the precept of the law.
delight and of one’s own accord. Accordingly, law, even
Now the precepts of law are concerned with human
by punishing, leads men on to being good.
1030
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 93
Of the Eternal Law
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider each law by itself; and (1) The eternal law; (2) The natural law; (3) The human law; (4) The old law; (5) The new law, which is the law of the Gospel. Of the sixth law which is the law of the “fomes,” suffice what we have said when treating of original sin.
Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:
(1) What is the eternal law?
(2) Whether it is known to all?
(3) Whether every law is derived from it?
(4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law?
(5) Whether natural contingencies are subject to the eternal law?
(6) Whether all human things are subject to it?
Whether the eternal law is a sovereign type∗ existing in God?
Ia IIae q. 93 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the eternal law is not
to be found in each single creature, as was also stated in
a sovereign type existing in God. For there is only one
the Ia, q. 103, a. 5. Wherefore as the type of the Divine
eternal law. But there are many types of things in the Di-
Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all things are created, has the
vine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 46) that
character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine
God “made each thing according to its type.” Therefore
Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, bears the
the eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the
character of law. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing
Divine mind.
else than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all ac-
Objection 2. Further, it is essential to a law that it be tions and movements.
promulgated by word, as stated above (q. 90, a. 4). But
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking in that
Word is a Personal name in God, as stated in the Ia, q. 34,
passage of the ideal types which regard the proper nature
a. 1: whereas type refers to the Essence. Therefore the
of each single thing; and consequently in them there is a
eternal law is not the same as a Divine type.
certain distinction and plurality, according to their differ-
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Vera Re-
ent relations to things, as stated in the Ia, q. 15, a. 2. But
lig. xxx): “We see a law above our minds, which is called
law is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the
truth.” But the law which is above our minds is the eternal
common good, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2). And things,
law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But the idea of
which are in themselves different, may be considered as
truth is not the same as the idea of a type. Therefore the
one, according as they are ordained to one common thing.
eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type.
Wherefore the eternal law is one since it is the type of this
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6)
order.
that “the eternal law is the sovereign type, to which we
Reply to Objection 2. With regard to any sort of
must always conform.”
word, two points may be considered: viz. the word itself,
I answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists and that which is expressed by the word. For the spoken
a type of the things that are made by his art, so too in ev-
word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and ex-
ery governor there must pre-exist the type of the order of
presses that which is signified by the human word. The
those things that are to be done by those who are subject
same applies to the human mental word, which is nothing
to his government. And just as the type of the things yet
else that something conceived by the mind, by which man
to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the
expresses his thoughts mentally. So then in God the Word
products of that art, so too the type in him who governs the
conceived by the intellect of the Father is the name of a
acts of his subjects, bears the character of a law, provided
Person: but all things that are in the Father’s knowledge,
the other conditions be present which we have mentioned
whether they refer to the Essence or to the Persons, or to
above (q. 90). Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator
the works of God, are expressed by this Word, as Augus-
of all things in relation to which He stands as the artificer
tine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And among other things
to the products of his art, as stated in the Ia, q. 14, a. 8.
expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is expressed
Moreover He governs all the acts and movements that are
thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Per-
∗ Ratio
1031
sonal name in God: yet it is appropriated to the Son, on with things, since “an opinion is true or false according as
account of the kinship between type and word.
it answers to the reality.” But the Divine intellect is the
Reply to Objection 3. The types of the Divine in-
measure of things: since each thing has so far truth in it,
tellect do not stand in the same relation to things, as the
as it represents the Divine intellect, as was stated in the
types of the human intellect. For the human intellect is
Ia, q. 16, a. 1. Consequently the Divine intellect is true in
measured by things, so that a human concept is not true
itself; and its type is truth itself.
by reason of itself, but by reason of its being consonant
Whether the eternal law is known to all?
Ia IIae q. 93 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the eternal law is not
common principles of the natural law: and as to the oth-
known to all. Because, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11),
ers, they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more,
“the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit
some less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant
of God.” But the eternal law is a type existing in the Di-
of the eternal law.
vine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone.
Reply to Objection 1. We cannot know the things that
Objection 2. Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb.
are of God, as they are in themselves; but they are made
i, 6) “the eternal law is that by which it is right that all
known to us in their effects, according to Rom. 1:20: “The
things should be most orderly.” But all do not know how
invisible things of God. . . are clearly seen, being under-
all things are most orderly. Therefore all do not know the
stood by the things that are made.”
eternal law.
Reply to Objection 2. Although each one knows the
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig.
eternal law according to his own capacity, in the way ex-
xxxi) that “the eternal law is not subject to the judgment
plained above, yet none can comprehend it: for it can-
of man.” But according to Ethic. i, “any man can judge
not be made perfectly known by its effects. Therefore it
well of what he knows.” Therefore the eternal law is not
does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law in
known to us.
the way aforesaid, knows also the whole order of things,
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6)
whereby they are most orderly.
that “knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us.”
Reply to Objection 3. To judge a thing may be un-
I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways:
derstood in two ways. First, as when a cognitive power
first, in itself; secondly, in its effect, wherein some like-
judges of its proper object, according to Job 12:11: “Doth
ness of that thing is found: thus someone not seeing the
not the ear discern words, and the palate of him that eateth,
sun in its substance, may know it by its rays. So then
the taste?” It is to this kind of judgment that the Philoso-
no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except
pher alludes when he says that “anyone can judge well of
the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every ratio-
what he knows,” by judging, namely, whether what is put
nal creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less. For
forward is true. In another way we speak of a superior
every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and par-
judging of a subordinate by a kind of practical judgment,
ticipation of the eternal law, which is the unchangeable
as to whether he should be such and such or not. And thus
truth, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all
none can judge of the eternal law.
men know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the
Whether every law is derived from the eternal law?
Ia IIae q. 93 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that not every law is
unjust, according to Is. 10:1: “Woe to them that make
derived from the eternal law. For there is a law of the
wicked laws.” Therefore not every law is derived from
“fomes,” as stated above (q. 91, a. 6), which is not de-
the eternal law.
rived from that Divine law which is the eternal law, since
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb.
thereunto pertains the “prudence of the flesh,” of which
i, 5) that “the law which is framed for ruling the people,
the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7), that “it cannot be subject to
rightly permits many things which are punished by Divine
the law of God.” Therefore not every law is derived from
providence.” But the type of Divine providence is the eter-
the eternal law.
nal law, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore not even every
Objection 2. Further, nothing unjust can be derived
good law is derived from the eternal law.
from the eternal law, because, as stated above (a. 2, obj. 2),
On the contrary, Divine Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15):
“the eternal law is that, according to which it is right that
“By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things.”
all things should be most orderly.” But some laws are
But the type of Divine Wisdom is the eternal law, as stated
1032
above (a. 1). Therefore all laws proceed from the eternal law in man, in so far as it is a punishment resulting from
law.
Divine justice; and in this respect it is evident that it is
I answer that, As stated above (q. 90, Aa. 1,2), the
derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it denotes a
law denotes a kind of plan directing acts towards an end.
proneness to sin, it is contrary to the Divine law, and has
Now wherever there are movers ordained to one another,
not the nature of law, as stated above (q. 91, a. 6).
the power of the second mover must needs be derived
Reply to Objection 2. Human law has the nature of
from the power of the first mover; since the second mover
law in so far as it partakes of right reason; and it is clear
does not move except in so far as it is moved by the first.
that, in this respect, it is derived from the eternal law. But
Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern,
in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust
so that the plan of government is derived by secondary
law, and has the nature, not of law but of violence. Nev-
governors from the governor in chief; thus the plan of
ertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some
what is to be done in a state flows from the king’s com-
appearance of law, though being framed by one who is in
mand to his inferior administrators: and again in things of
power, is derived from the eternal law; since all power is
art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the
from the Lord God, according to Rom. 13:1.
chief craftsman to the under-crafts-men, who work with
Reply to Objection 3. Human law is said to permit
their hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of gov-
certain things, not as approving them, but as being unable
ernment in the Chief Governor, all the plans of govern-
to direct them. And many things are directed by the Di-
ment in the inferior governors must be derived from the
vine law, which human law is unable to direct, because
eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all
more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause.
other laws besides the eternal law. Therefore all laws, in
Hence the very fact that human law does not meddle with
so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the
matters it cannot direct, comes under the ordination of
eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that
the eternal law. It would be different, were human law
“in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but what
to sanction what the eternal law condemns. Consequently
man has drawn from the eternal law.”
it does not follow that human law is not derived from the
Reply to Objection 1. The “fomes” has the nature of
eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect equality with it.
Whether necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law?
Ia IIae q. 93 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that necessary and eter-
is the type of the Divine government. Consequently what-
nal things are subject to the eternal law. For whatever is
ever is subject to the Divine government, is subject to the
reasonable is subject to reason. But the Divine will is rea-
eternal law: while if anything is not subject to the Divine
sonable, for it is just. Therefore it is subject to (the Divine) government, neither is it subject to the eternal law. The
reason. But the eternal law is the Divine reason. There-
application of this distinction may be gathered by looking
fore God’s will is subject to the eternal law. But God’s
around us. For those things are subject to human govern-
will is eternal. Therefore eternal and necessary things are
ment, which can be done by man; but what pertains to the
subject to the eternal law.
nature of man is not subject to human government; for
Objection 2. Further, whatever is subject to the King,
instance, that he should have a soul, hands, or feet. Ac-
is subject to the King’s law. Now the Son, according to
cordingly all that is in things created by God, whether it
1 Cor. 15:28,24, “shall be subject. . . to God and the Fa-
be contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law:
ther. . . when He shall have delivered up the Kingdom to
while things pertaining to the Divine Nature or Essence
Him.” Therefore the Son, Who is eternal, is subject to the
are not subject to the eternal law, but are the eternal law
eternal law.
itself.
Objection 3. Further, the eternal law is Divine prov-
Reply to Objection 1. We may speak of God’s will
idence as a type. But many necessary things are subject
in two ways. First, as to the will itself: and thus, since
to Divine providence: for instance, the stability of incor-
God’s will is His very Essence, it is subject neither to the
poreal substances and of the heavenly bodies. Therefore
Divine government, nor to the eternal law, but is the same
even necessary things are subject to the eternal law.
thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we may speak of God’s
On the contrary, Things that are necessary cannot be
will, as to the things themselves that God wills about crea-
otherwise, and consequently need no restraining. But laws
tures; which things are subject to the eternal law, in so
are imposed on men, in order to restrain them from evil, as
far as they are planned by Divine Wisdom. In reference
explained above (q. 92, a. 2). Therefore necessary things
to these things God’s will is said to be reasonable [ratio-
are not subject to the eternal law.
nalis]: though regarded in itself it should rather be called
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the eternal law
their type [ratio].
1033
Reply to Objection 2. God the Son was not made by those necessary things that are created.
God, but was naturally born of God. Consequently He is
Reply to Objection 4.
As the Philosopher says
not subject to Divine providence or to the eternal law: but
(Metaph. v, text. 6), some necessary things have a cause
rather is Himself the eternal law by a kind of appropria-
of their necessity: and thus they derive from something
tion, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig. xxxi). But He
else the fact that they cannot be otherwise. And this is in
is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human
itself a most effective restraint; for whatever is restrained,
nature, in respect of which also the Father is said to be
is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do otherwise
greater than He.
than it is allowed to.
The third objection we grant, because it deals with
Whether natural contingents are subject to the eternal law?
Ia IIae q. 93 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that natural contingents
Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses
are not subject to the eternal law. Because promulgation
a kind of inward principle of action on the man that is
is essential to law, as stated above (q. 90, a. 4). But a
subject to him, so God imprints on the whole of nature
law cannot be promulgated except to rational creatures, to
the principles of its proper actions. And so, in this way,
whom it is possible to make an announcement. Therefore
God is said to command the whole of nature, according
none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law;
to Ps. 148:6: “He hath made a decree, and it shall not
and consequently natural contingents are not.
pass away.” And thus all actions and movements of the
Objection 2. Further, “Whatever obeys reason par-
whole of nature are subject to the eternal law. Conse-
takes somewhat of reason,” as stated in Ethic. i. But the
quently irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law,
eternal law, is the supreme type, as stated above (a. 1).
through being moved by Divine providence; but not, as
Since then natural contingents do not partake of reason in
rational creatures are, through understanding the Divine
any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that
commandment.
they are not subject to the eternal law.
Reply to Objection 1. The impression of an inward
Objection 3. Further, the eternal law is most efficient.
active principle is to natural things, what the promulga-
But in natural contingents defects occur. Therefore they
tion of law is to men: because law, by being promulgated,
are not subject to the eternal law.
imprints on man a directive principle of human actions, as
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 8:29): “When
stated above.
He compassed the sea with its bounds, and set a law to the
Reply to Objection 2. Irrational creatures neither par-
waters, that they should not pass their limits.”
take of nor are obedient to human reason: whereas they do
I answer that, We must speak otherwise of the law of
partake of the Divine Reason by obeying it; because the
man, than of the eternal law which is the law of God. For
power of Divine Reason extends over more things than
the law of man extends only to rational creatures subject
human reason does. And as the members of the human
to man. The reason of this is because law directs the ac-
body are moved at the command of reason, and yet do not
tions of those that are subject to the government of some-
partake of reason, since they have no apprehension subor-
one: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law
dinate to reason; so too irrational creatures are moved by
on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding the
God, without, on that account, being rational.
use of irrational things subject to man, is done by the act
Reply to Objection 3. Although the defects which
of man himself moving those things, for these irrational
occur in natural things are outside the order of particular
creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by oth-
causes, they are not outside the order of universal causes,
ers, as stated above (q. 1, a. 2). Consequently man can-
especially of the First Cause, i.e. God, from Whose prov-
not impose laws on irrational beings, however much they
idence nothing can escape, as stated in the Ia, q. 22, a. 2.
may be subject to him. But he can impose laws on ratio-
And since the eternal law is the type of Divine providence,
nal beings subject to him, in so far as by his command or
as stated above (a. 1), hence the defects of natural things
pronouncement of any kind, he imprints on their minds a
are subject to the eternal law.
rule which is a principle of action.
1034
Whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law?
Ia IIae q. 93 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that not all human affairs
their actions, indeed, since both their knowledge of good,
are subject to the eternal law. For the Apostle says (Gal.
and their inclination thereto, are imperfect; but this imper-
5:18): “If you are led by the spirit you are not under the
fection on the part of action is supplied on the part of pas-
law.” But the righteous who are the sons of God by adop-
sion, in so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees
tion, are led by the spirit of God, according to Rom. 8:14:
concerning them, according as they fail to act in harmony
“Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons
with that law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15):
of God.” Therefore not all men are under the eternal law.
“I esteem that the righteous act according to the eternal
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7):
law; and (De Catech. Rud. xviii): Out of the just misery
“The prudence [Vulg.: ‘wisdom’] of the flesh is an enemy
of the souls which deserted Him, God knew how to fur-
to God: for it is not subject to the law of God.” But many
nish the inferior parts of His creation with most suitable
are those in whom the prudence of the flesh dominates.
laws.”
Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal law which
Reply to Objection 1. This saying of the Apostle may
is the law of God.
be understood in two ways. First, so that a man is said
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb.
to be under the law, through being pinned down thereby,
i, 6) that “the eternal law is that by which the wicked de-
against his will, as by a load. Hence, on the same passage
serve misery, the good, a life of blessedness.” But those
a gloss says that “he is under the law, who refrains from
who are already blessed, and those who are already lost,
evil deeds, through fear of punishment threatened by the
are not in the state of merit. Therefore they are not under
law, and not from love of virtue.” In this way the spiritual
the eternal law.
man is not under the law, because he fulfils the law will-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
ingly, through charity which is poured into his heart by the
12): “Nothing evades the laws of the most high Creator
Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood as meaning
and Governor, for by Him the peace of the universe is ad-
that the works of a man, who is led by the Holy Ghost, are
ministered.”
the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. There-
I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is
fore, since the Holy Ghost is not under the law, as neither
subject to the eternal law, as explained above (a. 5): first,
is the Son, as stated above (a. 4, ad 2); it follows that such
by partaking of the eternal law by way of knowledge; sec-
works, in so far as they are of the Holy Ghost, are not un-
ondly, by way of action and passion, i.e. by partaking of
der the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when he says
the eternal law by way of an inward motive principle: and
(2 Cor. 3:17): “Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is
in this second way, irrational creatures are subject to the
liberty.”
eternal law, as stated above (a. 5). But since the rational
Reply to Objection 2. The prudence of the flesh can-
nature, together with that which it has in common with
not be subject to the law of God as regards action; since
all creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it
it inclines to actions contrary to the Divine law: yet it is
is rational, consequently it is subject to the eternal law in
subject to the law of God, as regards passion; since it de-
both ways; because while each rational creature has some
serves to suffer punishment according to the law of Divine
knowledge of the eternal law, as stated above (a. 2), it also
justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the
has a natural inclination to that which is in harmony with
flesh dominate so far as to destroy the whole good of his
the eternal law; for “we are naturally adapted to the recip-
nature: and consequently there remains in man the incli-
ients of virtue” (Ethic. ii, 1).
nation to act in accordance with the eternal law. For we
Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain
have seen above (q. 85, a. 2) that sin does not destroy en-
extent destroyed, in the wicked; because in them the natu-
tirely the good of nature.
ral inclination to virtue is corrupted by vicious habits, and,
Reply to Objection 3. A thing is maintained in the
moreover, the natural knowledge of good is darkened by
end and moved towards the end by one and the same
passions and habits of sin. But in the good both ways are
cause: thus gravity which makes a heavy body rest in the
found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural
lower place is also the cause of its being moved thither.
knowledge of good, there is the added knowledge of faith
We therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law
and wisdom; and again, besides the natural inclination to
that some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it
good, there is the added motive of grace and virtue.
by the eternal law that some are maintained in a happy
Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eter-
state, others in an unhappy state. Accordingly both the
nal law, as always acting according to it: whereas the
blessed and the damned are under the eternal law.
wicked are subject to the eternal law, imperfectly as to
1035
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 94
Of the Natural Law
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six points of inquiry: (1) What is the natural law?
(2) What are the precepts of the natural law?
(3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?
(4) Whether the natural law is the same in all?
(5) Whether it is changeable?
(6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man?
Whether the natural law is a habit?
Ia IIae q. 94 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law is
Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which
a habit. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5),
we hold by a habit: thus faith may mean that which we
“there are three things in the soul: power, habit, and pas-
hold by faith. And accordingly, since the precepts of the
sion.” But the natural law is not one of the soul’s pow-
natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually,
ers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see by going
while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually, in
through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a
this way the natural law may be called a habit. Thus, in
habit.
speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not
Objection 2. Further, Basil∗ says that the conscience
the habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are
or “synderesis is the law of our mind”; which can only
the principles the habit of which we possess.
apply to the natural law. But the “synderesis” is a habit,
Reply to Objection 1.
The Philosopher proposes
as was shown in the Ia, q. 79, a. 12. Therefore the natural
there to discover the genus of virtue; and since it is ev-
law is a habit.
ident that virtue is a principle of action, he mentions only
Objection 3. Further, the natural law abides in man
those things which are principles of human acts, viz. pow-
always, as will be shown further on (a. 6). But man’s rea-
ers, habits and passions. But there are other things in the
son, which the law regards, does not always think about
soul besides these three: there are acts; thus “to will” is in
the natural law. Therefore the natural law is not an act, but
the one that wills; again, things known are in the knower;
a habit.
moreover its own natural properties are in the soul, such
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug.
as immortality and the like.
xxi) that “a habit is that whereby something is done when
Reply to Objection 2. “Synderesis” is said to be the
necessary.” But such is not the natural law: since it is in
law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the pre-
infants and in the damned who cannot act by it. Therefore
cepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of
the natural law is not a habit.
human actions.
I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two
Reply to Objection 3. This argument proves that the
ways. First, properly and essentially: and thus the natu-
natural law is held habitually; and this is granted.
ral law is not a habit. For it has been stated above (q. 90,
To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we re-
a. 1, ad 2) that the natural law is something appointed by
ply that sometimes a man is unable to make use of that
reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason. Now
which is in him habitually, on account of some impedi-
that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he
ment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable to use the
does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of
habit of science. In like manner, through the deficiency of
grammar. Since then a habit is that by which we act, a law
his age, a child cannot use the habit of understanding of
cannot be a habit properly and essentially.
principles, or the natural law, which is in him habitually.
∗ Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22
1036
Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?
Ia IIae q. 94 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law con-
ple is that “the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied
tains, not several precepts, but one only. For law is a kind
at the same time,” which is based on the notion of “be-
of precept, as stated above (q. 92, a. 2). If therefore there
ing” and “not-being”: and on this principle all others are
were many precepts of the natural law, it would follow
based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9. Now as “being”
that there are also many natural laws.
is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply,
Objection 2. Further, the natural law is consequent
so “good” is the first thing that falls under the apprehen-
to human nature. But human nature, as a whole, is one;
sion of the practical reason, which is directed to action:
though, as to its parts, it is manifold. Therefore, either
since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good.
there is but one precept of the law of nature, on account
Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one
of the unity of nature as a whole; or there are many, by
founded on the notion of good, viz. that “good is that
reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result
which all things seek after.” Hence this is the first pre-
would be that even things relating to the inclination of the
cept of law, that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil
concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law.
is to be avoided.” All other precepts of the natural law
Objection 3. Further, law is something pertaining to
are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason
reason, as stated above (q. 90, a. 1). Now reason is but one
naturally apprehends as man’s good (or evil) belongs to
in man. Therefore there is only one precept of the natural
the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or
law.
avoided.
On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and
man stand in relation to practical matters, as the first prin-
evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those
ciples to matters of demonstration. But there are several
things to which man has a natural inclination, are natu-
first indemonstrable principles. Therefore there are also
rally apprehended by reason as being good, and conse-
several precepts of the natural law.
quently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil,
I answer that, As stated above (q. 91, a. 3), the pre-
and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the or-
cepts of the natural law are to the practical reason, what
der of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of
the first principles of demonstrations are to the specula-
the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an incli-
tive reason; because both are self-evident principles. Now
nation to good in accordance with the nature which he has
a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways: first, in it-
in common with all substances: inasmuch as every sub-
self; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is said to
stance seeks the preservation of its own being, according
be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever
notion of the subject: although, to one who knows not the
is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off
definition of the subject, it happens that such a proposition
its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there
is not self-evident. For instance, this proposition, “Man
is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more
is a rational being,” is, in its very nature, self-evident,
specially, according to that nature which he has in com-
since who says “man,” says “a rational being”: and yet
mon with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination,
to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is
those things are said to belong to the natural law, “which
not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De
nature has taught to all animals”∗, such as sexual inter-
Hebdom.), certain axioms or propositions are universally
course, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there
self-evident to all; and such are those propositions whose
is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature
terms are known to all, as, “Every whole is greater than its
of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has
part,” and, “Things equal to one and the same are equal to
a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to
one another.” But some propositions are self-evident only
live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to
to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of
this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance,
such propositions: thus to one who understands that an
to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom
angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not
one has to live, and other such things regarding the above
circumscriptively in a place: but this is not evident to the
inclination.
unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.
Reply to Objection 1. All these precepts of the law
Now a certain order is to be found in those things
of nature have the character of one natural law, inasmuch
that are apprehended universally. For that which, before
as they flow from one first precept.
aught else, falls under apprehension, is “being,” the no-
Reply to Objection 2. All the inclinations of any parts
tion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man
whatsoever of human nature, e.g. of the concupiscible and
apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable princi-
irascible parts, in so far as they are ruled by reason, belong
∗ Pandect. Just. I, tit. i
1037
to the natural law, and are reduced to one first precept, as Reply to Objection 3. Although reason is one in it-stated above: so that the precepts of the natural law are
self, yet it directs all things regarding man; so that what-
many in themselves, but are based on one common foun-
ever can be ruled by reason, is contained under the law of
dation.
reason.
Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?
Ia IIae q. 94 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that not all acts of virtue
to act according to reason: and this is to act according to
are prescribed by the natural law. Because, as stated above
virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue
(q. 90, a. 2) it is essential to a law that it be ordained to
are prescribed by the natural law: since each one’s reason
the common good. But some acts of virtue are ordained to
naturally dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak
the private good of the individual, as is evident especially
of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e. in their
in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore not all acts of
proper species, thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by
virtue are the subject of natural law.
the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to
Objection 2. Further, every sin is opposed to some
which nature does not incline at first; but which, through
virtuous act. If therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed
the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be con-
by the natural law, it seems to follow that all sins are
ducive to well-living.
against nature: whereas this applies to certain special sins.
Reply to Objection 1. Temperance is about the nat-
Objection 3. Further, those things which are accord-
ural concupiscences of food, drink and sexual matters,
ing to nature are common to all. But acts of virtue are
which are indeed ordained to the natural common good,
not common to all: since a thing is virtuous in one, and
just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral com-
vicious in another. Therefore not all acts of virtue are pre-
mon good.
scribed by the natural law.
Reply to Objection 2. By human nature we may
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
mean either that which is proper to man—and in this sense
4) that “virtues are natural.” Therefore virtuous acts also
all sins, as being against reason, are also against nature, as
are a subject of the natural law.
Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or we may mean
I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two
that nature which is common to man and other animals;
ways: first, under the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such
and in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against
and such acts considered in their proper species. If then
nature; thus contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natu-
we speak of acts of virtue, considered as virtuous, thus all
ral to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the
virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For it has been
special name of the unnatural crime.
stated (a. 2) that to the natural law belongs everything to
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers acts
which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now
in themselves. For it is owing to the various conditions of
each thing is inclined naturally to an operation that is suit-
men, that certain acts are virtuous for some, as being pro-
able to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to
portionate and becoming to them, while they are vicious
give heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is the proper
for others, as being out of proportion to them.
form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination
Whether the natural law is the same in all men?
Ia IIae q. 94 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law is not
Objection 3. Further, as stated above (Aa. 2,3), to the
the same in all. For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i)
natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined
that “the natural law is that which is contained in the Law
according to his nature. Now different men are naturally
and the Gospel.” But this is not common to all men; be-
inclined to different things; some to the desire of plea-
cause, as it is written (Rom. 10:16), “all do not obey the
sures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to
gospel.” Therefore the natural law is not the same in all
other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for all.
men.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): “The nat-
Objection 2. Further, “Things which are according to
ural law is common to all nations.”
the law are said to be just,” as stated in Ethic. v. But it
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 2,3), to the natural is stated in the same book that nothing is so universally
law belongs those things to which a man is inclined natu-
just as not to be subject to change in regard to some men.
rally: and among these it is proper to man to be inclined
Therefore even the natural law is not the same in all men.
to act according to reason. Now the process of reason is
1038
from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i. The restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and
speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this
such a way; because the greater the number of conditions
matter, from the practical reason. For, since the specu-
added, the greater the number of ways in which the prin-
lative reason is busied chiefly with the necessary things,
ciple may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to
which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper con-
restore.
clusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth
Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to
without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is
general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude
busied with contingent matters, about which human ac-
and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail,
tions are concerned: and consequently, although there is
which are conclusions, as it were, of those general prin-
necessity in the general principles, the more we descend
ciples, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both
to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter de-
as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few
fects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the
cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of cer-
same in all men, both as to principles and as to conclu-
tain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and
sions: although the truth is not known to all as regards
corruption fail in some few cases on account of some ob-
the conclusions, but only as regards the principles which
stacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is
are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth
perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of
or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters
nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly con-
of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where
trary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among
there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not
the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).
equally known to all.
Reply to Objection 1. The meaning of the sentence
It is therefore evident that, as regards the general prin-
quoted is not that whatever is contained in the Law and the
ciples whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth
Gospel belongs to the natural law, since they contain many
or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by
things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs to
all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason,
the natural law is fully contained in them. Wherefore Gra-
the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to
tian, after saying that “the natural law is what is contained
all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle in the Law and the Gospel,” adds at once, by way of ex-are together equal to two right angles, although it is not
ample, “by which everyone is commanded to do to others
known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the prac-
as he would be done by.”
tical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for
Reply to Objection 2. The saying of the Philosopher
all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all.
is to be understood of things that are naturally just, not as
Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason:
general principles, but as conclusions drawn from them,
and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion,
having rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing in a
that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their
few.
owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it
Reply to Objection 3. As, in man, reason rules and
may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious,
commands the other powers, so all the natural inclinations
and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust;
belonging to the other powers must needs be directed ac-
for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting
cording to reason. Wherefore it is universally right for all
against one’s country. And this principle will be found to
men, that all their inclinations should be directed accord-
fail the more, according as we descend further into detail,
ing to reason.
e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be
Whether the natural law can be changed?
Ia IIae q. 94 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law can
ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the
be changed. Because on Ecclus. 17:9, “He gave them in-
Egyptians (Ex. 12:35); and when He commanded Osee to
structions, and the law of life,” the gloss says: “He wished
take to himself “a wife of fornications” (Osee 1:2). There-
the law of the letter to be written, in order to correct the
fore the natural law can be changed.
law of nature.” But that which is corrected is changed.
Objection 3. Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that
Therefore the natural law can be changed.
“the possession of all things in common, and universal
Objection 2. Further, the slaying of the innocent,
freedom, are matters of natural law.” But these things are
adultery, and theft are against the natural law. But we find
seen to be changed by human laws. Therefore it seems
these things changed by God: as when God commanded
that the natural law is subject to change.
Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22:2); and when he
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v):
1039
“The natural law dates from the creation of the rational inflicted by the power of God on account of original sin,
creature. It does not vary according to time, but remains
according to 1 Kings 2:6: “The Lord killeth and maketh
unchangeable.”
alive.” Consequently, by the command of God, death can
I answer that, A change in the natural law may be
be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any
understood in two ways. First, by way of addition. In this
injustice whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse
sense nothing hinders the natural law from being changed:
with another’s wife; who is allotted to him by the law
since many things for the benefit of human life have been
emanating from God. Consequently intercourse with any
added over and above the natural law, both by the Divine
woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor
law and by human laws.
fornication. The same applies to theft, which is the tak-
Secondly, a change in the natural law may be under-
ing of another’s property. For whatever is taken by the
stood by way of subtraction, so that what previously was
command of God, to Whom all things belong, is not taken
according to the natural law, ceases to be so. In this
against the will of its owner, whereas it is in this that theft sense, the natural law is altogether unchangeable in its
consists. Nor is it only in human things, that whatever is
first principles: but in its secondary principles, which, as
commanded by God is right; but also in natural things,
we have said (a. 4), are certain detailed proximate con-
whatever is done by God, is, in some way, natural, as
clusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is
stated in the Ia, q. 105, a. 6, ad 1.
not changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most
Reply to Objection 3. A thing is said to belong to
cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of
the natural law in two ways. First, because nature inclines
rare occurrence, through some special causes hindering
thereto: e.g. that one should not do harm to another. Sec-
the observance of such precepts, as stated above (a. 4).
ondly, because nature did not bring in the contrary: thus
Reply to Objection 1. The written law is said to be
we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural
given for the correction of the natural law, either because
law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art in-
it supplies what was wanting to the natural law; or because
vented them. In this sense, “the possession of all things
the natural law was perverted in the hearts of some men,
in common and universal freedom” are said to be of the
as to certain matters, so that they esteemed those things
natural law, because, to wit, the distinction of possessions
good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in
and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by
need of correction.
human reason for the benefit of human life. Accordingly
Reply to Objection 2. All men alike, both guilty and
the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except
innocent, die the death of nature: which death of nature is
by addition.
Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?
Ia IIae q. 94 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law can be
long to the natural law, first, certain most general precepts,
abolished from the heart of man. Because on Rom. 2:14,
that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and
“When the Gentiles who have not the law,” etc. a gloss
more detailed precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions
says that “the law of righteousness, which sin had blotted
following closely from first principles. As to those general
out, is graven on the heart of man when he is restored by
principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be
grace.” But the law of righteousness is the law of nature.
blotted out from men’s hearts. But it is blotted out in the
Therefore the law of nature can be blotted out.
case of a particular action, in so far as reason is hindered
Objection 2. Further, the law of grace is more effi-
from applying the general principle to a particular point of
cacious than the law of nature. But the law of grace is
practice, on account of concupiscence or some other pas-
blotted out by sin. Much more therefore can the law of
sion, as stated above (q. 77, a. 2). But as to the other, i.e.
nature be blotted out.
the secondary precepts, the natural law can be blotted out
Objection 3. Further, that which is established by law
from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as
is made just. But many things are enacted by men, which
in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary
are contrary to the law of nature. Therefore the law of
conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as
nature can be abolished from the heart of man.
among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii): “Thy
Apostle states (Rom. i), were not esteemed sinful.
law is written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself
Reply to Objection 1. Sin blots out the law of na-
effaces not.” But the law which is written in men’s hearts
ture in particular cases, not universally, except perchance
is the natural law. Therefore the natural law cannot be
in regard to the secondary precepts of the natural law, in
blotted out.
the way stated above.
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 4,5), there be-
Reply to Objection 2. Although grace is more effica-
1040
cious than nature, yet nature is more essential to man, and secondary precepts of the natural law, against which some
therefore more enduring.
legislators have framed certain enactments which are un-
Reply to Objection 3. This argument is true of the
just.
1041
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 95
Of Human Law
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider human law; and (1) this law considered in itself; (2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Its utility.
(2) Its origin.
(3) Its quality.
(4) Its division.
Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?
Ia IIae q. 95 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that it was not useful for
man could suffice for himself in the matter of this training:
laws to be framed by men. Because the purpose of ev-
since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdraw-
ery law is that man be made good thereby, as stated above
ing man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is
(q. 92, a. 1). But men are more to be induced to be good
inclined, and especially the young, who are more capable
willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will,
of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this
by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame
training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection
laws.
of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined
Objection 2. Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by
v, 4), “men have recourse to a judge as to animate justice.”
custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suf-
But animate justice is better than inanimate justice, which
fices, which is by admonitions. But since some are found
contained in laws. Therefore it would have been better for
to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable
the execution of justice to be entrusted to the decision of
to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from
judges, than to frame laws in addition.
evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might
Objection 3. Further, every law is framed for the di-
desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that
rection of human actions, as is evident from what has been
they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might
stated above (q. 90, Aa. 1,2). But since human actions are
be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from
about singulars, which are infinite in number, matter per-
fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training,
taining to the direction of human actions cannot be taken
which compels through fear of punishment, is the disci-
into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who
pline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have
looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been
peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed:
better for human acts to be directed by the judgment of
for, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), “as man is the
wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore there
most noble of animals if he be perfect in virtue, so is he
was no need of human laws.
the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and righteous-
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): “Laws
ness”; because man can use his reason to devise means of
were made that in fear thereof human audacity might be
satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals
held in check, that innocence might be safeguarded in the
are unable to do.
midst of wickedness, and that the dread of punishment
Reply to Objection 1. Men who are well disposed are
might prevent the wicked from doing harm.” But these
led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by
things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was
coercion: but men who are evilly disposed are not led to
necessary that human laws should be made.
virtue unless they are compelled.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 63, a. 1; q. 94, a. 3), Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Rhet.
man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of
i, 1), “it is better that all things be regulated by law, than
virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind
left to be decided by judges”: and this for three reasons.
of training. Thus we observe that man is helped by indus-
First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent
try in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing.
to frame right laws, than to find the many who would be
Certain beginnings of these he has from nature, viz. his
necessary to judge aright of each single case. Secondly,
reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement,
because those who make laws consider long beforehand
as other animals have, to whom nature has given suffi-
what laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case
ciency of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how
has to be pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is eas-
1042
ier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances fore it was necessary, whenever possible, for the law to
into consideration, than by considering one solitary fact.
determine how to judge, and for very few matters to be
Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of fu-
left to the decision of men.
ture events; whereas those who sit in judgment of things
Reply to Objection 3. Certain individual facts which
present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred,
cannot be covered by the law “have necessarily to be com-
or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is per-
mitted to judges,” as the Philosopher says in the same pas-
verted.
sage: for instance, “concerning something that has hap-
Since then the animated justice of the judge is not
pened or not happened,” and the like.
found in every man, and since it can be deflected, there-
Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?
Ia IIae q. 95 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that not every human law
from the natural law in two ways: first, as a conclu-
is derived from the natural law. For the Philosopher says
sion from premises, secondly, by way of determination
(Ethic. v, 7) that “the legal just is that which originally
of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by
was a matter of indifference.” But those things which
which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn
arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference.
from the principles: while the second mode is likened to
Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived
that whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized
from the natural law.
as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the
Objection 2. Further, positive law is contrasted with
general form of a house to some particular shape. Some
natural law, as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the
things are therefore derived from the general principles of
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But those things which flow
the natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g. that “one must
as conclusions from the general principles of the natural
not kill” may be derived as a conclusion from the princi-
law belong to the natural law, as stated above (q. 94, a. 4).
ple that “one should do harm to no man”: while some are
Therefore that which is established by human law does
derived therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the law
not belong to the natural law.
of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but
Objection 3. Further, the law of nature is the same
that he be punished in this or that way, is a determination
for all; since the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that “the
of the law of nature.
natural just is that which is equally valid everywhere.” If
Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the
therefore human laws were derived from the natural law,
human law. But those things which are derived in the first
it would follow that they too are the same for all: which is
way, are contained in human law not as emanating there-
clearly false.
from exclusively, but have some force from the natural
Objection 4. Further, it is possible to give a reason
law also. But those things which are derived in the second
for things which are derived from the natural law. But “it
way, have no other force than that of human law.
is not possible to give the reason for all the legal enact-
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking
ments of the lawgivers,” as the jurist says∗. Therefore not
of those enactments which are by way of determination or
all human laws are derived from the natural law.
specification of the precepts of the natural law.
On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii): “Things which
Reply to Objection 2. This argument avails for those
emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were
things that are derived from the natural law, by way of
sanctioned by fear and reverence for the laws.”
conclusions.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5)
Reply to Objection 3. The general principles of the
“that which is not just seems to be no law at all”: where-
natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way
fore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice.
on account of the great variety of human affairs: and
Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being
hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various
right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of
people.
reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been
Reply to Objection 4. These words of the Jurist are
stated above (q. 91, a. 2, ad 2). Consequently every human
to be understood as referring to decisions of rulers in de-
law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived
termining particular points of the natural law: on which
from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from
determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is
the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of
based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they see at
law.
once what is the best thing to decide.
But it must be noted that something may be derived
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in
∗ Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat.
1043
such matters, “we ought to pay as much attention to surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their
the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who
demonstrations.”
Whether Isidore’s description of the quality of positive law is appropriate?
Ia IIae q. 95 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that Isidore’s description
a rule or measure ruled or measured by a higher measure.
of the quality of positive law is not appropriate, when he
And this higher measure is twofold, viz. the Divine law
says (Etym. v, 21): “Law shall be virtuous, just, pos-
and the natural law, as explained above (a. 2; q. 93, a. 3 ).
sible to nature, according to the custom of the country,
Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the
suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly ex-
jurist states∗. Wherefore Isidore in determining the na-
pressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding;
ture of law, lays down, at first, three conditions; viz. that
framed for no private benefit, but for the common good.”
it “foster religion,” inasmuch as it is proportionate to the
Because he had previously expressed the quality of law in
Divine law; that it be “helpful to discipline,” inasmuch as
three conditions, saying that “law is anything founded on
it is proportionate to the nature law; and that it “further
reason, provided that it foster religion, be helpful to dis-
the common weal,” inasmuch as it is proportionate to the
cipline, and further the common weal.” Therefore it was
utility of mankind.
needless to add any further conditions to these.
All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced
Objection 2. Further, Justice is included in honesty,
to these three. For it is called virtuous because it fos-
as Tully says (De Offic. vii). Therefore after saying “hon-
ters religion. And when he goes on to say that it should
est” it was superfluous to add “just.”
be “just, possible to nature, according to the customs of
Objection 3. Further, written law is condivided with
the country, adapted to place and time,” he implies that it
custom, according to Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore
should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline de-
it should not be stated in the definition of law that it is
pends on first on the order of reason, to which he refers
“according to the custom of the country.”
by saying “just”: secondly, it depends on the ability of
Objection 4. Further, a thing may be necessary in two
the agent; because discipline should be adapted to each
ways. It may be necessary simply, because it cannot be
one according to his ability, taking also into account the
otherwise: and that which is necessary in this way, is not
ability of nature (for the same burdens should be not laid
subject to human judgment, wherefore human law is not
on children as adults); and should be according to human
concerned with necessity of this kind. Again a thing may
customs; since man cannot live alone in society, paying
be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as
no heed to others: thirdly, it depends on certain circum-
usefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say both “neces-
stances, in respect of which he says, “adapted to place
sary” and “useful.”
and time.” The remaining words, “necessary, useful,” etc.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Isidore.
mean that law should further the common weal: so that
I answer that, Whenever a thing is for an end, its
“necessity” refers to the removal of evils; “usefulness” to
form must be determined proportionately to that end; as
the attainment of good; “clearness of expression,” to the
the form of a saw is such as to be suitable for cutting
need of preventing any harm ensuing from the law itself.
(Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that is ruled and
And since, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordained to
measured must have a form proportionate to its rule and
the common good, this is expressed in the last part of the
measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human
description.
law: since it is both something ordained to an end; and is
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Whether Isidore’s division of human laws is appropriate?
Ia IIae q. 95 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that Isidore wrongly di-
force, seem to differ not formally but only materially. But
vided human statutes or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq.).
“statutes, decrees of the commonalty, senatorial decrees,”
For under this law he includes the “law of nations,” so
and the like which he mentions (Etym. v, 9), all have the
called, because, as he says, “nearly all nations use it.” But
same force. Therefore they do not differ, except materi-
as he says, “natural law is that which is common to all na-
ally. But art takes no notice of such a distinction: since
tions.” Therefore the law of nations is not contained under
it may go on to infinity. Therefore this division of human
positive human law, but rather under natural law.
laws is not appropriate.
Objection 2. Further, those laws which have the same
Objection 3. Further, just as, in the state, there are
∗ Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff., tit. iii; De Leg. et Senat.
1044
princes, priests and soldiers, so are there other human of-the safety of the people. Wherefore certain special kinds
fices. Therefore it seems that, as this division includes
of law are adapted to these men.
“military law,” and “public law,” referring to priests and
Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be
magistrates; so also it should include other laws pertain-
framed by that one who governs the community of the
ing to other offices of the state.
state, as shown above (q. 90, a. 3). In this respect, there
Objection 4. Further, those things that are accidental
are various human laws according to the various forms
should be passed over. But it is accidental to law that it be
of government. Of these, according to the Philosopher
framed by this or that man. Therefore it is unreasonable
(Polit. iii, 10) one is “monarchy,” i.e. when the state is
to divide laws according to the names of lawgivers, so that
governed by one; and then we have “Royal Ordinances.”
one be called the “Cornelian” law, another the “Falcidian”
Another form is “aristocracy,” i.e. government by the
law, etc.
best men or men of highest rank; and then we have the
On the contrary, The authority of Isidore (obj. 1) suf-
“Authoritative legal opinions” [Responsa Prudentum] and
fices.
“Decrees of the Senate” [Senatus consulta]. Another form
I answer that, A thing can of itself be divided in re-
is “oligarchy,” i.e. government by a few rich and pow-
spect of something contained in the notion of that thing.
erful men; and then we have “Praetorian,” also called
Thus a soul either rational or irrational is contained in the
“Honorary,” law. Another form of government is that of
notion of animal: and therefore animal is divided properly
the people, which is called “democracy,” and there we
and of itself in respect of its being rational or irrational;
have “Decrees of the commonalty” [Plebiscita]. There is
but not in the point of its being white or black, which are
also tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt,
entirely beside the notion of animal. Now, in the notion of
which, therefore, has no corresponding law. Finally, there
human law, many things are contained, in respect of any
is a form of government made up of all these, and which
of which human law can be divided properly and of itself.
is the best: and in this respect we have law sanctioned by
For in the first place it belongs to the notion of human
the “Lords and Commons,” as stated by Isidore (Etym. v,
law, to be derived from the law of nature, as explained
4, seqq.).
above (a. 2). In this respect positive law is divided into
Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to di-
the “law of nations” and “civil law,” according to the two
rect human actions. In this respect, according to the vari-
ways in which something may be derived from the law of
ous matters of which the law treats, there are various kinds
nature, as stated above (a. 2). Because, to the law of na-
of laws, which are sometimes named after their authors:
tions belong those things which are derived from the law
thus we have the “Lex Julia” about adultery, the “Lex Cor-
of nature, as conclusions from premises, e.g. just buyings
nelia” concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in
and sellings, and the like, without which men cannot live
this way, not on account of the authors, but on account of
together, which is a point of the law of nature, since man
the matters to which they refer.
is by nature a social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2. But
Reply to Objection 1. The law of nations is indeed,
those things which are derived from the law of nature by
in some way, natural to man, in so far as he is a reasonable
way of particular determination, belong to the civil law,
being, because it is derived from the natural law by way
according as each state decides on what is best for itself.
of a conclusion that is not very remote from its premises.
Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to
Wherefore men easily agreed thereto. Nevertheless it is
be ordained to the common good of the state. In this re-
distinct from the natural law, especially it is distinct from
spect human law may be divided according to the differ-
the natural law which is common to all animals.
ent kinds of men who work in a special way for the com-
The Replies to the other Objections are evident from
mon good: e.g. priests, by praying to God for the people;
what has been said.
princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for
1045
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 96
Of the Power of Human Law
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether human law should be framed for the community?
(2) Whether human law should repress all vices?
(3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue?
(4) Whether it binds man in conscience?
(5) Whether all men are subject to human law?
(6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter of the law?
Whether human law should be framed for the community rather than for the individ-Ia IIae q. 96 a. 1
ual?
Objection 1. It would seem that human law should be
succeeding one another, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
framed not for the community, but rather for the individ-
ii, 21; xxii, 6).
ual. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that “the legal
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7)
just. . . includes all particular acts of legislation. . . and all divides the legal just, i.e. positive law, into three parts.
those matters which are the subject of decrees,” which are
For some things are laid down simply in a general way:
also individual matters, since decrees are framed about in-
and these are the general laws. Of these he says that “the
dividual actions. Therefore law is framed not only for the
legal is that which originally was a matter of indifference,
community, but also for the individual.
but which, when enacted, is so no longer”: as the fixing of
Objection 2. Further, law is the director of human
the ransom of a captive. Some things affect the commu-
acts, as stated above (q. 90, Aa. 1,2). But human acts are
nity in one respect, and individuals in another. These are
about individual matters. Therefore human laws should
called “privileges,” i.e. “private laws,” as it were, because
be framed, not for the community, but rather for the indi-
they regard private persons, although their power extends
vidual.
to many matters; and in regard to these, he adds, “and fur-
Objection 3. Further, law is a rule and measure of
ther, all particular acts of legislation.” Other matters are
human acts, as stated above (q. 90, Aa. 1,2). But a mea-
legal, not through being laws, but through being applica-
sure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x. Since
tions of general laws to particular cases: such are decrees
therefore in human acts no general proposition can be so
which have the force of law; and in regard to these, he
certain as not to fail in some individual cases, it seems
adds “all matters subject to decrees.”
that laws should be framed not in general but for individ-
Reply to Objection 2. A principle of direction should
ual cases.
be applicable to many; wherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the
On the contrary, The jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib.
Philosopher says that all things belonging to one genus,
i, tit. iii, art. ii; De legibus, etc.) that “laws should be
are measured by one, which is the principle in that genus.
made to suit the majority of instances; and they are not
For if there were as many rules or measures as there are
framed according to what may possibly happen in an in-
things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use,
dividual case.”
since their use consists in being applicable to many things.
I answer that, Whatever is for an end should be pro-
Hence law would be of no use, if it did not extend further
portionate to that end. Now the end of law is the com-
than to one single act. Because the decrees than to one sin-
mon good; because, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that
gle act. Because the decrees of prudent men are made for
“law should be framed, not for any private benefit, but for
the purpose of directing individual actions; whereas law
the common good of all the citizens.” Hence human laws
is a general precept, as stated above (q. 92, a. 2, obj. 2).
should be proportionate to the common good. Now the
Reply to Objection 3. “We must not seek the same
common good comprises many things. Wherefore law
degree of certainty in all things” (Ethic. i, 3). Conse-
should take account of many things, as to persons, as to
quently in contingent matters, such as natural and human
matters, and as to times. Because the community of the
things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as being true
state is composed of many persons; and its good is pro-
in the greater number of instances, though at times and
cured by many actions; nor is it established to endure for
less frequently it fail.
only a short time, but to last for all time by the citizens
1046
Whether it belongs to the human law to repress all vices?
Ia IIae q. 96 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that it belongs to human
which would be intolerable in a virtuous man.
law to repress all vices. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that
Now human law is framed for a number of human
“laws were made in order that, in fear thereof, man’s au-
beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue.
dacity might be held in check.” But it would not be held in
Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which
check sufficiently, unless all evils were repressed by law.
the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices,
Therefore human laws should repress all evils.
from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and
Objection 2. Further, the intention of the lawgiver is
chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the pro-
to make the citizens virtuous. But a man cannot be virtu-
hibition of which human society could not be maintained:
ous unless he forbear from all kinds of vice. Therefore it
thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like.
belongs to human law to repress all vices.
Reply to Objection 1. Audacity seems to refer to the
Objection 3. Further, human law is derived from the
assailing of others. Consequently it belongs to those sins
natural law, as stated above (q. 95, a. 2). But all vices are
chiefly whereby one’s neighbor is injured: and these sins
contrary to the law of nature. Therefore human law should
are forbidden by human law, as stated.
repress all vices.
Reply to Objection 2. The purpose of human law is
On the contrary, We read in De Lib. Arb. i, 5: “It
to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. Where-
seems to me that the law which is written for the govern-
fore it does not lay upon the multitude of imperfect men
ing of the people rightly permits these things, and that Di-
the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz. that
vine providence punishes them.” But Divine providence
they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these imper-
punishes nothing but vices. Therefore human law rightly
fect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break
allows some vices, by not repressing them.
out into yet greater evils: thus it is written (Ps. 30:33):
I answer that, As stated above (q. 90, Aa. 1,2), law is
“He that violently bloweth his nose, bringeth out blood”;
framed as a rule or measure of human acts. Now a mea-
and (Mat. 9:17) that if “new wine,” i.e. precepts of a per-
sure should be homogeneous with that which it measures,
fect life, “is put into old bottles,” i.e. into imperfect men,
as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3,4, since different things are
“the bottles break, and the wine runneth out,” i.e. the pre-
measured by different measures. Wherefore laws imposed
cepts are despised, and those men, from contempt, break
on men should also be in keeping with their condition, for,
into evils worse still.
as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21), law should be “possible both
Reply to Objection 3. The natural law is a participa-
according to nature, and according to the customs of the
tion in us of the eternal law: while human law falls short
country.” Now possibility or faculty of action is due to an
of the eternal law. Now Augustine says (De Lib. Arb.
interior habit or disposition: since the same thing is not
i, 5): “The law which is framed for the government of
possible to one who has not a virtuous habit, as is possi-
states, allows and leaves unpunished many things that are
ble to one who has. Thus the same is not possible to a
punished by Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not
child as to a full-grown man: for which reason the law for
attempt to do everything, is this a reason why it should
children is not the same as for adults, since many things
be blamed for what it does.” Wherefore, too, human law
are permitted to children, which in an adult are punished
does not prohibit everything that is forbidden by the natu-
by law or at any rate are open to blame. In like manner
ral law.
many things are permissible to men not perfect in virtue,
Whether human law prescribes acts of all the virtues?
Ia IIae q. 96 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that human law does not
are ordained, not to the common good, but to private good.
prescribe acts of all the virtues. For vicious acts are con-
Therefore the law does not prescribe all acts of virtue.
trary to acts of virtue. But human law does not prohibit
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1)
all vices, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore neither does it
that the law “prescribes the performance of the acts of a
prescribe all acts of virtue.
brave man. . . and the acts of the temperate man. . . and the
Objection 2. Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a
acts of the meek man: and in like manner as regards the
virtue. But virtue is the end of law; so that whatever is
other virtues and vices, prescribing the former, forbidding
from a virtue, cannot come under a precept of law. There-
the latter.”
fore human law does not prescribe all acts of virtue.
I answer that, The species of virtues are distinguished
Objection 3. Further, law is ordained to the common
by their objects, as explained above (q. 54, a. 2; q. 60, a. 1; good, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2). But some acts of virtue
q. 62, a. 2). Now all the objects of virtues can be referred
1047
either to the private good of an individual, or to the com-vicious acts, by the obligation of a precept, as neither does
mon good of the multitude: thus matters of fortitude may
it prescribe all acts of virtue. But it forbids certain acts of be achieved either for the safety of the state, or for up-each vice, just as it prescribes some acts of each virtue.
holding the rights of a friend, and in like manner with the
Reply to Objection 2. An act is said to be an act of
other virtues. But law, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2) is or-
virtue in two ways. First, from the fact that a man does
dained to the common good. Wherefore there is no virtue
something virtuous; thus the act of justice is to do what is
whose acts cannot be prescribed by the law. Nevertheless
right, and an act of fortitude is to do brave things: and in
human law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of
this way law prescribes certain acts of virtue. Secondly an
every virtue: but only in regard to those that are ordain-
act of virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a way
able to the common good—either immediately, as when
in which a virtuous man does it. Such an act always pro-
certain things are done directly for the common good—
ceeds from virtue: and it does not come under a precept
or mediately, as when a lawgiver prescribes certain things
of law, but is the end at which every lawgiver aims.
pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens are directed
Reply to Objection 3. There is no virtue whose act
in the upholding of the common good of justice and peace.
is not ordainable to the common good, as stated above,
Reply to Objection 1. Human law does not forbid all
either mediately or immediately.
Whether human law binds a man in conscience?
Ia IIae q. 96 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that human law does not
is and has, belongs to the community; just as a part, in all
bind man in conscience. For an inferior power has no
that it is, belongs to the whole; wherefore nature inflicts a
jurisdiction in a court of higher power. But the power
loss on the part, in order to save the whole: so that on this
of man, which frames human law, is beneath the Divine
account, such laws as these, which impose proportionate
power. Therefore human law cannot impose its precept in
burdens, are just and binding in conscience, and are legal
a Divine court, such as is the court of conscience.
laws.
Objection 2. Further, the judgment of conscience de-
On the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways:
pends chiefly on the commandments of God. But some-
first, by being contrary to human good, through being op-
times God’s commandments are made void by human
posed to the things mentioned above—either in respect of
laws, according to Mat. 15:6: “You have made void the
the end, as when an authority imposes on his subjects bur-
commandment of God for your tradition.” Therefore hu-
densome laws, conducive, not to the common good, but
man law does not bind a man in conscience.
rather to his own cupidity or vainglory—or in respect of
Objection 3. Further, human laws often bring loss
the author, as when a man makes a law that goes beyond
of character and injury on man, according to Is. 10:1 et
the power committed to him—or in respect of the form, as
seqq.: “Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when
when burdens are imposed unequally on the community,
they write, write injustice; to oppress the poor in judg-
although with a view to the common good. The like are
ment, and do violence to the cause of the humble of My
acts of violence rather than laws; because, as Augustine
people.” But it is lawful for anyone to avoid oppression
says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5), “a law that is not just, seems
and violence. Therefore human laws do not bind man in
to be no law at all.” Wherefore such laws do not bind in
conscience.
conscience, except perhaps in order to avoid scandal or
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 2:19): “This is
disturbance, for which cause a man should even yield his
thankworthy, if the conscience. . . a man endure sorrows,
right, according to Mat. 5:40,41: “If a man. . . take away
suffering wrongfully.”
thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and whosoever
I answer that, Laws framed by man are either just or
will force thee one mile, go with him other two.”
unjust. If they be just, they have the power of binding
Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed
in conscience, from the eternal law whence they are de-
to the Divine good: such are the laws of tyrants inducing
rived, according to Prov. 8:15: “By Me kings reign, and
to idolatry, or to anything else contrary to the Divine law:
lawgivers decree just things.” Now laws are said to be
and laws of this kind must nowise be observed, because,
just, both from the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to
as stated in Acts 5:29, “we ought to obey God rather than
the common good—and from their author, that is to say,
man.”
when the law that is made does not exceed the power of
Reply to Objection 1. As the Apostle says (Rom.
the lawgiver—and from their form, when, to wit, burdens
13:1,2), all human power is from God. . . “therefore he
are laid on the subjects, according to an equality of pro-
that resisteth the power,” in matters that are within its
portion and with a view to the common good. For, since
scope, “resisteth the ordinance of God”; so that he be-
one man is a part of the community, each man in all that he
comes guilty according to his conscience.
1048
Reply to Objection 2. This argument is true of laws that inflicts unjust hurt on its subjects. The power that man
that are contrary to the commandments of God, which is
holds from God does not extend to this: wherefore neither
beyond the scope of (human) power. Wherefore in such
in such matters is man bound to obey the law, provided he
matters human law should not be obeyed.
avoid giving scandal or inflicting a more grievous hurt.
Reply to Objection 3. This argument is true of a law
Whether all are subject to the law?
Ia IIae q. 96 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that not all are subject to
wicked. Because coercion and violence are contrary to
the law. For those alone are subject to a law for whom a
the will: but the will of the good is in harmony with the
law is made. But the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:9): “The law
law, whereas the will of the wicked is discordant from it.
is not made for the just man.” Therefore the just are not
Wherefore in this sense the good are not subject to the
subject to the law.
law, but only the wicked.
Objection 2. Further, Pope Urban says∗: “He that is
Reply to Objection 1. This argument is true of sub-
guided by a private law need not for any reason be bound
jection by way of coercion: for, in this way, “the law is
by the public law.” Now all spiritual men are led by the
not made for the just men”: because “they are a law to
private law of the Holy Ghost, for they are the sons of
themselves,” since they “show the work of the law written
God, of whom it is said (Rom. 8:14): “Whosoever are led
in their hearts,” as the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14,15). Con-
by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.” Therefore
sequently the law does not enforce itself upon them as it
not all men are subject to human law.
does on the wicked.
Objection 3.
Further, the jurist says† that “the
Reply to Objection 2. The law of the Holy Ghost is
sovereign is exempt from the laws.” But he that is ex-
above all law framed by man: and therefore spiritual men,
empt from the law is not bound thereby. Therefore not all
in so far as they are led by the law of the Holy Ghost, are
are subject to the law.
not subject to the law in those matters that are inconsis-
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): “Let
tent with the guidance of the Holy Ghost. Nevertheless
every soul be subject to the higher powers.” But sub-
the very fact that spiritual men are subject to law, is due
jection to a power seems to imply subjection to the laws
to the leading of the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Pet. 2:13:
framed by that power. Therefore all men should be subject
“Be ye subject. . . to every human creature for God’s sake.”
to human law.
Reply to Objection 3. The sovereign is said to be
I answer that, As stated above (q. 90, Aa. 1,2; a. 3,
“exempt from the law,” as to its coercive power; since,
ad 2), the notion of law contains two things: first, that
properly speaking, no man is coerced by himself, and
it is a rule of human acts; secondly, that it has coercive
law has no coercive power save from the authority of the
power. Wherefore a man may be subject to law in two
sovereign. Thus then is the sovereign said to be exempt
ways. First, as the regulated is subject to the regulator:
from the law, because none is competent to pass sentence
and, in this way, whoever is subject to a power, is subject
on him, if he acts against the law. Wherefore on Ps. 50:6:
to the law framed by that power. But it may happen in two
“To Thee only have I sinned,” a gloss says that “there is no
ways that one is not subject to a power. In one way, by be-
man who can judge the deeds of a king.” But as to the di-
ing altogether free from its authority: hence the subjects
rective force of law, the sovereign is subject to the law by
of one city or kingdom are not bound by the laws of the
his own will, according to the statement (Extra, De Con-
sovereign of another city or kingdom, since they are not
stit. cap. Cum omnes) that “whatever law a man makes
subject to his authority. In another way, by being under a
for another, he should keep himself. And a wise authority‡
yet higher law; thus the subject of a proconsul should be
says: ‘Obey the law that thou makest thyself.’ ” Moreover
ruled by his command, but not in those matters in which
the Lord reproaches those who “say and do not”; and who
the subject receives his orders from the emperor: for in
“bind heavy burdens and lay them on men’s shoulders, but
these matters, he is not bound by the mandate of the lower
with a finger of their own they will not move them” (Mat.
authority, since he is directed by that of a higher. In this
23:3,4). Hence, in the judgment of God, the sovereign is
way, one who is simply subject to a law, may not be a
not exempt from the law, as to its directive force; but he
subject thereto in certain matters, in respect of which he
should fulfil it to his own free-will and not of constraint.
is ruled by a higher law.
Again the sovereign is above the law, in so far as, when
Secondly, a man is said to be subject to a law as the
it is expedient, he can change the law, and dispense in it
coerced is subject to the coercer. In this way the virtu-
according to time and place.
ous and righteous are not subject to the law, but only the
∗ Decretals. caus. xix, qu. 2
† Pandect. Justin. i, ff., tit. 3, De Leg. et Senat.
‡ Dionysius Cato, Dist. de Moribus
1049
Whether he who is under a law may act beside the letter of the law?
Ia IIae q. 96 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that he who is subject to a law
law would be hurtful to the general welfare, it should not
may not act beside the letter of the law. For Augustine
be observed. For instance, suppose that in a besieged city
says (De Vera Relig. 31): “Although men judge about
it be an established law that the gates of the city are to be
temporal laws when they make them, yet when once they
kept closed, this is good for public welfare as a general
are made they must pass judgment not on them, but ac-
rule: but, it were to happen that the enemy are in pursuit
cording to them.” But if anyone disregard the letter of the
of certain citizens, who are defenders of the city, it would
law, saying that he observes the intention of the lawgiver,
be a great loss to the city, if the gates were not opened to
he seems to pass judgment on the law. Therefore it is not
them: and so in that case the gates ought to be opened,
right for one who is under the law to disregard the letter of
contrary to the letter of the law, in order to maintain the
the law, in order to observe the intention of the lawgiver.
common weal, which the lawgiver had in view.
Objection 2. Further, he alone is competent to inter-
Nevertheless it must be noted, that if the observance of
pret the law who can make the law. But those who are
the law according to the letter does not involve any sud-
subject to the law cannot make the law. Therefore they
den risk needing instant remedy, it is not competent for
have no right to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, but
everyone to expound what is useful and what is not useful
should always act according to the letter of the law.
to the state: those alone can do this who are in authority,
Objection 3. Further, every wise man knows how to
and who, on account of such like cases, have the power
explain his intention by words. But those who framed the
to dispense from the laws. If, however, the peril be so
laws should be reckoned wise: for Wisdom says (Prov.
sudden as not to allow of the delay involved by referring
8:15): “By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just
the matter to authority, the mere necessity brings with it a
things.” Therefore we should not judge of the intention
dispensation, since necessity knows no law.
of the lawgiver otherwise than by the words of the law.
Reply to Objection 1. He who in a case of necessity
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): “The
acts beside the letter of the law, does not judge the law;
meaning of what is said is according to the motive for
but of a particular case in which he sees that the letter of
saying it: because things are not subject to speech, but
the law is not to be observed.
speech to things.” Therefore we should take account of
Reply to Objection 2. He who follows the intention
the motive of the lawgiver, rather than of his very words.
of the lawgiver, does not interpret the law simply; but in a
I answer that, As stated above (a. 4), every law is di-
case in which it is evident, by reason of the manifest harm,
rected to the common weal of men, and derives the force
that the lawgiver intended otherwise. For if it be a matter
and nature of law accordingly. Hence the jurist says∗: “By
of doubt, he must either act according to the letter of the
no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for us
law, or consult those in power.
to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those use-
Reply to Objection 3. No man is so wise as to be
ful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of
able to take account of every single case; wherefore he is
man.” Now it happens often that the observance of some
not able sufficiently to express in words all those things
point of law conduces to the common weal in the major-
that are suitable for the end he has in view. And even if a
ity of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful.
lawgiver were able to take all the cases into consideration,
Since then the lawgiver cannot have in view every single
he ought not to mention them all, in order to avoid confu-
case, he shapes the law according to what happens most
sion: but should frame the law according to that which is
frequently, by directing his attention to the common good.
of most common occurrence.
Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that
∗ Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 3, De Leg. et Senat.
1050
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 97
Of Change in Laws
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider change in laws: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether human law is changeable?
(2) Whether it should be always changed, whenever anything better occurs?
(3) Whether it is abolished by custom, and whether custom obtains the force of law?
(4) Whether the application of human law should be changed by dispensation of those in authority?
Whether human law should be changed in any way?
Ia IIae q. 97 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that human law should
On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law,
not be changed in any way at all. Because human law is
the law can be rightly changed on account of the changed
derived from the natural law, as stated above (q. 95, a. 2).
condition of man, to whom different things are expedient
But the natural law endures unchangeably. Therefore hu-
according to the difference of his condition. An exam-
man law should also remain without any change.
ple is proposed by Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): “If
Objection 2. Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
the people have a sense of moderation and responsibility,
v, 5), a measure should be absolutely stable. But human
and are most careful guardians of the common weal, it
law is the measure of human acts, as stated above (q. 90,
is right to enact a law allowing such a people to choose
Aa. 1,2). Therefore it should remain without change.
their own magistrates for the government of the common-
Objection 3. Further, it is of the essence of law to be
wealth. But if, as time goes on, the same people become
just and right, as stated above (q. 95, a. 2). But that which
so corrupt as to sell their votes, and entrust the govern-
is right once is right always. Therefore that which is law
ment to scoundrels and criminals; then the right of ap-
once, should be always law.
pointing their public officials is rightly forfeit to such a
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6):
people, and the choice devolves to a few good men.”
“A temporal law, however just, may be justly changed in
Reply to Objection 1. The natural law is a partici-
course of time.”
pation of the eternal law, as stated above (q. 91, a. 2), and
I answer that, As stated above (q. 91, a. 3), human
therefore endures without change, owing to the unchange-
law is a dictate of reason, whereby human acts are di-
ableness and perfection of the Divine Reason, the Author
rected. Thus there may be two causes for the just change
of nature. But the reason of man is changeable and im-
of human law: one on the part of reason; the other on the
perfect: wherefore his law is subject to change. Moreover
part of man whose acts are regulated by law. The cause on
the natural law contains certain universal precepts, which
the part of reason is that it seems natural to human reason
are everlasting: whereas human law contains certain par-
to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect.
ticular precepts, according to various emergencies.
Hence, in speculative sciences, we see that the teaching
Reply to Objection 2. A measure should be as endur-
of the early philosophers was imperfect, and that it was
ing as possible. But nothing can be absolutely unchange-
afterwards perfected by those who succeeded them. So
able in things that are subject to change. And therefore
also in practical matters: for those who first endeavored
human law cannot be altogether unchangeable.
to discover something useful for the human community,
Reply to Objection 3. In corporal things, right is
not being able by themselves to take everything into con-
predicated absolutely: and therefore, as far as itself is
sideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient
concerned, always remains right. But right is predicated
in many ways; and these were changed by subsequent
of law with reference to the common weal, to which one
lawgivers who made institutions that might prove less fre-
and the same thing is not always adapted, as stated above:
quently deficient in respect of the common weal.
wherefore rectitude of this kind is subject to change.
1051
Whether human law should always be changed, whenever something better occurs?
Ia IIae q. 97 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that human law should
because custom avails much for the observance of laws,
be changed, whenever something better occurs. Because
seeing that what is done contrary to general custom, even
human laws are devised by human reason, like other arts.
in slight matters, is looked upon as grave. Consequently,
But in the other arts, the tenets of former times give place
when a law is changed, the binding power of the law is
to others, if something better occurs. Therefore the same
diminished, in so far as custom is abolished. Wherefore
should apply to human laws.
human law should never be changed, unless, in some way
Objection 2. Further, by taking note of the past we
or other, the common weal be compensated according to
can provide for the future. Now unless human laws had
the extent of the harm done in this respect. Such compen-
been changed when it was found possible to improve
sation may arise either from some very great and every ev-
them, considerable inconvenience would have ensued; be-
ident benefit conferred by the new enactment; or from the
cause the laws of old were crude in many points. There-
extreme urgency of the case, due to the fact that either the
fore it seems that laws should be changed, whenever any-
existing law is clearly unjust, or its observance extremely
thing better occurs to be enacted.
harmful. Wherefore the jurist says∗ that “in establishing
Objection 3. Further, human laws are enacted about
new laws, there should be evidence of the benefit to be
single acts of man. But we cannot acquire perfect knowl-
derived, before departing from a law which has long been
edge in singular matters, except by experience, which “re-
considered just.”
quires time,” as stated in Ethic. ii. Therefore it seems that
Reply to Objection 1.
Rules of art derive their
as time goes on it is possible for something better to occur
force from reason alone: and therefore whenever some-
for legislation.
thing better occurs, the rule followed hitherto should be
On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (Dist. xii, changed. But “laws derive very great force from custom,”
5): “It is absurd, and a detestable shame, that we should
as the Philosopher states (Polit. ii, 5): consequently they
suffer those traditions to be changed which we have re-
should not be quickly changed.
ceived from the fathers of old.”
Reply to Objection 2. This argument proves that laws
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), human law is
ought to be changed: not in view of any improvement, but
rightly changed, in so far as such change is conducive
for the sake of a great benefit or in a case of great urgency,
to the common weal. But, to a certain extent, the mere
as stated above. This answer applies also to the Third Ob-
change of law is of itself prejudicial to the common good:
jection.
Whether custom can obtain force of law?
Ia IIae q. 97 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that custom cannot ob-
of our ancestors are to be considered as laws. And those
tain force of law, nor abolish a law. Because human law is
who throw contempt on the customs of the Church ought
derived from the natural law and from the Divine law, as
to be punished as those who disobey the law of God.”
stated above (q. 93, a. 3; q. 95, a. 2). But human custom
I answer that, All law proceeds from the reason and
cannot change either the law of nature or the Divine law.
will of the lawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from
Therefore neither can it change human law.
the reasonable will of God; the human law from the will
Objection 2. Further, many evils cannot make one
of man, regulated by reason. Now just as human rea-
good. But he who first acted against the law, did evil.
son and will, in practical matters, may be made manifest
Therefore by multiplying such acts, nothing good is the
by speech, so may they be made known by deeds: since
result. Now a law is something good; since it is a rule of
seemingly a man chooses as good that which he carries
human acts. Therefore law is not abolished by custom, so
into execution. But it is evident that by human speech,
that the mere custom should obtain force of law.
law can be both changed and expounded, in so far as it
Objection 3. Further, the framing of laws belongs
manifests the interior movement and thought of human
to those public men whose business it is to govern the
reason. Wherefore by actions also, especially if they be
community; wherefore private individuals cannot make
repeated, so as to make a custom, law can be changed and
laws. But custom grows by the acts of private individu-
expounded; and also something can be established which
als. Therefore custom cannot obtain force of law, so as to
obtains force of law, in so far as by repeated external ac-
abolish the law.
tions, the inward movement of the will, and concepts of
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Casulan.
reason are most effectually declared; for when a thing is
xxxvi): “The customs of God’s people and the institutions
done again and again, it seems to proceed from a delib-
∗ Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 4, De Constit. Princip.
1052
erate judgment of reason. Accordingly, custom has the law seeming useless, be that it is not “possible according
force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law.
to the custom of the country”∗, which has been stated to
Reply to Objection 1. The natural and Divine laws
be one of the conditions of law. For it is not easy to set
proceed from the Divine will, as stated above. Wherefore
aside the custom of a whole people.
they cannot be changed by a custom proceeding from the
Reply to Objection 3. The people among whom a
will of man, but only by Divine authority. Hence it is that
custom is introduced may be of two conditions. For if they
no custom can prevail over the Divine or natural laws: for
are free, and able to make their own laws, the consent of
Isidore says (Synon. ii, 16): “Let custom yield to author-
the whole people expressed by a custom counts far more
ity: evil customs should be eradicated by law and reason.”
in favor of a particular observance, that does the authority
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 96, a. 6),
of the sovereign, who has not the power to frame laws, ex-
human laws fail in some cases: wherefore it is possible
cept as representing the people. Wherefore although each
sometimes to act beside the law; namely, in a case where
individual cannot make laws, yet the whole people can. If
the law fails; yet the act will not be evil. And when such
however the people have not the free power to make their
cases are multiplied, by reason of some change in man,
own laws, or to abolish a law made by a higher authority;
then custom shows that the law is no longer useful: just
nevertheless with such a people a prevailing custom ob-
as it might be declared by the verbal promulgation of a
tains force of law, in so far as it is tolerated by those to
law to the contrary. If, however, the same reason remains,
whom it belongs to make laws for that people: because by
for which the law was useful hitherto, then it is not the
the very fact that they tolerate it they seem to approve of
custom that prevails against the law, but the law that over-
that which is introduced by custom.
comes the custom: unless perhaps the sole reason for the
Whether the rulers of the people can dispense from human laws?
Ia IIae q. 97 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the rulers of the peo-
because to each member of the household he distributes
ple cannot dispense from human laws. For the law is es-
work and necessaries of life in due weight and measure.
tablished for the “common weal,” as Isidore says (Etym.
Accordingly in every community a man is said to dis-
v, 21). But the common good should not be set aside for
pense, from the very fact that he directs how some gen-
the private convenience of an individual: because, as the
eral precept is to be fulfilled by each individual. Now it
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2), “the good of the nation is
happens at times that a precept, which is conducive to the
more godlike than the good of one man.” Therefore it
common weal as a general rule, is not good for a partic-
seems that a man should not be dispensed from acting in
ular individual, or in some particular case, either because
compliance with the general law.
it would hinder some greater good, or because it would
Objection 2. Further, those who are placed over oth-
be the occasion of some evil, as explained above (q. 96,
ers are commanded as follows (Dt. 1:17): “You shall hear
a. 6). But it would be dangerous to leave this to the dis-
the little as well as the great; neither shall you respect any
cretion of each individual, except perhaps by reason of
man’s person, because it is the judgment of God.” But to
an evident and sudden emergency, as stated above (q. 96,
allow one man to do that which is equally forbidden to all,
a. 6). Consequently he who is placed over a community
seems to be respect of persons. Therefore the rulers of a
is empowered to dispense in a human law that rests upon
community cannot grant such dispensations, since this is
his authority, so that, when the law fails in its application
against a precept of the Divine law.
to persons or circumstances, he may allow the precept of
Objection 3. Further, human law, in order to be just,
the law not to be observed. If however he grant this per-
should accord with the natural and Divine laws: else it
mission without any such reason, and of his mere will, he
would not “foster religion,” nor be “helpful to discipline,”
will be an unfaithful or an imprudent dispenser: unfaith-
which is requisite to the nature of law, as laid down by
ful, if he has not the common good in view; imprudent, if
Isidore (Etym. v, 3). But no man can dispense from the
he ignores the reasons for granting dispensations. Hence
Divine and natural laws. Neither, therefore, can he dis-
Our Lord says (Lk. 12:42): “Who, thinkest thou, is the
pense from the human law.
faithful and wise dispenser [Douay: steward], whom his
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:17): “A
lord setteth over his family?”
dispensation is committed to me.”
Reply to Objection 1. When a person is dispensed
I answer that, Dispensation, properly speaking, de-
from observing the general law, this should not be done to
notes a measuring out to individuals of some common
the prejudice of, but with the intention of benefiting, the
goods: thus the head of a household is called a dispenser,
common good.
∗ q. 95, a. 3
1053
Reply to Objection 2. It is not respect of persons if grants a dispensation: for instance, that a loan should not
unequal measures are served out to those who are them-
be paid back to the betrayer of his country, or something
selves unequal. Wherefore when the condition of any
similar. But to the Divine law each man stands as a private
person requires that he should reasonably receive special
person to the public law to which he is subject. Where-
treatment, it is not respect of persons if he be the object of
fore just as none can dispense from public human law, ex-
special favor.
cept the man from whom the law derives its authority, or
Reply to Objection 3. Natural law, so far as it con-
his delegate; so, in the precepts of the Divine law, which
tains general precepts, which never fail, does not allow
are from God, none can dispense but God, or the man to
of dispensations. In other precepts, however, which are
whom He may give special power for that purpose.
as conclusions of the general precepts, man sometimes
1054
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 98
Of the Old Law
(In Six Articles)
In due sequence we must now consider the Old Law; and (1) The Law itself; (2) Its precepts. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Old Law was good?
(2) Whether it was from God?
(3) Whether it came from Him through the angels?
(4) Whether it was given to all?
(5) Whether it was binding on all?
(6) Whether it was given at a suitable time?
Whether the Old Law was good?
Ia IIae q. 98 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law was
ward man”: and again (verse 16): “I consent to the law,
not good. For it is written (Ezech. 20:25): “I gave them
that is good.”
statutes that were not good, and judgments in which they
But it must be noted that the good has various degrees,
shall not live.” But a law is not said to be good except on
as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): for there is a perfect
account of the goodness of the precepts that it contains.
good, and an imperfect good. In things ordained to an end,
Therefore the Old Law was not good.
there is perfect goodness when a thing is such that it is suf-
Objection 2. Further, it belongs to the goodness of a
ficient in itself to conduce to the end: while there is imper-
law that it conduce to the common welfare, as Isidore says
fect goodness when a thing is of some assistance in attain-
(Etym. v, 3). But the Old Law was not salutary; rather was
ing the end, but is not sufficient for the realization thereof.
it deadly and hurtful. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:8,
Thus a medicine is perfectly good, if it gives health to a
seqq.): “Without the law sin was dead. And I lived some
man; but it is imperfect, if it helps to cure him, without be-
time without the law. But when the commandment came
ing able to bring him back to health. Again it must be ob-
sin revived; and I died.” Again he says (Rom. 5:20): “Law
served that the end of human law is different from the end
entered in that sin might abound.” Therefore the Old Law
of Divine law. For the end of human law is the temporal
was not good.
tranquillity of the state, which end law effects by direct-
Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the goodness of
ing external actions, as regards those evils which might
the law that it should be possible to obey it, both accord-
disturb the peaceful condition of the state. On the other
ing to nature, and according to human custom. But such
hand, the end of the Divine law is to bring man to that end
the Old Law was not: since Peter said (Acts 15:10): “Why
which is everlasting happiness; which end is hindered by
tempt you (God) to put a yoke on the necks of the disci-
any sin, not only of external, but also of internal action.
ples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to
Consequently that which suffices for the perfection of hu-
bear?” Therefore it seems that the Old Law was not good.
man law, viz. the prohibition and punishment of sin, does
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom.
7:12):
not suffice for the perfection of the Divine law: but it is
“Wherefore the law indeed is holy, and the commandment
requisite that it should make man altogether fit to partake
holy, and just, and good.”
of everlasting happiness. Now this cannot be done save
I answer that, Without any doubt, the Old Law was
by the grace of the Holy Ghost, whereby “charity” which
good. For just as a doctrine is shown to be good by the
fulfilleth the law. . . “is spread abroad in our hearts” (Rom.
fact that it accords with right reason, so is a law proved to
5:5): since “the grace of God is life everlasting” (Rom.
be good if it accords with reason. Now the Old Law was
6:23). But the Old Law could not confer this grace, for
in accordance with reason. Because it repressed concu-
this was reserved to Christ; because, as it is written (Jn.
piscence which is in conflict with reason, as evidenced by
1:17), the law was given “by Moses, grace and truth came
the commandment, “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s
by Jesus Christ.” Consequently the Old Law was good
goods” (Ex. 20:17). Moreover the same law forbade all
indeed, but imperfect, according to Heb. 7:19: “The law
kinds of sin; and these too are contrary to reason. Conse-
brought nothing to perfection.”
quently it is evident that it was a good law. The Apostle
Reply to Objection 1. The Lord refers there to the
argues in the same way (Rom. 7): “I am delighted,” says
ceremonial precepts; which are said not to be good, be-
he (verse 22), “with the law of God, according to the in-
cause they did not confer grace unto the remission of sins,
1055
although by fulfilling these precepts man confessed him-abound,” the conjunction “that” must be taken as consec-
self a sinner. Hence it is said pointedly, “and judgments in
utive and not final: in so far as men, taking occasion from
which they shall not live”; i.e. whereby they are unable to
the law, sinned all the more, both because a sin became
obtain life; and so the text goes on: “And I polluted them,”
more grievous after law had forbidden it, and because con-
i.e. showed them to be polluted, “in their own gifts, when
cupiscence increased, since we desire a thing the more
they offered all that opened the womb, for their offenses.”
from its being forbidden.
Reply to Objection 2. The law is said to have been
Reply to Objection 3. The yoke of the law could not
deadly, as being not the cause, but the occasion of death,
be borne without the help of grace, which the law did
on account of its imperfection: in so far as it did not con-
not confer: for it is written (Rom. 9:16): “It is not him
fer grace enabling man to fulfil what is prescribed, and
that willeth, nor of him that runneth,” viz. that he wills
to avoid what it forbade. Hence this occasion was not
and runs in the commandments of God, “but of God that
given to men, but taken by them. Wherefore the Apos-
showeth mercy.” Wherefore it is written (Ps. 118:32):
tle says (Rom. 5:11): “Sin, taking occasion by the com-
“I have run the way of Thy commandments, when Thou
mandment, seduced me, and by it killed me.” In the same
didst enlarge my heart,” i.e. by giving me grace and char-
sense when it is said that “the law entered in that sin might
ity.
Whether the Old Law was from God?
Ia IIae q. 98 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law was not
lieve Moses, you would perhaps believe Me also; for he
from God. For it is written (Dt. 32:4): “The works of God
wrote of Me.” Secondly, as a kind of disposition, since
are perfect.” But the Law was imperfect, as stated above
by withdrawing men from idolatrous worship, it enclosed
(a. 1). Therefore the Old Law was not from God.
[concludebat] them in the worship of one God, by Whom
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Eccles. 3:14): “I
the human race was to be saved through Christ. Where-
have learned that all the works which God hath made con-
fore the Apostle says (Gal. 3:23): “Before the faith came,
tinue for ever.” But the Old Law does not continue for
we were kept under the law shut up [conclusi], unto that
ever: since the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18): “There is in-
faith which was to be revealed.” Now it is evident that
deed a setting aside of the former commandment, because
the same thing it is, which gives a disposition to the end,
of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof.” Therefore
and which brings to the end; and when I say “the same,” I
the Old Law was not from God.
mean that it does so either by itself or through its subjects.
Objection 3. Further, a wise lawgiver should remove,
For the devil would not make a law whereby men would
not only evil, but also the occasions of evil. But the Old
be led to Christ, Who was to cast him out, according to
Law was an occasion of sin, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2).
Mat. 12:26: “If Satan cast out Satan, his kingdom is di-
Therefore the giving of such a law does not pertain to God,
vided” [Vulg.: ‘he is divided against himself’]. Therefore
to Whom “none is like among the lawgivers” (Job 36:22).
the Old Law was given by the same God, from Whom
Objection 4. Further, it is written (1 Tim. 2:4) that
came salvation to man, through the grace of Christ.
God “will have all men to be saved.” But the Old Law did
Reply to Objection 1. Nothing prevents a thing being
not suffice to save man, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore
not perfect simply, and yet perfect in respect of time: thus
the giving of such a law did not appertain to God. There-
a boy is said to be perfect, not simply, but with regard to
fore the Old Law was not from God.
the condition of time. So, too, precepts that are given to
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 15:6) while
children are perfect in comparison with the condition of
speaking to the Jews, to whom the Law was given: “You
those to whom they are given, although they are not per-
have made void the commandment of God for your tradi-
fect simply. Hence the Apostle says (Gal. 3:24): “The law
tion.” And shortly before (verse 4) He had said: “Honor
was our pedagogue in Christ.”
thy father and mother,” which is contained expressly in
Reply to Objection 2. Those works of God endure
the Old Law (Ex. 20:12; Dt. 5:16). Therefore the Old
for ever which God so made that they would endure for
Law was from God.
ever; and these are His perfect works. But the Old Law
I answer that, The Old Law was given by the good
was set aside when there came the perfection of grace;
God, Who is the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. For
not as though it were evil, but as being weak and useless
the Old Law ordained men to Christ in two ways. First
for this time; because, as the Apostle goes on to say, “the
by bearing witness to Christ; wherefore He Himself says
law brought nothing to perfection”: hence he says (Gal.
(Lk. 24:44): “All things must needs be fulfilled, which
3:25): “After the faith is come, we are no longer under a
are written in the law. . . and in the prophets, and in the
pedagogue.”
psalms, concerning Me”: and (Jn. 5:46): “If you did be-
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 79, a. 4),
1056
God sometimes permits certain ones to fall into sin, that Reply to Objection 4. Although the Old Law did not
they may thereby be humbled. So also did He wish to give
suffice to save man, yet another help from God besides
such a law as men by their own forces could not fulfill, so
the Law was available for man, viz. faith in the Media-
that, while presuming on their own powers, they might
tor, by which the fathers of old were justified even as we
find themselves to be sinners, and being humbled might
were. Accordingly God did not fail man by giving him
have recourse to the help of grace.
insufficient aids to salvation.
Whether the Old Law was given through the angels?
Ia IIae q. 98 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that the Old Law was not given
self rivets the planks together, but prepares the material
through the angels, but immediately by God. For an angel
by means of the workmen who assist him under his direc-
means a “messenger”; so that the word “angel” denotes
tion. Consequently it was fitting that the perfect law of
ministry, not lordship, according to Ps. 102:20,21: “Bless
the New Testament should be given by the incarnate God
the Lord, all ye His Angels. . . you ministers of His.” But
immediately; but that the Old Law should be given to men
the Old Law is related to have been given by the Lord:
by the ministers of God, i.e. by the angels. It is thus that
for it is written (Ex. 20:1): “And the Lord spoke. . . these
the Apostle at the beginning of his epistle to the Hebrews
words,” and further on: “I am the Lord Thy God.” More-
(1:2) proves the excellence of the New Law over the Old;
over the same expression is often repeated in Exodus, and
because in the New Testament “God. . . hath spoken to us
the later books of the Law. Therefore the Law was given
by His Son,” whereas in the Old Testament “the word was
by God immediately.
spoken by angels” (Heb. 2:2).
Objection 2. Further, according to Jn. 1:17, “the Law
Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory says at the begin-
was given by Moses.” But Moses received it from God
ning of his Morals (Praef. chap. i), “the angel who is
immediately: for it is written (Ex. 33:11): “The Lord
described to have appeared to Moses, is sometimes men-
spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak
tioned as an angel, sometimes as the Lord: an angel, in
to his friend.” Therefore the Old Law was given by God
truth, in respect of that which was subservient to the ex-
immediately.
ternal delivery; and the Lord, because He was the Director
Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the sovereign alone
within, Who supported the effectual power of speaking.”
to make a law, as stated above (q. 90, a. 3). But God alone
Hence also it is that the angel spoke as personating the
is Sovereign as regards the salvation of souls: while the
Lord.
angels are the “ministering spirits,” as stated in Heb. 1:14.
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Gen. ad
Therefore it was not meet for the Law to be given through
lit. xii, 27), it is stated in Exodus that “the Lord spoke
the angels, since it is ordained to the salvation of souls.
to Moses face to face”; and shortly afterwards we read,
On the contrary, The Apostle said (Gal. 3:19) that the
“Show me Thy glory. Therefore He perceived what he
Law was “given [Vulg.: ‘ordained’] by angels in the hand
saw and he desired what he saw not.” Hence he did not
of a Mediator.” And Stephen said (Acts 7:53): ”(Who)
see the very Essence of God; and consequently he was
have received the Law by the disposition of angels.”
not taught by Him immediately. Accordingly when Scrip-
I answer that, The Law was given by God through the
ture states that “He spoke to him face to face,” this is to
angels. And besides the general reason given by Diony-
be understood as expressing the opinion of the people,
sius (Coel. Hier. iv), viz. that “the gifts of God should be
who thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to
brought to men by means of the angels,” there is a special
mouth, when God spoke and appeared to him, by means
reason why the Old Law should have been given through
of a subordinate creature, i.e. an angel and a cloud. Again
them. For it has been stated (Aa. 1,2) that the Old Law
we may say that this vision “face to face” means some
was imperfect, and yet disposed man to that perfect salva-
kind of sublime and familiar contemplation, inferior to the
tion of the human race, which was to come through Christ.
vision of the Divine Essence.
Now it is to be observed that wherever there is an order of
Reply to Objection 3. It is for the sovereign alone
powers or arts, he that holds the highest place, himself ex-
to make a law by his own authority; but sometimes after
ercises the principal and perfect acts; while those things
making a law, he promulgates it through others. Thus God
which dispose to the ultimate perfection are effected by
made the Law by His own authority, but He promulgated
him through his subordinates: thus the ship-builder him-
it through the angels.
1057
Whether the Old Law should have been given to the Jews alone?
Ia IIae q. 98 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law should
made and to his seed. He saith not, ‘And to his seeds,’
not have been given to the Jews alone. For the Old Law
as of many: but as of one, ‘And to thy seed,’ which is
disposed men for the salvation which was to come through
Christ.” And so God vouchsafed both the Law and other
Christ, as stated above (Aa. 2,3). But that salvation was
special boons to that people, on account of the promised
to come not to the Jews alone but to all nations, according
made to their fathers that Christ should be born of them.
to Is. 49:6: “It is a small thing that thou shouldst be my
For it was fitting that the people, of whom Christ was to
servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to convert the
be born, should be signalized by a special sanctification,
dregs of Israel. Behold I have given thee to be the light of
according to the words of Lev. 19:2: “Be ye holy, because
the Gentiles, that thou mayest be My salvation, even to the
I. . . am holy.” Nor again was it on account of the merit
farthest part of the earth.” Therefore the Old Law should
of Abraham himself that this promise was made to him,
have been given to all nations, and not to one people only.
viz. that Christ should be born of his seed: but of gratu-
Objection 2. Further, according to Acts 10:34,35,
itous election and vocation. Hence it is written (Is. 41:2):
“God is not a respecter of persons: but in every nation,
“Who hath raised up the just one form the east, hath called
he that feareth Him, and worketh justice, is acceptable to
him to follow him?”
Him.” Therefore the way of salvation should not have
It is therefore evident that it was merely from gratu-
been opened to one people more than to another.
itous election that the patriarchs received the promise, and
Objection 3. Further, the law was given through the
that the people sprung from them received the law; ac-
angels, as stated above (a. 3). But God always vouchsafed
cording to Dt. 4:36, 37: “Ye did [Vulg.: ‘Thou didst’]
the ministrations of the angels not to the Jews alone, but
hear His words out of the midst of the fire, because He
to all nations: for it is written (Ecclus. 17:14): “Over ev-
loved thy fathers, and chose their seed after them.” And
ery nation He set a ruler.” Also on all nations He bestows
if again it asked why He chose this people, and not an-
temporal goods, which are of less account with God than
other, that Christ might be born thereof; a fitting answer
spiritual goods. Therefore He should have given the Law
is given by Augustine (Tract. super Joan. xxvi): “Why
also to all peoples.
He draweth one and draweth not another, seek not thou to
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 3:1,2): “What
judge, if thou wish not to err.”
advantage then hath the Jew?. . . Much every way. First in-
Reply to Objection 1. Although the salvation, which
deed, because the words of God were committed to them”:
was to come through Christ, was prepared for all na-
and (Ps. 147:9): “He hath not done in like manner to ev-
tions, yet it was necessary that Christ should be born of
ery nation: and His judgments He hath not made manifest
one people, which, for this reason, was privileged above
unto them.”
other peoples; according to Rom.
9:4: “To whom,”
I answer that, It might be assigned as a reason for the
namely the Jews, “belongeth the adoption as of chil-
Law being given to the Jews rather than to other peoples,
dren (of God). . . and the testament, and the giving of the
that the Jewish people alone remained faithful to the wor-
Law. . . whose are the fathers, and of whom is Christ ac-
ship of one God, while the others turned away to idolatry;
cording to the flesh.”
wherefore the latter were unworthy to receive the Law,
Reply to Objection 2. Respect of persons takes place
lest a holy thing should be given to dogs.
in those things which are given according to due; but it has
But this reason does not seem fitting: because that
no place in those things which are bestowed gratuitously.
people turned to idolatry, even after the Law had been
Because he who, out of generosity, gives of his own to one
made, which was more grievous, as is clear from Ex. 32
and not to another, is not a respecter of persons: but if he
and from Amos 5:25,26: “Did you offer victims and sacri-
were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were not
fices to Me in the desert for forty years, O house of Israel?
to distribute them according to personal merits, he would
But you carried a tabernacle for your Moloch, and the im-
be a respecter of persons. Now God bestows the benefits
age of your idols, the star of your god, which you made
of salvation on the human race gratuitously: wherefore
to yourselves.” Moreover it is stated expressly (Dt. 9:6):
He is not a respecter of persons, if He gives them to some
“Know therefore that the Lord thy God giveth thee not this
rather than to others. Hence Augustine says (De Praedest.
excellent land in possession for thy justices, for thou art a
Sanct. viii): “All whom God teaches, he teaches out of
very stiff-necked people”: but the real reason is given in
pity; but whom He teaches not, out of justice He teaches
the preceding verse: “That the Lord might accomplish His
not”: for this is due to the condemnation of the human
word, which He promised by oath to thy fathers Abraham,
race for the sin of the first parent.
Isaac, and Jacob.”
Reply to Objection 3. The benefits of grace are for-
What this promise was is shown by the Apostle, who
feited by man on account of sin: but not the benefits of
says (Gal. 3:16) that “to Abraham were the promises
nature. Among the latter are the ministries of the angels,
1058
which the very order of various natures demands, viz. that only to men, but also to beasts, according to Ps. 35:7:
the lowest beings be governed through the intermediate
“Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord.”
beings: and also bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not
Whether all men were bound to observe the Old Law?
Ia IIae q. 98 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that all men were bound
The reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated
to observe the Old Law. Because whoever is subject to
above (a. 4), was given to the Jewish people, that it might
the king, must needs be subject to his law. But the Old
receive a prerogative of holiness, in reverence for Christ
Law was given by God, Who is “King of all the earth”
Who was to be born of that people. Now whatever laws
(Ps. 46:8). Therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were
are enacted for the special sanctification of certain ones,
bound to observe the Law.
are binding on them alone: thus clerics who are set aside
Objection 2. Further, the Jews could not be saved
for the service of God are bound to certain obligations
without observing the Old Law: for it is written (Dt.
to which the laity are not bound; likewise religious are
27:26): “Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of
bound by their profession to certain works of perfection,
this law, and fulfilleth them not in work.” If therefore
to which people living in the world are not bound. In like
other men could be saved without the observance of the
manner this people was bound to certain special obser-
Old Law, the Jews would be in a worse plight than other
vances, to which other peoples were not bound. Where-
men.
fore it is written (Dt. 18:13): “Thou shalt be perfect and
Objection 3. Further, the Gentiles were admitted to
without spot before the Lord thy God”: and for this reason
the Jewish ritual and to the observances of the Law: for
they used a kind of form of profession, as appears from Dt.
it is written (Ex. 12:48): “If any stranger be willing to
26:3: “I profess this day before the Lord thy God,” etc.
dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the Lord, all
Reply to Objection 1. Whoever are subject to a king,
his males shall first be circumcised, and then shall he cel-
are bound to observe his law which he makes for all in
ebrate it according to the manner; and he shall be as he
general. But if he orders certain things to be observed
that is born in the land.” But it would have been useless
by the servants of his household, others are not bound
to admit strangers to the legal observances according to
thereto.
Divine ordinance, if they could have been saved without
Reply to Objection 2. The more a man is united to
the observance of the Law. Therefore none could be saved
God, the better his state becomes: wherefore the more
without observing the Law.
the Jewish people were bound to the worship of God, the
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that
greater their excellence over other peoples. Hence it is
many of the Gentiles were brought back to God by the an-
written (Dt. 4:8): “What other nation is there so renowned
gels. But it is clear that the Gentiles did not observe the
that hath ceremonies and just judgments, and all the law?”
Law. Therefore some could be saved without observing
In like manner, from this point of view, the state of clerics
the Law.
is better than that of the laity, and the state of religious
I answer that, The Old Law showed forth the pre-
than that of folk living in the world.
cepts of the natural law, and added certain precepts of its
Reply to Objection 3. The Gentiles obtained salva-
own. Accordingly, as to those precepts of the natural law
tion more perfectly and more securely under the obser-
contained in the Old Law, all were bound to observe the
vances of the Law than under the mere natural law: and
Old Law; not because they belonged to the Old Law, but
for this reason they were admitted to them. So too the
because they belonged to the natural law. But as to those
laity are now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and sec-
precepts which were added by the Old Law, they were not
ular persons to those of the religious, although they can be
binding on save the Jewish people alone.
saved without this.
Whether the Old Law was suitably given at the time of Moses?
Ia IIae q. 98 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law was not
sin.
suitably given at the time of Moses. Because the Old Law
Objection 2. Further, the Old Law was given for the
disposed man for the salvation which was to come through
sanctification of those from whom Christ was to be born.
Christ, as stated above (Aa. 2,3). But man needed this
Now the promise concerning the “seed, which is Christ”
salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned. There-
(Gal. 3:16) was first made to Abraham, as related in Gn.
fore the Law should have been given immediately after
12:7. Therefore the Law should have been given at once
1059
at the time of Abraham.
was convinced of his weakness, through his being unable
Objection 3. Further, as Christ was born of those
to fulfil what he knew. Hence, as the Apostle concludes
alone who descended from Noe through Abraham, to
(Rom. 8:3,4), “what the Law could not do in that it was
whom the promise was made; so was He born of no other
weak through the flesh, God sent [Vulg.: ‘sending’] His
of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the
own Son. . . that the justification of the Law might be ful-
promise was renewed, according to 2 Kings 23:1: “The
filled in us.”
man to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of
With regard to good men, the Law was given to them
the God of Jacob. . . said.” Therefore the Old Law should
as a help; which was most needed by the people, at the
have been given after David, just as it was given after
time when the natural law began to be obscured on ac-
Abraham.
count of the exuberance of sin: for it was fitting that this
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 3:19) that
help should be bestowed on men in an orderly manner,
the Law “was set because of transgressions, until the seed
so that they might be led from imperfection to perfection;
should come, to whom He made the promise, being or-
wherefore it was becoming that the Old Law should be
dained by angels in the hand of a Mediator”: ordained, i.e.
given between the law of nature and the law of grace.
“given in orderly fashion,” as the gloss explains. There-
Reply to Objection 1. It was not fitting for the Old
fore it was fitting that the Old Law should be given in this
Law to be given at once after the sin of the first man: both
order of time.
because man was so confident in his own reason, that he
I answer that, It was most fitting for the Law to be
did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law; because
given at the time of Moses. The reason for this may be
as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened by
taken from two things in respect of which every law is
habitual sinning.
imposed on two kinds of men. Because it is imposed on
Reply to Objection 2. A law should not be given save
some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom the law
to the people, since it is a general precept, as stated above
restrains and tames: and it is imposed on good men, who,
(q. 90, Aa. 2,3); wherefore at the time of Abraham God
through being instructed by the law, are helped to fulfil
gave men certain familiar, and, as it were, household pre-
what they desire to do. Hence it was fitting that the Law
cepts: but when Abraham’s descendants had multiplied,
should be given at such a time as would be appropriate
so as to form a people, and when they had been freed from
for the overcoming of man’s pride. For man was proud of
slavery, it was fitting that they should be given a law; for
two things, viz. of knowledge and of power. He was proud
“slaves are not that part of the people or state to which it is of his knowledge, as though his natural reason could suf-fitting for the law to be directed,” as the Philosopher says
fice him for salvation: and accordingly, in order that his
(Polit. iii, 2,4,5).
pride might be overcome in this matter, man was left to the
Reply to Objection 3. Since the Law had to be given
guidance of his reason without the help of a written law:
to the people, not only those, of whom Christ was born,
and man was able to learn from experience that his reason
received the Law, but the whole people, who were marked
was deficient, since about the time of Abraham man had
with the seal of circumcision, which was the sign of the
fallen headlong into idolatry and the most shameful vices.
promise made to Abraham, and in which he believed, ac-
Wherefore, after those times, it was necessary for a writ-
cording to Rom. 4:11: hence even before David, the Law
ten law to be given as a remedy for human ignorance: be-
had to be given to that people as soon as they were col-
cause “by the Law is the knowledge of sin” (Rom. 3:20).
lected together.
But, after man had been instructed by the Law, his pride
1060
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 99
Of the Precepts of the Old Law
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and (1) how they are distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Old Law contains several precepts or only one?
(2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts?
(3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts?
(4) Whether besides these it contains judicial precepts?
(5) Whether it contains any others besides these?
(6) How the Old Law induced men to keep its precepts.
Whether the Old Law contains only one precept?
Ia IIae q. 99 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law contains
of the diversity of those things that are ordained to that
but one precept. Because a law is nothing else than a pre-
end.
cept, as stated above (q. 90, Aa. 2,3). Now there is but one
Reply to Objection 1. The Old Law is said to be one
Old Law. Therefore it contains but one precept.
as being ordained to one end: yet it comprises various
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:9):
precepts, according to the diversity of the things which it
“If there be any other commandment, it is comprised in
directs to the end. Thus also the art of building is one
this word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” But
according to the unity of its end, because it aims at the
this is only one commandment. Therefore the Old Law
building of a house: and yet it contains various rules, ac-
contained but one commandment.
cording to the variety of acts ordained thereto.
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Mat. 7:12): “All
Reply to Objection 2. As the Apostle says (1 Tim.
things. . . whatsoever you would that men should do to
1:5), “the end of the commandment is charity”; since ev-
you, do you also to them. For this is the Law and the
ery law aims at establishing friendship, either between
prophets.” But the whole of the Old Law is comprised in
man and man, or between man and God. Wherefore the
the Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old
whole Law is comprised in this one commandment, “Thou
Law contains but one commandment.
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,” as expressing the end
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph.
2:15):
of all commandments: because love of one’s neighbor in-
“Making void the Law of commandments contained in de-
cludes love of God, when we love our neighbor for God’s
crees”: where he is referring to the Old Law, as the gloss
sake. Hence the Apostle put this commandment in place
comments, on the passage. Therefore the Old Law com-
of the two which are about the love of God and of one’s
prises many commandments.
neighbor, and of which Our Lord said (Mat. 22:40): “On
I answer that, Since a precept of law is binding, it is
these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and
about something which must be done: and, that a thing
the prophets.”
must be done, arises from the necessity of some end.
Reply to Objection 3. As stated in Ethic. ix, 8,
Hence it is evident that a precept implies, in its very idea,
“friendship towards another arises from friendship to-
relation to an end, in so far as a thing is commanded as
wards oneself,” in so far as man looks on another as on
being necessary or expedient to an end. Now many things
himself. Hence when it is said, “All things whatsoever you
may happen to be necessary or expedient to an end; and,
would that men should do to you, do you also to them,”
accordingly, precepts may be given about various things
this is an explanation of the rule of neighborly love con-
as being ordained to one end. Consequently we must say
tained implicitly in the words, “Thou shalt love thy neigh-
that all the precepts of the Old Law are one in respect of
bor as thyself”: so that it is an explanation of this com-
their relation to one end: and yet they are many in respect
mandment.
1061
Whether the Old Law contains moral precepts?
Ia IIae q. 99 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law con-
is written (Lev. 19:2; 11:45): “You shall be holy, for I am
tains no moral precepts. For the Old Law is distinct from
holy.” But the goodness of man is virtue, which “makes
the law of nature, as stated above (q. 91, Aa. 4,5; q. 98,
its possessor good” (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore it was nec-
a. 5). But the moral precepts belong to the law of nature.
essary for the Old Law to include precepts about acts of
Therefore they do not belong to the Old Law.
virtue: and these are the moral precepts of the Law.
Objection 2. Further, the Divine Law should have
Reply to Objection 1. The Old Law is distinct from
come to man’s assistance where human reason fails him:
the natural law, not as being altogether different from it,
as is evident in regard to things that are of faith, which
but as something added thereto. For just as grace pre-
are above reason. But man’s reason seems to suffice for
supposes nature, so must the Divine law presuppose the
the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts do not
natural law.
belong to the Old Law, which is a Divine law.
Reply to Objection 2. It was fitting that the Divine
Objection 3. Further, the Old Law is said to be “the
law should come to man’s assistance not only in those
letter that killeth” (2 Cor. 3:6). But the moral precepts do
things for which reason is insufficient, but also in those
not kill, but quicken, according to Ps. 118:93: “Thy justi-
things in which human reason may happen to be impeded.
fications I will never forget, for by them Thou hast given
Now human reason could not go astray in the abstract, as
me life.” Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to
to the universal principles of the natural law; but through
the Old Law.
being habituated to sin, it became obscured in the point of
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:9): “More-
things to be done in detail. But with regard to the other
over, He gave them discipline [Douay: ‘instructions’] and
moral precepts, which are like conclusions drawn from
the law of life for an inheritance.” Now discipline belongs
the universal principles of the natural law, the reason of
to morals; for this gloss on Heb. 12:11: “Now all chastise-
many men went astray, to the extend of judging to be law-
ment [disciplina],” etc., says: “Discipline is an exercise in
ful, things that are evil in themselves. Hence there was
morals by means of difficulties.” Therefore the Law which
need for the authority of the Divine law to rescue man
was given by God comprised moral precepts.
from both these defects. Thus among the articles of faith
I answer that, The Old Law contained some moral
not only are those things set forth to which reason cannot
precepts; as is evident from Ex. 20:13,15: “Thou shalt not
reach, such as the Trinity of the Godhead; but also those
kill, Thou shalt not steal.” This was reasonable: because,
to which right reason can attain, such as the Unity of the
just as the principal intention of human law is to created
Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors to which
friendship between man and man; so the chief intention
reason is liable.
of the Divine law is to establish man in friendship with
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine proves (De Spir-
God. Now since likeness is the reason of love, accord-
itu et Litera xiv), even the letter of the law is said to be the ing to Ecclus. 13:19: “Every beast loveth its like”; there
occasion of death, as to the moral precepts; in so far as, to
cannot possibly be any friendship of man to God, Who is
wit, it prescribes what is good, without furnishing the aid
supremely good, unless man become good: wherefore it
of grace for its fulfilment.
Whether the Old Law comprises ceremonial, besides moral, precepts?
Ia IIae q. 99 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law does not
Objection 3. Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to
comprise ceremonial, besides moral, precepts. For every
be those which signify something figuratively. But, as Au-
law that is given to man is for the purpose of directing
gustine observes (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3,4), “of all signs
human actions. Now human actions are called moral, as
employed by men words hold the first place.” Therefore
stated above (q. 1, a. 3). Therefore it seems that the Old
there is no need for the Law to contain ceremonial pre-
Law given to men should not comprise other than moral
cepts about certain figurative actions.
precepts.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13,14): “Ten
Objection 2. Further, those precepts that are styled
words. . . He wrote in two tables of stone; and He com-
ceremonial seem to refer to the Divine worship. But Di-
manded me at that time that I should teach you the cere-
vine worship is the act of a virtue, viz. religion, which, as
monies and judgments which you shall do.” But the ten
Tully says (De Invent. ii) “offers worship and ceremony
commandments of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore
to the Godhead.” Since, then, the moral precepts are about
besides the moral precepts there are others which are cer-
acts of virtue, as stated above (a. 2), it seems that the cer-
emonial.
emonial precepts should not be distinct from the moral.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the Divine law
1062
is instituted chiefly in order to direct men to God; while Reply to Objection 1. Human acts extend also to the
human law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men in
Divine worship: and therefore the Old Law given to man
relation to one another. Hence human laws have not con-
contains precepts about these matters also.
cerned themselves with the institution of anything relat-
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 91, a. 3),
ing to Divine worship except as affecting the common
the precepts of the natural law are general, and require to
good of mankind: and for this reason they have devised
be determined: and they are determined both by human
many institutions relating to Divine matters, according as
law and by Divine law. And just as these very determi-
it seemed expedient for the formation of human morals; as
nations which are made by human law are said to be, not
may be seen in the rites of the Gentiles. On the other hand
of natural, but of positive law; so the determinations of
the Divine law directed men to one another according to
the precepts of the natural law, effected by the Divine law,
the demands of that order whereby man is directed to God,
are distinct from the moral precepts which belong to the
which order was the chief aim of that law. Now man is di-
natural law. Wherefore to worship God, since it is an act
rected to God not only by the interior acts of the mind,
of virtue, belongs to a moral precept; but the determina-
which are faith, hope, and love, but also by certain exter-
tion of this precept, namely that He is to be worshipped
nal works, whereby man makes profession of his subjec-
by such and such sacrifices, and such and such offerings,
tion to God: and it is these works that are said to belong
belongs to the ceremonial precepts. Consequently the cer-
to the Divine worship. This worship is called “ceremony”
emonial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts.
[the munia, i.e. gifts] of Ceres (who was the goddess of
Reply to Objection 3. As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
fruits), as some say: because, at first, offerings were made
i), the things of God cannot be manifested to men except
to God from the fruits: or because, as Valerius Maximus
by means of sensible similitudes. Now these similitudes
states∗, the word “ceremony” was introduced among the
move the soul more when they are not only expressed in
Latins, to signify the Divine worship, being derived from
words, but also offered to the senses. Wherefore the things
a town near Rome called “Caere”: since, when Rome was
of God are set forth in the Scriptures not only by simili-
taken by the Gauls, the sacred chattels of the Romans were
tudes expressed in words, as in the case of metaphorical
taken thither and most carefully preserved. Accordingly
expressions; but also by similitudes of things set before
those precepts of the Law which refer to the Divine wor-
the eyes, which pertains to the ceremonial precepts.
ship are specially called ceremonial.
Whether, besides the moral and ceremonial precepts, there are also judicial precepts?
Ia IIae q. 99 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that there are no judicial
On the contrary, It is written (Dt.
6:1): “These
precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts
are the precepts and ceremonies, and judgments”: where
in the Old Law. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. vi,
“precepts” stands for “moral precepts” antonomastically.
2) that in the Old Law there are “precepts concerning the
Therefore there are judicial precepts besides moral and
life we have to lead, and precepts regarding the life that is
ceremonial precepts.
foreshadowed.” Now the precepts of the life we have to
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 2,3), it belongs to
lead are moral precepts; and the precepts of the life that
the Divine law to direct men to one another and to God.
is foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these
Now each of these belongs in the abstract to the dictates
two kinds of precepts we should not put any judicial pre-
of the natural law, to which dictates the moral precepts
cepts in the Law.
are to be referred: yet each of them has to be determined
Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Ps. 118:102, “I have
by Divine or human law, because naturally known prin-
not declined from Thy judgments,” says, i.e. “from the
ciples are universal, both in speculative and in practical
rule of life Thou hast set for me.” But a rule of life be-
matters. Accordingly just as the determination of the uni-
longs to the moral precepts. Therefore the judicial pre-
versal principle about Divine worship is effected by the
cepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral
ceremonial precepts, so the determination of the general
precepts.
precepts of that justice which is to be observed among
Objection 3. Further, judgment seems to be an act of
men is effected by the judicial precepts.
justice, according to Ps. 93:15: “Until justice be turned
We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in
into judgment.” But acts of justice, like the acts of other
the Old Law; viz. “moral” precepts, which are dictated by
virtues, belong to the moral precepts. Therefore the moral
the natural law; “ceremonial” precepts, which are deter-
precepts include the judicial precepts, and consequently
minations of the Divine worship; and “judicial” precepts,
should not be held as distinct from them.
which are determinations of the justice to be maintained
∗ Fact. et Dict. Memor. i, 1
1063
among men. Wherefore the Apostle (Rom. 7:12) after something in common with the moral precepts, in that
saying that the “Law is holy,” adds that “the command-
they are derived from reason; and something in common
ment is just, and holy, and good”: “just,” in respect of
with the ceremonial precepts, in that they are determina-
the judicial precepts; “holy,” with regard to the ceremo-
tions of general precepts. This explains why sometimes
nial precepts (since the word “sanctus”—“holy”—is ap-
“judgments” comprise both judicial and moral precepts,
plied to that which is consecrated to God); and “good,”
as in Dt. 5:1: “Hear, O Israel, the ceremonies and judg-
i.e. conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts.
ments”; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial precepts,
Reply to Objection 1. Both the moral and the judicial
as in Lev. 18:4: “You shall do My judgments, and shall
precepts aim at the ordering of human life: and conse-
observe My precepts,” where “precepts” denotes moral
quently they are both comprised under one of the heads
precepts, while “judgments” refers to judicial and cere-
mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the precepts of the
monial precepts.
life we have to lead.
Reply to Objection 3. The act of justice, in general,
Reply to Objection 2. Judgment denotes execution of
belongs to the moral precepts; but its determination to
justice, by an application of the reason to individual cases
some special kind of act belongs to the judicial precepts.
in a determinate way. Hence the judicial precepts have
Whether the Old Law contains any others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial Ia IIae q. 99 a. 5
precepts?
Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law con-
I answer that, Some things are included in the Law by
tains others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial
way of precept; other things, as being ordained to the ful-
precepts. Because the judicial precepts belong to the act
filment of the precepts. Now the precepts refer to things
of justice, which is between man and man; while the cer-
which have to be done: and to their fulfilment man is in-
emonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby
duced by two considerations, viz. the authority of the law-
God is worshipped. Now besides these there are many
giver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which
other virtues, viz. temperance, fortitude, liberality, and
benefit consists in the attainment of some good, useful,
several others, as stated above (q. 60, a. 5). Therefore be-
pleasurable or virtuous, or in the avoidance of some con-
sides the aforesaid precepts, the Old Law should comprise
trary evil. Hence it was necessary that in the Old Law
others.
certain things should be set forth to indicate the authority
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Dt. 11:1): “Love
of God the lawgiver: e.g. Dt. 6:4: “Hear, O Israel, the
the Lord thy God, and observe His precepts and cere-
Lord our God is one Lord”; and Gn. 1:1: “In the begin-
monies, His judgments and commandments.” Now pre-
ning God created heaven and earth”: and these are called
cepts concern moral matters, as stated above (a. 4). There-
“testimonies.” Again it was necessary that in the Law cer-
fore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial precepts,
tain rewards should be appointed for those who observe
the Law contains others which are called “command-
the Law, and punishments for those who transgress; as it
ments.”∗
may be seen in Dt. 28: “If thou wilt hear the voice of the
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Dt. 6:17): “Keep
Lord thy God. . . He will make thee higher than all the na-
the precepts of the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and
tions,” etc.: and these are called “justifications,” according
ceremonies which I have [Vulg.: ‘He hath’] commanded
as God punishes or rewards certain ones justly.
thee.” Therefore in addition to the above, the Law com-
The things that have to be done do not come under
prises “testimonies.”
the precept except in so far as they have the character of
Objection 4. Further, it is written (Ps. 118:93): “Thy
a duty. Now a duty is twofold: one according to the rule
justifications (i.e. “Thy Law,” according to a gloss) I will
of reason; the other according to the rule of a law which
never forget.” Therefore in the Old Law there are not only
prescribes that duty: thus the Philosopher distinguishes a
moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts, but also others,
twofold just—moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7).
called “justifications.”
Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): “These are
something must be done, either as being so necessary that
the precepts and ceremonies and judgments which the
without it the order of virtue would be destroyed; or as
Lord your God commanded. . . you.” And these words are
being useful for the better maintaining of the order of
placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all the pre-
virtue. And in this sense some of the moral precepts are
cepts of the Law are included under them.
expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as
∗ The “commandments” (mandata) spoken of here and in the body of this article are not to be confused with the Commandments (praecepta) in the ordinary acceptance of the word.
1064
“Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal”: and these are ments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that
properly called “precepts.” Other things are prescribed or
those things be called “precepts” which God Himself pre-
forbidden, not as an absolute duty, but as something better
scribed; and those things “commandments” which He en-
to be done. These may be called “commandments”; be-
joined [mandavit] through others, as the very word seems
cause they are expressed by way of inducement and per-
to denote.
suasion: an example whereof is seen in Ex. 22:26: “If
From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are
thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt
either moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordi-
give it him again before sunset”; and in other like cases.
nances have not the character of a precept, but are directed
Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc.)
to the observance of the precepts, as stated above.
says that “justice is in the precepts, charity in the com-
Reply to Objection 1. Justice alone, of all the virtues, mandments.” Duty as fixed by the Law, belongs to the
implies the notion of duty. Consequently moral matters
judicial precepts, as regards human affairs; to the “cere-
are determinable by law in so far as they belong to justice:
monial” precepts, as regards Divine matters.
of which virtue religion is a part, as Tully says (De Invent.
Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to pun-
ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot be anything foreign to
ishments and rewards may be called “testimonies,” in so
the ceremonial and judicial precepts.
far as they testify to the Divine justice. Again all the pre-
The Replies to the other Objections are clear from
cepts of the Law may be styled “justifications,” as being
what has been said.
executions of legal justice. Furthermore the command-
Whether the Old Law should have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by Ia IIae q. 99 a. 6
means of temporal promises and threats?
Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law should
things of the land. But if you will not, and will provoke
not have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by
Me to wrath: the sword shall devour you.”
means of temporal promises and threats. For the purpose
I answer that, As in speculative sciences men are per-
of the Divine law is to subject man to God by fear and
suaded to assent to the conclusions by means of syllogistic
love: hence it is written (Dt. 10:12): “And now, Israel,
arguments, so too in every law, men are persuaded to ob-
what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou
serve its precepts by means of punishments and rewards.
fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love
Now it is to be observed that, in speculative sciences,
Him?” But the desire for temporal goods leads man away
the means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of
from God: for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36), that
the pupil: wherefore the process of argument in sciences
“covetousness is the bane of charity.” Therefore temporal
should be ordered becomingly, so that the instruction is
promises and threats seem to be contrary to the intention
based on principles more generally known. And thus also
of a lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection,
he who would persuade a man to the observance of any
as the Philosopher declares (Polit. ii, 6).
precepts, needs to move him at first by things for which he
Objection 2. Further, the Divine law is more excel-
has an affection; just as children are induced to do some-
lent than human law. Now, in sciences, we notice that the
thing, by means of little childish gifts. Now it has been
loftier the science, the higher the means of persuasion that
said above (q. 98, Aa. 1,2,3) that the Old Law disposed
it employs. Therefore, since human law employs tempo-
men to (the coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in com-
ral threats and promises, as means of persuading man, the
parison disposes to the perfect, wherefore it was given to
Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty
a people as yet imperfect in comparison to the perfection
means.
which was to result from Christ’s coming: and for this
Objection 3. Further, the reward of righteousness
reason, that people is compared to a child that is still un-
and the punishment of guilt cannot be that which befalls
der a pedagogue (Gal. 3:24). But the perfection of man
equally the good and the wicked. But as stated in Eccles.
consists in his despising temporal things and cleaving to
9:2, “all” temporal “things equally happen to the just and
things spiritual, as is clear from the words of the Apostle
to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to
(Phil. 3:13,15): “Forgetting the things that are behind, I
the unclean, to him that offereth victims, and to him that
stretch [Vulg.: ‘and stretching’] forth myself to those that
despiseth sacrifices.” Therefore temporal goods or evils
are before. . . Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be
are not suitably set forth as punishments or rewards of the
thus minded.” Those who are yet imperfect desire tem-
commandments of the Divine law.
poral goods, albeit in subordination to God: whereas the
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 1:19,20): “If you
perverse place their end in temporalities. It was therefore
be willing, and will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good
fitting that the Old Law should conduct men to God by
1065
means of temporal goods for which the imperfect have an carefully the story of the Old Testament, the common
affection.
weal of the people prospered under the Law as long as
Reply to Objection 1. Covetousness whereby man
they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the pre-
places his end in temporalities, is the bane of charity. But
cepts of the Law they were overtaken by many calamities.
the attainment of temporal goods which man desires in
But certain individuals, although they observed the justice
subordination to God is a road leading the imperfect to
of the Law, met with misfortunes—either because they
the love of God, according to Ps. 48:19: “He will praise
had already become spiritual (so that misfortune might
Thee, when Thou shalt do well to him.”
withdraw them all the more from attachment to temporal
Reply to Objection 2. Human law persuades men by
things, and that their virtue might be tried)—or because,
means of temporal rewards or punishments to be inflicted
while outwardly fulfilling the works of the Law, their heart
by men: whereas the Divine law persuades men by meas
was altogether fixed on temporal goods, and far removed
of rewards or punishments to be received from God. In
from God, according to Is. 29:13 (Mat. 15:8): “This peo-
this respect it employs higher means.
ple honoreth Me with their lips; but their hearts is far from
Reply to Objection 3. As any one can see, who reads
Me.”
1066
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 100
Of the Moral Precepts of the Old Law
(In Twelve Articles)
We must now consider each kind of precept of the Old Law: and (1) the moral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts, (3) the judicial precepts. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?
(2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all the virtues?
(3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue?
(4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one another?
(5) Their number;
(6) Their order;
(7) The manner in which they were given;
(8) Whether they are dispensable?
(9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept of the Law?
(10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept?
(11) The distinction of other moral precepts;
(12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?
Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?
Ia IIae q. 100 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that not all the moral pre-
good which accord with reason, and those are called bad
cepts belong to the law of nature. For it is written (Ecclus.
which are discordant from reason. And as every judgment
17:9): “Moreover He gave them instructions, and the law
of speculative reason proceeds from the natural knowl-
of life for an inheritance.” But instruction is in contradis-
edge of first principles, so every judgment of practical rea-
tinction to the law of nature; since the law of nature is not
son proceeds from principles known naturally, as stated
learnt, but instilled by natural instinct. Therefore not all
above (q. 94, Aa. 2,4): from which principles one may
the moral precepts belong to the natural law.
proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For
Objection 2. Further, the Divine law is more perfect
some matters connected with human actions are so evi-
than human law. But human law adds certain things con-
dent, that after very little consideration one is able at once
cerning good morals, to those that belong to the law of
to approve or disapprove of them by means of these gen-
nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the natural law is
eral first principles: while some matters cannot be the sub-
the same in all men, while these moral institutions are var-
ject of judgment without much consideration of the vari-
ious for various people. Much more reason therefore was
ous circumstances, which all are not competent to do care-
there why the Divine law should add to the law of nature,
fully, but only those who are wise: just as it is not possible
ordinances pertaining to good morals.
for all to consider the particular conclusions of sciences,
Objection 3. Further, just as natural reason leads to
but only for those who are versed in philosophy: and lastly
good morals in certain matters, so does faith: hence it is
there are some matters of which man cannot judge unless
written (Gal. 5:6) that faith “worketh by charity.” But
he be helped by Divine instruction; such as the articles of
faith is not included in the law of nature; since that which
faith.
is of faith is above nature. Therefore not all the moral
It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are
precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature.
about matters which concern good morals; and since good
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that
morals are those which are in accord with reason; and
“the Gentiles, who have not the Law, do by nature those
since also every judgment of human reason must needs
things that are of the Law”: which must be understood of
by derived in some way from natural reason; it follows, of
things pertaining to good morals. Therefore all the moral
necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of
precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature.
nature; but not all in the same way. For there are certain
I answer that, The moral precepts, distinct from the
things which the natural reason of every man, of its own
ceremonial and judicial precepts, are about things pertain-
accord and at once, judges to be done or not to be done:
ing of their very nature to good morals. Now since human
e.g. “Honor thy father and thy mother,” and “Thou shalt
morals depend on their relation to reason, which is the
not kill, Thou shalt not steal”: and these belong to the law
proper principle of human acts, those morals are called
of nature absolutely. And there are certain things which,
1067
after a more careful consideration, wise men deem oblig-struction, whereby we are taught about the things of God:
atory. Such belong to the law of nature, yet so that they
e.g. “Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor
need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the less wise:
the likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the name of
e.g. “Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the per-
the Lord thy God in vain.”
son of the aged man,” and the like. And there are some
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
things, to judge of which, human reason needs Divine in-
Whether the moral precepts of the Law are about all the acts of virtue?
Ia IIae q. 100 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the moral precepts
proper function consists in directing the human commu-
of the Law are not about all the acts of virtue. For obser-
nity. Wherefore human law makes precepts only about
vance of the precepts of the Old Law is called justification,
acts of justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues,
according to Ps. 118:8: “I will keep Thy justifications.”
this is only in so far as they assume the nature of justice,
But justification is the execution of justice. Therefore the
as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. v, 1).
moral precepts are only about acts of justice.
But the community for which the Divine law is or-
Objection 2. Further, that which comes under a pre-
dained, is that of men in relation to God, either in this
cept has the character of a duty. But the character of duty
life or in the life to come. And therefore the Divine law
belongs to justice alone and to none of the other virtues,
proposes precepts about all those matters whereby men
for the proper act of justice consists in rendering to each
are well ordered in their relations to God. Now man is
one his due. Therefore the precepts of the moral law are
united to God by his reason or mind, in which is God’s
not about the acts of the other virtues, but only about the
image. Wherefore the Divine law proposes precepts about
acts of justice.
all those matters whereby human reason is well ordered.
Objection 3. Further, every law is made for the com-
But this is effected by the acts of all the virtues: since the
mon good, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But of all the
intellectual virtues set in good order the acts of the reason
virtues justice alone regards the common good, as the
in themselves: while the moral virtues set in good order
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the moral pre-
the acts of the reason in reference to the interior passions
cepts are only about the acts of justice.
and exterior actions. It is therefore evident that the Di-
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii)
vine law fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all
that “a sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a dis-
the virtues: yet so that certain matters, without which the
obedience to the commandments of heaven.” But there are
order of virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot even
sins contrary to all the acts of virtue. Therefore it belongs
exist, come under an obligation of precept; while other
to Divine law to direct all the acts of virtue.
matters, which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue,
I answer that, Since the precepts of the Law are or-
come under an admonition of counsel.
dained to the common good, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2),
Reply to Objection 1. The fulfilment of the com-
the precepts of the Law must needs be diversified accord-
mandments of the Law, even of those which are about the
ing to the various kinds of community: hence the Philoso-
acts of the other virtues, has the character of justification,
pher (Polit. iv, 1) teaches that the laws which are made in
inasmuch as it is just that man should obey God: or again,
a state which is ruled by a king must be different from the
inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs to man should
laws of a state which is ruled by the people, or by a few
be subject to reason.
powerful men in the state. Now human law is ordained for
Reply to Objection 2. Justice properly so called re-
one kind of community, and the Divine law for another
gards the duty of one man to another: but all the other
kind. Because human law is ordained for the civil com-
virtues regard the duty of the lower powers to reason. It
munity, implying mutual duties of man and his fellows:
is in relation to this latter duty that the Philosopher speaks
and men are ordained to one another by outward acts,
(Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical justice.
whereby men live in communion with one another. This
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what
life in common of man with man pertains to justice, whose
has been said about the different kinds of community.
1068
Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the Ia IIae q. 100 a. 3
decalogue?
Objection 1. It would seem that not all the moral pre-
precepts are not reckoned among the precepts of the deca-
cepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of
logue: viz. first general principles, for they need no fur-
the decalogue. For the first and principal precepts of the
ther promulgation after being once imprinted on the natu-
Law are, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God,” and “Thou
ral reason to which they are self-evident; as, for instance,
shalt love thy neighbor,” as stated in Mat. 22:37,39. But
that one should do evil to no man, and other similar princi-
these two are not contained in the precepts of the deca-
ples: and again those which the careful reflection of wise
logue. Therefore not all the moral precepts are contained
men shows to be in accord with reason; since the people
in the precepts of the decalogue.
receive these principles from God, through being taught
Objection 2. Further, the moral precepts are not re-
by wise men. Nevertheless both kinds of precepts are
ducible to the ceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa.
contained in the precepts of the decalogue; yet in differ-
But among the precepts of the decalogue, one is ceremo-
ent ways. For the first general principles are contained in
nial, viz. “Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-
them, as principles in their proximate conclusions; while
day.” Therefore the moral precepts are not reducible to all
those which are known through wise men are contained,
the precepts of the decalogue.
conversely, as conclusions in their principles.
Objection 3. Further, the moral precepts are about all
Reply to Objection 1. Those two principles are the
the acts of virtue. But among the precepts of the deca-
first general principles of the natural law, and are self-
logue are only such as regard acts of justice; as may be
evident to human reason, either through nature or through
seen by going through them all. Therefore the precepts of
faith. Wherefore all the precepts of the decalogue are re-
the decalogue do not include all the moral precepts.
ferred to these, as conclusions to general principles.
On the contrary, The gloss on Mat. 5:11: “Blessed
Reply to Objection 2. The precept of the Sabbath ob-
are ye when they shall revile you,” etc. says that “Moses,
servance is moral in one respect, in so far as it commands
after propounding the ten precepts, set them out in detail.”
man to give some time to the things of God, according
Therefore all the precepts of the Law are so many parts of
to Ps. 45:11: “Be still and see that I am God.” In this
the precepts of the decalogue.
respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue:
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue differ
but not as to the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a
from the other precepts of the Law, in the fact that God
ceremonial precept.
Himself is said to have given the precepts of the deca-
Reply to Objection 3. The notion of duty is not so
logue; whereas He gave the other precepts to the people
patent in the other virtues as it is in justice. Hence the
through Moses. Wherefore the decalogue includes those
precepts about the acts of the other virtues are not so well
precepts the knowledge of which man has immediately
known to the people as are the precepts about acts of jus-
from God. Such are those which with but slight reflection
tice. Wherefore the acts of justice especially come under
can be gathered at once from the first general principles:
the precepts of the decalogue, which are the primary ele-
and those also which become known to man immediately
ments of the Law.
through divinely infused faith. Consequently two kinds of
Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably distinguished from one another?
Ia IIae q. 100 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of the
which follows, “Thou shalt not have strange gods before
decalogue are unsuitably distinguished from one another.
Me,” is negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do
For worship is a virtue distinct from faith. Now the pre-
not, as Augustine says (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), make one.
cepts are about acts of virtue. But that which is said
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:7):
at the beginning of the decalogue, “Thou shalt not have
“I had not known concupiscence, if the Law did not say:
strange gods before Me,” belongs to faith: and that which
‘Thou shalt not covet.’ ” Hence it seems that this pre-
is added, “Thou shalt not make. . . any graven thing,” etc.
cept, “Thou shalt not covet,” is one precept; and, there-
belongs to worship. Therefore these are not one precept,
fore, should not be divided into two.
as Augustine asserts (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), but two.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Augustine
Objection 2. Further, the affirmative precepts in the
who, in commenting on Exodus (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi)
Law are distinct from the negative precepts; e.g. “Honor
distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and seven
thy father and thy mother,” and, “Thou shalt not kill.” But
as referring to our neighbor.
this, “I am the Lord thy God,” is affirmative: and that
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are dif-
1069
ferently divided by different authorities. For Hesychius to covet another’s wife, for the purpose of carnal knowl-commenting on Lev. 26:26, “Ten women shall bake your
edge, belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh; whereas,
bread in one oven,” says that the precept of the Sabbath-
to covet other things, which are desired for the purpose
day observance is not one of the ten precepts, because its
of possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes;
observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time. But he
wherefore Augustine reckons as distinct precepts, that
distinguishes four precepts pertaining to God, the first be-
which forbids the coveting of another’s goods, and that
ing, “I am the Lord thy God”; the second, “Thou shalt not
which prohibits the coveting of another’s wife. Thus he
have strange gods before Me,” (thus also Jerome distin-
distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and seven
guishes these two precepts, in his commentary on Osee
as referring to our neighbor. And this is better.
10:10, “On thy” [Vulg.: “their”] “two iniquities”); the
Reply to Objection 1. Worship is merely a declara-
third precept according to him is, “Thou shalt not make to
tion of faith: wherefore the precepts about worship should
thyself any graven thing”; and the fourth, “Thou shalt not
not be reckoned as distinct from those about faith. Never-
take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.” He states that
theless precepts should be given about worship rather than
there are six precepts pertaining to our neighbor; the first,
about faith, because the precept about faith is presupposed
“Honor thy father and thy mother”; the second, “Thou
to the precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of
shalt not kill”; the third, “Thou shalt not commit adul-
charity. For just as the first general principles of the natu-
tery”; the fourth, “Thou shalt not steal”; the fifth, “Thou
ral law are self-evident to a subject having natural reason,
shalt not bear false witness”; the sixth, “Thou shalt not
and need no promulgation; so also to believe in God is a
covet.”
first and self-evident principle to a subject possessed of
But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the
faith: “for he that cometh to God, must believe that He is”
precept of the Sabbath-day observance to be put among
(Heb. 11:6). Hence it needs no other promulgation that
the precepts of the decalogue, if it nowise belonged to the
the infusion of faith.
decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is written (Mat.
Reply to Objection 2. The affirmative precepts are
6:24), “No man can serve two masters,” the two state-
distinct from the negative, when one is not comprised in
ments, “I am the Lord thy God,” and, “Thou shalt not
the other: thus that man should honor his parents does not
have strange gods before Me” seem to be of the same na-
include that he should not kill another man; nor does the
ture and to form one precept. Hence Origen (Hom. viii in
latter include the former. But when an affirmative pre-
Exod.) who also distinguishes four precepts as referring
cept is included in a negative, or vice versa, we do not
to God, unites these two under one precept; and reckons
find that two distinct precepts are given: thus there is not
in the second place, “Thou shalt not make. . . any graven
one precept saying that “Thou shalt not steal,” and another
thing”; as third, “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord
binding one to keep another’s property intact, or to give it
thy God in vain”; and as fourth, “Remember that thou
back to its owner. In the same way there are not different
keep holy the Sabbath-day.” The other six he reckons in
precepts about believing in God, and about not believing
the same way as Hesychius.
in strange gods.
Since, however, the making of graven things or the
Reply to Objection 3. All covetousness has one com-
likeness of anything is not forbidden except as to the point
mon ratio: and therefore the Apostle speaks of the com-
of their being worshipped as gods—for God commanded
mandment about covetousness as though it were one. But
an image of the Seraphim [Vulg.: Cherubim] to be made
because there are various special kinds of covetousness,
and placed in the tabernacle, as related in Ex. 25:18—
therefore Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions
Augustine more fittingly unites these two, “Thou shalt
against coveting: for covetousness differs specifically in
not have strange gods before Me,” and, “Thou shalt not
respect of the diversity of actions or things coveted, as the
make. . . any graven thing,” into one precept. Likewise
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 5).
Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably set forth?
Ia IIae q. 100 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of the
relations to God and himself, it seems that the precepts of
decalogue are unsuitably set forth. Because sin, as stated
the decalogue are insufficiently enumerated.
by Ambrose (De Paradiso viii), is “a transgression of the
Objection 2. Further, just as the Sabbath-day obser-
Divine law and a disobedience to the commandments of
vance pertained to the worship of God, so also did the
heaven.” But sins are distinguished according as man sins
observance of other solemnities, and the offering of sac-
against God, or his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the
rifices. But the decalogue contains a precept about the
decalogue does not include any precepts directing man in
Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should contain oth-
his relations to himself, but only such as direct him in his
ers also, pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the
1070
sacrificial rite.
mandment, in the words “Thou shalt not have strange
Objection 3. Further, as sins against God include the
gods.” Reverence to his master requires that he should
sin of perjury, so also do they include blasphemy, or other
do nothing injurious to him: and this is conveyed by the
ways of lying against the teaching of God. But there is a
second commandment, “Thou shalt not take the name of
precept forbidding perjury, “Thou shalt not take the name
the Lord thy God in vain.” Service is due to the master
of the Lord thy God in vain.” Therefore there should be
in return for the benefits which his subjects receive from
also a precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and
him: and to this belongs the third commandment of the
false doctrine.
sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the creation of
Objection 4. Further, just as man has a natural affec-
all things.
tion for his parents, so has he also for his children. More-
To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in
over the commandment of charity extends to all our neigh-
particular and in general. In particular, as to those to
bors. Now the precepts of the decalogue are ordained
whom he is indebted, by paying his debts: and in this
unto charity, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: “The end of the
sense is to be taken the commandment about honoring
commandment is charity.” Therefore as there is a precept
one’s parents. In general, as to all men, by doing harm to
referring to parents, so should there have been some pre-
none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed,
cepts referring to children and other neighbors.
harm is done to one’s neighbor—sometimes in his person,
Objection 5. Further, in every kind of sin, it is pos-
i.e. as to his personal existence; and this is forbidden by
sible to sin in thought or in deed. But in some kinds of
the words, “Thou shalt not kill”: sometimes in a person
sin, namely in theft and adultery, the prohibition of sins
united to him, as to the propagation of offspring; and this
of deed, when it is said, “Thou shalt not commit adultery,
is prohibited by the words, “Thou shalt not commit adul-
Thou shalt not steal,” is distinct from the prohibition of the
tery”: sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to
sin of thought, when it is said, “Thou shalt not covet thy
both the aforesaid; and with this regard to this it is said,
neighbor’s goods,” and, “Thou shalt not covet thy neigh-
“Thou shalt not steal.” Harm done by word is forbidden
bor’s wife.” Therefore the same should have been done in
when it is said, “Thou shalt not bear false witness against
regard to the sins of homicide and false witness.
thy neighbor”: harm done by thought is forbidden in the
Objection 6. Further, just as sin happens through dis-
words, “Thou shalt not covet.”
order of the concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through
The three precepts that direct man in his behavior to-
disorder of the irascible part. But some precepts forbid
wards God may also be differentiated in this same way.
inordinate concupiscence, when it is said, “Thou shalt not
For the first refers to deeds; wherefore it is said, “Thou
covet.” Therefore the decalogue should have included
shalt not make. . . a graven thing”: the second, to words;
some precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible
wherefore it is said, “Thou shalt not take the name of the
faculty. Therefore it seems that the ten precepts of the
Lord thy God in vain”: the third, to thoughts; because the
decalogue are unfittingly enumerated.
sanctification of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral pre-
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13): “He shewed
cept, requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to
you His covenant, which He commanded you to do, and
Augustine (In Ps. 32: Conc. 1), by the first commandment
the ten words that He wrote in two tablets of stone.”
we reverence the unity of the First Principle; by the sec-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), just as the pre-
ond, the Divine truth; by the third, His goodness whereby
cepts of human law direct man in his relations to the hu-
we are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last end.
man community, so the precepts of the Divine law direct
Reply to Objection 1. This objection may be an-
man in his relations to a community or commonwealth of
swered in two ways. First, because the precepts of the
men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell
decalogue can be reduced to the precepts of charity. Now
aright in a community, two things are required: the first
there was need for man to receive a precept about loving
is that he behave well to the head of the community; the
God and his neighbor, because in this respect the natu-
other is that he behave well to those who are his fellows
ral law had become obscured on account of sin: but not
and partners in the community. It is therefore necessary
about the duty of loving oneself, because in this respect
that the Divine law should contain in the first place pre-
the natural law retained its vigor: or again, because love
cepts ordering man in his relations to God; and in the sec-
of oneself is contained in the love of God and of one’s
ond place, other precepts ordering man in his relations to
neighbor: since true self-love consists in directing oneself
other men who are his neighbors and live with him under
to God. And for this reason the decalogue includes those
God.
precepts only which refer to our neighbor and to God.
Now man owes three things to the head of the commu-
Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the
nity: first, fidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service.
decalogue are those which the people received from God
Fidelity to his master consists in his not giving sovereign
immediately; wherefore it is written (Dt. 10:4): “He wrote
honor to another: and this is the sense of the first com-
in the tables, according as He had written before, the ten
1071
words, which the Lord spoke to you.” Hence the precepts Hence, since oaths are common to all, inordinate swear-of the decalogue need to be such as the people can under-
ing is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept of
stand at once. Now a precept implies the notion of duty.
the decalogue. According to one interpretation, however,
But it is easy for a man, especially for a believer, to under-
the words, “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy
stand that, of necessity, he owes certain duties to God and
God in vain,” are a prohibition of false doctrine, for one
to his neighbor. But that, in matters which regard himself
gloss expounds them thus: “Thou shalt not say that Christ
and not another, man has, of necessity, certain duties to
is a creature.”
himself, is not so evident: for, at the first glance, it seems
Reply to Objection 4. That a man should not do harm
that everyone is free in matters that concern himself. And
to anyone is an immediate dictate of his natural reason:
therefore the precepts which prohibit disorders of a man
and therefore the precepts that forbid the doing of harm
with regard to himself, reach the people through the in-
are binding on all men. But it is not an immediate dictate
struction of men who are versed through the instruction
of natural reason that a man should do one thing in return
of men who are versed in such matters; and, consequently,
for another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone.
they are not contained in the decalogue.
Now a son’s debt to his father is so evident that one can-
Reply to Objection 2. All the solemnities of the Old
not get away from it by denying it: since the father is the
Law were instituted in celebration of some Divine favor,
principle of generation and being, and also of upbringing
either in memory of past favors, or in sign of some favor
and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue does not prescribe
to come: in like manner all the sacrifices were offered up
deeds of kindness or service to be done to anyone except
with the same purpose. Now of all the Divine favors to be
to one’s parents. On the other hand parents do not seem to
commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which
be indebted to their children for any favors received, but
was called to mind by the sanctification of the Sabbath;
rather the reverse is the case. Again, a child is a part of
wherefore the reason for this precept is given in Ex. 20:11:
his father; and “parents love their children as being a part
“In six days the Lord made heaven and earth,” etc. And of
of themselves,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12).
all future blessings, the chief and final was the repose of
Hence, just as the decalogue contains no ordinance as to
the mind in God, either, in the present life, by grace, or,
man’s behavior towards himself, so, for the same reason,
in the future life, by glory; which repose was also fore-
it includes no precept about loving one’s children.
shadowed in the Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is
Reply to Objection 5. The pleasure of adultery and
written (Is. 58:13): “If thou turn away thy foot from the
the usefulness of wealth, in so far as they have the char-
Sabbath, from doing thy own will in My holy day, and
acter of pleasurable or useful good, are of themselves, ob-
call the Sabbath delightful, and the holy of the Lord glo-
jects of appetite: and for this reason they needed to be
rious.” Because these favors first and chiefly are borne in
forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire. But
mind by men, especially by the faithful. But other solem-
murder and falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repul-
nities were celebrated on account of certain particular fa-
sion (since it is natural for man to love his neighbor and
vors temporal and transitory, such as the celebration of the
the truth): and are desired only for the sake of something
Passover in memory of the past favor of the delivery from
else. Consequently with regard to sins of murder and false
Egypt, and as a sign of the future Passion of Christ, which
witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of thought,
though temporal and transitory, brought us to the repose
but only sins of deed.
of the spiritual Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone,
Reply to Objection 6. As stated above (q. 25, a. 1),
and none of the other solemnities and sacrifices, is men-
all the passions of the irascible faculty arise from the pas-
tioned in the precepts of the decalogue.
sions of the concupiscible part. Hence, as the precepts of
Reply to Objection 3. As the Apostle says (Heb.
the decalogue are, as it were, the first elements of the Law,
6:16), “men swear by one greater than themselves; and an
there was no need for mention of the irascible passions,
oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy.”
but only of the concupiscible passions.
Whether the ten precepts of the decalogue are set in proper order?
Ia IIae q. 100 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the ten precepts of
the other seven pertain to the love of our neighbor. There-
the decalogue are not set in proper order. Because love of
fore the precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper
one’s neighbor is seemingly previous to love of God, since
order.
our neighbor is better known to us than God is; according
Objection 2. Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed
to 1 Jn. 4:20: “He that loveth not his brother, whom he
by the affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbid-
seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?” But
den by the negative precepts. But according to Boethius
the first three precepts belong to the love of God, while
1072
in his commentary on the Categories∗, vices should be wards his neighbor, it is evident that it is more repugnant
uprooted before virtues are sown. Therefore among the
to reason, and a more grievous sin, if man does not ob-
precepts concerning our neighbor, the negative precepts
serve the due order as to those persons to whom he is most
should have preceded the affirmative.
indebted. Consequently, among those precepts that direct
Objection 3. Further, the precepts of the Law are
man in his relations to his neighbor, the first place is given
about men’s actions. But actions of thought precede ac-
to that one which regards his parents. Among the other
tions of word or outward deed. Therefore the precepts
precepts we again find the order to be according to the
about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are unsuit-
gravity of sin. For it is more grave and more repugnant to
ably placed last in order.
reason, to sin by deed than by word; and by word than by
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom.
13:1):
thought. And among sins of deed, murder which destroys
“The things that are of God, are well ordered” [Vulg.:
life in one already living is more grievous than adultery,
‘Those that are, are ordained of God’]. But the precepts of
which imperils the life of the unborn child; and adultery
the decalogue were given immediately by God, as stated
is more grave than theft, which regards external goods.
above (a. 3). Therefore they are arranged in becoming
Reply to Objection 1. Although our neighbor is bet-
order.
ter known than God by the way of the senses, nevertheless
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 3,5, ad 1), the
the love of God is the reason for the love of our neighbor,
precepts of the decalogue are such as the mind of man
as shall be declared later on ( IIa IIae, q. 25, a. 1; IIa IIae, is ready to grasp at once. Now it is evident that a thing
q. 26, a. 2). Hence the precepts ordaining man to God
is so much the more easily grasped by the reason, as its
demanded precedence of the others.
contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason. More-
Reply to Objection 2. Just as God is the universal
over, it is clear, since the order of reason begins with the
principle of being in respect of all things, so is a father a
end, that, for a man to be inordinately disposed towards
principle of being in respect of his son. Therefore the pre-
his end, is supremely contrary to reason. Now the end of
cept regarding parents was fittingly placed after the pre-
human life and society is God. Consequently it was neces-
cepts regarding God. This argument holds in respect of
sary for the precepts of the decalogue, first of all, to direct affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of
man to God; since the contrary to this is most grievous.
deed: although even then it is not altogether cogent. For
Thus also, in an army, which is ordained to the comman-
although in the order of execution, vices should be up-
der as to its end, it is requisite first that the soldier should rooted before virtues are sown, according to Ps. 33:15:
be subject to the commander, and the opposite of this is
“Turn away from evil, and do good,” and Is. 1:16,17:
most grievous; and secondly it is requisite that he should
“Cease to do perversely; learn to do well”; yet, in the order
be in coordination with the other soldiers.
of knowledge, virtue precedes vice, because “the crooked
Now among those things whereby we are ordained to
line is known by the straight” (De Anima i): and “by the
God, the first is that man should be subjected to Him faith-
law is the knowledge of sin” (Rom. 3:20). Wherefore the
fully, by having nothing in common with His enemies.
affirmation precept demanded the first place. However,
The second is that he should show Him reverence: the
this is not the reason for the order, but that which is given
third that he should offer Him service. Thus, in an army,
above. Because in the precepts regarding God, which be-
it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and
longs to the first table, an affirmative precept is placed last, make a compact with the foe, than to be insolent to his
since its transgression implies a less grievous sin.
commander: and this last is more grievous than if he be
Reply to Objection 3. Although sin of thought stands
found wanting in some point of service to him.
first in the order of execution, yet its prohibition holds a
As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior to-
later position in the order of reason.
Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably formulated?
Ia IIae q. 100 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of the
fitting that affirmative precepts should be framed in some
decalogue are unsuitably formulated. Because the affir-
matters, and negative precepts in others.
mative precepts direct man to acts of virtue, while the
Objection 2. Further, Isidore says (Etym. ii, 10) that
negative precepts withdraw him from acts of vice. But in
every law is based on reason. But all the precepts of the
every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one an-
decalogue belong to the Divine law. Therefore the reason
other. Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance
should have been pointed out in each precept, and not only
of a precept of the decalogue, there should have been an
in the first and third.
affirmative and a negative precept. Therefore it was un-
Objection 3.
Further, by observing the precepts
∗ Lib. iv, cap. De Oppos.
1073
man deserves to be rewarded by God. But the Divine Now there are two whose favors no man can sufficiently
promises concern the rewards of the precepts. Therefore
repay, viz. God and man’s father, as stated in Ethic. viii,
the promise should have been included in each precept,
14. Therefore it is that there are only two affirmative pre-
and not only in the second and fourth.
cepts; one about the honor due to parents, the other about
Objection 4. Further, the Old Law is called “the law
the celebration of the Sabbath in memory of the Divine
of fear,” in so far as it induced men to observe the pre-
favor.
cepts, by means of the threat of punishments. But all the
Reply to Objection 2. The reasons for the purely
precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old Law. There-
moral precepts are manifest; hence there was no need to
fore a threat of punishment should have been included in
add the reason. But some of the precepts include ceremo-
each, and not only in the first and second.
nial matter, or a determination of a general moral precept;
Objection 5. Further, all the commandments of God
thus the first precept includes the determination, “Thou
should be retained in the memory: for it is written (Prov.
shalt not make a graven thing”; and in the third precept
3:3): “Write them in the tables of thy heart.” Therefore
the Sabbath-day is fixed. Consequently there was need to
it was not fitting that mention of the memory should be
state the reason in each case.
made in the third commandment only. Consequently it
Reply to Objection 3. Generally speaking, men di-
seems that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably
rect their actions to some point of utility. Consequently in
formulated.
those precepts in which it seemed that there would be no
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 11:21) that “God
useful result, or that some utility might be hindered, it was
made all things, in measure, number and weight.” Much
necessary to add a promise of reward. And since parents
more therefore did He observe a suitable manner in for-
are already on the way to depart from us, no benefit is ex-
mulating His Law.
pected from them: wherefore a promise of reward is added
I answer that, The highest wisdom is contained in
to the precept about honoring one’s parents. The same ap-
the precepts of the Divine law: wherefore it is written
plies to the precept forbidding idolatry: since thereby it
(Dt. 4:6): “This is your wisdom and understanding in the
seemed that men were hindered from receiving the appar-
sight of nations.” Now it belongs to wisdom to arrange
ent benefit which they think they can get by entering into
all things in due manner and order. Therefore it must be
a compact with the demons.
evident that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth.
Reply to Objection 4. Punishments are necessary
Reply to Objection 1. Affirmation of one thing al-
against those who are prone to evil, as stated in Ethic. x, 9.
ways leads to the denial of its opposite: but the denial of
Wherefore a threat of punishment is only affixed to those
one opposite does not always lead to the affirmation of
precepts of the law which forbade evils to which men were
the other. For it follows that if a thing is white, it is not
prone. Now men were prone to idolatry by reason of the
black: but it does not follow that if it is not black, it is
general custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to
white: because negation extends further than affirmation.
perjury on account of the frequent use of oaths. Hence it
And hence too, that one ought not to do harm to another,
is that a threat is affixed to the first two precepts.
which pertains to the negative precepts, extends to more
Reply to Objection 5. The commandment about the
persons, as a primary dictate of reason, than that one ought
Sabbath was made in memory of a past blessing. Where-
to do someone a service or kindness. Nevertheless it is a
fore special mention of the memory is made therein. Or
primary dictate of reason that man is a debtor in the point
again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a deter-
of rendering a service or kindness to those from whom he
mination affixed to it that does not belong to the natural
has received kindness, if he has not yet repaid the debt.
law, wherefore this precept needed a special admonition.
Whether the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable?
Ia IIae q. 100 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of the
to human law as God does to Divine law. But man can
decalogue are dispensable. For the precepts of the deca-
dispense with the precepts of a law made by man. There-
logue belong to the natural law. But the natural law fails
fore, since the precepts of the decalogue are ordained by
in some cases and is changeable, like human nature, as the
God, it seems that God can dispense with them. Now our
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7). Now the failure of law to
superiors are God’s viceregents on earth; for the Apostle
apply in certain particular cases is a reason for dispensa-
says (2 Cor. 2:10): “For what I have pardoned, if I have
tion, as stated above (q. 96, a. 6; q. 97, a. 4). Therefore
pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the
a dispensation can be granted in the precepts of the deca-
person of Christ.” Therefore superiors can dispense with
logue.
the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 2. Further, man stands in the same relation
Objection 3. Further, among the precepts of the deca-
1074
logue is one forbidding murder. But it seems that a disReply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is not speak-
pensation is given by men in this precept: for instance,
ing of the natural law which contains the very order of jus-
when according to the prescription of human law, such
tice: for it is a never-failing principle that “justice should
as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. Therefore the
be preserved.” But he is speaking in reference to certain
precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.
fixed modes of observing justice, which fail to apply in
Objection 4. Further, the observance of the Sabbath
certain cases.
is ordained by a precept of the decalogue. But a dispensa-
Reply to Objection 2. As the Apostle says (2 Tim.
tion was granted in this precept; for it is written (1 Macc.
2:13), “God continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself.”
2:4): “And they determined in that day, saying: Whoso-
But He would deny Himself if He were to do away with
ever shall come up to fight against us on the Sabbath-day,
the very order of His own justice, since He is justice it-
we will fight against him.” Therefore the precepts of the
self. Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be
decalogue are dispensable.
lawful for him not to direct himself to God, or not to be
On the contrary, are the words of Is. 24:5, where
subject to His justice, even in those matters in which men
some are reproved for that “they have changed the ordi-
are directed to one another.
nance, they have broken the everlasting covenant”; which,
Reply to Objection 3. The slaying of a man is for-
seemingly, apply principally to the precepts of the deca-
bidden in the decalogue, in so far as it bears the character
logue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be
of something undue: for in this sense the precept contains
changed by dispensation.
the very essence of justice. Human law cannot make it
I answer that, As stated above (q. 96, a. 6; q. 97,
lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not undue for
a. 4), precepts admit of dispensation, when there occurs
evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence
a particular case in which, if the letter of the law be ob-
this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue; and
served, the intention of the lawgiver is frustrated. Now
such a killing is no murder as forbidden by that precept,
the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and chiefly
as Augustine observes (De Lib. Arb. i, 4). In like manner
to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice and
when a man’s property is taken from him, if it be due that
virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and at-
he should lose it, this is not theft or robbery as forbidden
tained. If therefore there by any precepts which contain
by the decalogue.
the very preservation of the common good, or the very
Consequently when the children of Israel, by God’s
order of justice and virtue, such precepts contain the in-
command, took away the spoils of the Egyptians, this was
tention of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable.
not theft; since it was due to them by the sentence of God.
For instance, if in some community a law were enacted,
Likewise when Abraham consented to slay his son, he did
such as this—that no man should work for the destruction
not consent to murder, because his son was due to be slain
of the commonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies,
by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death:
or that no man should do anything unjust or evil, such
for He it is Who inflicts the punishment of death on all
precepts would not admit of dispensation. But if other
men, both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our
precepts were enacted, subordinate to the above, and de-
first parent, and if a man be the executor of that sentence
termining certain special modes of procedure, these lat-
by Divine authority, he will be no murderer any more than
ter precepts would admit of dispensation, in so far as the
God would be. Again Osee, by taking unto himself a wife
omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be
of fornications, or an adulterous woman, was not guilty
prejudicial to the former precepts which contain the inten-
either of adultery or of fornication: because he took unto
tion of the lawgiver. For instance if, for the safeguarding
himself one who was his by command of God, Who is the
of the commonwealth, it were enacted in some city that
Author of the institution of marriage.
from each ward some men should keep watch as sentries
Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue,
in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on
as to the essence of justice which they contain, are un-
account of some greater utility.
changeable: but as to any determination by application to
Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very in-
individual actions—for instance, that this or that be mur-
tention of the lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of
der, theft or adultery, or not—in this point they admit of
the first table, which direct us to God, contain the very or-
change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in
der to the common and final good, which is God; while the
such matters as are exclusively of Divine institution, as
precepts of the second table contain the order of justice to
marriage and the like; sometimes also by human author-
be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to
ity, namely in such matters as are subject to human juris-
anyone, and that each one be given his due; for it is in this
diction: for in this respect men stand in the place of God:
sense that we are to take the precepts of the decalogue.
and yet not in all respects.
Consequently the precepts of the decalogue admit of no
Reply to Objection 4. This determination was an in-
dispensation whatever.
terpretation rather than a dispensation. For a man is not
1075
taken to break the Sabbath, if he does something neces-seqq.).
sary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves (Mat. 12:3,
Whether the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law?
Ia IIae q. 100 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that the mode of virtue
competent to judge of the inward movements of wills, ac-
falls under the precept of the law. For the mode of virtue
cording to Ps. 7:10: “The searcher of hearts and reins is
is that deeds of justice should be done justly, that deeds
God.”
of fortitude should be done bravely, and in like manner as
Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of
to the other virtues. But it is commanded (Dt. 26:20) that
virtue is in some sort regarded both by human and by Di-
“thou shalt follow justly after that which is just.” There-
vine law; in some respect it is regarded by the Divine, but
fore the mode of virtue falls under the precept.
not by the human law; and in another way, it is regarded
Objection 2. Further, that which belongs to the inten-
neither by the human nor by the Divine law. Now the
tion of the lawgiver comes chiefly under the precept. But
mode of virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher
the intention of the lawgiver is directed chiefly to make
states in Ethic. ii. The first is that man should act “know-
men virtuous, as stated in Ethic. ii: and it belongs to a vir-
ingly”: and this is subject to the judgment of both Divine
tuous man to act virtuously. Therefore the mode of virtue
and human law; because what a man does in ignorance,
falls under the precept.
he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and
Objection 3. Further, the mode of virtue seems to
Divine law, certain things are judged in respect of igno-
consist properly in working willingly and with pleasure.
rance to be punishable or pardonable.
But this falls under a precept of the Divine law, for it is
The second point is that a man should act “deliber-
written (Ps. 99:2): “Serve ye the Lord with gladness”;
ately,” i.e. “from choice, choosing that particular action
and (2 Cor. 9:7): “Not with sadness or necessity: for
for its own sake”; wherein a twofold internal movement is
God loveth a cheerful giver”; whereupon the gloss says:
implied, of volition and of intention, about which we have
“Whatever ye do, do gladly; and then you will do it well;
spoken above (Qq. 8, 12): and concerning these two, Di-
whereas if you do it sorrowfully, it is done in thee, not by
vine law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge.
thee.” Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept
For human law does not punish the man who wishes to
of the law.
slay, and slays not: whereas the Divine law does, accord-
On the contrary, No man can act as a virtuous man
ing to Mat. 5:22: “Whosoever is angry with his brother,
acts unless he has the habit of virtue, as the Philosopher
shall be in danger of the judgment.”
explains (Ethic. ii, 4; v, 8). Now whoever transgresses
The third point is that he should “act from a firm and
a precept of the law, deserves to be punished. Hence it
immovable principle”: which firmness belongs properly
would follow that a man who has not the habit of virtue,
to a habit, and implies that the action proceeds from a
would deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But
rooted habit. In this respect, the mode of virtue does not
this is contrary to the intention of the law, which aims at
fall under the precept either of Divine or of human law,
leading man to virtue, by habituating him to good works.
since neither by man nor by God is he punished as break-
Therefore the mode of virtue does not fall under the pre-
ing the law, who gives due honor to his parents and yet
cept.
has not the habit of filial piety.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 90, a. 3, ad 2),
Reply to Objection 1. The mode of doing acts of jus-
a precept of law has compulsory power. Hence that on
tice, which falls under the precept, is that they be done in
which the compulsion of the law is brought to bear, falls
accordance with right; but not that they be done from the
directly under the precept of the law. Now the law com-
habit of justice.
pels through fear of punishment, as stated in Ethic. x, 9,
Reply to Objection 2. The intention of the lawgiver
because that properly falls under the precept of the law,
is twofold. His aim, in the first place, is to lead men to
for which the penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine
something by the precepts of the law: and this is virtue.
law and human law are differently situated as to the ap-
Secondly, his intention is brought to bear on the matter
pointment of penalties; since the penalty of the law is in-
itself of the precept: and this is something leading or dis-
flicted only for those things which come under the judg-
posing to virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the
ment of the lawgiver; for the law punishes in accordance
precept and the matter of the precept are not the same: just
with the verdict given. Now man, the framer of human
as neither in other things is the end the same as that which
law, is competent to judge only of outward acts; because
conduces to the end.
“man seeth those things that appear,” according to 1 Kings
Reply to Objection 3. That works of virtue should be
16:7: while God alone, the framer of the Divine law, is
done without sadness, falls under the precept of the Di-
1076
vine law; for whoever works with sadness works unwill-der the precept, in so far as pleasure ensues from a habit;
ingly. But to work with pleasure, i.e. joyfully or cheer-
for “pleasure taken in a work proves the existence of a
fully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz. in so
habit,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. For an act may give plea-
far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one’s
sure either on account of its end, or through its proceeding
neighbor (which love falls under the precept), and love
from a becoming habit.
causes pleasure: and in another respect does not fall un-
Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law?
Ia IIae q. 100 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that the mode of charity
Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Be-
falls under the precept of the Divine law. For it is writ-
cause the act of charity can be considered in two ways.
ten (Mat. 19:17): “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the
First, as an act by itself: and thus it falls under the precept commandments”: whence it seems to follow that the ob-of the law which specially prescribes it, viz. “Thou shalt
servance of the commandments suffices for entrance into
love the Lord thy God,” and “Thou shalt love thy neigh-
life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into life,
bor.” In this sense, the first opinion is true. Because it is
except they be done from charity: for it is written (1 Cor.
not impossible to observe this precept which regards the
13:3): “If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor,
act of charity; since man can dispose himself to possess
and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not
charity, and when he possesses it, he can use it. Secondly,
charity, it profiteth me nothing.” Therefore the mode of
the act of charity can be considered as being the mode of
charity is included in the commandment.
the acts of the other virtues, i.e. inasmuch as the acts of
Objection 2. Further, the mode of charity consists
the other virtues are ordained to charity, which is “the end
properly speaking in doing all things for God. But this
of the commandment,” as stated in 1 Tim. i, 5: for it has
falls under the precept; for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
been said above (q. 12, a. 4) that the intention of the end is
10:31): “Do all to the glory of God.” Therefore the mode
a formal mode of the act ordained to that end. In this sense
of charity falls under the precept.
the second opinion is true in saying that the mode of char-
Objection 3. Further, if the mode of charity does not
ity does not fall under the precept, that is to say that this
fall under the precept, it follows that one can fulfil the pre-
commandment, “Honor thy father,” does not mean that a
cepts of the law without having charity. Now what can be
man must honor his father from charity, but merely that he
done without charity can be done without grace, which
must honor him. Wherefore he that honors his father, yet
is always united to charity. Therefore one can fulfil the
has not charity, does not break this precept: although he
precepts of the law without grace. But this is the error
does break the precept concerning the act of charity, for
of Pelagius, as Augustine declares (De Haeres. lxxxviii).
which reason he deserves to be punished.
Therefore the mode of charity is included in the com-
Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord did not say, “If thou
mandment.
wilt enter into life, keep one commandment”; but “keep”
On the contrary, Whoever breaks a commandment
all “the commandments”: among which is included the
sins mortally. If therefore the mode of charity falls under
commandment concerning the love of God and our neigh-
the precept, it follows that whoever acts otherwise than
bor.
from charity sins mortally. But whoever has not char-
Reply to Objection 2. The precept of charity con-
ity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it follows
tains the injunction that God should be loved from our
that whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he
whole heart, which means that all things would be referred
does, however good this may be in itself: which is absurd.
to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the precept of
I answer that, Opinions have been contrary on this
charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore
question. For some have said absolutely that the mode of
he that honors his father and mother, is bound to honor
charity comes under the precept; and yet that it is possible
them from charity, not in virtue of the precept, “Honor
for one not having charity to fulfil this precept: because
thy father and mother,” but in virtue of the precept, “Thou
he can dispose himself to receive charity from God. Nor
shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart.” And
(say they) does it follow that a man not having charity sins
since these are two affirmative precepts, not binding for all
mortally whenever he does something good of its kind:
times, they can be binding, each one at a different time: so
because it is an affirmative precept that binds one to act
that it may happen that a man fulfils the precept of honor-
from charity, and is binding not for all time, but only for
ing his father and mother, without at the same time break-
such time as one is in a state of charity. On the other hand,
ing the precept concerning the omission of the mode of
some have said that the mode of charity is altogether out-
charity.
side the precept.
Reply to Objection 3. Man cannot fulfil all the pre-
1077
cepts of the law, unless he fulfil the precept of charity, not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for man to fulfil the
which is impossible without charity. Consequently it is
law without grace.
Whether it is right to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides the deca-Ia IIae q. 100 a. 11
logue?
Objection 1. It would seem that it is wrong to distin-
stances, happens to be led astray concerning them: these
guish other moral precepts of the law besides the deca-
are the precepts of the decalogue. Again, there are some
logue.
Because, as Our Lord declared (Mat.
22:40),
precepts the reason of which is not so evident to everyone,
“on these two commandments” of charity “dependeth the
but only the wise; these are moral precepts added to the
whole law and the prophets.” But these two command-
decalogue, and given to the people by God through Moses
ments are explained by the ten commandments of the
and Aaron.
decalogue. Therefore there is no need for other moral pre-
But since the things that are evident are the principles
cepts.
whereby we know those that are not evident, these other
Objection 2. Further, the moral precepts are distinct
moral precepts added to the decalogue are reducible to the
from the judicial and ceremonial precepts, as stated above
precepts of the decalogue, as so many corollaries. Thus
(q. 99, Aa. 3,4). But the determinations of the general
the first commandment of the decalogue forbids the wor-
moral precepts belong to the judicial and ceremonial pre-
ship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts
cepts: and the general moral precepts are contained in the
forbidding things relating to worship of idols: thus it is
decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as
written (Dt. 18:10,11): “Neither let there be found among
stated above (a. 3). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay
you anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, making
down other moral precepts besides the decalogue.
them to pass through the fire:. . . neither let there by any
Objection 3. Further, the moral precepts are about the
wizard nor charmer, nor anyone that consulteth pythonic
acts of all the virtues, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore, as
spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from
the Law contains, besides the decalogue, moral precepts
the dead.” The second commandment forbids perjury. To
pertaining to religion, liberality, mercy, and chastity; so
this is added the prohibition of blasphemy (Lev. 24:15,
there should have been added some precepts pertaining to
seqq) and the prohibition of false doctrine (Dt. 13). To
the other virtues, for instance, fortitude, sobriety, and so
the third commandment are added all the ceremonial pre-
forth. And yet such is not the case. It is therefore un-
cepts. To the fourth commandment prescribing the honor
becoming to distinguish other moral precepts in the Law
due to parents, is added the precept about honoring the
besides those of the decalogue.
aged, according to Lev. 19:32: “Rise up before the hoary
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:8): “The law
head, and honor the person of the aged man”; and likewise
of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls.” But man is
all the precepts prescribing the reverence to be observed
preserved from the stain of sin, and his soul is converted
towards our betters, or kindliness towards our equals or in-
to God by other moral precepts besides those of the deca-
feriors. To the fifth commandment, which forbids murder,
logue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include other
is added the prohibition of hatred and of any kind of vio-
moral precepts.
lence inflicted on our neighbor, according to Lev. 19:16:
I answer that, As is evident from what has been stated
“Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neigh-
(q. 99, Aa. 3,4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts de-
bor”: likewise the prohibition against hating one’s brother
rive their force from their institution alone: since before
(Lev. 19:17): “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy
they were instituted, it seemed of no consequence whether
heart.” To the sixth commandment which forbids adul-
things were done in this or that way. But the moral pre-
tery, is added the prohibition about whoredom, according
cepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural
to Dt. 23:17: “There shall be no whore among the daugh-
reason, even if they were never included in the Law. Now
ters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel”;
of these there are three grades: for some are most cer-
and the prohibition against unnatural sins, according to
tain, and so evident as to need no promulgation; such as
Lev. 28:22,23: “Thou shalt not lie with mankind. . . thou
the commandments of the love of God and our neighbor,
shalt not copulate with any beast.” To the seventh com-
and others like these, as stated above (a. 3), which are,
mandment which prohibits theft, is added the precept for-
as it were, the ends of the commandments; wherefore no
bidding usury, according to Dt. 23:19: “Thou shalt not
man can have an erroneous judgment about them. Some
lend to thy brother money to usury”; and the prohibition
precepts are more detailed, the reason of which even an
against fraud, according to Dt. 25:13: “Thou shalt not
uneducated man can easily grasp; and yet they need to
have divers weights in thy bag”; and universally all prohi-
be promulgated, because human judgment, in a few in-
bitions relating to peculations and larceny. To the eighth
1078
commandment, forbidding false testimony, is added the precepts.
prohibition against false judgment, according to Ex. 23:2:
Reply to Objection 3. The precepts of a law are or-
“Neither shalt thou yield in judgment, to the opinion of
dained for the common good, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2).
the most part, to stray from the truth”; and the prohibition
And since those virtues which direct our conduct towards
against lying (Ex. 23:7): “Thou shalt fly lying,” and the
others pertain directly to the common good, as also does
prohibition against detraction, according to Lev. 19:16:
the virtue of chastity, in so far as the generative act con-
“Thou shalt not be a detractor, nor a whisperer among the
duces to the common good of the species; hence precepts
people.” To the other two commandments no further pre-
bearing directly on these virtues are given, both in the
cepts are added, because thereby are forbidden all kinds
decalogue and in addition thereto. As to the act of for-
of evil desires.
titude there are the order to be given by the commanders
Reply to Objection 1. The precepts of the decalogue
in the war, which is undertaken for the common good: as
are ordained to the love of God and our neighbor as per-
is clear from Dt. 20:3, where the priest is commanded (to
taining evidently to our duty towards them; but the other
speak thus): “Be not afraid, do not give back.” In like
precepts are so ordained as pertaining thereto less evi-
manner the prohibition of acts of gluttony is left to pa-
dently.
ternal admonition, since it is contrary to the good of the
Reply to Objection 2. It is in virtue of their institution household; hence it is said (Dt. 21:20) in the person of
that the ceremonial and judicial precepts “are determina-
parents: “He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth
tions of the precepts of the decalogue,” not by reason of
himself to revelling, and to debauchery and banquetings.”
a natural instinct, as in the case of the superadded moral
Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?
Ia IIae q. 100 a. 12
Objection 1. It would seem that the moral precepts
xxii, 24), “even the life of that people foretold and fore-
of the Old Law justified man. Because the Apostle says
shadowed Christ.”
(Rom. 2:13): “For not the hearers of the Law are justified
But if we speak of justification properly so called, then
before God, but the doers of the Law shall be justified.”
we must notice that it can be considered as in the habit
But the doers of the Law are those who fulfil the precepts
or as in the act: so that accordingly justification may be
of the Law. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the
taken in two ways. First, according as man is made just,
Law was a cause of justification.
by becoming possessed of the habit of justice: secondly,
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Lev. 18:5): “Keep
according as he does works of justice, so that in this sense
My laws and My judgments, which if a man do, he shall
justification is nothing else than the execution of justice.
live in them.” But the spiritual life of man is through jus-
Now justice, like the other virtues, may denote either the
tice. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law
acquired or the infused virtue, as is clear from what has
was a cause of justification.
been stated (q. 63, a. 4). The acquired virtue is caused
Objection 3. Further, the Divine law is more effica-
by works; but the infused virtue is caused by God Him-
cious than human law. But human law justifies man; since
self through His grace. The latter is true justice, of which
there is a kind of justice consisting in fulfilling the pre-
we are speaking now, and in this respect of which a man
cepts of law. Therefore the precepts of the Law justified
is said to be just before God, according to Rom. 4:2:
man.
“If Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): “The
glory, but not before God.” Hence this justice could not
letter killeth”: which, according to Augustine (De Spir. et
be caused by moral precepts, which are about human ac-
Lit. xiv), refers even to the moral precepts. Therefore the
tions: wherefore the moral precepts could not justify man
moral precepts did not cause justice.
by causing justice.
I answer that, Just as “healthy” is said properly and
If, on the other hand, by justification we understand
first of that which is possessed of health, and secondarily
the execution of justice, thus all the precepts of the Law
of that which is a sign or a safeguard of health; so jus-
justified man, but in various ways. Because the ceremo-
tification means first and properly the causing of justice;
nial precepts taken as a whole contained something just in
while secondarily and improperly, as it were, it may de-
itself, in so far as they aimed at offering worship to God;
note a sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice be
whereas taken individually they contained that which is
taken in the last two ways, it is evident that it was con-
just, not in itself, but by being a determination of the Di-
ferred by the precepts of the Law; in so far, to wit, as they
vine law. Hence it is said of these precepts that they did
disposed men to the justifying grace of Christ, which they
not justify man save through the devotion and obedience
also signified, because as Augustine says (Contra Faust.
of those who complied with them. On the other hand the
1079
moral and judicial precepts, either in general or also in Reply to Objection 2. The man who fulfilled the pre-particular, contained that which is just in itself: but the
cepts of the Law is said to live in them, because he did
moral precepts contained that which is just in itself ac-
not incur the penalty of death, which the Law inflicted on
cording to that “general justice” which is “every virtue”
its transgressors: in this sense the Apostle quotes this pas-
according to Ethic. v, 1: whereas the judicial precepts be-
sage (Gal. 3:12).
longed to “special justice,” which is about contracts con-
Reply to Objection 3. The precepts of human law
nected with the human mode of life, between one man and
justify man by acquired justice: it is not about this that
another.
we are inquiring now, but only about that justice which is
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle takes justification
before God.
for the execution of justice.
1080
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 101
Of the Ceremonial Precepts in Themselves
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the ceremonial precepts: and first we must consider them in themselves; secondly, their cause; thirdly, their duration. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The nature of the ceremonial precepts;
(2) Whether they are figurative?
(3) Whether there should have been many of them?
(4) Of their various kinds.
Whether the nature of the ceremonial precepts consists in their pertaining to the wor-Ia IIae q. 101 a. 1
ship of God?
Objection 1. It would seem that the nature of the cer-
On the contrary, It is written (Ex.
18:19,20):
emonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to the
“Be thou to the people in those things that pertain to
worship of God. Because, in the Old Law, the Jews were
God. . . and. . . shew the people the ceremonies and the
given certain precepts about abstinence from food (Lev.
manner of worshipping.”
11); and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes,
I answer that, As stated above (q. 99, a. 4), the cere-
e.g. (Lev. 19:19): “Thou shalt not wear a garment that is
monial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts
woven of two sorts”; and again (Num. 15:38): “To make
whereby man is directed to God, just as the judicial pre-
to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments.”
cepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby he
But these are not moral precepts; since they do not remain
is directed to his neighbor. Now man is directed to God
in the New Law. Nor are they judicial precepts; since they
by the worship due to Him. Wherefore those precepts are
do not pertain to the pronouncing of judgment between
properly called ceremonial, which pertain to the Divine
man and man. Therefore they are ceremonial precepts.
worship. The reason for their being so called was given
Yet they seem in no way to pertain to the worship of God.
above (q. 99, a. 3), when we established the distinction
Therefore the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not
between the ceremonial and the other precepts.
consist in their pertaining to Divine worship.
Reply to Objection 1. The Divine worship includes
Objection 2. Further, some state that the ceremonial
not only sacrifices and the like, which seem to be directed
precepts are those which pertain to solemnities; as though
to God immediately, but also those things whereby His
they were so called from the “cerei” [candles] which are
worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him: thus too
lit up on those occasions. But many other things besides
in other matters, whatever is preparatory to the end comes
solemnities pertain to the worship of God. Therefore it
under the science whose object is the end. Accordingly
does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called
those precepts of the Law which regard the clothing and
from their pertaining to the Divine worship.
food of God’s worshippers, and other such matters, per-
Objection 3. Further, some say that the ceremonial
tain to a certain preparation of the ministers, with the view
precepts are patterns, i.e. rules, of salvation: because the
of fitting them for the Divine worship: just as those who
Greek chaire is the same as the Latin “salve.” But all the administer to a king make use of certain special obser-precepts of the Law are rules of salvation, and not only
vances. Consequently such are contained under the cere-
those that pertain to the worship of God. Therefore not
monial precepts.
only those precepts which pertain to Divine worship are
Reply to Objection 2. The alleged explanation of the
called ceremonial.
name does not seem very probable: especially as the Law
Objection 4. Further, Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Per-
does not contain many instances of the lighting of candles
plex. iii) that the ceremonial precepts are those for which
in solemnities; since, even the lamps of the Candlestick
there is no evident reason. But there is evident reason for
were furnished with “oil of olives,” as stated in Lev. 24:2.
many things pertaining to the worship of God; such as
Nevertheless we may say that all things pertaining to the
the observance of the Sabbath, the feasts of the Passover
Divine worship were more carefully observed on solemn
and of the Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason
festivals: so that all ceremonial precepts may be included
for which is set down in the Law. Therefore the ceremo-
under the observance of solemnities.
nial precepts are not those which pertain to the worship of
Reply to Objection 3. Neither does this explanation
God.
of the name appear to be very much to the point, since
1081
the word “ceremony” is not Greek but Latin. We may say, that they are called ceremonial precisely because there is
however, that, since man’s salvation is from God, those
no evident reason for them; this is a kind of consequence.
precepts above all seem to be rules of salvation, which
For, since the precepts referring to the Divine worship
direct man to God: and accordingly those which refer to
must needs be figurative, as we shall state further on (a. 2),
Divine worship are called ceremonial precepts.
the consequence is that the reason for them is not so very
Reply to Objection 4. This explanation of the cere-
evident.
monial precepts has a certain amount of probability: not
Whether the ceremonial precepts are figurative?
Ia IIae q. 101 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the ceremonial pre-
flesh have rejoiced in the living God.” And as the body is
cepts are not figurative. For it is the duty of every teacher
ordained to God through the soul, so the outward worship
to express himself in such a way as to be easily under-
is ordained to the internal worship. Now interior worship
stood, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 4,10)
consists in the soul being united to God by the intellect
and this seems very necessary in the framing of a law:
and affections. Wherefore according to the various ways
because precepts of law are proposed to the populace; for
in which the intellect and affections of the man who wor-
which reason a law should be manifest, as Isidore declares
ships God are rightly united to God, his external actions
(Etym. v, 21). If therefore the precepts of the Law were
are applied in various ways to the Divine worship.
given as figures of something, it seems unbecoming that
For in the state of future bliss, the human intellect will
Moses should have delivered these precepts without ex-
gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself. Wherefore the external
plaining what they signified.
worship will not consist in anything figurative, but solely
Objection 2. Further, whatever is done for the wor-
in the praise of God, proceeding from the inward knowl-
ship of God, should be entirely free from unfittingness.
edge and affection, according to Is. 51:3: “Joy and glad-
But the performance of actions in representation of oth-
ness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of
ers, seems to savor of the theatre or of the drama: because
praise.”
formerly the actions performed in theatres were done to
But in the present state of life, we are unable to gaze
represent the actions of others. Therefore it seems that
on the Divine Truth in Itself, and we need the ray of Di-
such things should not be done for the worship of God.
vine light to shine upon us under the form of certain sensi-
But the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the Divine
ble figures, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. i); in various
worship, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore they should not
ways, however, according to the various states of human
be figurative.
knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the Di-
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion iii,
vine Truth manifest in Itself, nor was the way leading to
iv) that “God is worshipped chiefly by faith, hope, and
that manifestation as yet opened out, as the Apostle de-
charity.” But the precepts of faith, hope, and charity are
clares (Heb. 9:8). Hence the external worship of the Old
not figurative. Therefore the ceremonial precepts should
Law needed to be figurative not only of the future truth to
not be figurative.
be manifested in our heavenly country, but also of Christ,
Objection 4. Further, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:24): “God
Who is the way leading to that heavenly manifestation.
is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in
But under the New Law this way is already revealed: and
spirit and in truth.” But a figure is not the very truth:
therefore it needs no longer to be foreshadowed as some-
in fact one is condivided with the other. Therefore the
thing future, but to be brought to our minds as something
ceremonial precepts, which refer to the Divine worship,
past or present: and the truth of the glory to come, which
should not be figurative.
is not yet revealed, alone needs to be foreshadowed. This
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:16,17):
is what the Apostle says (Heb. 11:1): “The Law has
“Let no man. . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect
[Vulg.: ‘having’] a shadow of the good things to come,
of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths,
not the very image of the things”: for a shadow is less
which are a shadow of things to come.”
than an image; so that the image belongs to the New Law,
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1; q. 99, Aa. 3,4),
but the shadow to the Old.
the ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the wor-
Reply to Objection 1. The things of God are not to
ship of God. Now the Divine worship is twofold: internal,
be revealed to man except in proportion to his capacity:
and external. For since man is composed of soul and body,
else he would be in danger of downfall, were he to de-
each of these should be applied to the worship of God; the
spise what he cannot grasp. Hence it was more beneficial
soul by an interior worship; the body by an outward wor-
that the Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured
ship: hence it is written (Ps. 83:3): “My heart and my
people under a veil of figures, that thus they might know
1082
them at least implicitly by using those figures to the honor sensible figures.
of God.
Reply to Objection 3. Augustine is speaking there
Reply to Objection 2. Just as human reason fails to
of internal worship; to which, however, external worship
grasp poetical expressions on account of their being lack-
should be ordained, as stated above.
ing in truth, so does it fail to grasp Divine things perfectly, The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection: be-on account of the sublimity of the truth they contain: and
cause men were taught by Him to practice more perfectly
therefore in both cases there is need of signs by means of
the spiritual worship of God.
Whether there should have been man ceremonial precepts?
Ia IIae q. 101 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that there should not have
And since men served idols in many ways, it was neces-
been many ceremonial precepts. For those things which
sary on the other hand to devise many means of repressing
conduce to an end should be proportionate to that end.
every single one: and again, to lay many obligations on
But the ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Aa. 1,2),
such like men, in order that being burdened, as it were, by
are ordained to the worship of God, and to the foreshad-
their duties to the Divine worship, they might have no time
owing of Christ. Now “there is but one God, of Whom
for the service of idols. As to those who were inclined to
are all things. . . and one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are
good, it was again necessary that there should be many
all things” (1 Cor. 8:6). Therefore there should not have
ceremonial precepts; both because thus their mind turned
been many ceremonial precepts.
to God in many ways, and more continually; and because
Objection 2. Further, the great number of the ceremo-
the mystery of Christ, which was foreshadowed by these
nial precepts was an occasion of transgression, according
ceremonial precepts, brought many boons to the world,
to the words of Peter (Acts 15:10): “Why tempt you God,
and afforded men many considerations, which needed to
to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which nei-
be signified by various ceremonies.
ther our fathers nor we have been able to bear?” Now
Reply to Objection 1. When that which conduces
the transgression of the Divine precepts is an obstacle to
to an end is sufficient to conduce thereto, then one such
man’s salvation. Since, therefore, every law should con-
thing suffices for one end: thus one remedy, if it be effi-
duce to man’s salvation, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3), it
cacious, suffices sometimes to restore men to health, and
seems that the ceremonial precepts should not have been
then the remedy needs not to be repeated. But when that
given in great number.
which conduces to an end is weak and imperfect, it needs
Objection 3. Further, the ceremonial precepts referred
to be multiplied: thus many remedies are given to a sick
to the outward and bodily worship of God, as stated above
man, when one is not enough to heal him. Now the cer-
(a. 2). But the Law should have lessened this bodily wor-
emonies of the Old Law were weak and imperfect, both
ship: since it directed men to Christ, Who taught them to
for representing the mystery of Christ, on account of its
worship God “in spirit and in truth,” as stated in Jn. 4:23.
surpassing excellence; and for subjugating men’s minds
Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial
to God. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18,19): “There
precepts.
is a setting aside of the former commandment because
On the contrary, (Osee 8:12): “I shall write to them
of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof, for the law
[Vulg.: ‘him’] My manifold laws”; and (Job 11:6): “That
brought nothing to perfection.” Consequently these cere-
He might show thee the secrets of His wisdom, and that
monies needed to be in great number.
His Law is manifold.”
Reply to Objection 2. A wise lawgiver should suf-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 96, a. 1), every law
fer lesser transgressions, that the greater may be avoided.
is given to a people. Now a people contains two kinds of
And therefore, in order to avoid the sin of idolatry, and the
men: some, prone to evil, who have to be coerced by the
pride which would arise in the hearts of the Jews, were
precepts of the law, as stated above (q. 95, a. 1); some,
they to fulfil all the precepts of the Law, the fact that they
inclined to good, either from nature or from custom, or
would in consequence find many occasions of disobedi-
rather from grace; and the like have to be taught and im-
ence did not prevent God from giving them many cere-
proved by means of the precepts of the law. Accordingly,
monial precepts.
with regard to both kinds of the law. Accordingly, with
Reply to Objection 3. The Old Law lessened bodily
regard to both kinds of men it was expedient that the Old
worship in many ways. Thus it forbade sacrifices to be
Law should contain many ceremonial precepts. For in that
offered in every place and by any person. Many such like
people there were many prone to idolatry; wherefore it
things did it enact for the lessening of bodily worship; as
was necessary to recall them by means of ceremonial pre-
Rabbi Moses, the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex. iii).
cepts from the worship of idols to the worship of God.
Nevertheless it behooved not to attenuate the bodily wor-
1083
ship of God so much as to allow men to fall away into the worship of idols.
Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law are suitably divided into sacrifices, sacred Ia IIae q. 101 a. 4
things, sacraments, and observances?
Objection 1. It would seem that the ceremonies of
nial precepts are ordained to the Divine worship. Now in
the Old Law are unsuitably divided into “sacrifices, sacred
this worship we may consider the worship itself, the wor-
things, sacraments, and observances.” For the ceremonies
shippers, and the instruments of worship. The worship
of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ. But this was done
consists specially in “sacrifices,” which are offered up in
only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed the sacrifice in
honor of God. The instruments of worship refer to the
which Christ “delivered Himself an oblation and a sacri-
“sacred things,” such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so
fice to God” (Eph. 5:2). Therefore none but the sacrifices
forth. With regard to the worshippers two points may be
were ceremonies.
considered. The first point is their preparation for Divine
Objection 2. Further, the Old Law was ordained to
worship, which is effected by a sort of consecration either
the New. But in the New Law the sacrifice is the Sacra-
of the people or of the ministers; and to this the “sacra-
ment of the Altar. Therefore in the Old Law there should
ments” refer. The second point is their particular mode
be no distinction between “sacrifices” and “sacraments.”
of life, whereby they are distinguished from those who do
Objection 3. Further, a “sacred thing” is something
not worship God: and to this pertain the “observances,”
dedicated to God: in which sense the tabernacle and its
for instance, in matters of food, clothing, and so forth.
vessels were said to be consecrated. But all the ceremonial
Reply to Objection 1. It was necessary for the sacri-
precepts were ordained to the worship of God, as stated
fices to be offered both in some certain place and by some
above (a. 1). Therefore all ceremonies were sacred things.
certain men: and all this pertained to the worship of God.
Therefore “sacred things” should not be taken as a part of
Wherefore just as their sacrifices signified Christ the vic-
the ceremonies.
tim, so too their sacraments and sacred things of the New
Objection 4. Further, “observances” are so called
Law; while their observances foreshadowed the mode of
from having to be observed. But all the precepts of the
life of the people under the New Law: all of which things
Law had to be observed: for it is written (Dt. 8:11):
pertain to Christ.
“Observe [Douay: ‘Take heed’] and beware lest at any
Reply to Objection 2. The sacrifice of the New Law,
time thou forget the Lord thy God, and neglect His com-
viz. the Eucharist, contains Christ Himself, the Author
mandments and judgments and ceremonies.” Therefore
of our Sanctification: for He sanctified “the people by
the “observances” should not be considered as a part of
His own blood” (Heb. 13:12). Hence this Sacrifice is
the ceremonies.
also a sacrament. But the sacrifices of the Old Law did
Objection 5. Further, the solemn festivals are reck-
not contain Christ, but foreshadowed Him; hence they
oned as part of the ceremonial: since they were a shadow
are not called sacraments. In order to signify this there
of things to come (Col. 2:16,17): and the same may be
were certain sacraments apart from the sacrifices of the
said of the oblations and gifts, as appears from the words
Old Law, which sacraments were figures of the sanctifica-
of the Apostle (Heb. 9:9): and yet these do not seem to be
tion to come. Nevertheless to certain consecrations certain
inclined in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the
sacrifices were united.
above division of ceremonies is unsuitable.
Reply to Objection 3. The sacrifices and sacraments
On the contrary, In the Old Law each of the above
were of course sacred things. But certain things were sa-
is called a ceremony. For the sacrifices are called cer-
cred, through being dedicated to the Divine worship, and
emonies (Num. 15:24): “They shall offer a calf. . . and
yet were not sacrifices or sacraments: wherefore they re-
the sacrifices and libations thereof, as the ceremonies re-
tained the common designation of sacred things.
quire.”
Of the sacrament of Order it is written (Lev.
Reply to Objection 4. Those things which pertained
7:35): “This is the anointing of Aaron and his sons in
to the mode of life of the people who worshipped God, re-
the ceremonies.” Of sacred things also it is written (Ex.
tained the common designation of observances, in so far
38:21): “These are the instruments of the tabernacle of
as they fell short of the above. For they were not called
the testimony. . . in the ceremonies of the Levites.” And
sacred things, because they had no immediate connection
again of the observances it is written (3 Kings 9:6): “If
with the worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its
you. . . shall turn away from following Me, and will not
vessels had. But by a sort of consequence they were mat-
observe [Douay: ‘keep’] My. . . ceremonies which I have
ters of ceremony, in so far as they affected the fitness of
set before you.”
the people who worshipped God.
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2), the ceremo-
Reply to Objection 5. Just as the sacrifices were of-
1084
fered in a fixed place, so were they offered at fixed times: tle says (Heb. 5:1): “Every high-priest taken from among
for which reason the solemn festivals seem to be reck-
men, is ordained for men in things that appertain to God,
oned among the sacred things. The oblations and gifts
that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices.”
are counted together with the sacrifices; hence the Apos-
1085
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 102
Of the Causes of the Ceremonial Precepts
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the causes of the ceremonial precepts: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?
(2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or figurative?
(3) The causes of the sacrifices;
(4) The causes of the sacrifices;
(5) The causes of the sacred things;
(6) The causes of the observances.
Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?
Ia IIae q. 102 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there was no cause
der in matters of action: since those things that happen
for the ceremonial precepts. Because on Eph. 2:15, “Mak-
by chance outside the intention of the end, or which are
ing void the law of the commandments,” the gloss says,
not done seriously but for fun, are said to be inordinate.
(i.e.) “making void the Old Law as to the carnal obser-
Secondly, that which is done in view of the end should
vances, by substituting decrees, i.e. evangelical precepts,
be proportionate to the end. From this it follows that the
which are based on reason.” But if the observances of the
reason for whatever conduces to the end is taken from the
Old Law were based on reason, it would have been use-
end: thus the reason for the disposition of a saw is taken
less to void them by the reasonable decrees of the New
from cutting, which is its end, as stated in Phys. ii, 9.
Law. Therefore there was no reason for the ceremonial
Now it is evident that the ceremonial precepts, like all the
observances of the Old Law.
other precepts of the Law, were institutions of Divine wis-
Objection 2. Further, the Old Law succeeded the law
dom: hence it is written (Dt. 4:6): “This is your wisdom
of nature. But in the law of nature there was a precept
and understanding in the sight of nations.” Consequently
for which there was no reason save that man’s obedience
we must needs say that the ceremonial precepts were or-
might be tested; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 6,13),
dained to a certain end, wherefrom their reasonable causes
concerning the prohibition about the tree of life. There-
can be gathered.
fore in the Old Law there should have been some precepts
Reply to Objection 1. It may be said there was no
for the purpose of testing man’s obedience, having no rea-
reason for the observances of the Old Law, in the sense
son in themselves.
that there was no reason in the very nature of the thing
Objection 3. Further, man’s works are called moral
done: for instance that a garment should not be made of
according as they proceed from reason. If therefore there
wool and linen. But there could be a reason for them in
is any reason for the ceremonial precepts, they would not
relation to something else: namely, in so far as something
differ from the moral precepts. It seems therefore that
was signified or excluded thereby. On the other hand, the
there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts: for the
decrees of the New Law, which refer chiefly to faith and
reason of a precept is taken from some cause.
the love of God, are reasonable from the very nature of
On the contrary, It is written (Ps.
18:9): “The
the act.
commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the
Reply to Objection 2. The reason for the prohibition
eyes.” But the ceremonial precepts are commandments of
concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil was
God. Therefore they are lightsome: and yet they would
not that this tree was naturally evil: and yet this prohibi-
not be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore the
tion was reasonable in its relation to something else, in as
ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause.
much as it signified something. And so also the ceremo-
I answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher
nial precepts of the Old Law were reasonable on account
(Metaph. i, 2), it is the function of a “wise man to do
of their relation to something else.
everything in order,” those things which proceed from the
Reply to Objection 3. The moral precepts in their
Divine wisdom must needs be well ordered, as the Apostle
very nature have reasonable causes: as for instance, “Thou
states (Rom. 13:1). Now there are two conditions required
shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal.” But the ceremonial
for things to be well ordered. First, that they be ordained
precepts have a reasonable cause in their relation to some-
to their due end, which is the principle of the whole or-
thing else, as stated above.
1086
Whether the ceremonial precepts have a literal cause or merely a figurative cause?
Ia IIae q. 102 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the ceremonial pre-
ceremonial precepts of the Old Law can be taken in two
cepts have not a literal, but merely a figurative cause. For
ways. First, in respect of the Divine worship which was to
among the ceremonial precepts, the chief was circumci-
be observed for that particular time: and these reasons are
sion and the sacrifice of the paschal lamb. But neither of
literal: whether they refer to the shunning of idolatry; or
these had any but a figurative cause: because each was
recall certain Divine benefits; or remind men of the Divine
given as a sign. For it is written (Gn. 17:11): “You shall
excellence; or point out the disposition of mind which was
circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, that it may be a sign
then required in those who worshipped God. Secondly,
of the covenant between Me and you”: and of the celebra-
their reasons can be gathered from the point of view of
tion of the Passover it is written (Ex. 13:9): “It shall be
their being ordained to foreshadow Christ: and thus their
as a sign in thy hand, and as a memorial before thy eyes.”
reasons are figurative and mystical: whether they be taken
Therefore much more did the other ceremonial precepts
from Christ Himself and the Church, which pertains to the
have none but a figurative reason.
allegorical sense; or to the morals of the Christian people,
Objection 2. Further, an effect is proportionate to its
which pertains to the moral sense; or to the state of fu-
cause. But all the ceremonial precepts are figurative, as
ture glory, in as much as we are brought thereto by Christ,
stated above (q. 101, a. 2). Therefore they have no other
which refers to the anagogical sense.
than a figurative cause.
Reply to Objection 1. Just as the use of metaphor-
Objection 3. Further, if it be a matter of indifference
ical expressions in Scripture belongs to the literal sense,
whether a certain thing, considered in itself, be done in
because the words are employed in order to convey that
a particular way or not, it seems that it has not a literal
particular meaning; so also the meaning of those legal cer-
cause. Now there are certain points in the ceremonial pre-
emonies which commemorated certain Divine benefits, on
cepts, which appear to be a matter of indifference, as to
account of which they were instituted, and of others sim-
whether they be done in one way or in another: for in-
ilar which belonged to that time, does not go beyond the
stance, the number of animals to be offered, and other
order of literal causes. Consequently when we assert that
such particular circumstances. Therefore there is no lit-
the cause of the celebration of the Passover was its signi-
eral cause for the precepts of the Old Law.
fication of the delivery from Egypt, or that circumcision
On the contrary, Just as the ceremonial precepts fore-
was a sign of God’s covenant with Abraham, we assign
shadowed Christ, so did the stories of the Old Testament:
the literal cause.
for it is written (1 Cor. 10:11) that “all (these things) hap-
Reply to Objection 2. This argument would avail if
pened to them in figure.” Now in the stories of the Old
the ceremonial precepts had been given merely as figures
Testament, besides the mystical or figurative, there is the
of things to come, and not for the purpose of worshipping
literal sense. Therefore the ceremonial precepts had also
God then and there.
literal, besides their figurative causes.
Reply to Objection 3. As we have stated when speak-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the reason for
ing of human laws (q. 96, Aa. 1 ,6), there is a reason for
whatever conduces to an end must be taken from that end.
them in the abstract, but not in regard to particular condi-
Now the end of the ceremonial precepts was twofold: for
tions, which depend on the judgment of those who frame
they were ordained to the Divine worship, for that partic-
them; so also many particular determinations in the cer-
ular time, and to the foreshadowing of Christ; just as the
emonies of the Old Law have no literal cause, but only a
words of the prophets regarded the time being in such a
figurative cause; whereas in the abstract they have a literal
way as to be utterances figurative of the time to come, as
cause.
Jerome says on Osee 1:3. Accordingly the reasons for the
Whether a suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies which pertained to sac-Ia IIae q. 102 a. 3
rifices?
Objection 1. It would seem that no suitable cause
Therefore such sacrifices were unfittingly offered to God.
can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to sacri-
Objection 2. Further, only three kinds of quadrupeds
fices. For those things which were offered in sacrifice,
were offered in sacrifice to God, viz. oxen, sheep and
are those which are necessary for sustaining human life:
goats; of birds, generally the turtledove and the dove; but
such as certain animals and certain loaves. But God needs
specially, in the cleansing of a leper, an offering was made
no such sustenance; according to Ps. 49:13: “Shall I eat
of sparrows. Now many other animals are more noble
the flesh of bullocks? Or shall I drink the blood of goats?”
than these. Since therefore whatever is best should be of-
1087
fered to God, it seems that not only of these three should Therefore it does not seem to be suitable that products of
sacrifices have been offered to Him.
the soil should be offered up in various ways; for some-
Objection 3. Further, just as man has received from
times an offering was made of ears of corn, sometimes of
God the dominion over birds and beasts, so also has he
flour, sometimes of bread, this being baked sometimes in
received dominion over fishes. Consequently it was unfit-
an oven, sometimes in a pan, sometimes on a gridiron.
ting for fishes to be excluded from the divine sacrifices.
Objection 13. Further, whatever things are service-
Objection 4. Further, turtledoves and doves indiffer-
able to us should be recognized as coming from God. It
ently are commanded to be offered up. Since then the
was therefore unbecoming that besides animals, nothing
young of the dove are commanded to be offered, so also
but bread, wine, oil, incense, and salt should be offered to
should the young of the turtledove.
God.
Objection 5. Further, God is the Author of life, not
Objection 14. Further, bodily sacrifices denote the in-
only of men, but also of animals, as is clear from Gn. 1:20,
ward sacrifice of the heart, whereby man offers his soul
seqq. Now death is opposed to life. Therefore it was fit-
to God. But in the inward sacrifice, the sweetness, which
ting that living animals rather than slain animals should
is denoted by honey, surpasses the pungency which salt
be offered to God, especially as the Apostle admonishes
represents; for it is written (Ecclus. 24:27): “My spirit
us (Rom. 12:1), to present our bodies “a living sacrifice,
is sweet above honey.” Therefore it was unbecoming that
holy, pleasing unto God.”
the use of honey, and of leaven which makes bread savory,
Objection 6. Further, if none but slain animals were
should be forbidden in a sacrifice; while the use was pre-
offered in sacrifice to God, it seems that it mattered not
scribed, of salt which is pungent, and of incense which has
how they were slain. Therefore it was unfitting that the
a bitter taste. Consequently it seems that things pertain-
manner of immolation should be determined, especially
ing to the ceremonies of the sacrifices have no reasonable
as regards birds (Lev. 1:15, seqq.).
cause.
Objection 7. Further, every defect in an animal is a
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 1:13): “The priest
step towards corruption and death. If therefore slain an-
shall offer it all and burn it all upon the altar, for a holo-
imals were offered to God, it was unreasonable to forbid
caust, and most sweet savor to the Lord.” Now accord-
the offering of an imperfect animal, e.g. a lame, or a blind,
ing to Wis. 7:28, “God loveth none but him that dwelleth
or otherwise defective animal.
with wisdom”: whence it seems to follow that whatever is
Objection 8. Further, those who offer victims to God
acceptable to God is wisely done. Therefore these cere-
should partake thereof, according to the words of the
monies of the sacrifices were wisely done, as having rea-
Apostle (1 Cor. 10:18): “Are not they that eat of the sacri-
sonable causes.
fices partakers of the altar?” It was therefore unbecoming
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the ceremonies
for the offerers to be denied certain parts of the victims,
of the Old Law had a twofold cause, viz. a literal cause,
namely, the blood, the fat, the breastbone and the right
according as they were intended for Divine worship; and
shoulder.
a figurative or mystical cause, according as they were in-
Objection 9. Further, just as holocausts were offered
tended to foreshadow Christ: and on either hand the cer-
up in honor of God, so also were the peace-offerings and
emonies pertaining to the sacrifices can be assigned to a
sin-offerings. But no female animals was offered up to
fitting cause.
God as a holocaust, although holocausts were offered of
For, according as the ceremonies of the sacrifices were
both quadrupeds and birds. Therefore it was inconsis-
intended for the divine worship, the causes of the sacri-
tent that female animals should be offered up in peace-
fices can be taken in two ways. First, in so far as the sacri-
offerings and sin-offerings, and that nevertheless birds
fice represented the directing of the mind to God, to which
should not be offered up in peace-offerings.
the offerer of the sacrifice was stimulated. Now in order
Objection 10. Further, all the peace-offerings seem
to direct his mind to God aright, man must recognize that
to be of one kind. Therefore it was unfitting to make
whatever he has is from God as from its first principle,
a distinction among them, so that it was forbidden to
and direct it to God as its last end. This was denoted in
eat the flesh of certain peace-offerings on the following
the offerings and sacrifices, by the fact that man offered
day, while it was allowed to eat the flesh of other peace-
some of his own belongings in honor of God, as though
offerings, as laid down in Lev. 7:15, seqq.
in recognition of his having received them from God, ac-
Objection 11. Further, all sins agree in turning us
cording to the saying of David (1 Paral. xxix, 14): “All
from God. Therefore, in order to reconcile us to God,
things are Thine: and we have given Thee what we re-
one kind of sacrifice should have been offered up for all
ceived of Thy hand.” Wherefore in offering up sacrifices
sins.
man made protestation that God is the first principle of
Objection 12. Further, all animals that were offered
the creation of all things, and their last end, to which all
up in sacrifice, were offered up in one way, viz. slain.
things must be directed. And since, for the human mind to
1088
be directed to God aright, it must recognize no first author in sacrifice to their gods. Hence it is written (Ex. 8:26):
of things other than God, nor place its end in any other;
“We shall sacrifice the abominations of the Egyptians to
for this reason it was forbidden in the Law to offer sac-
the Lord our God.” For they worshipped the sheep; they
rifice to any other but God, according to Ex. 22:20: “He
reverenced the ram (because demons appeared under the
that sacrificeth to gods, shall be put to death, save only to
form thereof); while they employed oxen for agriculture,
the Lord.” Wherefore another reasonable cause may be
which was reckoned by them as something sacred.
assigned to the ceremonies of the sacrifices, from the fact
Secondly, this was suitable for the aforesaid right or-
that thereby men were withdrawn from offering sacrifices
dering of man’s mind to God: and in two ways. First, be-
to idols. Hence too it is that the precepts about the sacri-
cause it is chiefly by means of these animals that human
fices were not given to the Jewish people until after they
life is sustained: and moreover they are most clean, and
had fallen into idolatry, by worshipping the molten calf:
partake of a most clean food: whereas other animals are
as though those sacrifices were instituted, that the people,
either wild, and not deputed to ordinary use among men:
being ready to offer sacrifices, might offer those sacrifices
or, if they be tame, they have unclean food, as pigs and
to God rather than to idols. Thus it is written (Jer. 7:22):
geese: and nothing but what is clean should be offered to
“I spake not to your fathers and I commanded them not,
God. These birds especially were offered in sacrifice be-
in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt,
cause there were plenty of them in the land of promise.
concerning the matter of burnt-offerings and sacrifices.”
Secondly, because the sacrificing of these animals repre-
Now of all the gifts which God vouchsafed to mankind
sented purity of heart. Because as the gloss says on Lev.
after they had fallen away by sin, the chief is that He
1, “We offer a calf, when we overcome the pride of the
gave His Son; wherefore it is written (Jn. 3:16): “God
flesh; a lamb, when we restrain our unreasonable motions;
so loved the world, as to give His only-begotten Son; that
a goat, when we conquer wantonness; a turtledove, when
whosoever believeth in Him, may not perish, but may have
we keep chaste; unleavened bread, when we feast on the
life everlasting.” Consequently the chief sacrifice is that
unleavened bread of sincerity.” And it is evident that the
whereby Christ Himself “delivered Himself. . . to God for
dove denotes charity and simplicity of heart.
an odor of sweetness” (Eph. 5:2). And for this reason
Thirdly, it was fitting that these animals should be of-
all the other sacrifices of the Old Law were offered up
fered, that they might foreshadow Christ. Because, as the
in order to foreshadow this one individual and paramount
gloss observes, “Christ is offered in the calf, to denote
sacrifice—the imperfect forecasting the perfect. Hence
the strength of the cross; in the lamb, to signify His inno-
the Apostle says (Heb. 10:11) that the priest of the Old
cence; in the ram, to foreshadow His headship; and in the
Law “often” offered “the same sacrifices, which can never
goat, to signify the likeness of ‘sinful flesh’∗. The turtle-
take away sins: but” Christ offered “one sacrifice for sins,
dove and dove denoted the union of the two natures”; or
for ever.” And since the reason of the figure is taken from
else the turtledove signified chastity; while the dove was
that which the figure represents, therefore the reasons of
a figure of charity. “The wheat-flour foreshadowed the
the figurative sacrifices of the Old Law should be taken
sprinkling of believers with the water of Baptism.”
from the true sacrifice of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3. Fish through living in water
Reply to Objection 1. God did not wish these sacri-
are further removed from man than other animals, which,
fices to be offered to Him on account of the things them-
like man, live in the air. Again, fish die as soon as they are
selves that were offered, as though He stood in need of
taken out of water; hence they could not be offered in the
them: wherefore it is written (Is. 1:11): “I desire not holo-
temple like other animals.
causts of rams, and fat of fatlings, and blood of calves and
Reply to Objection 4. Among turtledoves the older
lambs and buckgoats.” But, as stated above, He wished
ones are better than the young; while with doves the case
them to be offered to Him, in order to prevent idolatry; in
is the reverse. Wherefore, as Rabbi Moses observes (Doct.
order to signify the right ordering of man’s mind to God;
Perplex. iii), turtledoves and young doves are commanded
and in order to represent the mystery of the Redemption
to be offered, because nothing should be offered to God
of man by Christ.
but what is best.
Reply to Objection 2. In all the respects mentioned
Reply to Objection 5. The animals which were of-
above (ad 1), there was a suitable reason for these ani-
fered in sacrifice were slain, because it is by being killed
mals, rather than others, being offered in sacrifice to God.
that they become useful to man, forasmuch as God gave
First, in order to prevent idolatry. Because idolaters of-
them to man for food. Wherefore also they were burnt
fered all other animals to their gods, or made use of them
with fire: because it is by being cooked that they are made
in their sorceries: while the Egyptians (among whom the
fit for human consumption. Moreover the slaying of the
people had been dwelling) considered it abominable to
animals signified the destruction of sins: and also that man
slay these animals, wherefore they used not to offer them
deserved death on account of his sins; as though those an-
∗ An allusion to Col. 2:11 (Textus Receptus)
1089
imals were slain in man’s stead, in order to betoken the burnt in honor of God; another part was allotted to the use
expiation of sins. Again the slaying of these animals sig-
of the priests; and the third part to the use of the offerers;
nified the slaying of Christ.
in order to signify that man’s salvation is from God, by the
Reply to Objection 6. The Law fixed the special man-
direction of God’s ministers, and through the cooperation
ner of slaying the sacrificial animals in order to exclude
of those who are saved.
other ways of killing, whereby idolaters sacrificed ani-
But it was the universal rule that the blood and fat were
mals to idols. Or again, as Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Per-
not allotted to the use either of the priests or of the offer-
plex. iii), “the Law chose that manner of slaying which
ers: the blood being poured out at the foot of the altar, in
was least painful to the slain animal.” This excluded cru-
honor of God, while the fat was burnt upon the altar (Lev.
elty on the part of the offerers, and any mangling of the
9:9,10). The reason for this was, first, in order to pre-
animals slain.
vent idolatry: because idolaters used to drink the blood
Reply to Objection 7. It is because unclean animals
and eat the fat of the victims, according to Dt. 32:38:
are wont to be held in contempt among men, that it was
“Of whose victims they eat the fat, and drank the wine
forbidden to offer them in sacrifice to God: and for this
of their drink-offerings.” Secondly, in order to form them
reason too they were forbidden (Dt. 23:18) to offer “the
to a right way of living. For they were forbidden the use
hire of a strumpet or the price of a dog in the house
of the blood that they might abhor the shedding of hu-
of. . . God.” For the same reason they did not offer ani-
man blood; wherefore it is written (Gn. 9:4,5): “Flesh
mals before the seventh day, because such were abortive
with blood you shall not eat: for I will require the blood
as it were, the flesh being not yet firm on account of its
of your lives”: and they were forbidden to eat the fat, in
exceeding softness.
order to withdraw them from lasciviousness; hence it is
Reply to Objection 8. There were three kinds of sac-
written (Ezech. 34:3): “You have killed that which was
rifices. There was one in which the victim was entirely
fat.” Thirdly, on account of the reverence due to God: be-
consumed by fire: this was called “a holocaust, i.e. all
cause blood is most necessary for life, for which reason
burnt.” For this kind of sacrifice was offered to God spe-
“life” is said to be “in the blood” (Lev. 17:11,14): while
cially to show reverence to His majesty, and love of His
fat is a sign of abundant nourishment. Wherefore, in or-
goodness: and typified the state of perfection as regards
der to show that to God we owe both life and a sufficiency
the fulfilment of the counsels. Wherefore the whole was
of all good things, the blood was poured out, and the fat
burnt up: so that as the whole animal by being dissolved
burnt up in His honor. Fourthly, in order to foreshadow
into vapor soared aloft, so it might denote that the whole
the shedding of Christ’s blood, and the abundance of His
man, and whatever belongs to him, are subject to the au-
charity, whereby He offered Himself to God for us.
thority of God, and should be offered to Him.
In the peace-offerings, the breast-bone and the right
Another sacrifice was the “sin-offering,” which was
shoulder were allotted to the use of the priest, in order
offered to God on account of man’s need for the forgive-
to prevent a certain kind of divination which is known as
ness of sin: and this typifies the state of penitents in satis-
“spatulamantia,” so called because it was customary in di-
fying for sins. It was divided into two parts: for one part
vining to use the shoulder-blade [spatula], and the breast-
was burnt; while the other was granted to the use of the
bone of the animals offered in sacrifice; wherefore these
priests to signify that remission of sins is granted by God
things were taken away from the offerers. This is also de-
through the ministry of His priests. When, however, this
noted the priest’s need of wisdom in the heart, to instruct
sacrifice was offered for the sins of the whole people, or
the people—this was signified by the breast-bone, which
specially for the sin of the priest, the whole victim was
covers the heart; and his need of fortitude, in order to bear
burnt up. For it was not fitting that the priests should have
with human frailty—and this was signified by the right
the use of that which was offered for their own sins, to sig-
shoulder.
nify that nothing sinful should remain in them. Moreover,
Reply to Objection 9. Because the holocaust was the
this would not be satisfaction for sin: for if the offering
most perfect kind of sacrifice, therefore none but a male
were granted to the use of those for whose sins it was of-
was offered for a holocaust: because the female is an im-
fered, it would seem to be the same as if it had not been
perfect animal. The offering of turtledoves and doves was
offered.
on account of the poverty of the offerers, who were unable
The third kind of sacrifice was called the “peace-
to offer bigger animals. And since peace-victims were of-
offering,” which was offered to God, either in thanksgiv-
fered freely, and no one was bound to offer them against
ing, or for the welfare and prosperity of the offerers, in
his will, hence these birds were offered not among the
acknowledgment of benefits already received or yet to be
peace-victims, but among the holocausts and victims for
received: and this typifies the state of those who are pro-
sin, which man was obliged to offer at times. Moreover
ficient in the observance of the commandments. These
these birds, on account of their lofty flight, while befit-
sacrifices were divided into three parts: for one part was
ting the perfection of the holocausts: and were suitable
1090
for sin-offerings because their song is doleful.
nature, in the faith of the patriarchs; He was like flour in
Reply to Objection 10. The holocaust was the chief
the doctrine of the Law of the prophets; and He was like
of all the sacrifices: because all were burnt in honor of
perfect bread after He had taken human nature; baked in
God, and nothing of it was eaten. The second place in ho-
the fire, i.e. formed by the Holy Ghost in the oven of the
liness, belongs to the sacrifice for sins, which was eaten
virginal womb; baked again in a pan by the toils which He
in the court only, and on the very day of the sacrifice
suffered in the world; and consumed by fire on the cross
(Lev. 7:6,15). The third place must be given to the peace-
as on a gridiron.
offerings of thanksgiving, which were eaten on the same
Reply to Objection 13. The products of the soil are
day, but anywhere in Jerusalem. Fourth in order were
useful to man, either as food, and of these bread was of-
the “ex-voto” peace-offerings, the flesh of which could be
fered; or as drink, and of these wine was offered; or as sea-
eaten even on the morrow. The reason for this order is that
soning, and of these oil and salt were offered; or as heal-
man is bound to God, chiefly on account of His majesty;
ing, and of these they offered incense, which both smells
secondly, on account of the sins he has committed; thirdly,
sweetly and binds easily together.
because of the benefits he has already received from Him;
Now the bread foreshadowed the flesh of Christ; and
fourthly, by reason of the benefits he hopes to receive from
the wine, His blood, whereby we were redeemed; oil be-
Him.
tokens the grace of Christ; salt, His knowledge; incense,
Reply to Objection 11. Sins are more grievous by
His prayer.
reason of the state of the sinner, as stated above (q. 73,
Reply to Objection 14. Honey was not offered in the
a. 10): wherefore different victims are commanded to
sacrifices to God, both because it was wont to be offered
be offered for the sin of a priest, or of a prince, or of
in the sacrifices to idols; and in order to denote the ab-
some other private individual. “But,” as Rabbi Moses
sence of all carnal sweetness and pleasure from those who
says (Doct. Perplex. iii), “we must take note that the
intend to sacrifice to God. Leaven was not offered, to de-
more grievous the sin, the lower the species of animals
note the exclusion of corruption. Perhaps too, it was wont
offered for it. Wherefore the goat, which is a very base
to be offered in the sacrifices to idols.
animal, was offered for idolatry; while a calf was offered
Salt, however, was offered, because it wards off the
for a priest’s ignorance, and a ram for the negligence of a
corruption of putrefaction: for sacrifices offered to God
prince.”
should be incorrupt. Moreover, salt signifies the discre-
Reply to Objection 12. In the matter of sacrifices the
tion of wisdom, or again, mortification of the flesh.
Law had in view the poverty of the offerers; so that those
Incense was offered to denote devotion of the heart,
who could not have a four-footed animal at their disposal,
which is necessary in the offerer; and again, to signify the
might at least offer a bird; and that he who could not have
odor of a good name: for incense is composed of matter,
a bird might at least offer bread; and that if a man had not
both rich and fragrant. And since the sacrifice “of jeal-
even bread he might offer flour or ears of corn.
ousy” did not proceed from devotion, but rather from sus-
The figurative cause is that the bread signifies Christ
picion, therefore incense was not offered therein (Num.
Who is the “living bread” (Jn. 6:41,51). He was indeed
5:15).
an ear of corn, as it were, during the state of the law of
Whether sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to holy Ia IIae q. 102 a. 4
things?
Objection 1. It would seem that no sufficient reason
other indeed, should lead man to the worship of God. But
can be assigned for the ceremonies of the Old Law that
an increase of divine worship requires multiplication of
pertain to holy things. For Paul said (Acts 17:24): “God
altars and temples; as is evident in regard to the New
Who made the world and all things therein; He being Lord
Law. Therefore it seems that also under the Old Law there
of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made by
should have been not only one tabernacle or temple, but
hands.” It was therefore unfitting that in the Old Law a
many.
tabernacle or temple should be set up for the worship of
Objection 4. Further, the tabernacle or temple was
God.
ordained to the worship of God. But in God we should
Objection 2. Further, the state of the Old Law was not
worship above all His unity and simplicity. Therefore it
changed except by Christ. But the tabernacle denoted the
seems unbecoming for the tabernacle or temple to be di-
state of the Old Law. Therefore it should not have been
vided by means of veils.
changed by the building of a temple.
Objection 5. Further, the power of the First Mover,
Objection 3. Further, the Divine Law, more than any
i.e. God, appears first of all in the east, for it is in that
1091
quarter that the first movement begins. But the tabernacle are common, and indistinct from other things; whereas he
was set up for the worship of God. Therefore it should
admires and reveres those things which are distinct from
have been built so as to point to the east rather than the
others in some point of excellence. Hence too it is cus-
west.
tomary among men for kings and princes, who ought to
Objection 6. Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 20:4)
be reverenced by their subjects, to be clothed in more pre-
that they should “not make. . . a graven thing, nor the like-
cious garments, and to possess vaster and more beautiful
ness of anything.” It was therefore unfitting for graven im-
abodes. And for this reason it behooved special times, a
ages of the cherubim to be set up in the tabernacle or tem-
special abode, special vessels, and special ministers to be
ple. In like manner, the ark, the propitiatory, the candle-
appointed for the divine worship, so that thereby the soul
stick, the table, the two altars, seem to have been placed
of man might be brought to greater reverence for God.
there without reasonable cause.
In like manner the state of the Old Law, as observed
Objection 7.
Further, the Lord commanded (Ex.
above (a. 2; q. 100 , a. 12; q. 101, a. 2), was instituted
20:24): “You shall make an altar of earth unto Me”: and
that it might foreshadow the mystery of Christ. Now that
again (Ex. 20:26): “Thou shalt not go up by steps unto
which foreshadows something should be determinate, so
My altar.” It was therefore unfitting that subsequently they
that it may present some likeness thereto. Consequently,
should be commanded to make an altar of wood laid over
certain special points had to be observed in matters per-
with gold or brass; and of such a height that it was impos-
taining to the worship of God.
sible to go up to it except by steps. For it is written (Ex.
Reply to Objection 1. The divine worship regards
27:1,2): “Thou shalt make also an altar of setim wood,
two things: namely, God Who is worshipped; and men,
which shall be five cubits long, and as many broad. . . and
who worship Him. Accordingly God, Who is worshipped,
three cubits high. . . and thou shalt cover it with brass”:
is confined to no bodily place: wherefore there was no
and (Ex. 30:1,3): “Thou shalt make. . . an altar to burn
need, on His part, for a tabernacle or temple to be set up.
incense, of setim wood. . . and thou shalt overlay it with
But men, who worship Him, are corporeal beings: and for
the purest gold.”
their sake there was need for a special tabernacle or tem-
Objection 8. Further, in God’s works nothing should
ple to be set up for the worship of God, for two reasons.
be superfluous; for not even in the works of nature is any-
First, that through coming together with the thought that
thing superfluous to be found. But one cover suffices for
the place was set aside for the worship of God, they might
one tabernacle or house. Therefore it was unbecoming to
approach thither with greater reverence. Secondly, that
furnish the tabernacle with many coverings, viz. curtains,
certain things relating to the excellence of Christ’s Divine
curtains of goats’ hair, rams’ skins dyed red, and violet-
or human nature might be signified by the arrangement of
colored skins (Ex. 26).
various details in such temple or tabernacle.
Objection 9. Further, exterior consecration signifies
To this Solomon refers (3 Kings 8:27) when he says:
interior holiness, the subject of which is the soul. It was
“If heaven and the heavens of heavens cannot contain
therefore unsuitable for the tabernacle and its vessels to
Thee, how much less this house which I have built” for
be consecrated, since they were inanimate things.
Thee? And further on (3 Kings 8:29,20) he adds: “That
Objection 10. Further, it is written (Ps. 33:2): “I will Thy eyes may be open upon this house. . . of which Thou
bless the Lord at all times, His praise shall always be in
hast said: My name shall be there;. . . that Thou mayest
my mouth.” But the solemn festivals were instituted for
hearken to the supplication of Thy servant and of Thy peo-
the praise of God. Therefore it was not fitting that cer-
ple Israel.” From this it is evident that the house of the
tain days should be fixed for keeping solemn festivals; so
sanctuary was set up, not in order to contain God, as abid-
that it seems that there was no suitable cause for the cere-
ing therein locally, but that God might be made known
monies relating to holy things.
there by means of things done and said there; and that
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 8:4) that
those who prayed there might, through reverence for the
those who “offer gifts according to the law. . . serve unto
place, pray more devoutly, so as to be heard more readily.
the example and shadow of heavenly things. As it was
Reply to Objection 2. Before the coming of Christ,
answered to Moses, when he was to finish the tabernacle:
the state of the Old Law was not changed as regards the
See, says He, that thou make all things according to the
fulfilment of the Law, which was effected in Christ alone:
pattern which was shown thee on the mount.” But that
but it was changed as regards the condition of the peo-
is most reasonable, which presents a likeness to heavenly
ple that were under the Law. Because, at first, the people
things. Therefore the ceremonies relating to holy things
were in the desert, having no fixed abode: afterwards they
had a reasonable cause.
were engaged in various wars with the neighboring na-
I answer that, The chief purpose of the whole exter-
tions; and lastly, at the time of David and Solomon, the
nal worship is that man may give worship to God. Now
state of that people was one of great peace. And then for
man’s tendency is to reverence less those things which
the first time the temple was built in the place which Abra-
1092
ham, instructed by God, had chosen for the purpose of to gather together for the praise of God; just as now there
sacrifice. For it is written (Gn. 22:2) that the Lord com-
are places called churches in which the Christian people
manded Abraham to “offer” his son “for a holocaust upon
gather together for the divine worship. Thus our church
one of the mountains which I will show thee”: and it is
takes the place of both temple and synagogue: since the
related further on (Gn. 22:14) that “he calleth the name
very sacrifice of the Church is spiritual; wherefore with
of that place, The Lord seeth,” as though, according to the
us the place of sacrifice is not distinct from the place of
Divine prevision, that place were chosen for the worship
teaching. The figurative reason may be that hereby is
of God. Hence it is written (Dt. 12:5,6): “You shall come
signified the unity of the Church, whether militant or tri-
to the place which the Lord your God shall choose. . . and
umphant.
you shall offer. . . your holocausts and victims.”
Reply to Objection 4. Just as the unity of the temple
Now it was not meet for that place to be pointed out
or tabernacle betokened the unity of God, or the unity of
by the building of the temple before the aforesaid time;
the Church, so also the division of the tabernacle or tem-
for three reasons assigned by Rabbi Moses. First, lest the
ple signified the distinction of those things that are subject
Gentiles might seize hold of that place. Secondly, lest the
to God, and from which we arise to the worship of God.
Gentiles might destroy it. The third reason is lest each
Now the tabernacle was divided into two parts: one was
tribe might wish that place to fall to their lot, and strifes
called the “Holy of Holies,” and was placed to the west;
and quarrels be the result. Hence the temple was not built
the other was called the “Holy Place”∗, which was sit-
until they had a king who would be able to quell such
uated to the east. Moreover there was a court facing the
quarrels. Until that time a portable tabernacle was em-
tabernacle. Accordingly there are two reasons for this dis-
ployed for divine worship, no place being as yet fixed for
tinction. One is in respect of the tabernacle being ordained
the worship of God. This is the literal reason for the dis-
to the worship of God. Because the different parts of the
tinction between the tabernacle and the temple.
world are thus betokened by the division of the tabernacle.
The figurative reason may be assigned to the fact that
For that part which was called the Holy of Holies signi-
they signify a twofold state. For the tabernacle, which
fied the higher world, which is that of spiritual substances:
was changeable, signifies the state of the present change-
while that part which is called the Holy Place signified
able life: whereas the temple, which was fixed and stable,
the corporeal world. Hence the Holy Place was separated
signifies the state of future life which is altogether un-
from the Holy of Holies by a veil, which was of four dif-
changeable. For this reason it is said that in the building of
ferent colors (denoting the four elements), viz. of linen,
the temple no sound was heard of hammer or saw, to sig-
signifying earth, because linen, i.e. flax, grows out of the
nify that all movements of disturbance will be far removed
earth; purple, signifying water, because the purple tint was
from the future state. Or else the tabernacle signifies the
made from certain shells found in the sea; violet, signify-
state of the Old Law; while the temple built by Solomon
ing air, because it has the color of the air; and scarlet twice betokens the state of the New Law. Hence the Jews alone
dyed, signifying fire: and this because matter composed of
worked at the building of the tabernacle; whereas the tem-
the four elements is a veil between us and incorporeal sub-
ple was built with the cooperation of the Gentiles, viz. the
stances. Hence the high-priest alone, and that once a year,
Tyrians and Sidonians.
entered into the inner tabernacle, i.e. the Holy of Holies:
Reply to Objection 3. The reason for the unity of the
whereby we are taught that man’s final perfection consists
temple or tabernacle may be either literal or figurative.
in his entering into that (higher) world: whereas into the
The literal reason was the exclusion of idolatry. For the
outward tabernacle, i.e. the Holy Place, the priests entered
Gentiles put up various times to various gods: and so, to
every day: whereas the people were only admitted to the
strengthen in the minds of men their belief in the unity of
court; because the people were able to perceived material
the Godhead, God wished sacrifices to be offered to Him
things, the inner nature of which only wise men by dint of
in one place only. Another reason was in order to show
study are able to discover.
that bodily worship is not acceptable of itself: and so they
But regard to the figurative reason, the outward taber-
restrained from offering sacrifices anywhere and every-
nacle, which was called the Holy Place, betokened the
where. But the worship of the New Law, in the sacrifice
state of the Old Law, as the Apostle says (Heb. 9:6, seqq.):
whereof spiritual grace is contained, is of itself acceptable
because into that tabernacle “the priests always entered
to God; and consequently the multiplication of altars and
accomplishing the offices of sacrifices.” But the inner
temples is permitted in the New Law.
tabernacle, which was called the Holy of Holies, signi-
As to those matters that regarded the spiritual wor-
fied either the glory of heaven or the spiritual state of the
ship of God, consisting in the teaching of the Law and
New Law to come. To the latter state Christ brought us;
the Prophets, there were, even under the Old Law, vari-
and this was signified by the high-priest entering alone,
ous places, called synagogues, appointed for the people
once a year, into the Holy of Holies. The veil betokened
∗ Or ‘Sanctuary’. The Douay version uses both expressions
1093
the concealing of the spiritual sacrifices under the sacri-Him was set up; to denote His invisibility. But there was
fices of old. This veil was adorned with four colors: viz.
something to represent his seat; since, to wit, the crea-
that of linen, to designate purity of the flesh; purple, to
ture, which is beneath God, as the seat under the sitter, is
denote the sufferings which the saints underwent for God;
comprehensible. Again in that higher world there are spir-
scarlet twice dyed, signifying the twofold love of God and
itual substances called angels. These are signified by the
our neighbor; and violet, in token of heavenly contempla-
two cherubim, looking one towards the other, to show that
tion. With regard to the state of the Old Law the people
they are at peace with one another, according to Job 25:2:
and the priests were situated differently from one another.
“Who maketh peace in. . . high places.” For this reason,
For the people saw the mere corporeal sacrifices which
too, there was more than one cherub, to betoken the mul-
were offered in the court: whereas the priests were intent
titude of heavenly spirits, and to prevent their receiving
on the inner meaning of the sacrifices, because their faith
worship from those who had been commanded to worship
in the mysteries of Christ was more explicit. Hence they
but one God. Moreover there are, enclosed as it were in
entered into the outer tabernacle. This outer tabernacle
that spiritual world, the intelligible types of whatsoever
was divided from the court by a veil; because some mat-
takes place in this world, just as in every cause are en-
ters relating to the mystery of Christ were hidden from the
closed the types of its effects, and in the craftsman the
people, while they were known to the priests: though they
types of the works of his craft. This was betokened by
were not fully revealed to them, as they were subsequently
the ark, which represented, by means of the three things
in the New Testament (cf. Eph. 3:5).
it contained, the three things of greatest import in human
Reply to Objection 5. Worship towards the west was
affairs. These are wisdom, signified by the tables of the
introduced in the Law to the exclusion of idolatry: be-
testament; the power of governing, betokened by the rod
cause all the Gentiles, in reverence to the sun, worshipped
of Aaron; and life, betokened by the manna which was
towards the east; hence it is written (Ezech. 8:16) that cer-
the means of sustenance. Or else these three things sig-
tain men “had their backs towards the temple of the Lord,
nified the three Divine attributes, viz. wisdom, in the ta-
and their faces to the east, and they adored towards the ris-
bles; power, in the rod; goodness, in the manna—both
ing of the sun.” Accordingly, in order to prevent this, the
by reason of its sweetness, and because it was through
tabernacle had the Holy of Holies to westward, that they
the goodness of God that it was granted to man, where-
might adore toward the west. A figurative reason may also
fore it was preserved as a memorial of the Divine mercy.
be found in the fact that the whole state of the first taberna-
Again, these three things were represented in Isaias’ vi-
cle was ordained to foreshadow the death of Christ, which
sion. For he “saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high
is signified by the west, according to Ps. 67:5: “Who as-
and elevated”; and the seraphim standing by; and that the
cendeth unto the west; the Lord is His name.”
house was filled with the glory of the Lord; wherefrom the
Reply to Objection 6. Both literal and figurative rea-
seraphim cried out: “All the earth is full of His glory” (Is.
sons may be assigned for the things contained in the taber-
6:1,3). And so the images of the seraphim were set up,
nacle. The literal reason is in connection with the divine
not to be worshipped, for this was forbidden by the first
worship. And because, as already observed (ad 4), the
commandment; but as a sign of their function, as stated
inner tabernacle, called the Holy of Holies, signified the
above.
higher world of spiritual substances, hence that taberna-
The outer tabernacle, which denotes this present
cle contained three things, viz. “the ark of the testament
world, also contained three things, viz. the “altar of in-
in which was a golden pot that had manna, and the rod
cense,” which was directly opposite the ark; the “table of
of Aaron that had blossomed, and the tables” (Heb. 9:4)
proposition,” with the twelve loaves of proposition on it,
on which were written the ten commandments of the Law.
which stood on the northern side; and the “candlestick,”
Now the ark stood between two “cherubim” that looked
which was placed towards the south. These three things
one towards the other: and over the ark was a table, called
seem to correspond to the three which were enclosed in
the “propitiatory,” raised above the wings of the cheru-
the ark; and they represented the same things as the lat-
bim, as though it were held up by them; and appearing,
ter, but more clearly: because, in order that wise men,
to the imagination, to be the very seat of God. For this
denoted by the priests entering the temple, might grasp
reason it was called the “propitiatory,” as though the peo-
the meaning of these types, it was necessary to express
ple received propitiation thence at the prayers of the high-
them more manifestly than they are in the Divine or an-
priest. And so it was held up, so to speak, by the cheru-
gelic mind. Accordingly the candlestick betokened, as a
bim, in obedience, as it were, to God: while the ark of
sensible sign thereof, the wisdom which was expressed
the testament was like the foot-stool to Him that sat on
on the tables (of the Law) in intelligible words. The al-
the propitiatory. These three things denote three things
tar of incense signified the office of the priest, whose duty
in that higher world: namely, God Who is above all, and
it was to bring the people to God: and this was signified
incomprehensible to any creature. Hence no likeness of
also by the rod: because on that altar the sweet-smelling
1094
incense was burnt, signifying the holiness of the people the temple should take their food in the temple: where-acceptable to God: for it is written (Apoc. 8:3) that the
fore, as stated in Mat. 12:4, it was lawful for none but the
smoke of the sweet-smelling spices signifies the “justi-
priests to eat the twelve loaves which were put on the ta-
fications of the saints” (cf. Apoc. 19:8). Moreover it
ble in memory of the twelve tribes. And the table was not
was fitting that the dignity of the priesthood should be de-
placed in the middle directly in front of the propitiatory,
noted, in the ark, by the rod, and, in the outer tabernacle,
in order to exclude an idolatrous rite: for the Gentiles, on
by the altar of incense: because the priest is the mediator
the feasts of the moon, set up a table in front of the idol of
between God and the people, governing the people by Di-
the moon, wherefore it is written (Jer. 7:18): “The women
vine power, denoted by the rod; and offering to God the
knead the dough, to make cakes to the queen of heaven.”
fruit of His government, i.e. the holiness of the people, on
In the court outside the tabernacle was the altar of
the altar of incense, so to speak. The table signified the
holocausts, on which sacrifices of those things which the
sustenance of life, just as the manna did: but the former, a
people possessed were offered to God: and consequently
more general and a coarser kind of nourishment; the latter,
the people who offered these sacrifices to God by the
a sweeter and more delicate. Again, the candlestick was
hands of the priest could be present in the court. But the
fittingly placed on the southern side, while the table was
priests alone, whose function it was to offer the people
placed to the north: because the south is the right-hand
to God, could approach the inner altar, whereon the very
side of the world, while the north is the left-hand side, as
devotion and holiness of the people was offered to God.
stated in De Coelo et Mundo ii; and wisdom, like other
And this altar was put up outside the tabernacle and in the
spiritual goods, belongs to the right hand, while temporal
court, to the exclusion of idolatrous worship: for the Gen-
nourishment belongs on the left, according to Prov. 3:16:
tiles placed altars inside the temples to offer up sacrifices
“In her left hand (are) riches and glory.” And the priestly
thereon to idols.
power is midway between temporal goods and spiritual
The figurative reason for all these things may be taken
wisdom; because thereby both spiritual wisdom and tem-
from the relation of the tabernacle to Christ, who was fore-
poral goods are dispensed.
shadowed therein. Now it must be observed that to show
Another literal signification may be assigned. For the
the imperfection of the figures of the Law, various fig-
ark contained the tables of the Law, in order to prevent for-
ures were instituted in the temple to betoken Christ. For
getfulness of the Law, wherefore it is written (Ex. 24:12):
He was foreshadowed by the “propitiatory,” since He is “a
“I will give thee two tables of stone, and the Law, and the
propitiation for our sins” (1 Jn. 2:2). This propitiatory was
commandments which I have written: that thou mayest
fittingly carried by cherubim, since of Him it is written
teach them” to the children of Israel. The rod of Aaron
(Heb. 1:6): “Let all the angels of God adore Him.” He is
was placed there to restrain the people from insubordi-
also signified by the ark: because just as the ark was made
nation to the priesthood of Aaron; wherefore it is writ-
of setim-wood, so was Christ’s body composed of most
ten (Num. 17:10): “Carry back the rod of Aaron into the
pure members. More over it was gilded: for Christ was
tabernacle of the testimony, that it may be kept there for a
full of wisdom and charity, which are betokened by gold.
token of the rebellious children of Israel.” The manna was
And in the ark was a golden pot, i.e. His holy soul, having
kept in the ark to remind them of the benefit conferred by
manna, i.e. “all the fulness of the Godhead” (Col. 2:9).
God on the children of Israel in the desert; wherefore it is
Also there was a rod in the ark, i.e. His priestly power:
written (Ex. 16:32): “Fill a gomor of it, and let it be kept
for “He was made a. . . priest for ever” (Heb. 6:20). And
unto generations to come hereafter, that they may know
therein were the tables of the Testament, to denote that
the bread wherewith I fed you in the wilderness.” The
Christ Himself is a lawgiver. Again, Christ was signified
candlestick was set up to enhance the beauty of the tem-
by the candlestick, for He said Himself (Jn. 8:12): “I am
ple, for the magnificence of a house depends on its being
the Light of the world”; while the seven lamps denoted the
well lighted. Now the candlestick had seven branches, as
seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. He is also betokened in the
Josephus observes (Antiquit. iii, 7,8), to signify the seven
table, because He is our spiritual food, according to Jn.
planets, wherewith the whole world is illuminated. Hence
6:41,51: “I am the living bread”: and the twelve loaves
the candlestick was placed towards the south; because for
signified the twelve apostles, or their teaching. Or again,
us the course of the planets is from that quarter. The al-
the candlestick and table may signify the Church’s teach-
tar of incense was instituted that there might always be in
ing, and faith, which also enlightens and refreshes. Again,
the tabernacle a sweet-smelling smoke; both through re-
Christ is signified by the two altars of holocausts and in-
spect for the tabernacle, and as a remedy for the stenches
cense. Because all works of virtue must be offered to us
arising from the shedding of blood and the slaying of ani-
to God through Him; both those whereby we afflict the
mals. For men despise evil-smelling things as being vile,
body, which are offered, as it were, on the altar of holo-
whereas sweet-smelling things are much appreciated. The
causts; and those which, with greater perfection of mind,
table was place there to signify that the priests who served
are offered to God in Christ, by the spiritual desires of the
1095
perfect, on the altar of incense, as it were, according to curtain made of goats’ hair, which covered not only the
Heb. 13:15: “By Him therefore let us offer the sacrifice
roof of the tabernacle, but also reached to the ground and
of praise always to God.”
covered the boards of the tabernacle on the outside. The
Reply to Objection 7. The Lord commanded an al-
literal reason of these coverings taken altogether was the
tar to be made for the offering of sacrifices and gifts, in
adornment and protection of the tabernacle, that it might
honor of God, and for the upkeep of the ministers who
be an object of respect. Taken singly, according to some,
served the tabernacle. Now concerning the construction
the curtains denoted the starry heaven, which is adorned
of the altar the Lord issued a twofold precept. One was
with various stars; the curtain (of goats’ skin) signified the
at the beginning of the Law (Ex. 20:24, seqq.) when the
waters which are above the firmament; the skins dyed red
Lord commanded them to make “an altar of earth,” or at
denoted the empyrean heaven, where the angels are; the
least “not of hewn stones”; and again, not to make the al-
violet skins, the heaven of the Blessed Trinity.
tar high, so as to make it necessary to “go up” to it “by
The figurative meaning of these things is that the
steps.” This was in detestation of idolatrous worship: for
boards of which the tabernacle was constructed signify the
the Gentiles made their altars ornate and high, thinking
faithful of Christ, who compose the Church. The boards
that there was something holy and divine in such things.
were covered on the inner side by curtains of four col-
For this reason, too, the Lord commanded (Dt. 16:21):
ors: because the faithful are inwardly adorned with the
“Thou shalt plant no grove, nor any tree near the altar of
four virtues: for “the twisted linen,” as the gloss observes,
the Lord thy God”: since idolaters were wont to offer sac-
“signifies the flesh refulgent with purity; violet signifies
rifices beneath trees, on account of the pleasantness and
the mind desirous of heavenly things; purple denotes the
shade afforded by them. There was also a figurative rea-
flesh subject to passions; the twice dyed scarlet betokens
son for these precepts. Because we must confess that in
the mind in the midst of the passions enlightened by the
Christ, Who is our altar, there is the true nature of flesh,
love of God and our neighbor.” The coverings of the build-
as regards His humanity—and this is to make an altar of
ing designate prelates and doctors, who ought to be con-
earth; and again, in regard to His Godhead, we must con-
spicuous for their heavenly manner of life, signified by the
fess His equality with the Father—and this is “not to go
violet colored skins: and who should also be ready to suf-
up” to the altar by steps. Moreover we should not cou-
fer martyrdom, denoted by the skins dyed red; and austere
ple the doctrine of Christ to that of the Gentiles, which
of life and patient in adversity, betokened by the curtains
provokes men to lewdness.
of goats’ hair, which were exposed to wind and rain, as
But when once the tabernacle had been constructed to
the gloss observes.
the honor of God, there was no longer reason to fear these
Reply to Objection 9. The literal reason for the sanc-
occasions of idolatry. Wherefore the Lord commanded
tification of the tabernacle and vessels was that they might
the altar of holocausts to be made of brass, and to be con-
be treated with greater reverence, being deputed, as it
spicuous to all the people; and the altar of incense, which
were, to the divine worship by this consecration. The fig-
was visible to none but the priests. Nor was brass so pre-
urative reason is that this sanctification signified the sanc-
cious as to give the people an occasion for idolatry.
tification of the living tabernacle, i.e. the faithful of whom
Since, however, the reason for the precept, “Thou shalt
the Church of Christ is composed.
not go up by steps unto My altar” (Ex. 20:26) is stated to
Reply to Objection 10. Under the Old Law there were
have been “lest thy nakedness be discovered,” it should be
seven temporal solemnities, and one continual solemnity,
observed that this too was instituted with the purpose of
as may be gathered from Num. 28,29. There was a contin-
preventing idolatry, for in the feasts of Priapus the Gen-
ual feast, since the lamb was sacrificed every day, morn-
tiles uncovered their nakedness before the people. But
ing and evening: and this continual feast of an abiding
later on the priests were prescribed the use of loin-cloths
sacrifice signified the perpetuity of Divine bliss. Of the
for the sake of decency: so that without any danger the
temporal feasts the first was that which was repeated every
altar could be placed so high that the priests when offer-
week. This was the solemnity of the “Sabbath,” celebrated
ing sacrifices would go up by steps of wood, not fixed but
in memory of the work of the creation of the universe.
movable.
Another solemnity, viz. the “New Moon,” was repeated
Reply to Objection 8. The body of the tabernacle
every month, and was observed in memory of the work of
consisted of boards placed on end, and covered on the in-
the Divine government. For the things of this lower world
side with curtains of four different colors, viz. twisted
owe their variety chiefly to the movement of the moon;
linen, violet, purple, and scarlet twice dyed. These cur-
wherefore this feast was kept at the new moon: and not
tains, however, covered the sides only of the tabernacle;
at the full moon, to avoid the worship of idolaters who
and the roof of the tabernacle was covered with violet-
used to offer sacrifices to the moon at that particular time.
colored skins; and over this there was another covering
And these two blessings are bestowed in common on the
of rams’ skins dyed red; and over this there was a third
whole human race; and hence they were repeated more
1096
frequently.
are to be found in the Land of promise; to signify that
The other five feasts were celebrated once a year: and
God had brought them through the arid land of the wilder-
they commemorated the benefits which had been con-
ness to a land of delights. On the eighth day another feast
ferred especially on that people. For there was the feast
was observed, of “Assembly and Congregation,” on which
of the “Passover” in the first month to commemorate the
the people collected the expenses necessary for the divine
blessing of being delivered out of Egypt. The feast of
worship: and it signified the uniting of the people and the
“Pentecost” was celebrated fifty days later, to recall the
peace granted to them in the Land of promise.
blessing of the giving of the Law. The other three feasts
The figurative reason for these feasts was that the con-
were kept in the seventh month, nearly the whole of which
tinual sacrifice of the lamb foreshadowed the perpetuity
was solemnized by them, just as the seventh day. For on
of Christ, Who is the “Lamb of God,” according to Heb.
the first of the seventh month was the feast of “Trumpets,”
13:8: “Jesus Christ yesterday and today, and the same for
in memory of the delivery of Isaac, when Abraham found
ever.” The Sabbath signified the spiritual rest bestowed
the ram caught by its horns, which they represented by
by Christ, as stated in Heb. 4. The Neomenia, which is
the horns which they blew. The feast of Trumpets was
the beginning of the new moon, signified the enlightening
a kind of invitation whereby they prepared themselves
of the primitive Church by Christ’s preaching and mira-
to keep the following feast which was kept on the tenth
cles. The feast of Pentecost signified the Descent of the
day. This was the feast of “Expiation,” in memory of
Holy Ghost on the apostles. The feast of Trumpets signi-
the blessing whereby, at the prayer of Moses, God for-
fied the preaching of the apostles. The feast of Expiation
gave the people’s sin of worshipping the calf. After this
signified the cleansing of the Christian people from sins:
was the feast of “Scenopegia” or of “Tents,” which was
and the feast of Tabernacles signified their pilgrimage in
kept for seven days, to commemorate the blessing of be-
this world, wherein they walk by advancing in virtue. The
ing protected and led by God through the desert, where
feast of Assembly or Congregation foreshadowed the as-
they lived in tents. Hence during this feast they had to
sembly of the faithful in the kingdom of heaven: where-
take “the fruits of the fairest tree,” i.e. the citron, “and
fore this feast is described as “most holy” (Lev. 23:36).
the trees of dense foliage”∗, i.e. the myrtle, which is fra-
These three feasts followed immediately on one another,
grant, “and the branches of palm-trees, and willows of the
because those who expiate their vices should advance in
brook,” which retain their greenness a long time; and these
virtue, until they come to see God, as stated in Ps. 83:8.
Whether there can be any suitable cause for the sacraments of the Old Law?
Ia IIae q. 102 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that there can be no suit-
eating of the lamb were prescribed, which seem altogether
able cause for the sacraments of the Old Law. Because
unreasonable.
those things that are done for the purpose of divine wor-
Objection 3. Further, the sacraments of the Old Law
ship should not be like the observances of idolaters: since
were figures of the sacraments of the New Law. Now the
it is written (Dt. 12:31): “Thou shalt not do in like manner
Paschal lamb signified the sacrament of the Eucharist, ac-
to the Lord thy God: for they have done to their gods all
cording to 1 Cor. 5:7: “Christ our Pasch is sacrificed.”
the abominations which the Lord abhorreth.” Now wor-
Therefore there should also have been some sacraments
shippers of idols used to knive themselves to the shedding
of the Old Law to foreshadow the other sacraments of the
of blood: for it is related (3 Kings 18:28) that they “cut
New Law, such as Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and
themselves after their manner with knives and lancets, till
Matrimony, and so forth.
they were all covered with blood.” For this reason the
Objection 4.
Further, purification can scarcely be
Lord commanded (Dt. 14:1): “You shall not cut your-
done except by removing something impure. But as far as
selves nor make any baldness for the dead.” Therefore it
God is concerned, no bodily thing is reputed impure, be-
was unfitting for circumcision to be prescribed by the Law
cause all bodies are God’s creatures; and “every creature
(Lev. 12:3).
of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received
Objection 2. Further, those things which are done for
with thanksgiving” (1 Tim. 4:4). It was therefore unfitting
the worship of God should be marked with decorum and
for them to be purified after contact with a corpse, or any
gravity; according to Ps. 34:18: “I will praise Thee in a
similar corporeal infection.
grave [Douay: ‘strong’] people.” But it seems to savor of
Objection 5. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 34:4):
levity for a man to eat with haste. Therefore it was un-
“What can be made clean by the unclean?” But the ashes
fittingly commanded (Ex. 12:11) that they should eat the
of the red heifer† which was burnt, were unclean, since
Paschal lamb “in haste.” Other things too relative to the
they made a man unclean: for it is stated (Num. 19:7,
∗ Douay and A. V. and R. V. read: ‘Boughs of thick trees’ † Cf. Heb.
9:13
1097
seqq.) that the priest who immolated her was rendered I answer that, As stated above (q. 101, a. 4), the
unclean “until the evening”; likewise he that burnt her;
sacraments are, properly speaking, things applied to the
and he that gathered up her ashes. Therefore it was unfit-
worshippers of God for their consecration so as, in some
tingly prescribed there that the unclean should be purified
way, to depute them to the worship of God. Now the wor-
by being sprinkled with those cinders.
ship of God belonged in a general way to the whole peo-
Objection 6. Further, sins are not something corpo-
ple; but in a special way, it belonged to the priests and
real that can be carried from one place to another: nor can
Levites, who were the ministers of divine worship. Conse-
man be cleansed from sin by means of something unclean.
quently, in these sacraments of the Old Law, certain things
It was therefore unfitting for the purpose of expiating the
concerned the whole people in general; while others be-
sins of the people that the priest should confess the sins
longed to the ministers.
of the children of Israel on one of the buck-goats, that it
In regard to both, three things were necessary. The
might carry them away into the wilderness: while they
first was to be established in the state of worshipping God:
were rendered unclean by the other, which they used for
and this institution was brought about—for all in general,
the purpose of purification, by burning it together with
by circumcision, without which no one was admitted to
the calf outside the camp; so that they had to wash their
any of the legal observances—and for the priests, by their
clothes and their bodies with water (Lev. 16).
consecration. The second thing required was the use of
Objection 7. Further, what is already cleansed should
those things that pertain to divine worship. And thus, as
not be cleansed again. It was therefore unfitting to apply a
to the people, there was the partaking of the paschal ban-
second purification to a man cleansed from leprosy, or to
quet, to which no uncircumcised man was admitted, as is
a house; as laid down in Lev. 14.
clear from Ex. 12:43, seqq.: and, as to the priests, the of-
Objection 8. Further, spiritual uncleanness cannot be
fering of the victims, and the eating of the loaves of propo-
cleansed by material water or by shaving the hair. There-
sition and of other things that were allotted to the use of
fore it seems unreasonable that the Lord ordered (Ex.
the priests. The third thing required was the removal of
30:18, seqq.) the making of a brazen laver with its foot,
all impediments to divine worship, viz. of uncleannesses.
that the priests might wash their hands and feet before en-
And then, as to the people, certain purifications were in-
tering the temple; and that He commanded (Num. 8:7) the
stituted for the removal of certain external uncleannesses;
Levites to be sprinkled with the water of purification, and
and also expiations from sins; while, as to the priests and
to shave all the hairs of their flesh.
Levites, the washing of hands and feet and the shaving of
Objection 9. Further, that which is greater cannot be
the hair were instituted.
cleansed by that which is less. Therefore it was unfitting
And all these things had reasonable causes, both lit-
that, in the Law, the higher and lower priests, as stated in
eral, in so far as they were ordained to the worship of God
Lev. 8∗, and the Levites, according to Num. 8, should be
for the time being, and figurative, in so far as they were
consecrated with any bodily anointing, bodily sacrifices,
ordained to foreshadow Christ: as we shall see by taking
and bodily oblations.
them one by one.
Objection 10. Further, as stated in 1 Kings 16:7,
Reply to Objection 1. The chief literal reason for cir-
“Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord behold-
cumcision was in order that man might profess his belief
eth the heart.” But those things that appear outwardly
in one God. And because Abraham was the first to sever
in man are the dispositions of his body and his clothes.
himself from the infidels, by going out from his house and
Therefore it was unfitting for certain special garments to
kindred, for this reason he was the first to receive circum-
be appointed to the higher and lower priests, as related in
cision. This reason is set forth by the Apostle (Rom. 4:9,
Ex. 28†. It seems, moreover, unreasonable that anyone
seqq.) thus: “He received the sign of circumcision, a seal
should be debarred from the priesthood on account of de-
of the justice of the faith which he had, being uncircum-
fects in the body, as stated in Lev. 21:17, seqq.: “Whoso-
cised”; because, to wit, we are told that “unto Abraham
ever of thy seed throughout their families, hath a blemish,
faith was reputed to justice,” for the reason that “against
he shall not offer bread to his God. . . if he be blind, if he
hope he believed in hope,” i.e. against the hope that is of
be lame,” etc. It seems, therefore, that the sacraments of
nature he believed in the hope that is of grace, “that he
the Old Law were unreasonable.
might be made the father of many nations,” when he was
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 20:8): “I am the
an old man, and his wife an old and barren woman. And
Lord that sanctify you.” But nothing unreasonable is done
in order that this declaration, and imitation of Abraham’s
by God, for it is written (Ps. 103:24): “Thou hast made all
faith, might be fixed firmly in the hearts of the Jews, they
things in wisdom.” Therefore there was nothing without a
received in their flesh such a sign as they could not for-
reasonable cause in the sacraments of the Old Law, which
get, wherefore it is written (Gn. 17:13): “My covenant
were ordained to the sanctification of man.
shall be in your flesh for a perpetual covenant.” This was
∗ Cf. Ex. 29
† Cf. Lev. 8:7, seqq.
1098
done on the eighth day, because until then a child is very command: “In one house shall it be eaten, neither shall
tender, and so might be seriously injured; and is consid-
you carry forth of the flesh thereof out of the house”: be-
ered as something not yet consolidated: wherefore neither
cause, to wit, on account of their haste, they could not
are animals offered before the eighth day. And it was not
send any gifts of it.
delayed after that time, lest some might refuse the sign
The stress they suffered while in Egypt was denoted
of circumcision on account of the pain: and also lest the
by the wild lettuces. The figurative reason is evident, be-
parents, whose love for their children increases as they be-
cause the sacrifice of the paschal lamb signified the sacri-
come used to their presence and as they grow older, should
fice of Christ according to 1 Cor. 5:7: “Christ our pasch
withdraw their children from circumcision. A second rea-
is sacrificed.” The blood of the lamb, which ensured de-
son may have been the weakening of concupiscence in
liverance from the destroyer, by being sprinkled on the
that member. A third motive may have been to revile the
transoms, signified faith in Christ’s Passion, in the hearts
worship of Venus and Priapus, which gave honor to that
and on the lips of the faithful, by which same Passion we
part of the body. The Lord’s prohibition extended only to
are delivered from sin and death, according to 1 Pet. 1:18:
the cutting of oneself in honor of idols: and such was not
“You were. . . redeemed. . . with the precious blood. . . of a
the circumcision of which we have been speaking.
lamb unspotted.” The partaking of its flesh signified the
The figurative reason for circumcision was that it fore-
eating of Christ’s body in the Sacrament; and the flesh
shadowed the removal of corruption, which was to be
was roasted at the fire to signify Christ’s Passion or char-
brought about by Christ, and will be perfectly fulfilled in
ity. And it was eaten with unleavened bread to signify the
the eighth age, which is the age of those who rise from the
blameless life of the faithful who partake of Christ’s body,
dead. And since all corruption of guilt and punishment
according to 1 Cor. 5:8: “Let us feast . . . with the unleav-
comes to us through our carnal origin, from the sin of
ened bread of sincerity and truth.” The wild lettuces were
our first parent, therefore circumcision was applied to the
added to denote repentance for sins, which is required of
generative member. Hence the Apostle says (Col. 2:11):
those who receive the body of Christ. Their loins were
“You are circumcised” in Christ “with circumcision not
girt in sign of chastity: and the shoes of their feet are the
made by hand in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but
examples of our dead ancestors. The staves they were to
in the circumcision of” Our Lord Jesus “Christ.”
hold in their hands denoted pastoral authority: and it was
Reply to Objection 2.
The literal reason of the
commanded that the paschal lamb should be eaten in one
paschal banquet was to commemorate the blessing of be-
house, i.e. in a catholic church, and not in the conventicles
ing led by God out of Egypt. Hence by celebrating this
of heretics.
banquet they declared that they belonged to that people
Reply to Objection 3. Some of the sacraments of the
which God had taken to Himself out of Egypt. For when
New Law had corresponding figurative sacraments in the
they were delivered from Egypt, they were commanded to
Old Law. For Baptism, which is the sacrament of Faith,
sprinkle the lamb’s blood on the transoms of their house
corresponds to circumcision. Hence it is written (Col.
doors, as though declaring that they were averse to the
2:11,12): “You are circumcised. . . in the circumcision of”
rites of the Egyptians who worshipped the ram. Where-
Our Lord Jesus “Christ: buried with Him in Baptism.”
fore they were delivered by the sprinkling or rubbing of
In the New Law the sacrament of the Eucharist corre-
the blood of the lamb on the door-posts, from the danger
sponds to the banquet of the paschal lamb. The sacra-
of extermination which threatened the Egyptians.
ment of Penance in the New Law corresponds to all the
Now two things are to be observed in their departure
purifications of the Old Law. The sacrament of Orders
from Egypt: namely, their haste in going, for the Egyp-
corresponds to the consecration of the pontiff and of the
tians pressed them to go forth speedily, as related in Ex.
priests. To the sacrament of Confirmation, which is the
12:33; and there was danger that anyone who did not has-
sacrament of the fulness of grace, there would be no cor-
ten to go with the crowd might be slain by the Egyptians.
responding sacrament of the Old Law, because the time of
Their haste was shown in two ways. First by what they
fulness had not yet come, since “the Law brought no man
ate. For they were commanded to eat unleavened bread, as
[Vulg.: ‘nothing’] to perfection” (Heb. 7:19). The same
a sign “that it could not be leavened, the Egyptians press-
applies to the sacrament of Extreme Unction, which is an
ing them to depart”; and to eat roast meat, for this took
immediate preparation for entrance into glory, to which
less time to prepare; and that they should not break a bone
the way was not yet opened out in the Old Law, since the
thereof, because in their haste there was no time to break
price had not yet been paid. Matrimony did indeed exist
bones. Secondly, as to the manner of eating. For it is writ-
under the Old Law, as a function of nature, but not as the
ten: “You shall gird your reins, and you shall have shoes
sacrament of the union of Christ with the Church, for that
on your feet, holding staves in your hands, and you shall
union was not as yet brought about. Hence under the Old
eat in haste”: which clearly designates men at the point
Law it was allowable to give a bill of divorce, which is
of starting on a journey. To this also is to be referred the
contrary to the nature of the sacrament.
1099
Reply to Objection 4. As already stated, the purifi-the Gentiles sometimes employed human blood and seed.
cations of the Old Law were ordained for the removal
All these bodily uncleannesses were purified either by the
of impediments to the divine worship: which worship is
mere sprinkling of water, or, in the case of those which
twofold; viz. spiritual, consisting in devotion of the mind
were more grievous, by some sacrifice of expiation for the
to God; and corporal, consisting in sacrifices, oblations,
sin which was the occasion of the uncleanness in question.
and so forth. Now men are hindered in the spiritual wor-
The figurative reason for these uncleannesses was that
ship by sins, whereby men were said to be polluted, for
they were figures of various sins. For the uncleanness of
instance, by idolatry, murder, adultery, or incest. From
any corpse signifies the uncleanness of sin, which is the
such pollutions men were purified by certain sacrifices,
death of the soul. The uncleanness of leprosy betokened
offered either for the whole community in general, or also
the uncleanness of heretical doctrine: both because hereti-
for the sins of individuals; not that those carnal sacrifices
cal doctrine is contagious just as leprosy is, and because
had of themselves the power of expiating sin; but that they
no doctrine is so false as not to have some truth min-
signified that expiation of sins which was to be effected
gled with error, just as on the surface of a leprous body
by Christ, and of which those of old became partakers by
one may distinguish the healthy parts from those that are
protesting their faith in the Redeemer, while taking part in
infected. The uncleanness of a woman suffering from a
the figurative sacrifices.
flow of blood denotes the uncleanness of idolatry, on ac-
The impediments to external worship consisted in cer-
count of the blood which is offered up. The uncleanness
tain bodily uncleannesses; which were considered in the
of the man who has suffered seminal loss signifies the un-
first place as existing in man, and consequently in other
cleanness of empty words, for “the seed is the word of
animals also, and in man’s clothes, dwelling-place, and
God.” The uncleanness of sexual intercourse and of the
vessels. In man himself uncleanness was considered as
woman in child-birth signifies the uncleanness of original
arising partly from himself and partly from contact with
sin. The uncleanness of the woman in her periods signifies
unclean things. Anything proceeding from man was re-
the uncleanness of a mind that is sensualized by pleasure.
puted unclean that was already subject to corruption, or
Speaking generally, the uncleanness contracted by touch-
exposed thereto: and consequently since death is a kind
ing an unclean thing denotes the uncleanness arising from
of corruption, the human corpse was considered unclean.
consent in another’s sin, according to 2 Cor. 6:17: “Go
In like manner, since leprosy arises from corruption of the
out from among them, and be ye separate. . . and touch not
humors, which break out externally and infect other per-
the unclean thing.”
sons, therefore were lepers also considered unclean; and,
Moreover, this uncleanness arising from the touch was
again, women suffering from a flow of blood, whether
contracted even by inanimate objects; for whatever was
from weakness, or from nature (either at the monthly
touched in any way by an unclean man, became itself un-
course or at the time of conception); and, for the same
clean. Wherein the Law attenuated the superstition of
reason, men were reputed unclean if they suffered from a
the Gentiles, who held that uncleanness was contracted
flow of seed, whether due to weakness, to nocturnal pollu-
not only by touch, but also by speech or looks, as Rabbi
tion, or to sexual intercourse. Because every humor issu-
Moses states (Doct. Perplex. iii) of a woman in her pe-
ing from man in the aforesaid ways involves some unclean
riods. The mystical sense of this was that “to God the
infection. Again, man contracted uncleanness by touching
wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike” (Wis. 14:9).
any unclean thing whatever.
There was also an uncleanness of inanimate things
Now there was both a literal and a figurative reason for
considered in themselves, such as the uncleanness of lep-
these uncleannesses. The literal reason was taken from
rosy in a house or in clothes. For just as leprosy occurs
the reverence due to those things that belong to the divine
in men through a corrupt humor causing putrefaction and
worship: both because men are not wont, when unclean,
corruption in the flesh; so, too, through some corruption
to touch precious things: and in order that by rarely ap-
and excess of humidity or dryness, there arises sometimes
proaching sacred things they might have greater respect
a kind of corruption in the stones with which a house is
for them. For since man could seldom avoid all the afore-
built, or in clothes. Hence the Law called this corruption
said uncleannesses, the result was that men could seldom
by the name of leprosy, whereby a house or a garment
approach to touch things belonging to the worship of God,
was deemed to be unclean: both because all corruption
so that when they did approach, they did so with greater
savored of uncleanness, as stated above, and because the
reverence and humility. Moreover, in some of these the
Gentiles worshipped their household gods as a preserva-
literal reason was that men should not be kept away from
tive against this corruption. Hence the Law prescribed
worshipping God through fear of coming in contact with
such houses, where this kind of corruption was of a last-
lepers and others similarly afflicted with loathsome and
ing nature, to be destroyed; and such garments to be burnt,
contagious diseases. In others, again, the reason was to
in order to avoid all occasion of idolatry. There was also
avoid idolatrous worship: because in their sacrificial rites
an uncleanness of vessels, of which it is written (Num.
1100
19:15): “The vessel that hath no cover, and binding over just as the cow was burnt “with her skin and her flesh, her
it, shall be unclean.” The cause of this uncleanness was
blood and dung being delivered to the flames.” To this
that anything unclean might easily drop into such vessels,
burning were added “cedar-wood, and hyssop, and scar-
so as to render them unclean. Moreover, this command
let twice dyed,” to signify that just as cedar-wood is not
aimed at the prevention of idolatry. For idolaters believed
liable to putrefaction, and scarlet twice dyed does not eas-
that if mice, lizards, or the like, which they used to sac-
ily lose its color, and hyssop retains its odor after it has
rifice to the idols, fell into the vessels or into the water,
been dried; so also was this sacrifice for the preservation
these became more pleasing to the gods. Even now some
of the whole people, and for their good behavior and de-
women let down uncovered vessels in honor of the noc-
votion. Hence it is said of the ashes of the cow: “That
turnal deities which they call “Janae.”
they may be reserved for the multitude of the children of
The figurative reason of these uncleannesses is that the
Israel.” Or, according to Josephus (Antiq. iii, 8,9,10), the
leprosy of a house signified the uncleanness of the assem-
four elements are indicated here: for “cedar-wood” was
bly of heretics; the leprosy of a linen garment signified an
added to the fire, to signify the earth, on account of its
evil life arising from bitterness of mind; the leprosy of a
earthiness; “hyssop,” to signify the air, on account of its
woolen garment denoted the wickedness of flatterers; lep-
smell; “scarlet twice dyed,” to signify water, for the same
rosy in the warp signified the vices of the soul; leprosy on
reason as purple, on account of the dyes which are taken
the woof denoted sins of the flesh, for as the warp is in
out of the water: thus denoting the fact that this sacri-
the woof, so is the soul in the body. The vessel that has
fice was offered to the Creator of the four elements. And
neither cover nor binding, betokens a man who lacks the
since this sacrifice was offered for the sin of idolatry, both
veil of taciturnity, and who is unrestrained by any severity
“he that burned her,” and “he that gathered up the ashes,”
of discipline.
and “he that sprinkled the water” in which the ashes were
Reply to Objection 5. As stated above (ad 4), there
placed, were deemed unclean in detestation of that sin, in
was a twofold uncleanness in the Law; one by way of cor-
order to show that whatever was in any way connected
ruption in the mind or in the body; and this was the graver
with idolatry should be cast aside as being unclean. From
uncleanness; the other was by mere contact with an un-
this uncleanness they were purified by the mere washing
clean thing, and this was less grave, and was more easily
of their clothes; nor did they need to be sprinkled with
expiated. Because the former uncleanness was expiated
the water on account of this kind of uncleanness, because
by sacrifices for sins, since all corruption is due to sin, and otherwise the process would have been unending, since
signifies sin: whereas the latter uncleanness was expiated
he that sprinkled the water became unclean, so that if he
by the mere sprinkling of a certain water, of which water
were to sprinkle himself he would remain unclean; and if
we read in Num. 19. For there God commanded them
another were to sprinkle him, that one would have become
to take a red cow in memory of the sin they had commit-
unclean, and in like manner, whoever might sprinkle him,
ted in worshipping a calf. And a cow is mentioned rather
and so on indefinitely.
than a calf, because it was thus that the Lord was wont to
The figurative reason of this sacrifice was that the red
designate the synagogue, according to Osee 4:16: “Israel
cow signified Christ in respect his assumed weakness, de-
hath gone astray like a wanton heifer”: and this was, per-
noted by the female sex; while the color of the cow desig-
haps, because they worshipped heifers after the custom of
nated the blood of His Passion. And the “red cow was of
Egypt, according to Osee 10:5: ”(They) have worshipped
full age,” because all Christ’s works are perfect, “in which
the kine of Bethaven.” And in detestation of the sin of
there” was “no blemish”; “and which” had “not carried
idolatry it was sacrificed outside the camp; in fact, when-
the yoke,” because Christ was innocent, nor did He carry
ever sacrifice was offered up in expiation of the multitude
the yoke of sin. It was commanded to be taken to Moses,
of sins, it was all burnt outside the camp. Moreover, in
because they blamed Him for transgressing the law of
order to show that this sacrifice cleansed the people from
Moses by breaking the Sabbath. And it was commanded
all their sins, “the priest” dipped “his finger in her blood,”
to be delivered “to Eleazar the priest,” because Christ was
and sprinkled “it over against the door of the tabernacle
delivered into the hands of the priests to be slain. It was
seven times”; for the number seven signified universality.
immolated “without the camp,” because Christ “suffered
Further, the very sprinkling of blood pertained to the de-
outside the gate” (Heb. 13:12). And the priest dipped “his
testation of idolatry, in which the blood that was offered
finger in her blood,” because the mystery of Christ’s Pas-
up was not poured out, but was collected together, and
sion should be considered and imitated.
men gathered round it to eat in honor of the idols. Like-
It was sprinkled “over against. . . the tabernacle,”
wise it was burnt by fire, either because God appeared to
which denotes the synagogue, to signify either the con-
Moses in a fire, and the Law was given from the midst
demnation of the unbelieving Jews, or the purification
of fire; or to denote that idolatry, together with all that
of believers; and this “seven times,” in token either of
was connected therewith, was to be extirpated altogether;
the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, or of the seven days
1101
wherein all time is comprised. Again, all things that per-fered up for sin had to be burnt, to denote the destruction
tain to the Incarnation of Christ should be burnt with fire,
of sins. They were not, however, burnt on the altar: since
i.e. they should be understood spiritually; for the “skin”
none but holocausts were burnt thereon; but it was pre-
and “flesh” signified Christ’s outward works; the “blood”
scribed that they should be burnt without the camp, in de-
denoted the subtle inward force which quickened His ex-
testation of sin: for this was done whenever sacrifice was
ternal deeds; the “dung” betokened His weariness, His
offered for a grievous sin, or for the multitude of sins. The
thirst, and all such like things pertaining to His weakness.
other goat was let loose into the wilderness: not indeed to
Three things were added, viz. “cedar-wood,” which de-
offer it to the demons, whom the Gentiles worshipped in
notes the height of hope or contemplation; “hyssop,” in
desert places, because it was unlawful to offer aught to
token of humility or faith; “scarlet twice dyed,” which
them; but in order to point out the effect of the sacrifice
denotes twofold charity; for it is by these three that we
which had been offered up. Hence the priest put his hand
should cling to Christ suffering. The ashes of this burning
on its head, while confessing the sins of the children of Is-
were gathered by “a man that is clean,” because the relics
rael: as though that goat were to carry them away into the
of the Passion came into the possession of the Gentiles,
wilderness, where it would be devoured by wild beasts,
who were not guilty of Christ’s death. The ashes were put
because it bore the punishment of the people’s sins. And
into water for the purpose of expiation, because Baptism
it was said to bear the sins of the people, either because
receives from Christ’s Passion the power of washing away
the forgiveness of the people’s sins was signified by its
sins. The priest who immolated and burned the cow, and
being let loose, or because on its head written lists of sins
he who burned, and he who gathered together the ashes,
were fastened.
were unclean, as also he that sprinkled the water: either
The figurative reason of these things was that Christ
because the Jews became unclean through putting Christ
was foreshadowed both by the calf, on account of His
to death, whereby our sins are expiated; and this, until the
power; and by the ram, because He is the Head of the
evening, i.e. until the end of the world, when the remnants
faithful; and by the he-goat, on account of “the likeness of
of Israel will be converted; or else because they who han-
sinful flesh” (Rom. 8:3). Moreover, Christ was sacrificed
dle sacred things with a view to the cleansing of others
for the sins of both priests and people: since both those
contract certain uncleannesses, as Gregory says (Pastor.
of high and those of low degree are cleansed from sin by
ii, 5); and this until the evening, i.e. until the end of this
His Passion. The blood of the calf and of the goat was
life.
brought into the Holies by the priest, because the entrance
Reply to Objection 6. As stated above (ad 5), an un-
to the kingdom of heaven was opened to us by the blood
cleanness which was caused by corruption either of mind
of Christ’s Passion. Their bodies were burnt without the
or of body was expiated by sin-offerings. Now special
camp, because “Christ suffered without the gate,” as the
sacrifices were wont to be offered for the sins of individ-
Apostle declares (Heb. 13:12). The scape-goat may de-
uals: but since some were neglectful about expiating such
note either Christ’s Godhead Which went away into soli-
sins and uncleannesses; or, through ignorance, failed to
tude when the Man Christ suffered, not by going to an-
offer this expiation; it was laid down that once a year, on
other place, but by restraining His power: or it may signify
the tenth day of the seventh month, a sacrifice of expia-
the base concupiscence which we ought to cast away from
tion should be offered for the whole people. And because,
ourselves, while we offer up to Our Lord acts of virtue.
as the Apostle says (Heb. 7:28), “the Law maketh men
With regard to the uncleanness contracted by those
priests, who have infirmity,” it behooved the priest first of
who burnt these sacrifices, the reason is the same as that
all to offer a calf for his own sins, in memory of Aaron’s
which we assigned (ad 5) to the sacrifice of the red heifer.
sin in fashioning the molten calf; and besides, to offer
Reply to Objection 7. The legal rite did not cleanse
a ram for a holocaust, which signified that the priestly
the leper of his deformity, but declared him to be cleansed.
sovereignty denoted by the ram, who is the head of the
This is shown by the words of Lev. 14:3, seqq., where it
flock, was to be ordained to the glory of God. Then he
was said that the priest, “when he shall find that the lep-
offered two he-goats for the people: one of which was of-
rosy is cleansed,” shall command “him that is to be puri-
fered in expiation of the sins of the multitude. For the he-
fied”: consequently, the leper was already healed: but he
goat is an evil-smelling animal; and from its skin clothes
was said to be purified in so far as the verdict of the priest
are made having a pungent odor; to signify the stench, un-
restored him to the society of men and to the worship of
cleanness and the sting of sin. After this he-goat had been
God. It happened sometimes, however, that bodily lep-
immolated, its blood was taken, together with the blood of
rosy was miraculously cured by the legal rite, when the
the calf, into the Holy of Holies, and the entire sanctuary
priest erred in his judgment.
was sprinkled with it; to signify that the tabernacle was
Now this purification of a leper was twofold: for, in
cleansed from the uncleanness of the children of Israel.
the first place, he was declared to be clean; and, secondly,
But the corpses of the he-goat and calf which had been of-
he was restored, as clean, to the society of men and to the
1102
worship of God, to wit, after seven days. At the first pu-of any other uncleannesses, call for no special remark, be-
rification the leper who sought to be cleansed offered for
yond what applies to other sacrifices, whether for sins or
himself “two living sparrows. . . cedar-wood, and scarlet,
for trespasses.
and hyssop,” in such wise that a sparrow and the hyssop
Reply obj. 8 and 9: Just as the people were initiated by
should be tied to the cedar-wood with a scarlet thread, so
circumcision to the divine worship, so were the ministers
that the cedar-wood was like the handle of an aspersory:
by some special purification or consecration: wherefore
while the hyssop and sparrow were that part of the asper-
they are commanded to be separated from other men, as
sory which was dipped into the blood of the other spar-
being specially deputed, rather than others, to the min-
row which was “immolated. . . over living waters.” These
istry of the divine worship. And all that was done touch-
things he offered as an antidote to the four defects of lep-
ing them in their consecration or institution, was with a
rosy: for cedar-wood, which is not subject to putrefaction,
view to show that they were in possession of a preroga-
was offered against the putrefaction; hyssop, which is a
tive of purity, power and dignity. Hence three things were
sweet-smelling herb, was offered up against the stench;
done in the institution of ministers: for first, they were
a living sparrow was offered up against numbness; and
purified; secondly, they were adorned∗ and consecrated;
scarlet, which has a vivid color, was offered up against
thirdly, they were employed in the ministry. All in gen-
the repulsive color of leprosy. The living sparrow was let
eral used to be purified by washing in water, and by cer-
loose to fly away into the plain, because the leper was re-
tain sacrifices; but the Levites in particular shaved all the
stored to his former liberty.
hair of their bodies, as stated in Lev. 8 (cf. Num. 8).
On the eighth day he was admitted to divine worship,
With regard to the high-priests and priests the conse-
and was restored to the society of men; but only after hav-
cration was performed as follows. First, when they had
ing shaved all the hair of his body, and washed his clothes,
been washed, they were clothed with certain special gar-
because leprosy rots the hair, infects the clothes, and gives
ments in designation of their dignity. In particular, the
them an evil smell. Afterwards a sacrifice was offered for
high-priest was anointed on the head with the oil of unc-
his sin, since leprosy was frequently a result of sin: and
tion: to denote that the power of consecration was poured
some of the blood of the sacrifice was put on the tip of the
forth by him on to others, just as oil flows from the head
ear of the man that was to be cleansed, “and on the thumb
on to the lower parts of the body; according to Ps. 132:2:
of his right hand, and the great toe of his right foot”; be-
“Like the precious ointment on the head that ran down
cause it is in these parts that leprosy is first diagnosed and
upon the beard, the beard of Aaron.” But the Levites
felt. In this rite, moreover, three liquids were employed:
received no other consecration besides being offered to
viz. blood, against the corruption of the blood; oil, to de-
the Lord by the children of Israel through the hands of
note the healing of the disease; and living waters, to wash
the high-priest, who prayed for them. The lesser priests
away the filth.
were consecrated on the hands only, which were to be em-
The figurative reason was that the Divine and human
ployed in the sacrifices. The tip of their right ear and the
natures in Christ were denoted by the two sparrows, one
thumb of their right hand, and the great toe of their right
of which, in likeness of His human nature, was offered up
foot were tinged with the blood of the sacrificial animal,
in an earthen vessel over living waters, because the wa-
to denote that they should be obedient to God’s law in
ters of Baptism are sanctified by Christ’s Passion. The
offering the sacrifices (this is denoted by touching their
other sparrow, in token of His impassible Godhead, re-
right ear); and that they should be careful and ready in
mained living, because the Godhead cannot die: hence
performing the sacrifices (this is signified by the moisten-
it flew away, for the Godhead could not be encompassed
ing of the right foot and hand). They themselves and their
by the Passion. Now this living sparrow, together with
garments were sprinkled with the blood of the animal that
the cedar-wood and scarlet or cochineal, and hyssop, i.e.
had been sacrificed, in memory of the blood of the lamb
faith, hope and charity, as stated above (ad 5), was put
by which they had been delivered in Egypt. At their con-
into the water for the purpose of sprinkling, because we
secration the following sacrifices were offered: a calf, for
are baptized in the faith of the God-Man. By the waters
sin, in memory of Aaron’s sin in fashioning the molten
of Baptism or of his tears man washes his clothes, i.e.
calf; a ram, for a holocaust, in memory of the sacrifice of
his works, and all his hair, i.e. his thoughts. The tip of
Abraham, whose obedience it behooved the high-priest to
the right ear of the man to be cleansed is moistened with
imitate; again, a ram of consecration, which was a peace-
some the blood and oil, in order to strengthen his hearing
offering, in memory of the delivery form Egypt through
against harmful words; and the thumb and toe of his right
the blood of the lamb; and a basket of bread, in memory
hand and foot are moistened that his deeds may be holy.
of the manna vouchsafed to the people.
Other matters pertaining to this purification, or to that also
In reference to their being destined to the ministry, the
∗ ‘Ornabantur.’ Some editions have ‘ordinabantur’—‘were ordained’: the former reading is a reference to Lev. 8:7-9
1103
fat of the ram, one roll of bread, and the right shoulder he wore them on his breast, bearing them in his heart,
were placed on their hands, to show that they received
so to speak. And the Lord commanded the “Doctrine
the power of offering these things to the Lord: while the
and Truth” to be put in the rational: for certain matters
Levites were initiated to the ministry by being brought
regarding moral and dogmatic truth were written on it.
into the tabernacle of the covenant, as being destined to
The Jews indeed pretend that on the rational was placed a
the ministry touching the vessels of the sanctuary.
stone which changed color according to the various things
The figurative reason of these things was that those
which were about to happen to the children of Israel: and
who are to be consecrated to the spiritual ministry of
this they call the “Truth and Doctrine.” Fifthly, he wore
Christ, should be first of all purified by the waters of Bap-
a belt or girdle made of the four colors mentioned above.
tism, and by the waters of tears, in their faith in Christ’s
Sixthly, there was the tiara or mitre which was made of
Passion, which is a sacrifice both of expiation and of pu-
linen. Seventhly, there was the golden plate which hung
rification. They have also to shave all the hair of their
over his forehead; on it was inscribed the Lord’s name.
body, i.e. all evil thoughts. They should, moreover, be
Eighthly, there were “the linen breeches to cover the flesh
decked with virtues, and be consecrated with the oil of
of their nakedness,” when they went up to the sanctuary or
the Holy Ghost, and with the sprinkling of Christ’s blood.
altar. Of these eight vestments the lesser priests had four,
And thus they should be intent on the fulfilment of their
viz. the linen tunic and breeches, the belt and the tiara.
spiritual ministry.
According to some, the literal reason for these vest-
Reply to Objection 10. As already stated (a. 4), the
ments was that they denoted the disposition of the terres-
purpose of the Law was to induce men to have reverence
trial globe; as though the high-priest confessed himself to
for the divine worship: and this in two ways; first, by ex-
be the minister of the Creator of the world, wherefore it
cluding from the worship of God whatever might be an
is written (Wis. 18:24): “In the robe” of Aaron “was the
object of contempt; secondly, by introducing into the di-
whole world” described. For the linen breeches signified
vine worship all that seemed to savor of reverence. And,
the earth out of which the flax grows. The surrounding
indeed, if this was observed in regard to the tabernacle
belt signified the ocean which surrounds the earth. The
and its vessels, and in the animals to be sacrificed, much
violet tunic denoted the air by its color: its little bells be-
more was it to be observed in the very ministers. Where-
token the thunder; the pomegranates, the lightning. The
fore, in order to obviate contempt for the ministers, it was
ephod, by its many colors, signified the starry heaven; the
prescribed that they should have no bodily stain or defect:
two onyx stones denoted the two hemispheres, or the sun
since men so deformed are wont to be despised by oth-
and moon. The twelve precious stones on the breast are
ers. For the same reason it was also commanded that the
the twelve signs of the zodiac: and they are said to have
choice of those who were to be destined to the service of
been placed on the rational because in heaven, are the
God was not to be made in a broadcast manner from any
types [rationes] of earthly things, according to Job 38:33:
family, but according to their descent from one particular
“Dost thou know the order of heaven, and canst thou set
stock, thus giving them distinction and nobility.
down the reason [rationem] thereof on the earth?” The
In order that they might be revered, special ornate
turban or tiara signified the empyrean: the golden plate
vestments were appointed for their use, and a special form
was a token of God, the governor of the universe.
of consecration. This indeed is the general reason of or-
The figurative reason is evident. Because bodily stains
nate garments. But the high-priest in particular had eight
or defects wherefrom the priests had to be immune, sig-
vestments. First, he had a linen tunic. Secondly, he had
nify the various vices and sins from which they should be
a purple tunic; round the bottom of which were placed
free. Thus it is forbidden that he should be blind, i.e. he
“little bells” and “pomegranates of violet, and purple, and
ought not to be ignorant: he must not be lame, i.e. vac-
scarlet twice dyed.” Thirdly, he had the ephod, which cov-
illating and uncertain of purpose: that he must have “a
ered his shoulders and his breast down to the girdle; and it
little, or a great, or a crooked nose,” i.e. that he should
was made of gold, and violet and purple, and scarlet twice
not, from lack of discretion, exceed in one direction or in
dyed and twisted linen: and on his shoulders he bore two
another, or even exercise some base occupation: for the
onyx stones, on which were graven the names of the chil-
nose signifies discretion, because it discerns odors. It is
dren of Israel. Fourthly, he had the rational, made of the
forbidden that he should have “a broken foot” or “hand,”
same material; it was square in shape, and was worn on
i.e. he should not lose the power of doing good works or
the breast, and was fastened to the ephod. On this ratio-
of advancing in virtue. He is rejected, too, if he have a
nal there were twelve precious stones set in four rows, on
swelling either in front or behind [Vulg.: ‘if he be crook-
which also were graven the names of the children of Is-
backed’]: by which is signified too much love of earthly
rael, in token that the priest bore the burden of the whole
things: if he be blear-eyed, i.e. if his mind is darkened by
people, since he bore their names on his shoulders; and
carnal affections: for running of the eyes is caused by a
that it was his duty ever to think of their welfare, since
flow of matter. He is also rejected if he had “a pearl in his
1104
eye,” i.e. if he presumes in his own estimation that he is was signified by the golden plate worn over the forehead,
clothed in the white robe of righteousness. Again, he is
with the name of God engraved thereon. Secondly, they
rejected “if he have a continued scab,” i.e. lustfulness of
had to bear with the shortcomings of the people: this was
the flesh: also, if he have “a dry scurf,” which covers the
denoted by the ephod which they bore on their shoulders.
body without giving pain, and is a blemish on the comeli-
Thirdly, they had to carry the people in their mind and
ness of the members; which denotes avarice. Lastly, he is
heart by the solicitude of charity, in token of which they
rejected “if he have a rupture” or hernia; through baseness
wore the rational. Fourthly, they had to lead a godly life by
rending his heart, though it appear not in his deeds.
performing works of perfection; and this was signified by
The vestments denote the virtues of God’s ministers.
the violet tunic. Hence little golden bells were fixed to the
Now there are four things that are necessary to all His
bottom of the violet tunic, which bells signified the teach-
ministers, viz. chastity denoted by the breeches; a pure
ing of divine things united in the high-priest to his godly
life, signified by the linen tunic; the moderation of dis-
mode of life. In addition to these were the pomegranates,
cretion, betokened by the girdle; and rectitude of purpose,
signifying unity of faith and concord in good morals: be-
denoted by the mitre covering the head. But the high-
cause his doctrine should hold together in such a way that
priests needed four other things in addition to these. First,
it should not rend asunder the unity of faith and peace.
a continual recollection of God in their thoughts; and this
Whether there was any reasonable cause for the ceremonial observances?
Ia IIae q. 102 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that there was no rea-
be offered to the Lord (Ex. 13). Therefore it is an un-
sonable cause for the ceremonial observances. Because,
fitting command that is set forth in Lev. 19:23: “when
as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:4), “every creature of God
you shall be come into the land, and shall have planted in
is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received with
it fruit trees, you shall take away the uncircumcision† of
thanksgiving.” It was therefore unfitting that they should
them,” i.e. the first crops, and they “shall be unclean to
be forbidden to eat certain foods, as being unclean accord-
you, neither shall you eat of them.”
ing to Lev. 11∗.
Objection 6. Further, clothing is something extrane-
Objection 2. Further, just as animals are given to man
ous to man’s body. Therefore certain kinds of garments
for food, so also are herbs: wherefore it is written (Gn.
should not have been forbidden to the Jews: for instance
9:3): “As the green herbs have I delivered all” flesh “to
(Lev. 19:19): “Thou shalt not wear a garment that is wo-
you.” But the Law did not distinguish any herbs from the
ven of two sorts”: and (Dt. 22:5): “A woman shall not
rest as being unclean, although some are most harmful,
be clothed with man’s apparel, neither shall a man use
for instance, those that are poisonous. Therefore it seems
woman’s apparel”: and further on (Dt. 22:11): “Thou
that neither should any animals have been prohibited as
shalt not wear a garment that is woven of woolen and linen
being unclean.
together.”
Objection 3. Further, if the matter from which a thing
Objection 7. Further, to be mindful of God’s com-
is generated be unclean, it seems that likewise the thing
mandments concerns not the body but the heart. There-
generated therefrom is unclean. But flesh is generated
fore it is unsuitably prescribed (Dt. 6:8, seqq.) that they
from blood. Since therefore all flesh was not prohibited
should “bind” the commandments of God “as a sign” on
as unclean, it seems that in like manner neither should
their hands; and that they should “write them in the entry”;
blood have been forbidden as unclean; nor the fat which
and (Num. 15:38, seqq.) that they should “make to them-
is engendered from blood.
selves fringes in the corners of their garments, putting in
Objection 4. Further, Our Lord said (Mat. 10:28; cf.
them ribands of blue. . . they may remember. . . the com-
Lk. 12:4), that those should not be feared “that kill the
mandments of the Lord.”
body,” since after death they “have no more that they can
Objection 8. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9)
do”: which would not be true if after death harm might
that God does not “take care for oxen,” and, therefore,
come to man through anything done with his body. Much
neither of other irrational animals. Therefore without rea-
less therefore does it matter to an animal already dead how
son is it commanded (Dt. 22:6): “If thou find, as thou
its flesh be cooked. Consequently there seems to be no
walkest by the way, a bird’s nest in a tree. . . thou shalt not reason in what is said, Ex. 23:19: “Thou shalt not boil a
take the dam with her young”; and (Dt. 25:4): “Thou
kid in the milk of its dam.”
shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out thy corn”; and
Objection 5. Further, all that is first brought forth of (Lev. 19:19): “Thou shalt not make thy cattle to gender
man and beast, as being most perfect, is commanded to
with beasts of any other kind.”
∗ Cf. Dt. 14
† ‘Praeputia,’ which Douay version renders ‘first fruits’
1105
Objection 9. Further, no distinction was made be-read (Mat. 15:11): “Not that which goeth into the mouth
tween clean and unclean plants.
Much less therefore
defileth a man; but what cometh out of the mouth, this
should any distinction have been made about the culti-
defileth a man”: which words are explained (Mat. 15:17)
vation of plants. Therefore it was unfittingly prescribed
as referring to sins. Yet certain foods can defile the soul
(Lev. 19:19): “Thou shalt not sow thy field with different
accidentally; in so far as man partakes of them against
seeds”; and (Dt. 22:9, seqq.): “Thou shalt sow thy vine-
obedience or a vow, or from excessive concupiscence; or
yard with divers seeds”; and: “Thou shalt not plough with
through their being an incentive to lust, for which reason
an ox and an ass together.”
some refrain from wine and flesh-meat.
Objection 10. Further, it is apparent that inanimate
If, however, we speak of bodily uncleanness, consist-
things are most of all subject to the power of man. There-
ing in some kind of corruption, the flesh of certain animals
fore it was unfitting to debar man from taking silver and
is unclean, either because like the pig they feed on unclean
gold of which idols were made, or anything they found in
things; or because their life is among unclean surround-
the houses of idols, as expressed in the commandment of
ings: thus certain animals, like moles and mice and such
the Law (Dt. 7:25, seqq.). It also seems an absurd com-
like, live underground, whence they contract a certain un-
mandment set forth in Dt. 23:13, that they should “dig
pleasant smell; or because their flesh, through being too
round about and. . . cover with earth that which they were
moist or too dry, engenders corrupt humors in the human
eased of.”
body. Hence they were forbidden to eat the flesh of flat-
Objection 11. Further, piety is required especially in
footed animals, i.e. animals having an uncloven hoof, on
priests. But it seems to be an act of piety to assist at the
account of their earthiness; and in like manner they were
burial of one’s friends: wherefore Tobias is commended
forbidden to eat the flesh of animals that have many clefts
for so doing (Tob. 1:20, seqq.). In like manner it is some-
in their feet, because such are very fierce and their flesh
times an act of piety to marry a loose woman, because
is very dry, such as the flesh of lions and the like. For the
she is thereby delivered from sin and infamy. Therefore
same reason they were forbidden to eat certain birds of
it seems inconsistent for these things to be forbidden to
prey the flesh of which is very dry, and certain water-fowl
priests (Lev. 21).
on account of their exceeding humidity. In like manner
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:14): “But thou
certain fish lacking fins and scales were prohibited on ac-
art otherwise instructed by the Lord thy God”: from which
count of their excessive moisture; such as eels and the
words we may gather that these observances were insti-
like. They were, however, allowed to eat ruminants and
tuted by God to be a special prerogative of that people.
animals with a divided hoof, because in such animals the
Therefore they are not without reason or cause.
humors are well absorbed, and their nature well balanced:
I answer that, The Jewish people, as stated above
for neither are they too moist, as is indicated by the hoof;
(a. 5), were specially chosen for the worship of God,
nor are they too earthly, which is shown by their having
and among them the priests themselves were specially set
not a flat but a cloven hoof. Of fishes they were allowed to
apart for that purpose. And just as other things that are
partake of the drier kinds, of which the fins and scales are
applied to the divine worship, need to be marked in some
an indication, because thereby the moist nature of the fish
particular way so that they be worthy of the worship of
is tempered. Of birds they were allowed to eat the tamer
God; so too in that people’s, and especially the priests’,
kinds, such as hens, partridges, and the like. Another rea-
mode of life, there needed to be certain special things be-
son was detestation of idolatry: because the Gentiles, and
fitting the divine worship, whether spiritual or corporal.
especially the Egyptians, among whom they had grown
Now the worship prescribed by the Law foreshadowed the
up, offered up these forbidden animals to their idols, or
mystery of Christ: so that whatever they did was a figure
employed them for the purpose of sorcery: whereas they
of things pertaining to Christ, according to 1 Cor. 10:11:
did not eat those animals which the Jews were allowed to
“All these things happened to them in figures.” Conse-
eat, but worshipped them as gods, or abstained, for some
quently the reasons for these observances may be taken in
other motive, from eating them, as stated above (a. 3, ad
two ways, first according to their fittingness to the worship
2). The third reason was to prevent excessive care about
of God; secondly, according as they foreshadow some-
food: wherefore they were allowed to eat those animals
thing touching the Christian mode of life.
which could be procured easily and promptly.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 5, ad 4,5),
With regard to blood and fat, they were forbidden to
the Law distinguished a twofold pollution or uncleanness;
partake of those of any animals whatever without excep-
one, that of sin, whereby the soul was defiled; and an-
tion. Blood was forbidden, both in order to avoid cru-
other consisting in some kind of corruption, whereby the
elty, that they might abhor the shedding of human blood,
body was in some way infected. Speaking then of the
as stated above (a. 3, ad 8); and in order to shun idol-
first-mentioned uncleanness, no kind of food is unclean,
atrous rite whereby it was customary for men to collect
or can defile a man, by reason of its nature; wherefore we
the blood and to gather together around it for a banquet
1106
in honor of the idols, to whom they held the blood to be those who lack kindly feelings, for the raven did not remost acceptable. Hence the Lord commanded the blood to
turn when once it had been let loose from the ark. The
be poured out and to be covered with earth (Lev. 17:13).
ostrich which, though a bird, cannot fly, and is always on
For the same reason they were forbidden to eat animals
the ground, signifies those who fight God’s cause, and at
that had been suffocated or strangled: because the blood
the same time are taken up with worldly business. The
of these animals would not be separated from the body:
owl, which sees clearly at night, but cannot see in the day-
or because this form of death is very painful to the victim;
time, denotes those who are clever in temporal affairs, but
and the Lord wished to withdraw them from cruelty even
dull in spiritual matters. The gull, which flies both in the
in regard to irrational animals, so as to be less inclined to
air and swims in the water, signifies those who are partial
be cruel to other men, through being used to be kind to
both to Circumcision and to Baptism: or else it denotes
beasts. They were forbidden to eat the fat: both because
those who would fly by contemplation, yet dwell in the
idolaters ate it in honor of their gods; and because it used
waters of sensual delights. The hawk, which helps men to
to be burnt in honor of God; and, again, because blood
seize the prey, is a figure of those who assist the strong to
and fat are not nutritious, which is the cause assigned by
prey on the poor. The screech-owl, which seeks its food
Rabbi Moses (Doct. Perplex. iii). The reason why they
by night but hides by day, signifies the lustful man who
were forbidden to eat the sinews is given in Gn. 32:32,
seeks to lie hidden in his deeds of darkness. The cor-
where it is stated that “the children of Israel. . . eat not the morant, so constituted that it can stay a long time under
sinew. . . because he touched the sinew of” Jacob’s “thing
water, denotes the glutton who plunges into the waters of
and it shrank.”
pleasure. The ibis is an African bird with a long beak, and
The figurative reason for these things is that all these
feeds on snakes; and perhaps it is the same as the stork: it
animals signified certain sins, in token of which those
signifies the envious man, who refreshes himself with the
animals were prohibited. Hence Augustine says (Contra
ills of others, as with snakes. The swan is bright in color,
Faustum iv, 7): “If the swine and lamb be called in ques-
and by the aid of its long neck extracts its food from deep
tion, both are clean by nature, because all God’s creatures
places on land or water: it may denote those who seek
are good: yet the lamb is clean, and the pig is unclean
earthly profit though an external brightness of virtue. The
in a certain signification. Thus if you speak of a foolish,
bittern is a bird of the East: it has a long beak, and its jaws and of a wise man, each of these expressions is clean con-are furnished with follicules, wherein it stores its food at
sidered in the nature of the sound, letters and syllables
first, after a time proceeding to digest it: it is a figure of
of which it is composed: but in signification, the one is
the miser, who is excessively careful in hoarding up the
clean, the other unclean.” The animal that chews the cud
necessaries of life. The coot∗ has this peculiarity apart
and has a divided hoof, is clean in signification. Because
from other birds, that it has a webbed foot for swimming,
division of the hoof is a figure of the two Testaments: or
and a cloven foot for walking: for it swims like a duck in
of the Father and Son: or of the two natures in Christ:
the water, and walks like a partridge on land: it drinks only
of the distinction of good and evil. While chewing the
when it bites, since it dips all its food in water: it is a figure cud signifies meditation on the Scriptures and a sound un-of a man who will not take advice, and does nothing but
derstanding thereof; and whoever lacks either of these is
what is soaked in the water of his own will. The heron†,
spiritually unclean. In like manner those fish that have
commonly called a falcon, signifies those whose “feet are
scales and fins are clean in signification. Because fins
swift to shed blood” (Ps. 13:3). The plover‡, which is a
signify the heavenly or contemplative life; while scales
garrulous bird, signifies the gossip. The hoopoe, which
signify a life of trials, each of which is required for spiri-
builds its nest on dung, feeds on foetid ordure, and whose
tual cleanness. Of birds certain kinds were forbidden. In
song is like a groan, denotes worldly grief which works
the eagle which flies at a great height, pride is forbidden:
death in those who are unclean. The bat, which flies near
in the griffon which is hostile to horses and men, cruelty
the ground, signifies those who being gifted with worldly
of powerful men is prohibited. The osprey, which feeds
knowledge, seek none but earthly things. Of fowls and
on very small birds, signifies those who oppress the poor.
quadrupeds those alone were permitted which have the
The kite, which is full of cunning, denotes those who are
hind-legs longer than the forelegs, so that they can leap:
fraudulent in their dealings. The vulture, which follows
whereas those were forbidden which cling rather to the
an army, expecting to feed on the carcases of the slain,
earth: because those who abuse the doctrine of the four
signifies those who like others to die or to fight among
Evangelists, so that they are not lifted up thereby, are re-
themselves that they may gain thereby. Birds of the raven
puted unclean. By the prohibition of blood, fat and nerves,
kind signify those who are blackened by their lusts; or
we are to understand the forbidding of cruelty, lust, and
∗ Douay: ‘porphyrion.’ St. Thomas’ description tallies with the coot or moorhen: though of course he is mistaken about the feet differing from one another.
† Vulg.: ‘herodionem’
‡ Here, again, the Douay
translators transcribed from the Vulgate: ‘charadrion’; ‘charadrius’ is the generic name for all plovers.
1107
bravery in committing sin.
ried away to Babylon, the third until the time of Christ),
Reply to Objection 2. Men were wont to eat plants
the Fruit of the Law, i.e. Christ, was to be offered to God.
and other products of the soil even before the deluge: but
Or again, that we must mistrust our first efforts, on ac-
the eating of flesh seems to have been introduced after the
count of their imperfection.
deluge; for it is written (Gn. 9:3): “Even as the green
Reply to Objection 6. It is said of a man in Ecclus.
herbs have I delivered. . . all” flesh “to you.” The reason
19:27, that “the attire of the body. . . ” shows “what he
for this was that the eating of the products of the soil sa-
is.” Hence the Lord wished His people to be distinguished
vors rather of a simple life; whereas the eating of flesh sa-
from other nations, not only by the sign of the circumci-
vors of delicate and over-careful living. For the soil gives
sion, which was in the flesh, but also by a certain differ-
birth to the herb of its own accord; and such like products
ence of attire. Wherefore they were forbidden to wear
of the earth may be had in great quantities with very little
garments woven of woolen and linen together, and for a
effort: whereas no small trouble is necessary either to rear
woman to be clothed with man’s apparel, or vice versa,
or to catch an animal. Consequently God being wishful
for two reasons. First, to avoid idolatrous worship. Be-
to bring His people back to a more simple way of living,
cause the Gentiles, in their religious rites, used garments
forbade them to eat many kinds of animals, but not those
of this sort, made of various materials. Moreover in the
things that are produced by the soil. Another reason may
worship of Mars, women put on men’s armor; while, con-
be that animals were offered to idols, while the products
versely, in the worship of Venus men donned women’s
of the soil were not.
attire. The second reason was to preserve them from lust:
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what
because the employment of various materials in the mak-
has been said (ad 1).
ing of garments signified inordinate union of sexes, while
Reply to Objection 4. Although the kid that is slain
the use of male attire by a woman, or vice versa, has an
has no perception of the manner in which its flesh is
incentive to evil desires, and offers an occasion of lust.
cooked, yet it would seem to savor of heartlessness if the
The figurative reason is that the prohibition of wearing a
dam’s milk, which was intended for the nourishment of
garment woven of woolen and linen signified that it was
her offspring, were served up on the same dish. It might
forbidden to unite the simplicity of innocence, denoted by
also be said that the Gentiles in celebrating the feasts of
wool, with the duplicity of malice, betokened by linen.
their idols prepared the flesh of kids in this manner, for
It also signifies that woman is forbidden to presume to
the purpose of sacrifice or banquet: hence (Ex. 23) after
teach, or perform other duties of men: or that man should
the solemnities to be celebrated under the Law had been
not adopt the effeminate manners of a woman.
foretold, it is added: “Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk
Reply to Objection 7.
As Jerome says on Mat.
of its dam.” The figurative reason for this prohibition is
23:6, “the Lord commanded them to make violet-colored
this: the kid, signifying Christ, on account of “the like-
fringes in the four corners of their garments, so that
ness of sinful flesh” (Rom. 8:3), was not to be seethed,
the Israelites might be distinguished from other nations.”
i.e. slain, by the Jews, “in the milk of its dam,” i.e. during
Hence, in this way, they professed to be Jews: and conse-
His infancy. Or else it signifies that the kid, i.e. the sinner, quently the very sight of this sign reminded them of their
should not be boiled in the milk of its dam, i.e. should not
law.
be cajoled by flattery.
When we read: “Thou shalt bind them on thy hand,
Reply to Objection 5. The Gentiles offered their gods
and they shall be ever before thy eyes [Vulg.: ‘they shall
the first-fruits, which they held to bring them good luck:
be and shall move between thy eyes’], the Pharisees gave
or they burnt them for the purpose of secrecy. Conse-
a false interpretation to these words, and wrote the deca-
quently (the Israelites) were commanded to look upon the
logue of Moses on a parchment, and tied it on their fore-
fruits of the first three years as unclean: for in that coun-
heads like a wreath, so that it moved in front of their eyes”:
try nearly all the trees bear fruit in three years’ time; those whereas the intention of the Lord in giving this command-trees, to wit, that are cultivated either from seed, or from a
ment was that they should be bound in their hands, i.e. in
graft, or from a cutting: but it seldom happens that the
their works; and that they should be before their eyes, i.e.
fruit-stones or seeds encased in a pod are sown: since
in their thoughts. The violet-colored fillets which were
it would take a longer time for these to bear fruit: and
inserted in their cloaks signify the godly intention which
the Law considered what happened most frequently. The
should accompany our every deed. It may, however, be
fruits, however, of the fourth year, as being the firstlings
said that, because they were a carnal-minded and stiff-
of clean fruits, were offered to God: and from the fifth
necked people, it was necessary for them to be stirred by
year onward they were eaten.
these sensible things to the observance of the Law.
The figurative reason was that this foreshadowed the
Reply to Objection 8. Affection in man is twofold: it
fact that after the three states of the Law (the first lasting
may be an affection of reason, or it may be an affection
from Abraham to David, the second, until they were car-
of passion. If a man’s affection be one of reason, it mat-
1108
ters not how man behaves to animals, because God has senses, i.e. the offspring, and set aside the observance
subjected all things to man’s power, according to Ps. 8:8:
of the letter, i.e. the mother, for instance, in all the cere-
“Thou hast subjected all things under his feet”: and it is
monies of the Law. It is also forbidden that beast of bur-
in this sense that the Apostle says that “God has no care
den, i.e. any of the common people, should be allowed
for oxen”; because God does not ask of man what he does
to engender, i.e. to have any connection, with animals of
with oxen or other animals.
another kind, i.e. with Gentiles or Jews.
But if man’s affection be one of passion, then it is
Reply to Objection 9. All these minglings were for-
moved also in regard to other animals: for since the pas-
bidden in agriculture; literally, in detestation of idolatry.
sion of pity is caused by the afflictions of others; and since
For the Egyptians in worshipping the stars employed vari-
it happens that even irrational animals are sensible to pain,
ous combinations of seeds, animals and garments, in order
it is possible for the affection of pity to arise in a man
to represent the various connections of the stars. Or else
with regard to the sufferings of animals. Now it is evident
all these minglings were forbidden in detestation of the
that if a man practice a pitiful affection for animals, he
unnatural vice.
is all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-men:
They have, however, a figurative reason. For the prohi-
wherefore it is written (Prov. 11:10): “The just regardeth
bition: “Thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds,”
the lives of his beasts: but the bowels of the wicked are
is to be understood, in the spiritual sense, of the prohibi-
cruel.” Consequently the Lord, in order to inculcate pity
tion to sow strange doctrine in the Church, which is a spir-
to the Jewish people, who were prone to cruelty, wished
itual vineyard. Likewise “the field,” i.e. the Church, must
them to practice pity even with regard to dumb animals,
not be sown “with different seeds,” i.e. with Catholic and
and forbade them to do certain things savoring of cruelty
heretical doctrines. Neither is it allowed to plough “with
to animals. Hence He prohibited them to “boil a kid in
an ox and an ass together”; thus a fool should not accom-
the milk of its dam”; and to “muzzle the ox that tread-
pany a wise man in preaching, for one would hinder the
eth out the corn”; and to slay “the dam with her young.”
other.
It may, nevertheless, be also said that these prohibitions
Reply to Objection 10.∗ Silver and gold were rea-
were made in hatred of idolatry. For the Egyptians held
sonably forbidden (Dt. 7) not as though they were not
it to be wicked to allow the ox to eat of the grain while
subject to the power of man, but because, like the idols
threshing the corn. Moreover certain sorcerers were wont
themselves, all materials out of which idols were made,
to ensnare the mother bird with her young during incu-
were anathematized as hateful in God’s sight. This is
bation, and to employ them for the purpose of securing
clear from the same chapter, where we read further on (Dt.
fruitfulness and good luck in bringing up children: also
7:26): “Neither shalt thou bring anything of the idol into
because it was held to be a good omen to find the mother
thy house, lest thou become an anathema like it.” Another
sitting on her young.
reason was lest, by taking silver and gold, they should be
As to the mingling of animals of divers species, the
led by avarice into idolatry to which the Jews were in-
literal reason may have been threefold. The first was to
clined. The other precept (Dt. 23) about covering up ex-
show detestation for the idolatry of the Egyptians, who
cretions, was just and becoming, both for the sake of bod-
employed various mixtures in worshipping the planets,
ily cleanliness; and in order to keep the air wholesome;
which produce various effects, and on various kinds of
and by reason of the respect due to the tabernacle of the
things according to their various conjunctions. The sec-
covenant which stood in the midst of the camp, wherein
ond reason was in condemnation of unnatural sins. The
the Lord was said to dwell; as is clearly set forth in the
third reason was the entire removal of all occasions of
same passage, where after expressing the command, the
concupiscence. Because animals of different species do
reason thereof is at once added, to wit: “For the Lord thy
not easily breed, unless this be brought about by man;
God walketh in the midst of thy camp, to deliver thee,
and movements of lust are aroused by seeing such things.
and to give up thy enemies to thee, and let thy camp be
Wherefore in the Jewish traditions we find it prescribed as
holy [i.e. clean], and let no uncleanness appear therein.”
stated by Rabbi Moses that men shall turn away their eyes
The figurative reason for this precept, according to Gre-
from such sights.
gory (Moral. xxxi), is that sins which are the fetid excre-
The figurative reason for these things is that the ne-
tions of the mind should be covered over by repentance,
cessities of life should not be withdrawn from the ox
that we may become acceptable to God, according to Ps.
that treadeth the corn, i.e. from the preacher bearing the
31:1: “Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and
sheaves of doctrine, as the Apostle states (1 Cor. 9:4,
whose sins are covered.” Or else according to a gloss, that
seqq.). Again, we should not take the dam with her young:
we should recognize the unhappy condition of human na-
because in certain things we have to keep the spiritual
ture, and humbly cover and purify the stains of a puffed-
∗ The Reply to the Tenth Objection is lacking in the codices. The solution given here is found in some editions, and was supplied by Nicolai.
1109
up and proud spirit in the deep furrow of self-examination.
when the priestly dignity was passed on from father to
Reply to Objection 11.
Sorcerers and idolatrous
son. Again, they were commanded to shave neither head
priests made use, in their rites, of the bones and flesh of
nor beard, and not to make incisions in their flesh, in or-
dead men. Wherefore, in order to extirpate the customs of
der to exclude the rites of idolatry. For the priests of the
idolatrous worship, the Lord commanded that the priests
Gentiles shaved both head and beard, wherefore it is writ-
of inferior degree, who at fixed times served in the tem-
ten (Bar 6:30): “Priests sit in their temples having their
ple, should not “incur an uncleanness at the death” of any-
garments rent, and their heads and beards shaven.” More-
one except of those who were closely related to them, viz.
over, in worshipping their idols “they cut themselves with
their father or mother, and others thus near of kin to them.
knives and lancets” (3 Kings 18:28). For this reason the
But the high-priest had always to be ready for the service
priests of the Old Law were commanded to do the con-
of the sanctuary; wherefore he was absolutely forbidden
trary.
to approach the dead, however nearly related to him. They
The spiritual reason for these things is that priests
were also forbidden to marry a “harlot” or “one that has
should be entirely free from dead works, i.e. sins. And
been put away,” or any other than a virgin: both on ac-
they should not shave their heads, i.e. set wisdom aside;
count of the reverence due to the priesthood, the honor of
nor should they shave their beards, i.e. set aside the per-
which would seem to be tarnished by such a marriage: and
fection of wisdom; nor rend their garments or cut their
for the sake of the children who would be disgraced by
flesh, i.e. they should not incur the sin of schism.
the mother’s shame: which was most of all to be avoided
1110
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 103
Of the Duration of the Ceremonial Precepts
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the duration of the ceremonial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the ceremonial precepts were in existence before the Law?
(2) Whether at the time of the Law the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of justification?
(3) Whether they ceased at the coming of Christ?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to observe them after the coming of Christ?
Whether the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law?
Ia IIae q. 103 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the ceremonies of
the foreshadowing of Christ. Now whoever worships God
the Law were in existence before the Law. For sacrifices
must needs worship Him by means of certain fixed things
and holocausts were ceremonies of the Old Law, as stated
pertaining to external worship. But the fixing of the di-
above (q. 101, a. 4). But sacrifices and holocausts pre-
vine worship belongs to the ceremonies; just as the deter-
ceded the Law: for it is written (Gn. 4:3,4) that “Cain of-
mining of our relations with our neighbor is a matter de-
fered, of the fruits of the earth, gifts to the Lord,” and that termined by the judicial precepts, as stated above (q. 99,
“Abel offered of the firstlings of his flock, and of their fat.”
a. 4). Consequently, as among men in general there were
Noe also “offered holocausts” to the Lord (Gn. 18:20),
certain judicial precepts, not indeed established by Divine
and Abraham did in like manner (Gn. 22:13). Therefore
authority, but ordained by human reason; so also there
the ceremonies of the Old Law preceded the Law.
were some ceremonies fixed, not by the authority of any
Objection 2. Further, the erecting and consecrating
law, but according to the will and devotion of those that
of the altar were part of the ceremonies relating to holy
worship God. Since, however, even before the Law some
things. But these preceded the Law. For we read (Gn.
of the leading men were gifted with the spirit of prophecy,
13:18) that “Abraham. . . built. . . an altar to the Lord”; and it is to be believed that a heavenly instinct, like a private
(Gn. 28:18) that “Jacob. . . took the stone. . . and set it up
law, prompted them to worship God in a certain definite
for a title, pouring oil upon the top of it.” Therefore the
way, which would be both in keeping with the interior
legal ceremonies preceded the Law.
worship, and a suitable token of Christ’s mysteries, which
Objection 3. Further, the first of the legal sacraments
were foreshadowed also by other things that they did, ac-
seems to have been circumcision. But circumcision pre-
cording to 1 Cor. 10:11: “All. . . things happened to them
ceded the Law, as appears from Gn. 17. In like manner
in figure.” Therefore there were some ceremonies before
the priesthood preceded the Law; for it is written (Gn.
the Law, but they were not legal ceremonies, because they
14:18) that “Melchisedech. . . was the priest of the most
were not as yet established by legislation.
high God.” Therefore the sacramental ceremonies pre-
Reply to Objection 1. The patriarchs offered up these
ceded the Law.
oblations, sacrifices and holocausts previously to the Law,
Objection 4. Further, the distinction of clean from un-
out of a certain devotion of their own will, according as it
clean animals belongs to the ceremonies of observances,
seemed proper to them to offer up in honor of God those
as stated above (q. 100, 2, a. 6, ad 1). But this distinction
things which they had received from Him, and thus to tes-
preceded the Law; for it is written (Gn. 7:2,3): “Of all
tify that they worshipped God Who is the beginning and
clean beasts take seven and seven. . . but of the beasts that
end of all.
are unclean, two and two.” Therefore the legal ceremonies
Reply to Objection 2. They also established certain
preceded the Law.
sacred things, because they thought that the honor due to
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): “These are
God demanded that certain places should be set apart from
the precepts and ceremonies. . . which the Lord your God
others for the purpose of divine worship.
commanded that I should teach you.” But they would not
Reply to Objection 3.
The sacrament of circum-
have needed to be taught about these things, if the afore-
cision was established by command of God before the
said ceremonies had been already in existence. Therefore
Law. Hence it cannot be called a sacrament of the Law
the legal ceremonies did not precede the Law.
as though it were an institution of the Law, but only as
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said
an observance included in the Law. Hence Our Lord said
(q. 101, a. 2; q. 102 , a. 2), the legal ceremonies were
(Jn. 7:20) that circumcision was “not of Moses, but of his
ordained for a double purpose; the worship of God, and
fathers.” Again, among those who worshipped God, the
1111
priesthood was in existence before the Law by human aponly certain animals for that purpose. If, however, they
pointment, for the Law allotted the priestly dignity to the
did make any distinction in regard to eating; it was not
firstborn.
that it was considered illegal to eat such animals, since
Reply to Objection 4. The distinction of clean from
this was not forbidden by any law, but from dislike or cus-
unclean animals was in vogue before the Law, not with
tom: thus even now we see that certain foods are looked
regard to eating them, since it is written (Gn. 9:3): “Ev-
upon with disgust in some countries, while people partake
erything that moveth and liveth shall be meat for you”:
of them in others.
but only as to the offering of sacrifices because they used
Whether, at the time of the Law, the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of Ia IIae q. 103 a. 2
justification?
Objection 1. It would seem that the ceremonies of the
remedies for the removal of the aforesaid uncleannesses
Old Law had the power of justification at the time of the
which were contracted in consequence of the prescription
Law. Because expiation from sin and consecration per-
of the Law. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 9:13) that “the
tains to justification. But it is written (Ex. 39:21) that the
blood of goats and of oxen, and the ashes of a heifer, be-
priests and their apparel were consecrated by the sprin-
ing sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled, to the cleans-
kling of blood and the anointing of oil; and (Lev. 16:16)
ing of the flesh.” And just as this uncleanness which was
that, by sprinkling the blood of the calf, the priest expi-
washed away by such like ceremonies, affected the flesh
ated “the sanctuary from the uncleanness of the children
rather than the soul, so also the ceremonies themselves are
of Israel, and from their transgressions and. . . their sins.”
called by the Apostle shortly before (Heb. 9:10) justices
Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power
of the flesh: “justices of the flesh,” says he, “being laid on
of justification.
them until the time of correction.”
Objection 2. Further, that by which man pleases God
On the other hand, they had no power of cleansing
pertains to justification, according to Ps. 10:8: “The Lord
from uncleanness of the soul, i.e. from the uncleanness
is just and hath loved justice.” But some pleased God by
of sin. The reason of this was that at no time could there
means of ceremonies, according to Lev. 10:19: “How
be expiation from sin, except through Christ, “Who taketh
could I. . . please the Lord in the ceremonies, having a sor-
away the sins [Vulg.: ‘sin’] of the world” (Jn. 1:29). And
rowful heart?” Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law
since the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation and Passion had
had the power of justification.
not yet really taken place, those ceremonies of the Old
Objection 3. Further, things relating to the divine
Law could not really contain in themselves a power flow-
worship regard the soul rather than the body, according to
ing from Christ already incarnate and crucified, such as
Ps. 18:8: “The Law of the Lord is unspotted, converting
the sacraments of the New Law contain. Consequently
souls.” But the leper was cleansed by means of the cere-
they could not cleanse from sin: thus the Apostle says
monies of the Old Law, as stated in Lev. 14. Much more
(Heb. 10:4) that “it is impossible that with the blood of
therefore could the ceremonies of the Old Law cleanse the
oxen and goats sin should be taken away”; and for this rea-
soul by justifying it.
son he calls them (Gal. 4:9) “weak and needy elements”:
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 2)∗: “If
weak indeed, because they cannot take away sin; but this
there had been a law given which could justify [Vulg.:
weakness results from their being needy, i.e. from the fact
‘give life’], Christ died in vain,” i.e. without cause. But
that they do not contain grace within themselves.
this is inadmissible. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old
However, it was possible at the time of the Law, for
Law did not confer justice.
the minds of the faithful, to be united by faith to Christ
I answer that, As stated above (q. 102, a. 5, ad 4),
incarnate and crucified; so that they were justified by faith
a twofold uncleanness was distinguished in the Old Law.
in Christ: of which faith the observance of these cere-
One was spiritual and is the uncleanness of sin. The other
monies was a sort of profession, inasmuch as they fore-
was corporal, which rendered a man unfit for divine wor-
shadowed Christ. Hence in the Old Law certain sacrifices
ship; thus a leper, or anyone that touched carrion, was
were offered up for sins, not as though the sacrifices them-
said to be unclean: and thus uncleanness was nothing but
selves washed sins away, but because they were profes-
a kind of irregularity. From this uncleanness, then, the
sions of faith which cleansed from sin. In fact, the Law
ceremonies of the Old Law had the power to cleanse: be-
itself implies this in the terms employed: for it is written
cause they were ordered by the Law to be employed as
(Lev. 4:26; 5:16) that in offering the sacrifice for sin “the
∗ The first words of the quotation are from 3:21: St. Thomas probably quoting from memory, substituted them for 2:21, which runs thus: ‘If justice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain.’
1112
priest shall pray for him. . . and it shall be forgiven him,”
the ceremonies by their obedience and devotion, and by
as though the sin were forgiven, not in virtue of the sac-
their faith in the reality foreshadowed; not by reason of
rifices, but through the faith and devotion of those who
the things considered in themselves.
offered them. It must be observed, however, that the very
Reply to Objection 3. Those ceremonies which were
fact that the ceremonies of the Old Law washed away un-
prescribed in the cleansing of a leper, were not ordained
cleanness of the body, was a figure of that expiation from
for the purpose of taking away the defilement of leprosy.
sins which was effected by Christ.
This is clear from the fact that these ceremonies were not
It is therefore evident that under the state of the Old
applied to a man until he was already healed: hence it
Law the ceremonies had no power of justification.
is written (Lev. 14:3,4) that the priest, “going out of the
Reply to Objection 1. That sanctification of priests
camp, when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed, shall
and their sons, and of their apparel or of anything else be-
command him that is to be purified to offer,” etc.; whence
longing to them, by sprinkling them with blood, had no
it is evident that the priest was appointed the judge of lep-
other effect but to appoint them to the divine worship, and
rosy, not before, but after cleansing. But these ceremonies
to remove impediments from them, “to the cleansing of
were employed for the purpose of taking away the un-
the flesh,” as the Apostle states (Heb. 9:13) in token of
cleanness of irregularity. They do say, however, that if
that sanctification whereby “Jesus” sanctified “the people
a priest were to err in his judgment, the leper would be
by His own blood” (Heb. 13:12). Moreover, the expiation
cleansed miraculously by the power of God, but not in
must be understood as referring to the removal of these
virtue of the sacrifice. Thus also it was by miracle that the
bodily uncleannesses, not to the forgiveness of sin. Hence
thigh of the adulterous woman rotted, when she had drunk
even the sanctuary which could not be the subject of sin is
the water “on which” the priest had “heaped curses,” as
stated to be expiated.
stated in Num. 5:19-27.
Reply to Objection 2. The priests pleased God in
Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law ceased at the coming of Christ?
Ia IIae q. 103 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the ceremonies of
of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths,
the Old Law did not cease at the coming of Christ. For it
which are a shadow of things to come”: and (Heb. 8:13):
is written (Bar 4:1): “This is the book of the command-
“In saying a new (testament), he hath made the former
ments of God, and the law that is for ever.” But the legal
old: and that which decayeth and groweth old, is near its
ceremonies were part of the Law. Therefore the legal cer-
end.”
emonies were to last for ever.
I answer that, All the ceremonial precepts of the Old
Objection 2. Further, the offering made by a leper af-
Law were ordained to the worship of God as stated above
ter being cleansed was a ceremony of the Law. But the
(q. 101, Aa. 1,2). Now external worship should be in pro-
Gospel commands the leper, who has been cleansed, to
portion to the internal worship, which consists in faith,
make this offering (Mat. 8:4). Therefore the ceremonies
hope and charity. Consequently exterior worship had to
of the Old Law did not cease at Christ’s coming.
be subject to variations according to the variations in the
Objection 3. Further, as long as the cause remains,
internal worship, in which a threefold state may be distin-
the effect remains. But the ceremonies of the Old Law
guished. One state was in respect of faith and hope, both
had certain reasonable causes, inasmuch as they were or-
in heavenly goods, and in the means of obtaining them—
dained to the worship of God, besides the fact that they
in both of these considered as things to come. Such was
were intended to be figures of Christ. Therefore the cere-
the state of faith and hope in the Old Law. Another state of
monies of the Old Law should not have ceased.
interior worship is that in which we have faith and hope
Objection 4. Further, circumcision was instituted as
in heavenly goods as things to come; but in the means
a sign of Abraham’s faith: the observance of the sabbath,
of obtaining heavenly goods, as in things present or past.
to recall the blessing of creation: and other solemnities,
Such is the state of the New Law. The third state is that in
in memory of other Divine favors, as state above (q. 102,
which both are possessed as present; wherein nothing is
a. 4, ad 10; a. 5, ad 1). But Abraham’s faith is ever to be
believed in as lacking, nothing hoped for as being yet to
imitated even by us: and the blessing of creation and other
come. Such is the state of the Blessed.
Divine favors should never be forgotten. Therefore at least
In this state of the Blessed, then, nothing in regard to
circumcision and the other legal solemnities should not
worship of God will be figurative; there will be naught but
have ceased.
“thanksgiving and voice of praise” (Is. 51:3). Hence it is
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:16,17):
written concerning the city of the Blessed (Apoc. 21:22):
“Let no man. . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect
“I saw no temple therein: for the Lord God Almighty is
1113
the temple thereof, and the Lamb.” Proportionately, there-thereto.
fore, the ceremonies of the first-mentioned state which
Reply to Objection 4. The faith of Abraham was
foreshadowed the second and third states, had need to
commended in that he believed in God’s promise con-
cease at the advent of the second state; and other cere-
cerning his seed to come, in which all nations were to
monies had to be introduced which would be in keeping
blessed. Wherefore, as long as this seed was yet to come,
with the state of divine worship for that particular time,
it was necessary to make profession of Abraham’s faith by
wherein heavenly goods are a thing of the future, but the
means of circumcision. But now that it is consummated,
Divine favors whereby we obtain the heavenly boons are
the same thing needs to be declared by means of another
a thing of the present.
sign, viz. Baptism, which, in this respect, took the place
Reply to Objection 1. The Old Law is said to be “for
of circumcision, according to the saying of the Apostle
ever” simply and absolutely, as regards its moral precepts;
(Col. 2:11, 12): “You are circumcised with circumcision
but as regards the ceremonial precepts it lasts for even in
not made by hand, in despoiling of the body of the flesh,
respect of the reality which those ceremonies foreshad-
but in the circumcision of Christ, buried with Him in Bap-
owed.
tism.”
Reply to Objection 2. The mystery of the redemption
As to the sabbath, which was a sign recalling the first
of the human race was fulfilled in Christ’s Passion: hence
creation, its place is taken by the “Lord’s Day,” which re-
Our Lord said then: “It is consummated” (Jn. 19:30).
calls the beginning of the new creature in the Resurrec-
Consequently the prescriptions of the Law must have
tion of Christ. In like manner other solemnities of the
ceased then altogether through their reality being fulfilled.
Old Law are supplanted by new solemnities: because the
As a sign of this, we read that at the Passion of Christ “the
blessings vouchsafed to that people, foreshadowed the fa-
veil of the temple was rent” (Mat. 27:51). Hence, before
vors granted us by Christ. Hence the feast of the Passover
Christ’s Passion, while Christ was preaching and working
gave place to the feast of Christ’s Passion and Resurrec-
miracles, the Law and the Gospel were concurrent, since
tion: the feast of Pentecost when the Old Law was given,
the mystery of Christ had already begun, but was not as
to the feast of Pentecost on which was given the Law of
yet consummated. And for this reason Our Lord, before
the living spirit: the feast of the New Moon, to Lady Day,
His Passion, commanded the leper to observe the legal
when appeared the first rays of the sun, i.e. Christ, by the
ceremonies.
fulness of grace: the feast of Trumpets, to the feasts of
Reply to Objection 3. The literal reasons already
the Apostles: the feast of Expiation, to the feasts of Mar-
given (q. 102) for the ceremonies refer to the divine wor-
tyrs and Confessors: the feast of Tabernacles, to the feast
ship, which was founded on faith in that which was to
of the Church Dedication: the feast of the Assembly and
come. Hence, at the advent of Him Who was to come,
Collection, to feast of the Angels, or else to the feast of
both that worship ceased, and all the reasons referring
All Hallows.
Whether since Christ’s Passion the legal ceremonies can be observed without commit-Ia IIae q. 103 a. 4
ting mortal sin?
Objection 1. It would seem that since Christ’s Pas-
is stated (Gal. 2:12) that, “when” certain men “had come”
sion the legal ceremonies can be observed without com-
to Antioch, Peter “withdrew and separated himself” from
mitting mortal sin. For we must not believe that the apos-
the Gentiles. Therefore the legal ceremonies can be ob-
tles committed mortal sin after receiving the Holy Ghost:
served since Christ’s Passion without committing mortal
since by His fulness they were “endued with power from
sin.
on high” (Lk. 24:49). But the apostles observed the le-
Objection 3. Further, the commands of the apostles
gal ceremonies after the coming of the Holy Ghost: for
did not lead men into sin. But it was commanded by
it is stated (Acts 16:3) that Paul circumcised Timothy:
apostolic decree that the Gentiles should observe certain
and (Acts 21:26) that Paul, at the advice of James, “took
ceremonies of the Law: for it is written (Acts 15:28,29):
the men, and. . . being purified with them, entered into the
“It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay
temple, giving notice of the accomplishment of the days
no further burden upon you than these necessary things:
of purification, until an oblation should be offered for ev-
that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from
ery one of them.” Therefore the legal ceremonies can be
blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication.”
observed since the Passion of Christ without mortal sin.
Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed since
Objection 2. Further, one of the legal ceremonies con-
Christ’s Passion without committing mortal sin.
sisted in shunning the fellowship of Gentiles. But the first
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 5:2): “If
Pastor of the Church complied with this observance; for it
you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing.” But
1114
nothing save mortal sin hinders us from receiving Christ’s made use of pretense, in things pertaining to the salvation
fruit. Therefore since Christ’s Passion it is a mortal sin to
of the faithful; therefore Augustine (Epist. lxxxii) more
be circumcised, or to observe the other legal ceremonies.
fittingly distinguished three periods of time. One was the
I answer that, All ceremonies are professions of faith,
time that preceded the Passion of Christ, during which
in which the interior worship of God consists. Now man
the legal ceremonies were neither deadly nor dead: an-
can make profession of his inward faith, by deeds as well
other period was after the publication of the Gospel, dur-
as by words: and in either profession, if he make a false
ing which the legal ceremonies are both dead and deadly.
declaration, he sins mortally. Now, though our faith in
The third is a middle period, viz. from the Passion of
Christ is the same as that of the fathers of old; yet, since
Christ until the publication of the Gospel, during which
they came before Christ, whereas we come after Him, the
the legal ceremonies were dead indeed, because they had
same faith is expressed in different words, by us and by
neither effect nor binding force; but were not deadly, be-
them. For by them was it said: “Behold a virgin shall
cause it was lawful for the Jewish converts to Christianity
conceive and bear a son,” where the verbs are in the future
to observe them, provided they did not put their trust in
tense: whereas we express the same by means of verbs
them so as to hold them to be necessary unto salvation, as
in the past tense, and say that she “conceived and bore.”
though faith in Christ could not justify without the legal
In like manner the ceremonies of the Old Law betokened
observances. On the other hand, there was no reason why
Christ as having yet to be born and to suffer: whereas
those who were converted from heathendom to Christian-
our sacraments signify Him as already born and having
ity should observe them. Hence Paul circumcised Timo-
suffered. Consequently, just as it would be a mortal sin
thy, who was born of a Jewish mother; but was unwilling
now for anyone, in making a profession of faith, to say
to circumcise Titus, who was of heathen nationality.
that Christ is yet to be born, which the fathers of old said
The reason why the Holy Ghost did not wish the con-
devoutly and truthfully; so too it would be a mortal sin
verted Jews to be debarred at once from observing the le-
now to observe those ceremonies which the fathers of old
gal ceremonies, while converted heathens were forbidden
fulfilled with devotion and fidelity. Such is the teaching
to observe the rites of heathendom, was in order to show
Augustine (Contra Faust. xix, 16), who says: “It is no
that there is a difference between these rites. For heathen-
longer promised that He shall be born, shall suffer and
ish ceremonial was rejected as absolutely unlawful, and
rise again, truths of which their sacraments were a kind of
as prohibited by God for all time; whereas the legal cere-
image: but it is declared that He is already born, has suf-
monial ceased as being fulfilled through Christ’s Passion,
fered and risen again; of which our sacraments, in which
being instituted by God as a figure of Christ.
Christians share, are the actual representation.”
Reply to Objection 2. According to Jerome, Peter
Reply to Objection 1. On this point there seems to
withdrew himself from the Gentiles by pretense, in order
have been a difference of opinion between Jerome and
to avoid giving scandal to the Jews, of whom he was the
Augustine. For Jerome (Super Galat. ii, 11, seqq.) distin-
Apostle. Hence he did not sin at all in acting thus. On
guished two periods of time. One was the time previous to
the other hand, Paul in like manner made a pretense of
Christ’s Passion, during which the legal ceremonies were
blaming him, in order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles,
neither dead, since they were obligatory, and did expiate
whose Apostle he was. But Augustine disapproves of this
in their own fashion; nor deadly, because it was not sinful
solution: because in the canonical Scripture (viz. Gal.
to observe them. But immediately after Christ’s Passion
2:11), wherein we must not hold anything to be false, Paul
they began to be not only dead, so as no longer to be ei-
says that Peter “was to be blamed.” Consequently it is true
ther effectual or binding; but also deadly, so that whoever
that Peter was at fault: and Paul blamed him in very truth
observed them was guilty of mortal sin. Hence he main-
and not with pretense. Peter, however, did not sin, by ob-
tained that after the Passion the apostles never observed
serving the legal ceremonial for the time being; because
the legal ceremonies in real earnest; but only by a kind
this was lawful for him who was a converted Jew. But he
of pious pretense, lest, to wit, they should scandalize the
did sin by excessive minuteness in the observance of the
Jews and hinder their conversion. This pretense, however,
legal rites lest he should scandalize the Jews, the result
is to be understood, not as though they did not in reality
being that he gave scandal to the Gentiles.
perform those actions, but in the sense that they performed
Reply to Objection 3. Some have held that this pro-
them without the mind to observe the ceremonies of the
hibition of the apostles is not to be taken literally, but spir-Law: thus a man might cut away his foreskin for health’s
itually: namely, that the prohibition of blood signifies the
sake, not with the intention of observing legal circumci-
prohibition of murder; the prohibition of things strangled,
sion.
that of violence and rapine; the prohibition of things of-
But since it seems unbecoming that the apostles, in or-
fered to idols, that of idolatry; while fornication is forbid-
der to avoid scandal, should have hidden things pertaining
den as being evil in itself: which opinion they gathered
to the truth of life and doctrine, and that they should have
from certain glosses, which expound these prohibitions in
1115
a mystical sense. Since, however, murder and rapine were pose of enforcing compliance with the legal ceremonies,
held to be unlawful even by the Gentiles, there would have
but in order to further the union of Gentiles and Jews
been no need to give this special commandment to those
living side by side. Because blood and things strangled
who were converted to Christ from heathendom. Hence
were loathsome to the Jews by ancient custom; while the
others maintain that those foods were forbidden literally,
Jews might have suspected the Gentiles of relapse into
not to prevent the observance of legal ceremonies, but in
idolatry if the latter had partaken of things offered to
order to prevent gluttony. Thus Jerome says on Ezech.
idols. Hence these things were prohibited for the time be-
44:31 (“The priest shall not eat of anything that is dead”):
ing, during which the Gentiles and Jews were to become
“He condemns those priests who from gluttony did not
united together. But as time went on, with the lapse of the
keep these precepts.”
cause, the effect lapsed also, when the truth of the Gospel
But since certain foods are more delicate than these
teaching was divulged, wherein Our Lord taught that “not
and more conducive to gluttony, there seems no reason
that which entereth into the mouth defileth a man” (Mat.
why these should have been forbidden more than the oth-
15:11); and that “nothing is to be rejected that is received
ers.
with thanksgiving” (1 Tim. 4:4). With regard to fornica-
We must therefore follow the third opinion, and hold
tion a special prohibition was made, because the Gentiles
that these foods were forbidden literally, not with the pur-
did not hold it to be sinful.
1116
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 104
Of the Judicial Precepts
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the judicial precepts: and first of all we shall consider them in general; in the second place we shall consider their reasons. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is meant by the judicial precepts?
(2) Whether they are figurative?
(3) Their duration;
(4) Their division.
Whether the judicial precepts were those which directed man in relation to his neigh-Ia IIae q. 104 a. 1
bor?
Objection 1.
It would seem that the judicial pre-
precepts. When therefore the moral precepts are fixed by
cepts were not those which directed man in his relations
Divine institution in matters relating to man’s subordina-
to his neighbor. For judicial precepts take their name from
tion to God, they are called “ceremonial” precepts: but
“judgment.” But there are many things that direct man as
when they refer to man’s relations to other men, they are
to his neighbor, which are not subordinate to judgment.
called “judicial” precepts. Hence there are two conditions
Therefore the judicial precepts were not those which di-
attached to the judicial precepts: viz. first, that they refer
rected man in his relations to his neighbor.
to man’s relations to other men; secondly, that they derive
Objection 2. Further, the judicial precepts are distinct their binding force not from reason alone, but in virtue of
from the moral precepts, as stated above (q. 99, a. 4). But
their institution.
there are many moral precepts which direct man as to his
Reply to Objection 1. Judgments emanate through
neighbor: as is evidently the case with the seven precepts
the official pronouncement of certain men who are at the
of the second table. Therefore the judicial precepts are not
head of affairs, and in whom the judicial power is vested.
so called from directing man as to his neighbor.
Now it belongs to those who are at the head of affairs to
Objection 3. Further, as the ceremonial precepts re-
regulate not only litigious matters, but also voluntary con-
late to God, so do the judicial precepts relate to one’s
tracts which are concluded between man and man, and
neighbor, as stated above (q. 99, a. 4; q. 101, a. 1). But
whatever matters concern the community at large and the
among the ceremonial precepts there are some which con-
government thereof. Consequently the judicial precepts
cern man himself, such as observances in matter of food
are not only those which concern actions at law; but also
and apparel, of which we have already spoken (q. 102,
all those that are directed to the ordering of one man in re-
a. 6, ad 1,6). Therefore the judicial precepts are not so
lation to another, which ordering is subject to the direction
called from directing man as to his neighbor.
of the sovereign as supreme judge.
On the contrary, It is reckoned (Ezech. 18:8) among
Reply to Objection 2. This argument holds in respect
other works of a good and just man, that “he hath executed
of those precepts which direct man in his relations to his
true judgment between man and man.” But judicial pre-
neighbor, and derive their binding force from the mere
cepts are so called from “judgment.” Therefore it seems
dictate of reason.
that the judicial precepts were those which directed the
Reply to Objection 3. Even in those precepts which
relations between man and man.
direct us to God, some are moral precepts, which the rea-
I answer that, As is evident from what we have stated
son itself dictates when it is quickened by faith; such as
above (q. 95, a. 2 ; q. 99, a. 4), in every law, some precepts
that God is to be loved and worshipped. There are also
derive their binding force from the dictate of reason itself,
ceremonial precepts, which have no binding force except
because natural reason dictates that something ought to be
in virtue of their Divine institution. Now God is con-
done or to be avoided. These are called “moral” precepts:
cerned not only with the sacrifices that are offered to Him,
since human morals are based on reason. At the same time
but also with whatever relates to the fitness of those who
there are other precepts which derive their binding force,
offer sacrifices to Him and worship Him. Because men
not from the very dictate of reason (because, considered
are ordained to God as to their end; wherefore it concerns
in themselves, they do not imply an obligation of some-
God and, consequently, is a matter of ceremonial precept,
thing due or undue); but from some institution, Divine or
that man should show some fitness for the divine worship.
human: and such are certain determinations of the moral
On the other hand, man is not ordained to his neighbor as
1117
to his end, so as to need to be disposed in himself with re-in the state. Nevertheless we must take note that, since the
gard to his neighbor, for such is the relationship of a slave
relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason
to his master, since a slave “is his master’s in all that he is,”
than the relations of man to God, there are more precepts
as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Hence there are no
whereby man is directed in his relations to his neighbor,
judicial precepts ordaining man in himself; all such pre-
than whereby he is directed to God. For the same reason
cepts are moral: because the reason, which is the principal
there had to be more ceremonial than judicial precepts in
in moral matters, holds the same position, in man, with re-
the Law.
gard to things that concern him, as a prince or judge holds
Whether the judicial precepts were figurative?
Ia IIae q. 104 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the judicial precepts
not primarily and in themselves, but consequently. In this
were not figurative. Because it seems proper to the cere-
way the judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative.
monial precepts to be instituted as figures of something
For they were not instituted for the purpose of being fig-
else. Therefore, if the judicial precepts are figurative,
urative, but in order that they might regulate the state of
there will be no difference between the judicial and cer-
that people according to justice and equity. Nevertheless
emonial precepts.
they did foreshadow something consequently: since, to
Objection 2. Further, just as certain judicial precepts
wit, the entire state of that people, who were directed by
were given to the Jewish people, so also were some given
these precepts, was figurative, according to 1 Cor. 10:11:
to other heathen peoples. But the judicial precepts given
“All. . . things happened to them in figure.”
to other peoples were not figurative, but stated what had to
Reply to Objection 1. The ceremonial precepts are
be done. Therefore it seems that neither were the judicial
not figurative in the same way as the judicial precepts, as
precepts of the Old Law figures of anything.
explained above.
Objection 3. Further, those things which relate to the
Reply to Objection 2. The Jewish people were cho-
divine worship had to be taught under certain figures, be-
sen by God that Christ might be born of them. Conse-
cause the things of God are above our reason, as stated
quently the entire state of that people had to be prophetic
above (q. 101, a. 2, ad 2). But things concerning our
and figurative, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xxii,
neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the judi-
24). For this reason even the judicial precepts that were
cial precepts which direct us in relation to our neighbor
given to this people were more figurative that those which
should not have been figurative.
were given to other nations. Thus, too, the wars and deeds
On the contrary, The judicial precepts are expounded
of this people are expounded in the mystical sense: but not
both in the allegorical and in the moral sense (Ex. 21).
the wars and deeds of the Assyrians or Romans, although
I answer that, A precept may be figurative in two
the latter are more famous in the eyes of men.
ways. First, primarily and in itself: because, to wit, it is in-Reply to Objection 3. In this people the direction of
stituted principally that it may be the figure of something.
man in regard to his neighbor, considered in itself, was
In this way the ceremonial precepts are figurative; since
subject to reason. But in so far as it was referred to the
they were instituted for the very purpose that they might
worship of God, it was above reason: and in this respect
foreshadow something relating to the worship of God and
it was figurative.
the mystery of Christ. But some precepts are figurative,
Whether the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever?
Ia IIae q. 104 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the judicial precepts
that “there is a setting aside of the former commandment,
of the Old Law bind for ever. Because the judicial pre-
because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof.”
cepts relate to the virtue of justice: since a judgment is
Now this is true of the ceremonial precept, which “could
an execution of the virtue of justice. Now “justice is per-
[Vulg.: ‘can’] not, as to the conscience, make him per-
petual and immortal” (Wis. 1:15). Therefore the judicial
fect that serveth only in meats and in drinks, and divers
precepts bind for ever.
washings and justices of the flesh,” as the Apostle declares
Objection 2. Further, Divine institutions are more en-
(Heb. 9:9,10). On the other hand, the judicial precepts
during than human institutions. But the judicial precepts
were useful and efficacious in respect of the purpose for
of human laws bind for ever. Therefore much more do the
which they were instituted, viz. to establish justice and
judicial precepts of the Divine Law.
equity among men. Therefore the judicial precepts of the
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18)
Old Law are not set aside, but still retain their efficacy.
1118
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12) that in Gal. 3:24. Since, however, these judicial precepts are
“the priesthood being translated it is necessary that a
instituted, not for the purpose of being figures, but for the
translation also be made of the Law.” But the priesthood
performance of certain deeds, the observance thereof is
was transferred from Aaron to Christ. Therefore the entire
not prejudicial to the truth of faith. But the intention of
Law was also transferred. Therefore the judicial precepts
observing them, as though one were bound by the Law,
are no longer in force.
is prejudicial to the truth of faith: because it would fol-
I answer that, The judicial precepts did not bind for
low that the former state of the people still lasts, and that
ever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not
Christ has not yet come.
in the same way as the ceremonial precepts. For the cer-
Reply to Objection 1. The obligation of observing
emonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only
justice is indeed perpetual. But the determination of those
“dead,” but also deadly to those who observe them since
things that are just, according to human or Divine insti-
the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation
tution, must needs be different, according to the different
of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts
states of mankind.
are dead indeed, because they have no binding force: but
Reply to Objection 2. The judicial precepts estab-
they are not deadly. For if a sovereign were to order these
lished by men retain their binding force for ever, so long
judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would
as the state of government remains the same. But if the
not sin: unless perchance they were observed, or ordered
state or nation pass to another form of government, the
to be observed, as though they derived their binding force
laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which is
through being institutions of the Old Law: for it would be
government by the people, demands different laws from
a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus.
those of oligarchy, which is government by the rich, as
The reason for this difference may be gathered from
the Philosopher shows (Polit. iv, 1). Consequently when
what has been said above (a. 2). For it has been stated
the state of that people changed, the judicial precepts had
that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and
to be changed also.
in themselves, as being instituted chiefly for the purpose
Reply to Objection 3. Those judicial precepts di-
of foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. On the
rected the people to justice and equity, in keeping with
other hand, the judicial precepts were not instituted that
the demands of that state. But after the coming of Christ,
they might be figures, but that they might shape the state
there had to be a change in the state of that people, so
of that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently,
that in Christ there was no distinction between Gentile and
when the state of that people changed with the coming
Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial
of Christ, the judicial precepts lost their binding force: for
precepts needed to be changed also.
the Law was a pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated
Whether it is possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts?
Ia IIae q. 104 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that it is impossible to as-
On the contrary, Wherever there is order there must
sign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. Because
needs be division. But the notion of order is chiefly ap-
the judicial precepts direct men in their relations to one
plicable to the judicial precepts, since thereby that people
another. But those things which need to be directed, as
was ordained. Therefore it is most necessary that they
pertaining to the relationship between man and man, and
should have a distinct division.
which are made use of by men, are not subject to division,
I answer that, Since law is the art, as it were, of di-
since they are infinite in number. Therefore it is not pos-
recting or ordering the life of man, as in every art there is
sible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts.
a distinct division in the rules of art, so, in every law, there Objection 2. Further, the judicial precepts are deci-must be a distinct division of precepts: else the law would
sions on moral matters. But moral precepts do not seem
be rendered useless by confusion. We must therefore say
to be capable of division, except in so far as they are re-
that the judicial precepts of the Old Law, whereby men
ducible to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore there
were directed in their relations to one another, are subject
is no distinct division of the judicial precepts.
to division according to the divers ways in which man is
Objection 3. Further, because there is a distinct di-
directed.
vision of the ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this
Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found:
division, by describing some as “sacrifices,” others as “ob-
one, of the people’s sovereign to his subjects; a second of
servances.” But the Law contains no allusion to a division
the subjects among themselves; a third, of the citizens to
of the judicial precepts. Therefore it seems that they have
foreigners; a fourth, of members of the same household,
no distinct division.
such as the order of the father to his son; of the wife to
1119
her husband; of the master to his servant: and according Reply to Objection 1. Things pertaining to the order-to these four orders we may distinguish different kinds of
ing of relations between one man and another are indeed
judicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are
infinite in number: yet they are reducible to certain dis-
laid down concerning the institution of the sovereign and
tinct heads, according to the different relations in which
relating to his office, and about the respect due to him: this
one man stands to another, as stated above.
is one part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts
Reply to Objection 2.
The precepts of the deca-
are given in respect of a man to his fellow citizens: for in-
logue held the first place in the moral order, as stated
stance, about buying and selling, judgments and penalties:
above (q. 100, a. 3): and consequently it is fitting that
this is the second part of the judicial precepts. Again, cer-
other moral precepts should be distinguished in relation
tain precepts are enjoined with regard to foreigners: for
to them. But the judicial and ceremonial precepts have a
instance, about wars waged against their foes, and about
different binding force, derived, not from natural reason,
the way to receive travelers and strangers: this is the third
but from their institution alone. Hence there is a distinct
part of the judicial precepts. Lastly, certain precepts are
reason for distinguishing them.
given relating to home life: for instance, about servants,
Reply to Objection 3. The Law alludes to the divi-
wives and children: this is the fourth part of the judicial
sion of the judicial precepts in the very things themselves
precepts.
which are prescribed by the judicial precepts of the Law.
1120
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 105
Of the Reason for the Judicial Precepts
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the reason for the judicial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Concerning the reason for the judicial precepts relating to the rulers; (2) Concerning the fellowship of one man with another;
(3) Concerning matters relating to foreigners;
(4) Concerning things relating to domestic matters.
Whether the Old Law enjoined fitting precepts concerning rulers?
Ia IIae q. 105 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law made
have been determined for the livelihood of the rulers of
unfitting precepts concerning rulers.
Because, as the
the people: the more that they were forbidden to accept
Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 4), “the ordering of the people
presents, as is clearly stated in Ex. 23:8: “You shall not
depends mostly on the chief ruler.” But the Law contains
[Vulg.: ‘Neither shalt thou’] take bribes, which even blind
no precept relating to the institution of the chief ruler; and
the wise, and pervert the words of the just.”
yet we find therein prescriptions concerning the inferior
Objection 5. Further, as a kingdom is the best form
rulers: firstly (Ex. 18:21): “Provide out of all the peo-
of government, so is tyranny the most corrupt. But when
ple wise [Vulg.: ‘able’] men,” etc.; again (Num. 11:16):
the Lord appointed the king, He established a tyrannical
“Gather unto Me seventy men of the ancients of Israel”;
law; for it is written (1 Kings 8:11): “This will be the right
and again (Dt. 1:13): “Let Me have from among you wise
of the king, that shall reign over you: He will take your
and understanding men,” etc. Therefore the Law provided
sons,” etc. Therefore the Law made unfitting provision
insufficiently in regard to the rulers of the people.
with regard to the institution of rulers.
Objection 2. Further, “The best gives of the best,” as
On the contrary, The people of Israel is commended
Plato states (Tim. ii). Now the best ordering of a state or
for the beauty of its order (Num. 24:5): “How beautiful
of any nation is to be ruled by a king: because this kind
are thy tabernacles, O Jacob, and thy tents.” But the beau-
of government approaches nearest in resemblance to the
tiful ordering of a people depends on the right establish-
Divine government, whereby God rules the world from
ment of its rulers. Therefore the Law made right provision
the beginning. Therefore the Law should have set a king
for the people with regard to its rulers.
over the people, and they should not have been allowed
I answer that, Two points are to be observed concern-
a choice in the matter, as indeed they were allowed (Dt.
ing the right ordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is
17:14,15): “When thou. . . shalt say: I will set a king over
that all should take some share in the government: for
me. . . thou shalt set him,” etc.
this form of constitution ensures peace among the people,
Objection 3. Further, according to Mat. 12:25: “Ev-
commends itself to all, and is most enduring, as stated in
ery kingdom divided against itself shall be made deso-
Polit. ii, 6. The other point is to be observed in respect of
late”: a saying which was verified in the Jewish people,
the kinds of government, or the different ways in which
whose destruction was brought about by the division of
the constitutions are established. For whereas these differ
the kingdom. But the Law should aim chiefly at things
in kind, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5), neverthe-
pertaining to the general well-being of the people. There-
less the first place is held by the “kingdom,” where the
fore it should have forbidden the kingdom to be divided
power of government is vested in one; and “aristocracy,”
under two kings: nor should this have been introduced
which signifies government by the best, where the power
even by Divine authority; as we read of its being intro-
of government is vested in a few. Accordingly, the best
duced by the authority of the prophet Ahias the Silonite
form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is
(3 Kings 11:29, seqq.).
given the power to preside over all; while under him are
Objection 4. Further, just as priests are instituted for others having governing powers: and yet a government of
the benefit of the people in things concerning God, as
this kind is shared by all, both because all are eligible to
stated in Heb. 5:1; so are rulers set up for the benefit of
govern, and because the rules are chosen by all. For this is
the people in human affairs. But certain things were al-
the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since there
lotted as a means of livelihood for the priests and Levites
is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a
of the Law: such as the tithes and first-fruits, and many
number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy,
like things. Therefore in like manner certain things should
i.e. government by the people, in so far as the rulers can
1121
be chosen from the people, and the people have the right man of another nation king, because such kings are wont
to choose their rulers.
to take little interest in the people they are set over, and
Such was the form of government established by the
consequently to have no care for their welfare: secondly,
Divine Law. For Moses and his successors governed the
He prescribed how the king after his appointment should
people in such a way that each of them was ruler over all;
behave, in regard to himself; namely, that he should not
so that there was a kind of kingdom. Moreover, seventy-
accumulate chariots and horses, nor wives, nor immense
two men were chosen, who were elders in virtue: for it
wealth: because through craving for such things princes
is written (Dt. 1:15): “I took out of your tribes wise and
become tyrants and forsake justice. He also appointed the
honorable, and appointed them rulers”: so that there was
manner in which they were to conduct themselves towards
an element of aristocracy. But it was a democratical gov-
God: namely, that they should continually read and pon-
ernment in so far as the rulers were chosen from all the
der on God’s Law, and should ever fear and obey God.
people; for it is written (Ex. 18:21): “Provide out of all
Moreover, He decided how they should behave towards
the people wise [Vulg.: ‘able’] men,” etc.; and, again, in
their subjects: namely, that they should not proudly de-
so far as they were chosen by the people; wherefore it is
spise them, or ill-treat them, and that they should not de-
written (Dt. 1:13): “Let me have from among you wise
part from the paths of justice.
[Vulg.: ‘able’] men,” etc. Consequently it is evident that
Reply to Objection 3.
The division of the king-
the ordering of the rulers was well provided for by the
dom, and a number of kings, was rather a punishment in-
Law.
flicted on that people for their many dissensions, specially
Reply to Objection 1. This people was governed un-
against the just rule of David, than a benefit conferred on
der the special care of God: wherefore it is written (Dt.
them for their profit. Hence it is written (Osee 13:11): “I
7:6): “The Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be His pecu-
will give thee a king in My wrath”; and (Osee 8:4): “They
liar people”: and this is why the Lord reserved to Himself
have reigned, but not by Me: they have been princes, and
the institution of the chief ruler. For this too did Moses
I knew not.”
pray (Num. 27:16): “May the Lord the God of the spirits
Reply to Objection 4. The priestly office was be-
of all the flesh provide a man, that may be over this mul-
queathed by succession from father to son: and this, in
titude.” Thus by God’s orders Josue was set at the head
order that it might be held in greater respect, if not any
in place of Moses; and we read about each of the judges
man from the people could become a priest: since honor
who succeeded Josue that God “raised. . . up a saviour”
was given to them out of reverence for the divine wor-
for the people, and that “the spirit of the Lord was” in
ship. Hence it was necessary to put aside certain things
them (Judges 3:9,10,15). Hence the Lord did not leave
for them both as to tithes and as to first-fruits, and, again,
the choice of a king to the people; but reserved this to
as to oblations and sacrifices, that they might be afforded
Himself, as appears from Dt. 17:15: “Thou shalt set him
a means of livelihood. On the other hand, the rulers, as
whom the Lord thy God shall choose.”
stated above, were chosen from the whole people; where-
Reply to Objection 2. A kingdom is the best form
fore they had their own possessions, from which to de-
of government of the people, so long as it is not corrupt.
rive a living: and so much the more, since the Lord for-
But since the power granted to a king is so great, it easily
bade even a king to have superabundant wealth to make
degenerates into tyranny, unless he to whom this power is
too much show of magnificence: both because he could
given be a very virtuous man: for it is only the virtuous
scarcely avoid the excesses of pride and tyranny, arising
man that conducts himself well in the midst of prosperity,
from such things, and because, if the rulers were not very
as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 3). Now perfect
rich, and if their office involved much work and anxiety, it
virtue is to be found in few: and especially were the Jews
would not tempt the ambition of the common people; and
inclined to cruelty and avarice, which vices above all turn
would not become an occasion of sedition.
men into tyrants. Hence from the very first the Lord did
Reply to Objection 5. That right was not given to
not set up the kingly authority with full power, but gave
the king by Divine institution: rather was it foretold that
them judges and governors to rule them. But afterwards
kings would usurp that right, by framing unjust laws, and
when the people asked Him to do so, being indignant with
by degenerating into tyrants who preyed on their subjects.
them, so to speak, He granted them a king, as is clear
This is clear from the context that follows: “And you shall
from His words to Samuel (1 Kings 8:7): “They have not
be his slaves [Douay: ‘servants’]”: which is significative
rejected thee, but Me, that I should not reign over them.”
of tyranny, since a tyrant rules is subjects as though they
Nevertheless, as regards the appointment of a king,
were his slaves. Hence Samuel spoke these words to deter
He did establish the manner of election from the very
them from asking for a king; since the narrative contin-
beginning (Dt. 17:14, seqq.): and then He determined
ues: “But the people would not hear the voice of Samuel.”
two points: first, that in choosing a king they should wait
It may happen, however, that even a good king, without
for the Lord’s decision; and that they should not make a
being a tyrant, may take away the sons, and make them
1122
tribunes and centurions; and may take many things from his subjects in order to secure the common weal.
Whether the judicial precepts were suitably framed as to the relations of one man Ia IIae q. 105 a. 2
with another?
Objection 1. It would seem that the judicial precepts
given to be kept, that He would preserve them safe, for
were not suitably framed as regards the relations of one
them that had deposited them.” But the precepts of the Old
man with another. Because men cannot live together in
Law observed little caution in regard to deposits: since it
peace, if one man takes what belongs to another. But this
is prescribed (Ex. 22:10,11) that when goods deposited
seems to have been approved by the Law: since it is writ-
are lost, the owner is to stand by the oath of the deposi-
ten (Dt. 23:24): “Going into thy neighbor’s vineyard, thou
tary. Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision in this
mayest eat as many grapes as thou pleasest.” Therefore
matter.
the Old Law did not make suitable provisions for man’s
Objection 6. Further, just as a workman offers his
peace.
work for hire, so do men let houses and so forth. But
Objection 2. Further, one of the chief causes of the
there is no need for the tenant to pay his rent as soon as he
downfall of states has been the holding of property by
takes a house. Therefore it seems an unnecessarily hard
women, as the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 6). But this
prescription (Lev. 19:13) that “the wages of him that hath
was introduced by the Old Law; for it is written (Num.
been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until morn-
27:8): “When a man dieth without a son, his inheritance
ing.”
shall pass to his daughter.” Therefore the Law made un-
Objection 7. Further, since there is often pressing
suitable provision for the welfare of the people.
need for a judge, it should be easy to gain access to one.
Objection 3.
Further, it is most conducive to the
It was therefore unfitting that the Law (Dt. 17:8,9) should
preservation of human society that men may provide
command them to go to a fixed place to ask for judgment
themselves with necessaries by buying and selling, as
on doubtful matters.
stated in Polit. i. But the Old Law took away the force
Objection 8. Further, it is possible that not only two,
of sales; since it prescribes that in the 50th year of the ju-
but three or more, should agree to tell a lie. Therefore it is
bilee all that is sold shall return to the vendor (Lev. 25:28).
unreasonably stated (Dt. 19:15) that “in the mouth of two
Therefore in this matter the Law gave the people an unfit-
or three witnesses every word shall stand.”
ting command.
Objection 9. Further, punishment should be fixed ac-
Objection 4. Further, man’s needs require that men
cording to the gravity of the fault: for which reason also
should be ready to lend: which readiness ceases if the
it is written (Dt. 25:2): “According to the measure of the
creditors do not return the pledges: hence it is written
sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be.” Yet the Law
(Ecclus. 29:10): “Many have refused to lend, not out of
fixed unequal punishments for certain faults: for it is writ-
wickedness, but they were afraid to be defrauded without
ten (Ex. 22:1) that the thief “shall restore five oxen for
cause.” And yet this was encouraged by the Law. First,
one ox, and four sheep for one sheep.” Moreover, certain
because it prescribed (Dt. 15:2): “He to whom any thing
slight offenses are severely punished: thus (Num. 15:32,
is owing from his friend or neighbor or brother, cannot
seqq.) a man is stoned for gathering sticks on the sabbath
demand it again, because it is the year of remission of the
day: and (Dt. 21:18, seqq.) the unruly son is commanded
Lord”; and (Ex. 22:15) it is stated that if a borrowed ani-
to be stoned on account of certain small transgressions,
mal should die while the owner is present, the borrower is
viz. because “he gave himself to revelling. . . and banquet-
not bound to make restitution. Secondly, because the se-
ings.” Therefore the Law prescribed punishments in an
curity acquired through the pledge is lost: for it is written
unreasonable manner.
(Dt. 24:10): “When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor
Objection 10. Further, as Augustine says (De Civ.
any thing that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his
Dei xxi, 11), “Tully writes that the laws recognize eight
house to take away a pledge”; and again (Dt. 24:12,13):
forms of punishment, indemnity, prison, stripes, retalia-
“The pledge shall not lodge with thee that night, but thou
tion, public disgrace, exile, death, slavery.” Now some of
shalt restore it to him presently.” Therefore the Law made
these were prescribed by the Law. “Indemnity,” as when a
insufficient provision in the matter of loans.
thief was condemned to make restitution fivefold or four-
Objection 5. Further, considerable risk attaches to
fold. “Prison,” as when (Num. 15:34) a certain man is
goods deposited with a fraudulent depositary: wherefore
ordered to be imprisoned. “Stripes”; thus (Dt. 25:2), “if
great caution should be observed in such matters: hence
they see that the offender be worthy of stripes; they shall
it is stated in 2 Mac. 3:15 that “the priests. . . called upon
lay him down, and shall cause him to be beaten before
Him from heaven, Who made the law concerning things
them.” “Public disgrace” was brought on to him who re-
1123
fused to take to himself the wife of his deceased brother, judges, as is clearly indicated in Dt. 16:18: “Thou shalt
for she took “off his shoe from his foot, and” did “spit in
appoint judges and magistrates in all its [Vulg.: ‘thy’]
his face” (Dt. 25:9). It prescribed the “death” penalty, as
gates. . . that they may judge the people with just judg-
is clear from (Lev. 20:9): “He that curseth his father, or
ment.” It is also directed the manner of pronouncing just
mother, dying let him die.” The Law also recognized the
judgments, according to Dt. 1:16,17: “Judge that which is
“lex talionis,” by prescribing (Ex. 21:24): “Eye for eye,
just, whether he be one of your own country or a stranger:
tooth for tooth.” Therefore it seems unreasonable that the
there shall be no difference of persons.” It also removed
Law should not have inflicted the two other punishments,
an occasion of pronouncing unjust judgment, by forbid-
viz. “exile” and “slavery.”
ding judges to accept bribes (Ex. 23:8; Dt. 16:19). It pre-
Objection 11. Further, no punishment is due except
scribed the number of witnesses, viz. two or three: and
for a fault. But dumb animals cannot commit a fault.
it appointed certain punishments to certain crimes, as we
Therefore the Law is unreasonable in punishing them (Ex.
shall state farther on (ad 10).
21:29): “If the ox. . . shall kill a man or a woman,” it “shall But with regard to possessions, it is a very good thing,
be stoned”: and (Lev. 20:16): “The woman that shall lie
says the Philosopher (Polit. ii, 2) that the things possessed
under any beast, shall be killed together with the same.”
should be distinct, and the use thereof should be partly
Therefore it seems that matters pertaining to the relations
common, and partly granted to others by the will of the
of one man with another were unsuitably regulated by the
possessors. These three points were provided for by the
Law.
Law. Because, in the first place, the possessions them-
Objection 12. Further, the Lord commanded (Ex.
selves were divided among individuals: for it is written
21:12) a murderer to be punished with death. But the
(Num. 33:53,54): “I have given you” the land “for a pos-
death of a dumb animal is reckoned of much less account
session: and you shall divide it among you by lot.” And
than the slaying of a man. Hence murder cannot be suffi-
since many states have been ruined through want of regu-
ciently punished by the slaying of a dumb animal. There-
lations in the matter of possessions, as the Philosopher ob-
fore it is unfittingly prescribed (Dt. 21:1,4) that “when
serves (Polit. ii, 6); therefore the Law provided a threefold
there shall be found. . . the corpse of a man slain, and it is
remedy against the regularity of possessions. The first was
not known who is guilty of the murder. . . the ancients” of
that they should be divided equally, wherefore it is writ-
the nearest city “shall take a heifer of the herd, that hath
ten (Num. 33:54): “To the more you shall give a larger
not drawn in the yoke, nor ploughed the ground, and they
part, and to the fewer, a lesser.” A second remedy was
shall bring her into a rough and stony valley, that never
that possessions could not be alienated for ever, but after a
was ploughed, nor sown; and there they shall strike off
certain lapse of time should return to their former owner,
the head of the heifer.”
so as to avoid confusion of possessions (cf. ad 3). The
On the contrary, It is recalled as a special blessing
third remedy aimed at the removal of this confusion, and
(Ps. 147:20) that “He hath not done in like manner to ev-
provided that the dead should be succeeded by their next
ery nation; and His judgments He hath not made manifest
of kin: in the first place, the son; secondly, the daughter;
to them.”
thirdly, the brother; fourthly, the father’s brother; fifthly,
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21),
any other next of kin. Furthermore, in order to preserve
quoting Tully, “a nation is a body of men united together
the distinction of property, the Law enacted that heiresses
by consent to the law and by community of welfare.” Con-
should marry within their own tribe, as recorded in Num.
sequently it is of the essence of a nation that the mutual
36:6.
relations of the citizens be ordered by just laws. Now the
Secondly, the Law commanded that, in some re-
relations of one man with another are twofold: some are
spects, the use of things should belong to all in common.
effected under the guidance of those in authority: others
Firstly, as regards the care of them; for it was prescribed
are effected by the will of private individuals. And since
(Dt. 22:1-4): “Thou shalt not pass by, if thou seest thy
whatever is subject to the power of an individual can be
brother’s ox or his sheep go astray; but thou shalt bring
disposed of according to his will, hence it is that the de-
them back to thy brother,” and in like manner as to other
cision of matters between one man and another, and the
things. Secondly, as regards fruits. For all alike were al-
punishment of evildoers, depend on the direction of those
lowed on entering a friend’s vineyard to eat of the fruit,
in authority, to whom men are subject. On the other hand,
but not to take any away. And, specially, with respect to
the power of private persons is exercised over the things
the poor, it was prescribed that the forgotten sheaves, and
they possess: and consequently their dealings with one
the bunches of grapes and fruit, should be left behind for
another, as regards such things, depend on their own will,
them (Lev. 19:9; Dt. 24:19). Moreover, whatever grew
for instance in buying, selling, giving, and so forth. Now
in the seventh year was common property, as stated in Ex.
the Law provided sufficiently in respect of each of these
23:11 and Lev. 25:4.
relations between one man and another. For it established
Thirdly, the law recognized the transference of goods
1124
by the owner. There was a purely gratuitous transfer: thus avail for a certain period, at the same time the said danger
it is written (Dt. 14:28,29): “The third day thou shalt sepa-
was removed, by prescribing the return of those posses-
rate another tithe. . . and the Levite. . . and the stranger, and sions after that period had elapsed. The reason for this
the fatherless, and the widow. . . shall come and shall eat
law was to prevent confusion of possessions, and to en-
and be filled.” And there was a transfer for a consider-
sure the continuance of a definite distinction among the
ation, for instance, by selling and buying, by letting out
tribes.
and hiring, by loan and also by deposit, concerning all of
But as the town houses were not allotted to distinct es-
which we find that the Law made ample provision. Con-
tates, therefore the Law allowed them to be sold in perpe-
sequently it is clear that the Old Law provided sufficiently
tuity, like movable goods. Because the number of houses
concerning the mutual relations of one man with another.
in a town was not fixed, whereas there was a fixed limit
Reply to Objection 1. As the Apostle says (Rom.
to the amount of estates, which could not be exceeded,
13:8), “he that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law”:
while the number of houses in a town could be increased.
because, to wit, all the precepts of the Law, chiefly those
On the other hand, houses situated not in a town, but “in
concerning our neighbor, seem to aim at the end that men
a village that hath no walls,” could not be sold in perpe-
should love one another. Now it is an effect of love that
tuity: because such houses are built merely with a view
men give their own goods to others: because, as stated in
to the cultivation and care of possessions; wherefore the
1 Jn. 3:17: “He that. . . shall see his brother in need, and
Law rightly made the same prescription in regard to both
shall shut up his bowels from him: how doth the charity of
(Lev. 25).
God abide in him?” Hence the purpose of the Law was to
Reply to Objection 4. As stated above (ad 1), the pur-
accustom men to give of their own to others readily: thus
pose of the Law was to accustom men to its precepts, so
the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:18) commands the rich “to give eas-
as to be ready to come to one another’s assistance: be-
ily and to communicate to others.” Now a man does not
cause this is a very great incentive to friendship. The Law
give easily to others if he will not suffer another man to
granted these facilities for helping others in the matter not
take some little thing from him without any great injury
only of gratuitous and absolute donations, but also of mu-
to him. And so the Law laid down that it should be lawful
tual transfers: because the latter kind of succor is more
for a man, on entering his neighbor’s vineyard, to eat of
frequent and benefits the greater number: and it granted
the fruit there: but not to carry any away, lest this should
facilities for this purpose in many ways. First of all by
lead to the infliction of a grievous harm, and cause a dis-
prescribing that men should be ready to lend, and that they
turbance of the peace: for among well-behaved people,
should not be less inclined to do so as the year of remis-
the taking of a little does not disturb the peace; in fact, it
sion drew nigh, as stated in Dt. 15:7, seqq. Secondly,
rather strengthens friendship and accustoms men to give
by forbidding them to burden a man to whom they might
things to one another.
grant a loan, either by exacting usury, or by accepting ne-
Reply to Objection 2. The Law did not prescribe
cessities of life in security; and by prescribing that when
that women should succeed to their father’s estate except
this had been done they should be restored at once. For it
in default of male issue: failing which it was necessary
is written (Dt. 23:19): “Thou shalt not lend to thy brother
that succession should be granted to the female line in or-
money to usury”: and (Dt. 24:6): “Thou shalt not take
der to comfort the father, who would have been sad to
the nether nor the upper millstone to pledge; for he hath
think that his estate would pass to strangers. Nevertheless
pledged his life to thee”: and (Ex. 22:26): “If thou take
the Law observed due caution in the matter, by providing
of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him
that those women who succeeded to their father’s estate,
again before sunset.” Thirdly, by forbidding them to be
should marry within their own tribe, in order to avoid con-
importunate in exacting payment. Hence it is written (Ex.
fusion of tribal possessions, as stated in Num. 36:7,8.
22:25): “If thou lend money to any of my people that is
Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Polit.
poor that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon
ii, 4), the regulation of possessions conduces much to the
them as an extortioner.” For this reason, too, it is enacted
preservation of a state or nation. Consequently, as he him-
(Dt. 24:10,11): “When thou shalt demand of thy neigh-
self observes, it was forbidden by the law in some of the
bor anything that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his
heathen states, “that anyone should sell his possessions,
house to take away a pledge, but thou shalt stand without,
except to avoid a manifest loss.” For if possessions were
and he shall bring out to thee what he hath”: both because
to be sold indiscriminately, they might happen to come
a man’s house is his surest refuge, wherefore it is offensive
into the hands of a few: so that it might become neces-
to a man to be set upon in his own house; and because the
sary for a state or country to become void of inhabitants.
Law does not allow the creditor to take away whatever he
Hence the Old Law, in order to remove this danger, or-
likes in security, but rather permits the debtor to give what
dered things in such a way that while provision was made
he needs least. Fourthly, the Law prescribed that debts
for men’s needs, by allowing the sale of possessions to
should cease together after the lapse of seven years. For it
1125
was probable that those who could conveniently pay their offer other commodities for hire, are wont to be rich: nor
debts, would do so before the seventh year, and would not
are they in such need of their price in order to gain a liveli-
defraud the lender without cause. But if they were alto-
hood: and consequently the comparison does not hold.
gether insolvent, there was the same reason for remitting
Reply to Objection 7. The purpose for which judges
the debt from love for them, as there was for renewing the
are appointed among men, is that they may decide doubt-
loan on account of their need.
ful points in matters of justice. Now a matter may be
As regards animals granted in loan, the Law enacted
doubtful in two ways. First, among simple-minded peo-
that if, through the neglect of the person to whom they
ple: and in order to remove doubts of this kind, it was pre-
were lent, they perished or deteriorated in his absence,
scribed (Dt. 16:18) that “judges and magistrates” should
he was bound to make restitution. But if they perished
be appointed in each tribe, “to judge the people with just
or deteriorated while he was present and taking proper
judgment.”
Secondly, a matter may be doubtful even
care of them, he was not bound to make restitution, es-
among experts: and therefore, in order to remove doubts
pecially if they were hired for a consideration: because
of this kind, the Law prescribed that all should foregather
they might have died or deteriorated in the same way if
in some chief place chosen by God, where there would
they had remained in possession of the lender, so that if
be both the high-priest, who would decide doubtful mat-
the animal had been saved through being lent, the lender
ters relating to the ceremonies of divine worship; and the
would have gained something by the loan which would no
chief judge of the people, who would decide matters re-
longer have been gratuitous. And especially was this to
lating to the judgments of men: just as even now cases
be observed when animals were hired for a consideration:
are taken from a lower to a higher court either by appeal
because then the owner received a certain price for the use
or by consultation. Hence it is written (Dt. 17:8,9): “If
of the animals; wherefore he had no right to any profit, by
thou perceive that there be among you a hard and doubt-
receiving indemnity for the animal, unless the person who
ful matter in judgment. . . and thou see that the words of
had charge of it were negligent. In the case, however, of
the judges within thy gates do vary; arise and go up to
animals not hired for a consideration, equity demanded
the place, which the Lord thy God shall choose; and thou
that he should receive something by way of restitution at
shalt come to the priests of the Levitical race, and to the
least to the value of the hire of the animal that had per-
judge that shall be at that time.” But such like doubtful
ished or deteriorated.
matters did not often occur for judgment: wherefore the
Reply to Objection 5. The difference between a loan
people were not burdened on this account.
and a deposit is that a loan is in respect of goods trans-
Reply to Objection 8.
In the business affairs of
ferred for the use of the person to whom they are trans-
men, there is no such thing as demonstrative and infal-
ferred, whereas a deposit is for the benefit of the deposi-
lible proof, and we must be content with a certain con-
tor. Hence in certain cases there was a stricter obligation
jectural probability, such as that which an orator employs
of returning a loan than of restoring goods held in deposit.
to persuade. Consequently, although it is quite possible
Because the latter might be lost in two ways. First, un-
for two or three witnesses to agree to a falsehood, yet it
avoidably: i.e. either through a natural cause, for instance
is neither easy nor probable that they succeed in so do-
if an animal held in deposit were to die or depreciate in
ing: wherefore their testimony is taken as being true, es-
value; or through an extrinsic cause, for instance, if it were
pecially if they do not waver in giving it, or are not oth-
taken by an enemy, or devoured by a beast (in which case,
erwise suspect. Moreover, in order that witnesses might
however, a man was bound to restore to the owner what
not easily depart from the truth, the Law commanded that
was left of the animal thus slain): whereas in the other
they should be most carefully examined, and that those
cases mentioned above, he was not bound to make resti-
who were found untruthful should be severely punished,
tution; but only to take an oath in order to clear himself
as stated in Dt. 19:16, seqq.
of suspicion. Secondly, the goods deposited might be lost
There was, however, a reason for fixing on this partic-
through an avoidable cause, for instance by theft: and then
ular number, in token of the unerring truth of the Divine
the depositary was bound to restitution on account of his
Persons, Who are sometimes mentioned as two, because
neglect. But, as stated above (ad 4), he who held an an-
the Holy Ghost is the bond of the other two Persons; and
imal on loan, was bound to restitution, even if he were
sometimes as three: as Augustine observes on Jn. 8:17:
absent when it depreciated or died: because he was held
“In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is
responsible for less negligence than a depositary, who was
true.”
only held responsible in case of theft.
Reply to Objection 9. A severe punishment is in-
Reply to Objection 6. Workmen who offer their labor
flicted not only on account of the gravity of a fault, but
for hire, are poor men who toil for their daily bread: and
also for other reasons. First, on account of the greatness
therefore the Law commanded wisely that they should be
of the sin, because a greater sin, other things being equal,
paid at once, lest they should lack food. But they who
deserves a greater punishment. Secondly, on account of a
1126
habitual sin, since men are not easily cured of habitual sin in the case of other thefts: for there was reason to pre-except by severe punishments. Thirdly, on account of a
sume that he intended to restore the animal, since he kept
great desire for or a great pleasure in the sin: for men are
it alive. Again, we might say, according to a gloss, that
not easily deterred from such sins unless they be severely
“a cow is useful in five ways: it may be used for sacrifice,
punished. Fourthly, on account of the facility of commit-
for ploughing, for food, for milk, and its hide is employed
ting a sin and of concealing it: for such like sins, when
for various purposes”: and therefore for one cow five had
discovered, should be more severely punished in order to
to be restored. But the sheep was useful in four ways:
deter others from committing them.
“for sacrifice, for meat, for milk, and for its wool.” The
Again, with regard to the greatness of a sin, four de-
unruly son was slain, not because he ate and drank: but
grees may be observed, even in respect of one single deed.
on account of his stubbornness and rebellion, which was
The first is when a sin is committed unwillingly; because
always punished by death, as stated above. As to the man
then, if the sin be altogether involuntary, man is altogether
who gathered sticks on the sabbath, he was stoned as a
excused from punishment; for it is written (Dt. 22:25,
breaker of the Law, which commanded the sabbath to be
seqq.) that a damsel who suffers violence in a field is not
observed, to testify the belief in the newness of the world,
guilty of death, because “she cried, and there was no man
as stated above (q. 100, a. 5): wherefore he was slain as
to help her.” But if a man sinned in any way voluntarily,
an unbeliever.
and yet through weakness, as for instance when a man sins
Reply to Objection 10. The Old Law inflicted the
from passion, the sin is diminished: and the punishment,
death penalty for the more grievous crimes, viz. for those
according to true judgment, should be diminished also;
which are committed against God, and for murder, for
unless perchance the common weal requires that the sin
stealing a man, irreverence towards one’s parents, adul-
be severely punished in order to deter others from com-
tery and incest. In the case of thief of other things it in-
mitting such sins, as stated above. The second degree is
flicted punishment by indemnification: while in the case
when a man sins through ignorance: and then he was held
of blows and mutilation it authorized punishment by re-
to be guilty to a certain extent, on account of his negli-
taliation; and likewise for the sin of bearing false witness.
gence in acquiring knowledge: yet he was not punished
In other faults of less degree it prescribed the punishment
by the judges but expiated his sin by sacrifices. Hence it
of stripes or of public disgrace.
is written (Lev. 4:2): “The soul that sinneth through ig-
The punishment of slavery was prescribed by the Law
norance,” etc. This is, however, to be taken as applying
in two cases. First, in the case of a slave who was unwill-
to ignorance of fact; and not to ignorance of the Divine
ing to avail himself of the privilege granted by the Law,
precept, which all were bound to know. The third degree
whereby he was free to depart in the seventh year of re-
was when a man sinned from pride, i.e. through deliberate
mission: wherefore he was punished by remaining a slave
choice or malice: and then he was punished according to
for ever. Secondly, in the case of a thief, who had not
the greatness of the sin∗. The fourth degree was when a
wherewith to make restitution, as stated in Ex. 22:3.
man sinned from stubbornness or obstinacy: and then he
The punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed
was to be utterly cut off as a rebel and a destroyer of the
by the Law: because God was worshipped by that people
commandment of the Law†.
alone, whereas all other nations were given to idolatry:
Accordingly we must say that, in appointing the pun-
wherefore if any man were exiled from that people abso-
ishment for theft, the Law considered what would be
lutely, he would be in danger of falling into idolatry. For
likely to happen most frequently (Ex. 22:1-9): wherefore,
this reason it is related (1 Kings 26:19) that David said to
as regards theft of other things which can easily be safe-
Saul: “They are cursed in the sight of the Lord, who have
guarded from a thief, the thief restored only twice their
case me out this day, that I should not dwell in the inheri-
value. But sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a
tance of the Lord, saying: Go, serve strange gods.” There
thief, because they graze in the fields: wherefore it hap-
was, however, a restricted sort of exile: for it is written
pened more frequently that sheep were stolen in the fields.
in Dt. 19:4‡ that “he that striketh [Vulg.: ‘killeth’] his
Consequently the Law inflicted a heavier penalty, by or-
neighbor ignorantly, and is proved to have had no hatred
dering four sheep to be restored for the theft of one. As
against him, shall flee to one of the cities” of refuge and
to cattle, they were yet more difficult to safeguard, be-
“abide there until the death of the high-priest.” For then it
cause they are kept in the fields, and do not graze in flocks
became lawful for him to return home, because when the
as sheep do; wherefore a yet more heavy penalty was in-
whole people thus suffered a loss they forgot their private
flicted in their regard, so that five oxen were to be restored
quarrels, so that the next of kin of the slain were not so
for one ox. And this I say, unless perchance the animal
eager to kill the slayer.
itself were discovered in the thief’s possession: because
Reply to Objection 11. Dumb animals were ordered
in that case he had to restore only twice the number, as
to be slain, not on account of any fault of theirs; but as
∗ Cf. Dt. 25:2
† Cf. Num. 15:30,31
‡ Cf. Num. 35:25
1127
a punishment to their owners, who had not safeguarded knew who he was: and it would seldom happen but that
their beasts from these offenses. Hence the owner was
some word or sign would escape about the matter. Or
more severely punished if his ox had butted anyone “yes-
again, this was done in order to frighten people, in detes-
terday or the day before” (in which case steps might have
tation of murder. Because the slaying of a heifer, which
been taken to butting suddenly). Or again, the animal was
is a useful animal and full of strength, especially before it
slain in detestation of the sin; and lest men should be hor-
has been put under the yoke, signified that whoever com-
rified at the sight thereof.
mitted murder, however useful and strong he might be,
Reply to Objection 12. The literal reason for this
was to forfeit his life; and that, by a cruel death, which
commandment, as Rabbi Moses declares (Doct. Perplex.
was implied by the striking off of its head; and that the
iii), was because the slayer was frequently from the near-
murderer, as vile and abject, was to be cut off from the
est city: wherefore the slaying of the calf was a means of
fellowship of men, which was betokened by the fact that
investigating the hidden murder. This was brought about
the heifer after being slain was left to rot in a rough and
in three ways. In the first place the elders of the city swore
uncultivated place.
that they had taken every measure for safeguarding the
Mystically, the heifer taken from the herd signifies the
roads. Secondly, the owner of the heifer was indemnified
flesh of Christ; which had not drawn a yoke, since it had
for the slaying of his beast, and if the murder was pre-
done no sin; nor did it plough the ground, i.e. it never
viously discovered, the beast was not slain. Thirdly, the
knew the stain of revolt. The fact of the heifer being killed
place, where the heifer was slain, remained uncultivated.
in an uncultivated valley signified the despised death of
Wherefore, in order to avoid this twofold loss, the men of
Christ, whereby all sins are washed away, and the devil is
the city would readily make known the murderer, if they
shown to be the arch-murderer.
Whether the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were framed in a suitable manIa IIae q. 105 a. 3
ner?
Objection 1. It would seem that the judicial precepts
Objection 4. Further, men are much more akin to us
regarding foreigners were not suitably framed. For Peter
than trees. But we should show greater care and love for
said (Acts 10:34,35): “In very deed I perceive that God
these things that are nearest to us, according to Ecclus.
is not a respecter of persons, but in every nation, he that
13:19: “Every beast loveth its like: so also every man him
feareth Him and worketh justice is acceptable to Him.”
that is nearest to himself.” Therefore the Lord unsuitably
But those who are acceptable to God should not be ex-
commanded (Dt. 20:13-19) that all the inhabitants of a
cluded from the Church of God. Therefore it is unsuit-
captured hostile city were to be slain, but that the fruit-
ably commanded (Dt. 23:3) that “the Ammonite and the
trees should not be cut down.
Moabite, even after the tenth generation, shall not enter
Objection 5. Further, every one should prefer the
into the church of the Lord for ever”: whereas, on the
common good of virtue to the good of the individual. But
other hand, it is prescribed (Dt. 23:7) to be observed with
the common good is sought in a war which men fight
regard to certain other nations: “Thou shalt not abhor the
against their enemies. Therefore it is unsuitably com-
Edomite, because he is thy brother; nor the Egyptian be-
manded (Dt.
20:5-7) that certain men should be sent
cause thou wast a stranger in his land.”
home, for instance a man that had built a new house, or
Objection 2. Further, we do not deserve to be pun-
who had planted a vineyard, or who had married a wife.
ished for those things which are not in our power. But it
Objection 6. Further, no man should profit by his own
is not in man’s power to be an eunuch, or born of a pros-
fault. But it is a man’s fault if he be timid or faint-hearted: titute. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded (Dt. 23:1,2)
since this is contrary to the virtue of fortitude. Therefore
that “an eunuch and one born of a prostitute shalt not enter
the timid and faint-hearted are unfittingly excused from
into the church of the Lord.”
the toil of battle (Dt. 20:8).
Objection 3. Further, the Old Law mercifully forbade
On the contrary, Divine Wisdom declares (Prov.
strangers to be molested: for it is written (Ex. 22:21):
8:8): “All my words are just, there is nothing wicked nor
“Thou shalt not molest a stranger, nor afflict him; for your-
perverse in them.”
selves also were strangers in the land of Egypt”: and (Ex.
I answer that, Man’s relations with foreigners are
23:9): “Thou shalt not molest a stranger, for you know
twofold: peaceful, and hostile: and in directing both
the hearts of strangers, for you also were strangers in the
kinds of relation the Law contained suitable precepts. For
land of Egypt.” But it is an affliction to be burdened with
the Jews were offered three opportunities of peaceful re-
usury. Therefore the Law unsuitably permitted them (Dt.
lations with foreigners.
First, when foreigners passed
23:19,20) to lend money to the stranger for usury.
through their land as travelers. Secondly, when they came
1128
to dwell in their land as newcomers. And in both these eryone at once, for the reason given above: but to some,
respects the Law made kind provision in its precepts: for
i.e. the Egyptians and Idumeans, in the third generation;
it is written (Ex. 22:21): “Thou shalt not molest a stranger
while others were excluded in perpetuity, in detestation
[advenam]”; and again (Ex. 22:9): “Thou shalt not mo-
of their past offense, i.e. the peoples of Moab, Ammon,
lest a stranger [peregrino].” Thirdly, when any foreign-
and Amalec. For just as one man is punished for a sin
ers wished to be admitted entirely to their fellowship and
committed by him, in order that others seeing this may be
mode of worship. With regard to these a certain order was
deterred and refrain from sinning; so too may one nation
observed. For they were not at once admitted to citizen-
or city be punished for a crime, that others may refrain
ship: just as it was law with some nations that no one was
from similar crimes.
deemed a citizen except after two or three generations, as
Nevertheless it was possible by dispensation for a man
the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 1). The reason for this
to be admitted to citizenship on account of some act of
was that if foreigners were allowed to meddle with the af-
virtue: thus it is related (Judith 14:6) that Achior, the cap-
fairs of a nation as soon as they settled down in its midst,
tain of the children of Ammon, “was joined to the people
many dangers might occur, since the foreigners not yet
of Israel, with all the succession of his kindred.” The same
having the common good firmly at heart might attempt
applies to Ruth the Moabite who was “a virtuous woman”
something hurtful to the people. Hence it was that the
(Ruth 3:11): although it may be said that this prohibition
Law prescribed in respect of certain nations that had close
regarded men and not women, who are not competent to
relations with the Jews (viz., the Egyptians among whom
be citizens absolutely speaking.
they were born and educated, and the Idumeans, the chil-
Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Polit.
dren of Esau, Jacob’s brother), that they should be admit-
iii, 3), a man is said to be a citizen in two ways: first,
ted to the fellowship of the people after the third genera-
simply; secondly, in a restricted sense. A man is a citizen
tion; whereas others (with whom their relations had been
simply if he has all the rights of citizenship, for instance,
hostile, such as the Ammonites and Moabites) were never
the right of debating or voting in the popular assembly.
to be admitted to citizenship; while the Amalekites, who
On the other hand, any man may be called citizen, only
were yet more hostile to them, and had no fellowship of
in a restricted sense, if he dwells within the state, even
kindred with them, were to be held as foes in perpetuity:
common people or children or old men, who are not fit
for it is written (Ex. 17:16): “The war of the Lord shall be
to enjoy power in matters pertaining to the common weal.
against Amalec from generation to generation.”
For this reason bastards, by reason of their base origin,
In like manner with regard to hostile relations with
were excluded from the “ecclesia,” i.e. from the popular
foreigners, the Law contained suitable precepts. For, in
assembly, down to the tenth generation. The same applies
the first place, it commanded that war should be declared
to eunuchs, who were not competent to receive the honor
for a just cause: thus it is commanded (Dt. 20:10) that
due to a father, especially among the Jews, where the di-
when they advanced to besiege a city, they should at first
vine worship was continued through carnal generation:
make an offer of peace. Secondly, it enjoined that when
for even among the heathens, those who had many chil-
once they had entered on a war they should undauntedly
dren were marked with special honor, as the Philosopher
persevere in it, putting their trust in God. And in order
remarks (Polit. ii, 6). Nevertheless, in matters pertaining
that they might be the more heedful of this command, it
to the grace of God, eunuchs were not discriminated from
ordered that on the approach of battle the priest should
others, as neither were strangers, as already stated: for it
hearten them by promising them God’s aid. Thirdly, it
is written (Isa. 56:3): “Let not the son of the stranger that
prescribed the removal of whatever might prove an obsta-
adhereth to the Lord speak, saying: The Lord will divide
cle to the fight, and that certain men, who might be in the
and separate me from His people. And let not the eunuch
way, should be sent home. Fourthly, it enjoined that they
say: Behold I am a dry tree.”
should use moderation in pursuing the advantage of vic-
Reply to Objection 3. It was not the intention of the
tory, by sparing women and children, and by not cutting
Law to sanction the acceptance of usury from strangers,
down fruit-trees of that country.
but only to tolerate it on account of the proneness of the
Reply to Objection 1. The Law excluded the men of
Jews to avarice; and in order to promote an amicable feel-
no nation from the worship of God and from things per-
ing towards those out of whom they made a profit.
taining to the welfare of the soul: for it is written (Ex.
Reply to Objection 4. A distinction was observed
12:48): “If any stranger be willing to dwell among you,
with regard to hostile cities.
For some of them were
and to keep the Phase of the Lord; all his males shall first
far distant, and were not among those which had been
be circumcised, and then shall he celebrate it according
promised to them. When they had taken these cities, they
to the manner, and he shall be as that which is born in
killed all the men who had fought against God’s people;
the land.” But in temporal matters concerning the pub-
whereas the women and children were spared. But in
lic life of the people, admission was not granted to ev-
the neighboring cities which had been promised to them,
1129
all were ordered to be slain, on account of their former and be so much the less brave in battle. Secondly, be-crimes, to punish which God sent the Israelites as executor
cause, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5), “it is a misfor-
of Divine justice: for it is written (Dt. 9:5) “because they
tune for a man if he is prevented from obtaining something
have done wickedly, they are destroyed at thy coming in.”
good when it is within his grasp.” And so lest the surviv-
The fruit-trees were commanded to be left untouched, for
ing relations should be the more grieved at the death of
the use of the people themselves, to whom the city with
these men who had not entered into the possession of the
its territory was destined to be subjected.
good things prepared for them; and also lest the people
Reply to Objection 5. The builder of a new house, the
should be horror-stricken at the sight of their misfortune:
planter of a vineyard, the newly married husband, were
these men were taken away from the danger of death by
excluded from fighting, for two reasons. First, because
being removed from the battle.
man is wont to give all his affection to those things which
Reply to Objection 6.
The timid were sent back
he has lately acquired, or is on the point of having, and
home, not that they might be the gainers thereby; but lest
consequently he is apt to dread the loss of these above
the people might be the losers by their presence, since
other things. Wherefore it was likely enough that on ac-
their timidity and flight might cause others to be afraid
count of this affection they would fear death all the more,
and run away.
Whether the Old Law set forth suitable precepts about the members of the household?
Ia IIae q. 105 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law set forth
Objection 6. Further, the Lord forbade them (Dt. 7:3,
unsuitable precepts about the members of the household.
seqq.) to make marriages with strange nations; and com-
For a slave “is in every respect his master’s property,” as
manded the dissolution of such as had been contracted (1
the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). But that which is a
Esdras 10). Therefore it was unfitting to allow them to
man’s property should be his always. Therefore it was
marry captive women from strange nations (Dt. 21:10,
unfitting for the Law to command (Ex. 21:2) that slaves
seqq.).
should “go out free” in the seventh year.
Objection 7. Further, the Lord forbade them to marry
Objection 2. Further, a slave is his master’s property,
within certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity, ac-
just as an animal, e.g. an ass or an ox. But it is com-
cording to Lev. 18. Therefore it was unsuitably com-
manded (Dt. 22:1-3) with regard to animals, that they
manded (Dt. 25:5) that if any man died without issue,
should be brought back to the owner if they be found go-
his brother should marry his wife.
ing astray. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded (Dt.
Objection 8. Further, as there is the greatest familiar-
23:15): “Thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant
ity between man and wife, so should there be the staunch-
that is fled to thee.”
est fidelity. But this is impossible if the marriage bond can
Objection 3. Further, the Divine Law should encour-
be sundered. Therefore it was unfitting for the Lord to al-
age mercy more even than the human law. But according
low (Dt. 24:1-4) a man to put his wife away, by writing
to human laws those who ill-treat their servants and maid-
a bill of divorce; and besides, that he could not take her
servants are severely punished: and the worse treatment
again to wife.
of all seems to be that which results in death. Therefore
Objection 9. Further, just as a wife can be faithless
it is unfittingly commanded (Ex. 21:20,21) that “he that
to her husband, so can a slave be to his master, and a son
striketh his bondman or bondwoman with a rod, and they
to his father. But the Law did not command any sacrifice
die under his hands. . . if the party remain alive a day. . . he to be offered in order to investigate the injury done by a
shall not be subject to the punishment, because it is his
servant to his master, or by a son to his father. Therefore
money.”
it seems to have been superfluous for the Law to prescribe
Objection 4. Further, the dominion of a master over
the “sacrifice of jealousy” in order to investigate a wife’s
his slave differs from that of the father over his son (Polit.
adultery (Num. 5:12, seqq.). Consequently it seems that
i, 3). But the dominion of master over slave gives the
the Law put forth unsuitable judicial precepts about the
former the right to sell his servant or maidservant. There-
members of the household.
fore it was unfitting for the Law to allow a man to sell his
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:10): “The judg-
daughter to be a servant or handmaid (Ex. 21:7).
ments of the Lord are true, justified in themselves.”
Objection 5. Further, a father has power over his son.
I answer that, The mutual relations of the members
But he who has power over the sinner has the right to pun-
of a household regard everyday actions directed to the ne-
ish him for his offenses. Therefore it is unfittingly com-
cessities of life, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1). Now manded (Dt. 21:18, seqq.) that a father should bring his
the preservation of man’s life may be considered from two
son to the ancients of the city for punishment.
points of view. First, from the point of view of the individ-
1130
ual, i.e. in so far as man preserves his individuality: and might be free to rejoice with his wife.
for the purpose of the preservation of life, considered from
With regard to children, the Law commanded parents
this standpoint, man has at his service external goods, by
to educate them by instructing them in the faith: hence it
means of which he provides himself with food and cloth-
is written (Ex. 12:26, seqq.): “When your children shall
ing and other such necessaries of life: in the handling of
say to you: What is the meaning of this service? You shall
which he has need of servants. Secondly man’s life is pre-
say to them: It is the victim of the passage of the Lord.”
served from the point of view of the species, by means
Moreover, they are commanded to teach them the rules of
of generation, for which purpose man needs a wife, that
right conduct: wherefore it is written (Dt. 21:20) that the
she may bear him children. Accordingly the mutual rela-
parents had to say: “He slighteth hearing our admonitions,
tions of the members of a household admit of a threefold
he giveth himself to revelling and to debauchery.”
combination: viz. those of master and servant, those of
Reply to Objection 1. As the children of Israel had
husband and wife, and those of father and son: and in
been delivered by the Lord from slavery, and for this rea-
respect of all these relationships the Old Law contained
son were bound to the service of God, He did not wish
fitting precepts. Thus, with regard to servants, it com-
them to be slaves in perpetuity. Hence it is written (Lev.
manded them to be treated with moderation—both as to
25:39, seqq.): “If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell
their work, lest, to wit, they should be burdened with ex-
himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the ser-
cessive labor, wherefore the Lord commanded (Dt. 5:14)
vice of bondservants: but he shall be as a hireling and a
that on the Sabbath day “thy manservant and thy maid-
sojourner. . . for they are My servants, and I brought them
servant” should “rest even as thyself”—and also as to the
out of the land of Egypt: let them not be sold as bond-
infliction of punishment, for it ordered those who maimed
men”: and consequently, since they were slaves, not ab-
their servants, to set them free (Ex. 21:26,27). Similar
solutely but in a restricted sense, after a lapse of time they
provision was made in favor of a maidservant when mar-
were set free.
ried to anyone (Ex. 21:7, seqq.). Moreover, with regard to
Reply to Objection 2. This commandment is to be
those servants in particular who were taken from among
understood as referring to a servant whom his master
the people, the Law prescribed that they should go out
seeks to kill, or to help him in committing some sin.
free in the seventh year taking whatever they brought with
Reply to Objection 3. With regard to the ill-treatment
them, even their clothes (Ex. 21:2, seqq.): and further-
of servants, the Law seems to have taken into considera-
more it was commanded (Dt. 15:13) that they should be
tion whether it was certain or not: since if it were certain,
given provision for the journey.
the Law fixed a penalty: for maiming, the penalty was
With regard to wives the Law made certain prescrip-
forfeiture of the servant, who was ordered to be given his
tions as to those who were to be taken in marriage: for in-
liberty: while for slaying, the punishment was that of a
stance, that they should marry a wife from their own tribe
murderer, when the slave died under the blow of his mas-
(Num. 36:6): and this lest confusion should ensue in the
ter. If, however, the hurt was not certain, but only proba-
property of various tribes. Also that a man should marry
ble, the Law did not impose any penalty as regards a man’s
the wife of his deceased brother when the latter died with-
own servant: for instance if the servant did not die at once
out issue, as prescribed in Dt. 25:5,6: and this in order
after being struck, but after some days: for it would be
that he who could not have successors according to carnal
uncertain whether he died as a result of the blows he re-
origin, might at least have them by a kind of adoption, and
ceived. For when a man struck a free man, yet so that he
that thus the deceased might not be entirely forgotten. It
did not die at once, but “walked abroad again upon his
also forbade them to marry certain women; to wit, women
staff,” he that struck him was quit of murder, even though
of strange nations, through fear of their losing their faith;
afterwards he died. Nevertheless he was bound to pay the
and those of their near kindred, on account of the natural
doctor’s fees incurred by the victim of his assault. But
respect due to them. Furthermore it prescribed in what
this was not the case if a man killed his own servant: be-
way wives were to be treated after marriage. To wit, that
cause whatever the servant had, even his very person, was
they should not be slandered without grave reason: where-
the property of his master. Hence the reason for his not
fore it ordered punishment to be inflicted on the man who
being subject to a pecuniary penalty is set down as being
falsely accused his wife of a crime (Dt. 22:13, seqq.).
“because it is his money.”
Also that a man’s hatred of his wife should not be detri-
Reply to Objection 4. As stated above (ad 1), no Jew
mental to his son (Dt. 21:15, seqq.). Again, that a man
could own a Jew as a slave absolutely: but only in a re-
should not ill-use his wife through hatred of her, but rather
stricted sense, as a hireling for a fixed time. And in this
that he should write a bill of divorce and send her away
way the Law permitted that through stress of poverty a
(Dt. 24:1). Furthermore, in order to foster conjugal love
man might sell his son or daughter. This is shown by the
from the very outset, it was prescribed that no public du-
very words of the Law, where we read: “If any man sell
ties should be laid on a recently married man, so that he
his daughter to be a servant, she shall not go out as bond-
1131
women are wont to go out.” Moreover, in this way a man xlviii super Matth.), “because death was an unmitigated
might sell not only his son, but even himself, rather as a
evil for the Jews, who did everything with a view to the
hireling than as a slave, according to Lev. 25:39,40: “If
present life, it was ordained that children should be born
thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee,
to the dead man through his brother: thus affording a cer-
thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondser-
tain mitigation to his death. It was not, however, ordained
vants: but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner.”
that any other than his brother or one next of kin should
Reply to Objection 5. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
marry the wife of the deceased, because” the offspring of
x, 9), the paternal authority has the power only of admo-
this union “would not be looked upon as that of the de-
nition; but not that of coercion, whereby rebellious and
ceased: and moreover, a stranger would not be under the
headstrong persons can be compelled. Hence in this case
obligation to support the household of the deceased, as his
the Lord commanded the stubborn son to be punished by
brother would be bound to do from motives of justice on
the rulers of the city.
account of his relationship.” Hence it is evident that in
Reply to Objection 6. The Lord forbade them to
marrying the wife of his dead brother, he took his dead
marry strange women on account of the danger of se-
brother’s place.
duction, lest they should be led astray into idolatry. And
Reply to Objection 8. The Law permitted a wife to
specially did this prohibition apply with respect to those
be divorced, not as though it were just absolutely speak-
nations who dwelt near them, because it was more proba-
ing, but on account of the Jews’ hardness of heart, as Our
ble that they would adopt their religious practices. When,
Lord declared (Mat. 19:8). Of this, however, we must
however, the woman was willing to renounce idolatry, and
speak more fully in the treatise on Matrimony ( Suppl.,
become an adherent of the Law, it was lawful to take
q. 67).
her in marriage: as was the case with Ruth whom Booz
Reply to Objection 9. Wives break their conjugal
married. Wherefore she said to her mother-in-law (Ruth
faith by adultery, both easily, for motives of pleasure, and
1:16): “Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my
hiddenly, since “the eye of the adulterer observeth dark-
God.” Accordingly it was not permitted to marry a cap-
ness” (Job 24:15). But this does not apply to a son in
tive woman unless she first shaved her hair, and pared her
respect of his father, or to a servant in respect of his mas-
nails, and put off the raiment wherein she was taken, and
ter: because the latter infidelity is not the result of the lust mourned for her father and mother, in token that she re-of pleasure, but rather of malice: nor can it remain hidden
nounced idolatry for ever.
like the infidelity of an adulterous woman.
Reply to Objection 7. As Chrysostom says (Hom.
1132
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 106
Of the Law of the Gospel, Called the New Law, Considered in Itself (In Four Articles)
In proper sequence we have to consider now the Law of the Gospel which is called the New Law: and in the first place we must consider it in itself; secondly, in comparison with the Old Law; thirdly, we shall treat of those things that are contained in the New Law. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What kind of law is it? i.e. Is it a written law or is it instilled in the heart?
(2) Of its efficacy, i.e. does it justify?
(3) Of its beginning: should it have been given at the beginning of the world?
(4) Of its end: i.e. whether it will last until the end, or will another law take its place?
Whether the New Law is a written law?
Ia IIae q. 106 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law is a
lieve in Christ. This is manifestly stated by the Apostle
written law. For the New Law is just the same as the
who says (Rom. 3:27): “Where is. . . thy boasting? It is
Gospel. But the Gospel is set forth in writing, according
excluded. By what law? Of works? No, but by the law of
to Jn. 20:31: “But these are written that you may believe.”
faith”: for he calls the grace itself of faith “a law.” And
Therefore the New Law is a written law.
still more clearly it is written (Rom. 8:2): “The law of the
Objection 2. Further, the law that is instilled in the
spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath delivered me from the
heart is the natural law, according to Rom.
2:14,15:
law of sin and of death.” Hence Augustine says (De Spir.
”(The Gentiles) do by nature those things that are of the
et Lit. xxiv) that “as the law of deeds was written on ta-
law. . . who have [Vulg.: ‘show’] the work of the law writ-
bles of stone, so is the law of faith inscribed on the hearts
ten in their hearts.” If therefore the law of the Gospel were
of the faithful”: and elsewhere, in the same book (xxi):
instilled in our hearts, it would not be distinct from the law
“What else are the Divine laws written by God Himself
of nature.
on our hearts, but the very presence of His Holy Spirit?”
Objection 3. Further, the law of the Gospel is proper
Nevertheless the New Law contains certain things that
to those who are in the state of the New Testament. But the
dispose us to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost, and
law that is instilled in the heart is common to those who
pertaining to the use of that grace: such things are of sec-
are in the New Testament and to those who are in the Old
ondary importance, so to speak, in the New Law; and the
Testament: for it is written (Wis. 7:27) that Divine Wis-
faithful need to be instructed concerning them, both by
dom “through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls,
word and writing, both as to what they should believe and
she maketh the friends of God and prophets.” Therefore
as to what they should do. Consequently we must say that
the New Law is not instilled in our hearts.
the New Law is in the first place a law that is inscribed on
On the contrary, The New Law is the law of the New
our hearts, but that secondarily it is a written law.
Testament. But the law of the New Testament is instilled
Reply to Objection 1. The Gospel writings contain
in our hearts. For the Apostle, quoting the authority of
only such things as pertain to the grace of the Holy Ghost,
Jeremiah 31:31,33: “Behold the days shall come, saith
either by disposing us thereto, or by directing us to the
the Lord; and I will perfect unto the house of Israel, and
use thereof. Thus with regard to the intellect, the Gospel
unto the house of Judah, a new testament,” says, explain-
contains certain matters pertaining to the manifestation of
ing what this statement is (Heb. 8:8,10): “For this is the
Christ’s Godhead or humanity, which dispose us by means
testament which I will make to the house of Israel. . . by
of faith through which we receive the grace of the Holy
giving [Vulg.: ‘I will give’] My laws into their mind, and
Ghost: and with regard to the affections, it contains mat-
in their heart will I write them.” Therefore the New Law
ters touching the contempt of the world, whereby man is
is instilled in our hearts.
rendered fit to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost: for
I answer that, “Each thing appears to be that which
“the world,” i.e. worldly men, “cannot receive” the Holy
preponderates in it,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix,
Ghost (Jn. 14:17). As to the use of spiritual grace, this
8). Now that which is preponderant in the law of the New
consists in works of virtue to which the writings of the
Testament, and whereon all its efficacy is based, is the
New Testament exhort men in divers ways.
grace of the Holy Ghost, which is given through faith in
Reply to Objection 2. There are two ways in which
Christ. Consequently the New Law is chiefly the grace
a thing may be instilled into man. First, through being
itself of the Holy Ghost, which is given to those who be-
part of his nature, and thus the natural law is instilled into
1133
man. Secondly, a thing is instilled into man by being, as the Holy Ghost except through faith in Christ either ex-it were, added on to his nature by a gift of grace. In this
plicit or implicit: and by faith in Christ man belongs to
way the New Law is instilled into man, not only by indi-
the New Testament. Consequently whoever had the law
cating to him what he should do, but also by helping him
of grace instilled into them belonged to the New Testa-
to accomplish it.
ment.
Reply to Objection 3. No man ever had the grace of
Whether the New Law justifies?
Ia IIae q. 106 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law does
the New Testament, “it is given in an inward manner, that
not justify. For no man is justified unless he obeys God’s
they may be justified.” The other element of the Evan-
law, according to Heb. 5:9: “He,” i.e. Christ, “became to
gelical Law is secondary: namely, the teachings of faith,
all that obey Him the cause of eternal salvation.” But the
and those commandments which direct human affections
Gospel does not always cause men to believe in it: for it
and human actions. And as to this, the New Law does not
is written (Rom. 10:16): “All do not obey the Gospel.”
justify. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6) “The letter
Therefore the New Law does not justify.
killeth, but the spirit quickeneth”: and Augustine explains
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle proves in his epistle
this (De Spir. et Lit. xiv, xvii) by saying that the letter de-
to the Romans that the Old Law did not justify, because
notes any writing external to man, even that of the moral
transgression increased at its advent: for it is stated (Rom.
precepts such as are contained in the Gospel. Wherefore
4:15): “The Law worketh wrath: for where there is no
the letter, even of the Gospel would kill, unless there were
law, neither is there transgression.” But much more did
the inward presence of the healing grace of faith.
the New Law increase transgression: since he who sins
Reply to Objection 1. This argument holds true of the
after the giving of the New Law deserves greater punish-
New Law, not as to its principal, but as to its secondary el-
ment, according to Heb. 10:28,29: “A man making void
ement: i.e. as to the dogmas and precepts outwardly put
the Law of Moses dieth without any mercy under two or
before man either in words or in writing.
three witnesses. How much more, do you think, he de-
Reply to Objection 2. Although the grace of the New
serveth worse punishments, who hath trodden underfoot
Testament helps man to avoid sin, yet it does not so con-
the Son of God,” etc.? Therefore the New Law, like the
firm man in good that he cannot sin: for this belongs to the
Old Law, does not justify.
state of glory. Hence if a man sin after receiving the grace
Objection 3. Further, justification is an effect proper
of the New Testament, he deserves greater punishment, as
to God, according to Rom. 8:33: “God that justifieth.” But
being ungrateful for greater benefits, and as not using the
the Old Law was from God just as the New Law. There-
help given to him. And this is why the New Law is not
fore the New Law does not justify any more than the Old
said to “work wrath”: because as far as it is concerned it
Law.
gives man sufficient help to avoid sin.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 1:16): “I
Reply to Objection 3. The same God gave both the
am not ashamed of the Gospel: for it is in the power of
New and the Old Law, but in different ways. For He gave
God unto salvation to everyone that believeth.” But there
the Old Law written on tables of stone: whereas He gave
is no salvation but to those who are justified. Therefore
the New Law written “in the fleshly tables of the heart,” as
the Law of the Gospel justifies.
the Apostle expresses it (2 Cor. 3:3). Wherefore, as Au-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), there is a
gustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xviii), “the Apostle calls this
twofold element in the Law of the Gospel. There is the
letter which is written outside man, a ministration of death
chief element, viz. the grace of the Holy Ghost bestowed
and a ministration of condemnation: whereas he calls the
inwardly. And as to this, the New Law justifies. Hence
other letter, i.e. the Law of the New Testament, the minis-
Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xvii): “There,” i.e. in
tration of the spirit and the ministration of justice: because
the Old Testament, “the Law was set forth in an outward
through the gift of the Spirit we work justice, and are de-
fashion, that the ungodly might be afraid”; “here,” i.e. in
livered from the condemnation due to transgression.”
1134
Whether the New Law should have been given from the beginning of the world?
Ia IIae q. 106 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law should
ful flesh, of sin∗ hath condemned sin in the flesh, that the
have been given from the beginning of the world. “For
justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us.”
there is no respect of persons with God” (Rom. 2:11). But
A second reason may be taken from the perfection of
“all” men “have sinned and do need the glory of God”
the New Law. Because a thing is not brought to perfection
(Rom. 3:23). Therefore the Law of the Gospel should
at once from the outset, but through an orderly succession
have been given from the beginning of the world, in order
of time; thus one is at first a boy, and then a man. And this
that it might bring succor to all.
reason is stated by the Apostle (Gal. 3:24,25): “The Law
Objection 2. Further, as men dwell in various places,
was our pedagogue in Christ that we might be justified by
so do they live in various times. But God, “Who will have
faith. But after the faith is come, we are no longer under
all men to be saved” (1 Tim. 2:4), commanded the Gospel
a pedagogue.”
to be preached in all places, as may be seen in the last
The third reason is found in the fact that the New Law
chapters of Matthew and Mark. Therefore the Law of the
is the law of grace: wherefore it behoved man first of all
Gospel should have been at hand for all times, so as to be
to be left to himself under the state of the Old Law, so
given from the beginning of the world.
that through falling into sin, he might realize his weak-
Objection 3. Further, man needs to save his soul,
ness, and acknowledge his need of grace. This reason is
which is for all eternity, more than to save his body, which
set down by the Apostle (Rom. 5:20): “The Law entered
is a temporal matter. But God provided man from the be-
in, that sin might abound: and when sin abounded grace
ginning of the world with things that are necessary for the
did more abound.”
health of his body, by subjecting to his power whatever
Reply to Objection 1. Mankind on account of the sin
was created for the sake of man (Gn. 1:26-29). There-
of our first parents deserved to be deprived of the aid of
fore the New Law also, which is very necessary for the
grace: and so “from whom it is withheld it is justly with-
health of the soul, should have been given to man from
held, and to whom it is given, it is mercifully given,” as
the beginning of the world.
Augustine states (De Perfect. Justit. iv)†. Consequently it
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46):
does not follow that there is respect of persons with God,
“That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is
from the fact that He did not offer the Law of grace to
natural.” But the New Law is highly spiritual. Therefore
all from the beginning of the world, which Law was to be
it was not fitting for it to be given from the beginning of
published in due course of time, as stated above.
the world.
Reply to Objection 2. The state of mankind does not
I answer that, Three reasons may be assigned why it
vary according to diversity of place, but according to suc-
was not fitting for the New Law to be given from the be-
cession of time. Hence the New Law avails for all places,
ginning of the world. The first is because the New Law,
but not for all times: although at all times there have been
as stated above (a. 1), consists chiefly in the grace of the
some persons belonging to the New Testament, as stated
Holy Ghost: which it behoved not to be given abundantly
above (a. 1, ad 3).
until sin, which is an obstacle to grace, had been cast out
Reply to Objection 3. Things pertaining to the health
of man through the accomplishment of his redemption by
of the body are of service to man as regards his nature,
Christ: wherefore it is written (Jn. 7:39): “As yet the
which sin does not destroy: whereas things pertaining to
Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified.”
the health of the soul are ordained to grace, which is for-
This reason the Apostle states clearly (Rom. 8:2, seqq.)
feit through sin. Consequently the comparison will not
where, after speaking of “the Law of the Spirit of life,” he
hold.
adds: “God sending His own Son, in the likeness of sin-
Whether the New Law will last till the end of the world?
Ia IIae q. 106 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law will
“We know in part and we prophesy in part.” Therefore the
not last until the end of the world. Because, as the Apos-
New Law is to be done away, and will be succeeded by a
tle says (1 Cor. 13:10), “when that which is perfect is
more perfect state.
come, that which is in part shall be done away.” But the
Objection 2. Further, Our Lord (Jn. 16:13) promised
New Law is “in part,” since the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:9):
His disciples the knowledge of all truth when the Holy
∗ St. Thomas, quoting perhaps from memory, omits the “et” (and), after “sinful flesh.” The text quoted should read thus: “in the likeness of sinful flesh, and a sin offering ( peri hamartias), hath,” etc.
† Cf. Ep.
ccvii; De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. ii, 19
1135
Ghost, the Comforter, should come.
But the Church
persons, according as the grace of the Holy Ghost dwells
knows not yet all truth in the state of the New Testament.
in man more or less perfectly. Nevertheless we are not to
Therefore we must look forward to another state, wherein
look forward to a state wherein man is to possess the grace
all truth will be revealed by the Holy Ghost.
of the Holy Ghost more perfectly than he has possessed it
Objection 3. Further, just as the Father is distinct
hitherto, especially the apostles who “received the first-
from the Son and the Son from the Father, so is the Holy
fruits of the Spirit, i.e. sooner and more abundantly than
Ghost distinct from the Father and the Son. But there
others,” as a gloss expounds on Rom. 8:23.
was a state corresponding with the Person of the Father,
Reply to Objection 1. As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier.
viz. the state of the Old Law, wherein men were intent
v), there is a threefold state of mankind; the first was un-
on begetting children: and likewise there is a state cor-
der the Old Law; the second is that of the New Law; the
responding to the Person of the Son: viz. the state of
third will take place not in this life, but in heaven. But
the New Law, wherein the clergy who are intent on wis-
as the first state is figurative and imperfect in comparison
dom (which is appropriated to the Son) hold a prominent
with the state of the Gospel; so is the present state figura-
place. Therefore there will be a third state corresponding
tive and imperfect in comparison with the heavenly state,
to the Holy Ghost, wherein spiritual men will hold the first
with the advent of which the present state will be done
place.
away as expressed in that very passage (1 Cor. 13:12):
Objection 4. Further, Our Lord said (Mat. 24:14):
“We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then
“This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the
face to face.”
whole world. . . and then shall the consummation come.”
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Contra
But the Gospel of Christ is already preached throughout
Faust. xix, 31), Montanus and Priscilla pretended that
the whole world: and yet the consummation has not yet
Our Lord’s promise to give the Holy Ghost was fulfilled,
come. Therefore the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of
not in the apostles, but in themselves. In like manner
the kingdom, but another Gospel, that of the Holy Ghost,
the Manicheans maintained that it was fulfilled in Manes
is to come yet, like unto another Law.
whom they held to be the Paraclete. Hence none of the
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 24:34): “I
above received the Acts of the Apostles, where it is clearly
say to you that this generation shall not pass till all
shown that the aforesaid promise was fulfilled in the apos-
(these) things be done”:
which passage Chrysostom
tles: just as Our Lord promised them a second time (Acts
(Hom. lxxvii) explains as referring to “the generation of
1:5): “You shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost, not
those that believe in Christ.” Therefore the state of those
many days hence”: which we read as having been fulfilled
who believe in Christ will last until the consummation of
in Acts 2. However, these foolish notions are refuted by
the world.
the statement (Jn. 7:39) that “as yet the Spirit was not
I answer that, The state of the world may change in
given, because Jesus was not yet glorified”; from which
two ways. In one way, according to a change of law: and
we gather that the Holy Ghost was given as soon as Christ
thus no other state will succeed this state of the New Law.
was glorified in His Resurrection and Ascension. More-
Because the state of the New Law succeeded the state of
over, this puts out of court the senseless idea that the Holy
the Old Law, as a more perfect law a less perfect one. Now
Ghost is to be expected to come at some other time.
no state of the present life can be more perfect that the
Now the Holy Ghost taught the apostles all truth in re-
state of the New Law: since nothing can approach nearer
spect of matters necessary for salvation; those things, to
to the last end than that which is the immediate cause of
wit, that we are bound to believe and to do. But He did not
our being brought to the last end. But the New Law does
teach them about all future events: for this did not regard
this: wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. 10:19-22): “Hav-
them according to Acts 1:7: “It is not for you to know the
ing therefore, brethren, a confidence in the entering into
times or moments which the Father hath put in His own
the Holies by the blood of Christ, a new. . . way which He
power.”
hath dedicated for us. . . let us draw near.” Therefore no
Reply to Objection 3. The Old Law corresponded
state of the present life can be more perfect than that of
not only to the Father, but also to the Son: because Christ
the New Law, since the nearer a thing is to the last end the
was foreshadowed in the Old Law. Hence Our Lord said
more perfect it is.
(Jn. 5:46): “If you did believe Moses, you would per-
In another way the state of mankind may change ac-
haps believe me also; for he wrote of Me.” In like manner
cording as man stands in relation to one and the same
the New Law corresponds not only to Christ, but also to
law more or less perfectly. And thus the state of the Old
the Holy Ghost; according to Rom. 8:2: “The Law of
Law underwent frequent changes, since at times the laws
the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus,” etc. Hence we are not
were very well kept, and at other times were altogether
to look forward to another law corresponding to the Holy
unheeded. Thus, too, the state of the New Law is sub-
Ghost.
ject to change with regard to various places, times, and
Reply to Objection 4. Since Christ said at the very
1136
outset of the preaching of the Gospel: “The kingdom of mation come,” refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, of
heaven is at hand” (Mat. 4:17), it is most absurd to say that
which He was speaking literally. Secondly, the preaching
the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom. But
of the Gospel may be understood as extending throughout
the preaching of the Gospel of Christ may be understood
the world and producing its full effect, so that, to wit, the
in two ways. First, as denoting the spreading abroad of the
Church would be founded in every nation. And in these
knowledge of Christ: and thus the Gospel was preached
sense, as Augustine writes to Hesychius (Epist. cxcix),
throughout the world even at the time of the apostles, as
the Gospel is not preached to the whole world yet, but,
Chrysostom states (Hom. lxxv in Matth.). And in this
when it is, the consummation of the world will come.
sense the words that follow—“and then shall the consum-
1137
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 107
Of the New Law As Compared with the Old
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the New Law as compared with the Old: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?
(2) Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?
(3) Whether the New Law is contained in the Old?
(4) Which is the more burdensome, the New or the Old Law?
Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?
Ia IIae q. 107 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law is not
tion also be made of the Law.” But the priesthood of the
distinct from the Old. Because both these laws were given
New Testament is distinct from that of the Old, as the
to those who believe in God: since “without faith it is im-
Apostle shows in the same place. Therefore the Law is
possible to please God,” according to Heb. 11:6. But the
also distinct.
faith of olden times and of nowadays is the same, as the
I answer that, As stated above (q. 90, a. 2; q. 91,
gloss says on Mat. 21:9. Therefore the law is the same
a. 4), every law ordains human conduct to some end.
also.
Now things ordained to an end may be divided in two
Objection 2.
Further, Augustine says (Contra
ways, considered from the point of view of the end. First,
Adamant. Manich. discip. xvii) that “there is little dif-
through being ordained to different ends: and this differ-
ference between the Law and Gospel”∗—“fear and love.”
ence will be specific, especially if such ends are proxi-
But the New and Old Laws cannot be differentiated in re-
mate. Secondly, by reason of being closely or remotely
spect of these two things: since even the Old Law com-
connected with the end. Thus it is clear that movements
prised precepts of charity: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor”
differ in species through being directed to different terms:
(Lev. 19:18), and: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God”
while according as one part of a movement is nearer to
(Dt. 6:5). In like manner neither can they differ according
the term than another part, the difference of perfect and
to the other difference which Augustine assigns (Contra
imperfect movement is assessed.
Faust. iv, 2), viz. that “the Old Testament contained tem-
Accordingly then two laws may be distinguished from
poral promises, whereas the New Testament contains spir-
one another in two ways. First, through being altogether
itual and eternal promises”: since even the New Testament
diverse, from the fact that they are ordained to diverse
contains temporal promises, according to Mk. 10:30: He
ends: thus a state-law ordained to democratic government,
shall receive “a hundred times as much. . . in this time,
would differ specifically from a law ordained to govern-
houses and brethren,” etc.: while in the Old Testament
ment by the aristocracy. Secondly, two laws may be dis-
they hoped in promises spiritual and eternal, according to
tinguished from one another, through one of them being
Heb. 11:16: “But now they desire a better, that is to say, a
more closely connected with the end, and the other more
heavenly country,” which is said of the patriarchs. There-
remotely: thus in one and the same state there is one law
fore it seems that the New Law is not distinct from the
enjoined on men of mature age, who can forthwith ac-
Old.
complish that which pertains to the common good; and
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle seems to distinguish
another law regulating the education of children who need
both laws by calling the Old Law “a law of works,” and
to be taught how they are to achieve manly deeds later on.
the New Law “a law of faith” (Rom. 3:27). But the Old
We must therefore say that, according to the first way,
Law was also a law of faith, according to Heb. 11:39:
the New Law is not distinct from the Old Law: because
“All were [Vulg.: ‘All these being’] approved by the tes-
they both have the same end, namely, man’s subjection
timony of faith,” which he says of the fathers of the Old
to God; and there is but one God of the New and of the
Testament. In like manner the New Law is a law of works:
Old Testament, according to Rom. 3:30: “It is one God
since it is written (Mat. 5:44): “Do good to them that hate
that justifieth circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision
you”; and (Lk. 22:19): “Do this for a commemoration of
through faith.” According to the second way, the New
Me.” Therefore the New Law is not distinct from the Old.
Law is distinct from the Old Law: because the Old Law
On the contrary, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:12): “The
is like a pedagogue of children, as the Apostle says (Gal.
priesthood being translated it is necessary that a transla-
3:24), whereas the New Law is the law of perfection, since
∗ The ‘little difference’ refers to the Latin words ‘timor’ and ‘amor’
1138
it is the law of charity, of which the Apostle says (Col.
eign but as to something of their own. For this reason, too,
3:14) that it is “the bond of perfection.”
the Old Law is described as “restraining the hand, not the
Reply to Objection 1. The unity of faith under both
will”∗; since when a man refrains from some sins through
Testaments witnesses to the unity of end: for it has been
fear of being punished, his will does not shrink simply
stated above (q. 62, a. 2) that the object of the theological
from sin, as does the will of a man who refrains from sin
virtues, among which is faith, is the last end. Yet faith
through love of righteousness: and hence the New Law,
had a different state in the Old and in the New Law: since
which is the Law of love, is said to restrain the will.
what they believed as future, we believe as fact.
Nevertheless there were some in the state of the Old
Reply to Objection 2. All the differences assigned
Testament who, having charity and the grace of the Holy
between the Old and New Laws are gathered from their
Ghost, looked chiefly to spiritual and eternal promises:
relative perfection and imperfection. For the precepts of
and in this respect they belonged to the New Law. In like
every law prescribe acts of virtue. Now the imperfect,
manner in the New Testament there are some carnal men
who as yet are not possessed of a virtuous habit, are di-
who have not yet attained to the perfection of the New
rected in one way to perform virtuous acts, while those
Law; and these it was necessary, even under the New Tes-
who are perfected by the possession of virtuous habits
tament, to lead to virtuous action by the fear of punish-
are directed in another way. For those who as yet are not
ment and by temporal promises.
endowed with virtuous habits, are directed to the perfor-
But although the Old Law contained precepts of char-
mance of virtuous acts by reason of some outward cause:
ity, nevertheless it did not confer the Holy Ghost by
for instance, by the threat of punishment, or the promise
Whom “charity. . . is spread abroad in our hearts” (Rom.
of some extrinsic rewards, such as honor, riches, or the
5:5).
like. Hence the Old Law, which was given to men who
Reply to Objection 3.
As stated above (q. 106,
were imperfect, that is, who had not yet received spiritual
Aa. 1,2), the New Law is called the law of faith, in so
grace, was called the “law of fear,” inasmuch as it induced
far as its pre-eminence is derived from that very grace
men to observe its commandments by threatening them
which is given inwardly to believers, and for this reason
with penalties; and is spoken of as containing temporal
is called the grace of faith. Nevertheless it consists sec-
promises. On the other hand, those who are possessed of
ondarily in certain deeds, moral and sacramental: but the
virtue, are inclined to do virtuous deeds through love of
New Law does not consist chiefly in these latter things,
virtue, not on account of some extrinsic punishment or re-
as did the Old Law. As to those under the Old Testament
ward. Hence the New Law which derives its pre-eminence
who through faith were acceptable to God, in this respect
from the spiritual grace instilled into our hearts, is called
they belonged to the New Testament: for they were not
the “Law of love”: and it is described as containing spiri-
justified except through faith in Christ, Who is the Au-
tual and eternal promises, which are objects of the virtues,
thor of the New Testament. Hence of Moses the Apostle
chiefly of charity. Accordingly such persons are inclined
says (Heb. 11:26) that he esteemed “the reproach of Christ
of themselves to those objects, not as to something for-
greater riches than the treasure of the Egyptians.”
Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?
Ia IIae q. 107 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law does
tion, and against hating one’s enemies. In like manner
not fulfil the Old. Because to fulfil and to void are con-
Our Lord seems to have done away with the precepts of
trary. But the New Law voids or excludes the observances
the Old Law relating to the different kinds of foods (Mat.
of the Old Law: for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:2): “If you
15:11): “Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth the
be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing.” There-
man: but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a
fore the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old.
man.” Therefore the New Law is not a fulfilment of the
Objection 2. Further, one contrary is not the fulfil-
Old.
ment of another. But Our Lord propounded in the New
Objection 3. Further, whoever acts against a law does
Law precepts that were contrary to precepts of the Old
not fulfil the law. But Christ in certain cases acted against
Law. For we read (Mat. 5:27-32): You have heard that
the Law. For He touched the leper (Mat. 8:3), which
it was said to them of old:. . . “Whosoever shall put away
was contrary to the Law. Likewise He seems to have fre-
his wife, let him give her a bill of divorce. But I say to
quently broken the sabbath; since the Jews used to say of
you that whosoever shall put away his wife. . . maketh her
Him (Jn. 9:16): “This man is not of God, who keepeth not
to commit adultery.” Furthermore, the same evidently ap-
the sabbath.” Therefore Christ did not fulfil the Law: and
plies to the prohibition against swearing, against retalia-
so the New Law given by Christ is not a fulfilment of the
∗ Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40
1139
Old.
perjury: and this is more safely avoided, by abstaining al-
Objection 4. Further, the Old Law contained precepts,
together from swearing, save in cases of urgency. Thirdly,
moral, ceremonial, and judicial, as stated above (q. 99,
Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law, by adding some
a. 4). But Our Lord (Mat. 5) fulfilled the Law in some
counsels of perfection: this is clearly seen in Mat. 19:21,
respects, but without mentioning the judicial and ceremo-
where Our Lord said to the man who affirmed that he had
nial precepts. Therefore it seems that the New Law is not
kept all the precepts of the Old Law: “One thing is want-
a complete fulfilment of the Old.
ing to thee: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell whatsoever
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 5:17): “I am
thou hast,” etc.†.
not come to destroy, but to fulfil”: and went on to say
Reply to Objection 1. The New Law does not void
(Mat. 5:18): “One jot or one tittle shall not pass of the
observance of the Old Law except in the point of cere-
Law till all be fulfilled.”
monial precepts, as stated above (q. 103, Aa. 3,4). Now
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the New Law is
the latter were figurative of something to come. Where-
compared to the Old as the perfect to the imperfect. Now
fore from the very fact that the ceremonial precepts were
everything perfect fulfils that which is lacking in the im-
fulfilled when those things were accomplished which they
perfect. And accordingly the New Law fulfils the Old by
foreshadowed, it follows that they are no longer to be ob-
supplying that which was lacking in the Old Law.
served: for it they were to be observed, this would mean
Now two things of every law is to make men righ-
that something is still to be accomplished and is not yet
teous and virtuous, as was stated above (q. 92, a. 1):
fulfilled. Thus the promise of a future gift holds no longer
and consequently the end of the Old Law was the jus-
when it has been fulfilled by the presentation of the gift.
tification of men. The Law, however, could not accom-
In this way the legal ceremonies are abolished by being
plish this: but foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial ac-
fulfilled.
tions, and promised it in words. And in this respect, the
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Contra
New Law fulfils the Old by justifying men through the
Faust. xix, 26), those precepts of Our Lord are not con-
power of Christ’s Passion. This is what the Apostle says
trary to the precepts of the Old Law. For what Our Lord
(Rom. 8:3,4): “What the Law could not do. . . God send-
commanded about a man not putting away his wife, is not
ing His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh. . . hath con-
contrary to what the Law prescribed. “For the Law did
demned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law
not say: ‘Let him that wills, put his wife away’: the con-
might be fulfilled in us.” And in this respect, the New
trary of which would be not to put her away. On the con-
Law gives what the Old Law promised, according to 2
trary, the Law was unwilling that a man should put away
Cor. 1:20: “Whatever are the promises of God, in Him,”
his wife, since it prescribed a delay, so that excessive ea-
i.e. in Christ, “they are ‘Yea’.”∗ Again, in this respect,
gerness for divorce might cease through being weakened
it also fulfils what the Old Law foreshadowed. Hence
during the writing of the bill. Hence Our Lord, in order to
it is written (Col. 2:17) concerning the ceremonial pre-
impress the fact that a wife ought not easily to be put away,
cepts that they were “a shadow of things to come, but the
allowed no exception save in the case of fornication.” The
body is of Christ”; in other words, the reality is found in
same applies to the prohibition about swearing, as stated
Christ. Wherefore the New Law is called the law of real-
above. The same is also clear with respect to the prohibi-
ity; whereas the Old Law is called the law of shadow or
tion of retaliation. For the Law fixed a limit to revenge, by
of figure.
forbidding men to seek vengeance unreasonably: whereas
Now Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both
Our Lord deprived them of vengeance more completely
in His works and in His doctrine. In His works, because
by commanding them to abstain from it altogether. With
He was willing to be circumcised and to fulfil the other
regard to the hatred of one’s enemies, He dispelled the
legal observances, which were binding for the time be-
false interpretation of the Pharisees, by admonishing us to
ing; according to Gal. 4:4: “Made under the Law.” In
hate, not the person, but his sin. As to discriminating be-
His doctrine He fulfilled the precepts of the Law in three
tween various foods, which was a ceremonial matter, Our
ways. First, by explaining the true sense of the Law. This
Lord did not forbid this to be observed: but He showed
is clear in the case of murder and adultery, the prohibition
that no foods are naturally unclean, but only in token of
of which the Scribes and Pharisees thought to refer only to
something else, as stated above (q. 102, a. 6, ad 1).
the exterior act: wherefore Our Lord fulfilled the Law by
Reply to Objection 3. It was forbidden by the Law
showing that the prohibition extended also to the interior
to touch a leper; because by doing so, man incurred a cer-
acts of sins. Secondly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of
tain uncleanness of irregularity, as also by touching the
the Law by prescribing the safest way of complying with
dead, as stated above (q. 102, a. 5, ad 4). But Our Lord,
the statutes of the Old Law. Thus the Old Law forbade
Who healed the leper, could not contract an uncleanness.
∗ The Douay version reads thus: “All the promises of God are in Him,
‘It is’.”
† St. Thomas combines Mat. 19:21 with Mk. 10:21
1140
By those things which He did on the sabbath, He did not of kindness on the sabbath; which was contrary to the in-break the sabbath in reality, as the Master Himself shows
tention of the Law.
in the Gospel: both because He worked miracles by His
Reply to Objection 4. The reason why the ceremo-
Divine power, which is ever active among things; and be-
nial precepts of the Law are not mentioned in Mat. 5 is
cause He worked miracles by His Divine power, which
because, as stated above (ad 1), their observance was abol-
is ever active among things; and because His works were
ished by their fulfilment. But of the judicial precepts He
concerned with the salvation of man, while the Pharisees
mentioned that of retaliation: so that what He said about it
were concerned for the well-being of animals even on the
should refer to all the others. With regard to this precept,
sabbath; and again because on account of urgency He ex-
He taught that the intention of the Law was that retalia-
cused His disciples for gathering the ears of corn on the
tion should be sought out of love of justice, and not as
sabbath. But He did seem to break the sabbath according
a punishment out of revengeful spite, which He forbade,
to the superstitious interpretation of the Pharisees, who
admonishing man to be ready to suffer yet greater insults;
thought that man ought to abstain from doing even works
and this remains still in the New Law.
Whether the New Law is contained in the Old?
Ia IIae q. 107 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law is not
the full corn in the ear,” expresses himself as follows: “He
contained in the Old. Because the New Law consists
brought forth first the blade, i.e. the Law of Nature; then
chiefly in faith: wherefore it is called the “law of faith”
the ear, i.e. the Law of Moses; lastly, the full corn, i.e. the (Rom. 3:27). But many points of faith are set forth in the
Law of the Gospel.” Hence then the New Law is in the
New Law, which are not contained in the Old. Therefore
Old as the corn in the ear.
the New Law is not contained in the Old.
Reply to Objection 1. Whatsoever is set down in the
Objection 2. Further, a gloss says on Mat. 5:19, “He
New Testament explicitly and openly as a point of faith,
that shall break one of these least commandments,” that
is contained in the Old Testament as a matter of belief,
the lesser commandments are those of the Law, and the
but implicitly, under a figure. And accordingly, even as to
greater commandments, those contained in the Gospel.
those things which we are bound to believe, the New Law
Now the greater cannot be contained in the lesser. There-
is contained in the Old.
fore the New Law is not contained in the Old.
Reply to Objection 2. The precepts of the New Law
Objection 3. Further, who holds the container holds
are said to be greater than those of the Old Law, in the
the contents. If, therefore, the New Law is contained in
point of their being set forth explicitly. But as to the sub-
the Old, it follows that whoever had the Old Law had the
stance itself of the precepts of the New Testament, they
New: so that it was superfluous to give men a New Law
are all contained in the Old. Hence Augustine says (Con-
when once they had the Old. Therefore the New Law is
tra Faust. xix, 23,28) that “nearly all Our Lord’s admo-
not contained in the Old.
nitions or precepts, where He expressed Himself by say-
On the contrary, As expressed in Ezech. 1:16, there
ing: ‘But I say unto you,’ are to be found also in those
was “a wheel in the midst of a wheel,” i.e. “the New Testa-
ancient books. Yet, since they thought that murder was
ment within the Old,” according to Gregory’s exposition.
only the slaying of the human body, Our Lord declared to
I answer that, One thing may be contained in another
them that every wicked impulse to hurt our brother is to
in two ways. First, actually; as a located thing is in a
be looked on as a kind of murder.” And it is in the point
place. Secondly, virtually; as an effect in its cause, or as
of declarations of this kind that the precepts of the New
the complement in that which is incomplete; thus a genus
Law are said to be greater than those of the Old. Nothing,
contains its species, and a seed contains the whole tree,
however, prevents the greater from being contained in the
virtually. It is in this way that the New Law is contained
lesser virtually; just as a tree is contained in the seed.
in the Old: for it has been stated (a. 1) that the New Law
Reply to Objection 3. What is set forth implicitly
is compared to the Old as perfect to imperfect. Hence
needs to be declared explicitly. Hence after the publish-
Chrysostom, expounding Mk. 4:28, “The earth of itself
ing of the Old Law, a New Law also had to be given.
bringeth forth fruit, first the blade, then the ear, afterwards 1141
Whether the New Law is more burdensome than the Old?
Ia IIae q. 107 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law is more
tion should be observed, lest good conduct should become
burdensome than the Old. For Chrysostom (Opus Imp.
a burden to the faithful. For he says in reply to the queries
in Matth., Hom. x∗) say: “The commandments given to
of Januarius (Ep. lv) that, “whereas God in His mercy
Moses are easy to obey: Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt
wished religion to be a free service rendered by the public
not commit adultery: but the commandments of Christ are
solemnization of a small number of most manifest sacra-
difficult to accomplish, for instance: Thou shalt not give
ments, certain persons make it a slave’s burden; so much
way to anger, or to lust.” Therefore the New Law is more
so that the state of the Jews who were subject to the sacra-
burdensome than the Old.
ments of the Law, and not to the presumptuous devices of
Objection 2.
Further, it is easier to make use of
man, was more tolerable.”
earthly prosperity than to suffer tribulations. But in the
The other difficulty attaches to works of virtue as to in-
Old Testament observance of the Law was followed by
terior acts: for instance, that a virtuous deed be done with
temporal prosperity, as may be gathered from Dt. 28:1-
promptitude and pleasure. It is this difficulty that virtue
14; whereas many kinds of trouble ensue to those who ob-
solves: because to act thus is difficult for a man without
serve the New Law, as stated in 2 Cor. 6:4-10: “Let us ex-
virtue: but through virtue it becomes easy for him. In this
hibit ourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience,
respect the precepts of the New Law are more burden-
in tribulation, in necessities, in distresses,” etc. Therefore
some than those of the Old; because the New Law pro-
the New Law is more burdensome than the Old.
hibits certain interior movements of the soul, which were
Objection 3. The more one has to do, the more dif-
not expressly forbidden in the Old Law in all cases, al-
ficult it is. But the New Law is something added to the
though they were forbidden in some, without, however,
Old. For the Old Law forbade perjury, while the New Law
any punishment being attached to the prohibition. Now
proscribed even swearing: the Old Law forbade a man to
this is very difficult to a man without virtue: thus even
cast off his wife without a bill of divorce, while the New
the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 9) that it is easy to do
Law forbade divorce altogether; as is clearly stated in Mat.
what a righteous man does; but that to do it in the same
5:31, seqq., according to Augustine’s expounding. There-
way, viz. with pleasure and promptitude, is difficult to a
fore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old.
man who is not righteous. Accordingly we read also (1
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 11:28): “Come to
Jn. 5:3) that “His commandments are not heavy”: which
Me, all you that labor and are burdened”: which words are
words Augustine expounds by saying that “they are not
expounded by Hilary thus: “He calls to Himself all those
heavy to the man that loveth; whereas they are a burden to
that labor under the difficulty of observing the Law, and
him that loveth not.”
are burdened with the sins of this world.” And further on
Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted speaks ex-
He says of the yoke of the Gospel: “For My yoke is sweet
pressly of the difficulty of the New Law as to the deliber-
and My burden light.” Therefore the New Law is a lighter
ate curbing of interior movements.
burden than the Old.
Reply to Objection 2. The tribulations suffered by
I answer that, A twofold difficult may attach to works
those who observe the New Law are not imposed by the
of virtue with which the precepts of the Law are con-
Law itself. Moreover they are easily borne, on account of
cerned. One is on the part of the outward works, which of
the love in which the same Law consists: since, as Augus-
themselves are, in a way, difficult and burdensome. And
tine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxx), “love makes light
in this respect the Old Law is a much heavier burden than
and nothing of things that seem arduous and beyond our
the New: since the Old Law by its numerous ceremonies
power.”
prescribed many more outward acts than the New Law,
Reply to Objection 3. The object of these additions
which, in the teaching of Christ and the apostles, added
to the precepts of the Old Law was to render it easier to do
very few precepts to those of the natural law; although af-
what it prescribed, as Augustine states†. Accordingly this
terwards some were added, through being instituted by the
does not prove that the New Law is more burdensome, but
holy Fathers. Even in these Augustine says that modera-
rather that it is a lighter burden.
∗ The work of an unknown author
† De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17,21; xix, 23,26
1142
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 108
Of Those Things That Are Contained in the New Law
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider those things that are contained in the New Law: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or to forbid any outward works?
(2) Whether the New Law makes sufficient provision in prescribing and forbidding external acts?
(3) Whether in the matter of internal acts it directs man sufficiently?
(4) Whether it fittingly adds counsels to precepts?
Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or prohibit any external acts?
Ia IIae q. 108 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law should
“The Word was made flesh,” and afterwards: “full of
not prescribe or prohibit any external acts. For the New
grace and truth”; and further on: “Of His fulness we all
Law is the Gospel of the kingdom, according to Mat.
have received, and grace for grace.” Hence it is added that
24:14: “This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in
“grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.” Consequently
the whole world.” But the kingdom of God consists not in
it was becoming that the grace flows from the incarnate
exterior, but only in interior acts, according to Lk. 17:21:
Word should be given to us by means of certain external
“The kingdom of God is within you”; and Rom. 14:17:
sensible objects; and that from this inward grace, whereby
“The kingdom of God is not meat and drink; but justice
the flesh is subjected to the Spirit, certain external works
and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.” Therefore the New
should ensue.
Law should not prescribe or forbid any external acts.
Accordingly external acts may have a twofold connec-
Objection 2. Further, the New Law is “the law of the
tion with grace. In the first place, as leading in some way
Spirit” (Rom. 8:2). But “where the Spirit of the Lord is,
to grace. Such are the sacramental acts which are insti-
there is liberty” (2 Cor. 3:17). Now there is no liberty
tuted in the New Law, e.g. Baptism, the Eucharist, and
when man is bound to do or avoid certain external acts.
the like.
Therefore the New Law does not prescribe or forbid any
In the second place there are those external acts which
external acts.
ensue from the promptings of grace: and herein we must
Objection 3. Further, all external acts are understood
observe a difference. For there are some which are nec-
as referable to the hand, just as interior acts belong to the
essarily in keeping with, or in opposition to inward grace
mind. But this is assigned as the difference between the
consisting in faith that worketh through love. Such ex-
New and Old Laws that the “Old Law restrains the hand,
ternal works are prescribed or forbidden in the New Law;
whereas the New Law curbs the will”∗. Therefore the
thus confession of faith is prescribed, and denial of faith is
New Law should not contain prohibitions and commands
forbidden; for it is written (Mat. 10:32,33) ”(Every one)
about exterior deeds, but only about interior acts.
that shall confess Me before men, I will also confess him
On the contrary, Through the New Law, men are
before My Father. . . But he that shall deny Me before men,
made “children of light”: wherefore it is written (Jn.
I will also deny him before My Father.” On the other hand,
12:36): “Believe in the light that you may be the children
there are works which are not necessarily opposed to, or in
of light.” Now it is becoming that children of the light
keeping with faith that worketh through love. Such works
should do deeds of light and cast aside deeds of darkness,
are not prescribed or forbidden in the New Law, by virtue
according to Eph. 5:8: “You were heretofore darkness,
of its primitive institution; but have been left by the Law-
but now light in the Lord. Walk. . . as children of the light.”
giver, i.e. Christ, to the discretion of each individual. And
Therefore the New Law had to forbid certain external acts
so to each one it is free to decide what he should do or
and prescribe others.
avoid; and to each superior, to direct his subjects in such
I answer that, As stated above (q. 106, Aa. 1,2), the
matters as regards what they must do or avoid. Where-
New Law consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost,
fore also in this respect the Gospel is called the “law of
which is shown forth by faith that worketh through love.
libertyӠ: since the Old Law decided many points and left
Now men become receivers of this grace through God’s
few to man to decide as he chose.
Son made man, Whose humanity grace filled first, and
Reply to Objection 1. The kingdom of God consists
thence flowed forth to us. Hence it is written (Jn. 1:14):
chiefly in internal acts: but as a consequence all things
∗ Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40
† Cf. Reply obj. 2
1143
that are essential to internal acts belong also to the king-to some corruption affecting that nature. Since then the
dom of God. Thus if the kingdom of God is internal righ-
grace of the Holy Ghost is like an interior habit bestowed
teousness, peace, and spiritual joy, all external acts that
on us and inclining us to act aright, it makes us do freely
are incompatible with righteousness, peace, and spiritual
those things that are becoming to grace, and shun what is
joy, are in opposition to the kingdom of God; and conse-
opposed to it.
quently should be forbidden in the Gospel of the kingdom.
Accordingly the New Law is called the law of liberty
On the other hand, those things that are indifferent as re-
in two respects. First, because it does not bind us to do
gards the aforesaid, for instance, to eat of this or that food, or avoid certain things, except such as are of themselves
are not part of the kingdom of God; wherefore the Apos-
necessary or opposed to salvation, and come under the
tle says before the words quoted: “The kingdom of God
prescription or prohibition of the law. Secondly, because
is not meat and drink.”
it also makes us comply freely with these precepts and
Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher
prohibitions, inasmuch as we do so through the prompt-
(Metaph. i, 2), what is “free is cause of itself.” Therefore
ings of grace. It is for these two reasons that the New Law
he acts freely, who acts of his own accord. Now man does
is called “the law of perfect liberty” (James 1:25).
of his own accord that which he does from a habit that is
Reply to Objection 3. The New Law, by restraining
suitable to his nature: since a habit inclines one as a sec-
the mind from inordinate movements, must needs also re-
ond nature. If, however, a habit be in opposition to nature,
strain the hand from inordinate acts, which ensue from
man would not act according to his nature, but according
inward movements.
Whether the New Law made sufficient ordinations about external acts?
Ia IIae q. 108 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law made
and ceremonial precepts, there were certain judicial pre-
insufficient ordinations about external acts. Because faith
cepts. But in the New Law there are no judicial pre-
that worketh through charity seems chiefly to belong to
cepts. Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordina-
the New Law, according to Gal. 5:6: “In Christ Jesus nei-
tions about external works.
ther circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision:
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 7:24): “Every
but faith that worketh through charity.” But the New Law
one. . . that heareth these My words, and doth them, shall
declared explicitly certain points of faith which were not
be likened to a wise man that built his house upon a rock.”
set forth explicitly in the Old Law; for instance, belief
But a wise builder leaves out nothing that is necessary to
in the Trinity. Therefore it should also have added cer-
the building. Therefore Christ’s words contain all things
tain outward moral deeds, which were not fixed in the Old
necessary for man’s salvation.
Law.
I answer that, as stated above (a. 1), the New Law
Objection 2. Further, in the Old Law not only were
had to make such prescriptions or prohibitions alone as
sacraments instituted, but also certain sacred things, as
are essential for the reception or right use of grace. And
stated above (q. 101, a. 4; q. 102, a. 4). But in the New
since we cannot of ourselves obtain grace, but through
Law, although certain sacraments are instituted by Our
Christ alone, hence Christ of Himself instituted the sacra-
Lord; for instance, pertaining either to the sanctification
ments whereby we obtain grace: viz. Baptism, Eucharist,
of a temple or of the vessels, or to the celebration of some
Orders of the ministers of the New Law, by the institu-
particular feast. Therefore the New Law made insufficient
tion of the apostles and seventy-two disciples, Penance,
ordinations about external matters.
and indissoluble Matrimony. He promised Confirmation
Objection 3. Further, in the Old Law, just as there
through the sending of the Holy Ghost: and we read that
were certain observances pertaining to God’s ministers,
by His institution the apostles healed the sick by anointing
so also were there certain observances pertaining to the
them with oil (Mk. 6:13). These are the sacraments of the
people: as was stated above when we were treating of the
New Law.
ceremonial of the Old Law (q. 101, a. 4; q. 102, a. 6).
The right use of grace is by means of works of char-
Now in the New Law certain observances seem to have
ity. These, in so far as they are essential to virtue, pertain
been prescribed to the ministers of God; as may be gath-
to the moral precepts, which also formed part of the Old
ered from Mat. 10:9: “Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor
Law. Hence, in this respect, the New Law had nothing
money in your purses,” nor other things which are men-
to add as regards external action. The determination of
tioned here and Lk. 9,10. Therefore certain observances
these works in their relation to the divine worship, be-
pertaining to the faithful should also have been instituted
longs to the ceremonial precepts of the Law; and, in re-
in the New Law.
lation to our neighbor, to the judicial precepts, as stated
Objection 4. Further, in the Old Law, besides moral
above (q. 99, a. 4). And therefore, since these determi-
1144
nations are not in themselves necessarily connected with from those to whom they preached: wherefore He goes
inward grace wherein the Law consists, they do not come
on to say: “For the laborer is worthy of his hire.” Nor is it
under a precept of the New Law, but are left to the decision
a sin, but a work of supererogation for a preacher to take
of man; some relating to inferiors—as when a precept is
means of livelihood with him, without accepting supplies
given to an individual; others, relating to superiors, tem-
from those to whom he preaches; as Paul did (1 Cor. 9:4,
poral or spiritual, referring, namely, to the common good.
seqq.).
Accordingly the New Law had no other external works
Secondly, according to the explanation of other holy
to determine, by prescribing or forbidding, except the
men, they may be considered as temporal commands laid
sacraments, and those moral precepts which have a nec-
upon the apostles for the time during which they were
essary connection with virtue, for instance, that one must
sent to preach in Judea before Christ’s Passion. For the
not kill, or steal, and so forth.
disciples, being yet as little children under Christ’s care,
Reply to Objection 1. Matters of faith are above
needed to receive some special commands from Christ,
human reason, and so we cannot attain to them except
such as all subjects receive from their superiors: and es-
through grace. Consequently, when grace came to be be-
pecially so, since they were to be accustomed little by
stowed more abundantly, the result was an increase in the
little to renounce the care of temporalities, so as to be-
number of explicit points of faith. On the other hand, it
come fitted for the preaching of the Gospel throughout the
is through human reason that we are directed to works of
whole world. Nor must we wonder if He established cer-
virtue, for it is the rule of human action, as stated above
tain fixed modes of life, as long as the state of the Old Law
(q. 19, a. 3; q. 63, a. 2). Wherefore in such matters as
endured and the people had not as yet achieved the perfect
these there was no need for any precepts to be given be-
liberty of the Spirit. These statutes He abolished shortly
sides the moral precepts of the Law, which proceed from
before His Passion, as though the disciples had by their
the dictate of reason.
means become sufficiently practiced. Hence He said (Lk.
Reply to Objection 2. In the sacraments of the New
22:35,36) “When I sent you without purse and scrip and
Law grace is bestowed, which cannot be received except
shoes, did you want anything? But they said: Nothing.
through Christ: consequently they had to be instituted by
Then said He unto them: But now, he that hath a purse, let
Him. But in the sacred things no grace is given: for in-
him take it, and likewise a scrip.” Because the time of per-
stance, in the consecration of a temple, an altar or the like,
fect liberty was already at hand, when they would be left
or, again, in the celebration of feasts. Wherefore Our Lord
entirely to their own judgment in matters not necessarily
left the institution of such things to the discretion of the
connected with virtue.
faithful, since they have not of themselves any necessary
Reply to Objection 4. Judicial precepts also, are not
connection with inward grace.
essential to virtue in respect of any particular determina-
Reply to Objection 3.
Our Lord gave the apos-
tion, but only in regard to the common notion of justice.
tles those precepts not as ceremonial observances, but as
Consequently Our Lord left the judicial precepts to the
moral statutes: and they can be understood in two ways.
discretion of those who were to have spiritual or temporal
First, following Augustine (De Consensu Evang. 30), as
charge of others. But as regards the judicial precepts of the
being not commands but permissions. For He permitted
Old Law, some of them He explained, because they were
them to set forth to preach without scrip or stick, and so
misunderstood by the Pharisees, as we shall state later on
on, since they were empowered to accept their livelihood
(a. 3, ad 2).
Whether the New Law directed man sufficiently as regards interior actions?
Ia IIae q. 108 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law directed
other judicial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above
man insufficiently as regards interior actions. For there
(q. 104, a. 4; q. 105). Therefore, in this respect, He di-
are ten commandments of the decalogue directing man to
rected human life insufficiently.
God and his neighbor. But Our Lord partly fulfilled only
Objection 3. Further, in the Old Law, besides moral
three of them: as regards, namely, the prohibition of mur-
and judicial, there were ceremonial precepts about which
der, of adultery, and of perjury. Therefore it seems that,
Our Lord made no ordination. Therefore it seems that He
by omitting to fulfil the other precepts, He directed man
ordained insufficiently.
insufficiently.
Objection 4. Further, in order that the mind be in-
Objection 2. Further, as regards the judicial precepts,
wardly well disposed, man should do no good deed for
Our Lord ordained nothing in the Gospel, except in the
any temporal whatever. But there are many other tempo-
matter of divorcing of wife, of punishment by retaliation,
ral goods besides the favor of man: and there are many
and of persecuting one’s enemies. But there are many
other good works besides fasting, alms-deeds, and prayer.
1145
Therefore Our Lord unbecomingly taught that only in re-wary lest we be led astray by evil influences. Moreover,
spect of these three works, and of no other earthly goods
He declares that we must observe His commandments,
ought we to shun the glory of human favor.
and that it is not enough to make profession of faith, or
Objection 5.
Further, solicitude for the necessary
to work miracles, or merely to hear His words.
means of livelihood is by nature instilled into man, and
Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord explained the man-
this solicitude even other animals share with man: where-
ner of fulfilling those precepts which the Scribes and Phar-
fore it is written (Prov. 6:6,8): “Go to the ant, O sluggard,
isees did not rightly understand: and this affected chiefly
and consider her ways. . . she provideth her meat for her-
those precepts of the decalogue. For they thought that the
self in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest.”
prohibition of adultery and murder covered the external
But every command issued against the inclination of na-
act only, and not the internal desire. And they held this
ture is an unjust command, forasmuch as it is contrary to
opinion about murder and adultery rather than about theft
the law of nature. Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbe-
and false witness, because the movement of anger tending
comingly forbade solicitude about food and raiment.
to murder, and the movement of desire tending to adul-
Objection 6. Further, no act of virtue should be the
tery, seem to be in us from nature somewhat, but not the
subject of a prohibition. Now judgment is an act of jus-
desire of stealing or bearing false witness. They held a
tice, according to Ps. 18:15: “Until justice be turned into
false opinion about perjury, for they thought that perjury
judgment.” Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecom-
indeed was a sin; but that oaths were of themselves to be
ingly forbade judgment: and consequently that the New
desired and to be taken frequently, since they seem to pro-
Law directed man insufficiently in the matter of interior
ceed from reverence to God. Hence Our Lord shows that
acts.
an oath is not desirable as a good thing; and that it is better On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
to speak without oaths, unless necessity forces us to have
in Monte i, 1): We should take note that, when He said:
recourse to them.
“ ‘He that heareth these My words,’ He indicates clearly
Reply to Objection 2. The Scribes and Pharisees
that this sermon of the Lord is replete with all the precepts
erred about the judicial precepts in two ways. First, be-
whereby a Christian’s life is formed.”
cause they considered certain matters contained in the
I answer that, As is evident from Augustine’s words
Law of Moses by way of permission, to be right in them-
just quoted, the sermon, contains the whole process of
selves: namely, divorce of a wife, and the taking of usury
forming the life of a Christian. Therein man’s interior
from strangers. Wherefore Our Lord forbade a man to
movements are ordered. Because after declaring that his
divorce his wife (Mat. 5:32); and to receive usury (Lk.
end is Beatitude; and after commending the authority of
6:35), when He said: “Lend, hoping for nothing thereby.”
the apostles, through whom the teaching of the Gospel
In another way they erred by thinking that certain
was to be promulgated, He orders man’s interior move-
things which the Old Law commanded to be done for
ments, first in regard to man himself, secondly in regard
justice’s sake, should be done out of desire for revenge,
to his neighbor.
or out of lust for temporal goods, or out of hatred of
This he does in regard to man himself, in two ways,
one’s enemies; and this in respect of three precepts. For
corresponding to man’s two interior movements in respect
they thought that desire for revenge was lawful, on ac-
of any prospective action, viz. volition of what has to be
count of the precept concerning punishment by retalia-
done, and intention of the end. Wherefore, in the first
tion: whereas this precept was given that justice might
place, He directs man’s will in respect of the various pre-
be safeguarded, not that man might seek revenge. Where-
cepts of the Law: by prescribing that man should refrain
fore, in order to do away with this, Our Lord teaches that
not merely from those external works that are evil in them-
man should be prepared in his mind to suffer yet more
selves, but also from internal acts, and from the occasions
if necessary. They thought that movements of covetous-
of evil deeds. In the second place He directs man’s inten-
ness were lawful on account of those judicial precepts
tion, by teaching that in our good works, we should seek
which prescribed restitution of what had been purloined,
neither human praise, nor worldly riches, which is to lay
together with something added thereto, as stated above
up treasures on earth.
(q. 105, a. 2, ad 9); whereas the Law commanded this
Afterwards He directs man’s interior movement in re-
to be done in order to safeguard justice, not to encour-
spect of his neighbor, by forbidding us, on the one hand,
age covetousness. Wherefore Our Lord teaches that we
to judge him rashly, unjustly, or presumptuously; and, on
should not demand our goods from motives of cupidity,
the other, to entrust him too readily with sacred things if
and that we should be ready to give yet more if necessary.
he be unworthy.
They thought that the movement of hatred was lawful, on
Lastly, He teaches us how to fulfil the teaching of the
account of the commandments of the Law about the slay-
Gospel; viz. by imploring the help of God; by striving to
ing of one’s enemies: whereas the Law ordered this for
enter by the narrow door of perfect virtue; and by being
the fulfilment of justice, as stated above (q. 105, a. 3, ad
1146
4), not to satisfy hatred. Wherefore Our Lord teaches us torted the true meaning of these promises, as to think that
that we ought to love our enemies, and to be ready to do
we ought to serve God, with these things as the end in
good to them if necessary. For these precepts are to be
view. Wherefore Our Lord set this aside by teaching, first
taken as binding “the mind to be prepared to fulfil them,”
of all, that works of virtue should not be done for human
as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19).
glory. And He mentions three works, to which all oth-
Reply to Objection 3. The moral precepts necessar-
ers may be reduced: since whatever a man does in order
ily retained their force under the New Law, because they
to curb his desires, comes under the head of fasting; and
are of themselves essential to virtue: whereas the judicial
whatever a man does for the love of his neighbor, comes
precepts did not necessarily continue to bind in exactly
under the head of alms-deeds; and whatever a man does
the same way as had been fixed by the Law: this was left
for the worship of God, comes under the head of prayer.
to man to decide in one way or another. Hence Our Lord
And He mentions these three specifically, as they hold the
directed us becomingly with regard to these two kinds of
principal place, and are most often used by men in order
precepts. On the other hand, the observance of the cer-
to gain glory. In the second place He taught us that we
emonial precepts was totally abolished by the advent of
must not place our end in riches, when He said: “Lay not
the reality; wherefore in regard to these precepts He com-
up to yourselves treasures on earth” (Mat. 6:19).
manded nothing on this occasion when He was giving the
Reply to Objection 5. Our Lord forbade, not neces-
general points of His doctrine. Elsewhere, however, He
sary, but inordinate solicitude. Now there is a fourfold
makes it clear that the entire bodily worship which was
solicitude to be avoided in temporal matters. First, we
fixed by the Law, was to be changed into spiritual wor-
must not place our end in them, nor serve God for the
ship: as is evident from Jn. 4:21,23, where He says: “The
sake of the necessities of food and raiment. Wherefore
hour cometh when you shall neither on this mountain,
He says: “Lay not up for yourselves,” etc. Secondly,
nor in Jerusalem adore the Father. . . but. . . the true ador-
we must not be so anxious about temporal things, as to
ers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth.”
despair of God’s help: wherefore Our Lord says (Mat.
Reply to Objection 4. All worldly goods may be
6:32): “Your Father knoweth that you have need of all
reduced to three—honors, riches, and pleasures; accord-
these things.” Thirdly, we must not add presumption to
ing to 1 Jn. 2:16: “All that is in the world is the con-
our solicitude; in other words, we must not be confident of
cupiscence of the flesh,” which refers to pleasures of the
getting the necessaries of life by our own efforts without
flesh, “and the concupiscence of the eyes,” which refers to
God’s help: such solicitude Our Lord sets aside by saying
riches, “and the pride of life,” which refers to ambition for
that a man cannot add anything to his stature (Mat. 6:27).
renown and honor. Now the Law did not promise an abun-
We must not anticipate the time for anxiety; namely, by
dance of carnal pleasures; on the contrary, it forbade them.
being solicitous now, for the needs, not of the present, but
But it did promise exalted honors and abundant riches; for
of a future time: wherefore He says (Mat. 6:34): “Be
it is written in reference to the former (Dt. 28:1): “If thou
not. . . solicitous for tomorrow.”
wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God. . . He will make
Reply to Objection 6. Our Lord did not forbid the
thee higher than all the nations”; and in reference to the
judgment of justice, without which holy things could not
latter, we read a little further on (Dt. 28:11): “He will
be withdrawn from the unworthy. But he forbade inordi-
make thee abound with all goods.” But the Jews so dis-
nate judgment, as stated above.
Whether certain definite counsels are fittingly proposed in the New Law?
Ia IIae q. 108 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that certain definite coun-
Objection 4. Further, many matters pertaining to the
sels are not fittingly proposed in the New Law. For coun-
life of perfection are found among the commandments, as,
sels are given about that which is expedient for an end, as
for instance, “Love your enemies” (Mat. 5:44), and those
we stated above, when treating of counsel (q. 14 , a. 2).
precepts which Our Lord gave His apostles (Mat. 10).
But the same things are not expedient for all. Therefore
Therefore the counsels are unfittingly given in the New
certain definite counsels should not be proposed to all.
Law: both because they are not all mentioned; and be-
Objection 2. Further, counsels regard a greater good.
cause they are not distinguished from the commandments.
But there are no definite degrees to the greater good.
On the contrary, The counsels of a wise friend are of
Therefore definite counsels should not be given.
great use, according to Prov. (27:9): “Ointment and per-
Objection 3. Further, counsels pertain to the life of
fumes rejoice the heart: and the good counsels of a friend
perfection. But obedience pertains to the life of perfec-
rejoice the soul.” But Christ is our wisest and greatest
tion. Therefore it was unfitting that no counsel of obedi-
friend. Therefore His counsels are supremely useful and
ence should be contained in the Gospel.
becoming.
1147
I answer that, The difference between a counsel and a not his will as to some deed which he might do lawfully,
commandment is that a commandment implies obligation,
he follows the counsel in that particular case: for instance,
whereas a counsel is left to the option of the one to whom
if he do good to his enemies when he is not bound to, or
it is given. Consequently in the New Law, which is the
if he forgive an injury of which he might justly seek to be
law of liberty, counsels are added to the commandments,
avenged. In this way, too, all particular counsels may be
and not in the Old Law, which is the law of bondage. We
reduced to these three general and perfect counsels.
must therefore understand the commandments of the New
Reply to Objection 1. The aforesaid counsels, con-
Law to have been given about matters that are necessary
sidered in themselves, are expedient to all; but owing to
to gain the end of eternal bliss, to which end the New Law
some people being ill-disposed, it happens that some of
brings us forthwith: but that the counsels are about mat-
them are inexpedient, because their disposition is not in-
ters that render the gaining of this end more assured and
clined to such things. Hence Our Lord, in proposing the
expeditious.
evangelical counsels, always makes mention of man’s fit-
Now man is placed between the things of this world,
ness for observing the counsels. For in giving the counsel
and spiritual goods wherein eternal happiness consists: so
of perpetual poverty (Mat. 19:21), He begins with the
that the more he cleaves to the one, the more he with-
words: “If thou wilt be perfect,” and then He adds: “Go,
draws from the other, and conversely. Wherefore he that
sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast.” In like manner when
cleaves wholly to the things of this world, so as to make
He gave the counsel of perpetual chastity, saying (Mat.
them his end, and to look upon them as the reason and
19:12): “There are eunuchs who have made themselves
rule of all he does, falls away altogether from spiritual
eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven,” He adds straight-
goods. Hence this disorder is removed by the command-
way: “He that can take, let him take it.” And again, the
ments. Nevertheless, for man to gain the end aforesaid,
Apostle (1 Cor. 7:35), after giving the counsel of virgin-
he does not need to renounce the things of the world alto-
ity, says: “And this I speak for your profit; not to cast a
gether: since he can, while using the things of this world,
snare upon you.”
attain to eternal happiness, provided he does not place his
Reply to Objection 2. The greater goods are not def-
end in them: but he will attain more speedily thereto by
initely fixed in the individual; but those which are simply
giving up the goods of this world entirely: wherefore the
and absolutely the greater good in general are fixed: and
evangelical counsels are given for this purpose.
to these all the above particular goods may be reduced, as
Now the goods of this world which come into use in
stated above.
human life, consist in three things: viz. in external wealth
Reply to Objection 3. Even the counsel of obedi-
pertaining to the “concupiscence of the eyes”; carnal plea-
ence is understood to have been given by Our Lord in the
sures pertaining to the “concupiscence of the flesh”; and
words: “And [let him] follow Me.” For we follow Him
honors, which pertain to the “pride of life,” according to
not only by imitating His works, but also by obeying His
1 Jn. 2:16: and it is in renouncing these altogether, as far
commandments, according to Jn. 10:27: “My sheep hear
as possible, that the evangelical counsels consist. More-
My voice. . . and they follow Me.”
over, every form of the religious life that professes the
Reply to Objection 4. Those things which Our Lord
state of perfection is based on these three: since riches
prescribed about the true love of our enemies, and other
are renounced by poverty; carnal pleasures by perpetual
similar sayings (Mat. 5; Lk. 6), may be referred to the
chastity; and the pride of life by the bondage of obedi-
preparation of the mind, and then they are necessary for
ence.
salvation; for instance, that man be prepared to do good
Now if a man observe these absolutely, this is in ac-
to his enemies, and other similar actions, when there is
cordance with the counsels as they stand. But if a man
need. Hence these things are placed among the precepts.
observe any one of them in a particular case, this is taking
But that anyone should actually and promptly behave thus
that counsel in a restricted sense, namely, as applying to
towards an enemy when there is no special need, is to be
that particular case. For instance, when anyone gives an
referred to the particular counsels, as stated above. As to
alms to a poor man, not being bound so to do, he follows
those matters which are set down in Mat. 10 and Lk. 9
the counsels in that particular case. In like manner, when
and 10, they were either disciplinary commands for that
a man for some fixed time refrains from carnal pleasures
particular time, or concessions, as stated above (a. 2, ad
that he may give himself to prayer, he follows the counsel
3). Hence they are not set down among the counsels.
for that particular time. And again, when a man follows
1148
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 109
Of the Necessity of Grace
(In Ten Articles)
We must now consider the exterior principle of human acts, i.e. God, in so far as, through grace, we are helped by Him to do right: and, first, we must consider the grace of God; secondly, its cause; thirdly, its effects.
The first point of consideration will be threefold: for we shall consider (1) The necessity of grace; (2) grace itself, as to its essence; (3) its division.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether without grace man can know anything?
(2) Whether without God’s grace man can do or wish any good?
(3) Whether without grace man can love God above all things?
(4) Whether without grace man can keep the commandments of the Law?
(5) Whether without grace he can merit eternal life?
(6) Whether without grace man can prepare himself for grace?
(7) Whether without grace he can rise from sin?
(8) Whether without grace man can avoid sin?
(9) Whether man having received grace can do good and avoid sin without any further Divine help?
(10) Whether he can of himself persevere in good?
Whether without grace man can know any truth?
Ia IIae q. 109 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that without grace man
I answer that, To know truth is a use or act of intel-
can know no truth. For, on 1 Cor. 12:3: “No man can say,
lectual light, since, according to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13):
the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost,” a gloss says: “Ev-
“All that is made manifest is light.” Now every use implies
ery truth, by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost.”
movement, taking movement broadly, so as to call think-
Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by grace. Therefore we
ing and willing movements, as is clear from the Philoso-
cannot know truth without grace.
pher (De Anima iii, 4). Now in corporeal things we see
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Solil. i, 6) that
that for movement there is required not merely the form
“the most certain sciences are like things lit up by the sun
which is the principle of the movement or action, but there
so as to be seen. Now God Himself is He Whom sheds
is also required the motion of the first mover. Now the
the light. And reason is in the mind as sight is in the
first mover in the order of corporeal things is the heav-
eye. And the eyes of the mind are the senses of the soul.”
enly body. Hence no matter how perfectly fire has heat,
Now the bodily senses, however pure, cannot see any vis-
it would not bring about alteration, except by the motion
ible object, without the sun’s light. Therefore the human
of the heavenly body. But it is clear that as all corpo-
mind, however perfect, cannot, by reasoning, know any
real movements are reduced to the motion of the heavenly
truth without Divine light: and this pertains to the aid of
body as to the first corporeal mover, so all movements,
grace.
both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the simple
Objection 3. Further, the human mind can only un-
First Mover, Who is God. And hence no matter how per-
derstand truth by thinking, as is clear from Augustine (De
fect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it
Trin. xiv, 7). But the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:5): “Not that
cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by God; but
we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of our-
this motion is according to the plan of His providence, and
selves; but our sufficiency is from God.” Therefore man
not by necessity of nature, as the motion of the heavenly
cannot, of himself, know truth without the help of grace.
body. Now not only is every motion from God as from
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 4): “I do
the First Mover, but all formal perfection is from Him as
not approve having said in the prayer, O God, Who dost
from the First Act. And thus the act of the intellect or of
wish the sinless alone to know the truth; for it may be an-
any created being whatsoever depends upon God in two
swered that many who are not sinless know many truths.”
ways: first, inasmuch as it is from Him that it has the
Now man is cleansed from sin by grace, according to Ps.
form whereby it acts; secondly, inasmuch as it is moved
50:12: “Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a
by Him to act.
right spirit within my bowels.” Therefore without grace
Now every form bestowed on created things by God
man of himself can know truth.
has power for a determined act, which it can bring about
1149
in proportion to its own proper endowment; and beyond Reply to Objection 1. Every truth by whomsoever
which it is powerless, except by a superadded form, as
spoken is from the Holy Ghost as bestowing the natural
water can only heat when heated by the fire. And thus the
light, and moving us to understand and speak the truth, but
human understanding has a form, viz. intelligible light,
not as dwelling in us by sanctifying grace, or as bestowing
which of itself is sufficient for knowing certain intelligi-
any habitual gift superadded to nature. For this only takes
ble things, viz. those we can come to know through the
place with regard to certain truths that are known and spo-
senses. Higher intelligible things of the human intellect
ken, and especially in regard to such as pertain to faith, of
cannot know, unless it be perfected by a stronger light, viz.
which the Apostle speaks.
the light of faith or prophecy which is called the “light of
Reply to Objection 2. The material sun sheds its light
grace,” inasmuch as it is added to nature.
outside us; but the intelligible Sun, Who is God, shines
Hence we must say that for the knowledge of any truth
within us. Hence the natural light bestowed upon the soul
whatsoever man needs Divine help, that the intellect may
is God’s enlightenment, whereby we are enlightened to
be moved by God to its act. But he does not need a new
see what pertains to natural knowledge; and for this there
light added to his natural light, in order to know the truth
is required no further knowledge, but only for such things
in all things, but only in some that surpass his natural
as surpass natural knowledge.
knowledge. And yet at times God miraculously instructs
Reply to Objection 3. We always need God’s help for
some by His grace in things that can be known by natural
every thought, inasmuch as He moves the understanding
reason, even as He sometimes brings about miraculously
to act; for actually to understand anything is to think, as is
what nature can do.
clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7).
Whether man can wish or do any good without grace?
Ia IIae q. 109 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that man can wish and do
good proportionate to his nature, such as the good of ac-
good without grace. For that is in man’s power, whereof
quired virtue; but not surpassing good, as the good of in-
he is master. Now man is master of his acts, and espe-
fused virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature, man falls
cially of his willing, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1; q. 13, a. 6).
short of what he could do by his nature, so that he is un-
Hence man, of himself, can wish and do good without the
able to fulfil it by his own natural powers. Yet because
help of grace.
human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to
Objection 2. Further, man has more power over what
be shorn of every natural good, even in the state of cor-
is according to his nature than over what is beyond his
rupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural endowments,
nature. Now sin is against his nature, as Damascene says
work some particular good, as to build dwellings, plant
(De Fide Orth. ii, 30); whereas deeds of virtue are accord-
vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the good nat-
ing to his nature, as stated above (q. 71, a. 1). Therefore
ural to it, so as to fall short in nothing; just as a sick man
since man can sin of himself he can wish and do good.
can of himself make some movements, yet he cannot be
Objection 3.
Further, the understanding’s good is
perfectly moved with the movements of one in health, un-
truth, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). Now the intel-
less by the help of medicine he be cured.
lect can of itself know truth, even as every other thing can
And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a
work its own operation of itself. Therefore, much more
gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength for one
can man, of himself, do and wish good.
reason, viz. in order to do and wish supernatural good;
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 9:16): “It
but for two reasons, in the state of corrupt nature, viz. in
is not of him that willeth,” namely, to will, “nor of him that
order to be healed, and furthermore in order to carry out
runneth,” namely to run, “but of God that showeth mercy.”
works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Be-
And Augustine says (De Corrept. et Gratia ii) that “with-
yond this, in both states man needs the Divine help, that
out grace men do nothing good when they either think or
he may be moved to act well.
wish or love or act.”
Reply to Objection 1. Man is master of his acts and of
I answer that, Man’s nature may be looked at in two
his willing or not willing, because of his deliberate reason,
ways: first, in its integrity, as it was in our first parent be-which can be bent to one side or another. And although
fore sin; secondly, as it is corrupted in us after the sin of
he is master of his deliberating or not deliberating, yet this
our first parent. Now in both states human nature needs
can only be by a previous deliberation; and since it can-
the help of God as First Mover, to do or wish any good
not go on to infinity, we must come at length to this, that
whatsoever, as stated above (a. 1). But in the state of in-
man’s free-will is moved by an extrinsic principle, which
tegrity, as regards the sufficiency of the operative power,
is above the human mind, to wit by God, as the Philoso-
man by his natural endowments could wish and do the
pher proves in the chapter “On Good Fortune” (Ethic. Eu-
1150
dem. vii). Hence the mind of man still unweakened is not need to be preserved by another in the good which perso much master of its act that it does not need to be moved
tains to its nature. For it can of itself fail in good, even as by God; and much more the free-will of man weakened by
of itself it can fall into non-existence, unless it is upheld
sin, whereby it is hindered from good by the corruption of
by God.
the nature.
Reply to Objection 3. Man cannot even know truth
Reply to Objection 2. To sin is nothing else than to
without Divine help, as stated above (a. 1). And yet hu-
fail in the good which belongs to any being according to
man nature is more corrupt by sin in regard to the desire
its nature. Now as every created thing has its being from
for good, than in regard to the knowledge of truth.
another, and, considered in itself, is nothing, so does it
Whether by his own natural powers and without grace man can love God above all Ia IIae q. 109 a. 3
things?
Objection 1. It would seem that without grace man
love, loves its own proper good on account of the com-
cannot love God above all things by his own natural pow-
mon good of the whole universe, which is God. Hence
ers. For to love God above all things is the proper and
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “God leads everything
principal act of charity. Now man cannot of himself pos-
to love of Himself.” Hence in the state of perfect nature
sess charity, since the “charity of God is poured forth in
man referred the love of himself and of all other things
our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us,” as is
to the love of God as to its end; and thus he loved God
said Rom. 5:5. Therefore man by his natural powers alone
more than himself and above all things. But in the state
cannot love God above all things.
of corrupt nature man falls short of this in the appetite of
Objection 2. Further, no nature can rise above itself.
his rational will, which, unless it is cured by God’s grace,
But to love God above all things is to tend above oneself.
follows its private good, on account of the corruption of
Therefore without the help of grace no created nature can
nature. And hence we must say that in the state of per-
love God above itself.
fect nature man did not need the gift of grace added to his
Objection 3. Further, to God, Who is the Highest
natural endowments, in order to love God above all things
Good, is due the best love, which is that He be loved above
naturally, although he needed God’s help to move him to
all things. Now without grace man is not capable of giving
it; but in the state of corrupt nature man needs, even for
God the best love, which is His due; otherwise it would
this, the help of grace to heal his nature.
be useless to add grace. Hence man, without grace and
Reply to Objection 1. Charity loves God above all
with his natural powers alone, cannot love God above all
things in a higher way than nature does. For nature loves
things.
God above all things inasmuch as He is the beginning and
On the contrary, As some maintain, man was first
the end of natural good; whereas charity loves Him, as
made with only natural endowments; and in this state it is
He is the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has
manifest that he loved God to some extent. But he did not
a spiritual fellowship with God. Moreover charity adds
love God equally with himself, or less than himself, other-
to natural love of God a certain quickness and joy, in the
wise he would have sinned. Therefore he loved God above
same way that every habit of virtue adds to the good act
himself. Therefore man, by his natural powers alone, can
which is done merely by the natural reason of a man who
love God more than himself and above all things.
has not the habit of virtue.
I answer that, As was said above ( Ia, q. 60, a. 5),
Reply to Objection 2. When it is said that nature can-
where the various opinions concerning the natural love of
not rise above itself, we must not understand this as if it
the angels were set forth, man in a state of perfect na-
could not be drawn to any object above itself, for it is clear
ture, could by his natural power, do the good natural to
that our intellect by its natural knowledge can know things
him without the addition of any gratuitous gift, though not
above itself, as is shown in our natural knowledge of God.
without the help of God moving him. Now to love God
But we are to understand that nature cannot rise to an act
above all things is natural to man and to every nature, not
exceeding the proportion of its strength. Now to love God
only rational but irrational, and even to inanimate nature
above all things is not such an act; for it is natural to every according to the manner of love which can belong to each
creature, as was said above.
creature. And the reason of this is that it is natural to all
Reply to Objection 3. Love is said to be best, both
to seek and love things according as they are naturally fit
with respect to degree of love, and with regard to the mo-
(to be sought and loved) since “all things act according
tive of loving, and the mode of love. And thus the highest
as they are naturally fit” as stated in Phys. ii, 8. Now
degree of love is that whereby charity loves God as the
it is manifest that the good of the part is for the good of
giver of beatitude, as was said above.
the whole; hence everything, by its natural appetite and
1151
Whether man without grace and by his own natural powers can fulfil the command-Ia IIae q. 109 a. 4
ments of the Law?
Objection 1. It would seem that man without grace,
Divine commandments. But in the state of corrupted na-
and by his own natural powers, can fulfil the command-
ture man cannot fulfil all the Divine commandments with-
ments of the Law. For the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that
out healing grace. Secondly, the commandments of the
“the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature those
law can be fulfilled, not merely as regards the substance
things that are of the Law.” Now what a man does nat-
of the act, but also as regards the mode of acting, i.e. their
urally he can do of himself without grace. Hence a man
being done out of charity. And in this way, neither in
can fulfil the commandments of the Law without grace.
the state of perfect nature, nor in the state of corrupt na-
Objection 2. Further, Jerome says (Expos. Cathol.
ture can man fulfil the commandments of the law without
Fide∗) that “they are anathema who say God has laid im-
grace. Hence, Augustine (De Corrupt. et Grat. ii) having
possibilities upon man.” Now what a man cannot fulfil by
stated that “without grace men can do no good whatever,”
himself is impossible to him. Therefore a man can fulfil
adds: “Not only do they know by its light what to do, but
all the commandments of himself.
by its help they do lovingly what they know.” Beyond this,
Objection 3. Further, of all the commandments of the
in both states they need the help of God’s motion in order
Law, the greatest is this, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy
to fulfil the commandments, as stated above (Aa. 2,3).
God with thy whole heart” (Mat. 27:37). Now man with
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Spir. et
his natural endowments can fulfil this command by lov-
Lit. xxvii), “do not be disturbed at his saying that they do
ing God above all things, as stated above (a. 3). Therefore
by nature those things that are of the Law; for the Spirit
man can fulfil all the commandments of the Law without
of grace works this, in order to restore in us the image of
grace.
God, after which we were naturally made.”
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres.
Reply to Objection 2. What we can do with the Di-
lxxxviii) that it is part of the Pelagian heresy that “they
vine assistance is not altogether impossible to us; accord-
believe that without grace man can fulfil all the Divine
ing to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3): “What we can do
commandments.”
through our friends, we can do, in some sense, by our-
I answer that, There are two ways of fulfilling the
selves.” Hence Jerome† concedes that “our will is in such
commandments of the Law. The first regards the sub-
a way free that we must confess we still require God’s
stance of the works, as when a man does works of justice,
help.”
fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this way man in the
Reply to Objection 3. Man cannot, with his purely
state of perfect nature could fulfil all the commandments
natural endowments, fulfil the precept of the love of God,
of the Law; otherwise he would have been unable to sin in
as stated above (a. 3).
that state, since to sin is nothing else than to transgress the Whether man can merit everlasting life without grace?
Ia IIae q. 109 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that man can merit ev-
Objection 3. Further, everlasting life is the last end
erlasting life without grace. For Our Lord says (Mat.
of human life. Now every natural thing by its natural en-
19:17): “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the command-
dowments can attain its end. Much more, therefore, may
ments”; from which it would seem that to enter into ever-
man attain to life everlasting by his natural endowments,
lasting life rests with man’s will. But what rests with our
without grace.
will, we can do of ourselves. Hence it seems that man can
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom.
6:23):
merit everlasting life of himself.
“The grace of God is life everlasting.” And as a gloss
Objection 2. Further, eternal life is the wage of re-
says, this is said “that we may understand that God, of
ward bestowed by God on men, according to Mat. 5:12:
His own mercy, leads us to everlasting life.”
“Your reward is very great in heaven.” But wage or re-
I answer that, Acts conducing to an end must be pro-
ward is meted by God to everyone according to his works,
portioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of
according to Ps. 61:12: “Thou wilt render to every man
its active principle; and hence we see in natural things,
according to his works.” Hence, since man is master of
that nothing can by its operation bring about an effect
his works, it seems that it is within his power to reach
which exceeds its active force, but only such as is propor-
everlasting life.
tionate to its power. Now everlasting life is an end exceed-
∗ Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to Pelagius
† Symboli Explanatio ad
Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to Pelagius
1152
ing the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what Reply to Objection 2. As the gloss upon Rom. 6:23,
we have said above (q. 5, a. 5). Hence man, by his nat-
“The grace of God is life everlasting,” says, “It is certain
ural endowments, cannot produce meritorious works pro-
that everlasting life is meter to good works; but the works
portionate to everlasting life; and for this a higher force
to which it is meted, belong to God’s grace.” And it has
is needed, viz. the force of grace. And thus without
been said (a. 4), that to fulfil the commandments of the
grace man cannot merit everlasting life; yet he can per-
Law, in their due way, whereby their fulfilment may be
form works conducing to a good which is natural to man,
meritorious, requires grace.
as “to toil in the fields, to drink, to eat, or to have friends,”
Reply to Objection 3. This objection has to do with
and the like, as Augustine says in his third Reply to the
the natural end of man. Now human nature, since it is
Pelagians‡.
nobler, can be raised by the help of grace to a higher end,
Reply to Objection 1. Man, by his will, does works
which lower natures can nowise reach; even as a man who
meritorious of everlasting life; but as Augustine says, in
can recover his health by the help of medicines is better
the same book, for this it is necessary that the will of man
disposed to health than one who can nowise recover it, as
should be prepared with grace by God.
the Philosopher observes (De Coelo ii, 12).
Whether a man, by himself and without the external aid of grace, can prepare himself Ia IIae q. 109 a. 6
for grace?
Objection 1. It would seem that man, by himself and
will cannot take place without the habitual gift of grace,
without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for
which is the principle of meritorious works, as stated
grace. For nothing impossible is laid upon man, as stated
above (a. 5). There is a second way in which the human
above (a. 4, ad 1). But it is written (Zech. 1:3): “Turn
will may be taken to be prepared for the gift of habitual
ye to Me. . . and I will turn to you.” Now to prepare for
grace itself. Now in order that man prepare himself to re-
grace is nothing more than to turn to God. Therefore it
ceive this gift, it is not necessary to presuppose any further
seems that man of himself, and without the external help
habitual gift in the soul, otherwise we should go on to in-
of grace, can prepare himself for grace.
finity. But we must presuppose a gratuitous gift of God,
Objection 2. Further, man prepares himself for grace
Who moves the soul inwardly or inspires the good wish.
by doing what is in him to do, since if man does what is
For in these two ways do we need the Divine assistance,
in him to do, God will not deny him grace, for it is written
as stated above (Aa. 2,3). Now that we need the help of
(Mat. 7:11) that God gives His good Spirit “to them that
God to move us, is manifest. For since every agent acts
ask Him.” But what is in our power is in us to do. There-
for an end, every cause must direct is effect to its end, and
fore it seems to be in our power to prepare ourselves for
hence since the order of ends is according to the order of
grace.
agents or movers, man must be directed to the last end by
Objection 3. Further, if a man needs grace in order
the motion of the first mover, and to the proximate end by
to prepare for grace, with equal reason will he need grace
the motion of any of the subordinate movers; as the spirit
to prepare himself for the first grace; and thus to infinity,
of the soldier is bent towards seeking the victory by the
which is impossible. Hence it seems that we must not go
motion of the leader of the army—and towards following
beyond what was said first, viz. that man, of himself and
the standard of a regiment by the motion of the standard-
without grace, can prepare himself for grace.
bearer. And thus since God is the First Mover, simply,
Objection 4. Further, it is written (Prov. 16:1) that “it it is by His motion that everything seeks to be likened to
is the part of man to prepare the soul.” Now an action is
God in its own way. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
said to be part of a man, when he can do it by himself.
iv) that “God turns all to Himself.” But He directs righ-
Hence it seems that man by himself can prepare himself
teous men to Himself as to a special end, which they seek,
for grace.
and to which they wish to cling, according to Ps. 72:28,
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:44): “No man
“it is good for Me to adhere to my God.” And that they
can come to Me except the Father, Who hath sent Me,
are “turned” to God can only spring from God’s having
draw him.” But if man could prepare himself, he would
“turned” them. Now to prepare oneself for grace is, as it
not need to be drawn by another. Hence man cannot pre-
were, to be turned to God; just as, whoever has his eyes
pare himself without the help of grace.
turned away from the light of the sun, prepares himself
I answer that, The preparation of the human will for
to receive the sun’s light, by turning his eyes towards the
good is twofold: the first, whereby it is prepared to oper-
sun. Hence it is clear that man cannot prepare himself to
ate rightly and to enjoy God; and this preparation of the
receive the light of grace except by the gratuitous help of
‡ Hypognosticon iii, among the spurious works of St. Augustine
1153
God moving him inwardly.
he is moved by God.
Reply to Objection 1. Man’s turning to God is by
Reply to Objection 3. This objection regards habit-
free-will; and thus man is bidden to turn himself to God.
ual grace, for which some preparation is required, since
But free-will can only be turned to God, when God turns
every form requires a disposition in that which is to be its
it, according to Jer. 31:18: “Convert me and I shall be con-
subject. But in order that man should be moved by God,
verted, for Thou art the Lord, my God”; and Lam. 5:21:
no further motion is presupposed since God is the First
“Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.”
Mover. Hence we need not go to infinity.
Reply to Objection 2. Man can do nothing unless
Reply to Objection 4. It is the part of man to prepare
moved by God, according to Jn. 15:5: “Without Me, you
his soul, since he does this by his free-will. And yet he
can do nothing.” Hence when a man is said to do what is
does not do this without the help of God moving him, and
in him to do, this is said to be in his power according as
drawing him to Himself, as was said above.
Whether man can rise from sin without the help of grace?
Ia IIae q. 109 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that man can rise from
debt of punishment. He incurs a stain, inasmuch as he
sin without the help of grace. For what is presupposed to
forfeits the lustre of grace through the deformity of sin.
grace, takes place without grace. But to rise to sin is pre-
Natural good is corrupted, inasmuch as man’s nature is
supposed to the enlightenment of grace; since it is written
disordered by man’s will not being subject to God’s; and
(Eph. 5:14): “Arise from the dead and Christ shall en-
this order being overthrown, the consequence is that the
lighten thee.” Therefore man can rise from sin without
whole nature of sinful man remains disordered. Lastly,
grace.
there is the debt of punishment, inasmuch as by sinning
Objection 2. Further, sin is opposed to virtue as ill-
man deserves everlasting damnation.
ness to health, as stated above (q. 71, a. 1, ad 3). Now,
Now it is manifest that none of these three can be re-
man, by force of his nature, can rise from illness to health,
stored except by God. For since the lustre of grace springs
without the external help of medicine, since there still re-
from the shedding of Divine light, this lustre cannot be
mains in him the principle of life, from which the natural
brought back, except God sheds His light anew: hence a
operation proceeds. Hence it seems that, with equal rea-
habitual gift is necessary, and this is the light of grace.
son, man may be restored by himself, and return from the
Likewise, the order of nature can only be restored, i.e.
state of sin to the state of justice without the help of exter-
man’s will can only be subject to God when God draws
nal grace.
man’s will to Himself, as stated above (a. 6). So, too,
Objection 3. Further, every natural thing can return
the guilt of eternal punishment can be remitted by God
by itself to the act befitting its nature, as hot water returns alone, against Whom the offense was committed and Who
by itself to its natural coldness, and a stone cast upwards
is man’s Judge. And thus in order that man rise from sin
returns by itself to its natural movement. Now a sin is an
there is required the help of grace, both as regards a habit-
act against nature, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide
ual gift, and as regards the internal motion of God.
Orth. ii, 30). Hence it seems that man by himself can
Reply to Objection 1. To man is bidden that which
return from sin to the state of justice.
pertains to the act of free-will, as this act is required in
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 2:21; Cf.
order that man should rise from sin. Hence when it is
Gal. 3:21): “For if there had been a law given which could
said, “Arise, and Christ shall enlighten thee,” we are not
give life—then Christ died in vain,” i.e. to no purpose.
to think that the complete rising from sin precedes the en-
Hence with equal reason, if man has a nature, whereby he
lightenment of grace; but that when man by his free-will,
can he justified, “Christ died in vain,” i.e. to no purpose.
moved by God, strives to rise from sin, he receives the
But this cannot fittingly be said. Therefore by himself he
light of justifying grace.
cannot be justified, i.e. he cannot return from a state of sin
Reply to Objection 2. The natural reason is not the
to a state of justice.
sufficient principle of the health that is in man by justify-
I answer that, Man by himself can no wise rise from
ing grace. This principle is grace which is taken away by
sin without the help of grace. For since sin is transient as
sin. Hence man cannot be restored by himself; but he re-
to the act and abiding in its guilt, as stated above (q. 87,
quires the light of grace to be poured upon him anew, as if
a. 6), to rise from sin is not the same as to cease the act
the soul were infused into a dead body for its resurrection.
of sin; but to rise from sin means that man has restored to
Reply to Objection 3. When nature is perfect, it can
him what he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a triple loss
be restored by itself to its befitting and proportionate con-
by sinning, as was clearly shown above (q. 85, a. 1; q. 86,
dition; but without exterior help it cannot be restored to
a. 1; q. 87, a. 1), viz. stain, corruption of natural good, and what surpasses its measure. And thus human nature un-1154
done by reason of the act of sin, remains no longer per-restored, by itself, to its connatural good, much less to the
fect, but corrupted, as stated above (q. 85); nor can it be
supernatural good of justice.
Whether man without grace can avoid sin?
Ia IIae q. 109 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that without grace man
ways alert to avoid these movements, as was said above
can avoid sin. Because “no one sins in what he cannot
(q. 74, a. 3, ad 2).
avoid,” as Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. x, xi; De
So, too, before man’s reason, wherein is mortal sin, is
Libero Arbit. iii, 18). Hence if a man in mortal sin cannot
restored by justifying grace, he can avoid each mortal sin,
avoid sin, it would seem that in sinning he does not sin,
and for a time, since it is not necessary that he should be
which is impossible.
always actually sinning. But it cannot be that he remains
Objection 2. Further, men are corrected that they may
for a long time without mortal sin. Hence Gregory says
not sin. If therefore a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin,
(Super Ezech. Hom. xi) that ” a sin not at once taken away
correction would seem to be given to no purpose; which
by repentance, by its weight drags us down to other sins”:
is absurd.
and this because, as the lower appetite ought to be subject
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:18):
to the reason, so should the reason be subject to God, and
“Before man is life and death, good and evil; that which
should place in Him the end of its will. Now it is by the
he shall choose shall be given him.” But by sinning no
end that all human acts ought to be regulated, even as it is
one ceases to be a man. Hence it is still in his power to
by the judgment of the reason that the movements of the
choose good or evil; and thus man can avoid sin without
lower appetite should be regulated. And thus, even as in-
grace.
ordinate movements of the sensitive appetite cannot help
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect Just.
occurring since the lower appetite is not subject to reason,
xxi): “Whoever denies that we ought to say the prayer
so likewise, since man’s reason is not entirely subject to
‘Lead us not into temptation’ (and they deny it who main-
God, the consequence is that many disorders occur in the
tain that the help of God’s grace is not necessary to man
reason. For when man’s heart is not so fixed on God as to
for salvation, but that the gift of the law is enough for the
be unwilling to be parted from Him for the sake of find-
human will) ought without doubt to be removed beyond
ing any good or avoiding any evil, many things happen for
all hearing, and to be anathematized by the tongues of
the achieving or avoiding of which a man strays from God
all.”
and breaks His commandments, and thus sins mortally:
I answer that, We may speak of man in two ways:
especially since, when surprised, a man acts according to
first, in the state of perfect nature; secondly, in the state
his preconceived end and his pre-existing habits, as the
of corrupted nature. Now in the state of perfect nature,
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii); although with premeditation
man, without habitual grace, could avoid sinning either
of his reason a man may do something outside the order of
mortally or venially; since to sin is nothing else than to
his preconceived end and the inclination of his habit. But
stray from what is according to our nature—and in the
because a man cannot always have this premeditation, it
state of perfect nature man could avoid this. Nevertheless
cannot help occurring that he acts in accordance with his
he could not have done it without God’s help to uphold
will turned aside from God, unless, by grace, he is quickly
him in good, since if this had been withdrawn, even his
brought back to the due order.
nature would have fallen back into nothingness.
Reply to Objection 1. Man can avoid each but every
But in the state of corrupt nature man needs grace to
act of sin, except by grace, as stated above. Nevertheless,
heal his nature in order that he may entirely abstain from
since it is by his own shortcoming that he does not pre-
sin. And in the present life this healing is wrought in the
pare himself to have grace, the fact that he cannot avoid
mind—the carnal appetite being not yet restored. Hence
sin without grace does not excuse him from sin.
the Apostle (Rom. 7:25) says in the person of one who is
Reply to Objection 2. Correction is useful “in order
restored: “I myself, with the mind, serve the law of God,
that out of the sorrow of correction may spring the wish
but with the flesh, the law of sin.” And in this state man
to be regenerate; if indeed he who is corrected is a son of
can abstain from all mortal sin, which takes its stand in
promise, in such sort that whilst the noise of correction is
his reason, as stated above (q. 74, a. 5); but man cannot
outwardly resounding and punishing, God by hidden in-
abstain from all venial sin on account of the corruption
spirations is inwardly causing to will,” as Augustine says
of his lower appetite of sensuality. For man can, indeed,
(De Corr. et Gratia vi). Correction is therefore necessary,
repress each of its movements (and hence they are sinful
from the fact that man’s will is required in order to abstain
and voluntary), but not all, because whilst he is resisting
from sin; yet it is not sufficient without God’s help. Hence
one, another may arise, and also because the reason is al-
it is written (Eccles. 7:14): “Consider the works of God
1155
that no man can correct whom He hath despised.”
of sin. Hence he was able to sin and not to sin. Now,
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Hypog-
too, whatever a man wills, is given to him; but his willing
nosticon iii∗), this saying is to be understood of man in
good, he has by God’s assistance.
the state of perfect nature, when as yet he was not a slave
Whether one who has already obtained grace, can, of himself and without further Ia IIae q. 109 a. 9
help of grace, do good and avoid sin?
Objection 1. It would seem that whoever has already
need a further help of grace, e.g. a further infused habit.
obtained grace, can by himself and without further help
Yet he needs the help of grace in another way, i.e. in order
of grace, do good and avoid sin. For a thing is useless or
to be moved by God to act righteously, and this for two
imperfect, if it does not fulfil what it was given for. Now
reasons: first, for the general reason that no created thing
grace is given to us that we may do good and keep from
can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the Divine mo-
sin. Hence if with grace man cannot do this, it seems that
tion. Secondly, for this special reason—the condition of
grace is either useless or imperfect.
the state of human nature. For although healed by grace as
Objection 2. Further, by grace the Holy Spirit dwells
to the mind, yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the
in us, according to 1 Cor. 3:16: “Know you not that you
flesh, whereby it serves “the law of sin,” Rom. 7:25. In
are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth
the intellect, too, there seems the darkness of ignorance,
in you?” Now since the Spirit of God is omnipotent, He
whereby, as is written (Rom. 8:26): “We know not what
is sufficient to ensure our doing good and to keep us from
we should pray for as we ought”; since on account of the
sin. Hence a man who has obtained grace can do the above
various turns of circumstances, and because we do not
two things without any further assistance of grace.
know ourselves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is
Objection 3. Further, if a man who has obtained grace
for our good, according to Wis. 9:14: “For the thoughts of
needs further aid of grace in order to live righteously and
mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain.” Hence
to keep free from sin, with equal reason, will he need yet
we must be guided and guarded by God, Who knows and
another grace, even though he has obtained this first help
can do all things. For which reason also it is becoming in
of grace. Therefore we must go on to infinity; which is
those who have been born again as sons of God, to say:
impossible. Hence whoever is in grace needs no further
“Lead us not into temptation,” and “Thy Will be done on
help of grace in order to do righteously and to keep free
earth as it is in heaven,” and whatever else is contained in
from sin.
the Lord’s Prayer pertaining to this.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Natura et Gra-
Reply to Objection 1. The gift of habitual grace is
tia xxvi) that “as the eye of the body though most healthy
not therefore given to us that we may no longer need the
cannot see unless it is helped by the brightness of light,
Divine help; for every creature needs to be preserved in
so, neither can a man, even if he is most righteous, live
the good received from Him. Hence if after having re-
righteously unless he be helped by the eternal light of jus-
ceived grace man still needs the Divine help, it cannot be
tice.” But justification is by grace, according to Rom.
concluded that grace is given to no purpose, or that it is
3:24: “Being justified freely by His grace.” Hence even
imperfect, since man will need the Divine help even in
a man who already possesses grace needs a further assis-
the state of glory, when grace shall be fully perfected. But
tance of grace in order to live righteously.
here grace is to some extent imperfect, inasmuch as it does
I answer that, As stated above (a. 5), in order to live
not completely heal man, as stated above.
righteously a man needs a twofold help of God—first, a
Reply to Objection 2. The operation of the Holy
habitual gift whereby corrupted human nature is healed,
Ghost, which moves and protects, is not circumscribed by
and after being healed is lifted up so as to work deeds
the effect of habitual grace which it causes in us; but be-
meritoriously of everlasting life, which exceed the capa-
yond this effect He, together with the Father and the Son,
bility of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace in
moves and protects us.
order to be moved by God to act.
Reply to Objection 3. This argument merely proves
Now with regard to the first kind of help, man does not
that man needs no further habitual grace.
∗ Among the spurious works of St. Augustine
1156
Whether man possessed of grace needs the help of grace in order to persevere?
Ia IIae q. 109 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that man possessed of
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7). Secondly, perseverance
grace needs no help to persevere. For perseverance is
may be called a habit, whereby a man has the purpose of
something less than virtue, even as continence is, as is
persevering in good unto the end. And in both these ways
clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7,9). Now since
perseverance is infused together with grace, even as con-
man is justified by grace, he needs no further help of grace
tinence and the other virtues are. Thirdly, perseverance is
in order to have the virtues. Much less, therefore, does he
called the abiding in good to the end of life. And in or-
need the help of grace to have perseverance.
der to have this perseverance man does not, indeed, need
Objection 2. Further, all the virtues are infused at
another habitual grace, but he needs the Divine assistance
once. But perseverance is put down as a virtue. Hence it
guiding and guarding him against the attacks of the pas-
seems that, together with grace, perseverance is given to
sions, as appears from the preceding article. And hence
the other infused virtues.
after anyone has been justified by grace, he still needs to
Objection 3. Further, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:20)
beseech God for the aforesaid gift of perseverance, that he
more was restored to man by Christ’s gift, than he had lost
may be kept from evil till the end of his life. For to many
by Adam’s sin. But Adam received what enabled him to
grace is given to whom perseverance in grace is not given.
persevere; and thus man does not need grace in order to
Reply to Objection 1. This objection regards the first
persevere.
mode of perseverance, as the second objection regards the
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev.
ii):
second.
“Why is perseverance besought of God, if it is not be-
Hence the solution of the second objection is clear.
stowed by God? For is it not a mocking request to seek
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Natura
what we know He does not give, and what is in our power
et Gratia xliii)∗: “in the original state man received a
without His giving it?” Now perseverance is besought by
gift whereby he could persevere, but to persevere was not
even those who are hallowed by grace; and this is seen,
given him. But now, by the grace of Christ, many receive
when we say “Hallowed be Thy name,” which Augustine
both the gift of grace whereby they may persevere, and
confirms by the words of Cyprian (De Correp. et Grat.
the further gift of persevering,” and thus Christ’s gift is
xii). Hence man, even when possessed of grace, needs
greater than Adam’s fault. Nevertheless it was easier for
perseverance to be given to him by God.
man to persevere, with the gift of grace in the state of in-
I answer that, Perseverance is taken in three ways.
nocence in which the flesh was not rebellious against the
First, to signify a habit of the mind whereby a man stands
spirit, than it is now. For the restoration by Christ’s grace,
steadfastly, lest he be moved by the assault of sadness
although it is already begun in the mind, is not yet com-
from what is virtuous. And thus perseverance is to sad-
pleted in the flesh, as it will be in heaven, where man will
ness as continence is to concupiscence and pleasure, as the
not merely be able to persevere but will be unable to sin.
∗ Cf. De Correp. et Grat. xii
1157
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 110
Of the Grace of God As Regards Its Essence
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the grace of God as regards its essence; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether grace implies something in the soul?
(2) Whether grace is a quality?
(3) Whether grace differs from infused virtue?
(4) Of the subject of grace.
Whether grace implies anything in the soul?
Ia IIae q. 110 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that grace does not imply
love wherewith he receives him into his good “graces.”
anything in the soul. For man is said to have the grace of
And from the second proceeds the third, since from bene-
God even as the grace of man. Hence it is written (Gn.
fits bestowed “gratis” arises “gratitude.”
39:21) that the Lord gave to Joseph “grace [Douay: ‘fa-
Now as regards the last two, it is clear that grace im-
vor’] in the sight of the chief keeper of the prison.” Now
plies something in him who receives grace: first, the gift
when we say that a man has the favor of another, nothing
given gratis; secondly, the acknowledgment of the gift.
is implied in him who has the favor of the other, but an
But as regards the first, a difference must be noted be-
acceptance is implied in him whose favor he has. Hence
tween the grace of God and the grace of man; for since the
when we say that a man has the grace of God, nothing
creature’s good springs from the Divine will, some good
is implied in his soul; but we merely signify the Divine
in the creature flows from God’s love, whereby He wishes
acceptance.
the good of the creature. On the other hand, the will of
Objection 2. Further, as the soul quickens the body so
man is moved by the good pre-existing in things; and
does God quicken the soul; hence it is written (Dt. 30:20):
hence man’s love does not wholly cause the good of the
“He is thy life.” Now the soul quickens the body immedi-
thing, but pre-supposes it either in part or wholly. There-
ately. Therefore nothing can come as a medium between
fore it is clear that every love of God is followed at some
God and the soul. Hence grace implies nothing created in
time by a good caused in the creature, but not co-eternal
the soul.
with the eternal love. And according to this difference of
Objection 3. Further, on Rom. 1:7, “Grace to you and
good the love of God to the creature is looked at differ-
peace,” the gloss says: “Grace, i.e. the remission of sins.”
ently. For one is common, whereby He loves “all things
Now the remission of sin implies nothing in the soul, but
that are” (Wis. 11:25), and thereby gives things their nat-
only in God, Who does not impute the sin, according to
ural being. But the second is a special love, whereby He
Ps. 31:2: “Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not
draws the rational creature above the condition of its na-
imputed sin.” Hence neither does grace imply anything in
ture to a participation of the Divine good; and according
the soul.
to this love He is said to love anyone simply, since it is by
On the contrary, Light implies something in what is
this love that God simply wishes the eternal good, which
enlightened. But grace is a light of the soul; hence Au-
is Himself, for the creature.
gustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxii): “The light of truth
Accordingly when a man is said to have the grace of
rightly deserts the prevaricator of the law, and those who
God, there is signified something bestowed on man by
have been thus deserted become blind.” Therefore grace
God. Nevertheless the grace of God sometimes signifies
implies something in the soul.
God’s eternal love, as we say the grace of predestination,
I answer that, According to the common manner of
inasmuch as God gratuitously and not from merits predes-
speech, grace is usually taken in three ways. First, for
tines or elects some; for it is written (Eph. 1:5): “He hath
anyone’s love, as we are accustomed to say that the sol-
predestinated us into the adoption of children. . . unto the
dier is in the good graces of the king, i.e. the king looks
praise of the glory of His grace.”
on him with favor. Secondly, it is taken for any gift freely
Reply to Objection 1. Even when a man is said to
bestowed, as we are accustomed to say: I do you this act
be in another’s good graces, it is understood that there is
of grace. Thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a gift
something in him pleasing to the other; even as anyone is
given “gratis,” inasmuch as we are said to be “grateful” for
said to have God’s grace—with this difference, that what
benefits. Of these three the second depends on the first,
is pleasing to a man in another is presupposed to his love,
since one bestows something on another “gratis” from the
but whatever is pleasing to God in a man is caused by the
1158
Divine love, as was said above.
“When I said that grace was for the remission of sins, and
Reply to Objection 2. God is the life of the soul af-
peace for our reconciliation with God, you must not take
ter the manner of an efficient cause; but the soul is the
it to mean that peace and reconciliation do not pertain to
life of the body after the manner of a formal cause. Now
general peace, but that the special name of grace signi-
there is no medium between form and matter, since the
fies the remission of sins.” Not only grace, therefore, but
form, of itself, “informs” the matter or subject; whereas
many other of God’s gifts pertain to grace. And hence the
the agent “informs” the subject, not by its substance, but
remission of sins does not take place without some effect
by the form, which it causes in the matter.
divinely caused in us, as will appear later (q. 113, a. 2).
Reply to Objection 3. Augustine says (Retract. i, 25):
Whether grace is a quality of the soul?
Ia IIae q. 110 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that grace is not a quality
come natural and easy to creatures, according to Wis. 8:1:
of the soul. For no quality acts on its subject, since the
“she. . . ordereth all things sweetly.” Much more therefore
action of a quality is not without the action of its subject,
does He infuse into such as He moves towards the acqui-
and thus the subject would necessarily act upon itself. But
sition of supernatural good, certain forms or supernatural
grace acts upon the soul, by justifying it. Therefore grace
qualities, whereby they may be moved by Him sweetly
is not a quality.
and promptly to acquire eternal good; and thus the gift of
Objection 2. Furthermore, substance is nobler than
grace is a quality.
quality. But grace is nobler than the nature of the soul,
Reply to Objection 1. Grace, as a quality, is said
since we can do many things by grace, to which nature is
to act upon the soul, not after the manner of an efficient
not equal, as stated above (q. 109, Aa. 1,2,3). Therefore
cause, but after the manner of a formal cause, as whiteness
grace is not a quality.
makes a thing white, and justice, just.
Objection 3. Furthermore, no quality remains after it
Reply to Objection 2. Every substance is either the
has ceased to be in its subject. But grace remains; since
nature of the thing whereof it is the substance or is a part
it is not corrupted, for thus it would be reduced to noth-
of the nature, even as matter and form are called sub-
ing, since it was created from nothing; hence it is called a
stance. And because grace is above human nature, it can-
“new creature”(Gal. 6:15).
not be a substance or a substantial form, but is an acciden-
On the contrary, on Ps. 103:15: “That he may make
tal form of the soul. Now what is substantially in God,
the face cheerful with oil”; the gloss says: “Grace is a
becomes accidental in the soul participating the Divine
certain beauty of soul, which wins the Divine love.” But
goodness, as is clear in the case of knowledge. And thus
beauty of soul is a quality, even as beauty of body. There-
because the soul participates in the Divine goodness im-
fore grace is a quality.
perfectly, the participation of the Divine goodness, which
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), there is under-
is grace, has its being in the soul in a less perfect way than
stood to be an effect of God’s gratuitous will in whoever is
the soul subsists in itself. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is
said to have God’s grace. Now it was stated (q. 109, a. 1)
the expression or participation of the Divine goodness, it
that man is aided by God’s gratuitous will in two ways:
is nobler than the nature of the soul, though not in its mode
first, inasmuch as man’s soul is moved by God to know
of being.
or will or do something, and in this way the gratuitous ef-
Reply to Objection 3. As Boethius∗ says, the “being
fect in man is not a quality, but a movement of the soul;
of an accident is to inhere.” Hence no accident is called
for “motion is the act of the mover in the moved.” Sec-
being as if it had being, but because by it something is;
ondly, man is helped by God’s gratuitous will, inasmuch
hence it is said to belong to a being rather to be a being
as a habitual gift is infused by God into the soul; and for
(Metaph. vii, text. 2). And because to become and to be
this reason, that it is not fitting that God should provide
corrupted belong to what is, properly speaking, no acci-
less for those He loves, that they may acquire supernat-
dent comes into being or is corrupted, but is said to come
ural good, than for creatures, whom He loves that they
into being and to be corrupted inasmuch as its subject be-
may acquire natural good. Now He so provides for natu-
gins or ceases to be in act with this accident. And thus
ral creatures, that not merely does He move them to their
grace is said to be created inasmuch as men are created
natural acts, but He bestows upon them certain forms and
with reference to it, i.e. are given a new being out of noth-
powers, which are the principles of acts, in order that they
ing, i.e. not from merits, according to Eph. 2:10, “created
may of themselves be inclined to these movements, and
in Jesus Christ in good works.”
thus the movements whereby they are moved by God be-
∗ Pseudo-Bede, Sent. Phil. ex Artist
1159
Whether grace is the same as virtue?
Ia IIae q. 110 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that grace is the same as
vii, text. 17), “virtue is disposition of what is perfect—
virtue. For Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xiv) that “op-
and I call perfect what is disposed according to its nature.”
erating grace is faith that worketh by charity.” But faith
Now from this it is clear that the virtue of a thing has refer-
that worketh by charity is a virtue. Therefore grace is a
ence to some pre-existing nature, from the fact that every-
virtue.
thing is disposed with reference to what befits its nature.
Objection 2. Further, what fits the definition, fits the But it is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts
defined. But the definitions of virtue given by saints and
of which we spoke above (q. 55, seqq.) are dispositions,
philosophers fit grace, since “it makes its subject good,
whereby a man is fittingly disposed with reference to the
and his work good,” and “it is a good quality of the mind,
nature whereby he is a man; whereas infused virtues dis-
whereby we live righteously,” etc.
Therefore grace is
pose man in a higher manner and towards a higher end,
virtue.
and consequently in relation to some higher nature, i.e. in
Objection 3. Further, grace is a quality. Now it is
relation to a participation of the Divine Nature, according
clearly not in the “fourth” species of quality; viz. “form”
to 2 Pet. 1:4: “He hath given us most great and most pre-
which is the “abiding figure of things,” since it does not
cious promises; that by these you may be made partakers
belong to bodies. Nor is it in the “third,” since it is not a
of the Divine Nature.” And it is in respect of receiving
“passion nor a passion-like quality,” which is in the sen-
this nature that we are said to be born again sons of God.
sitive part of the soul, as is proved in Physic. viii; and
And thus, even as the natural light of reason is some-
grace is principally in the mind. Nor is it in the “sec-
thing besides the acquired virtues, which are ordained to
ond” species, which is “natural power” or “impotence”;
this natural light, so also the light of grace which is a par-
since grace is above nature and does not regard good and
ticipation of the Divine Nature is something besides the
evil, as does natural power. Therefore it must be in the
infused virtues which are derived from and are ordained
“first” species which is “habit” or “disposition.” Now
to this light, hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:8): “For you
habits of the mind are virtues; since even knowledge itself
were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk
is a virtue after a manner, as stated above (q. 57, Aa. 1,2).
then as children of the light.” For as the acquired virtues
Therefore grace is the same as virtue.
enable a man to walk, in accordance with the natural light
On the contrary, If grace is a virtue, it would seem
of reason, so do the infused virtues enable a man to walk
before all to be one of the three theological virtues. But
as befits the light of grace.
grace is neither faith nor hope, for these can be without
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine calls “faith that wor-
sanctifying grace. Nor is it charity, since “grace foreruns
keth by charity” grace, since the act of faith of him that
charity,” as Augustine says in his book on the Predestina-
worketh by charity is the first act by which sanctifying
tion of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xvi). Therefore grace
grace is manifested.
is not virtue.
Reply to Objection 2. Good is placed in the defini-
I answer that, Some held that grace and virtue were
tion of virtue with reference to its fitness with some pre-
identical in essence, and differed only logically—in the
existing nature essential or participated. Now good is not
sense that we speak of grace inasmuch as it makes man
attributed to grace in this manner, but as to the root of
pleasing to God, or is given gratuitously—and of virtue
goodness in man, as stated above.
inasmuch as it empowers us to act rightly. And the Mas-
Reply to Objection 3. Grace is reduced to the first
ter seems to have thought this (Sent. ii, D 27).
species of quality; and yet it is not the same as virtue, but
But if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue,
is a certain disposition which is presupposed to the infused
this cannot hold, since, as the Philosopher says (Physic.
virtues, as their principle and root.
Whether grace is in the essence of the soul as in a subject, or in one of the powers?
Ia IIae q. 110 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that grace is not in the
Objection 2.
Further, “Man’s merit springs from
essence of the soul, as in a subject, but in one of the pow-
grace” as Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. vi).
ers. For Augustine says (Hypognosticon iii∗) that grace
Now merit consists in acts, which proceed from a power.
is related to the will or to the free will “as a rider to his
Hence it seems that grace is a perfection of a power of the
horse.” Now the will or the free will is a power, as stated
soul.
above ( Ia, q. 83, a. 2). Hence grace is in a power of the
Objection 3. Further, if the essence of the soul is the
soul, as in a subject.
proper subject of grace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an
∗ Among the spurious works of St. Augustine
1160
essence, must be capable of grace. But this is false; since Reply to Objection 1. As from the essence of the
it would follow that every soul would be capable of grace.
soul flows its powers, which are the principles of deeds,
Therefore the essence of the soul is not the proper subject
so likewise the virtues, whereby the powers are moved to
of grace.
act, flow into the powers of the soul from grace. And thus
Objection 4. Further, the essence of the soul is prior
grace is compared to the will as the mover to the moved,
to its powers. Now what is prior may be understood with-
which is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the
out what is posterior. Hence it follows that grace may be
horse—but not as an accident to a subject.
taken to be in the soul, although we suppose no part or
And thereby is made clear the Reply to the Second
power of the soul—viz. neither the will, nor the intellect,
Objection. For grace is the principle of meritorious works
nor anything else; which is impossible.
through the medium of virtues, as the essence of the soul
On the contrary, By grace we are born again sons of
is the principal of vital deeds through the medium of the
God. But generation terminates at the essence prior to the
powers.
powers. Therefore grace is in the soul’s essence prior to
Reply to Objection 3. The soul is the subject of grace,
being in the powers.
as being in the species of intellectual or rational nature.
I answer that, This question depends on the preced-
But the soul is not classed in a species by any of its pow-
ing. For if grace is the same as virtue, it must necessar-
ers, since the powers are natural properties of the soul fol-
ily be in the powers of the soul as in a subject; since the
lowing upon the species. Hence the soul differs specifi-
soul’s powers are the proper subject of virtue, as stated
cally in its essence from other souls, viz. of dumb ani-
above (q. 56, a. 1). But if grace differs from virtue, it can-
mals, and of plants. Consequently it does not follow that,
not be said that a power of the soul is the subject of grace,
if the essence of the human soul is the subject of grace,
since every perfection of the soul’s powers has the nature
every soul may be the subject of grace; since it belongs to
of virtue, as stated above (q. 55, a. 1; q. 56, a. 1). Hence
the essence of the soul, inasmuch as it is of such a species.
it remains that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject
Reply to Objection 4. Since the powers of the soul
prior to the powers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of are natural properties following upon the species, the soul
the soul. For as man in his intellective powers participates
cannot be without them. Yet, granted that it was without
in the Divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and in
them, the soul would still be called intellectual or rational
his power of will participates in the Divine love through
in its species, not that it would actually have these pow-
the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of the soul does
ers, but on account of the essence of such a species, from
he participate in the Divine Nature, after the manner of a
which these powers naturally flow.
likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation.
1161
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 111
Of the Division of Grace
(In Five Articles)
We must now consider the division of grace; under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether grace is fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and sanctifying grace?
(2) Of the division into operating and cooperating grace;
(3) Of the division of it into prevenient and subsequent grace; (4) Of the division of gratuitous grace;
(5) Of the comparison between sanctifying and gratuitous grace.
Whether grace is fittingly divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace?
Ia IIae q. 111 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that grace is not fittingly
grace”; the other is that whereby one man cooperates with
divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace. For
another in leading him to God, and this gift is called “gra-
grace is a gift of God, as is clear from what has been al-
tuitous grace,” since it is bestowed on a man beyond the
ready stated (q. 110, a. 1). But man is not therefore pleas-
capability of nature, and beyond the merit of the person.
ing to God because something is given him by God, but
But whereas it is bestowed on a man, not to justify him,
rather on the contrary; since something is freely given by
but rather that he may cooperate in the justification of an-
God, because man is pleasing to Him. Hence there is no
other, it is not called sanctifying grace. And it is of this
sanctifying grace.
that the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:7): “And the manifesta-
Objection 2. Further, whatever is not given on ac-
tion of the Spirit is given to every man unto utility,” i.e. of count of preceding merits is given gratis. Now even nat-others.
ural good is given to man without preceding merit, since
Reply to Objection 1. Grace is said to make pleasing,
nature is presupposed to merit. Therefore nature itself is
not efficiently but formally, i.e. because thereby a man is
given gratuitously by God. But nature is condivided with
justified, and is made worthy to be called pleasing to God,
grace. Therefore to be gratuitously given is not fittingly
according to Col. 1:21: “He hath made us worthy to be
set down as a difference of grace, since it is found outside
made partakers of the lot of the saints in light.”
the genus of grace.
Reply to Objection 2. Grace, inasmuch as it is gra-
Objection 3. Further, members of a division are mu-
tuitously given, excludes the notion of debt. Now debt
tually opposed. But even sanctifying grace, whereby we
may be taken in two ways: first, as arising from merit;
are justified, is given to us gratuitously, according to Rom.
and this regards the person whose it is to do meritorious
3:24: “Being justified freely [gratis] by His grace.” Hence
works, according to Rom. 4:4: “Now to him that wor-
sanctifying grace ought not to be divided against gratu-
keth, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but
itous grace.
according to debt.” The second debt regards the condi-
On the contrary, The Apostle attributes both to grace,
tion of nature. Thus we say it is due to a man to have
viz. to sanctify and to be gratuitously given. For with re-
reason, and whatever else belongs to human nature. Yet
gard to the first he says (Eph. 1:6): “He hath graced us in
in neither way is debt taken to mean that God is under
His beloved son.” And with regard to the second (Rom.
an obligation to His creature, but rather that the creature
2:6): “And if by grace, it is not now by works, otherwise
ought to be subject to God, that the Divine ordination may
grace is no more grace.” Therefore grace can be distin-
be fulfilled in it, which is that a certain nature should have
guished by its having one only or both.
certain conditions or properties, and that by doing certain
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1),
works it should attain to something further. And hence
“those things that are of God are well ordered [Vulg.:
natural endowments are not a debt in the first sense but
‘those that are, are ordained by God].” Now the order
in the second. Hence they especially merit the name of
of things consists in this, that things are led to God by
grace.
other things, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). And
Reply to Objection 3. Sanctifying grace adds to the
hence since grace is ordained to lead men to God, this
notion of gratuitous grace something pertaining to the na-
takes place in a certain order, so that some are led to God
ture of grace, since it makes man pleasing to God. And
by others.
hence gratuitous grace which does not do this keeps the
And thus there is a twofold grace: one whereby man
common name, as happens in many other cases; and thus
himself is united to God, and this is called “sanctifying
the two parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying
1162
and non-sanctifying grace.
Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace?
Ia IIae q. 111 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that grace is not fittingly
the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the
divided into operating and cooperating grace. For grace is
will is a thing moved, and God is the mover; and espe-
an accident, as stated above (q. 110, a. 2). Now no acci-
cially when the will, which hitherto willed evil, begins to
dent can act upon its subject. Therefore no grace can be
will good. And hence, inasmuch as God moves the human
called operating.
mind to this act, we speak of operating grace. But there
Objection 2. Further, if grace operates anything in us
is another, exterior act; and since it is commanded by the
it assuredly brings about justification. But not only grace
will, as was shown above (q. 17, a. 9) the operation of this
works this. For Augustine says, on Jn. 14:12, “the works
act is attributed to the will. And because God assists us in
that I do he also shall do,” says (Serm. clxix): “He Who
this act, both by strengthening our will interiorly so as to
created thee without thyself, will not justify thee without
attain to the act, and by granting outwardly the capability
thyself.” Therefore no grace ought to be called simply
of operating, it is with respect to this that we speak of co-
operating.
operating grace. Hence after the aforesaid words Augus-
Objection 3. Further, to cooperate seems to pertain
tine subjoins: “He operates that we may will; and when
to the inferior agent, and not to the principal agent. But
we will, He cooperates that we may perfect.” And thus
grace works in us more than free-will, according to Rom.
if grace is taken for God’s gratuitous motion whereby He
9:16: “It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that run-
moves us to meritorious good, it is fittingly divided into
neth, but of God that sheweth mercy.” Therefore no grace
operating and cooperating grace.
ought to be called cooperating.
But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again
Objection 4. Further, division ought to rest on oppo-
there is a double effect of grace, even as of every other
sition. But to operate and to cooperate are not opposed;
form; the first of which is “being,” and the second, “op-
for one and the same thing can both operate and cooper-
eration”; thus the work of heat is to make its subject hot,
ate. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into operating
and to give heat outwardly. And thus habitual grace, inas-
and cooperating.
much as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes it pleas-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib.
ing to God, is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is
Arbit. xvii): “God by cooperating with us, perfects what
the principle of meritorious works, which spring from the
He began by operating in us, since He who perfects by
free-will, it is called cooperating grace.
cooperation with such as are willing, beings by operating
Reply to Objection 1. Inasmuch as grace is a certain
that they may will.” But the operations of God whereby
accidental quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently,
He moves us to good pertain to grace. Therefore grace is
but formally, as whiteness makes a surface white.
fittingly divided into operating and cooperating.
Reply to Objection 2. God does not justify us without
I answer that, As stated above (q. 110, a. 2) grace
ourselves, because whilst we are being justified we con-
may be taken in two ways; first, as a Divine help, whereby
sent to God’s justification [justitiae] by a movement of our
God moves us to will and to act; secondly, as a habitual
free-will. Nevertheless this movement is not the cause of
gift divinely bestowed on us.
grace, but the effect; hence the whole operation pertains
Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into
to grace.
operating and cooperating. For the operation of an ef-
Reply to Objection 3. One thing is said to cooper-
fect is not attributed to the thing moved but to the mover.
ate with another not merely when it is a secondary agent
Hence in that effect in which our mind is moved and does
under a principal agent, but when it helps to the end in-
not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the oper-
tended. Now man is helped by God to will the good,
ation is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this
through the means of operating grace. And hence, the
that we speak of “operating grace.” But in that effect in
end being already intended, grace cooperates with us.
which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation
Reply to Objection 4. Operating and cooperating
is not only attributed to God, but also to the soul; and
grace are the same grace; but are distinguished by their
it is with reference to this that we speak of “cooperating
different effects, as is plain from what has been said.
grace.” Now there is a double act in us. First, there is
1163
Whether grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent grace?
Ia IIae q. 111 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that grace is not fittingly
hence grace, inasmuch as it causes the first effect in us,
divided into prevenient and subsequent. For grace is an
is called prevenient with respect to the second, and inas-
effect of the Divine love. But God’s love is never sub-
much as it causes the second, it is called subsequent with
sequent, but always prevenient, according to 1 Jn. 4:10:
respect to the first effect. And as one effect is posterior
“Not as though we had loved God, but because He hath
to this effect, and prior to that, so may grace be called
first loved us.” Therefore grace ought not to be divided
prevenient and subsequent on account of the same effect
into prevenient and subsequent.
viewed relatively to divers others. And this is what Au-
Objection 2. Further, there is but one sanctifying
gustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxxi): “It is prevenient,
grace in man, since it is sufficient, according to 2 Cor.
inasmuch as it heals, and subsequent, inasmuch as, being
12:9: “My grace is sufficient for thee.” But the same thing
healed, we are strengthened; it is prevenient, inasmuch as
cannot be before and after. Therefore grace is not fittingly
we are called, and subsequent, inasmuch as we are glori-
divided into prevenient and subsequent.
fied.”
Objection 3. Further, grace is known by its effects.
Reply to Objection 1. God’s love signifies something
Now there are an infinite number of effects—one preced-
eternal; and hence can never be called anything but pre-
ing another. Hence it with regard to these, grace must
venient. But grace signifies a temporal effect, which can
be divided into prevenient and subsequent, it would seem
precede and follow another; and thus grace may be both
that there are infinite species of grace. Now no art takes
prevenient and subsequent.
note of the infinite in number. Hence grace is not fittingly
Reply to Objection 2. The division into prevenient
divided into prevenient and subsequent.
and subsequent grace does not divide grace in its essence,
On the contrary, God’s grace is the outcome of His
but only in its effects, as was already said of operating and
mercy. Now both are said in Ps. 58:11: “His mercy shall
cooperating grace. For subsequent grace, inasmuch as it
prevent me,” and again, Ps. 22:6: “Thy mercy will follow
pertains to glory, is not numerically distinct from preve-
me.” Therefore grace is fittingly divided into prevenient
nient grace whereby we are at present justified. For even
and subsequent.
as the charity of the earth is not voided in heaven, so must
I answer that, As grace is divided into operating and
the same be said of the light of grace, since the notion of
cooperating, with regard to its diverse effects, so also is
neither implies imperfection.
it divided into prevenient and subsequent, howsoever we
Reply to Objection 3. Although the effects of grace
consider grace. Now there are five effects of grace in us:
may be infinite in number, even as human acts are infinite,
of these, the first is, to heal the soul; the second, to desire nevertheless all reduced to some of a determinate species,
good; the third, to carry into effect the good proposed; the
and moreover all coincide in this—that one precedes an-
fourth, to persevere in good; the fifth, to reach glory. And
other.
Whether gratuitous grace is rightly divided by the Apostle?
Ia IIae q. 111 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that gratuitous grace is
tation of speeches pertains either to wisdom or to knowl-
not rightly divided by the Apostle. For every gift vouch-
edge, according to Dan. 1:17: “And to these children God
safed to us by God, may be called a gratuitous grace. Now
gave knowledge and understanding in every book and wis-
there are an infinite number of gifts freely bestowed on
dom.” Hence it is not correct to divide the grace of healing
us by God as regards both the good of the soul and the
and kinds of tongues against the working of miracles; and
good of the body—and yet they do not make us pleasing
the interpretation of speeches against the word of wisdom
to God. Hence gratuitous graces cannot be contained un-
and knowledge.
der any certain division.
Objection 4. Further, as wisdom and knowledge are
Objection 2.
Further, gratuitous grace is distin-
gifts of the Holy Ghost, so also are understanding, coun-
guished from sanctifying grace. But faith pertains to sanc-
sel, piety, fortitude, and fear, as stated above (q. 68, a. 4).
tifying grace, since we are justified by it, according to
Therefore these also ought to be placed amongst the gra-
Rom. 5:1: “Being justified therefore by faith.” Hence it is
tuitous gifts.
not right to place faith amongst the gratuitous graces, es-
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8,9,10):
pecially since the other virtues are not so placed, as hope
“To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom;
and charity.
and to another the word of knowledge, according to the
Objection 3. Further, the operation of healing, and
same Spirit; to another, the working of miracles; to an-
speaking divers tongues are miracles. Again, the interpre-
other, prophecy; to another, the discerning of spirits; to
1164
another divers kinds of tongues; to another interpretation But the capability of speaking can regard either the id-of speeches.”
iom in which a person can be understood, and thus there
I answer that, As was said above (a. 1), gratuitous
is “kinds of tongues”; or it can regard the sense of what is
grace is ordained to this, viz. that a man may help another
said, and thus there is the “interpretation of speeches.”
to be led to God. Now no man can help in this by moving
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 1), not
interiorly (for this belongs to God alone), but only exte-
all the benefits divinely conferred upon us are called gra-
riorly by teaching or persuading. Hence gratuitous grace
tuitous graces, but only those that surpass the power of
embraces whatever a man needs in order to instruct an-
nature—e.g. that a fisherman should be replete with the
other in Divine things which are above reason. Now for
word of wisdom and of knowledge and the like; and such
this three things are required: first, a man must possess
as these are here set down as gratuitous graces.
the fullness of knowledge of Divine things, so as to be
Reply to Objection 2. Faith is enumerated here un-
capable of teaching others. Secondly, he must be able to
der the gratuitous graces, not as a virtue justifying man
confirm or prove what he says, otherwise his words would
in himself, but as implying a super-eminent certitude of
have no weight. Thirdly, he must be capable of fittingly
faith, whereby a man is fitted for instructing others con-
presenting to his hearers what he knows.
cerning such things as belong to the faith. With regard
Now as regards the first, three things are necessary, as
to hope and charity, they belong to the appetitive power,
may be seen in human teaching. For whoever would teach
according as man is ordained thereby to God.
another in any science must first be certain of the princi-
Reply to Objection 3. The grace of healing is distin-
ples of the science, and with regard to this there is “faith,”
guished from the general working of miracles because it
which is certitude of invisible things, the principles of
has a special reason for inducing one to the faith, since a
Catholic doctrine. Secondly, it behooves the teacher to
man is all the more ready to believe when he has received
know the principal conclusions of the science, and hence
the gift of bodily health through the virtue of faith. So,
we have the word of “wisdom,” which is the knowledge
too, to speak with divers tongues and to interpret speeches
of Divine things. Thirdly, he ought to abound with ex-
have special efficacy in bestowing faith. Hence they are
amples and a knowledge of effects, whereby at times he
set down as special gratuitous graces.
needs to manifest causes; and thus we have the word of
Reply to Objection 4. Wisdom and knowledge are
“knowledge,” which is the knowledge of human things,
not numbered among the gratuitous graces in the same
since “the invisible things of Him. . . are clearly seen, be-
way as they are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy
ing understood by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20).
Ghost, i.e. inasmuch as man’s mind is rendered easily
Now the confirmation of such things as are within rea-
movable by the Holy Ghost to the things of wisdom and
son rests upon arguments; but the confirmation of what
knowledge; for thus they are gifts of the Holy Ghost, as
is above reason rests on what is proper to the Divine
stated above (q. 68, Aa. 1,4). But they are numbered
power, and this in two ways: first, when the teacher of sa-
amongst the gratuitous graces, inasmuch as they imply
cred doctrine does what God alone can do, in miraculous
such a fullness of knowledge and wisdom that a man may
deeds, whether with respect to bodily health—and thus
not merely think aright of Divine things, but may instruct
there is the “grace of healing,” or merely for the purpose
others and overpower adversaries. Hence it is significant
of manifesting the Divine power; for instance, that the
that it is the “word” of wisdom and the “word” of knowl-
sun should stand still or darken, or that the sea should be
edge that are placed in the gratuitous graces, since, as Au-
divided—and thus there is the “working of miracles.” Sec-
gustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1), “It is one thing merely to
ondly, when he can manifest what God alone can know,
know what a man must believe in order to reach everlast-
and these are either future contingents—and thus there is
ing life, and another thing to know how this may benefit
“prophecy,” or also the secrets of hearts—and thus there
the godly and may be defended against the ungodly.”
is the “discerning of spirits.”
Whether gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace?
Ia IIae q. 111 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that gratuitous grace is
sanctifying grace.
nobler than sanctifying grace. For “the people’s good is
Objection 2. Further, it is a greater power that is
better than the individual good,” as the Philosopher says
able to act upon another, than that which is confined to
(Ethic. i, 2). Now sanctifying grace is ordained to the
itself, even as greater is the brightness of the body that
good of one man alone, whereas gratuitous grace is or-
can illuminate other bodies, than of that which can only
dained to the common good of the whole Church, as stated
shine but cannot illuminate; and hence the Philosopher
above (Aa. 1,4). Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than
says (Ethic. v, 1) “that justice is the most excellent of the
1165
virtues,” since by it a man bears himself rightly towards Reply to Objection 1.
As the Philosopher says
others. But by sanctifying grace a man is perfected only
(Metaph. xii, text. 52), a multitude, as an army, has a
in himself; whereas by gratuitous grace a man works for
double good; the first is in the multitude itself, viz. the
the perfection of others. Hence gratuitous grace is nobler
order of the army; the second is separate from the multi-
than sanctifying grace.
tude, viz. the good of the leader—and this is better good,
Objection 3. Further, what is proper to the best is no-
since the other is ordained to it. Now gratuitous grace is
bler than what is common to all; thus to reason, which
ordained to the common good of the Church, which is ec-
is proper to man is nobler than to feel, which is common
clesiastical order, whereas sanctifying grace is ordained to
to all animals. Now sanctifying grace is common to all
the separate common good, which is God. Hence sancti-
members of the Church, but gratuitous grace is the proper
fying grace is the nobler.
gift of the more exalted members of the Church. Hence
Reply to Objection 2. If gratuitous grace could cause
gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.
a man to have sanctifying grace, it would follow that the
On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:31), hav-
gratuitous grace was the nobler; even as the brightness of
ing enumerated the gratuitous graces adds: “And I shew
the sun that enlightens is more excellent than that of an
unto you yet a more excellent way”; and as the sequel
object that is lit up. But by gratuitous grace a man cannot
proves he is speaking of charity, which pertains to sancti-
cause another to have union with God, which he himself
fying grace. Hence sanctifying grace is more noble than
has by sanctifying grace; but he causes certain disposi-
gratuitous grace.
tions towards it. Hence gratuitous grace needs not to be
I answer that, The higher the good to which a virtue
the more excellent, even as in fire, the heat, which mani-
is ordained, the more excellent is the virtue. Now the end
fests its species whereby it produces heat in other things,
is always greater than the means. But sanctifying grace
is not more noble than its substantial form.
ordains a man immediately to a union with his last end,
Reply to Objection 3. Feeling is ordained to reason,
whereas gratuitous grace ordains a man to what is prepara-
as to an end; and thus, to reason is nobler. But here it
tory to the end; i.e. by prophecy and miracles and so forth,
is the contrary; for what is proper is ordained to what is
men are induced to unite themselves to their last end. And
common as to an end. Hence there is no comparison.
hence sanctifying grace is nobler than gratuitous grace.
1166
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 112
Of the Cause of Grace
(In Five Articles)
We must now consider the cause of grace; and under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace?
(2) Whether any disposition towards grace is needed on the part of the recipient, by an act of free-will?
(3) Whether such a disposition can make grace follow of necessity?
(4) Whether grace is equal in all?
(5) Whether anyone may know that he has grace?
Whether God alone is the cause of grace?
Ia IIae q. 112 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that God alone is not the
bestowing a partaking of the Divine Nature by a partici-
cause of grace. For it is written (Jn. 1:17): “Grace and
pated likeness, as it is impossible that anything save fire
truth came by Jesus Christ.” Now, by the name of Jesus
should enkindle.
Christ is understood not merely the Divine Nature assum-
Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s humanity is an “organ
ing, but the created nature assumed. Therefore a creature
of His Godhead,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
may be the cause of grace.
19). Now an instrument does not bring forth the action of
Objection 2. Further, there is this difference between
the principal agent by its own power, but in virtue of the
the sacraments of the New Law and those of the Old, that
principal agent. Hence Christ’s humanity does not cause
the sacraments of the New Law cause grace, whereas the
grace by its own power, but by virtue of the Divine Nature
sacraments of the Old Law merely signify it. Now the
joined to it, whereby the actions of Christ’s humanity are
sacraments of the New Law are certain visible elements.
saving actions.
Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.
Reply to Objection 2. As in the person of Christ the
Objection 3. Further, according to Dionysius (Coel.
humanity causes our salvation by grace, the Divine power
Hier. iii, iv, vii, viii), “Angels cleanse, enlighten, and
being the principal agent, so likewise in the sacraments of
perfect both lesser angels and men.” Now the rational
the New Law, which are derived from Christ, grace is in-
creature is cleansed, enlightened, and perfected by grace.
strumentally caused by the sacraments, and principally by
Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.
the power of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments,
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): “The Lord
according to Jn. 3:5: “Unless a man be born again of wa-
will give grace and glory.”
ter and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom
I answer that, Nothing can act beyond its species,
of God.”
since the cause must always be more powerful than its
Reply to Objection 3. Angels cleanse, enlighten, and
effect. Now the gift of grace surpasses every capability
perfect angels or men, by instruction, and not by justifying
of created nature, since it is nothing short of a partaking
them through grace. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
of the Divine Nature, which exceeds every other nature.
vii) that “this cleansing and enlightenment and perfecting
And thus it is impossible that any creature should cause
is nothing else than the assumption of Divine knowledge.”
grace. For it is as necessary that God alone should deify,
Whether any preparation and disposition for grace is required on man’s part?
Ia IIae q. 112 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that no preparation or dis-
are going on sinning grace is given, as is clear in the
position for grace is required on man’s part, since, as the
case of Paul, who received grace whilst he was “breath-
Apostle says (Rom. 4:4), “To him that worketh, the re-
ing our threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of
ward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to
the Lord” (Act 9:1). Hence no preparation for grace is
debt.” Now a man’s preparation by free-will can only be
required on man’s part.
through some operation. Hence it would do away with the
Objection 3. Further, an agent of infinite power needs
notion of grace.
no disposition in matter, since it does not even require
Objection 2. Further, whoever is going on sinning, is
matter, as appears in creation, to which grace is com-
not preparing himself to have grace. But to some who
pared, which is called “a new creature” (Gal. 6:15). But
1167
only God, Who has infinite power, causes grace, as stated sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace, and yet
above (a. 1 ). Hence no preparation is required on man’s
it is from God’s motion. But it does not suffice for merit,
part to obtain grace.
since man is not yet justified by grace, and merit can only
On the contrary, It is written (Amos 4:12): “Be pre-
arise from grace, as will be seen further on (q. 114, a. 2).
pared to meet thy God, O Israel,” and (1 Kings 7:3): “Pre-
Reply to Objection 2. Since a man cannot prepare
pare your hearts unto the Lord.”
himself for grace unless God prevent and move him to
I answer that, As stated above (q. 111, a. 2), grace is
good, it is of no account whether anyone arrive at per-
taken in two ways: first, as a habitual gift of God. Sec-
fect preparation instantaneously, or step by step. For it
ondly, as a help from God, Who moves the soul to good.
is written (Ecclus. 11:23): “It is easy in the eyes of God
Now taking grace in the first sense, a certain preparation
on a sudden to make the poor man rich.” Now it some-
of grace is required for it, since a form can only be in dis-
times happens that God moves a man to good, but not
posed matter. But if we speak of grace as it signifies a help
perfect good, and this preparation precedes grace. But
from God to move us to good, no preparation is required
He sometimes moves him suddenly and perfectly to good,
on man’s part, that, as it were, anticipates the Divine help,
and man receives grace suddenly, according to Jn. 6:45:
but rather, every preparation in man must be by the help
“Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned,
of God moving the soul to good. And thus even the good
cometh to Me.” And thus it happened to Paul, since, sud-
movement of the free-will, whereby anyone is prepared
denly when he was in the midst of sin, his heart was per-
for receiving the gift of grace is an act of the free-will
fectly moved by God to hear, to learn, to come; and hence
moved by God. And thus man is said to prepare himself,
he received grace suddenly.
according to Prov. 16:1: “It is the part of man to prepare
Reply to Objection 3. An agent of infinite power
the soul”; yet it is principally from God, Who moves the
needs no matter or disposition of matter, brought about
free-will. Hence it is said that man’s will is prepared by
by the action of something else; and yet, looking to the
God, and that man’s steps are guided by God.
condition of the thing caused, it must cause, in the thing
Reply to Objection 1. A certain preparation of man
caused, both the matter and the due disposition for the
for grace is simultaneous with the infusion of grace; and
form. So likewise, when God infuses grace into a soul, no
this operation is meritorious, not indeed of grace, which
preparation is required which He Himself does not bring
is already possessed—but of glory which is not yet pos-
about.
sessed. But there is another imperfect preparation, which
Whether grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for it, or to whoever Ia IIae q. 112 a. 3
does what he can?
Objection 1. It would seem that grace is necessarily
the potter, according to Jer. 18:6: “As clay is in the hand of
given to whoever prepares himself for grace, or to who-
the potter, so are you in My hand.” But however much the
ever does what he can, because, on Rom. 5:1, “Being jus-
clay is prepared, it does not necessarily receive its shape
tified. . . by faith, let us have peace,” etc. the gloss says:
from the potter. Hence, however much a man prepares
“God welcomes whoever flies to Him, otherwise there
himself, he does not necessarily receive grace from God.
would be injustice with Him.” But it is impossible for in-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), man’s prepara-
justice to be with God. Therefore it is impossible for God
tion for grace is from God, as Mover, and from the free-
not to welcome whoever flies to Him. Hence he receives
will, as moved. Hence the preparation may be looked at
grace of necessity.
in two ways: first, as it is from free-will, and thus there is
Objection 2. Further, Anselm says (De Casu Diaboli.
no necessity that it should obtain grace, since the gift of
iii) that the reason why God does not bestow grace on
grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But it
the devil, is that he did not wish, nor was he prepared, to
may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the Mover,
receive it. But if the cause be removed, the effect must
and thus it has a necessity—not indeed of coercion, but
needs be removed also. Therefore, if anyone is willing to
of infallibility—as regards what it is ordained to by God,
receive grace it is bestowed on them of necessity.
since God’s intention cannot fail, according to the say-
Objection 3. Further, good is diffusive of itself, as
ing of Augustine in his book on the Predestination of the
appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now the good
Saints (De Dono Persev. xiv) that “by God’s good gifts
of grace is better than the good of nature. Hence, since
whoever is liberated, is most certainly liberated.” Hence
natural forms necessarily come to disposed matter, much
if God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He
more does it seem that grace is necessarily bestowed on
moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to it,
whoever prepares himself for grace.
according to Jn. 6:45: “Every one that hath heard of the
On the contrary, Man is compared to God as clay to
Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me.”
1168
Reply to Objection 1. This gloss is speaking of such Reply to Objection 2. The first cause of the defect of
as fly to God by a meritorious act of their free-will, al-
grace is on our part; but the first cause of the bestowal of
ready “informed” with grace; for if they did not receive
grace is on God’s according to Osee 13:9: “Destruction is
grace, it would be against the justice which He Himself
thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me.”
established. Or if it refers to the movement of free-will
Reply to Objection 3. Even in natural things, the
before grace, it is speaking in the sense that man’s flight
form does not necessarily ensue the disposition of the mat-
to God is by a Divine motion, which ought not, in justice,
ter, except by the power of the agent that causes the dis-
to fail.
position.
Whether grace is greater in one than in another?
Ia IIae q. 112 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that grace is not greater in
prepares himself, only inasmuch as his free-will is pre-
one than in another. For grace is caused in us by the Di-
pared by God. Hence the first cause of this diversity is to
vine love, as stated above (q. 110, a. 1). Now it is written
be sought on the part of the God, Who dispenses His gifts
(Wis. 6:8): “He made the little and the great and He hath
of grace variously, in order that the beauty and perfection
equally care of all.” Therefore all obtain grace from Him
of the Church may result from these various degree; even
equally.
as He instituted the various conditions of things, that the
Objection 2. Further, whatever is the greatest possi-
universe might be perfect. Hence after the Apostle had
ble, cannot be more or less. But grace is the greatest pos-
said (Eph. 4:7): “To every one of us is given grace ac-
sible, since it joins us with our last end. Therefore there is
cording to the measure of the giving of Christ,” having
no greater or less in it. Hence it is not greater in one than
enumerated the various graces, he adds (Eph. 4:12): “For
in another.
the perfecting of the saints. . . for the edifying of the body
Objection 3. Further, grace is the soul’s life, as stated of Christ.”
above (q. 110, a. 1, ad 2). But there is no greater or less in
Reply to Objection 1. The Divine care may be looked
life. Hence, neither is there in grace.
at in two ways: first, as regards the Divine act, which is
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:7): “But to ev-
simple and uniform; and thus His care looks equally to
ery one of us is given grace according to the measure of
all, since by one simple act He administers great things
the giving of Christ.” Now what is given in measure, is not
and little. But, “secondly,” it may be considered in those
given to all equally. Hence all have not an equal grace.
things which come to be considered by the Divine care;
I answer that, As stated above (q. 52, Aa. 1,2; q. 56,
and thus, inequality is found, inasmuch as God by His
Aa. 1,2), habits can have a double magnitude: one, as re-
care provides greater gifts to some, and lesser gifts for
gards the end or object, as when a virtue is said to be more
others.
noble through being ordained to a greater good; the other
Reply to Objection 2. This objection is based on the
on the part of the subject, which more or less participates
first kind of magnitude of grace; since grace cannot be
in the habit inhering to it.
greater by ordaining to a greater good, but inasmuch as
Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace
it more or less ordains to a greater or less participation of
cannot be greater or less, since, of its nature, grace joins
the same good. For there may be diversity of intensity and
man to the Highest Good, which is God. But as regards
remissness, both in grace and in final glory as regards the
the subject, grace can receive more or less, inasmuch as
subjects’ participation.
one may be more perfectly enlightened by grace than an-
Reply to Objection 3. Natural life pertains to man’s
other. And a certain reason for this is on the part of him
substance, and hence cannot be more or less; but man par-
who prepares himself for grace; since he who is better pre-
takes of the life of grace accidentally, and hence man may
pared for grace, receives more grace. Yet it is not here that
possess it more or less.
we must seek the first cause of this diversity, since man
Whether man can know that he has grace?
Ia IIae q. 112 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that man can know that he
most certainly by one who has grace.
has grace. For grace by its physical reality is in the soul.
Objection 2. Further, as knowledge is a gift of God,
Now the soul has most certain knowledge of those things
so is grace. But whoever receives knowledge from God,
that are in it by their physical reality, as appears from Au-
knows that he has knowledge, according to Wis. 7:17:
gustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 31). Hence grace may be known
The Lord “hath given me the true knowledge of the things
1169
that are.” Hence, with equal reason, whoever receives self. . . but He that judgeth me is the Lord.”
grace from God, knows that he has grace.
Thirdly, things are known conjecturally by signs; and
Objection 3. Further, light is more knowable than
thus anyone may know he has grace, when he is conscious
darkness, since, according to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13), “all
of delighting in God, and of despising worldly things, and
that is made manifest is light,” Now sin, which is spiritual
inasmuch as a man is not conscious of any mortal sin. And
darkness, may be known with certainty by one that is in
thus it is written (Apoc. 2:17): “To him that overcometh I
sin. Much more, therefore, may grace, which is spiritual
will give the hidden manna. . . which no man knoweth, but
light, be known.
he that receiveth it,” because whoever receives it knows,
Objection 4. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:12):
by experiencing a certain sweetness, which he who does
“Now we have received not the Spirit of this world, but
not receive it, does not experience. Yet this knowledge is
the Spirit that is of God; that we may know the things that
imperfect; hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:4): “I am not
are given us from God.” Now grace is God’s first gift.
conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justi-
Hence, the man who receives grace by the Holy Spirit, by
fied,” since, according to Ps. 18:13: “Who can understand
the same Holy Spirit knows the grace given to him.
sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord, and from
Objection 5. Further, it was said by the Lord to Abra-
those of others spare Thy servant.”
ham (Gn. 22:12): “Now I know that thou fearest God,”
Reply to Objection 1. Those things which are in the
i.e. “I have made thee know.” Now He is speaking there
soul by their physical reality, are known through experi-
of chaste fear, which is not apart from grace. Hence a man
mental knowledge; in so far as through acts man has ex-
may know that he has grace.
perience of their inward principles: thus when we wish,
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 9:1): “Man
we perceive that we have a will; and when we exercise the
knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred.”
functions of life, we observe that there is life in us.
Now sanctifying grace maketh a man worthy of God’s
Reply to Objection 2. It is an essential condition of
love. Therefore no one can know whether he has sanc-
knowledge that a man should have certitude of the objects
tifying grace.
of knowledge; and again, it is an essential condition of
I answer that, There are three ways of knowing a
faith that a man should be certain of the things of faith,
thing: first, by revelation, and thus anyone may know that
and this, because certitude belongs to the perfection of
he has grace, for God by a special privilege reveals this at
the intellect, wherein these gifts exist. Hence, whoever
times to some, in order that the joy of safety may begin in
has knowledge or faith is certain that he has them. But it
them even in this life, and that they may carry on toilsome
is otherwise with grace and charity and such like, which
works with greater trust and greater energy, and may bear
perfect the appetitive faculty.
the evils of this present life, as when it was said to Paul (2
Reply to Objection 3. Sin has for its principal object
Cor. 12:9): “My grace is sufficient for thee.”
commutable good, which is known to us. But the object or
Secondly, a man may, of himself, know something,
end of grace is unknown to us on account of the greatness
and with certainty; and in this way no one can know that
of its light, according to 1 Tim. 6:16: “Who. . . inhabiteth
he has grace. For certitude about a thing can only be had
light inaccessible.”
when we may judge of it by its proper principle. Thus
Reply to Objection 4. The Apostle is here speaking
it is by undemonstrable universal principles that certitude
of the gifts of glory, which have been given to us in hope,
is obtained concerning demonstrative conclusions. Now
and these we know most certainly by faith, although we
no one can know he has the knowledge of a conclusion if
do not know for certain that we have grace to enable us to
he does not know its principle. But the principle of grace
merit them. Or it may be said that he is speaking of the
and its object is God, Who by reason of His very excel-
privileged knowledge, which comes of revelation. Hence
lence is unknown to us, according to Job 36:26: “Behold
he adds (1 Cor. 2:10): “But to us God hath revealed them
God is great, exceeding our knowledge.” And hence His
by His Spirit.”
presence in us and His absence cannot be known with cer-
Reply to Objection 5. What was said to Abraham
tainty, according to Job 9:11: “If He come to me, I shall
may refer to experimental knowledge which springs from
not see Him; if He depart I shall not understand.” And
deeds of which we are cognizant. For in the deed that
hence man cannot judge with certainty that he has grace,
Abraham had just wrought, he could know experimentally
according to 1 Cor. 4:3,4: “But neither do I judge my own
that he had the fear of God. Or it may refer to a revelation.
1170
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 113
Of the Effects of Grace
(In Ten Articles)
We have now to consider the effect of grace; (1) the justification of the ungodly, which is the effect of operating grace; and (2) merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) What is the justification of the ungodly?
(2) Whether grace is required for it?
(3) Whether any movement of the free-will is required?
(4) Whether a movement of faith is required?
(5) Whether a movement of the free-will against sin is required?
(6) Whether the remission of sins is to be reckoned with the foregoing?
(7) Whether the justification of the ungodly is a work of time or is sudden?
(8) Of the natural order of the things concurring to justification; (9) Whether the justification of the ungodly is God’s greatest work?
(10) Whether the justification of the ungodly is miraculous?
Whether the justification of the ungodly is the remission of sins?
Ia IIae q. 113 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the justification of
lation to the common good of society, as appears from
the ungodly is not the remission of sins. For sin is op-
Ethic. v, 1.
posed not only to justice, but to all the other virtues, as
Secondly, justice is so-called inasmuch as it implies a
stated above (q. 71, a. 1). Now justification signifies a
certain rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a
certain movement towards justice. Therefore not even re-
man, in so far as what is highest in man is subject to God,
mission of sin is justification, since movement is from one
and the inferior powers of the soul are subject to the supe-
contrary to the other.
rior, i.e. to the reason; and this disposition the Philoso-
Objection 2. Further, everything ought to be named
pher calls “justice metaphorically speaking” (Ethic. v,
from what is predominant in it, according to De Anima
11). Now this justice may be in man in two ways: first, by
ii, text. 49. Now the remission of sins is brought about
simple generation, which is from privation to form; and
chiefly by faith, according to Acts 15:9: “Purifying their
thus justification may belong even to such as are not in
hearts by faith”; and by charity, according to Prov. 10:12:
sin, when they receive this justice from God, as Adam is
“Charity covereth all sins.” Therefore the remission of
said to have received original justice. Secondly, this jus-
sins ought to be named after faith or charity rather than
tice may be brought about in man by a movement from
justice.
one contrary to the other, and thus justification implies a
Objection 3. Further, the remission of sins seems
transmutation from the state of injustice to the aforesaid
to be the same as being called, for whoever is called is
state of justice. And it is thus we are now speaking of
afar off, and we are afar off from God by sin. But one
the justification of the ungodly, according to the Apostle
is called before being justified according to Rom. 8:30:
(Rom. 4:5): “But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in
“And whom He called, them He also justified.” Therefore
Him that justifieth the ungodly,” etc. And because move-
justification is not the remission of sins.
ment is named after its term “whereto” rather than from
On the contrary, On Rom. 8:30, “Whom He called,
its term “whence,” the transmutation whereby anyone is
them He also justified,” the gloss says i.e. “by the remis-
changed by the remission of sins from the state of ungodli-
sion of sins.” Therefore the remission of sins is justifica-
ness to the state of justice, borrows its name from its term
tion.
“whereto,” and is called “justification of the ungodly.”
I answer that, Justification taken passively implies a
Reply to Objection 1. Every sin, inasmuch as it im-
movement towards heat. But since justice, by its nature,
plies the disorder of a mind not subject to God, may be
implies a certain rectitude of order, it may be taken in two
called injustice, as being contrary to the aforesaid justice,
ways: first, inasmuch as it implies a right order in man’s
according to 1 Jn. 3:4: “Whosoever committeth sin, com-
act, and thus justice is placed amongst the virtues—either
mitteth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity.” And thus the re-
as particular justice, which directs a man’s acts by regulat-
moval of any sin is called the justification of the ungodly.
ing them in relation to his fellowman—or as legal justice,
Reply to Objection 2. Faith and charity imply a spe-
which directs a man’s acts by regulating them in their re-
cial directing of the human mind to God by the intellect
1171
and will; whereas justice implies a general rectitude of orReply to Objection 3. Being called refers to God’s
der. Hence this transmutation is named after justice rather
help moving and exciting our mind to give up sin, and this
than after charity or faith.
motion of God is not the remission of sins, but its cause.
Whether the infusion of grace is required for the remission of guilt, i.e. for the justifi-Ia IIae q. 113 a. 2
cation of the ungodly?
Objection 1. It would seem that for the remission of
us, which is taken away by sin, is grace, whereby a man
guilt, which is the justification of the ungodly, no infusion
is made worthy of eternal life, from which sin shuts him
of grace is required. For anyone may be moved from one
out. Hence we could not conceive the remission of guilt,
contrary without being led to the other, if the contraries
without the infusion of grace.
are not immediate. Now the state of guilt and the state of
Reply to Objection 1. More is required for an of-
grace are not immediate contraries; for there is the middle
fender to pardon an offense, than for one who has com-
state of innocence wherein a man has neither grace nor
mitted no offense, not to be hated. For it may happen
guilt. Hence a man may be pardoned his guilt without his
amongst men that one man neither hates nor loves another.
being brought to a state of grace.
But if the other offends him, then the forgiveness of the of-
Objection 2. Further, the remission of guilt consists in fense can only spring from a special goodwill. Now God’s
the Divine imputation, according to Ps. 31:2: “Blessed is
goodwill is said to be restored to man by the gift of grace;
the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin.” Now the
and hence although a man before sinning may be without
infusion of grace puts something into our soul, as stated
grace and without guilt, yet that he is without guilt after
above (q. 110, a. 1). Hence the infusion of grace is not
sinning can only be because he has grace.
required for the remission of guilt.
Reply to Objection 2. As God’s love consists not
Objection 3. Further, no one can be subject to two
merely in the act of the Divine will but also implies a
contraries at once.
Now some sins are contraries, as
certain effect of grace, as stated above (q. 110, a. 1), so
wastefulness and miserliness. Hence whoever is subject
likewise, when God does not impute sin to a man, there
to the sin of wastefulness is not simultaneously subject to
is implied a certain effect in him to whom the sin is not
the sin of miserliness, yet it may happen that he has been
imputed; for it proceeds from the Divine love, that sin is
subject to it hitherto. Hence by sinning with the vice of
not imputed to a man by God.
wastefulness he is freed from the sin of miserliness. And
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Nup.
thus a sin is remitted without grace.
et Concup. i, 26), if to leave off sinning was the same as
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 3:24): “Justified
to have no sin, it would be enough if Scripture warned us
freely by His grace.”
thus: “ ‘My son, hast thou sinned? do so no more?’ Now
I answer that, by sinning a man offends God as stated
this is not enough, but it is added: ‘But for thy former sins
above (q. 71, a. 5 ). Now an offense is remitted to anyone,
also pray that they may be forgiven thee.’ ” For the act of
only when the soul of the offender is at peace with the
sin passes, but the guilt remains, as stated above (q. 87,
offended. Hence sin is remitted to us, when God is at
a. 6). Hence when anyone passes from the sin of one vice
peace with us, and this peace consists in the love whereby
to the sin of a contrary vice, he ceases to have the act of
God loves us. Now God’s love, considered on the part
the former sin, but he does not cease to have the guilt,
of the Divine act, is eternal and unchangeable; whereas,
hence he may have the guilt of both sins at once. For sins
as regards the effect it imprints on us, it is sometimes in-
are not contrary to each other on the part of their turning
terrupted, inasmuch as we sometimes fall short of it and
from God, wherein sin has its guilt.
once more require it. Now the effect of the Divine love in
Whether for the justification of the ungodly is required a movement of the free-will?
Ia IIae q. 113 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that no movement of
his knowing, and was regenerated”; which is effected by
the free-will is required for the justification of the un-
sanctifying grace. Now God does not confine His power
godly. For we see that by the sacrament of Baptism, in-
to the sacraments. Hence He can justify a man without the
fants and sometimes adults are justified without a move-
sacraments, and without any movement of the free-will.
ment of their free-will: hence Augustine says (Confess.
Objection 2. Further, a man has not the use of reason
iv) that when one of his friends was taken with a fever,
when asleep, and without it there can be no movement of
“he lay for a long time senseless and in a deadly sweat,
the free-will. But Solomon received from God the gift of
and when he was despaired of, he was baptized without
wisdom when asleep, as related in 3 Kings 3 and 2 Paral
1172
1. Hence with equal reason the gift of sanctifying grace ness or sleep, he does not obtain justifying grace by the
is sometimes bestowed by God on man without the move-
exterior rite of Baptism, or of any other sacrament, unless
ment of his free-will.
he intended to make use of this sacrament, and this can
Objection 3. Further, grace is preserved by the same
only be by the use of his free-will. And it was in this way
cause as brings it into being, for Augustine says (Gen. ad
that he of whom Augustine speaks was regenerated, be-
lit. viii, 12) that “so ought man to turn to God as he is ever
cause both previously and afterwards he assented to the
made just by Him.” Now grace is preserved in man with-
Baptism.
out a movement of his free-will. Hence it can be infused
Reply to Objection 2. Solomon neither merited nor
in the beginning without a movement of the free-will.
received wisdom whilst asleep; but it was declared to him
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:45): “Every one
in his sleep that on account of his previous desire wisdom
that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to
would be infused into him by God. Hence it is said in
Me.” Now to learn cannot be without a movement of the
his person (Wis. 7:7): “I wished, and understanding was
free-will, since the learner assents to the teacher. Hence,
given unto me.”
no one comes to the Father by justifying grace without a
Or it may be said that his sleep was not natural, but
movement of the free-will.
was the sleep of prophecy, according to Num. 12:6: “If
I answer that, The justification of the ungodly is
there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear
brought about by God moving man to justice. For He it
to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream.” In
is “that justifieth the ungodly” according to Rom. 4:5.
such cases the use of free-will remains.
Now God moves everything in its own manner, just as we
And yet it must be observed that the comparison be-
see that in natural things, what is heavy and what is light
tween the gift of wisdom and the gift of justifying grace
are moved differently, on account of their diverse natures.
does not hold. For the gift of justifying grace especially
Hence He moves man to justice according to the condi-
ordains a man to good, which is the object of the will;
tion of his human nature. But it is man’s proper nature
and hence a man is moved to it by a movement of the
to have free-will. Hence in him who has the use of rea-
will which is a movement of free-will. But wisdom per-
son, God’s motion to justice does not take place without
fects the intellect which precedes the will; hence without
a movement of the free-will; but He so infuses the gift of
any complete movement of the free-will, the intellect can
justifying grace that at the same time He moves the free-
be enlightened with the gift of wisdom, even as we see
will to accept the gift of grace, in such as are capable of
that things are revealed to men in sleep, according to Job
being moved thus.
33:15,16: “When deep sleep falleth upon men and they
Reply to Objection 1. Infants are not capable of the
are sleeping in their beds, then He openeth the ears of
movement of their free-will; hence it is by the mere infu-
men, and teaching, instructeth them in what they are to
sion of their souls that God moves them to justice. Now
learn.”
this cannot be brought about without a sacrament; because
Reply to Objection 3. In the infusion of justifying
as original sin, from which they are justified, does not
grace there is a certain transmutation of the human soul,
come to them from their own will, but by carnal gener-
and hence a proper movement of the human soul is re-
ation, so also is grace given them by Christ through spir-
quired in order that the soul may be moved in its own
itual regeneration. And the same reason holds good with
manner. But the conservation of grace is without trans-
madmen and idiots that have never had the use of their
mutation: no movement on the part of the soul is required
free-will. But in the case of one who has had the use of
but only a continuation of the Divine influx.
his free-will and afterwards has lost it either through sick-
Whether a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly?
Ia IIae q. 113 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that no movement of faith
and faith sins are purged away.” Hence the movement of
is required for the justification of the ungodly. For as a
faith is no more required for the justification of the un-
man is justified by faith, so also by other things, viz. by
godly, than the movements of the aforesaid virtues.
fear, of which it is written (Ecclus. 1:27): “The fear of
Objection 2. Further, the act of faith is required for
the Lord driveth out sin, for he that is without fear can-
justification only inasmuch as a man knows God by faith.
not be justified”; and again by charity, according to Lk.
But a man may know God in other ways, viz. by natural
7:47: “Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved
knowledge, and by the gift of wisdom. Hence no act of
much”; and again by humility, according to James 4:6:
faith is required for the justification of the ungodly.
“God resisteth the proud and giveth grace to the humble”;
Objection 3.
Further, there are several articles of
and again by mercy, according to Prov. 15:27: “By mercy
faith. Therefore if the act of faith is required for the jus-
1173
tification of the ungodly, it would seem that a man ought of filial fear and an act of humility also concur. For it
to think on every article of faith when he is first justified.
may happen that one and the same act of free-will springs
But this seems inconvenient, since such thought would re-
from different virtues, when one commands and another
quire a long delay of time. Hence it seems that an act of
is commanded, inasmuch as the act may be ordained to
faith is not required for the justification of the ungodly.
various ends. But the act of mercy counteracts sin either
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:1): “Being
by way of satisfying for it, and thus it follows justification; justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God.”
or by way of preparation, inasmuch as the merciful obtain
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3) a movement of
mercy; and thus it can either precede justification, or con-
free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly,
cur with the other virtues towards justification, inasmuch
inasmuch as man’s mind is moved by God. Now God
as mercy is included in the love of our neighbor.
moves man’s soul by turning it to Himself according to
Reply to Objection 2. By natural knowledge a man is
Ps. 84:7 (Septuagint): “Thou wilt turn us, O God, and
not turned to God, according as He is the object of beati-
bring us to life.” Hence for the justification of the un-
tude and the cause of justification. Hence such knowledge
godly a movement of the mind is required, by which it is
does not suffice for justification. But the gift of wisdom
turned to God. Now the first turning to God is by faith,
presupposes the knowledge of faith, as stated above (q. 68,
according to Heb. 11:6: “He that cometh to God must be-
a. 4, ad 3).
lieve that He is.” Hence a movement of faith is required
Reply to Objection 3. As the Apostle says (Rom.
for the justification of the ungodly.
4:5), “to him that. . . believeth in Him that justifieth the
Reply to Objection 1. The movement of faith is not
ungodly his faith is reputed to justice, according to the
perfect unless it is quickened by charity; hence in the
purpose of the grace of God.” Hence it is clear that in the
justification of the ungodly, a movement of charity is in-
justification of the ungodly an act of faith is required in or-
fused together with the movement of faith. Now free-will
der that a man may believe that God justifies man through
is moved to God by being subject to Him; hence an act
the mystery of Christ.
Whether for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the free-Ia IIae q. 113 a. 5
will towards sin?
Objection 1. It would seem that no movement of the
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 31:5): “I will con-
free-will towards sin is required for the justification of the
fess against myself my injustice to the Lord; and Thou
ungodly. For charity alone suffices to take away sin, ac-
hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin.”
cording to Prov. 10:12: “Charity covereth all sins.” Now
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the justification the object of charity is not sin. Therefore for this justifica-of the ungodly is a certain movement whereby the human
tion of the ungodly no movement of the free-will towards
mind is moved by God from the state of sin to the state
sin is required.
of justice. Hence it is necessary for the human mind to
Objection 2. Further, whoever is tending onward,
regard both extremes by an act of free-will, as a body in
ought not to look back, according to Phil. 3:13,14: “For-
local movement is related to both terms of the movement.
getting the things that are behind, and stretching forth my-
Now it is clear that in local movement the moving body
self to those that are before, I press towards the mark,
leaves the term “whence” and nears the term “whereto.”
to the prize of the supernal vocation.” But whoever is
Hence the human mind whilst it is being justified, must,
stretching forth to righteousness has his sins behind him.
by a movement of its free-will withdraw from sin and
Hence he ought to forget them, and not stretch forth to
draw near to justice.
them by a movement of his free-will.
Now to withdraw from sin and to draw near to justice,
Objection 3. Further, in the justification of the un-
in an act of free-will, means detestation and desire. For
godly one sin is not remitted without another, for “it is
Augustine says on the words “the hireling fleeth,” etc. (Jn.
irreverent to expect half a pardon from God”∗. Hence,
10:12): “Our emotions are the movements of our soul; joy
in the justification of the ungodly, if man’s free-will must
is the soul’s outpouring; fear is the soul’s flight; your soul
move against sin, he ought to think of all his sins. But this
goes forward when you seek; your soul flees, when you
is unseemly, both because a great space of time would be
are afraid.” Hence in the justification of the ungodly there
required for such thought, and because a man could not
must be two acts of the free-will—one, whereby it tends
obtain the forgiveness of such sins as he had forgotten.
to God’s justice; the other whereby it hates sin.
Hence for the justification of the ungodly no movement
Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to the same virtue to
of the free-will is required.
seek one contrary and to avoid the other; and hence, as it
∗ Cap., Sunt. plures: Dist. iii, De Poenit.
1174
belongs to charity to love God, so likewise, to detest sin must detest each sin he remembers to have committed,
whereby the soul is separated from God.
and from this remembrance the soul goes on to have a
Reply to Objection 2. A man ought not to return to
general movement of detestation with regard to all sins
those things that are behind, by loving them; but, for that
committed, in which are included such sins as have been
matter, he ought to forget them, lest he be drawn to them.
forgotten. For a man is then in such a frame of mind that
Yet he ought to recall them to mind, in order to detest
he would be sorry even for those he does not remember,
them; for this is to fly from them.
if they were present to his memory; and this movement
Reply to Objection 3. Previous to justification a man
cooperates in his justification.
Whether the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst the things required for Ia IIae q. 113 a. 6
justification?
Objection 1. It would seem that the remission of sins
ungodly is a movement whereby the soul is moved by God
ought not to be reckoned amongst the things required for
from a state of sin to a state of justice. Now in the move-
justification. For the substance of a thing is not reckoned
ment whereby one thing is moved by another, three things
together with those that are required for a thing; thus a
are required: first, the motion of the mover; secondly, the
man is not reckoned together with his body and soul. But
movement of the moved; thirdly, the consummation of the
the justification of the ungodly is itself the remission of
movement, or the attainment of the end. On the part of the
sins, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore the remission of
Divine motion, there is the infusion of grace; on the part of
sins ought not to be reckoned among the things required
the free-will which is moved, there are two movements—
for the justification of the ungodly.
of departure from the term “whence,” and of approach to
Objection 2. Further, infusion of grace and remis-
the term “whereto”; but the consummation of the move-
sion of sins are the same; as illumination and expulsion
ment or the attainment of the end of the movement is im-
of darkness are the same. But a thing ought not to be
plied in the remission of sins; for in this is the justification reckoned together with itself; for unity is opposed to mul-of the ungodly completed.
titude. Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be
Reply to Objection 1. The justification of the ungodly
reckoned with the infusion of grace.
is called the remission of sins, even as every movement
Objection 3. Further, the remission of sin follows as
has its species from its term. Nevertheless, many other
effect from cause, from the free-will’s movement towards
things are required in order to reach the term, as stated
God and sin; since it is by faith and contrition that sin is
above (a. 5).
forgiven. But an effect ought not to be reckoned with its
Reply to Objection 2. The infusion of grace and the
cause; since things thus enumerated together, and, as it
remission of sin may be considered in two ways: first,
were, condivided, are by nature simultaneous. Hence the
with respect to the substance of the act, and thus they are
remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the things
the same; for by the same act God bestows grace and re-
required for the justification of the ungodly.
mits sin. Secondly, they may be considered on the part of
On the contrary, In reckoning what is required for a
the objects; and thus they differ by the difference between
thing we ought not to pass over the end, which is the chief
guilt, which is taken away, and grace, which is infused;
part of everything. Now the remission of sins is the end of
just as in natural things generation and corruption differ,
the justification of the ungodly; for it is written (Is. 27:9): although the generation of one thing is the corruption of
“This is all the fruit, that the sin thereof should be taken
another.
away.” Hence the remission of sins ought to be reckoned
Reply to Objection 3. This enumeration is not the
amongst the things required for justification.
division of a genus into its species, in which the things
I answer that, There are four things which are ac-
enumerated must be simultaneous; but it is division of the
counted to be necessary for the justification of the un-
things required for the completion of anything; and in this
godly, viz. the infusion of grace, the movement of the
enumeration we may have what precedes and what fol-
free-will towards God by faith, the movement of the free-
lows, since some of the principles and parts of a compos-
will towards sin, and the remission of sins. The reason for
ite thing may precede and some follow.
this is that, as stated above (a. 1), the justification of the
1175
Whether the justification of the ungodly takes place in an instant or successively?
Ia IIae q. 113 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the justification of the by grace that free-will is moved and sin is remitted. Now
ungodly does not take place in an instant, but successively,
the infusion of grace takes place in an instant and without
since, as already stated (a. 3), for the justification of the
succession. And the reason of this is that if a form be not
ungodly, there is required a movement of free-will. Now
suddenly impressed upon its subject, it is either because
the act of the free-will is choice, which requires the de-
that subject is not disposed, or because the agent needs
liberation of counsel, as stated above (q. 13, a. 1). Hence,
time to dispose the subject. Hence we see that immedi-
since deliberation implies a certain reasoning process, and
ately the matter is disposed by a preceding alteration, the
this implies succession, the justification of the ungodly
substantial form accrues to the matter; thus because the
would seem to be successive.
atmosphere of itself is disposed to receive light, it is sud-
Objection 2. Further, the free-will’s movement is not
denly illuminated by a body actually luminous. Now it
without actual consideration. But it is impossible to un-
was stated (q. 112, a. 2) that God, in order to infuse grace
derstand many things actually and at once, as stated above
into the soul, needs no disposition, save what He Him-
( Ia, q. 85, a. 4). Hence, since for the justification of the
self has made. And sometimes this sufficient disposition
ungodly there is required a movement of the free-will to-
for the reception of grace He makes suddenly, sometimes
wards several things, viz. towards God and towards sin, it
gradually and successively, as stated above (q. 112, a. 2,
would seem impossible for the justification of the ungodly
ad 2). For the reason why a natural agent cannot sud-
to be in an instant.
denly dispose matter is that in the matter there is a re-
Objection 3. Further, a form that may be greater or
sistant which has some disproportion with the power of
less, e.g. blackness or whiteness, is received successively
the agent; and hence we see that the stronger the agent,
by its subject. Now grace may be greater or less, as stated
the more speedily is the matter disposed. Therefore, since
above (q. 112, a. 4). Hence it is not received suddenly by
the Divine power is infinite, it can suddenly dispose any
its subject. Therefore, seeing that the infusion of grace
matter whatsoever to its form; and much more man’s free-
is required for the justification of the ungodly, it would
will, whose movement is by nature instantaneous. There-
seem that the justification of the ungodly cannot be in an
fore the justification of the ungodly by God takes place in
instant.
an instant.
Objection 4.
Further, the free-will’s movement,
Reply to Objection 1. The movement of the free-will,
which cooperates in justification, is meritorious; and
which concurs in the justification of the ungodly, is a con-
hence it must proceed from grace, without which there
sent to detest sin, and to draw near to God; and this con-
is no merit, as we shall state further on (q. 114, a. 2).
sent takes place suddenly. Sometimes, indeed, it happens
Now a thing receives its form before operating by this
that deliberation precedes, yet this is not of the substance
form. Hence grace is first infused, and then the free-will is
of justification, but a way of justification; as local move-
moved towards God and to detest sin. Hence justification
ment is a way of illumination, and alteration to generation.
is not all at once.
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above ( Ia, q. 85,
Objection 5. Further, if grace is infused into the soul, a. 5), there is nothing to prevent two things being under-there must be an instant when it first dwells in the soul;
stood at once, in so far as they are somehow one; thus we
so, too, if sin is forgiven there must be a last instant that
understand the subject and predicate together, inasmuch
man is in sin. But it cannot be the same instant, otherwise
as they are united in the order of one affirmation. And
opposites would be in the same simultaneously. Hence
in the same manner can the free-will be moved to two
they must be two successive instants; between which there
things at once in so far as one is ordained to the other.
must be time, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, 1). There-
Now the free-will’s movement towards sin is ordained to
fore the justification of the ungodly takes place not all at
the free-will’s movement towards God, since a man de-
once, but successively.
tests sin, as contrary to God, to Whom he wishes to cling.
On the contrary, The justification of the ungodly is
Hence in the justification of the ungodly the free-will si-
caused by the justifying grace of the Holy Spirit. Now the
multaneously detests sin and turns to God, even as a body
Holy Spirit comes to men’s minds suddenly, according to
approaches one point and withdraws from another simul-
Acts 2:2: “And suddenly there came a sound from heaven
taneously.
as of a mighty wind coming,” upon which the gloss says
Reply to Objection 3. The reason why a form is not
that “the grace of the Holy Ghost knows no tardy efforts.”
received instantaneously in the matter is not the fact that
Hence the justification of the ungodly is not successive,
it can inhere more or less; for thus the light would not be
but instantaneous.
suddenly received in the air, which can be illumined more
I answer that, The entire justification of the ungodly
or less. But the reason is to be sought on the part of the
consists as to its origin in the infusion of grace. For it is
disposition of the matter or subject, as stated above.
1176
Reply to Objection 4. The same instant the form is has the form which is the term of the movement.
acquired, the thing begins to operate with the form; as
But in those that are above time, it is otherwise. For if
fire, the instant it is generated moves upwards, and if its
there be any succession of affections or intellectual con-
movement was instantaneous, it would be terminated in
ceptions in them (as in the angels), such succession is not
the same instant. Now to will and not to will—the move-
measured by continuous time, but by discrete time, even
ments of the free-will—are not successive, but instanta-
as the things measured are not continuous, as stated above
neous. Hence the justification of the ungodly must not be
( Ia, q. 53, Aa. 2,3). In these, therefore, there is a last in-
successive.
stant in which the preceding is, and a first instant in which
Reply to Objection 5. The succession of opposites
the subsequent is. Nor must there be time in between,
in the same subject must be looked at differently in the
since there is no continuity of time, which this would ne-
things that are subject to time and in those that are above
cessitate.
time. For in those that are in time, there is no last instant in Now the human mind, which is justified, is, in itself,
which the previous form inheres in the subject; but there is
above time, but is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch
the last time, and the first instant that the subsequent form
as it understands with continuity and time, with respect
inheres in the matter or subject; and this for the reason,
to the phantasms in which it considers the intelligible
that in time we are not to consider one instant, since nei-
species, as stated above ( Ia, q. 85, Aa. 1,2). We must,
ther do instants succeed each other immediately in time,
therefore, decide from this about its change as regards the
nor points in a line, as is proved in Physic. vi, 1. But time
condition of temporal movements, i.e. we must say that
is terminated by an instant. Hence in the whole of the pre-
there is no last instant that sin inheres, but a last time;
vious time wherein anything is moving towards its form,
whereas there is a first instant that grace inheres; and in
it is under the opposite form; but in the last instant of this
all the time previous sin inhered.
time, which is the first instant of the subsequent time, it
Whether the infusion of grace is naturally the first of the things required for the jus-Ia IIae q. 113 a. 8
tification of the ungodly?
Objection 1. It would seem that the infusion of grace
wards God; the third, the free-will’s movement towards
is not what is naturally required first for the justification of sin; the fourth, the remission of sin.
the ungodly. For we withdraw from evil before drawing
The reason for this is that in every movement the mo-
near to good, according to Ps. 33:15: “Turn away from
tion of the mover is naturally first; the disposition of the
evil, and do good.” Now the remission of sins regards the
matter, or the movement of the moved, is second; the end
turning away from evil, and the infusion of grace regards
or term of the movement in which the motion of the mover
the turning to good. Hence the remission of sin is natu-
rests, is last. Now the motion of God the Mover is the in-
rally before the infusion of grace.
fusion of grace, as stated above (a. 6); the movement or
Objection 2. Further, the disposition naturally pre-
disposition of the moved is the free-will’s double move-
cedes the form to which it disposes. Now the free-will’s
ment; and the term or end of the movement is the remis-
movement is a disposition for the reception of grace.
sion of sin, as stated above (a. 6). Hence in their natural
Therefore it naturally precedes the infusion of grace.
order the first in the justification of the ungodly is the in-
Objection 3. Further, sin hinders the soul from tend-
fusion of grace; the second is the free-will’s movement to-
ing freely to God. Now a hindrance to movement must
wards God; the third is the free-will’s movement towards
be removed before the movement takes place. Hence the
sin, for he who is being justified detests sin because it is
remission of sin and the free-will’s movement towards sin
against God, and thus the free-will’s movement towards
are naturally before the infusion of grace.
God naturally precedes the free-will’s movement towards
On the contrary, The cause is naturally prior to its
sin, since it is its cause and reason; the fourth and last
effect. Now the infusion of grace is the cause of whatever
is the remission of sin, to which this transmutation is or-
is required for the justification of the ungodly, as stated
dained as to an end, as stated above (Aa. 1,6).
above (a. 7). Therefore it is naturally prior to it.
Reply to Objection 1. The withdrawal from one term
I answer that, The aforesaid four things required for
and approach to another may be looked at in two ways:
the justification of the ungodly are simultaneous in time,
first, on the part of the thing moved, and thus the with-
since the justification of the ungodly is not successive, as
drawal from a term naturally precedes the approach to
stated above (a. 7); but in the order of nature, one is prior
a term, since in the subject of movement the opposite
to another; and in their natural order the first is the in-
which is put away is prior to the opposite which the sub-
fusion of grace; the second, the free-will’s movement to-
ject moved attains to by its movement. But on the part of
1177
the agent it is the other way about, since the agent, by the sin and of obtaining of justice.
form pre-existing in it, acts for the removal of the oppo-
Reply to Objection 2. The disposition of the subject
site form; as the sun by its light acts for the removal of
precedes the reception of the form, in the order of nature;
darkness, and hence on the part of the sun, illumination is
yet it follows the action of the agent, whereby the subject
prior to the removal of darkness; but on the part of the at-
is disposed. And hence the free-will’s movement precedes
mosphere to be illuminated, to be freed from darkness is,
the reception of grace in the order of nature, and follows
in the order of nature, prior to being illuminated, although
the infusion of grace.
both are simultaneous in time. And since the infusion of
Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Phys.
grace and the remission of sin regard God Who justifies,
ii, 9), in movements of the soul the movement toward the
hence in the order of nature the infusion of grace is prior to
speculative principle or the practical end is the very first,
the freeing from sin. But if we look at what is on the part
but in exterior movements the removal of the impediment
of the man justified, it is the other way about, since in the
precedes the attainment of the end. And as the free-will’s
order of nature the being freed from sin is prior to the ob-
movement is a movement of the soul, in the order of na-
taining of justifying grace. Or it may be said that the term
ture it moves towards God as to its end, before removing
“whence” of justification is sin; and the term “whereto” is
the impediment of sin.
justice; and that grace is the cause of the forgiveness of
Whether the justification of the ungodly is God’s greatest work?
Ia IIae q. 113 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that the justification of the is made from nothing; secondly, a work may be called
ungodly is not God’s greatest work. For it is by the justi-
great on account of what is made, and thus the justifica-
fication of the ungodly that we attain the grace of a way-
tion of the ungodly, which terminates at the eternal good
farer. Now by glorification we receive heavenly grace,
of a share in the Godhead, is greater than the creation of
which is greater. Hence the glorification of angels and
heaven and earth, which terminates at the good of mutable
men is a greater work than the justification of the ungodly.
nature. Hence, Augustine, after saying that “for a just man
Objection 2. Further, the justification of the ungodly
to be made from a sinner is greater than to create heaven
is ordained to the particular good of one man. But the
and earth,” adds, “for heaven and earth shall pass away,
good of the universe is greater than the good of one man,
but the justification of the ungodly shall endure.”
as is plain from Ethic. i, 2. Hence the creation of heaven
Again, we must bear in mind that a thing is called great
and earth is a greater work than the justification of the un-
in two ways: first, in an absolute quantity, and thus the gift
godly.
of glory is greater than the gift of grace that sanctifies the
Objection 3. Further, to make something from noth-
ungodly; and in this respect the glorification of the just is
ing, where there is nought to cooperate with the agent,
greater than the justification of the ungodly. Secondly,
is greater than to make something with the cooperation
a thing may be said to be great in proportionate quan-
of the recipient. Now in the work of creation something
tity, and thus the gift of grace that justifies the ungodly is
is made from nothing, and hence nothing can cooperate
greater than the gift of glory that beatifies the just, for the with the agent; but in the justification of the ungodly God
gift of grace exceeds the worthiness of the ungodly, who
makes something from something, i.e. a just man from
are worthy of punishment, more than the gift of glory ex-
a sinner, and there is a cooperation on man’s part, since
ceeds the worthiness of the just, who by the fact of their
there is a movement of the free-will, as stated above (a. 3).
justification are worthy of glory. Hence Augustine says:
Hence the justification of the ungodly is not God’s great-
“Let him that can, judge whether it is greater to create the
est work.
angels just, than to justify the ungodly. Certainly, if they
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 144:9): “His ten-
both betoken equal power, one betokens greater mercy.”
der mercies are over all His works,” and in a collect∗ we
And thus the reply to the first is clear.
say: “O God, Who dost show forth Thine all-mightiness
Reply to Objection 2. The good of the universe is
most by pardoning and having mercy,” and Augustine, ex-
greater than the particular good of one, if we consider both
pounding the words, “greater than these shall he do” (Jn.
in the same genus. But the good of grace in one is greater
14:12) says that “for a just man to be made from a sinner,
than the good of nature in the whole universe.
is greater than to create heaven and earth.”
Reply to Objection 3. This objection rests on the
I answer that, A work may be called great in two
manner of acting, in which way creation is God’s great-
ways: first, on the part of the mode of action, and thus the
est work.
work of creation is the greatest work, wherein something
∗ Tenth Sunday after Pentecost
1178
Whether the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work?
Ia IIae q. 113 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that the justification of
to the likeness of God, it is fit to receive God by grace, as
the ungodly is a miraculous work. For miraculous works
Augustine says, in the above quotation.
are greater than non-miraculous. Now the justification of
Thirdly, in miraculous works something is found be-
the ungodly is greater than the other miraculous works, as
sides the usual and customary order of causing an ef-
is clear from the quotation from Augustine (a. 9). Hence
fect, as when a sick man suddenly and beyond the wonted
the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work.
course of healing by nature or art, receives perfect health;
Objection 2. Further, the movement of the will in the
and thus the justification of the ungodly is sometimes
soul is like the natural inclination in natural things. But
miraculous and sometimes not.
For the common and
when God works in natural things against their inclina-
wonted course of justification is that God moves the soul
tion of their nature, it is a miraculous work, as when He
interiorly and that man is converted to God, first by an
gave sight to the blind or raised the dead. Now the will
imperfect conversion, that it may afterwards become per-
of the ungodly is bent on evil. Hence, since God in jus-
fect; because “charity begun merits increase, and when
tifying a man moves him to good, it would seem that the
increased merits perfection,” as Augustine says (In Epist.
justification of the ungodly is miraculous.
Joan. Tract. v). Yet God sometimes moves the soul so ve-
Objection 3. Further, as wisdom is a gift of God, so
hemently that it reaches the perfection of justice at once,
also is justice. Now it is miraculous that anyone should
as took place in the conversion of Paul, which was accom-
suddenly obtain wisdom from God without study. There-
panied at the same time by a miraculous external prostra-
fore it is miraculous that the ungodly should be justified
tion. Hence the conversion of Paul is commemorated in
by God.
the Church as miraculous.
On the contrary, Miraculous works are beyond natu-
Reply to Objection 1. Certain miraculous works, al-
ral power. Now the justification of the ungodly is not be-
though they are less than the justification of the ungodly,
yond natural power; for Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.
as regards the good caused, are beyond the wonted order
v) that “to be capable of having faith and to be capable of
of such effects, and thus have more of the nature of a mir-
having charity belongs to man’s nature; but to have faith
acle.
and charity belongs to the grace of the faithful.” Therefore
Reply to Objection 2. It is not a miraculous work,
the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous.
whenever a natural thing is moved contrary to its incli-
I answer that, In miraculous works it is usual to find
nation, otherwise it would be miraculous for water to be
three things: the first is on the part of the active power, be-
heated, or for a stone to be thrown upwards; but only
cause they can only be performed by Divine power; and
whenever this takes place beyond the order of the proper
they are simply wondrous, since their cause is hidden, as
cause, which naturally does this. Now no other cause save
stated above ( Ia, q. 105, a. 7). And thus both the justifi-
God can justify the ungodly, even as nothing save fire can
cation of the ungodly and the creation of the world, and,
heat water. Hence the justification of the ungodly by God
generally speaking, every work that can be done by God
is not miraculous in this respect.
alone, is miraculous.
Reply to Objection 3. A man naturally acquires wis-
Secondly, in certain miraculous works it is found that
dom and knowledge from God by his own talent and
the form introduced is beyond the natural power of such
study. Hence it is miraculous when a man is made wise or
matter, as in the resurrection of the dead, life is above the
learned outside this order. But a man does not naturally
natural power of such a body. And thus the justification
acquire justifying grace by his own action, but by God’s.
of the ungodly is not miraculous, because the soul is nat-
Hence there is no parity.
urally capable of grace; since from its having been made
1179
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 114
Of Merit
(In Ten Articles)
We must now consider merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace; and under this head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a man can merit anything from God?
(2) Whether without grace anyone can merit eternal life?
(3) Whether anyone with grace may merit eternal life condignly?
(4) Whether it is chiefly through the instrumentality of charity that grace is the principle of merit?
(5) Whether a man may merit the first grace for himself?
(6) Whether he may merit it for someone else?
(7) Whether anyone can merit restoration after sin?
(8) Whether he can merit for himself an increase of grace or charity?
(9) Whether he can merit final perseverance?
(10) Whether temporal goods fall under merit?
Whether a man may merit anything from God?
Ia IIae q. 114 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that a man can merit noth-
tween those that are simply equal; but where there is no
ing from God. For no one, it would seem, merits by giv-
absolute equality between them, neither is there absolute
ing another his due. But by all the good we do, we cannot
justice, but there may be a certain manner of justice, as
make sufficient return to God, since yet more is His due,
when we speak of a father’s or a master’s right (Ethic. v,
as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14). Hence it
6), as the Philosopher says. And hence where there is jus-
is written (Lk. 17:10): “When you have done all these
tice simply, there is the character of merit and reward sim-
things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable
ply. But where there is no simple right, but only relative,
servants; we have done that which we ought to do.” There-
there is no character of merit simply, but only relatively,
fore a man can merit nothing from God.
in so far as the character of justice is found there, since the Objection 2. Further, it would seem that a man mer-child merits something from his father and the slave from
its nothing from God, by what profits himself only, and
his lord.
profits God nothing. Now by acting well, a man prof-
Now it is clear that between God and man there is the
its himself or another man, but not God, for it is written
greatest inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all
(Job 35:7): “If thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him,
man’s good is from God. Hence there can be no justice of
or what shall He receive of thy hand.” Hence a man can
absolute equality between man and God, but only of a cer-
merit nothing from God.
tain proportion, inasmuch as both operate after their own
Objection 3. Further, whoever merits anything from
manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue
another makes him his debtor; for a man’s wage is a debt
is in man from God. Hence man’s merit with God only
due to him. Now God is no one’s debtor; hence it is writ-
exists on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, so
ten (Rom. 11:35): “Who hath first given to Him, and rec-
that man obtains from God, as a reward of his operation,
ompense shall be made to him?” Hence no one can merit
what God gave him the power of operation for, even as
anything from God.
natural things by their proper movements and operations
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 31:16): “There is
obtain that to which they were ordained by God; differ-
a reward for thy work.” Now a reward means something
ently, indeed, since the rational creature moves itself to
bestowed by reason of merit. Hence it would seem that a
act by its free-will, hence its action has the character of
man may merit from God.
merit, which is not so in other creatures.
I answer that, Merit and reward refer to the same,
Reply to Objection 1. Man merits, inasmuch as he
for a reward means something given anyone in return for
does what he ought, by his free-will; otherwise the act of
work or toil, as a price for it. Hence, as it is an act of jus-
justice whereby anyone discharges a debt would not be
tice to give a just price for anything received from another,
meritorious.
so also is it an act of justice to make a return for work or
Reply to Objection 2. God seeks from our goods not
toil. Now justice is a kind of equality, as is clear from the
profit, but glory, i.e. the manifestation of His goodness;
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3), and hence justice is simply be-
even as He seeks it also in His own works. Now nothing
1180
accrues to Him, but only to ourselves, by our worship of acter of merit, only on the presupposition of the Divine
Him. Hence we merit from God, not that by our works
ordination, it does not follow that God is made our debtor
anything accrues to Him, but inasmuch as we work for
simply, but His own, inasmuch as it is right that His will
His glory.
should be carried out.
Reply to Objection 3. Since our action has the char-
Whether anyone without grace can merit eternal life?
Ia IIae q. 114 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that without grace anyone
seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of
can merit eternal life. For man merits from God what he is
man.” And hence it is that no created nature is a sufficient
divinely ordained to, as stated above (a. 1). Now man by
principle of an act meritorious of eternal life, unless there
his nature is ordained to beatitude as his end; hence, too,
is added a supernatural gift, which we call grace. But if
he naturally wishes to be blessed. Hence man by his nat-
we speak of man as existing in sin, a second reason is
ural endowments and without grace can merit beatitude
added to this, viz. the impediment of sin. For since sin is
which is eternal life.
an offense against God, excluding us from eternal life, as
Objection 2. Further, the less a work is due, the more
is clear from what has been said above (q. 71, a. 6; q. 113,
meritorious it is. Now, less due is that work which is done
a. 2), no one existing in a state of mortal sin can merit
by one who has received fewer benefits. Hence, since he
eternal life unless first he be reconciled to God, through
who has only natural endowments has received fewer gifts
his sin being forgiven, which is brought about by grace.
from God, than he who has gratuitous gifts as well as na-
For the sinner deserves not life, but death, according to
ture, it would seem that his works are more meritorious
Rom. 6:23: “The wages of sin is death.”
with God. And thus if he who has grace can merit eternal
Reply to Objection 1. God ordained human nature
life to some extent, much more may he who has no grace.
to attain the end of eternal life, not by its own strength,
Objection 3. Further, God’s mercy and liberality in-
but by the help of grace; and in this way its act can be
finitely surpass human mercy and liberality. Now a man
meritorious of eternal life.
may merit from another, even though he has not hitherto
Reply to Objection 2. Without grace a man cannot
had his grace. Much more, therefore, would it seem that a
have a work equal to a work proceeding from grace, since
man without grace may merit eternal life.
the more perfect the principle, the more perfect the ac-
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom.
6:23):
tion. But the objection would hold good, if we supposed
“The grace of God, life everlasting.”
the operations equal in both cases.
I answer that, Man without grace may be looked at in
Reply to Objection 3. With regard to the first reason
two states, as was said above (q. 109, a. 2): the first, a state adduced, the case is different in God and in man. For a
of perfect nature, in which Adam was before his sin; the
man receives all his power of well-doing from God, and
second, a state of corrupt nature, in which we are before
not from man. Hence a man can merit nothing from God
being restored by grace. Therefore, if we speak of man
except by His gift, which the Apostle expresses aptly say-
in the first state, there is only one reason why man can-
ing (Rom. 11:35): “Who hath first given to Him, and
not merit eternal life without grace, by his purely natural
recompense shall be made to him?” But man may merit
endowments, viz. because man’s merit depends on the Di-
from man, before he has received anything from him, by
vine pre-ordination. Now no act of anything whatsoever
what he has received from God.
is divinely ordained to anything exceeding the proportion
But as regards the second proof taken from the im-
of the powers which are the principles of its act; for it is
pediment of sin, the case is similar with man and God,
a law of Divine providence that nothing shall act beyond
since one man cannot merit from another whom he has
its powers. Now everlasting life is a good exceeding the
offended, unless he makes satisfaction to him and is rec-
proportion of created nature; since it exceeds its knowl-
onciled.
edge and desire, according to 1 Cor. 2:9: “Eye hath not
Whether a man in grace can merit eternal life condignly?
Ia IIae q. 114 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that a man in grace cannot
ferings of the saints would seem the most meritorious.
merit eternal life condignly, for the Apostle says (Rom.
Therefore no works of men are meritorious of eternal life
8:18): “The sufferings of this time are not worthy [condig-
condignly.
nae] to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be
Objection 2. Further, on Rom. 6:23, “The grace of
revealed in us.” But of all meritorious works, the suf-
God, life everlasting,” a gloss says: “He might have truly
1181
said: ‘The wages of justice, life everlasting’; but He pre-for it would seem congruous that, if a man does what he
ferred to say ‘The grace of God, life everlasting,’ that we
can, God should reward him according to the excellence
may know that God leads us to life everlasting of His own
of his power.
mercy and not by our merits.” Now when anyone merits
If, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch
something condignly he receives it not from mercy, but
as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving
from merit. Hence it would seem that a man with grace
us to life everlasting, it is meritorious of life everlasting
cannot merit life everlasting condignly.
condignly. For thus the value of its merit depends upon
Objection 3. Further, merit that equals the reward,
the power of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting
would seem to be condign. Now no act of the present life
according to Jn. 4:14: “Shall become in him a fount of
can equal everlasting life, which surpasses our knowledge
water springing up into life everlasting.” And the worth of
and our desire, and moreover, surpasses the charity or love
the work depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man,
of the wayfarer, even as it exceeds nature. Therefore with
being made a partaker of the Divine Nature, is adopted as
grace a man cannot merit eternal life condignly.
a son of God, to whom the inheritance is due by right of
On the contrary, What is granted in accordance with
adoption, according to Rom. 8:17: “If sons, heirs also.”
a fair judgment, would seem a condign reward. But life
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking of the
everlasting is granted by God, in accordance with the
substance of these sufferings.
judgment of justice, according to 2 Tim. 4:8: “As to the
Reply to Objection 2. This saying is to be under-
rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the
stood of the first cause of our reaching everlasting life,
Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day.” There-
viz. God’s mercy. But our merit is a subsequent cause.
fore man merits everlasting life condignly.
Reply to Objection 3. The grace of the Holy Ghost
I answer that, Man’s meritorious work may be con-
which we have at present, although unequal to glory in
sidered in two ways: first, as it proceeds from free-will;
act, is equal to it virtually as the seed of a tree, wherein
secondly, as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost.
the whole tree is virtually. So likewise by grace of the
If it is considered as regards the substance of the work,
Holy Ghost dwells in man; and He is a sufficient cause
and inasmuch as it springs from the free-will, there can
of life everlasting; hence, 2 Cor. 1:22, He is called the
be no condignity because of the very great inequality. But
“pledge” of our inheritance.
there is congruity, on account of an equality of proportion:
Whether grace is the principle of merit through charity rather than the other virtues?
Ia IIae q. 114 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that grace is not the prin-
him and will manifest Myself to him.” Now everlasting
ciple of merit through charity rather than the other virtues.
life consists in the manifest knowledge of God, accord-
For wages are due to work, according to Mat. 20:8: “Call
ing to Jn. 17:3: “This is eternal life: that they may know
the laborers and pay them their hire.” Now every virtue is
Thee, the only true” and living “God.” Hence the merit of
a principle of some operation, since virtue is an operative
eternal life rests chiefly with charity.
habit, as stated above (q. 55, a. 2). Hence every virtue is
I answer that, As we may gather from what has been
equally a principle of merit.
stated above (a. 1), human acts have the nature of merit
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:8):
from two causes: first and chiefly from the Divine ordina-
“Every man shall receive his own reward according to his
tion, inasmuch as acts are said to merit that good to which
labor.” Now charity lessens rather than increases the la-
man is divinely ordained. Secondly, on the part of free-
bor, because as Augustine says (De Verbis Dom., Serm.
will, inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has the
lxx), “love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and
power of voluntary acts by acting by himself. And in both
next to nothing.” Hence charity is no greater principle of
these ways does merit chiefly rest with charity. For we
merit than any other virtue.
must bear in mind that everlasting life consists in the en-
Objection 3. Further, the greatest principle of merit
joyment of God. Now the human mind’s movement to
would seem to be the one whose acts are most meritori-
the fruition of the Divine good is the proper act of char-
ous. But the acts of faith and patience or fortitude would
ity, whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained
seem to be the most meritorious, as appears in the mar-
to this end, since all the other virtues are commanded by
tyrs, who strove for the faith patiently and bravely even
charity. Hence the merit of life everlasting pertains first
till death. Hence other virtues are a greater principle of
to charity, and secondly, to the other virtues, inasmuch
merit than charity.
as their acts are commanded by charity. So, likewise, is it
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 14:21): “He that
manifest that what we do out of love we do most willingly.
loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father; and I will love
Hence, even inasmuch as merit depends on voluntariness,
1182
merit is chiefly attributed to charity.
things, if it exists,” as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxx).
Reply to Objection 1. Charity, inasmuch as it has the
Secondly, from the defect of the operator; for what is not
last end for object, moves the other virtues to act. For
done with a ready will is hard and difficult to all of us, and
the habit to which the end pertains always commands the
this toil lessens merit and is removed by charity.
habits to which the means pertain, as was said above (q. 9,
Reply to Objection 3. The act of faith is not merito-
a. 1).
rious unless “faith. . . worketh by charity” (Gal. 5:6). So,
Reply to Objection 2. A work can be toilsome and
too, the acts of patience and fortitude are not meritorious
difficult in two ways: first, from the greatness of the work,
unless a man does them out of charity, according to 1 Cor.
and thus the greatness of the work pertains to the increase
13:3: “If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have
of merit; and thus charity does not lessen the toil—rather,
not charity, it profiteth me nothing.”
it makes us undertake the greatest toils, “for it does great
Whether a man may merit for himself the first grace?
Ia IIae q. 114 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that a man may merit for
ing grace, viz. sin. But when anyone has grace, the grace
himself the first grace, because, as Augustine says (Ep.
already possessed cannot come under merit, since reward
clxxxvi), “faith merits justification.” Now a man is justi-
is the term of the work, but grace is the principle of all
fied by the first grace. Therefore a man may merit the first
our good works, as stated above (q. 109). But of anyone
grace.
merits a further gratuitous gift by virtue of the preceding
Objection 2. Further, God gives grace only to the wor-
grace, it would not be the first grace. Hence it is manifest
thy. Now, no one is said to be worthy of some good, unless
that no one can merit for himself the first grace.
he has merited it condignly. Therefore we may merit the
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Retract. i,
first grace condignly.
23), he was deceived on this point for a time, believing
Objection 3. Further, with men we may merit a gift
the beginning of faith to be from us, and its consumma-
already received. Thus if a man receives a horse from his
tion to be granted us by God; and this he here retracts.
master, he merits it by a good use of it in his master’s ser-
And seemingly it is in this sense that he speaks of faith
vice. Now God is much more bountiful than man. Much
as meriting justification. But if we suppose, as indeed it
more, therefore, may a man, by subsequent works, merit
is a truth of faith, that the beginning of faith is in us from
the first grace already received from God.
God, the first act must flow from grace; and thus it cannot
On the contrary, The nature of grace is repugnant
be meritorious of the first grace. Therefore man is jus-
to reward of works, according to Rom. 4:4: “Now to
tified by faith, not as though man, by believing, were to
him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according
merit justification, but that, he believes, whilst he is being
to grace but according to debt.” Now a man merits what
justified; inasmuch as a movement of faith is required for
is reckoned to him according to debt, as the reward of his
the justification of the ungodly, as stated above (q. 113,
works. Hence a man may not merit the first grace.
a. 4).
I answer that, The gift of grace may be considered in
Reply to Objection 2. God gives grace to none but
two ways: first in the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus
to the worthy, not that they were previously worthy, but
it is manifest that all merit is repugnant to grace, since as
that by His grace He makes them worthy, Who alone “can
the Apostle says (Rom. 11:6), “if by grace, it is not now
make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed” (Job
by works.” Secondly, it may be considered as regards the
14:4).
nature of the thing given, and thus, also, it cannot come
Reply to Objection 3. Man’s every good work pro-
under the merit of him who has not grace, both because it
ceeds from the first grace as from its principle; but not
exceeds the proportion of nature, and because previous to
from any gift of man. Consequently, there is no compari-
grace a man in the state of sin has an obstacle to his merit-
son between gifts of grace and gifts of men.
Whether a man can merit the first grace for another?
Ia IIae q. 114 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that a man can merit the
Now inward healing is brought about by grace. Hence a
first grace for another. Because on Mat. 9:2: “Jesus seeing
man can merit the first grace for another.
their faith,” etc. a gloss says: “How much is our personal
Objection 2. Further, the prayers of the just are not
faith worth with God, Who set such a price on another’s
void, but efficacious, according to James 5:16: “The con-
faith, as to heal the man both inwardly and outwardly!”
tinued prayer of a just man availeth much.” Now he had
1183
previously said: “Pray one for another, that you may be glory of life everlasting, but so as to lead others to it, inas-saved.” Hence, since man’s salvation can only be brought
much as He is the Head of the Church, and the Author
about by grace, it seems that one man may merit for an-
of human salvation, according to Heb. 2:10: “Who hath
other his first grace.
brought many children into glory [to perfect] the Author
Objection 3.
Further, it is written (Lk.
16:9):
of their salvation.”
“Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that
But one may merit the first grace for another congru-
when you shall fail they may receive you into everlasting
ously; because a man in grace fulfils God’s will, and it
dwellings.” Now it is through grace alone that anyone is
is congruous and in harmony with friendship that God
received into everlasting dwellings, for by it alone does
should fulfil man’s desire for the salvation of another, al-
anyone merit everlasting life as stated above (a. 2; q. 109,
though sometimes there may be an impediment on the part
a. 5). Hence one man may by merit obtain for another his
of him whose salvation the just man desires. And it is in
first grace.
this sense that the passage from Jeremias speaks.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 15:1): “If Moses
Reply to Objection 1. A man’s faith avails for an-
and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards
other’s salvation by congruous and not by condign merit.
this people” —yet they had great merit with God. Hence
Reply to Objection 2. The impetration of prayer rests
it seems that no one can merit the first grace for another.
on mercy, whereas condign merit rests on justice; hence
I answer that, As shown above (Aa. 1,3,4), our works
a man may impetrate many things from the Divine mercy
are meritorious from two causes: first, by virtue of the
in prayer, which he does not merit in justice, according
Divine motion; and thus we merit condignly; secondly,
to Dan. 9:18: “For it is not for our justifications that we
according as they proceed from free-will in so far as we
present our prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude
do them willingly, and thus they have congruous merit,
of Thy tender mercies.”
since it is congruous that when a man makes good use of
Reply to Objection 3. The poor who receive alms
his power God should by His super-excellent power work
are said to receive others into everlasting dwellings, either
still higher things. And therefore it is clear that no one
by impetrating their forgiveness in prayer, or by meriting
can merit condignly for another his first grace, save Christ
congruously by other good works, or materially speaking,
alone; since each one of us is moved by God to reach life
inasmuch as by these good works of mercy, exercised to-
everlasting through the gift of grace; hence condign merit
wards the poor, we merit to be received into everlasting
does not reach beyond this motion. But Christ’s soul is
dwellings.
moved by God through grace, not only so as to reach the
Whether a man may merit restoration after a fall?
Ia IIae q. 114 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that anyone may merit
remembered.” Therefore his previous merits will nowise
for himself restoration after a fall. For what a man may
help him to rise again. Hence no one can merit for himself
justly ask of God, he may justly merit. Now nothing may
restoration after a fall.
more justly be besought of God than to be restored after
I answer that, No one can merit for himself restora-
a fall, as Augustine says∗, according to Ps. 70:9: “When
tion after a future fall, either condignly or congruously.
my strength shall fail, do not Thou forsake me.” Hence a
He cannot merit for himself condignly, since the reason
man may merit to be restored after a fall.
of this merit depends on the motion of Divine grace, and
Objection 2. Further, a man’s works benefit himself
this motion is interrupted by the subsequent sin; hence all
more than another. Now a man may, to some extent, merit
benefits which he afterwards obtains from God, whereby
for another his restoration after a fall, even as his first
he is restored, do not fall under merit—the motion of the
grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for himself
preceding grace not extending to them. Again, congru-
restoration after a fall.
ous merit, whereby one merits the first grace for another,
Objection 3. Further, when a man is once in grace he
is prevented from having its effect on account of the im-
merits life everlasting by the good works he does, as was
pediment of sin in the one for whom it is merited. Much
shown above (a. 2; q. 109, a. 5). Now no one can attain
more, therefore, is the efficacy of such merit impeded by
life everlasting unless he is restored by grace. Hence it
the obstacle which is in him who merits, and in him for
would seem that he merits for himself restoration.
whom it is merited; for both these are in the same per-
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:24): “If the
son. And therefore a man can nowise merit for himself
just man turn himself away from his justice and do in-
restoration after a fall.
iquity. . . all his justices which he hath done shall not be
Reply to Objection 1. The desire whereby we seek
∗ Cf. Ennar. i super Ps. lxx.
1184
for restoration after a fall is called just, and likewise the
“absolutely” merits life everlasting except by the act of fi-
prayer whereby this restoration is besought is called just,
nal grace, but only “conditionally,” i.e. if he perseveres.
because it tends to justice; and not that it depends on jus-
But it is unreasonable to say this, for sometimes the act of
tice by way of merit, but only on mercy.
the last grace is not more, but less meritorious than pre-
Reply to Objection 2.
Anyone may congruously
ceding acts, on account of the prostration of illness. Hence
merit for another his first grace, because there is no im-
it must be said that every act of charity merits eternal life
pediment (at least, on the part of him who merits), such as
absolutely; but by subsequent sin, there arises an impedi-
is found when anyone recedes from justice after the merit
ment to the preceding merit, so that it does not obtain its
of grace.
effect; just as natural causes fail of their effects on account Reply to Objection 3. Some have said that no one
of a supervening impediment.
Whether a man may merit the increase of grace or charity?
Ia IIae q. 114 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that a man cannot merit
increased merits to be perfected.” Hence the increase of
an increase of grace or charity. For when anyone receives
grace or charity falls under merit.
the reward he merited no other reward is due to him; thus
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 6,7), whatever
it was said of some (Mat. 6:2): “They have received their
the motion of grace reaches to, falls under condign merit.
reward.” Hence, if anyone were to merit the increase of
Now the motion of a mover extends not merely to the last
charity or grace, it would follow that, when his grace has
term of the movement, but to the whole progress of the
been increased, he could not expect any further reward,
movement. But the term of the movement of grace is eter-
which is unfitting.
nal life; and progress in this movement is by the increase
Objection 2. Further, nothing acts beyond its species.
of charity or grace according to Prov. 4:18: “But the path
But the principle of merit is grace or charity, as was shown
of the just as a shining light, goeth forward and increaseth
above (Aa. 2, 4). Therefore no one can merit greater grace
even to perfect day,” which is the day of glory. And thus
or charity than he has.
the increase of grace falls under condign merit.
Objection 3. Further, what falls under merit a man
Reply to Objection 1. Reward is the term of merit.
merits by every act flowing from grace or charity, as by
But there is a double term of movement, viz. the last, and
every such act a man merits life everlasting. If, therefore,
the intermediate, which is both beginning and term; and
the increase of grace or charity falls under merit, it would
this term is the reward of increase. Now the reward of hu-
seem that by every act quickened by charity a man would
man favor is as the last end to those who place their end
merit an increase of charity. But what a man merits, he
in it; hence such as these receive no other reward.
infallibly receives from God, unless hindered by subse-
Reply to Objection 2. The increase of grace is not
quent sin; for it is written (2 Tim. 1:12): “I know Whom
above the virtuality of the pre-existing grace, although it
I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep
is above its quantity, even as a tree is not above the virtu-
that which I have committed unto Him.” Hence it would
ality of the seed, although above its quantity.
follow that grace or charity is increased by every merito-
Reply to Objection 3. By every meritorious act a man
rious act; and this would seem impossible since at times
merits the increase of grace, equally with the consumma-
meritorious acts are not very fervent, and would not suf-
tion of grace which is eternal life. But just as eternal life
fice for the increase of charity. Therefore the increase of
is not given at once, but in its own time, so neither is grace
charity does not come under merit.
increased at once, but in its own time, viz. when a man is
On the contrary, Augustine says (super Ep. Joan.;
sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace.
cf. Ep. clxxxvi) that “charity merits increase, and being
Whether a man may merit perseverance?
Ia IIae q. 114 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that anyone may merit
whoever has grace.
perseverance. For what a man obtains by asking, can
Objection 2. Further, it is more not to be able to sin
come under the merit of anyone that is in grace. Now
than not to sin. But not to be able to sin comes under
men obtain perseverance by asking it of God; otherwise
merit, for we merit eternal life, of which impeccability is
it would be useless to ask it of God in the petitions of
an essential part. Much more, therefore, may we merit not
the Lord’s Prayer, as Augustine says (De Dono Persev.
to sin, i.e. to persevere.
ii). Therefore perseverance may come under the merit of
Objection 3. Further, increase of grace is greater than
1185
perseverance in the grace we already possess. But a man that the perseverance of glory which is the term of the
may merit an increase of grace, as was stated above (a. 8).
aforesaid movement falls under merit; but perseverance
Much more, therefore, may he merit perseverance in the
of the wayfarer does not fall under merit, since it depends
grace he has already.
solely on the Divine motion, which is the principle of all
On the contrary, What we merit, we obtain from
merit. Now God freely bestows the good of perseverance,
God, unless it is hindered by sin. Now many have mer-
on whomsoever He bestows it.
itorious works, who do not obtain perseverance; nor can it
Reply to Objection 1. We impetrate in prayer things
be urged that this takes place because of the impediment
that we do not merit, since God hears sinners who beseech
of sin, since sin itself is opposed to perseverance; and thus
the pardon of their sins, which they do not merit, as ap-
if anyone were to merit perseverance, God would not per-
pears from Augustine∗ on Jn. 11:31, “Now we know that
mit him to fall into sin. Hence perseverance does not come
God doth not hear sinners,” otherwise it would have been
under merit.
useless for the publican to say: “O God, be merciful to
I answer that, Since man’s free-will is naturally flex-
me a sinner,” Lk. 18:13. So too may we impetrate of God
ible towards good and evil, there are two ways of ob-
in prayer the grace of perseverance either for ourselves or
taining from God perseverance in good: first, inasmuch
for others, although it does not fall under merit.
as free-will is determined to good by consummate grace,
Reply to Objection 2. The perseverance which is in
which will be in glory; secondly, on the part of the Di-
heaven is compared as term to the free-will’s movement;
vine motion, which inclines man to good unto the end.
not so, the perseverance of the wayfarer, for the reason
Now as explained above (Aa. 6,7,8), that which is related
given in the body of the article.
as a term to the free-will’s movement directed to God the
In the same way may we answer the third objection
mover, falls under human merit; and not what is related
which concerns the increase of grace, as was explained
to the aforesaid movement as principle. Hence it is clear
above.
Whether temporal goods fall under merit?
Ia IIae q. 114 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that temporal goods fall
does not come upon all alike. But temporal goods regard
under merit. For what is promised to some as a reward
the good and the wicked alike; according to Eccles. 9:2:
of justice, falls under merit. Now, temporal goods were
“All things equally happen to the just and the wicked, to
promised in the Old Law as the reward of justice, as ap-
the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to
pears from Dt. 28. Hence it seems that temporal goods
him that offereth victims and to him that despiseth sacri-
fall under merit.
fices.” Therefore temporal goods do not fall under merit.
Objection 2. Further, that would seem to fall under
I answer that, What falls under merit is the reward
merit, which God bestows on anyone for a service done.
or wage, which is a kind of good. Now man’s good is
But God sometimes bestows temporal goods on men for
twofold: the first, simply; the second, relatively. Now
services done for Him. For it is written (Ex. 1:21): “And
man’s good simply is his last end (according to Ps. 72:27:
because the midwives feared God, He built them houses”;
“But it is good for men to adhere to my God”) and conse-
on which a gloss of Gregory (Moral. xviii, 4) says that
quently what is ordained and leads to this end; and these
“life everlasting might have been awarded them as the
fall simply under merit. But the relative, not the simple,
fruit of their goodwill, but on account of their sin of false-
good of man is what is good to him now, or what is a good
hood they received an earthly reward.” And it is writ-
to him relatively; and this does not fall under merit simply,
ten (Ezech. 29:18): “The King of Babylon hath made
but relatively.
his army to undergo hard service against Tyre. . . and there
Hence we must say that if temporal goods are consid-
hath been no reward given him,” and further on: “And it
ered as they are useful for virtuous works, whereby we are
shall be wages for his army. . . I have given him the land
led to heaven, they fall directly and simply under merit,
of Egypt because he hath labored for me.” Therefore tem-
even as increase of grace, and everything whereby a man
poral goods fall under merit.
is helped to attain beatitude after the first grace. For God
Objection 3. Further, as good is to merit so is evil to
gives men, both just and wicked, enough temporal goods
demerit. But on account of the demerit of sin some are
to enable them to attain to everlasting life; and thus these
punished by God with temporal punishments, as appears
temporal goods are simply good. Hence it is written (Ps.
from the Sodomites, Gn. 19. Hence temporal goods fall
33:10): “For there is no want to them that fear Him,” and
under merit.
again, Ps. 36:25: “I have not seen the just forsaken,” etc.
Objection 4. On the contrary, What falls under merit
But if these temporal goods are considered in them-
∗ Tract. xliv in Joan.
1186
selves, they are not man’s good simply, but relatively, tion, and not in relation to the malice of their wills, es-and thus they do not fall under merit simply, but rela-
pecially as regards the King of Babylon, since he did not
tively, inasmuch as men are moved by God to do tem-
besiege Tyre as if wishing to serve God, but rather in order
poral works, in which with God’s help they reach their
to usurp dominion. So, too, although the midwives had a
purpose. And thus as life everlasting is simply the reward
good will with regard to saving the children, yet their will
of the works of justice in relation to the Divine motion, as
was not right, inasmuch as they framed falsehoods.
stated above (Aa. 3,6), so have temporal goods, consid-
Reply to Objection 3. Temporal evils are imposed
ered in themselves, the nature of reward, with respect to
as a punishment on the wicked, inasmuch as they are not
the Divine motion, whereby men’s wills are moved to un-
thereby helped to reach life everlasting. But to the just
dertake these works, even though, sometimes, men have
who are aided by these evils they are not punishments but
not a right intention in them.
medicines as stated above (q. 87, a. 8).
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Contra
Reply to Objection 4. All things happen equally to
Faust. iv, 2), “in these temporal promises were figures
the good and the wicked, as regards the substance of tem-
of spiritual things to come. For the carnal people were ad-
poral good or evil; but not as regards the end, since the
hering to the promises of the present life; and not merely
good and not the wicked are led to beatitude by them.
their speech but even their life was prophetic.”
And now enough has been said regarding morals in
Reply to Objection 2. These rewards are said to have
general.
been divinely brought about in relation to the Divine mo-
1187
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 1
Of Faith
(In Ten Articles)
Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity.
The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of the corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the opposite vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.
About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; (3) the habit of faith.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, i.e. whether it is a thing or a proposition?
(3) Whether anything false can come under faith?
(4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen?
(5) Whether it can be anything known?
(6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a certain number of articles?
(7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times?
(8) Of the number of articles;
(9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol;
(10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?
Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
IIa IIae q. 1 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the object of faith is
I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit in-
not the First Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is
cludes two things: first, that which is known materially,
that which is proposed to us to be believed. Now not only
and is the material object, so to speak, and, secondly, that
things pertaining to the Godhead, i.e. the First Truth, are
whereby it is known, which is the formal aspect of the ob-
proposed to us to be believed, but also things concerning
ject. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions are
Christ’s human nature, and the sacraments of the Church,
what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the
and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of
science is the mean of demonstration, through which the
faith is not only the First Truth.
conclusions are known.
Objection 2. Further, faith and unbelief have the same
Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal as-
object since they are opposed to one another. Now unbe-
pect of the object, it is nothing else than the First Truth.
lief can be about all things contained in Holy Writ, for
For the faith of which we are speaking, does not assent
whichever one of them a man denies, he is considered an
to anything, except because it is revealed by God. Hence
unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things con-
the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If,
tained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein,
however, we consider materially the things to which faith
concerning man and other creatures. Therefore the object
assents, they include not only God, but also many other
of faith is not only the First Truth, but also created truth.
things, which, nevertheless, do not come under the as-
Objection 3. Further, faith is condivided with charity,
sent of faith, except as bearing some relation to God, in
as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 3). Now by charity we
as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine
love not only God, who is the sovereign Good, but also
operation, man is helped on his journey towards the en-
our neighbor. Therefore the object of Faith is not only the
joyment of God. Consequently from this point of view
First Truth.
also the object of faith is, in a way, the First Truth, in as
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that
much as nothing comes under faith except in relation to
“faith is about the simple and everlasting truth.” Now this
God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for it
is the First Truth. Therefore the object of faith is the First
considers nothing save in relation to health.
Truth.
Reply to Objection 1. Things concerning Christ’s
1188
human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, or any regards all things contained in Holy Writ.
creatures whatever, come under faith, in so far as by them
Reply to Objection 3. Charity also loves our neighbor
we are directed to God, and in as much as we assent to
on account of God, so that its object, properly speaking,
them on account of the Divine Truth.
is God, as we shall show further on (q. 25 , a. 1).
The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as
Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition?
IIa IIae q. 1 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the object of faith is
hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity,
not something complex by way of a proposition. For the
things that are complex in themselves.
object of faith is the First Truth, as stated above (a. 1).
Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in
Now the First Truth is something simple. Therefore the
two ways. First, as regards the thing itself which is be-
object of faith is not something complex.
lieved, and thus the object of faith is something simple,
Objection 2. Further, the exposition of faith is con-
namely the thing itself about which we have faith. Sec-
tained in the symbol. Now the symbol does not con-
ondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the
tain propositions, but things: for it is not stated therein
object of faith is something complex by way of a proposi-
that God is almighty, but: “I believe in God. . . almighty.”
tion.
Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a
Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a
thing.
certain amount of truth.
Objection 3. Further, faith is succeeded by vision, ac-
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the
cording to 1 Cor. 13:12: “We see now through a glass in
object of faith on the part of the thing believed.
a dark manner; but then face to face. Now I know in part;
Reply to Objection 2.
The symbol mentions the
but then I shall know even as I am known.” But the ob-
things about which faith is, in so far as the act of the be-
ject of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is
liever is terminated in them, as is evident from the manner
the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is
of speaking about them. Now the act of the believer does
also.
not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in
On the contrary, Faith is a mean between science and
science we do not form propositions, except in order to
opinion. Now the mean is in the same genus as the ex-
have knowledge about things through their means, so is it
tremes. Since, then, science and opinion are about propo-
in faith.
sitions, it seems that faith is likewise about propositions;
Reply to Objection 3. The object of the heavenly vi-
so that its object is something complex.
sion will be the First Truth seen in itself, according to 1
I answer that, The thing known is in the knower ac-
Jn. 3:2: “We know that when He shall appear, we shall be
cording to the mode of the knower. Now the mode proper
like to Him: because we shall see Him as He is”: hence
to the human intellect is to know the truth by synthesis
that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by way
and analysis, as stated in the Ia, q. 85, a. 5. Hence things
of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we
that are simple in themselves, are known by the intellect
do not apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence
with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other
the comparison fails.
Whether anything false can come under faith?
IIa IIae q. 1 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that something false can
that He did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ
come under faith. For faith is condivided with hope and
would have been false. Therefore the object of faith can
charity. Now something false can come under hope, since
be something false.
many hope to have eternal life, who will not obtain it. The
Objection 3. Further, the ancients believed in the fu-
same may be said of charity, for many are loved as being
ture birth of Christ, and many continued so to believe, un-
good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore some-
til they heard the preaching of the Gospel. Now, when
thing false can be the object of faith.
once Christ was born, even before He began to preach, it
Objection 2. Further, Abraham believed that Christ
was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore some-
would be born, according to Jn. 8:56: “Abraham your fa-
thing false can come under faith.
ther rejoiced that he might see My day: he saw it, and
Objection 4. Further, it is a matter of faith, that one
was glad.” But after the time of Abraham, God might
should believe that the true Body of Christ is contained
not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed
in the Sacrament of the altar. But it might happen that
1189
the bread was not rightly consecrated, and that there was the comparison between them fails.
not Christ’s true Body there, but only bread. Therefore
Nevertheless neither can anything false come under
something false can come under faith.
hope, for a man hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his
On the contrary, No virtue that perfects the intellect
own power (since this would be an act of presumption),
is related to the false, considered as the evil of the intel-
but with the help of grace; and if he perseveres therein he
lect, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith
will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.
is a virtue that perfects the intellect, as we shall show fur-
In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wher-
ther on (q. 4, Aa. 2,5). Therefore nothing false can come
ever He may be; so that it matters not to charity, whether
under it.
God be in the individual whom we love for God’s sake.
I answer that, Nothing comes under any power, habit
Reply to Objection 2. That “God would not take
or act, except by means of the formal aspect of the object:
flesh,” considered in itself was possible even after Abra-
thus color cannot be seen except by means of light, and
ham’s time, but in so far as it stands in God’s foreknowl-
a conclusion cannot be known save through the mean of
edge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as explained demonstration. Now it has been stated (a. 1) that the for-in the Ia, q. 14, Aa. 13,15: and it is thus that it comes un-
mal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that
der faith. Hence in so far as it comes under faith, it cannot
nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands un-
be false.
der the First Truth, under which nothing false can stand,
Reply to Objection 3. After Christ’s birth, to believe
as neither can non-being stand under being, nor evil under
in Him, was to believe in Christ’s birth at some time or
goodness. It follows therefore that nothing false can come
other. The fixing of the time, wherein some were deceived
under faith.
was not due to their faith, but to a human conjecture. For
Reply to Objection 1. Since the true is the good of the
it is possible for a believer to have a false opinion through
intellect, but not of the appetitive power, it follows that all a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a false
virtues which perfect the intellect, exclude the false alto-
opinion to be the outcome of faith.
gether, because it belongs to the nature of a virtue to bear
Reply to Objection 4. The faith of the believer is not
relation to the good alone. On the other hand those virtues
directed to such and such accidents of bread, but to the
which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not entirely ex-
fact that the true body of Christ is under the appearances
clude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance with
of sensible bread, when it is rightly consecrated. Hence if
justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about
it be not rightly consecrated, it does not follow that any-
what one is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intel-
thing false comes under faith.
lect, whereas hope and charity perfect the appetitive part,
Whether the object of faith can be something seen?
IIa IIae q. 1 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the object of faith is
that which is believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing
something seen. For Our Lord said to Thomas (Jn. 20:29):
in two ways. First, through being moved to assent by its
“Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed.”
very object, which is known either by itself (as in the case
Therefore vision and faith regard the same object.
of first principles, which are held by the habit of under-
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle, while speaking of
standing), or through something else already known (as
the knowledge of faith, says (1 Cor. 13:12): “We see now
in the case of conclusions which are held by the habit
through a glass in a dark manner.” Therefore what is be-
of science). Secondly the intellect assents to something,
lieved is seen.
not through being sufficiently moved to this assent by its
Objection 3. Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now
proper object, but through an act of choice, whereby it
something is seen under every light. Therefore faith is of
turns voluntarily to one side rather than to the other: and
things seen.
if this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite
Objection 4. Further, “Every sense is a kind of sight,”
side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and
as Augustine states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii).
no fear of the other side, there will be faith.
But faith is of things heard, according to Rom. 10:17:
Now those things are said to be seen which, of them-
“Faith. . . cometh by hearing.” Therefore faith is of things
selves, move the intellect or the senses to knowledge of
seen.
them. Wherefore it is evident that neither faith nor opin-
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that
ion can be of things seen either by the senses or by the
“faith is the evidence of things that appear not.”
intellect.
I answer that, Faith implies assent of the intellect to
Reply to Objection 1. Thomas “saw one thing, and
∗ St. Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang.
1190
believed another”∗: he saw the Man, and believing Him Reply to Objection 3. The light of faith makes us see
to be God, he made profession of his faith, saying: “My
what we believe. For just as, by the habits of the other
Lord and my God.”
virtues, man sees what is becoming to him in respect of
Reply to Objection 2. Those things which come un-
that habit, so, by the habit of faith, the human mind is di-
der faith can be considered in two ways. First, in particu-
rected to assent to such things as are becoming to a right
lar; and thus they cannot be seen and believed at the same
faith, and not to assent to others.
time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that is, under
Reply to Objection 4. Hearing is of words signify-
the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are
ing what is of faith, but not of the things themselves that
seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on
are believed; hence it does not follow that these things are
the evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that
seen.
they ought to be believed.
Whether those things that are of faith can be an object of science∗?
IIa IIae q. 1 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that those things that are
by another: since we hope to see some day what we now
of faith can be an object of science. For where science is
believe about the Trinity, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: “We
lacking there is ignorance, since ignorance is the opposite
see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face
of science. Now we are not in ignorance of those things
to face”: which vision the angels possess already; so that
we have to believe, since ignorance of such things savors
what we believe, they see. In like manner it may happen
of unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: “I did it ignorantly
that what is an object of vision or scientific knowledge for
in unbelief.” Therefore things that are of faith can be an
one man, even in the state of a wayfarer, is, for another
object of science.
man, an object of faith, because he does not know it by
Objection 2. Further, science is acquired by reasons.
demonstration.
Now sacred writers employ reasons to inculcate things
Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed
that are of faith. Therefore such things can be an object of
equally by all, is equally unknown by all as an object
science.
of science: such are the things which are of faith sim-
Objection 3. Further, things which are demonstrated
ply. Consequently faith and science are not about the same
are an object of science, since a “demonstration is a syl-
things.
logism that produces science.” Now certain matters of
Reply to Objection 1. Unbelievers are in ignorance
faith have been demonstrated by the philosophers, such as
of things that are of faith, for neither do they see or know
the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth. Therefore
them in themselves, nor do they know them to be credi-
things that are of faith can be an object of science.
ble. The faithful, on the other hand, know them, not as by
Objection 4. Further, opinion is further from science
demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes them
than faith is, since faith is said to stand between opinion
see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (a. 4,
and science. Now opinion and science can, in a way, be
ad 2,3).
about the same object, as stated in Poster. i. Therefore
Reply to Objection 2. The reasons employed by holy
faith and science can be about the same object also.
men to prove things that are of faith, are not demonstra-
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.)
tions; they are either persuasive arguments showing that
that “when a thing is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, what is proposed to our faith is not impossible, or else they
but of perception.” Therefore things that are of faith are
are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i.e. from
not the object of perception, whereas what is an object of
the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares (Div.
science is the object of perception. Therefore there can be
Nom. ii). Whatever is based on these principles is as well
no faith about things which are an object of science.
proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn
I answer that, All science is derived from self-evident
from self-evident principles is in the eyes of all. Hence
and therefore “seen” principles; wherefore all objects of
again, theology is a science, as we stated at the outset of
science must needs be, in a fashion, seen.
this work ( Ia, q. 1, a. 2).
Now as stated above (a. 4), it is impossible that one
Reply to Objection 3. Things which can be proved
and the same thing should be believed and seen by the
by demonstration are reckoned among the articles of faith,
same person. Hence it is equally impossible for one and
not because they are believed simply by all, but because
the same thing to be an object of science and of belief for
they are a necessary presupposition to matters of faith, so
the same person. It may happen, however, that a thing
that those who do not known them by demonstration must
which is an object of vision or science for one, is believed
know them first of all by faith.
∗ Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration
1191
Reply to Objection 4.
As the Philosopher says
patible with either opinion or faith, yet for different rea-
(Poster. i), “science and opinion about the same object
sons. Because science is incompatible with opinion about
can certainly be in different men,” as we have stated above
the same object simply, for the reason that science de-
about science and faith; yet it is possible for one and the
mands that its object should be deemed impossible to be
same man to have science and faith about the same thing
otherwise, whereas it is essential to opinion, that its ob-
relatively, i.e. in relation to the object, but not in the same ject should be deemed possible to be otherwise. Yet that
respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one
which is the object of faith, on account of the certainty of
and the same object, to know one thing and to think an-
faith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the
other: and, in like manner, one may know by demonstra-
reason why science and faith cannot be about the same
tion the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith, the Trinity.
object and in the same respect is because the object of sci-
On the other hand, in one and the same man, about the
ence is something seen whereas the object of faith is the
same object, and in the same respect, science is incom-
unseen, as stated above.
Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain articles?
IIa IIae q. 1 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that those things that are
terror into your foes.”
of faith should not be divided into certain articles. For all
Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain
things contained in Holy Writ are matters of faith. But
distinct articles, in so far as they are divided into parts, and these, by reason of their multitude, cannot be reduced to a
fit together. Now the object of faith is something unseen
certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous to distin-
in connection with God, as stated above (a. 4). Conse-
guish certain articles of faith.
quently any matter that, for a special reason, is unseen, is
Objection 2. Further, material differences can be mul-
a special article; whereas when several matters are known
tiplied indefinitely, and therefore art should take no notice
or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to distin-
of them. Now the formal aspect of the object of faith is
guish various articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty
one and indivisible, as stated above (a. 1), viz. the First
in seeing that God suffered, and another in seeing that He
Truth, so that matters of faith cannot be distinguished in
rose again from the dead, wherefore the article of the Res-
respect of their formal object. Therefore no notice should
urrection is distinct from the article of the Passion. But
be taken of a material division of matters of faith into ar-
that He suffered, died and was buried, present the same
ticles.
difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to
Objection 3. Further, it has been said by some∗ that
accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one arti-
“an article is an indivisible truth concerning God, exact-
cle.
ing [arctans] our belief.” Now belief is a voluntary act,
Reply to Objection 1. Some things are proposed to
since, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), “no man
our belief are in themselves of faith, while others are of
believes against his will.” Therefore it seems that matters
faith, not in themselves but only in relation to others:
of faith should not be divided into articles.
even as in sciences certain propositions are put forward
On the contrary, Isidore says: “An article is a glimpse
on their own account, while others are put forward in or-
of Divine truth, tending thereto.” Now we can only get a
der to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith
glimpse of Divine truth by way of analysis, since things
consists in those things which we hope to see, according
which in God are one, are manifold in our intellect. There-
to Heb. 11:2: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped
fore matters of faith should be divided into articles.
for,” it follows that those things are in themselves of faith,
I answer that, the word “article” is apparently derived
which order us directly to eternal life. Such are the Trin-
from the Greek; for the Greek arthron† which the Latin
ity of Persons in Almighty God‡, the mystery of Christ’s
renders “articulus,” signifies a fitting together of distinct
Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of
parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit to-
faith. On the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are
gether are called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise,
proposed to our belief, not chiefly on their own account,
in the Greek grammar, articles are parts of speech which
but for the manifestation of those mentioned above: for in-
are affixed to words to show their gender, number or case.
stance, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man rose
Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit together in a
again at the touch of Eliseus’ bones, and the like, which
sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is com-
are related in Holy Writ for the purpose of manifesting
posed of words each pronounced singly and separately,
the Divine mystery or the Incarnation of Christ: and such
thus: “Your passion, your voice, your look, have struck
things should not form distinct articles.
∗ Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea
† Cf. William of Auxerre,
Summa Aurea
‡ The Leonine Edition reads: The Three Persons, the
omnipotence of God, etc.
1192
Reply to Objection 2. The formal aspect of the object Reply to Objection 3. This definition of an article
of faith can be taken in two ways: first, on the part of the
is taken from an etymology of the word as derived from
thing believed, and thus there is one formal aspect of all
the Latin, rather than in accordance with its real meaning,
matters of faith, viz. the First Truth: and from this point
as derived from the Greek: hence it does not carry much
of view there is no distinction of articles. Secondly, the
weight. Yet even then it could be said that although faith is
formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered from
exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since belief
our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter
is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity
of faith is that it is something unseen; and from this point
of end, since “he that cometh to God must believe that He
of view there are various distinct articles of faith, as we
is,” and “without faith it is impossible to please God,” as
saw above.
the Apostle declares (Heb. 11:6).
Whether the articles of faith have increased in course of time?
IIa IIae q. 1 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the articles of faith
relation to the doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles
have not increased in course of time. Because, as the
to a teaching based on natural reason. Among these prin-
Apostle says (Heb. 11:1), “faith is the substance of things
ciples there is a certain order, so that some are contained
to be hoped for.” Now the same things are to be hoped for
implicitly in others; thus all principles are reduced, as to
at all times. Therefore, at all times, the same things are to
their first principle, to this one: “The same thing cannot
be believed.
be affirmed and denied at the same time,” as the Philoso-
Objection 2. Further, development has taken place, in
pher states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). In like manner all the
sciences devised by man, on account of the lack of knowl-
articles are contained implicitly in certain primary mat-
edge in those who discovered them, as the Philosopher
ters of faith, such as God’s existence, and His providence
observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of faith was not
over the salvation of man, according to Heb. 11: “He that
devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as stated
cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder
in Eph. 2:8: “It is the gift of God.” Since then there can
to them that seek Him.” For the existence of God includes
be no lack of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge
all that we believe to exist in God eternally, and in these
of matters of faith was perfect from the beginning and did
our happiness consists; while belief in His providence in-
not increase as time went on.
cludes all those things which God dispenses in time, for
Objection 3. Further, the operation of grace proceeds
man’s salvation, and which are the way to that happiness:
in orderly fashion no less than the operation of nature.
and in this way, again, some of those articles which fol-
Now nature always makes a beginning with perfect things,
low from these are contained in others: thus faith in the
as Boethius states (De Consol. iii). Therefore it seems that
Redemption of mankind includes belief in the Incarnation
the operation of grace also began with perfect things, so
of Christ, His Passion and so forth.
that those who were the first to deliver the faith, knew it
Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the
most perfectly.
substance of the articles of faith, they have not received
Objection 4. Further, just as the faith of Christ was
any increase as time went on: since whatever those who
delivered to us through the apostles, so too, in the Old Tes-
lived later have believed, was contained, albeit implicitly,
tament, the knowledge of faith was delivered by the early
in the faith of those Fathers who preceded them. But
fathers to those who came later, according to Dt. 32:7:
there was an increase in the number of articles believed
“Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee.” Now the
explicitly, since to those who lived in later times some
apostles were most fully instructed about the mysteries,
were known explicitly which were not known explicitly
for “they received them more fully than others, even as
by those who lived before them. Hence the Lord said to
they received them earlier,” as a gloss says on Rom. 8:23:
Moses (Ex. 6:2,3): “I am the God of Abraham, the God
“Ourselves also who have the first fruits of the Spirit.”
of Isaac, the God of Jacob∗. . . and My name Adonai I did
Therefore it seems that knowledge of matters of faith has
not show them”: David also said (Ps. 118:100): “I have
not increased as time went on.
had understanding above ancients”: and the Apostle says
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.)
(Eph. 3:5) that the mystery of Christ, “in other genera-
that “the knowledge of the holy fathers increased as time
tions was not known, as it is now revealed to His holy
went on. . . and the nearer they were to Our Savior’s com-
apostles and prophets.”
ing, the more fully did they received the mysteries of sal-
Reply to Objection 1. Among men the same things
vation.”
were always to be hoped for from Christ. But as they
I answer that, The articles of faith stand in the same
did not acquire this hope save through Christ, the further
∗ Vulg.: ‘I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob’
1193
they were removed from Christ in point of time, the furtence. On the other hand, in the order of the material
ther they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence
cause, the imperfect comes first, and in this way nature
the Apostle says (Heb. 11:13): “All these died according
proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Now in the
to faith, not having received the promises, but beholding
manifestation of faith, God is the active cause, having
them afar off.” Now the further off a thing is the less
perfect knowledge from all eternity; while man is likened
distinctly is it seen; wherefore those who were nigh to
to matter in receiving the influx of God’s action. Hence,
Christ’s advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good
among men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from
things to be hoped for.
imperfection to perfection; and, although some men have
Reply to Objection 2. Progress in knowledge occurs
been after the manner of active causes, through being doc-
in two ways. First, on the part of the teacher, be he one or
tors of faith, nevertheless the manifestation of the Spirit is
many, who makes progress in knowledge as time goes on:
given to such men for the common good, according to 1
and this is the kind of progress that takes place in sciences
Cor. 12:7; so that the knowledge of faith was imparted
devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the learner; thus
to the Fathers who were instructors in the faith, so far as
the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does not
was necessary at the time for the instruction of the people,
deliver it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for either openly or in figures.
he would not be able to take it all in, but he condescends
Reply to Objection 4. The ultimate consummation
to the disciple’s capacity and instructs him little by little.
of grace was effected by Christ, wherefore the time of
It is in this way that men made progress in the knowledge
His coming is called the “time of fulness∗” (Gal. 4:4).
of faith as time went on. Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24)
Hence those who were nearest to Christ, wherefore be-
compares the state of the Old Testament to childhood.
fore, like John the Baptist, or after, like the apostles, had
Reply to Objection 3. Two causes are requisite before
a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith; for even with
actual generation can take place, an agent, namely, and
regard to man’s state we find that the perfection of man-
matter. In the order of the active cause, the more perfect
hood comes in youth, and that a man’s state is all the more
is naturally first; and in this way nature makes a beginning
perfect, whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time
with perfect things, since the imperfect is not brought to
of his youth.
perfection, except by something perfect already in exis-
Whether the articles of faith are suitably formulated?
IIa IIae q. 1 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that the articles of faith
Now there are several articles about the Person of the Holy
are unsuitably formulated. For those things, which can
Ghost, and likewise about the Person of the Son. There-
be known by demonstration, do not belong to faith as to
fore there should be several articles about the Person of
an object of belief for all, as stated above (a. 5 ). Now
the Father.
it can be known by demonstration that there is one God;
Objection 5. Further, just as certain things are said by hence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52)
appropriation, of the Person of the Father and of the Per-
and many other philosophers demonstrated the same truth.
son of the Holy Ghost, so too is something appropriated
Therefore that “there is one God” should not be set down
to the Person of the Son, in respect of His Godhead. Now,
as an article of faith.
among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work ap-
Objection 2. Further, just as it is necessary to faith
propriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a
that we should believe God to be almighty, so is it too that
work appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that “He spoke
we should believe Him to be “all-knowing” and “provi-
by the prophets.” Therefore the articles of faith should
dent for all,” about both of which points some have erred.
contain some work appropriated to the Son in respect of
Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention should
His Godhead.
have been made of God’s wisdom and providence, even
Objection 6. Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist
as of His omnipotence.
presents a special difficulty over and above the other arti-
Objection 3. Further, to know the Father is the same
cles. Therefore it should have been mentioned in a special
things as to know the Son, according to Jn. 14:9: “He that
article: and consequently it seems that there is not a suffi-
seeth Me, seeth the Father also.” Therefore there ought to
cient number of articles.
be but one article about the Father and Son, and, for the
On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who
same reason, about the Holy Ghost.
formulates the articles thus.
Objection 4. Further, the Person of the Father is no
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 4,6), to faith those less than the Person of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.
things in themselves belong, the sight of which we shall
∗ Vulg.: ‘fulness of time’
1194
enjoy in eternal life, and by which we are brought to eter-not work save by the will and knowledge. Hence God’s
nal life. Now two things are proposed to us to be seen in
omnipotence includes, in a way, universal knowledge and
eternal life: viz. the secret of the Godhead, to see which
providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills
is to possess happiness; and the mystery of Christ’s In-
in things here below, unless He knew them, and exercised
carnation, “by Whom we have access” to the glory of the
His providence over them.
sons of God, according to Rom. 5:2. Hence it is written
Reply to Objection 3. We have but one knowledge
(Jn. 17:3): “This is eternal life: that they may know Thee,
of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as to the unity of the
the. . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.”
Essence, to which the first article refers: but, as to the dis-
Wherefore the first distinction in matters of faith is that
tinction of the Persons, which is by the relations of origin,
some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others
knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way, include
pertain to the mystery of Christ’s human nature, which is
knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had
the “mystery of godliness” (1 Tim. 3:16).
He not a Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost.
Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three
From this point of view, there was a sufficient motive for
things are proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the
those who referred one article to the three Persons. Since,
Godhead, to which the first article refers; secondly, the
however, with regard to each Person, certain points have
trinity of the Persons, to which three articles refer, cor-
to be observed, about which some happen to fall into error,
responding to the three Persons; and thirdly, the works
looking at it in this way, we may distinguish three articles
proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the or-
about the three Persons. For Arius believed in the omnipo-
der of nature, in relation to which the article about the
tence and eternity of the Father, but did not believe the Son
creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order
to be co-equal and consubstantial with the Father; hence
of grace, in relation to which all matters concerning the
the need for an article about the Person of the Son in or-
sanctification of man are included in one article; while the
der to settle this point. In like manner it was necessary to
third refers to the order of glory, and in relation to this
appoint a third article about the Person of the Holy Ghost,
another article is proposed to us concerning the resurrec-
against Macedonius. In the same way Christ’s conception
tion of the dead and life everlasting. Thus there are seven
and birth, just as the resurrection and life everlasting, can
articles referring to the Godhead.
from one point of view be united together in one article, in
In like manner, with regard to Christ’s human na-
so far as they are ordained to one end; while, from another
ture, there are seven articles, the first of which refers to
point of view, they can be distinct articles, in as much as
Christ’s incarnation or conception; the second, to His vir-
each one separately presents a special difficulty.
ginal birth; the third, to His Passion, death and burial;
Reply to Objection 4. It belongs to the Son and Holy
the fourth, to His descent into hell; the fifth, to His res-
Ghost to be sent to sanctify the creature; and about this
urrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh, to His
several things have to be believed. Hence it is that there
coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen
are more articles about the Persons of the Son and Holy
articles.
Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is never
Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six per-
sent, as we stated in the Ia, q. 43, a. 4.
taining to the Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they
Reply to Objection 5. The sanctification of a creature
include in one article the three about the three Persons; be-
by grace, and its consummation by glory, is also effected
cause we have one knowledge of the three Persons: while
by the gift of charity, which is appropriated to the Holy
they divide the article referring to the work of glorifica-
Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom, which is appropriated to
tion into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the
the Son: so that each work belongs by appropriation, but
glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and
under different aspects, both to the Son and to the Holy
nativity into one article.
Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1. By faith we hold many truths
Reply to Objection 6. Two things may be considered
about God, which the philosophers were unable to dis-
in the sacrament of the Eucharist. One is the fact that it
cover by natural reason, for instance His providence and
is a sacrament, and in this respect it is like the other ef-
omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped, all of
fects of sanctifying grace. The other is that Christ’s body
which are contained in the one article of the unity of God.
is miraculously contained therein and thus it is included
Reply to Objection 2. The very name of the Godhead
under God’s omnipotence, like all other miracles which
implies a kind of watching over things, as stated in the Ia,
are ascribed to God’s almighty power.
q. 13, a. 8. Now in beings having an intellect, power does
1195
Whether it is suitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol?
IIa IIae q. 1 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that it is unsuitable for
in Holy Writ, diffusely, under various modes of expres-
the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol. Because
sion, and sometimes obscurely, so that, in order to gather
Holy Writ is the rule of faith, to which no addition or sub-
the truth of faith from Holy Writ, one needs long study
traction can lawfully be made, since it is written (Dt. 4:2):
and practice, which are unattainable by all those who re-
“You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither
quire to know the truth of faith, many of whom have no
shall you take away from it.” Therefore it was unlawful to
time for study, being busy with other affairs. And so it
make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy Writ had
was necessary to gather together a clear summary from
once been published.
the sayings of Holy Writ, to be proposed to the belief of
Objection 2. Further, according to the Apostle (Eph.
all. This indeed was no addition to Holy Writ, but some-
4:5) there is but “one faith.” Now the symbol is a profes-
thing taken from it.
sion of faith. Therefore it is not fitting that there should
Reply to Objection 2. The same doctrine of faith is
be more than one symbol.
taught in all the symbols. Nevertheless, the people need
Objection 3. Further, the confession of faith, which
more careful instruction about the truth of faith, when er-
is contained in the symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now
rors arise, lest the faith of simple-minded persons be cor-
the faithful are not all competent to believe in God, but
rupted by heretics. It was this that gave rise to the neces-
only those who have living faith. Therefore it is unfitting
sity of formulating several symbols, which nowise differ
for the symbol of faith to be expressed in the words: “I
from one another, save that on account of the obstinacy of
believe in one God.”
heretics, one contains more explicitly what another con-
Objection 4. Further, the descent into hell is one of
tains implicitly.
the articles of faith, as stated above (a. 8). But the descent
Reply to Objection 3.
The confession of faith is
into hell is not mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers.
drawn up in a symbol in the person, as it were, of the
Therefore the latter is expressed inadequately.
whole Church, which is united together by faith. Now the
Objection 5. Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan.)
faith of the Church is living faith; since such is the faith to expounding the passage, “You believe in God, believe also
be found in all those who are of the Church not only out-
in Me” (Jn. 14:1) says: “We believe Peter or Paul, but we
wardly but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is
speak only of believing ‘in’ God.” Since then the Catholic
expressed in a symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with
Church is merely a created being, it seems unfitting to say:
living faith, so that even if some of the faithful lack living
“In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church.”
faith, they should endeavor to acquire it.
Objection 6. Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may
Reply to Objection 4. No error about the descent into
be a rule of faith. Now a rule of faith ought to be proposed
hell had arisen among heretics, so that there was no need
to all, and that publicly. Therefore every symbol, besides
to be more explicit on that point. For this reason it is not
the symbol of the Fathers, should be sung at Mass. There-
repeated in the symbol of the Fathers, but is supposed as
fore it seems unfitting to publish the articles of faith in a
already settled in the symbol of the Apostles. For a sub-
symbol.
sequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one; rather
On the contrary, The universal Church cannot err,
does it expound it, as stated above (ad 2).
since she is governed by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit
Reply to Objection 5. If we say: “ ‘In’ the holy
of truth: for such was Our Lord’s promise to His disciples
Catholic Church,” this must be taken as verified in so far
(Jn. 16:13): “When He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He
as our faith is directed to the Holy Ghost, Who sanctifies
will teach you all truth.” Now the symbol is published by
the Church; so that the sense is: “I believe in the Holy
the authority of the universal Church. Therefore it con-
Ghost sanctifying the Church.” But it is better and more
tains nothing defective.
in keeping with the common use, to omit the ‘in,’ and
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6), “he
say simply, “the holy Catholic Church,” as Pope Leo† ob-
that cometh to God, must believe that He is.” Now a man
serves.
cannot believe, unless the truth be proposed to him that
Reply to Objection 6. Since the symbol of the Fa-
he may believe it. Hence the need for the truth of faith
thers is an explanation of the symbol of the Apostles, and
to be collected together, so that it might the more easily
was drawn up after the faith was already spread abroad,
be proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth
and when the Church was already at peace, it is sung pub-
through ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a col-
licly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of the
lection of maxims of faith that the symbol∗ takes its name.
Apostles, which was drawn up at the time of persecution,
Reply to Objection 1. The truth of faith is contained
before the faith was made public, is said secretly at Prime
∗ The Greek symballein
† Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost.
1196
and Compline, as though it were against the darkness of past and future errors.
Whether it belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith?
IIa IIae q. 1 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong to
longs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, “to whom
the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a
the more important and more difficult questions that arise
new edition of the symbol becomes necessary in order to
in the Church are referred,” as stated in the Decretals‡.
explain the articles of faith, as stated above (a. 9). Now,
Hence our Lord said to Peter whom he made Sovereign
in the Old Testament, the articles of faith were more and
Pontiff (Lk. 22:32): “I have prayed for thee,” Peter, “that
more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth of
thy faith fail not, and thou, being once converted, confirm
faith becoming clearer through greater nearness to Christ,
thy brethren.” The reason of this is that there should be but
as stated above (a. 7). Since then this reason ceased with
one faith of the whole Church, according to 1 Cor. 1:10:
the advent of the New Law, there is no need for the ar-
“That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no
ticles of faith to be more and more explicit. Therefore it
schisms among you”: and this could not be secured unless
does not seem to belong to the authority of the Sovereign
any question of faith that may arise be decided by him
Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the symbol.
who presides over the whole Church, so that the whole
Objection 2. Further, no man has the power to do
Church may hold firmly to his decision. Consequently it
what is forbidden under pain of anathema by the univer-
belongs to the sole authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to
sal Church. Now it was forbidden under pain of anath-
publish a new edition of the symbol, as do all other mat-
ema by the universal Church, to make a new edition of
ters which concern the whole Church, such as to convoke
the symbol. For it is stated in the acts of the first∗ coun-
a general council and so forth.
cil of Ephesus (P. ii, Act. 6) that “after the symbol of the
Reply to Objection 1. The truth of faith is sufficiently Nicene council had been read through, the holy synod de-explicit in the teaching of Christ and the apostles. But
creed that it was unlawful to utter, write or draw up any
since, according to 2 Pet. 3:16, some men are so evil-
other creed, than that which was defined by the Fathers
minded as to pervert the apostolic teaching and other doc-
assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost,” and
trines and Scriptures to their own destruction, it was nec-
this under pain of anathema. The same was repeated in
essary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly
the acts of the council of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). There-
against the errors which arose.
fore it seems that the Sovereign Pontiff has no authority
Reply to Objection 2. This prohibition and sentence
to publish a new edition of the symbol.
of the council was intended for private individuals, who
Objection 3.
Further, Athanasius was not the
have no business to decide matters of faith: for this de-
Sovereign Pontiff, but patriarch of Alexandria, and yet he
cision of the general council did not take away from a
published a symbol which is sung in the Church. There-
subsequent council the power of drawing up a new edi-
fore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign Pontiff
tion of the symbol, containing not indeed a new faith, but
any more than to other bishops, to publish a new edition
the same faith with greater explicitness. For every coun-
of the symbol.
cil has taken into account that a subsequent council would
On the contrary, The symbol was drawn us by a gen-
expound matters more fully than the preceding council, if
eral council. Now such a council cannot be convoked oth-
this became necessary through some heresy arising. Con-
erwise than by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, as
sequently this belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff, by whose
stated in the Decretals†. Therefore it belongs to the au-
authority the council is convoked, and its decision con-
thority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol.
firmed.
I answer that, As stated above (obj. 1), a new edi-
Reply to Objection 3. Athanasius drew up a declara-
tion of the symbol becomes necessary in order to set aside
tion of faith, not under the form of a symbol, but rather by
the errors that may arise. Consequently to publish a new
way of an exposition of doctrine, as appears from his way
edition of the symbol belongs to that authority which is
of speaking. But since it contained briefly the whole truth
empowered to decide matters of faith finally, so that they
of faith, it was accepted by the authority of the Sovereign
may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this be-
Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith.
∗ St. Thomas wrote ‘first’ (expunged by Nicolai) to distinguish it from the other council, A.D. 451, known as the “Latrocinium” and condemned by the Pope.
† Dist. xvii, Can. 4,5
‡ Dist. xvii, Can. 5
1197
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 2
Of the Act of Faith
(In Ten Articles)
We must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act; (2) the external act.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) What is “to believe,” which is the internal act of faith?
(2) In how many ways is it expressed?
(3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything above natural reason?
(4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are attainable by natural reason?
(5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things explicitly?
(6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith?
(7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for salvation?
(8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity explicitly?
(9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious?
(10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith?
Whether to believe is to think with assent?
IIa IIae q. 2 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that to believe is not
comes our word. Hence the Word of God must be under-
to think with assent. Because the Latin word “cogita-
stood without any thinking on the part of God, for there
tio” [thought] implies a research, for “cogitare” [to think]
is nothing there that can take form, or be unformed.” In
seems to be equivalent to “coagitare,” i.e. “to discuss to-
this way thought is, properly speaking, the movement of
gether.” Now Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that
the mind while yet deliberating, and not yet perfected by
faith is “an assent without research.” Therefore thinking
the clear sight of truth. Since, however, such a movement
has no place in the act of faith.
of the mind may be one of deliberation either about uni-
Objection 2. Further, faith resides in the reason, as
versal notions, which belongs to the intellectual faculty,
we shall show further on (q. 4, a. 2). Now to think is an
or about particular matters, which belongs to the sensitive
act of the cogitative power, which belongs to the sensitive
part, hence it is that “to think” is taken secondly for an act
faculty, as stated in the Ia, q. 78, a. 4. Therefore thought
of the deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the
has nothing to do with faith.
cogitative power.
Objection 3. Further, to believe is an act of the intel-
Accordingly, if “to think” be understood broadly ac-
lect, since its object is truth. But assent seems to be an
cording to the first sense, then “to think with assent,” does
act not of the intellect, but of the will, even as consent is,
not express completely what is meant by “to believe”:
as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 15, a. 1, ad 3). Therefore to
since, in this way, a man thinks with assent even when
believe is not to think with assent.
he considers what he knows by science∗, or understands.
On the contrary, This is how “to believe” is defined
If, on the other hand, “to think” be understood in the sec-
by Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. ii).
ond way, then this expresses completely the nature of the
I answer that, “To think” can be taken in three ways.
act of believing. For among the acts belonging to the in-
First, in a general way for any kind of actual consideration
tellect, some have a firm assent without any such kind
of the intellect, as Augustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7):
of thinking, as when a man considers the things that he
“By understanding I mean now the faculty whereby we
knows by science, or understands, for this consideration
understand when thinking.” Secondly, “to think” is more
is already formed. But some acts of the intellect have
strictly taken for that consideration of the intellect, which
unformed thought devoid of a firm assent, whether they
is accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which pre-
incline to neither side, as in one who “doubts”; or incline
cedes the intellect’s arrival at the stage of perfection that
to one side rather than the other, but on account of some
comes with the certitude of sight. In this sense Augustine
slight motive, as in one who “suspects”; or incline to one
says (De Trin. xv, 16) that “the Son of God is not called
side yet with fear of the other, as in one who “opines.”
the Thought, but the Word of God. When our thought
But this act “to believe,” cleaves firmly to one side, in
realizes what we know and takes form therefrom, it be-
which respect belief has something in common with sci-
∗ Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration.
1198
ence and understanding; yet its knowledge does not attain believe, for instance that such things have been uttered by
the perfection of clear sight, wherein it agrees with doubt,
God and confirmed by miracles.
suspicion and opinion. Hence it is proper to the believer
Reply to Objection 2. “To think” is not taken here
to think with assent: so that the act of believing is distin-
for the act of the cogitative power, but for an act of the
guished from all the other acts of the intellect, which are
intellect, as explained above.
about the true or the false.
Reply to Objection 3. The intellect of the believer
Reply to Objection 1. Faith has not that research of
is determined to one object, not by the reason, but by the
natural reason which demonstrates what is believed, but
will, wherefore assent is taken here for an act of the intel-
a research into those things whereby a man is induced to
lect as determined to one object by the will.
Whether the act of faith is suitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a God IIa IIae q. 2 a. 2
and believing in God?
Objection 1. It would seem that the act of faith is
If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then
unsuitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a
two things can be observed in the object of faith, as stated
God, and believing in God. For one habit has but one act.
above (q. 1, a. 1). One of these is the material object of
Now faith is one habit since it is one virtue. Therefore it
faith, and in this way an act of faith is “to believe in a
is unreasonable to say that there are three acts of faith.
God”; because, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1) nothing is pro-
Objection 2. Further, that which is common to all acts
posed to our belief, except in as much as it is referred to
of faith should not be reckoned as a particular kind of act
God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it
of faith. Now “to believe God” is common to all acts of
is the medium on account of which we assent to such and
faith, since faith is founded on the First Truth. Therefore
such a point of faith; and thus an act of faith is “to believe
it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from certain other
God,” since, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1) the formal object
acts of faith.
of faith is the First Truth, to Which man gives his adhe-
Objection 3. Further, that which can be said of unbe-
sion, so as to assent to Its sake to whatever he believes.
lievers, cannot be called an act of faith. Now unbelievers
Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far
can be said to believe in a God. Therefore it should not be
as the intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is “to
reckoned an act of faith.
believe in God.” For the First Truth is referred to the will,
Objection 4. Further, movement towards the end be-
through having the aspect of an end.
longs to the will, whose object is the good and the end.
Reply to Objection 1. These three do not denote dif-
Now to believe is an act, not of the will, but of the intel-
ferent acts of faith, but one and the same act having dif-
lect. Therefore “to believe in God,” which implies move-
ferent relations to the object of faith.
ment towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
of that act.
Reply to Objection 3. Unbelievers cannot be said “to
On the contrary is the authority of Augustine who
believe in a God” as we understand it in relation to the act
makes this distinction (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi—Tract.
of faith. For they do not believe that God exists under the
xxix in Joan.).
conditions that faith determines; hence they do not truly
I answer that, The act of any power or habit depends
imply believe in a God, since, as the Philosopher observes
on the relation of that power or habit to its object. Now
(Metaph. ix, text. 22) “to know simple things defectively
the object of faith can be considered in three ways. For,
is not to know them at all.”
since “to believe” is an act of the intellect, in so far as the Reply to Objection 4. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 9,
will moves it to assent, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3), the
a. 1) the will moves the intellect and the other powers of
object of faith can be considered either on the part of the
the soul to the end: and in this respect an act of faith is “to intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect.
believe in God.”
Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural reason?
IIa IIae q. 2 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem unnecessary for salvation
as stated above (q. 1, a. 4). Therefore to believe seems
to believe anything above the natural reason. For the sal-
unnecessary for salvation.
vation and perfection of a thing seem to be sufficiently
Objection 2. Further, it is dangerous for man to assent
insured by its natural endowments. Now matters of faith,
to matters, wherein he cannot judge whether that which is
surpass man’s natural reason, since they are things unseen
proposed to him be true or false, according to Job 12:11:
1199
“Doth not the ear discern words?” Now a man cannot Consequently the perfection of the rational creature
form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith, since he
consists not only in what belongs to it in respect of its na-
cannot trace them back to first principles, by which all our
ture, but also in that which it acquires through a supernat-
judgments are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe
ural participation of Divine goodness. Hence it was said
in such matters. Therefore to believe is not necessary for
above ( Ia IIae, q. 3, a. 8) that man’s ultimate happiness
salvation.
consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which vision
Objection 3. Further, man’s salvation rests on God,
man cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according
according to Ps. 36:39: “But the salvation of the just is
to Jn. 6:45: “Every one that hath heard of the Father and
from the Lord.” Now “the invisible things” of God “are
hath learned cometh to Me.” Now man acquires a share
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made;
of this learning, not indeed all at once, but by little and
His eternal power also and Divinity,” according to Rom.
little, according to the mode of his nature: and every one
1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the un-
who learns thus must needs believe, in order that he may
derstanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not
acquire science in a perfect degree; thus also the Philoso-
necessary for man’s salvation, that he should believe cer-
pher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that “it behooves a
tain things.
learner to believe.”
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): “Without
Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision
faith it is impossible to please God.”
of heavenly happiness, he must first of all believe God, as
I answer that, Wherever one nature is subordinate to
a disciple believes the master who is teaching him.
another, we find that two things concur towards the per-
Reply to Objection 1. Since man’s nature is depen-
fection of the lower nature, one of which is in respect of
dent on a higher nature, natural knowledge does not suf-
that nature’s proper movement, while the other is in re-
fice for its perfection, and some supernatural knowledge
spect of the movement of the higher nature. Thus water
is necessary, as stated above.
by its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the
Reply to Objection 2. Just as man assents to first
earth), while according to the movement of the moon, it
principles, by the natural light of his intellect, so does a
moves round the centre by ebb and flow. In like man-
virtuous man, by the habit of virtue, judge aright of things
ner the planets have their proper movements from west to
concerning that virtue; and in this way, by the light of
east, while in accordance with the movement of the first
faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to matters
heaven, they have a movement from east to west. Now the
of faith and not to those which are against faith. Conse-
created rational nature alone is immediately subordinate
quently “there is no” danger or “condemnation to them
to God, since other creatures do not attain to the univer-
that are in Christ Jesus,” and whom He has enlightened
sal, but only to something particular, while they partake
by faith.
of the Divine goodness either in “being” only, as inani-
Reply to Objection 3. In many respects faith per-
mate things, or also in “living,” and in “knowing singu-
ceives the invisible things of God in a higher way than
lars,” as plants and animals; whereas the rational nature,
natural reason does in proceeding to God from His crea-
in as much as it apprehends the universal notion of good
tures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): “Many things
and being, is immediately related to the universal princi-
are shown to thee above the understandings of man.”
ple of being.
Whether it is necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason?
IIa IIae q. 2 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem unnecessary to believe
need to believe what can be proved by natural reason.
those things which can be proved by natural reason. For
Objection 3. Further, all things knowable scientifi-
nothing is superfluous in God’s works, much less even
cally∗ would seem to come under one head: so that if
than in the works of nature. Now it is superfluous to em-
some of them are proposed to man as objects of faith, in
ploy other means, where one already suffices. Therefore
like manner the others should also be believed. But this
it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that can
is not true. Therefore it is not necessary to believe those
be known by natural reason.
things which can be proved by natural reason.
Objection 2. Further, those things must be believed,
On the contrary, It is necessary to believe that God is
which are the object of faith. Now science and faith are
one and incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by
not about the same object, as stated above (q. 1, Aa. 4,5).
natural reason.
Since therefore all things that can be known by natural
I answer that, It is necessary for man to accept by
reason are an object of science, it seems that there is no
faith not only things which are above reason, but also
∗ Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration
1200
those which can be known by reason: and this for three tigation, into human affairs, have fallen into many errors,
motives. First, in order that man may arrive more quickly
and have disagreed among themselves. And consequently,
at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the science to
in order that men might have knowledge of God, free of
whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God,
doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for Divine matters
is the last of all to offer itself to human research, since it
to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them,
presupposes many other sciences: so that it would not by
as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie.
until late in life that man would arrive at the knowledge of
Reply to Objection 1. The researches of natural rea-
God. The second reason is, in order that the knowledge of
son do not suffice mankind for the knowledge of Divine
God may be more general. For many are unable to make
matters, even of those that can be proved by reason: and
progress in the study of science, either through dullness
so it is not superfluous if these others be believed.
of mind, or through having a number of occupations, and
Reply to Objection 2. Science and faith cannot be in
temporal needs, or even through laziness in learning, all
the same subject and about the same object: but what is
of whom would be altogether deprived of
an object of science for one, can be an object of faith for
the knowledge of God, unless Divine things were
another, as stated above (q. 1, a. 5).
brought to their knowledge under the guise of faith. The
Reply to Objection 3. Although all things that can
third reason is for the sake of certitude. For human reason
be known by science are of one common scientific aspect,
is very deficient in things concerning God. A sign of this
they do not all alike lead man to beatitude: hence they are
is that philosophers in their researches, by natural inves-
not all equally proposed to our belief.
Whether man is bound to believe anything explicitly?
IIa IIae q. 2 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that man is not bound
is bound to fulfil, concern acts of virtue which are the
to believe anything explicitly. For no man is bound to
means of attaining salvation. Now an act of virtue, as
do what is not in his power.
Now it is not in man’s
stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 60, a. 5) depends on the relation
power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written (Rom.
of the habit to its object. Again two things may be consid-
10:14,15): “How shall they believe Him, of whom they
ered in the object of any virtue; namely, that which is the
have not heard?
And how shall they hear without a
proper and direct object of that virtue, and that which is
preacher?
And how shall they preach unless they be
accidental and consequent to the object properly so called.
sent?” Therefore man is not bound to believe anything
Thus it belongs properly and directly to the object of forti-
explicitly.
tude, to face the dangers of death, and to charge at the foe
Objection 2. Further, just as we are directed to God
with danger to oneself, for the sake of the common good:
by faith, so are we by charity. Now man is not bound
yet that, in a just war, a man be armed, or strike another
to keep the precepts of charity, and it is enough if he be
with his sword, and so forth, is reduced to the object of
ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the precept of Our
fortitude, but indirectly.
Lord (Mat. 5:39): “If one strike thee on one [Vulg.: ‘thy
Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the
right’] cheek, turn to him also the other”; and by others of
fulfilment of a precept, so is it necessary that the virtu-
the same kind, according to Augustine’s exposition (De
ous act should terminate in its proper and direct object:
Serm. Dom. in Monte xix). Therefore neither is man
but, on the other hand, the fulfilment of the precept does
bound to believe anything explicitly, and it is enough if he
not require that a virtuous act should terminate in those
be ready to believe whatever God proposes to be believed.
things which have an accidental or secondary relation to
Objection 3. Further, the good of faith consists in
the proper and direct object of that virtue, except in certain
obedience, according to Rom. 1:5: “For obedience to the
places and at certain times. We must, therefore, say that
faith in all nations.” Now the virtue of obedience does not
the direct object of faith is that whereby man is made one
require man to keep certain fixed precepts, but it is enough
of the Blessed, as stated above (q. 1, a. 8): while the in-
that his mind be ready to obey, according to Ps. 118:60: “I
direct and secondary object comprises all things delivered
am ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy com-
by God to us in Holy Writ, for instance that Abraham had
mandments.” Therefore it seems enough for faith, too,
two sons, that David was the son of Jesse, and so forth.
that man should be ready to believe whatever God may
Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of
propose, without his believing anything explicitly.
faith, man is bound to believe them, just as he is bound
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): “He that
to have faith; but as to other points of faith, man is not
cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder
bound to believe them explicitly, but only implicitly, or to
to them that seek Him.”
be ready to believe them, in so far as he is prepared to be-
I answer that, The precepts of the Law, which man
lieve whatever is contained in the Divine Scriptures. Then
1201
alone is he bound to believe such things explicitly, when vi∗).
it is clear to him that they are contained in the doctrine of
Reply to Objection 2. Man is bound to love definitely
faith.
those lovable things which are properly and directly the
Reply to Objection 1. If we understand those things
objects of charity, namely, God and our neighbor. The ob-
alone to be in a man’s power, which we can do without the
jection refers to those precepts of charity which belong,
help of grace, then we are bound to do many things which
as a consequence, to the objects of charity.
we cannot do without the aid of healing grace, such as
Reply to Objection 3. The virtue of obedience is
to love God and our neighbor, and likewise to believe the
seated, properly speaking, in the will; hence promptness
articles of faith. But with the help of grace we can do
of the will subject to authority, suffices for the act of obe-
this, for this help “to whomsoever it is given from above
dience, because it is the proper and direct object of obedi-
it is mercifully given; and from whom it is withheld it is
ence. But this or that precept is accidental or consequent
justly withheld, as a punishment of a previous, or at least
to that proper and direct object.
of original, sin,” as Augustine states (De Corr. et Grat. v,
Whether all are equally bound to have explicit faith?
IIa IIae q. 2 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that all are equally bound
through those of higher degree. Consequently, just as the
to have explicit faith. For all are bound to those things
higher angels, who enlighten those who are below them,
which are necessary for salvation, as is evidenced by the
have a fuller knowledge of Divine things than the lower
precepts of charity. Now it is necessary for salvation that
angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xii), so too, men
certain things should be believed explicitly. Therefore all
of higher degree, whose business it is to teach others, are
are equally bound to have explicit faith.
under obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of
Objection 2. Further, no one should be put to test in
faith, and to believe them more explicitly.
matters that he is not bound to believe. But simple reasons
Reply to Objection 1. The unfolding of the articles of
are sometimes tested in reference to the slightest articles
faith is not equally necessary for the salvation of all, since
of faith. Therefore all are bound to believe everything ex-
those of higher degree, whose duty it is to teach others, are
plicitly.
bound to believe explicitly more things than others are.
Objection 3. Further, if the simple are bound to have,
Reply to Objection 2. Simple persons should not be
not explicit but only implicit faith, their faith must needs
put to the test about subtle questions of faith, unless they
be implied in the faith of the learned. But this seems un-
be suspected of having been corrupted by heretics, who
safe, since it is possible for the learned to err. Therefore
are wont to corrupt the faith of simple people in such ques-
it seems that the simple should also have explicit faith; so
tions. If, however, it is found that they are free from ob-
that all are, therefore, equally bound to have explicit faith.
stinacy in their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due to
On the contrary, It is written (Job 1:14): “The oxen
their simplicity, it is no fault of theirs.
were ploughing, and the asses feeding beside them,” be-
Reply to Objection 3. The simple have no faith im-
cause, as Gregory expounds this passage (Moral. ii, 17),
plied in that of the learned, except in so far as the latter
the simple, who are signified by the asses, ought, in mat-
adhere to the Divine teaching. Hence the Apostle says
ters of faith, to stay by the learned, who are denoted by
(1 Cor. 4:16): “Be ye followers of me, as I also am of
the oxen.
Christ.” Hence it is not human knowledge, but the Divine
I answer that, The unfolding of matters of faith is the
truth that is the rule of faith: and if any of the learned stray result of Divine revelation: for matters of faith surpass
from this rule, he does not harm the faith of the simple
natural reason. Now Divine revelation reaches those of
ones, who think that the learned believe aright; unless the
lower degree through those who are over them, in a cer-
simple hold obstinately to their individual errors, against
tain order; to men, for instance, through the angels, and
the faith of the universal Church, which cannot err, since
to the lower angels through the higher, as Dionysius ex-
Our Lord said (Lk. 22:32): “I have prayed for thee,” Peter,
plains (Coel. Hier. iv, vii). In like manner therefore the
“that thy faith fail not.”
unfolding of faith must needs reach men of lower degree
∗ Cf. Ep. cxc; De Praed. Sanct. viii.
1202
Whether it is necessary for the salvation of all, that they should believe explicitly in IIa IIae q. 2 a. 7
the mystery of Christ?
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not necessary
leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife,” of
for the salvation of all that they should believe explicitly
which the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32) that “this is a great
in the mystery of Christ. For man is not bound to believe
sacrament. . . in Christ and the Church,” and it is incredi-
explicitly what the angels are ignorant about: since the
ble that the first man was ignorant about this sacrament.
unfolding of faith is the result of Divine revelation, which
But after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not
reaches man by means of the angels, as stated above (a. 6;
only as to the Incarnation, but also as to the Passion and
Ia, q. 111, a. 1). Now even the angels were in ignorance
Resurrection, whereby the human race is delivered from
of the mystery of the Incarnation: hence, according to the
sin and death: for they would not, else, have foreshad-
commentary of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), it is they who
owed Christ’s Passion by certain sacrifices both before
ask (Ps. 23:8): “Who is this king of glory?” and (Is.
and after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was
63:1): “Who is this that cometh from Edom?” Therefore
known by the learned explicitly, while the simple folk,
men were not bound to believe explicitly in the mystery
under the veil of those sacrifices, believed them to be or-
of Christ’s Incarnation.
dained by God in reference to Christ’s coming, and thus
Objection 2. Further, it is evident that John the Baptist their knowledge was covered with a veil, so to speak.
was one of the teachers, and most nigh to Christ, Who said
And, as stated above (q. 1, a. 7), the nearer they were to
of him (Mat. 11:11) that “there hath not risen among them
Christ, the more distinct was their knowledge of Christ’s
that are born of women, a greater than” he. Now John
mysteries.
the Baptist does not appear to have known the mystery of
After grace had been revealed, both learned and sim-
Christ explicitly, since he asked Christ (Mat. 11:3): “Art
ple folk are bound to explicit faith in the mysteries
Thou He that art to come, or look we for another?” There-
of Christ, chiefly as regards those which are observed
fore even the teachers were not bound to explicit faith in
throughout the Church, and publicly proclaimed, such as
Christ.
the articles which refer to the Incarnation, of which we
Objection 3. Further, many gentiles obtained salva-
have spoken above (q. 1, a. 8). As to other minute points in
tion through the ministry of the angels, as Dionysius states
reference to the articles of the Incarnation, men have been
(Coel. Hier. ix). Now it would seem that the gentiles had
bound to believe them more or less explicitly according to
neither explicit nor implicit faith in Christ, since they re-
each one’s state and office.
ceived no revelation. Therefore it seems that it was not
Reply to Objection 1. The mystery of the Kingdom
necessary for the salvation of all to believe explicitly in
of God was not entirely hidden from the angels, as Au-
the mystery of Christ.
gustine observes (Gen. ad lit. v, 19), yet certain aspects
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Gra-
thereof were better known to them when Christ revealed
tia vii; Ep. cxc): “Our faith is sound if we believe that
them to them.
no man, old or young is delivered from the contagion of
Reply to Objection 2. It was not through ignorance
death and the bonds of sin, except by the one Mediator of
that John the Baptist inquired of Christ’s advent in the
God and men, Jesus Christ.”
flesh, since he had clearly professed his belief therein,
I answer that, As stated above (a. 5; q. 1, a. 8), the
saying: “I saw, and I gave testimony, that this is the Son of
object of faith includes, properly and directly, that thing
God” (Jn. 1:34). Hence he did not say: “Art Thou He that
through which man obtains beatitude. Now the mystery of
hast come?” but “Art Thou He that art to come?” thus
Christ’s Incarnation and Passion is the way by which men
saying about the future, not about the past. Likewise it
obtain beatitude; for it is written (Acts 4:12): “There is no
is not to be believed that he was ignorant of Christ’s fu-
other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must
ture Passion, for he had already said (Jn. 1:39): “Behold
be saved.” Therefore belief of some kind in the mystery of
the Lamb of God, behold Him who taketh away the sins
Christ’s Incarnation was necessary at all times and for all
[Vulg.: ‘sin’] of the world,” thus foretelling His future im-
persons, but this belief differed according to differences
molation; and since other prophets had foretold it, as may
of times and persons. The reason of this is that before the
be seen especially in Isaias 53. We may therefore say with
state of sin, man believed, explicitly in Christ’s Incarna-
Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that he asked this ques-
tion, in so far as it was intended for the consummation of
tion, being in ignorance as to whether Christ would de-
glory, but not as it was intended to deliver man from sin
scend into hell in His own Person. But he did not ignore
by the Passion and Resurrection, since man had no fore-
the fact that the power of Christ’s Passion would be ex-
knowledge of his future sin. He does, however, seem to
tended to those who were detained in Limbo, according
have had foreknowledge of the Incarnation of Christ, from
to Zech. 9:11: “Thou also, by the blood of Thy testament
the fact that he said (Gn. 2:24): “Wherefore a man shall
hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein there
1203
is no water”; nor was he bound to believe explicitly, before read in the history of the Romans, that at the time of Con-its fulfilment, that Christ was to descend thither Himself.
stantine Augustus and his mother Irene a tomb was dis-
It may also be replied that, as Ambrose observes in
covered, wherein lay a man on whose breast was a golden
his commentary on Lk. 7:19, he made this inquiry, not
plate with the inscription: “Christ shall be born of a vir-
from doubt or ignorance but from devotion: or again, with
gin, and in Him, I believe. O sun, during the lifetime
Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvi in Matth.), that he inquired, not
of Irene and Constantine, thou shalt see me again”∗. If,
as though ignorant himself, but because he wished his dis-
however, some were saved without receiving any revela-
ciples to be satisfied on that point, through Christ: hence
tion, they were not saved without faith in a Mediator, for,
the latter framed His answer so as to instruct the disciples,
though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they did,
by pointing to the signs of His works.
nevertheless, have implicit faith through believing in Di-
Reply to Objection 3. Many of the gentiles received
vine providence, since they believed that God would de-
revelations of Christ, as is clear from their predictions.
liver mankind in whatever way was pleasing to Him, and
Thus we read (Job 19:25): “I know that my Redeemer
according to the revelation of the Spirit to those who knew
liveth.” The Sibyl too foretold certain things about Christ,
the truth, as stated in Job 35:11: “Who teacheth us more
as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xiii, 15). Moreover, we
than the beasts of the earth.”
Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity?
IIa IIae q. 2 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that it was not necessary
“Let us make man to Our image and likeness” (Gn. 1:26).
for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity. For the
Therefore from the very beginning it was necessary for
Apostle says (Heb. 11:6): “He that cometh to God must
salvation to believe in the Trinity.
believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek
I answer that, It is impossible to believe explicitly in Him.” Now one can believe this without believing in the
the mystery of Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since
Trinity. Therefore it was not necessary to believe explic-
the mystery of Christ includes that the Son of God took
itly in the Trinity.
flesh; that He renewed the world through the grace of the
Objection 2.
Further our Lord said (Jn.
17:5,6):
Holy Ghost; and again, that He was conceived by the Holy
“Father, I have manifested Thy name to men,” which
Ghost. Wherefore just as, before Christ, the mystery of
words Augustine expounds (Tract. cvi) as follows: “Not
Christ was believed explicitly by the learned, but implic-
the name by which Thou art called God, but the name
itly and under a veil, so to speak, by the simple, so too
whereby Thou art called My Father,” and further on he
was it with the mystery of the Trinity. And consequently,
adds: “In that He made this world, God is known to all
when once grace had been revealed, all were bound to ex-
nations; in that He is not to be worshipped together with
plicit faith in the mystery of the Trinity: and all who are
false gods, ‘God is known in Judea’; but, in that He is the
born again in Christ, have this bestowed on them by the
Father of this Christ, through Whom He takes away the
invocation of the Trinity, according to Mat. 28:19: “Going
sin of the world, He now makes known to men this name
therefore teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name
of His, which hitherto they knew not.” Therefore before
of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.”
the coming of Christ it was not known that Paternity and
Reply to Objection 1. Explicit faith in those two
Filiation were in the Godhead: and so the Trinity was not
things was necessary at all times and for all people: but
believed explicitly.
it was not sufficient at all times and for all people.
Objection 3. Further, that which we are bound to be-
Reply to Objection 2. Before Christ’s coming, faith
lieve explicitly of God is the object of heavenly happiness.
in the Trinity lay hidden in the faith of the learned, but
Now the object of heavenly happiness is the sovereign
through Christ and the apostles it was shown to the world.
good, which can be understood to be in God, without any
Reply to Objection 3. God’s sovereign goodness as
distinction of Persons. Therefore it was not necessary to
we understand it now through its effects, can be under-
believe explicitly in the Trinity.
stood without the Trinity of Persons: but as understood in
On the contrary, In the Old Testament the Trinity of
itself, and as seen by the Blessed, it cannot be understood
Persons is expressed in many ways; thus at the very out-
without the Trinity of Persons. Moreover the mission of
set of Genesis it is written in manifestation of the Trinity:
the Divine Persons brings us to heavenly happiness.
∗ Cf. Baron, Annal., A.D. 780
1204
Whether to believe is meritorious?
IIa IIae q. 2 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that to believe in not mer-
cedes the ultimate form. Now it is evident that the subject
itorious. For the principle of all merit is charity, as stated
or the matter cannot act save by virtue of the form, nor can
above ( Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 4). Now faith, like nature, is a
a preceding disposition, before the advent of the form: but
preamble to charity. Therefore, just as an act of nature is
after the advent of the form, both the subject and the pre-
not meritorious, since we do not merit by our natural gifts,
ceding disposition act by virtue of the form, which is the
so neither is an act of faith.
chief principle of action, even as the heat of fire acts by
Objection 2. Further, belief is a mean between opin-
virtue of the substantial form of fire. Accordingly neither
ion and scientific knowledge or the consideration of things
nature nor faith can, without charity, produce a meritori-
scientifically known∗. Now the considerations of science
ous act; but, when accompanied by charity, the act of faith
are not meritorious, nor on the other hand is opinion.
is made meritorious thereby, even as an act of nature, and
Therefore belief is not meritorious.
a natural act of the free-will.
Objection 3. Further, he who assents to a point of
Reply to Objection 2. Two things may be considered
faith, either has a sufficient motive for believing, or he
in science: namely the scientist’s assent to a scientific fact
has not. If he has a sufficient motive for his belief, this
and his consideration of that fact. Now the assent of sci-
does not seem to imply any merit on his part, since he is
ence is not subject to free-will, because the scientist is
no longer free to believe or not to believe: whereas if he
obliged to assent by force of the demonstration, wherefore
has not a sufficient motive for believing, this is a mark of
scientific assent is not meritorious. But the actual consid-
levity, according to Ecclus. 19:4: “He that is hasty to give
eration of what a man knows scientifically is subject to his
credit, is light of heart,” so that, seemingly, he gains no
free-will, for it is in his power to consider or not to con-
merit thereby. Therefore to believe is by no means meri-
sider. Hence scientific consideration may be meritorious
torious.
if it be referred to the end of charity, i.e. to the honor of
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:33) that the
God or the good of our neighbor. On the other hand, in the
saints “by faith. . . obtained promises,” which would not
case of faith, both these things are subject to the free-will
be the case if they did not merit by believing. Therefore
so that in both respects the act of faith can be meritorious:
to believe is meritorious.
whereas in the case of opinion, there is no firm assent,
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 114,
since it is weak and infirm, as the Philosopher observes
Aa. 3,4), our actions are meritorious in so far as they pro-
(Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed from a
ceed from the free-will moved with grace by God. There-
perfect act of the will: and for this reason, as regards the
fore every human act proceeding from the free-will, if it
assent, it does not appear to be very meritorious, though it
be referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the act of
can be as regards the actual consideration.
believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine
Reply to Objection 3. The believer has sufficient mo-
truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of
tive for believing, for he is moved by the authority of Di-
God, so that it is subject to the free-will in relation to God; vine teaching confirmed by miracles, and, what is more,
and consequently the act of faith can be meritorious.
by the inward instinct of the Divine invitation: hence he
Reply to Objection 1. Nature is compared to charity
does not believe lightly. He has not, however, sufficient
which is the principle of merit, as matter to form: whereas
reason for scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose
faith is compared to charity as the disposition which pre-
the merit.
Whether reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith?
IIa IIae q. 2 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that reasons in support
of virtue, lessens the amount of merit, since “happiness
of what we believe lessen the merit of faith. For Gregory
is the reward of virtue,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that “there is no merit in be-
i, 9). Now human reasoning seems to diminish the mea-
lieving what is shown by reason.” If, therefore, human
sure of the virtue of faith, since it is essential to faith to
reason provides sufficient proof, the merit of faith is al-
be about the unseen, as stated above (q. 1, Aa. 4,5). Now
together taken away. Therefore it seems that any kind of
the more a thing is supported by reasons the less is it un-
human reasoning in support of matters of faith, diminishes
seen. Therefore human reasons in support of matters of
the merit of believing.
faith diminish the merit of faith.
Objection 2. Further, whatever lessens the measure
Objection 3. Further, contrary things have contrary
∗ Science is a certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration.
1205
causes. Now an inducement in opposition to faith in-have an indication of this in the words of the Samaritans
creases the merit of faith whether it consist in persecu-
to the woman, who is a type of human reason: “We now
tion inflicted by one who endeavors to force a man to
believe, not for thy saying” (Jn. 4:42).
renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading him to
Reply to Objection 1. Gregory is referring to the case
do so. Therefore reasons in support of faith diminish the
of a man who has no will to believe what is of faith, unless
merit of faith.
he be induced by reasons. But when a man has the will to
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 3:15): “Being
believe what is of faith on the authority of God alone, al-
ready always to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason
though he may have reasons in demonstration of some of
of that faith∗ and hope which is in you.” Now the Apostle
them, e.g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith is
would not give this advice, if it would imply a diminution
not, for that reason, lost or diminished.
in the merit of faith. Therefore reason does not diminish
Reply to Objection 2. The reasons which are brought
the merit of faith.
forward in support of the authority of faith, are not demon-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 9), the act of faith
strations which can bring intellectual vision to the human
can be meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will,
intellect, wherefore they do not cease to be unseen. But
not only as to the use, but also as to the assent. Now hu-
they remove obstacles to faith, by showing that what faith
man reason in support of what we believe, may stand in a
proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do
twofold relation to the will of the believer. First, as pre-
not diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the
ceding the act of the will; as, for instance, when a man
other hand, though demonstrative reasons in support of
either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe,
the preambles of faith†, but not of the articles of faith,
unless he be moved by human reasons: and in this way
diminish the measure of faith, since they make the thing
human reason diminishes the merit of faith. In this sense
believed to be seen, yet they do not diminish the measure
it has been said above ( Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 3, ad 1; q. 77,
of charity, which makes the will ready to believe them,
a. 6, ad 2) that, in moral virtues, a passion which precedes
even if they were unseen; and so the measure of merit is
choice makes the virtuous act less praiseworthy. For just
not diminished.
as a man ought to perform acts of moral virtue, on ac-
Reply to Objection 3. Whatever is in opposition to
count of the judgment of his reason, and not on account
faith, whether it consist in a man’s thoughts, or in out-
of a passion, so ought he to believe matters of faith, not
ward persecution, increases the merit of faith, in so far as
on account of human reason, but on account of the Divine
the will is shown to be more prompt and firm in believ-
authority. Secondly, human reasons may be consequent
ing. Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith, through
to the will of the believer. For when a man’s will is ready
not renouncing faith on account of persecution; and even
to believe, he loves the truth he believes, he thinks out
the wise have greater merit of faith, through not renounc-
and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support
ing their faith on account of the reasons brought forward
thereof; and in this way human reason does not exclude
by philosophers or heretics in opposition to faith. On the
the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit. Thus again,
other hand things that are favorable to faith, do not always
in moral virtues a consequent passion is the sign of a more
diminish the promptness of the will to believe, and there-
prompt will, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 3, ad 1). We
fore they do not always diminish the merit of faith.
∗ Vulg.: ‘Of that hope which is in you.’ St. Thomas’ reading is apparently taken from Bede.
† The Leonine Edition reads: ‘in support of matters
of faith which are however, preambles to the articles of faith, diminish,’ etc.
1206
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 3
Of the Outward Act of Faith
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith: under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether confession is an act of faith?
(2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?
Whether confession is an act of faith?
IIa IIae q. 3 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that confession is not an
ferred specifically as to its end, to that which concerns
act of faith. For the same act does not belong to different
faith, according to 2 Cor. 4:13: “Having the same spirit
virtues. Now confession belongs to penance of which it is
of faith. . . we believe, and therefore we speak also.” For
a part. Therefore it is not an act of faith.
the outward utterance is intended to signify the inward
Objection 2. Further, man is sometimes deterred by
thought. Wherefore, just as the inward thought of matters
fear or some kind of confusion, from confessing his faith:
of faith is properly an act of faith, so too is the outward
wherefore the Apostle (Eph. 6:19) asks for prayers that
confession of them.
it may be granted him “with confidence, to make known
Reply to Objection 1. A threefold confession is com-
the mystery of the gospel.” Now it belongs to fortitude,
mended by the Scriptures. One is the confession of mat-
which moderates daring and fear, not to be deterred from
ters of faith, and this is a proper act of faith, since it is
doing good on account of confusion or fear. Therefore it
referred to the end of faith as stated above. Another is the
seems that confession is not an act of faith, but rather of
confession of thanksgiving or praise, and this is an act of
fortitude or constancy.
“latria,” for its purpose is to give outward honor to God,
Objection 3. Further, just as the ardor of faith makes
which is the end of “latria.” The third is the confession of
one confess one’s faith outwardly, so does it make one do
sins, which is ordained to the blotting out of sins, which is
other external good works, for it is written (Gal. 5:6) that
the end of penance, to which virtue it therefore belongs.
“faith. . . worketh by charity.” But other external works are
Reply to Objection 2. That which removes an obsta-
not reckoned acts of faith. Therefore neither is confession
cle is not a direct, but an indirect, cause, as the Philoso-
an act of faith.
pher proves (Phys. viii, 4). Hence fortitude which re-
On the contrary, A gloss explains the words of 2
moves an obstacle to the confession of faith, viz. fear or
Thess. 1:11, “and the work of faith in power” as refer-
shame, is not the proper and direct cause of confession,
ring to “confession which is a work proper to faith.”
but an indirect cause so to speak.
I answer that, Outward actions belong properly to the
Reply to Objection 3. Inward faith, with the aid of
virtue to whose end they are specifically referred: thus
charity, causes all outward acts of virtue, by means of
fasting is referred specifically to the end of abstinence,
the other virtues, commanding, but not eliciting them;
which is to tame the flesh, and consequently it is an act of
whereas it produces the act of confession as its proper act,
abstinence.
without the help of any other virtue.
Now confession of those things that are of faith is re-
Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?
IIa IIae q. 3 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that confession of faith
necessary save for those who have to instruct others in
is not necessary for salvation. For, seemingly, a thing is
the faith. Therefore it seems that the simple folk are not
sufficient for salvation, if it is a means of attaining the end bound to confess the faith.
of virtue. Now the proper end of faith is the union of the
Objection 3. Further, whatever may tend to scandal-
human mind with Divine truth, and this can be realized
ize and disturb others, is not necessary for salvation, for
without any outward confession. Therefore confession of
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:32): “Be without offense to
faith is not necessary for salvation.
the Jews and to the gentiles and to the Church of God.”
Objection 2. Further, by outward confession of faith,
Now confession of faith sometimes causes a disturbance
a man reveals his faith to another man. But this is un-
among unbelievers. Therefore it is not necessary for sal-
1207
vation.
the other virtues, must be referred to the end of char-
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 10:10):
ity, which is the love of God and our neighbor. Conse-
“With the heart we believe unto justice; but with the
quently when God’s honor and our neighbor’s good de-
mouth, confession is made unto salvation.”
mand, man should not be contented with being united by
I answer that, Things that are necessary for salvation
faith to God’s truth, but ought to confess his faith out-
come under the precepts of the Divine law. Now since
wardly.
confession of faith is something affirmative, it can only
Reply to Objection 2. In cases of necessity where
fall under an affirmative precept. Hence its necessity for
faith is in danger, every one is bound to proclaim his faith
salvation depends on how it falls under an affirmative pre-
to others, either to give good example and encouragement
cept of the Divine law. Now affirmative precepts as stated
to the rest of the faithful, or to check the attacks of un-
above ( Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 5, ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 88, a. 1, ad 2) believers: but at other times it is not the duty of all the
do not bind for always, although they are always binding;
faithful to instruct others in the faith.
but they bind as to place and time according to other due
Reply to Objection 3. There is nothing commendable
circumstances, in respect of which human acts have to be
in making a public confession of one’s faith, if it causes a
regulated in order to be acts of virtue.
disturbance among unbelievers, without any profit either
Thus then it is not necessary for salvation to confess
to the faith or to the faithful. Hence Our Lord said (Mat.
one’s faith at all times and in all places, but in certain
7:6): “Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast
places and at certain times, when, namely, by omitting to
ye your pearls before swine. . . lest turning upon you, they
do so, we would deprive God of due honor, or our neigh-
tear you.” Yet, if there is hope of profit to the faith, or if
bor of a service that we ought to render him: for instance,
there be urgency, a man should disregard the disturbance
if a man, on being asked about his faith, were to remain
of unbelievers, and confess his faith in public. Hence it is
silent, so as to make people believe either that he is with-
written (Mat. 15:12) that when the disciples had said to
out faith, or that the faith is false, or so as to turn others
Our Lord that “the Pharisee, when they heard this word,
away from the faith; for in such cases as these, confession
were scandalized,” He answered: “Let them alone, they
of faith is necessary for salvation.
are blind, and leaders of the blind.”
Reply to Objection 1. The end of faith, even as of
1208
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 4
Of the Virtue Itself of Faith
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first place, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly, the cause of faith; fourthly, its effects.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) What is faith?
(2) In what power of the soul does it reside?
(3) Whether its form is charity?
(4) Whether living [formata] faith and lifeless [informis] faith are one identically?
(5) Whether faith is a virtue?
(6) Whether it is one virtue?
(7) Of its relation to the other virtues;
(8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the intellectual virtues.
Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: “Faith is the substance of things to be IIa IIae q. 4 a. 1
hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not?”
Objection 1. It would seem that the Apostle gives
a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the princi-
an unfitting definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says:
ples of the syllogism, without employing the syllogistic
“Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evi-
form.
dence of things that appear not.” For no quality is a sub-
In order to make this clear, we must observe that since
stance: whereas faith is a quality, since it is a theological
habits are known by their acts, and acts by their objects,
virtue, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 3). Therefore it
faith, being a habit, should be defined by its proper act in
is not a substance.
relation to its proper object. Now the act of faith is to be-
Objection 2. Further, different virtues have different
lieve, as stated above (q. 2, Aa. 2,3), which is an act of the
objects. Now things to be hoped for are the object of hope.
intellect determinate to one object of the will’s command.
Therefore they should not be included in a definition of
Hence an act of faith is related both to the object of the
faith, as though they were its object.
will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the
Objection 3. Further, faith is perfected by charity
intellect, i.e. to the true. And since faith, through being a
rather than by hope, since charity is the form of faith, as
theological virtues, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 2),
we shall state further on (a. 3). Therefore the definition
has one same thing for object and end, its object and end
of faith should have included the thing to be loved rather
must, of necessity, be in proportion to one another. Now
than the thing to be hoped for.
it has been already stated (q. 1, Aa. 1,4) that the object of
Objection 4. Further, the same thing should not be
faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and whatever we hold
placed in different genera. Now “substance” and “evi-
on account thereof: so that it must needs be under the as-
dence” are different genera, and neither is subalternate to
pect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of
the other. Therefore it is unfitting to state that faith is both the act of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for,
“substance” and “evidence.”
according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:25): “We hope for that
Objection 5. Further, evidence manifests the truth of
which we see not”: because to see the truth is to possess
the matter for which it is adduced. Now a thing is said to
it. Now one hopes not for what one has already, but for
be apparent when its truth is already manifest. Therefore
what one has not, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 67, a. 4). Ac-
it seems to imply a contradiction to speak of “evidence of
cordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which
things that appear not”: and so faith is unfittingly defined.
is the object of the will, is indicated by the words: “Faith
On the contrary, The authority of the Apostle suf-
is the substance of things to be hoped for.” For we are
fices.
wont to call by the name of substance, the first beginning
I answer that, Though some say that the above words
of a thing, especially when the whole subsequent thing is
of the Apostle are not a definition of faith, yet if we con-
virtually contained in the first beginning; for instance, we
sider the matter aright, this definition overlooks none of
might say that the first self-evident principles are the sub-
the points in reference to which faith can be defined, al-
stance of science, because, to wit, these principles are in
beit the words themselves are not arranged in the form of
us the first beginnings of science, the whole of which is
1209
itself contained in them virtually. In this way then faith not see,” and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv,
is said to be the “substance of things to be hoped for,” for
11) that “faith is an assent without research,” and when
the reason that in us the first beginning of things to be
others say that “faith is that certainty of the mind about
hoped for is brought about by the assent of faith, which
absent things which surpasses opinion but falls short of
contains virtually all things to be hoped for. Because we
science,” these all amount to the same as the Apostle’s
hope to be made happy through seeing the unveiled truth
words: “Evidence of things that appear not”; and when
to which our faith cleaves, as was made evident when we
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that “faith is the solid
were speaking of happiness ( Ia IIae, q. 3, a. 8; Ia IIae,
foundation of the believer, establishing him in the truth,
q. 4, a. 3).
and showing forth the truth in him,” comes to the same as
The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the
“substance of things to be hoped for.”
intellect, considered as the object of faith, is indicated by
Reply to Objection 1. “Substance” here does not
the words, “evidence of things that appear not,” where
stand for the supreme genus condivided with the other
“evidence” is taken for the result of evidence. For evi-
genera, but for that likeness to substance which is found in
dence induces the intellect to adhere to a truth, wherefore
each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in a genus contains
the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth
the others virtually and is said to be the substance thereof.
of faith is called “evidence” here. Hence another reading
Reply to Objection 2. Since faith pertains to the intel-
has “conviction,” because to wit, the intellect of the be-
lect as commanded by the will, it must needs be directed,
liever is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to
as to its end, to the objects of those virtues which perfect
what it sees not. Accordingly if anyone would reduce the
the will, among which is hope, as we shall prove further
foregoing words to the form of a definition, he may say
on (q. 18, a. 1). For this reason the definition of faith in-
that “faith is a habit of the mind, whereby eternal life is
cludes the object of hope.
begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is non-
Reply to Objection 3. Love may be of the seen and of
apparent.”
the unseen, of the present and of the absent. Consequently
In this way faith is distinguished from all other things
a thing to be loved is not so adapted to faith, as a thing to
pertaining to the intellect. For when we describe it as “ev-
be hoped for, since hope is always of the absent and the
idence,” we distinguish it from opinion, suspicion, and
unseen.
doubt, which do not make the intellect adhere to anything
Reply to Objection 4. “Substance” and “evidence” as
firmly; when we go on to say, “of things that appear not,”
included in the definition of faith, do not denote various
we distinguish it from science and understanding, the ob-
genera of faith, nor different acts, but different relation-
ject of which is something apparent; and when we say that
ships of one act to different objects, as is clear from what
it is “the substance of things to be hoped for,” we distin-
has been said.
guish the virtue of faith from faith commonly so called,
Reply to Objection 5.
Evidence taken from the
which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for.
proper principles of a thing, make it apparent, whereas ev-
Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are ex-
idence taken from Divine authority does not make a thing
planations of this one given by the Apostle. For when
apparent in itself, and such is the evidence referred to in
Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.: QQ. Evang. ii, qu.
the definition of faith.
39) that “faith is a virtue whereby we believe what we do
Whether faith resides in the intellect?
IIa IIae q. 4 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that faith does not reside
avoided, as stated in De Anima iii, 9, so that it is not a
in the intellect. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct.
principle of operation, whereas “faith. . . worketh by char-
v) that “faith resides in the believer’s will.” Now the will
ity” (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is it in the practical in-
is a power distinct from the intellect. Therefore faith does
tellect, the object of which is some true, contingent thing,
not reside in the intellect.
that can be made or done. For the object of faith is the
Objection 2. Further, the assent of faith to believe
Eternal Truth, as was shown above (q. 1, a. 1). Therefore
anything, proceeds from the will obeying God. Therefore
faith does not reside in the intellect.
it seems that faith owes all its praise to obedience. Now
On the contrary, Faith is succeeded by the heavenly
obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is in the will, and
vision, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: “We see now through a
not in the intellect.
glass in a dark manner; but then face to face.” Now vision
Objection 3. Further, the intellect is either speculative is in the intellect. Therefore faith is likewise.
or practical. Now faith is not in the speculative intellect,
I answer that, Since faith is a virtue, its act must
since this is not concerned with things to be sought or
needs be perfect. Now, for the perfection of an act pro-
1210
ceeding from two active principles, each of these princi-sequently faith, which is the proper principle of that act,
ples must be perfect: for it is not possible for a thing to
must needs reside in the intellect.
be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the art, and the
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine takes faith for the
saw be well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the
act of faith, which is described as depending on the be-
soul, which is related to opposite objects, a disposition to
liever’s will, in so far as his intellect assents to matters of act well is a habit, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 49, a. 4,
faith at the command of the will.
ad 1,2,3). Wherefore an act that proceeds from two such
Reply to Objection 2. Not only does the will need
powers must be perfected by a habit residing in each of
to be ready to obey but also the intellect needs to be well
them. Again, it has been stated above (q. 2, Aa. 1,2) that
disposed to follow the command of the will, even as the
to believe is an act of the intellect inasmuch as the will
concupiscible faculty needs to be well disposed in order
moves it to assent. And this act proceeds from the will
to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to be
and the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude
a habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also
to be perfected in this way. Consequently, if the act of
in the assenting intellect.
faith is to be perfect, there needs to be a habit in the will
Reply to Objection 3. Faith resides in the speculative
as well as in the intellect: even as there needs to be the
intellect, as evidenced by its object. But since this object,
habit of prudence in the reason, besides the habit of tem-
which is the First Truth, is the end of all our desires and
perance in the concupiscible faculty, in order that the act
actions, as Augustine proves (De Trin. i, 8), it follows that
of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is immediately
faith worketh by charity just as “the speculative intellect
an act of the intellect, because the object of that act is
becomes practical by extension” (De Anima iii, 10).
“the true,” which pertains properly to the intellect. Con-
Whether charity is the form of faith?
IIa IIae q. 4 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not the form
voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to which that act is
of faith. For each thing derives its species from its form.
directed, both because it takes its species therefrom, and
When therefore two things are opposite members of a di-
because the mode of an action should correspond propor-
vision, one cannot be the form of the other. Now faith and
tionately to the end. Now it is evident from what has been
charity are stated to be opposite members of a division,
said (a. 1), that the act of faith is directed to the object of as different species of virtue (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore
the will, i.e. the good, as to its end: and this good which
charity is not the form of faith.
is the end of faith, viz. the Divine Good, is the proper
Objection 2. Further, a form and the thing of which
object of charity. Therefore charity is called the form of
it is the form are in one subject, since together they form
faith in so far as the act of faith is perfected and formed
one simply. Now faith is in the intellect, while charity is
by charity.
in the will. Therefore charity is not the form of faith.
Reply to Objection 1. Charity is called the form of
Objection 3. Further, the form of a thing is a princi-
faith because it quickens the act of faith. Now nothing
ple thereof. Now obedience, rather than charity, seems to
hinders one act from being quickened by different habits,
be the principle of believing, on the part of the will, ac-
so as to be reduced to various species in a certain order, as
cording to Rom. 1:5: “For obedience to the faith in all
stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, Aa. 6,7; Ia IIae, q. 61, a. 2)
nations.” Therefore obedience rather than charity, is the
when we were treating of human acts in general.
form of faith.
Reply to Objection 2. This objection is true of an in-
On the contrary, Each thing works through its form.
trinsic form. But it is not thus that charity is the form of
Now faith works through charity. Therefore the love of
faith, but in the sense that it quickens the act of faith, as
charity is the form of faith.
explained above.
I answer that, As appears from what has been said
Reply to Objection 3. Even obedience, and hope like-
above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 6), voluntary acts wise, and whatever other virtue might precede the act of
take their species from their end which is the will’s object.
faith, is quickened by charity, as we shall show further on
Now that which gives a thing its species, is after the man-
(q. 23, a. 8), and consequently charity is spoken of as the
ner of a form in natural things. Wherefore the form of any
form of faith.
1211
Whether lifeless faith can become living, or living faith, lifeless?
IIa IIae q. 4 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that lifeless faith does not
that pertains directly to faith, which pertains to the intel-
become living, or living faith lifeless. For, according to
lect. Again, what pertains to the will, does not pertain
1 Cor. 13:10, “when that which is perfect is come, that
directly to faith, so as to be able to differentiate the habit
which is in part shall be done away.” Now lifeless faith is
of faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is
imperfect in comparison with living faith. Therefore when
in respect of something pertaining to the will, i.e. charity,
living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, so that they
and not in respect of something pertaining to the intellect.
are not one identical habit.
Therefore living and lifeless faith are not distinct habits.
Objection 2. Further, a dead thing does not become a
Reply to Objection 1. The saying of the Apostle
living thing. Now lifeless faith is dead, according to James
refers to those imperfect things from which imperfection
2:20: “Faith without works is dead.” Therefore lifeless
is inseparable, for then, when the perfect comes the im-
faith cannot become living.
perfect must needs be done away. Thus with the advent of
Objection 3. Further, God’s grace, by its advent, has
clear vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially
no less effect in a believer than in an unbeliever. Now
“of the things that appear not.” When, however, imper-
by coming to an unbeliever it causes the habit of faith.
fection is not inseparable from the imperfect thing, the
Therefore when it comes to a believer, who hitherto had
same identical thing which was imperfect becomes per-
the habit of lifeless faith, it causes another habit of faith
fect. Thus childhood is not essential to man and conse-
in him.
quently the same identical subject who was a child, be-
Objection 4. Further, as Boethius says (In Categ.
comes a man. Now lifelessness is not essential to faith,
Arist. i), “accidents cannot be altered.” Now faith is an
but is accidental thereto as stated above. Therefore life-
accident. Therefore the same faith cannot be at one time
less faith itself becomes living.
living, and at another, lifeless.
Reply to Objection 2. That which makes an animal
On the contrary, A gloss on the words, “Faith with-
live is inseparable from an animal, because it is its sub-
out works is dead” (James 2:20) adds, “by which it lives
stantial form, viz. the soul: consequently a dead thing
once more.” Therefore faith which was lifeless and with-
cannot become a living thing, and a living and a dead
out form hitherto, becomes formed and living.
thing differ specifically. On the other hand that which
I answer that, There have been various opinions on
gives faith its form, or makes it live, is not essential to
this question. For some∗ have said that living and lifeless
faith. Hence there is no comparison.
faith are distinct habits, but that when living faith comes,
Reply to Objection 3. Grace causes faith not only
lifeless faith is done away, and that, in like manner, when
when faith begins anew to be in a man, but also as long
a man sins mortally after having living faith, a new habit
as faith lasts. For it has been said above ( Ia, q. 104, a. 1;
of lifeless faith is infused into him by God. But it seems
Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 9) that God is always working man’s
unfitting that grace should deprive man of a gift of God by
justification, even as the sun is always lighting up the air.
coming to him, and that a gift of God should be infused
Hence grace is not less effective when it comes to a be-
into man, on account of a mortal sin.
liever than when it comes to an unbeliever: since it causes
Consequently others† have said that living and lifeless
faith in both, in the former by confirming and perfecting
faith are indeed distinct habits, but that, all the same, when
it, in the latter by creating it anew.
living faith comes the habit of lifeless faith is not taken
We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on ac-
away, and that it remains together with the habit of living
count of the disposition of the subject, that grace does not
faith in the same subject. Yet again it seems unreasonable
cause faith in one who has it already: just as, on the other
that the habit of lifeless faith should remain inactive in a
hand, a second mortal sin does not take away grace from
person having living faith.
one who has already lost it through a previous mortal sin.
We must therefore hold differently that living and life-
Reply to Objection 4. When living faith becomes
less faith are one and the same habit. The reason is that
lifeless, faith is not changed, but its subject, the soul,
a habit is differentiated by that which directly pertains to
which at one time has faith without charity, and at another
that habit. Now since faith is a perfection of the intellect,
time, with charity.
∗ William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15
† Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64
1212
Whether faith is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 4 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that faith is not a virtue.
the will: just as if temperance be in the concupiscible,
For virtue is directed to the good, since “it is virtue that
without prudence being in the rational part, temperance is
makes its subject good,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
not a virtue, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1), because
ii, 6). But faith is directed to the true. Therefore faith is
the act of temperance requires both an act of reason, and
not a virtue.
an act of the concupiscible faculty, even as the act of faith
Objection 2. Further, infused virtue is more perfect
requires an act of the will, and an act of the intellect.
than acquired virtue. Now faith, on account of its im-
Reply to Objection 1. The truth is itself the good of
perfection, is not placed among the acquired intellectual
the intellect, since it is its perfection: and consequently
virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3). Much
faith has a relation to some good in so far as it directs the
less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue.
intellect to the true. Furthermore, it has a relation to the
Objection 3. Further, living and lifeless faith are the
good considered as the object of the will, inasmuch as it
same species, as stated above (a. 4). Now lifeless faith
is formed by charity.
is not a virtue, since it is not connected with the other
Reply to Objection 2. The faith of which the Philoso-
virtues. Therefore neither is living faith a virtue.
pher speaks is based on human reasoning in a conclusion
Objection 4. Further, the gratuitous graces and the
which does not follow, of necessity, from its premisses;
fruits are distinct from the virtues. But faith is numbered
and which is subject to be false: hence such like faith is
among the gratuitous graces (1 Cor. 12:9) and likewise
not a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which we are
among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore faith is not a
speaking is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible,
virtue.
and consequently its object cannot be anything false; so
On the contrary, Man is justified by the virtues, since
that faith of this kind can be a virtue.
“justice is all virtue,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v,
Reply to Objection 3. Living and lifeless faith do
1). Now man is justified by faith according to Rom. 5:1:
not differ specifically, as though they belonged to different
“Being justified therefore by faith let us have peace,” etc.
species. But they differ as perfect and imperfect within the
Therefore faith is a virtue.
same species. Hence lifeless faith, being imperfect, does
I answer that, As shown above, it is by human virtue
not satisfy the conditions of a perfect virtue, for “virtue is
that human acts are rendered good; hence, any habit that is
a kind of perfection” (Phys. vii, text. 18).
always the principle of a good act, may be called a human
Reply to Objection 4. Some say that faith which is
virtue. Such a habit is living faith. For since to believe
numbered among the gratuitous graces is lifeless faith.
is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth at the com-
But this is said without reason, since the gratuitous graces,
mand of the will, two things are required that this act may
which are mentioned in that passage, are not common to
be perfect: one of which is that the intellect should infal-
all the members of the Church: wherefore the Apostle
libly tend to its object, which is the true; while the other
says: “There are diversities of graces,” and again, “To one
is that the will should be infallibly directed to the last end, is given” this grace and “to another” that. Now lifeless
on account of which it assents to the true: and both of
faith is common to all members of the Church, because
these are to be found in the act of living faith. For it be-
its lifelessness is not part of its substance, if we consider
longs to the very essence of faith that the intellect should
it as a gratuitous gift. We must, therefore, say that in that
ever tend to the true, since nothing false can be the object
passage, faith denotes a certain excellency of faith, for in-
of faith, as proved above (q. 1, a. 3): while the effect of
stance, “constancy in faith,” according to a gloss, or the
charity, which is the form of faith, is that the soul ever has
“word of faith.”
its will directed to a good end. Therefore living faith is a
Faith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it
virtue.
gives a certain pleasure in its act by reason of its certainty, On the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, be-wherefore the gloss on the fifth chapter to the Galatians,
cause, though the act of lifeless faith is duly perfect on the
where the fruits are enumerated, explains faith as being
part of the intellect, it has not its due perfection as regards
“certainty about the unseen.”
Whether faith is one virtue?
IIa IIae q. 4 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that faith is not one. For
in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and knowl-
just as faith is a gift of God according to Eph. 2:8, so also
edge about temporal things, as Augustine states (De Trin.
wisdom and knowledge are numbered among God’s gifts
xii, 14,15). Since, then, faith is about eternal things, and
according to Is. 11:2. Now wisdom and knowledge differ
also about some temporal things, it seems that faith is not
1213
one virtue, but divided into several parts.
specifically, but differs numerically according to its vari-
Objection 2. Further, confession is an act of faith, as
ous subjects.
stated above (q. 3, a. 1). Now confession of faith is not one
If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is
and the same for all: since what we confess as past, the fa-
believed, then, again, there is one faith, since what is be-
thers of old confessed as yet to come, as appears from Is.
lieved by all is one same thing: for though the things be-
7:14: “Behold a virgin shall conceive.” Therefore faith is
lieved, which all agree in believing, be diverse from one
not one.
another, yet they are all reduced to one.
Objection 3. Further, faith is common to all believers
Reply to Objection 1. Temporal matters which are
in Christ. But one accident cannot be in many subjects.
proposed to be believed, do not belong to the object of
Therefore all cannot have one faith.
faith, except in relation to something eternal, viz. the
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): “One
First Truth, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1). Hence there is
Lord, one faith.”
one faith of things both temporal and eternal. It is differ-
I answer that, If we take faith as a habit, we can con-
ent with wisdom and knowledge, which consider temporal
sider it in two ways. First on the part of the object, and
and eternal matters under their respective aspects.
thus there is one faith. Because the formal object of faith
Reply to Objection 2. This difference of past and fu-
is the First Truth, by adhering to which we believe what-
ture arises, not from any difference in the thing believed,
ever is contained in the faith. Secondly, on the part of the
but from the different relationships of believers to the one
subject, and thus faith is differentiated according as it is
thing believed, as also we have mentioned above ( Ia IIae,
in various subjects. Now it is evident that faith, just as
q. 103, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 107, a. 1, ad 1).
any other habit, takes its species from the formal aspect
Reply to Objection 3. This objection considers nu-
of its object, but is individualized by its subject. Hence if
merical diversity of faith.
we take faith for the habit whereby we believe, it is one
Whether faith is the first of the virtues?
IIa IIae q. 4 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that faith is not the first
“faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.” Now the
of the virtues. For a gloss on Lk. 12:4, “I say to you My
substance of a thing is that which comes first. Therefore
friends,” says that fortitude is the foundation of faith. Now
faith is first among the virtues.
the foundation precedes that which is founded thereon.
I answer that, One thing can precede another in two
Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
ways: first, by its very nature; secondly, by accident.
Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Ps. 36, “Be not emu-
Faith, by its very nature, precedes all other virtues. For
lous,” says that hope “leads on to faith.” Now hope is a
since the end is the principle in matters of action, as stated
virtue, as we shall state further on (q. 17, a. 1). Therefore
above ( Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 34, a. 4, ad 1), the the-faith is not the first of the virtues.
ological virtues, the object of which is the last end, must
Objection 3. Further, it was stated above (a. 2) that
needs precede all the others. Again, the last end must of
the intellect of the believer is moved, out of obedience to
necessity be present to the intellect before it is present to
God, to assent to matters of faith. Now obedience also is
the will, since the will has no inclination for anything ex-
a virtue. Therefore faith is not the first virtue.
cept in so far as it is apprehended by the intellect. Hence,
Objection 4. Further, not lifeless but living faith is
as the last end is present in the will by hope and char-
the foundation, as a gloss remarks on 1 Cor. 3:11∗. Now
ity, and in the intellect, by faith, the first of all the virtues faith is formed by charity, as stated above (a. 3). There-must, of necessity, be faith, because natural knowledge
fore it is owing to charity that faith is the foundation: so
cannot reach God as the object of heavenly bliss, which
that charity is the foundation yet more than faith is (for the
is the aspect under which hope and charity tend towards
foundation is the first part of a building) and consequently
Him.
it seems to precede faith.
On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith acci-
Objection 5. Further, the order of habits is taken from
dentally. For an accidental cause precedes its effect acci-
the order of acts. Now, in the act of faith, the act of the will dentally. Now that which removes an obstacle is a kind of
which is perfected by charity, precedes the act of the intel-
accidental cause, according to the Philosopher (Phys. viii,
lect, which is perfected by faith, as the cause which pre-
4): and in this sense certain virtues may be said to pre-
cedes its effect. Therefore charity precedes faith. There-
cede faith accidentally, in so far as they remove obstacles
fore faith is not the first of the virtues.
to belief. Thus fortitude removes the inordinate fear that
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that
hinders faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man re-
∗ Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi.
1214
fuses to submit himself to the truth of faith. The same may an inclination to fulfil the commandments considered as
be said of some other virtues, although there are no real
a duty. In this way it is a special virtue, and a part of
virtues, unless faith be presupposed, as Augustine states
justice: for a man does his duty by his superior when
(Contra Julian. iv, 3).
he obeys him: and thus obedience follows faith, whereby
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
man knows that God is his superior, Whom he must obey.
Reply to Objection 2. Hope cannot lead to faith ab-
Reply to Objection 4. To be a foundation a thing re-
solutely. For one cannot hope to obtain eternal happiness,
quires not only to come first, but also to be connected with
unless one believes this possible, since hope does not tend
the other parts of the building: since the building would
to the impossible, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 1).
not be founded on it unless the other parts adhered to it.
It is, however, possible for one to be led by hope to per-
Now the connecting bond of the spiritual edifice is charity,
severe in faith, or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in this
according to Col. 3:14: “Above all. . . things have charity
sense that hope is said to lead to faith.
which is the bond of perfection.” Consequently faith with-
Reply to Objection 3. Obedience is twofold: for
out charity cannot be the foundation: and yet it does not
sometimes it denotes the inclination of the will to ful-
follow that charity precedes faith.
fil God’s commandments. In this way it is not a special
Reply to Objection 5. Some act of the will is required
virtue, but is a general condition of every virtue; since
before faith, but not an act of the will quickened by char-
all acts of virtue come under the precepts of the Divine
ity. This latter act presupposes faith, because the will can-
law, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 2); and thus it
not tend to God with perfect love, unless the intellect pos-
is requisite for faith. In another way, obedience denotes
sesses right faith about Him.
Whether faith is more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues?
IIa IIae q. 4 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that faith is not more cer-
ad 2) two of the intellectual virtues are about contingent
tain than science and the other intellectual virtues. For
matter, viz. prudence and art; to which faith is prefer-
doubt is opposed to certitude, wherefore a thing would
able in point of certitude, by reason of its matter, since
seem to be the more certain, through being less doubtful,
it is about eternal things, which never change, whereas
just as a thing is the whiter, the less it has of an admixture
the other three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science†
of black. Now understanding, science and also wisdom
and understanding, are about necessary things, as stated
are free of any doubt about their objects; whereas the be-
above ( Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3). But it must be observed
liever may sometimes suffer a movement of doubt, and
that wisdom, science and understanding may be taken in
doubt about matters of faith. Therefore faith is no more
two ways: first, as intellectual virtues, according to the
certain than the intellectual virtues.
Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3); secondly, for the gifts of the
Objection 2. Further, sight is more certain than hear-
Holy Ghost. If we consider them in the first way, we must
ing. But “faith is through hearing” according to Rom.
note that certitude can be looked at in two ways. First, on
10:17; whereas understanding, science and wisdom im-
the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more cer-
ply some kind of intellectual sight. Therefore science and
tain cause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more
understanding are more certain than faith.
certain than those three virtues, because it is founded on
Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more
the Divine truth, whereas the aforesaid three virtues are
perfect is the more certain. Now understanding is more
based on human reason. Secondly, certitude may be con-
perfect than faith, since faith is the way to understand-
sidered on the part of the subject, and thus the more a
ing, according to another version∗ of Is. 7:9: “If you will
man’s intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain it is.
not believe, you shall not understand [Vulg.: ‘continue’]”:
In this way, faith is less certain, because matters of faith
and Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that “faith is strength-
are above the human intellect, whereas the objects of the
ened by science.” Therefore it seems that science or un-
aforesaid three virtues are not. Since, however, a thing is
derstanding is more certain than faith.
judged simply with regard to its cause, but relatively, with
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:15):
respect to a disposition on the part of the subject, it fol-
“When you had received of us the word of the hearing,”
lows that faith is more certain simply, while the others are
i.e. by faith. . . “you received it not as the word of men,
more certain relatively, i.e. for us. Likewise if these three
but, as it is indeed, the word of God.” Now nothing is
be taken as gifts received in this present life, they are re-
more certain than the word of God. Therefore science is
lated to faith as to their principle which they presuppose:
not more certain than faith; nor is anything else.
so that again, in this way, faith is more certain.
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 4,
Reply to Objection 1. This doubt is not on the side of
∗ The Septuagint
† In English the corresponding ‘gift’ is called
knowledge
1215
the cause of faith, but on our side, in so far as we do not Reply to Objection 3. The gifts of understanding and
fully grasp matters of faith with our intellect.
knowledge are more perfect than the knowledge of faith
Reply to Objection 2. Other things being equal sight
in the point of their greater clearness, but not in regard
is more certain than hearing; but if (the authority of) the
to more certain adhesion: because the whole certitude of
person from whom we hear greatly surpasses that of the
the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises from the
seer’s sight, hearing is more certain than sight: thus a man
certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge
of little science is more certain about what he hears on the
of conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses. But
authority of an expert in science, than about what is appar-
in so far as science, wisdom and understanding are intel-
ent to him according to his own reason: and much more is
lectual virtues, they are based upon the natural light of
a man certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot
reason, which falls short of the certitude of God’s word,
be deceived, than about what he sees with his own reason,
on which faith is founded.
which can be mistaken.
1216
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 5
Of Those Who Have Faith
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider those who have faith: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state?
(2) Whether the demons have faith?
(3) Whether those heretics who err in one article, have faith in others?
(4) Whether among those who have faith, one has it more than another?
Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state?
IIa IIae q. 5 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there was no faith,
xl in Joan.; QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39), that manifestation
either in the angels, or in man, in their original state.
alone excludes faith, which renders apparent or seen the
For Hugh St. Victor says in his Sentences (De Sacram.
principal object of faith. Now the principal object of faith
i, 10) that “man cannot see God or things that are in
is the First Truth, the sight of which gives the happiness
God, because he closes his eyes to contemplation.” Now
of heaven and takes the place of faith. Consequently, as
the angels, in their original state, before they were either
the angels before their confirmation in grace, and man be-
confirmed in grace, or had fallen from it, had their eyes
fore sin, did not possess the happiness whereby God is
opened to contemplation, since “they saw things in the
seen in His Essence, it is evident that the knowledge they
Word,” according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Like-
possessed was not such as to exclude faith.
wise the first man, while in the state of innocence, seem-
It follows then, that the absence of faith in them could
ingly had his eyes open to contemplation; for Hugh St.
only be explained by their being altogether ignorant of
Victor says (De Sacram. i, 6) that “in his original state
the object of faith. And if man and the angels were cre-
man knew his Creator, not by the mere outward percep-
ated in a purely natural state, as some∗ hold, perhaps one
tion of hearing, but by inward inspiration, not as now be-
might hold that there was no faith in the angels before
lievers seek an absent God by faith, but by seeing Him
their confirmation in grace, or in man before sin, because
clearly present to their contemplation.” Therefore there
the knowledge of faith surpasses not only a man’s but even
was no faith in the angels and man in their original state.
an angel’s natural knowledge about God.
Objection 2. Further, the knowledge of faith is dark
Since, however, we stated in the Ia, q. 62, a. 3; Ia,
and obscure, according to 1 Cor. 13:13: “We see now
q. 95, a. 1 that man and the angels were created with the
through a glass in a dark manner.” Now in their original
gift of grace, we must needs say that there was in them
state there was not obscurity either in the angels or in man,
a certain beginning of hoped-for happiness, by reason of
because it is a punishment of sin. Therefore there could
grace received but not yet consummated, which happiness
be no faith in the angels or in man, in their original state.
was begun in their will by hope and charity, and in the in-
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 10:17)
tellect by faith, as stated above (q. 4, a. 7). Consequently
that “faith. . . cometh by hearing.” Now this could not ap-
we must hold that the angels had faith before they were
ply to angels and man in their original state; for then they
confirmed, and man, before he sinned. Nevertheless we
could not hear anything from another. Therefore, in that
must observe that in the object of faith, there is something
state, there was no faith either in man or in the angels.
formal, as it were, namely the First Truth surpassing all
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): “He that
the natural knowledge of a creature, and something mate-
cometh to God, must believe.” Now the original state of
rial, namely, the thing to which we assent while adhering
angels and man was one of approach to God. Therefore
to the First Truth. With regard to the former, before ob-
they had need of faith.
taining the happiness to come, faith is common to all who
I answer that, Some say that there was no faith in the
have knowledge of God, by adhering to the First Truth:
angels before they were confirmed in grace or fell from
whereas with regard to the things which are proposed as
it, and in man before he sinned, by reason of the manifest
the material object of faith, some are believed by one, and
contemplation that they had of Divine things. Since, how-
known manifestly by another, even in the present state,
ever, “faith is the evidence of things that appear not,” ac-
as we have shown above (q. 1, a. 5; q. 2, a. 4, ad 2). In
cording to the Apostle (Heb. 11:2), and since “by faith we
this respect, too, it may be said that the angels before be-
believe what we see not,” according to Augustine (Tract.
ing confirmed, and man, before sin, possessed manifest
∗ St. Bonaventure, Sent. ii, D, 29
1217
knowledge about certain points in the Divine mysteries, since by the light of wisdom He was more present to them
which now we cannot know except by believing them.
than He is to us, although He was not so present to them
Reply to Objection 1. Although the words of Hugh
as He is to the Blessed by the light of glory.
of St. Victor are those of a master, and have the force
Reply to Objection 2. There was no darkness of sin
of an authority, yet it may be said that the contemplation
or punishment in the original state of man and the angels,
which removes the need of faith is heavenly contempla-
but there was a certain natural obscurity in the human and
tion, whereby the supernatural truth is seen in its essence.
angelic intellect, in so far as every creature is darkness in
Now the angels did not possess this contemplation before
comparison with the immensity of the Divine light: and
they were confirmed, nor did man before he sinned: yet
this obscurity suffices for faith.
their contemplation was of a higher order than ours, for by
Reply to Objection 3. In the original state there was
its means they approached nearer to God, and had mani-
no hearing anything from man speaking outwardly, but
fest knowledge of more of the Divine effects and myster-
there was from God inspiring inwardly: thus the prophets
ies than we can have knowledge of. Hence faith was not in
heard, as expressed by the Ps. 84:9: “I will hear what the
them so that they sought an absent God as we seek Him:
Lord God will speak in me.”
Whether in the demons there is faith?
IIa IIae q. 5 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the demons have no
through the will being directed to the good, and in this
faith. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that
way, to believe is a praiseworthy action. Secondly, be-
“faith depends on the believer’s will”: and this is a good
cause the intellect is convinced that it ought to believe
will, since by it man wishes to believe in God. Since then
what is said, though that conviction is not based on ob-
no deliberate will of the demons is good, as stated above
jective evidence. Thus if a prophet, while preaching the
( Ia, q. 64, a. 2, ad 5), it seems that in the demons there is
word of God, were to foretell something, and were to give
no faith.
a sign, by raising a dead person to life, the intellect of
Objection 2. Further, faith is a gift of Divine grace,
a witness would be convinced so as to recognize clearly
according to Eph. 2:8: “By grace you are saved through
that God, Who lieth not, was speaking, although the thing
faith. . . for it is the gift of God.” Now, according to a gloss itself foretold would not be evident in itself, and conse-on Osee 3:1, “They look to strange gods, and love the
quently the essence of faith would not be removed.
husks of the grapes,” the demons lost their gifts of grace
Accordingly we must say that faith is commended in
by sinning. Therefore faith did not remain in the demons
the first sense in the faithful of Christ: and in this way
after they sinned.
faith is not in the demons, but only in the second way, for
Objection 3.
Further, unbelief would seem to be
they see many evident signs, whereby they recognize that
graver than other sins, as Augustine observes (Tract.
the teaching of the Church is from God, although they do
lxxxix in Joan.) on Jn. 15:22, “If I had not come and
not see the things themselves that the Church teaches, for
spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they
instance that there are three Persons in God, and so forth.
have no excuse for their sin.” Now the sin of unbelief
Reply to Objection 1. The demons are, in a way,
is in some men. Consequently, if the demons have faith,
compelled to believe, by the evidence of signs, and so
some men would be guilty of a sin graver than that of
their will deserves no praise for their belief.
the demons, which seems unreasonable. Therefore in the
Reply to Objection 2. Faith, which is a gift of grace,
demons there is no faith.
inclines man to believe, by giving him a certain affec-
On the contrary, It is written (James 2:19): “The dev-
tion for the good, even when that faith is lifeless. Con-
ils. . . believe and tremble.”
sequently the faith which the demons have, is not a gift of
I answer that, As stated above (q. 1, a. 4; q. 2, a. 1), grace. Rather are they compelled to believe through their
the believer’s intellect assents to that which he believes,
natural intellectual acumen.
not because he sees it either in itself, or by resolving it
Reply to Objection 3. The very fact that the signs of
to first self-evident principles, but because his will com-
faith are so evident, that the demons are compelled to be-
mands his intellect to assent. Now, that the will moves
lieve, is displeasing to them, so that their malice is by no
the intellect to assent, may be due to two causes. First,
means diminished by their believe.
1218
Whether a man who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other IIa IIae q. 5 a. 3
articles?
Objection 1. It would seem that a heretic who dis-
but merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he
believes one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the
who adheres to the teaching of the Church, as to an infal-
other articles. For the natural intellect of a heretic is not
lible rule, assents to whatever the Church teaches; other-
more able than that of a catholic. Now a catholic’s intel-
wise, if, of the things taught by the Church, he holds what
lect needs the aid of the gift of faith in order to believe any he chooses to hold, and rejects what he chooses to reject,
article whatever of faith. Therefore it seems that heretics
he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church as to
cannot believe any articles of faith without the gift of life-
an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident
less faith.
that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of
Objection 2. Further, just as faith contains many ar-
faith, is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church
ticles, so does one science, viz. geometry, contain many
in all things; but if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in
conclusions. Now a man may possess the science of ge-
heresy but only in error. Therefore it is clear that such a
ometry as to some geometrical conclusions, and yet be ig-
heretic with regard to one article has no faith in the other
norant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe
articles, but only a kind of opinion in accordance with his
some articles of faith without believing the others.
own will.
Objection 3. Further, just as man obeys God in be-
Reply to Objection 1. A heretic does not hold the
lieving the articles of faith, so does he also in keeping the
other articles of faith, about which he does not err, in the
commandments of the Law. Now a man can obey some
same way as one of the faithful does, namely by adhering
commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can be-
simply to the Divine Truth, because in order to do so, a
lieve some articles, and disbelieve others.
man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he holds the
On the contrary, Just as mortal sin is contrary to char-
things that are of faith, by his own will and judgment.
ity, so is disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith.
Reply to Objection 2. The various conclusions of a
Now charity does not remain in a man after one mortal
science have their respective means of demonstration, one
sin. Therefore neither does faith, after a man disbelieves
of which may be known without another, so that we may
one article.
know some conclusions of a science without knowing the
I answer that, Neither living nor lifeless faith remains others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the articles
in a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith.
of faith by reason of one mean, viz. on account of the
The reason of this is that the species of every habit de-
First Truth proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the
pends on the formal aspect of the object, without which
teaching of the Church who has the right understanding
the species of the habit cannot remain. Now the formal
of them. Hence whoever abandons this mean is altogether
object of faith is the First Truth, as manifested in Holy
lacking in faith.
Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from
Reply to Objection 3. The various precepts of the
the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere,
Law may be referred either to their respective proxi-
as to an infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the
mate motives, and thus one can be kept without another;
Church, which proceeds from the First Truth manifested
or to their primary motive, which is perfect obedience
in Holy Writ, has not the habit of faith, but holds that
to God, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one
which is of faith otherwise than by faith. Even so, it is ev-
commandment, according to James 2:10: “Whosoever
ident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion without
shall. . . offend in one point is become guilty of all.”
knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge,
Whether faith can be greater in one man than in another?
IIa IIae q. 5 a. 4
Objection 1.
It would seem that faith cannot be
faith consists in something supreme, because it requires
greater in one man than in another. For the quantity of
that man should adhere to the First Truth above all things.
a habit is taken from its object. Now whoever has faith
Therefore faith cannot be “more” or “less.”
believes everything that is of faith, since by failing in one
Objection 3. Further, faith is to knowledge by grace,
point, a man loses his faith altogether, as stated above
as the understanding of principles is to natural knowledge,
(a. 3). Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater in
since the articles of faith are the first principles of knowl-
one than in another.
edge by grace, as was shown above (q. 1, a. 7). Now the
Objection 2. Further, those things which consist in
understanding of principles is possessed in equal degree
something supreme cannot be “more” or “less.” Now
by all men. Therefore faith is possessed in equal degree
1219
by all the faithful.
two ways, since the act of faith proceeds both from the
On the contrary, Wherever we find great and little,
intellect and from the will, as stated above (q. 2, Aa. 1,2;
there we find more or less. Now in the matter of faith
q. 4, a. 2). Consequently a man’s faith may be described
we find great and little, for Our Lord said to Peter (Mat.
as being greater, in one way, on the part of his intellect,
14:31): “O thou of little faith, why didst thou doubt?”
on account of its greater certitude and firmness, and, in
And to the woman he said (Mat. 15: 28): “O woman,
another way, on the part of his will, on account of his
great is thy faith!” Therefore faith can be greater in one
greater promptitude, devotion, or confidence.
than in another.
Reply to Objection 1. A man who obstinately disbe-
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 52, Aa. 1,2; lieves a thing that is of faith, has not the habit of faith, and Ia IIae, q. 112, a. 4), the quantity of a habit may be con-yet he who does not explicitly believe all, while he is pre-
sidered from two points of view: first, on the part of the
pared to believe all, has that habit. In this respect, one man
object; secondly, on the part of its participation by the
has greater faith than another, on the part of the object, in
subject.
so far as he believes more things, as stated above.
Now the object of faith may be considered in two
Reply to Objection 2. It is essential to faith that one
ways: first, in respect of its formal aspect; secondly, in
should give the first place to the First Truth. But among
respect of the material object which is proposed to be be-
those who do this, some submit to it with greater certitude
lieved. Now the formal object of faith is one and simple,
and devotion than others; and in this way faith is greater
namely the First Truth, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1). Hence
in one than in another.
in this respect there is no diversity of faith among believ-
Reply to Objection 3. The understanding of prin-
ers, but it is specifically one in all, as stated above (q. 4,
ciples results from man’s very nature, which is equally
a. 6). But the things which are proposed as the matter of
shared by all: whereas faith results from the gift of grace,
our belief are many and can be received more or less ex-
which is not equally in all, as explained above ( Ia IIae,
plicitly; and in this respect one man can believe explicitly
q. 112, a. 4). Hence the comparison fails.
more things than another, so that faith can be greater in
Nevertheless the truth of principles is more known to
one man on account of its being more explicit.
one than to another, according to the greater capacity of
If, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point
intellect.
of view of its participation by the subject, this happens in
1220
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 6
Of the Cause of Faith
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether faith is infused into man by God?
(2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?
Whether faith is infused into man by God?
IIa IIae q. 6 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that faith is not infused
preach, unless they be sent?”
into man by God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that
As regards the second, viz. man’s assent to the things
“science begets faith in us, and nourishes, defends and
which are of faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one
strengthens it.” Now those things which science begets
of external inducement, such as seeing a miracle, or be-
in us seem to be acquired rather than infused. Therefore
ing persuaded by someone to embrace the faith: neither
faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.
of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who see the
Objection 2. Further, that to which man attains by
same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some be-
hearing and seeing, seems to be acquired by him. Now
lieve, and some do not. Hence we must assert another
man attains to belief, both by seeing miracles, and by
internal cause, which moves man inwardly to assent to
hearing the teachings of faith: for it is written (Jn. 4:53):
matters of faith.
“The father. . . knew that it was at the same hour, that Je-
The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else
sus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, and
than man’s free-will: and consequently they said that the
his whole house”; and (Rom. 10:17) it is said that “faith
beginning of faith is from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit,
is through hearing.” Therefore man attains to faith by ac-
it is in our power to be ready to assent to things which
quiring it.
are of faith, but that the consummation of faith is from
Objection 3. Further, that which depends on a man’s
God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe.
will can be acquired by him. But “faith depends on the be-
But this is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters
liever’s will,” according to Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct.
of faith, is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue
v). Therefore faith can be acquired by man.
to him from some supernatural principle moving him in-
On the contrary, It is written (Eph.
2:8,9): “By
wardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the
grace you are saved through faith, and that not of your-
assent which is the chief act of faith, is from God moving
selves. . . that no man may glory. . . for it is the gift of God.”
man inwardly by grace.
I answer that, Two things are requisite for faith. First, Reply to Objection 1. Science begets and nourishes
that the things which are of faith should be proposed to
faith, by way of external persuasion afforded by science;
man: this is necessary in order that man believe anything
but the chief and proper cause of faith is that which moves
explicitly. The second thing requisite for faith is the assent
man inwardly to assent.
of the believer to the things which are proposed to him.
Reply to Objection 2. This argument again refers to
Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith must needs
the cause that proposes outwardly the things that are of
be from God. Because those things which are of faith
faith, or persuades man to believe by words or deeds.
surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man’s
Reply to Objection 3. To believe does indeed depend
knowledge, unless God reveal them. To some, indeed,
on the will of the believer: but man’s will needs to be pre-
they are revealed by God immediately, as those things
pared by God with grace, in order that he may be raised
which were revealed to the apostles and prophets, while
to things which are above his nature, as stated above (q. 2
to some they are proposed by God in sending preachers
, a. 3).
of the faith, according to Rom. 10:15: “How shall they
1221
Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?
IIa IIae q. 6 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that lifeless faith is not a
diaphanous body.
gift of God. For it is written (Dt. 32:4) that “the works of
Now the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the
God are perfect.” Now lifeless faith is something imper-
species of faith, since faith is said to be lifeless through
fect. Therefore it is not the work of God.
lack of an extrinsic form, as stated above (q. 4, a. 4). Con-
Objection 2. Further, just as an act is said to be de-
sequently the cause of lifeless faith is that which is the
formed through lacking its due form, so too is faith called
cause of faith strictly so called: and this is God, as stated
lifeless [informis] when it lacks the form due to it. Now
above (a. 1). It follows, therefore, that lifeless faith is a
the deformed act of sin is not from God, as stated above (
gift of God.
Ia IIae, q. 79, a. 2, ad 2). Therefore neither is lifeless faith Reply to Objection 1. Lifeless faith, though it is not
from God.
simply perfect with the perfection of a virtue, is, neverthe-
Objection 3. Further, whomsoever God heals, He
less, perfect with a perfection that suffices for the essential heals wholly: for it is written (Jn. 7:23): “If a man receive
notion of faith.
circumcision on the sabbath-day, that the law of Moses
Reply to Objection 2. The deformity of an act is es-
may not be broken; are you angry at Me because I have
sential to the act’s species, considered as a moral act, as
healed the whole man on the sabbath-day?” Now faith
stated above ( Ia, q. 48, a. 1, ad 2; Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 5): for heals man from unbelief.
Therefore whoever receives
an act is said to be deformed through being deprived of an
from God the gift of faith, is at the same time healed from
intrinsic form, viz. the due commensuration of the act’s
all his sins. But this is not done except by living faith.
circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God is the cause
Therefore living faith alone is a gift of God: and conse-
of a deformed act, for He is not the cause of its deformity,
quently lifeless faith is not from God.
though He is the cause of the act as such.
On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 13:2 says that
We may also reply that deformity denotes not only
“the faith which lacks charity is a gift of God.” Now this
privation of a due form, but also a contrary disposition,
is lifeless faith. Therefore lifeless faith is a gift of God.
wherefore deformity is compared to the act, as falsehood
I answer that, Lifelessness is a privation. Now it
is to faith. Hence, just as the deformed act is not from
must be noted that privation is sometimes essential to the
God, so neither is a false faith; and as lifeless faith is from species, whereas sometimes it is not, but supervenes in a
God, so too, acts that are good generically, though not
thing already possessed of its proper species: thus priva-
quickened by charity, as is frequently the case in sinners,
tion of the due equilibrium of the humors is essential to
are from God.
the species of sickness, while darkness is not essential to
Reply to Objection 3. He who receives faith from
a diaphanous body, but supervenes in it. Since, therefore,
God without charity, is healed from unbelief, not entirely
when we assign the cause of a thing, we intend to assign
(because the sin of his previous unbelief is not removed)
the cause of that thing as existing in its proper species, it
but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing from commit-
follows that what is not the cause of privation, cannot be
ting such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently that
assigned as the cause of the thing to which that privation
a man desists from one act of sin, through God causing
belongs as being essential to its species. For we cannot
him thus to desist, without desisting from another act of
assign as the cause of a sickness, something which is not
sin, through the instigation of his own malice. And in this
the cause of a disturbance in the humors: though we can
way sometimes it is granted by God to a man to believe,
assign as cause of a diaphanous body, something which is
and yet he is not granted the gift of charity: even so the gift not the cause of the darkness, which is not essential to the
of prophecy, or the like, is given to some without charity.
1222
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 7
Of the Effects of Faith
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the effects of faith: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether fear is an effect of faith?
(2) Whether the heart is purified by faith?
Whether fear is an effect of faith?
IIa IIae q. 7 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that fear is not an effect of inasmuch as faith makes us appreciate God as an unfaith. For an effect does not precede its cause. Now fear
fathomable and supreme good, separation from which is
precedes faith: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): “Ye that fear
the greatest evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be
the Lord, believe in Him.” Therefore fear is not an effect
equalled. Of the first fear, viz. servile fear, lifeless faith
of faith.
is the cause, while living faith is the cause of the second,
Objection 2. Further, the same thing is not the cause
viz. filial fear, because it makes man adhere to God and
of contraries. Now fear and hope are contraries, as stated
to be subject to Him by charity.
above ( Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 2): and faith begets hope, as a
Reply to Objection 1. Fear of God cannot altogether
gloss observes on Mat. 1:2. Therefore fear is not an effect
precede faith, because if we knew nothing at all about
of faith.
Him, with regard to rewards and punishments, concern-
Objection 3. Further, one contrary does not cause an-
ing which faith teaches us, we should nowise fear Him.
other. Now the object of faith is a good, which is the First
If, however, faith be presupposed in reference to certain
Truth, while the object of fear is an evil, as stated above (
articles of faith, for example the Divine excellence, then
Ia IIae, q. 42, a. 1). Again, acts take their species from the
reverential fear follows, the result of which is that man
object, according to what was stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18,
submits his intellect to God, so as to believe in all the Di-
a. 2). Therefore faith is not a cause of fear.
vine promises. Hence the text quoted continues: “And
On the contrary, It is written (James 2:19): “The dev-
your reward shall not be made void.”
ils. . . believe and tremble.”
Reply to Objection 2. The same thing in respect of
I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive
contraries can be the cause of contraries, but not under the
power, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 41, a. 1). Now the
same aspect. Now faith begets hope, in so far as it en-
principle of all appetitive movements is the good or evil
ables us to appreciate the prize which God awards to the
apprehended: and consequently the principle of fear and
just, while it is the cause of fear, in so far as it makes us
of every appetitive movement must be an apprehension.
appreciate the punishments which He intends to inflict on
Again, through faith there arises in us an apprehension of
sinners.
certain penal evils, which are inflicted in accordance with
Reply to Objection 3. The primary and formal object
the Divine judgment. In this way, then, faith is a cause of
of faith is the good which is the First Truth; but the mate-
the fear whereby one dreads to be punished by God; and
rial object of faith includes also certain evils; for instance, this is servile fear.
that it is an evil either not to submit to God, or to be sep-
It is also the cause of filial fear, whereby one dreads
arated from Him, and that sinners will suffer penal evils
to be separated from God, or whereby one shrinks from
from God: in this way faith can be the cause of fear.
equalling oneself to Him, and holds Him in reverence,
Whether faith has the effect of purifying the heart?
IIa IIae q. 7 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that faith does not purify
less faith. Therefore faith does not purify the heart.
the heart. For purity of the heart pertains chiefly to the af-
Objection 3. Further, if faith were to purify the hu-
fections, whereas faith is in the intellect. Therefore faith
man heart in any way, it would chiefly purify the intellect
has not the effect of purifying the heart.
of man. Now it does not purify the intellect from obscu-
Objection 2. Further, that which purifies the heart is
rity, since it is a veiled knowledge. Therefore faith nowise
incompatible with impurity. But faith is compatible with
purifies the heart.
the impurity of sin, as may be seen in those who have life-
On the contrary, Peter said (Acts 15:9): “Purifying
1223
their hearts by faith.”
Reply to Objection 1. Things that are in the intellect
I answer that, A thing is impure through being mixed
are the principles of those which are in the appetite, in so
with baser things: for silver is not called impure, when
far as the apprehended good moves the appetite.
mixed with gold, which betters it, but when mixed with
Reply to Objection 2. Even lifeless faith excludes a
lead or tin. Now it is evident that the rational creature is
certain impurity which is contrary to it, viz. that of error,
more excellent than all transient and corporeal creatures;
and which consists in the human intellect, adhering inor-
so that it becomes impure through subjecting itself to tran-
dinately to things below itself, through wishing to mea-
sient things by loving them. From this impurity the ratio-
sure Divine things by the rule of sensible objects. But
nal creature is purified by means of a contrary movement,
when it is quickened by charity, then it is incompatible
namely, by tending to that which is above it, viz. God.
with any kind of impurity, because “charity covereth all
The first beginning of this movement is faith: since “he
sins” (Prov. 10:12).
that cometh to God must believe that He is,” according
Reply to Objection 3. The obscurity of faith does not
to Heb. 11:6. Hence the first beginning of the heart’s
pertain to the impurity of sin, but rather to the natural de-
purifying is faith; and if this be perfected through being
fect of the human intellect, according to the present state
quickened by charity, the heart will be perfectly purified
of life.
thereby.
1224
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 8
Of the Gift of Understanding
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the gifts of understand and knowledge, which respond to the virtue of faith. With regard to the gift of understanding there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(2) Whether it can be together with faith in the same person?
(3) Whether the understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is only speculative, or practical also?
(4) Whether all who are in a state of grace have the gift of understanding?
(5) Whether this gift is to be found in those who are without grace?
(6) Of the relationship of the gift of understanding to the other gifts; (7) Which of the beatitudes corresponds to this gift?
(8) Which of the fruits?
Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
IIa IIae q. 8 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that understanding is not
the nature of the substantial reality, under words lies hid-
a gift of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts of grace are distinct
den their meaning; under likenesses and figures the truth
from the gifts of nature, since they are given in addition
they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world
to the latter. Now understanding is a natural habit of the
is enclosed within as compared with the sensible world,
soul, whereby self-evident principles are known, as stated
which is perceived externally), and effects lie hidden in
in Ethic. vi, 6. Therefore it should not be reckoned among
their causes, and vice versa. Hence we may speak of un-
the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
derstanding with regard to all these things.
Objection 2. Further, the Divine gifts are shared by
Since, however, human knowledge begins with the
creatures according to their capacity and mode, as Diony-
outside of things as it were, it is evident that the stronger
sius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now the mode of human nature
the light of the understanding, the further can it penetrate
is to know the truth, not simply (which is a sign of under-
into the heart of things. Now the natural light of our un-
standing), but discursively (which is a sign of reason), as
derstanding is of finite power; wherefore it can reach to a
Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine
certain fixed point. Consequently man needs a supernat-
knowledge which is bestowed on man, should be called a
ural light in order to penetrate further still so as to know
gift of reason rather than a gift of understanding.
what it cannot know by its natural light: and this super-
Objection 3. Further, in the powers of the soul the
natural light which is bestowed on man is called the gift
understanding is condivided with the will (De Anima iii,
of understanding.
9,10). Now no gift of the Holy Ghost is called after the
Reply to Objection 1.
The natural light instilled
will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Ghost should receive
within us, manifests only certain general principles, which
the name of understanding.
are known naturally. But since man is ordained to super-
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): “The Spirit
natural happiness, as stated above (q. 2, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 3
of the Lord shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom of
, a. 8), man needs to reach to certain higher truths, for
understanding.”
which he requires the gift of understanding.
I answer that, Understanding implies an intimate
Reply to Objection 2. The discourse of reason always
knowledge, for “intelligere” [to understand] is the same as
begins from an understanding and ends at an understand-
“intus legere” [to read inwardly]. This is clear to anyone
ing; because we reason by proceeding from certain under-
who considers the difference between intellect and sense,
stood principles, and the discourse of reason is perfected
because sensitive knowledge is concerned with external
when we come to understand what hitherto we ignored.
sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge pene-
Hence the act of reasoning proceeds from something pre-
trates into the very essence of a thing, because the object
viously understood. Now a gift of grace does not proceed
of the intellect is “what a thing is,” as stated in De Anima
from the light of nature, but is added thereto as perfecting
iii, 6.
it. Wherefore this addition is not called “reason” but “un-
Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden
derstanding,” since the additional light is in comparison
within, to find which human knowledge has to penetrate
with what we know supernaturally, what the natural light
within so to speak. Thus, under the accidents lies hidden
is in regard to those things which we known from the first.
1225
Reply to Objection 3. “Will” denotes simply a move-knowledge that penetrates into the heart of things. Hence
ment of the appetite without indicating any excellence;
the supernatural gift is called after the understanding
whereas “understanding” denotes a certain excellence of a
rather than after the will.
Whether the gift of understanding is compatible with faith?
IIa IIae q. 8 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of under-
certain things, of themselves, come directly under faith,
standing is incompatible with faith. For Augustine says
such as the mystery to three Persons in one God, and the
(QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 15) that “the thing which is understood
incarnation of God the Son; whereas other things come
is bounded by the comprehension of him who understands
under faith, through being subordinate, in one way or an-
it.” But the thing which is believed is not comprehended,
other, to those just mentioned, for instance, all that is con-
according to the word of the Apostle to the Philippi-
tained in the Divine Scriptures.
ans 3:12: “Not as though I had already comprehended
On the part of understanding the distinction to be ob-
[Douay: ‘attained’], or were already perfect.” Therefore
served is that there are two ways in which we may be
it seems that faith and understanding are incompatible in
said to understand. In one way, we understand a thing
the same subject.
perfectly, when we arrive at knowing the essence of the
Objection 2. Further, whatever is understood is seen
thing we understand, and the very truth considered in it-
by the understanding. But faith is of things that appear
self of the proposition understood. In this way, so long as
not, as stated above (q. 1, a. 4; q. 4, a. 1). Therefore faith
the state of faith lasts, we cannot understand those things
is incompatible with understanding in the same subject.
which are the direct object of faith: although certain other
Objection 3. Further, understanding is more certain
things that are subordinate to faith can be understood even
than science. But science and faith are incompatible in
in this way.
the same subject, as stated above (q. 1, Aa. 4,5). Much
In another way we understand a thing imperfectly,
less, therefore, can understanding and faith be in the same
when the essence of a thing or the truth of a proposition is
subject.
not known as to its quiddity or mode of being, and yet we
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that
know that whatever be the outward appearances, they do
“understanding enlightens the mind concerning the things
not contradict the truth, in so far as we understand that we
it has heard.” Now one who has faith can be enlightened
ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the sake of
in his mind concerning what he has heard; thus it is writ-
things that appear externally. In this way, even during the
ten (Lk. 24:27,32) that Our Lord opened the scriptures to
state of faith, nothing hinders us from understanding even
His disciples, that they might understand them. Therefore
those things which are the direct object of faith.
understanding is compatible with faith.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for
I answer that, We need to make a twofold distinction
the first three argue in reference to perfect understanding,
here: one on the side of faith, the other on the part of un-
while the last refers to the understanding of matters sub-
derstanding.
ordinate to faith.
On the side of faith the distinction to be made is that
Whether the gift of understanding is merely speculative or also practical?
IIa IIae q. 8 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that understanding, con-
fore, is the gift of understanding concerned with none but
sidered as a gift of the Holy Ghost, is not practical,
necessary matters. Now the practical intellect is not about
but only speculative. For, according to Gregory (Moral.
necessary things, but about things which may be other-
i, 32), “understanding penetrates certain more exalted
wise than they are, and which may result from man’s ac-
things.” But the practical intellect is occupied, not with
tivity. Therefore the gift of understanding is not practical.
exalted, but with inferior things, viz. singulars, about
Objection 3. Further, the gift of understanding en-
which actions are concerned. Therefore understanding,
lightens the mind in matters which surpass natural reason.
considered as a gift, is not practical.
Now human activities, with which the practical intellect
Objection 2.
Further, the gift of understanding is
is concerned, do not surpass natural reason, which is the
something more excellent than the intellectual virtue of
directing principle in matters of action, as was made clear
understanding. But the intellectual virtue of understand-
above ( Ia IIae, q. 58, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 6). Therefore
ing is concerned with none but necessary things, accord-
the gift of understanding is not practical.
ing to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much more, there-
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 110:10): “A good
1226
understanding to all that do it.”
sidered in themselves, but, as referred to the rule of the
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the gift of under-eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness, they are
standing is not only about those things which come under
exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding.
faith first and principally, but also about all things subordi-
Reply to Objection 2. The excellence of the gift of
nate to faith. Now good actions have a certain relationship
understanding consists precisely in its considering eternal
to faith: since “faith worketh through charity,” according
or necessary matters, not only as they are rules of human
to the Apostle (Gal. 5:6). Hence the gift of understanding
actions, because a cognitive virtue is the more excellent,
extends also to certain actions, not as though these were
according to the greater extent of its object.
its principal object, but in so far as the rule of our ac-
Reply to Objection 3. The rule of human actions is
tions is the eternal law, to which the higher reason, which
the human reason and the eternal law, as stated above (
is perfected by the gift of understanding, adheres by con-
Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 6). Now the eternal law surpasses hu-
templating and consulting it, as Augustine states (De Trin.
man reason: so that the knowledge of human actions, as
xii, 7).
ruled by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and
Reply to Objection 1. The things with which human
requires the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost.
actions are concerned are not surpassingly exalted con-
Whether the gift of understanding is in all who are in a state of grace?
IIa IIae q. 8 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of under-
I answer that, In all who are in a state of grace, there standing is not in all who are in a state of grace. For Gre-must needs be rectitude of the will, since grace prepares
gory says (Moral. ii, 49) that “the gift of understanding is
man’s will for good, according to Augustine (Contra Ju-
given as a remedy against dulness of mind.” Now many
lian. Pelag. iv, 3). Now the will cannot be rightly directed
who are in a state of grace suffer from dulness of mind.
to good, unless there be already some knowledge of the
Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in
truth, since the object of the will is good understood, as
a state of grace.
stated in De Anima iii, 7. Again, just as the Holy Ghost
Objection 2. Further, of all the things that are con-
directs man’s will by the gift of charity, so as to move it
nected with knowledge, faith alone seems to be necessary
directly to some supernatural good; so also, by the gift
for salvation, since by faith Christ dwells in our hearts,
of understanding, He enlightens the human mind, so that
according to Eph. 3:17. Now the gift of understanding
it knows some supernatural truth, to which the right will
is not in everyone that has faith; indeed, those who have
needs to tend.
faith ought to pray that they may understand, as Augustine
Therefore, just as the gift of charity is in all of those
says (De Trin. xv, 27). Therefore the gift of understanding
who have sanctifying grace, so also is the gift of under-
is not necessary for salvation: and, consequently, is not in
standing.
all who are in a state of grace.
Reply to Objection 1. Some who have sanctifying
Objection 3. Further, those things which are common
grace may suffer dulness of mind with regard to things
to all who are in a state of grace, are never withdrawn
that are not necessary for salvation; but with regard to
from them. Now the grace of understanding and of the
those that are necessary for salvation, they are sufficiently
other gifts sometimes withdraws itself profitably, for, at
instructed by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Jn. 2:27:
times, “when the mind is puffed up with understanding
“His unction teacheth you of all things.”
sublime things, it becomes sluggish and dull in base and
Reply to Objection 2. Although not all who have
vile things,” as Gregory observes (Moral. ii, 49). There-
faith understand fully the things that are proposed to be
fore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a
believed, yet they understand that they ought to believe
state of grace.
them, and that they ought nowise to deviate from them.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 81:5): “They have
Reply to Objection 3. With regard to things necessary
not known or understood, they walk on in darkness.” But
for salvation, the gift of understanding never withdraws
no one who is in a state of grace walks in darkness, ac-
from holy persons: but, in order that they may have no in-
cording to Jn. 8:12: “He that followeth Me, walketh not
centive to pride, it does withdraw sometimes with regard
in darkness.” Therefore no one who is in a state of grace
to other things, so that their mind is unable to penetrate all
is without the gift of understanding.
things clearly.
1227
Whether the gift of understanding is found also in those who have not sanctifying IIa IIae q. 8 a. 5
grace?
Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of under-
cordingly then, the intellectual light of grace is called the
standing is found also in those who have not sanctifying
gift of understanding, in so far as man’s understanding
grace. For Augustine, in expounding the words of Ps.
is easily moved by the Holy Ghost, the consideration of
118:20: “My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifica-
which movement depends on a true apprehension of the
tions,” says: “Understanding flies ahead, and man’s will is
end. Wherefore unless the human intellect be moved by
weak and slow to follow.” But in all who have sanctifying
the Holy Ghost so far as to have a right estimate of the end,
grace, the will is prompt on account of charity. Therefore
it has not yet obtained the gift of understanding, however
the gift of understanding can be in those who have not
much the Holy Ghost may have enlightened it in regard to
sanctifying grace.
other truths that are preambles to the faith.
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Dan. 10:1) that
Now to have a right estimate about the last end one
“there is need of understanding in a” prophetic “vision,”
must not be in error about the end, and must adhere to it
so that, seemingly, there is no prophecy without the gift of
firmly as to the greatest good: and no one can do this with-
understanding. But there can be prophecy without sancti-
out sanctifying grace; even as in moral matters a man has
fying grace, as evidenced by Mat. 7:22, where those who
a right estimate about the end through a habit of virtue.
say: “We have prophesied in Thy name∗,” are answered
Therefore no one has the gift of understanding without
with the words: “I never knew you.” Therefore the gift of
sanctifying grace.
understanding can be without sanctifying grace.
Reply to Objection 1. By understanding Augustine
Objection 3. Further, the gift of understanding re-
means any kind of intellectual light, that, however, does
sponds to the virtue of faith, according to Is. 7:9, follow-
not fulfil all the conditions of a gift, unless the mind of
ing another reading†: “If you will not believe you shall not
man be so far perfected as to have a right estimate about
understand.” Now faith can be without sanctifying grace.
the end.
Therefore the gift of understanding can be without it.
Reply to Objection 2. The understanding that is req-
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 6:45): “Ev-
uisite for prophecy, is a kind of enlightenment of the mind
ery one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned,
with regard to the things revealed to the prophet: but it is
cometh to Me.” Now it is by the intellect, as Gregory ob-
not an enlightenment of the mind with regard to a right
serves (Moral. i, 32), that we learn or understand what
estimate about the last end, which belongs to the gift of
we hear. Therefore whoever has the gift of understanding,
understanding.
cometh to Christ, which is impossible without sanctify-
Reply to Objection 3. Faith implies merely assent
ing grace. Therefore the gift of understanding cannot be
to what is proposed but understanding implies a certain
without sanctifying grace.
perception of the truth, which perception, except in one
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, Aa. 1,2) who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard the end, as stated
the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect the soul, according
above. Hence the comparison fails between understand-
as it is amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Ac-
ing and faith.
Whether the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts?
IIa IIae q. 8 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of under-
ples, since the natural habit of first principles suffices in
standing is not distinct from the other gifts. For there
respect of those matters which are naturally self-evident:
is no distinction between things whose opposites are not
while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as are
distinct. Now “wisdom is contrary to folly, understand-
supernatural, since the articles of faith are like first prin-
ing is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to rashness,
ciples in supernatural knowledge, as stated above (q. 1,
knowledge is contrary to ignorance,” as Gregory states
a. 7). Therefore the gift of understanding does not differ
(Moral. ii, 49). But there would seem to be no difference
from the other intellectual gifts.
between folly, dulness, ignorance and rashness. Therefore
Objection 3. Further, all intellectual knowledge is ei-
neither does understanding differ from the other gifts.
ther speculative or practical. Now the gift of understand-
Objection 2. Further, the intellectual virtue of under-
ing is related to both, as stated above (a. 3). Therefore it is standing differs from the other intellectual virtues in that
not distinct from the other intellectual gifts, but comprises
it is proper to it to be about self-evident principles. But the them all.
gift of understanding is not about any self-evident princi-
On the contrary, When several things are enumerated
∗ Vulg.: ‘Have we not prophesied in Thy name?
† The Septuagint
1228
together they must be, in some way, distinct from one an-Accordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith
other, because distinction is the origin of number. Now
for belief, two things are requisite on our part: first that
the gift of understanding is enumerated together with the
they be penetrated or grasped by the intellect, and this be-
other gifts, as appears from Is. 11:2. Therefore the gift of
longs to the gift of understanding. Secondly, it is nec-
understanding is distinct from the other gifts.
essary that man should judge these things aright, that he
I answer that, The difference between the gift of un-
should esteem that he ought to adhere to these things, and
derstanding and three of the others, viz. piety, fortitude,
to withdraw from their opposites: and this judgment, with
and fear, is evident, since the gift of understanding be-
regard to Divine things belong to the gift of wisdom, but
longs to the cognitive power, while the three belong to the
with regard to created things, belongs to the gift of knowl-
appetitive power.
edge, and as to its application to individual actions, be-
But the difference between this gift of understanding
longs to the gift of counsel.
and the remaining three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and
Reply to Objection 1. The foregoing difference be-
counsel, which also belong to the cognitive power, is not
tween those four gifts is clearly in agreement with the dis-
so evident. To some∗, it seems that the gift of understand-
tinction of those things which Gregory assigns as their op-
ing differs from the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in that
posites. For dulness is contrary to sharpness, since an in-
these two belong to practical knowledge, while the gift of
tellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp, when it is able
understanding belongs to speculative knowledge; and that
to penetrate into the heart of the things that are proposed
it differs from the gift of wisdom, which also belongs to
to it. Hence it is dulness of mind that renders the mind
speculative knowledge, in that wisdom is concerned with
unable to pierce into the heart of a thing. A man is said
judgment, while understanding renders the mind apt to
to be a fool if he judges wrongly about the common end
grasp the things that are proposed, and to penetrate into
of life, wherefore folly is properly opposed to wisdom,
their very heart. And in this sense we have assigned the
which makes us judge aright about the universal cause.
number of the gifts, above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 4).
Ignorance implies a defect in the mind, even about any
But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of un-
particular things whatever, so that it is contrary to knowl-
derstanding is concerned not only with speculative, but
edge, which gives man a right judgment about particular
also with practical matters, as stated above (a. 3), and
causes, viz. about creatures. Rashness is clearly opposed
likewise, the gift of knowledge regards both matters, as
to counsel, whereby man does not proceed to action be-
we shall show further on (q. 9, a. 3), and consequently,
fore deliberating with his reason.
we must take their distinction in some other way. For all
Reply to Objection 2. The gift of understanding is
these four gifts are ordained to supernatural knowledge,
about the first principles of that knowledge which is con-
which, in us, takes its foundation from faith. Now “faith
ferred by grace; but otherwise than faith, because it be-
is through hearing” (Rom. 10:17). Hence some things
longs to faith to assent to them, while it belongs to the gift
must be proposed to be believed by man, not as seen, but
of understanding to pierce with the mind the things that
as heard, to which he assents by faith. But faith, first and
are said.
principally, is about the First Truth, secondarily, about
Reply to Objection 3. The gift of understanding is
certain considerations concerning creatures, and further-
related to both kinds of knowledge, viz. speculative and
more extends to the direction of human actions, in so far
practical, not as to the judgment, but as to apprehension,
as it works through charity, as appears from what has been
by grasping what is said.
said above (q. 4, a. 2, ad 3).
Whether the sixth beatitude, “Blessed are the clean of heart,” etc., responds to the gift IIa IIae q. 8 a. 7
of understanding?
Objection 1. It would seem that the sixth beatitude,
rifying their hearts by faith.” Now cleanness of heart is
“Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God,”
acquired by the heart being purified. Therefore the afore-
does not respond to the gift of understanding. Because
said beatitude is related to the virtue of faith rather than to cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly to the appetite.
the gift of understanding.
But the gift of understanding belongs, not to the appetite,
Objection 3. Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost per-
but rather to the intellectual power. Therefore the afore-
fect man in the present state of life. But the sight of God
said beatitude does not respond to the gift of understand-
does not belong to the present life, since it is that which
ing.
gives happiness to the Blessed, as stated above ( Ia IIae,
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Acts 15:9): “Pu-
q. 3, a. 8). Therefore the sixth beatitude which comprises
∗ William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 8
1229
the sight of God, does not respond to the gift of under-longer by way of corporeal phantasms, nor infected with
standing.
heretical misrepresentations: and this cleanness is the re-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
sult of the gift of understanding.
Monte i, 4): “The sixth work of the Holy Ghost which is
Again, the sight of God is twofold. One is perfect,
understanding, is applicable to the clean of heart, whose
whereby God’s Essence is seen: the other is imperfect,
eye being purified, they can see what eye hath not seen.”
whereby, though we see not what God is, yet we see what
I answer that, Two things are contained in the sixth
He is not; and whereby, the more perfectly do we know
beatitude, as also in the others, one by way of merit, viz.
God in this life, the more we understand that He surpasses
cleanness of heart; the other by way of reward, viz. the
all that the mind comprehends. Each of these visions of
sight of God, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 69, Aa. 2 ,4),
God belongs to the gift of understanding; the first, to the
and each of these, in some way, responds to the gift of
gift of understanding in its state of perfection, as pos-
understanding.
sessed in heaven; the second, to the gift of understanding
For cleanness is twofold. One is a preamble and a
in its state of inchoation, as possessed by wayfarers.
disposition to seeing God, and consists in the heart being
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the
cleansed of inordinate affections: and this cleanness of
first two arguments refer to the first kind of cleanness;
heart is effected by the virtues and gifts belonging to the
while the third refers to the perfect vision of God. More-
appetitive power. The other cleanness of heart is a kind of
over the gifts both perfect us in this life by way of inchoa-
complement to the sight of God; such is the cleanness of
tion, and will be fulfilled, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 69,
the mind that is purged of phantasms and errors, so as to
a. 2).
receive the truths which are proposed to it about God, no
Whether faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding?
IIa IIae q. 8 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that, among the fruits,
is the proper object of the will: and consequently that
faith does not respond to the gift of understanding. For
which is ultimate and delightful with regard to the will,
understanding is the fruit of faith, since it is written (Is.
must be, after a fashion, the fruit of all the other things
7:9) according to another reading∗: “If you will not be-
that pertain to the other powers.
lieve you shall not understand,” where our version has:
Accordingly, therefore, to this kind of gift of virtue
“If you will not believe, you shall not continue.” There-
that perfects a power, we may distinguish a double fruit:
fore fruit is not the fruit of understanding.
one, belonging to the same power; the other, the last of
Objection 2. Further, that which precedes is not the
all as it were, belonging to the will. In this way we must
fruit of what follows. But faith seems to precede under-
conclude that the fruit which properly responds to the gift
standing, since it is the foundation of the entire spiritual
of understanding is faith, i.e. the certitude of faith; while
edifice, as stated above (q. 4, Aa. 1,7). Therefore faith is
the fruit that responds to it last of all is joy, which belongs not the fruit of understanding.
to the will.
Objection 3. Further, more gifts pertain to the intel-
Reply to Objection 1. Understanding is the fruit of
lect than to the appetite. Now, among the fruits, only one
faith, taken as a virtue. But we are not taking faith in this
pertains to the intellect; namely, faith, while all the others
sense here, but for a kind of certitude of faith, to which
pertain to the appetite. Therefore faith, seemingly, does
man attains by the gift of understanding.
not pertain to understanding more than to wisdom, knowl-
Reply to Objection 2. Faith cannot altogether pre-
edge or counsel.
cede understanding, for it would be impossible to assent
On the contrary, The end of a thing is its fruit. Now
by believing what is proposed to be believed, without un-
the gift of understanding seems to be ordained chiefly to
derstanding it in some way. However, the perfection of
the certitude of faith, which certitude is reckoned a fruit.
understanding follows the virtue of faith: which perfec-
For a gloss on Gal. 5:22 says that the “faith which is
tion of understanding is itself followed by a kind of cer-
a fruit, is certitude about the unseen.” Therefore faith,
tainty of faith.
among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding.
Reply to Objection 3. The fruit of practical knowl-
I answer that, The fruits of the Spirit, as stated above edge cannot consist in that very knowledge, since knowl-
( Ia IIae, q. 70, a. 1), when we were discussing them, are
edge of that kind is known not for its own sake, but for
so called because they are something ultimate and delight-
the sake of something else. On the other hand, specula-
ful, produced in us by the power of the Holy Ghost. Now
tive knowledge has its fruit in its very self, which fruit
the ultimate and delightful has the nature of an end, which
is the certitude about the thing known. Hence the gift of
∗ The Septuagint
1230
counsel, which belongs only to practical knowledge, has The reason why there are several fruits pertaining to the
no corresponding fruit of its own: while the gifts of wis-
appetitive faculty, is because, as already stated, the char-
dom, understanding and knowledge, which can belongs
acter of end, which the word fruit implies, pertains to the
also to speculative knowledge, have but one correspond-
appetitive rather than to the intellective part.
ing fruit, which is certainly denoted by the name of faith.
1231
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 9
Of the Gift of Knowledge
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether knowledge is a gift?
(2) Whether it is about Divine things?
(3) Whether it is speculative or practical?
(4) Which beatitude responds to it?
Whether knowledge is a gift?
IIa IIae q. 9 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that knowledge is not
right judgment on them, so as to discern what is to be be-
a gift. For the gifts of the Holy Ghost surpass the nat-
lieved, from what is not to be believed, and for this the
ural faculty. But knowledge implies an effect of natu-
gift of knowledge is required.
ral reason: for the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that
Reply to Objection 1. Certitude of knowledge varies
a “demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowl-
in various natures, according to the various conditions of
edge.” Therefore knowledge is not a gift of the Holy
each nature. Because man forms a sure judgment about
Ghost.
a truth by the discursive process of his reason: and so
Objection 2. Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are
human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative
common to all holy persons, as stated above (q. 8, a. 4;
reasoning. On the other hand, in God, there is a sure judg-
Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 5). Now Augustine says (De Trin. xiv,
ment of truth, without any discursive process, by simple
1) that “many of the faithful lack knowledge though they
intuition, as was stated in the Ia, q. 14, a. 7; wherefore
have faith.” Therefore knowledge is not a gift.
God’s knowledge is not discursive, or argumentative, but
Objection 3. Further, the gifts are more perfect than
absolute and simple, to which that knowledge is likened
the virtues, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 8). There-
which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, since it is a participated
fore one gift suffices for the perfection of one virtue. Now
likeness thereof.
the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of faith,
Reply to Objection 2. A twofold knowledge may be
as stated above (q. 8, a. 2). Therefore the gift of knowl-
had about matters of belief. One is the knowledge of what
edge does not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear to
one ought to believe by discerning things to be believed
which other virtue it can respond. Since, then, the gifts
from things not to be believe: in this way knowledge is
are perfections of virtues, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68,
a gift and is common to all holy persons. The other is a
Aa. 1,2), it seems that knowledge is not a gift.
knowledge about matters of belief, whereby one knows
On the contrary, Knowledge is reckoned among the
not only what one ought to believe, but also how to make
seven gifts (Is. 11:2).
the faith known, how to induce others to believe, and con-
I answer that, Grace is more perfect than nature, and,
fute those who deny the faith. This knowledge is num-
therefore, does not fail in those things wherein man can
bered among the gratuitous graces, which are not given to
be perfected by nature. Now, when a man, by his natural
all, but to some. Hence Augustine, after the words quoted,
reason, assents by his intellect to some truth, he is per-
adds: “It is one thing for a man merely to know what he
fected in two ways in respect of that truth: first, because
ought to believe, and another to know how to dispense
he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure judgment
what he believes to the godly, and to defend it against the
on it.
ungodly.”
Accordingly, two things are requisite in order that the
Reply to Objection 3. The gifts are more perfect than
human intellect may perfectly assent to the truth of the
the moral and intellectual virtues; but they are not more
faith: one of these is that he should have a sound grasp of
perfect than the theological virtues; rather are all the gifts
the things that are proposed to be believed, and this per-
ordained to the perfection of the theological virtues, as to
tains to the gift of understanding, as stated above (q. 8,
their end. Hence it is not unreasonable if several gifts are
a. 6): while the other is that he should have a sure and
ordained to one theological virtue.
1232
Whether the gift of knowledge is about Divine things?
IIa IIae q. 9 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of knowl-
edge has a special name, which is wisdom: for a wise man
edge is about Divine things. For Augustine says (De Trin.
in any branch of knowledge is one who knows the high-
xiv, 1) that “knowledge begets, nourishes and strengthens
est cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge
faith.” Now faith is about Divine things, because its object
of all matters by that cause: and a wise man “absolutely,”
is the First Truth, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1). Therefore
is one who knows the cause which is absolutely highest,
the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.
namely God. Hence the knowledge of Divine things is
Objection 2. Further, the gift of knowledge is more
called “wisdom,” while the knowledge of human things is
excellent than acquired knowledge. But there is an ac-
called “knowledge,” this being the common name denot-
quired knowledge about Divine things, for instance, the
ing certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judg-
science of metaphysics. Much more therefore is the gift
ment which is formed through second causes. Accord-
of knowledge about Divine things.
ingly, if we take knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift
Objection 3. Further, according to Rom. 1:20, “the
from the gift of wisdom, so that the gift of knowledge is
invisible things of God. . . are clearly seen, being under-
only about human or created things.
stood by the things that are made.” If therefore there is
Reply to Objection 1. Although matters of faith are
knowledge about created things, it seems that there is also
Divine and eternal, yet faith itself is something temporal
knowledge of Divine things.
in the mind of the believer. Hence to know what one ought
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1):
to believe, belongs to the gift of knowledge, but to know in
“The knowledge of Divine things may be properly called
themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of union
wisdom, and the knowledge of human affairs may prop-
with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the
erly receive the name of knowledge.”
gift of wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites
I answer that, A sure judgment about a thing formed
man’s mind to God.
chiefly from its cause, and so the order of judgments
Reply to Objection 2. This argument takes knowl-
should be according to the order of causes. For just as
edge in the generic acceptation of the term: it is not thus
the first cause is the cause of the second, so ought the
that knowledge is a special gift, but according as it is re-
judgment about the second cause to be formed through
stricted to judgments formed through created things.
the first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first cause Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 1, a. 1),
through any other cause; wherefore the judgment which is
every cognitive habit regards formally the mean through
formed through the first cause, is the first and most perfect
which things are known, and materially, the things that are
judgment.
known through the mean. And since that which is formal,
Now in those things where we find something most
is of most account, it follows that those sciences which
perfect, the common name of the genus is appropriated
draw conclusions about physical matter from mathemati-
for those things which fall short of the most perfect, and
cal principles, are reckoned rather among the mathemat-
some special name is adapted to the most perfect thing, as
ical sciences, though, as to their matter they have more
is the case in Logic. For in the genus of convertible terms,
in common with physical sciences: and for this reason it
that which signifies “what a thing is,” is given the spe-
is stated in Phys. ii, 2 that they are more akin to physics.
cial name of “definition,” but the convertible terms which
Accordingly, since man knows God through His creatures,
fall short of this, retain the common name, and are called
this seems to pertain to “knowledge,” to which it belongs
“proper” terms.
formally, rather than to “wisdom,” to which it belongs ma-
Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certi-
terially: and, conversely, when we judge of creatures ac-
tude of judgment as stated above (a. 1), if this certitude of
cording to Divine things, this pertains to “wisdom” rather
the judgment is derived from the highest cause, the knowl-
than to “knowledge.”
Whether the gift of knowledge is practical knowledge?
IIa IIae q. 9 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the knowledge, which
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32):
is numbered among the gifts, is practical knowledge. For
“Knowledge is nought if it hath not its use for piety. . . and
Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14) that “knowledge is con-
piety is very useless if it lacks the discernment of knowl-
cerned with the actions in which we make use of exter-
edge.” Now it follows from this authority that knowledge
nal things.” But the knowledge which is concerned about
directs piety. But this cannot apply to a speculative sci-
actions is practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is
ence. Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative
practical.
but practical.
1233
Objection 3. Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are so far as man knows what he ought to hold by faith; yet,
only in the righteous, as stated above (q. 9, a. 5). But spec-
secondarily, it extends to works, since we are directed in
ulative knowledge can be also in the unrighteous, accord-
our actions by the knowledge of matters of faith, and of
ing to James 4:17: “To him. . . who knoweth to do good,
conclusions drawn therefrom.
and doth it not, to him it is a sin.” Therefore the gift of
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of the
knowledge is not speculative but practical.
gift of knowledge, in so far as it extends to works; for ac-
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral.
i, 32):
tion is ascribed to knowledge, yet not action solely, nor
“Knowledge on her own day prepares a feast, because she
primarily: and in this way it directs piety.
overcomes the fast of ignorance in the mind.” Now ig-
Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.
norance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds of
Reply to Objection 3. As we have already stated
knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the
(q. 8, a. 5) about the gift of understanding, not everyone
gift of knowledge is both speculative and practical.
who understands, has the gift of understanding, but only
I answer that, As stated above (q. 9, a. 8), the gift of he that understands through a habit of grace: and so we
knowledge, like the gift of understanding, is ordained to
must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge, that
the certitude of faith. Now faith consists primarily and
they alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright
principally in speculation, in as much as it is founded
about matters of faith and action, through the grace be-
on the First Truth. But since the First Truth is also the
stowed on them, so as never to wander from the straight
last end for the sake of which our works are done, hence
path of justice. This is the knowledge of holy things, ac-
it is that faith extends to works, according to Gal. 5:6:
cording to Wis. 10:10: “She conducted the just. . . through
“Faith. . . worketh by charity.”
the right ways. . . and gave him the knowledge of holy
The consequence is that the gift of knowledge also,
things.”
primarily and principally indeed, regards speculation, in
Whether the third beatitude, “Blessed are they that mourn,” etc. corresponds to the IIa IIae q. 9 a. 4
gift of knowledge?
Objection 1. It would seem that the third beatitude,
I answer that, Right judgment about creatures be-
“Blessed are they that mourn,” does not correspond to the
longs properly to knowledge. Now it is through creatures
gift of knowledge. For, even as evil is the cause of sor-
that man’s aversion from God is occasioned, according
row and grief, so is good the cause of joy. Now knowl-
to Wis. 14:11: “Creatures. . . are turned to an abomina-
edge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter
tion. . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise,” of those,
is known through evil: for “the straight line rules both it-
namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since
self and the crooked line” (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the
they deem the perfect good to consist in them. Hence
aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond to the gift
they sin by placing their last end in them, and lose the true
of knowledge.
good. It is by forming a right judgment of creatures that
Objection 2. Further, consideration of truth is an act
man becomes aware of the loss (of which they may be the
of knowledge. Now there is no sorrow in the considera-
occasion), which judgment he exercises through the gift
tion of truth; rather is there joy, since it is written (Wis.
of knowledge.
8:16): “Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her com-
Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to
pany any tediousness, but joy and gladness.” Therefore
the gift of knowledge.
the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond with
Reply to Objection 1. Created goods do not cause
the gift of knowledge.
spiritual joy, except in so far as they are referred to the
Objection 3. Further, the gift of knowledge consists
Divine good, which is the proper cause of spiritual joy.
in speculation, before operation. Now, in so far as it con-
Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy correspond di-
sists in speculation, sorrow does not correspond to it, since
rectly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of knowledge
“the speculative intellect is not concerned about things to
there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past errors,
be sought or avoided” (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore the
and, in consequence, consolation, since, by his right judg-
aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to correspond
ment, man directs creatures to the Divine good. For this
with the gift of knowledge.
reason sorrow is set forth in this beatitude, as the merit,
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
and the resulting consolation, as the reward; which is be-
Monte iv): “Knowledge befits the mourner, who has dis-
gun in this life, and is perfected in the life to come.
covered that he has been mastered by the evil which he
Reply to Objection 2. Man rejoices in the very con-
coveted as though it were good.”
sideration of truth; yet he may sometimes grieve for the
1234
thing, the truth of which he considers: it is thus that sor-sist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in well-
row is ascribed to knowledge.
ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the
Reply to Objection 3. No beatitude corresponds to
beatitude of a wayfarer. Hence beatitude relating to con-
knowledge, in so far as it consists in speculation, because
templation is not ascribed to knowledge, but to under-
man’s beatitude consists, not in considering creatures, but
standing and wisdom, which are about Divine things.
in contemplating God. But man’s beatitude does con-
1235
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 10
Of Unbelief in General
(In Twelve Articles)
In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief, which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which are contrary to knowledge and understanding.
As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general; (2) heresy; (3) apostasy from the faith.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether unbelief is a sin?
(2) What is its subject?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin?
(5) Of the species of unbelief;
(6) Of their comparison, one with another;
(7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers?
(8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith?
(9) Whether we ought to have communications with them?
(10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians?
(11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated?
(12) Whether the children of unbelievers are to be baptized against their parents’ will?
Whether unbelief is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 10 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that unbelief is not a sin.
it, according to Is. 53:1: “Who hath believed our report?”
For every sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene proves
It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is in
(De Fide Orth. ii, 4). Now unbelief seems not to be con-
this sense that unbelief is a sin.
trary to nature; for Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct.
If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we
v) that “to be capable to having faith, just as to be capable
find it in those who have heard nothing about the faith, it
of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have
bears the character, not of sin, but of punishment, because
faith, even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the
such like ignorance of Divine things is a result of the sin
faithful.” Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an
of our first parent. If such like unbelievers are damned, it
unbeliever, is not a sin.
is on account of other sins, which cannot be taken away
Objection 2. Further, no one sins that which he cannot
without faith, but not on account of their sin of unbelief.
avoid, since every sin is voluntary. Now it is not in a man’s
Hence Our Lord said (Jn. 15:22) “If I had not come, and
power to avoid unbelief, for he cannot avoid it unless he
spoken to them, they would not have sin”; which Augus-
have faith, because the Apostle says (Rom. 10:14): “How
tine expounds (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) as “referring to the
shall they believe in Him, of Whom they have not heard?
sin whereby they believed not in Christ.”
And how shall they hear without a preacher?” Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. To have the faith is not part of
unbelief does not seem to be a sin.
human nature, but it is part of human nature that man’s
Objection 3. Further, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 84,
mind should not thwart his inner instinct, and the outward
a. 4), there are seven capital sins, to which all sins are re-
preaching of the truth. Hence, in this way, unbelief is con-
duced. But unbelief does not seem to be comprised under
trary to nature.
any of them. Therefore unbelief is not a sin.
Reply to Objection 2. This argument takes unbelief
On the contrary, Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith
as denoting a pure negation.
is a virtue, and unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbe-
Reply to Objection 3. Unbelief, in so far as it is a
lief is a sin.
sin, arises from pride, through which man is unwilling to
I answer that, Unbelief may be taken in two ways:
subject his intellect to the rules of faith, and to the sound
first, by way of pure negation, so that a man be called an
interpretation of the Fathers. Hence Gregory says (Moral.
unbeliever, merely because he has not the faith. Secondly,
xxxi, 45) that “presumptuous innovations arise from vain-
unbelief may be taken by way of opposition to the faith;
glory.”
in which sense a man refuses to hear the faith, or despises
It might also be replied that just as the theological
1236
virtues are not reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede are not reduced to the capital vices.
them, so too, the vices opposed to the theological virtues
Whether unbelief is in the intellect as its subject?
IIa IIae q. 10 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that unbelief is not in the
principles: one is its first and universal principle, which
intellect as its subject. For every sin is in the will, accord-
commands all acts of sin; and this is the will, because ev-
ing to Augustine (De Duabus Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief
ery sin is voluntary. The other principle of the sinful act is
is a sin, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore unbelief resides
the proper and proximate principle which elicits the sinful
in the will and not in the intellect.
act: thus the concupiscible is the principle of gluttony and
Objection 2. Further, unbelief is sinful through con-
lust, wherefore these sins are said to be in the concupis-
tempt of the preaching of the faith. But contempt pertains
cible. Now dissent, which is the act proper to unbelief, is
to the will. Therefore unbelief is in the will.
an act of the intellect, moved, however, by the will, just as
Objection 3. Further, a gloss∗ on 2 Cor. 11:14 “Sa-
assent is.
tan. . . transformeth himself into an angel of light,” says
Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its
that if “a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and
proximate subject. But it is in the will as its first moving
be taken for a good angel, it is not a dangerous or an un-
principle, in which way every sin is said to be in the will.
healthy error, if he does or says what is becoming to a
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.
good angel.” This seems to be because of the rectitude of
Reply to Objection 2. The will’s contempt causes the
the will of the man who adheres to the angel, since his in-
intellect’s dissent, which completes the notion of unbelief.
tention is to adhere to a good angel. Therefore the sin of
Hence the cause of unbelief is in the will, while unbelief
unbelief seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and,
itself is in the intellect.
consequently, it does not reside in the intellect.
Reply to Objection 3. He that believes a wicked an-
On the contrary, Things which are contrary to one
gel to be a good one, does not dissent from a matter of
another are in the same subject. Now faith, to which unbe-
faith, because “his bodily senses are deceived, while his
lief is opposed, resides in the intellect. Therefore unbelief
mind does not depart from a true and right judgment” as
also is in the intellect.
the gloss observes†. But, according to the same author-
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 74,
ity, to adhere to Satan when he begins to invite one to his
Aa. 1,2), sin is said to be in the power which is the prin-
abode, i.e. wickedness and error, is not without sin.
ciple of the sinful act. Now a sinful act may have two
Whether unbelief is the greatest of sin?
IIa IIae q. 10 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that unbelief is not the
be.” Now a greater punishment is due to believers than to
greatest of sins. For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra
unbelievers, according to Heb. 10:29: “How much more,
Donat. iv, 20): “I should hesitate to decide whether a
do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath
very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a heretic,
trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed the
in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible beyond the
blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sancti-
fact that he is a heretic.” But a heretic is an unbeliever.
fied?” Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins.
Therefore we ought not to say absolutely that unbelief is
On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Jn.
the greatest of sins.
15:22, “If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would
Objection 2.
Further, that which diminishes or
not have sin,” says (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.): “Under the
excuses a sin is not, seemingly, the greatest of sins.
general name, He refers to a singularly great sin. For
Now unbelief excuses or diminishes sin: for the Apos-
this,” viz. infidelity, “is the sin to which all others may
tle says (1 Tim.
1:12,13):
“I. . . before was a blas-
be traced.” Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins.
phemer, and a persecutor and contumelious; but I ob-
I answer that, Every sin consists formally in aversion
tained. . . mercy. . . because I did it ignorantly in unbelief.”
from God, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 6; Ia IIae,
Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins.
q. 73, a. 3). Hence the more a sin severs man from God,
Objection 3. Further, the greater sin deserves the
the graver it is. Now man is more than ever separated from
greater punishment, according to Dt. 25:2: “According to
God by unbelief, because he has not even true knowledge
the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes
of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not
∗ Augustine, Enchiridion lx.
† Augustine, Enchiridion lx
1237
approach Him, but is severed from Him.
Reply to Objection 2. Unbelief includes both igno-
Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of
rance, as an accessory thereto, and resistance to matters
God, to know Him in any way at all, because the object
of faith, and in the latter respect it is a most grave sin. In
of his opinion is not God. Therefore it is clear that the
respect, however, of this ignorance, it has a certain reason
sin of unbelief is greater than any sin that occurs in the
for excuse, especially when a man sins not from malice,
perversion of morals. This does not apply to the sins that
as was the case with the Apostle.
are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated
Reply to Objection 3. An unbeliever is more severely
further on (q. 20, a. 3; q. 34, a. 2, ad 2; q. 39, a. 2, ad 3).
punished for his sin of unbelief than another sinner is for
Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders a sin that is
any sin whatever, if we consider the kind of sin. But in
more grave in its genus from being less grave in respect
the case of another sin, e.g. adultery, committed by a be-
of some circumstances. Hence Augustine hesitated to de-
liever, and by an unbeliever, the believer, other things be-
cide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic not sinning oth-
ing equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both on
erwise, because although the heretic’s sin is more grave
account of his knowledge of the truth through faith, and
generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and con-
on account of the sacraments of faith with which he has
versely the sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance,
been satiated, and which he insults by committing sin.
be aggravated.
Whether every act of an unbeliever is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 10 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that each act of an unbe-
Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything
liever is a sin. Because a gloss on Rom. 14:23, “All that
they do; but whenever they do anything out of their un-
is not of faith is sin,” says: “The whole life of unbeliev-
belief, then they sin. For even as one who has the faith,
ers is a sin.” Now the life of unbelievers consists of their
can commit an actual sin, venial or even mortal, which he
actions. Therefore every action of an unbeliever is a sin.
does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an unbeliever can
Objection 2. Further, faith directs the intention. Now
do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to the
there can be no good save what comes from a right in-
end of his unbelief.
tention. Therefore, among unbelievers, no action can be
Reply to Objection 1. The words quoted must be
good.
taken to mean either that the life of unbelievers cannot
Objection 3. Further, when that which precedes is
be sinless, since without faith no sin is taken away, or that
corrupted, that which follows is corrupted also. Now an
whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin. Hence the same
act of faith precedes the acts of all the virtues. Therefore,
authority adds: “Because every one that lives or acts ac-
since there is no act of faith in unbelievers, they can do no
cording to his unbelief, sins grievously.”
good work, but sin in every action of theirs.
Reply to Objection 2. Faith directs the intention with
On the contrary, It is said of Cornelius, while yet an
regard to the supernatural last end: but even the light of
unbeliever (Acts 10:4,31), that his alms were acceptable
natural reason can direct the intention in respect of a con-
to God. Therefore not every action of an unbeliever is a
natural good.
sin, but some of his actions are good.
Reply to Objection 3. Unbelief does not so wholly
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 85, Aa. 2,4) destroy natural reason in unbelievers, but that some
mortal sin takes away sanctifying grace, but does not
knowledge of the truth remains in them, whereby they are
wholly corrupt the good of nature. Since therefore, un-
able to do deeds that are generically good. With regard,
belief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are without grace in-
however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not
deed, yet some good of nature remains in them. Conse-
an unbeliever, else his works would not have been accept-
quently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good
able to God, whom none can please without faith. Now he
works which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works;
had implicit faith, as the truth of the Gospel was not yet
yet they can, to a certain extent, do those good works for
made manifest: hence Peter was sent to him to give him
which the good of nature suffices.
fuller instruction in the faith.
1238
Whether there are several species of unbelief?
IIa IIae q. 10 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that there are not several
Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be consid-
species of unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are con-
ered in comparison to faith, there are several species of
trary to one another, they must be about the same thing.
unbelief, determinate in number. For, since the sin of un-
Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, whence it
belief consists in resisting the faith, this may happen in
derives its unity, although its matter contains many points
two ways: either the faith is resisted before it has been
of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also is the First
accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or heathens;
Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves
or the Christian faith is resisted after it has been accepted,
are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference
and this either in the figure, and such is the unbelief of
depends not on material but on formal principles. There-
the Jews, or in the very manifestation of truth, and such is
fore there are not several species of unbelief, according to
the unbelief of heretics. Hence we may, in a general way,
the various points which the unbeliever disbelieves.
reckon these three as species of unbelief.
Objection 2. Further, it is possible to stray from the
If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished
truth of faith in an infinite number of ways. If therefore
according to the various errors that occur in matters of
the various species of unbelief correspond to the number
faith, there are not determinate species of unbelief: for er-
of various errors, it would seem to follow that there is an
rors can be multiplied indefinitely, as Augustine observes
infinite number of species of unbelief, and consequently,
(De Haeresibus).
that we ought not to make these species the object of our
Reply to Objection 1. The formal aspect of a sin can
consideration.
be considered in two ways. First, according to the inten-
Objection 3. Further, the same thing does not belong
tion of the sinner, in which case the thing to which the
to different species. Now a man may be an unbeliever
sinner turns is the formal object of his sin, and determines
through erring about different points of truth. Therefore
the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may be con-
diversity of errors does not make a diversity of species of
sidered as an evil, and in this case the good which is for-
unbelief: and so there are not several species of unbelief.
saken is the formal object of the sin; which however does
On the contrary, Several species of vice are opposed
not derive its species from this point of view, in fact it
to each virtue, because “good happens in one way, but evil
is a privation. We must therefore reply that the object of
in many ways,” according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv)
unbelief is the First Truth considered as that which unbe-
and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now faith is a virtue.
lief forsakes, but its formal aspect, considered as that to
Therefore several species of vice are opposed to it.
which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that it follows:
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 4; Ia and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives its
IIae, q. 64, a. 1), every virtue consists in following some
various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because
rule of human knowledge or operation. Now conformity
it adheres to the Sovereign Good, while there are various
to a rule happens one way in one matter, whereas a breach
species of vice opposed to charity, which turn away from
of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices are
the Sovereign Good by turning to various temporal goods,
opposed to one virtue. The diversity of the vices that are
and also in respect of various inordinate relations to God,
opposed to each virtue may be considered in two ways,
so too, faith is one virtue through adhering to the one First
first, with regard to their different relations to the virtue:
Truth, yet there are many species of unbelief, because un-
and in this way there are determinate species of vices con-
believers follow many false opinions.
trary to a virtue: thus to a moral virtue one vice is opposed
Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the
by exceeding the virtue, and another, by falling short of
various species of unbelief according to various points in
the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of vices opposed to one
which errors occur.
virtue may be considered in respect of the corruption of
Reply to Objection 3. Since faith is one because it
the various conditions required for that virtue. In this way
believes in many things in relation to one, so may unbe-
an infinite number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e.g.
lief, although it errs in many things, be one in so far as all
temperance or fortitude, according to the infinite number
those things are related to one. Yet nothing hinders one
of ways in which the various circumstances of a virtue
man from erring in various species of unbelief, even as
may be corrupted, so that the rectitude of virtue is for-
one man may be subject to various vices, and to various
saken. For this reason the Pythagoreans held evil to be
bodily diseases.
infinite.
1239
Whether the unbelief of pagans or heathens is graver than other kinds?
IIa IIae q. 10 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the unbelief of hea-
be considered in unbelief. One of these is its relation
thens or pagans is graver than other kinds. For just as bod-
to faith: and from this point of view, he who resists the
ily disease is graver according as it endangers the health
faith after accepting it, sins more grievously against faith,
of a more important member of the body, so does sin ap-
than he who resists it without having accepted it, even
pear to be graver, according as it is opposed to that which
as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised, sins more
holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which is
grievously than if he had never promised it. In this way
most important in faith, is belief in the unity of God, from
the unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the
which the heathens deviate by believing in many gods.
Gospel, and resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more
Therefore their unbelief is the gravest of all.
grievous sin than that of the Jews, who have never ac-
Objection 2. Further, among heresies, the more de-
cepted the Gospel faith. Since, however, they accepted
testable are those which contradict the truth of faith in
the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which they cor-
more numerous and more important points: thus, the
rupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more
heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more de-
grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter
testable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity
have not accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all.
of Christ from the Person of God the Son. Now the hea-
The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the
thens deny the faith in more numerous and more important
corruption of matters of faith. In this respect, since hea-
points than Jews and heretics; since they do not accept the
thens err on more points than Jews, and these in more
faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest.
points than heretics, the unbelief of heathens is more
Objection 3. Further, every good diminishes evil.
grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of the Jews
Now there is some good in the Jews, since they believe in
than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of the
the Old Testament as being from God, and there is some
Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than
good in heretics, since they venerate the New Testament.
heathens do.
Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who re-
Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second
ceive neither Testament.
from the point of view of guilt; since, as stated above (a. 1)
On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 2:21): “It had
unbelief has the character of guilt, from its resisting faith
been better for them not to have known the way of justice,
rather than from the mere absence of faith, for the latter
than after they have known it, to turn back.” Now the hea-
as was stated (a. 1) seems rather to bear the character of
thens have not known the way of justice, whereas heretics
punishment. Hence, speaking absolutely, the unbelief of
and Jews have abandoned it after knowing it in some way.
heretics is the worst.
Therefore theirs is the graver sin.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 5), two things may
Whether one ought to dispute with unbelievers in public?
IIa IIae q. 10 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not to dis-
Objection 3. Further, disputations are conducted by
pute with unbelievers in public. For the Apostle says (2
means of arguments. But an argument is a reason in set-
Tim. 2:14): “Contend not in words, for it is to no profit,
tlement of a dubious matter: whereas things that are of
but to the subverting of the hearers.” But it is impossible
faith, being most certain, ought not to be a matter of doubt.
to dispute with unbelievers publicly without contending in
Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about matters
words. Therefore one ought not to dispute publicly with
of faith.
unbelievers.
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 9:22,29) that
Objection 2. Further, the law of Martianus Augustus
“Saul increased much more in strength, and confounded
confirmed by the canons∗ expresses itself thus: “It is an
the Jews,” and that “he spoke. . . to the gentiles and dis-
insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if any-
puted with the Greeks.”
one ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters
I answer that, In disputing about the faith, two things
which have once been judged and disposed of.” Now all
must be observed: one on the part of the disputant; the
matters of faith have been decided by the holy councils.
other on the part of his hearers. On the part of the dis-
Therefore it is an insult to the councils, and consequently
putant, we must consider his intention. For if he were to
a grave sin to presume to dispute in public about matters
dispute as though he had doubts about the faith, and did
of faith.
not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as though he in-
∗ De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo
1240
tended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would been instructed.” On the other hand, in the second case
sin, as being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On
it is dangerous to dispute in public about the faith, in the
the other hand, it is praiseworthy to dispute about the faith
presence of simple people, whose faith for this very rea-
in order to confute errors, or for practice.
son is more firm, that they have never heard anything dif-
On the part of the hearers we must consider whether
fering from what they believe. Hence it is not expedient
those who hear the disputation are instructed and firm in
for them to hear what unbelievers have to say against the
the faith, or simple and wavering. As to those who are
faith.
well instructed and firm in the faith, there can be no dan-
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle does not entirely
ger in disputing about the faith in their presence. But as
forbid disputations, but such as are inordinate, and consist
to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction; be-
of contentious words rather than of sound speeches.
cause either they are provoked and molested by unbeliev-
Reply to Objection 2. That law forbade those public
ers, for instance, Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive
disputations about the faith, which arise from doubting the
to corrupt the faith in them, or else they are not subject
faith, but not those which are for the safeguarding thereof.
to provocation in this matter, as in those countries where
Reply to Objection 3. One ought to dispute about
there are not unbelievers. In the first case it is necessary to matters of faith, not as though one doubted about them,
dispute in public about the faith, provided there be those
but in order to make the truth known, and to confute er-
who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting errors;
rors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is necessary
since in this way simple people are strengthened in the
sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by de-
faith, and unbelievers are deprived of the opportunity to
fending the faith, according to 1 Pet. 3:15: “Being ready
deceive, while if those who ought to withstand the per-
always to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that
verters of the truth of faith were silent, this would tend
hope and faith which is in you∗.” Sometimes again, it is
to strengthen error. Hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 4):
necessary, in order to convince those who are in error, ac-
“Even as a thoughtless speech gives rise to error, so does
cording to Titus 1:9: “That he may be able to exhort in
an indiscreet silence leave those in error who might have
sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers.”
Whether unbelievers ought to be compelled to the faith?
IIa IIae q. 10 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that unbelievers ought
him that dieth’].” Now we ought to conform our will to
by no means to be compelled to the faith. For it is writ-
the Divine will, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 19, Aa. 9,10).
ten (Mat. 13:28) that the servants of the householder, in
Therefore we should not even wish unbelievers to be put
whose field cockle had been sown, asked him: “Wilt thou
to death.
that we go and gather it up?” and that he answered: “No,
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 14:23): “Go out
lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat
into the highways and hedges; and compel them to come
also together with it”: on which passage Chrysostom says
in.” Now men enter into the house of God, i.e. into Holy
(Hom. xlvi in Matth.): “Our Lord says this so as to for-
Church, by faith. Therefore some ought to be compelled
bid the slaying of men. For it is not right to slay heretics,
to the faith.
because if you do you will necessarily slay many inno-
I answer that, Among unbelievers there are some
cent persons.” Therefore it seems that for the same reason
who have never received the faith, such as the heathens
unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.
and the Jews: and these are by no means to be compelled
Objection 2. Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist.
to the faith, in order that they may believe, because to
xlv can., De Judaeis): “The holy synod prescribes, with
believe depends on the will: nevertheless they should be
regard to the Jews, that for the future, none are to be
compelled by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so
compelled to believe.” Therefore, in like manner, neither
that they do not hinder the faith, by their blasphemies, or
should unbelievers be compelled to the faith.
by their evil persuasions, or even by their open persecu-
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in
tions. It is for this reason that Christ’s faithful often wage
Joan.) that “it is possible for a man to do other things
war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose of forc-
against his will, but he cannot believe unless he is will-
ing them to believe, because even if they were to conquer
ing.” Therefore it seems that unbelievers ought not to be
them, and take them prisoners, they should still leave them
compelled to the faith.
free to believe, if they will, but in order to prevent them
Objection 4.
It is said in God’s person (Ezech.
from hindering the faith of Christ.
18:32†): “I desire not the death of the sinner [Vulg.: ‘of
On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some
∗ Vulg.: ‘Of that hope which is in you’ St. Thomas’ reading is apparently taken from Bede
† Ezech. 33:11
1241
time have accepted the faith, and professed it, such as Reply to Objection 2. Those Jews who have in no
heretics and all apostates: such should be submitted even
way received the faith, ought not by no means to be com-
to bodily compulsion, that they may fulfil what they have
pelled to the faith: if, however, they have received it, they
promised, and hold what they, at one time, received.
ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated in the same
Reply to Objection 1. Some have understood the au-
chapter.
thority quoted to forbid, not the excommunication but the
Reply to Objection 3. Just as taking a vow is a mat-
slaying of heretics, as appears from the words of Chrysos-
ter of will, and keeping a vow, a matter of obligation, so
tom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent. xciii) of him-
acceptance of the faith is a matter of the will, whereas
self: “It was once my opinion that none should be com-
keeping the faith, when once one has received it, is a mat-
pelled to union with Christ, that we should deal in words,
ter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be compelled
and fight with arguments. However this opinion of mine
to keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boni-
is undone, not by words of contradiction, but by convinc-
face (Ep. clxxxv): “What do these people mean by crying
ing examples. Because fear of the law was so profitable,
out continually: ‘We may believe or not believe just as
that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has broken our
we choose. Whom did Christ compel?’ They should re-
chains asunder.” Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord’s
member that Christ at first compelled Paul and afterwards
words, “Suffer both to grow until the harvest,” must be
taught Him.”
gathered from those which precede, “lest perhaps gather-
Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine says in the same
ing up the cockle, you root the wheat also together with
letter, “none of us wishes any heretic to perish. But the
it.” For, Augustine says (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) “these
house of David did not deserve to have peace, unless his
words show that when this is not to be feared, that is to
son Absalom had been killed in the war which he had
say, when a man’s crime is so publicly known, and so
raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church gath-
hateful to all, that he has no defenders, or none such as
ers together some of the perdition of others, she heals the
might cause a schism, the severity of discipline should not
sorrow of her maternal heart by the delivery of so many
slacken.”
nations.”
Whether it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers?
IIa IIae q. 10 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that it is lawful to com-
should not come in touch with idolaters or their disciples,
municate with unbelievers. For the Apostle says (1 Cor.
nor have any dealings with them.”
10:27): “If any of them that believe not, invite you, and
I answer that, Communication with a particular per-
you be willing to go, eat of anything that is set before
son is forbidden to the faithful, in two ways: first, as a
you.” And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad
punishment of the person with whom they are forbidden
Heb.): “If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit
to communicate; secondly, for the safety of those who are
it without any reservation.” Now to sit at table with any-
forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can
one is to communicate with him. Therefore it is lawful to
be gathered from the Apostle’s words (1 Cor. 5:6). For af-
communicate with unbelievers.
ter he had pronounced sentence of excommunication, he
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:12):
adds as his reason: “Know you not that a little leaven cor-
“What have I to do to judge them that are without?” Now
rupts the whole lump?” and afterwards he adds the reason
unbelievers are without. When, therefore, the Church for-
on the part of the punishment inflicted by the sentence of
bids the faithful to communicate with certain people, it
the Church when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): “Do not you judge
seems that they ought not to be forbidden to communicate
them that are within?”
with unbelievers.
Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not for-
Objection 3. Further, a master cannot employ his ser-
bid the faithful to communicate with unbelievers, who
vant, unless he communicate with him, at least by word,
have not in any way received the Christian faith, viz. with
since the master moves his servant by command. Now
pagans and Jews, because she has not the right to exer-
Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews, or pagans, or
cise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal judg-
Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully com-
ment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians
municate with them.
they are guilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 7:2,3): “Thou shalt
by the faithful to some temporal punishment. On the other
make no league with them, nor show mercy to them; nei-
hand, in this way, i.e. as a punishment, the Church forbids
ther shalt thou make marriages with them”: and a gloss on
the faithful to communicate with those unbelievers who
Lev. 15:19, “The woman who at the return of the month,”
have forsaken the faith they once received, either by cor-
etc. says: “It is so necessary to shun idolatry, that we
rupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the
1242
faith, as apostates, because the Church pronounces sen-ment over some of them in the matter of temporal punish-
tence of excommunication on both.
ment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church, for
With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought
certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from commu-
to distinguish according to the various conditions of per-
nication with certain unbelievers.
sons, circumstances and time. For some are firm in the
Reply to Objection 3. There is more probability that
faith; and so it is to be hoped that their communicating
a servant who is ruled by his master’s commands, will
with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the latter
be converted to the faith of his master who is a believer,
rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith.
than if the case were the reverse: and so the faithful are
These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbe-
not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If, however,
lievers who have not received the faith, such as pagans or
the master were in danger, through communicating with
Jews, especially if there be some urgent necessity for so
such a servant, he should send him away, according to
doing. But in the case of simple people and those who
Our Lord’s command (Mat. 18:8): “If. . . thy foot scandal-
are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared as
ize thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee.”
a probable result, they should be forbidden to communi-
With regard to the argument in the contrary∗ sense the
cate with unbelievers, and especially to be on very famil-
reply is that the Lord gave this command in reference to
iar terms with them, or to communicate with them without
those nations into whose territory the Jews were about to
necessity.
enter. For the latter were inclined to idolatry, so that it was This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
to be feared lest, through frequent dealings with those na-
Reply to Objection 2. The Church does not exer-
tions, they should be estranged from the faith: hence the
cise judgment against unbelievers in the point of inflicting
text goes on (Dt. 7:4): “For she will turn away thy son
spiritual punishment on them: but she does exercise judg-
from following Me.”
Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful?
IIa IIae q. 10 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that unbelievers may have
On the contrary, Those who are in authority can pro-
authority or dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle
nounce judgment on those over whom they are placed.
says (1 Tim. 6:1): “Whosoever are servants under the
But unbelievers cannot pronounce judgment on the faith-
yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor”:
ful, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:1): “Dare any of you,
and it is clear that he is speaking of unbelievers, since he
having a matter against another, go to be judged before
adds (1 Tim. 6:2): “But they that have believing mas-
the unjust,” i.e. unbelievers, “and not before the saints?”
ters, let them not despise them.” Moreover it is written
Therefore it seems that unbelievers cannot have authority
(1 Pet. 2:18): “Servants be subject to your masters with
over the faithful.
all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the
I answer that, That this question may be considered
froward.” Now this command would not be contained in
in two ways. First, we may speak of dominion or authority
the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could have au-
of unbelievers over the faithful as of a thing to be estab-
thority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbeliev-
lished for the first time. This ought by no means to be
ers can have authority over the faithful.
allowed, since it would provoke scandal and endanger the
Objection 2. Further, all the members of a prince’s
faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their superiors
household are his subjects. Now some of the faithful were
to comply with their commands, unless the subjects are of
members of unbelieving princes’ households, for we read
great virtue: moreover unbelievers hold the faith in con-
in the Epistle to the Philippians (4:22): “All the saints
tempt, if they see the faithful fall away. Hence the Apos-
salute you, especially they that are of Caesar’s house-
tle forbade the faithful to go to law before an unbelieving
hold,” referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever. There-
judge. And so the Church altogether forbids unbelievers
fore unbelievers can have authority over the faithful.
to acquire dominion over believers, or to have authority
Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher
over them in any capacity whatever.
(Polit. i, 2) a slave is his master’s instrument in matters
Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as
concerning everyday life, even as a craftsman’s laborer is
already in force: and here we must observe that dominion
his instrument in matters concerning the working of his
and authority are institutions of human law, while the dis-
art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject to
tinction between faithful and unbelievers arises from the
an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever’s farm.
Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of grace,
Therefore unbelievers may have authority over the faithful
does not do away with human law which is the law of nat-
even as to dominion.
ural reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful
∗ The Leonine Edition gives this solution before the Reply obj. 2
1243
and unbelievers, considered in itself, does not do away paid in order to avoid giving scandal. Thus Paul too, after
with dominion and authority of unbelievers over the faith-
saying that servants should honor their masters, adds, “lest
ful.
the name of the Lord and His doctrine be blasphemed.”
Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
justly done away with by the sentence or ordination of the
Reply to Objection 2. The authority of Caesar pre-
Church who has the authority of God: since unbelievers in
ceded the distinction of faithful from unbelievers. Hence
virtue of their unbelief deserve to forfeit their power over
it was not cancelled by the conversion of some to the faith.
the faithful who are converted into children of God.
Moreover it was a good thing that there should be a few
This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not.
of the faithful in the emperor’s household, that they might
For among those unbelievers who are subject, even in tem-
defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed Sebastian
poral matters, to the Church and her members, the Church
encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture,
made the law that if the slave of a Jew became a Christian,
and, the while, remained hidden under the military cloak
he should forthwith receive his freedom, without paying
in the palace of Diocletian.
any price, if he should be a “vernaculus,” i.e. born in slav-
Reply to Objection 3. Slaves are subject to their
ery; and likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been
masters for their whole lifetime, and are subject to their
bought for his service: if, however, he had been bought
overseers in everything: whereas the craftsman’s laborer
for sale, then he should be offered for sale within three
is subject to him for certain special works.
Hence it
months. Nor does the Church harm them in this, because
would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have domin-
since those Jews themselves are subject to the Church, she
ion or authority over the faithful, than that they should
can dispose of their possessions, even as secular princes
be allowed to employ them in some craft. Wherefore the
have enacted many laws to be observed by their subjects,
Church permits Christians to work on the land of Jews, be-
in favor of liberty. On the other hand, the Church has
cause this does not entail their living together with them.
not applied the above law to those unbelievers who are
Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre to send master
not subject to her or her members, in temporal matters,
workmen to hew the trees, as related in 3 Kings 5:6. Yet,
although she has the right to do so: and this, in order to
if there be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted
avoid scandal, for as Our Lord showed (Mat. 17:25,26)
by such communications and dealings, they should be ab-
that He could be excused from paying the tribute, because
solutely forbidden.
“the children are free,” yet He ordered the tribute to be
Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated?
IIa IIae q. 10 a. 11
Objection 1. It would seem that rites of unbelievers
On the contrary, Gregory∗ says, speaking of the
ought not to be tolerated. For it is evident that unbeliev-
Jews: “They should be allowed to observe all their feasts,
ers sin in observing their rites: and not to prevent a sin,
just as hitherto they and their fathers have for ages ob-
when one can, seems to imply consent therein, as a gloss
served them.”
observes on Rom. 1:32: “Not only they that do them, but
I answer that, Human government is derived from the
they also that consent to them that do them.” Therefore it
Divine government, and should imitate it. Now although
is a sin to tolerate their rites.
God is all-powerful and supremely good, nevertheless He
Objection 2. Further, the rites of the Jews are com-
allows certain evils to take place in the universe, which
pared to idolatry, because a gloss on Gal. 5:1, “Be not held
He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods might
again under the yoke of bondage,” says: “The bondage of
be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human
that law was not lighter than that of idolatry.” But it would
government also, those who are in authority, rightly tol-
not be allowable for anyone to observe the rites of idolatry,
erate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain
in fact Christian princes at first caused the temples of idols
greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says (De Or-
to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as Augus-
dine ii, 4): “If you do away with harlots, the world will
tine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows
be convulsed with lust.” Hence, though unbelievers sin
that even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated.
in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on account of
Objection 3. Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins,
some good that ensues therefrom, or because of some evil
as stated above (a. 3 ). Now other sins such as adultery,
avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their
theft and the like, are not tolerated, but are punishable by
rites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith
law. Therefore neither ought the rites of unbelievers to be
which we hold, there follows this good—that our very en-
tolerated.
emies bear witness to our faith, and that our faith is rep-
∗ Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret., dist. xlv, can., Qui sincera 1244
resented in a figure, so to speak. For this reason they are drance to the salvation of those who if they were unmo-tolerated in the observance of their rites.
lested might gradually be converted to the faith. For this
On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which
reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of
are neither truthful nor profitable are by no means to be
heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numer-
tolerated, except perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g.
ous.
the scandal or disturbance that might ensue, or some hin-
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Whether the children of Jews and other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their IIa IIae q. 10 a. 12
parents’ will?
Objection 1. It would seem that the children of Jews
the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue through not
and of other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their
preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach,
parents’ will. For the bond of marriage is stronger than the
according to the words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man
right of parental authority over children, since the right of
who “sees the sword coming and sounds not the trumpet.”
parental authority can be made to cease, when a son is
Much more therefore, if Jewish children are lost through
set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot be sev-
not being baptized are they accounted guilty of sin, who
ered by man, according to Mat. 19:6: “What. . . God hath
could have baptized them and did not.
joined together let no man put asunder.” And yet the mar-
On the contrary, Injustice should be done to no man.
riage bond is broken on account of unbelief: for the Apos-
Now it would be an injustice to Jews if their children were
tle says (1 Cor. 7:15): “If the unbeliever depart, let him
to be baptized against their will, since they would lose the
depart. For a brother or sister is not under servitude in
rights of parental authority over their children as soon as
such cases”: and a canon∗ says that “if the unbelieving
these were Christians. Therefore these should not be bap-
partner is unwilling to abide with the other, without in-
tized against their parents’ will.
sult to their Creator, then the other partner is not bound to
I answer that, The custom of the Church has very
cohabitation.” Much more, therefore, does unbelief abro-
great authority and ought to be jealously observed in all
gate the right of unbelieving parents’ authority over their
things, since the very doctrine of catholic doctors derives
children: and consequently their children may be baptized
its authority from the Church. Hence we ought to abide by
against their parents’ will.
the authority of the Church rather than by that of an Au-
Objection 2. Further, one is more bound to succor a
gustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was
man who is in danger of everlasting death, than one who
never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of
is in danger of temporal death. Now it would be a sin, if
the Jews against the will of their parents, although at times
one saw a man in danger of temporal death and failed to
past there have been many very powerful catholic princes
go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews and other
like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom most holy
unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they
bishops have been on most friendly terms, as Sylvester
be left to their parents who would imbue them with their
with Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius, who
unbelief, it seems that they ought to be taken away from
would certainly not have failed to obtain this favor from
them and baptized, and instructed in the faith.
them if it had been at all reasonable. It seems there-
Objection 3. Further, the children of a bondsman are
fore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the children
themselves bondsmen, and under the power of his mas-
of Jews should be baptized against their parents’ wishes,
ter. Now the Jews are bondsmen of kings and princes:
in contradiction to the Church’s custom observed hitherto.
therefore their children are also. Consequently kings and
There are two reasons for this custom. One is on
princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish
account of the danger to the faith.
For children bap-
children. Therefore no injustice is committed if they bap-
tized before coming to the use of reason, afterwards when
tize them against their parents’ wishes.
they come to perfect age, might easily be persuaded by
Objection 4. Further, every man belongs more to
their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly em-
God, from Whom he has his soul, than to his carnal fa-
braced; and this would be detrimental to the faith.
ther, from whom he has his body. Therefore it is not un-
The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For
just if Jewish children be taken away from their parents,
a child is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not and consecrated to God in Baptism.
distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is en-
Objection 5. Further, Baptism avails for salvation
folded within its mother’s womb; and later on after birth,
more than preaching does, since Baptism removes forth-
and before it has the use of its free-will, it is enfolded
with the stain of sin and the debt of punishment, and opens
in the care of its parents, which is like a spiritual womb,
∗ Can. Uxor legitima, and Idololatria, qu. i
1245
for so long as man has not the use of reason, he differs come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted.
not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a
Reply to Objection 2. No one should be snatched
horse belongs to someone who, according to the civil law,
from natural death against the order of civil law: for in-
can use them when he likes, as his own instrument, so,
stance, if a man were condemned by the judge to temporal
according to the natural law, a son, before coming to the
death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence: hence no
use of reason, is under his father’s care. Hence it would
one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby
be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before coming to
a child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it
the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents’
from the danger of everlasting death.
custody, or anything done to it against its parents’ wish.
Reply to Objection 3. Jews are bondsmen of princes
As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its free-
by civil bondage, which does not exclude the order of nat-
will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to look after
ural or Divine law.
itself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law,
Reply to Objection 4. Man is directed to God by his
and then it should be induced, not by compulsion but by
reason, whereby he can know Him. Hence a child before
persuasion, to embrace the faith: it can then consent to the
coming to the use of reason, in the natural order of things,
faith, and be baptized, even against its parents’ wish; but
is directed to God by its parents’ reason, under whose care
not before it comes to the use of reason. Hence it is said
it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of the child
of the children of the fathers of old that they were saved in
in all matters relating to God.
the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to under-
Reply to Objection 5. The peril that ensues from the
stand that it is the parents’ duty to look after the salvation
omission of preaching, threatens only those who are en-
of their children, especially before they come to the use of
trusted with the duty of preaching. Hence it had already
reason.
been said (Ezech. 3:17): “I have made thee a watchman to
Reply to Objection 1. In the marriage bond, both hus-
the children [Vulg.: ‘house’] of Israel.” On the other hand,
band and wife have the use of the free-will, and each can
to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of
assent to the faith without the other’s consent. But this
unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they
does not apply to a child before it comes to the use of
whom the danger threatens, if through being deprived of
reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child has
the sacraments their children fail to obtain salvation.
1246
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 11
Of Heresy
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief?
(2) Of the matter about which it is;
(3) Whether heretics should be tolerated?
(4) Whether converts should be received?
Whether heresy is a species of unbelief?
IIa IIae q. 11 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that heresy is not a species
truth, has the character of last end, while those which are
of unbelief. For unbelief is in the understanding, as stated
secondary truths, have the character of being directed to
above (q. 10, a. 2). Now heresy would seem not to pertain
the end.
to the understanding, but rather to the appetitive power;
Now, whoever believes, assents to someone’s words;
for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19:∗ “The works of the flesh
so that, in every form of unbelief, the person to whose
are manifest: Heresy is derived from a Greek word mean-
words assent is given seems to hold the chief place and to
ing choice, whereby a man makes choice of that school
be the end as it were; while the things by holding which
which he deems best.” But choice is an act of the appeti-
one assents to that person hold a secondary place. Con-
tive power, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 1). Therefore
sequently he that holds the Christian faith aright, assents,
heresy is not a species of unbelief.
by his will, to Christ, in those things which truly belong
Objection 2. Further, vice takes its species chiefly
to His doctrine.
from its end; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that
Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may
“he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief
deviate from the rectitude of the Christian faith. First,
rather than an adulterer.” Now the end of heresy is tempo-
because he is unwilling to assent to Christ: and such a
ral profit, especially lordship and glory, which belong to
man has an evil will, so to say, in respect of the very end.
the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De
This belongs to the species of unbelief in pagans and Jews.
Util. Credendi i) that “a heretic is one who either devises
Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to Christ,
or follows false and new opinions, for the sake of some
yet he fails in his choice of those things wherein he as-
temporal profit, especially that he may lord and be hon-
sents to Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really
ored above others.” Therefore heresy is a species of pride
taught, but the suggestions of his own mind.
rather than of unbelief.
Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to
Objection 3. Further, since unbelief is in the under-
those who profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dog-
standing, it would seem not to pertain to the flesh. Now
mas.
heresy belongs to the works of the flesh, for the Apostle
Reply to Objection 1. Choice regards unbelief in the
says (Gal. 5:19): “The works of the flesh are manifest,
same way as the will regards faith, as stated above.
which are fornication, uncleanness,” and among the oth-
Reply to Objection 2. Vices take their species from
ers, he adds, “dissensions, sects,” which are the same as
their proximate end, while, from their remote end, they
heresies. Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.
take their genus and cause. Thus in the case of adultery
On the contrary, Falsehood is contrary to truth. Now
committed for the sake of theft, there is the species of
a heretic is one who devises or follows false or new opin-
adultery taken from its proper end and object; but the ul-
ions. Therefore heresy is opposed to the truth, on which
timate end shows that the act of adultery is both the result
faith is founded; and consequently it is a species of unbe-
of the theft, and is included under it, as an effect under
lief.
its cause, or a species under its genus, as appears from
I answer that, The word heresy as stated in the first
what we have said about acts in general ( Ia IIae, q. 18,
objection denotes a choosing. Now choice as stated above
a. 7). Wherefore, as to the case in point also, the proxi-
( Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 3) is about things directed to the end,
mate end of heresy is adherence to one’s own false opin-
the end being presupposed. Now, in matters of faith, the
ion, and from this it derives its species, while its remote
will assents to some truth, as to its proper good, as was
end reveals its cause, viz. that it arises from pride or cov-
shown above (q. 4, a. 3): wherefore that which is the chief
etousness.
∗ Cf. Decretals xxiv, qu. iii, cap. 27
1247
Reply to Objection 3. Just as heresy is so called from sire of an undue end in which way it arises from pride or
its being a choosing†, so does sect derive its name from
covetousness, as stated in the second objection, or some
its being a cutting off [secando], as Isidore states (Etym.
illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to error, as
viii, 3). Wherefore heresy and sect are the same thing, and
the Philosopher states in Metaph. iv; Ed. Did. iii, 5), for
each belongs to the works of the flesh, not indeed by rea-
this faculty has a certain connection with the flesh, in as
son of the act itself of unbelief in respect of its proximate
much as its act is independent on a bodily organ.
object, but by reason of its cause, which is either the de-
Whether heresy is properly about matters of faith?
IIa IIae q. 11 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that heresy is not properly
a. 5), in one way, directly and principally, e.g. the articles
about matters of faith. For just as there are heresies and
of faith; in another way, indirectly and secondarily, e.g.
sects among Christians, so were there among the Jews,
those matters, the denial of which leads to the corruption
and Pharisees, as Isidore observes (Etym. viii, 3,4,5).
of some article of faith; and there may be heresy in either
Now their dissensions were not about matters of faith.
way, even as there can be faith.
Therefore heresy is not about matters of faith, as though
Reply to Objection 1. Just as the heresies of the Jews
they were its proper matter.
and Pharisees were about opinions relating to Judaism or
Objection 2. Further, the matter of faith is the thing
Pharisaism, so also heresies among Christians are about
believed. Now heresy is not only about things, but also
matter touching the Christian faith.
about works, and about interpretations of Holy Writ. For
Reply to Objection 2. A man is said to expound
Jerome says on Gal. 5:20 that “whoever expounds the
Holy Writ in another sense than that required by the Holy
Scriptures in any sense but that of the Holy Ghost by
Ghost, when he so distorts the meaning of Holy Writ, that
Whom they were written, may be called a heretic, though
it is contrary to what the Holy Ghost has revealed. Hence
he may not have left the Church”: and elsewhere he
it is written (Ezech. 13:6) about the false prophets: “They
says that “heresies spring up from words spoken amiss.”∗
have persisted to confirm what they have said,” viz. by
Therefore heresy is not properly about the matter of faith.
false interpretations of Scripture. Moreover a man pro-
Objection 3. Further, we find the holy doctors differ-
fesses his faith by the words that he utters, since confes-
ing even about matters pertaining to the faith, for example
sion is an act of faith, as stated above (q. 3, a. 1 ). Where-
Augustine and Jerome, on the question about the cessa-
fore inordinate words about matters of faith may lead to
tion of the legal observances: and yet this was without
corruption of the faith; and hence it is that Pope Leo says
any heresy on their part. Therefore heresy is not properly
in a letter to Proterius, Bishop of Alexandria: “The ene-
about the matter of faith.
mies of Christ’s cross lie in wait for our every deed and
On the contrary,
Augustine says against the
word, so that, if we but give them the slightest pretext,
Manichees†: “In Christ’s Church, those are heretics, who
they may accuse us mendaciously of agreeing with Nesto-
hold mischievous and erroneous opinions, and when re-
rius.”
buked that they may think soundly and rightly, offer a
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Ep. xliii)
stubborn resistance, and, refusing to mend their perni-
and we find it stated in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can.
cious and deadly doctrines, persist in defending them.”
Dixit Apostolus): “By no means should we accuse of
Now pernicious and deadly doctrines are none but those
heresy those who, however false and perverse their opin-
which are contrary to the dogmas of faith, whereby “the
ion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek
just man liveth” (Rom. 1:17). Therefore heresy is about
the truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their opinion,
matters of faith, as about its proper matter.
when they have found the truth,” because, to wit, they do
I answer that, We are speaking of heresy now as de-
not make a choice in contradiction to the doctrine of the
noting a corruption of the Christian faith. Now it does not
Church. Accordingly, certain doctors seem to have dif-
imply a corruption of the Christian faith, if a man has a
fered either in matters the holding of which in this or that
false opinion in matters that are not of faith, for instance,
way is of no consequence, so far as faith is concerned, or
in questions of geometry and so forth, which cannot be-
even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined by
long to the faith by any means; but only when a person
the Church; although if anyone were obstinately to deny
has a false opinion about things belonging to the faith.
them after they had been defined by the authority of the
Now a thing may be of the faith in two ways, as stated
universal Church, he would be deemed a heretic. This au-
above ( Ia, q. 32, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1; Ia IIae, q. 2, thority resides chiefly in the Sovereign Pontiff. For we
† From the Greek airein [hairein], to cut off ∗ St. Thomas quotes this saying elsewhere, in Sent. iv, D, 13, and IIIa, q. 16, a. 8, but it is not to be found in St. Jerome’s works.
† Cf. De Civ. Dei xviii, 51
1248
read‡: “Whenever a question of faith is in dispute, I think, the Catholic Church. If anything therein has been incor-that all our brethren and fellow bishops ought to refer the
rectly or carelessly expressed, we beg that it may be set
matter to none other than Peter, as being the source of their
aright by you who hold the faith and see of Peter. If how-
name and honor, against whose authority neither Jerome
ever this, our profession, be approved by the judgment of
nor Augustine nor any of the holy doctors defended their
your apostleship, whoever may blame me, will prove that
opinion.” Hence Jerome says (Exposit. Symbol§): “This,
he himself is ignorant, or malicious, or even not a catholic
most blessed Pope, is the faith that we have been taught in
but a heretic.”
Whether heretics ought to be tolerated?
IIa IIae q. 11 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that heretics ought to be toler-
fore she condemns not at once, but “after the first and
ated. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:24,25): “The servant
second admonition,” as the Apostle directs: after that, if
of the Lord must not wrangle. . . with modesty admonish-
he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for his
ing them that resist the truth, if peradventure God may
conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excom-
give them repentance to know the truth, and they may re-
municating him and separating him from the Church, and
cover themselves from the snares of the devil.” Now if
furthermore delivers him to the secular tribunal to be ex-
heretics are not tolerated but put to death, they lose the
terminated thereby from the world by death. For Jerome
opportunity of repentance. Therefore it seems contrary to
commenting on Gal. 5:9, “A little leaven,” says: “Cut off
the Apostle’s command.
the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold,
Objection 2. Further, whatever is necessary in the
lest the whole house, the whole paste, the whole body,
Church should be tolerated. Now heresies are necessary in
the whole flock, burn, perish, rot, die. Arius was but one
the Church, since the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:19): “There
spark in Alexandria, but as that spark was not at once put
must be. . . heresies, that they. . . who are reproved, may be
out, the whole earth was laid waste by its flame.”
manifest among you.” Therefore it seems that heretics
Reply to Objection 1. This very modesty demands
should be tolerated.
that the heretic should be admonished a first and second
Objection 3. Further, the Master commanded his ser-
time: and if he be unwilling to retract, he must be reck-
vants (Mat. 13:30) to suffer the cockle “to grow until the
oned as already “subverted,” as we may gather from the
harvest,” i.e. the end of the world, as a gloss explains it.
words of the Apostle quoted above.
Now holy men explain that the cockle denotes heretics.
Reply to Objection 2. The profit that ensues from
Therefore heretics should be tolerated.
heresy is beside the intention of heretics, for it consists
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:10,11):
in the constancy of the faithful being put to the test, and
“A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admo-
“makes us shake off our sluggishness, and search the
nition, avoid: knowing that he, that is such an one, is sub-
Scriptures more carefully,” as Augustine states (De Gen.
verted.”
cont. Manich. i, 1). What they really intend is the cor-
I answer that, With regard to heretics two points must
ruption of the faith, which is to inflict very great harm
be observed: one, on their own side; the other, on the side
indeed. Consequently we should consider what they di-
of the Church. On their own side there is the sin, whereby
rectly intend, and expel them, rather than what is beside
they deserve not only to be separated from the Church by
their intention, and so, tolerate them.
excommunication, but also to be severed from the world
Reply to Objection 3. According to Decret. (xxiv,
by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the
qu. iii, can. Notandum), “to be excommunicated is not to
faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which
be uprooted.” A man is excommunicated, as the Apostle
supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and
says (1 Cor. 5:5) that his “spirit may be saved in the day of
other evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the
Our Lord.” Yet if heretics be altogether uprooted by death,
secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics,
this is not contrary to Our Lord’s command, which is to
as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only
be understood as referring to the case when the cockle
excommunicated but even put to death.
cannot be plucked up without plucking up the wheat, as
On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy
we explained above (q. 10, a. 8, ad 1), when treating of
which looks to the conversion of the wanderer, where-
unbelievers in general.
‡ Decret. xxiv, qu. 1, can. Quoties
§ Among the supposititious works of St. Jerome
1249
Whether the Church should receive those who return from heresy?
IIa IIae q. 11 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the Church ought in
nal salvation in many, we are not bound out of charity to
all cases to receive those who return from heresy. For it
wish such a good to that person, rather should we desire
is written (Jer. 3:1) in the person of the Lord: “Thou hast
him to be without it, both because eternal salvation takes
prostituted thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to
precedence of temporal good, and because the good of the
Me saith the Lord.” Now the sentence of the Church is
many is to be preferred to the good of one. Now if heretics
God’s sentence, according to Dt. 1:17: “You shall hear
were always received on their return, in order to save their
the little as well as the great: neither shall you respect any
lives and other temporal goods, this might be prejudicial
man’s person, because it is the judgment of God.” There-
to the salvation of others, both because they would infect
fore even those who are guilty of the prostitution of unbe-
others if they relapsed again, and because, if they escaped
lief which is spiritual prostitution, should be received all
without punishment, others would feel more assured in
the same.
lapsing into heresy. For it is written (Eccles. 8:11): “For
Objection 2. Further, Our Lord commanded Peter
because sentence is not speedily pronounced against the
(Mat. 18:22) to forgive his offending brother “not” only
evil, the children of men commit evils without any fear.”
“till seven times, but till seventy times seven times,” which
For this reason the Church not only admits to Penance
Jerome expounds as meaning that “a man should be for-
those who return from heresy for the first time, but also
given, as often as he has sinned.” Therefore he ought to
safeguards their lives, and sometimes by dispensation, re-
be received by the Church as often as he has sinned by
stores them to the ecclesiastical dignities which they may
falling back into heresy.
have had before, should their conversion appear to be sin-
Objection 3. Further, heresy is a kind of unbelief.
cere: we read of this as having frequently been done for
Now other unbelievers who wish to be converted are re-
the good of peace. But when they fall again, after having
ceived by the Church. Therefore heretics also should be
been received, this seems to prove them to be inconstant
received.
in faith, wherefore when they return again, they are ad-
On the contrary, The Decretal Ad abolendam (De
mitted to Penance, but are not delivered from the pain of
Haereticis, cap. ix) says that “those who are found to
death.
have relapsed into the error which they had already ab-
Reply to Objection 1. In God’s tribunal, those who
jured, must be left to the secular tribunal.” Therefore they
return are always received, because God is a searcher of
should not be received by the Church.
hearts, and knows those who return in sincerity. But the
I answer that, In obedience to Our Lord’s institution,
Church cannot imitate God in this, for she presumes that
the Church extends her charity to all, not only to friends,
those who relapse after being once received, are not sin-
but also to foes who persecute her, according to Mat. 5:44:
cere in their return; hence she does not debar them from
“Love your enemies; do good to them that hate you.” Now
the way of salvation, but neither does she protect them
it is part of charity that we should both wish and work our
from the sentence of death.
neighbor’s good. Again, good is twofold: one is spiri-
Reply to Objection 2. Our Lord was speaking to Pe-
tual, namely the health of the soul, which good is chiefly
ter of sins committed against oneself, for one should al-
the object of charity, since it is this chiefly that we should
ways forgive such offenses and spare our brother when he
wish for one another. Consequently, from this point of
repents. These words are not to be applied to sins commit-
view, heretics who return after falling no matter how of-
ted against one’s neighbor or against God, for it is not left
ten, are admitted by the Church to Penance whereby the
to our discretion to forgive such offenses, as Jerome says
way of salvation is opened to them.
on Mat. 18:15, “If thy brother shall offend against thee.”
The other good is that which charity considers sec-
Yet even in this matter the law prescribes limits according
ondarily, viz. temporal good, such as life of the body,
as God’s honor or our neighbor’s good demands.
worldly possessions, good repute, ecclesiastical or secu-
Reply to Objection 3. When other unbelievers, who
lar dignity, for we are not bound by charity to wish oth-
have never received the faith are converted, they do not as
ers this good, except in relation to the eternal salvation
yet show signs of inconstancy in faith, as relapsed heretics
of them and of others. Hence if the presence of one of
do; hence the comparison fails.
these goods in one individual might be an obstacle to eter-
1250
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 12
Of Apostasy
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider apostasy: about which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?
(2) Whether, on account of apostasy from the faith, subjects are absolved from allegiance to an apostate prince?
Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?
IIa IIae q. 12 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that apostasy does not
by profession, or from the Holy Order which he had re-
pertain to unbelief. For that which is the origin of all sins,
ceived: and this is called “apostasy from religious life”
does not, seemingly, pertain to unbelief, since many sins
or “Orders.” A man may also apostatize from God, by
there are without unbelief. Now apostasy seems to be the
rebelling in his mind against the Divine commandments:
origin of every sin, for it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): “The
and though man may apostatize in both the above ways,
beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: ‘to fall
he may still remain united to God by faith.
off’] from God,” and further on, (Ecclus. 10:15): “Pride
But if he give up the faith, then he seems to turn away
is the beginning of all sin.” Therefore apostasy does not
from God altogether: and consequently, apostasy simply
pertain to unbelief.
and absolutely is that whereby a man withdraws from the
Objection 2. Further, unbelief is an act of the un-
faith, and is called “apostasy of perfidy.” In this way apos-
derstanding: whereas apostasy seems rather to consist in
tasy, simply so called, pertains to unbelief.
some outward deed or utterance, or even in some inward
Reply to Objection 1. This objection refers to the
act of the will, for it is written (Prov. 6:12-14): “A man
second kind of apostasy, which denotes an act of the will
that is an apostate, an unprofitable man walketh with a
in rebellion against God’s commandments, an act that is
perverse mouth. He winketh with the eyes, presseth with
to be found in every mortal sin.
the foot, speaketh with the finger. With a wicked heart he
Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to faith not only that
deviseth evil, and at all times he soweth discord.” More-
the heart should believe, but also that external words and
over if anyone were to have himself circumcised, or to
deeds should bear witness to the inward faith, for confes-
worship at the tomb of Mahomet, he would be deemed an
sion is an act of faith. In this way too, certain external
apostate. Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
words or deeds pertain to unbelief, in so far as they are
Objection 3. Further, heresy, since it pertains to unbe-
signs of unbelief, even as a sign of health is said itself to
lief, is a determinate species of unbelief. If then, apostasy
be healthy. Now although the authority quoted may be
pertained to unbelief, it would follow that it is a deter-
understood as referring to every kind of apostate, yet it
minate species of unbelief, which does not seem to agree
applies most truly to an apostate from the faith. For since
with what has been said (q. 10, a. 5). Therefore apostasy
faith is the first foundation of things to be hoped for, and
does not pertain to unbelief.
since, without faith it is “impossible to please God”; when
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:67): “Many of his
once faith is removed, man retains nothing that may be
disciples went back,” i.e. apostatized, of whom Our Lord
useful for the obtaining of eternal salvation, for which rea-
had said previously (Jn. 6:65): “There are some of you
son it is written (Prov. 6:12): “A man that is an apostate,
that believe not.” Therefore apostasy pertains to unbelief.
an unprofitable man”: because faith is the life of the soul,
I answer that, Apostasy denotes a backsliding from
according to Rom. 1:17: “The just man liveth by faith.”
God. This may happen in various ways according to the
Therefore, just as when the life of the body is taken away,
different kinds of union between man and God. For, in
man’s every member and part loses its due disposition, so
the first place, man is united to God by faith; secondly, by
when the life of justice, which is by faith, is done away,
having his will duly submissive in obeying His command-
disorder appears in all his members. First, in his mouth,
ments; thirdly, by certain special things pertaining to su-
whereby chiefly his mind stands revealed; secondly, in his
pererogation such as the religious life, the clerical state, or eyes; thirdly, in the instrument of movement; fourthly, in
Holy Orders. Now if that which follows be removed, that
his will, which tends to evil. The result is that “he sows
which precedes, remains, but the converse does not hold.
discord,” endeavoring to sever others from the faith even
Accordingly a man may apostatize from God, by with-
as he severed himself.
drawing from the religious life to which he was bound
Reply to Objection 3. The species of a quality or
1251
form are not diversified by the fact of its being the term apostasy does not imply a special kind of unbelief, but
“wherefrom” or “whereto” of movement: on the contrary,
an aggravating circumstance thereof, according to 2 Pet.
it is the movement that takes its species from the terms.
2:21: “It had been better for them not to know the truth
Now apostasy regards unbelief as the term “whereto” of
[Vulg.: ‘the way of justice’], than after they had known it,
the movement of withdrawal from the faith; wherefore
to turn back.”
Whether a prince forfeits his dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from IIa IIae q. 12 a. 2
the faith, so that they no longer owe him allegiance?
Objection 1. It would seem that a prince does not
ion is a device of the law of nations which is a human law:
so forfeit his dominion over his subjects, on account of
whereas the distinction between believers and unbelievers
apostasy from the faith, that they no longer owe him al-
is of Divine right, which does not annul human right. Nev-
legiance. For Ambrose∗ says that the Emperor Julian,
ertheless a man who sins by unbelief may be sentenced to
though an apostate, nevertheless had under him Christian
the loss of his right of dominion, as also, sometimes, on
soldiers, who when he said to them, “Fall into line for the
account of other sins.
defense of the republic,” were bound to obey. Therefore
Now it is not within the competency of the Church
subjects are not absolved from their allegiance to their
to punish unbelief in those who have never received the
prince on account of his apostasy.
faith, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 5:12):
Objection 2. Further, an apostate from the faith is
“What have I to do to judge them that are without?” She
an unbeliever. Now we find that certain holy men served
can, however, pass sentence of punishment on the unbe-
unbelieving masters; thus Joseph served Pharaoh, Daniel
lief of those who have received the faith: and it is fit-
served Nabuchodonosor, and Mardochai served Assuerus.
ting that they should be punished by being deprived of
Therefore apostasy from the faith does not release sub-
the allegiance of their subjects: for this same allegiance
jects from allegiance to their sovereign.
might conduce to great corruption of the faith, since, as
Objection 3. Further, just as by apostasy from the
was stated above (a. 1, obj. 2), “a man that is an apos-
faith, a man turns away from God, so does every sin. Con-
tate. . . with a wicked heart deviseth evil, and. . . soweth
sequently if, on account of apostasy from the faith, princes
discord,” in order to sever others from the faith. Con-
were to lose their right to command those of their subjects
sequently, as soon as sentence of excommunication is
who are believers, they would equally lose it on account of
passed on a man on account of apostasy from the faith,
other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we
his subjects are “ipso facto” absolved from his authority
ought not to refuse allegiance to a sovereign on account
and from the oath of allegiance whereby they were bound
of his apostatizing from the faith.
to him.
On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Council, Roman
Reply to Objection 1. At that time the Church was
V): “Holding to the institutions of our holy predecessors,
but recently instituted, and had not, as yet, the power of
we, by our apostolic authority, absolve from their oath
curbing earthly princes; and so she allowed the faithful
those who through loyalty or through the sacred bond of
to obey Julian the apostate, in matters that were not con-
an oath owe allegiance to excommunicated persons: and
trary to the faith, in order to avoid incurring a yet greater
we absolutely forbid them to continue their allegiance
danger.
to such persons, until these shall have made amends.”
Reply to Objection 2. As stated in the article, it is not Now apostates from the faith, like heretics, are excom-a question of those unbelievers who have never received
municated, according to the Decretal†. Therefore princes
the faith.
should not be obeyed when they have apostatized from the
Reply to Objection 3. Apostasy from the faith severs
faith.
man from God altogether, as stated above (a. 1), which is
I answer that, As stated above (q. 10, a. 10), unbelief, not the case in any other sin.
in itself, is not inconsistent with dominion, since domin-
∗ St. Augustine, Super Ps. 124:3
† Extra, De Haereticis, cap. Ad abolendam
1252
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 13
Of the Sin of Blasphemy, in General
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the sin of blasphemy, which is opposed to the confession of faith; and (1) blasphemy in general, (2) that blasphemy which is called the sin against the Holy Ghost.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?
(2) Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?
(3) Whether blasphemy is the most grievous sin?
(4) Whether blasphemy is in the damned?
Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?
IIa IIae q. 13 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that blasphemy is not op-
Now this may happen in two ways. In the first way it
posed to the confession of faith. Because to blaspheme
may happen merely in respect of the opinion in the intel-
is to utter an affront or insult against the Creator. Now
lect; in the second way this opinion is united to a certain
this pertains to ill-will against God rather than to unbelief.
detestation in the affections, even as, on the other hand,
Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to the confession of
faith in God is perfected by love of Him. Accordingly this
faith.
disparagement of the Divine goodness is either in the in-
Objection 2.
Further, on Eph.
4:31, “Let blas-
tellect alone, or in the affections also. If it is in thought
phemy. . . be put away from you,” a gloss says, “that which
only, it is blasphemy of the heart, whereas if it betrays
is committed against God or the saints.” But confession of
itself outwardly in speech it is blasphemy is opposed to
faith, seemingly, is not about other things than those per-
confession of faith.
taining to God, Who is the object of faith. Therefore blas-
Reply to Objection 1. He that speaks against God,
phemy is not always opposed to the confession of faith.
with the intention of reviling Him, disparages the Divine
Objection 3. Further, according to some, there are
goodness, not only in respect of the falsehood in his in-
three kinds of blasphemy.
The first of these is when
tellect, but also by reason of the wickedness of his will,
something unfitting is affirmed of God; the second is
whereby he detests and strives to hinder the honor due to
when something fitting is denied of Him; and the third,
God, and this is perfect blasphemy.
when something proper to God is ascribed to a creature,
Reply to Objection 2. Even as God is praised in His
so that, seemingly, blasphemy is not only about God,
saints, in so far as praise is given to the works which God
but also about His creatures. Now the object of faith is
does in His saints, so does blasphemy against the saints,
God. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to confession
redound, as a consequence, against God.
of faith.
Reply to Objection 3. Properly speaking, the sin of
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12,13):
blasphemy is not in this way divided into three species:
“I. . . before was a blasphemer and a persecutor,” and af-
since to affirm unfitting things, or to deny fitting things
terwards, “I did it ignorantly in” my “unbelief.” Hence it
of God, differ merely as affirmation and negation. For
seems that blasphemy pertains to unbelief.
this diversity does not cause distinct species of habits,
I answer that, The word blasphemy seems to denote
since the falsehood of affirmations and negations is made
the disparagement of some surpassing goodness, espe-
known by the same knowledge, and it is the same igno-
cially that of God. Now God, as Dionysius says (Div.
rance which errs in either way, since negatives are proved
Nom. i), is the very essence of true goodness. Hence
by affirmatives, according to Poster. i, 25. Again to as-
whatever befits God, pertains to His goodness, and what-
cribe to creatures things that are proper to God, seems
ever does not befit Him, is far removed from the perfection
to amount to the same as affirming something unfitting of
of goodness which is His Essence. Consequently whoever
Him, since whatever is proper to God is God Himself: and
either denies anything befitting God, or affirms anything
to ascribe to a creature, that which is proper to God, is to
unbefitting Him, disparages the Divine goodness.
assert that God is the same as a creature.
1253
Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 13 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that blasphemy is not al-
is a mortal sin, by reason of its genus.
ways a mortal sin. Because a gloss on the words, “Now
Reply to Objection 1. This gloss is not to be under-
lay you also all away,” etc. (Col. 3:8) says: “After pro-
stood as meaning that all the sins which follow, are mortal,
hibiting greater crimes he forbids lesser sins”: and yet
but that whereas all those mentioned previously are more
among the latter he includes blasphemy. Therefore blas-
grievous sins, some of those mentioned afterwards are less
phemy is comprised among the lesser, i.e. venial, sins.
grievous; and yet among the latter some more grievous
Objection 2. Further, every mortal sin is opposed to
sins are included.
one of the precepts of the decalogue. But, seemingly, blas-
Reply to Objection 2. Since, as stated above (a. 1),
phemy is not contrary to any of them. Therefore blas-
blasphemy is contrary to the confession of faith, its prohi-
phemy is not a mortal sin.
bition is comprised under the prohibition of unbelief, ex-
Objection 3. Further, sins committed without deliber-
pressed by the words: “I am the Lord thy God,” etc. (Ex.
ation, are not mortal: hence first movements are not mor-
20:1). Or else, it is forbidden by the words: “Thou shalt
tal sins, because they precede the deliberation of the rea-
not take the name of. . . God in vain” (Ex. 20:7). Because
son, as was shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 74, Aa. 3,10). Now
he who asserts something false about God, takes His name
blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation of the
in vain even more than he who uses the name of God in
reason. Therefore it is not always a mortal sin.
confirmation of a falsehood.
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 24:16): “He that
Reply to Objection 3. There are two ways in which
blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die.”
blasphemy may occur unawares and without deliberation.
Now the death punishment is not inflicted except for a
In the first way, by a man failing to advert to the blasphe-
mortal sin. Therefore blasphemy is a mortal sin.
mous nature of his words, and this may happen through
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 72, a. 5), a his being moved suddenly by passion so as to break out
mortal sin is one whereby a man is severed from the first
into words suggested by his imagination, without heeding
principle of spiritual life, which principle is the charity of
to the meaning of those words: this is a venial sin, and is
God. Therefore whatever things are contrary to charity,
not a blasphemy properly so called. In the second way, by
are mortal sins in respect of their genus. Now blasphemy,
adverting to the meaning of his words, and to their blas-
as to its genus, is opposed to Divine charity, because, as
phemous nature: in which case he is not excused from
stated above (a. 1), it disparages the Divine goodness,
mortal sin, even as neither is he who, in a sudden move-
which is the object of charity. Consequently blasphemy
ment of anger, kills one who is sitting beside him.
Whether the sin of blasphemy is the greatest sin?
IIa IIae q. 13 a. 3
Objection 1.
It would seem that the sin of blas-
opposed to the confession of faith, so that it contains the
phemy is not the greatest sin. For, according to Augustine
gravity of unbelief: while the sin is aggravated if the will’s
(Enchiridion xii), a thing is said to be evil because it does
detestation is added thereto, and yet more, if it breaks out
harm. Now the sin of murder, since it destroys a man’s
into words, even as love and confession add to the praise
life, does more harm than the sin of blasphemy, which
of faith.
can do no harm to God. Therefore the sin of murder is
Therefore, since, as stated above (q. 10, a. 3), unbelief
more grievous than that of blasphemy.
is the greatest of sins in respect of its genus, it follows that Objection 2. Further, a perjurer calls upon God to
blasphemy also is a very great sin, through belonging to
witness to a falsehood, and thus seems to assert that God
the same genus as unbelief and being an aggravated form
is false. But not every blasphemer goes so far as to say
of that sin.
that God is false. Therefore perjury is a more grievous sin
Reply to Objection 1. If we compare murder and
than blasphemy.
blasphemy as regards the objects of those sins, it is clear
Objection 3. Further, on Ps. 74:6, “Lift not up your
that blasphemy, which is a sin committed directly against
horn on high,” a gloss says: “To excuse oneself for sin
God, is more grave than murder, which is a sin against
is the greatest sin of all.” Therefore blasphemy is not the
one’s neighbor. On the other hand, if we compare them
greatest sin.
in respect of the harm wrought by them, murder is the
On the contrary, On Is. 18:2, “To a terrible people,”
graver sin, for murder does more harm to one’s neighbor,
etc. a gloss says: “In comparison with blasphemy, every
than blasphemy does to God. Since, however, the gravity
sin is slight.”
of a sin depends on the intention of the evil will, rather
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), blasphemy is
than on the effect of the deed, as was shown above ( Ia
1254
IIae, q. 73, a. 8), it follows that, as the blasphemer intends about God, as the blasphemer does: but he calls God to
to do harm to God’s honor, absolutely speaking, he sins
witness to a falsehood, not that he deems God a false wit-
more grievously that the murderer. Nevertheless murder
ness, but in the hope, as it were, that God will not testify
takes precedence, as to punishment, among sins commit-
to the matter by some evident sign.
ted against our neighbor.
Reply to Objection 3. To excuse oneself for sin is a
Reply to Objection 2.
A gloss on the words,
circumstance that aggravates every sin, even blasphemy
“Let. . . blasphemy be put away from you” (Eph. 4:31)
itself: and it is called the most grievous sin, for as much
says: “Blasphemy is worse than perjury.” The reason is
as it makes every sin more grievous.
that the perjurer does not say or think something false
Whether the damned blaspheme?
IIa IIae q. 13 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the damned do not
phemy. Now those who are in hell retain their wicked
blaspheme. Because some wicked men are deterred from
will which is turned away from God’s justice, since they
blaspheming now, on account of the fear of future punish-
love the things for which they are punished, would wish to
ment. But the damned are undergoing these punishments,
use them if they could, and hate the punishments inflicted
so that they abhor them yet more. Therefore, much more
on them for those same sins. They regret indeed the sins
are they restrained from blaspheming.
which they have committed, not because they hate them,
Objection 2.
Further, since blasphemy is a most
but because they are punished for them. Accordingly this
grievous sin, it is most demeritorious. Now in the life to
detestation of the Divine justice is, in them, the interior
come there is no state of meriting or demeriting. There-
blasphemy of the heart: and it is credible that after the res-
fore there will be no place for blasphemy.
urrection they will blaspheme God with the tongue, even
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Eccles. 11:3) that
as the saints will praise Him with their voices.
“the tree. . . in what place soever it shall fall, there shall
Reply to Objection 1. In the present life men are de-
it be”: whence it clearly follows that, after this life, man
terred from blasphemy through fear of punishment which
acquires neither merit nor sin, which he did not already
they think they can escape: whereas, in hell, the damned
possess in this life. Now many will be damned who were
have no hope of escape, so that, in despair, they are borne
not blasphemous in this life. Neither, therefore, will they
towards whatever their wicked will suggests to them.
blaspheme in the life to come.
Reply to Objection 2. Merit and demerit belong to
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 16:9): “The men
the state of a wayfarer, wherefore good is meritorious in
were scorched with great heat, and they blasphemed the
them, while evil is demeritorious. In the blessed, on the
name of God, Who hath power over these plagues,” and
other hand, good is not meritorious, but is part of their
a gloss on these words says that “those who are in hell,
blissful reward, and, in like manner, in the damned, evil is
though aware that they are deservedly punished, will nev-
not demeritorious, but is part of the punishment of damna-
ertheless complain that God is so powerful as to torture
tion.
them thus.” Now this would be blasphemy in their present
Reply to Objection 3. Whoever dies in mortal sin,
state: and consequently it will also be in their future state.
bears with him a will that detests the Divine justice with
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,3), detestation
regard to a certain thing, and in this respect there can be
of the Divine goodness is a necessary condition of blas-
blasphemy in him.
1255
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 14
Of Blasphemy Against the Holy Ghost
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider in particular blasphemy against the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as the sin committed through certain malice?
(2) Of the species of this sin;
(3) Whether it can be forgiven?
(4) Whether it is possible to begin by sinning against the Holy Ghost before committing other sins?
Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as the sin committed through IIa IIae q. 14 a. 1
certain malice?
Objection 1. It would seem that the sin against the
we understand the essential name applicable to the whole
Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through
Trinity, each Person of which is a Spirit and is holy, or
certain malice. Because the sin against the Holy Ghost
the personal name of one of the Persons of the Trinity, in
is the sin of blasphemy, according to Mat. 12:32. But
which sense blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is distinct
not every sin committed through certain malice is a sin of
from the blasphemy against the Son of Man (Mat. 12:32),
blasphemy: since many other kinds of sin may be commit-
for Christ did certain things in respect of His human na-
ted through certain malice. Therefore the sin against the
ture, by eating, drinking, and such like actions, while He
Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through
did others in respect of His Godhead, by casting out dev-
certain malice.
ils, raising the dead, and the like: which things He did
Objection 2. Further, the sin committed through cer-
both by the power of His own Godhead and by the opera-
tain malice is condivided with sin committed through ig-
tion of the Holy Ghost, of Whom He was full, according
norance, and sin committed through weakness: whereas
to his human nature. Now the Jews began by speaking
the sin against the Holy Ghost is condivided with the sin
blasphemy against the Son of Man, when they said (Mat.
against the Son of Man (Mat. 12:32). Therefore the sin
11:19) that He was “a glutton. . . a wine drinker,” and a
against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin commit-
“friend of publicans”: but afterwards they blasphemed
ted through certain malice, since things whose opposites
against the Holy Ghost, when they ascribed to the prince
differ, are themselves different.
of devils those works which Christ did by the power of
Objection 3. Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost
His own Divine Nature and by the operation of the Holy
is itself a generic sin, having its own determinate species:
Ghost.
whereas sin committed through certain malice is not a spe-
Augustine, however (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi),
cial kind of sin, but a condition or general circumstance of
says that blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost, is
sin, which can affect any kind of sin at all. Therefore the
final impenitence when, namely, a man perseveres in mor-
sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin com-
tal sin until death, and that it is not confined to utterance
mitted through certain malice.
by word of mouth, but extends to words in thought and
On the contrary, The Master says (Sent. ii, D, 43)
deed, not to one word only, but to many. Now this word,
that “to sin against the Holy Ghost is to take pleasure in
in this sense, is said to be uttered against the Holy Ghost,
the malice of sin for its own sake.” Now this is to sin
because it is contrary to the remission of sins, which is the
through certain malice. Therefore it seems that the sin
work of the Holy Ghost, Who is the charity both of the
committed through certain malice is the same as the sin
Father and of the Son. Nor did Our Lord say this to the
against the Holy Ghost.
Jews, as though they had sinned against the Holy Ghost,
I answer that, Three meanings have been given to the
since they were not yet guilty of final impenitence, but He
sin against the Holy Ghost. For the earlier doctors, viz.
warned them, lest by similar utterances they should come
Athanasius (Super Matth. xii, 32), Hilary (Can. xii in
to sin against the Holy Ghost: and it is in this sense that
Matth.), Ambrose (Super Luc. xii, 10), Jerome (Super
we are to understand Mark 3:29,30, where after Our Lord
Matth. xii), and Chrysostom (Hom. xli in Matth.), say
had said: “But he that shall blaspheme against the Holy
that the sin against the Holy Ghost is literally to utter a
Ghost,” etc. the Evangelist adds, “because they said: He
blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, whether by Holy Spirit
hath an unclean spirit.”
1256
But others understand it differently, and say that the Reply to Objection 1. Just as the confession of faith
sin of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, is a sin commit-
consists in a protestation not only of words but also of
ted against that good which is appropriated to the Holy
deeds, so blasphemy against the Holy Ghost can be ut-
Ghost: because goodness is appropriated to the Holy
tered in word, thought and deed.
Ghost, just a power is appropriated to the Father, and wis-
Reply to Objection 2. According to the third interpre-
dom to the Son. Hence they say that when a man sins
tation, blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is condivided
through weakness, it is a sin “against the Father”; that
with blasphemy against the Son of Man, forasmuch as He
when he sins through ignorance, it is a sin “against the
is also the Son of God, i.e. the “power of God and the
Son”; and that when he sins through certain malice, i.e.
wisdom of God” (1 Cor. 1:24). Wherefore, in this sense,
through the very choosing of evil, as explained above ( Ia
the sin against the Son of Man will be that which is com-
IIae, q. 78, Aa. 1 ,3), it is a sin “against the Holy Ghost.”
mitted through ignorance, or through weakness.
Now this may happen in two ways. First by reason of
Reply to Objection 3. Sin committed through cer-
the very inclination of a vicious habit which we call mal-
tain malice, in so far as it results from the inclination of a
ice, and, in this way, to sin through malice is not the same
habit, is not a special sin, but a general condition of sin:
as to sin against the Holy Ghost. In another way it happens
whereas, in so far as it results from a special contempt of
that by reason of contempt, that which might have pre-
an effect of the Holy Ghost in us, it has the character of a
vented the choosing of evil, is rejected or removed; thus
special sin. According to this interpretation the sin against
hope is removed by despair, and fear by presumption, and
the Holy Ghost is a special kind of sin, as also according
so on, as we shall explain further on (Qq. 20,21). Now
to the first interpretation: whereas according to the sec-
all these things which prevent the choosing of sin are ef-
ond, it is not a species of sin, because final impenitence
fects of the Holy Ghost in us; so that, in this sense, to sin
may be a circumstance of any kind of sin.
through malice is to sin against the Holy Ghost.
Whether it is fitting to distinguish six kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost?
IIa IIae q. 14 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem unfitting to distinguish
Therefore it seems that the species of sins against the Holy
six kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, viz. despair,
Ghost are insufficiently enumerated.
presumption, impenitence, obstinacy, resisting the known
On the contrary, Augustine∗ (De Fide ad Petrum iii)
truth, envy of our brother’s spiritual good, which are as-
says that “those who despair of pardon for their sins, or
signed by the Master (Sent. ii, D, 43). For to deny God’s
who without merits presume on God’s mercy, sin against
justice or mercy belongs to unbelief. Now, by despair, a
the Holy Ghost,” and (Enchiridion lxxxiii) that “he who
man rejects God’s mercy, and by presumption, His justice.
dies in a state of obstinacy is guilty of the sin against the
Therefore each of these is a kind of unbelief rather than of
Holy Ghost,” and (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that “im-
the sin against the Holy Ghost.
penitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost,” and (De Serm.
Objection 2.
Further, impenitence, seemingly, re-
Dom. in Monte xxii), that “to resist fraternal goodness
gards past sins, while obstinacy regards future sins. Now
with the brands of envy is to sin against the Holy Ghost,”
past and future time do not diversify the species of virtues
and in his book De unico Baptismo (De Bap. contra Do-
or vices, since it is the same faith whereby we believe that
nat. vi, 35) he says that “a man who spurns the truth, is ei-
Christ was born, and those of old believed that He would
ther envious of his brethren to whom the truth is revealed,
be born. Therefore obstinacy and impenitence should not
or ungrateful to God, by Whose inspiration the Church is
be reckoned as two species of sin against the Holy Ghost.
taught,” and therefore, seemingly, sins against the Holy
Objection 3. Further, “grace and truth came by Jesus
Ghost.
Christ” (Jn. 1:17). Therefore it seem that resistance of the
I answer that, The above species are fittingly as-
known truth, and envy of a brother’s spiritual good, be-
signed to the sin against the Holy Ghost taken in the third
long to blasphemy against the Son rather than against the
sense, because they are distinguished in respect of the re-
Holy Ghost.
moval of contempt of those things whereby a man can
Objection 4. Further, Bernard says (De Dispens. et
be prevented from sinning through choice. These things
Praecept. xi) that “to refuse to obey is to resist the Holy
are either on the part of God’s judgment, or on the part
Ghost.”
Moreover a gloss on Lev.
10:16, says that
of His gifts, or on the part of sin. For, by consideration
“a feigned repentance is a blasphemy against the Holy
of the Divine judgment, wherein justice is accompanied
Ghost.” Again, schism is, seemingly, directly opposed to
with mercy, man is hindered from sinning through choice,
the Holy Ghost by Whom the Church is united together.
both by hope, arising from the consideration of the mercy
∗ Fulgentius
1257
that pardons sins and rewards good deeds, which hope is 6:21: “What fruit had you therefore then in those things,
removed by “despair”; and by fear, arising from the con-
of which you are now ashamed?” The consideration of
sideration of the Divine justice that punishes sins, which
this is wont to prevent man’s will from being hardened
fear is removed by “presumption,” when, namely, a man
in sin, and this is removed by “obstinacy,” whereby man
presumes that he can obtain glory without merits, or par-
hardens his purpose by clinging to sin. Of these two it is
don without repentance.
written (Jer. 8:6): “There is none that doth penance for
God’s gifts whereby we are withdrawn from sin, are
his sin, saying: What have I done?” as regards the first;
two: one is the acknowledgment of the truth, against
and, “They are all turned to their own course, as a horse
which there is the “resistance of the known truth,” when,
rushing to the battle,” as regards the second.
namely, a man resists the truth which he has acknowl-
Reply to Objection 1. The sins of despair and pre-
edged, in order to sin more freely: while the other is the
sumption consist, not in disbelieving in God’s justice and
assistance of inward grace, against which there is “envy
mercy, but in contemning them.
of a brother’s spiritual good,” when, namely, a man is en-
Reply to Objection 2. Obstinacy and impenitence
vious not only of his brother’s person, but also of the in-
differ not only in respect of past and future time, but also
crease of Divine grace in the world.
in respect of certain formal aspects by reason of the di-
On the part of sin, there are two things which may
verse consideration of those things which may be consid-
withdraw man therefrom: one is the inordinateness and
ered in sin, as explained above.
shamefulness of the act, the consideration of which is
Reply to Objection 3. Grace and truth were the work
wont to arouse man to repentance for the sin he has com-
of Christ through the gifts of the Holy Ghost which He
mitted, and against this there is “impenitence,” not as de-
gave to men.
noting permanence in sin until death, in which sense it
Reply to Objection 4. To refuse to obey belongs to
was taken above (for thus it would not be a special sin,
obstinacy, while a feigned repentance belongs to impeni-
but a circumstance of sin), but as denoting the purpose of
tence, and schism to the envy of a brother’s spiritual good,
not repenting. The other thing is the smallness or brevity
whereby the members of the Church are united together.
of the good which is sought in sin, according to Rom.
Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven?
IIa IIae q. 14 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the sin against the
humiliation of asking for pardon.”
Holy Ghost can be forgiven. For Augustine says (De Verb.
I answer that, According to the various interpreta-
Dom., Serm. lxxi): “We should despair of no man, so long
tions of the sin against the Holy Ghost, there are various
as Our Lord’s patience brings him back to repentance.”
ways in which it may be said that it cannot be forgiven.
But if any sin cannot be forgiven, it would be possible
For if by the sin against the Holy Ghost we understand
to despair of some sinners. Therefore the sin against the
final impenitence, it is said to be unpardonable, since in
Holy Ghost can be forgiven.
no way is it pardoned: because the mortal sin wherein a
Objection 2.
Further, no sin is forgiven, except
man perseveres until death will not be forgiven in the life
through the soul being healed by God. But “no disease
to come, since it was not remitted by repentance in this
is incurable to an all-powerful physician,” as a gloss says
life.
on Ps. 102:3, “Who healeth all thy diseases.” Therefore
According to the other two interpretations, it is said
the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.
to be unpardonable, not as though it is nowise forgiven,
Objection 3. Further, the free-will is indifferent to
but because, considered in itself, it deserves not to be par-
either good or evil. Now, so long as man is a wayfarer,
doned: and this in two ways. First, as regards the punish-
he can fall away from any virtue, since even an angel fell
ment, since he that sins through ignorance or weakness,
from heaven, wherefore it is written (Job 4:18,19): “In His
deserves less punishment, whereas he that sins through
angels He found wickedness: how much more shall they
certain malice, can offer no excuse in alleviation of his
that dwell in houses of clay?” Therefore, in like manner, a
punishment. Likewise those who blasphemed against the
man can return from any sin to the state of justice. There-
Son of Man before His Godhead was revealed, could have
fore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.
some excuse, on account of the weakness of the flesh
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 12:32): “He that
which they perceived in Him, and hence, they deserved
shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven
less punishment; whereas those who blasphemed against
him, neither in this world, nor in the world to come”: and
His very Godhead, by ascribing to the devil the works
Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 22) that “so
of the Holy Ghost, had no excuse in diminution of their
great is the downfall of this sin that it cannot submit to the
punishment. Wherefore, according to Chrysostom’s com-
1258
mentary (Hom. xlii in Matth.), the Jews are said not to means of cure, as when it takes away the power of nature,
be forgiven this sin, neither in this world nor in the world
or causes loathing for food and medicine, although God
to come, because they were punished for it, both in the
is able to cure such a disease. So too, the sin against the
present life, through the Romans, and in the life to come,
Holy Ghost is said to be unpardonable, by reason of its na-
in the pains of hell. Thus also Athanasius adduces the ex-
ture, in so far as it removes those things which are a means
ample of their forefathers who, first of all, wrangled with
towards the pardon of sins. This does not, however, close
Moses on account of the shortage of water and bread; and
the way of forgiveness and healing to an all-powerful and
this the Lord bore with patience, because they were to be
merciful God, Who, sometimes, by a miracle, so to speak,
excused on account of the weakness of the flesh: but af-
restores spiritual health to such men.
terwards they sinned more grievously when, by ascribing
Reply to Objection 1. We should despair of no man in
to an idol the favors bestowed by God Who had brought
this life, considering God’s omnipotence and mercy. But
them out of Egypt, they blasphemed, so to speak, against
if we consider the circumstances of sin, some are called
the Holy Ghost, saying (Ex. 32:4): “These are thy gods,
(Eph. 2:2) “children of despair”∗.
O Israel, that have brought thee out of the land of Egypt.”
Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the
Therefore the Lord both inflicted temporal punishment on
question on the part of God’s omnipotence, not on that of
them, since “there were slain on that day about three and
the circumstances of sin.
twenty thousand men” (Ex. 32:28), and threatened them
Reply to Objection 3. In this life the free-will does
with punishment in the life to come, saying, (Ex. 32:34):
indeed ever remain subject to change: yet sometimes it
“I, in the day of revenge, will visit this sin . . . of theirs.”
rejects that whereby, so far as it is concerned, it can be
Secondly, this may be understood to refer to the guilt:
turned to good. Hence considered in itself this sin is un-
thus a disease is said to be incurable in respect of the na-
pardonable, although God can pardon it.
ture of the disease, which removes whatever might be a
Whether a man can sin first of all against the Holy Ghost?
IIa IIae q. 14 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that a man cannot sin
fore, conversely, it is possible for a man, according to the
first of all against the Holy Ghost, without having previ-
malice of the devil who tempts him, to be led to commit
ously committed other sins. For the natural order requires
the most grievous of sins which is that against the Holy
that one should be moved to perfection from imperfec-
Ghost.
tion. This is evident as regards good things, according to
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), in one way, to
Prov. 4:18: “The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth
sin against the Holy Ghost is to sin through certain mal-
forwards and increases even to perfect day.” Now, in evil
ice. Now one may sin through certain malice in two ways,
things, the perfect is the greatest evil, as the Philosopher
as stated in the same place: first, through the inclination
states (Metaph. v, text. 21). Since then the sin against
of a habit; but this is not, properly speaking, to sin against
the Holy Ghost is the most grievous sin, it seems that man
the Holy Ghost, nor does a man come to commit this sin
comes to commit this sin through committing lesser sins.
all at once, in as much as sinful acts must precede so as
Objection 2. Further, to sin against the Holy Ghost
to cause the habit that induces to sin. Secondly, one may
is to sin through certain malice, or through choice. Now
sin through certain malice, by contemptuously rejecting
man cannot do this until he has sinned many times; for
the things whereby a man is withdrawn from sin. This is,
the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6,9) that “although a man
properly speaking, to sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated
is able to do unjust deeds, yet he cannot all at once do
above (a. 1); and this also, for the most part, presupposes
them as an unjust man does,” viz. from choice. There-
other sins, for it is written (Prov. 18:3) that “the wicked
fore it seems that the sin against the Holy Ghost cannot be
man, when he is come into the depth of sins, contemneth.”
committed except after other sins.
Nevertheless it is possible for a man, in his first sin-
Objection 3. Further, repentance and impenitence are
ful act, to sin against the Holy Ghost by contempt, both
about the same object. But there is no repentance, ex-
on account of his free-will, and on account of the many
cept about past sins. Therefore the same applies to im-
previous dispositions, or again, through being vehemently
penitence which is a species of the sin against the Holy
moved to evil, while but feebly attached to good. Hence
Ghost. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost presup-
never or scarcely ever does it happen that the perfect sin
poses other sins.
all at once against the Holy Ghost: wherefore Origen says
On the contrary, “It is easy in the eyes of God on a
(Peri Archon. i, 3): “I do not think that anyone who stands
sudden to make a poor man rich” (Ecclus. 11:23). There-
on the highest step of perfection, can fail or fall suddenly;
∗ ‘Filios diffidentiae,’ which the Douay version renders ‘children of unbelief.’
1259
this can only happen by degrees and bit by bit.”
cording to its genus, although it may be imperfect as re-
The same applies, if the sin against the Holy Ghost be
gards the series of good or evil actions whereby a man
taken literally for blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. For
progresses in good or evil.
such blasphemy as Our Lord speaks of, always proceeds
Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the
from contemptuous malice.
sin which is committed through certain malice, when it
If, however, with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm.
proceeds from the inclination of a habit.
lxxi) we understand the sin against the Holy Ghost to de-
Reply to Objection 3. If by impenitence we under-
note final impenitence, it does not regard the question in
stand with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) per-
point, because this sin against the Holy Ghost requires
sistence in sin until the end, it is clear that it presupposes
persistence in sin until the end of life.
sin, just as repentance does. If, however, we take it for
Reply to Objection 1. Movement both in good and
habitual impenitence, in which sense it is a sin against the
in evil is made, for the most part, from imperfect to per-
Holy Ghost, it is evident that it can precede sin: for it is
fect, according as man progresses in good or evil: and yet
possible for a man who has never sinned to have the pur-
in both cases, one man can begin from a greater (good
pose either of repenting or of not repenting, if he should
or evil) than another man does. Consequently, that from
happen to sin.
which a man begins can be perfect in good or evil ac-
1260
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 15
Of the Vices Opposed to Knowledge and Understanding
(In Three Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to knowledge and understanding. Since, however, we have treated of ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, when we were discussing the causes of sins ( Ia IIae, q. 76), we must now inquire about blindness of mind and dulness of sense, which are opposed to the gift of understanding; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether blindness of mind is a sin?
(2) Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind?
(3) Whether these vices arise from sins of the flesh?
Whether blindness of mind is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 15 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that blindness of mind is
q. 84, Aa. 7,8.
not a sin. Because, seemingly, that which excuses from
Another principle of intellectual sight is a certain ha-
sin is not itself a sin. Now blindness of mind excuses
bitual light superadded to the natural light of reason,
from sin; for it is written (Jn. 9:41): “If you were blind,
which light is sometimes forfeit from the soul. This pri-
you should not have sin.” Therefore blindness of mind is
vation is blindness, and is a punishment, in so far as the
not a sin.
privation of the light of grace is a punishment. Hence it is
Objection 2. Further, punishment differs from guilt.
written concerning some (Wis. 2:21): “Their own malice
But blindness of mind is a punishment as appears from Is.
blinded them.”
6:10, “Blind the heart of this people,” for, since it is an
A third principle of intellectual sight is an intelligible
evil, it could not be from God, were it not a punishment.
principle, through which a man understands other things;
Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.
to which principle a man may attend or not attend. That
Objection 3. Further, every sin is voluntary, accord-
he does not attend thereto happens in two ways. Some-
ing to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv). Now blindness of
times it is due to the fact that a man’s will is deliberately
mind is not voluntary, since, as Augustine says (Confess.
turned away from the consideration of that principle, ac-
x), “all love to know the resplendent truth,” and as we read
cording to Ps. 35:4, “He would not understand, that he
in Eccles. 11:7, “the light is sweet and it is delightful for
might do well”: whereas sometimes it is due to the mind
the eyes to see the sun.” Therefore blindness of mind is
being more busy about things which it loves more, so as
not a sin.
to be hindered thereby from considering this principle, ac-
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons
cording to Ps. 57:9, “Fire,” i.e. of concupiscence, “hath
blindness of mind among the vices arising from lust.
fallen on them and they shall not see the sun.” In either of
I answer that, Just as bodily blindness is the privation these ways blindness of mind is a sin.
of the principle of bodily sight, so blindness of mind is the
Reply to Objection 1. The blindness that excuses
privation of the principle of mental or intellectual sight.
from sin is that which arises from the natural defect of
Now this has a threefold principle. One is the light of nat-
one who cannot see.
ural reason, which light, since it pertains to the species of
Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the
the rational soul, is never forfeit from the soul, and yet,
second kind of blindness which is a punishment.
at times, it is prevented from exercising its proper act,
Reply to Objection 3. To understand the truth is, in
through being hindered by the lower powers which the
itself, beloved by all; and yet, accidentally it may be hate-
human intellect needs in order to understand, for instance
ful to someone, in so far as a man is hindered thereby from
in the case of imbeciles and madmen, as stated in the Ia,
having what he loves yet more.
Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind?
IIa IIae q. 15 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that dulness of sense is not a
is blindness of mind, since understanding denotes a prin-
distinct sin from blindness of mind. Because one thing
ciple of sight. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as
has one contrary. Now dulness is opposed to the gift of un-
blindness of mind.
derstanding, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49); and so
Objection 2. Further, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) in
1261
speaking of dulness describes it as “dullness of sense in sense is in respect of certain primals and extremes, as
respect of understanding.” Now dulness of sense in re-
stated in Ethic. vi, even as the senses are cognizant of sen-
spect of understanding seems to be the same as a defect
sible objects as of certain principles of knowledge. Now
in understanding, which pertains to blindness of mind.
this sense which is connected with understanding, does
Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of
not perceive its object through a medium of corporeal dis-
mind.
tance, but through certain other media, as, for instance,
Objection 3. Further, if they differ at all, it seems to when it perceives a thing’s essence through a property
be chiefly in the fact that blindness of mind is voluntary, as
thereof, and the cause through its effect. Consequently
stated above (a. 1), while dulness of sense is a natural de-
a man is said to have an acute sense in connection with
fect. But a natural defect is not a sin: so that, accordingly,
his understanding, if, as soon as he apprehends a prop-
dulness of sense would not be a sin, which is contrary to
erty or effect of a thing, he understands the nature or the
what Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), where he reckons it
thing itself, and if he can succeed in perceiving its slight-
among the sins arising from gluttony.
est details: whereas a man is said to have a dull sense in
On the contrary, Different causes produce different
connection with his understanding, if he cannot arrive at
effects. Now Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness
knowing the truth about a thing, without many explana-
of sense arises from gluttony, and that blindness of mind
tions; in which case, moreover, he is unable to obtain a
arises from lust. Now these others are different vices.
perfect perception of everything pertaining to the nature
Therefore those are different vices also.
of that thing.
I answer that, Dull is opposed to sharp: and a thing
Accordingly dulness of sense in connection with un-
is said to be sharp because it can pierce; so that a thing
derstanding denotes a certain weakness of the mind as to
is called dull through being obtuse and unable to pierce.
the consideration of spiritual goods; while blindness of
Now a bodily sense, by a kind of metaphor, is said to
mind implies the complete privation of the knowledge of
pierce the medium, in so far as it perceives its object from
such things. Both are opposed to the gift of understand-
a distance or is able by penetration as it were to perceive
ing, whereby a man knows spiritual goods by apprehend-
the smallest details or the inmost parts of a thing. Hence in
ing them, and has a subtle penetration of their inmost na-
corporeal things the senses are said to be acute when they
ture. This dulness has the character of sin, just as blind-
can perceive a sensible object from afar, by sight, hearing,
ness of mind has, that is, in so far as it is voluntary, as
or scent, while on the other hand they are said to be dull,
evidenced in one who, owing to his affection for carnal
through being unable to perceive, except sensible objects
things, dislikes or neglects the careful consideration of
that are near at hand, or of great power.
spiritual things.
Now, by way of similitude to bodily sense, we speak
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
of sense in connection with the intellect; and this latter
Whether blindness of mind and dulness of sense arise from sins of the flesh?
IIa IIae q. 15 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that blindness of mind
fore blindness of mind and dulness of sense are caused by
and dulness of sense do not arise from sins of the flesh.
spiritual rather than by carnal vices.
For Augustine (Retract. i, 4) retracts what he had said
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45)
in his Soliloquies i, 1, “God Who didst wish none but
that dulness of sense arises from gluttony and blindness
the clean to know the truth,” and says that one might re-
of mind from lust.
ply that “many, even those who are unclean, know many
I answer that, The perfect intellectual operation in
truths.” Now men become unclean chiefly by sins of the
man consists in an abstraction from sensible phantasms,
flesh. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense
wherefore the more a man’s intellect is freed from those
are not caused by sins of the flesh.
phantasms, the more thoroughly will it be able to consider
Objection 2. Further, blindness of mind and dulness
things intelligible, and to set in order all things sensible.
of sense are defects in connection with the intellective part
Thus Anaxagoras stated that the intellect requires to be
of the soul: whereas carnal sins pertain to the corruption
“detached” in order to command, and that the agent must
of the flesh. But the flesh does not act on the soul, but
have power over matter, in order to be able to move it.
rather the reverse. Therefore the sins of the flesh do not
Now it is evident that pleasure fixes a man’s attention on
cause blindness of mind and dulness of sense.
that which he takes pleasure in: wherefore the Philoso-
Objection 3. Further, all things are more passive to
pher says (Ethic. x, 4,5) that we all do best that which
what is near them than to what is remote. Now spiritual
we take pleasure in doing, while as to other things, we do
vices are nearer the mind than carnal vices are. There-
them either not at all, or in a faint-hearted fashion.
1262
Now carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are con-derstanding in every book, and wisdom.”
cerned with pleasures of touch in matters of food and sex;
Reply to Objection 1. Although some who are the
and these are the most impetuous of all pleasures of the
slaves of carnal vices are at times capable of subtle con-
body. For this reason these vices cause man’s attention to
siderations about intelligible things, on account of the
be very firmly fixed on corporeal things, so that in conse-
perfection of their natural genius, or of some habit su-
quence man’s operation in regard to intelligible things is
peradded thereto, nevertheless, on account of the plea-
weakened, more, however, by lust than by gluttony, foras-
sures of the body, it must needs happen that their atten-
much as sexual pleasures are more vehement than those
tion is frequently withdrawn from this subtle contempla-
of the table. Wherefore lust gives rise to blindness of
tion: wherefore the unclean can know some truths, but
mind, which excludes almost entirely the knowledge of
their uncleanness is a clog on their knowledge.
spiritual things, while dulness of sense arises from glut-
Reply to Objection 2. The flesh acts on the intellec-
tony, which makes a man weak in regard to the same in-
tive faculties, not by altering them, but by impeding their
telligible things. On the other hand, the contrary virtues,
operation in the aforesaid manner.
viz. abstinence and chastity, dispose man very much to
Reply to Objection 3. It is owing to the fact that the
the perfection of intellectual operation. Hence it is writ-
carnal vices are further removed from the mind, that they
ten (Dan. 1:17) that “to these children” on account of their
distract the mind’s attention to more remote things, so that
abstinence and continency, “God gave knowledge and un-
they hinder the mind’s contemplation all the more.
1263
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 16
Of the Precepts of Faith, Knowledge and Understanding
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the precepts pertaining to the aforesaid, and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) The precepts concerning faith;
(2) The precepts concerning the gifts of knowledge and understanding.
Whether in the Old Law there should have been given precepts of faith?
IIa IIae q. 16 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that, in the Old Law,
I answer that, A master does not impose laws on oth-
there should have been given precepts of faith. Because
ers than his subjects; wherefore the precepts of a law pre-
a precept is about something due and necessary. Now it
suppose that everyone who receives the law is subject to
is most necessary for man that he should believe, accord-
the giver of the law. Now the primary subjection of man
ing to Heb. 11:6, “Without faith it is impossible to please
to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: “He that
God.” Therefore there was very great need for precepts of
cometh to God, must believe that He is.” Hence faith is
faith to be given.
presupposed to the precepts of the Law: for which rea-
Objection 2. Further, the New Testament is contained
son (Ex. 20:2) that which is of faith, is set down before
in the Old, as the reality in the figure, as stated above ( Ia
the legal precepts, in the words, “I am the Lord thy God,
IIae, q. 107, a. 3). Now the New Testament contains ex-
Who brought thee out of the land of Egypt,” and, likewise
plicit precepts of faith, for instance Jn. 14:1: “You believe
(Dt. 6:4), the words, “Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy [Vulg.:
in God; believe also in Me.” Therefore it seems that some
‘our’] God is one,” precede the recording of the precepts.
precepts of faith ought to have been given in the Old Law
Since, however, faith contains many things subordi-
also.
nate to the faith whereby we believe that God is, which is
Objection 3. Further, to prescribe the act of a virtue
the first and chief of all articles of faith, as stated above
comes to the same as to forbid the opposite vices. Now
(q. 1, Aa. 1,7), it follows that, if we presuppose faith in
the Old Law contained many precepts forbidding unbe-
God, whereby man’s mind is subjected to Him, it is pos-
lief: thus (Ex. 20:3): “Thou shalt not have strange gods
sible for precepts to be given about other articles of faith.
before Me,” and (Dt. 13:1-3) they were forbidden to hear
Thus Augustine expounding the words: “This is My com-
the words of the prophet or dreamer who might wish to
mandment” (Jn. 15:12) says (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.) that
turn them away from their faith in God. Therefore pre-
we have received many precepts of faith. In the Old Law,
cepts of faith should have been given in the Old Law also.
however, the secret things of faith were not to be set be-
Objection 4. Further, confession is an act of faith, as
fore the people, wherefore, presupposing their faith in one
stated above (q. 3, a. 1). Now the Old Law contained
God, no other precepts of faith were given in the Old Law.
precepts about the confession and the promulgation of
Reply to Objection 1. Faith is necessary as being the
faith: for they were commanded (Ex. 12:27) that, when
principle of spiritual life, wherefore it is presupposed be-
their children should ask them, they should tell them the
fore the receiving of the Law.
meaning of the paschal observance, and (Dt. 13:9) they
Reply to Objection 2. Even then Our Lord both pre-
were commanded to slay anyone who disseminated doc-
supposed something of faith, namely belief in one God,
trine contrary to faith. Therefore the Old Law should have
when He said: “You believe in God,” and commanded
contained precepts of faith.
something, namely, belief in the Incarnation whereby one
Objection 5. Further, all the books of the Old Testa-
Person is God and man. This explanation of faith belongs
ment are contained in the Old Law; wherefore Our Lord
to the faith of the New Testament, wherefore He added:
said (Jn. 15:25) that it was written in the Law: “They have
“Believe also in Me.”
hated Me without cause,” although this is found written
Reply to Objection 3. The prohibitive precepts regard
in Ps. 34 and 68. Now it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): “Ye
sins, which corrupt virtue. Now virtue is corrupted by any
that fear the Lord, believe Him.” Therefore the Old Law
particular defect, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 4, ad
should have contained precepts of faith.
3; Ia IIae, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1, a. 7, ad 3). Therefore faith
On the contrary, The Apostle (Rom. 3:27) calls the
in one God being presupposed, prohibitive precepts had
Old Law the “law of works” which he contrasts with the
to be given in the Old Law, so that men might be warned
“law of faith.” Therefore the Old Law ought not to have
off those particular defects whereby their faith might be
contained precepts of faith.
corrupted.
1264
Reply to Objection 4. Confession of faith and the it begins, “Ye that fear the Lord,” which is not possible
teaching thereof also presuppose man’s submission to
without faith. The words which follow—“believe Him”—
God by faith: so that the Old Law could contain precepts
must be referred to certain special articles of faith, chiefly
relating to the confession and teaching of faith, rather than
to those things which God promises to them that obey
to faith itself.
Him, wherefore the passage concludes—“and your re-
Reply to Objection 5. In this passage again that faith
ward shall not be made void.”
is presupposed whereby we believe that God is; hence
Whether the precepts referring to knowledge and understanding were fittingly set IIa IIae q. 16 a. 2
down in the Old Law?
Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts refer-
Now the reception of knowledge or understanding, is by
ring to knowledge and understanding were unfittingly set
means of teaching and learning, and both are prescribed in
down in the Old Law. For knowledge and understanding
the Law. For it is written (Dt. 6:6): “These words which
pertain to cognition. Now cognition precedes and directs
I command thee. . . shall be in thy heart.” This refers to
action. Therefore the precepts referring to knowledge and
learning, since it is the duty of a disciple to apply his mind
understanding should precede the precepts of the Law re-
to what is said, while the words that follow—“and thou
ferring to action. Since, then, the first precepts of the
shalt tell them to thy children”—refer to teaching.
Law are those of the decalogue, it seems that precepts of
The use of knowledge and understanding is the med-
knowledge and understanding should have been given a
itation on those things which one knows or understands.
place among the precepts of the decalogue.
In reference to this, the text goes on: “thou shalt meditate
Objection 2. Further, learning precedes teaching, for
upon them sitting in thy house,” etc.
a man must learn from another before he teaches another.
Their preservation is effected by the memory, and,
Now the Old Law contains precepts about teaching—both
as regards this, the text continues—“and thou shalt bind
affirmative precepts as, for example, (Dt. 4:9), “Thou
them as a sign on thy hand, and they shall be and shall
shalt teach them to thy sons”—and prohibitive precepts,
move between thy eyes. And thou shalt write them in
as, for instance, (Dt. 4:2), “You shall not add to the word
the entry, and on the doors of thy house.” Thus the con-
that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it.”
tinual remembrance of God’s commandments is signified,
Therefore it seems that man ought to have been given also
since it is impossible for us to forget those things which
some precepts directing him to learn.
are continually attracting the notice of our senses, whether
Objection 3. Further, knowledge and understanding
by touch, as those things we hold in our hands, or by sight,
seem more necessary to a priest than to a king, wherefore
as those things which are ever before our eyes, or to which
it is written (Malachi 2:7): “The lips of the priest shall
we are continually returning, for instance, to the house
keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law at his mouth,”
door. Moreover it is clearly stated (Dt. 4:9): “Forget not
and (Osee 4:6): “Because thou hast rejected knowledge, I
the words that thy eyes have seen and let them not go out
will reject thee, that thou shalt not do the office of priest-
of thy heart all the days of thy life.”
hood to Me.” Now the king is commanded to learn knowl-
We read of these things also being commanded more
edge of the Law (Dt. 17:18,19). Much more therefore
notably in the New Testament, both in the teaching of the
should the Law have commanded the priests to learn the
Gospel and in that of the apostles.
Law.
Reply to Objection 1. According to Dt. 4:6, “this
Objection 4. Further, it is not possible while asleep
is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of the na-
to meditate on things pertaining to knowledge and under-
tions.” By this we are given to understand that the wisdom
standing: moreover it is hindered by extraneous occupa-
and understanding of those who believe in God consist in
tions. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded (Dt. 6:7):
the precepts of the Law. Wherefore the precepts of the
“Thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house, and
Law had to be given first, and afterwards men had to be
walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising.” Therefore
led to know and understand them, and so it was not fit-
the precepts relating to knowledge and understanding are
ting that the aforesaid precepts should be placed among
unfittingly set down in the Law.
the precepts of the decalogue which take the first place.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:6): “That, hear-
Reply to Objection 2. There are also in the Law pre-
ing all these precepts, they may say, Behold a wise and
cepts relating to learning, as stated above. Nevertheless
understanding people.”
teaching was commanded more expressly than learning,
I answer that, Three things may be considered in rela-
because it concerned the learned, who were not under any
tion to knowledge and understanding: first, the reception
other authority, but were immediately under the law, and
thereof; secondly, the use; and thirdly, their preservation.
to them the precepts of the Law were given. On the other
1265
hand learning concerned the people of lower degree, and pertaining to the law of God.
these the precepts of the Law have to reach through the
Reply to Objection 4. That precept of the Law does
learned.
not mean that man should meditate on God’s law of sleep-
Reply to Objection 3.
Knowledge of the Law is
ing, but during sleep, i.e. that he should meditate on the
so closely bound up with the priestly office that being
law of God when he is preparing to sleep, because this
charged with the office implies being charged to know
leads to his having better phantasms while asleep, in so
the Law: hence there was no need for special precepts
far as our movements pass from the state of vigil to the
to be given about the training of the priests. On the other
state of sleep, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. i, 13).
hand, the doctrine of God’s law is not so bound up with the
In like manner we are commanded to meditate on the Law
kingly office, because a king is placed over his people in
in every action of ours, not that we are bound to be always
temporal matters: hence it is especially commanded that
actually thinking about the Law, but that we should regu-
the king should be instructed by the priests about things
late all our actions according to it.
1266
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 17
Of Hope, Considered in Itself
(In Eight Articles)
After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself; (2) the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding precepts. The first of these points gives rise to a twofold consideration: (1) hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether hope is a virtue?
(2) Whether its object is eternal happiness?
(3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another’s happiness?
(4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man?
(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?
(6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues?
(7) Of its relation to faith;
(8) Of its relation to charity.
Whether hope is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 17 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that hope is not a virtue.
we have already stated ( Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 1), when we were
For “no man makes ill use of a virtue,” as Augustine states
treating of the passion of hope, the object of hope is a fu-
(De Lib. Arb. ii, 18). But one may make ill use of
ture good, difficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is
hope, since the passion of hope, like the other passions,
possible to us in two ways: first, by ourselves; secondly,
is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore hope is not
by means of others, as stated in Ethic. iii. Wherefore,
a virtue.
in so far as we hope for anything as being possible to us
Objection 2. Further, no virtue results from merits,
by means of the Divine assistance, our hope attains God
since “God works virtue in us without us,” as Augustine
Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident
states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xvii). But hope is caused
that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be
by grace and merits, according to the Master (Sent. iii, D,
good and to attain its due rule.
26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1. In the passions, the mean of
Objection 3. Further, “virtue is the disposition of a
virtue depends on right reason being attained, wherein
perfect thing” (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But hope is the dis-
also consists the essence of virtue. Wherefore in hope
position of an imperfect thing, of one, namely, that lacks
too, the good of virtue depends on a man’s attaining, by
what it hopes to have. Therefore hope is not a virtue.
hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the
make ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he
three daughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith,
make ill use of moral virtue which attains the reason, be-
hope and charity. Therefore hope is a virtue.
cause to attain thus is to make good use of virtue. Never-
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic.
theless, the hope of which we speak now, is not a passion
ii, 6) “the virtue of a thing is that which makes its subject
but a habit of the mind, as we shall show further on (a. 5;
good, and its work good likewise.” Consequently wher-
q. 18, a. 1).
ever we find a good human act, it must correspond to some
Reply to Objection 2. Hope is said to arise from mer-
human virtue. Now in all things measured and ruled, the
its, as regards the thing hoped for, in so far as we hope
good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say that
to obtain happiness by means of grace and merits; or as
a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its
regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of hope,
proper measurement. But, as we stated above (q. 8, a. 3,
whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from
ad 3) human acts have a twofold measure; one is proxi-
our merits, but from grace alone.
mate and homogeneous, viz. the reason, while the other is
Reply to Objection 3. He who hopes is indeed imper-
remote and excelling, viz. God: wherefore every human
fect in relation to that which he hopes to obtain, but has
act is good, which attains reason or God Himself. Now the
not as yet; yet he is perfect, in so far as he already attains
act of hope, whereof we speak now, attains God. For, as
his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose help he leans.
1267
Whether eternal happiness is the proper object of hope?
IIa IIae q. 17 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that eternal happiness is
the infinite good, which is proportionate to the power of
not the proper object of hope. For a man does not hope for
our divine helper, since it belongs to an infinite power to
that which surpasses every movement of the soul, since
lead anyone to an infinite good. Such a good is eternal
hope itself is a movement of the soul. Now eternal hap-
life, which consists in the enjoyment of God Himself. For
piness surpasses every movement of the human soul, for
we should hope from Him for nothing less than Himself,
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) that it hath not “entered into
since His goodness, whereby He imparts good things to
the heart of man.” Therefore happiness is not the proper
His creature, is no less than His Essence. Therefore the
object of hope.
proper and principal object of hope is eternal happiness.
Objection 2. Further, prayer is an expression of hope,
Reply to Objection 1. Eternal happiness does not en-
for it is written (Ps. 36:5): “Commit thy way to the Lord,
ter into the heart of man perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible and trust in Him, and He will do it.” Now it is lawful for
for a wayfarer to know its nature and quality; yet, under
man to pray God not only for eternal happiness, but also
the general notion of the perfect good, it is possible for
for the goods, both temporal and spiritual, of the present
it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in this way that
life, and, as evidenced by the Lord’s Prayer, to be deliv-
the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the Apos-
ered from evils which will no longer be in eternal happi-
tle says pointedly (Heb. 6:19) that hope “enters in, even
ness. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object
within the veil,” because that which we hope for is as yet
of hope.
veiled, so to speak.
Objection 3. Further, the object of hope is something
Reply to Objection 2. We ought not to pray God for
difficult. Now many things besides eternal happiness are
any other goods, except in reference to eternal happiness.
difficult to man. Therefore eternal happiness is not the
Hence hope regards eternal happiness chiefly, and other
proper object of hope.
things, for which we pray God, it regards secondarily and
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 6:19) that
as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith regards God
we have hope “which entereth in,” i.e. maketh us to en-
principally, and, secondarily, those things which are re-
ter. . . “within the veil,” i.e. into the happiness of heaven,
ferred to God, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1).
according to the interpretation of a gloss on these words.
Reply to Objection 3. To him that longs for some-
Therefore the object of hope is eternal happiness.
thing great, all lesser things seem small; wherefore to him
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the hope of
that hopes for eternal happiness, nothing else appears ar-
which we speak now, attains God by leaning on His help
duous, as compared with that hope; although, as com-
in order to obtain the hoped for good. Now an effect must
pared with the capability of the man who hopes, other
be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore the good which
things besides may be arduous to him, so that he may have
we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is
hope for such things in reference to its principal object.
Whether one man may hope for another’s eternal happiness?
IIa IIae q. 17 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that one may hope for an-
can also hope for another’s eternal salvation.
other’s eternal happiness. For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6):
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii)
“Being confident of this very thing, that He Who hath be-
that “hope is only of such things as belong to him who is
gun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day of
supposed to hope for them.”
Jesus Christ.” Now the perfection of that day will be eter-
I answer that, We can hope for something in two
nal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another’s
ways: first, absolutely, and thus the object of hope is al-
eternal happiness.
ways something arduous and pertaining to the person who
Objection 2. Further, whatever we ask of God, we
hopes. Secondly, we can hope for something, through
hope to obtain from Him. But we ask God to bring others
something else being presupposed, and in this way its ob-
to eternal happiness, according to James 5:16: “Pray for
ject can be something pertaining to someone else. In or-
one another that you may be saved.” Therefore we can
der to explain this we must observe that love and hope
hope for another’s eternal happiness.
differ in this, that love denotes union between lover and
Objection 3. Further, hope and despair are about the
beloved, while hope denotes a movement or a stretching
same object. Now it is possible to despair of another’s
forth of the appetite towards an arduous good. Now union
eternal happiness, else Augustine would have no reason
is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can directly
for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we should
regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love,
not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one
looking upon him as his other self: whereas movement is
1268
always towards its own term which is proportionate to the inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is
subject moved. Therefore hope regards directly one’s own
the same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, him-
good, and not that which pertains to another. Yet if we pre-
self, and his neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope,
suppose the union of love with another, a man can hope
whereby a man hopes for himself and for another.
for and desire something for another man, as for himself;
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
and, accordingly, he can hope for another eternal’s life,
Whether a man can lawfully hope in man?
IIa IIae q. 17 a. 4
Objection 1. It wold seem that one may lawfully hope
hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient
in man. For the object of hope is eternal happiness. Now
cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a prin-
we are helped to obtain eternal happiness by the patronage
cipal and a secondary cause. For the principal end is the
of the saints, for Gregory says (Dial. i, 8) that “predesti-
last end, while the secondary end is that which is referred
nation is furthered by the saints’ prayers.” Therefore one
to an end. In like manner the principal efficient cause is
may hope in man.
the first agent, while the secondary efficient cause is the
Objection 2. Further, if a man may not hope in an-
secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope regards eter-
other man, it ought not to be reckoned a sin in a man, that
nal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance as
one should not be able to hope in him. Yet this is reck-
the first cause leading to happiness.
oned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4: “Let every
Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any
man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in any
good save happiness, as one’s last end, but only as some-
brother of his.” Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man.
thing referred to final happiness, so too, it is unlawful to
Objection 3. Further, prayer is the expression of hope,
hope in any man, or any creature, as though it were the
as stated above (a. 2, obj. 2). But it is lawful to pray to a
first cause of movement towards happiness. It is, how-
man for something. Therefore it is lawful to trust in him.
ever, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 17:5): “Cursed be
secondary and instrumental agent through whom one is
the man that trusteth in man.”
helped to obtain any goods that are ordained to happiness.
I answer that, Hope, as stated above (a. 1; Ia IIae,
It is in this way that we turn to the saints, and that we ask
q. 40, a. 7), regards two things, viz. the good which it
men also for certain things; and for this reason some are
intends to obtain, and the help by which that good is ob-
blamed in that they cannot be trusted to give help.
tained. Now the good which a man hopes to obtain, has
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which one
Whether hope is a theological virtue?
IIa IIae q. 17 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that hope is not a theo-
virtues.
logical virtue. For a theological virtue is one that has God
I answer that, Since specific differences, by their very for its object. Now hope has for its object not only God
nature, divide a genus, in order to decide under what di-
but also other goods which we hope to obtain from God.
vision we must place hope, we must observe whence it
Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
derives its character of virtue.
Objection 2. Further, a theological virtue is not a
Now it has been stated above (a. 1) that hope has the
mean between two vices, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 64,
character of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme
a. 4). But hope is a mean between presumption and de-
rule of human actions: and this it attains both as its first
spair. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
efficient cause, in as much as it leans on its assistance, and
Objection 3. Further, expectation belongs to longa-
as its last final cause, in as much as it expects happiness
nimity which is a species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is
in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is evident that God is
a kind of expectation, it seems that hope is not a theologi-
the principal object of hope, considered as a virtue. Since,
cal, but a moral virtue.
then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one that has
Objection 4. Further, the object of hope is something
God for its object, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 1), it arduous. But it belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral
is evident that hope is a theological virtue.
virtue, to tend to the arduous. Therefore hope is a moral,
Reply to Objection 1. Whatever else hope expects to
and not a theological virtue.
obtain, it hopes for it in reference to God as the last end,
On the contrary, Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13)
or as the first efficient cause, as stated above (a. 4).
together with faith and charity, which are theological
Reply to Objection 2. In things measured and ruled
1269
the mean consists in the measure or rule being attained; mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has no mean
if we go beyond the rule, there is excess, if we fall short
or extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is im-
of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the rule or measure
possible to trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it
itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes. Now a
may have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a
moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and
man trusts to obtain, in so far as he either presumes above
these things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to
his capability, or despairs of things of which he is capable.
it to follow the mean as regards its proper object. On the
Reply to Objection 3. The expectation which is men-
other hand, a theological virtue is concerned with the First
tioned in the definition of hope does not imply delay, as
Rule not ruled by another rule, and that Rule is its proper
does the expectation which belongs to longanimity. It im-
object. Wherefore it is not proper for a theological virtue,
plies a reference to the Divine assistance, whether that
with regard to its proper object, to follow the mean, al-
which we hope for be delayed or not.
though this may happen to it accidentally with regard to
Reply to Objection 4. Magnanimity tends to some-
something that is referred to its principal object. Thus
thing arduous in the hope of obtaining something that is
faith can have no mean or extremes in the point of trust-
within one’s power, wherefore its proper object is the do-
ing to the First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust
ing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a theolog-
too much; whereas on the part of the things believed, it
ical virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by
may have a mean and extremes; for instance one truth is a
another’s help, as stated above (a. 1).
Whether hope is distinct from the other theological virtues?
IIa IIae q. 17 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that hope is not distinct
sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.
from the other theological virtues. For habits are distin-
On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere
guished by their objects, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 54,
to God as to a principle wherefrom certain things accrue
a. 2). Now the object of hope is the same as of the other
to us. Now we derive from God both knowledge of truth
theological virtues. Therefore hope is not distinct from
and the attainment of perfect goodness. Accordingly faith
the other theological virtues.
makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive
Objection 2. Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby
the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God
we make profession of faith, we say: “I expect the res-
tells us is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the
urrection of the dead and the life of the world to come.”
source whence we derive perfect goodness, i.e. in so far
Now expectation of future happiness belongs to hope, as
as, by hope, we trust to the Divine assistance for obtaining
stated above (a. 5). Therefore hope is not distinct from
happiness.
faith.
Reply to Objection 1. God is the object of these
Objection 3. Further, by hope man tends to God. But
virtues under different aspects, as stated above: and a dif-
this belongs properly to charity. Therefore hope is not
ferent aspect of the object suffices for the distinction of
distinct from charity.
habits, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2).
On the contrary, There cannot be number without
Reply to Objection 2. Expectation is mentioned in
distinction. Now hope is numbered with the other theo-
the symbol of faith, not as though it were the proper act of
logical virtues: for Gregory says (Moral. i, 16) that the
faith, but because the act of hope presupposes the act of
three virtues are faith, hope, and charity. Therefore hope
faith, as we shall state further on (a. 7). Hence an act of
is distinct from the theological virtues.
faith is expressed in the act of hope.
I answer that, A virtue is said to be theological from
Reply to Objection 3. Hope makes us tend to God, as
having God for the object to which it adheres. Now one
to a good to be obtained finally, and as to a helper strong
may adhere to a thing in two ways: first, for its own sake;
to assist: whereas charity, properly speaking, makes us
secondly, because something else is attained thereby. Ac-
tend to God, by uniting our affections to Him, so that we
cordingly charity makes us adhere to God for His own
live, not for ourselves, but for God.
Whether hope precedes faith?
IIa IIae q. 17 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that hope precedes faith.
are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.
Because a gloss on Ps. 36:3, “Trust in the Lord, and do
Objection 2.
Further, that which is included in a
good,” says: “Hope is the entrance to faith and the begin-
definition should precede the thing defined and be more
ning of salvation.” But salvation is by faith whereby we
known. But hope is included in the definition of faith
1270
(Heb. 11:1): “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped 11:6: “He that cometh to God, must believe that He is,
for.” Therefore hope precedes faith.
and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.” Therefore it is
Objection 3. Further, hope precedes a meritorious act,
evident that faith precedes hope.
for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:10): “He that plougheth
Reply to Objection 1. As the same gloss observes fur-
should plough in hope. . . to receive fruit.” But the act of
ther on, “hope” is called “the entrance” to faith, i.e. of the
faith is meritorious. Therefore hope precedes faith.
thing believed, because by hope we enter in to see what
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:2): “Abraham
we believe. Or we may reply that it is called the “entrance
begot Isaac,” i.e. “Faith begot hope,” according to a gloss.
to faith,” because thereby man begins to be established
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, faith precedes
and perfected in faith.
hope. For the object of hope is a future good, arduous but
Reply to Objection 2. The thing to be hoped for is in-
possible to obtain. In order, therefore, that we may hope,
cluded in the definition of faith, because the proper object
it is necessary for the object of hope to be proposed to us
of faith, is something not apparent in itself. Hence it was
as possible. Now the object of hope is, in one way, eternal
necessary to express it in a circumlocution by something
happiness, and in another way, the Divine assistance, as
resulting from faith.
explained above (a. 2; a. 6, ad 3): and both of these are
Reply to Objection 3. Hope does not precede every
proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that
meritorious act; but it suffices for it to accompany or fol-
we are able to obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose
low it.
the Divine assistance is ready for us, according to Heb.
Whether charity precedes hope?
IIa IIae q. 17 a. 8
Objection 1.
It would seem that charity precedes
when someone wishes a person some good for his own
hope. For Ambrose says on Lk. 27:6, “If you had faith
sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is that
like to a grain of mustard seed,” etc.: “Charity flows from
whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but
faith, and hope from charity.” But faith precedes charity.
that he may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves
Therefore charity precedes hope.
what he desires. The first love of God pertains to char-
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
ity, which adheres to God for His own sake; while hope
xiv, 9) that “good emotions and affections proceed from
pertains to the second love, since he that hopes, intends to
love and holy charity.” Now to hope, considered as an act
obtain possession of something for himself.
of hope, is a good emotion of the soul. Therefore it flows
Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes char-
from charity.
ity. For just as a man is led to love God, through fear of
Objection 3. Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D,
being punished by Him for his sins, as Augustine states
26) that hope proceeds from merits, which precede not
(In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so too, hope leads
only the thing hoped for, but also hope itself, which, in the
to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be re-
order of nature, is preceded by charity. Therefore charity
warded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His
precedes hope.
commandments. On the other hand, in the order of per-
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): “The
fection charity naturally precedes hope, wherefore, with
end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and
the advent of charity, hope is made more perfect, because
a good conscience,” i.e. “from hope,” according to a gloss.
we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this sense that Am-
Therefore hope precedes charity.
brose states (obj. 1) that charity flows from hope: so that
I answer that, Order is twofold. One is the order of
this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
generation and of matter, in respect of which the imperfect
Reply to Objection 2. Hope and every movement of
precedes the perfect: the other is the order of perfection
the appetite proceed from some kind of love, whereby the
and form, in respect of which the perfect naturally pre-
expected good is loved. But not every kind of hope pro-
cedes the imperfect. In respect of the first order hope pre-
ceeds from charity, but only the movement of living hope,
cedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that hope and
viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as
all movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated
from a friend.
above ( Ia IIae, q. 27, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 28, a. 6, ad 2; Ia IIae, Reply to Objection 3. The Master is speaking of liv-q. 40, a. 7) in the treatise on the passions.
ing hope, which is naturally preceded by charity and the
Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Per-
merits caused by charity.
fect love is that whereby a man is loved in himself, as
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SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 18
Of the Subject of Hope
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject?
(2) Whether it is in the blessed?
(3) Whether it is in the damned?
(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?
Whether hope is in the will as its subject?
IIa IIae q. 18 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that hope is not in the will
And, since there is a twofold appetite in man, namely, the
as its subject. For the object of hope is an arduous good,
sensitive which is divided into irascible and concupisci-
as stated above (q. 17, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 1). Now the
ble, and the intellective appetite, called the will, as stated
arduous is the object, not of the will, but of the irascible.
in the Ia, q. 82, a. 5, those movements which occur in
Therefore hope is not in the will but in the irascible.
the lower appetite, are with passion, while those in the
Objection 2. Further, where one suffices it is superflu-
higher appetite are without passion, as shown above ( Ia,
ous to add another. Now charity suffices for the perfecting
q. 87, a. 2, ad 1; Ia IIae, q. 22, a. 3, ad 3). Now the act of
of the will, which is the most perfect of the virtues. There-
the virtue of hope cannot belong to the sensitive appetite,
fore hope is not in the will.
since the good which is the principal object of this virtue,
Objection 3. Further, the one same power cannot ex-
is not a sensible but a Divine good. Therefore hope re-
ercise two acts at the same time; thus the intellect cannot
sides in the higher appetite called the will, and not in the
understand many things simultaneously. Now the act of
lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.
hope can be at the same time as an act of charity. Since,
Reply to Objection 1. The object of the irascible is
then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the will, it fol-
an arduous sensible: whereas the object of the virtue of
lows that the act of hope does not belong to that power: so
hope is an arduous intelligible, or rather superintelligible.
that, therefore, hope is not in the will.
Reply to Objection 2. Charity perfects the will suffi-
On the contrary, The soul is not apprehensive of God
ciently with regard to one act, which is the act of loving:
save as regards the mind in which is memory, intellect and
but another virtue is required in order to perfect it with
will, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Now hope
regard to its other act, which is that of hoping.
is a theological virtue having God for its object. Since
Reply to Objection 3. The movement of hope and the
therefore it is neither in the memory, nor in the intellect,
movement of charity are mutually related, as was shown
which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is
above (q. 17, a. 8). Hence there is no reason why both
in the will as its subject.
movements should not belong at the same time to the same
I answer that, As shown above ( Ia, q. 87, a. 2), habits power: even as the intellect can understand many things
are known by their acts. Now the act of hope is a move-
at the same time if they be related to one another, as stated
ment of the appetitive faculty, since its object is a good.
in the Ia, q. 85, a. 4.
Whether in the blessed there is hope?
IIa IIae q. 18 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that in the blessed there
in its possession.
is hope. For Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the
Objection 3. Further, by the virtue of hope, a man
first moment of His conception. Now He had hope, since,
can hope for happiness, not only for himself, but also for
according to a gloss, the words of Ps. 30:2, “In Thee, O
others, as stated above (q. 17, a. 3). But the blessed who
Lord, have I hoped,” are said in His person. Therefore in
are in heaven hope for the happiness of others, else they
the blessed there can be hope.
would not pray for them. Therefore there can be hope in
Objection 2. Further, even as the obtaining of happi-
them.
ness is an arduous good, so is its continuation. Now, be-
Objection 4. Further, the happiness of the saints im-
fore they obtain happiness, men hope to obtain it. There-
plies not only glory of the soul but also glory of the body.
fore, after they have obtained it, they can hope to continue
Now the souls of the saints in heaven, look yet for the
1272
glory of their bodies (Apoc. 6:10; Augustine, Gen. ad lit.
the body but the enjoyment of God.
xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
Reply to Objection 2. The happiness of the saints
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom.
8:24):
is called eternal life, because through enjoying God they
“What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?” Now the
become partakers, as it were, of God’s eternity which sur-
blessed enjoy the sight of God. Therefore hope has no
passes all time: so that the continuation of happiness does
place in them.
not differ in respect of present, past and future. Hence
I answer that, If what gives a thing its species be
the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their hap-
removed, the species is destroyed, and that thing cannot
piness (for as regards this there is no future), but are in
remain the same; just as when a natural body loses its
actual possession thereof.
form, it does not remain the same specifically. Now hope
Reply to Objection 3. So long as the virtue of hope
takes its species from its principal object, even as the other
lasts, it is by the same hope that one hopes for one’s own
virtues do, as was shown above (q. 17, Aa. 5,6; Ia IIae,
happiness, and for that of others. But when hope is voided
q. 54, a. 2): and its principal object is eternal happiness
in the blessed, whereby they hoped for their own happi-
as being possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as
ness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet not
stated above (q. 17, a. 2).
by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity.
Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an ob-
Even so, he that has Divine charity, by that same charity
ject of hope except in so far as it is something future, it fol-loves his neighbor, without having the virtue of charity,
lows that when happiness is no longer future, but present,
but by some other love.
it is incompatible with the virtue of hope. Consequently
Reply to Objection 4. Since hope is a theological
hope, like faith, is voided in heaven, and neither of them
virtue having God for its object, its principal object is the
can be in the blessed.
glory of the soul, which consists in the enjoyment of God,
Reply to Objection 1. Although Christ was a compre-
and not the glory of the body. Moreover, although the
hensor and therefore blessed as to the enjoyment of God,
glory of the body is something arduous in comparison
nevertheless He was, at the same time, a wayfarer, as re-
with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the
gards the passibility of nature, to which He was still sub-
glory of the soul; both because the glory of the body is a
ject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the glory
very small thing as compared with the glory of the soul,
of impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to the virtue
and because one who has the glory of the soul has already
of hope, the principal object of which is not the glory of
the sufficient cause of the glory of the body.
Whether hope is in the damned?
IIa IIae q. 18 a. 3
Objection 1.
It would seem that there is hope in
sorrow of heart, and shall howl for grief of spirit.” There-
the damned. For the devil is damned and prince of the
fore no hope is in the damned.
damned, according to Mat. 25:41: “Depart. . . you cursed,
I answer that, Just as it is a condition of happiness
into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil
that the will should find rest therein, so is it a condition of and his angels.” But the devil has hope, according to
punishment, that what is inflicted in punishment, should
Job 40:28, “Behold his hope shall fail him.” Therefore
go against the will. Now that which is not known can nei-
it seems that the damned have hope.
ther be restful nor repugnant to the will: wherefore Au-
Objection 2. Further, just as faith is either living or
gustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could
dead, so is hope. But lifeless faith can be in the dev-
not be perfectly happy in their first state before their con-
ils and the damned, according to James 2:19: “The dev-
firmation, or unhappy before their fall, since they had no
ils. . . believe and tremble.” Therefore it seems that lifeless foreknowledge of what would happen to them. For per-hope also can be in the damned.
fect and true happiness requires that one should be certain
Objection 3. Further, after death there accrues to man
of being happy for ever, else the will would not rest.
no merit or demerit that he had not before, according to
In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation
Eccles. 11:3, “If the tree fall to the south, or to the north,
is a necessary condition of the punishment of the damned,
in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be.” Now
it would not be truly penal unless it went against the will;
many who are damned, in this life hoped and never de-
and this would be impossible if they were ignorant of the
spaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.
everlastingness of their damnation. Hence it belongs to
On the contrary, Hope causes joy, according to Rom.
the unhappy state of the damned, that they should know
12:12, “Rejoicing in hope.” Now the damned have no joy,
that they cannot by any means escape from damnation and
but sorrow and grief, according to Is. 65:14, “My servants
obtain happiness. Wherefore it is written (Job 15:22): “He
shall praise for joyfulness of heart, and you shall cry for
believeth not that he may return from darkness to light.”
1273
It is, therefore, evident that they cannot apprehend happi-into his mouth”: this is not, however, the hope of which
ness as a possible good, as neither can the blessed appre-
we are speaking.
hend it as a future good. Consequently there is no hope
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Enchirid-
either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand,
ion viii), “faith is about things, bad or good, past, present,
hope can be in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purga-
or future, one’s own or another’s; whereas hope is only
tory, because in either case they apprehend happiness as a
about good things, future and concerning oneself.” Hence
future possible thing.
it is possible for lifeless faith to be in the damned, but
Reply to Objection 1.
As Gregory says (Moral.
not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them future
xxxiii, 20) this is said of the devil as regards his mem-
possible things, but far removed from them.
bers, whose hope will fail utterly: or, if it be understood
Reply to Objection 3. Lack of hope in the damned
of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope whereby he
does not change their demerit, as neither does the voiding
expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just
of hope in the blessed increase their merit: but both these
before (Job 40:18): “He trusteth that the Jordan may run
things are due to the change in their respective states.
Whether there is certainty in the hope of a wayfarer?
IIa IIae q. 18 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no certainty
is moved infallibly to its end by the cognitive power. In
in the hope of a wayfarer. For hope resides in the will.
this way we say that nature works with certainty, since it
But certainty pertains not to the will but to the intellect.
is moved by the Divine intellect which moves everything
Therefore there is no certainty in hope.
with certainty to its end. In this way too, the moral virtues
Objection 2. Further, hope is based on grace and mer-
are said to work with greater certainty than art, in as much
its, as stated above (q. 17, a. 1). Now it is impossible in
as, like a second nature, they are moved to their acts by the
this life to know for certain that we are in a state of grace,
reason: and thus too, hope tends to its end with certainty,
as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 112, a. 5). Therefore there is
as though sharing in the certainty of faith which is in the
no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer.
cognitive faculty.
Objection 3. Further, there can be no certainty about
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
that which may fail. Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails
Reply to Objection 2. Hope does not trust chiefly
to obtain happiness. Therefore wayfarer’s hope has no
in grace already received, but on God’s omnipotence and
certainty.
mercy, whereby even he that has not grace, can obtain it,
On the contrary, “Hope is the certain expectation of
so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever has faith is
future happiness,” as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26):
certain of God’s omnipotence and mercy.
and this may be gathered from 2 Tim. 1:12, “I know
Reply to Objection 3. That some who have hope
Whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able
fail to obtain happiness, is due to a fault of the free will
to keep that which I have committed to Him.”
in placing the obstacle of sin, but not to any deficiency
I answer that, Certainty is found in a thing in two
in God’s power or mercy, in which hope places its trust.
ways, essentially and by participation. It is found essen-
Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope.
tially in the cognitive power; by participation in whatever
1274
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 19
Of the Gift of Fear
(In Twelve Articles)
We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is to be feared?
(2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly; (3) Whether worldly fear is always evil?
(4) Whether servile fear is good?
(5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear?
(6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes?
(7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?
(8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear?
(9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(10) Whether it grows when charity grows?
(11) Whether it remains in heaven?
(12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
Whether God can be feared?
IIa IIae q. 19 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot be feared.
ing, is a good. Because, since a thing is said to be good
For the object of fear is a future evil, as stated above ( Ia
through being ordered to an end, while evil implies lack of
IIae, q. 41, Aa. 2,3). But God is free of all evil, since He
this order, that which excludes the order to the last end is
is goodness itself. Therefore God cannot be feared.
altogether evil, and such is the evil of fault. On the other
Objection 2. Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now
hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in so far as
we hope in God. Therefore we cannot fear Him at the
it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely
same time.
speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last Objection 3. Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet.
end.
ii, 5), “we fear those things whence evil comes to us.” But
In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if
evil comes to us, not from God, but from ourselves, ac-
we be separated from Him: and in this way God can and
cording to Osee 13:9: “Destruction is thy own, O Israel:
ought to be feared.
thy help is. . . in Me.” Therefore God is not to be feared.
Reply to Objection 1. This objection considers the
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 10:7): “Who shall
object of fear as being the evil which a man shuns.
not fear Thee, O King of nations?” and (Malachi 1:6): “If
Reply to Objection 2. In God, we may consider both
I be a master, where is My fear?”
His justice, in respect of which He punishes those who
I answer that, Just as hope has two objects, one of
sin, and His mercy, in respect of which He sets us free: in
which is the future good itself, that one expects to obtain,
us the consideration of His justice gives rise to fear, but
while the other is someone’s help, through whom one ex-
the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so that,
pects to obtain what one hopes for, so, too, fear may have
accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but
two objects, one of which is the very evil which a man
under different aspects.
shrinks from, while the other is that from which the evil
Reply to Objection 3. The evil of fault is not from
may come. Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is
God as its author but from us, in for far as we forsake God:
goodness itself, cannot be an object of fear; but He can
while the evil of punishment is from God as its author, in
be an object of fear in the second way, in so far as there
so far as it has character of a good, since it is something
may come to us some evil either from Him or in relation
just, through being inflicted on us justly; although orig-
to Him.
inally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is written
From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this
(Wis. 1:13,16): “God made not death. . . but the wicked
is evil not absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speak-
with works and words have called it to them.”
1275
Whether fear is fittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly fear?
IIa IIae q. 19 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that fear is unfittingly di-
which is between both these fears. As to whether it is pos-
vided into filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Dam-
sible to fear the evil of fault, the question has been treated
ascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds
above ( Ia IIae, q. 42, a. 3) when we were considering the
of fear, viz. “laziness, shamefacedness,” etc. of which we
passion of fear.
have treated above ( Ia IIae, q. 41, a. 4), and which are
Reply to Objection 1. Damascene divides fear as a
not mentioned in the division in question. Therefore this
passion of the soul: whereas this division of fear is taken
division of fear seems unfitting.
from its relation to God, as explained above.
Objection 2. Further, each of these fears is either
Reply to Objection 2. Moral good consists chiefly in
good or evil. But there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which
turning to God, while moral evil consists chiefly in turn-
is neither morally good, since it is in the demons, accord-
ing away from Him: wherefore all the fears mentioned
ing to James 2:19, “The devils. . . believe and tremble,” nor
above imply either moral evil or moral good. Now natural
evil, since it is in Christ, according to Mk. 14:33, Jesus
fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is not
“began to fear and be heavy.” Therefore the aforesaid di-
numbered among these kinds of fear.
vision of fear is insufficient.
Reply to Objection 3. The relation of servant to mas-
Objection 3. Further, the relation of son to father dif-
ter is based on the power which the master exercises over
fers from that of wife to husband, and this again from that
the servant; whereas, on the contrary, the relation of a
of servant to master. Now filial fear, which is that of the
son to his father or of a wife to her husband is based on
son in comparison with his father, is distinct from servile
the son’s affection towards his father to whom he submits
fear, which is that of the servant in comparison with his
himself, or on the wife’s affection towards her husband to
master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be that of
whom she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial
the wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be dis-
and chaste fear amount to the same, because by the love
tinguished from all these other fears.
of charity God becomes our Father, according to Rom.
Objection 4. Further, even as servile fear fears pun-
8:15, “You have received the spirit of adoption of sons,
ishment, so do initial and worldly fear. Therefore no dis-
whereby we cry: Abba [Father]”; and by this same char-
tinction should be made between them.
ity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, “I
Objection 5. Further, even as concupiscence is about
have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you
some good, so is fear about some evil. Now “concupis-
as a chaste virgin to Christ”: whereas servile fear has no
cence of the eyes,” which is the desire for things of this
connection with these, since it does not include charity in
world, is distinct from “concupiscence of the flesh,” which
its definition.
is the desire for one’s own pleasure. Therefore “worldly
Reply to Objection 4.
These three fears regard
fear,” whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct
punishment but in different ways. For worldly or hu-
from “human fear,” whereby one fears harm to one’s own
man fear regards a punishment which turns man away
person.
from God, and which God’s enemies sometimes inflict or
On the contrary stands the authority of the Master
threaten: whereas servile and initial fear regard a pun-
(Sent. iii, D, 34).
ishment whereby men are drawn to God, and which is
I answer that, We are speaking of fear now, in so far
inflicted or threatened by God. Servile fear regards this
as it makes us turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him.
punishment chiefly, while initial fear regards it secondar-
For, since the object of fear is an evil, sometimes, on ac-
ily.
count of the evils he fears, man withdraws from God, and
Reply to Objection 5. It amounts to the same whether
this is called human fear; while sometimes, on account of
man turns away from God through fear of losing his
the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him.
worldly goods, or through fear of forfeiting the well-being
This latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and
of his body, since external goods belong to the body.
evil of fault.
Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although
Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him,
they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the de-
through fear of punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it
sire of different goods. This diversity causes a specific di-
be on account of fear of committing a fault, it will be fil-
versity of sins, all of which alike however lead man away
ial fear, for it becomes a child to fear offending its father.
from God.
If, however, it be on account of both, it will be initial fear, 1276
Whether worldly fear is always evil?
IIa IIae q. 19 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that worldly fear is not
is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as
always evil. Because regard for men seems to be a kind of
the desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accord-
human fear. Now some are blamed for having no regard
ingly worldly love is, properly speaking, the love whereby
for man, for instance, the unjust judge of whom we read
a man trusts in the world as his end, so that worldly love is
(Lk. 18:2) that he “feared not God, nor regarded man.”
always evil. Now fear is born of love, since man fears the
Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.
loss of what he loves, as Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
Objection 2. Further, worldly fear seems to have ref-
33). Now worldly fear is that which arises from worldly
erence to the punishments inflicted by the secular power.
love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear is
Now such like punishments incite us to good actions, ac-
always evil.
cording to Rom. 13:3, “Wilt thou not be afraid of the
Reply to Objection 1. One may have regard for men
power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise
in two ways. First in so far as there is in them something
from the same.” Therefore worldly fear is not always evil.
divine, for instance, the good of grace or of virtue, or at
Objection 3. Further, it seems that what is in us nat-
least of the natural image of God: and in this way those
urally, is not evil, since our natural gifts are from God.
are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one
Now it is natural to man to fear detriment to his body, and
may have regard for men as being in opposition to God,
loss of his worldly goods, whereby the present life is sup-
and thus it is praiseworthy to have no regard for men, ac-
ported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always
cording as we read of Elias or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): “In
evil.
his days he feared not the prince.”
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 10:28): “Fear
Reply to Objection 2. When the secular power in-
ye not them that kill the body,” thus forbidding worldly
flicts punishment in order to withdraw men from sin, it is
fear. Now nothing but what is evil is forbidden by God.
acting as God’s minister, according to Rom. 13:4, “For he
Therefore worldly fear is evil.
is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him
I answer that, As shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3;
that doth evil.” To fear the secular power in this way is
Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2) moral acts and
part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.
habits take their name and species from their objects. Now
Reply to Objection 3. It is natural for man to shrink
the proper object of the appetite’s movement is the final
from detriment to his own body and loss of worldly goods,
good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive movement
but to forsake justice on that account is contrary to natu-
is both specified and named from its proper end. For if
ral reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that
anyone were to describe covetousness as love of work be-
there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which no fear
cause men work on account of covetousness, this descrip-
should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than
tion would be incorrect, since the covetous man seeks
to suffer any punishment whatever.
work not as end but as a means: the end that he seeks
Whether servile fear is good?
IIa IIae q. 19 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that servile fear is not
opposed to chaste fear. But mercenary love is always evil.
good. For if the use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is
Therefore servile fear is also.
evil. Now the use of servile fear is evil, for according to a
On the contrary, Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost.
gloss on Rom. 8:15, “if a man do anything through fear,
But servile fear is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on
although the deed be good, it is not well done.” Therefore
Rom. 8:15, “You have not received the spirit of bondage,”
servile fear is not good.
etc. says: “It is the one same spirit that bestows two fears,
Objection 2. Further, no good grows from a sinful
viz. servile and chaste fear.” Therefore servile fear is not
root. Now servile fear grows from a sinful root, because
evil.
when commenting on Job 3:11, “Why did I not die in the
I answer that, It is owing to its servility that servile womb?” Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): “When a man
fear may be evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom.
dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin
Since, then, “what is free is cause of itself” (Metaph. i,
and no longer loves the friendship of God which he has
2), a slave is one who does not act as cause of his own
lost, his fear is born of pride, not of humility.” Therefore
action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever
servile fear is evil.
does a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak,
Objection 3. Further, just as mercenary love is op-
because it is by his own inclination that he is moved to act:
posed to the love of charity, so is servile fear, apparently,
so that it is contrary to the very notion of servility that one 1277
should act from love. Consequently servile fear as such ject or end being directed to a further end. Consequently
is contrary to charity: so that if servility were essential to
servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is evil.
fear, servile fear would be evil simply, even as adultery is
Reply to Objection 1. This saying of Augustine is to
evil simply, because that which makes it contrary to char-
be applied to a man who does something through servile
ity belongs to its very species.
fear as such, so that he loves not justice, and fears nothing
This servility, however, does not belong to the species
but the punishment.
of servile fear, even as neither does lifelessness to the
Reply to Objection 2. Servile fear as to its substance
species of lifeless faith. For the species of a moral habit
is not born of pride, but its servility is, inasmuch as man
or act is taken from the object. Now the object of servile
is unwilling, by love, to subject his affections to the yoke
fear is punishment, and it is by accident that, either the
of justice.
good to which the punishment is contrary, is loved as the
Reply to Objection 3.
Mercenary love is that
last end, and that consequently the punishment is feared
whereby God is loved for the sake of worldly goods, and
as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is de-
this is, of itself, contrary to charity, so that mercenary love void of charity, or that the punishment is directed to God
is always evil. But servile fear, as to its substance, implies
as its end, and that, consequently, it is not feared as the
merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be feared
greatest evil, which is the case with one who has charity.
as the principal evil.
For the species of a habit is not destroyed through its ob-
Whether servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear?
IIa IIae q. 19 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that servile fear is sub-
Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear
stantially the same as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile shrinks, differs specifically from evil of fault, which fil-fear the same apparently as living faith is to lifeless faith,
ial fear shuns, as shown above (a. 2). Hence it is evident
since the one is accompanied by mortal sin and the other
that servile and filial fear are not the same substantially
not. Now living faith and lifeless faith are substantially
but differ specifically.
the same. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially
Reply to Objection 1. Living and lifeless faith differ,
the same.
not as regards the object, since each of them believes God
Objection 2. Further, habits are diversified by their
and believes in a God, but in respect of something extrin-
objects. Now the same thing is the object of servile and of
sic, viz. the presence or absence of charity, and so they
filial fear, since they both fear God. Therefore servile and
do not differ substantially. On the other hand, servile and
filial fear are substantially the same.
filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the compar-
Objection 3. Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God
ison fails.
and to obtain favors from Him, so does he fear to be sep-
Reply to Objection 2. Servile fear and filial fear do
arated from God and to be punished by Him. Now it is
not regard God in the same light. For servile fear looks
the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God, and to re-
upon God as the cause of the infliction of punishment,
ceive other favors from Him, as stated above (q. 17, a. 2,
whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as the active cause
ad 2). Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation
of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks to
from God, is the same as servile fear whereby we fear His
be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of ob-
punishments.
ject, viz. God, does not prove a specific identity of fear,
On the contrary, Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan.
since also natural movements differ specifically accord-
Tract. ix) says that there are two fears, one servile, an-
ing to their different relationships to some one term, for
other filial or chaste fear.
movement from whiteness is not specifically the same as
I answer that, The proper object of fear is evil. And
movement towards whiteness.
since acts and habits are diversified by their objects, as
Reply to Objection 3. Hope looks upon God as the
shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2 ), it follows of necessity
principle not only of the enjoyment of God, but also of
that different kinds of fear correspond to different kinds
any other favor whatever. This cannot be said of fear; and
of evil.
so there is no comparison.
1278
Whether servile fear remains with charity?
IIa IIae q. 19 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that servile fear does not
for the sake of God and in God. In a third way, it is indeed
remain with charity. For Augustine says (In prim. canon.
distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as when
Joan. Tract. ix) that “when charity takes up its abode, it
a man loves himself from the point of view of his own
drives away fear which had prepared a place for it.”
good, yet not so as to place his end in this his own good:
Objection 2. Further, “The charity of God is poured
even as one may have another special love for one’s neigh-
forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us”
bor, besides the love of charity which is founded on God,
(Rom. 5:5). Now “where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is
when we love him by reason of usefulness, consanguin-
liberty” (2 Cor. 3:17). Since then freedom excludes servi-
ity, or some other human consideration, which, however,
tude, it seems that servile fear is driven away when charity
is referable to charity.
comes.
Accordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, in-
Objection 3. Further, servile fear is caused by self-
cluded in charity, because separation from God is a pun-
love, in so far as punishment diminishes one’s own good.
ishment, which charity shuns exceedingly; so that this be-
Now love of God drives away self-love, for it makes us
longs to chaste fear. In another way, it is contrary to char-
despise ourselves: thus Augustine testifies (De Civ. Dei
ity, when a man shrinks from the punishment that is op-
xiv, 28) that “the love of God unto the contempt of self
posed to his natural good, as being the principal evil in
builds up the city of God.” Therefore it seems that servile
opposition to the good which he loves as an end; and in
fear is driven out when charity comes.
this way fear of punishment is not consistent with charity.
On the contrary, Servile fear is a gift of the Holy
In another way fear of punishment is indeed substantially
Ghost, as stated above (a. 4). Now the gifts of the Holy
distinct from chaste fear, when, to wit, a man fears a penal
Ghost are not forfeited through the advent of charity,
evil, not because it separates him from God, but because
whereby the Holy Ghost dwells in us. Therefore servile
it is hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not place
fear is not driven out when charity comes.
his end in this good, so that neither does he dread this
I answer that, Servile fear proceeds from self-love,
evil as being the principal evil. Such fear of punishment
because it is fear of punishment which is detrimental to
is consistent with charity; but it is not called servile, ex-
one’s own good. Hence the fear of punishment is consis-
cept when punishment is dreaded as a principal evil, as ex-
tent with charity, in the same way as self-love is: because
plained above (Aa. 2,4). Hence fear considered as servile,
it comes to the same that a man love his own good and
does not remain with charity, but the substance of servile
that he fear to be deprived of it.
fear can remain with charity, even as self-love can remain
Now self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to
with charity.
charity. In one way it is contrary to charity, when a man
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of fear
places his end in the love of his own good. In another
considered as servile: and such is the sense of the two
way it is included in charity, when a man loves himself
other objections.
Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?
IIa IIae q. 19 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that fear is not the be-
I answer that, A thing may be called the beginning of
ginning of wisdom. For the beginning of a thing is a part
wisdom in two ways: in one way because it is the begin-
thereof. But fear is not a part of wisdom, since fear is
ning of wisdom itself as to its essence; in another way, as
seated in the appetitive faculty, while wisdom is in the in-
to its effect. Thus the beginning of an art as to its essence
tellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning of
consists in the principles from which that art proceeds,
wisdom.
while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that where-
Objection 2. Further, nothing is the beginning of it-
from it begins to operate: for instance we might say that
self. “Now fear of the Lord, that is wisdom,” according to
the beginning of the art of building is the foundation be-
Job 28:28. Therefore it seems that fear of God is not the
cause that is where the builder begins his work.
beginning of wisdom.
Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things,
Objection 3. Further, nothing is prior to the begin-
as we shall state further on (q. 45, a. 1), it is considered by ning. But something is prior to fear, since faith precedes
us in one way, and in another way by philosophers. For,
fear. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning of
seeing that our life is ordained to the enjoyment of God,
wisdom.
and is directed thereto according to a participation of the
On the contrary, It is written in the Ps. 110:10: “The
Divine Nature, conferred on us through grace, wisdom, as
fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.”
we look at it, is considered not only as being cognizant of
1279
God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as directing ning, man must first of all fear God and submit himself
human conduct; since this is directed not only by the hu-
to Him: for the result will be that in all things he will be
man law, but also by the Divine law, as Augustine shows
ruled by God.
(De Trin. xii, 14). Accordingly the beginning of wisdom
Reply to Objection 1. This argument proves that fear
as to its essence consists in the first principles of wisdom,
is not the beginning of wisdom as to the essence of wis-
i.e. the articles of faith, and in this sense faith is said to
dom.
be the beginning of wisdom. But as regards the effect, the
Reply to Objection 2. The fear of God is compared to
beginning of wisdom is the point where wisdom begins
a man’s whole life that is ruled by God’s wisdom, as the
to work, and in this way fear is the beginning of wisdom,
root to the tree: hence it is written (Ecclus. 1:25): “The
yet servile fear in one way, and filial fear, in another. For
root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for [Vulg.: ‘and’] the
servile fear is like a principle disposing a man to wisdom
branches thereof are longlived.” Consequently, as the root
from without, in so far as he refrains from sin through
is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said to fear of punishment, and is thus fashioned for the effect of
be wisdom.
wisdom, according to Ecclus. 1:27, “The fear of the Lord
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, faith is the be-
driveth out sin.” On the other hand, chaste or filial fear is
ginning of wisdom in one way, and fear, in another. Hence
the beginning of wisdom, as being the first effect of wis-
it is written (Ecclus. 25:16): “The fear of God is the be-
dom. For since the regulation of human conduct by the
ginning of love: and the beginning of faith is to be fast
Divine law belongs to wisdom, in order to make a begin-
joined to it.”
Whether initial fear differs substantially from filial fear?
IIa IIae q. 19 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that initial fear differs
they do not possess the perfection of filial fear, because
substantially from filial fear. For filial fear is caused by
they have not yet attained to the perfection of charity.
love. Now initial fear is the beginning of love, according
Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to fil-
to Ecclus. 25:16, “The fear of God is the beginning of
ial fear as imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and
love.” Therefore initial fear is distinct from filial fear.
imperfect charity differ, not as to essence but as to state.
Objection 2. Further, initial fear dreads punishment,
Therefore we must conclude that initial fear, as we under-
which is the object of servile fear, so that initial and servile stand it here, does not differ essentially from filial fear.
fear would seem to be the same. But servile fear is distinct
Reply to Objection 1. The fear which is a beginning
from filial fear. Therefore initial fear also is substantially
of love is servile fear, which is the herald of charity, just
distinct from initial fear.
as the bristle introduces the thread, as Augustine states
Objection 3. Further, a mean differs in the same ratio
(Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan.). Or else, if it be referred to initial from both the extremes. Now initial fear is the mean be-fear, this is said to be the beginning of love, not absolutely, tween servile and filial fear. Therefore it differs from both
but relatively to the state of perfect charity.
filial and servile fear.
Reply to Objection 2. Initial fear does not dread pun-
On the contrary, Perfect and imperfect do not diver-
ishment as its proper object, but as having something of
sify the substance of a thing. Now initial and filial fear
servile fear connected with it: for this servile fear, as to its differ in respect of perfection and imperfection of char-substance, remains indeed, with charity, its servility being
ity, as Augustine states (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix).
cast aside; whereas its act remains with imperfect char-
Therefore initial fear does not differ substantially from fil-
ity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not
ial fear.
only through love of justice, but also through fear of pun-
I answer that, Initial fear is so called because it is a ishment, though this same act ceases in the man who has
beginning [initium]. Since, however, both servile and fil-
perfect charity, which “casteth out fear,” according to 1
ial fear are, in some way, the beginning of wisdom, each
Jn. 4:18.
may be called in some way, initial.
Reply to Objection 3. Initial fear is a mean between
It is not in this sense, however, that we are to under-
servile and filial fear, not as between two things of the
stand initial fear in so far as it is distinct from servile and same genus, but as the imperfect is a mean between a per-filial fear, but in the sense according to which it belongs
fect being and a non-being, as stated in Metaph. ii, for it is
to the state of beginners, in whom there is a beginning of
the same substantially as the perfect being, while it differs
filial fear resulting from a beginning of charity, although
altogether from non-being.
1280
Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
IIa IIae q. 19 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that fear is not a gift of
to be amenable to the motion of a certain mover, the first
the Holy Ghost. For no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed
condition required is that it be a non-resistant subject of
to a virtue, which is also from the Holy Ghost; else the
that mover, because resistance of the movable subject to
Holy Ghost would be in opposition to Himself. Now fear
the mover hinders the movement. This is what filial or
is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore fear is not
chaste fear does, since thereby we revere God and avoid
a gift of the Holy Ghost.
separating ourselves from Him. Hence, according to Au-
Objection 2. Further, it is proper to a theological
gustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) filial fear holds the
virtue to have God for its object. But fear has God for
first place, as it were, among the gifts of the Holy Ghost,
its object, in so far as God is feared. Therefore fear is not
in the ascending order, and the last place, in the descend-
a gift, but a theological virtue.
ing order.
Objection 3. Further, fear arises from love. But love
Reply to Objection 1. Filial fear is not opposed to
is reckoned a theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a
the virtue of hope: since thereby we fear, not that we may
theological virtue, being connected with the same matter,
fail of what we hope to obtain by God’s help, but lest we
as it were.
withdraw ourselves from this help. Wherefore filial fear
Objection 4. Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49)
and hope cling together, and perfect one another.
that “fear is bestowed as a remedy against pride.” But the
Reply to Objection 2. The proper and principal ob-
virtue of humility is opposed to pride. Therefore again,
ject of fear is the evil shunned, and in this way, as stated
fear is a kind of virtue.
above (a. 1), God cannot be an object of fear. Yet He is,
Objection 5. Further, the gifts are more perfect than
in this way, the object of hope and the other theological
the virtues, since they are bestowed in support of the
virtues, since, by the virtue of hope, we trust in God’s
virtues as Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49). Now hope is more
help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to
perfect than fear, since hope regards good, while fear re-
obtain God Himself, as the principal good. The same evi-
gards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue, it should not be
dently applies to the other theological virtues.
said that fear is a gift.
Reply to Objection 3. From the fact that love is the
On the contrary, The fear of the Lord is numbered
origin of fear, it does not follow that the fear of God is
among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost (Is. 11:3).
not a distinct habit from charity which is the love of God,
I answer that, Fear is of several kinds, as stated above since love is the origin of all the emotions, and yet we are
(a. 2). Now it is not “human fear,” according to Augustine
perfected by different habits in respect of different emo-
(De Gratia et Lib. Arb. xviii), “that is a gift of God”—for
tions. Yet love is more of a virtue than fear is, because
it was by this fear that Peter denied Christ—but that fear
love regards good, to which virtue is principally directed
of which it was said (Mat. 10:28): “Fear Him that can
by reason of its own nature, as was shown above ( Ia IIae,
destroy both soul and body into hell.”
q. 55, Aa. 3,4); for which reason hope is also reckoned as
Again servile fear is not to be reckoned among the
a virtue; whereas fear principally regards evil, the avoid-
seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, though it is from Him, be-
ance of which it denotes, wherefore it is something less
cause according to Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lvii) it
than a theological virtue.
is compatible with the will to sin: whereas the gifts of
Reply to Objection 4. According to Ecclus. 10:14,
the Holy Ghost are incompatible with the will to sin, as
“the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God,”
they are inseparable from charity, as stated above ( Ia IIae,
that is to refuse submission to God, and this is opposed
q. 68, a. 5).
to filial fear, which reveres God. Thus fear cuts off the
It follows, therefore, that the fear of God, which is
source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a rem-
numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is fil-
edy against pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same
ial or chaste fear. For it was stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68,
as the virtue of humility, but that it is its origin. For the
Aa. 1,3) that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are certain ha-
gifts of the Holy Ghost are the origin of the intellectual
bitual perfections of the soul’s powers, whereby these are
and moral virtues, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 4),
rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just
while the theological virtues are the origin of the gifts, as
as, by the moral virtues, the appetitive powers are ren-
stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 69, a. 4, ad 3).
dered amenable to the motion of reason. Now for a thing
This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.
1281
Whether fear decreases when charity increases?
IIa IIae q. 19 a. 10
Objection 1. It seems that fear decreases when char-
is entirely cast out when charity comes, although the fear
ity increases. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan.
of punishment remains as to its substance, as stated above
Tract. ix): “The more charity increases, the more fear de-
(a. 6). This fear decreases as charity increases, chiefly as
creases.”
regards its act, since the more a man loves God, the less
Objection 2. Further, fear decreases when hope in-
he fears punishment; first, because he thinks less of his
creases. But charity increases when hope increases, as
own good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly, be-
stated above (q. 17, a. 8). Therefore fear decreases when
cause, the faster he clings, the more confident he is of the
charity increases.
reward, and, consequently the less fearful of punishment.
Objection 3. Further, love implies union, whereas
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine speaks there of the
fear implies separation. Now separation decreases when
fear of punishment.
union increases. Therefore fear decreases when the love
Reply to Objection 2. It is fear of punishment that
of charity increases.
decreases when hope increases; but with the increase of
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
the latter filial fear increases, because the more certainly a
36) that “the fear of God not only begins but also perfects
man expects to obtain a good by another’s help, the more
wisdom, whereby we love God above all things, and our
he fears to offend him or to be separated from him.
neighbor as ourselves.”
Reply to Objection 3. Filial fear does not imply sep-
I answer that, Fear is twofold, as stated above
aration from God, but submission to Him, and shuns sep-
(Aa. 2,4); one is filial fear, whereby a son fears to offend
aration from that submission. Yet, in a way, it implies
his father or to be separated from him; the other is servile
separation, in the point of not presuming to equal oneself
fear, whereby one fears punishment.
to Him, and of submitting to Him, which separation is to
Now filial fear must needs increase when charity in-
be observed even in charity, in so far as a man loves God
creases, even as an effect increases with the increase of its
more than himself and more than aught else. Hence the
cause. For the more one loves a man, the more one fears
increase of the love of charity implies not a decrease but
to offend him and to be separated from him.
an increase in the reverence of fear.
On the other hand servile fear, as regards its servility,
Whether fear remains in heaven?
IIa IIae q. 19 a. 11
Objection 1. It would seem that fear does not remain
perfect; hence, in heaven, it will not have quite the same
in heaven. For it is written (Prov. 1:33): “He. . . shall enjoy act as it has now.
abundance, without fear of evils,” which is to be under-
In order to make this clear, we must observe that the
stood as referring to those who already enjoy wisdom in
proper object of fear is a possible evil, just as the proper
everlasting happiness. Now every fear is about some evil,
object of hope is a possible good: and since the movement
since evil is the object of fear, as stated above (Aa. 2,5; Ia
of fear is like one of avoidance, fear implies avoidance of
IIae, q. 42, a. 1). Therefore there will be no fear in heaven.
a possible arduous evil, for little evils inspire no fear. Now
Objection 2. Further, in heaven men will be con-
as a thing’s good consists in its staying in its own order,
formed to God, according to 1 Jn. 3:2, “When He shall
so a thing’s evil consists in forsaking its order. Again, the
appear, we shall be like to Him.” But God fears nothing.
order of a rational creature is that it should be under God
Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear.
and above other creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for a
Objection 3. Further, hope is more perfect than fear,
rational creature to submit, by love, to a lower creature, so
since hope regards good, and fear, evil. Now hope will
too is it an evil for it, if it submit not to God, by presump-
not be in heaven. Therefore neither will there be fear in
tuously revolt against Him or contemn Him. Now this
heaven.
evil is possible to a rational creature considered as to its
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:10): “The fear
nature on account of the natural flexibility of the free-will;
of the Lord is holy, enduring for ever and ever.”
whereas in the blessed, it becomes impossible, by reason
I answer that, Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will of the perfection of glory. Therefore the avoidance of this
by no means be in heaven, since such a fear is excluded
evil that consists in non-subjection to God, and is possi-
by the security which is essential to everlasting happiness,
ble to nature, but impossible in the state of bliss, will be
as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 5, a. 4).
in heaven; while in this life there is avoidance of this evil
But regard to filial fear, as it increases with the in-
as of something altogether possible. Hence Gregory, ex-
crease of charity, so is it perfected when charity is made
pounding the words of Job (26:11), “The pillars of heaven
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tremble, and dread at His beck,” says (Moral. xvii, 29): from the blessed, the fear that denotes solicitude, and anx-
“The heavenly powers that gaze on Him without ceasing,
iety about evil, but not the fear which is accompanied by
tremble while contemplating: but their awe, lest it should
security.
be of a penal nature, is one not of fear but of wonder,”
Reply to Objection 2.
As Dionysius says (Div.
because, to wit, they wonder at God’s supereminence and
Nom. ix) “the same things are both like and unlike God.
incomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9)
They are like by reason of a variable imitation of the
in this sense, admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the
Inimitable”—that is, because, so far as they can, they imi-
question doubtful. “If,” he says, “this chaste fear that en-
tate God Who cannot be imitated perfectly—“they are un-
dureth for ever and ever is to be in the future life, it will
like because they are the effects of a Cause of Whom they
not be a fear that is afraid of an evil which might possibly
fall short infinitely and immeasurably.” Hence, if there be
occur, but a fear that holds fast to a good which we cannot
no fear in God (since there is none above Him to whom He
lose. For when we love the good which we have acquired,
may be subject) it does not follow that there is none in the
with an unchangeable love, without doubt, if it is allow-
blessed, whose happiness consists in perfect subjection to
able to say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because
God.
chaste fear denotes a will that cannot consent to sin, and
Reply to Objection 3. Hope implies a certain defect,
whereby we avoid sin without trembling lest, in our weak-
namely the futurity of happiness, which ceases when hap-
ness, we fall, and possess ourselves in the tranquillity born
piness is present: whereas fear implies a natural defect in
of charity. Else, if no kind of fear is possible there, per-
a creature, in so far as it is infinitely distant from God, and haps fear is said to endure for ever and ever, because that
this defect will remain even in heaven. Hence fear will not
which fear will lead us to, will be everlasting.”
be cast out altogether.
Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted excludes
Whether poverty of spirit is the beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear?
IIa IIae q. 19 a. 12
Objection 1. It would seem that poverty of spirit is
of whom it is said: Blessed are the poor in spirit.”
not the beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear. For
I answer that, Poverty of spirit properly corresponds
fear is the beginning of the spiritual life, as explained
to fear. Because, since it belongs to filial fear to show rev-
above (a. 7): whereas poverty belongs to the perfection
erence and submission to God, whatever results from this
of the spiritual life, according to Mat. 19:21, “If thou wilt
submission belongs to the gift of fear. Now from the very
be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to the poor.”
fact that a man submits to God, it follows that he ceases
Therefore poverty of spirit does not correspond to the gift
to seek greatness either in himself or in another but seeks
of fear.
it only in God. For that would be inconsistent with per-
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ps. 118:120):
fect subjection to God, wherefore it is written (Ps. 19:8):
“Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear,” whence it seems
“Some trust in chariots and some in horses; but we will
to follow that it belongs to fear to restrain the flesh. But
call upon the name of. . . our God.” It follows that if a man
the curbing of the flesh seems to belong rather to the beat-
fear God perfectly, he does not, by pride, seek greatness
itude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of mourning
either in himself or in external goods, viz. honors and
corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than the beatitude of
riches. In either case, this proceeds from poverty of spirit,
poverty.
in so far as the latter denotes either the voiding of a puffed
Objection 3. Further, the gift of fear corresponds to
up and proud spirit, according to Augustine’s interpreta-
the virtue of hope, as stated above (a. 9, ad 1). Now the
tion (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4), or the renunciation
last beatitude which is, “Blessed are the peacemakers, for
of worldly goods which is done in spirit, i.e. by one’s own
they shall be called the children of God,” seems above all
will, through the instigation of the Holy Spirit, according
to correspond to hope, because according to Rom. 5:2,
to the expounding of Ambrose on Lk. 6:20 and Jerome on
“we. . . glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God.”
Mat. 5:3.
Therefore that beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear,
Reply to Objection 1. Since a beatitude is an act of
rather than poverty of spirit.
perfect virtue, all the beatitudes belong to the perfection
Objection 4. Further, it was stated above ( Ia IIae,
of spiritual life. And this perfection seems to require that
q. 70, a. 2) that the fruits correspond to the beatitudes.
whoever would strive to obtain a perfect share of spir-
Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of fear. Nei-
itual goods, needs to begin by despising earthly goods,
ther, therefore, does any of the beatitudes.
wherefore fear holds the first place among the gifts. Per-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
fection, however, does not consist in the renunciation it-
Monte i, 4): “The fear of the Lord is befitting the humble
self of temporal goods; since this is the way to perfection:
1283
whereas filial fear, to which the beatitude of poverty cor-Reply to Objection 3. Hope denotes a movement by
responds, is consistent with the perfection of wisdom, as
way of a relation of tendency to a term, whereas fear im-
stated above (Aa. 7,10).
plies movement by way of a relation of withdrawal from
Reply to Objection 2. The undue exaltation of man
a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the term of
either in himself or in another is more directly opposed to
spiritual perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope, by way
that submission to God which is the result of filial fear,
of ultimate object; while the first beatitude, which implies
than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in consequence, op-
withdrawal from external things which hinder submission
posed to fear, since whoever fears God and is subject to
to God, fittingly corresponds to fear.
Him, takes no delight in things other than God. Neverthe-
Reply to Objection 4. As regards the fruits, it seems
less, pleasure is not concerned, as exaltation is, with the
that those things correspond to the gift of fear, which
arduous character of a thing which fear regards: and so
pertain to the moderate use of temporal things or to ab-
the beatitude of poverty corresponds to fear directly, and
stinence therefrom; such are modesty, continency and
the beatitude of mourning, consequently.
chastity.
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SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 20
Of Despair
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the contrary vices; (1) despair; (2) presumption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether despair is a sin?
(2) Whether it can be without unbelief?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Whether it arises from sloth?
Whether despair is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 20 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that despair is not a sin.
in conformity with the true opinion, is praiseworthy and
For every sin includes conversion to a mutable good, to-
virtuous, so the contrary movement of despair, which is
gether with aversion from the immutable good, as Augus-
in conformity with the false opinion about God, is vicious
tine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But despair includes no
and sinful.
conversion to a mutable good. Therefore it is not a sin.
Reply to Objection 1. In every mortal sin there is, in
Objection 2. Further, that which grows from a good
some way, aversion from the immutable good, and conver-
root, seems to be no sin, because “a good tree cannot bring
sion to a mutable good, but not always in the same way.
forth evil fruit” (Mat. 7:18). Now despair seems to grow
Because, since the theological virtues have God for their
from a good root, viz. fear of God, or from horror at the
object, the sins which are contrary to them, such as hatred
greatness of one’s own sins. Therefore despair is not a sin.
of God, despair and unbelief, consist principally in aver-
Objection 3. Further, if despair were a sin, it would
sion from the immutable good; but, consequently, they
be a sin also for the damned to despair. But this is not im-
imply conversion to a mutable good, in so far as the soul
puted to them as their fault but as part of their damnation.
that is a deserter from God, must necessarily turn to other
Therefore neither is it imputed to wayfarers as their fault,
things. Other sins, however, consist principally in con-
so that it is not a sin.
version to a mutable good, and, consequently, in aversion
On the contrary, That which leads men to sin, seems
from the immutable good: because the fornicator intends,
not only to be a sin itself, but a source of sins. Now such is
not to depart from God, but to enjoy carnal pleasure, the
despair, for the Apostle says of certain men (Eph. 4:19):
result of which is that he departs from God.
“Who, despairing, have given themselves up to lascivi-
Reply to Objection 2. A thing may grow from a virtu-
ousness, unto the working of all uncleanness and [Vulg.:
ous root in two ways: first, directly and on the part of the
‘unto’] covetousness.” Therefore despair is not only a sin
virtue itself; even as an act proceeds from a habit: and in
but also the origin of other sins.
this way no sin can grow from a virtuous root, for in this
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic.
sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that “no
vi, 2) affirmation and negation in the intellect correspond
man makes evil use of virtue.” Secondly, a thing proceeds
to search and avoidance in the appetite; while truth and
from a virtue indirectly, or is occasioned by a virtue, and
falsehood in the intellect correspond to good and evil in
in this way nothing hinders a sin proceeding from a virtue:
the appetite. Consequently every appetitive movement
thus sometimes men pride themselves of their virtues, ac-
which is conformed to a true intellect, is good in itself,
cording to Augustine (Ep. ccxi): “Pride lies in wait for
while every appetitive movement which is conformed to
good works that they may die.” In this way fear of God
a false intellect is evil in itself and sinful. Now the true
or horror of one’s own sins may lead to despair, in so far
opinion of the intellect about God is that from Him comes
as man makes evil use of those good things, by allowing
salvation to mankind, and pardon to sinners, according to
them to be an occasion of despair.
Ezech. 18:23, “I desire not the death of the sinner, but
Reply to Objection 3. The damned are outside the
that he should be converted, and live”∗: while it is a false
pale of hope on account of the impossibility of returning
opinion that He refuses pardon to the repentant sinner, or
to happiness: hence it is not imputed to them that they
that He does not turn sinners to Himself by sanctifying
hope not, but it is a part of their damnation. Even so,
grace. Therefore, just as the movement of hope, which is
it would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of obtaining
∗ Vulg.: ‘Is it My will that a sinner should die. . . and not that he should be converted and live?’ Cf. Ezech. 33:11
1285
that which he had no natural capacity for obtaining, or a physician were to despair of healing some sick man, or
which was not due to be obtained by him; for instance, if
if anyone were to despair of ever becoming rich.
Whether there can be despair without unbelief?
IIa IIae q. 20 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there can be no de-
as it is impossible to infer a particular conclusion from an
spair without unbelief. For the certainty of hope is derived
universal proposition, except through the holding of a par-
from faith; and so long as the cause remains the effect is
ticular proposition. Hence it is that a man, while having
not done away. Therefore a man cannot lose the certainty
right faith, in the universal, fails in an appetitive move-
of hope, by despairing, unless his faith be removed.
ment, in regard to some particular, his particular estimate
Objection 2. Further, to prefer one’s own guilt to
being corrupted by a habit or a passion, just as the forni-
God’s mercy and goodness, is to deny the infinity of God’s
cator, by choosing fornication as a good for himself at this
goodness and mercy, and so savors of unbelief. But who-
particular moment, has a corrupt estimate in a particular
ever despairs, prefers his own guilt to the Divine mercy
matter, although he retains the true universal estimate ac-
and goodness, according to Gn. 4:13: “My iniquity is
cording to faith, viz. that fornication is a mortal sin. In
greater than that I may deserve pardon.” Therefore who-
the same way, a man while retaining in the universal, the
ever despairs, is an unbeliever.
true estimate of faith, viz. that there is in the Church the
Objection 3. Further, whoever falls into a condemned
power of forgiving sins, may suffer a movement of de-
heresy, is an unbeliever. But he that despairs seems to fall
spair, to wit, that for him, being in such a state, there is no into a condemned heresy, viz. that of the Novatians, who
hope of pardon, his estimate being corrupted in a particu-
say that there is no pardon for sins after Baptism. There-
lar matter. In this way there can be despair, just as there
fore it seems that whoever despairs, is an unbeliever.
can be other mortal sins, without belief.
On the contrary, If we remove that which follows,
Reply to Objection 1. The effect is done away, not
that which precedes remains. But hope follows faith, as
only when the first cause is removed, but also when the
stated above (q. 17, a. 7). Therefore when hope is re-
secondary cause is removed. Hence the movement of
moved, faith can remain; so that, not everyone who de-
hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the
spairs, is an unbeliever.
universal estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first
I answer that, Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but
cause of the certainty of hope, but also by the removal of
despair, to the appetite: and the intellect is about univer-
the particular estimate, which is the secondary cause, as it
sals, while the appetite is moved in connection with par-
were.
ticulars, since the appetitive movement is from the soul
Reply to Objection 2. If anyone were to judge, in
towards things, which, in themselves, are particular. Now
universal, that God’s mercy is not infinite, he would be
it may happen that a man, while having a right opinion
an unbeliever. But he who despairs judges not thus, but
in the universal, is not rightly disposed as to his appeti-
that, for him in that state, on account of some particular
tive movement, his estimate being corrupted in a partic-
disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy.
ular matter, because, in order to pass from the universal
The same answer applies to the Third Objection, since
opinion to the appetite for a particular thing, it is neces-
the Novatians denied, in universal, that there is remission
sary to have a particular estimate (De Anima iii, 2), just
of sins in the Church.
Whether despair is the greatest of sins?
IIa IIae q. 20 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that despair is not the
Objection 3. Further, in the sin of despair there is
greatest of sins. For there can be despair without unbe-
nothing but inordinate aversion from God: whereas in
lief, as stated above (a. 2). But unbelief is the greatest of
other sins there is not only inordinate aversion from God,
sins because it overthrows the foundation of the spiritual
but also an inordinate conversion. Therefore the sin of
edifice. Therefore despair is not the greatest of sins.
despair is not more but less grave than other sins.
Objection 2. Further, a greater evil is opposed to
On the contrary, An incurable sin seems to be most
a greater good, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
viii,
grievous, according to Jer. 30:12: “Thy bruise is incur-
10). But charity is greater than hope, according to 1 Cor.
able, thy wound is very grievous.” Now the sin of despair
13:13. Therefore hatred of God is a greater sin than de-
is incurable, according to Jer. 15:18: “My wound is des-
spair.
perate so as to refuse to be healed.”∗ Therefore despair is
∗ Vulg.: ‘Why is my wound,’ etc.
1286
a most grievous sin.
share of God’s goodness. Hence it is clear that unbelief
I answer that, Those sins which are contrary to the
and hatred of God are against God as He is in Himself,
theological virtues are in themselves more grievous than
while despair is against Him, according as His good is
others: because, since the theological virtues have God
partaken of by us. Wherefore strictly speaking it is more
for their object, the sins which are opposed to them imply
grievous sin to disbelieve God’s truth, or to hate God, than
aversion from God directly and principally. Now every
not to hope to receive glory from Him.
mortal sin takes its principal malice and gravity from the
If, however, despair be compared to the other two sins
fact of its turning away from God, for if it were possi-
from our point of view, then despair is more dangerous,
ble to turn to a mutable good, even inordinately, without
since hope withdraws us from evils and induces us to seek
turning away from God, it would not be a mortal sin. Con-
for good things, so that when hope is given up, men rush
sequently a sin which, first and of its very nature, includes
headlong into sin, and are drawn away from good works.
aversion from God, is most grievous among mortal sins.
Wherefore a gloss on Prov. 24:10, “If thou lose hope be-
Now unbelief, despair and hatred of God are opposed
ing weary in the day of distress, thy strength shall be di-
to the theological virtues: and among them, if we compare
minished,” says: “Nothing is more hateful than despair,
hatred of God and unbelief to despair, we shall find that,
for the man that has it loses his constancy both in the ev-
in themselves, that is, in respect of their proper species,
ery day toils of this life, and, what is worse, in the battle
they are more grievous. For unbelief is due to a man not
of faith.” And Isidore says (De Sum. Bono ii, 14): “To
believing God’s own truth; while the hatred of God arises
commit a crime is to kill the soul, but to despair is to fall
from man’s will being opposed to God’s goodness itself;
into hell.”
whereas despair consists in a man ceasing to hope for a
Whether despair arises from sloth?
IIa IIae q. 20 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that despair does not arise
goods of no great account, is chiefly due to our affections
from sloth. Because different causes do not give rise to
being infected with the love of bodily pleasures, among
one same effect. Now despair of the future life arises from
which, sexual pleasures hold the first place: for the love
lust, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore it
of those pleasures leads man to have a distaste for spiri-
does not arise from sloth.
tual things, and not to hope for them as arduous goods. In
Objection 2. Further, just as despair is contrary to
this way despair is caused by lust.
hope, so is sloth contrary to spiritual joy. But spiritual joy
On the other hand, the fact that a man deems an ar-
arises from hope, according to Rom. 12:12, “rejoicing in
duous good impossible to obtain, either by himself or by
hope.” Therefore sloth arises from despair, and not vice
another, is due to his being over downcast, because when
versa.
this state of mind dominates his affections, it seems to him
Objection 3. Further, contrary effects have contrary
that he will never be able to rise to any good. And since
causes. Now hope, the contrary of which is despair, seems
sloth is a sadness that casts down the spirit, in this way
to proceed from the consideration of Divine favors, espe-
despair is born of sloth.
cially the Incarnation, for Augustine says (De Trin. xiii,
Now this is the proper object of hope—that the thing
10): “Nothing was so necessary to raise our hope, than
is possible, because the good and the arduous regard other
that we should be shown how much God loves us. Now
passions also. Hence despair is born of sloth in a more
what greater proof could we have of this than that God’s
special way: though it may arise from lust, for the reason
Son should deign to unite Himself to our nature?” There-
given above.
fore despair arises rather from the neglect of the above
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
consideration than from sloth.
Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons
(Rhet. i, 11), just as hope gives rise to joy, so, when a man
despair among the effects of sloth.
is joyful he has greater hope: and, accordingly, those who
I answer that, As stated above (q. 17, a. 1; Ia IIae,
are sorrowful fall the more easily into despair, according
q. 40, a. 1), the object of hope is a good, difficult but pos-
to 2 Cor. 2:7: “Lest. . . such an one be swallowed up by
sible to obtain by oneself or by another. Consequently the
overmuch sorrow.” Yet, since the object of hope is good,
hope of obtaining happiness may be lacking in a person
to which the appetite tends naturally, and which it shuns,
in two ways: first, through his not deeming it an arduous
not naturally but only on account of some supervening
good; secondly, through his deeming it impossible to ob-
obstacle, it follows that, more directly, hope gives birth to
tain either by himself, or by another. Now, the fact that
joy, while on the contrary despair is born of sorrow.
spiritual goods taste good to us no more, or seem to be
Reply to Objection 3. This very neglect to consider
1287
the Divine favors arises from sloth. For when a man is is full of sorrow does not easily think of great and joyful
influenced by a certain passion he considers chiefly the
things, but only of sad things, unless by a great effort he
things which pertain to that passion: so that a man who
turn his thoughts away from sadness.
1288
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 21
Of Presumption
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider presumption, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is the object in which presumption trusts?
(2) Whether presumption is a sin?
(3) To what is it opposed?
(4) From what vice does it arise?
Whether presumption trusts in God or in our own power?
IIa IIae q. 21 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that presumption, which
relies on his own power, there is presumption if he tends
is a sin against the Holy Ghost, trusts, not in God, but
to a good as though it were possible to him, whereas it sur-
in our own power. For the lesser the power, the more
passes his powers, according to Judith 6:15: “Thou hum-
grievously does he sin who trusts in it too much. But
blest them that presume of themselves.” This presumption
man’s power is less than God’s. Therefore it is a more
is contrary to the virtue of magnanimity which holds to the
grievous sin to presume on human power than to presume
mean in this kind of hope.
on the power of God. Now the sin against the Holy Ghost
But as to the hope whereby a man relies on the power
is most grievous. Therefore presumption, which is reck-
of God, there may be presumption through immoderation,
oned a species of sin against the Holy Ghost, trusts to hu-
in the fact that a man tends to some good as though it were
man rather than to Divine power.
possible by the power and mercy of God, whereas it is
Objection 2. Further, other sins arise from the sin
not possible, for instance, if a man hope to obtain pardon
against the Holy Ghost, for this sin is called malice which
without repenting, or glory without merits. This presump-
is a source from which sins arise. Now other sins seem
tion is, properly, the sin against the Holy Ghost, because,
to arise from the presumption whereby man presumes on
to wit, by presuming thus a man removes or despises the
himself rather than from the presumption whereby he pre-
assistance of the Holy Spirit, whereby he is withdrawn
sumes on God, since self-love is the origin of sin, accord-
from sin.
ing to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it seems
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 20, a. 3; Ia
that presumption which is a sin against the Holy Ghost,
IIae, q. 73, a. 3) a sin which is against God is, in its genus, relies chiefly on human power.
graver than other sins. Hence presumption whereby a man
Objection 3. Further, sin arises from the inordinate
relies on God inordinately, is a more grievous sin than the
conversion to a mutable good. Now presumption is a sin.
presumption of trusting in one’s own power, since to rely
Therefore it arises from turning to human power, which is
on the Divine power for obtaining what is unbecoming to
a mutable good, rather than from turning to the power of
God, is to depreciate the Divine power, and it is evident
God, which is an immutable good.
that it is a graver sin to detract from the Divine power than
On the contrary, Just as, through despair, a man de-
to exaggerate one’s own.
spises the Divine mercy, on which hope relies, so, through
Reply to Objection 2. The presumption whereby a
presumption, he despises the Divine justice, which pun-
man presumes inordinately on God, includes self-love,
ishes the sinner. Now justice is in God even as mercy is.
whereby he loves his own good inordinately. For when
Therefore, just as despair consists in aversion from God,
we desire a thing very much, we think we can easily pro-
so presumption consists in inordinate conversion to Him.
cure it through others, even though we cannot.
I answer that, Presumption seems to imply immoder-
Reply to Objection 3. Presumption on God’s mercy
ate hope. Now the object of hope is an arduous possible
implies both conversion to a mutable good, in so far as it
good: and a thing is possible to a man in two ways: first
arises from an inordinate desire of one’s own good, and
by his own power; secondly, by the power of God alone.
aversion from the immutable good, in as much as it as-
With regard to either hope there may be presumption ow-
cribes to the Divine power that which is unbecoming to it,
ing to lack of moderation. As to the hope whereby a man
for thus man turns away from God’s power.
1289
Whether presumption is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 21 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that presumption is not
to those who cease from good works: and it is to this esti-
a sin. For no sin is a reason why man should be heard
mate that the movement of presumption is conformed.
by God. Yet, through presumption some are heard by
Consequently presumption is a sin, but less grave than
God, for it is written (Judith 9:17): “Hear me a poor
despair, since, on account of His infinite goodness, it is
wretch making supplication to Thee, and presuming of
more proper to God to have mercy and to spare, than to
Thy mercy.” Therefore presumption on God’s mercy is
punish: for the former becomes God in Himself, the latter
not a sin.
becomes Him by reason of our sins.
Objection 2. Further, presumption denotes excessive
Reply to Objection 1. Presumption sometimes stands
hope. But there cannot be excess of that hope which is in
for hope, because even the right hope which we have in
God, since His power and mercy are infinite. Therefore it
God seems to be presumption, if it be measured according
seems that presumption is not a sin.
to man’s estate: yet it is not, if we look at the immensity
Objection 3. Further, that which is a sin does not
of the goodness of God.
excuse from sin: for the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 22)
Reply to Objection 2. Presumption does not denote
that “Adam sinned less, because he sinned in the hope of
excessive hope, as though man hoped too much in God;
pardon,” which seems to indicate presumption. Therefore
but through man hoping to obtain from God something
presumption is not a sin.
unbecoming to Him; which is the same as to hope too lit-
On the contrary, It is reckoned a species of sin
tle in Him, since it implies a depreciation of His power;
against the Holy Ghost.
as stated above (a. 1, ad 1).
I answer that, As stated above (q. 20, a. 1) with regard Reply to Objection 3. To sin with the intention of per-to despair, every appetitive movement that is conformed
severing in sin and through the hope of being pardoned, is
to a false intellect, is evil in itself and sinful. Now pre-
presumptuous, and this does not diminish, but increases
sumption is an appetitive movement, since it denotes an
sin. To sin, however, with the hope of obtaining pardon
inordinate hope. Moreover it is conformed to a false intel-
some time, and with the intention of refraining from sin
lect, just as despair is: for just as it is false that God does and of repenting of it, is not presumptuous, but diminishes
not pardon the repentant, or that He does not turn sinners
sin, because this seems to indicate a will less hardened in
to repentance, so is it false that He grants forgiveness to
sin.
those who persevere in their sins, and that He gives glory
Whether presumption is more opposed to fear than to hope?
IIa IIae q. 21 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that presumption is more
another they are contrary to the same virtue, as timidity
opposed to fear than to hope. Because inordinate fear is
and audacity are opposed to fortitude. Now the sin of pre-
opposed to right fear. Now presumption seems to pertain
sumption is contrary to the sin of despair, which is directly
to inordinate fear, for it is written (Wis. 17:10): “A trou-
opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that presumption also
bled conscience always presumes [Douay: ‘forecasteth’]
is more directly opposed to hope.
grievous things,” and (Wis. 17:11) that “fear is a help to
I answer that, As Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv,
presumption∗.” Therefore presumption is opposed to fear
3), “every virtue not only has a contrary vice manifestly
rather than to hope.
distinct from it, as temerity is opposed to prudence, but
Objection 2. Further, contraries are most distant from
also a sort of kindred vice, alike, not in truth but only in its one another. Now presumption is more distant from fear
deceitful appearance, as cunning is opposed to prudence.”
than from hope, because presumption implies movement
This agrees with the Philosopher who says (Ethic. ii, 8)
to something, just as hope does, whereas fear denotes
that a virtue seems to have more in common with one of
movement from a thing. Therefore presumption is con-
the contrary vices than with the other, as temperance with
trary to fear rather than to hope.
insensibility, and fortitude with audacity.
Objection 3. Further, presumption excludes fear al-
Accordingly presumption appears to be manifestly op-
together, whereas it does not exclude hope altogether, but
posed to fear, especially servile fear, which looks at the
only the rectitude of hope. Since therefore contraries de-
punishment arising from God’s justice, the remission of
stroy one another, it seems that presumption is contrary to
which presumption hopes for; yet by a kind of false like-
fear rather than to hope.
ness it is more opposed to hope, since it denotes an inor-
On the contrary, When two vices are opposed to one
dinate hope in God. And since things are more directly
∗ Vulg.: ‘Fear is nothing else but a yielding up of the succours from thought.’
1290
opposed when they belong to the same genus, than when same genus, which can be either ordinate or inordinate.
they belong to different genera, it follows that presump-
Hence presumption is more directly opposed to hope than
tion is more directly opposed to hope than to fear. For
to fear, since it is opposed to hope in respect of its spe-
they both regard and rely on the same object, hope inordi-
cific difference, as an inordinate thing to an ordinate one,
nately, presumption inordinately.
whereas it is opposed to fear, in respect of its generic dif-
Reply to Objection 1. Just as hope is misused in
ference, which is the movement of hope.
speaking of evils, and properly applied in speaking of
Reply to Objection 3. Presumption is opposed to fear
good, so is presumption: it is in this way that inordinate
by a generic contrariety, and to the virtue of hope by a spe-
fear is called presumption.
cific contrariety. Hence presumption excludes fear alto-
Reply to Objection 2. Contraries are things that are
gether even generically, whereas it does not exclude hope
most distant from one another within the same genus.
except by reason of its difference, by excluding its ordi-
Now presumption and hope denote a movement of the
nateness.
Whether presumption arises from vainglory?
IIa IIae q. 21 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that presumption does not
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), presumption
arise from vainglory. For presumption seems to rely most
is twofold; one whereby a man relies on his own power,
of all on the Divine mercy. Now mercy [misericordia] re-
when he attempts something beyond his power, as though
gards unhappiness [miseriam] which is contrary to glory.
it were possible to him. Such like presumption clearly
Therefore presumption does not arise from vainglory.
arises from vainglory; for it is owing to a great desire
Objection 2. Further, presumption is opposed to de-
for glory, that a man attempts things beyond his power,
spair. Now despair arises from sorrow, as stated above
and especially novelties which call for greater admiration.
(q. 20, a. 4, ad 2). Since therefore opposites have opposite
Hence Gregory states explicitly that presumption of nov-
causes, presumption would seem to arise from pleasure,
elties is a daughter of vainglory.
and consequently from sins of the flesh, which give the
The other presumption is an inordinate trust in the Di-
most absorbing pleasure.
vine mercy or power, consisting in the hope of obtain-
Objection 3. Further, the vice of presumption consists
ing glory without merits, or pardon without repentance.
in tending to some impossible good, as though it were
Such like presumption seems to arise directly from pride,
possible. Now it is owing to ignorance that one deems an
as though man thought so much of himself as to esteem
impossible thing to be possible. Therefore presumption
that God would not punish him or exclude him from glory,
arises from ignorance rather than from vainglory.
however much he might be a sinner.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
“presumption of novelties is a daughter of vainglory.”
1291
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 22
Of the Precepts Relating to Hope and Fear
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the precepts relating to hope and fear: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) The precepts relating to hope;
(2) The precepts relating to fear.
Whether there should be a precept of hope?
IIa IIae q. 22 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that no precept should be
Law: but, just as the precept of faith had to be given un-
given relating to the virtue of hope. For when an effect
der the form of an announcement or reminder, as stated
is sufficiently procured by one cause, there is no need to
above (q. 16, a. 1), so too, the precept of hope, in the first
induce it by another. Now man is sufficiently induced by
promulgation of the Law, had to be given under the form
his natural inclination to hope for good. Therefore there is
of a promise. For he who promises rewards to them that
no need of a precept of the Law to induce him to do this.
obey him, by that very fact, urges them to hope: hence
Objection 2. Further, since precepts are given about
all the promises contained in the Law are incitements to
acts of virtue, the chief precepts are about the acts of the
hope.
chief virtues. Now the chief of all the virtues are the three
Since, however, when once the Law has been given, it
theological virtues, viz. hope, faith and charity. Conse-
is for a wise man to induce men not only to observe the
quently, as the chief precepts of the Law are those of the
precepts, but also, and much more, to safeguard the foun-
decalogue, to which all others may be reduced, as stated
dation of the Law, therefore, after the first promulgation of
above ( Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 3), it seems that if any precept of the Law, Holy Writ holds out to man many inducements
hope were given, it should be found among the precepts of
to hope, even by way of warning or command, and not
the decalogue. But it is not to be found there. Therefore it
merely by way of promise, as in the Law; for instance, in
seems that the Law should contain no precept of hope.
the Ps. 61:9: “Hope [Douay: ‘Trust’] in Him all ye con-
Objection 3. Further, to prescribe an act of virtue is
gregation of the people,” and in many other passages of
equivalent to a prohibition of the act of the opposite vice.
the Scriptures.
Now no precept is to be found forbidding despair which is
Reply to Objection 1. Nature inclines us to hope for
contrary to hope. Therefore it seems that the Law should
the good which is proportionate to human nature; but for
contain no precept of hope.
man to hope for a supernatural good he had to be induced
On the contrary, Augustine says on Jn. 15:12, “This
by the authority of the Divine law, partly by promises,
is My commandment, that you love one another” (Tract.
partly by admonitions and commands. Nevertheless there
lxxxiii in Joan.): “How many things are commanded us
was need for precepts of the Divine law to be given even
about faith! How many relating to hope!” Therefore it is
for those things to which natural reason inclines us, such
fitting that some precepts should be given about hope.
as the acts of the moral virtues, for sake of insuring a
I answer that, Among the precepts contained in Holy
greater stability, especially since the natural reason of man
Writ, some belong to the substance of the Law, others are
was clouded by the lusts of sin.
preambles to the Law. The preambles to the Law are those
Reply to Objection 2. The precepts of the law of the
without which no law is possible: such are the precepts re-
decalogue belong to the first promulgation of the Law:
lating to the act of faith and the act of hope, because the
hence there was no need for a precept of hope among the
act of faith inclines man’s mind so that he believes the Au-
precepts of the decalogue, and it was enough to induce
thor of the Law to be One to Whom he owes submission,
men to hope by the inclusion of certain promises, as in
while, by the hope of a reward, he is induced to observe
the case of the first and fourth commandments.
the precepts. The precepts that belong to the substance
Reply to Objection 3. In those observances to which
of the Law are those which relate to right conduct and
man is bound as under a duty, it is enough that he receive
are imposed on man already subject and ready to obey:
an affirmative precept as to what he has to do, wherein is
wherefore when the Law was given these precepts were
implied the prohibition of what he must avoid doing: thus
set forth from the very outset under form of a command.
he is given a precept concerning the honor due to parents,
Yet the precepts of hope and faith were not to be given
but not a prohibition against dishonoring them, except by
under the form of a command, since, unless man already
the law inflicting punishment on those who dishonor their
believed and hoped, it would be useless to give him the
parents. And since in order to be saved it is man’s duty to
1292
hope in God, he had to be induced to do so by one of the the prohibition of the opposite.
above ways, affirmatively, so to speak, wherein is implied
Whether there should have been given a precept of fear?
IIa IIae q. 22 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that, in the Law, there
secondary precepts of the Law.
should not have been given a precept of fear. For the fear
Yet, just as wise men and the prophets who, conse-
of God is about things which are a preamble to the Law,
quently, strove to strengthen man in the observance of the
since it is the “beginning of wisdom.” Now things which
Law, delivered their teaching about hope under the form
are a preamble to the Law do not come under a precept of
of admonition or command, so too did they in the matter
the Law. Therefore no precept of fear should be given in
of fear.
the Law.
On the other hand filial fear which shows reverence
Objection 2. Further, given the cause, the effect is
to God, is a sort of genus in respect of the love of God,
also given. Now love is the cause of fear, since “every
and a kind of principle of all observances connected with
fear proceeds from some kind of love,” as Augustine states
reverence for God. Hence precepts of filial fear are given
(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Therefore given the precept of love,
in the Law, even as precepts of love, because each is a
it would have been superfluous to command fear.
preamble to the external acts prescribed by the Law and
Objection 3. Further, presumption, in a way, is op-
to which the precepts of the decalogue refer. Hence in the
posed to fear. But the Law contains no prohibition against
passage quoted in the argument, “On the contrary,” man
presumption. Therefore it seems that neither should any
is required “to have fear, to walk in God’s ways,” by wor-
precept of fear have been given.
shipping Him, and “to love Him.”
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 10:12): “And now,
Reply to Objection 1. Filial fear is a preamble to the
Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that
Law, not as though it were extrinsic thereto, but as being
thou fear the Lord thy God?” But He requires of us that
the beginning of the Law, just as love is. Hence precepts
which He commands us to do. Therefore it is a matter of
are given of both, since they are like general principles of
precept that man should fear God.
the whole Law.
I answer that, Fear is twofold, servile and filial. Now
Reply to Objection 2.
From love proceeds filial
just as man is induced, by the hope of rewards, to observe
fear as also other good works that are done from char-
precepts of law, so too is he induced thereto by the fear of
ity. Hence, just as after the precept of charity, precepts
punishment, which fear is servile.
are given of the other acts of virtue, so at the same time
And just as according to what has been said (a. 1),
precepts are given of fear and of the love of charity, just
in the promulgation of the Law there was no need for a
as, in demonstrative sciences, it is not enough to lay down
precept of the act of hope, and men were to be induced
the first principles, unless the conclusions also are given
thereto by promises, so neither was there need for a pre-
which follow from them proximately or remotely.
cept, under form of command, of fear which regards pun-
Reply to Objection 3. Inducement to fear suffices to
ishment, and men were to be induced thereto by the threat
exclude presumption, even as inducement to hope suffices
of punishment: and this was realized both in the precepts
to exclude despair, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3).
of the decalogue, and afterwards, in due sequence, in the
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SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 23
Of Charity, Considered in Itself
(In Eight Articles)
In proper sequence, we must consider charity; and (1) charity itself; (2) the corresponding gift of wisdom. The first consideration will be fivefold: (1) Charity itself; (2) The object of charity; (3) Its acts; (4) The opposite vices; (5) The precepts relating thereto.
The first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Charity, considered as regards itself; (2) Charity, considered in its relation to its subject. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether charity is friendship?
(2) Whether it is something created in the soul?
(3) Whether it is a virtue?
(4) Whether it is a special virtue?
(5) Whether it is one virtue?
(6) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?
(7) Whether any true virtue is possible without it?
(8) Whether it is the form of the virtues?
Whether charity is friendship?
IIa IIae q. 23 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not friend-
to wit, we love someone so as to wish good to him. If,
ship. For nothing is so appropriate to friendship as to
however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish
dwell with one’s friend, according to the Philosopher
its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or
(Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is of man towards God
a horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a
and the angels, “whose dwelling [Douay: ‘conversation’]
kind of concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of
is not with men” (Dan. 2:11). Therefore charity is not
having friendship for wine or for a horse.
friendship.
Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship,
Objection 2. Further, there is no friendship without
for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship
return of love (Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to
is between friend and friend: and this well-wishing is
one’s enemies, according to Mat. 5:44: “Love your ene-
founded on some kind of communication.
mies.” Therefore charity is not friendship.
Accordingly, since there is a communication between
Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher
man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happi-
(Ethic. viii, 3) there are three kinds of friendship, directed
ness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based
respectively towards the delightful, the useful, or the vir-
on this same communication, of which it is written (1 Cor.
tuous. Now charity is not the friendship for the useful or
1:9): “God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the
delightful; for Jerome says in his letter to Paulinus which
fellowship of His Son.” The love which is based on this
is to be found at the beginning of the Bible: “True friend-
communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that
ship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn together,
charity is the friendship of man for God.
not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence,
Reply to Objection 1. Man’s life is twofold. There
not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God,
is his outward life in respect of his sensitive and corporeal
and the study of the Divine Scriptures.” No more is it
nature: and with regard to this life there is no communica-
friendship for the virtuous, since by charity we love even
tion or fellowship between us and God or the angels. The
sinners, whereas friendship based on the virtuous is only
other is man’s spiritual life in respect of his mind, and with
for virtuous men (Ethic. viii). Therefore charity is not
regard to this life there is fellowship between us and both
friendship.
God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 15:15): “I will
state of life, wherefore it is written (Phil. 3:20): “Our
not now call you servants. . . but My friends.” Now this
conversation is in heaven.” But this “conversation” will be
was said to them by reason of nothing else than charity.
perfected in heaven, when “His servants shall serve Him,
Therefore charity is friendship.
and they shall see His face” (Apoc. 22:3,4). Therefore
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic.
charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected in heaven.
viii, 2,3) not every love has the character of friendship,
Reply to Objection 2. Friendship extends to a person
but that love which is together with benevolence, when,
in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way
1294
friendship never extends but to one’s friends: secondly, it friendship of charity is chiefly directed.
extends to someone in respect of another, as, when a man
Reply to Objection 3. The friendship that is based on
has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves
the virtuous is directed to none but a virtuous man as the
all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or con-
principal person, but for his sake we love those who be-
nected with him in any way. Indeed so much do we love
long to him, even though they be not virtuous: in this way
our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to
charity, which above all is friendship based on the virtu-
them, even if they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the
ous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for
friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom
God’s sake.
we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the
Whether charity is something created in the soul?
IIa IIae q. 23 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not some-
Ghost moves the human mind the movement of charity
thing created in the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin.
does not proceed from this motion in such a way that the
viii, 7): “He that loveth his neighbor, consequently, loveth
human mind be merely moved, without being the princi-
love itself.” Now God is love. Therefore it follows that he
ple of this movement, as when a body is moved by some
loves God in the first place. Again he says (De Trin. xv,
extrinsic motive power. For this is contrary to the nature
17): “It was said: God is Charity, even as it was said: God
of a voluntary act, whose principle needs to be in itself, as
is a Spirit.” Therefore charity is not something created in
stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 1): so that it would follow
the soul, but is God Himself.
that to love is not a voluntary act, which involves a con-
Objection 2. Further, God is the life of the soul spir-
tradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an act of
itually just as the soul is the life of the body, according
the will.
to Dt. 30:20: “He is thy life.” Now the soul by itself
Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost
quickens the body. Therefore God quickens the soul by
moves the will in such a way to the act of loving, as though
Himself. But He quickens it by charity, according to 1 Jn.
the will were an instrument, for an instrument, though it
3:14: “We know that we have passed from death to life,
be a principle of action, nevertheless has not the power
because we love the brethren.” Therefore God is charity
to act or not to act, for then again the act would cease to
itself.
be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has been stated
Objection 3. Further, no created thing is of infinite
above ( Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 4) that the love of charity is
power; on the contrary every creature is vanity. But char-
the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the
ity is not vanity, indeed it is opposed to vanity; and it is
Holy Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will
of infinite power, since it brings the human soul to the in-
also should be the efficient cause of that act.
finite good. Therefore charity is not something created in
Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power,
the soul.
unless it be connatural to that power of reason of some
On the charity, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii,
form which is the principle of that action. Wherefore
10): “By charity I mean the movement of the soul towards
God, Who moves all things to their due ends, bestowed
the enjoyment of God for His own sake.” But a movement
on each thing the form whereby it is inclined to the end
of the soul is something created in the soul. Therefore
appointed to it by Him; and in this way He “ordereth all
charity is something created in the soul.
things sweetly” (Wis. 8:1). But it is evident that the act
I answer that, The Master looks thoroughly into this
of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will,
question in q. 17
so that, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the
of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not
natural power, inclining it to the act of love, this same act
something created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Him-
would be less perfect than the natural acts and the acts of
self dwelling in the mind. Nor does he mean to say that
the other powers; nor would it be easy and pleasurable to
this movement of love whereby we love God is the Holy
perform. And this is evidently untrue, since no virtue has
Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from the Holy
such a strong inclination to its act as charity has, nor does
Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other vir-
any virtue perform its act with so great pleasure. There-
tuous acts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits
fore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of
of other virtues, for instance the habit of faith or hope or
charity, there should be in us some habitual form super-
of some other virtue: and this he said on account of the
added to the natural power, inclining that power to the act
excellence of charity.
of charity, and causing it to act with ease and pleasure.
But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on
Reply to Objection 1. The Divine Essence Itself is
the contrary, detrimental to charity. For when the Holy
charity, even as It is wisdom and goodness. Wherefore
1295
just as we are said to be good with the goodness which is formally charity is the life of the soul, even as the soul is
God, and wise with the wisdom which is God (since the
the life of the body. Consequently we may conclude from
goodness whereby we are formally good is a participa-
this that just as the soul is immediately united to the body,
tion of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are
so is charity to the soul.
formally wise, is a share of Divine wisdom), so too, the
Reply to Objection 3. Charity works formally. Now
charity whereby formally we love our neighbor is a par-
the efficacy of a form depends on the power of the agent,
ticipation of Divine charity. For this manner of speaking
who instills the form, wherefore it is evident that charity
is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines
is not vanity. But because it produces an infinite effect,
Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this
since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God, this proves has been to some an occasion of error.
the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of
Reply to Objection 2. God is effectively the life both
charity.
of the soul by charity, and of the body by the soul: but
Whether charity is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 23 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not a virtue.
person, but under a different aspect from justice. For jus-
For charity is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers
tice is about works done in respect of another person, un-
do not reckon friendship a virtue, as may be gathered
der the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship consid-
from Ethic. viii, 1; nor is it numbered among the virtues
ers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of
whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore, is char-
a gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii,
ity a virtue.
13). Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue
Objection 2. Further, “virtue is the ultimate limit of
distinct of itself from the other virtues. For its praise-
power” (De Coelo et Mundo i, 11). But charity is not
worthiness and virtuousness are derived merely from its
something ultimate, this applies rather to joy and peace.
object, in so far, to wit, as it is based on the moral good-
Therefore it seems that charity is not a virtue, and that
ness of the virtues. This is evident from the fact that not
this should be said rather of joy and peace.
every friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous, as in the
Objection 3. Further, every virtue is an accidental
case of friendship based on pleasure or utility. Where-
habit. But charity is not an accidental habit, since it is
fore friendship for the virtuous is something consequent
a more excellent thing than the soul itself: whereas no ac-
to virtue rather than a virtue. Moreover there is no com-
cident is more excellent than its subject. Therefore charity
parison with charity since it is not founded principally on
is not a virtue.
the virtue of a man, but on the goodness of God.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl.
Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to the same virtue to
xi): “Charity is a virtue which, when our affections are
love a man and to rejoice about him, since joy results from
perfectly ordered, unites us to God, for by it we love Him.”
love, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 25, a. 2) in the treatise on I answer that, Human acts are good according as they
the passions: wherefore love is reckoned a virtue, rather
are regulated by their due rule and measure. Wherefore
than joy, which is an effect of love. And when virtue is
human virtue which is the principle of all man’s good
described as being something ultimate, we mean that it is
acts consists in following the rule of human acts, which
last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of excess,
is twofold, as stated above (q. 17, a. 1), viz. human reason
just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.
and God.
Reply to Objection 3. Every accident is inferior to
Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being
substance if we consider its being, since substance has
“in accord with right reason,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 6, so
being in itself, while an accident has its being in another:
too, the nature of virtue consists in attaining God, as also
but considered as to its species, an accident which results
stated above with regard to faith, (q. 4, a. 5) and hope
from the principles of its subject is inferior to its subject,
(q. 17, a. 1). Wherefore, it follows that charity is a virtue,
even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an acci-
for, since charity attains God, it unites us to God, as evi-
dent that results from a participation of some higher na-
denced by the authority of Augustine quoted above.
ture is superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher (Ethic. viii)
of that higher nature, even as light is superior to the di-
does not deny that friendship is a virtue, but affirms that it
aphanous body. In this way charity is superior to the soul,
is “either a virtue or with a virtue.” For we might say that
in as much as it is a participation of the Holy Ghost.
it is a moral virtue about works done in respect of another
1296
Whether charity is a special virtue?
IIa IIae q. 23 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not a spe-
above ( Ia IIae, q. 27, a. 1), so that wherever there is a
cial virtue. For Jerome says: “Let me briefly define all
special aspect of good, there is a special kind of love. But
virtue as the charity whereby we love God”∗: and Augus-
the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of happiness,
tine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv)† that “virtue is the order
has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of char-
of love.” Now no special virtue is included in the defini-
ity, which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love.
tion of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a special
Therefore charity is a special virtue.
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1. Charity is included in the defi-
Objection 2. Further, that which extends to all works
nition of every virtue, not as being essentially every virtue,
of virtue, cannot be a special virtue. But charity extends
but because every virtue depends on it in a way, as we
to all works of virtue, according to 1 Cor. 13:4: “Charity
shall state further on (Aa. 7,8). In this way prudence is in-
is patient, is kind,” etc.; indeed it extends to all human ac-
cluded in the definition of the moral virtues, as explained
tions, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: “Let all your things be
in Ethic. ii, vi, from the fact that they depend on prudence.
done in charity.” Therefore charity is not a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 2. The virtue or art which is
Objection 3. Further, the precepts of the Law refer
concerned about the last end, commands the virtues or
to acts of virtue. Now Augustine says (De Perfect. Hu-
arts which are concerned about other ends which are sec-
man. Justit. v) that, “Thou shalt love” is “a general com-
ondary, thus the military art commands the art of horse-
mandment,” and “Thou shalt not covet,” “a general prohi-
riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its
bition.” Therefore charity is a general virtue.
object the last end of human life, viz. everlasting happi-
On the contrary, Nothing general is enumerated to-
ness, it follows that it extends to the acts of a man’s whole
gether with what is special. But charity is enumerated
life, by commanding them, not by eliciting immediately
together with special virtues, viz. hope and faith, accord-
all acts of virtue.
ing to 1 Cor. 13:13: “And now there remain faith, hope,
Reply to Objection 3. The precept of love is said to
charity, these three.” Therefore charity is a special virtue.
be a general command, because all other precepts are re-
I answer that, Acts and habits are specified by their
duced thereto as to their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5:
objects, as shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 54,
“The end of the commandment is charity.”
a. 2). Now the proper object of love is the good, as stated
Whether charity is one virtue?
IIa IIae q. 23 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not one
I answer that, Charity, as stated above (a. 1) is a kind virtue.
For habits are distinct according to their ob-
of friendship of man for God. Now the different species
jects. Now there are two objects of charity—God and our
of friendship are differentiated, first of all, in respect of a neighbor—which are infinitely distant from one another.
diversity of end, and in this way there are three species
Therefore charity is not one virtue.
of friendship, namely friendship for the useful, for the
Objection 2. Further, different aspects of the object
delightful, and for the virtuous; secondly, in respect of
diversify a habit, even though that object be one in real-
the different kinds of communion on which friendships
ity, as shown above (q. 17, a. 6; Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2, ad 1).
are based; thus there is one species of friendship between
Now there are many aspects under which God is an object
kinsmen, and another between fellow citizens or fellow
of love, because we are debtors to His love by reason of
travellers, the former being based on natural communion,
each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
the latter on civil communion or on the comradeship of
Objection 3. Further, charity comprises friendship for
the road, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12).
our neighbor. But the Philosopher reckons several species
Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these
of friendship (Ethic. viii, 3,11,12). Therefore charity is
ways: for its end is one, namely, the goodness of God;
not one virtue, but is divided into a number of various
and the fellowship of everlasting happiness, on which this
species.
friendship is based, is also one. Hence it follows that
On the contrary, Just as God is the object of faith,
charity is simply one virtue, and not divided into several
so is He the object of charity. Now faith is one virtue by
species.
reason of the unity of the Divine truth, according to Eph.
Reply to Objection 1. This argument would hold, if
4:5: “One faith.” Therefore charity also is one virtue by
God and our neighbor were equally objects of charity. But
reason of the unity of the Divine goodness.
this is not true: for God is the principal object of charity,
∗ The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii
† De Civ. Dei xv,
22
1297
while our neighbor is loved out of charity for God’s sake.
love for Him, or which make it our duty to love Him, are
Reply to Objection 2. God is loved by charity for His
secondary and result from the first.
own sake: wherefore charity regards principally but one
Reply to Objection 3. Human friendship of which the
aspect of lovableness, namely God’s goodness, which is
Philosopher treats has various ends and various forms of
His substance, according to Ps. 105:1: “Give glory to the
fellowship. This does not apply to charity, as stated above:
Lord for He is good.” Other reasons that inspire us with
wherefore the comparison fails.
Whether charity is the most excellent of the virtues?
IIa IIae q. 23 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not the most
accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent
excellent of the virtues. Because the higher power has the
than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other
higher virtue even as it has a higher operation. Now the
virtues, just as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is
intellect is higher than the will, since it directs the will.
more excellent than the other moral virtues, which attain
Therefore, faith, which is in the intellect, is more excel-
reason in so far as it appoints the mean in human opera-
lent than charity which is in the will.
tions or passions.
Objection 2.
Further, the thing by which another
Reply to Objection 1. The operation of the intellect
works seems the less excellent of the two, even as a ser-
is completed by the thing understood being in the intel-
vant, by whom his master works, is beneath his master.
lectual subject, so that the excellence of the intellectual
Now “faith. . . worketh by charity,” according to Gal. 5:6.
operation is assessed according to the measure of the in-
Therefore faith is more excellent than charity.
tellect. On the other hand, the operation of the will and
Objection 3. Further, that which is by way of addition
of every appetitive power is completed in the tendency of
to another seems to be the more perfect of the two. Now
the appetite towards a thing as its term, wherefore the ex-
hope seems to be something additional to charity: for the
cellence of the appetitive operation is gauged according to
object of charity is good, whereas the object of hope is
the thing which is the object of the operation. Now those
an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent than
things which are beneath the soul are more excellent in the
charity.
soul than they are in themselves, because a thing is con-
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:13): “The
tained according to the mode of the container (De Causis
greater of these is charity.”
xii). On the other hand, things that are above the soul,
I answer that, Since good, in human acts, depends on
are more excellent in themselves than they are in the soul.
their being regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that
Consequently it is better to know than to love the things
human virtue, which is a principle of good acts, consists
that are beneath us; for which reason the Philosopher gave
in attaining the rule of human acts. Now the rule of human
the preference to the intellectual virtues over the moral
acts is twofold, as stated above (a. 3), namely, human rea-
virtues (Ethic. x, 7,8): whereas the love of the things that
son and God: yet God is the first rule, whereby, even hu-
are above us, especially of God, ranks before the knowl-
man reason must be regulated. Consequently the theolog-
edge of such things. Therefore charity is more excellent
ical virtues, which consist in attaining this first rule, since than faith.
their object is God, are more excellent than the moral, or
Reply to Objection 2. Faith works by love, not instru-
the intellectual virtues, which consist in attaining human
mentally, as a master by his servant, but as by its proper
reason: and it follows that among the theological virtues
form: hence the argument does not prove.
themselves, the first place belongs to that which attains
Reply to Objection 3. The same good is the object of
God most.
charity and of hope: but charity implies union with that
Now that which is of itself always ranks before that
good, whereas hope implies distance therefrom. Hence
which is by another. But faith and hope attain God indeed
charity does not regard that good as being arduous, as
in so far as we derive from Him the knowledge of truth or
hope does, since what is already united has not the charac-
the acquisition of good, whereas charity attains God Him-
ter of arduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect
self that it may rest in Him, but not that something may
than hope.
1298
Whether any true virtue is possible without charity?
IIa IIae q. 23 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that there can be true
is no charity, in so far as it is directed to some particular
virtue without charity. For it is proper to virtue to pro-
good. But if this particular good is not a true, but an ap-
duce a good act. Now those who have not charity, do
parent good, it is not a true virtue that is ordered to such a
some good actions, as when they clothe the naked, or feed
good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as Augustine says
the hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is possible
(Contra Julian. iv, 3), “the prudence of the miser, whereby
without charity.
he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the
Objection 2. Further, charity is not possible without
miser’s justice, whereby he scorns the property of another
faith, since it comes of “an unfeigned faith,” as the Apos-
through fear of severe punishment; nor the miser’s tem-
tle says (1 Tim. 1:5). Now, in unbelievers, there can be
perance, whereby he curbs his desire for expensive plea-
true chastity, if they curb their concupiscences, and true
sures; nor the miser’s fortitude, whereby as Horace, says,
justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore true virtue is pos-
‘he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he goes through
sible without charity.
fire, in order to avoid poverty’ ” (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i, 45). If, Objection 3. Further, science and art are virtues, ac-on the other hand, this particular good be a true good, for
cording to Ethic. vi. But they are to be found in sinners
instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed
who lack charity. Therefore true virtue can be without
be a true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred
charity.
to the final and perfect good. Accordingly no strictly true
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3):
virtue is possible without charity.
“If I should distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I
Reply to Objection 1. The act of one lacking charity
should deliver my body to be burned, and have not char-
may be of two kinds; one is in accordance with his lack
ity, it profiteth me nothing.” And yet true virtue is very
of charity, as when he does something that is referred to
profitable, according to Wis. 8:7: “She teacheth temper-
that whereby he lacks charity. Such an act is always evil:
ance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are
thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the actions
such things as men can have nothing more profitable in
which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always
life.” Therefore no true virtue is possible without charity.
sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like
I answer that, Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated
thing, and directs it to his unbelief as end.
above ( Ia IIae, q. 55 , a. 4). Now the good is chiefly an
There is, however, another act of one lacking char-
end, for things directed to the end are not said to be good
ity, not in accordance with his lack of charity, but in ac-
except in relation to the end. Accordingly, just as the end
cordance with his possession of some other gift of God,
is twofold, the last end, and the proximate end, so also,
whether faith, or hope, or even his natural good, which is
is good twofold, one, the ultimate and universal good, the
not completely taken away by sin, as stated above (q. 10,
other proximate and particular. The ultimate and principal
a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 2). In this way it is possible for an
good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Ps.
act, without charity, to be generically good, but not per-
72:28: “It is good for me to adhere to God,” and to this
fectly good, because it lacks its due order to the last end.
good man is ordered by charity. Man’s secondary and, as
Reply to Objection 2. Since the end is in practical
it were, particular good may be twofold: one is truly good,
matters, what the principle is in speculative matters, just
because, considered in itself, it can be directed to the prin-
as there can be no strictly true science, if a right estimate
cipal good, which is the last end; while the other is good
of the first indemonstrable principle be lacking, so, there
apparently and not truly, because it leads us away from
can be no strictly true justice, or chastity, without that due
the final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true
ordering to the end, which is effected by charity, however
virtue is that which is directed to man’s principal good;
rightly a man may be affected about other matters.
thus also the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that
Reply to Objection 3. Science and art of their very
“virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which
nature imply a relation to some particular good, and not to
is best”: and in this way no true virtue is possible without
the ultimate good of human life, as do the moral virtues,
charity.
which make man good simply, as stated above ( Ia IIae,
If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some
q. 56 , a. 3). Hence the comparison fails.
particular end, then we speak of virtue being where there
1299
Whether charity is the form of the virtues?
IIa IIae q. 23 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not the true
from a form of the agent. Consequently, in morals, that
form of the virtues. Because the form of a thing is either
which gives an act its order to the end, must needs give
exemplar or essential. Now charity is not the exemplar
the act its form. Now it is evident, in accordance with
form of the other virtues, since it would follow that the
what has been said (a. 7), that it is charity which directs
other virtues are of the same species as charity: nor is it
the acts of all other virtues to the last end, and which, con-
the essential form of the other virtues, since then it would
sequently, also gives the form to all other acts of virtue:
not be distinct from them. Therefore it is in no way the
and it is precisely in this sense that charity is called the
form of the virtues.
form of the virtues, for these are called virtues in relation
Objection 2. Further, charity is compared to the other
to “informed” acts.
virtues as their root and foundation, according to Eph.
Reply to Objection 1. Charity is called the form of
3:17: “Rooted and founded in charity.” Now a root or
the other virtues not as being their exemplar or their es-
foundation is not the form, but rather the matter of a thing,
sential form, but rather by way of efficient cause, in so far
since it is the first part in the making. Therefore charity is
as it sets the form on all, in the aforesaid manner.
not the form of the virtues.
Reply to Objection 2. Charity is compared to the
Objection 3.
Further, formal, final, and efficient
foundation or root in so far as all other virtues draw their
causes do not coincide with one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now
sustenance and nourishment therefrom, and not in the
charity is called the end and the mother of the virtues.
sense that the foundation and root have the character of
Therefore it should not be called their form.
a material cause.
On the contrary, Ambrose∗ says that charity is the
Reply to Objection 3. Charity is said to be the end
form of the virtues.
of other virtues, because it directs all other virtues to its
I answer that, In morals the form of an act is taken
own end. And since a mother is one who conceives within
chiefly from the end. The reason of this is that the princi-
herself and by another, charity is called the mother of the
pal of moral acts is the will, whose object and form, so to
other virtues, because, by commanding them, it conceives
speak, are the end. Now the form of an act always follows
the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last end.
∗ Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23
1300
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 24
Of the Subject of Charity
(In Twelve Articles)
We must now consider charity in relation to its subject, under which head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether charity is in the will as its subject?
(2) Whether charity is caused in man by preceding acts or by a Divine infusion?
(3) Whether it is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts?
(4) Whether it increases in the person who has it?
(5) Whether it increases by addition?
(6) Whether it increases by every act?
(7) Whether it increases indefinitely?
(8) Whether the charity of a wayfarer can be perfect?
(9) Of the various degrees of charity;
(10) Whether charity can diminish?
(11) Whether charity can be lost after it has been possessed?
(12) Whether it is lost through one mortal sin?
Whether the will is the subject of charity?
IIa IIae q. 24 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not the
intellect alone. Therefore the subject of charity is not the
subject of charity. For charity is a kind of love. Now,
sensitive, but the intellective appetite, i.e. the will.
according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 3) love is in the
Reply to Objection 1. The concupiscible is a part of
concupiscible part. Therefore charity is also in the concu-
the sensitive, not of the intellective appetite, as proved in
piscible and not in the will.
the Ia, q. 81, a. 2: wherefore the love which is in the con-
Objection 2. Further, charity is the foremost of the
cupiscible, is the love of sensible good: nor can the concu-
virtues, as stated above (q. 23, a. 6). But the reason is the
piscible reach to the Divine good which is an intelligible
subject of virtue. Therefore it seems that charity is in the
good; the will alone can. Consequently the concupiscible
reason and not in the will.
cannot be the subject of charity.
Objection 3. Further, charity extends to all human
Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher
acts, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: “Let all your things be
(De Anima iii, 9), the will also is in the reason: wherefore
done in charity.” Now the principle of human acts is the
charity is not excluded from the reason through being in
free-will. Therefore it seems that charity is chiefly in the
the will. Yet charity is regulated, not by the reason, as hu-
free-will as its subject and not in the will.
man virtues are, but by God’s wisdom, and transcends the
On the contrary, The object of charity is the good,
rule of human reason, according to Eph. 3:19: “The char-
which is also the object of the will. Therefore charity is in
ity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge.” Hence it
the will as its subject.
is not in the reason, either as its subject, like prudence is,
I answer that, Since, as stated in the Ia, q. 80, a. 2,
or as its rule, like justice and temperance are, but only by
the appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the in-
a certain kinship of the will to the reason.
tellective which is called the will, the object of each is
Reply to Objection 3. As stated in the Ia, q. 83, a. 4,
the good, but in different ways: for the object of the sen-
the free-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet
sitive appetite is a good apprehended by sense, whereas
charity is not in the will considered as free-will, the act
the object of the intellective appetite or will is good under
of which is to choose. For choice is of things directed to
the universal aspect of good, according as it can be appre-
the end, whereas the will is of the end itself (Ethic. iii, 2).
hended by the intellect. Now the object of charity is not a
Hence charity, whose object is the last end, should be de-
sensible good, but the Divine good which is known by the
scribed as residing in the will rather than in the free-will.
1301
Whether charity is caused in us by infusion?
IIa IIae q. 24 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not caused
effect does not transcend its cause.
in us by infusion. For that which is common to all crea-
Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor
tures, is in man naturally. Now, according to Dionysius
through acquisition by the natural powers, but by the in-
(Div. Nom. iv), the “Divine good”, which is the object of
fusion of the Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father
charity, “is for all an object of dilection and love.” There-
and the Son, and the participation of Whom in us is cre-
fore charity is in us naturally, and not by infusion.
ated charity, as stated above (q. 23, a. 2).
Objection 2. Further, the more lovable a thing is the
Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius is speaking of the
easier it is to love it. Now God is supremely lovable, since
love of God, which is founded on the fellowship of nat-
He is supremely good. Therefore it is easier to love Him
ural goods, wherefore it is in all naturally. On the other
than other things. But we need no infused habit in order
hand, charity is founded on a supernatural fellowship, so
to love other things. Neither, therefore, do we need one in
the comparison fails.
order to love God.
Reply to Objection 2.
Just as God is supremely
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5):
knowable in Himself yet not to us, on account of a de-
“The end of the commandment is charity from a pure
fect in our knowledge which depends on sensible things,
heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith.”
so too, God is supremely lovable in Himself, in as much
Now these three have reference to human acts. Therefore
as He is the object of happiness. But He is not supremely
charity is caused in us from preceding acts, and not from
lovable to us in this way, on account of the inclination of
infusion.
our appetite towards visible goods. Hence it is evident
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): “The
that for us to love God above all things in this way, it is
charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy
necessary that charity be infused into our hearts.
Ghost, Who is given to us.”
Reply to Objection 3. When it is said that in us char-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 23, a. 1), charity
ity proceeds from “a pure heart, and a good conscience,
is a friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellow-
and an unfeigned faith,” this must be referred to the act of
ship of everlasting happiness. Now this fellowship is in
charity which is aroused by these things. Or again, this is
respect, not of natural, but of gratuitous gifts, for, accord-
said because the aforesaid acts dispose man to receive the
ing to Rom. 6:23, “the grace of God is life everlasting”:
infusion of charity. The same remark applies to the say-
wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural facilities.
ing of Augustine (Tract. ix in prim. canon. Joan.): “Fear
Now that which surpasses the faculty of nature, cannot be
leads to charity,” and of a gloss on Mat. 1:2: “Faith begets
natural or acquired by the natural powers, since a natural
hope, and hope charity.”
Whether charity is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts?
IIa IIae q. 24 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is infused ac-
Now charity and other gratuitous gifts are bestowed on
cording to the capacity of our natural gifts. For it is written the angels, according to their natural capacity, as the Mas-
(Mat. 25:15) that “He gave to every one according to his
ter teaches (Sent. ii, D, 3). Therefore the same apparently
own virtue [Douay: ‘proper ability’].” Now, in man, none
applies to man.
but natural virtue precedes charity, since there is no virtue
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:8): “The Spirit
without charity, as stated above (q. 23, a. 7). Therefore
breatheth where He will,” and (1 Cor. 12:11): “All these
God infuses charity into man according to the measure of
things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to ev-
his natural virtue.
ery one according as He will.” Therefore charity is given,
Objection 2. Further, among things ordained towards
not according to our natural capacity, but according as the
one another, the second is proportionate to the first: thus
Spirit wills to distribute His gifts.
we find in natural things that the form is proportionate to
I answer that, The quantity of a thing depends on the
the matter, and in gratuitous gifts, that glory is proportion-
proper cause of that thing, since the more universal cause
ate to grace. Now, since charity is a perfection of nature,
produces a greater effect. Now, since charity surpasses the
it is compared to the capacity of nature as second to first.
proportion of human nature, as stated above (a. 2) it de-
Therefore it seems that charity is infused according to the
pends, not on any natural virtue, but on the sole grace of
capacity of nature.
the Holy Ghost Who infuses charity. Wherefore the quan-
Objection 3. Further, men and angels partake of hap-
tity of charity depends neither on the condition of nature
piness according to the same measure, since happiness is
nor on the capacity of natural virtue, but only on the will
alike in both, according to Mat. 22:30 and Lk. 20:36.
of the Holy Ghost Who “divides” His gifts “according as
1302
He will.” Hence the Apostle says (Eph. 4:7): “To every not belong to the same genus, so that the comparison fails.
one of us is given grace according to the measure of the
Reply to Objection 3. The angel’s is an intellec-
giving of Christ.”
tual nature, and it is consistent with his condition that
Reply to Objection 1. The virtue in accordance with
he should be borne wholly whithersoever he is borne, as
which God gives His gifts to each one, is a disposition
stated in the Ia, q. 61, a. 6. Hence there was a greater ef-
or previous preparation or effort of the one who receives
fort in the higher angels, both for good in those who per-
grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this disposi-
severed, and for evil in those who fell, and consequently
tion or effort, by moving man’s mind either more or less,
those of the higher angels who remained steadfast became
according as He will. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col.
better than the others, and those who fell became worse.
1:12): “Who hath made us worthy to be partakers of the
But man’s is a rational nature, with which it is consistent
lot of the saints in light.”
to be sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act: so
Reply to Objection 2. The form does not surpass the
that it is not necessarily borne wholly whithersoever it is
proportion of the matter. In like manner grace and glory
borne, and where there are greater natural gifts there may
are referred to the same genus, for grace is nothing else
be less effort, and vice versa. Thus the comparison fails.
than a beginning of glory in us. But charity and nature do
Whether charity can increase?
IIa IIae q. 24 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that charity cannot in-
if it could not, all further advance along the way would
crease. For nothing increases save what has quantity. Now
cease. Hence the Apostle calls charity the way, when he
quantity is twofold, namely dimensive and virtual. The
says (1 Cor. 12:31): “I show unto you yet a more excellent
former does not befit charity which is a spiritual perfec-
way.”
tion, while virtual quantity regards the objects in respect
Reply to Objection 1. Charity is not subject to dimen-
of which charity does not increase, since the slightest
sive, but only to virtual quantity: and the latter depends
charity loves all that is to be loved out of charity. There-
not only on the number of objects, namely whether they
fore charity does not increase.
be in greater number or of greater excellence, but also on
Objection 2. Further, that which consists in some-
the intensity of the act, namely whether a thing is loved
thing extreme receives no increase. But charity consists in
more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual quantity of
something extreme, being the greatest of the virtues, and
charity increases.
the supreme love of the greatest good. Therefore charity
Reply to Objection 2. Charity consists in an extreme
cannot increase.
with regard to its object, in so far as its object is the
Objection 3. Further, increase is a kind of movement.
Supreme Good, and from this it follows that charity is
Therefore wherever there is increase there is movement,
the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not every charity
and if there be increase of essence there is movement of
consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of the act.
essence. Now there is no movement of essence save either
Reply to Objection 3. Some have said that charity
by corruption or generation. Therefore charity cannot in-
does not increase in its essence, but only as to its radica-
crease essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew
tion in its subject, or according to its fervor.
or corrupted, which is unreasonable.
But these people did not know what they were talk-
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract.
lxxiv in
ing about. For since charity is an accident, its being is to
Joan.)∗ that “charity merits increase that by increase it
be in something. So that an essential increase of charity
may merit perfection.”
means nothing else but that it is yet more in its subject,
I answer that, The charity of a wayfarer can increase.
which implies a greater radication in its subject. Further-
For we are called wayfarers by reason of our being on
more, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to act, so that
the way to God, Who is the last end of our happiness. In
an essential increase of charity implies ability to produce
this way we advance as we get nigh to God, Who is ap-
an act of more fervent love. Hence charity increases es-
proached, “not by steps of the body but by the affections
sentially, not by beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its
of the soulӠ: and this approach is the result of charity,
subject, as the objection imagines, but by beginning to be
since it unites man’s mind to God. Consequently it is es-
more and more in its subject.
sential to the charity of a wayfarer that it can increase, for
∗ Cf. Ep. clxxxv.
† St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. xxxii
1303
Whether charity increases by addition?
IIa IIae q. 24 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that charity increases by
It follows therefore that if charity be added to char-
addition. For just as increase may be in respect of bodily
ity, we must presuppose a numerical distinction between
quantity, so may it be according to virtual quantity. Now
them, which follows a distinction of subjects: thus white-
increase in bodily quantity results from addition; for the
ness receives an increase when one white thing is added to
Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5) that “increase is addi-
another, although such an increase does not make a thing
tion to pre-existing magnitude.” Therefore the increase of
whiter. This, however, does not apply to the case in point,
charity which is according to virtual quantity is by addi-
since the subject of charity is none other than the rational
tion.
mind, so that such like an increase of charity could only
Objection 2. Further, charity is a kind of spiritual
take place by one rational mind being added to another;
light in the soul, according to 1 Jn. 2:10: “He that loveth
which is impossible. Moreover, even if it were possible,
his brother abideth in the light.” Now light increases in the
the result would be a greater lover, but not a more loving
air by addition; thus the light in a house increases when
one. It follows, therefore, that charity can by no means in-
another candle is lit. Therefore charity also increases in
crease by addition of charity to charity, as some have held
the soul by addition.
to be the case.
Objection 3. Further, the increase of charity is God’s
Accordingly charity increases only by its subject par-
work, even as the causing of it, according to 2 Cor. 9:10:
taking of charity more and more subject thereto. For this
“He will increase the growth of the fruits of your justice.”
is the proper mode of increase in a form that is intensified,
Now when God first infuses charity, He puts something in
since the being of such a form consists wholly in its ad-
the soul that was not there before. Therefore also, when
hering to its subject. Consequently, since the magnitude
He increases charity, He puts something there which was
of a thing follows on its being, to say that a form is greater
not there before. Therefore charity increases by addition.
is the same as to say that it is more in its subject, and not
On the contrary, Charity is a simple form. Now noth-
that another form is added to it: for this would be the case
ing greater results from the addition of one simple thing
if the form, of itself, had any quantity, and not in compar-
to another, as proved in Phys. iii, text. 59, and Metaph. ii,
ison with its subject. Therefore charity increases by being
4. Therefore charity does not increase by addition.
intensified in its subject, and this is for charity to increase I answer that, Every addition is of something to
in its essence; and not by charity being added to charity.
something else: so that in every addition we must at least
Reply to Objection 1. Bodily quantity has something
presuppose that the things added together are distinct be-
as quantity, and something else, in so far as it is an acci-
fore the addition. Consequently if charity be added to
dental form. As quantity, it is distinguishable in respect of
charity, the added charity must be presupposed as distinct
position or number, and in this way we have the increase
from charity to which it is added, not necessarily by a dis-
of magnitude by addition, as may be seen in animals. But
tinction of reality, but at least by a distinction of thought.
in so far as it is an accidental form, it is distinguishable
For God is able to increase a bodily quantity by adding
only in respect of its subject, and in this way it has its
a magnitude which did not exist before, but was created
proper increase, like other accidental forms, by way of
at that very moment; which magnitude, though not pre-
intensity in its subject, for instance in things subject to
existent in reality, is nevertheless capable of being distin-
rarefaction, as is proved in Phys. iv, 9. In like manner
guished from the quantity to which it is added. Wherefore
science, as a habit, has its quantity from its objects, and
if charity be added to charity we must presuppose the dis-
accordingly it increases by addition, when a man knows
tinction, at least logical, of the one charity from the other.
more things; and again, as an accidental form, it has a
Now distinction among forms is twofold: specific and
certain quantity through being in its subject, and in this
numeric. Specific distinction of habits follows diversity
way it increase in a man who knows the same scientific
of objects, while numeric distinction follows distinction
truths with greater certainty now than before. In the same
of subjects. Consequently a habit may receive increase
way charity has a twofold quantity; but with regard to that
through extending to objects to which it did not extend
which it has from its object, it does not increase, as stated
before: thus the science of geometry increases in one who
above: hence it follows that it increases solely by being
acquires knowledge of geometrical matters which he ig-
intensified.
nored hitherto. But this cannot be said of charity, for even
Reply to Objection 2. The addition of light to light
the slightest charity extends to all that we have to love by
can be understood through the light being intensified in
charity. Hence the addition which causes an increase of
the air on account of there being several luminaries giv-
charity cannot be understood, as though the added charity
ing light: but this distinction does not apply to the case in
were presupposed to be distinct specifically from that to
point, since there is but one luminary shedding forth the
which it is added.
light of charity.
1304
Reply to Objection 3. The infusion of charity denotes there that was not there before, but for something to be
a change to the state of “having” charity from the state
more there that previously was less there. This is what
of “not having it,” so that something must needs come
God does when He increases charity, that is He makes it
which was not there before. On the other hand, the in-
to have a greater hold on the soul, and the likeness of the
crease of charity denotes a change to “more having” from
Holy Ghost to be more perfectly participated by the soul.
“less having,” so that there is need, not for anything to be
Whether charity increases through every act of charity?
IIa IIae q. 24 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that charity increases
of that time, as happens in local movement; but for a
through every act of charity. For that which can do what
certain space of time nature works by disposing for the
is more, can do what is less. But every act of charity can
increase, without causing any actual increase, and after-
merit everlasting life; and this is more than a simple addi-
wards brings into effect that to which it had disposed, by
tion of charity, since it includes the perfection of charity.
giving the animal or plant an actual increase. In like man-
Much more, therefore, does every act of charity increase
ner charity does not actually increase through every act of
charity.
charity, but each act of charity disposes to an increase of
Objection 2. Further, just as the habits of acquired
charity, in so far as one act of charity makes man more
virtue are engendered by acts, so too an increase of charity
ready to act again according to charity, and this readiness
is caused by an act of charity. Now each virtuous act con-
increasing, man breaks out into an act of more fervent
duces to the engendering of virtue. Therefore also each
love, and strives to advance in charity, and then his charity
virtuous act of charity conduces to the increase of charity.
increases actually.
Objection 3. Further, Gregory∗ says that “to stand
Reply to Objection 1. Every act of charity merits ev-
still in the way to God is to go back.” Now no man goes
erlasting life, which, however, is not to be bestowed then
back when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore
and there, but at its proper time. In like manner every act
whoever is moved by an act of charity goes forward in the
of charity merits an increase of charity; yet this increase
way to God. Therefore charity increases through every act
does not take place at once, but when we strive for that
of charity.
increase.
On the contrary, The effect does not surpass the
Reply to Objection 2. Even when an acquired virtue
power of its cause. But an act of charity is sometimes done
is being engendered, each act does not complete the for-
with tepidity or slackness. Therefore it does not conduce
mation of the virtue, but conduces towards that effect by
to a more excellent charity, rather does it dispose one to a
disposing to it, while the last act, which is the most per-
lower degree.
fect, and acts in virtue of all those that preceded it, reduces I answer that, The spiritual increase of charity is
the virtue into act, just as when many drops hollow out a
somewhat like the increase of a body. Now bodily in-
stone.
crease in animals and plants is not a continuous move-
Reply to Objection 3. Man advances in the way to
ment, so that, to wit, if a thing increase so much in so
God, not merely by actual increase of charity, but also by
much time, it need to increase proportionally in each part
being disposed to that increase.
Whether charity increases indefinitely?
IIa IIae q. 24 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that charity does not in-
ual increase, attain to the quantity of another finite thing
crease indefinitely. For every movement is towards some
however much greater, unless the amount of its increase
end and term, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8,9. But the
be ever less and less. Thus the Philosopher states (Phys.
increase of charity is a movement. Therefore it tends to
iii, 6) that if we divide a line into an indefinite number
an end and term. Therefore charity does not increase in-
of parts, and take these parts away and add them indef-
definitely.
initely to another line, we shall never arrive at any defi-
Objection 2. Further, no form surpasses the capacity
nite quantity resulting from those two lines, viz. the one
of its subject. But the capacity of the rational creature who
from which we subtracted and the one to which we added
is the subject of charity is finite. Therefore charity cannot
what was subtracted. But this does not occur in the case
increase indefinitely.
in point: because there is no need for the second increase
Objection 3. Further, every finite thing can, by contin-
of charity to be less than the first, since rather is it prob-
∗ St. Bernard, Serm. ii in Festo Purif.
1305
able that it would be equal or greater. As, therefore, the increase of man’s charity, while he is in the state of the
charity of the blessed is something finite, if the charity
wayfarer. For charity itself considered as such has no
of the wayfarer can increase indefinitely, it would follow
limit to its increase, since it is a participation of the in-
that the charity of the way can equal the charity of heaven;
finite charity which is the Holy Ghost. In like manner the
which is absurd. Therefore the wayfarer’s charity cannot
cause of the increase of charity, viz. God, is possessed of
increase indefinitely.
infinite power. Furthermore, on the part of its subject, no
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): “Not
limit to this increase can be determined, because when-
as though I had already attained, or were already per-
ever charity increases, there is a corresponding increased
fect; but I follow after, if I may, by any means appre-
ability to receive a further increase. It is therefore evident
hend,” on which words a gloss says: “Even if he has made
that it is not possible to fix any limits to the increase of
great progress, let none of the faithful say: ‘Enough.’ For
charity in this life.
whosoever says this, leaves the road before coming to his
Reply to Objection 1. The increase of charity is di-
destination.” Therefore the wayfarer’s charity can ever in-
rected to an end, which is not in this, but in a future life.
crease more and more.
Reply to Objection 2. The capacity of the rational
I answer that, A term to the increase of a form may
creature is increased by charity, because the heart is en-
be fixed in three ways: first by reason of the form itself
larged thereby, according to 2 Cor. 6:11: “Our heart is
having a fixed measure, and when this has been reached
enlarged”; so that it still remains capable of receiving a
it is no longer possible to go any further in that form, but
further increase.
if any further advance is made, another form is attained.
Reply to Objection 3. This argument holds good in
And example of this is paleness, the bounds of which may,
those things which have the same kind of quantity, but not
by continual alteration, be passed, either so that whiteness
in those which have different kinds: thus however much
ensues, or so that blackness results. Secondly, on the part
a line may increase it does not reach the quantity of a su-
of the agent, whose power does not extend to a further in-
perficies. Now the quantity of a wayfarer’s charity which
crease of the form in its subject. Thirdly, on the part of
follows the knowledge of faith is not of the same kind as
the subject, which is not capable of ulterior perfection.
the quantity of the charity of the blessed, which follows
Now, in none of these ways, is a limit imposed to the
open vision. Hence the argument does not prove.
Whether charity can be perfect in this life?
IIa IIae q. 24 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that charity cannot be
I answer that, The perfection of charity may be un-
perfect in this life. For this would have been the case with
derstood in two ways: first with regard to the object loved,
the apostles before all others. Yet it was not so, since the
secondly with regard to the person who loves. With re-
Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): “Not as though I had already at-
gard to the object loved, charity is perfect, if the object be
tained, or were already perfect.” Therefore charity cannot
loved as much as it is lovable. Now God is as lovable as
be perfect in this life.
He is good, and His goodness is infinite, wherefore He is
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
infinitely lovable. But no creature can love Him infinitely
36) that “whatever kindles charity quenches cupidity, but
since all created power is finite. Consequently no crea-
where charity is perfect, cupidity is done away altogether.”
ture’s charity can be perfect in this way; the charity of
But this cannot be in this world, wherein it is impossible
God alone can, whereby He loves Himself.
to live without sin, according to 1 Jn. 1:8: “If we say that
On the part of the person who loves, charity is perfect,
we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” Now all sin arises
when he loves as much as he can. This happens in three
from some inordinate cupidity. Therefore charity cannot
ways. First, so that a man’s whole heart is always actually
be perfect in this life.
borne towards God: this is the perfection of the charity of
Objection 3. Further, what is already perfect cannot
heaven, and is not possible in this life, wherein, by reason
be perfected any more. But in this life charity can always
of the weakness of human life, it is impossible to think
increase, as stated above (a. 7). Therefore charity cannot
always actually of God, and to be moved by love towards
be perfect in this life.
Him. Secondly, so that man makes an earnest endeavor
On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon.
to give his time to God and Divine things, while scorning
Joan. Tract. v) “Charity is perfected by being strength-
other things except in so far as the needs of the present life
ened; and when it has been brought to perfection, it ex-
demand. This is the perfection of charity that is possible
claims, ‘I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.’ ”
to a wayfarer; but is not common to all who have char-
Now this is possible in this life, as in the case of Paul.
ity. Thirdly, so that a man gives his whole heart to God
Therefore charity can be perfect in this life.
habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor desiring anything
1306
contrary to the love of God; and this perfection is common Reply to Objection 2. This is said on account of ve-to all who have charity.
nial sins, which are contrary, not to the habit, but to the
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle denies that he has
act of charity: hence they are incompatible, not with the
the perfection of heaven, wherefore a gloss on the same
perfection of the way, but with that of heaven.
passage says that “he was a perfect wayfarer, but had not
Reply to Objection 3. The perfection of the way is
yet achieved the perfection to which the way leads.”
not perfection simply, wherefore it can always increase.
Whether charity is rightly distinguished into three degrees, beginning, progress, and IIa IIae q. 24 a. 9
perfection?
Objection 1. It would seem unfitting to distinguish
cumbent on man to occupy himself chiefly with avoiding
three degrees of charity, beginning, progress, and perfec-
sin and resisting his concupiscences, which move him in
tion. For there are many degrees between the beginning
opposition to charity: this concerns beginners, in whom
of charity and its ultimate perfection. Therefore it is not
charity has to be fed or fostered lest it be destroyed: in the
right to put only one.
second place man’s chief pursuit is to aim at progress in
Objection 2. Further, charity begins to progress as
good, and this is the pursuit of the proficient, whose chief
soon as it begins to be. Therefore we ought not to distin-
aim is to strengthen their charity by adding to it: while
guish between charity as progressing and as beginning.
man’s third pursuit is to aim chiefly at union with and en-
Objection 3. Further, in this world, however perfect
joyment of God: this belongs to the perfect who “desire
a man’s charity may be, it can increase, as stated above
to be dissolved and to be with Christ.”
(a. 7). Now for charity to increase is to progress. There-
In like manner we observe in local motion that at first
fore perfect charity ought not to be distinguished from
there is withdrawal from one term, then approach to the
progressing charity: and so the aforesaid degrees are un-
other term, and thirdly, rest in this term.
suitably assigned to charity.
Reply to Objection 1.
All these distinct degrees
On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon.
which can be discerned in the increase of charity, are com-
Joan. Tract. v) “As soon as charity is born it takes food,”
prised in the aforesaid three, even as every division of
which refers to beginners, “after taking food, it waxes
continuous things is included in these three—the begin-
strong,” which refers to those who are progressing, “and
ning, the middle, and the end, as the Philosopher states
when it has become strong it is perfected,” which refers to
(De Coelo i, 1).
the perfect. Therefore there are three degrees of charity.
Reply to Objection 2. Although those who are begin-
I answer that, The spiritual increase of charity may be
ners in charity may progress, yet the chief care that besets
considered in respect of a certain likeness to the growth of
them is to resist the sins which disturb them by their on-
the human body. For although this latter growth may be
slaught. Afterwards, however, when they come to feel
divided into many parts, yet it has certain fixed divisions
this onslaught less, they begin to tend to perfection with
according to those particular actions or pursuits to which
greater security; yet with one hand doing the work, and
man is brought by this same growth. Thus we speak of a
with the other holding the sword as related in 2 Esdr 4:17
man being an infant until he has the use of reason, after
about those who built up Jerusalem.
which we distinguish another state of man wherein he be-
Reply to Objection 3. Even the perfect make progress
gins to speak and to use his reason, while there is again a
in charity: yet this is not their chief care, but their aim is
third state, that of puberty when he begins to acquire the
principally directed towards union with God. And though
power of generation, and so on until he arrives at perfec-
both the beginner and the proficient seek this, yet their so-
tion.
licitude is chiefly about other things, with the beginner,
In like manner the divers degrees of charity are distin-
about avoiding sin, with the proficient, about progressing
guished according to the different pursuits to which man
in virtue.
is brought by the increase of charity. For at first it is in-
Whether charity can decrease?
IIa IIae q. 24 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that charity can decrease.
Objection 2. Further, Augustine, speaking to God,
For contraries by their nature affect the same subject.
says (Confess. x) “He loves Thee less, who loves aught
Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since then
besides Thee”: and (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) he says that
charity increases, as stated above (a. 4), it seems that it
“what kindles charity quenches cupidity.”
For this it
can also decrease.
seems to follow that, on the contrary, what arouses cupid-
1307
ity quenches charity. But cupidity, whereby a man loves we shall state further on (a. 12), and by way of merit, since
something besides God, can increase in man. Therefore
when, by sinning mortally, a man acts against charity, he
charity can decrease.
deserves that God should withdraw charity from him.
Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
In like manner, neither can venial sin diminish charity
lit. viii, 12) “God makes the just man, by justifying him,
either effectively or by way of merit. Not effectively, be-
but in such a way, that if the man turns away from God,
cause it does not touch charity, since charity is about the
he no longer retains the effect of the Divine operation.”
last end, whereas venial sin is a disorder about things di-
From this we may gather that when God preserves char-
rected to the end: and a man’s love for the end is none the
ity in man, He works in the same way as when He first
less through his committing an inordinate act as regards
infuses charity into him. Now at the first infusion of char-
the things directed to the end. Thus sick people some-
ity God infuses less charity into him that prepares himself
times, though they love health much, are irregular in keep-
less. Therefore also in preserving charity, He preserves
ing to their diet: and thus again, in speculative sciences,
less charity in him that prepares himself less. Therefore
the false opinions that are derived from the principles, do
charity can decrease.
not diminish the certitude of the principles. So too, ve-
On the contrary, In Scripture, charity is compared
nial sin does not merit diminution of charity; for when a
to fire, according to Cant 8:6: “The lamps thereof,” i.e.
man offends in a small matter he does not deserve to be
of charity, “are fire and flames.” Now fire ever mounts
mulcted in a great matter. For God does not turn away
upward so long as it lasts. Therefore as long as charity
from man, more than man turns away from Him: where-
endures, it can ascend, but cannot descend, i.e. decrease.
fore he that is out of order in respect of things directed to
I answer that, The quantity which charity has in com-
the end, does not deserve to be mulcted in charity whereby
parison with its proper object, cannot decrease, even as
he is ordered to the last end.
neither can it increase, as stated above (a. 4, ad 2).
The consequence is that charity can by no means be
Since, however, it increases in that quantity which it
diminished, if we speak of direct causality, yet whatever
has in comparison with its subject, here is the place to
disposes to its corruption may be said to conduce indi-
consider whether it can decrease in this way. Now, if
rectly to its diminution, and such are venial sins, or even
it decrease, this must needs be either through an act, or
the cessation from the practice of works of charity.
by the mere cessation from act. It is true that virtues ac-
Reply to Objection 1. Contraries affect the same sub-
quired through acts decrease and sometimes cease alto-
ject when that subject stands in equal relation to both. But
gether through cessation from act, as stated above ( Ia IIae,
charity does not stand in equal relation to increase and
q. 53, a. 3). Wherefore the Philosopher says, in reference
decrease. For it can have a cause of increase, but not of
to friendship (Ethic. viii, 5) “that want of intercourse,”
decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument does not
i.e. the neglect to call upon or speak with one’s friends,
prove.
“has destroyed many a friendship.” Now this is because
Reply to Objection 2.
Cupidity is twofold, one
the safe-keeping of a thing depends on its cause, and the
whereby man places his end in creatures, and this kills
cause of human virtue is a human act, so that when hu-
charity altogether, since it is its poison, as Augustine
man acts cease, the virtue acquired thereby decreases and
states (Confess. x). This makes us love God less (i.e. less
at last ceases altogether. Yet this does not occur to charity,
than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed by di-
because it is not the result of human acts, but is caused by
minishing charity but by destroying it altogether. It is thus
God alone, as stated above (a. 2). Hence it follows that
that we must understand the saying: “He loves Thee less,
even when its act ceases, it does not for this reason de-
who loves aught beside Thee,” for he adds these words,
crease, or cease altogether, unless the cessation involves a
“which he loveth not for Thee.” This does not apply to ve-
sin.
nial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that which we love
The consequence is that a decrease of charity cannot
in venial sin, is loved for God’s sake habitually though
be caused except either by God or by some sinful act.
not actually. There is another cupidity, that of venial sin,
Now no defect is caused in us by God, except by way
which is always diminished by charity: and yet this cupid-
of punishment, in so far as He withdraws His grace in
ity cannot diminish charity, for the reason given above.
punishment of sin. Hence He does not diminish charity
Reply to Objection 3. A movement of the free-will
except by way of punishment: and this punishment is due
is requisite in the infusion of charity, as stated above (
on account of sin.
Ia IIae, q. 113, a. 3). Wherefore that which diminishes
It follows, therefore, that if charity decrease, the cause
the intensity of the free-will conduces dispositively to a
of this decrease must be sin either effectively or by way
diminution in the charity to be infused. On the other
of merit. But mortal sin does not diminish charity, in
hand, no movement of the free-will is required for the
either of these ways, but destroys it entirely, both effec-
safe-keeping of charity, else it would not remain inn us
tively, because every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as
while we sleep. Hence charity does not decrease on ac-
1308
count of an obstacle on the part of the intensity of the free-will’s movement.
Whether we can lose charity when once we have it?
IIa IIae q. 24 a. 11
Objection 1. It would seem that we cannot lose char-
Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its
ity when once we have it. For if we lose it, this can only
subject, which is changeable on account of the free-will.
be through sin. Now he who has charity cannot sin, for it
Moreover charity may be compared with this subject, both
is written (1 Jn. 3:9): “Whosoever is born of God, com-
from the general point of view of form in comparison with
mitteth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he cannot
matter, and from the specific point of view of habit as
sin, because he is born of God.” But none save the chil-
compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be in
dren of God have charity, for it is this which distinguishes
its subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does
“the children of God from the children of perdition,” as
not entirely fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident
Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17). Therefore he that has
in the forms of things generated and corrupted, because
charity cannot lose it.
the matter of such things receives one form in such a way,
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii,
that it retains the potentiality to another form, as though
7) that “if love be not true, it should not be called love.”
its potentiality were not completely satisfied with the one
Now, as he says again in a letter to Count Julian, “char-
form. Hence the one form may be lost by the other being
ity which can fail was never true.”∗ Therefore it was no
received. On the other hand the form of a celestial body
charity at all. Therefore, when once we have charity, we
which entirely fills the potentiality of its matter, so that
cannot lose it.
the latter does not retain the potentiality to another form,
Objection 3. Further, Gregory says in a homily for
is in its subject inseparably. Accordingly the charity of
Pentecost (In Evang. xxx) that “God’s love works great
the blessed, because it entirely fills the potentiality of the
things where it is; if it ceases to work it is not charity.”
rational mind, since every actual movement of that mind
Now no man loses charity by doing great things. There-
is directed to God, is possessed by its subject inseparably:
fore if charity be there, it cannot be lost.
whereas the charity of the wayfarer does not so fill the
Objection 4. Further, the free-will is not inclined to
potentiality of its subject, because the latter is not always
sin unless by some motive for sinning. Now charity ex-
actually directed to God: so that when it is not actually
cludes all motives for sinning, both self-love and cupidity,
directed to God, something may occur whereby charity is
and all such things. Therefore charity cannot be lost.
lost.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 2:4): “I have
It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and
somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first
this belongs to a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is
charity.”
suitable to it, to seem good, and whatever is unsuitable, to
I answer that, The Holy Ghost dwells in us by char-
seem evil. For as the taste judges of savors according to its
ity, as shown above (a. 2; Qq. 23,24). We can, accord-
disposition, even so does the human mind judge of things
ingly, consider charity in three ways: first on the part of
to be done, according to its habitual disposition. Hence
the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul to love God, and in
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that “such as a man
this respect charity is incompatible with sin through the
is, so does the end appear to him.” Accordingly charity is
power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever
inseparable from its possessor, where that which pertains
He wills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two things
to charity cannot appear otherwise than good, and that is
to be true at the same time—that the Holy Ghost should
in heaven, where God is seen in His Essence, which is
will to move a certain man to an act of charity, and that this
the very essence of goodness. Therefore the charity of
man, by sinning, should lose charity. For the gift of perse-
heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity of the way can,
verance is reckoned among the blessings of God whereby
because in this state God is not seen in His Essence, which
“whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered,” as Au-
is the essence of goodness.
gustine says in his book on the Predestination of the saints
Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted speaks
(De Dono Persev. xiv).
from the point of view of the power of the Holy Ghost,
Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and
by Whose safeguarding, those whom He wills to move
thus it is incapable of anything that is against its nature.
are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills.
Wherefore charity cannot sin at all, even as neither can
Reply to Objection 2. The charity which can fail by
heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good, as Augustine says
reason of itself is no true charity; for this would be the
(De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24).
case, were its love given only for a time, and afterwards
∗ The quotation is from De Salutaribus Documentis ad quemdam
comitem, vii., among the works of Paul of Friuli, more commonly known as Paul the Deacon, a monk of Monte Cassino.
1309
were to cease, which would be inconsistent with true love.
count of the condition of its subject.
If, however, charity be lost through the changeableness of
Reply to Objection 4. Charity by reason of its act
the subject, and against the purpose of charity included in
excludes every motive for sinning. But it happens some-
its act, this is not contrary to true charity.
times that charity is not acting actually, and then it is pos-
Reply to Objection 3. The love of God ever works
sible for a motive to intervene for sinning, and if we con-
great things in its purpose, which is essential to charity;
sent to this motive, we lose charity.
but it does not always work great things in its act, on ac-
Whether charity is lost through one mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 24 a. 12
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not lost
the. . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.”
through one mortal sin. For Origen says (Peri Archon i):
Now no man can be worthy, at the same time, of eternal
“When a man who has mounted to the stage of perfection,
life and of eternal death. Therefore it is impossible for a
is satiated, I do not think that he will become empty or fall
man to have charity with a mortal sin. Therefore charity
away suddenly; but he must needs do so gradually and by
is destroyed by one mortal sin.
little and little.” But man falls away by losing charity.
I answer that, That one contrary is removed by the
Therefore charity is not lost through only one mortal sin.
other contrary supervening. Now every mortal sin is con-
Objection 2. Further, Pope Leo in a sermon on the
trary to charity by its very nature, which consists in man’s
Passion (60) addresses Peter thus: “Our Lord saw in thee
loving God above all things, and subjecting himself to
not a conquered faith, not an averted love, but constancy
Him entirely, by referring all that is his to God. It is there-
shaken. Tears abounded where love never failed, and the
fore essential to charity that man should so love God as to
words uttered in trepidation were washed away by the
wish to submit to Him in all things, and always to follow
fount of charity.” From this Bernard∗ drew his assertion
the rule of His commandments; since whatever is contrary
that “charity in Peter was not quenched, but cooled.” But
to His commandments is manifestly contrary to charity,
Peter sinned mortally in denying Christ. Therefore charity
and therefore by its very nature is capable of destroying
is not lost through one mortal sin.
charity.
Objection 3. Further, charity is stronger than an ac-
If indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on
quired virtue. Now a habit of acquired virtue is not de-
the power of its subject, it would not necessarily be re-
stroyed by one contrary sinful act. Much less, therefore,
moved by one mortal sin, for act is directly contrary, not
is charity destroyed by one contrary mortal sin.
to habit but to act. Now the endurance of a habit in its
Objection 4. Further, charity denotes love of God and
subject does not require the endurance of its act, so that
our neighbor. Now, seemingly, one may commit a mortal
when a contrary act supervenes the acquired habit is not
sin, and yet retain the love of God and one’s neighbor; be-
at once done away. But charity, being an infused habit, de-
cause an inordinate affection for things directed to the end,
pends on the action of God Who infuses it, Who stands in
does not remove the love for the end, as stated above (a. 10
relation to the infusion and safekeeping of charity, as the
). Therefore charity towards God can endure, though there
sun does to the diffusion of light in the air, as stated above
be a mortal sin through an inordinate affection for some
(a. 10, obj. 3). Consequently, just as the light would cease
temporal good.
at once in the air, were an obstacle placed to its being lit
Objection 5. Further, the object of a theological virtue up by the sun, even so charity ceases at once to be in the
is the last end. Now the other theological virtues, namely
soul through the placing of an obstacle to the outpouring
faith and hope, are not done away by one mortal sin, in
of charity by God into the soul.
fact they remain though lifeless. Therefore charity can
Now it is evident that through every mortal sin which
remain without a form, even when a mortal sin has been
is contrary to God’s commandments, an obstacle is placed
committed.
to the outpouring of charity, since from the very fact that
On the contrary, By mortal sin man becomes deserv-
a man chooses to prefer sin to God’s friendship, which re-
ing of eternal death, according to Rom. 6:23: “The wages
quires that we should obey His will, it follows that the
of sin is death.” On the other hand whoever has charity
habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal sin.
is deserving of eternal life, for it is written (Jn. 14:21):
Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that “man is
“He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My Father: and
enlightened by God’s presence, but he is darkened at once
I will love Him, and will manifest Myself to him,” in
by God’s absence, because distance from Him is effected
which manifestation everlasting life consists, according to
not by change of place but by aversion of the will.”
Jn. 17:3: “This is eternal life; that they may know Thee
Reply to Objection 1. This saying of Origen may be
∗ William of St. Thierry, De Nat. et Dig. Amoris. vi.
1310
understood, in one way, that a man who is in the state of that Peter lost charity; yet he soon recovered it.
perfection, does not suddenly go so far as to commit a
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what
mortal sin, but is disposed thereto by some previous neg-
has been said.
ligence, for which reason venial sins are said to be dispo-
Reply to Objection 4. Not every inordinate affection
sitions to mortal sin, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 88, a. 3).
for things directed to the end, i.e., for created goods, con-
Nevertheless he falls, and loses charity through the one
stitutes a mortal sin, but only such as is directly contrary
mortal sin if he commits it.
to the Divine will; and then the inordinate affection is con-
Since, however, he adds: “If some slight slip should
trary to charity, as stated.
occur, and he recover himself quickly he does not appear
Reply to Objection 5. Charity denotes union with
to fall altogether,” we may reply in another way, that when
God, whereas faith and hope do not. Now every mortal
he speaks of a man being emptied and falling away alto-
sin consists in aversion from God, as stated above (Gen.
gether, he means one who falls so as to sin through malice;
ad lit. viii, 12). Consequently every moral sin is contrary
and this does not occur in a perfect man all at once.
to charity, but not to faith and hope, but only certain de-
Reply to Objection 2. Charity may be lost in two
terminate sins, which destroy the habit of faith or of hope,
ways; first, directly, by actual contempt, and, in this way,
even as charity is destroyed by every moral sin. Hence
Peter did not lose charity. Secondly, indirectly, when a sin
it is evident that charity cannot remain lifeless, since it is
is committed against charity, through some passion of de-
itself the ultimate form regarding God under the aspect of
sire or fear; it was by sinning against charity in this way,
last end as stated above (q. 23, a. 8).
1311
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 25
Of the Object of Charity
(In Twelve Articles)
We must now consider the object of charity; which consideration will be twofold: (1) The things we ought to love out of charity: (2) The order in which they ought to be loved. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether we should love God alone, out of charity, or should we love our neighbor also?
(2) Whether charity should be loved out of charity?
(3) Whether irrational creatures ought to be loved out of charity?
(4) Whether one may love oneself out of charity?
(5) Whether one’s own body?
(6) Whether sinners should be loved out of charity?
(7) Whether sinners love themselves?
(8) Whether we should love our enemies out of charity?
(9) Whether we are bound to show them tokens of friendship?
(10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?
(11) Whether we ought to love the demons?
(12) How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity.
Whether the love of charity stops at God, or extends to our neighbor?
IIa IIae q. 25 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the love of charity
the same act that tends to an aspect of the object, and that
stops at God and does not extend to our neighbor. For
tends to the object under that aspect: thus it is specifically
as we owe God love, so do we owe Him fear, accord-
the same visual act whereby we see the light, and whereby
ing Dt. 10:12: “And now Israel, what doth the Lord thy
we see the color under the aspect of light.
God require of thee, but that thou fear. . . and love Him?”
Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be
Now the fear with which we fear man, and which is called
loved, is God, since what we ought to love in our neighbor
human fear, is distinct from the fear with which we fear
is that he may be in God. Hence it is clear that it is specif-
God, and which is either servile or filial, as is evident from
ically the same act whereby we love God, and whereby
what has been stated above (q. 10, a. 2). Therefore also
we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity
the love with which we love God, is distinct from the love
extends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of
with which we love our neighbor.
our neighbor.
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic.
Reply to Objection 1. We may fear our neighbor,
viii, 8) that “to be loved is to be honored.” Now the honor
even as we may love him, in two ways: first, on account
due to God, which is known as “latria,” is distinct from the
of something that is proper to him, as when a man fears
honor due to a creature, and known as “dulia.” Therefore
a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by reason
again the love wherewith we love God, is distinct from
of his own desire to get something from him. Such like
that with which we love our neighbor.
human fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same
Objection 3. Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss
applies to love. Secondly, we fear a man, or love him on
states on Mat. 1:2. Now hope is so due to God that it
account of what he has of God; as when we fear the sec-
is reprehensible to hope in man, according to Jer. 17:5:
ular power by reason of its exercising the ministry of God
“Cursed be the man that trusteth in man.” Therefore char-
for the punishment of evildoers, and love it for its justice:
ity is so due to God, as not to extend to our neighbor.
such like fear of man is not distinct from fear of God, as
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): “This com-
neither is such like love.
mandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God,
Reply to Objection 2. Love regards good in general,
love also his brother.”
whereas honor regards the honored person’s own good,
I answer that, As stated above (q. 17, a. 6; q. 19, a. 3; for it is given to a person in recognition of his own virtue.
Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 3) habits are not differentiated except
Hence love is not differentiated specifically on account
their acts be of different species. For every act of the one
of the various degrees of goodness in various persons, so
species belongs to the same habit. Now since the species
long as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas
of an act is derived from its object, considered under its
honor is distinguished according to the good belonging to
formal aspect, it follows of necessity that it is specifically
individuals. Consequently we love all our neighbors with
1312
the same love of charity, in so far as they are referred to though he were the principal author of salvation, but not,
one good common to them all, which is God; whereas we
to hope in man as helping us ministerially under God. In
give various honors to various people, according to each
like manner it would be wrong if a man loved his neighbor
one’s own virtue, and likewise to God we give the singular
as though he were his last end, but not, if he loved him for
honor of latria on account of His singular virtue.
God’s sake; and this is what charity does.
Reply to Objection 3. It is wrong to hope in man as
Whether we should love charity out of charity?
IIa IIae q. 25 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that charity need not be
whose object is the true, understands that it understands,
loved out of charity. For the things to be loved out of
because this again is something true. Love, however, even
charity are contained in the two precepts of charity (Mat.
by reason of its own species, is capable of reflecting on
22:37-39): and neither of them includes charity, since
itself, because it is a spontaneous movement of the lover
charity is neither God nor our neighbor. Therefore charity
towards the beloved, wherefore from the moment a man
need not be loved out of charity.
loves, he loves himself to love.
Objection 2. Further, charity is founded on the fel-
Yet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of
lowship of happiness, as stated above (q. 23, a. 1). But
friendship, as stated above (q. 23, a. 1). Now by friend-
charity cannot participate in happiness. Therefore charity
ship a thing is loved in two ways: first, as the friend for
need not be loved out of charity.
whom we have friendship, and to whom we wish good
Objection 3. Further, charity is a kind of friendship,
things: secondly, as the good which we wish to a friend.
as stated above (q. 23, a. 1). But no man can have friend-
It is in the latter and not in the former way that charity
ship for charity or for an accident, since such things can-
is loved out of charity, because charity is the good which
not return love for love, which is essential to friendship, as
we desire for all those whom we love out of charity. The
stated in Ethic. viii. Therefore charity need not be loved
same applies to happiness, and to the other virtues.
out of charity.
Reply to Objection 1. God and our neighbor are those
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8):
with whom we are friends, but love of them includes the
“He that loves his neighbor, must, in consequence, love
loving of charity, since we love both God and our neigh-
love itself.” But we love our neighbor out of charity.
bor, in so far as we love ourselves and our neighbor to
Therefore it follows that charity also is loved out of char-
love God, and this is to love charity.
ity.
Reply to Objection 2. Charity is itself the fellowship
I answer that, Charity is love. Now love, by reason
of the spiritual life, whereby we arrive at happiness: hence
of the nature of the power whose act it is, is capable of
it is loved as the good which we desire for all whom we
reflecting on itself; for since the object of the will is the
love out of charity.
universal good, whatever has the aspect of good, can be
Reply to Objection 3.
This argument considers
the object of an act of the will: and since to will is itself a friendship as referred to those with whom we are friends.
good, man can will himself to will. Even so the intellect,
Whether irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity?
IIa IIae q. 25 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that irrational creatures
irrational creatures.
also ought to be loved out of charity. For it is chiefly by
Objection 3. Further, just as the object of charity
charity that we are conformed to God. Now God loves
is God.
so is the object of faith.
Now faith extends
irrational creatures out of charity, for He loves “all things
to irrational creatures, since we believe that heaven and
that are” (Wis. 11:25), and whatever He loves, He loves
earth were created by God, that the fishes and birds were
by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should love
brought forth out of the waters, and animals that walk, and
irrational creatures out of charity.
plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to
Objection 2. Further, charity is referred to God prin-
irrational creatures.
cipally, and extends to other things as referable to God.
On the contrary, The love of charity extends to none
Now just as the rational creature is referable to God, in
but God and our neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot
as much as it bears the resemblance of image, so too, are
be extended to irrational creatures, since they have no fel-
the irrational creatures, in as much as they bear the re-
lowship with man in the rational life. Therefore charity
semblance of a trace∗. Therefore charity extends also to
does not extend to irrational creatures.
∗ Cf. Ia, q. 45, a. 7
1313
I answer that, According to what has been stated life which is regulated by reason. Hence friendship with
above (q. 13, a. 1) charity is a kind of friendship. Now
irrational creatures is impossible, except metaphorically
the love of friendship is twofold: first, there is the love
speaking. The third reason is proper to charity, for char-
for the friend to whom our friendship is given, secondly,
ity is based on the fellowship of everlasting happiness, to
the love for those good things which we desire for our
which the irrational creature cannot attain. Therefore we
friend. With regard to the first, no irrational creature can
cannot have the friendship of charity towards an irrational
be loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of
creature.
these reasons refer in a general way to friendship, which
Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of
cannot have an irrational creature for its object: first be-
charity, if we regard them as the good things that we de-
cause friendship is towards one to whom we wish good
sire for others, in so far, to wit, as we wish for their preserthings, while, properly speaking, we cannot wish good
vation, to God’s honor and man’s use; thus too does God
things to an irrational creature, because it is not compe-
love them out of charity.
tent, properly speaking, to possess good, this being proper
Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
to the rational creature which, through its free-will, is the
Reply to Objection 2. The likeness by way of trace
master of its disposal of the good it possesses. Hence the
does not confer the capacity for everlasting life, whereas
Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 6) that we do not speak of good
the likeness of image does: and so the comparison fails.
or evil befalling such like things, except metaphorically.
Reply to Objection 3. Faith can extend to all that is
Secondly, because all friendship is based on some fellow-
in any way true, whereas the friendship of charity extends
ship in life; since “nothing is so proper to friendship as to
only to such things as have a natural capacity for everlast-
live together,” as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. viii, 5).
ing life; wherefore the comparison fails.
Now irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human
Whether a man ought to love himself out of charity?
IIa IIae q. 25 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that a man is bound to
whereas a man is one with himself which is more than be-
love himself out of charity. For Gregory says in a homily
ing united to another. Hence, just as unity is the principle
(In Evang. xvii) that there “can be no charity between less
of union, so the love with which a man loves himself is
than two.” Therefore no man has charity towards himself.
the form and root of friendship. For if we have friendship
Objection 2. Further, friendship, by its very nature,
with others it is because we do unto them as we do unto
implies mutual love and equality (Ethic. viii, 2,7), which
ourselves, hence we read in Ethic. ix, 4,8, that “the ori-
cannot be of one man towards himself. But charity is a
gin of friendly relations with others lies in our relations
kind of friendship, as stated above (q. 23, a. 1). Therefore
to ourselves.” Thus too with regard to principles we have
a man cannot have charity towards himself.
something greater than science, namely understanding.
Objection 3.
Further, anything relating to charity
Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its
cannot be blameworthy, since charity “dealeth not per-
specific nature, namely as denoting man’s friendship with
versely” (1 Cor. 23:4). Now a man deserves to be blamed
God in the first place, and, consequently, with the things
for loving himself, since it is written (2 Tim. 3:1,2): “In
of God, among which things is man himself who has char-
the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be
ity. Hence, among these other things which he loves out of
lovers of themselves.” Therefore a man cannot love him-
charity because they pertain to God, he loves also himself
self out of charity.
out of charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 19:18): “Thou
Reply to Objection 1. Gregory speaks there of char-
shalt love thy friend as thyself.” Now we love our friends
ity under the general notion of friendship: and the Second
out of charity. Therefore we should love ourselves too out
Objection is to be taken in the same sense.
of charity.
Reply to Objection 3. Those who love themselves are
I answer that, Since charity is a kind of friendship, as to be blamed, in so far as they love themselves as regards
stated above (q. 23, a. 1), we may consider charity from
their sensitive nature, which they humor. This is not to
two standpoints: first, under the general notion of friend-
love oneself truly according to one’s rational nature, so as
ship, and in this way we must hold that, properly speak-
to desire for oneself the good things which pertain to the
ing, a man is not a friend to himself, but something more
perfection of reason: and in this way chiefly it is through
than a friend, since friendship implies union, for Diony-
charity that a man loves himself.
sius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “love is a unitive force,”
1314
Whether a man ought to love his body out of charity?
IIa IIae q. 25 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought not to
we love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but we
love his body out of charity. For we do not love one with
ought not to love the evil effects of sin and the corruption
whom we are unwilling to associate. But those who have
of punishment; we ought rather, by the desire of charity,
charity shun the society of the body, according to Rom.
to long for the removal of such things.
7:24: “Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?”
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle did not shrink
and Phil. 1:23: “Having a desire to be dissolved and to be
from the society of his body, as regards the nature of
with Christ.” Therefore our bodies are not to be loved out
the body, in fact in this respect he was loth to be de-
of charity.
prived thereof, according to 2 Cor. 5:4: “We would not
Objection 2.
Further, the friendship of charity is
be unclothed, but clothed over.” He did, however, wish
based on fellowship in the enjoyment of God. But the
to escape from the taint of concupiscence, which remains
body can have no share in that enjoyment. Therefore the
in the body, and from the corruption of the body which
body is not to be loved out of charity.
weighs down the soul, so as to hinder it from seeing God.
Objection 3. Further, since charity is a kind of friend-
Hence he says expressly: “From the body of this death.”
ship it is towards those who are capable of loving in re-
Reply to Objection 2. Although our bodies are un-
turn. But our body cannot love us out of charity. There-
able to enjoy God by knowing and loving Him, yet by the
fore it should not be loved out of charity.
works which we do through the body, we are able to attain
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
to the perfect knowledge of God. Hence from the enjoy-
i, 23,26) that there are four things that we should love out
ment in the soul there overflows a certain happiness into
of charity, and among them he reckons our own body.
the body, viz., “the flush of health and incorruption,” as
I answer that, Our bodies can be considered in two
Augustine states (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii). Hence, since
ways: first, in respect of their nature, secondly, in respect
the body has, in a fashion, a share of happiness, it can be
of the corruption of sin and its punishment.
loved with the love of charity.
Now the nature of our body was created, not by an evil
Reply to Objection 3. Mutual love is found in the
principle, as the Manicheans pretend, but by God. Hence
friendship which is for another, but not in that which a
we can use it for God’s service, according to Rom. 6:13:
man has for himself, either in respect of his soul, or in
“Present. . . your members as instruments of justice unto
respect of his body.
God.” Consequently, out of the love of charity with which
Whether we ought to love sinners out of charity?
IIa IIae q. 25 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to love
in, and will the same things. Now charity does not make
sinners out of charity. For it is written (Ps. 118:113):
us will what sinners will, nor to rejoice in what gives them
“I have hated the unjust.” But David had perfect charity.
joy, but rather the contrary. Therefore sinners should not
Therefore sinners should be hated rather than loved, out
be loved out of charity.
of charity.
Objection 5. Further, it is proper to friends to asso-
Objection 2. Further, “love is proved by deeds” as
ciate together, according to Ethic. viii. But we ought not
Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx).
to associate with sinners, according to 2 Cor. 6:17: “Go
But good men do no works of the unjust: on the contrary,
ye out from among them.” Therefore we should not love
they do such as would appear to be works of hate, accord-
sinners out of charity.
ing to Ps. 100:8: “In the morning I put to death all the
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
wicked of the land”: and God commanded (Ex. 22:18):
i, 30) that “when it is said: ‘Thou shalt love thy neigh-
“Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live.” Therefore sinners
bor,’ it is evident that we ought to look upon every man as
should not be loved out of charity.
our neighbor.” Now sinners do not cease to be men, for
Objection 3. Further, it is part of friendship that one
sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we ought to love
should desire and wish good things for one’s friends. Now
sinners out of charity.
the saints, out of charity, desire evil things for the wicked,
I answer that, Two things may be considered in the
according to Ps. 9:18: “May the wicked be turned into
sinner: his nature and his guilt. According to his na-
hell∗.” Therefore sinners should not be loved out of char-
ture, which he has from God, he has a capacity for happi-
ity.
ness, on the fellowship of which charity is based, as stated
Objection 4. Further, it is proper to friends to rejoice above (a. 3; q. 23, Aa. 1,5), wherefore we ought to love
∗ Douay and A. V.: ‘The wicked shall be,’ etc. See Reply to this Objection.
1315
sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature.
put an end to the sin, because the sinner is thus deprived
On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and
of the power to sin any more.
is an obstacle to happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their
Reply to Objection 3. Such like imprecations which
guilt whereby they are opposed to God, all sinners are to
we come across in Holy Writ, may be understood in three
be hated, even one’s father or mother or kindred, accord-
ways: first, by way of prediction, not by way of wish,
ing to Lk. 12:26. For it is our duty to hate, in the sinner,
so that the sense is: “May the wicked be,” that is, “The
his being a sinner, and to love in him, his being a man ca-
wicked shall be, turned into hell.” Secondly, by way of
pable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of charity,
wish, yet so that the desire of the wisher is not referred to
for God’s sake.
the man’s punishment, but to the justice of the punisher,
Reply to Objection 1. The prophet hated the unjust,
according to Ps. 57:11: “The just shall rejoice when he
as such, and the object of his hate was their injustice,
shall see the revenge,” since, according to Wis. 1:13, not
which was their evil. Such hatred is perfect, of which he
even God “hath pleasure in the destruction of the wicked
himself says (Ps. 138:22): “I have hated them with a per-
[Vulg.: ‘living’]” when He punishes them, but He rejoices
fect hatred.” Now hatred of a person’s evil is equivalent to
in His justice, according to Ps. 10:8: “The Lord is just and
love of his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs
hath loved justice.” Thirdly, so that this desire is referred
to charity.
to the removal of the sin, and not to the punishment itself,
Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher observes
to the effect, namely, that the sin be destroyed, but that the
(Ethic. ix, 3), when our friends fall into sin, we ought
man may live.
not to deny them the amenities of friendship, so long as
Reply to Objection 4. We love sinners out of char-
there is hope of their mending their ways, and we ought
ity, not so as to will what they will, or to rejoice in what
to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover
gives them joy, but so as to make them will what we will,
money, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin
and rejoice in what rejoices us. Hence it is written (Jer.
than money to friendship. When, however, they fall into
15:19): “They shall be turned to thee, and thou shalt not
very great wickedness, and become incurable, we ought
to be turned to them.”
no longer to show them friendliness. It is for this rea-
Reply to Objection 5. The weak should avoid associ-
son that both Divine and human laws command such like
ating with sinners, on account of the danger in which they
sinners to be put to death, because there is greater likeli-
stand of being perverted by them. But it is commendable
hood of their harming others than of their mending their
for the perfect, of whose perversion there is no fear, to
ways. Nevertheless the judge puts this into effect, not out
associate with sinners that they may convert them. For
of hatred for the sinners, but out of the love of charity, by
thus did Our Lord eat and drink with sinners as related by
reason of which he prefers the public good to the life of
Mat. 9:11-13. Yet all should avoid the society of sinners,
the individual. Moreover the death inflicted by the judge
as regards fellowship in sin; in this sense it is written (2
profits the sinner, if he be converted, unto the expiation of
Cor. 6:17): “Go out from among them. . . and touch not
his crime; and, if he be not converted, it profits so as to
the unclean thing,” i.e. by consenting to sin.
Whether sinners love themselves?
IIa IIae q. 25 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that sinners love them-
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 10:6): “He that
selves. For that which is the principle of sin, is most of
loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul.”
all in the sinner. Now love of self is the principle of sin,
I answer that, Love of self is common to all, in one
since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that it “builds
way; in another way it is proper to the good; in a third
up the city of Babylon.” Therefore sinners most of all love
way, it is proper to the wicked. For it is common to all
themselves.
for each one to love what he thinks himself to be. Now
Objection 2. Further, sin does not destroy nature.
a man is said to be a thing, in two ways: first, in respect
Now it is in keeping with nature that every man should
of his substance and nature, and, this way all think them-
love himself: wherefore even irrational creatures naturally
selves to be what they are, that is, composed of a soul and
desire their own good, for instance, the preservation of
body. In this way too, all men, both good and wicked, love
their being, and so forth. Therefore sinners love them-
themselves, in so far as they love their own preservation.
selves.
Secondly, a man is said to be something in respect of
Objection 3.
Further, good is beloved by all, as
some predominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now many sinners
of as being the state, and so, what the sovereign does, the
reckon themselves to be good. Therefore many sinners
state is said to do. In this way, all do not think themselves
love themselves.
to be what they are. For the reasoning mind is the pre-
1316
dominant part of man, while the sensitive and corporeal experience no clashing of wills, since their whole soul
nature takes the second place, the former of which the
tends to one thing.
Apostle calls the “inward man,” and the latter, the “out-
On the other hand, the wicked have no wish to be pre-
ward man” (2 Cor. 4:16). Now the good look upon their
served in the integrity of the inward man, nor do they de-
rational nature or the inward man as being the chief thing
sire spiritual goods for him, nor do they work for that end,
in them, wherefore in this way they think themselves to
nor do they take pleasure in their own company by en-
be what they are. On the other hand, the wicked reckon
tering into their own hearts, because whatever they find
their sensitive and corporeal nature, or the outward man,
there, present, past and future, is evil and horrible; nor do
to hold the first place. Wherefore, since they know not
they agree with themselves, on account of the gnawings of
themselves aright, they do not love themselves aright, but
conscience, according to Ps. 49:21: “I will reprove thee
love what they think themselves to be. But the good know
and set before thy face.”
themselves truly, and therefore truly love themselves.
In the same manner it may be shown that the wicked
The Philosopher proves this from five things that are
love themselves, as regards the corruption of the outward
proper to friendship. For in the first place, every friend
man, whereas the good do not love themselves thus.
wishes his friend to be and to live; secondly, he desires
Reply to Objection 1. The love of self which is the
good things for him; thirdly, he does good things to him;
principle of sin is that which is proper to the wicked, and
fourthly, he takes pleasure in his company; fifthly, he is
reaches “to the contempt of God,” as stated in the passage
of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in almost
quoted, because the wicked so desire external goods as to
the same things. In this way the good love themselves,
despise spiritual goods.
as to the inward man, because they wish the preservation
Reply to Objection 2. Although natural love is not
thereof in its integrity, they desire good things for him,
altogether forfeited by wicked men, yet it is perverted in
namely spiritual goods, indeed they do their best to ob-
them, as explained above.
tain them, and they take pleasure in entering into their
Reply to Objection 3. The wicked have some share
own hearts, because they find there good thoughts in the
of self-love, in so far as they think themselves good. Yet
present, the memory of past good, and the hope of future
such love of self is not true but apparent: and even this is
good, all of which are sources of pleasure. Likewise they
not possible in those who are very wicked.
Whether charity requires that we should love our enemies?
IIa IIae q. 25 a. 8
Objection 1.
It would seem that charity does not
enemies as such: this is perverse, and contrary to charity,
require us to love our enemies.
For Augustine says
since it implies love of that which is evil in another.
(Enchiridion lxxiii) that “this great good,” namely, the
Secondly love of one’s enemies may mean that we
love of our enemies, is “not so universal in its applica-
love them as to their nature, but in general: and in this
tion, as the object of our petition when we say: Forgive
sense charity requires that we should love our enemies,
us our trespasses.” Now no one is forgiven sin without he
namely, that in loving God and our neighbor, we should
have charity, because, according to Prov. 10:12, “charity
not exclude our enemies from the love given to our neigh-
covereth all sins.” Therefore charity does not require that
bor in general.
we should love our enemies.
Thirdly, love of one’s enemies may be considered as
Objection 2. Further, charity does not do away with
specially directed to them, namely, that we should have
nature. Now everything, even an irrational being, natu-
a special movement of love towards our enemies. Char-
rally hates its contrary, as a lamb hates a wolf, and water
ity does not require this absolutely, because it does not
fire. Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies.
require that we should have a special movement of love
Objection 3.
Further, charity “doth nothing per-
to every individual man, since this would be impossible.
versely” (1 Cor. 13:4). Now it seems perverse to love
Nevertheless charity does require this, in respect of our
one’s enemies, as it would be to hate one’s friends: hence
being prepared in mind, namely, that we should be ready
Joab upbraided David by saying (2 Kings 19:6): “Thou
to love our enemies individually, if the necessity were to
lovest them that hate thee, and thou hatest them that love
occur. That man should actually do so, and love his en-
thee.” Therefore charity does not make us love our ene-
emy for God’s sake, without it being necessary for him to
mies.
do so, belongs to the perfection of charity. For since man
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 4:44): “Love
loves his neighbor, out of charity, for God’s sake, the more
your enemies.”
he loves God, the more does he put enmities aside and
I answer that, Love of one’s enemies may be under-
show love towards his neighbor: thus if we loved a certain
stood in three ways. First, as though we were to love our
man very much, we would love his children though they
1317
were unfriendly towards us. This is the sense in which their enmity should displease us. They are not, however,
Augustine speaks in the passage quoted in the First Ob-
contrary to us, as men and capable of happiness: and it is
jection, the Reply to which is therefore evident.
as such that we are bound to love them.
Reply to Objection 2. Everything naturally hates its
Reply to Objection 3. It is wrong to love one’s ene-
contrary as such. Now our enemies are contrary to us, as
mies as such: charity does not do this, as stated above.
enemies, wherefore this itself should be hateful to us, for
Whether it is necessary for salvation that we should show our enemies the signs and IIa IIae q. 25 a. 9
effects of love?
Objection 1. It would seem that charity demands of a
precept, that we should inwardly love our enemies in gen-
man to show his enemy the signs or effects of love. For
eral, but not individually, except as regards the mind being
it is written (1 Jn. 3:18): “Let us not love in word nor
prepared to do so, as explained above (a. 8).
in tongue, but in deed and in truth.” Now a man loves
We must accordingly apply this to the showing of the
in deed by showing the one he loves signs and effects of
effects and signs of love. For some of the signs and fa-
love. Therefore charity requires that a man show his ene-
vors of love are shown to our neighbors in general, as
mies such signs and effects of love.
when we pray for all the faithful, or for a whole people, or
Objection 2.
Further, Our Lord said in the same
when anyone bestows a favor on a whole community: and
breath (Mat. 5:44): “Love your enemies,” and, “Do good
the fulfilment of the precept requires that we should show
to them that hate you.” Now charity demands that we love
such like favors or signs of love towards our enemies. For
our enemies. Therefore it demands also that we should
if we did not so, it would be a proof of vengeful spite,
“do good to them.”
and contrary to what is written (Lev. 19:18): “Seek not
Objection 3. Further, not only God but also our neigh-
revenge, nor be mindful of the injury of thy citizens.” But
bor is the object of charity. Now Gregory says in a homily
there are other favors or signs of love, which one shows
for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx), that “love of God cannot be
to certain persons in particular: and it is not necessary
idle for wherever it is it does great things, and if it ceases
for salvation that we show our enemies such like favors
to work, it is no longer love.” Hence charity towards our
and signs of love, except as regards being ready in our
neighbor cannot be without producing works. But charity
minds, for instance to come to their assistance in a case
requires us to love our neighbor without exception, though
of urgency, according to Prov. 25:21: “If thy enemy be
he be an enemy. Therefore charity requires us to show the
hungry, give him to eat; if he thirst, give him. . . drink.”
signs and effects of love towards our enemies.
Outside cases of urgency, to show such like favors to an
On the contrary, A gloss on Mat. 5:44, “Do good to
enemy belongs to the perfection of charity, whereby we
them that hate you,” says: “To do good to one’s enemies is
not only beware, as in duty bound, of being overcome by
the height of perfection”∗. Now charity does not require
evil, but also wish to overcome evil by good†, which be-
us to do that which belongs to its perfection. Therefore
longs to perfection: for then we not only beware of being
charity does not require us to show the signs and effects
drawn into hatred on account of the hurt done to us, but
of love to our enemies.
purpose to induce our enemy to love us on account of our
I answer that, The effects and signs of charity are
kindliness.
the result of inward love, and are in proportion with it.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Now it is absolutely necessary, for the fulfilment of the
Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?
IIa IIae q. 25 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that we are not bound to
Objection 2. Further, dumb animals have more in
love the angels out of charity. For, as Augustine says (De
common with us than the angels have, since they belong
Doctr. Christ. i), charity is a twofold love: the love of
to the same proximate genus as we do. But we have not
God and of our neighbor. Now love of the angels is not
charity towards dumb animals, as stated above (a. 3). Nei-
contained in the love of God, since they are created sub-
ther, therefore, have we towards the angels.
stances; nor is it, seemingly, contained in the love of our
Objection 3. Further, nothing is so proper to friends
neighbor, since they do not belong with us to a common
as companionship with one another (Ethic. viii, 5). But
species. Therefore we are not bound to love them out of
the angels are not our companions; we cannot even see
charity.
them. Therefore we are unable to give them the friend-
∗ Augustine, Enchiridion lxxiii
† Rom. 12:21
1318
ship of charity.
who is united to us in a common species, but also one
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
who is united to us by sharing in the blessings pertaining
i, 30): “If the name of neighbor is given either to those
to everlasting life, and it is on the latter fellowship that the whom we pity, or to those who pity us, it is evident that
friendship of charity is founded.
the precept binding us to love our neighbor includes also
Reply to Objection 2. Dumb animals are united to
the holy angels from whom we receive many merciful fa-
us in the proximate genus, by reason of their sensitive na-
vors.”
ture; whereas we are partakers of everlasting happiness,
I answer that, As stated above (q. 23, a. 1), the friend-by reason not of our sensitive nature but of our rational
ship of charity is founded upon the fellowship of everlast-
mind wherein we associate with the angels.
ing happiness, in which men share in common with the
Reply to Objection 3. The companionship of the an-
angels. For it is written (Mat. 22:30) that “in the resur-
gels does not consist in outward fellowship, which we
rection. . . men shall be as the angels of God in heaven.” It
have in respect of our sensitive nature; it consists in a
is therefore evident that the friendship of charity extends
fellowship of the mind, imperfect indeed in this life, but
also to the angels.
perfect in heaven, as stated above (q. 23, a. 1, ad 1).
Reply to Objection 1. Our neighbor is not only one
Whether we are bound to love the demons out of charity?
IIa IIae q. 25 a. 11
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to love the
be loved as the person who is the object of friendship,
demons out of charity. For the angels are our neighbors by
and thus we cannot have the friendship of charity towards
reason of their fellowship with us in a rational mind. But
the demons. For it is an essential part of friendship that
the demons also share in our fellowship thus, since natu-
one should be a well-wisher towards one’s friend; and it
ral gifts, such as life and understanding, remain in them
is impossible for us, out of charity, to desire the good of
unimpaired, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). There-
everlasting life, to which charity is referred, for those spir-
fore we ought to love the demons out of charity.
its whom God has condemned eternally, since this would
Objection 2.
Further, the demons differ from the
be in opposition to our charity towards God whereby we
blessed angels in the matter of sin, even as sinners from
approve of His justice.
just men. Now the just man loves the sinner out of charity.
Secondly, we love a thing as being that which we de-
Therefore he ought to love the demons also out of charity.
sire to be enduring as another’s good. In this way we love
Objection 3. Further, we ought, out of charity, to love, irrational creatures out of charity, in as much as we wish
as being our neighbors, those from whom we receive fa-
them to endure, to give glory to God and be useful to man,
vors, as appears from the passage of Augustine quoted
as stated above (a. 3): and in this way too we can love the
above (a. 9). Now the demons are useful to us in many
nature of the demons even out of charity, in as much as
things, for “by tempting us they work crowns for us,” as
we desire those spirits to endure, as to their natural gifts,
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 17). Therefore we ought
unto God’s glory.
to love the demons out of charity.
Reply to Objection 1. The possession of everlasting
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 28:18): “Your
happiness is not impossible for the angelic mind as it is for
league with death shall be abolished, and your covenant
the mind of a demon; consequently the friendship of char-
with hell shall not stand.” Now the perfection of a peace
ity which is based on the fellowship of everlasting life,
and covenant is through charity. Therefore we ought not
rather than on the fellowship of nature, is possible towards
to have charity for the demons who live in hell and com-
the angels, but not towards the demons.
pass death.
Reply to Objection 2. In this life, men who are in sin
I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), in the sinner, we retain the possibility of obtaining everlasting happiness:
are bound, out of charity, to love his nature, but to hate his
not so those who are lost in hell, who, in this respect, are
sin. But the name of demon is given to designate a nature
in the same case as the demons.
deformed by sin, wherefore demons should not be loved
Reply to Objection 3. That the demons are useful to
out of charity. Without however laying stress on the word,
us is due not to their intention but to the ordering of Di-
the question as to whether the spirits called demons ought
vine providence; hence this leads us to be friends, not with
to be loved out of charity, must be answered in accordance
them, but with God, Who turns their perverse intention to
with the statement made above (Aa. 2,3), that a thing may
our profit.
be loved out of charity in two ways. First, a thing may
1319
Whether four things are rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, viz. God, our IIa IIae q. 25 a. 12
neighbor, our body and ourselves?
Objection 1. It would seem that these four things are
piness comes by a kind of overflow, namely the human
not rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit:
body.
God, our neighbor, our body, and ourselves. For, as Au-
Now the source from which happiness flows is lovable
gustine states (Tract. super Joan. lxxxiii), “he that loveth
by reason of its being the cause of happiness: that which
not God, loveth not himself.” Hence love of oneself is in-
is a partaker of happiness, can be an object of love for two
cluded in the love of God. Therefore love of oneself is not
reasons, either through being identified with ourselves, or
distinct from the love of God.
through being associated with us in partaking of happi-
Objection 2. Further, a part ought not to be condi-
ness, and in this respect, there are two things to be loved
vided with the whole. But our body is part of ourselves.
out of charity, in as much as man loves both himself and
Therefore it ought not to be condivided with ourselves as
his neighbor.
a distinct object of love.
Reply to Objection 1. The different relations between
Objection 3. Further, just as a man has a body, so
a lover and the various things loved make a different kind
has his neighbor. Since then the love with which a man
of lovableness. Accordingly, since the relation between
loves his neighbor, is distinct from the love with which a
the human lover and God is different from his relation to
man loves himself, so the love with which a man loves his
himself, these two are reckoned as distinct objects of love,
neighbor’s body, ought to be distinct from the love with
for the love of the one is the cause of the love of the other,
which he loves his own body. Therefore these four things
so that the former love being removed the latter is taken
are not rightly distinguished as objects to be loved out of
away.
charity.
Reply to Objection 2. The subject of charity is the ra-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
tional mind that can be capable of obtaining happiness, to
i, 23): “There are four things to be loved; one which is
which the body does not reach directly, but only by a kind
above us,” namely God, “another, which is ourselves, a
of overflow. Hence, by his reasonable mind which holds
third which is nigh to us,” namely our neighbor, “and a
the first place in him, man, out of charity, loves himself in
fourth which is beneath us,” namely our own body.
one way, and his own body in another.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 23, Aa. 1,5), the
Reply to Objection 3. Man loves his neighbor, both
friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happi-
as to his soul and as to his body, by reason of a certain
ness. Now, in this fellowship, one thing is considered as
fellowship in happiness. Wherefore, on the part of his
the principle from which happiness flows, namely God;
neighbor, there is only one reason for loving him; and
a second is that which directly partakes of happiness,
our neighbor’s body is not reckoned as a special object
namely men and angels; a third is a thing to which hap-
of love.
1320
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 26
Of the Order of Charity
(In Thirteen Articles)
We must now consider the order of charity, under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is an order in charity?
(2) Whether man ought to love God more than his neighbor?
(3) Whether more than himself?
(4) Whether he ought to love himself more than his neighbor?
(5) Whether man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?
(6) Whether he ought to love one neighbor more than another?
(7) Whether he ought to love more, a neighbor who is better, or one who is more closely united to him?
(8) Whether he ought to love more, one who is akin to him by blood, or one who is united to him by other ties?
(9) Whether, out of charity, a man ought to love his son more than his father ?
(10) Whether he ought to love his mother more than his father?
(11) Whether he ought to love his wife more than his father or mother?
(12) Whether we ought to love those who are kind to us more than those whom we are kind to?
(13) Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?
Whether there is order in charity?
IIa IIae q. 26 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no order in
erence to the first principle of that love, which is God.
charity. For charity is a virtue. But no order is assigned to
Reply to Objection 1. Charity tends towards the last
the other virtues. Neither, therefore, should any order be
end considered as last end: and this does not apply to any
assigned to charity.
other virtue, as stated above (q. 23, a. 6 ). Now the end
Objection 2. Further, just as the object of faith is the has the character of principle in matters of appetite and
First Truth, so is the object of charity the Sovereign Good.
action, as was shown above (q. 23, a. 7, ad 2; Ia IIae, a. 1,
Now no order is appointed for faith, but all things are be-
ad 1). Wherefore charity, above all, implies relation to the
lieved equally. Neither, therefore, ought there to be any
First Principle, and consequently, in charity above all, we
order in charity.
find an order in reference to the First Principle.
Objection 3. Further, charity is in the will: whereas
Reply to Objection 2. Faith pertains to the cognitive
ordering belongs, not to the will, but to the reason. There-
power, whose operation depends on the thing known be-
fore no order should be ascribed to charity.
ing in the knower. On the other hand, charity is in an ap-
On the contrary, It is written (Cant 2:4): “He brought
petitive power, whose operation consists in the soul tend-
me into the cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me.”
ing to things themselves. Now order is to be found in
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v,
things themselves, and flows from them into our knowl-
text. 16), the terms “before” and “after” are used in ref-
edge. Hence order is more appropriate to charity than to
erence to some principle. Now order implies that certain
faith.
things are, in some way, before or after. Hence wherever
And yet there is a certain order in faith, in so far as it is
there is a principle, there must needs be also order of some
chiefly about God, and secondarily about things referred
kind. But it has been said above (q. 23, a. 1; q. 25, a. 12)
to God.
that the love of charity tends to God as to the principle
Reply to Objection 3. Order belongs to reason as the
of happiness, on the fellowship of which the friendship of
faculty that orders, and to the appetitive power as to the
charity is based. Consequently there must needs be some
faculty which is ordered. It is in this way that order is
order in things loved out of charity, which order is in ref-
stated to be in charity.
1321
Whether God ought to be loved more than our neighbor?
IIa IIae q. 26 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that God ought not to
Principle, whence it flows to all who are capable of hap-
be loved more than our neighbor. For it is written (1 Jn.
piness.
4:20): “He that loveth not his brother whom he seeth, how
Therefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all
can he love God, Whom he seeth not?” Whence it seems
out of charity: for He is loved as the cause of happiness,
to follow that the more a thing is visible the more lov-
whereas our neighbor is loved as receiving together with
able it is, since loving begins with seeing, according to
us a share of happiness from Him.
Ethic. ix, 5,12. Now God is less visible than our neigh-
Reply to Objection 1. A thing is a cause of love in
bor. Therefore He is less lovable, out of charity, than our
two ways: first, as being the reason for loving. In this way
neighbor.
good is the cause of love, since each thing is loved accord-
Objection 2. Further, likeness causes love, according
ing to its measure of goodness. Secondly, a thing causes
to Ecclus. 13:19: “Every beast loveth its like.” Now man
love, as being a way to acquire love. It is in this way that
bears more likeness to his neighbor than to God. There-
seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were
fore man loves his neighbor, out of charity, more than he
lovable according as it is visible, but because by seeing a
loves God.
thing we are led to love it. Hence it does not follow that
Objection 3. Further, what charity loves in a neigh-
what is more visible is more lovable, but that as an object
bor, is God, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ.
of love we meet with it before others: and that is the sense
i, 22,27). Now God is not greater in Himself than He is
of the Apostle’s argument. For, since our neighbor is more
in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more to be loved in
visible to us, he is the first lovable object we meet with,
Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we ought not to
because “the soul learns, from those things it knows, to
love God more than our neighbor.
love what it knows not,” as Gregory says in a homily (In
On the contrary, A thing ought to be loved more, if
Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued that, if any man loves
others ought to be hated on its account. Now we ought
not his neighbor, neither does he love God, not because
to hate our neighbor for God’s sake, if, to wit, he leads
his neighbor is more lovable, but because he is the first
us astray from God, according to Lk. 14:26: “If any man
thing to demand our love: and God is more lovable by
come to Me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife,
reason of His greater goodness.
end children, and brethren, and sisters. . . he cannot be My
Reply to Objection 2. The likeness we have to God
disciple.” Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity,
precedes and causes the likeness we have to our neigh-
more than our neighbor.
bor: because from the very fact that we share along with
I answer that, Each kind of friendship regards chiefly
our neighbor in something received from God, we become
the subject in which we chiefly find the good on the
like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we
fellowship of which that friendship is based: thus civil
ought to love God more than we love our neighbor.
friendship regards chiefly the ruler of the state, on whom
Reply to Objection 3. Considered in His substance,
the entire common good of the state depends; hence to
God is equally in all, in whomsoever He may be, for He is
him before all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience.
not lessened by being in anything. And yet our neighbor
Now the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of
does not possess God’s goodness equally with God, for
happiness, which consists essentially in God, as the First
God has it essentially, and our neighbor by participation.
Whether out of charity, man is bound to love God more than himself?
IIa IIae q. 26 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that man is not bound,
thing are more known. Therefore man loves himself more
out of charity, to love God more than himself. For the
than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does not
Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8) that “a man’s friendly re-
love God more than himself.
lations with others arise from his friendly relations with
Objection 3. Further, a man loves God as much as he
himself.” Now the cause is stronger than its effect. There-
loves to enjoy God. But a man loves himself as much as
fore man’s friendship towards himself is greater than his
he loves to enjoy God; since this is the highest good a man
friendship for anyone else. Therefore he ought to love
can wish for himself. Therefore man is not bound, out of
himself more than God.
charity, to love God more than himself.
Objection 2. Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
one’s own good. Now the reason for loving a thing is more
i, 22): “If thou oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own
loved than the thing itself which is loved for that reason,
sake, but for the sake of Him in Whom is the rightest end
even as the principles which are the reason for knowing a
of thy love, let no other man take offense if him also thou
1322
lovest for God’s sake.” Now “the cause of a thing being the fellowship of the gifts of grace.
such is yet more so.” Therefore man ought to love God
Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who
more than himself.
is the common good of all, more than himself: since hap-
I answer that, The good we receive from God is
piness is in God as in the universal and fountain principle
twofold, the good of nature, and the good of grace. Now
of all who are able to have a share of that happiness.
the fellowship of natural goods bestowed on us by God
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking
is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of which not
of friendly relations towards another person in whom the
only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves
good, which is the object of friendship, resides in some
God above all things and more than himself, but also ev-
restricted way; and not of friendly relations with another
ery single creature, each in its own way, i.e. either by an
in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality.
intellectual, or by a rational, or by an animal, or at least by Reply to Objection 2. The part does indeed love the
a natural love, as stones do, for instance, and other things
good of the whole, as becomes a part, not however so as
bereft of knowledge, because each part naturally loves the
to refer the good of the whole to itself, but rather itself to
common good of the whole more than its own particular
the good of the whole.
good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the prin-
Reply to Objection 3. That a man wishes to enjoy
cipal inclination of each part is towards common action
God pertains to that love of God which is love of concu-
conducive to the good of the whole. It may also be seen in
piscence. Now we love God with the love of friendship
civic virtues whereby sometimes the citizens suffer dam-
more than with the love of concupiscence, because the
age even to their own property and persons for the sake of
Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good in
the common good. Wherefore much more is this realized
enjoying Him. Hence, out of charity, man simply loves
with regard to the friendship of charity which is based on
God more than himself.
Whether our of charity, man ought to love himself more than his neighbor?
IIa IIae q. 26 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought not, out
as stated above (q. 25, Aa. 1,12), God is loved as the prin-
of charity, to love himself more than his neighbor. For the
ciple of good, on which the love of charity is founded;
principal object of charity is God, as stated above (a. 2;
while man, out of charity, loves himself by reason of
q. 25, Aa. 1,12). Now sometimes our neighbor is more
his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves his
closely united to God than we are ourselves. Therefore
neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that good. Now
we ought to love such a one more than ourselves.
fellowship is a reason for love according to a certain union
Objection 2. Further, the more we love a person, the
in relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses
more we avoid injuring him. Now a man, out of char-
union, the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine
ity, submits to injury for his neighbor’s sake, according to
good, is a more potent reason for loving than that another
Prov. 12:26: “He that neglecteth a loss for the sake of a
should be a partner with him in that share. Therefore man,
friend, is just.” Therefore a man ought, out of charity, to
out of charity, ought to love himself more than his neigh-
love his neighbor more than himself.
bor: in sign whereof, a man ought not to give way to any
Objection 3. Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:5) “char-
evil of sin, which counteracts his share of happiness, not
ity seeketh not its own.” Now the thing we love most is
even that he may free his neighbor from sin.
the one whose good we seek most. Therefore a man does
Reply to Objection 1. The love of charity takes its
not, out of charity, love himself more than his neighbor.
quantity not only from its object which is God, but also
On the contrary, It is written (Lev.
19:18, Mat.
from the lover, who is the man that has charity, even as
22:39): “Thou shalt love thy neighbor (Lev.
19:18:
the quantity of any action depends in some way on the
‘friend’) as thyself.” Whence it seems to follow that man’s
subject. Wherefore, though a better neighbor is nearer to
love for himself is the model of his love for another. But
God, yet because he is not as near to the man who has
the model exceeds the copy. Therefore, out of charity, a
charity, as this man is to himself, it does not follow that a
man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.
man is bound to love his neighbor more than himself.
I answer that, There are two things in man, his spiri-
Reply to Objection 2. A man ought to bear bodily
tual nature and his corporeal nature. And a man is said to
injury for his friend’s sake, and precisely in so doing he
love himself by reason of his loving himself with regard
loves himself more as regards his spiritual mind, because
to his spiritual nature, as stated above (q. 25, a. 7): so that it pertains to the perfection of virtue, which is a good of
accordingly, a man ought, out of charity, to love himself
the mind. In spiritual matters, however, man ought not to
more than he loves any other person.
suffer injury by sinning, in order to free his neighbor from
This is evident from the very reason for loving: since,
sin, as stated above.
1323
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says in his Rule dividual than his private good, even as the good of the
(Ep.
ccxi), the saying, “ ‘charity seeks not her own,’
whole is more lovable to the part, than the latter’s own
means that it prefers the common to the private good.”
partial good, as stated above (a. 3).
Now the common good is always more lovable to the in-
Whether a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?
IIa IIae q. 26 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that a man is not bound to
in the full participation of happiness which is the reason
love his neighbor more than his own body. For his neigh-
for loving one’s neighbor, is a greater reason for loving,
bor includes his neighbor’s body. If therefore a man ought
than the participation of happiness by way of overflow,
to love his neighbor more than his own body, it follows
which is the reason for loving one’s own body. Therefore,
that he ought to love his neighbor’s body more than his
as regards the welfare of the soul we ought to love our
own.
neighbor more than our own body.
Objection 2. Further, a man ought to love his own
Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher
soul more than his neighbor’s, as stated above (a. 4). Now
(Ethic. ix, 8) a thing seems to be that which is predomi-
a man’s own body is nearer to his soul than his neighbor.
nant in it: so that when we say that we ought to love our
Therefore we ought to love our body more than our neigh-
neighbor more than our own body, this refers to his soul,
bor.
which is his predominant part.
Objection 3. Further, a man imperils that which he
Reply to Objection 2. Our body is nearer to our soul
loves less for the sake of what he loves more. Now every
than our neighbor, as regards the constitution of our own
man is not bound to imperil his own body for his neigh-
nature: but as regards the participation of happiness, our
bor’s safety: this belongs to the perfect, according to Jn.
neighbor’s soul is more closely associated with our own
15:13: “Greater love than this no man hath, that a man
soul, than even our own body is.
lay down his life for his friends.” Therefore a man is not
Reply to Objection 3. Every man is immediately con-
bound, out of charity, to love his neighbor more than his
cerned with the care of his own body, but not with his
own body.
neighbor’s welfare, except perhaps in cases of urgency:
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
wherefore charity does not necessarily require a man to
i, 27) that “we ought to love our neighbor more than our
imperil his own body for his neighbor’s welfare, except
own body.”
in a case where he is under obligation to do so and if a
I answer that, Out of charity we ought to love more
man of his own accord offer himself for that purpose, this
that which has more fully the reason for being loved out of
belongs to the perfection of charity.
charity, as stated above (a. 2; q. 25, a. 12). Now fellowship
Whether we ought to love one neighbor more than another?
IIa IIae q. 26 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to love
equally.
one neighbor more than another. For Augustine says (De
On the contrary, One’s obligation to love a person
Doctr. Christ. i, 28): “One ought to love all men equally.
is proportionate to the gravity of the sin one commits in
Since, however, one cannot do good to all, we ought to
acting against that love. Now it is a more grievous sin
consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time or
to act against the love of certain neighbors, than against
any other circumstance, by a kind of chance, are more
the love of others. Hence the commandment (Lev. 10:9),
closely united to us.” Therefore one neighbor ought not to
“He that curseth his father or mother, dying let him die,”
be loved more than another.
which does not apply to those who cursed others than the
Objection 2. Further, where there is one and the same
above. Therefore we ought to love some neighbors more
reason for loving several, there should be no inequality of
than others.
love. Now there is one and the same reason for loving all
I answer that, There have been two opinions on this
one’s neighbors, which reason is God, as Augustine states
question: for some have said that we ought, out of char-
(De Doctr. Christ. i, 27). Therefore we ought to love all
ity, to love all our neighbors equally, as regards our affec-
our neighbors equally.
tion, but not as regards the outward effect. They held that
Objection 3. Further, to love a man is to wish him
the order of love is to be understood as applying to out-
good things, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now
ward favors, which we ought to confer on those who are
to all our neighbors we wish an equal good, viz. ever-
connected with us in preference to those who are uncon-
lasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our neighbors
nected, and not to the inward affection, which ought to be
1324
given equally to all including our enemies.
ways: first on the part of the good we wish our friend. In
But this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity,
this respect we love all men equally out of charity: be-
which is the inclination of grace, is not less orderly than
cause we wish them all one same generic good, namely
the natural appetite, which is the inclination of nature, for
everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be greater
both inclinations flow from Divine wisdom. Now we ob-
through its action being more intense: and in this way we
serve in the physical order that the natural inclination in
ought not to love all equally.
each thing is proportionate to the act or movement that
Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain
is becoming to the nature of that thing: thus in earth the
persons in two ways: first, through our loving some and
inclination of gravity is greater than in water, because it
not loving others. As regards beneficence we are bound to
is becoming to earth to be beneath water. Consequently
observe this inequality, because we cannot do good to all:
the inclination also of grace which is the effect of charity,
but as regards benevolence, love ought not to be thus un-
must needs be proportionate to those actions which have
equal. The other inequality arises from our loving some
to be performed outwardly, so that, to wit, the affection
more than others: and Augustine does not mean to ex-
of our charity be more intense towards those to whom we
clude the latter inequality, but the former, as is evident
ought to behave with greater kindness.
from what he says of beneficence.
We must, therefore, say that, even as regards the af-
Reply to Objection 2.
Our neighbors are not all
fection we ought to love one neighbor more than another.
equally related to God; some are nearer to Him, by rea-
The reason is that, since the principle of love is God, and
son of their greater goodness, and those we ought, out of
the person who loves, it must needs be that the affection of
charity, to love more than those who are not so near to
love increases in proportion to the nearness to one or the
Him.
other of those principles. For as we stated above (a. 1),
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the
wherever we find a principle, order depends on relation to
quantity of love on the part of the good which we wish
that principle.
our friends.
Reply to Objection 1. Love can be unequal in two
Whether we ought to love those who are better more those who are more closely united IIa IIae q. 26 a. 7
us?
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to love
man have not care of his own and especially of those of
those who are better more than those who are more closely
his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an
united to us. For that which is in no way hateful seems
infidel.” Now the inward affection of charity ought to cor-
more lovable than that which is hateful for some reason:
respond to the outward effect. Therefore charity regards
just as a thing is all the whiter for having less black mixed
those who are nearer to us before those who are better.
with it. Now those who are connected with us are hate-
I answer that, Every act should be proportionate both
ful for some reason, according to Lk. 14:26: “If any man
to its object and to the agent. But from its object it takes
come to Me, and hate not his father,” etc. On the other
its species, while, from the power of the agent it takes
hand good men are not hateful for any reason. Therefore
the mode of its intensity: thus movement has its species
it seems that we ought to love those who are better more
from the term to which it tends, while the intensity of its
than those who are more closely connected with us.
speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved and
Objection 2. Further, by charity above all, man is
the power of the mover. Accordingly love takes its species
likened to God.
But God loves more the better man.
from its object, but its intensity is due to the lover.
Therefore man also, out of charity, ought to love the better
Now the object of charity’s love is God, and man is the
man more than one who is more closely united to him.
lover. Therefore the specific diversity of the love which
Objection 3. Further, in every friendship that ought to
is in accordance with charity, as regards the love of our
be loved most which has most to do with the foundation
neighbor, depends on his relation to God, so that, out
of that friendship: for, by natural friendship we love most
of charity, we should wish a greater good to one who is
those who are connected with us by nature, our parents
nearer to God; for though the good which charity wishes
for instance, or our children. Now the friendship of char-
to all, viz. everlasting happiness, is one in itself, yet it
ity is founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which
has various degrees according to various shares of happi-
has more to do with better men than with those who are
ness, and it belongs to charity to wish God’s justice to be
more closely united to us. Therefore, out of charity, we
maintained, in accordance with which better men have a
ought to love better men more than those who are more
fuller share of happiness. And this regards the species of
closely connected with us.
love; for there are different species of love according to
On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 5:8): “If any
the different goods that we wish for those whom we love.
1325
On the other hand, the intensity of love is measured which charity is based, it follows that charity commands
with regard to the man who loves, and accordingly man
each act of another friendship, even as the art which is
loves those who are more closely united to him, with more
about the end commands the art which is about the means.
intense affection as to the good he wishes for them, than
Consequently this very act of loving someone because he
he loves those who are better as to the greater good he
is akin or connected with us, or because he is a fellow-
wishes for them.
countryman or for any like reason that is referable to the
Again a further difference must be observed here: for
end of charity, can be commanded by charity, so that,
some neighbors are connected with us by their natural ori-
out of charity both eliciting and commanding, we love in
gin, a connection which cannot be severed, since that ori-
more ways those who are more nearly connected with us.
gin makes them to be what they are. But the goodness
Reply to Objection 1. We are commanded to hate, in
of virtue, wherein some are close to God, can come and
our kindred, not their kinship, but only the fact of their be-
go, increase and decrease, as was shown above (q. 24,
ing an obstacle between us and God. In this respect they
Aa. 4,10,11). Hence it is possible for one, out of char-
are not akin but hostile to us, according to Micah 7:6: “A
ity, to wish this man who is more closely united to one,
men’s enemies are they of his own household.”
to be better than another, and so reach a higher degree of
Reply to Objection 2. Charity conforms man to God
happiness.
proportionately, by making man comport himself towards
Moreover there is yet another reason for which, out
what is his, as God does towards what is His. For we
of charity, we love more those who are more nearly con-
may, out of charity, will certain things as becoming to us
nected with us, since we love them in more ways. For,
which God does not will, because it becomes Him not to
towards those who are not connected with us we have no
will them, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 19, a. 10), when we
other friendship than charity, whereas for those who are
were treating of the goodness of the will.
connected with us, we have certain other friendships, ac-
Reply to Objection 3. Charity elicits the act of love
cording to the way in which they are connected. Now
not only as regards the object, but also as regards the lover,
since the good on which every other friendship of the vir-
as stated above. The result is that the man who is more
tuous is based, is directed, as to its end, to the good on
nearly united to us is more loved.
Whether we ought to love more those who are connected with us by ties of blood?
IIa IIae q. 26 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to love
On the contrary, The commandments of the deca-
more those who are more closely united to us by ties of
logue contain a special precept about the honor due to our
blood. For it is written (Prov. 18:24): “A man amiable in
parents (Ex. 20:12). Therefore we ought to love more
society, shall be more friendly than a brother.” Again, Va-
specially those who are united to us by ties of blood.
lerius Maximus says (Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv 7): “The
I answer that, As stated above (a. 7), we ought out
ties of friendship are most strong and in no way yield to
of charity to love those who are more closely united to us
the ties of blood.” Moreover it is quite certain and unde-
more, both because our love for them is more intense, and
niable, that as to the latter, the lot of birth is fortuitous,
because there are more reasons for loving them. Now in-
whereas we contract the former by an untrammelled will,
tensity of love arises from the union of lover and beloved:
and a solid pledge. Therefore we ought not to love more
and therefore we should measure the love of different per-
than others those who are united to us by ties of blood.
sons according to the different kinds of union, so that
Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7):
a man is more loved in matters touching that particular
“I love not less you whom I have begotten in the Gospel,
union in respect of which he is loved. And, again, in com-
than if I had begotten you in wedlock, for nature is no
paring love to love we should compare one union with
more eager to love than grace.” Surely we ought to love
another. Accordingly we must say that friendship among
those whom we expect to be with us for ever more than
blood relations is based upon their connection by natu-
those who will be with us only in this world. Therefore
ral origin, the friendship of fellow-citizens on their civic
we should not love our kindred more than those who are
fellowship, and the friendship of those who are fighting
otherwise connected with us.
side by side on the comradeship of battle. Wherefore in
Objection 3. Further, “Love is proved by deeds,” as
matters pertaining to nature we should love our kindred
Gregory states (Hom. in Evang. xxx). Now we are bound
most, in matters concerning relations between citizens, we
to do acts of love to others than our kindred: thus in the
should prefer our fellow-citizens, and on the battlefield
army a man must obey his officer rather than his father.
our fellow-soldiers. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
Therefore we are not bound to love our kindred most of
ix, 2) that “it is our duty to render to each class of people
all.
such respect as is natural and appropriate. This is in fact
1326
the principle upon which we seem to act, for we invite ters where we are free to do as we choose, for instance in
our relations to a wedding. . . It would seem to be a spe-
matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred is more
cial duty to afford our parents the means of living. . . and
stable, since it is more natural, and preponderates over
to honor them.”
others in matters touching nature: consequently we are
The same applies to other kinds of friendship.
more beholden to them in the providing of necessaries.
If however we compare union with union, it is evi-
Reply to Objection 2. Ambrose is speaking of love
dent that the union arising from natural origin is prior to,
with regard to favors respecting the fellowship of grace,
and more stable than, all others, because it is something
namely, moral instruction. For in this matter, a man ought
affecting the very substance, whereas other unions super-
to provide for his spiritual children whom he has begotten
vene and may cease altogether. Therefore the friendship
spiritually, more than for the sons of his body, whom he is
of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be
bound to support in bodily sustenance.
stronger in respect of that which is proper to each of them.
Reply to Objection 3. The fact that in the battle a
Reply to Objection 1. In as much as the friendship
man obeys his officer rather than his father proves, that he
of comrades originates through their own choice, love of
loves his father less, not simply relatively, i.e. as regards
this kind takes precedence of the love of kindred in mat-
the love which is based on fellowship in battle.
Whether a man ought, out of charity, to love his children more than his father?
IIa IIae q. 26 a. 9
Objection 1. It seems that a man ought, out of charity,
his father, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii). First,
to love his children more than his father. For we ought to
because parents love their children as being part of them-
love those more to whom we are more bound to do good.
selves, whereas the father is not part of his son, so that
Now we are more bound to do good to our children than to
the love of a father for his children, is more like a man’s
our parents, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:14): “Nei-
love for himself. Secondly, because parents know better
ther ought the children to lay up for the parents, but the
that so and so is their child than vice versa. Thirdly, be-
parents for the children.” Therefore a man ought to love
cause children are nearer to their parents, as being part of
his children more than his parents.
them, than their parents are to them to whom they stand
Objection 2. Further, grace perfects nature. But par-
in the relation of a principle. Fourthly, because parents
ents naturally love their children more than these love
have loved longer, for the father begins to love his child
them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Therefore
at once, whereas the child begins to love his father after a
a man ought to love his children more than his parents.
lapse of time; and the longer love lasts, the stronger it is,
Objection 3. Further, man’s affections are conformed
according to Ecclus. 9:14: “Forsake not an old friend, for
to God by charity. But God loves His children more than
the new will not be like to him.”
they love Him. Therefore we also ought to love our chil-
Reply to Objection 1. The debt due to a principle is
dren more than our parents.
submission of respect and honor, whereas that due to the
On the contrary, Ambrose∗ says: “We ought to love
effect is one of influence and care. Hence the duty of chil-
God first, then our parents, then our children, and lastly
dren to their parents consists chiefly in honor: while that
those of our household.”
of parents to their children is especially one of care.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 4, ad 1; a. 7), the
Reply to Objection 2. It is natural for a man as father
degrees of love may be measured from two standpoints.
to love his children more, if we consider them as closely
First, from that of the object. In this respect the better a
connected with him: but if we consider which is the more
thing is, and the more like to God, the more is it to be
exalted good, the son naturally loves his father more.
loved: and in this way a man ought to love his father more
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Doctr.
than his children, because, to wit, he loves his father as
Christ. i, 32), God loves us for our good and for His honor.
his principle, in which respect he is a more exalted good
Wherefore since our father is related to us as principle,
and more like God.
even as God is, it belongs properly to the father to receive
Secondly, the degrees of love may be measured from
honor from his children, and to the children to be provided
the standpoint of the lover, and in this respect a man loves
by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless
more that which is more closely connected with him, in
in cases of necessity the child is bound out of the favors
which way a man’s children are more lovable to him than
received to provide for his parents before all.
∗ Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.
1327
Whether a man ought to love his mother more than his father?
IIa IIae q. 26 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought to love
present question is whether the father as father, ought to
his mother more than his father. For, as the Philosopher
be loved more than the mother as mother. The reason is
says (De Gener. Animal. i, 20), “the female produces
that virtue and vice may make such a difference in such
the body in generation.” Now man receives his soul, not
like matters, that friendship may be diminished or de-
from his father, but from God by creation, as stated in the
stroyed, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii, 7). Hence
Ia, q. 90, a. 2; q. 118. Therefore a man receives more
Ambrose∗ says: “Good servants should be preferred to
from his mother than from his father: and consequently
wicked children.”
he ought to love her more than him.
Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved
Objection 2. Further, where greater love is given,
more than the mother. For father and mother are loved as
greater love is due. Now a mother loves her child more
principles of our natural origin. Now the father is princi-
than the father does: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix,
ple in a more excellent way than the mother, because he is
7) that “mothers have greater love for their children. For
the active principle, while the mother is a passive and ma-
the mother labors more in child-bearing, and she knows
terial principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the father
more surely than the father who are her children.”
is to be loved more.
Objection 3. Further, love should be more fond to-
Reply to Objection 1. In the begetting of man, the
wards those who have labored for us more, according to
mother supplies the formless matter of the body; and the
Rom. 16:6: “Salute Mary, who hath labored much among
latter receives its form through the formative power that is
you.” Now the mother labors more than the father in giv-
in the semen of the father. And though this power cannot
ing birth and education to her child; wherefore it is written
create the rational soul, yet it disposes the matter of the
(Ecclus. 7:29): “Forget not the groanings of thy mother.”
body to receive that form.
Therefore a man ought to love his mother more than his
Reply to Objection 2. This applies to another kind of
father.
love. For the friendship between lover and lover differs
On the contrary, Jerome says on Ezech. 44:25 that
specifically from the friendship between child and parent:
“man ought to love God the Father of all, and then his
while the friendship we are speaking of here, is that which
own father,” and mentions the mother afterwards.
a man owes his father and mother through being begotten
I answer that, In making such comparisons as this,
of them.
we must take the answer in the strict sense, so that the
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
Whether a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother?
IIa IIae q. 26 a. 11
Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought to love
ought to love his body less than his neighbor, as stated
his wife more than his father and mother. For no man
above (a. 5): and among his neighbors he should love his
leaves a thing for another unless he love the latter more.
parents most. Therefore he ought to love his parents more
Now it is written (Gn. 2:24) that “a man shell leave fa-
than his wife.
ther and mother” on account of his wife. Therefore a man
I answer that, As stated above (a. 9), the degrees of
ought to love his wife more than his father and mother.
love may be taken from the good (which is loved), or from
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:33)
the union between those who love. On the part of the good
that a husband should “love his wife as himself.” Now a
which is the object loved, a man should love his parents
man ought to love himself more than his parents. There-
more than his wife, because he loves them as his princi-
fore he ought to love his wife also more than his parents.
ples and considered as a more exalted good.
Objection 2. Further, love should be greater where
But on the part of the union, the wife ought to be loved
there are more reasons for loving. Now there are more rea-
more, because she is united with her husband, as one flesh,
sons for love in the friendship of a man towards his wife.
according to Mat. 19:6: “Therefore now they are not two,
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12) that “in this
but one flesh.” Consequently a man loves his wife more
friendship there are the motives of utility, pleasure, and
intensely, but his parents with greater reverence.
also of virtue, if husband and wife are virtuous.” There-
Reply to Objection 1. A man does not in all respects
fore a man’s love for his wife ought to be greater than his
leave his father and mother for the sake of his wife: for
love for his parents.
in certain cases a man ought to succor his parents rather
On the contrary, According to Eph.
5:28, “men
than his wife. He does however leave all his kinsfolk, and
ought to love their wives as their own bodies.” Now a man
cleaves to his wife as regards the union of carnal connec-
∗ Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.
1328
tion and co-habitation.
those for which a man loves his wife; although the latter
Reply to Objection 2. The words of the Apostle do
outweigh the former as regards the closeness of the union.
not mean that a man ought to love his wife equally with
As to the argument in the contrary sense, it must be
himself, but that a man’s love for himself is the reason for
observed that in the words quoted, the particle “as” de-
his love of his wife, since she is one with him.
notes not equality of love but the motive of love. For the
Reply to Objection 3. There are also several reasons
principal reason why a man loves his wife is her being
for a man’s love for his father; and these, in a certain re-
united to him in the flesh.
spect, namely, as regards good, are more weighty than
Whether a man ought to love more his benefactor than one he has benefited?
IIa IIae q. 26 a. 12
Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought to love
these are made manifest in our “action.” Secondly, be-
his benefactor more than one he has benefited. For Au-
cause we all naturally love that in which we see our own
gustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv): “Nothing will incite
good. Now it is true that the benefactor has some good
another more to love you than that you love him first: for
of his in the recipient of his benefaction, and the recipient
he must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses
some good in the benefactor; but the benefactor sees his
to love, but declines to return love already given.” Now
virtuous good in the recipient, while the recipient sees his
a man’s benefactor forestalls him in the kindly deeds of
useful good in the benefactor. Now it gives more pleasure
charity. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors above
to see one’s virtuous good than one’s useful good, both
all.
because it is more enduring for usefulness quickly flits
Objection 2. Further, the more grievously we sin by
by, and the pleasure of calling a thing to mind is not like
ceasing to love a man or by working against him, the more
the pleasure of having it present and because it is more
ought we to love him. Now it is a more grievous sin to
pleasant to recall virtuous goods than the profit we have
cease loving a benefactor or to work against him, than to
derived from others. Thirdly, because is it the lover’s part
cease loving one to whom one has hitherto done kindly
to act, since he wills and works the good of the beloved,
actions. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors more
while the beloved takes a passive part in receiving good,
than those to whom we are kind.
so that to love surpasses being loved, for which reason
Objection 3. Further, of all things lovable, God is
the greater love is on the part of the benefactor. Fourthly
to be loved most, and then one’s father, as Jerome says∗.
because it is more difficult to give than to receive favors:
Now these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a bene-
and we are most fond of things which have cost us most
factor should be loved above all others.
trouble, while we almost despise what comes easy to us.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7),
Reply to Objection 1. It is some thing in the bene-
that “benefactors seem to love recipients of their benefac-
factor that incites the recipient to love him: whereas the
tions, rather than vice versa.”
benefactor loves the recipient, not through being incited
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 9,11), a thing is
by him, but through being moved thereto of his own ac-
loved more in two ways: first because it has the character
cord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses what
of a more excellent good, secondly by reason of a closer
we do through another.
connection. In the first way we ought to love our benefac-
Reply to Objection 2. The love of the beneficiary for
tor most, because, since he is a principle of good to the
the benefactor is more of a duty, wherefore the contrary is
man he has benefited, he has the character of a more ex-
the greater sin. On the other hand, the love of the bene-
cellent good, as stated above with regard to one’s father
factor for the beneficiary is more spontaneous, wherefore
(a. 9).
it is quicker to act.
In the second way, however, we love those more who
Reply to Objection 3. God also loves us more than
have received benefactions from us, as the Philosopher
we love Him, and parents love their children more than
proves (Ethic. ix, 7) by four arguments. First because the
these love them. Yet it does not follow that we love all
recipient of benefactions is the handiwork of the benefac-
who have received good from us, more than any of our
tor, so that we are wont to say of a man: “He was made by
benefactors. For we prefer such benefactors as God and
so and so.” Now it is natural to a man to love his own work
our parents, from whom we have received the greatest fa-
(thus it is to be observed that poets love their own poems):
vors, to those on whom we have bestowed lesser benefits.
and the reason is that we love “to be” and “to live,” and
∗ Comment. in Ezechiel xliv, 25
1329
Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?
IIa IIae q. 26 a. 13
Objection 1. It would seem that the order of charity
his better neighbors, because the intensity of the act of
does not endure in heaven. For Augustine says (De Vera
love arises on the part of the person who loves, as stated
Relig. xlviii): “Perfect charity consists in loving greater
above (Aa. 7,9). Moreover it is for this that the gift of
goods more, and lesser goods less.” Now charity will be
charity is bestowed by God on each one, namely, that he
perfect in heaven. Therefore a man will love those who
may first of all direct his mind to God, and this pertains
are better more than either himself or those who are con-
to a man’s love for himself, and that, in the second place,
nected with him.
he may wish other things to be directed to God, and even
Objection 2. Further, we love more him to whom we
work for that end according to his capacity.
wish a greater good. Now each one in heaven wishes
As to the order to be observed among our neighbors,
a greater good for those who have more good, else his
a man will simply love those who are better, according to
will would not be conformed in all things to God’s will:
the love of charity. Because the entire life of the blessed
and there to be better is to have more good. Therefore
consists in directing their minds to God, wherefore the
in heaven each one loves more those who are better, and
entire ordering of their love will be ruled with respect to
consequently he loves others more than himself, and one
God, so that each one will love more and reckon to be
who is not connected with him, more than one who is.
nearer to himself those who are nearer to God. For then
Objection 3. Further, in heaven love will be entirely
one man will no longer succor another, as he needs to in
for God’s sake, for then will be fulfilled the words of 1
the present life, wherein each man has to succor those who
Cor. 15:28: “That God may be all in all.” Therefore he
are closely connected with him rather than those who are
who is nearer God will be loved more, so that a man will
not, no matter what be the nature of their distress: hence
love a better man more than himself, and one who is not
it is that in this life, a man, by the inclination of charity,
connected with him, more than one who is.
loves more those who are more closely united to him, for
On the contrary, Nature is not done away, but per-
he is under a greater obligation to bestow on them the ef-
fected, by glory. Now the order of charity given above
fect of charity. It will however be possible in heaven for
(Aa. 2,3,4) is derived from nature: since all things nat-
a man to love in several ways one who is connected with
urally love themselves more than others. Therefore this
him, since the causes of virtuous love will not be ban-
order of charity will endure in heaven.
ished from the mind of the blessed. Yet all these reasons
I answer that, The order of charity must needs remain
are incomparably surpassed by that which is taken from
in heaven, as regards the love of God above all things. For
nighness to God.
this will be realized simply when man shall enjoy God
Reply to Objection 1.
This argument should be
perfectly. But, as regards the order between man him-
granted as to those who are connected together; but as
self and other men, a distinction would seem to be nec-
regards man himself, he ought to love himself so much
essary, because, as we stated above (Aa. 7,9), the degrees
the more than others, as his charity is more perfect, since
of love may be distinguished either in respect of the good
perfect entire reason of his love, for God is man’s charity
which a man desires for another, or according to the inten-
directs man to God perfectly, and this belongs to love of
sity of love itself. In the first way a man will love better
oneself, as stated above.
men more than himself, and those who are less good, less
Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the
than himself: because, by reason of the perfect conformity
order of charity in respect of the degree of good one wills
of the human to the Divine will, each of the blessed will
the person one loves.
desire everyone to have what is due to him according to
Reply to Objection 3. God will be to each one the
Divine justice. Nor will that be a time for advancing by
entire reason of his love, for God is man’s entire good.
means of merit to a yet greater reward, as happens now
For if we make the impossible supposition that God were
while it is possible for a man to desire both the virtue and
not man’s good, He would not be man’s reason for lov-
the reward of a better man, whereas then the will of each
ing. Hence it is that in the order of love man should love
one will rest within the limits determined by God. But in
himself more than all else after God.
the second way a man will love himself more than even
1330
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 27
Of the Principle Act of Charity, Which Is to Love
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the act of charity, and (1) the principal act of charity, which is to love, (2) the other acts or effects which follow from that act.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved?
(2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?
(3) Whether God should be loved for His own sake?
(4) Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?
(5) Whether God can be loved wholly?
(6) Whether the love of God is according to measure?
(7) Which is the better, to love one’s friend, or one’s enemy? (8) Which is the better, to love God, or one’s neighbor?
Whether to be loved is more proper to charity than to love?
IIa IIae q. 27 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that it is more proper to
of something else. This can be exemplified in two ways.
charity to be loved than to love. For the better charity
First, in the fact that friends are more commended for lov-
is to be found in those who are themselves better. But
ing than for being loved, indeed, if they be loved and yet
those who are better should be more loved. Therefore to
love not, they are blamed. Secondly, because a mother,
be loved is more proper to charity.
whose love is the greatest, seeks rather to love than to be
Objection 2. Further, that which is to be found in
loved: for “some women,” as the Philosopher observes
more subjects seems to be more in keeping with nature,
(Ethic. viii, 8) “entrust their children to a nurse; they do
and, for that reason, better. Now, as the Philosopher says
love them indeed, yet seek not to be loved in return, if they
(Ethic. viii, 8), “many would rather be loved than love,
happen not to be loved.”
and lovers of flattery always abound.” Therefore it is bet-
Reply to Objection 1. A better man, through being
ter to be loved than to love, and consequently it is more in
better, is more lovable; but through having more perfect
keeping with charity.
charity, loves more. He loves more, however, in propor-
Objection 3. Further, “the cause of anything being
tion to the person he loves. For a better man does not love
such is yet more so.” Now men love because they are
that which is beneath him less than it ought to be loved:
loved, for Augustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv) that “noth-
whereas he who is less good fails to love one who is better,
ing incites another more to love you than that you love
as much as he ought to be loved.
him first.” Therefore charity consists in being loved rather
Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
than in loving.
viii, 8), “men wish to be loved in as much as they wish
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii,
to be honored.” For just as honor is bestowed on a man
8) that friendship consists in loving rather than in being
in order to bear witness to the good which is in him, so
loved. Now charity is a kind of friendship. Therefore it
by being loved a man is shown to have some good, since
consists in loving rather than in being loved.
good alone is lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved
I answer that, To love belongs to charity as charity.
and to be honored, for the sake of something else, viz. to
For, since charity is a virtue, by its very essence it has an
make known the good which is in the person loved. On
inclination to its proper act. Now to be loved is not the act
the other hand, those who have charity seek to love for
of the charity of the person loved; for this act is to love:
the sake of loving, as though this were itself the good of
and to be loved is competent to him as coming under the
charity, even as the act of any virtue is that virtue’s good.
common notion of good, in so far as another tends towards
Hence it is more proper to charity to wish to love than to
his good by an act of charity. Hence it is clear that to love
wish to be loved.
is more proper to charity than to be loved: for that which
Reply to Objection 3. Some love on account of being
befits a thing by reason of itself and its essence is more
loved, not so that to be loved is the end of their loving, but
competent to it than that which is befitting to it by reason
because it is a kind of way leading a man to love.
1331
Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?
IIa IIae q. 27 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that to love, considered
ing the difference between goodwill and the love which is
as an act of charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the
a passion, says (Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not im-
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “to love is to wish a
ply impetuosity or desire, that is to say, has not an eager
person well”; and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of
inclination, because it is by the sole judgment of his rea-
charity is nothing but goodwill.
son that one man wishes another well. Again such like
Objection 2. Further, the act belongs to the same sub-
love arises from previous acquaintance, whereas goodwill
ject as the habit. Now the habit of charity is in the power
sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us if we look
of the will, as stated above (q. 24, a. 1). Therefore the act
on at a boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to
of charity is also an act of the will. But it tends to good
win. But the love, which is in the intellective appetite,
only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is
also differs from goodwill, because it denotes a certain
nothing else than goodwill.
union of affections between the lover and the beloved,
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher reckons five
in as much as the lover deems the beloved as somewhat
things pertaining to friendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of
united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards
which is that a man should wish his friend well; the sec-
him. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the
ond, that he should wish him to be and to live; the third,
will, whereby we wish a person well, even without pre-
that he should take pleasure in his company; the fourth,
supposing the aforesaid union of the affections with him.
that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth,
Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of charity, in-
that he should grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first
cludes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of
two pertain to goodwill. Therefore goodwill is the first act
affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5)
of charity.
that “goodwill is a beginning of friendship.”
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix,
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher, by thus defin-
5) that “goodwill is neither friendship nor love, but the
ing “to love,” does not describe it fully, but mentions only
beginning of friendship.” Now charity is friendship, as
that part of its definition in which the act of love is chiefly stated above (q. 23, a. 1). Therefore goodwill is not the
manifested.
same as to love considered as an act of charity.
Reply to Objection 2. To love is indeed an act of the
I answer that, Goodwill properly speaking is that act
will tending to the good, but it adds a certain union with
of the will whereby we wish well to another. Now this act
the beloved, which union is not denoted by goodwill.
of the will differs from actual love, considered not only as
Reply to Objection 3. These things mentioned by the
being in the sensitive appetite but also as being in the in-
Philosopher belong to friendship because they arise from
tellective appetite or will. For the love which is in the sen-
a man’s love for himself, as he says in the same passage,
sitive appetite is a passion. Now every passion seeks its
in so far as a man does all these things in respect of his
object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of love is
friend, even as he does them to himself: and this belongs
not aroused suddenly, but is born of an earnest considera-
to the aforesaid union of the affections.
tion of the object loved; wherefore the Philosopher, show-
Whether out of charity God ought to be loved for Himself?
IIa IIae q. 27 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that God is loved out of
Objection 3. Further, “hope begets charity” as a gloss
charity, not for Himself but for the sake of something else.
says on Mat. 1:1, and “fear leads to charity,” according to
For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi): “The soul
Augustine in his commentary on the First Canonical Epis-
learns from the things it knows, to love those it knows
tle of John (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). Now hope
not,” where by things unknown he means the intelligible
looks forward to obtain something from God, while fear
and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the ob-
shuns something which can be inflicted by God. There-
jects of the senses. Therefore God is to be loved for the
fore it seems that God is to be loved on account of some
sake of something else.
good we hope for, or some evil to be feared. Therefore He
Objection 2. Further, love follows knowledge. But
is not to be loved for Himself.
God is known through something else, according to Rom.
On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Doctr.
1:20: “The invisible things of God are clearly seen, be-
Christ. i), to enjoy is to cleave to something for its own
ing understood by the things that are made.” Therefore
sake. Now “God is to be enjoyed” as he says in the same
He is also loved on account of something else and not for
book. Therefore God is to be loved for Himself.
Himself.
I answer that, The preposition “for” denotes a rela-
1332
tion of causality. Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., all other good things; nor again does goodness accrue to
final, formal, efficient, and material, to which a material
Him from aught else, but from Him to all other things. In
disposition also is to be reduced, though it is not a cause
the fourth way, however, He can be loved for something
simply but relatively. According to these four different
else, because we are disposed by certain things to advance
causes one thing is said to be loved for another. In re-
in His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by Him, by
spect of the final cause, we love medicine, for instance,
the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or even by the
for health; in respect of the formal cause, we love a man
punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.
for his virtue, because, to wit, by his virtue he is for-
Reply to Objection 1. From the things it knows the
mally good and therefore lovable; in respect of the effi-
soul learns to love what it knows not, not as though the
cient cause, we love certain men because, for instance,
things it knows were the reason for its loving things it
they are the sons of such and such a father; and in re-
knows not, through being the formal, final, or efficient
spect of the disposition which is reducible to the genus of
cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes
a material cause, we speak of loving something for that
man to love the unknown.
which disposed us to love it, e.g. we love a man for the
Reply to Objection 2. Knowledge of God is indeed
favors received from him, although after we have begun
acquired through other things, but after He is known, He
to love our friend, we no longer love him for his favors,
is no longer known through them, but through Himself,
but for his virtue. Accordingly, as regards the first three
according to Jn. 4:42: “We now believe, not for thy say-
ways, we love God, not for anything else, but for Him-
ing: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this
self. For He is not directed to anything else as to an end,
is indeed the Saviour of the world.”
but is Himself the last end of all things; nor does He re-
Reply to Objection 3. Hope and fear lead to char-
quire to receive any form in order to be good, for His very
ity by way of a certain disposition, as was shown above
substance is His goodness, which is itself the exemplar of
(q. 17, a. 8; q. 19, Aa. 4,7,10).
Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?
IIa IIae q. 27 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot be loved
ment of the appetitive power is towards things in respect
immediately in this life. For the “unknown cannot be
of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive
loved” as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Now we do
power follows the mode of the knower.
not know God immediately in this life, since “we see now
Now in itself the very order of things is such, that
through a glass, in a dark manner” (1 Cor. 13:12). Nei-
God is knowable and lovable for Himself, since He is es-
ther, therefore, do we love Him immediately.
sentially truth and goodness itself, whereby other things
Objection 2. Further, he who cannot do what is less,
are known and loved: but with regard to us, since our
cannot do what is more. Now it is more to love God than
knowledge is derived through the senses, those things are
to know Him, since “he who is joined” to God by love,
knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last
is “one spirit with Him” (1 Cor. 6:17). But man cannot
term of knowledge is that which is most remote from our
know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love
senses.
Him immediately.
Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an
Objection 3. Further, man is severed from God by
act of the appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends
sin, according to Is. 59:2: “Your iniquities have divided
to God first, and flows on from Him to other things, and in
between you and your God.” Now sin is in the will rather
this sense charity loves God immediately, and other things
than in the intellect. Therefore man is less able to love
through God. On the other hand, with regard to knowl-
God immediately than to know Him immediately.
edge, it is the reverse, since we know God through other
On the contrary, Knowledge of God, through being
things, either as a cause through its effects, or by way of
mediate, is said to be “enigmatic,” and “falls away” in
pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom.
heaven, as stated in 1 Cor. 13:12. But charity “does not
i; cf.
fall away” as stated in the same passage (1 Cor. 13:12).
Ia, q. 12, a. 12).
Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God immedi-
Reply to Objection 1. Although the unknown cannot
ately.
be loved, it does not follow that the order of knowledge
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia, q. 82, a. 3; q. 84, is the same as the order of love, since love is the term
a. 7), the act of a cognitive power is completed by the
of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin at once
thing known being in the knower, whereas the act of an
where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is
appetitive power consists in the appetite being inclined to-
known through another thing.
wards the thing in itself. Hence it follows that the move-
Reply to Objection 2. Since to love God is some-
1333
thing greater than to know Him, especially in this state of tures, tends to God, and love begins with God as the last
life, it follows that love of God presupposes knowledge of
end, and passes on to creatures.
God. And because this knowledge does not rest in crea-
Reply to Objection 3. Aversion from God, which is
tures, but, through them, tends to something else, love be-
brought about by sin, is removed by charity, but not by
gins there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular
knowledge alone: hence charity, by loving God, unites the
movement so to speak; for knowledge begins from crea-
soul immediately to Him with a chain of spiritual union.
Whether God can be loved wholly? ∗
IIa IIae q. 27 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot be loved
in three ways, first so that the qualification “wholly” be
wholly. For love follows knowledge. Now God cannot
referred to the thing loved, and thus God is to be loved
be wholly known by us, since this would imply compre-
wholly, since man should love all that pertains to God.
hension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved by
Secondly, it may be understood as though “wholly”
us.
qualified the lover: and thus again God ought to be loved
Objection 2.
Further, love is a kind of union, as
wholly, since man ought to love God with all his might,
Dionysius shows (Div. Nom. iv). But the heart of man
and to refer all he has to the love of God, according to Dt.
cannot be wholly united to God, because “God is greater
6:5: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole
than our heart” (1 Jn. 3:20). Therefore God cannot be
heart.”
loved wholly.
Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison
Objection 3. Further, God loves Himself wholly. If
of the lover to the thing loved, so that the mode of the lover
therefore He be loved wholly by another, this one will
equal the mode of the thing loved. This is impossible: for,
love Him as much as God loves Himself. But this is un-
since a thing is lovable in proportion to its goodness, God
reasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly loved by a
is infinitely lovable, since His goodness is infinite. Now
creature.
no creature can love God infinitely, because all power of
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): “Thou shalt
creatures, whether it be natural or infused, is finite.
love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart.”
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because
I answer that, Since love may be considered as some-
the first three objections consider the question in this third
thing between lover and beloved, when we ask whether
sense, while the last takes it in the second sense.
God can be wholly loved, the question may be understood
Whether in loving God we ought to observe any mode?
IIa IIae q. 27 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to observe
mode.
some mode in loving God. For the notion of good con-
On the contrary, Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1)
sists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De
that “God is the cause of our loving God; the measure is
Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love of God is the best thing
to love Him without measure.”
in man, according to Col. 3:14: “Above all. . . things, have
I answer that, As appears from the words of Augus-
charity.” Therefore there ought to be a mode of the love
tine quoted above (obj. 3) mode signifies a determination
of God.
of measure; which determination is to be found both in the
Objection 2.
Further, Augustine says (De Morib.
measure and in the thing measured, but not in the same
Eccl. viii): “Prithee, tell me which is the mode of love.
way. For it is found in the measure essentially, because a
For I fear lest I burn with the desire and love of my Lord,
measure is of itself the determining and modifying rule of
more or less than I ought.” But it would be useless to
other things; whereas in the things measured, it is found
seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were one.
relatively, that is in so far as they attain to the measure.
Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.
Hence there can be nothing unmodified in the measure
Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
whereas the thing measured is unmodified if it fails to at-
iv, 3), “the measure which nature appoints to a thing, is
tain to the measure, whether by deficiency or by excess.
its mode.” Now the measure of the human will, as also
Now in all matters of appetite and action the measure
of external action, is the reason. Therefore just as it is
is the end, because the proper reason for all that we desire
necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the exterior
or do should be taken from the end, as the Philosopher
effect of charity, according to Rom. 12:1: “Your reason-
proves (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore the end has a mode by it-
able service,” so also the interior love of God requires a
self, while the means take their mode from being propor-
∗ Cf. q. 184, a. 2
1334
tionate to the end. Hence, according to the Philosopher else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure
(Polit. i, 3), “in every art, the desire for the end is endless has, stands before the other virtues, which have a mode
and unlimited,” whereas there is a limit to the means: thus
through being measured .
the physician does not put limits to health, but makes it as
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine adds in the same
perfect as he possibly can; but he puts a limit to medicine,
passage, “the measure of our love for God is to love Him
for he does not give as much medicine as he can, but ac-
with our whole heart,” that is to love Him as much as He
cording as health demands so that if he give too much or
can be loved, and this belongs to the mode which is proper
too little, the medicine would be immoderate.
to the measure.
Again, the end of all human actions and affections is
Reply to Objection 3. An affection, whose object is
the love of God, whereby principally we attain to our last
subject to reason’s judgment, should be measured by rea-
end, as stated above (q. 23, a. 6), wherefore the mode in
son. But the object of the Divine love which is God sur-
the love of God, must not be taken as in a thing measured
passes the judgment of reason, wherefore it is not mea-
where we find too much or too little, but as in the measure
sured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity be-
itself, where there cannot be excess, and where the more
tween the interior act and external acts of charity. For the
the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we love interior act of charity has the character of an end, since
God the better our love is.
man’s ultimate good consists in his soul cleaving to God,
Reply to Objection 1. That which is so by its essence
according to Ps. 72:28: “It is good for me to adhere to my
takes precedence of that which is so through another,
God”; whereas the exterior acts are as means to the end,
wherefore the goodness of the measure which has the
and so have to be measured both according to charity and
mode essentially, takes precedence of the goodness of the
according to reason.
thing measured, which has its mode through something
Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend?
IIa IIae q. 27 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem more meritorious to love
to love one’s friend or one’s enemy, these two loves may
an enemy than to love a friend. For it is written (Mat.
be compared in two ways, first, on the part of our neigh-
5:46): “If you love them that love you, what reward shall
bor whom we love, secondly, on the part of the reason for
you have?” Therefore it is not deserving of reward to love
which we love him.
one’s friend: whereas, as the same passage proves, to love
In the first way, love of one’s friend surpasses love
one’s enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more
of one’s enemy, because a friend is both better and more
meritorious to love one’s enemy than to love one’s friend.
closely united to us, so that he is a more suitable matter of
Objection 2. Further, an act is the more meritori-
love and consequently the act of love that passes over this
ous through proceeding from a greater charity. But it be-
matter, is better, and therefore its opposite is worse, for it
longs to the perfect children of God to love their enemies,
is worse to hate a friend than an enemy.
whereas those also who have imperfect charity love their
In the second way, however, it is better to love one’s
friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one’s en-
enemy than one’s friend, and this for two reasons. First,
emy than to love one’s friend.
because it is possible to love one’s friend for another rea-
Objection 3. Further, where there is more effort for
son than God, whereas God is the only reason for loving
good, there seems to be more merit, since “every man
one’s enemy. Secondly, because if we suppose that both
shall receive his own reward according to his own labor”
are loved for God, our love for God is proved to be all
(1 Cor. 3:8). Now a man has to make a greater effort
the stronger through carrying a man’s affections to things
to love his enemy than to love his friend, because it is
which are furthest from him, namely, to the love of his
more difficult. Therefore it seems more meritorious to
enemies, even as the power of a furnace is proved to be
love one’s enemy than to love one’s friend.
the stronger, according as it throws its heat to more dis-
On the contrary, The better an action is, the more
tant objects. Hence our love for God is proved to be so
meritorious it is. Now it is better to love one’s friend,
much the stronger, as the more difficult are the things we
since it is better to love a better man, and the friend who
accomplish for its sake, just as the power of fire is so much
loves you is better than the enemy who hates you. There-
the stronger, as it is able to set fire to a less inflammable
fore it is more meritorious to love one’s friend than to love
matter.
one’s enemy.
Yet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what
I answer that, God is the reason for our loving our
is near than on what is distant, so too, charity loves with
neighbor out of charity, as stated above (q. 25, a. 1). When
greater fervor those who are united to us than those who
therefore it is asked which is better or more meritorious,
are far removed; and in this respect the love of friends,
1335
considered in itself, is more ardent and better than the love way that we love not our enemies. On the other hand
of one’s enemy.
the love of our friends is meritorious, if we love them for
Reply to Objection 1. The words of Our Lord must
God’s sake, and not merely because they are our friends.
be taken in their strict sense: because the love of one’s
The Reply to the other Objections is evident from what
friends is not meritorious in God’s sight when we love
has been said in the article, because the two arguments
them merely because they are our friends: and this would
that follow consider the reason for loving, while the last
seem to be the case when we love our friends in such a
considers the question on the part of those who are loved.
Whether it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor than to love God?
IIa IIae q. 27 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that it is more meritori-
will. . . manifest Myself to him.” Secondly, the compar-
ous to love one’s neighbor than to love God. For the more
ison may be understood to be between the love of God
meritorious thing would seem to be what the Apostle pre-
alone on the one side, and the love of one’s neighbor for
ferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love of our neigh-
God’s sake, on the other. In this way love of our neighbor
bor to the love of God, according to Rom. 9:3: “I wished
includes love of God, while love of God does not include
myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren.”
love of our neighbor. Hence the comparison will be be-
Therefore it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor
tween perfect love of God, extending also to our neighbor,
than to love God.
and inadequate and imperfect love of God, for “this com-
Objection 2. Further, in a certain sense it seems to
mandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God,
be less meritorious to love one’s friend, as stated above
love also his brother” (1 Jn. 4:21).
(a. 7). Now God is our chief friend, since “He hath first
Reply to Objection 1. According to one gloss, the
loved us” (1 Jn. 4:10). Therefore it seems less meritorious
Apostle did not desire this, viz. to be severed from Christ
to love God.
for his brethren, when he was in a state of grace, but had
Objection 3. Further, whatever is more difficult seems
formerly desired it when he was in a state of unbelief, so
to be more virtuous and meritorious since “virtue is about
that we should not imitate him in this respect.
that which is difficult and good” (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is
We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct.
easier to love God than to love one’s neighbor, both be-
i, 8)∗ that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved
cause all things love God naturally, and because there is
his neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more
nothing unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one’s
than himself. For he wished to be deprived for a time of
neighbor. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one’s
the Divine fruition which pertains to love of one self, in
neighbor than to love God.
order that God might be honored in his neighbor, which
On the contrary, That on account of which a thing is
pertains to the love of God.
such, is yet more so. Now the love of one’s neighbor is not
Reply to Objection 2. A man’s love for his friends
meritorious, except by reason of his being loved for God’s
is sometimes less meritorious in so far as he loves them
sake. Therefore the love of God is more meritorious than
for their sake, so as to fall short of the true reason for the
the love of our neighbor.
friendship of charity, which is God. Hence that God be
I answer that, This comparison may be taken in two
loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit, but is
ways. First, by considering both loves separately: and
the entire reason for merit.
then, without doubt, the love of God is the more meri-
Reply to Objection 3. The “good” has, more than
torious, because a reward is due to it for its own sake,
the “difficult,” to do with the reason of merit and virtue.
since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to
Therefore it does not follow that whatever is more diffi-
Whom the movement of the Divine love tends: hence a
cult is more meritorious, but only what is more difficult,
reward is promised to him that loves God (Jn. 14:21):
and at the same time better.
“He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father, and I
∗ Hom. xvi in Ep. ad Rom.
1336
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 28
Of Joy
(In Four Articles)
WE must now consider the effects which result from the principal act of charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects, (2) the exterior effects. As to the first, three things have to be considered: (1) Joy, (2) Peace, (3) Mercy.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether joy is an effect of charity?
(2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow?
(3) Whether this joy can be full?
(4) Whether it is a virtue?
Whether joy is effected in us by charity?
IIa IIae q. 28 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that joy is not effected in
sorrow arises from love, either through the absence of the
us by charity. For the absence of what we love causes sor-
thing loved, or because the loved object to which we wish
row rather than joy. But God, Whom we love by charity,
well, is deprived of its good or afflicted with some evil.
is absent from us, so long as we are in this state of life,
Now charity is love of God, Whose good is unchangeable,
since “while we are in the body, we are absent from the
since He is His goodness, and from the very fact that He is
Lord” (2 Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us
loved, He is in those who love Him by His most excellent
rather than joy.
effect, according to 1 Jn. 4:16: “He that abideth in charity,
Objection 2. Further, it is chiefly through charity that abideth in God, and God in him.” Therefore spiritual joy,
we merit happiness. Now mourning, which pertains to
which is about God, is caused by charity.
sorrow, is reckoned among those things whereby we merit
Reply to Objection 1. So long as we are in the body,
happiness, according to Mat. 5:5: “Blessed are they that
we are said to be “absent from the Lord,” in comparison
mourn, for they shall be comforted.” Therefore sorrow,
with that presence whereby He is present to some by the
rather than joy, is an effect of charity.
vision of “sight”; wherefore the Apostle goes on to say (2
Objection 3. Further, charity is a virtue distinct from
Cor. 5:6): “For we walk by faith and not by sight.” Nev-
hope, as shown above (q. 17, a. 6). Now joy is the effect
ertheless, even in this life, He is present to those who love
of hope, according to Rom. 12:12: “Rejoicing in hope.”
Him, by the indwelling of His grace.
Therefore it is not the effect of charity.
Reply to Objection 2. The mourning that merits hap-
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:5): “The char-
piness, is about those things that are contrary to happiness.
ity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost,
Wherefore it amounts to the same that charity causes this
Who is given to us.” But joy is caused in us by the Holy
mourning, and this spiritual joy about God, since to re-
Ghost according to Rom. 14:17: “The kingdom of God is
joice in a certain good amounts to the same as to grieve
not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and joy in the
for things that are contrary to it.
Holy Ghost.” Therefore charity is a cause of joy.
Reply to Objection 3.
There can be spiritual joy
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 25,
about God in two ways. First, when we rejoice in the Di-
Aa. 1,2,3), when we were treating of the passions, joy and
vine good considered in itself; secondly, when we rejoice
sorrow proceed from love, but in contrary ways. For joy
in the Divine good as participated by us. The former joy
is caused by love, either through the presence of the thing
is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly: while the
loved, or because the proper good of the thing loved exists
latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look for-
and endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in the
ward to enjoy the Divine good, although this enjoyment
love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-
itself, whether perfect or imperfect, is obtained according
being of his friend, though he be absent. On the other hand
to the measure of one’s charity.
1337
Whether the spiritual joy, which results from charity, is compatible with an admixture IIa IIae q. 28 a. 2
of sorrow?
Objection 1.
It would seem that the spiritual joy
Divine good considered in itself. This joy of charity is in-
that results from charity is compatible with an admix-
compatible with an admixture of sorrow, even as the good
ture of sorrow. For it belongs to charity to rejoice in
which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of
our neighbor’s good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4,6: “Char-
evil: hence the Apostle says (Phil. 4:4): “Rejoice in the
ity. . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth.”
Lord always.”
But this joy is compatible with an admixture of sorrow, ac-
The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in
cording to Rom. 12:15: “Rejoice with them that rejoice,
the Divine good as participated by us. This participation
weep with them that weep.” Therefore the spiritual joy of
can be hindered by anything contrary to it, wherefore, in
charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow.
this respect, the joy of charity is compatible with an ad-
Objection 2. Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in
mixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves for that which
Evang. xxxiv), “penance consists in deploring past sins,
hinders the participation of the Divine good, either in us
and in not committing again those we have deplored.” But
or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.
there is no true penance without charity. Therefore the joy
Reply to Objection 1. Our neighbor does not weep
of charity has an admixture of sorrow.
save on account of some evil. Now every evil implies
Objection 3. Further, it is through charity that man
lack of participation in the sovereign good: hence charity
desires to be with Christ according to Phil. 1:23: “Having
makes us weep with our neighbor in so far as he is hin-
a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” Now this
dered from participating in the Divine good.
desire gives rise, in man, to a certain sadness, according to
Reply to Objection 2. Our sins divide between us
Ps. 119:5: “Woe is me that my sojourning is prolonged!”
and God, according to Is. 59:2; wherefore this is the rea-
Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of sor-
son why we grieve for our past sins, or for those of others,
row.
in so far as they hinder us from participating in the Divine
On the contrary, The joy of charity is joy about the
good.
Divine wisdom. Now such like joy has no admixture of
Reply to Objection 3.
Although in this unhappy
sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16: “Her conversation hath
abode we participate, after a fashion, in the Divine good,
no bitterness.” Therefore the joy of charity is incompati-
by knowledge and love, yet the unhappiness of this life is
ble with an admixture of sorrow.
an obstacle to a perfect participation in the Divine good:
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 3), a twofold
hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for the de-
joy in God arises from charity. One, the more excellent,
lay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a partici-
is proper to charity; and with this joy we rejoice in the
pation of the Divine good.
Whether the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity, can be filled?
IIa IIae q. 28 a. 3
Objection 1.
It would seem that the spiritual joy
15:11): “That My joy may be in you, and your joy may be
which proceeds from charity cannot be filled. For the
filled.”
more we rejoice in God, the more is our joy in Him filled.
I answer that, Fulness of joy can be understood in two
But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it is meet that
ways; first, on the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one
we should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is in-
rejoice in it as much as it is meet that one should rejoice in
finite, surpasses the creature’s joy which is finite. There-
it, and thus God’s joy alone in Himself is filled, because it
fore joy in God can never be filled.
is infinite; and this is condignly due to the infinite good-
Objection 2. Further, that which is filled cannot be in-
ness of God: but the joy of any creature must needs be
creased. But the joy, even of the blessed, can be increased,
finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be understood on the
since one’s joy is greater than another’s. Therefore joy in
part of the one who rejoices. Now joy is compared to de-
God cannot be filled in a creature.
sire, as rest to movement, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 25,
Objection 3. Further, comprehension seems to be
Aa. 1,2), when we were treating of the passions: and rest
nothing else than the fulness of knowledge. Now, just as
is full when there is no more movement. Hence joy is
the cognitive power of a creature is finite, so is its appeti-
full, when there remains nothing to be desired. But as
tive power. Since therefore God cannot be comprehended
long as we are in this world, the movement of desire does
by any creature, it seems that no creature’s joy in God can
not cease in us, because it still remains possible for us
be filled.
to approach nearer to God by grace, as was shown above
On the contrary, Our Lord said to His disciples (Jn.
(q. 24, Aa. 4,7). When once, however, perfect happiness
1338
has been attained, nothing will remain to be desired, be-ness of joy in reference to the thing in which we rejoice.
cause then there will be full enjoyment of God, wherein
Reply to Objection 2. When each one attains to hap-
man will obtain whatever he had desired, even with regard
piness he will reach the term appointed to him by Divine
to other goods, according to Ps. 102:5: “Who satisfieth
predestination, and nothing further will remain to which
thy desire with good things.” Hence desire will be at rest,
he may tend, although by reaching that term, some will
not only our desire for God, but all our desires: so that the
approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one’s joy
joy of the blessed is full to perfection—indeed over-full,
will be full with regard to himself, because his desire will
since they will obtain more than they were capable of de-
be fully set at rest; yet one’s joy will be greater than an-
siring: for “neither hath it entered into the heart of man,
other’s, on account of a fuller participation of the Divine
what things God hath prepared for them that love Him” (1
happiness.
Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant by the words of Lk. 6:38:
Reply to Objection 3. Comprehension denotes ful-
“Good measure and pressed down, and shaken together,
ness of knowledge in respect of the thing known, so that it
and running over shall they give into your bosom.” Yet,
is known as much as it can be. There is however a fulness
since no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to
of knowledge in respect of the knower, just as we have
God, it follows that this perfectly full joy is not taken into
said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): “That
man, but, on the contrary, man enters into it, according to
you may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all
Mat. 25:21: “Enter into the joy of thy Lord.”
wisdom and spiritual understanding.”
Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes the ful-
Whether joy is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 28 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that joy is a virtue. For
love is the first affection of the appetitive power, and that
vice is contrary to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a
desire and joy follow from it. Hence the same virtuous
vice, as in the case of sloth and envy. Therefore joy also
habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved good, and
should be accounted a virtue.
to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first of these
Objection 2. Further, as love and hope are passions,
acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from
the object of which is “good,” so also is joy. Now love
desire, but from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is
and hope are reckoned to be virtues. Therefore joy also
not a virtue distinct from charity, but an act, or effect, of
should be reckoned a virtue.
charity: for which reason it is numbered among the Fruits
Objection 3. Further, the precepts of the Law are
(Gal. 5:22).
about acts of virtue. But we are commanded to rejoice
Reply to Objection 1. The sorrow which is a vice
in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4: “Rejoice in the Lord
is caused by inordinate self-love, and this is not a special
always.” Therefore joy is a virtue.
vice, but a general source of the vices, as stated above ( Ia
On the contrary, It is not numbered among the the-
IIae, q. 77, a. 4); so that it was necessary to account certain ological virtues, nor among the moral, nor among the in-particular sorrows as special vices, because they do not
tellectual virtues, as is evident from what has been said
arise from a special, but from a general vice. On the other
above ( Ia IIae, Qq. 57,60,62).
hand love of God is accounted a special virtue, namely
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 55,
charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as
Aa. 2,4), virtue is an operative habit, wherefore by its very
stated above (here and a. 2).
nature it has an inclination to a certain act. Now it may
Reply to Objection 2. Hope proceeds from love even
happen that from the same habit there proceed several or-
as joy does, but hope adds, on the part of the object, a spe-
dinate and homogeneous acts, each of which follows from
cial character, viz. “difficult,” and “possible to obtain”;
another. And since the subsequent acts do not proceed
for which reason it is accounted a special virtue. On the
from the virtuous habit except through the preceding act,
other hand joy does not add to love any special aspect, that
hence it is that the virtue is defined and named in refer-
might cause a special virtue.
ence to that preceding act, although those other acts also
Reply to Objection 3. The Law prescribes joy, as be-
proceed from the virtue. Now it is evident from what we
ing an act of charity, albeit not its first act.
have said about the passions ( Ia IIae, q. 25, Aa. 2,4) that
1339
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 29
Of Peace
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether peace is the same as concord?
(2) Whether all things desire peace?
(3) Whether peace is an effect of charity?
(4) Whether peace is a virtue?
Whether peace is the same as concord?
IIa IIae q. 29 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that peace is the same
verse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the
as concord. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13):
same time: so that there must needs be a clashing of the
“Peace among men is well ordered concord.” Now we are
movements of the appetite. Now the union of such move-
speaking here of no other peace than that of men. There-
ments is essential to peace, because man’s heart is not at
fore peace is the same as concord.
peace, so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having
Objection 2. Further, concord is union of wills. Now
what he wants, there still remains something for him to
the nature of peace consists in such like union, for Diony-
want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the
sius says (Div. Nom. xi) that peace unites all, and makes
other hand this union is not essential to concord: where-
them of one mind. Therefore peace is the same as con-
fore concord denotes union of appetites among various
cord.
persons, while peace denotes, in addition to this union,
Objection 3.
Further, things whose opposites are
the union of the appetites even in one man.
identical are themselves identical. Now the one same
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking there
thing is opposed to concord and peace, viz. dissension;
of that peace which is between one man and another, and
hence it is written (1 Cor. 16:33): “God is not the God of
he says that this peace is concord, not indeed any kind of
dissension but of peace.” Therefore peace is the same as
concord, but that which is well ordered, through one man
concord.
agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to
On the contrary, There can be concord in evil be-
both of them . For if one man concord with another, not
tween wicked men. But “there is no peace to the wicked”
of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were,
(Is. 48:22). Therefore peace is not the same as concord.
by the fear of some evil that besets him, such concord
I answer that, Peace includes concord and adds
is not really peace, because the order of each concordant
something thereto. Hence wherever peace is, there is con-
is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring
cord, but there is not peace, wherever there is concord, if
cause. For this reason he premises that “peace is tranquil-
we give peace its proper meaning.
lity of order,” which tranquillity consists in all the appeti-
For concord, properly speaking, is between one man
tive movements in one man being set at rest together.
and another, in so far as the wills of various hearts agree
Reply to Objection 2. If one man consent to the same
together in consenting to the same thing. Now the heart of
thing together with another man, his consent is neverthe-
one man may happen to tend to diverse things, and this in
less not perfectly united to himself, unless at the same
two ways. First, in respect of the diverse appetitive pow-
time all his appetitive movements be in agreement.
ers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that
Reply to Objection 3. A twofold dissension is op-
which is opposed to the rational appetite, according to
posed to peace, namely dissension between a man and
Gal. 5:17: “The flesh lusteth against the spirit.” Secondly,
himself, and dissension between one man and another.
in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to di-
The latter alone is opposed to concord.
Whether all things desire peace?
IIa IIae q. 29 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that not all things desire
things cannot desire peace.
peace. For, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace
Objection 2. Further, the appetite does not tend to op-
“unites consent.” But there cannot be unity of consent in
posite things at the same time. Now many desire war and
things which are devoid of knowledge. Therefore such
dissension. Therefore all men do not desire peace.
1340
Objection 3. Further, good alone is an object of ap-dissension, desire nothing but peace, which they deem
petite. But a certain peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our
themselves not to have. For as we stated above, there is no
Lord would not have said (Mat. 10:34): “I came not to
peace when a man concords with another man counter to
send peace.” Therefore all things do not desire peace.
what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means
Objection 4. Further, that which all desire is, seem-
of war to break this concord, because it is a defective
ingly, the sovereign good which is the last end. But this
peace, in order that they may obtain peace, where noth-
is not true of peace, since it is attainable even by a way-
ing is contrary to their will. Hence all wars are waged that
farer; else Our Lord would vainly command (Mk. 9:49):
men may find a more perfect peace than that which they
“Have peace among you.” Therefore all things do not de-
had heretofore.
sire peace.
Reply to Objection 3. Peace gives calm and unity to
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
the appetite. Now just as the appetite may tend to what
12,14) that “all things desire peace”: and Dionysius says
is good simply, or to what is good apparently, so too,
the same (Div. Nom. xi).
peace may be either true or apparent. There can be no
I answer that, From the very fact that a man desires
true peace except where the appetite is directed to what
a certain thing it follows that he desires to obtain what he
is truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good
desires, and, in consequence, to remove whatever may be
in a way, so as to calm the appetite in some respect, has,
an obstacle to his obtaining it. Now a man may be hin-
nevertheless many defects, which cause the appetite to re-
dered from obtaining the good he desires, by a contrary
main restless and disturbed. Hence true peace is only in
desire either of his own or of some other, and both are
good men and about good things. The peace of the wicked
removed by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of
is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore it is
necessity that whoever desires anything desires peace, in
written (Wis. 14:22): “Whereas they lived in a great war
so far as he who desires anything, desires to attain, with
of ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace.”
tranquillity and without hindrance, to that which he de-
Reply to Objection 4. Since true peace is only about
sires: and this is what is meant by peace which Augustine
good things, as the true good is possessed in two ways,
defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) “the tranquillity of order.”
perfectly and imperfectly, so there is a twofold true peace.
Reply to Objection 1. Peace denotes union not only
One is perfect peace. It consists in the perfect enjoyment
of the intellective or rational appetite, or of the animal ap-
of the sovereign good, and unites all one’s desires by giv-
petite, in both of which consent may be found, but also of
ing them rest in one object. This is the last end of the ra-
the natural appetite. Hence Dionysius says that “peace
tional creature, according to Ps. 147:3: “Who hath placed
is the cause of consent and of connaturalness,” where
peace in thy borders.” The other is imperfect peace, which
“consent” denotes the union of appetites proceeding from
may be had in this world, for though the chief movement
knowledge, and “connaturalness,” the union of natural ap-
of the soul finds rest in God, yet there are certain things
petites.
within and without which disturb the peace.
Reply to Objection 2. Even those who seek war and
Whether peace is the proper effect of charity?
IIa IIae q. 29 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that peace is not the
be peace.” Therefore it is not the effect of charity.
proper effect of charity. For one cannot have charity with-
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:165): “Much
out sanctifying grace. But some have peace who have not
peace have they that love Thy Law.”
sanctifying grace, thus heathens sometimes have peace.
I answer that, Peace implies a twofold union, as
Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.
stated above (a. 1). The first is the result of one’s own ap-
Objection 2. Further, if a certain thing is caused by
petites being directed to one object; while the other results
charity, its contrary is not compatible with charity. But
from one’s own appetite being united with the appetite of
dissension, which is contrary to peace, is compatible with
another: and each of these unions is effected by charity—
charity, for we find that even holy doctors, such as Jerome
the first, in so far as man loves God with his whole heart,
and Augustine, dissented in some of their opinions. We
by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires tend
also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from one an-
to one object—the second, in so far as we love our neigh-
other (Acts 15). Therefore it seems that peace is not the
bor as ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our
effect of charity.
neighbor’s will as though it were ours: hence it is reck-
Objection 3. Further, the same thing is not the proper
oned a sign of friendship if people “make choice of the
effect of different things. Now peace is the effect of jus-
same things” (Ethic. ix, 4), and Tully says (De Amici-
tice, according to Is. 32:17: “And the work of justice shall
tia) that friends “like and dislike the same things” (Sallust,
1341
Catilin.)
tle account is not contrary to charity: for such a dissen-
Reply to Objection 1. Without sin no one falls from a
sion proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one
state of sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his
man thinks that the particular good, which is the object of
due end by making him place his end in something un-
dissension, belongs to the good about which they agree,
due: so that his appetite does not cleave chiefly to the true
while the other thinks that it does not. Accordingly such
final good, but to some apparent good. Hence, without
like dissension about very slight matters and about opin-
sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely apparent.
ions is inconsistent with a state of perfect peace, wherein
Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
the truth will be known fully, and every desire fulfilled;
ix, 6) friends need not agree in opinion, but only upon
but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the
such goods as conduce to life, and especially upon such
wayfarer.
as are important; because dissension in small matters is
Reply to Objection 3. Peace is the “work of justice”
scarcely accounted dissension.
Hence nothing hinders
indirectly, in so far as justice removes the obstacles to
those who have charity from holding different opinions.
peace: but it is the work of charity directly, since char-
Nor is this an obstacle to peace, because opinions concern
ity, according to its very nature, causes peace. For love is
the intellect, which precedes the appetite that is united by
“a unitive force” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): and
peace. In like manner if there be concord as to goods of
peace is the union of the appetite’s inclinations.
importance, dissension with regard to some that are of lit-
Whether peace is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 29 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that peace is a virtue. For
proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For, though
nothing is a matter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue.
fire by heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not
But there are precepts about keeping peace, for example:
two powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rar-
“Have peace among you” (Mk. 9:49). Therefore peace is
efaction: and fire produces all such actions by its own
a virtue.
power of calefaction.
Objection 2. Further, we do not merit except by acts
Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is
of virtue. Now it is meritorious to keep peace, according
love of God and of our neighbor, as shown above (a. 3),
to Mat. 5:9: “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall
there is no other virtue except charity whose proper act is
be called the children of God.” Therefore peace is a virtue.
peace, as we have also said in reference to joy (q. 28, a. 4).
Objection 3. Further, vices are opposed to virtues.
Reply to Objection 1. We are commanded to keep
But dissensions, which are contrary to peace, are num-
peace because it is an act of charity; and for this reason too
bered among the vices (Gal. 5:20). Therefore peace is a
it is a meritorious act. Hence it is placed among the beati-
virtue.
tudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as stated above ( Ia
On the contrary, Virtue is not the last end, but the
IIae, q. 69, Aa. 1,3). It is also numbered among the fruits,
way thereto. But peace is the last end, in a sense, as Au-
in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness.
gustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 11). Therefore peace is not
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
a virtue.
Reply to Objection 3. Several vices are opposed to
I answer that, As stated above (q. 28, a. 4), when a
one virtue in respect of its various acts: so that not only
number of acts all proceeding uniformly from an agent,
is hatred opposed to charity, in respect of its act which is
follow one from the other, they all arise from the same
love, but also sloth and envy, in respect of joy, and dissen-
virtue, nor do they each have a virtue from which they
sion in respect of peace.
1342
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 30
Of Mercy∗
(In Four Articles)
We must now go on to consider Mercy, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether evil is the cause of mercy on the part of the person pitied?
(2) To whom does it belong to pity?
(3) Whether mercy is a virtue?
(4) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?
Whether evil is properly the motive of mercy?
IIa IIae q. 30 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that, properly speaking,
urally, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that
evil is not the motive of mercy. For, as shown above (q. 19,
“pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether corruptive or dis-
a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 79, a. 1, ad 4; Ia, q. 48 , a. 6), fault is an evil tressing.” Secondly, such like evils are yet more provoca-rather than punishment. Now fault provokes indignation
tive of pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice,
rather than mercy. Therefore evil does not excite mercy.
wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil ex-
Objection 2. Further, cruelty and harshness seem to
cites our pity “when it is the result of an accident, as when
excel other evils. Now the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8)
something turns out ill, whereas we hoped well of it.”
that “harshness does not call for pity but drives it away.”
Thirdly, they cause yet greater pity, if they are entirely
Therefore evil, as such, is not the motive of mercy.
contrary to the will, as when evil befalls a man who has
Objection 3. Further, signs of evils are not true evils.
always striven to do well: wherefore the Philosopher says
But signs of evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher
(Rhet. ii, 8) that “we pity most the distress of one who
states (Rhet. ii, 8). Therefore evil, properly speaking, is
suffers undeservedly.”
not an incentive to mercy.
Reply to Objection 1. It is essential to fault that it
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
be voluntary; and in this respect it deserves punishment
2) that mercy is a kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive
rather than mercy. Since, however, fault may be, in a way,
of sorrow. Therefore it is the motive of mercy.
a punishment, through having something connected with
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix,
it that is against the sinner’s will, it may, in this respect,
5), mercy is heartfelt sympathy for another’s distress, im-
call for mercy. It is in this sense that we pity and com-
pelling us to succor him if we can. For mercy takes its
miserate sinners. Thus Gregory says in a homily (Hom.
name “misericordia” from denoting a man’s compassion-
in Evang. xxxiv) that “true godliness is not disdainful but
ate heart [miserum cor] for another’s unhappiness. Now
compassionate,” and again it is written (Mat. 9:36) that
unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential
Jesus “seeing the multitudes, had compassion on them:
to beatitude or happiness that one should obtain what one
because they were distressed, and lying like sheep that
wishes; for, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5),
have no shepherd.”
“happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires
Reply to Objection 2. Since pity is sympathy for an-
nothing amiss.” Hence, on the other hand, it belongs to
other’s distress, it is directed, properly speaking, towards
unhappiness that a man should suffer what he wishes not.
another, and not to oneself, except figuratively, like jus-
Now a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his
tice, according as a man is considered to have various
natural appetite; thus all men naturally wish to be and
parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (Ecclus. 30:24):
to live: secondly, a man wishes a thing from deliberate
“Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God”†.
choice: thirdly, a man wishes a thing, not in itself, but in
Accordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does
its cause, thus, if a man wishes to eat what is bad for him,
not pity himself, but suffers in himself, as when we suffer
we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill.
cruel treatment in ourselves, so too, in the case of those
Accordingly the motive of “mercy,” being something
who are so closely united to us, as to be part of ourselves,
pertaining to “misery,” is, in the first way, anything con-
such as our children or our parents, we do not pity their
trary to the will’s natural appetite, namely corruptive or
distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in which sense
distressing evils, the contrary of which man desires nat-
the Philosopher says that “harshness drives pity away.”
∗ the One Latin Word “Misericordia” Signifies Either Pity or Mercy.
The Distinction Between These Two Is That Pity May Stand Either for the Act or for the Virtue, Whereas Mercy Stands Only for the Virtue.
† Cf. q. 106, a. 3, ad 1
1343
Reply to Objection 3. Just as pleasure results from not so keenly as when they are present to the senses.
hope and memory of good things, so does sorrow arise
Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so far as they
from the prospect or the recollection of evil things; though
represent as present, the evil that excites our pity.
Whether the reason for taking pity is a defect in the person who pities?
IIa IIae q. 30 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the reason for taking
Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance
pity is not a defect in the person who takes pity. For it is
when another’s evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us
proper to God to be merciful, wherefore it is written (Ps.
from him. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that
144:9): “His tender mercies are over all His works.” But
men pity such as are akin to them, and the like, because
there is no defect in God. Therefore a defect cannot be the
it makes them realize that the same may happen to them-
reason for taking pity.
selves. This also explains why the old and the wise who
Objection 2. Further, if a defect is the reason for tak-
consider that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble
ing pity, those in whom there is most defect, must needs
and timorous persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas
take most pity. But this is false: for the Philosopher says
those who deem themselves happy, and so far powerful as
(Rhet. ii, 8) that “those who are in a desperate state are
to think themselves in no danger of suffering any hurt, are
pitiless.” Therefore it seems that the reason for taking pity
not so inclined to pity.
is not a defect in the person who pities.
Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking
Objection 3. Further, to be treated with contempt is
pity, either because one looks upon another’s defect as
to be defective. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8)
one’s own, through being united to him by love, or on
that “those who are disposed to contumely are pitiless.”
account of the possibility of suffering in the same way.
Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not a defect in the
Reply to Objection 1. God takes pity on us through
person who pities.
love alone, in as much as He loves us as belonging to Him.
On the contrary, Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a de-
Reply to Objection 2. Those who are already in in-
fect is the reason of sorrow, wherefore those who are in
finite distress, do not fear to suffer more, wherefore they
bad health give way to sorrow more easily, as we shall say
are without pity. In like manner this applies to those also
further on (q. 35, a. 1, ad 2). Therefore the reason why
who are in great fear, for they are so intent on their own
one takes pity is a defect in oneself.
passion, that they pay no attention to the suffering of oth-
I answer that, Since pity is grief for another’s dis-
ers.
tress, as stated above (a. 1), from the very fact that a per-
Reply to Objection 3. Those who are disposed to
son takes pity on anyone, it follows that another’s distress
contumely, whether through having been contemned, or
grieves him. And since sorrow or grief is about one’s own
because they wish to contemn others, are incited to anger
ills, one grieves or sorrows for another’s distress, in so far
and daring, which are manly passions and arouse the hu-
as one looks upon another’s distress as one’s own.
man spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a
Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of
man think that he is going to suffer something in the fu-
the affections, which is the effect of love. For, since he
ture, so that while they are disposed in that way they are
who loves another looks upon his friend as another self,
pitiless, according to Prov. 27:4: “Anger hath no mercy,
he counts his friend’s hurt as his own, so that he grieves
nor fury when it breaketh forth.” For the same reason the
for his friend’s hurt as though he were hurt himself. Hence
proud are without pity, because they despise others, and
the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons “grieving with one’s
think them wicked, so that they account them as suffer-
friend” as being one of the signs of friendship, and the
ing deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says
Apostle says (Rom. 12:15): “Rejoice with them that re-
(Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) that “false godliness,” i.e. of the
joice, weep with them that weep.”
proud, “is not compassionate but disdainful.”
Whether mercy is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 30 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that mercy is not a virtue.
(Catilin.): “All those that take counsel about matters of
For the chief part of virtue is choice as the Philosopher
doubt, should be free from. . . anger. . . and mercy, because
states (Ethic. ii, 5). Now choice is “the desire of what
the mind does not easily see aright, when these things
has been already counselled” (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore
stand in the way.” Therefore mercy is not a virtue.
whatever hinders counsel cannot be called a virtue. But
Objection 2. Further, nothing contrary to virtue is
mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of Sallust
praiseworthy. But nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the
1344
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9), and yet it is a praisewor-whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant.”
thy passion (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore mercy is not a virtue.
And since it is essential to human virtue that the move-
Objection 3. Further, joy and peace are not special
ments of the soul should be regulated by reason, as was
virtues, because they result from charity, as stated above
shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 59, Aa. 4,5), it follows that mercy
(q. 28, a. 4; q. 29, a. 4). Now mercy, also, results from
is a virtue.
charity; for it is out of charity that we weep with them
Reply to Objection 1. The words of Sallust are to be
that weep, as we rejoice with them that rejoice. Therefore
understood as applying to the mercy which is a passion
mercy is not a special virtue.
unregulated by reason: for thus it impedes the counselling
Objection 4. Further, since mercy belongs to the ap-
of reason, by making it wander from justice.
petitive power, it is not an intellectual virtue, and, since
Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher is speaking
it has not God for its object, neither is it a theological
there of pity and nemesis, considered, both of them, as
virtue. Moreover it is not a moral virtue, because neither
passions. They are contrary to one another on the part
is it about operations, for this belongs to justice; nor is it
of their respective estimation of another’s evils, for which
about passions, since it is not reduced to one of the twelve
pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer un-
means mentioned by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7). There-
deservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it es-
fore mercy is not a virtue.
teems someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5):
go well with the undeserving: “both of these are praise-
“Cicero in praising Caesar expresses himself much better
worthy and come from the same disposition of character”
and in a fashion at once more humane and more in ac-
(Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking, however, it is envy which
cordance with religious feeling, when he says: ‘Of all thy
is opposed to pity, as we shall state further on (q. 36, a. 3).
virtues none is more marvelous or more graceful than thy
Reply to Objection 3. Joy and peace add nothing to
mercy.’ ” Therefore mercy is a virtue.
the aspect of good which is the object of charity, where-
I answer that, Mercy signifies grief for another’s dis-
fore they do not require any other virtue besides charity.
tress. Now this grief may denote, in one way, a move-
But mercy regards a certain special aspect, namely the
ment of the sensitive appetite, in which case mercy is
misery of the person pitied.
not a virtue but a passion; whereas, in another way, it
Reply to Objection 4. Mercy, considered as a virtue,
may denote a movement of the intellective appetite, in as
is a moral virtue having relation to the passions, and it is
much as one person’s evil is displeasing to another. This
reduced to the mean called nemesis, because “they both
movement may be ruled in accordance with reason, and in
proceed from the same character” (Rhet. ii, 9). Now
accordance with this movement regulated by reason, the
the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but
movement of the lower appetite may be regulated. Hence
as passions, because, even as passions, they are praise-
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that “this movement
worthy. Yet nothing prevents them from proceeding from
of the mind” (viz. mercy) “obeys the reason, when mercy
some elective habit, in which case they assume the char-
is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is safeguarded,
acter of a virtue.
Whether mercy is the greatest of the virtues?
IIa IIae q. 30 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that mercy is the great-
Now this is chiefly the result of mercy, since of God is it
est of the virtues. For the worship of God seems a most
said (Ps. 144:9) that “His tender mercies are over all His
virtuous act. But mercy is preferred before the worship
works,” and (Lk. 6:36) Our Lord said: “Be ye. . . merciful,
of God, according to Osee 6:6 and Mat. 12:7: “I have
as your Father also is merciful.” Therefore mercy is the
desired mercy and not sacrifice.” Therefore mercy is the
greatest of virtues.
greatest virtue.
On the contrary, The Apostle after saying (Col.
Objection 2. Further, on the words of 1 Tim. 4:8:
3:12): “Put ye on. . . as the elect of God. . . the bowels of
“Godliness is profitable to all things,” a gloss says: “The
mercy,” etc., adds (Col. 3:14): “Above all things have
sum total of a Christian’s rule of life consists in mercy and
charity.” Therefore mercy is not the greatest of virtues.
godliness.” Now the Christian rule of life embraces every
I answer that, A virtue may take precedence of oth-
virtue. Therefore the sum total of all virtues is contained
ers in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in comparison
in mercy.
with its subject. In itself, mercy takes precedence of other
Objection 3. Further, “Virtue is that which makes its
virtues, for it belongs to mercy to be bountiful to others,
subject good,” according to the Philosopher. Therefore
and, what is more, to succor others in their wants, which
the more a virtue makes a man like God, the better is that
pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence mercy
virtue: since man is the better for being more like God.
is accounted as being proper to God: and therein His om-
1345
nipotence is declared to be chiefly manifested∗.
fices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in order to
On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is
arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence
not the greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than
mercy, whereby we supply others’ defects is a sacrifice
all others, surpassed by none and excelling all: since for
more acceptable to Him, as conducing more directly to
him that has anyone above him it is better to be united
our neighbor’s well-being, according to Heb. 13:16: “Do
to that which is above than to supply the defect of that
not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices
which is beneath.∗. Hence, as regards man, who has God
God’s favor is obtained.”
above him, charity which unites him to God, is greater
Reply to Objection 2. The sum total of the Christian
than mercy, whereby he supplies the defects of his neigh-
religion consists in mercy, as regards external works: but
bor. But of all the virtues which relate to our neighbor,
the inward love of charity, whereby we are united to God
mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpasses all others,
preponderates over both love and mercy for our neighbor.
since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply
Reply to Objection 3. Charity likens us to God by
the defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient.
uniting us to Him in the bond of love: wherefore it sur-
Reply to Objection 1. We worship God by external
passes mercy, which likens us to God as regards similarity
sacrifices and gifts, not for His own profit, but for that of
of works.
ourselves and our neighbor. For He needs not our sacri-
∗ Collect, Tenth Sunday after Pentecost ∗ “The quality of mercy is not strained./‘Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes/The throned monarch better than his crown.” Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene i.
1346
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 31
Of Beneficence
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the outward acts or effects of charity, (1) Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of beneficence, (3) Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity ?
(2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all?
(3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to us?
(4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue?
Whether beneficence is an act of charity?
IIa IIae q. 31 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that beneficence is not an
But if the good which one man does another, be con-
act of charity. For charity is chiefly directed to God. Now
sidered under some special aspect of good, then benefi-
we cannot benefit God, according to Job 35:7: “What
cence will assume a special character and will belong to
shalt thou give Him? or what shall He receive of thy
some special virtue.
hand?” Therefore beneficence is not an act of charity.
Reply to Objection 1. According to Dionysius (Div.
Objection 2. Further, beneficence consists chiefly in
Nom. iv), “love moves those, whom it unites, to a mu-
making gifts. But this belongs to liberality. Therefore
tual relationship: it turns the inferior to the superior to be
beneficence is an act of liberality and not of charity.
perfected thereby; it moves the superior to watch over the
Objection 3. Further, what a man gives, he gives ei-
inferior:” and in this respect beneficence is an effect of
ther as being due, or as not due. But a benefit conferred
love. Hence it is not for us to benefit God, but to honor
as being due belongs to justice while a benefit conferred
Him by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of His love,
as not due, is gratuitous, and in this respect is an act of
to bestow good things on us.
mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred is either an act
Reply to Objection 2. Two things must be observed
of justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an act of
in the bestowal of gifts. One is the thing given outwardly,
charity.
while the other is the inward passion that a man has in the
On the contrary, Charity is a kind of friendship, as
delight of riches. It belongs to liberality to moderate this
stated above (q. 23 , a. 1). Now the Philosopher reckons
inward passion so as to avoid excessive desire and love for
among the acts of friendship (Ethic. ix, 1) “doing good,”
riches; for this makes a man more ready to part with his
i.e. being beneficent, “to one’s friends.” Therefore it is an
wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift, while yet
act of charity to do good to others.
desiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving.
I answer that, Beneficence simply means doing good
On the other hand, as regards the outward gift, the act
to someone. This good may be considered in two ways,
of beneficence belongs in general to friendship or char-
first under the general aspect of good, and this belongs to
ity. Hence it does not detract from a man’s friendship, if,
beneficence in general, and is an act of friendship, and,
through love, he give his friend something he would like
consequently, of charity: because the act of love includes
to I keep for himself; rather does this prove the perfection
goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated
of his friendship.
above (q. 23, a. 1; q. 27 , a. 2). Now the will carries into
Reply to Objection 3. Just as friendship or charity
effect if possible, the things it wills, so that, consequently, sees, in the benefit bestowed, the general aspect of good,
the result of an act of love is that a man is beneficent to his so does justice see therein the aspect of debt, while pity
friend. Therefore beneficence in its general acceptation is
considers the relieving of distress or defect.
an act of friendship or charity.
1347
Whether we ought to do good to all?
IIa IIae q. 31 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that we are not bound to
cause all acts of virtue must be modified with a view to
do good to all. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i,
their due circumstances.
28) that we “are unable to do good to everyone.” Now
Reply to Objection 1. Absolutely speaking it is im-
virtue does not incline one to the impossible. Therefore it
possible to do good to every single one: yet it is true of
is not necessary to do good to all.
each individual that one may be bound to do good to him
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 12:5)
in some particular case. Hence charity binds us, though
“Give to the good, and receive not a sinner.” But many
not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in
men are sinners. Therefore we need not do good to all.
mind to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There
Objection 3.
Further, “Charity dealeth not per-
is however a good that we can do to all, if not to each in-
versely” (1 Cor. 13:4). Now to do good to some is to
dividual, at least to all in general, as when we pray for all,
deal perversely: for instance if one were to do good to an
for unbelievers as well as for the faithful.
enemy of the common weal, or if one were to do good to
Reply to Objection 2. In a sinner there are two things,
an excommunicated person, since, by doing so, he would
his guilt and his nature. Accordingly we are bound to suc-
be holding communion with him. Therefore, since benef-
cor the sinner as to the maintenance of his nature, but not
icence is an act of charity, we ought not to do good to all.
so as to abet his sin, for this would be to do evil rather
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal.
6:10):
than good.
“Whilst we have time, let us work good to all men.”
Reply to Objection 3. The excommunicated and the
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 1), benefi-
enemies of the common weal are deprived of all benef-
cence is an effect of love in so far as love moves the supe-
icence, in so far as this prevents them from doing evil
rior to watch over the inferior. Now degrees among men
deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of succor lest
are not unchangeable as among angels, because men are
it fail, we are bound to help them: for instance, if they
subject to many failings, so that he who is superior in one
be in danger of death through hunger or thirst, or suffer
respect, is or may be inferior in another. Therefore, since
some like distress, unless this be according to the order of
the love of charity extends to all, beneficence also should
justice.
extend to all, but according as time and place require: be-
Whether we ought to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us?
IIa IIae q. 31 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that we are nor bound to
a man ought to be more beneficent to his children, since
do good to those rather who are more closely united to
“neither ought the children to lay up for the parents,” ac-
us. For it is written (Lk. 14:12): “When thou makest a
cording to 2 Cor. 12:14. Therefore we are not bound to
dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren,
be more beneficent to those who are more closely united
nor thy kinsmen.” Now these are the most closely united
to us.
to us. Therefore we are not bound to do good to those
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
rather who are more closely united to us, but preferably
i, 28): “Since one cannot do good to all, we ought to con-
to strangers and to those who are in want: hence the text
sider those chiefly who by reason of place, time or any
goes on: “But, when thou makest a feast, call the poor, the
other circumstance, by a kind of chance are more closely
maimed,” etc.
united to us.”
Objection 2. Further, to help another in the battle is
I answer that, Grace and virtue imitate the order of
an act of very great goodness. But a soldier on the bat-
nature, which is established by Divine wisdom. Now the
tlefield is bound to help a fellow-soldier who is a stranger
order of nature is such that every natural agent pours forth
rather than a kinsman who is a foe. Therefore in doing
its activity first and most of all on the things which are
acts of kindness we are not bound to give the preference
nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next to it. In
to those who are most closely united to us.
like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first
Objection 3. Further, we should pay what is due be-
and most plentifully on the substances which are nearest
fore conferring gratuitous favors. But it is a man’s duty
to Him, as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the
to be good to those who have been good to him. There-
bestowal of benefits is an act of charity towards others.
fore we ought to do good to our benefactors rather than to
Therefore we ought to be most beneficent towards those
those who are closely united to us.
who are most closely connected with us.
Objection 4. Further, a man ought to love his parents
Now one man’s connection with another may be mea-
more than his children, as stated above (q. 26, a. 9). Yet
sured in reference to the various matters in which men are
1348
engaged together; (thus the intercourse of kinsmen is in the goods of the debtor, but rather as belonging to the pernatural matters, that of fellow-citizens is in civic matters,
son to whom it is due: for instance, a man may have an-
that of the faithful is in spiritual matters, and so forth):
other’s goods, whether in money or in kind, either because
and various benefits should be conferred in various ways
he has stolen them, or because he has received them on
according to these various connections, because we ought
loan or in deposit or in some other way. In this case a man
in preference to bestow on each one such benefits as per-
ought to pay what he owes, rather than benefit his con-
tain to the matter in which, speaking simply, he is most
nections out of it, unless perchance the case be so urgent
closely connected with us. And yet this may vary accord-
that it would be lawful for him to take another’s property
ing to the various requirements of time, place, or matter in
in order to relieve the one who is in need. Yet, again, this
hand: because in certain cases one ought, for instance, to
would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress: in
succor a stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than one’s
which case, however, the claims on either side would have
own father, if he is not in such urgent need.
to be weighed with regard to such other conditions as a
Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord did not absolutely
prudent man would take into consideration, because, on
forbid us to invite our friends and kinsmen to eat with us,
account of the different particular cases, as the Philoso-
but to invite them so that they may invite us in return,
pher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it is impossible to lay down a
since that would be an act not of charity but of cupidity.
general rule.
The case may occur, however, that one ought rather to in-
The other kind of due is one which is reckoned among
vite strangers, on account of their greater want. For it must
the goods of the debtor and not of the creditor; for in-
be understood that, other things being equal, one ought to
stance, a thing may be due, not because justice requires it,
succor those rather who are most closely connected with
but on account of a certain moral equity, as in the case of
us. And if of two, one be more closely connected, and the
benefits received gratis. Now no benefactor confers a ben-
other in greater want, it is not possible to decide, by any
efit equal to that which a man receives from his parents:
general rule, which of them we ought to help rather than
wherefore in paying back benefits received, we should
the other, since there are various degrees of want as well
give the first place to our parents before all others, un-
as of connection: and the matter requires the judgment of
less, on the other side, there be such weightier motives,
a prudent man.
as need or some other circumstance, for instance the com-
Reply to Objection 2. The common good of many is
mon good of the Church or state. In other cases we must
more Godlike than the good of an individual. Wherefore
take to account the connection and the benefit received;
it is a virtuous action for a man to endanger even his own
and here again no general rule can laid down.
life, either for the spiritual or for the temporal common
Reply to Objection 4. Parents are like superiors, and
good of his country. Since therefore men engage together
so a parent’s love tends to conferring benefits, while the
in warlike acts in order to safeguard the common weal,
children’s love tends to honor their parents. Nevertheless
the soldier who with this in view succors his comrade,
in a case of extreme urgency it would be lawful to aban-
succors him not as a private individual, but with a view to
don one’s children rather than one’s parents, to abandon
the welfare of his country as a whole: wherefore it is not
whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the obliga-
a matter for wonder if a stranger be preferred to one who
tion we lie under towards them for the benefits we have
is a blood relation.
received from them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii,
Reply to Objection 3. A thing may be due in two
14).
ways. There is one which should be reckoned, not among
Whether beneficence is a special virtue?
IIa IIae q. 31 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that beneficence is a spe-
cial virtue.
cial virtue. For precepts are directed to virtue, since law-
Objection 3. Further, charity is not divided into sev-
givers purpose to make men virtuous (Ethic. i 9,13; ii,
eral species: whereas there would seem to be several kinds
1). Now beneficence and love are prescribed as distinct
of beneficence, according to the various kinds of benefits.
from one another, for it is written (Mat. 4:44): “Love
Therefore beneficence is a distinct virtue from charity.
your enemies, do good to them that hate you.” Therefore
On the contrary, The internal and the external act do
beneficence is a virtue distinct from charity.
not require different virtues. Now beneficence and good-
Objection 2. Further, vices are opposed to virtues.
will differ only as external and internal act, since benefi-
Now there are opposed to beneficence certain vices
cence is the execution of goodwill. Therefore as goodwill
whereby a hurt is inflicted on our neighbor, for instance,
is not a distinct virtue from charity, so neither is benefi-
rapine, theft and so forth. Therefore beneficence is a spe-
cence.
1349
I answer that, Virtues differ according to the different Reply to Objection 2. Even as all benefits conferred
aspects of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the ob-
on our neighbor, if we consider them under the common
ject of charity and of beneficence is the same, since both
aspect of good, are to be traced to love, so all hurts consid-
virtues regard the common aspect of good, as explained
ered under the common aspect of evil, are to be traced to
above (a. 1). Wherefore beneficence is not a distinct virtue
hatred. But if we consider these same things under certain
from charity, but denotes an act of charity.
special aspects of good or of evil, they are to be traced to
Reply to Objection 1. Precepts are given, not about
certain special virtues or vices, and in this way also there
habits but about acts of virtue: wherefore distinction of
are various kinds of benefits.
precept denotes distinction, not of habits, but of acts.
Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
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SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 32
Of Almsdeeds
(In Ten Articles)
We must now consider almsdeeds, under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?
(2) Of the different kinds of alms;
(3) Which alms are of greater account, spiritual or corporal?
(4) Whether corporal alms have a spiritual effect?
(5) Whether the giving of alms is a matter of precept?
(6) Whether corporal alms should be given out of the things we need?
(7) Whether corporal alms should be given out of ill-gotten goods?
(8) Who can give alms?
(9) To whom should we give alms?
(10) How should alms be given ?
Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?
IIa IIae q. 32 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that almsgiving is not an
almsgiving is, properly speaking, an act of mercy. This
act of charity. For without charity one cannot do acts of
appears in its very name, for in Greek eleemosyne it is de-charity. Now it is possible to give alms without having
rived from having mercy eleein even as the Latin “miser-charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: “If I should distribute
atio” is. And since mercy is an effect of charity, as shown
all my goods to feed the poor. . . and have not charity, it
above (q. 30, a. 2, a. 3, obj. 3 ), it follows that almsgiving
profiteth me nothing.” Therefore almsgiving is not an act
is an act of charity through the medium of mercy.
of charity.
Reply to Objection 1. An act of virtue may be taken
Objection 2. Further, almsdeeds are reckoned among
in two ways: first materially, thus an act of justice is to do
works of satisfaction, according to Dan. 4:24: “Redeem
what is just; and such an act of virtue can be without the
thou thy sins with alms.” Now satisfaction is an act of jus-
virtue, since many, without having the habit of justice, do
tice. Therefore almsgiving is an act of justice and not of
what is just, led by the natural light of reason, or through
charity.
fear, or in the hope of gain. Secondly, we speak of a thing
Objection 3. Further, the offering of sacrifices to God
being an act of justice formally, and thus an act of jus-
is an act of religion. But almsgiving is offering a sacrifice
tice is to do what is just, in the same way as a just man,
to God, according to Heb. 13:16: “Do not forget to do
i.e. with readiness and delight, and such an act of virtue
good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God’s favor is
cannot be without the virtue.
obtained.” Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity,
Accordingly almsgiving can be materially without
but of religion.
charity, but to give alms formally, i.e. for God’s sake,
Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
with delight and readiness, and altogether as one ought, is
l) that to give for a good purpose is an act of liberality.
not possible without charity.
Now this is especially true of almsgiving. Therefore alms-
Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders the proper
giving is not an act of charity.
elicited act of one virtue being commanded by another
On the contrary, It is written 2 Jn. 3:17: “He that
virtue as commanding it and directing it to this other
hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother
virtue’s end. It is in this way that almsgiving is reckoned
in need, and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth
among works of satisfaction in so far as pity for the one in
the charity of God abide in him?”
distress is directed to the satisfaction for his sin; and in so I answer that, External acts belong to that virtue
far as it is directed to placate God, it has the character of
which regards the motive for doing those acts.
Now
a sacrifice, and thus it is commanded by religion.
the motive for giving alms is to relieve one who is in
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
need. Wherefore some have defined alms as being “a deed
Reply to Objection 4. Almsgiving belongs to liberal-
whereby something is given to the needy, out of compas-
ity, in so far as liberality removes an obstacle to that act,
sion and for God’s sake,” which motive belongs to mercy,
which might arise from excessive love of riches, the result
as stated above (q. 30, Aa. 1,2). Hence it is clear that
of which is that one clings to them more than one ought.
1351
Whether the different kinds of almsdeeds are suitably enumerated?
IIa IIae q. 32 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the different kinds
said almsdeeds are suitably enumerated in respect of those
of almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated. For we reckon
things whereof men have abundance or insufficiency.
seven corporal almsdeeds, namely, to feed the hungry, to
I answer that, The aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds
give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to harbor the
is suitably taken from the various needs of our neighbor:
harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive, to bury
some of which affect the soul, and are relieved by spiritual
the dead; all of which are expressed in the following verse:
almsdeeds, while others affect the body, and are relieved
“To visit, to quench, to feed, to ransom, clothe, harbor or
by corporal almsdeeds. For corporal need occurs either
bury.”
during this life or afterwards. If it occurs during this life,
Again we reckon seven spiritual alms, namely, to in-
it is either a common need in respect of things needed by
struct the ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the
all, or it is a special need occurring through some accident
sorrowful, to reprove the sinner, to forgive injuries, to bear
supervening. In the first case, the need is either internal or
with those who trouble and annoy us, and to pray for all,
external. Internal need is twofold: one which is relieved
which are all contained in the following verse: “To coun-
by solid food, viz. hunger, in respect of which we have
sel, reprove, console, to pardon, forbear, and to pray,” yet
“to feed the hungry”; while the other is relieved by liq-
so that counsel includes both advice and instruction.
uid food, viz. thirst, and in respect of this we have “to
And it seems that these various almsdeeds are unsuit-
give drink to the thirsty.” The common need with regard
ably enumerated. For the purpose of almsdeeds is to suc-
to external help is twofold; one in respect of clothing, and
cor our neighbor. But a dead man profits nothing by being
as to this we have “to clothe the naked”: while the other
buried, else Our Lord would not have spoken truly when
is in respect of a dwelling place, and as to this we have
He said (Mat. 10:28): “Be not afraid of them who kill
“to harbor the harborless.” Again if the need be special,
the body, and after that have no more that they can do.”∗
it is either the result of an internal cause, like sickness,
This explains why Our Lord, in enumerating the works of
and then we have “to visit the sick,” or it results from an
mercy, made no mention of the burial of the dead (Mat.
external cause, and then we have “to ransom the captive.”
25:35,36). Therefore it seems that these almsdeeds are
After this life we give “burial to the dead.”
unsuitably enumerated.
In like manner spiritual needs are relieved by spiritual
Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a. 1), the pur-
acts in two ways, first by asking for help from God, and
pose of giving alms is to relieve our neighbor’s need. Now
in this respect we have “prayer,” whereby one man prays
there are many needs of human life other than those men-
for others; secondly, by giving human assistance, and this
tioned above, for instance, a blind man needs a leader, a
in three ways. First, in order to relieve a deficiency on
lame man needs someone to lean on, a poor man needs
the part of the intellect, and if this deficiency be in the
riches. Therefore these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumer-
speculative intellect, the remedy is applied by “instruct-
ated.
ing,” and if in the practical intellect, the remedy is applied
Objection 3. Further, almsgiving is a work of mercy.
by “counselling.” Secondly, there may be a deficiency on
But the reproof of the wrong-doer savors, apparently, of
the part of the appetitive power, especially by way of sor-
severity rather than of mercy. Therefore it ought not to be
row, which is remedied by “comforting.” Thirdly, the de-
reckoned among the spiritual almsdeeds.
ficiency may be due to an inordinate act; and this may be
Objection 4. Further, almsgiving is intended for the
the subject of a threefold consideration. First, in respect of
supply of a defect. But no man is without the defect of
the sinner, inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his inordi-
ignorance in some matter or other. Therefore, apparently,
nate will, and thus the remedy takes the form of “reproof.”
each one ought to instruct anyone who is ignorant of what
Secondly, in respect of the person sinned against; and if
he knows himself.
the sin be committed against ourselves, we apply the rem-
On the contrary, Gregory says (Nom. in Evang. ix):
edy by “pardoning the injury,” while, if it be committed
“Let him that hath understanding beware lest he withhold
against God or our neighbor, it is not in our power to par-
his knowledge; let him that hath abundance of wealth,
don, as Jerome observes (Super Matth. xviii, 15). Thirdly,
watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let him who
in respect of the result of the inordinate act, on account of
is a servant to art be most solicitous to share his skill and
which the sinner is an annoyance to those who live with
profit with his neighbor; let him who has an opportunity
him, even beside his intention; in which case the remedy
of speaking with the wealthy, fear lest he be condemned
is applied by “bearing with him,” especially with regard to
for retaining his talent, if when he has the chance he plead
those who sin out of weakness, according to Rom. 15:1:
not with him the cause of the poor.” Therefore the afore-
“We that are stronger, ought to bear the infirmities of the
∗ The quotation is from Lk. 12:4.
1352
weak,” and not only as regards their being infirm and con-that to lead the blind, and to support the lame, come to the
sequently troublesome on account of their unruly actions,
same as visiting the sick. In like manner to assist a man
but also by bearing any other burdens of theirs with them,
against any distress that is due to an extrinsic cause comes
according to Gal. 6:2: “Bear ye one another’s burdens.”
to the same as the ransom of captives. And the wealth
Reply to Objection 1. Burial does not profit a dead
with which we relieve the poor is sought merely for the
man as though his body could be capable of perception
purpose of relieving the aforesaid needs: hence there was
after death. In this sense Our Lord said that those who
no reason for special mention of this particular need.
kill the body “have no more that they can do”; and for
Reply to Objection 3. The reproof of the sinner, as
this reason He did not mention the burial of the dead with
to the exercise of the act of reproving, seems to imply the
the other works of mercy, but those only which are more
severity of justice, but, as to the intention of the reprover,
clearly necessary. Nevertheless it does concern the de-
who wishes to free a man from the evil of sin, it is an act of
ceased what is done with his body: both that he may live
mercy and lovingkindness, according to Prov. 27:6: “Bet-
in the memory of man whose respect he forfeits if he re-
ter are the wounds of a friend, than the deceitful kisses of
main without burial, and as regards a man’s fondness for
an enemy.”
his own body while he was yet living, a fondness which
Reply to Objection 4. Nescience is not always a de-
kindly persons should imitate after his death. It is thus
fect, but only when it is about what one ought to know,
that some are praised for burying the dead, as Tobias, and
and it is a part of almsgiving to supply this defect by in-
those who buried Our Lord; as Augustine says (De Cura
struction. In doing this however we should observe the
pro Mort. iii).
due circumstances of persons, place and time, even as in
Reply to Objection 2. All other needs are reduced to
other virtuous acts.
these, for blindness and lameness are kinds of sickness, so
Whether corporal alms are of more account than spiritual alms?
IIa IIae q. 32 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that corporal alms are
thee” (Mat. 5:42): “You should give so as to injure neither
of more account than spiritual alms. For it is more praise-
yourself nor another, and when you refuse what another
worthy to give an alms to one who is in greater want, since
asks you must not lose sight of the claims of justice, and
an almsdeed is to be praised because it relieves one who
send him away empty; at times indeed you will give what
is in need. Now the body which is relieved by corporal
is better than what is asked for, if you reprove him that
alms, is by nature more needy than the spirit which is re-
asks unjustly.” Now reproof is a spiritual alms. Therefore
lieved by spiritual alms. Therefore corporal alms are of
spiritual almsdeeds are preferable to corporal almsdeeds.
more account.
I answer that, There are two ways of comparing these
Objection 2. Further, an alms is less praiseworthy
almsdeeds. First, simply; and in this respect, spiritual
and meritorious if the kindness is compensated, where-
almsdeeds hold the first place, for three reasons. First, be-
fore Our Lord says (Lk. 14:12): “When thou makest a
cause the offering is more excellent, since it is a spiritual
dinner or a supper, call not thy neighbors who are rich, lest
gift, which surpasses a corporal gift, according to Prov.
perhaps they also invite thee again. Now there is always
4:2: “I will give you a good gift, forsake not My Law.”
compensation in spiritual almsdeeds, since he who prays
Secondly, on account of the object succored, because the
for another, profits thereby, according to Ps. 34:13: “My
spirit is more excellent than the body, wherefore, even as
prayer shall be turned into my bosom: and he who teaches
a man in looking after himself, ought to look to his soul
another, makes progress in knowledge, which cannot be
more than to his body, so ought he in looking after his
said of corporal almsdeeds. Therefore corporal almsdeeds
neighbor, whom he ought to love as himself. Thirdly, as
are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.
regards the acts themselves by which our neighbor is suc-
Objection 3. Further, an alms is to be commended if
cored, because spiritual acts are more excellent than cor-
the needy one is comforted by it: wherefore it is written
poral acts, which are, in a fashion, servile.
(Job 31:20): “If his sides have not blessed me,” and the
Secondly, we may compare them with regard to some
Apostle says to Philemon (verse 7): “The bowels of the
particular case, when some corporal alms excels some
saints have been refreshed by thee, brother.” Now a cor-
spiritual alms: for instance, a man in hunger is to be fed
poral alms is sometimes more welcome to a needy man
rather than instructed, and as the Philosopher observes
than a spiritual alms. Therefore bodily almsdeeds are of
(Topic. iii, 2), for a needy man “money is better than phi-
more account than spiritual almsdeeds.
losophy,” although the latter is better simply.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
Reply to Objection 1. It is better to give to one who
in Monte i, 20) on the words, “Give to him that asketh of
is in greater want, other things being equal, but if he who
1353
is less needy is better, and is in want of better things, it is Nevertheless the intention of gaining spiritual goods
better to give to him: and it is thus in the case in point.
does not detract from merit, as the intention of gaining
Reply to Objection 2. Compensation does not detract
corporal goods.
from merit and praise if it be not intended, even as human
Reply to Objection 3. The merit of an almsgiver de-
glory, if not intended, does not detract from virtue. Thus
pends on that in which the will of the recipient rests rea-
Sallust says of Cato (Catilin.), that “the less he sought
sonably, and not on that in which it rests when it is inor-
fame, the more he became famous”: and thus it is with
dinate.
spiritual almsdeeds.
Whether corporal almsdeeds have a spiritual effect?
IIa IIae q. 32 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that corporal almsdeeds
a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God and his
have not a spiritual effect. For no effect exceeds its cause.
neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual
But spiritual goods exceed corporal goods. Therefore cor-
fruit, according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: “Lose thy money
poral almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.
for thy brother . . . place thy treasure in the command-
Objection 2. Further, the sin of simony consists in
ments of the Most High, and it shall bring thee more profit
giving the corporal for the spiritual, and it is to be utterly
than gold.”
avoided. Therefore one ought not to give alms in order to
Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way
receive a spiritual effect.
again, they have a spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neigh-
Objection 3. Further, to multiply the cause is to mul-
bor, who is succored by a corporal alms, is moved to pray
tiply the effect. If therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a
for his benefactor; wherefore the above text goes on (Ec-
spiritual effect, the greater the alms, the greater the spiri-
clus. 29:15): “Shut up alms in the heart of the poor, and it
tual profit, which is contrary to what we read (Lk. 21:3)
shall obtain help for thee from all evil.”
of the widow who cast two brass mites into the treasury,
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers cor-
and in Our Lord’s own words “cast in more than. . . all.”
poral almsdeeds as to their substance.
Therefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.
Reply to Objection 2. He who gives an alms does rot
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): “The
intend to buy a spiritual thing with a corporal thing, for
alms of a man. . . shall preserve the grace of a man as the
he knows that spiritual things infinitely surpass corporal
apple of the eye.”
things, but he intends to merit a spiritual fruit through the
I answer that, Corporal almsdeeds may be considered
love of charity.
in three ways. First, with regard to their substance, and in
Reply to Objection 3. The widow who gave less in
this way they have merely a corporal effect, inasmuch as
quantity, gave more in proportion; and thus we gather that
they supply our neighbor’s corporal needs. Secondly, they
the fervor of her charity, whence corporal almsdeeds de-
may be considered with regard to their cause, in so far as
rive their spiritual efficacy, was greater.
Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept?
IIa IIae q. 32 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that almsgiving is not a
a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave an alms.
matter of precept. For the counsels are distinct from the
But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can
precepts. Now almsgiving is a matter of counsel, accord-
always be deemed probable that the person in need can be
ing to Dan. 4:24: “Let my counsel be acceptable to the
relieved in some other way, and that what we would spend
King; [Vulg.: ‘to thee, and’] redeem thou thy sins with
in almsgiving might be needful to ourselves either now or
alms.” Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
in some future time. Therefore it seems that almsgiving is
Objection 2. Further, it is lawful for everyone to use
not a matter of precept.
and to keep what is his own. Yet by keeping it he will
Objection 4.
Further, every commandment is re-
not give alms. Therefore it is lawful not to give alms: and
ducible to the precepts of the Decalogue. But these pre-
consequently almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
cepts contain no reference to almsgiving. Therefore alms-
Objection 3. Further, whatever is a matter of precept
giving is not a matter of precept.
binds the transgressor at some time or other under pain of
On the contrary, No man is punished eternally for
mortal sin, because positive precepts are binding for some
omitting to do what is not a matter of precept. But some
fixed time. Therefore, if almsgiving were a matter of pre-
are punished eternally for omitting to give alms, as is clear
cept, it would be possible to point to some fixed time when
from Mat. 25:41-43. Therefore almsgiving is a matter of
1354
precept.
was not subject to God’s Law, wherefore such things as
I answer that, As love of our neighbor is a matter of
were prescribed by the Law which he did not profess, had
precept, whatever is a necessary condition to the love of
to be counselled to him. Or he may have been speaking in
our neighbor is a matter of precept also. Now the love
reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter
of our neighbor requires that not only should we be our
of precept.
neighbor’s well-wishers, but also his well-doers, accord-
Reply to Objection 2. The temporal goods which
ing to 1 Jn. 3:18: “Let us not love in word, nor in tongue,
God grants us, are ours as to the ownership, but as to the
but in deed, and in truth.” And in order to be a person’s
use of them, they belong not to us alone but also to such
well-wisher and well-doer, we ought to succor his needs:
others as we are able to succor out of what we have over
this is done by almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is a mat-
and above our needs. Hence Basil says‡: “If you acknowl-
ter of precept.
edge them,” viz. your temporal goods, “as coming from
Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it
God, is He unjust because He apportions them unequally?
follows that all almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in
Why are you rich while another is poor, unless it be that
so far as it is necessary to virtue, namely, in so far as it
you may have the merit of a good stewardship, and he
is demanded by right reason. Now right reason demands
the reward of patience? It is the hungry man’s bread that
that we should take into consideration something on the
you withhold, the naked man’s cloak that you have stored
part of the giver, and something on the part of the recip-
away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot, the
ient. On the part of the giver, it must be noted that he
money of the needy that you have buried underground:
should give of his surplus, according to Lk. 11:41: “That
and so you injure as many as you might help.” Ambrose
which remaineth, give alms.” This surplus is to be taken in
expresses himself in the same way.
reference not only to himself, so as to denote what is un-
Reply to Objection 3. There is a time when we sin
necessary to the individual, but also in reference to those
mortally if we omit to give alms; on the part of the re-
of whom he has charge (in which case we have the expres-
cipient when we see that his need is evident and urgent,
sion “necessary to the person”∗ taking the word “person”
and that he is not likely to be succored otherwise—on the
as expressive of dignity). Because each one must first of
part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods, which
all look after himself and then after those over whom he
he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge
has charge, and afterwards with what remains relieve the
with probability. Nor need he consider every case that
needs of others. Thus nature first, by its nutritive power,
may possibly occur in the future, for this would be to think
takes what it requires for the upkeep of one’s own body,
about the morrow, which Our Lord forbade us to do (Mat.
and afterwards yields the residue for the formation of an-
6:34), but he should judge what is superfluous and what
other by the power of generation.
necessary, according as things probably and generally oc-
On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should
cur.
be in need, else there would be no reason for giving him
Reply to Objection 4. All succor given to our neigh-
alms: yet since it is not possible for one individual to re-
bor is reduced to the precept about honoring our par-
lieve the needs of all, we are not bound to relieve all who
ents. For thus does the Apostle interpret it (1 Tim. 4:8)
are in need, but only those who could not be succored if
where he says: “Dutifulness§ [Douay: ‘Godliness’] is
we not did succor them. For in such cases the words of
profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now
Ambrose apply, “Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou
is, and of that which is to come,” and he says this be-
hast not fed him, thou hast slain himӠ. Accordingly we
cause the precept about honoring our parents contains the
are bound to give alms of our surplus, as also to give alms
promise, “that thou mayest be longlived upon the land”
to one whose need is extreme: otherwise almsgiving, like
(Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness comprises all kinds of alms-
any other greater good, is a matter of counsel.
giving.
Reply to Objection 1. Daniel spoke to a king who
Whether one ought to give alms out of what one needs?
IIa IIae q. 32 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not to
this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the order of
give alms out of what one needs. For the order of char-
charity requires that a man should love himself more than
ity should be observed not only as regards the effect of
his neighbor, it seems that he would sin if he deprived
our benefactions but also as regards our interior affections.
himself of what he needed, in order to succor his neigh-
Now it is a sin to contravene the order of charity, because
bor.
∗ The official necessities of a person in position
† Cf. Canon Pasce,
dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken
‡ Hom. super
Luc. xii, 18
§ “Pietas,” whence our English word “Piety.” Cf. also
inf. q. 101, a. 2.
1355
Objection 2. Further, whoever gives away what he person, since the common good is to be preferred to one’s
needs himself, squanders his own substance, and that is to
own.
be a prodigal, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1).
Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man can-
But no sinful deed should be done. Therefore we should
not without it live in keeping with his social station, as
not give alms out of what we need.
regards either himself or those of whom he has charge.
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8):
The “necessary” considered thus is not an invariable quan-
“If any man have not care of his own, and especially of
tity, for one might add much more to a man’s property,
those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse
and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one
than an infidel.” Now if a man gives of what he needs
might take much from him, and he would still have suf-
for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from the
ficient for the decencies of life in keeping with his own
care he should have for himself or his charge. Therefore it
position. Accordingly it is good to give alms of this kind
seems that whoever gives alms from what he needs, sins
of “necessary”; and it is a matter not of precept but of
gravely.
counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive oneself of
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): “If
one’s own, in order to give to others to such an extent
thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to
that the residue would be insufficient for one to live in
the poor.” Now he that gives all he has to the poor, gives
keeping with one’s station and the ordinary occurrences
not only what he needs not, but also what he needs. There-
of life: for no man ought to live unbecomingly. There
fore a man may give alms out of what he needs.
are, however, three exceptions to the above rule. The first
I answer that, A thing is necessary in two ways: first,
is when a man changes his state of life, for instance, by
because without it something is impossible, and it is al-
entering religion, for then he gives away all his posses-
together wrong to give alms out of what is necessary to
sions for Christ’s sake, and does the deed of perfection by
us in this sense; for instance, if a man found himself in
transferring himself to another state. Secondly, when that
the presence of a case of urgency, and had merely suffi-
which he deprives himself of, though it be required for the
cient to support himself and his children, or others under
decencies of life, can nevertheless easily be recovered, so
his charge, he would be throwing away his life and that
that he does not suffer extreme inconvenience. Thirdly,
of others if he were to give away in alms, what was then
when he is in presence of extreme indigence in an indi-
necessary to him. Yet I say this without prejudice to such
vidual, or great need on the part of the common weal. For
a case as might happen, supposing that by depriving him-
in such cases it would seem praiseworthy to forego the
self of necessaries a man might help a great personage,
requirements of one’s station, in order to provide for a
and a support of the Church or State, since it would be
greater need.
a praiseworthy act to endanger one’s life and the lives of
The objections may be easily solved from what has
those who are under our charge for the delivery of such a
been said.
Whether one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods?
IIa IIae q. 32 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that one may give alms
Objection 3. Further, greater evils should be avoided
out of ill-gotten goods. For it is written (Lk. 16:9): “Make
more than lesser evils. Now it is less sinful to keep back
unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity.” Now mam-
another’s property than to commit murder, of which a man
mon signifies riches. Therefore it is lawful to make unto
is guilty if he fails to succor one who is in extreme need,
oneself spiritual friends by giving alms out of ill-gotten
as appears from the words of Ambrose who says (Cf.
riches.
Canon Pasce dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted,
Objection 2. Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill-
are taken): “Feed him that dies of hunger, if thou hast not
gotten. But the profits from whoredom are filthy lucre;
fed him, thou hast slain him”. Therefore, in certain cases,
wherefore it was forbidden (Dt. 23:18) to offer therefrom
it is lawful to give alms of ill-gotten goods.
sacrifices or oblations to God: “Thou shalt not offer the
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.
hire of a strumpet. . . in the house of. . . thy God.” In like
xxxv, 2): “Give alms from your just labors. For you will
manner gains from games of chance are ill-gotten, for, as
not bribe Christ your judge, not to hear you with the poor
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), “we take such like
whom you rob. . . Give not alms from interest and usury:
gains from our friends to whom we ought rather to give.”
I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense the Body of
And most of all are the profits from simony ill-gotten,
Christ.”
since thereby the Holy Ghost is wronged. Nevertheless
I answer that, A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways.
out of such gains it is lawful to give alms. Therefore one
In the first place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the per-may give alms out of ill-gotten goods.
son from whom it is gotten, and may not be kept by the
1356
person who has obtained possession of it; as in the case of fluence.
rapine, theft and usury, and of such things a man may not
Reply to Objection 2. We have already explained
give alms since he is bound to restore them.
how alms may be given out of the profits of whoredom.
Secondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may
Yet sacrifices and oblations were not made therefrom at
not keep it, and yet he may not return it to the person
the altar, both on account of the scandal, and through rev-
from whom he received it, because he received it unjustly,
erence for sacred things. It is also lawful to give alms
while the latter gave it unjustly. This happens in simony,
out of the profits of simony, because they are not due to
wherein both giver and receiver contravene the justice of
him who paid, indeed he deserves to lose them. But as to
the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be made not to the
the profits from games of chance, there would seem to be
giver, but by giving alms. The same applies to all similar
something unlawful as being contrary to the Divine Law,
cases of illegal giving and receiving.
when a man wins from one who cannot alienate his prop-
Thirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking
erty, such as minors, lunatics and so forth, or when a man,
was unlawful, but because it is the outcome of something
with the desire of making money out of another man, en-
unlawful, as in the case of a woman’s profits from whore-
tices him to play, and wins from him by cheating. In these
dom. This is filthy lucre properly so called, because the
cases he is bound to restitution, and consequently cannot
practice of whoredom is filthy and against the Law of
give away his gains in alms. Then again there would seem
God, yet the woman does not act unjustly or unlawfully
to be something unlawful as being against the positive
in taking the money. Consequently it is lawful to keep
civil law, which altogether forbids any such profits. Since,
and to give in alms what is thus acquired by an unlawful
however, a civil law does not bind all, but only those who
action.
are subject to that law, and moreover may be abrogated
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Verb.
through desuetude, it follows that all such as are bound
Dom. 2), “Some have misunderstood this saying of Our
by these laws are bound to make restitution of such gains,
Lord, so as to take another’s property and give thereof to
unless perchance the contrary custom prevail, or unless a
the poor, thinking that they are fulfilling the command-
man win from one who enticed him to play, in which case
ment by so doing. This interpretation must be amended.
he is not bound to restitution, because the loser does not
Yet all riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in De
deserve to be paid back: and yet he cannot lawfully keep
Quaest. Ev. ii, 34, because “riches are not unjust save for
what he has won, so long as that positive law is in force,
those who are themselves unjust, and put all their trust in
wherefore in this case he ought to give it away in alms.
them. Or, according to Ambrose in his commentary on
Reply to Objection 3. All things are common prop-
Lk. 16:9, “Make unto yourselves friends,” etc., “He calls
erty in a case of extreme necessity. Hence one who is in
mammon unjust, because it draws our affections by the
such dire straits may take another’s goods in order to suc-
various allurements of wealth.” Or, because “among the
cor himself, if he can find no one who is willing to give
many ancestors whose property you inherit, there is one
him something. For the same reason a man may retain
who took the property of others unjustly, although you
what belongs to another, and give alms thereof; or even
know nothing about it,” as Basil says in a homily (Hom.
take something if there be no other way of succoring the
super Luc. A, 5). Or, all riches are styled riches “of iniq-
one who is in need. If however this be possible without
uity,” i.e., of “inequality,” because they are not distributed
danger, he must ask the owner’s consent, and then succor
equally among all, one being in need, and another in af-
the poor man who is in extreme necessity.
Whether one who is under another’s power can give alms?
IIa IIae q. 32 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that one who is under an-
Therefore those who are in another’s power can give alms.
other’s power can give alms. For religious are under the
Objection 2. Further, a wife is under her husband’s
power of their prelates to whom they have vowed obe-
power (Gn. 3:16). But a wife can give alms since she is
dience. Now if it were unlawful for them to give alms,
her husband’s partner; hence it is related of the Blessed
they would lose by entering the state of religion, for as
Lucy that she gave alms without the knowledge of her be-
Ambrose∗ says on 1 Tim. 4:8: “ ‘Dutifulness [Douay:
trothed† Therefore a person is not prevented from giving
‘godliness’] is profitable to all things’: The sum total of
alms, by being under another’s power.
the Christian religion consists in doing one’s duty by all,”
Objection 3. Further, the subjection of children to
and the most creditable way of doing this is to give alms.
their parents is founded on nature, wherefore the Apos-
∗ The quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index to ecclesiastical authorities quoted by St. Thomas
† “Sponsus” The mat-
rimonial institutions of the Romans were so entirely different from ours that “sponsus” is no longer accurately rendered either “husband” or
“betrothed.”
1357
tle says (Eph. 6:1): “Children, obey your parents in the being commissioned by his superior, he can give alms
Lord.” But, apparently, children may give alms out of
from the property of his monaster, in accordance with the
their parents’ property. For it is their own, since they are
terms of his commission; but if he has no such dispensa-
the heirs; wherefore, since they can employ it for some
tion, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot give alms
bodily use, it seems that much more can they use it in giv-
without his abbot’s permission either express or presumed
ing alms so as to profit their souls. Therefore those who
for some probable reason: except in a case of extreme ne-
are under another’s power can give alms.
cessity, when it would be lawful for him to commit a theft
Objection 4. Further, servants are under their mas-
in order to give an alms. Nor does it follow that he is
ter’s power, according to Titus 2:9: “Exhort servants to
worse off than before, because, as stated in De Eccles.
be obedient to their masters.” Now they may lawfully do
Dogm. lxxi, “it is a good thing to give one’s property to
anything that will profit their masters: and this would be
the poor little by little, but it is better still to give all at especially the case if they gave alms for them. Therefore
once in order to follow Christ, and being freed from care,
those who are under another’s power can give alms.
to be needy with Christ.”
On the contrary, Alms should not be given out of an-
Reply to Objection 2. A wife, who has other property
other’s property; and each one should give alms out of the
besides her dowry which is for the support of the burdens
just profit of his own labor as Augustine says (De Verb.
of marriage, whether that property be gained by her own
Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who are subject to anyone
industry or by any other lawful means, can give alms, out
were to give alms, this would be out of another’s prop-
of that property, without asking her husband’s permission:
erty. Therefore those who are under another’s power can-
yet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too
not give alms.
much she impoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought
I answer that, Anyone who is under another’s power
not to give alms without the express or presumed consent
must, as such, be ruled in accordance with the power of
of her husband, except in cases of necessity as stated, in
his superior: for the natural order demands that the infe-
the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply. For though
rior should be ruled according to its superior. Therefore
the wife be her husband’s equal in the marriage act, yet
in those matters in which the inferior is subject to his su-
in matters of housekeeping, the head of the woman is
perior, his ministrations must be subject to the superior’s
the man, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:3). As regards
permission.
Blessed Lucy, she had a betrothed, not a husband, where-
Accordingly he that is under another’s power must not
fore she could give alms with her mother’s consent.
give alms of anything in respect of which he is subject to
Reply to Objection 3. What belongs to the children
that other, except in so far as he has been commissioned
belongs also to the father: wherefore the child cannot give
by his superior. But if he has something in respect of
alms, except in such small quantity that one may presume
which he is not under the power of his superior, he is no
the father to be willing: unless, perchance, the father au-
longer subject to another in its regard, being independent
thorize his child to dispose of any particular property. The
in respect of that particular thing, and he can give alms
same applies to servants. Hence the Reply to the Fourth
therefrom.
Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 1. If a monk be dispensed through
Whether one ought to give alms to those rather who are more closely united to us?
IIa IIae q. 32 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not to give
when you shall fail, they may receive you into everlasting
alms to those rather who are more closely united to us.
dwellings, which passage Augustine expounds (De Verb.
For it is written (Ecclus. 12:4,6): “Give to the merciful
Dom. xxxv, 1): “Who shall have everlasting dwellings
and uphold not the sinner. . . Do good to the humble and
unless the saints of God? And who are they that shall be
give not to the ungodly.” Now it happens sometimes that
received by them into their dwellings, if not those who
those who are closely united to us are sinful and ungodly.
succor them in their needs? Therefore alms should be
Therefore we ought not to give alms to them in preference
given to the more holy persons rather than to those who
to others.
are more closely united to us.
Objection 2. Further, alms should be given that we
Objection 3. Further, man is more closely united to
may receive an eternal reward in return, according to Mat.
himself. But a man cannot give himself an alms. There-
6:18: “And thy Father Who seeth in secret, will repay
fore it seems that we are not bound to give alms to those
thee.” Now the eternal reward is gained chiefly by the
who are most closely united to us.
alms which are given to the saints, according to Lk. 16:9:
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): “If
“Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that
any man have not care of his own, and especially of those
1358
of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than torious in so far as it observes the order of charity, which
an infidel.”
requires that, other things being equal, we should, in pref-
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
erence, help those who are more closely connected with
i, 28), “it falls to us by lot, as it were, to have to look to
us. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): “It is
the welfare of those who are more closely united to us.”
with commendable liberality that you forget not your kin-
Nevertheless in this matter we must employ discretion,
dred, if you know them to be in need, for it is better that
according to the various degrees of connection, holiness
you should yourself help your own family, who would be
and utility. For we ought to give alms to one who is much
ashamed to beg help from others.” Secondly, almsdeeds
holier and in greater want, and to one who is more use-
deserve to be rewarded eternally, through the merit of the
ful to the common weal, rather than to one who is more
recipient, who prays for the giver, and it is in this sense
closely united to us, especially if the latter be not very
that Augustine is speaking.
closely united, and has no special claim on our care then
Reply to Objection 3. Since almsdeeds are works
and there, and who is not in very urgent need.
of mercy, just as a man does not, properly speaking, pity
Reply to Objection 1. We ought not to help a sinner
himself, but only by a kind of comparison, as stated above
as such, that is by encouraging him to sin, but as man, that
(q. 30, Aa. 1,2), so too, properly speaking, no man gives
is by supporting his nature.
himself an alms, unless he act in another’s person; thus
Reply to Objection 2. Almsdeeds deserve on two
when a man is appointed to distribute alms, he can take
counts to receive an eternal reward. First because they are
something for himself, if he be in want, on the same
rooted in charity, and in this respect an almsdeed is meri-
ground as when he gives to others.
Whether alms should be given in abundance?
IIa IIae q. 32 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that alms should not be
in this sense it is praiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by
given in abundance. For we ought to give alms to those
relieving his need more than sufficiently; this is not praise-
chiefly who are most closely connected with us. But we
worthy, and it would be better to give to several that are
ought not to give to them in such a way that they are likely
in need, wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): “If I
to become richer thereby, as Ambrose says (De Officiis i,
should distribute. . . to feed the poor,” on which words a
30). Therefore neither should we give abundantly to oth-
gloss comments: “Thus we are warned to be careful in
ers.
giving alms, and to give, not to one only, but to many, that
Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i,
we may profit many.”
30): “We should not lavish our wealth on others all at
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers abun-
once, we should dole it out by degrees.” But to give abun-
dance of alms as exceeding the needs of the recipient.
dantly is to give lavishly. Therefore alms should not be
Reply to Objection 2. The passage quoted considers
given in abundance.
abundance of alms on the part of the giver; but the sense
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 8:13):
is that God does not wish a man to lavish all his wealth at
“Not that others should be eased,” i.e. should live on
once, except when he changes his state of life, wherefore
you without working themselves, “and you burthened,”
he goes on to say: “Except we imitate Eliseus who slew
i.e. impoverished. But this would be the result if alms
his oxen and fed the poor with what he had, so that no
were given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to give
household cares might keep him back” (3 Kings 19:21).
alms abundantly.
Reply to Objection 3.
In the passage quoted the
On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:93): “If thou
words, “not that others should be eased or refreshed,” re-
have much, give abundantly.”
fer to that abundance of alms which surpasses the need of
I answer that, Alms may be considered abundant in
the recipient, to whom one should give alms not that he
relation either to the giver, or to the recipient: in rela-
may have an easy life, but that he may have relief. Never-
tion to the giver, when that which a man gives is great
theless we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on
as compared with his means. To give thus is praisewor-
account of the various conditions of men, some of whom
thy, wherefore Our Lord (Lk. 21:3,4) commended the
are more daintily nurtured, and need finer food and cloth-
widow because “of her want, she cast in all the living that
ing. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): “When you
she had.” Nevertheless those conditions must be observed
give an alms to a man, you should take into considera-
which were laid down when we spoke of giving alms out
tion his age and his weakness; and sometimes the shame
of one’s necessary goods (a. 9).
which proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps he
On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant
has fallen from riches to indigence through no fault of his
in two ways; first, by relieving his need sufficiently, and
own.”
1359
With regard to the words that follow, “and you bur-not because it would be better to give in abundance, but
dened,” they refer to abundance on the part of the giver.
because he fears for the weak, and he admonishes them
Yet, as a gloss says on the same passage, “he says this,
so to give that they lack not for themselves.”
1360
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 33
Of Fraternal Correction
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
(2) Whether it is a matter of precept?
(3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors?
(4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior?
(5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone?
(6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through being corrected?
(7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement?
(8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement?
Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
IIa IIae q. 33 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that fraternal correction
Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity,
is not an act of charity. For a gloss on Mat. 18:15, “If thy
because thereby we drive out our brother’s evil, viz. sin,
brother shall offend against thee,” says that “a man should
the removal of which pertains to charity rather than the re-
reprove his brother out of zeal for justice.” But justice is a
moval of an external loss, or of a bodily injury, in so much
distinct virtue from charity. Therefore fraternal correction
as the contrary good of virtue is more akin to charity than
is an act, not of charity, but of justice.
the good of the body or of external things. Therefore fra-
Objection 2. Further, fraternal correction is given by
ternal correction is an act of charity rather than the healing
secret admonition. Now admonition is a kind of counsel,
of a bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an external bodily
which is an act of prudence, for a prudent man is one who
need. There is another correction which applies a remedy
is of good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore fraternal cor-
to the sin of the wrongdoer, considered as hurtful to oth-
rection is an act, not of charity, but of prudence.
ers, and especially to the common good. This correction
Objection 3. Further, contrary acts do not belong to
is an act of justice, whose concern it is to safeguard the
the same virtue. Now it is an act of charity to bear with
rectitude of justice between one man and another.
a sinner, according to Gal. 6:2: “Bear ye one another’s
Reply to Objection 1. This gloss speaks of the sec-
burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of Christ,” which
ond correction which is an act of justice. Or if it speaks
is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that the correc-
of the first correction, then it takes justice as denoting a
tion of a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with
general virtue, as we shall state further on (q. 58 , a. 5), in him, is not an act of charity.
which sense again all “sin is iniquity” (1 Jn. 3:4), through
On the contrary, To correct the wrongdoer is a spir-
being contrary to justice.
itual almsdeed. But almsdeeds are works of charity, as
Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher
stated above (q. 32, a. 1). Therefore fraternal correction is
(Ethic. vi, 12), prudence regulates whatever is directed to
an act of charity.
the end, about which things counsel and choice are con-
I answer that, The correction of the wrongdoer is a
cerned. Nevertheless when, guided by prudence, we per-
remedy which should be employed against a man’s sin.
form some action aright which is directed to the end of
Now a man’s sin may be considered in two ways, first as
some virtue, such as temperance or fortitude, that action
being harmful to the sinner, secondly as conducing to the
belongs chiefly to the virtue to whose end it is directed.
harm of others, by hurting or scandalizing them, or by be-
Since, then, the admonition which is given in fraternal
ing detrimental to the common good, the justice of which
correction is directed to the removal of a brother’s sin,
is disturbed by that man’s sin.
which removal pertains to charity, it is evident that this
Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is
admonition is chiefly an act of charity, which virtue com-
twofold, one which applies a remedy to the sin considered
mands it, so to speak, but secondarily an act of prudence,
as an evil of the sinner himself. This is fraternal correction
which executes and directs the action.
properly so called, which is directed to the amendment of
Reply to Objection 3. Fraternal correction is not op-
the sinner. Now to do away with anyone’s evil is the same
posed to forbearance with the weak, on the contrary it re-
as to procure his good: and to procure a person’s good is
sults from it. For a man bears with a sinner, in so far as
an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well.
he is not disturbed against him, and retains his goodwill
1361
towards him: the result being that he strives to make him do better.
Whether fraternal correction is a matter of precept?
IIa IIae q. 33 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that fraternal correction is
anyhow, but by observing the due circumstances, which
not a matter of precept. For nothing impossible is a matter
are requisite in order that an act be virtuous; namely, that
of precept, according to the saying of Jerome∗: “Accursed
it be done where, when, and how it ought to be done. And
be he who says that God has commanded any. thing im-
since the disposition of whatever is directed to the end de-
possible.” Now it is written (Eccles. 7:14): “Consider the
pends on the formal aspect of the end, the chief of these
works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath de-
circumstances of a virtuous act is this aspect of the end,
spised.” Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter of
which in this case is the good of virtue. If therefore such
precept.
a circumstance be omitted from a virtuous act, as entirely
Objection 2. Further, all the precepts of the Divine
takes away the good of virtue, such an act is contrary to a
Law are reduced to the precepts of the Decalogue. But
precept. If, however, the circumstance omitted from a vir-
fraternal correction does not come under any precept of
tuous act be such as not to destroy the virtue altogether,
the Decalogue. Therefore it is not a matter of precept.
though it does not perfectly attain the good of virtue, it is
Objection 3. Further, the omission of a Divine pre-
not against a precept. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ii,
cept is a mortal sin, which has no place in a holy man. Yet
9) says that if we depart but little from the mean, it is not
holy and spiritual men are found to omit fraternal correc-
contrary to the virtue, whereas if we depart much from the
tion: since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): “Not only
mean virtue is destroyed in its act. Now fraternal correc-
those of low degree, but also those of high position, re-
tion is directed to a brother’s amendment: so that it is a
frain from reproving others, moved by a guilty cupidity,
matter of precept, in so far as it is necessary for that end,
not by the claims of charity.” Therefore fraternal correc-
but not so as we have to correct our erring brother at all
tion is not a matter of precept.
places and times.
Objection 4. Further, whatever is a matter of precept
Reply to Objection 1. In all good deeds man’s ac-
is something due. If, therefore, fraternal correction is a
tion is not efficacious without the Divine assistance: and
matter of precept, it is due to our brethren that we correct
yet man must do what is in his power. Hence Augustine
them when they sin. Now when a man owes anyone a ma-
says (De Correp. et Gratia xv): “Since we ignore who is
terial due, such as the payment of a sum of money, he must
predestined and who is not, charity should so guide our
not be content that his creditor come to him, but he should
feelings, that we wish all to be saved.” Consequently we
seek him out, that he may pay him his due. Hence we
ought to do our brethren the kindness of correcting them,
should have to go seeking for those who need correction,
with the hope of God’s help.
in order that we might correct them; which appears to be
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 32, a. 5, ad
inconvenient, both on account of the great number of sin-
4), all the precepts about rendering service to our neighbor
ners, for whose correction one man could not suffice, and
are reduced to the precept about the honor due to parents.
because religious would have to leave the cloister in order
Reply to Objection 3. Fraternal correction may be
to reprove men, which would be unbecoming. Therefore
omitted in three ways.
fraternal correction is not a matter of precept.
First, meritoriously, when out of charity one omits to
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi,
correct someone. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9):
4): “You become worse than the sinner if you fail to cor-
“If a man refrains from chiding and reproving wrongdo-
rect him.” But this would not be so unless, by this neglect,
ers, because he awaits a suitable time for so doing, or be-
one omitted to observe some precept. Therefore fraternal
cause he fears lest, if he does so, they may become worse,
correction is a matter of precept.
or hinder, oppress, or turn away from the faith, others who
I answer that, Fraternal correction is a matter of pre-
are weak and need to be instructed in a life of goodness
cept. We must observe, however, that while the negative
and virtue, this does not seem to result from covetousness,
precepts of the Law forbid sinful acts, the positive pre-
but to be counselled by charity.”
cepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now sinful acts are evil in
Secondly, fraternal correction may be omitted in such
themselves, and cannot become good, no matter how, or
a way that one commits a mortal sin, namely, “when” (as
when, or where, they are done, because of their very na-
he says in the same passage) “one fears what people may
ture they are connected with an evil end, as stated in Ethic.
think, or lest one may suffer grievous pain or death; pro-
ii, 6: wherefore negative precepts bind always and for all
vided, however, that the mind is so dominated by such
times. On the other hand, acts of virtue must not be done
things, that it gives them the preference to fraternal char-
∗ Pelagius, Expos. Symb. ad Damas
1362
ity.” This would seem to be the case when a man reckons seek him out, in order to reprove him for a sin. On the
that he might probably withdraw some wrongdoer from
other hand, we are not bound to seek someone on whom
sin, and yet omits to do so, through fear or covetousness.
to bestow such favors as are due, not to any certain person,
Thirdly, such an omission is a venial sin, when through
but to all our neighbors in general, whether those favors be
fear or covetousness, a man is loth to correct his brother’s
material or spiritual goods, but it suffices that we bestow
faults, and yet not to such a degree, that if he saw clearly
them when the opportunity occurs; because, as Augustine
that he could withdraw him from sin, he would still for-
says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), we must look upon this
bear from so doing, through fear or covetousness, be-
as a matter of chance. For this reason he says (De Verb.
cause in his own mind he prefers fraternal charity to these
Dom. xvi, 1) that “Our Lord warns us not to be listless
things. It is in this way that holy men sometimes omit to
in regard of one another’s sins: not indeed by being on
correct wrongdoers.
the lookout for something to denounce, but by correcting
Reply to Objection 4. We are bound to pay that which
what we see”: else we should become spies on the lives
is due to some fixed and certain person, whether it be a
of others, which is against the saying of Prov. 24:19: “Lie
material or a spiritual good, without waiting for him to
not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the
come to us, but by taking proper steps to find him. Where-
just, nor spoil his rest.” It is evident from this that there
fore just as he that owes money to a creditor should seek
is no need for religious to leave their cloister in order to
him, when the time comes, so as to pay him what he owes,
rebuke evil-doers.
so he that has spiritual charge of some person is bound to
Whether fraternal correction belongs only to prelates?
IIa IIae q. 33 a. 3
Objection 1.
It would seem that fraternal correc-
tice purposing the common good, which is procured not
tion belongs to prelates alone. For Jerome∗ says: “Let
only by warning one’s brother, but also, sometimes, by
priests endeavor to fulfil this saying of the Gospel: ‘If
punishing him, that others may, through fear, desist from
thy brother sin against thee,’ ” etc. Now prelates having
sin. Such a correction belongs only to prelates, whose
charge of others were usually designated under the name
business it is not only to admonish, but also to correct by
of priests. Therefore it seems that fraternal correction be-
means of punishments.
longs to prelates alone.
Reply to Objection 1. Even as regards that fraternal
Objection 2. Further, fraternal correction is a spiritual correction which is common to all, prelates have a grave
alms. Now corporal almsgiving belongs to those who are
responsibility, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): “for
placed above others in temporal matters, i.e. to the rich.
just as a man ought to bestow temporal favors on those
Therefore fraternal correction belongs to those who are
especially of whom he has temporal care, so too ought he
placed above others in spiritual matters, i.e. to prelates.
to confer spiritual favors, such as correction, teaching and
Objection 3. Further, when one man reproves another
the like, on those who are entrusted to his spiritual care.”
he moves him by his rebuke to something better. Now
Therefore Jerome does not mean that the precept of frater-
in the physical order the inferior is moved by the supe-
nal correction concerns priests only, but that it concerns
rior. Therefore in the order of virtue also, which follows
them chiefly.
the order of nature, it belongs to prelates alone to correct
Reply to Objection 2. Just as he who has the means
inferiors.
wherewith to give corporal assistance is rich in this re-
On the contrary, It is written (Dist. xxiv, qu. 3,
spect, so he whose reason is gifted with a sane judgment,
Can. Tam Sacerdotes): “Both priests and all the rest of the
so as to be able to correct another’s wrong-doing, is, in
faithful should be most solicitous for those who perish, so
this respect, to be looked on as a superior.
that their reproof may either correct their sinful ways. or,
Reply to Objection 3. Even in the physical order cer-
if they be incorrigible, cut them off from the Church.”
tain things act mutually on one another, through being in
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), correction is
some respect higher than one another, in so far as each is
twofold. One is an act of charity, which seeks in a special
somewhat in act, and somewhat in potentiality with regard
way the recovery of an erring brother by means of a sim-
to another. In like manner one man can correct another in
ple warning: such like correction belongs to anyone who
so far as he has a sane judgment in a matter wherein the
has charity, be he subject or prelate.
other sins, though he is not his superior simply.
But there is another correction which is an act of jus-
∗ Origen, Hom. vii in Joan.
1363
Whether a mann is bound to correct his prelate?
IIa IIae q. 33 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that no man is bound to
says (1 Tim. 5:1): “An ancient man rebuke not, but entreat
correct his prelate. For it is written (Ex. 19:12): “The
him as a father.” Wherefore Dionysius finds fault with the
beast that shall touch the mount shall be stoned,”∗ and
monk Demophilus (Ep. viii), for rebuking a priest with
(2 Kings 6:7) it is related that the Lord struck Oza for
insolence, by striking and turning him out of the church.
touching the ark. Now the mount and the ark signify our
Reply to Objection 1. It would seem that a subject
prelates. Therefore prelates should not be corrected by
touches his prelate inordinately when he upbraids him
their subjects.
with insolence, as also when he speaks ill of him: and this
Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Gal. 2:11, “I with-
is signified by God’s condemnation of those who touched
stood him to the face,” adds: “as an equal.” Therefore,
the mount and the ark.
since a subject is not equal to his prelate, he ought not to
Reply to Objection 2. To withstand anyone in pub-
correct him.
lic exceeds the mode of fraternal correction, and so Paul
Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 8)
would not have withstood Peter then, unless he were in
that “one ought not to presume to reprove the conduct of
some way his equal as regards the defense of the faith.
holy men, unless one thinks better of oneself.” But one
But one who is not an equal can reprove privately and
ought not to think better of oneself than of one’s prelate.
respectfully. Hence the Apostle in writing to the Colos-
Therefore one ought not to correct one’s prelate.
sians (4:17) tells them to admonish their prelate: “Say
On the contrary, Augustine says in his Rule: “Show
to Archippus: Fulfil thy ministry†.” It must be observed,
mercy not only to yourselves, but also to him who, being
however, that if the faith were endangered, a subject ought
in the higher position among you, is therefore in greater
to rebuke his prelate even publicly. Hence Paul, who was
danger.”
But fraternal correction is a work of mercy.
Peter’s subject, rebuked him in public, on account of the
Therefore even prelates ought to be corrected.
imminent danger of scandal concerning faith, and, as the
I answer that, A subject is not competent to adminis-
gloss of Augustine says on Gal. 2:11, “Peter gave an ex-
ter to his prelate the correction which is an act of justice
ample to superiors, that if at any time they should happen
through the coercive nature of punishment: but the fra-
to stray from the straight path, they should not disdain to
ternal correction which is an act of charity is within the
be reproved by their subjects.”
competency of everyone in respect of any person towards
Reply to Objection 3. To presume oneself to be sim-
whom he is bound by charity, provided there be something
ply better than one’s prelate, would seem to savor of pre-
in that person which requires correction.
sumptuous pride; but there is no presumption in thinking
Now an act which proceeds from a habit or power ex-
oneself better in some respect, because, in this life, no
tends to whatever is contained under the object of that
man is without some fault. We must also remember that
power or habit: thus vision extends to all things com-
when a man reproves his prelate charitably, it does not fol-
prised in the object of sight. Since, however, a virtuous act
low that he thinks himself any better, but merely that he
needs to be moderated by due circumstances, it follows
offers his help to one who, “being in the higher position
that when a subject corrects his prelate, he ought to do
among you, is therefore in greater danger,” as Augustine
so in a becoming manner, not with impudence and harsh-
observes in his Rule quoted above.
ness, but with gentleness and respect. Hence the Apostle
Whether a sinner ought to reprove a wrongdoer?
IIa IIae q. 33 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that a sinner ought to re-
sin, to refrain from correcting wrongdoers.
prove a wrongdoer. For no man is excused from obeying
Objection 3. Further, it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): “If we
a precept by having committed a sin. But fraternal correc-
say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” Therefore
tion is a matter of precept, as stated above (a. 2). There-
if, on account of a sin, a man is hindered from reproving
fore it seems that a man ought not to forbear from such
his brother, there will be none to reprove the wrongdoer.
like correction for the reason that he has committed a sin.
But the latter proposition is unreasonable: therefore the
Objection 2. Further, spiritual almsdeeds are of more
former is also.
account than corporal almsdeeds. Now one who is in sin
On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii,
ought not to abstain from administering corporal alms.
32): “He that is subject to vice should not correct the vices
Much less therefore ought he, on account of a previous
of others.” Again it is written (Rom. 2:1): “Wherein thou
∗ Vulg.: ‘Everyone that shall touch the mount, dying he shall die.’
† Vulg.: ‘Take heed to the ministry which thou hast received in the Lord, that thou fulfil it.’ Cf. 2 Tim. 4:5
1364
judgest another, thou condemnest thyself. For thou dost good teaching, and to seek to be praised by men for your
the same things which thou judgest.”
knowledge.”
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3, ad 2), to correct
Thirdly, on account of the rebuker’s pride; when, for
a wrongdoer belongs to a man, in so far as his reason is
instance, a man thinks lightly of his own sins, and, in
gifted with right judgment. Now sin, as stated above ( Ia
his own heart, sets himself above his neighbor, judging
IIae, q. 85, Aa. 1,2), does not destroy the good of nature so
the latter’s sins with harsh severity, as though he himself
as to deprive the sinner’s reason of all right judgment, and
were just man. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
in this respect he may be competent to find fault with oth-
in Monte ii, 19): “To reprove the faults of others is the
ers for committing sin. Nevertheless a previous sin proves
duty of good and kindly men: when a wicked man re-
somewhat of a hindrance to this correction, for three rea-
bukes anyone, his rebuke is the latter’s acquittal.” And
sons. First because this previous sin renders a man un-
so, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19):
worthy to rebuke another; and especially is he unworthy
“When we have to find fault with anyone, we should think
to correct another for a lesser sin, if he himself has com-
whether we were never guilty of his sin; and then we must
mitted a greater. Hence Jerome says on the words, “Why
remember that we are men, and might have been guilty of
seest thou the mote?” etc. (Mat. 7:3): “He is speaking of
it; or that we once had it on our conscience, but have it no
those who, while they are themselves guilty of mortal sin,
longer: and then we should bethink ourselves that we are
have no patience with the lesser sins of their brethren.”
all weak, in order that our reproof may be the outcome,
Secondly, such like correction becomes unseemly, on
not of hatred, but of pity. But if we find that we are guilty
account of the scandal which ensues therefrom, if the cor-
of the same sin, we must not rebuke him, but groan with
rector’s sin be well known, because it would seem that
him, and invite him to repent with us.” It follows from
he corrects, not out of charity, but more for the sake of
this that, if a sinner reprove a wrongdoer with humility,
ostentation. Hence the words of Mat. 7:4, “How sayest
he does not sin, nor does he bring a further condemnation
thou to thy brother?” etc. are expounded by Chrysostom∗
on himself, although thereby he proves himself deserving
thus: “That is—‘With what object?’ Out of charity, think
of condemnation, either in his brother’s or in his own con-
you, that you may save your neighbor?” No, “because
science, on account of his previous sin.
you would look after your own salvation first. What you
Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
want is, not to save others, but to hide your evil deeds with
Whether one ought to forbear from correcting someone, through fear lest he become IIa IIae q. 33 a. 6
worse?
Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not to for-
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 9:8): “Rebuke
bear from correcting someone through fear lest he become
not a scorner lest he hate thee,” where a gloss remarks:
worse. For sin is weakness of the soul, according to Ps.
“You must not fear lest the scorner insult you when you
6:3: “Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak.” Now
rebuke him: rather should you bear in mind that by mak-
he that has charge of a sick person, must not cease to take
ing him hate you, you may make him worse.” Therefore
care of him, even if he be fractious or contemptuous, be-
one ought to forego fraternal correction, when we fear lest
cause then the danger is greater, as in the case of madmen.
we may make a man worse.
Much more, therefore should one correct a sinner, no mat-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3) the correction of
ter how badly he takes it.
the wrongdoer is twofold. One, which belongs to prelates,
Objection 2. Further, according to Jerome vital truths
and is directed to the common good, has coercive force.
are not to be foregone on account of scandal. Now God’s
Such correction should not be omitted lest the person cor-
commandments are vital truths. Since, therefore, fraternal
rected be disturbed, both because if he is unwilling to
correction is a matter of precept, as stated above (a. 2), it
amend his ways of his own accord, he should be made
seems that it should not be foregone for fear of scandaliz-
to cease sinning by being punished, and because, if he be
ing the person to be corrected.
incorrigible, the common good is safeguarded in this way,
Objection 3. Further, according to the Apostle (Rom.
since the order of justice is observed, and others are de-
3:8) we should not do evil that good may come of it.
terred by one being made an example of. Hence a judge
Therefore, in like manner, good should not be omitted
does not desist from pronouncing sentence of condem-
lest evil befall. Now fraternal correction is a good thing.
nation against a sinner, for fear of disturbing him or his
Therefore it should not be omitted for fear lest the person
friends.
corrected become worse.
The other fraternal correction is directed to the amend-
∗ Hom. xvii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom
1365
ment of the wrongdoer, whom it does not coerce, but of precept, in so far as it is an act of virtue, and it will
merely admonishes.
Consequently when it is deemed
be a virtuous act in so far as it is proportionate to the end.
probable that the sinner will not take the warning, and will
Consequently whenever it is a hindrance to the end, for in-
become worse, such fraternal correction should be fore-
stance when a man becomes worse through it, it is longer
gone, because the means should be regulated according to
a vital truth, nor is it a matter precept.
the requirements of the end.
Reply to Objection 3. Whatever is directed to end,
Reply to Objection 1. The doctor uses force towards
becomes good through being directed to the end. Hence
a madman, who is unwilling to submit to his treatment;
whenever fraternal correction hinders the end, namely the
and this may be compared with the correction adminis-
amendment of our brother, it is no longer good, so that
tered by prelates, which has coercive power, but not with
when such a correction is omitted, good is not omitted
simple fraternal correction.
lest evil should befall.
Reply to Objection 2. Fraternal correction is a matter
Whether the precept of fraternal correction demands that a private admonition IIa IIae q. 33 a. 7
should precede denunciation?
Objection 1. It would seem that the precept of frater-
gious orders to proclaim this or that one for a fault, with-
nal correction does not demand that a private admonition
out any previous secret admonition. Therefore it seems
should precede denunciation. For, in works of charity, we
that this admonition is not required by the precept.
should above all follow the example of God, according to
Objection 5. Further, religious are bound to obey their
Eph. 5:1,2: “Be ye followers of God, as most dear chil-
prelates. Now a prelate sometimes commands either all in
dren, and walk in love.” Now God sometimes punishes a
general, or someone in particular, to tell him if they know
man for a sin, without previously warning him in secret.
of anything that requires correction. Therefore it would
Therefore it seems that there is no need for a private ad-
seem that they are bound to tell them this, even before any
monition to precede denunciation.
secret admonition. Therefore the precept does not require
Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De
secret admonition before public denunciation.
Mendacio xv), we learn from the deeds of holy men how
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.
we ought to understand the commandments of Holy Writ.
xvi, 4) on the words, “Rebuke him between thee and him
Now among the deeds of holy men we find that a hidden
alone” (Mat. 18:15): “Aiming at his amendment, while
sin is publicly denounced, without any previous admoni-
avoiding his disgrace: since perhaps from shame he might
tion in private. Thus we read (Gn. 37:2) that “Joseph ac-
begin to defend his sin; and him whom you thought to
cused his brethren to his father of a most wicked crime”:
make a better man, you make worse.” Now we are bound
and (Acts 5:4,9) that Peter publicly denounced Ananias
by the precept of charity to beware lest our brother be-
and Saphira who had secretly “by fraud kept back the
come worse. Therefore the order of fraternal correction
price of the land,” without beforehand admonishing them
comes under the precept.
in private: nor do we read that Our Lord admonished Ju-
I answer that, With regard to the public denunciation
das in secret before denouncing him. Therefore the pre-
of sins it is necessary to make a distinction: because sins
cept does not require that secret admonition should pre-
may be either public or secret. In the case of public sins, a
cede public denunciation.
remedy is required not only for the sinner, that he may be-
Objection 3. Further, it is a graver matter to accuse
come better, but also for others, who know of his sin, lest
than to denounce.
Now one may go to the length of
they be scandalized. Wherefore such like sins should be
accusing a person publicly, without previously admon-
denounced in public, according to the saying of the Apos-
ishing him in secret: for it is decided in the Decretal
tle (1 Tim. 5:20): “Them that sin reprove before all, that
(Cap. Qualiter, xiv, De Accusationibus) that “nothing else
the rest also may have fear,” which is to be understood
need precede accusation except inscription.”∗ Therefore
as referring to public sins, as Augustine states (De Verb.
it seems that the precept does not require that a secret ad-
Dom. xvi, 7).
monition should precede public denunciation.
On the other hand, in the case of secret sins, the words
Objection 4. Further, it does not seem probable that
of Our Lord seem to apply (Mat. 18:15): “If thy brother
the customs observed by religious in general are contrary
shall offend against thee,” etc. For if he offend thee pub-
to the precepts of Christ. Now it is customary among reli-
licly in the presence of others, he no longer sins against
∗ The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.
1366
thee alone, but also against others whom he ‘disturbs.
just what public sins are to the judgment of man. Nev-
Since, however, a man’s neighbor may take offense even
ertheless God does rebuke sinners sometimes by secretly
at his secret sins, it seems that we must make yet a fur-
admonishing them, so to speak, with an inward inspira-
ther distinction. For certain secret sins are hurtful to our
tion, either while they wake or while they sleep, according
neighbor either in his body or in his soul, as, for instance,
to Job 33:15-17: “By a dream in a vision by night, when
when a man plots secretly to betray his country to its en-
deep sleep falleth upon men. . . then He openeth the ears
emies, or when a heretic secretly turns other men away
of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to
from the faith. And since he that sins thus in secret, sins
learn, that He may withdraw a man from the things he is
not only against you in particular, but also against others,
doing.”
it is necessary to take steps to denounce him at once, in or-
Reply to Objection 2. Our Lord as God knew the
der to prevent him doing such harm, unless by chance you
sin of Judas as though it were public, wherefore He could
were firmly persuaded that this evil result would be pre-
have made it known at once. Yet He did not, but warned
vented by admonishing him secretly. On the other hand
Judas of his sin in words that were obscure. The sin of
there are other sins which injure none but the sinner, and
Ananias and Saphira was denounced by Peter acting as
the person sinned against, either because he alone is hurt
God’s executor, by Whose revelation he knew of their sin.
by the sinner, or at least because he alone knows about
With regard to Joseph it is probable that he warned his
his sin, and then our one purpose should be to succor our
brethren, though Scripture does not say so. Or we may
sinning brother: and just as the physician of the body
say that the sin was public with regard to his brethren,
restores the sick man to health, if possible, without cut-
wherefore it is stated in the plural that he accused “his
ting off a limb, but, if this be unavoidable, cuts off a limb
brethren.”
which is least indispensable, in order to preserve the life
Reply to Objection 3. When there is danger to a great
of the whole body, so too he who desires his brother’s
number of people, those words of Our Lord do not apply,
amendment should, if possible, so amend him as regards
because then thy brother does not sin against thee alone.
his conscience, that he keep his good name.
Reply to Objection 4. Proclamations made in the
For a good name is useful, first of all to the sinner
chapter of religious are about little faults which do not
himself, not only in temporal matters wherein a man suf-
affect a man’s good name, wherefore they are reminders
fers many losses, if he lose his good name, but also in
of forgotten faults rather than accusations or denuncia-
spiritual matters, because many are restrained from sin-
tions. If, however, they should be of such a nature as to
ning, through fear of dishonor, so that when a man finds
injure our brother’s good name, it would be contrary to
his honor lost, he puts no curb on his sinning. Hence
Our Lord’s precept, to denounce a brother’s fault in this
Jerome says on Mat. 18:15: “If he sin against thee, thou
manner.
shouldst rebuke him in private, lest he persist in his sin
Reply to Objection 5. A prelate is not to be obeyed
if he should once become shameless or unabashed.” Sec-
contrary to a Divine precept, according to Acts 5:29: “We
ondly, we ought to safeguard our sinning brother’s good
ought to obey God rather then men.” Therefore when
name, both because the dishonor of one leads to the dis-
a prelate commands anyone to tell him anything that he
honor of others, according to the saying of Augustine (Ep.
knows to need correction, the command rightly under-
ad pleb. Hipponens. lxxviii): “When a few of those who
stood supports the safeguarding of the order of fraternal
bear a name for holiness are reported falsely or proved in
correction, whether the command be addressed to all in
truth to have done anything wrong, people will seek by
general, or to some particular individual. If, on the other
busily repeating it to make it believed of all”: and also
hand, a prelate were to issue a command in express op-
because when one man’s sin is made public others are in-
position to this order instituted by Our Lord, both would
cited to sin likewise.
sin, the one commanding, and the one obeying him, as
Since, however, one’s conscience should be preferred
disobeying Our Lord’s command. Consequently he ought
to a good name, Our Lord wished that we should pub-
not to be obeyed, because a prelate is not the judge of se-
licly denounce our brother and so deliver his conscience
cret things, but God alone is, wherefore he has no power
from sin, even though he should forfeit his good name.
to command anything in respect of hidden matters, except
Therefore it is evident that the precept requires a secret
in so far as they are made known through certain signs,
admonition to precede public denunciation.
as by ill-repute or suspicion; in which cases a prelate can
Reply to Objection 1. Whatever is hidden, is known
command just as a judge, whether secular or ecclesiasti-
to God, wherefore hidden sins are to the judgment of God,
cal, can bind a man under oath to tell the truth.
1367
Whether before the public denunciation witnesses ought to be brought forward?
IIa IIae q. 33 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that before the public de-
der of fraternal correction to demand that we should first
nunciation witnesses ought not to be brought forward. For
of all rebuke our brother secretly, and that if he listens, it
secret sins ought not to be made known to others, because
is well; but if he listen not, and his sin be altogether hid-
by so doing “a man would betray his brother’s sins instead
den, they say that we should go no further in the matter,
of correcting them,” as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.
whereas if it has already begun to reach the ears of sev-
xvi, 7). Now by bringing forward witnesses one makes
eral by various signs, we ought to prosecute the matter,
known a brother’s sin to others. Therefore in the case of
according to Our Lord’s command. But this is contrary
secret sins one ought not to bring witnesses forward be-
to what Augustine says in his Rule that “we are bound to
fore the public denunciation.
reveal” a brother’s sin, if it “will cause a worse corrup-
Objection 2. Further, man should love his neighbor
tion in the heart.” Wherefore we must say otherwise that
as himself. Now no man brings in witnesses to prove his
when the secret admonition has been given once or several
own secret sin. Neither therefore ought one to bring for-
times, as long as there is probable hope of his amendment,
ward witnesses to prove the secret sin of our brother.
we must continue to admonish him in private, but as soon
Objection 3. Further, witnesses are brought forward
as we are able to judge with any probability that the se-
to prove something. But witnesses afford no proof in se-
cret admonition is of no avail, we must take further steps,
cret matters. Therefore it is useless to bring witnesses for-
however secret the sin may be, and call witnesses, unless
ward in such cases.
perhaps it were thought probable that this would not con-
Objection 4. Further, Augustine says in his Rule that
duce to our brother’s amendment, and that he would be-
“before bringing it to the notice of witnesses. . . it should
come worse: because on that account one ought to abstain
be put before the superior.” Now to bring a matter before
altogether from correcting him, as stated above (a. 6).
a superior or a prelate is to tell the Church. Therefore wit-
Reply to Objection 2. A man needs no witnesses that
nesses should not be brought forward before the public
he may amend his own sin: yet they may be necessary
denunciation.
that we may amend a brother’s sin. Hence the comparison
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 18:16): “Take
fails.
with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two,” etc.
Reply to Objection 3. There may be three reasons for
I answer that, The right way to go from one extreme
citing witnesses. First, to show that the deed in question is
to another is to pass through the middle space. Now Our
a sin, as Jerome says: secondly, to prove that the deed was
Lord wished the beginning of fraternal correction to be
done, if repeated, as Augustine says (in his Rule): thirdly,
hidden, when one brother corrects another between this
“to prove that the man who rebuked his brother, has done
one and himself alone, while He wished the end to be pub-
what he could,” as Chrysostom says (Hom. in Matth. lx).
lic, when such a one would be denounced to the Church.
Reply to Objection 4. Augustine means that the mat-
Consequently it is befitting that a citation of witnesses
ter ought to be made known to the prelate before it is
should be placed between the two extremes, so that at first
stated to the witnesses, in so far as the prelate is a pri-
the brother’s sin be indicated to a few, who will be of use
vate individual who is able to be of more use than others,
without being a hindrance, and thus his sin be amended
but not that it is to be told him as to the Church, i.e. as
without dishonoring him before the public.
holding the position of judge.
Reply to Objection 1. Some have understood the or-
1368
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 34
Of Hatred
(In Six Articles)
We must how consider the vices opposed to charity: (1) hatred, which is opposed to love; (2) sloth and envy, which are opposed to the joy of charity; (3) discord and schism, which are contrary to peace; (4) offense and scandal, which are contrary to beneficence and fraternal correction.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is possible to hate God?
(2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?
(3) Whether hatred of one’s neighbor is always a sin?
(4) Whether it is the greatest of all sins against our neighbor?
(5) Whether it is a capital sin?
(6) From what capital sin does it arise?
Whether it is possible for anyone to hate God?
IIa IIae q. 34 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that no man can hate God.
for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is impossible
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the first good
for one who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him.
and beautiful is an object of love and dilection to all.” But
Moreover some of His effects are such that they can
God is goodness and beauty itself. Therefore He is hated
nowise be contrary to the human will, since “to be, to live,
by none.
to understand,” which are effects of God, are desirable and
Objection 2. Further, in the Apocryphal books of
lovable to all. Wherefore again God cannot be an object
3 Esdras 4:36,39 it is written that “all things call upon
of hatred if we consider Him as the Author of such like ef-
truth. . . and (all men) do well like of her works.” Now
fects. Some of God’s effects, however, are contrary to an
God is the very truth according to Jn. 14:6. Therefore all
inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment, and
love God, and none can hate Him.
the prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects
Objection 3. Further, hatred is a kind of aversion.
are repugnant to a will debased by sin, and as regards the
But according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) God draws all
consideration of them, God may be an object of hatred to
things to Himself. Therefore none can hate Him.
some, in so far as they look upon Him as forbidding sin,
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 73:23): “The pride
and inflicting punishment.
of them that hate Thee ascendeth continually,” and (Jn.
Reply to Objection 1. This argument is true of those
15:24): “But now they have both seen and hated both Me
who see God’s Essence, which is the very essence of
and My Father.”
goodness.
I answer that, As shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 29,
Reply to Objection 2. This argument is true in so far
a. 1), hatred is a movement of the appetitive power,
as God is apprehended as the cause of such effects as are
which power is not set in motion save by something ap-
naturally beloved of all, among which are the works of
prehended. Now God can be apprehended by man in
Truth who reveals herself to men.
two ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His
Reply to Objection 3. God draws all things to Him-
Essence; secondly, in His effects, when, to wit, “the invis-
self, in so far as He is the source of being, since all things, ible things” of God. . . “are clearly seen, being understood
in as much as they are, tend to be like God, Who is Being
by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20). Now God in
itself.
His Essence is goodness itself, which no man can hate—
Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?
IIa IIae q. 34 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that hatred of God is not
may be seen from what has been said above (q. 14, a. 2).
the greatest of sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin
Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.
against the Holy Ghost, since it cannot be forgiven, ac-
Objection 2. Further, sin consists in withdrawing one-
cording to Mat. 12:32. Now hatred of God is not reckoned
self from God. Now an unbeliever who has not even
among the various kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, as
knowledge of God seems to be further away from Him
1369
than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless xxv, 11), “it is one thing not to do good things, end an-knows Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief
other to hate the giver of good things, even as it is one
is graver than the sin of hatred against God.
thing to sin indeliberately, and another to sin deliberately.”
Objection 3. Further, God is an object of hatred, only
This implies that to hate God, the giver of all good things,
by reason of those of His effects that are contrary to the
is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy
will: the chief of which is punishment. But hatred of pun-
Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a
ishment is not the most grievous sin. Therefore hatred of
sin against the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the
God is not the most grievous sin.
Holy Ghost denotes a special kind of sin: and yet it is not
On the contrary, The best is opposite to the worst,
reckoned among the kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred
because it is universally found in every kind of that sin.
of God is contrary to the love of God, wherein man’s best
Reply to Objection 2. Even unbelief is not sinful un-
consists. Therefore hatred of God is man’s worst sin.
less it be voluntary: wherefore the more voluntary it is,
I answer that, The defect in sin consists in its aver-
the more it is sinful. Now it becomes voluntary by the
sion from God, as stated above (q. 10, a. 3): and this aver-
fact that a man hates the truth that is proposed to him.
sion would not have the character of guilt, were it not vol-
Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its sinfulness
untary. Hence the nature of guilt consists in a voluntary
from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith; and
aversion from God.
hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of
Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly im-
God is a greater sin than unbelief.
plied in the hatred of God, but in other sins, by partici-
Reply to Objection 3. Not everyone who hates his
pation and indirectly. For just as the will cleaves directly
punishment, hates God the author of punishments. For
to what it loves, so does it directly shun what it hates.
many hate the punishments inflicted on them, and yet they
Hence when a man hates God, his will is directly averted
bear them patiently out of reverence for the Divine jus-
from God, whereas in other sins, fornication for instance,
tice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God
a man turns away from God, not directly, but indirectly,
commands us to bear with penal evils, not to love them.
in so far, namely, as he desires an inordinate pleasure, to
On the other hand, to break out into hatred of God when
which aversion from God is connected. Now that which
He inflicts those punishments, is to hate God’s very jus-
is so by itself, always takes precedence of that which is
tice, and that is a most grievous sin. Hence Gregory says
so by another. Wherefore hatred of God is more grievous
(Moral. xxv, 11): “Even as sometimes it is more grievous
than other sins.
to love sin than to do it, so is it more wicked to hate justice Reply to Objection 1. According to Gregory (Moral.
than, not to have done it.”
Whether hatred of one’s neighbor is always a sin?
IIa IIae q. 34 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that hatred of one’s neigh-
that. . . hateth his brother, is in darkness.” Now spiritual
bor is not always a sin. For no sin is commanded or coun-
darkness is sin. Therefore there cannot be hatred of one’s
selled by God, according to Prov. 8:8: “All My words are
neighbor without sin.
just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them.” Now,
I answer that, Hatred is opposed to love, as stated
it is written (Lk. 14:26): “If any man come to Me, and
above ( Ia IIae, q. 29, a. 2); so that hatred of a thing is evil hate not his father and mother. . . he cannot be My disci-according as the love of that thing is good. Now love is
ple.” Therefore hatred of one’s neighbor is not always a
due to our neighbor in respect of what he holds from God,
sin.
i.e. in respect of nature and grace, but not in respect of
Objection 2. Further, nothing wherein we imitate God
what he has of himself and from the devil, i.e. in respect
can be a sin. But it is in imitation of God that we hate cer-
of sin and lack of justice.
tain people: for it is written (Rom. 1:30): “Detractors,
Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one’s
hateful to God.” Therefore it is possible to hate certain
brother, and whatever pertains to the defect of Divine jus-
people without committing a sin.
tice, but we cannot hate our brother’s nature and grace
Objection 3. Further, nothing that is natural is a sin,
without sin. Now it is part of our love for our brother that
for sin is a “wandering away from what is according to
we hate the fault and the lack of good in him, since de-
nature,” according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30;
sire for another’s good is equivalent to hatred of his evil.
iv, 20). Now it is natural to a thing to hate whatever is con-
Consequently the hatred of one’s brother, if we consider
trary to it, and to aim at its undoing. Therefore it seems
it simply, is always sinful.
that it is not a sin to hate one’s I enemy.
Reply to Objection 1. By the commandment of God
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn.
2:9): “He
(Ex. 20:12) we must honor our parents—as united to us
1370
in nature and kinship. But we must hate them in so far as respect of the goods which they have received from God:
they prove an obstacle to our attaining the perfection of
wherefore, in this respect, we should love them. But they
Divine justice.
are opposed to us, in so far as they show hostility towards
Reply to Objection 2. God hates the sin which is in
us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we should
the detractor, not his nature: so that we can hate detractors
hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they
without committing a sin.
are hostile to us.
Reply to Objection 3. Men are not opposed to us in
Whether hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our neighbor?
IIa IIae q. 34 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that hatred of our neigh-
oned great in their reward, but little in the transgression.”
bor is the most grievous sin against our neighbor. For it
Now hatred is an internal movement like anger and de-
is written (1 Jn. 3:15): “Whosoever hateth his brother
sire. Therefore hatred of one’s brother is a less grievous
is a murderer.” Now murder is the most grievous of sins
sin than murder.
against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also.
I answer that, Sins committed against our neighbor
Objection 2. Further, worst is opposed to best. Now
are evil on two counts; first by reason of the disorder in
the best thing we give our neighbor is love, since all other
the person who sins, secondly by reason of the hurt in-
things are referable to love. Therefore hatred is the worst.
flicted on the person sinned against. On the first count, ha-
On the contrary, A thing is said to be evil, because it
tred is a more grievous sin than external actions that hurt
hurts, as Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there
our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder of man’s will,
are sins by which a man hurts his neighbor more than by
which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the root of
hatred, e.g. theft, murder and adultery. Therefore hatred
sin, so that if a man’s outward actions were to be inordi-
is not the most grievous sin.
nate, without any disorder in his will, they would not be
Moreover, Chrysostom∗ commenting on Mat. 5:19,
sinful, for instance, if he were to kill a man, through ig-
“He that shall break one of these least commandments,”
norance or out of zeal for justice: and if there be anything
says: “The commandments of Moses, Thou shalt not kill,
sinful in a man’s outward sins against his neighbor, it is
Thou shalt not commit adultery, count for little in their
all to be traced to his inward hatred.
reward, but they count for much if they be disobeyed.
On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his
On the other hand the commandments of Christ such as,
neighbor, a man’s outward sins are worse than his inward
Thou shalt not be angry, Thou shalt not desire, are reck-
hatred. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Whether hatred is a capital sin?
IIa IIae q. 34 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that hatred is a capital sin.
Aa. 3,4), a capital vice is one from which other vices arise
For hatred is directly opposed to charity. Now charity is
most frequently. Now vice is contrary to man’s nature,
the foremost among the virtues, and the mother of all oth-
in as much as he is a rational animal: and when a thing
ers. Therefore hatred is the chief of the capital sins, and
acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it is
the origin of all others.
corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all
Objection 2. Further, sins arise in us on account of the fail in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and
inclinations of our passions, according to Rom. 7:5: “The
last of all in that which is most in accordance with its na-
passions of sins. . . did work in our members to bring forth
ture, since what is first in construction is last in destruc-
fruit unto death.” Now all other passions of the soul seem
tion. Now that which, first and foremost, is most natural
to arise from love and hatred, as was shown above ( Ia
to man, is the love of what is good, and especially love of
IIae, q. 25, Aa. 1,2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned
the Divine good, and of his neighbor’s good. Wherefore
one of the capital sins.
hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but
Objection 3. Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred
the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice:
regards evil more than any other passion does. Therefore
and therefore it is not a capital vice.
it seems that hatred should be reckoned a capital sin.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated in Phys. vii, text. 18,
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not
“the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed
reckon hatred among the seven capital sins.
in accordance with its nature.” Hence what is first and
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 84,
foremost in the virtues must be first and foremost in the
∗ Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John
Chrysostom
1371
natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the foremost of Reply to Objection 3. Evil is twofold. One is a true
the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be first
evil, for the reason that it is incompatible with one’s natu-
among the vices, as stated above.
ral good, and the hatred of such an evil may have priority
Reply to Objection 2. Hatred of the evil that is con-
over the other passions. There is, however, another which
trary to one’s natural good, is the first of the soul’s pas-
is not a true, but an apparent evil, which, namely, is a true
sions, even as love of one’s natural good is. But hatred
and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on account
of one’s connatural good cannot be first, but is something
of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil
last, because such like hatred is a proof of an already cor-
must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the for-
rupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.
mer is not.
Whether hatred arises from envy?
IIa IIae q. 34 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that hatred does not arise from
the apprehensive power, reflects on its own acts, it follows
envy. For envy is sorrow for another’s good. Now hatred
that there is a kind of circular movement in the actions of
does not arise from sorrow, for, on the contrary, we grieve
the appetitive power. And so according to the first for-
for the presence of the evil we hate. Therefore hatred does
ward course of the appetitive movement, love gives rise
not arise from envy.
to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has obtained
Objection 2. Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now
what one desired. And since the very fact of taking plea-
love of our neighbor is referred to our love of God, as
sure in the good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that
stated above (q. 25, a. 1; q. 26, a. 2). Therefore hatred of
pleasure causes love. And in the same way sorrow causes
our neighbor is referred to our hatred of God. But hatred
hatred.
of God does not arise from envy, for we do not envy those
Reply to Objection 2. Love and hatred are essentially
who are very far removed from us, but rather those who
different, for the object of love is good, which flows from
seem to be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii).
God to creatures, wherefore love is due to God in the first
Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
place, and to our neighbor afterwards. On the other hand,
Objection 3. Further, to one effect there is one cause.
hatred is of evil, which has no place in God Himself, but
Now hatred is caused by anger, for Augustine says in his
only in His effects, for which reason it has been stated
Rule that “anger grows into hatred.” Therefore hatred
above (a. 1), that God is not an object of hatred, except in
does not arise from envy.
so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that
consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before be-
“out of envy cometh hatred.”
ing directed to God. Therefore, since envy of our neigh-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 5), hatred of his
bor is the mother of hatred of our neighbor, it becomes, in
neighbor is a man’s last step in the path of sin, because it
consequence, the cause of hatred towards God.
is opposed to the love which he naturally has for his neigh-
Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents a thing aris-
bor. Now if a man declines from that which is natural, it
ing from various causes in various respects, and accord-
is because he intends to avoid that which is naturally an
ingly hatred may arise both from anger and from envy.
object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids
However it arises more directly from envy, which looks
sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states
upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and
(Ethic. vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from plea-
therefore hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by
sure, so does hatred arise from sorrow. For just as we are
way of increase. For at first, through anger, we desire
moved to love whatever gives us pleasure, in as much as
our neighbor’s evil according to a certain measure, that is
for that very reason it assumes the aspect of good; so we
in so far as that evil has the aspect of vengeance: but af-
are moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for
terwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes so
this very reason it assumes the aspect of evil. Wherefore,
far as absolutely to desire his neighbor’s evil, which de-
since envy is sorrow for our neighbor’s good, it follows
sire is part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred
that our neighbor’s good becomes hateful to us, so that
is caused by envy formally as regards the aspect of the
“out of envy cometh hatred.”
object, but dispositively by anger.
Reply to Objection 1. Since the appetitive power, like
1372
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 35
Of Sloth
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or about our neighbor’s good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we must consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sloth is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special vice?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital sin?
Whether sloth is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 35 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For
a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on
we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions, ac-
Ps. 106:18, “Their soul abhorred all manner of meat,” and
cording to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a
from the definition of some who say that sloth is a “slug-
passion, since it is a kind of sorrow, according to Dama-
gishness of the mind which neglects to begin good.”
scene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as we stated above ( Ia
Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself,
IIae, q. 35, a. 8 ). Therefore sloth is not a sin.
sometimes in its effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it
Objection 2. Further, no bodily failing that occurs at
is about that which is apparently evil but good in reality,
fixed times is a sin. But sloth is like this, for Cassian says
even as, on the other hand, pleasure is evil if it is about that (De Instit. Monast. x,∗): “The monk is troubled with
which seems to be good but is, in truth, evil. Since, then,
sloth chiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent
spiritual good is a good in very truth, sorrow about spiri-
fever, and inflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burn-
tual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow also which is
ing fires at regular and fixed intervals.” Therefore sloth is
about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so oppresses man not a sin.
as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the
Objection 3. Further, that which proceeds from a
Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7) did not wish those who repented to
good root is, seemingly, no sin. Now sloth proceeds from
be “swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.”
a good root, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x) that
Accordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, de-
“sloth arises from the fact that we sigh at being deprived of
notes sorrow for spiritual good, it is evil on two counts,
spiritual fruit, and think that other monasteries and those
both in itself and in point of its effect. Consequently it
which are a long way off are much better than the one we
is a sin, for by sin we mean an evil movement of the ap-
dwell in”: all of which seems to point to humility. There-
petite, as appears from what has been said above (q. 10,
fore sloth is not a sin.
a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 74, a. 4).
Objection 4. Further, all sin is to be avoided, accord-
Reply to Objection 1. Passions are not sinful in them-
ing to Ecclus. 21:2: “Flee from sins as from the face of
selves; but they are blameworthy in so far as they are ap-
a serpent.” Now Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x):
plied to something evil, just as they deserve praise in so far
“Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth is not to
as they are applied to something good. Wherefore sorrow,
be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance.”
in itself, calls neither for praise nor for blame: whereas
Therefore sloth is not a sin.
moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow
On the contrary, Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ
for good, and again immoderate sorrow for evil, call for
is a sin. Now such is sloth [acedia]: for it is written
blame. It is in this sense that sloth is said to be a sin.
(Ecclus. 6:26): “Bow down thy shoulder, and bear her,”
Reply to Objection 2. The passions of the sensitive
namely spiritual wisdom, “and be not grieved [acedieris]
appetite may either be venial sins in themselves, or incline
with her bands.” Therefore sloth is a sin.
the soul to mortal sin. And since the sensitive appetite has
I answer that, Sloth, according to Damascene (De
a bodily organ, it follows that on account of some bodily
Fide Orth. ii, 14) is an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit,
transmutation a man becomes apt to commit some par-
so weighs upon man’s mind, that he wants to do noth-
ticular sin. Hence it may happen that certain sins may
ing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence sloth implies
become more insistent, through certain bodily transmu-
∗ De Institutione Caeobiorum
1373
tations occurring at certain fixed times. Now all bodily to disparage those we have received ourselves, because if
effects, of themselves, dispose one to sorrow; and thus it
we did they would give us sorrow.
is that those who fast are harassed by sloth towards mid-
Reply to Objection 4. Sin is ever to be shunned,
day, when they begin to feel the want of food, and to be
but the assaults of sin should be overcome, sometimes by
parched by the sun’s heat.
flight, sometimes by resistance; by flight when a contin-
Reply to Objection 3. It is a sign of humility if a
ued thought increases the incentive to sin, as in lust; for
man does not think too much of himself, through observ-
which reason it is written (1 Cor. 6:18): “Fly fornica-
ing his own faults; but if a man contemns the good things
tion”; by resistance, when perseverance in the thought di-
he has received from God, this, far from being a proof of
minishes the incentive to sin, which incentive arises from
humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such like
some trivial consideration. This is the case with sloth, be-
contempt results sloth, because we sorrow for things that
cause the more we think about spiritual goods, the more
we reckon evil and worthless. Accordingly we ought to
pleasing they become to us, and forthwith sloth dies away.
think much of the goods of others, in such a way as not
Whether sloth is a special vice?
IIa IIae q. 35 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that sloth is not a special
guishes sloth from the other vices. Therefore it is a special
vice. For that which is common to all vices does not con-
vice.
stitute a special kind of vice. But every vice makes a man
I answer that, Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, sorrowful about the opposite spiritual good: for the lust-if we take spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not
ful man is sorrowful about the good of continence, and the
be a special vice, because, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 71,
glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then sloth is
a. 1), every vice shuns the spiritual good of its opposite
sorrow for spiritual good, as stated above (a. 1), it seems
virtue. Again it cannot be said that sloth is a special vice,
that sloth is not a special sin.
in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as toilsome, or trouble-
Objection 2. Further, sloth, through being a kind of
some to the body, or as a hindrance to the body’s pleasure,
sorrow, is opposed to joy. Now joy is not accounted one
for this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices,
special virtue. Therefore sloth should not be reckoned a
whereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure.
special vice.
Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists
Objection 3. Further, since spiritual good is a general
among spiritual goods, since all the spiritual goods that
kind of object, which virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does
are in the acts of each virtue are directed to one spiritual
not constitute a special virtue or vice, unless it be deter-
good, which is the Divine good, about which there is a
mined by some addition. Now nothing, seemingly, except
special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is proper to each
toil, can determine it to sloth, if this be a special vice; be-
virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which consists
cause the reason why a man shuns spiritual goods, is that
in its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to have
they are toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of weariness:
that spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good.
while dislike of toil, and love of bodily repose seem to be
In like manner the sorrow whereby one is displeased at
due to the same cause, viz. idleness. Hence sloth would
the spiritual good which is in each act of virtue, belongs,
be nothing but laziness, which seems untrue, for idleness
not to any special vice, but to every vice, but sorrow in
is opposed to carefulness, whereas sloth is opposed to joy.
the Divine good about which charity rejoices, belongs to
Therefore sloth is not a special vice.
a special vice, which is called sloth. This suffices for the
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distin-
Replies to the Objections.
Whether sloth is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 35 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that sloth is not a mortal
which leads to God, else it would be a mortal sin not to
sin. For every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Di-
observe the counsels. Therefore it is not a mortal sin to re-
vine Law. But sloth seems contrary to no precept, as one
frain in thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore
may see by going through the precepts of the Decalogue.
sloth is not a mortal sin.
Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3. Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a
Objection 2. Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed
perfect man. But sloth is to be found in a perfect man: for
is no less grievous than a sin of thought. Now it is not
Cassian says (De Instit. Caenob. x, l) that “sloth is well
a mortal sin to refrain in deed from some spiritual good
known to the solitary, and is a most vexatious and persis-
1374
tent foe to the hermit.” Therefore sloth is not always a than the sensuality is a venial sin, whereas if it reach to the mortal sin.
consent of reason, it is a mortal sin. So too, the movement
On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 7:20): “The sor-
of sloth is sometimes in the sensuality alone, by reason
row of the world worketh death.” But such is sloth; for
of the opposition of the flesh to the spirit, and then it is
it is not sorrow “according to God,” which is contrasted
a venial sin; whereas sometimes it reaches to the reason,
with sorrow of the world. Therefore it is a mortal sin.
which consents in the dislike, horror and detestation of
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 88,
the Divine good, on account of the flesh utterly prevail-
Aa. 1,2), mortal sin is so called because it destroys the
ing over the spirit. In this case it is evident that sloth is a spiritual life which is the effect of charity, whereby God
mortal sin.
dwells in us. Wherefore any sin which by its very na-
Reply to Objection 1. Sloth is opposed to the precept
ture is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason of its
about hallowing the Sabbath day. For this precept, in so
genus. And such is sloth, because the proper effect of
far as it is a moral precept, implicitly commands the mind
charity is joy in God, as stated above (q. 28, a. 1), while
to rest in God: and sorrow of the mind about the Divine
sloth is sorrow about spiritual good in as much as it is a
good is contrary thereto.
Divine good. Therefore sloth is a mortal sin in respect of
Reply to Objection 2. Sloth is not an aversion of the
its genus. But it must be observed with regard to all sins
mind from any spiritual good, but from the Divine good,
that are mortal in respect of their genus, that they are not
to which the mind is obliged to adhere. Wherefore if a
mortal, save when they attain to their perfection. Because
man is sorry because someone forces him to do acts of
the consummation of sin is in the consent of reason: for
virtue that he is not bound to do, this is not a sin of sloth;
we are speaking now of human sins consisting in human
but when he is sorry to have to do something for God’s
acts, the principle of which is the reason. Wherefore if
sake.
the sin be a mere beginning of sin in the sensuality alone,
Reply to Objection 3. Imperfect movements of sloth
without attaining to the consent of reason, it is a venial
are to be found in holy men, but they do not reach to the
sin on account of the imperfection of the act. Thus in the
consent of reason.
genus of adultery, the concupiscence that goes no further
Whether sloth should be accounted a capital vice?
IIa IIae q. 35 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that sloth ought not to
he says that it gives rise to “spite, faint-heartedness, bit-
be accounted a capital vice. For a capital vice is one that
terness, despair,” whereas he states that from sloth seven
moves a man to sinful acts, as stated above (q. 34, a. 5).
things arise, viz. “idleness, drowsiness, uneasiness of the
Now sloth does not move one to action, but on the con-
mind, restlessness of the body, instability, loquacity, cu-
trary withdraws one from it. Therefore it should not be
riosity.” Therefore it seems that either Gregory or Isidore
accounted a capital sin.
has wrongly assigned sloth as a capital sin together with
Objection 2. Further, a capital sin is one to which
its daughters.
daughters are assigned.
Now Gregory (Moral.
xxxi,
On the contrary, The same Gregory (Moral. xxxi,
45) assigns six daughters to sloth, viz. “malice, spite,
45) states that sloth is a capital sin, and has the daughters
faint-heartedness, despair, sluggishness in regard to the
aforesaid.
commandments, wandering of the mind after unlawful
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 84,
things.” Now these do not seem in reality to arise from
Aa. 3,4), a capital vice is one which easily gives rise to
sloth. For “spite” is, seemingly the same as hatred, which
others as being their final cause. Now just as we do many
arises from envy, as stated above (q. 34, a. 6); “mal-
things on account of pleasure, both in order to obtain it,
ice” is a genus which contains all vices, and, in like
and through being moved to do something under the im-
manner, a “wandering” of the mind after unlawful things
pulse of pleasure, so again we do many things on account
is to be found in every vice; “sluggishness” about the
of sorrow, either that we may avoid it, or through being
commandments seems to be the same as sloth, while
exasperated into doing something under pressure thereof.
“faint-heartedness” and “despair” may arise from any sin.
Wherefore, since sloth is a kind of sorrow, as stated above
Therefore sloth is not rightly accounted a capital sin.
(a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 8), it is fittingly reckoned a capital Objection 3. Further, Isidore distinguishes the vice of
sin.
sloth from the vice of sorrow, saying (De Summo Bono
Reply to Objection 1. Sloth by weighing on the mind,
ii, 37) that in so far as a man shirks his duty because it is
hinders us from doing things that cause sorrow: neverthe-
distasteful and burdensome, it is sorrow, and in so far as
less it induces the mind to do certain things, either because
he is inclined to undue repose, it is sloth: and of sorrow
they are in harmony with sorrow, such as weeping, or be-
1375
cause they are a means of avoiding sorrow.
above: and the same applies to the others.
Reply to Objection 2. Gregory fittingly assigns the
Reply to Objection 3. This distinction between sor-
daughters of sloth. For since, according to the Philoso-
row and sloth is also given by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob.
pher (Ethic. viii, 5,6) “no man can be a long time in com-
x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly (Moral. xxxi, 45) calls
pany with what is painful and unpleasant,” it follows that
sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated above (a. 2),
something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that man
sorrow is not a distinct vice, in so far as a man shirks a
shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to
distasteful and burdensome work, or sorrows on account
other things that give him pleasure: thus those who find
of any other cause whatever, but only in so far as he is
no joy in spiritual pleasures, have recourse to pleasures
sorry on account of the Divine good, which sorrow be-
of the body, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6).
longs essentially to sloth; since sloth seeks undue rest in
Now in the avoidance of sorrow the order observed is that
so far as it spurns the Divine good. Moreover the things
man at first flies from unpleasant objects, and secondly
which Isidore reckons to arise from sloth and sorrow, are
he even struggles against such things as cause sorrow.
reduced to those mentioned by Gregory: for “bitterness”
Now spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow
which Isidore states to be the result of sorrow, is an effect
of sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end
of “spite.” “Idleness” and “drowsiness” are reduced to
is the result of “despair,” while avoidance of those goods
“sluggishness about the precepts”: for some are idle and
which are the means to the end, in matters of difficulty
omit them altogether, while others are drowsy and fulfil
which come under the counsels, is the effect of “faint-
them with negligence. All the other five which he reckons
heartedness,” and in matters of common righteousness,
as effects of sloth, belong to the “wandering of the mind
is the effect of “sluggishness about the commandments.”
after unlawful things.” This tendency to wander, if it re-
The struggle against spiritual goods that cause sorrow is
side in the mind itself that is desirous of rushing after var-
sometimes with men who lead others to spiritual goods,
ious things without rhyme or reason, is called “uneasiness
and this is called “spite”; and sometimes it extends to the
of the mind,” but if it pertains to the imaginative power,
spiritual goods themselves, when a man goes so far as to
it is called “curiosity”; if it affect the speech it is called
detest them, and this is properly called “malice.” In so
“loquacity”; and in so far as it affects a body that changes
far as a man has recourse to eternal objects of pleasure,
place, it is called “restlessness of the body,” when, to wit,
the daughter of sloth is called “wandering after unlawful
a man shows the unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordi-
things.” From this it is clear how to reply to the objec-
nate movements of members of his body; while if it causes
tions against each of the daughters: for “malice” does not
the body to move from one place to another, it is called
denote here that which is generic to all vices, but must be
“instability”; or “instability” may denote changeableness
understood as explained. Nor is “spite” taken as synony-
of purpose.
mous with hatred, but for a kind of indignation, as stated
1376
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 36
Of Envy
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider envy, and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is envy?
(2) Whether it is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters?
Whether envy is a kind of sorrow?
IIa IIae q. 36 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that envy is not a kind of
Secondly, another’s good may be reckoned as being
sorrow. For the object of envy is a good, for Gregory says
one’s own evil, in so far as it conduces to the lessening of
(Moral. v, 46) of the envious man that “self-inflicted pain
one’s own good name or excellence. It is in this way that
wounds the pining spirit, which is racked by the prosper-
envy grieves for another’s good: and consequently men
ity of another.” Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.
are envious of those goods in which a good name consists,
Objection 2. Further, likeness is a cause, not of sor-
and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as
row but rather of pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy:
the Philosopher remarks (Rhet. ii, 10).
for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10): “Men are envious
Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders what is good
of such as are like them in genus, in knowledge, in stature,
for one from being reckoned as evil for another: and in
in habit, or in reputation.” Therefore envy is not a kind of
this way it is possible for sorrow to be about good, as
sorrow.
stated above.
Objection 3. Further, sorrow is caused by a defect,
Reply to Objection 2. Since envy is about another’s
wherefore those who are in great defect are inclined to
good name in so far as it diminishes the good name a man
sorrow, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 47, a. 3) when we
desires to have, it follows that a man is envious of those
were treating of the passions. Now those who lack lit-
only whom he wishes to rival or surpass in reputation. But
tle, and who love honors, and who are considered wise,
this does not apply to people who are far removed from
are envious, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10).
one another: for no man, unless he be out of his mind, en-
Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.
deavors to rival or surpass in reputation those who are far
Objection 4. Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure.
above him. Thus a commoner does not envy the king, nor
Now opposite effects have not one and the same cause.
does the king envy a commoner whom he is far above.
Therefore, since the recollection of goods once possessed
Wherefore a man envies not those who are far removed
is a cause of pleasure, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 32, a. 3) from him, whether in place, time, or station, but those
it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it is a cause of envy;
who are near him, and whom he strives to rival or surpass.
for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that “we envy those
For it is against our will that these should be in better re-
who have or have had things that befitted ourselves, or
pute than we are, and that gives rise to sorrow. On the
which we possessed at some time.” Therefore sloth is not
other hand, likeness causes pleasure in so far as it is in
a kind of sorrow.
agreement with the will.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14)
Reply to Objection 3. A man does not strive for
calls envy a species of sorrow, and says that “envy is sor-
mastery in matters where he is very deficient; so that he
row for another’s good.”
does not envy one who surpasses him in such matters,
I answer that, The object of a man’s sorrow is his
unless he surpass him by little, for then it seems to him
own evil. Now it may happen that another’s good is ap-
that this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort;
prehended as one’s own evil, and in this way sorrow can
wherefore, if his effort fails through the other’s reputa-
be about another’s good. But this happens in two ways:
tion surpassing his, he grieves. Hence it is that those who
first, when a man is sorry about another’s good, in so far
love to be honored are more envious; and in like man-
as it threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as
ner the faint-hearted are envious, because all things are
when a man grieves for his enemy’s prosperity, for fear
great to them, and whatever good may befall another, they
lest he may do him some harm: such like sorrow is not
reckon that they themselves have been bested in some-
envy, but rather an effect of fear, as the Philosopher states
thing great. Hence it is written (Job 5:2): “Envy slayeth
(Rhet. ii, 9).
the little one,” and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that “we
1377
can envy those only whom we think better in some respect belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet.
than ourselves.”
ii) that the old envy the young, and those who have spent
Reply to Objection 4. Recollection of past goods in
much in order to get something, envy those who have got
so far as we have had them, causes pleasure; in so far as
it by spending little, because they grieve that they have
we have lost them, causes sorrow; and in so far as others
lost their goods, and that others have acquired goods.
have them, causes envy, because that, above all, seems to
Whether envy is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 36 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that envy is not a sin. For
we have not: and this, properly speaking, is zeal, as the
Jerome says to Laeta about the education of her daughter
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this zeal be about
(Ep. cvii): “Let her have companions, so that she may
virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Cor.
learn together with them, envy them, and be nettled when
14:1: “Be zealous for spiritual gifts”: while, if it be about
they are praised.” But no one should be advised to commit
temporal goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Thirdly,
a sin. Therefore envy is not a sin
one may grieve over another’s good, because he who hap-
Objection 1. Further, “Envy is sorrow for another’s
pens to have that good is unworthy of it. Such sorrow
good,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But
as this cannot be occasioned by virtuous goods, which
this is sometimes praiseworthy: for it is written (Prov.
make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher states, is
29:2): “When the wicked shall bear rule, the people shall
about riches, and those things which can accrue to the
mourn.” Therefore envy is not always a sin.
worthy and the unworthy; and he calls this sorrow neme-
Objection 3. Further, envy denotes a kind of zeal. But
sis∗, saying that it belongs to good morals. But he says there is a good zeal, according to Ps. 68:10: “The zeal of
this because he considered temporal goods in themselves,
Thy house hath eaten me up.” Therefore envy is not al-
in so far as they may seem great to those who look not
ways a sin.
to eternal goods: whereas, according to the teaching of
Objection 4. Further, punishment is condivided with
faith, temporal goods that accrue to those who are unwor-
fault. But envy is a kind of punishment: for Gregory
thy, are so disposed according to God’s just ordinance,
says (Moral. v, 46): “When the foul sore of envy cor-
either for the correction of those men, or for their con-
rupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself shows
demnation, and such goods are as nothing in comparison
how forcibly the mind is urged by madness. For pale-
with the goods to come, which are prepared for good men.
ness seizes the complexion, the eyes are weighed down,
Wherefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in Holy Writ,
the spirit is inflamed, while the limbs are chilled, there
according to Ps. 36:1: “Be not emulous of evil doers, nor
is frenzy in the heart, there is gnashing with the teeth.”
envy them that work iniquity,” and elsewhere (Ps. 72:2,3):
Therefore envy is not a sin.
“My steps had well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 5:26): “Let us not
wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners†.” Fourthly,
be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, en-
we grieve over a man’s good, in so far as his good sur-
vying one another.”
passes ours; this is envy properly speaking, and is always
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), envy is sorrow
sinful, as also the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), be-
for another’s good. Now this sorrow may come about in
cause to do so is to grieve over what should make us re-
four ways. First, when a man grieves for another’s good,
joice, viz. over our neighbor’s good.
through fear that it may cause harm either to himself, or
Reply to Objection 1. Envy there denotes the zeal
to some other goods. This sorrow is not envy, as stated
with which we ought to strive to progress with those who
above (a. 1), and may be void of sin. Hence Gregory
are better than we are.
says (Moral. xxii, 11): “It very often happens that with-
Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers sor-
out charity being lost, both the destruction of an enemy
row for another’s good in the first sense given above.
rejoices us, and again his glory, without any sin of envy,
Reply to Objection 3. Envy differs from zeal, as
saddens us, since, when he falls, we believe that some are
stated above. Hence a certain zeal may be good, whereas
deservedly set up, and when he prospers, we dread lest
envy is always evil.
many suffer unjustly.”
Reply to Objection 4. Nothing hinders a sin from be-
Secondly, we may grieve over another’s good, not
ing penal accidentally, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 87, a. 2) because he has it, but because the good which he has,
when we were treating of sins.
∗ The nearest equivalent is “indignation.” The use of the word “nemesis” to signify “revenge” does not represent the original Greek.
† Douay:
‘because I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners’
1378
Whether envy is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 36 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that envy is not a mortal
imperfect movements in the sensuality, which are venial
sin. For since envy is a kind of sorrow, it is a passion of
sins: such are the first movement of concupiscence, in
the sensitive appetite. Now there is no mortal sin in the
the genus of adultery, and the first movement of anger, in
sensuality, but only in the reason, as Augustine declares
the genus of murder, and so in the genus of envy we find
(De Trin. xii, 12)∗. Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
sometimes even in perfect men certain first movements,
Objection 2. Further, there cannot be mortal sin in in-
which are venial sins.
fants. But envy can be in them, for Augustine says (Con-
Reply to Objection 1. The movement of envy in so
fess. i): “I myself have seen and known even a baby envi-
far as it is a passion of the sensuality, is an imperfect thing ous, it could not speak, yet it turned pale and looked bitin the genus of human acts, the principle of which is the
terly on its foster-brother.” Therefore envy is not a mortal
reason, so that envy of that kind is not a mortal sin. The
sin.
same applies to the envy of little children who have not
Objection 3. Further, every mortal sin is contrary to
the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second Ob-
some virtue. But envy is contrary, not to a virtue but to
jection is manifest.
nemesis, which is a passion, according to the Philosopher Reply to Objection 3. According to the Philosopher
(Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
(Rhet. ii, 9), envy is contrary both to nemesis and to On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:2): “Envy slayeth
pity, but for different reasons. For it is directly contrary
the little one.” Now nothing slays spiritually, except mor-
to pity, their principal objects being contrary to one an-
tal sin. Therefore envy is a mortal sin.
other, since the envious man grieves over his neighbor’s
I answer that, Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its
good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor’s
genus. For the genus of a sin is taken from its object;
evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states in the
and envy according to the aspect of its object is contrary
same passage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other
to charity, whence the soul derives its spiritual life, ac-
hand, envy is contrary to nemesis on the part of the man cording to 1 Jn. 3:14: “We know that we have passed
whose good grieves the envious man, for nemesis is sor-from death to life, because we love the brethren.” Now
row for the good of the undeserving according to Ps. 72:3:
the object both of charity and of envy is our neighbor’s
“I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the prosperity
good, but by contrary movements, since charity rejoices in
of sinnersӠ, whereas the envious grieves over the good of
our neighbor’s good, while envy grieves over it, as stated
those who are deserving of it. Hence it is clear that the
above (a. 1). Therefore it is evident that envy is a mortal
former contrariety is more direct than the latter. Now pity
sin in respect of its genus.
is a virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is
Nevertheless, as stated above (q. 35, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 72,
contrary to pity and charity.
a. 5, ad 1), in every kind of mortal sin we find certain
Whether envy is a capital vice?
IIa IIae q. 36 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that envy is not a cap-
the heart of man, yet in this wickedness the serpent stirs
ital vice.
For the capital vices are distinct from their
his whole bowels and discharges the bane of spite fitted to
daughters. Now envy is the daughter of vainglory; for
enter deep into the mind.” Therefore envy is not a capital
the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that “those who love
sin.
honor and glory are more envious.” Therefore envy is not
Objection 3. Further, it seems that its daughters are
a capital vice.
unfittingly assigned by Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45), who
Objection 2. Further, the capital vices seem to be less
says that from envy arise “hatred, tale-bearing, detraction,
grave than the other vices which arise from them. For Gre-
joy at our neighbor’s misfortunes, and grief for his pros-
gory says (Moral. xxxi, 45): “The leading vices seem to
perity.” For joy at our neighbor’s misfortunes and grief
worm their way into the deceived mind under some kind
for his prosperity seem to be the same as envy, as appears
of pretext, but those which follow them provoke the soul
from what has been said above (a. 3). Therefore these
to all kinds of outrage, and confuse the mind with their
should not be assigned as daughters of envy.
wild outcry.” Now envy is seemingly a most grave sin, for
On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory
Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): “Though in every evil thing
(Moral. xxxi, 45) who states that envy is a capital sin
that is done, the venom of our old enemy is infused into
and assigns the aforesaid daughters thereto.
∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 74, a. 4
† Douay: ‘because I had a zeal on occasion
of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners’
1379
I answer that, Just as sloth is grief for a Divine spiri-among the most grievous sins, viz. envy of another’s spiri-
tual good, so envy is grief for our neighbor’s good. Now
tual good, which envy is a sorrow for the increase of God’s
it has been stated above (q. 35, a. 4) that sloth is a capital
grace, and not merely for our neighbor’s good. Hence it is
vice for the reason that it incites man to do certain things,
accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, because thereby
with the purpose either of avoiding sorrow or of satisfying
a man envies, as it were, the Holy Ghost Himself, Who is
its demands. Wherefore envy is accounted a capital vice
glorified in His works.
for the same reason.
Reply to Objection 3. The number of envy’s daugh-
Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,
ters may be understood for the reason that in the struggle
45), “the capital vices are so closely akin to one another
aroused by envy there is something by way of beginning,
that one springs from the other. For the first offspring of
something by way of middle, and something by way of
pride is vainglory, which by corrupting the mind it occu-
term. The beginning is that a man strives to lower an-
pies begets envy, since while it craves for the power of
other’s reputation, and this either secretly, and then we
an empty name, it repines for fear lest another should ac-
have “tale-bearing,” or openly, and then we have “detrac-
quire that power.” Consequently the notion of a capital
tion.” The middle consists in the fact that when a man
vice does not exclude its originating from another vice,
aims at defaming another, he is either able to do so, and
but it demands that it should have some principal reason
then we have “joy at another’s misfortune,” or he is un-
for being itself the origin of several kinds of sin. However
able, and then we have “grief at another’s prosperity.” The
it is perhaps because envy manifestly arises from vain-
term is hatred itself, because just as good which delights
glory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either by Isidore causes love, so does sorrow cause hatred, as stated above
(De Summo Bono) or by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. v,
(q. 34, a. 6). Grief at another’s prosperity is in one way
1).
the very same as envy, when, to Wit, a man grieves over
Reply to Objection 2. It does not follow from the
another’s prosperity, in so far as it gives the latter a good
passage quoted that envy is the greatest of sins, but that
name, but in another way it is a daughter of envy, in so
when the devil tempts us to envy, he is enticing us to that
far as the envious man sees his neighbor prosper notwith-
which has its chief place in his heart, for as quoted further
standing his efforts to prevent it. On the other hand, “joy
on in the same passage, “by the envy of the devil, death
at another’s misfortune” is not directly the same as envy,
came into the world” (Wis. 2:24).
but is a result thereof, because grief over our neighbor’s
There is, however, a kind of envy which is accounted
good which is envy, gives rise to joy in his evil.
1380
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 37
Of Discord, Which Is Contrary to Peace
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the sins contrary to peace, and first we shall consider discord which is in the heart, secondly contention, which is on the lips, thirdly, those things which consist in deeds, viz. schism, quarrelling, war, and sedition.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether discord is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?
Whether discord is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 37 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that discord is not a sin.
it is contrary to charity, although the first movements of
For to disaccord with man is to sever oneself from an-
such discord are venial sins by reason of their being im-
other’s will. But this does not seem to be a sin, because
perfect acts.
God’s will alone, and not our neighbor’s, is the rule of our
The accidental in human acts is that which occurs be-
own will. Therefore discord is not a sin.
side the intention. Hence when several intend a good per-
Objection 2. Further, whoever induces another to sin,
taining to God’s honor, or our neighbor’s profit, while one
sins also himself. But it appears not to be a sin to incite
deems a certain thing good, and another thinks contrari-
others to discord, for it is written (Acts 23:6) that Paul,
wise, the discord is in this case accidentally contrary to
knowing that the one part were Sadducees, and the other
the Divine good or that of our neighbor. Such like discord
Pharisees, cried out in the council: “Men brethren, I am
is neither sinful nor against charity, unless it be accompa-
a Pharisee, the son of Pharisees, concerning the hope and
nied by an error about things necessary to salvation, or by
resurrection of the dead I am called in question. And when
undue obstinacy, since it has also been stated above (q. 29,
he had so said, there arose a dissension between the Phar-
Aa. 1,3, ad 2) that the concord which is an effect of char-
isees and the Sadducees.” Therefore discord is not a sin.
ity, is union of wills not of opinions. It follows from this
Objection 3. Further, sin, especially mortal sin, is not that discord is sometimes the sin of one party only, for in-to be found in a holy man. But discord is to be found even
stance, when one wills a good which the other knowingly
among holy men, for it is written (Acts 15:39): “There
resists; while sometimes it implies sin in both parties, as
arose a dissension” between Paul and Barnabas, “so that
when each dissents from the other’s good, and loves his
they departed one from another.” Therefore discord is not
own.
a sin. and least of all a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1. One man’s will considered in
On the contrary, “Dissensions,” that is, discords, are
itself is not the rule of another man’s will; but in so far
reckoned among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), of
as our neighbor’s will adheres to God’s will, it becomes
which it is said afterwards (Gal. 5:21) that “they who do
in consequence, a rule regulated according to its proper
such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.” Now
measure. Wherefore it is a sin to disaccord with such a
nothing, save mortal sin, excludes man from the kingdom
will, because by that very fact one disaccords with the Di-
of God. Therefore discord is a mortal sin.
vine rule.
I answer that, Discord is opposed to concord. Now,
Reply to Objection 2. Just as a man’s will that ad-
as stated above (q. 29, Aa. 1,3) concord results from char-
heres to God is a right rule, to disaccord with which is a
ity, in as much as charity directs many hearts together to
sin, so too a man’s will that is opposed to God is a per-
one thing, which is chiefly the Divine good, secondarily,
verse rule, to disaccord with which is good. Hence to
the good of our neighbor. Wherefore discord is a sin, in
cause a discord, whereby a good concord resulting from
so far as it is opposed to this concord.
charity is destroyed, is a grave sin: wherefore it is writ-
But it must be observed that this concord is destroyed
ten (Prov. 6:16): “Six things there are, which the Lord
by discord in two ways: first, directly; secondly, acciden-
hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth,” which sev-
tally. Now, human acts and movements are said to be di-
enth is stated (Prov. 6:19) to be “him that soweth dis-
rect when they are according to one’s intention. Where-
cord among brethren.” On the other hand, to arouse a
fore a man directly disaccords with his neighbor, when
discord whereby an evil concord (i.e. concord in an evil
he knowingly and intentionally dissents from the Divine
will) is destroyed, is praiseworthy. In this way Paul was
good and his neighbor’s good, to which he ought to con-
to be commended for sowing discord among those who
sent. This is a mortal sin in respect of its genus, because
concorded together in evil, because Our Lord also said of
1381
Himself (Mat. 10:34): “I came not to send peace, but the while the other thought something else, which was ow-sword.”
ing to human deficiency: for that controversy was not
Reply to Objection 3. The discord between Paul and
about things necessary to salvation. Moreover all this was
Barnabas was accidental and not direct: because each in-
ordained by Divine providence, on account of the good
tended some good, yet the one thought one thing good,
which would ensue.
Whether discord is a daughter of vainglory?
IIa IIae q. 37 a. 2
Objection 1.
It would seem that discord is not a
a man holds to his own way of thinking, and departs from
daughter of vainglory. For anger is a vice distinct from
that of others, is reckoned to be a daughter of vainglory.
vainglory.
Now discord is apparently the daughter of
Reply to Objection 1. Strife is not the same as dis-
anger, according to Prov. 15:18: “A passionate man stir-
cord, for strife consists in external deeds, wherefore it is
reth up strifes.” Therefore it is not a daughter of vainglory.
becoming that it should arise from anger, which incites
Objection 2.
Further, Augustine expounding the
the mind to hurt one’s neighbor; whereas discord consists
words of Jn. 7:39, “As yet the Spirit was not given,” says
in a divergence in the movements of wills, which arises
(Tract. xxxii) “Malice severs, charity unites.” Now dis-
from pride or vainglory, for the reason given above.
cord is merely a separation of wills. Therefore discord
Reply to Objection 2. In discord we may consider
arises from malice, i.e. envy, rather than from vainglory.
that which is the term “wherefrom,” i.e. another’s will
Objection 3. Further, whatever gives rise to many
from which we recede, and in this respect it arises from
evils, would seem to be a capital vice. Now such is dis-
envy; and again we may consider that which is the term
cord, because Jerome in commenting on Mat. 12:25, “Ev-
“whither,” i.e. something of our own to which we cling,
ery kingdom divided against itself shall be made deso-
and in this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in
late,” says: “Just as concord makes small things thrive, so
every moment the term “whither” is more important than
discord brings the greatest things to ruin.” Therefore dis-
the term “wherefrom” (because the end is of more account
cord should itself be reckoned a capital vice, rather than a
than the beginning), discord is accounted a daughter of
daughter of vainglory.
vainglory rather than of envy, though it may arise from
On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory
both for different reasons, as stated.
(Moral. xxxi, 45).
Reply to Objection 3.
The reason why concord
I answer that, Discord denotes a certain disunion of
makes small things thrive, while discord brings the great-
wills, in so far, to wit, as one man’s will holds fast to one
est to ruin, is because “the more united a force is, the
thing, while the other man’s will holds fast to something
stronger it is, while the more disunited it is the weaker it
else. Now if a man’s will holds fast to its own ground,
becomes” (De Causis xvii). Hence it is evident that this is
this is due to the act that he prefers what is his own to that
part of the proper effect of discord which is a disunion of
which belongs to others, and if he do this inordinately, it
wills, and in no way indicates that other vices arise from
is due to pride and vainglory. Therefore discord, whereby
discord, as though it were a capital vice.
1382
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 38
Of Contention
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether contention is a mortal sin?
(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?
Whether contention is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 38 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that contention is not a
says that “it consists in developing a speech from contrary
mortal sin. For there is no mortal sin in spiritual men: and
things,” for instance: “Adulation has a pleasant beginning,
yet contention is to be found in them, according to Lk.
and a most bitter end.”
22:24: “And there was also a strife amongst” the disci-
Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two
ples of Jesus, “which of them should. . . be the greatest.”
ways: first with regard to the intention of the contentious
Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.
party, secondly, with regard to the manner of contending.
Objection 2. Further, no well disposed man should
As to the intention, we must consider whether he contends
be pleased that his neighbor commit a mortal sin. But the
against the truth, and then he is to be blamed, or against
Apostle says (Phil. 1:17): “Some out of contention preach
falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to the man-
Christ,” and afterwards he says (Phil. 1:18): “In this also
ner, we must consider whether his manner of contending
I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice.” Therefore contention is
is in keeping with the persons and the matter in dispute,
not a mortal sin.
for then it would be praiseworthy, hence Tully says (De
Objection 3. Further, it happens that people contend
Rhet. ad Heren. iii) that “contention is a sharp speech
either in the courts or in disputations, without any spiteful
suitable for proof and refutation”—or whether it exceeds
purpose, and with a good intention, as, for example, those
the demands of the persons and matter in dispute, in which
who contend by disputing with heretics. Hence a gloss
case it is blameworthy.
on 1 Kings 14:1, “It came to pass one day,” etc. says:
Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a dis-
“Catholics do not raise contentions with heretics, unless
claimer of the truth and an inordinate manner, it is a mor-
they are first challenged to dispute.” Therefore contention
tal sin. Thus Ambrose∗ defines contention: “Contention
is not a mortal sin.
is a disclaimer of the truth with clamorous confidence.” If,
Objection 4. Further, Job seems to have contended
however, contention denote a disavowal of what is false,
with God, according to Job 39:32: “Shall he that con-
with the proper measure of acrimony, it is praiseworthy:
tendeth with God be so easily silenced?” And yet Job was
whereas, if it denote a disavowal of falsehood, together
not guilty of mortal sin, since the Lord said of him (Job
with an inordinate manner, it can be a venial sin, unless
42:7): “You have not spoken the thing that is right before
the contention be conducted so inordinately, as to give
me, as my servant Job hath.” Therefore contention is not
scandal to others. Hence the Apostle after saying (2 Tim.
always a mortal sin.
2:14): “Contend not in words,” adds, “for it is to no profit,
On the contrary, It is against the precept of the Apos-
but to the subverting of the hearers.”
tle who says (2 Tim. 2:14): “Contend not in words.”
Reply to Objection 1. The disciples of Christ con-
Moreover (Gal. 5:20) contention is included among the
tended together, not with the intention of disclaiming the
works of the flesh, and as stated there (Gal. 5:21) “they
truth, since each one stood up for what he thought was
who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.”
true. Yet there was inordinateness in their contention, be-
Now whatever excludes a man from the kingdom of God
cause they contended about a matter which they ought not
and is against a precept, is a mortal sin. Therefore con-
to have contended about, viz. the primacy of honor; for
tention is a mortal sin.
they were not spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the
I answer that, To contend is to tend against some one.
same passage; and for this reason Our Lord checked them.
Wherefore just as discord denotes a contrariety of wills,
Reply to Objection 2. Those who preached Christ
so contention signifies contrariety of speech. For this rea-
“out of contention,” were to be blamed, because, although
son when a man contrasts various contrary things in a
they did not gainsay the truth of faith, but preached it, yet
speech, this is called “contentio,” which Tully calls one
they did gainsay the truth, by the fact that they thought
of the rhetorical colors (De Rhet. ad Heren. iv), where he
they would “raise affliction” to the Apostle who was
∗ Cf. Gloss. Ord. in Rom. i, 29
1383
preaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced whether in court or in a disputation, it is incomplete, i.e.
not in their contention, but in the fruit that would result
in respect of the acrimony of speech, it is not always a
therefrom, namely that Christ would be made known—
mortal sin.
since evil is sometimes the occasion of good results.
Reply to Objection 4. Contention here denotes an or-
Reply to Objection 3. Contention is complete and is
dinary dispute. For Job had said (13:3): “I will speak to
a mortal sin when, in contending before a judge, a man
the Almighty, and I desire to reason with God”: yet he
gainsays the truth of justice, or in a disputation, intends
intended not to impugn the truth, but to defend it, and in
to impugn the true doctrine. In this sense Catholics do
seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be inordinate in
not contend against heretics, but the reverse. But when,
mind or in speech.
Whether contention is a daughter of vainglory?
IIa IIae q. 38 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that contention is not
when they hold to their own opinion in their hearts, so are
a daughter of vainglory. For contention is akin to zeal,
they contentious when each defends his own opinion by
wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 3:3): “Whereas there is
words. Consequently contention is reckoned a daughter
among you zeal [Douay: ‘envying’] and contention, are
of vainglory for the same reason as discord.
you not carnal, and walk according to men?” Now zeal
Reply to Objection 1. Contention, like discord, is
pertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from
akin to envy in so far as a man severs himself from the one
envy.
with whom he is discordant, or with whom he contends,
Objection 2. Further, contention is accompanied by
but in so far as a contentious man holds to something, it is
raising of the voice. But the voice is raised on account of
akin to pride and vainglory, because, to wit, he clings to
anger, as Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 14). Therefore
his own opinion, as stated above (q. 37, a. 2, ad 1).
contention too arises from anger.
Reply to Objection 2. The contention of which we
Objection 3. Further, among other things knowledge
are speaking puts on a loud voice, for the purpose of im-
seems to be the matter of pride and vainglory, according
pugning the truth, so that it is not the chief part of con-
to 1 Cor. 8:1: “Knowledge puffeth up.” Now contention is
tention. Hence it does not follow that contention arises
often due to lack of knowledge, and by knowledge we do
from the same source as the raising of the voice.
not impugn the truth, we know it. Therefore contention is
Reply to Objection 3. Pride and vainglory are oc-
not a daughter of vainglory.
casioned chiefly by goods even those that are contrary to
On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory
them, for instance, when a man is proud of his humility:
(Moral. xxxi, 14).
for when a thing arises in this way, it does so not directly
I answer that, As stated above (q. 37, a. 2), discord is but accidentally, in which way nothing hinders one cona daughter of vainglory, because each of the disaccording
trary from arising out of another. Hence there is no reason
parties clings to his own opinion, rather than acquiesce
why the “per se” and direct effects of pride or vainglory,
with the other. Now it is proper to pride and vainglory to
should not result from the contraries of those things which
seek one’s own glory. And just as people are discordant
are the occasion of pride.
1384
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 39
Of Schism
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the vices contrary to peace, which belong to deeds: such are schism, strife, sedition, and war. In the first place, then, about schism, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether schism is a special sin?
(2) Whether it is graver than unbelief?
(3) Of the power exercised by schismatics;
(4) Of the punishment inflicted on them.
Whether schism is a special sin?
IIa IIae q. 39 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that schism is not a spe-
who, wilfully and intentionally separate themselves from
cial sin. For “schism,” as Pope Pelagius I says (Epist. ad
the unity of the Church; for this is the chief unity, and
Victor. et Pancrat.), “denotes a division.” But every sin
the particular unity of several individuals among them-
causes a division, according to Is. 59:: “Your sins have
selves is subordinate to the unity of the Church, even as
divided between you and your God.” Therefore schism is
the mutual adaptation of each member of a natural body
not a special sin.
is subordinate to the unity of the whole body. Now the
Objection 2. Further, a man is apparently a schis-
unity of the Church consists in two things; namely, in the
matic if he disobeys the Church. But every sin makes a
mutual connection or communion of the members of the
man disobey the commandments of the Church, because
Church, and again in the subordination of all the members
sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) “is disobe-
of the Church to the one head, according to Col. 2:18,19:
dience against the heavenly commandments.” Therefore
“Puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and not holding the
every sin is a schism.
Head, from which the whole body, by joints and bands,
Objection 3. Further, heresy also divides a man from
being supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth
the unity of faith. If, therefore, the word schism denotes a
unto the increase of God.” Now this Head is Christ Him-
division, it would seem not to differ, as a special sin, from
self, Whose viceregent in the Church is the Sovereign
the sin of unbelief.
Pontiff. Wherefore schismatics are those who refuse to
On the contrary, Augustine (Contra Faust. xx, 3;
submit to the Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold communion
Contra Crescon. ii, 4) distinguishes between schism and
with those members of the Church who acknowledge his
heresy, for he says that a “schismatic is one who holds
supremacy.
the same faith, and practises the same worship, as others,
Reply to Objection 1. The division between man and
and takes pleasure in the mere disunion of the community,
God that results from sin is not intended by the sinner:
whereas a heretic is one who holds another faith from that
it happens beside his intention as a result of his turning
of the Catholic Church.” Therefore schism is not a generic
inordinately to a mutable good, and so it is not schism
sin.
properly so called.
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. viii, 3), schism
Reply to Objection 2. The essence of schism consists
takes its name “from being a scission of minds,” and scis-
in rebelliously disobeying the commandments: and I say
sion is opposed to unity. Wherefore the sin of schism
“rebelliously,” since a schismatic both obstinately scorns
is one that is directly and essentially opposed to unity.
the commandments of the Church, and refuses to submit
For in the moral, as in the physical order, the species is
to her judgment. But every sinner does not do this, where-
not constituted by that which is accidental. Now, in the
fore not every sin is a schism.
moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and
Reply to Objection 3. Heresy and schism are distin-
that which results beside the intention, is, as it were, ac-
guished in respect of those things to which each is op-
cidental. Hence the sin of schism is, properly speaking,
posed essentially and directly. For heresy is essentially
a special sin, for the reason that the schismatic intends to
opposed to faith, while schism is essentially opposed to
sever himself from that unity which is the effect of char-
the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just as faith
ity: because charity unites not only one person to another
and charity are different virtues, although whoever lacks
with the bond of spiritual love, but also the whole Church
faith lacks charity, so too schism and heresy are differ-
in unity of spirit.
ent vices, although whoever is a heretic is also a schis-
Accordingly schismatics properly so called are those
matic, but not conversely. This is what Jerome says in
1385
his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians∗: “I con-schism is the road to heresy. Wherefore Jerome adds (In
sider the difference between schism and heresy to be that
Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that “at the outset it is possible, in a
heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs a man
certain respect, to find a difference between schism and
from the Church.” Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity
heresy: yet there is no schism that does not devise some
is the road to the loss of faith, according to 1 Tim. 1:6:
heresy for itself, that it may appear to have had a reason
“From which things,” i.e. charity and the like, “some go-
for separating from the Church.”
ing astray, are turned aside into vain babbling,” so too,
Whether schism is a graver sin than unbelief?
IIa IIae q. 39 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that schism is a graver sin
the question must be understood to refer to the gravity de-
than unbelief. For the graver sin meets with a graver pun-
rived from the sin’s genus. Now the genus or species of
ishment, according to Dt. 25:2: “According to the mea-
a sin is taken from its object, as shown above ( Ia IIae,
sure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.”
q. 72, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 73, a. 3). Wherefore the sin which
Now we find the sin of schism punished more severely
is opposed to the greater good is, in respect of its genus,
than even the sin of unbelief or idolatry: for we read (Ex.
more grievous, for instance a sin committed against God
32:28) that some were slain by the swords of their fellow
is graver than a sin committed against one’s neighbor.
men on account of idolatry: whereas of the sin of schism
Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed
we read (Num. 16:30): “If the Lord do a new thing, and
against God Himself, according as He is Himself the First
the earth opening her mouth swallow them down, and all
Truth, on which faith is founded; whereas schism is op-
things that belong to them, and they go down alive into
posed to ecclesiastical unity, which is a participated good,
hell, you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord
and a lesser good than God Himself. Wherefore it is man-
God.” Moreover the ten tribes who were guilty of schism
ifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous
in revolting from the rule of David were most severely
than the sin of schism, although it may happen that a par-
punished (4 Kings 17). Therefore the sin of schism is
ticular schismatic sins more grievously than a particular
graver than the sin of unbelief.
unbeliever, either because his contempt is greater, or be-
Objection 2. Further, “The good of the multitude is
cause his sin is a source of greater danger, or for some
greater and more godlike than the good of the individual,”
similar reason.
as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 2). Now schism is op-
Reply to Objection 1. It had already been declared
posed to the good of the multitude, namely, ecclesiastical
to that people by the law which they had received that
unity, whereas unbelief is contrary to the particular good
there was one God, and that no other God was to be wor-
of one man, namely the faith of an individual. Therefore
shipped by them; and the same had been confirmed among
it seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.
them by many kinds of signs. Consequently there was no
Objection 3. Further, a greater good is opposed to
need for those who sinned against this faith by falling into
a greater evil, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii,
idolatry, to be punished in an unwonted manner: it was
10). Now schism is opposed to charity, which is a greater
enough that they should be punished in the usual way. On
virtue than faith to which unbelief is opposed, as shown
the other hand, it was not so well known among them that
above (q. 10, a. 2; q. 23, a. 6). Therefore schism is a graver
Moses was always to be their ruler, and so it behooved
sin than unbelief.
those who rebelled against his authority to be punished in
On the contrary, That which results from an addition
a miraculous and unwonted manner.
to something else surpasses that thing either in good or in
We may also reply by saying that the sin of schism
evil. Now heresy results from something being added to
was sometimes more severely punished in that people, be-
schism, for it adds corrupt doctrine, as Jerome declares in
cause they were inclined to seditions and schisms. For
the passage quoted above (a. 1, ad 3). Therefore schism is
it is written (1 Esdra 4:15): “This city since days gone
a less grievous sin than unbelief.
by has rebelled against its kings: and seditions and wars
I answer that, The gravity of a sin can be considered
were raised therein∗.” Now sometimes a more severe pun-
in two ways: first, according to the species of that sin,
ishment is inflicted for an habitual sin (as stated above,
secondly, according to its circumstances. And since par-
Ia IIae, q. 105, a. 2, ad 9), because punishments are
ticular circumstances are infinite in number, so too they
medicines intended to keep man away from sin: so that
can be varied in an infinite number of ways: wherefore if
where there is greater proneness to sin, a more severe pun-
one were to ask in general which of two sins is the graver,
ishment ought to be inflicted. As regards the ten tribes,
∗ In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10
∗ Vulg.: ‘This city is a rebellious city, and
hurtful to the kings and provinces, and. . . wars were raised therein of old’
1386
they were punished not only for the sin of schism, but its principal object and is the Divine goodness, the other
also for that of idolatry as stated in the passage quoted.
is its secondary object and is our neighbor’s good. Now
Reply to Objection 2. Just as the good of the multi-
schism and other sins against our neighbor, are opposed to
tude is greater than the good of a unit in that multitude, so
charity in respect of its secondary good, which is less than
is it less than the extrinsic good to which that multitude is
the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so these
directed, even as the good of a rank in the army is less than
sins are less grievous than unbelief. On the other hand, ha-
the good of the commander-in-chief. In like manner the
tred of God, which is opposed to charity in respect of its
good of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed,
principal object, is not less grievous than unbelief. Never-
is less than the good of Divine truth, to which unbelief is
theless of all sins committed by man against his neighbor,
opposed.
the sin of schism would seem to be the greatest, because
Reply to Objection 3. Charity has two objects; one is
it is opposed to the spiritual good of the multitude.
Whether schismatics have any power?
IIa IIae q. 39 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that schismatics have
consecration. Now all the consecrations of the Church
some power. For Augustine says (Contra Donat. i, 1):
are immovable so long as the consecrated thing remains:
“Just as those who come back to the Church after being
as appears even in inanimate things, since an altar, once
baptized, are not baptized again, so those who return after
consecrated, is not consecrated again unless it has been
being ordained, are not ordained again.” Now Order is a
broken up. Consequently such a power as this remains, as
kind of power. Therefore schismatics have some power
to its essence, in the man who has received it by conse-
since they retain their Orders.
cration, as long as he lives, even if he fall into schism or
Objection 2.
Further, Augustine says (De Unico
heresy: and this is proved from the fact that if he come
Bapt.∗): “One who is separated can confer a sacrament
back to the Church, he is not consecrated anew. Since,
even as he can have it.” But the power of conferring
however, the lower power ought not to exercise its act, ex-
a sacrament is a very great power. Therefore schismat-
cept in so far as it is moved by the higher power, as may
ics who are separated from the Church, have a spiritual
be seen also in the physical order, it follows that such per-
power.
sons lose the use of their power, so that it is not lawful
Objection 3.
Further, Pope Urban II† says: “We
for them to use it. Yet if they use it, this power has its
command that persons consecrated by bishops who were
effect in sacramental acts, because therein man acts only
themselves consecrated according to the Catholic rite, but
as God’s instrument, so that sacramental effects are not
have separated themselves by schism from the Roman
precluded on account of any fault whatever in the person
Church, should be received mercifully and that their Or-
who confers the sacrament.
ders should be acknowledged, when they return to the
On the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that
unity of the Church, provided they be of commendable
which is conferred by a mere human appointment. Such
life and knowledge.” But this would not be so, unless
a power as this does not adhere to the recipient immov-
spiritual power were retained by schismatics. Therefore
ably: so that it does not remain in heretics and schismat-
schismatics have spiritual power.
ics; and consequently they neither absolve nor excommu-
On the contrary, Cyprian says in a letter (Ep. lii,
nicate, nor grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind,
quoted vii, qu. 1, can. Novatianus): “He who observes
and if they do, it is invalid.
neither unity of spirit nor the concord of peace, and sev-
Accordingly when it is said that such like persons have
ers himself from the bonds of the Church, and from the
no spiritual power, it is to be understood as referring ei-
fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal power or
ther to the second power, or if it be referred to the first
honor.”
power, not as referring to the essence of the power, but to
I answer that, Spiritual power is twofold, the one
its lawful use.
sacramental, the other a power of jurisdiction. The sacra-
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
mental power is one that is conferred by some kind of
∗ De Bap. contra Donat. vi, 5
† Council of Piacenza, cap. x; cf. Can. Ordinationes, ix, qu. 1
1387
Whether it is right that schismatics should be punished with excommunication?
IIa IIae q. 39 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that schismatics are not
ished” [Vulg.: ‘he is tormented’].
Now a schismatic,
rightly punished with excommunication. For excommu-
as shown above (a. 1), commits a twofold sin: first by
nication deprives a man chiefly of a share in the sacra-
separating himself from communion with the members
ments. But Augustine says (Contra Donat. vi, 5) that
of the Church, and in this respect the fitting punishment
“Baptism can be received from a schismatic.” Therefore
for schismatics is that they be excommunicated. Sec-
it seems that excommunication is not a fitting punishment
ondly, they refuse submission to the head of the Church,
for schismatics.
wherefore, since they are unwilling to be controlled by
Objection 2. Further, it is the duty of Christ’s faith-
the Church’s spiritual power, it is just that they should be
ful to lead back those who have gone astray, wherefore
compelled by the secular power.
it is written against certain persons (Ezech. 34:4): “That
Reply to Objection 1. It is not lawful to receive Bap-
which was driven away you have not brought again, nei-
tism from a schismatic, save in a case of necessity, since it
ther have you sought that which was lost.” Now schis-
is better for a man to quit this life, marked with the sign of
matics are more easily brought back by such as may hold
Christ, no matter from whom he may receive it, whether
communion with them. Therefore it seems that they ought
from a Jew or a pagan, than deprived of that mark, which
not to be excommunicated.
is bestowed in Baptism.
Objection 3. Further, a double punishment is not in-
Reply to Objection 2. Excommunication does not
flicted for one and the same sin, according to Nahum 1:9:
forbid the intercourse whereby a person by salutary ad-
“God will not judge the same twice”∗. Now some receive
monitions leads back to the unity of the Church those who
a temporal punishment for the sin of schism, according to
are separated from her. Indeed this very separation brings
q. 23, a. 5, where it is stated: “Both divine and earthly
them back somewhat, because through confusion at their
laws have laid down that those who are severed from the
separation, they are sometimes led to do penance
unity of the Church, and disturb her peace, must be pun-
Reply to Objection 3. The punishments of the present
ished by the secular power.” Therefore they ought not to
life are medicinal, and therefore when one punishment
be punished with excommunication.
does not suffice to compel a man, another is added: just as
On the contrary, It is written (Num. 16:26): “Depart
physicians employ several body medicines when one has
from the tents of these wicked men,” those, to wit, who
no effect. In like manner the Church, when excommuni-
had caused the schism, “and touch nothing of theirs, lest
cation does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs
you be involved in their sins.”
the compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one pun-
I answer that, According to Wis. 11:11, “By what
ishment suffices, another should not be employed.
things a man sinneth, by the same also he should be pun-
∗ Septuagint version
1388
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 40
Of War
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether some kind of war is lawful?
(2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight?
(3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes?
(4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?
Whether it is always sinful to wage war?
IIa IIae q. 40 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that it is always sinful to
ness to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom
wage war. Because punishment is not inflicted except for
or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for
sin. Now those who wage war are threatened by Our Lord
them to have recourse to the sword in defending that com-
with punishment, according to Mat. 26:52: “All that take
mon weal against internal disturbances, when they punish
the sword shall perish with the sword.” Therefore all wars
evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom.
are unlawful.
13:4): “He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God’s
Objection 2. Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine
minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth
precept is a sin. But war is contrary to a Divine precept,
evil”; so too, it is their business to have recourse to the
for it is written (Mat. 5:39): “But I say to you not to resist
sword of war in defending the common weal against exter-
evil”; and (Rom. 12:19): “Not revenging yourselves, my
nal enemies. Hence it is said to those who are in authority
dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath.” Therefore war
(Ps. 81:4): “Rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of
is always sinful.
the hand of the sinner”; and for this reason Augustine says
Objection 3. Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary
(Contra Faust. xxii, 75): “The natural order conducive to
to an act of virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore
peace among mortals demands that the power to declare
war is always a sin.
and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold
Objection 4. Further, the exercise of a lawful thing
the supreme authority.”
is itself lawful, as is evident in scientific exercises. But
Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those
warlike exercises which take place in tournaments are for-
who are attacked, should be attacked because they de-
bidden by the Church, since those who are slain in these
serve it on account of some fault. Wherefore Augustine
trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Therefore it
says (QQ. in Hept., qu. x, super Jos.): “A just war is wont
seems that war is a sin in itself.
to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on the
or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends
son of the centurion∗: “If the Christian Religion forbade
for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what
war altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the
it has seized unjustly.”
Gospel would rather have been counselled to cast aside
Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should
their arms, and to give up soldiering altogether. On the
have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advance-
contrary, they were told: ‘Do violence to no man. . . and
ment of good, or the avoidance of evil. Hence Augus-
be content with your pay’†. If he commanded them to be
tine says (De Verb. Dom.‡): “True religion looks upon as
content with their pay, he did not forbid soldiering.”
peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of ag-
I answer that, In order for a war to be just, three
grandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing
things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign
peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.”
by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not
For it may happen that the war is declared by the legiti-
the business of a private individual to declare war, because
mate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered
he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of
unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine
his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private
says (Contra Faust. xxii, 74): “The passion for inflicting
individual to summon together the people, which has to
harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and re-
be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal
lentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and
is committed to those who are in authority, it is their busi-
such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war.”
∗ Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii
† Lk. 3:14
‡ The words quoted are to
be found not in St. Augustine’s works, but Can. Apud. Caus. xxiii, qu.
1
1389
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Contra we have to punish with a kindly severity, it is necessary
Faust. xxii, 70): “To take the sword is to arm oneself in
to handle in many ways against their will. For when we
order to take the life of anyone, without the command or
are stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good for
permission of superior or lawful authority.” On the other
him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than
hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private person)
the happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity,
by the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public
and an evil will, like an internal enemy.”
person) through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so
Reply to Objection 3. Those who wage war justly
to speak, of God, is not to “take the sword,” but to use it as
aim at peace, and so they are not opposed to peace, ex-
commissioned by another, wherefore it does not deserve
cept to the evil peace, which Our Lord “came not to send
punishment. And yet even those who make sinful use of
upon earth” (Mat. 10:34). Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad
the sword are not always slain with the sword, yet they
Bonif. clxxxix): “We do not seek peace in order to be at
always perish with their own sword, because, unless they
war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be peace-
repent, they are punished eternally for their sinful use of
ful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those
the sword.
whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity
Reply to Objection 2. Such like precepts, as Augus-
of peace.”
tine observes (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19), should
Reply to Objection 4. Manly exercises in warlike
always be borne in readiness of mind, so that we be ready
feats of arms are not all forbidden, but those which are
to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain from resistance
inordinate and perilous, and end in slaying or plundering.
or self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes
In olden times warlike exercises presented no such dan-
for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for
ger, and hence they were called “exercises of arms” or
the good of those with whom he is fighting. Hence Au-
“bloodless wars,” as Jerome states in an epistle∗.
gustine says (Ep. ad Marcellin. cxxxviii): “Those whom
Whether it is lawful for clerics and bishops to fight?
IIa IIae q. 40 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem lawful for clerics and
qu. 8, can. Hortatu) that Charles went to war with the
bishops to fight. For, as stated above (a. 1), wars are law-
Lombards at the instance and entreaty of Adrian, bishop
ful and just in so far as they protect the poor and the entire
of Rome. Therefore they also are allowed to fight.
common weal from suffering at the hands of the foe. Now
Objection 4. Further, whatever is right and merito-
this seems to be above all the duty of prelates, for Gregory
rious in itself, is lawful for prelates and clerics. Now it
says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): “The wolf comes upon the sheep,
is sometimes right and meritorious to make war, for it is
when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who
written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Omni timore) that if “a man die
are faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be
for the true faith, or to save his country, or in defense of
the shepherd, and was not, leaveth the sheep, end flieth,
Christians, God will give him a heavenly reward.” There-
for he fears lest the wolf hurt him, and dares not stand up
fore it is lawful for bishops and clerics to fight.
against his injustice.” Therefore it is lawful for prelates
On the contrary, It was said to Peter as representing
and clerics to fight.
bishops and clerics (Mat. 16:52): “Put up again thy sword
Objection 2. Further, Pope Leo IV writes (xxiii, qu.
into the scabbard [Vulg.: ‘its place’]†.” Therefore it is not
8, can. Igitur): “As untoward tidings had frequently come
lawful for them to fight.
from the Saracen side, some said that the Saracens would
I answer that, Several things are requisite for the
come to the port of Rome secretly and covertly; for which
good of a human society: and a number of things are done
reason we commanded our people to gather together, and
better and quicker by a number of persons than by one, as
ordered them to go down to the seashore.” Therefore it is
the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 1), while certain oc-
lawful for bishops to fight.
cupations are so inconsistent with one another, that they
Objection 3. Further, apparently, it comes to the same
cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore
whether a man does a thing himself, or consents to its be-
those who are deputed to important duties are forbidden
ing done by another, according to Rom. 1:32: “They who
to occupy themselves with things of small importance.
do such things, are worthy of death, and not only they
Thus according to human laws, soldiers who are deputed
that do them, but they also that consent to them that do
to warlike pursuits are forbidden to engage in commerce‡.
them.” Now those, above all, seem to consent to a thing,
Now warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with
who induce others to do it. But it is lawful for bishops
the duties of a bishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The
and clerics to induce others to fight: for it is written (xxiii, first reason is a general one, because, to wit, warlike pur-
∗ Reference incorrect: cf. Veget., De Re Milit. i
† “Scabbard” is the
reading in Jn. 18:11
‡ Cod. xii, 35, De Re Milit.
1390
suits are full of unrest, so that they hinder the mind very Such are salutary warnings, devout prayers, and, for those
much from the contemplation of Divine things, the praise
who are obstinate, the sentence of excommunication.
of God, and prayers for the people, which belong to the
Reply to Objection 2. Prelates and clerics may, by the
duties of a cleric. Wherefore just as commercial enter-
authority of their superiors, take part in wars, not indeed
prises are forbidden to clerics, because they unsettle the
by taking up arms themselves, but by affording spiritual
mind too much, so too are warlike pursuits, according to
help to those who fight justly, by exhorting and absolv-
2 Tim. 2:4: “No man being a soldier to God, entangleth
ing them, and by other like spiritual helps. Thus in the
himself with secular business.” The second reason is a
Old Testament (Joshua 6:4) the priests were commanded
special one, because, to wit, all the clerical Orders are di-
to sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this
rected to the ministry of the altar, on which the Passion
purpose that bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to
of Christ is represented sacramentally, according to 1 Cor.
the front: and it is an abuse of this permission, if any of
11:26: “As often as you shall eat this bread, and drink the
them take up arms themselves.
chalice, you shall show the death of the Lord, until He
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 23, a. 4,
come.” Wherefore it is unbecoming for them to slay or
ad 2) every power, art or virtue that regards the end, has
shed blood, and it is more fitting that they should be ready
to dispose that which is directed to the end. Now, among
to shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed
the faithful, carnal wars should be considered as having
what they portray in their ministry. For this reason it has
for their end the Divine spiritual good to which clerics are
been decreed that those who shed blood, even without sin,
deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and
become irregular. Now no man who has a certain duty to
counsel other men to engage in just wars. For they are
perform, can lawfully do that which renders him unfit for
forbidden to take up arms, not as though it were a sin, but
that duty. Wherefore it is altogether unlawful for clerics
because such an occupation is unbecoming their person-
to fight, because war is directed to the shedding of blood.
ality.
Reply to Objection 1. Prelates ought to withstand not
Reply to Objection 4. Although it is meritorious to
only the wolf who brings spiritual death upon the flock,
wage a just war, nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for
but also the pillager and the oppressor who work bodily
clerics, by reason of their being deputed to works more
harm; not, however, by having recourse themselves to ma-
meritorious still. Thus the marriage act may be meritori-
terial arms, but by means of spiritual weapons, according
ous; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who have
to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:4): “The weapons
vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater
of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God.”
good.
Whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in war?
IIa IIae q. 40 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that it is unlawful to lay
super Jos): “Provided the war be just, it is no concern of
ambushes in war. For it is written (Dt. 16:20): “Thou
justice whether it be carried on openly or by ambushes”:
shalt follow justly after that which is just.” But ambushes,
and he proves this by the authority of the Lord, Who com-
since they are a kind of deception, seem to pertain to in-
manded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of Hai (Joshua
justice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even in a
8:2).
just war.
I answer that, The object of laying ambushes is in or-
Objection 2. Further, ambushes and deception seem
der to deceive the enemy. Now a man may be deceived
to be opposed to faithfulness even as lies are. But since
by another’s word or deed in two ways. First, through
we are bound to keep faith with all men, it is wrong to lie
being told something false, or through the breaking of a
to anyone, as Augustine states (Contra Mend. xv). There-
promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to de-
fore, as one is bound to keep faith with one’s enemy, as
ceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain “rights
Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems that it
of war and covenants, which ought to be observed even
is unlawful to lay ambushes for one’s enemies.
among enemies,” as Ambrose states (De Officiis i).
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Mat. 7:12): “What-
Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or
soever you would that men should do to you, do you also
do, because we do not declare our purpose or meaning
to them”: and we ought to observe this in all our deal-
to him. Now we are not always bound to do this, since
ings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is our neighbor.
even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have to be con-
Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions
cealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it,
to be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to
according to Mat. 7:6: “Give not that which is holy, to
carry on war by laying ambushes.
dogs.” Wherefore much more ought the plan of campaign
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x
to be hidden from the enemy. For this reason among other
1391
things that a soldier has to learn is the art of concealing his Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions,
purpose lest it come to the enemy’s knowledge, as stated
nor are they contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will.
in the Book on Strategy∗ by Frontinus. Such like con-
For a man would have an inordinate will if he were un-
cealment is what is meant by an ambush which may be
willing that others should hide anything from him
lawfully employed in a just war.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?
IIa IIae q. 40 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to fight on holy
against him.”
days. For holy days are instituted that we may give our
I answer that, The observance of holy days is no hin-
time to the things of God. Hence they are included in the
drance to those things which are ordained to man’s safety,
keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Ex. 20:8: for “sabbath”
even that of his body. Hence Our Lord argued with the
is interpreted “rest.” But wars are full of unrest. Therefore
Jews, saying (Jn. 7:23): “Are you angry at Me because I
by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days.
have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day?” Hence
Objection 2. Further, certain persons are reproached
physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy
(Is. 58:3) because on fast-days they exacted what was ow-
days. Now there is much more reason for safeguarding
ing to them, were guilty of strife, and of smiting with the
the common weal (whereby many are saved from being
fist. Much more, therefore, is it unlawful to fight on holy
slain, and innumerable evils both temporal and spiritual
days.
prevented), than the bodily safety of an individual. There-
Objection 3. Further, no ill deed should be done to
fore, for the purpose of safeguarding the common weal of
avoid temporal harm. But fighting on a holy day seems
the faithful, it is lawful to carry on a war on holy days,
in itself to be an ill deed. Therefore no one should fight
provided there be need for doing so: because it would be
on a holy day even through the need of avoiding temporal
to tempt God, if notwithstanding such a need, one were to
harm.
choose to refrain from fighting.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Mac. 2:41): The Jews
However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer
rightly determined. . . saying: “Whosoever shall come up
lawful to fight on a holy day, for the reasons given: where-
against us to fight on the Sabbath-day, we will fight
fore this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
∗ Stratagematum i, 1
1392
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 41
Of Strife∗
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider strife, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether strife is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a daughter of anger?
Whether strife is always a sin?
IIa IIae q. 41 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that strife is not always a
to him, and he defend himself with due moderation, it is
sin. For strife seems a kind of contention: hence Isidore
no sin, and one cannot say properly that there is strife on
says (Etym. x) that the word “rixosus [quarrelsome] is de-
his part. But if, on the other hand, his self-defense be in-
rived from the snarling [rictu] of a dog, because the quar-
spired by vengeance and hatred, it is always a sin. It is
relsome man is ever ready to contradict; he delights in
a venial sin, if a slight movement of hatred or vengeance
brawling, and provokes contention.” Now contention is
obtrude itself, or if he does not much exceed moderation
not always a sin. Neither, therefore, is strife.
in defending himself: but it is a mortal sin if he makes
Objection 2. Further, it is related (Gn. 26:21) that the for his assailant with the fixed intention of killing him, or
servants of Isaac “digged” another well, “and for that they
inflicting grievous harm on him.
quarrelled likewise.” Now it is not credible that the house-
Reply to Objection 1. Strife is not just the same
hold of Isaac quarrelled publicly, without being reproved
as contention: and there are three things in the passage
by him, supposing it were a sin. Therefore strife is not a
quoted from Isidore, which express the inordinate nature
sin.
of strife. First, the quarrelsome man is always ready to
Objection 3. Further, strife seems to be a war between
fight, and this is conveyed by the words, “ever ready to
individuals. But war is not always sinful. Therefore strife
contradict,” that is to say, whether the other man says or
is not always a sin.
does well or ill. Secondly, he delights in quarrelling itself,
On the contrary, Strifes† are reckoned among the
and so the passage proceeds, “and delights in brawling.”
works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), and “they who do such
Thirdly, “he” provokes others to quarrel, wherefore it goes
things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.” Therefore
on, “and provokes contention.”
strifes are not only sinful, but they are even mortal sins.
Reply to Objection 1. The sense of the text is not
I answer that, While contention implies a contra-
that the servants of Isaac quarrelled, but that the inhab-
diction of words, strife denotes a certain contradiction
itants of that country quarrelled with them: wherefore
of deeds.
Wherefore a gloss on Gal.
5:20 says that
these sinned, and not the servants of Isaac, who bore the
“strifes are when persons strike one another through
calumny‡.
anger.” Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it
Reply to Objection 3. In order for a war to be just it
takes place between private persons, being declared not by
must be declared by authority of the governing power, as
public authority, but rather by an inordinate will. There-
stated above (q. 40, a. 1); whereas strife proceeds from a
fore strife is always sinful. In fact it is a mortal sin in
private feeling of anger or hatred. For if the servants of a
the man who attacks another unjustly, for it is not with-
sovereign or judge, in virtue of their public authority, at-
out mortal sin that one inflicts harm on another even if the
tack certain men and these defend themselves, it is not the
deed be done by the hands. But in him who defends him-
former who are said to be guilty of strife, but those who
self, it may be without sin, or it may sometimes involve
resist the public authority. Hence it is not the assailants in
a venial sin, or sometimes a mortal sin; and this depends
this case who are guilty of strife and commit sin, but those
on his intention and on his manner of defending himself.
who defend themselves inordinately.
For if his sole intention be to withstand the injury done
∗ Strife Here Denotes Fighting Between Individuals
† The Douay version has ‘quarrels’
‡ Cf. Gn. 26:20
1393
Whether strife is a daughter of anger?
IIa IIae q. 41 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that strife is not a daugh-
of vengeance: for the angry man is not content to hurt se-
ter of anger. For it is written (James 4:1): “Whence are
cretly the object of his anger, he even wishes him to feel
wars and contentions? Are they not. . . from your concu-
the hurt and know that what he suffers is in revenge for
piscences, which war in your members?” But anger is not
what he has done, as may be seen from what has been said
in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore strife is a daughter,
above about the passion of anger ( Ia IIae, q. 46, a. 6, ad
not of anger, but of concupiscence.
2). Therefore, properly speaking, strife arises from anger.
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 28:25): “He
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 25,
that boasteth and puffeth up himself, stirreth up quarrels.”
Aa. 1,2), all the irascible passions arise from those of the
Now strife is apparently the same as quarrel. Therefore it
concupiscible faculty, so that whatever is the immediate
seems that strife is a daughter of pride or vainglory which
outcome of anger, arises also from concupiscence as from
makes a man boast and puff himself up.
its first root.
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Prov. 18:6): “The
Reply to Objection 2. Boasting and puffing up of self
lips of a fool intermeddle with strife.” Now folly differs
which are the result of anger or vainglory, are not the di-
from anger, for it is opposed, not to meekness, but to wis-
rect but the occasional cause of quarrels or strife, because,
dom or prudence. Therefore strife is not a daughter of
when a man resents another being preferred to him, his
anger.
anger is aroused, and then his anger results in quarrel and
Objection 4. Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): “Ha-
strife.
tred stirreth up strifes.” But hatred arises from envy, ac-
Reply to Objection 3. Anger, as stated above ( Ia IIae,
cording to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17). Therefore strife is
q. 48, a. 3) hinders the judgment of the reason, so that it
not a daughter of anger, but of envy.
bears a likeness to folly. Hence they have a common ef-
Objection 5. Further, it is written (Prov. 17:19): “He
fect, since it is due to a defect in the reason that a man
that studieth discords, soweth [Vulg.: ‘loveth’] quarrels.”
designs to hurt another inordinately.
But discord is a daughter of vainglory, as stated above
Reply to Objection 4. Although strife sometimes
(q. 37, a. 2). Therefore strife is also.
arises from hatred, it is not the proper effect thereof, be-
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that
cause when one man hates another it is beside his inten-
“anger gives rise to strife”; and it is written (Prov. 15:18;
tion to hurt him in a quarrelsome and open manner, since
29:22): “A passionate man stirreth up strifes.”
sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When, however,
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), strife denotes an he sees himself prevailing, he endeavors to harm him with
antagonism extending to deeds, when one man designs to
strife and quarrel. But to hurt a man in a quarrel is the
harm another. Now there are two ways in which one man
proper effect of anger, for the reason given above.
may intend to harm another. In one way it is as though
Reply to Objection 5. Strifes give rise to hatred and
he intended absolutely the other’s hurt, which in this case
discord in the hearts of those who are guilty of strife, and
is the outcome of hatred, for the intention of hatred is di-
so he that “studies,” i.e., intends to sow discord among
rected to the hurt of one’s enemy either openly or secretly.
others, causes them to quarrel among themselves. Even
In another way a man intends to hurt another who knows
so any sin may command the act of another sin, by direct-
and withstands his intention. This is what we mean by
ing it to its own end. This does not, however, prove that
strife, and belongs properly to anger which is the desire
strife is the daughter of vainglory properly and directly.
1394
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 42
Of Sedition
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a special sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
Whether sedition is a special sin distinct from other sins?
IIa IIae q. 42 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that sedition is not a spe-
tions with the intention of fighting. Secondly, they dif-
cial sin distinct from other sins. For, according to Isidore
fer in that war is, properly speaking, carried on against
(Etym. x), “a seditious man is one who sows dissent
external foes, being as it were between one people and
among minds, and begets discord.” Now, by provoking
another, whereas strife is between one individual and an-
the commission of a sin, a man sins by no other kind of
other, or between few people on one side and few on the
sin than that which he provoked. Therefore it seems that
other side, while sedition, in its proper sense, is between
sedition is not a special sin distinct from discord.
mutually dissentient parts of one people, as when one part
Objection 2. Further, sedition denotes a kind of divi-
of the state rises in tumult against another part. Where-
sion. Now schism takes its name from scission, as stated
fore, since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good,
above (q. 39, a. 1). Therefore, seemingly, the sin of sedi-
namely the unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind
tion is not distinct from that of schism.
of sin.
Objection 3. Further, every special sin that is dis-
Reply to Objection 1. A seditious man is one who in-
tinct from other sins, is either a capital vice, or arises
cites others to sedition, and since sedition denotes a kind
from some capital vice. Now sedition is reckoned nei-
of discord, it follows that a seditious man is one who cre-
ther among the capital vices, nor among those vices which
ates discord, not of any kind, but between the parts of a
arise from them, as appears from Moral. xxxi, 45, where
multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only in him who
both kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is
sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one an-
not a special sin, distinct from other sins.
other inordinately.
On the contrary, Seditions are mentioned as distinct
Reply to Objection 2. Sedition differs from schism
from other sins (2 Cor. 12:20).
in two respects. First, because schism is opposed to the
I answer that, Sedition is a special sin, having some-
spiritual unity of the multitude, viz. ecclesiastical unity,
thing in common with war and strife, and differing some-
whereas sedition is contrary to the temporal or secular
what from them. It has something in common with them,
unity of the multitude, for instance of a city or kingdom.
in so far as it implies a certain antagonism, and it dif-
Secondly, schism does not imply any preparation for a
fers from them in two points. First, because war and
material fight as sedition does, but only for a spiritual dis-
strife denote actual aggression on either side, whereas
sent.
sedition may be said to denote either actual aggression,
Reply to Objection 3. Sedition, like schism, is con-
or the preparation for such aggression. Hence a gloss on
tained under discord, since each is a kind of discord, not
2 Cor. 12:20 says that “seditions are tumults tending to
between individuals, but between the parts of a multitude.
fight,” when, to wit, a number of people make prepara-
Whether sedition is always a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 42 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that sedition is not al-
mortal sin, and sometimes without any sin at all. There-
ways a mortal sin. For sedition denotes “a tumult tending
fore sedition can be also.
to fight,” according to the gloss quoted above (a. 1). But
Objection 3. Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a
fighting is not always a mortal sin, indeed it is sometimes
multitude from a tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be
just and lawful, as stated above (q. 40, a. 1). Much more,
done without some dissension in the multitude, if one part
therefore, can sedition be without a mortal sin.
of the multitude seeks to retain the tyrant, while the rest
Objection 2. Further, sedition is a kind of discord,
strive to dethrone him. Therefore there can be sedition
as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). Now discord can be without
without mortal sin.
1395
On the contrary, The Apostle forbids seditions to-he defends himself, as stated above (q. 41, a. 1).
gether with other things that are mortal sins (2 Cor.
Reply to Objection 1. It is lawful to fight, provided
12:20).
it be for the common good, as stated above (q. 40, a. 1).
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 2), sedition is But sedition runs counter to the common good of the mul-contrary to the unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a
titude, so that it is always a mortal sin.
city or kingdom. Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21)
Reply to Objection 2. Discord from what is not ev-
that “wise men understand the word people to designate
idently good, may be without sin, but discord from what
not any crowd of persons, but the assembly of those who
is evidently good, cannot be without sin: and sedition is
are united together in fellowship recognized by law and
discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the unity of the
for the common good.” Wherefore it is evident that the
multitude, which is a manifest good.
unity to which sedition is opposed is the unity of law and
Reply to Objection 3. A tyrannical government is not
common good: whence it follows manifestly that sedition
just, because it is directed, not to the common good, but
is opposed to justice and the common good. Therefore by
to the private good of the ruler, as the Philosopher states
reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its gravity will
(Polit. iii, 5; Ethic. viii, 10). Consequently there is no
be all the greater according as the common good which
sedition in disturbing a government of this kind, unless
it assails surpasses the private good which is assailed by
indeed the tyrant’s rule be disturbed so inordinately, that
strife.
his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent dis-
Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in
turbance than from the tyrant’s government. Indeed it is
its authors, who sin most grievously; and secondly it is in
the tyrant rather that is guilty of sedition, since he encour-
those who are led by them to disturb the common good.
ages discord and sedition among his subjects, that he may
Those, however, who defend the common good, and with-
lord over them more securely; for this is tyranny, being
stand the seditious party, are not themselves seditious,
conducive to the private good of the ruler, and to the in-
even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because
jury of the multitude.
1396
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 43
Of Scandal
(In Eight Articles)
It remains for us to consider the vices which are opposed to beneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice, those, to wit, whereby one harms one’s neighbor unjustly. But scandal seems to be specially opposed to charity. Accordingly we must here consider scandal, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) What is scandal?
(2) Whether scandal is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a special sin?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(5) Whether the perfect can be scandalized?
(6) Whether they can give scandal?
(7) Whether spiritual goods are to be foregone on account of scandal?
(8) Whether temporal things are to be foregone on account of scandal?
Whether scandal is fittingly defined as being something less rightly said or done that IIa IIae q. 43 a. 1
occasions spiritual downfall?
Objection 1. It would seem that scandal is unfittingly
word,” etc. says: “When we read ‘Whosoever shall scan-
defined as “something less rightly said or done that occa-
dalize,’ the sense is ‘Whosoever shall, by deed or word,
sions spiritual downfall.” For scandal is a sin as we shall
occasion another’s spiritual downfall.’ ”
state further on (a. 2). Now, according to Augustine (Con-
I answer that, As Jerome observes the Greek skan-
tra Faust. xxii, 27), a sin is a “word, deed, or desire con-
dalon may be rendered offense, downfall, or a stumbling trary to the law of God.” Therefore the definition given
against something. For when a body, while moving along
above is insufficient, since it omits “thought” or “desire.”
a path, meets with an obstacle, it may happen to stumble
Objection 2. Further, since among virtuous or right
against it, and be disposed to fall down: such an obstacle
acts one is more virtuous or more right than another, that
is a skandalon.
one alone which has perfect rectitude would not seem to
In like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a
be a “less” right one. If, therefore, scandal is something
man may be disposed to a spiritual downfall by another’s
“less” rightly said or done, it follows that every virtuous
word or deed, in so far, to wit, as one man by his injunc-
act except the best of all, is a scandal.
tion, inducement or example, moves another to sin; and
Objection 3. Further, an occasion is an accidental
this is scandal properly so called.
cause. But nothing accidental should enter a definition,
Now nothing by its very nature disposes a man to spir-
because it does not specify the thing defined. Therefore it
itual downfall, except that which has some lack of rec-
is unfitting, in defining scandal, to say that it is an “occa-
titude, since what is perfectly right, secures man against
sion.”
a fall, instead of conducing to his downfall. Scandal is,
Objection 4. Further, whatever a man does may be
therefore, fittingly defined as “something less rightly done
the occasion of another’s spiritual downfall, because acci-
or said, that occasions another’s spiritual downfall.”
dental causes are indeterminate. Consequently, if scandal
Reply to Objection 1. The thought or desire of evil
is something that occasions another’s spiritual downfall,
lies hidden in the heart, wherefore it does not suggest it-
any deed or word can be a scandal: and this seems unrea-
self to another man as an obstacle conducing to his spir-
sonable.
itual downfall: hence it cannot come under the head of
Objection 5. Further, a man occasions his neighbor’s
scandal.
spiritual downfall when he offends or weakens him. Now
Reply to Objection 2. A thing is said to be less right,
scandal is condivided with offense and weakness, for the
not because something else surpasses it in rectitude, but
Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): “It is good not to eat flesh,
because it has some lack of rectitude, either through be-
and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother
ing evil in itself, such as sin, or through having an appear-
is offended or scandalized, or weakened.” Therefore the
ance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man were to “sit at
aforesaid definition of scandal is unfitting.
meat in the idol’s temple” (1 Cor. 8:10), though this is
On the contrary, Jerome in expounding Mat. 15:12,
not sinful in itself, provided it be done with no evil inten-
“Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this
tion, yet, since it has a certain appearance of evil, and a
1397
semblance of worshipping the idol, it might occasion an-itual downfall, wherefore his act is called “active scan-
other man’s spiritual downfall. Hence the Apostle says (1
dal.” One man’s word or deed is the accidental cause of
Thess. 5:22): “From all appearance of evil refrain your-
another’s sin, when he neither intends to lead him into
selves.” Scandal is therefore fittingly described as some-
sin, nor does what is of a nature to lead him into sin, and
thing done “less rightly,” so as to comprise both whatever
yet this other one, through being ill-disposed, is led into
is sinful in itself, and all that has an appearance of evil.
sin, for instance, into envy of another’s good, and then
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 75,
he who does this righteous act, does not, so far as he is
Aa. 2,3; Ia IIae, q. 80, a. 1), nothing can be a sufficient
concerned, afford an occasion of the other’s downfall, but
cause of a man’s spiritual downfall, which is sin, save
it is this other one who takes the occasion according to
his own will. Wherefore another man’s words or deeds
Rom. 7:8: “Sin taking occasion by the commandment
can only be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat to
wrought in me all manner of concupiscence.” Wherefore
that downfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford
this is “passive,” without “active scandal,” since he that
not a cause, but an occasion, which is an imperfect, and
acts rightly does not, for his own part, afford the occa-
not always an accidental cause. Nor is there any reason
sion of the other’s downfall. Sometimes therefore it hap-
why certain definitions should not make mention of things
pens that there is active scandal in the one together with
that are accidental, since what is accidental to one, may
passive scandal in the other, as when one commits a sin
be proper to something else: thus the accidental cause is
being induced thereto by another; sometimes there is ac-
mentioned in the definition of chance (Phys. ii, 5).
tive without passive scandal, for instance when one, by
Reply to Objection 4. Another’s words or deed may
word or deed, provokes another to sin, and the latter does
be the cause of another’s sin in two ways, directly and
not consent; and sometimes there is passive without active
accidentally. Directly, when a man either intends, by his
scandal, as we have already said.
evil word or deed, to lead another man into sin, or, if he
Reply to Objection 5. “Weakness” denotes proneness
does not so intend, when his deed is of such a nature as
to scandal; while “offense” signifies resentment against
to lead another into sin: for instance, when a man pub-
the person who commits a sin, which resentment may be
licly commits a sin or does something that has an appear-
sometimes without spiritual downfall; and “scandal” is the
ance of sin. In this case he that does such an act does,
stumbling that results in downfall.
properly speaking, afford an occasion of another’s spir-
Whether scandal is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 43 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that scandal is not a sin.
dal is always a sin in the person scandalized; for he is not
For sins do not occur from necessity, since all sin is vol-
scandalized except in so far as he succumbs to a spiritual
untary, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 74, Aa. 1,2). Now it
downfall, and that is a sin.
is written (Mat. 18:7): “It must needs be that scandals
Yet there can be passive scandal, without sin on the
come.” Therefore scandal is not a sin.
part of the person whose action has occasioned the scan-
Objection 2. Further, no sin arises from a sense of
dal, as for instance, when a person is scandalized at an-
dutifulness, because “a good tree cannot bring forth evil
other’s good deed. In like manner active scandal is al-
fruit” (Mat. 7:18). But scandal may come from a sense
ways a sin in the person who gives scandal, since either
of dutifulness, for Our Lord said to Peter (Mat. 16:23):
what he does is a sin, or if it only have the appearance of
“Thou art a scandal unto Me,” in reference to which words
sin, it should always be left undone out of that love for
Jerome says that “the Apostle’s error was due to his sense
our neighbor which binds each one to be solicitous for his
of dutifulness, and such is never inspired by the devil.”
neighbor’s spiritual welfare; so that if he persist in doing
Therefore scandal is not always a sin.
it he acts against charity.
Objection 3. Further, scandal denotes a stumbling.
Yet there can be active scandal without sin on the part
But he that stumbles does not always fall. Therefore scan-
of the person scandalized, as stated above (a. 1, ad 4).
dal, which is a spiritual fall, can be without sin.
Reply to Objection 1. These words, “It must needs
On the contrary, Scandal is “something less rightly
be that scandals come,” are to be understood to convey,
said or done.” Now anything that lacks rectitude is a sin.
not the absolute, but the conditional necessity of scandal;
Therefore scandal is always with sin.
in which sense it is necessary that whatever God foresees
I answer that, As already said (a. 1, ad 4), scandal
or foretells must happen, provided it be taken conjointly
is of two kinds, passive scandal in the person scandalized,
with such foreknowledge, as explained in the Ia, q. 14,
and active scandal in the person who gives scandal, and so
a. 13, ad 3; Ia, q. 23, a. 6, ad 2.
occasions a spiritual downfall. Accordingly passive scan-
Or we may say that the necessity of scandals occurring
1398
is a necessity of end, because they are useful in order that come, so long as men fail to change their evil mode of
“they. . . who are reproved may be made manifest” (1 Cor.
living.
11:19).
Reply to Objection 2. In that passage scandal de-
Or scandals must needs occur, seeing the condition of
notes any kind of hindrance: for Peter wished to hinder
man who fails to shield himself from sin. Thus a physi-
Our Lord’s Passion out of a sense of dutifulness towards
cian on seeing a man partaking of unsuitable food might
Christ.
say that such a man must needs injure his health, which is
Reply to Objection 3. No man stumbles spiritually,
to be understood on the condition that he does not change
without being kept back somewhat from advancing in
his diet. In like manner it must needs be that scandals
God’s way, and that is at least a venial sin.
Whether scandal is a special sin?
IIa IIae q. 43 a. 3
Objection 1.
It would seem that scandal is not a
in two ways, directly and accidently. The scandal is ac-
special sin. For scandal is “something said or done less
cidental when it is beside the agent’s intention, as when
rightly.” But this applies to every kind of sin. Therefore
a man does not intend, by his inordinate deed or word, to
every sin is a scandal, and consequently, scandal is not a
occasion another’s spiritual downfall, but merely to sat-
special sin.
isfy his own will. In such a case even active scandal is not
Objection 2. Further, every special kind of sin, or
a special sin, because a species is not constituted by that
every special kind of injustice, may be found separately
which is accidental.
from other kinds, as stated in Ethic. v, 3,5. But scandal is
Active scandal is direct when a man intends, by his in-
not to be found separately from other sins. Therefore it is
ordinate word or deed, to draw another into sin, and then
not a special kind of sin.
it becomes a special kind of sin on account of the inten-
Objection 3. Further, every special sin is constituted
tion of a special kind of end, because moral actions take
by something which specifies the moral act. But the no-
their species from their end, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1,
tion of scandal consists in its being something done in the
a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 18, Aa. 4,6). Hence, just as theft and mur-
presence of others: and the fact of a sin being committed
der are special kinds of sin, on account of their denoting
openly, though it is an aggravating circumstance, does not
the intention of doing a special injury to one’s neighbor:
seem to constitute the species of a sin. Therefore scandal
so too, scandal is a special kind of sin, because thereby
is not a special sin.
a man intends a special harm to his neighbor, and it is
On the contrary, A special virtue has a special sin
directly opposed to fraternal correction, whereby a man
opposed to it. But scandal is opposed to a special virtue,
intends the removal of a special kind of harm.
viz. charity. For it is written (Rom. 14:15): “If, because
Reply to Objection 1. Any sin may be the matter of
of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now
active scandal, but it may derive the formal aspect of a
according to charity.” Therefore scandal is a special sin.
special sin from the end intended, as stated above.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), scandal is
Reply to Objection 2. Active scandal can be found
twofold, active and passive. Passive scandal cannot be
separate from other sins, as when a man scandalizes his
a special sin, because through another’s word or deed a
neighbor by a deed which is not a sin in itself, but has an
man may fall into any kind of sin: and the fact that a man
appearance of evil.
takes occasion to sin from another’s word or deed, does
Reply to Objection 3. Scandal does not derive the
not constitute a special kind of sin, because it does not
species of a special sin from the circumstance in question,
imply a special deformity in opposition to a special virtue.
but from the intention of the end, as stated above.
On the other hand, active scandal may be understood
Whether scandal is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 43 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that scandal is a mortal
serves the punishment of eternal damnation, according to
sin. For every sin that is contrary to charity is a mortal
Mat. 18:6: “He that shall scandalize one of these little
sin, as stated above (q. 24, a. 12; q. 35 , a. 3). But scandal
ones, that believe in Me, it were better for him that a mill-
is contrary to charity, as stated above (Aa. 2,3). Therefore
stone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should
scandal is a mortal sin.
be drowned in the depth of the sea.” For, as Jerome says
Objection 2. Further, no sin, save mortal sin, deserves
on this passage, “it is much better to receive a brief pun-
the punishment of eternal damnation. But scandal de-
ishment for a fault, than to await everlasting torments.”
1399
Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.
when a person goes so far as to commit a mortal sin
Objection 3. Further, every sin committed against
through another’s inordinate word or deed.
God is a mortal sin, because mortal sin alone turns man
Active scandal, if it be accidental, may sometimes be
away from God. Now scandal is a sin against God, for
a venial sin; for instance, when, through a slight indiscre-
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:12): “When you wound the
tion, a person either commits a venial sin, or does some-
weak conscience of the brethren∗, you sin against Christ.”
thing that is not a sin in itself, but has some appearance of
Therefore scandal is always a mortal sin.
evil. On the other hand, it is sometimes a mortal sin, ei-
On the contrary, It may be a venial sin to lead a per-
ther because a person commits a mortal sin, or because he
son into venial sin: and yet this would be to give scandal.
has such contempt for his neighbor’s spiritual welfare that
Therefore scandal may be a venial sin.
he declines, for the sake of procuring it, to forego doing
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), scandal denotes
what he wishes to do. But in the case of active direct scan-
a stumbling whereby a person is disposed to a spiritual
dal, as when a person intends to lead another into sin, if
downfall. Consequently passive scandal may sometimes
he intends to lead him into mortal sin, his own sin will be
be a venial sin, when it consists in a stumbling and noth-
mortal; and in like manner if he intends by committing a
ing more; for instance, when a person is disturbed by a
mortal sin himself, to lead another into venial sin; whereas
movement of venial sin occasioned by another’s inordi-
if he intends, by committing a venial sin, to lead another
nate word or deed: while sometimes it is a mortal sin,
into venial sin, there will be a venial sin of scandal.
when the stumbling results in a downfall, for instance,
And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Whether passive scandal may happen even to the perfect?
IIa IIae q. 43 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that passive scandal may
1 Cor. 4:16: “Be ye followers of me, as I also am of
happen even to the perfect. For Christ was supremely per-
Christ.” Wherefore, however much others may appear
fect: and yet He said to Peter (Mat. 16:23): “Thou art a
to them to conduct themselves ill in word or deed, they
scandal to Me.” Much more therefore can other perfect
themselves do not stray from their righteousness, accord-
men suffer scandal.
ing to Ps. 124:1: “They that trust in the Lord shall be as
Objection 2. Further, scandal denotes an obstacle
Mount Sion: he shall not be moved for ever that dwelleth
which is put in a person’s spiritual way. Now even perfect
in Jerusalem.” Therefore scandal is not found in those
men can be hindered in their progress along the spiritual
who adhere to God perfectly by love, according to Ps.
way, according to 1 Thess. 2:18: “We would have come
118:165: “Much peace have they that love Thy law, and
to you, I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath hin-
to them there is no stumbling-block [scandalum].”
dered us.” Therefore even perfect men can suffer scandal.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 2, ad 2),
Objection 3. Further, even perfect men are liable to
in this passage, scandal is used in a broad sense, to de-
venial sins, according to 1 Jn. 1:8: “If we say that we
note any kind of hindrance. Hence Our Lord said to Peter:
have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” Now passive scan-
“Thou art a scandal to Me,” because he was endeavoring
dal is not always a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial,
to weaken Our Lord’s purpose of undergoing His Passion.
as stated above (a. 4). Therefore passive scandal may be
Reply to Objection 2. Perfect men may be hindered
found in perfect men.
in the performance of external actions. But they are not
On the contrary, Jerome, in commenting on Mat.
hindered by the words or deeds of others, from tending
18:6, “He that shall scandalize one of these little ones,”
to God in the internal acts of the will, according to Rom.
says: “Observe that it is the little one that is scandalized,
8:38,39: “Neither death, nor life. . . shall be able to sepa-
for the elders do not take scandal.”
rate us from the love of God.”
I answer that, Passive scandal implies that the mind
Reply to Objection 3. Perfect men sometimes fall
of the person who takes scandal is unsettled in its adher-
into venial sins through the weakness of the flesh; but they
ence to good. Now no man can be unsettled, who adheres
are not scandalized (taking scandal in its true sense), by
firmly to something immovable. The elders, i.e. the per-
the words or deeds of others, although there can be an ap-
fect, adhere to God alone, Whose goodness is unchange-
proach to scandal in them, according to Ps. 72:2: “My
able, for though they adhere to their superiors, they do
feet were almost moved.”
so only in so far as these adhere to Christ, according to
∗ Vulg.: ‘When you sin thus against the brethren and wound their weak conscience’
1400
Whether active scandal can be found in the perfect?
IIa IIae q. 43 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that active scandal can
all things be done decently and according to order”; and
be found in the perfect. For passion is the effect of ac-
they are careful to do this in those matters chiefly wherein
tion. Now some are scandalized passively by the words or
not only would they do wrong, but would also be to oth-
deeds of the perfect, according to Mat. 15:12: “Dost thou
ers an occasion of wrongdoing. And if indeed they fail
know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word, were
in this moderation in such words or deeds as come to the
scandalized?” Therefore active scandal can be found in
knowledge of others, this has its origin in human weak-
the perfect.
ness wherein they fall short of perfection. Yet they do not
Objection 2. Further, Peter, after receiving the Holy
fall short so far as to stray far from the order of reason, but Ghost, was in the state of the perfect. Yet afterwards he
only a little and in some slight matter: and this is not so
scandalized the gentiles: for it is written (Gal. 2:14):
grave that anyone can reasonably take therefrom an occa-
“When I saw that they walked not uprightly unto the truth
sion for committing sin.
of the Gospel, I said to Cephas,” i.e. Peter, “before them
Reply to Objection 1. Passive scandal is always due
all: If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner of the gen-
to some active scandal; yet this active scandal is not al-
tiles, and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the
ways in another, but in the very person who is scandalized,
gentiles to live as do the Jews?” Therefore active scandal
because, to wit, he scandalizes himself.
can be in the perfect.
Reply to Objection 2. In the opinion of Augustine
Objection 3. Further, active scandal is sometimes a
(Ep. xxviii, xl, lxxxii) and of Paul also, Peter sinned and
venial sin. But venial sins may be in perfect men. There-
was to be blamed, in withdrawing from the gentiles in or-
fore active scandal may be in perfect men.
der to avoid the scandal of the Jews, because he did this
On the contrary, Active scandal is more opposed to
somewhat imprudently, so that the gentiles who had been
perfection, than passive scandal. But passive scandal can-
converted to the faith were scandalized. Nevertheless Pe-
not be in the perfect. Much less, therefore, can active
ter’s action was not so grave a sin as to give others suffi-
scandal be in them.
cient ground for scandal. Hence they were guilty of pas-
I answer that, Active scandal, properly so called, oc-
sive scandal, while there was no active scandal in Peter.
curs when a man says or does a thing which in itself is
Reply to Objection 3. The venial sins of the perfect
of a nature to occasion another’s spiritual downfall, and
consist chiefly in sudden movements, which being hidden
that is only when what he says or does is inordinate. Now
cannot give scandal. If, however, they commit any venial
it belongs to the perfect to direct all their actions accord-
sins even in their external words or deeds, these are so
ing to the rule of reason, as stated in 1 Cor. 14:40: “Let
slight as to be insufficient in themselves to give scandal.
Whether spiritual goods should be foregone on account of scandal?
IIa IIae q. 43 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that spiritual goods ought
scandal.
to be foregone on account of scandal.
For Augustine
Objection 4. Further, Jerome∗ says that in order to
(Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) teaches that “punishment for
avoid scandal we should forego whatever it is possible to
sin should cease, when the peril of schism is feared.” But
omit without prejudice to the threefold truth, i.e. “the truth
punishment of sins is a spiritual good, since it is an act
of life, of justice and of doctrine.” Now the observance of
of justice. Therefore a spiritual good is to be foregone on
the counsels, and the bestowal of alms may often be omit-
account of scandal.
ted without prejudice to the aforesaid threefold truth, else
Objection 2. Further, the Sacred Doctrine is a most
whoever omitted them would always be guilty of sin, and
spiritual thing. Yet one ought to desist therefrom on ac-
yet such things are the greatest of spiritual works. There-
count of scandal, according to Mat. 7:6: “Give not that
fore spiritual works should be omitted on account of scan-
which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before
dal.
swine lest. . . turning upon you, they tear you.” Therefore
Objection 5. Further, the avoidance of any sin is a
a spiritual good should be foregone on account of scandal.
spiritual good, since any sin brings spiritual harm to the
Objection 3. Further, since fraternal correction is an
sinner. Now it seems that one ought sometimes to commit
act of charity, it is a spiritual good. Yet sometimes it is
a venial sin in order to avoid scandalizing one’s neighbor,
omitted out of charity, in order to avoid giving scandal to
for instance, when by sinning venially, one would pre-
others, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i, 9). There-
vent someone else from committing a mortal sin: because
fore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of
one is bound to hinder the damnation of one’s neighbor
∗ Hugh de S. Cher., In Matth. xviii; in Luc. xvii, 2
1401
as much as one can without prejudice to one’s own salva-pronounce excommunication.
tion, which is not precluded by a venial sin. Therefore one
Reply to Objection 2. With regard to a man’s doctrine
ought to forego a spiritual good in order to avoid scandal.
two points must be considered, namely, the truth which is
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. Super Ezech.
taught, and the act of teaching. The first of these is neces-
vii): “If people are scandalized at the truth, it is better
sary for salvation, to wit, that he whose duty it is to teach
to allow the birth of scandal, than to abandon the truth.”
should no’ teach what is contrary to the truth, and that
Now spiritual goods belong, above all others, to the truth.
he should teach the truth according to the requirements of
Therefore spiritual goods are not to be foregone on ac-
times and persons: wherefore on no account ought he to
count of scandal.
suppress the truth and teach error in order to avoid any
I answer that, Whereas scandal is twofold, active and
scandal that might ensue. But the act itself of teaching
passive, the present question does not apply to active scan-
is one of the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (q. 32,
dal, for since active scandal is “something said or done
a. 2), and so the same is to be said of it as of the other
less rightly,” nothing ought to be done that implies active
works of mercy, of which we shall speak further on (ad
scandal. The question does, however, apply to passive
4).
scandal, and accordingly we have to see what ought to be
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 33, a. 1),
foregone in order to avoid scandal. Now a distinction must
fraternal correction aims at the correction of a brother,
be made in spiritual goods. For some of them are neces-
wherefore it is to be reckoned among spiritual goods in
sary for salvation, and cannot be foregone without mortal
so far as this end can be obtained, which is not the case if
sin: and it is evident that no man ought to commit a mor-
the brother be scandalized through being corrected. And
tal sin, in order to prevent another from sinning, because
so, if the correction be omitted in order to avoid scandal,
according to the order of charity, a man ought to love his
no spiritual good is foregone.
own spiritual welfare more than another’s. Therefore one
Reply to Objection 4. The truth of life, of doctrine,
ought not to forego that which is necessary for salvation,
and of justice comprises not only whatever is necessary
in order to avoid giving scandal.
for salvation, but also whatever is a means of obtaining
Again a distinction seems necessary among spiritual
salvation more perfectly, according to 1 Cor. 12:31: “Be
things which are not necessary for salvation: because the
zealous for the better gifts.” Wherefore neither the coun-
scandal which arises from such things sometimes pro-
sels nor even the works of mercy are to be altogether omit-
ceeds from malice, for instance when a man wishes to hin-
ted in order to avoid scandal; but sometimes they should
der those spiritual goods by stirring up scandal. This is the
be concealed or deferred, on account of the scandal of the
“scandal of the Pharisees,” who were scandalized at Our
little ones, as stated above. Sometimes, however, the ob-
Lord’s teaching: and Our Lord teaches (Mat. 15:14) that
servance of the counsels and the fulfilment of the works of
we ought to treat such like scandal with contempt. Some-
mercy are necessary for salvation. This may be seen in the
times scandal proceeds from weakness or ignorance, and
case of those who have vowed to keep the counsels, and
such is the “scandal of little ones.” In order to avoid this
of those whose duty it is to relieve the wants of others, ei-
kind of scandal, spiritual goods ought to be either con-
ther in temporal matters (as by feeding the hungry), or in
cealed, or sometimes even deferred (if this can be done
spiritual matters (as by instructing the ignorant), whether
without incurring immediate danger), until the matter be-
such duties arise from their being enjoined as in the case
ing explained the scandal cease. If, however, the scan-
of prelates, or from the need on the part of the person in
dal continue after the matter has been explained, it would
want; and then the same applies to these things as to others
seem to be due to malice, and then it would no longer be
that are necessary for salvation.
right to forego that spiritual good in order to avoid such
Reply to Objection 5. Some have said that one ought
like scandal.
to commit a venial sin in order to avoid scandal. But this
Reply to Objection 1. In the infliction of punishment
implies a contradiction, since if it ought to be done, it is no it is not the punishment itself that is the end in view, but
longer evil or sinful, for a sin cannot be a matter of choice.
its medicinal properties in checking sin; wherefore pun-
It may happen however that, on account of some circum-
ishment partakes of the nature of justice, in so far as it
stance, something is not a venial sin, though it would be
checks sin. But if it is evident that the infliction of pun-
were it not for that circumstance: thus an idle word is a
ishment will result in more numerous and more grievous
venial sin, when it is uttered uselessly; yet if it be uttered
sins being committed, the infliction of punishment will no
for a reasonable cause, it is neither idle nor sinful. And
longer be a part of justice. It is in this sense that Augus-
though venial sin does not deprive a man of grace which
tine is speaking, when, to wit, the excommunication of a
is his means of salvation, yet, in so far as it disposes him
few threatens to bring about the danger of a schism, for
to mortal sin, it tends to the loss of salvation.
in that case it would be contrary to the truth of justice to
1402
Whether temporal goods should be foregone on account of scandal?
IIa IIae q. 43 a. 8
Objection 1.
It would seem that temporal goods
wherefore, even as other things that are necessary for sal-
should be foregone on account of scandal. For we ought
vation, they are not to be foregone on account of scandal.
to love our neighbor’s spiritual welfare which is hindered
On the other hand, as regards those temporalities of which
by scandal, more than any temporal goods whatever. But
we have the dominion, sometimes, on account of scandal,
we forego what we love less for the sake of what we love
we are bound to forego them, and sometimes we are not
more. Therefore we should forego temporal goods in or-
so bound, whether we forego them by giving them up, if
der to avoid scandalizing our neighbor.
we have them in our possession, or by omitting to claim
Objection 2. Further, according to Jerome’s rule∗,
them, if they are in the possession of others. For if the
whatever can be foregone without prejudice to the three-
scandal arise therefrom through the ignorance or weak-
fold truth, should be omitted in order to avoid scandal.
ness of others (in which case, as stated above, a. 7, it
Now temporal goods can be foregone without prejudice
is scandal of the little ones) we must either forego such
to the threefold truth. Therefore they should be foregone
temporalities altogether, or the scandal must be abated by
in order to avoid scandal.
some other means, namely, by some kind of admonition.
Objection 3. Further, no temporal good is more nec-
Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20):
essary than food. But we ought to forego taking food on
“Thou shouldst give so as to injure neither thyself nor an-
account of scandal, according to Rom. 14:15: “Destroy
other, as much as thou canst lend, and if thou refusest
not him with thy meat for whom Christ died.” Much more
what is asked, thou must yet be just to him, indeed thou
therefore should all other temporal goods be foregone on
wilt give him something better than he asks, if thou re-
account of scandal.
prove him that asks unjustly.” Sometimes, however, scan-
Objection 4. Further, the most fitting way of safe-
dal arises from malice. This is scandal of the Pharisees:
guarding and recovering temporal goods is the court of
and we ought not to forego temporal goods for the sake
justice. But it is unlawful to have recourse to justice, es-
of those who stir up scandals of this kind, for this would
pecially if scandal ensues: for it is written (Mat. 5:40):
both be harmful to the common good, since it would give
“If a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take
wicked men an opportunity of plunder, and would be inju-
away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him”; and (1
rious to the plunderers themselves, who would remain in
Cor. 6:7): “Already indeed there is plainly a fault among
sin as long as they were in possession of another’s prop-
you, that you have lawsuits one with another. Why do you
erty. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 13): “Sometimes
not rather take wrong? why do you not rather suffer your-
we ought to suffer those who rob us of our temporalities,
selves to be defrauded?” Therefore it seems that we ought
while sometimes we should resist them, as far as equity
to forego temporal goods on account of scandal.
allows, in the hope not only that we may safeguard our
Objection 5. Further, we ought, seemingly, to forego
property, but also lest those who take what is not theirs
least of all those temporal goods which are connected with
may lose themselves.”
spiritual goods: and yet we ought to forego them on ac-
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
count of scandal. For the Apostle while sowing spiritual
Reply to Objection 2.
If it were permissible for
things did not accept a temporal stipend lest he “should
wicked men to rob other people of their property, this
give any hindrance to the Gospel of Christ” as we read 1
would tend to the detriment of the truth of life and jus-
Cor. 9:12. For a like reason the Church does not demand
tice. Therefore we are not always bound to forego our
tithes in certain countries, in order to avoid scandal. Much
temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.
more, therefore, ought we to forego other temporal goods
Reply to Objection 3. The Apostle had no intention
in order to avoid scandal.
of counselling total abstinence from food on account of
On the contrary, Blessed Thomas of Canterbury de-
scandal, because our welfare requires that we should take
manded the restitution of Church property, notwithstand-
food: but he intended to counsel abstinence from a partic-
ing that the king took scandal from his doing so.
ular kind of food, in order to avoid scandal, according to 1
I answer that, A distinction must be made in tempo-
Cor. 8:13: “I will never eat flesh, lest I should scandalize
ral goods: for either they are ours, or they are consigned
my brother.”
to us to take care of them for someone else; thus the goods
Reply to Objection 4. According to Augustine (De
of the Church are consigned to prelates, and the goods of
Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) this precept of Our Lord is
the community are entrusted to all such persons as have
to be understood of the preparedness of the mind, namely,
authority over the common weal. In this latter case the
that man should be prepared, if it be expedient, to suffer
care of such things (as of things held in deposit) devolves
being harmed or defrauded, rather than go to law. But
of necessity on those persons to whom they are entrusted,
sometimes it is not expedient, as stated above (ad 2). The
∗ Cf. a. 7, obj. 4
1403
same applies to the saying of the Apostle.
it for the time being, so that they might be taught first of
Reply to Objection 5. The scandal which the Apostle
all that such a payment was a duty. For a like reason the
avoided, arose from an error of the gentiles who were not
Church refrains from demanding tithes in those countries
used to this payment. Hence it behooved him to forego
where it is not customary to pay them.
1404
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 44
Of the Precepts of Charity
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the Precepts of Charity, under which there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether precepts should be given about charity?
(2) Whether there should be one or two?
(3) Whether two suffice?
(4) Whether it is fittingly prescribed that we should love God, “with thy whole heart”?
(5) Whether it is fittingly added: “With thy whole mind,” etc.?
(6) Whether it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life?
(7) Of the precept: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself”;
(8) Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?
Whether any precept should be given about charity?
IIa IIae q. 44 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that no precept should be
der to heal. Now the end of the spiritual life is that man
given about charity. For charity imposes the mode on all
be united to God, and this union is effected by charity,
acts of virtue, since it is the form of the virtues as stated
while all things pertaining to the spiritual life are ordained
above (q. 23, a. 8), while the precepts are about the virtues
to this union, as to their end. Hence the Apostle says
themselves. Now, according to the common saying, the
(1 Tim. 1:5): “The end of the commandment is charity
mode is not included in the precept. Therefore no pre-
from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an un-
cepts should be given about charity.
feigned faith.” For all the virtues, about whose acts the
Objection 2. Further, charity, which “is poured forth
precepts are given, are directed either to the freeing of the
in our hearts by the Holy Ghost” (Rom. 5:5), makes us
heart from the whirl of the passions—such are the virtues
free, since “where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is lib-
that regulate the passions—or at least to the possession
erty” (2 Cor. 3:17). Now the obligation that arises from a
of a good conscience—such are the virtues that regulate
precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a necessity.
operations—or to the having of a right faith—such are
Therefore no precept should be given about charity.
those which pertain to the worship of God: and these three
Objection 3. Further, charity is the foremost among
things are required of man that he may love God. For an
all the virtues, to which the precepts are directed, as
impure heart is withdrawn from loving God, on account
shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 90, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 9).
of the passion that inclines it to earthly things; an evil
If, therefore, any precepts were given about charity, they
conscience gives man a horror for God’s justice, through
should have a place among the chief precepts which are
fear of His punishments; and an untrue faith draws man’s
those of the decalogue. But they have no place there.
affections to an untrue representation of God, and sepa-
Therefore no precepts should be given about charity.
rates him from the truth of God. Now in every genus that
On the contrary, Whatever God requires of us is in-
which is for its own sake takes precedence of that which
cluded in a precept. Now God requires that man should
is for the sake of another, wherefore the greatest precept
love Him, according to Dt. 10:12. Therefore it behooved
is that of charity, as stated in Mat. 22:39.
precepts to be given about the love of charity, which is the
Reply to Objection 1.
As stated above ( Ia IIae,
love of God.
q. 100, a. 10) when we were treating of the command-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 16, a. 1; Ia IIae,
ments, the mode of love does not come under those pre-
q. 99, a. 1), a precept implies the notion of something
cepts which are about the other acts of virtue: for instance,
due. Hence a thing is a matter of precept, in so far as
this precept, “Honor thy father and thy mother,” does not
it is something due. Now a thing is due in two ways,
prescribe that this should be done out of charity. The act
for its own sake, and for the sake of something else. In
of love does, however, fall under special precepts.
every affair, it is the end that is due for its own sake,
Reply to Objection 2. The obligation of a precept
because it has the character of a good for its own sake:
is not opposed to liberty, except in one whose mind is
while that which is directed to the end is due for the sake
averted from that which is prescribed, as may be seen in
of something else: thus for a physician, it is due for its
those who keep the precepts through fear alone. But the
own sake, that he should heal, while it is due for the sake
precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one’s own will,
of something else that he should give a medicine in or-
wherefore it is not opposed to charity.
1405
Reply to Objection 3. All the precepts of the deca-merated among the precepts of the decalogue, since they
logue are directed to the love of God and of our neighbor:
are included in all of them.
and therefore the precepts of charity had not to be enu-
Whether there should have been given two precepts of charity?
IIa IIae q. 44 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there should not have
to speculative sciences, for in these latter, the conclusions
been given two precepts of charity. For the precepts of the
are virtually contained in the first principles. Hence who-
Law are directed to virtue, as stated above (a. 1, obj. 3).
ever knows the principles as to their entire virtual extent
Now charity is one virtue, as shown above (q. 33, a. 5).
has no need to have the conclusions put separately before
Therefore only one precept of charity should have been
him. Since, however, some who know the principles are
given.
unable to consider all that is virtually contained therein,
Objection 2. Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr.
it is necessary, for their sake, that scientific conclusions
Christ. i, 22,27), charity loves none but God in our neigh-
should be traced to their principles. Now in practical mat-
bor. Now we are sufficiently directed to love God by the
ters wherein the precepts of the Law direct us, the end has
precept, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God.” Therefore
the character of principle, as stated above (q. 23, a. 7, ad 2; there was no need to add the precept about loving our
q. 26, a. 1, ad 1): and the love of God is the end to which
neighbor.
the love of our neighbor is directed. Therefore it behooved
Objection 3. Further, different sins are opposed to dif-
us to receive precepts not only of the love of God but also
ferent precepts. But it is not a sin to put aside the love of
of the love of our neighbor, on account of those who are
our neighbor, provided we put not aside the love of God;
less intelligent, who do not easily understand that one of
indeed, it is written (Lk. 15:26): “If any man come to
these precepts is included in the other.
Me, and hate not his father, and mother. . . he cannot be
Reply to Objection 1. Although charity is one virtue,
My disciple.” Therefore the precept of the love of God is
yet it has two acts, one of which is directed to the other
not distinct from the precept of the love of our neighbor.
as to its end. Now precepts are given about acts of virtue,
Objection 4. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8):
and so there had to be several precepts of charity.
“He that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law.” But
Reply to Objection 2. God is loved in our neighbor,
a law is not fulfilled unless all its precepts be observed.
as the end is loved in that which is directed to the end; and
Therefore all the precepts are included in the love of our
yet there was need for an explicit precept about both, for
neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the love of
the reason given above.
our neighbor suffices. Therefore there should not be two
Reply to Objection 3. The means derive their good-
precepts of charity.
ness from their relation to the end, and accordingly aver-
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): “This com-
sion from the means derives its malice from the same
mandment we have from God, that he who loveth God,
source and from no other
love also his brother.”
Reply to Objection 4. Love of our neighbor includes
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 91, a. 3; Ia love of God, as the end is included in the means, and vice
IIae, q. 94, a. 2) when we were treating of the command-
versa: and yet it behooved each precept to be given ex-
ments, the precepts are to the Law what propositions are
plicitly, for the reason given above.
Whether two precepts of charity suffice?
IIa IIae q. 44 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that two precepts of char-
Objection 3. Further, virtue consists not only in do-
ity do not suffice. For precepts are given about acts of
ing good but also in avoiding evil. Now we are led by the
virtue. Now acts are distinguished by their objects. Since,
positive precepts to do good, and by the negative precepts
then, man is bound to love four things out of charity,
to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to have been not only
namely, God, himself, his neighbor and his own body, as
positive, but also negative precepts about charity; and so
shown above (q. 25, a. 12; q. 26), it seems that there ought
two precepts of charity are not sufficient.
to be four precepts of charity, so that two are not sufficient.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 22:40): “On
Objection 2. Further, love is not the only act of char-
these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and
ity, but also joy, peace and beneficence. But precepts
the prophets.”
should be given about the acts of the virtues. Therefore
I answer that, Charity, as stated above (q. 23, a. 1),
two precepts of charity do not suffice.
is a kind of friendship. Now friendship is between one
1406
person and another, wherefore Gregory says (Hom. in Ev.
of love virtually include the precepts about the other acts.
xvii): “Charity is not possible between less than two”:
And yet we find that, for the sake of the laggards, spe-
and it has been explained how one may love oneself out
cial precepts were given about each act—about joy (Phil.
of charity (q. 25, a. 4). Now since good is the object of
4:4): “Rejoice in the Lord always”—about peace (Heb.
dilection and love, and since good is either an end or a
12:14): “Follow peace with all men”—about beneficence
means, it is fitting that there should be two precepts of
(Gal. 6:10): “Whilst we have time, let us work good to
charity, one whereby we are induced to love God as our
all men”—and Holy Writ contains precepts about each of
end, and another whereby we are led to love our neighbor
the parts of beneficence, as may be seen by anyone who
for God’s sake, as for the sake of our end
considers the matter carefully.
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Doctr.
Reply to Objection 3. To do good is more than to
Christ. i, 23), “though four things are to be loved out of
avoid evil, and therefore the positive precepts virtually in-
charity, there was no need of a precept as regards the sec-
clude the negative precepts. Nevertheless we find explicit
ond and fourth,” i.e. love of oneself and of one’s own
precepts against the vices contrary to charity: for, against
body. “For however much a man may stray from the truth,
hatred it is written (Lev. 12:17): “Thou shalt not hate thy
the love of himself and of his own body always remains in
brother in thy heart”; against sloth (Ecclus. 6:26): “Be not
him.” And yet the mode of this love had to be prescribed
grieved with her bands”; against envy (Gal. 5:26): “Let
to man, namely, that he should love himself and his own
us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one an-
body in an ordinate manner, and this is done by his loving
other, envying one another”; against discord (1 Cor. 1:10):
God and his neighbor.
“That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 28, a. 4;
schisms among you”; and against scandal (Rom. 14:13):
q. 29, a. 3), the other acts of charity result from the act
“That you put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your
of love as effects from their cause. Hence the precepts
brother’s way.”
Whether it is fittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole heart?
IIa IIae q. 44 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that it is unfittingly com-
is adapted to that matter. But God is to be loved as the last
manded that man should love God with his whole heart.
end, to which all things are to be referred. Therefore some
For the mode of a virtuous act is not a matter of precept,
kind of totality was to be indicated in connection with the
as shown above (a. 1, ad 1; Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 9). Now the
precept of the love of God.
words “with thy whole heart” signify the mode of the love
Reply to Objection 1. The commandment that pre-
of God. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded that man
scribes an act of virtue does not prescribe the mode which
should love God with his whole heart.
that virtue derives from another and higher virtue, but it
Objection 2. Further, “A thing is whole and perfect
does prescribe the mode which belongs to its own proper
when it lacks nothing” (Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a
virtue, and this mode is signified in the words “with thy
matter of precept that God be loved with the whole heart,
whole heart.”
whoever does something not pertaining to the love of God,
Reply to Objection 2. To love God with one’s whole
acts counter to the precept, and consequently sins mor-
heart has a twofold signification. First, actually, so that
tally. Now a venial sin does not pertain to the love of God.
a man’s whole heart be always actually directed to God:
Therefore a venial sin is a mortal sin, which is absurd.
this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly, in the sense that
Objection 3.
Further, to love God with one’s
a man’s whole heart be habitually directed to God, so that
whole heart belongs to perfection, since according to the
it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this
Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64), “to be whole is to be per-
is the perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to
fect.” But that which belongs to perfection is not a matter
this latter perfection, because it does not destroy the habit
of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we ought
of charity, since it does not tend to a contrary object, but
not to be commanded to love God with our whole heart.
merely hinders the use of charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): “Thou shalt
Reply to Objection 3. That perfection of charity to
love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart.”
which the counsels are directed, is between the two per-
I answer that, Since precepts are given about acts of
fections mentioned in the preceding reply: and it consists
virtue, an act is a matter of precept according as it is an
in man renouncing, as much as possible, temporal things,
act of virtue. Now it is requisite for an act of virtue that
even such as are lawful, because they occupy the mind
not only should it fall on its own matter, but also that it
and hinder the actual movement of the heart towards God.
should be endued with its due circumstances, whereby it
1407
Whether to the words, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart,” it IIa IIae q. 44 a. 5
was fitting to add “and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength”?
Objection 1. It would seem that it was unfitting to
fact that one of them is omitted here or there is due to one
the words, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with thy
implying another. We must therefore observe that love is
whole heart,” to add, “and with thy whole soul, and with
an act of the will which is here denoted by the “heart,”
thy whole strength” (Dt. 6:5). For heart does not mean
because just as the bodily heart is the principle of all the
here a part of the body, since to love God is not a bodily
movements of the body, so too the will, especially as re-
action: and therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual
gards the intention of the last end which is the object of
sense. Now the heart understood spiritually is either the
charity, is the principle of all the movements of the soul.
soul itself or part of the soul. Therefore it is superfluous
Now there are three principles of action that are moved by
to mention both heart and soul.
the will, namely, the intellect which is signified by “the
Objection 2. Further, a man’s strength whether spiri-
mind,” the lower appetitive power, signified by “the soul”;
tual or corporal depends on the heart. Therefore after the
and the exterior executive power signified by “strength,”
words, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole
“force” or “might.” Accordingly we are commanded to
heart,” it was unnecessary to add, “with all thy strength.”
direct our whole intention to God, and this is signified
Objection 3. Further, in Mat. 22:37 we read: “With
by the words “with thy whole heart”; to submit our intel-
all thy mind,” which words do not occur here. Therefore
lect to God, and this is expressed in the words “with thy
it seems that this precept is unfittingly worded in Dt. 6.
whole mind”; to regulate our appetite according to God, in
On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.
the words “with thy whole soul”; and to obey God in our
I answer that, This precept is differently worded in
external actions, and this is to love God with our whole
various places: for, as we said in the first objection, in Dt.
“strength,” “force” or “might.”
6 three points are mentioned: “with thy whole heart,” and
Chrysostom†, on the other hand, takes “heart” and
“with thy whole soul,” and “with thy whole strength.” In
“soul” in the contrary sense; and Augustine (De Doctr.
Mat. 22 we find two of these mentioned, viz. “with thy
Christ. i, 22) refers “heart” to the thought, “soul” to the
whole heart” and “with thy whole soul,” while “with thy
manner of life, and “mind” to the intellect. Again some
whole strength” is omitted, but “with thy whole mind”
explain “with thy whole heart” as denoting the intellect,
is added. Yet in Mark 12 we find all four, viz. “with
“with thy whole soul” as signifying the will, “with thy
thy whole heart,” and “with thy whole soul,” and “with
mind” as pointing to the memory. And again, according
thy whole mind,” and “with thy whole force” which is the
to Gregory of Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), “heart” signi-
same as “strength.” Moreover, these four are indicated in
fies the vegetative soul, “soul” the sensitive, and “mind”
Luke 10, where in place of “strength” or “force” we read
the intellective soul, because our nourishment, sensation,
“with all thy might.”∗
and understanding ought all to be referred by us to God.
Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Whether it is possible in this life to fulfil this precept of the love of God?
IIa IIae q. 44 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that in this life it is possisin, and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor.
ble to fulfil this precept of the love of God. For according
1:8): ”(Who also) will confirm you unto the end without
to Jerome‡ “accursed is he who says that Cod has com-
crime,” and (1 Tim. 3:10): “Let them minister, having no
manded anything impossible.” But God gave this com-
crime.”
mandment, as is clear from Dt. 6:5. Therefore it is possi-
Objection 3. Further, precepts are given in order to
ble to fulfil this precept in this life.
direct man in the way of salvation, according to Ps. 18:9:
Objection 2. Further, whoever does not fulfil a pre-
“The commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlighten-
cept sins mortally, since according to Ambrose (De Parad.
ing the eyes.” Now it is useless to direct anyone to what
viii) sin is nothing else than “a transgression of the Divine
is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill this
Law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments.”
precept in this life.
If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by wayfarers,
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit.
it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal
viii): “In the fulness of heavenly charity this precept will
∗ St. Thomas is explaining the Latin text which reads “ex tota fortitu-dine tua” (Dt.), “ex tota virtue tua” (Mk.), and “ex omnibus tuis” (Lk.), although the Greek in all three cases has ex holes tes ischyos, which the Douay renders “with thy whole strength.”
† The quotation is from
an anonymous author’s unfinished work (Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth.) which is included in Chrysostom’s works
‡ Pelagius, Ex-
posit. Cath. Fid.
1408
be fulfilled: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God,” etc. For fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is fulfilled, though im-as long as any carnal concupiscence remains, that can be
perfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one man
restrained by continence, man cannot love God with all
will fulfil it more perfectly than another, and so much the
his heart.
more, as he approaches by some kind of likeness to the
I answer that, A precept can be fulfilled in two ways;
perfection of heaven.
perfectly, and imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly,
Reply to Objection 1. This argument proves that the
when the end intended by the author of the precept is
precept can be fulfilled after a fashion on the way, but not
reached; yet it is fulfilled, imperfectly however, when al-
perfectly.
though the end intended by its author is not reached, nev-
Reply to Objection 2. Even as the soldier who fights
ertheless the order to that end is not departed from. Thus
legitimately without conquering is not blamed nor de-
if the commander of an army order his soldiers to fight, his
serves to be punished for this, so too he that does not fulfil
command will be perfectly obeyed by those who fight and
this precept on the way, but does nothing against the love
conquer the foe, which is the commander’s intention; yet
of God, does not sin mortally.
it is fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by those who fight with-
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Perfect.
out gaining the victory, provided they do nothing contrary
Justit. viii), “why should not this perfection be prescribed
to military discipline. Now God intends by this precept
to man, although no man attains it in this life? For one
that man should be entirely united to Him, and this will be
cannot run straight unless one knows whither to run. And
realized in heaven, when God will be “all in all,” accord-
how would one know this if no precept pointed it out.”
ing to 1 Cor. 15:28. Hence this precept will be observed
Whether the precept of love of our neighbor is fittingly expressed?
IIa IIae q. 44 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the precept of the
to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity for
love of our neighbor is unfittingly expressed. For the love
glory. Nor does it matter whether we say “neighbor,” or
of charity extends to all men, even to our enemies, as may
“brother” according to 1 Jn. 4:21, or “friend,” according
be seen in Mat. 5:44. But the word “neighbor” denotes a
to Lev. 19:18, because all these words express the same
kind of “nighness” which does not seem to exist towards
affinity.
all men. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly
The mode of love is indicated in the words “as thy-
expressed.
self.” This does not mean that a man must love his neigh-
Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher
bor equally as himself, but in like manner as himself, and
(Ethic. ix, 8) “the origin of our friendly relations with
this in three ways. First, as regards the end, namely, that
others lies in our relation to ourselves,” whence it seems
he should love his neighbor for God’s sake, even as he
to follow that love of self is the origin of one’s love for
loves himself for God’s sake, so that his love for his neigh-
one’s neighbor. Now the principle is greater than that
bor is a “holy” love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love,
which results from it. Therefore man ought not to love
namely, that a man should not give way to his neighbor
his neighbor as himself.
in evil, but only in good things, even as he ought to grat-
Objection 3. Further, man loves himself, but not his
ify his will in good things alone, so that his love for his
neighbor, naturally. Therefore it is unfitting that he should
neighbor may be a “righteous” love. Thirdly, as regards
be commanded to love his neighbor as himself.
the reason for loving, namely, that a man should love his
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 22:39): “The sec-
neighbor, not for his own profit, or pleasure, but in the
ond” commandment “is like to this: Thou shalt love thy
sense of wishing his neighbor well, even as he wishes
neighbor as thyself.”
himself well, so that his love for his neighbor may be a
I answer that, This precept is fittingly expressed,
“true” love: since when a man loves his neighbor for his
for it indicates both the reason for loving and the mode
own profit or pleasure, he does not love his neighbor truly,
of love. The reason for loving is indicated in the word
but loves himself.
“neighbor,” because the reason why we ought to love oth-
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
ers out of charity is because they are nigh to us, both as
1409
Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?
IIa IIae q. 44 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that the order of charity
(q. 25, a. 12; q. 26, Aa. 1,2). It is therefore evident that
is not included in the precept. For whoever transgresses a
the order of charity must come under the precept.
precept does a wrong. But if man loves some one as much
Reply to Objection 1. A man gratifies more the per-
as he ought, and loves any other man more, he wrongs no
son he loves more, so that if he loved less one whom he
man. Therefore he does not transgress the precept. There-
ought to love more, he would wish to gratify more one
fore the order of charity is not included in the precept.
whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an in-
Objection 2. Further, whatever is a matter of precept
justice to the one he ought to love more.
is sufficiently delivered to us in Holy Writ. Now the or-
Reply to Objection 2. The order of those four things
der of charity which was given above (q. 26) is nowhere
we have to love out of charity is expressed in Holy Writ.
indicated in Holy Writ. Therefore it is not included in the
For when we are commanded to love God with our “whole
precept.
heart,” we are given to understand that we must love Him
Objection 3. Further, order implies some kind of dis-
above all things. When we are commanded to love our
tinction. But the love of our neighbor is prescribed with-
neighbor “as ourselves,” the love of self is set before love
out any distinction, in the words, “Thou shalt love thy
of our neighbor. In like manner where we are commanded
neighbor as thyself.” Therefore the order of charity is not
(1 Jn. 3:16) “to lay down our souls,” i.e. the life of our
included in the precept.
bodies, “for the brethren,” we are given to understand that
On the contrary, Whatever God works in us by His
a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body;
grace, He teaches us first of all by His Law, according to
and again when we are commanded (Gal. 6:10) to “work
Jer. 31:33: “I will give My Law in their heart∗.” Now
good. . . especially to those who are of the household of
God causes in us the order of charity, according to Cant
the faith,” and when a man is blamed (1 Tim. 5:8) if he
2:4: “He set in order charity in me.” Therefore the order
“have not care of his own, and especially of those of his
of charity comes under the precept of the Law.
house,” it means that we ought to love most those of our
I answer that, As stated above (a. 4, ad 1), the mode
neighbors who are more virtuous or more closely united
which is essential to an act of virtue comes under the pre-
to us.
cept which prescribes that virtuous act. Now the order of
Reply to Objection 3. It follows from the very words,
charity is essential to the virtue, since it is based on the
“Thou shalt love thy neighbor” that those who are nearer
proportion of love to the thing beloved, as shown above
to us are to be loved more.
∗ Vulg.: ‘in their bowels, and I will write it in their heart’
1410
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 45
Of the Gift of Wisdom
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the gift of wisdom which corresponds to charity; and firstly, wisdom itself, secondly, the opposite vice. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?
(2) What is its subject?
(3) Whether wisdom is only speculative or also practical?
(4) Whether the wisdom that is a gift is compatible with mortal sin?
(5) Whether it is in all those who have sanctifying grace?
(6) Which beatitude corresponds to it?
Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?
IIa IIae q. 45 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that wisdom ought not to
may be understood in two ways, either simply or in some
be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. For the
particular genus. Accordingly he that knows the highest
gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as stated above ( Ia
cause in any particular genus, and by its means is able to
IIae, q. 68, a. 8). Now virtue is directed to the good alone,
judge and set in order all the things that belong to that
wherefore Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that “no
genus, is said to be wise in that genus, for instance in
man makes bad use of the virtues.” Much more therefore
medicine or architecture, according to 1 Cor. 3:10: “As
are the gifts of the Holy Ghost directed to the good alone.
a wise architect, I have laid a foundation.” On the other
But wisdom is directed to evil also, for it is written (James
hand, he who knows the cause that is simply the highest,
3:15) that a certain wisdom is “earthly, sensual, devilish.”
which is God, is said to be wise simply, because he is able
Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned among the gifts
to judge and set in order all things according to Divine
of the Holy Ghost.
rules.
Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De
Now man obtains this judgment through the Holy
Trin. xii, 14) “wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things.”
Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 2:15: “The spiritual man jud-
Now that knowledge of Divine things which man can
geth all things,” because as stated in the same chapter (1
acquire by his natural endowments, belongs to the wis-
Cor. 2:10), “the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep
dom which is an intellectual virtue, while the supernatu-
things of God.” Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a
ral knowledge of Divine things belongs to faith which is a
gift of the Holy Ghost.
theological virtue, as explained above (q. 4, a. 5; Ia IIae,
Reply to Objection 1. A thing is said to be good in
q. 62, a. 3). Therefore wisdom should be called a virtue
two senses: first in the sense that it is truly good and sim-
rather than a gift.
ply perfect, secondly, by a kind of likeness, being perfect
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Job 28:28): “Be-
in wickedness; thus we speak of a good or a perfect thief,
hold the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart
as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. v, text. 21). And
from evil, that is understanding.” And in this passage ac-
just as with regard to those things which are truly good,
cording to the rendering of the Septuagint which Augus-
we find a highest cause, namely the sovereign good which
tine follows (De Trin. xii, 14; xiv, 1) we read: “Behold
is the last end, by knowing which, man is said to be truly
piety, that is wisdom.” Now both fear and piety are gifts
wise, so too in evil things something is to be found to
of the Holy Ghost. Therefore wisdom should not be reck-
which all others are to be referred as to a last end, by
oned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as though it were
knowing which, man is said to be wise unto evil doing,
distinct from the others.
according to Jer. 4:22: “They are wise to do evils, but
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): “The Spirit
to do good they have no knowledge.” Now whoever turns
of the Lord shall rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and
away from his due end, must needs fix on some undue end,
of understanding.”
since every agent acts for an end. Wherefore, if he fixes
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph.
his end in external earthly things, his “wisdom” is called
i: 2), it belongs to wisdom to consider the highest cause.
“earthly,” if in the goods of the body, it is called “sensual
By means of that cause we are able to form a most cer-
wisdom,” if in some excellence, it is called “devilish wis-
tain judgment about other causes, and according thereto
dom” because it imitates the devil’s pride, of which it is
all things should be set in order. Now the highest cause
written (Job 41:25): “He is king over all the children of
1411
pride.”
because “a man judges well what he knows” (Ethic. i, 3).
Reply to Objection 2. The wisdom which is called a
Reply to Objection 3. Just as piety which pertains to
gift of the Holy Ghost, differs from that which is an ac-
the worship of God is a manifestation of faith, in so far as
quired intellectual virtue, for the latter is attained by hu-
we make profession of faith by worshipping God, so too,
man effort, whereas the latter is “descending from above”
piety manifests wisdom. For this reason piety is stated to
(James 3:15). In like manner it differs from faith, since
be wisdom, and so is fear, for the same reason, because if
faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it be-
a man fear and worship God, this shows that he has a right
longs to the gift of wisdom to judge according to the Di-
judgment about Divine things.
vine truth. Hence the gift of wisdom presupposes faith,
Whether wisdom is in the intellect as its subject?
IIa IIae q. 45 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that wisdom is not in the
lectual virtue to pronounce right judgment about Divine
intellect as its subject. For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that
things after reason has made its inquiry, but it belongs to
“wisdom is the charity of God.” Now charity is in the
wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge aright about
will as its subject, and not in the intellect, as stated above
them on account of connaturality with them: thus Diony-
(q. 24, a. 1). Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect as its
sius says (Div. Nom. ii) that “Hierotheus is perfect in
subject.
Divine things, for he not only learns, but is patient of, Di-
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 6:23):
vine things.”
“The wisdom of doctrine is according to her name,” for
Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things
wisdom [sapientia] may be described as “sweet-tasting
is the result of charity, which unites us to God, accord-
science [sapida scientia],” and this would seem to regard
ing to 1 Cor. 6:17: “He who is joined to the Lord, is one
the appetite, to which it belongs to taste spiritual pleasure
spirit.” Consequently wisdom which is a gift, has its cause
or sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appetite rather
in the will, which cause is charity, but it has its essence in
than in the intellect.
the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated above
Objection 3. Further, the intellective power is suffi-
( Ia IIae, q. 14, a. 1).
ciently perfected by the gift of understanding. Now it is
Reply to Objection 1.
Augustine is speaking of
superfluous to require two things where one suffices for
wisdom as to its cause, whence also wisdom [sapientia]
the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect.
takes its name, in so far as it denotes a certain sweet-
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that
ness [saporem]. Hence the Reply to the Second Objection
“wisdom is contrary to folly.” But folly is in the intellect.
is evident, that is if this be the true meaning of the text
Therefore wisdom is also.
quoted. For, apparently this is not the case, because such
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), wisdom denotes
an exposition of the text would only fit the Latin word for
a certain rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal
wisdom, whereas it does not apply to the Greek and per-
Law. Now rectitude of judgment is twofold: first, on ac-
haps not in other languages. Hence it would seem that in
count of perfect use of reason, secondly, on account of a
the text quoted wisdom stands for the renown of doctrine,
certain connaturality with the matter about which one has
for which it is praised by all.
to judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after in-
Reply to Objection 3.
The intellect exercises a
quiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has
twofold act, perception and judgment. The gift of under-
learnt the science of morals, while he who has the habit of
standing regards the former; the gift of wisdom regards
chastity judges of such matters by a kind of connaturality.
the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of knowl-
Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intel-
edge, according to human ideas.
Whether wisdom is merely speculative, or practical also?
IIa IIae q. 45 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that wisdom is not prac-
matters of operation which are contingent. But wisdom
tical but merely speculative. For the gift of wisdom is
is about Divine things which are eternal and necessary.
more excellent than the wisdom which is an intellectual
Therefore wisdom cannot be practical.
virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual virtue, is merely
Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37)
speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a gift,
that “in contemplation we seek the Beginning which is
speculative and not practical.
God, but in action we labor under a mighty bundle of
Objection 2. Further, the practical intellect is about
wants.” Now wisdom regards the vision of Divine things,
1412
in which there is no toiling under a load, since according Reply to Objection 1. The higher a virtue is, the
to Wis. 8:16, “her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her
greater the number of things to which it extends, as stated
company any tediousness.” Therefore wisdom is merely
in De Causis, prop. x, xvii. Wherefore from the very fact
contemplative, and not practical or active.
that wisdom as a gift is more excellent than wisdom as an
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 4:5): “Walk with
intellectual virtue, since it attains to God more intimately
wisdom towards them that are without.” Now this pertains
by a kind of union of the soul with Him, it is able to direct
to action. Therefore wisdom is not merely speculative, but
us not only in contemplation but also in action.
also practical.
Reply to Objection 2. Divine things are indeed nec-
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14),
essary and eternal in themselves, yet they are the rules of
the higher part of the reason is the province of wisdom,
the contingent things which are the subject-matter of hu-
while the lower part is the domain of knowledge. Now the
man actions.
higher reason according to the same authority (De Trin.
Reply to Objection 3. A thing is considered in itself
xii, 7) “is intent on the consideration and consultation of
before being compared with something else. Wherefore
the heavenly,” i.e. Divine, “types”∗; it considers them, in
to wisdom belongs first of all contemplation which is the
so far as it contemplates Divine things in themselves, and
vision of the Beginning, and afterwards the direction of
it consults them, in so far as it judges of human acts by
human acts according to the Divine rules. Nor from the
Divine things, and directs human acts according to Divine
direction of wisdom does there result any bitterness or toil
rules.
in human acts; on the contrary the result of wisdom is to
Accordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely specula-
make the bitter sweet, and labor a rest.
tive but also practical.
Whether wisdom can be without grace, and with mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 45 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that wisdom can be with-
Ghost, as stated above (a. 1), enables us to judge aright of
out grace and with mortal sin. For saints glory chiefly in
Divine things, or of other things according to Divine rules,
such things as are incompatible with mortal sin, accord-
by reason of a certain connaturalness or union with Divine
ing to 2 Cor. 1:12: “Our glory is this, the testimony of our
things, which is the effect of charity, as stated above (a. 2;
conscience.” Now one ought not to glory in one’s wis-
q. 23, a. 5). Hence the wisdom of which we are speak-
dom, according to Jer. 9:23: “Let not the wise man glory
ing presupposes charity. Now charity is incompatible with
in his wisdom.” Therefore wisdom can be without grace
mortal sin, as shown above (q. 24, a. 12). Therefore it fol-
and with mortal sin.
lows that the wisdom of which we are speaking cannot be
Objection 2. Further, wisdom denotes knowledge of
together with mortal sin.
Divine things, as stated above (a. 1). Now one in mortal
Reply to Objection 1. These words are to be under-
sin may have knowledge of the Divine truth, according to
stood as referring to worldly wisdom, or to wisdom in
Rom. 1:18: ”(Those men that) detain the truth of God in
Divine things acquired through human reasons. In such
injustice.” Therefore wisdom is compatible with mortal
wisdom the saints do not glory, according to Prov. 30:2:
sin.
“The wisdom of men is not with Me”: But they do glory
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv,
in Divine wisdom according to 1 Cor. 1:30: ”(Who) of
18) while speaking of charity: “Nothing surpasses this
God is made unto us wisdom.”
gift of God, it is this alone that divides the children of the
Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers, not
eternal kingdom from the children of eternal perdition.”
the wisdom of which we speak but that which is acquired
But wisdom is distinct from charity. Therefore it does not
by the study and research of reason, and is compatible
divide the children of the kingdom from the children of
with mortal sin.
perdition. Therefore it is compatible with mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3. Although wisdom is distinct
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:4): “Wisdom
from charity, it presupposes it, and for that very reason
will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body
divides the children of perdition from the children of the
subject to sins.”
kingdom.
I answer that, The wisdom which is a gift of the Holy
∗ Cf. Ia, q. 79, a. 9; Ia IIae, q. 74, a. 7
1413
Whether wisdom is in all who have grace?
IIa IIae q. 45 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that wisdom is not in all
fairs according to Divine rules, is no more than suffices
who have grace. For it is more to have wisdom than to
for their salvation. This measure is wanting to none who is
hear wisdom. Now it is only for the perfect to hear wis-
without mortal sin through having sanctifying grace, since
dom, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: “We speak wisdom among
if nature does not fail in necessaries, much less does grace
the perfect.” Since then not all who have grace are perfect,
fail: wherefore it is written (1 Jn. 2:27): ”(His) unction
it seems that much less all who have grace have wisdom.
teacheth you of all things.”
Objection 2. Further, “The wise man sets things in
Some, however, receive a higher degree of the gift of
order,” as the Philosopher states (Metaph. i, 2): and it is
wisdom, both as to the contemplation of Divine things (by
written (James 3:17) that the wise man “judges without
both knowing more exalted mysteries and being able to
dissimulation∗”. Now it is not for all that have grace, to
impart this knowledge to others) and as to the direction
judge, or put others in order, but only for those in author-
of human affairs according to Divine rules (by being able
ity. Therefore wisdom is not in all that have grace.
to direct not only themselves but also others according to
Objection 3. Further, “Wisdom is a remedy against
those rules). This degree of wisdom is not common to all
folly,” as Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49). Now many that
that have sanctifying grace, but belongs rather to the gra-
have grace are naturally foolish, for instance madmen who
tuitous graces, which the Holy Ghost dispenses as He will,
are baptized or those who without being guilty of mortal
according to 1 Cor. 12:8: “To one indeed by the Spirit is
sin have become insane. Therefore wisdom is not in all
given the word of wisdom,” etc.
that have grace.
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle speaks there of
On the contrary, Whoever is without mortal sin, is
wisdom, as extending to the hidden mysteries of Divine
beloved of God; since he has charity, whereby he loves
things, as indeed he says himself (2 Cor. 1:7): “We speak
God, and God loves them that love Him (Prov. 8:17).
the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is hid-
Now it is written (Wis. 7:28) that “God loveth none but
den.”
him that dwelleth with wisdom.” Therefore wisdom is in
Reply to Objection 2. Although it belongs to those
all those who have charity and are without mortal sin.
alone who are in authority to direct and judge other men,
I answer that, The wisdom of which we are speak-
yet every man is competent to direct and judge his own
ing, as stated above (a. 4), denotes a certain rectitude of
actions, as Dionysius declares (Ep. ad Demophil.).
judgment in the contemplation and consultation of Divine
Reply to Objection 3. Baptized idiots, like little chil-
things, and as to both of these men obtain various degrees
dren, have the habit of wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy
of wisdom through union with Divine things. For the mea-
Ghost, but they have not the act, on account of the bodily
sure of right judgment attained by some, whether in the
impediment which hinders the use of reason in them.
contemplation of Divine things or in directing human af-
Whether the seventh beatitude corresponds to the gift of wisdom?
IIa IIae q. 45 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that the seventh beatitude does
ing to Wis. 7:27: “Through nations she conveyeth her-
not correspond to the gift of wisdom. For the seventh beat-
self into holy souls; she maketh the friends of God and
itude is: “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be
prophets”: whereas peace and the adoption of sons seem
called the children of God.” Now both these things be-
to be remote effects, since they result from charity, as
long to charity: since of peace it is written (Ps. 118:165):
stated above (q. 29, a. 3). Therefore the beatitude cor-
“Much peace have they that love Thy law,” and, as the
responding to wisdom should be determined in respect of
Apostle says (Rom. 5:5), “the charity of God is poured
the love of charity rather than in respect of peace.
forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to
Objection 3. Further, it is written (James 3:17): “The
us,” and Who is “the Spirit of adoption of sons, whereby
wisdom, that is from above, first indeed is chaste, then
we cry: Abba [Father]” (Rom. 8:15). Therefore the sev-
peaceable, modest, easy to be persuaded, consenting to
enth beatitude ought to be ascribed to charity rather than
the good, full of mercy and good fruits, judging without
to wisdom.
dissimulation†.” Therefore the beatitude corresponding to
Objection 2. Further, a thing is declared by its prox-
wisdom should not refer to peace rather than to the other
imate effect rather than by its remote effect. Now the
effects of heavenly wisdom.
proximate effect of wisdom seems to be charity, accord-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
∗ Vulg.: ‘The wisdom that is from above. . . is. . . without judging, without dissimulation’
† Vulg.: ‘without judging, without dissimulation’
1414
Monte i, 4) that “wisdom is becoming to peacemakers, in longs to wisdom, as a gift, not only to contemplate Di-whom there is no movement of rebellion, but only obedi-
vine things, but also to regulate human acts. Now the first
ence to reason.”
thing, to be effected in this direction of human acts is the
I answer that, The seventh beatitude is fittingly as-
removal of evils opposed to wisdom: wherefore fear is
cribed to the gift of wisdom, both as to the merit and as to
said to be “the beginning of wisdom,” because it makes
the reward. The merit is denoted in the words, “Blessed
us shun evil, while the last thing is like an end, whereby
are the peacemakers.” Now a peacemaker is one who
all things are reduced to their right order; and it is this
makes peace, either in himself, or in others: and in both
that constitutes peace. Hence James said with reason that
cases this is the result of setting in due order those things
“the wisdom that is from above” (and this is the gift of the
in which peace is established, for “peace is the tranquil-
Holy Ghost) “first indeed is chaste,” because it avoids the
lity of order,” according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix,
corruption of sin, and “then peaceable,” wherein lies the
13). Now it belongs to wisdom to set things in order, as
ultimate effect of wisdom, for which reason peace is num-
the Philosopher declares (Metaph. i, 2), wherefore peace-
bered among the beatitudes. As to the things that follow,
ableness is fittingly ascribed to wisdom. The reward is
they declare in becoming order the means whereby wis-
expressed in the words, “they shall be called the children
dom leads to peace. For when a man, by chastity, avoids
of God.” Now men are called the children of God in so far
the corruption of sin, the first thing he has to do is, as far
as they participate in the likeness of the only-begotten and
as he can, to be moderate in all things, and in this respect
natural Son of God, according to Rom. 8:29, “Whom He
wisdom is said to be modest. Secondly, in those matters in
foreknew. . . to be made conformable to the image of His
which he is not sufficient by himself, he should be guided
Son,” Who is Wisdom Begotten. Hence by participating
by the advice of others, and as to this we are told further
in the gift of wisdom, man attains to the sonship of God.
that wisdom is “easy to be persuaded.” These two are con-
Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to charity to be at
ditions required that man may be at peace with himself.
peace, but it belongs to wisdom to make peace by set-
But in order that man may be at peace with others it is
ting things in order. Likewise the Holy Ghost is called the
furthermore required, first that he should not be opposed
“Spirit of adoption” in so far as we receive from Him the
to their good; this is what is meant by “consenting to the
likeness of the natural Son, Who is the Begotten Wisdom.
good.” Secondly, that he should bring to his neighbor’s
Reply to Objection 2. These words refer to the Un-
deficiencies, sympathy in his heart, and succor in his ac-
created Wisdom, which in the first place unites itself to
tions, and this is denoted by the words “full of mercy and
us by the gift of charity, and consequently reveals to us
good fruits.” Thirdly, he should strive in all charity to cor-
the mysteries the knowledge of which is infused wisdom.
rect the sins of others, and this is indicated by the words
Hence, the infused wisdom which is a gift, is not the cause
“judging without dissimulation∗,” lest he should purpose
but the effect of charity.
to sate his hatred under cover of correction.
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (a. 3) it be-
∗ Vulg.: ‘The wisdom that is from above. . . is. . . without judging, without dissimulation’
1415
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 46
Of Folly Which Is Opposed to Wisdom
(In Three Articles)
We must now consider folly which is opposed to wisdom; and under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?
(2) Whether folly is a sin?
(3) To which capital sin is it reducible?
Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?
IIa IIae q. 46 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that folly is not con-
For “sapiens” [wise] as Isidore says (Etym. x) “is
trary to wisdom. For seemingly unwisdom is directly
so named from sapor [savor], because just as the taste
opposed to wisdom. But folly does not seem to be the
is quick to distinguish between savors of meats, so is a
same as unwisdom, for the latter is apparently about Di-
wise man in discerning things and causes.” Wherefore it
vine things alone, whereas folly is about both Divine and
is manifest that “folly” is opposed to “wisdom” as its con-
human things. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.
trary, while “fatuity” is opposed to it as a pure negation:
Objection 2. Further, one contrary is not the way to
since the fatuous man lacks the sense of judgment, while
arrive at the other. But folly is the way to arrive at wis-
the fool has the sense, though dulled, whereas the wise
dom, for it is written (1 Cor. 3:18): “If any man among
man has the sense acute and penetrating.
you seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool,
Reply to Objection 1. According to Isidore (Etym.
that he may be wise.” Therefore folly is not opposed to
x), “unwisdom is contrary to wisdom because it lacks the
wisdom.
savor of discretion and sense”; so that unwisdom is seem-
Objection 3. Further, one contrary is not the cause of
ingly the same as folly. Yet a man would appear to be a
the other. But wisdom is the cause of folly; for it is writ-
fool chiefly through some deficiency in the verdict of that
ten (Jer. 10:14): “Every man is become a fool for knowl-
judgment, which is according to the highest cause, for if a
edge,” and wisdom is a kind of knowledge. Moreover, it
man fails in judgment about some trivial matter, he is not
is written (Is. 47:10): “Thy wisdom and thy knowledge,
for that reason called a fool.
this hath deceived thee.” Now it belongs to folly to be
Reply to Objection 2. Just as there is an evil wis-
deceived. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.
dom, as stated above (q. 45, a. 1, ad 1), called “worldly
Objection 4. Further, Isidore says (Etym. x, under the
wisdom,” because it takes for the highest cause and last
letter S) that “a fool is one whom shame does not incite
end some worldly good, so too there is a good folly op-
to sorrow, and who is unconcerned when he is injured.”
posed to this evil wisdom, whereby man despises worldly
But this pertains to spiritual wisdom, according to Gre-
things: and it is of this folly that the Apostle speaks.
gory (Moral. x, 49). Therefore folly is not opposed to
Reply to Objection 3. It is the wisdom of the world
wisdom.
that deceives and makes us foolish in God’s sight, as is
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that
evident from the Apostle’s words (1 Cor. 3:19).
“the gift of wisdom is given as a remedy against folly.”
Reply to Objection 4. To be unconcerned when one is
I answer that, Stultitia [Folly] seems to take its name
injured is sometimes due to the fact that one has no taste
from “stupor”; wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x, under
for worldly things, but only for heavenly things. Hence
the letter of S): “A fool is one who through dullness [stu-
this belongs not to worldly but to Divine wisdom, as Gre-
porem] remains unmoved.” And folly differs from fatu-
gory declares (Moral. x, 49). Sometimes however it is the
ity, according to the same authority (Etym. x), in that
result of a man’s being simply stupid about everything, as
folly implies apathy in the heart and dullness in the senses,
may be seen in idiots, who do not discern what is injurious
while fatuity denotes entire privation of the spiritual sense.
to them, and this belongs to folly simply.
Therefore folly is fittingly opposed to wisdom.
1416
Whether folly is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 46 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that folly is not a sin. For
whereby his sense is rendered incapable of perceiving Di-
no sin arises in us from nature. But some are fools natu-
vine things, according to 1 Cor. 2:14, “The sensual man
rally. Therefore folly is not a sin.
perceiveth not these things that are of the Spirit of God,”
Objection 2. Further, “Every sin is voluntary,” ac-
even as sweet things have no savor for a man whose taste
cording to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv). But folly is
is infected with an evil humor: and such like folly is a sin.
not voluntary. Therefore it is not a sin.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Objection 3. Further, every sin is contrary to a Divine
Reply to Objection 2. Though no man wishes to be
precept. But folly is not contrary to any precept. There-
a fool, yet he wishes those things of which folly is a con-
fore folly is not a sin.
sequence, viz. to withdraw his sense from spiritual things
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 1:32): “The pros-
and to plunge it into earthly things. The same thing hap-
perity of fools shall destroy them.” But no man is de-
pens in regard to other sins; for the lustful man desires
stroyed save for sin. Therefore folly is a sin.
pleasure, without which there is no sin, although he does
I answer that, Folly, as stated above (a. 1), denotes
not desire sin simply, for he would wish to enjoy the plea-
dullness of sense in judging, and chiefly as regards the
sure without sin.
highest cause, which is the last end and the sovereign
Reply to Objection 3. Folly is opposed to the pre-
good. Now a man may in this respect contract dullness
cepts about the contemplation of truth, of which we have
in judgment in two ways. First, from a natural indispo-
spoken above (q. 16) when we were treating of knowledge
sition, as in the case of idiots, and such like folly is no
and understanding.
sin. Secondly, by plunging his sense into earthly things,
Whether folly is a daughter of lust?
IIa IIae q. 46 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that folly is not a daugh-
which is about the greatest of pleasures; and these absorb
ter of lust. For Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) enumerates
the mind more than any others. Therefore the folly which
the daughters of lust, among which however he makes no
is a sin, arises chiefly from lust.
mention of folly. Therefore folly does not proceed from
Reply to Objection 1. It is part of folly that a man
lust.
should have a distaste for God and His gifts. Hence Gre-
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:19):
gory mentions two daughters of lust, pertaining to folly,
“The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God.” Now,
namely, “hatred of God” and “despair of the life to come”;
according to Gregory (Moral. x, 29) “the wisdom of this
thus he divides folly into two parts as it were.
world consists in covering the heart with crafty devices;”
Reply to Objection 2. These words of the Apostle
and this savors of duplicity. Therefore folly is a daughter
are to be understood, not causally but essentially, because,
of duplicity rather than of lust.
to wit, worldly wisdom itself is folly with God. Hence it
Objection 3. Further, anger especially is the cause of
does not follow that whatever belongs to worldly wisdom,
fury and madness in some persons; and this pertains to
is a cause of this folly.
folly. Therefore folly arises from anger rather than from
Reply to Objection 3. Anger by reason of its keen-
lust.
ness, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 48 , Aa. 2,3,4), pro-
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 7:22): “Imme-
duces a great change in the nature of the body, wherefore
diately he followeth her,” i.e. the harlot. . . “not knowing
it conduces very much to the folly which results from a
that he is drawn like a fool to bonds.”
bodily impediment. On the other hand the folly which is
I answer that, As already stated (a. 2), folly, in so far caused by a spiritual impediment, viz. by the mind be-as it is a sin, is caused by the spiritual sense being dulled,
ing plunged into earthly things, arises chiefly from lust,
so as to be incapable of judging spiritual things. Now
as stated above.
man’s sense is plunged into earthly things chiefly by lust,
1417
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 47
Of Prudence, Considered in Itself
(In Sixteen Articles)
After treating of the theological virtues, we must in due sequence consider the cardinal virtues. In the first place we shall consider prudence in itself; secondly, its parts; thirdly, the corresponding gift; fourthly, the contrary vices; fifthly, the precepts concerning prudence.
Under the first head there are sixteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prudence is in the will or in the reason?
(2) If in the reason, whether it is only in the practical, or also in the speculative reason?
(3) Whether it takes cognizance of singulars?
(4) Whether it is virtue?
(5) Whether it is a special virtue?
(6) Whether it appoints the end to the moral virtues?
(7) Whether it fixes the mean in the moral virtues?
(8) Whether its proper act is command?
(9) Whether solicitude or watchfulness belongs to prudence?
(10) Whether prudence extends to the governing of many?
(11) Whether the prudence which regards private good is the same in species as that which regards the common good?
(12) Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?
(13) Whether prudence is in the wicked?
(14) Whether prudence is in all good men?
(15) Whether prudence is in us naturally?
(16) Whether prudence is lost by forgetfulness ?
Whether prudence is in the cognitive or in the appetitive faculty?
IIa IIae q. 47 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not in the
Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but to the cogni-
cognitive but in the appetitive faculty. For Augustine says
tive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence be-
(De Morib. Eccl. xv): “Prudence is love choosing wisely
longs directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive
between the things that help and those that hinder.” Now
faculty, because by the latter we know nothing but what is
love is not in the cognitive, but in the appetitive faculty.
within reach and offers itself to the senses: while to obtain
Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty.
knowledge of the future from knowledge of the present or
Objection 2. Further, as appears from the foregoing
past, which pertains to prudence, belongs properly to the
definition it belongs to prudence “to choose wisely.” But
reason, because this is done by a process of comparison.
choice is an act of the appetitive faculty, as stated above
It follows therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is in
( Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 1). Therefore prudence is not in the
the reason.
cognitive but in the appetitive faculty.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above ( Ia, q. 82, a. 4) Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
the will moves all the faculties to their acts. Now the first
5) that “in art it is better to err voluntarily than involuntaract of the appetitive faculty is love, as stated above ( Ia
ily, whereas in the case of prudence, as of the virtues, it
IIae, q. 25, Aa. 1,2). Accordingly prudence is said to be
is worse.” Now the moral virtues, of which he is treating
love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as love moves to
there, are in the appetitive faculty, whereas art is in the
the act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say
reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather than
that “prudence is love discerning aright that which helps
in the rational faculty.
from that which hinders us in tending to God.” Now love
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu.
is said to discern because it moves the reason to discern.
61): “Prudence is the knowledge of what to seek and what
Reply to Objection 2. The prudent man considers
to avoid.”
things afar off, in so far as they tend to be a help or a hin-
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x): “A pru-
drance to that which has to be done at the present time.
dent man is one who sees as it were from afar, for his
Hence it is clear that those things which prudence consid-
sight is keen, and he foresees the event of uncertainties.”
ers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to the end.
1418
Now of those things that are directed to the end there is sists not in thought merely, but in its application to action,
counsel in the reason, and choice in the appetite, of which
which is the end of the practical reason. Wherefore if any
two, counsel belongs more properly to prudence, since the
defect occur in this, it is most contrary to prudence, since,
Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5,7,9) that a prudent man
the end being of most import in everything, it follows that
“takes good counsel.” But as choice presupposes coun-
a defect which touches the end is the worst of all. Hence
sel, since it is “the desire for what has been already coun-
the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence
selled” (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also be
is “something more than a merely rational habit,” such as
ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as pru-
art is, since, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 57 , a. 4) it in-
dence directs the choice by means of counsel.
cludes application to action, which application is an act of
Reply to Objection 3. The worth of prudence con-
the will.
Whether prudence belongs to the practical reason alone or also to the speculative IIa IIae q. 47 a. 2
reason?
Objection 1. It would seem that prudence belongs not
tends. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as
only to the practical, but also to the speculative reason.
he who reasons well for the realization of a particular end,
For it is written (Prov. 10:23): “Wisdom is prudence to
such as victory, is said to be prudent, not absolutely, but
a man.” Now wisdom consists chiefly in contemplation.
in a particular genus, namely warfare, so he that reasons
Therefore prudence does also.
well with regard to right conduct as a whole, is said to be
Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24):
prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is clear that prudence is
“Prudence is concerned with the quest of truth, and fills
wisdom about human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely,
us with the desire of fuller knowledge.” Now this belongs
because it is not about the absolutely highest cause, for it
to the speculative reason. Therefore prudence resides also
is about human good, and this is not the best thing of all.
in the speculative reason.
And so it is stated significantly that “prudence is wisdom
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher assigns art and
for man,” but not wisdom absolutely.
prudence to the same part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now
Reply to Objection 2. Ambrose, and Tully also (De
art may be not only practical but also speculative, as in
Invent. ii, 53) take the word prudence in a broad sense
the case of the liberal arts. Therefore prudence also is
for any human knowledge, whether speculative or practi-
both practical and speculative.
cal. And yet it may also be replied that the act itself of the
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5)
speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a matter
that prudence is right reason applied to action. Now this
of choice and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently
belongs to none but the practical reason. Therefore pru-
comes under the direction of prudence. On the other hand,
dence is in the practical reason only.
as regards its specification in relation to its object which
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic.
is the “necessary true,” it comes under neither counsel nor
vi, 5) “a prudent man is one who is capable of taking good
prudence.
counsel.” Now counsel is about things that we have to do
Reply to Objection 3. Every application of right rea-
in relation to some end: and the reason that deals with
son in the work of production belongs to art: but to pru-
things to be done for an end is the practical reason. Hence
dence belongs only the application of right reason in mat-
it is evident that prudence resides only in the practical rea-
ters of counsel, which are those wherein there is no fixed
son.
way of obtaining the end, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Since
Reply to Objection 1.
As stated above (q. 45,
then, the speculative reason makes things such as syllo-
Aa. 1,3), wisdom considers the absolutely highest cause:
gisms, propositions and the like, wherein the process fol-
so that the consideration of the highest cause in any par-
lows certain and fixed rules, consequently in respect of
ticular genus belongs to wisdom in that genus. Now in
such things it is possible to have the essentials of art, but
the genus of human acts the highest cause is the common
not of prudence; and so we find such a thing as a specula-
end of all human life, and it is this end that prudence in-
tive art, but not a speculative prudence.
Whether prudence takes cognizance of singulars?
IIa IIae q. 47 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that prudence does not
does not take cognizance except of universals.
take cognizance of singulars. For prudence is in the rea-
Objection 2. Further, singulars are infinite in number.
son, as stated above (Aa. 1,2). But “reason deals with
But the reason cannot comprehend an infinite number of
universals,” according to Phys. i, 5. Therefore prudence
things. Therefore prudence which is right reason, is not
1419
about singulars.
rules to particular cases: hence the conclusions of syllo-
Objection 3. Further, particulars are known by the
gisms are not only universal, but also particular, because
senses. But prudence is not in a sense, for many persons
the intellect by a kind of reflection extends to matter, as
who have keen outward senses are devoid of prudence.
stated in De Anima iii.
Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of singulars.
Reply to Objection 2. It is because the infinite num-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
ber of singulars cannot be comprehended by human rea-
7) that “prudence does not deal with universals only, but
son, that “our counsels are uncertain” (Wis. 9:14). Nev-
needs to take cognizance of singulars also.”
ertheless experience reduces the infinity of singulars to a
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 3), to pru-
certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and
dence belongs not only the consideration of the reason,
the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.
but also the application to action, which is the end of the
Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
practical reason. But no man can conveniently apply one
vi, 8), prudence does not reside in the external senses
thing to another, unless he knows both the thing to be ap-
whereby we know sensible objects, but in the interior
plied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now ac-
sense, which is perfected by memory and experience so
tions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the
as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does not
prudent man to know both the universal principles of rea-
mean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in
son, and the singulars about which actions are concerned.
its principle subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by
Reply to Objection 1. Reason first and chiefly is con-
a kind of application it extends to this sense.
cerned with universals, and yet it is able to apply universal
Whether prudence is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 47 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not a
without considering it under the aspect of good. On the
virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that “pru-
other hand those virtues which regard the rectitude of the
dence is the science of what to desire and what to avoid.”
appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because they
Now science is condivided with virtue, as appears in the
consider the good not only materially, but also formally,
Predicaments (vi). Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
in other words, they consider that which is good under the
Objection 2. Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but aspect of good.
“there is a virtue of art,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (a. 1, ad
vi, 5): wherefore art is not a virtue. Now there is pru-
3; a. 3) to apply right reason to action, and this is not done
dence in art, for it is written (2 Paralip. ii, 14) concerning
without a right appetite. Hence prudence has the nature of
Hiram, that he knew “to grave all sort of graving, and to
virtue not only as the other intellectual virtues have it, but
devise ingeniously [prudenter] all that there may be need
also as the moral virtues have it, among which virtues it is
of in the work.” Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
enumerated.
Objection 3. Further, no virtue can be immoderate.
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine there takes science
But prudence is immoderate, else it would be useless to
in the broad sense for any kind of right reason.
say (Prov. 23:4): “Set bounds to thy prudence.” There-
Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher says that there
fore prudence is not a virtue.
is a virtue of art, because art does not require rectitude of
On the contrary, Gregory states (Moral.
ii, 49)
the appetite; wherefore in order that a man may make right
that prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice are four
use of his art, he needs to have a virtue which will rectify
virtues.
his appetite. Prudence however has nothing to do with
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 3; Ia the matter of art, because art is both directed to a partic-IIae, q. 56, a. 1) when we were treating of virtues in gen-
ular end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And
eral, “virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and
yet, by a kind of comparison, a man may be said to act
his work good likewise.” Now good may be understood in
prudently in matters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on
a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing that is good, account of the uncertainty of the means for obtaining the
secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under
end, there is need for counsel, as for instance in the arts of
the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power.
medicine and navigation, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3.
Hence if any habits rectify the consideration of reason,
Reply to Objection 3. This saying of the wise man
without regarding the rectitude of the appetite, they have
does not mean that prudence itself should be moderate,
less of the nature of a virtue since they direct man to good
but that moderation must be imposed on other things ac-
materially, that is to say, to the thing which is good, but
cording to prudence.
1420
Whether prudence is a special virtue?
IIa IIae q. 47 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not a spe-
in the aspect of an object, that requires a difference of
cial virtue. For no special virtue is included in the defini-
powers, will “a fortiori” require a difference of habits.
tion of virtue in general, since virtue is defined (Ethic. ii,
Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the
6) “an elective habit that follows a mean appointed by rea-
reason, as stated above (a. 2), it is differentiated from the
son in relation to ourselves, even as a wise man decides.”
other intellectual virtues by a material difference of ob-
Now right reason is reason in accordance with prudence,
jects. “Wisdom,” “knowledge” and “understanding” are
as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a
about necessary things, whereas “art” and “prudence” are
special virtue.
about contingent things, art being concerned with “things
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
made,” that is, with things produced in external matter,
13) that “the effect of moral virtue is right action as re-
such as a house, a knife and so forth; and prudence, be-
gards the end, and that of prudence, right action as regards
ing concerned with “things done,” that is, with things that
the means.” Now in every virtue certain things have to be
have their being in the doer himself, as stated above ( Ia
done as means to the end. Therefore prudence is in every
IIae, q. 57, a. 4). On the other hand prudence is differen-
virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue.
tiated from the moral virtues according to a formal aspect
Objection 3. Further, a special virtue has a special ob-
distinctive of powers, i.e. the intellective power, wherein
ject. But prudence has not a special object, for it is right
is prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral
reason “applied to action” (Ethic. vi, 5); and all works
virtue. Hence it is evident that prudence is a special virtue,
of virtue are actions. Therefore prudence is not a special
distinct from all other virtues.
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1. This is not a definition of
On the contrary, It is distinct from and numbered
virtue in general, but of moral virtue, the definition of
among the other virtues, for it is written (Wis. 8:7): “She
which fittingly includes an intellectual virtue, viz., pru-
teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude.”
dence, which has the same matter in common with moral
I answer that, Since acts and habits take their species
virtue; because, just as the subject of moral virtue is some-
from their objects, as shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3; Ia
thing that partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the as-
IIae, q. 18, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2 ), any habit that has a pect of virtue, in so far as it partakes of intellectual virtue.
corresponding special object, distinct from other objects,
Reply to Objection 2. This argument proves that pru-
must needs be a special habit, and if it be a good habit, it
dence helps all the virtues, and works in all of them; but
must be a special virtue. Now an object is called special,
this does not suffice to prove that it is not a special virtue; not merely according to the consideration of its matter, but
for nothing prevents a certain genus from containing a
rather according to its formal aspect, as explained above (
species which is operative in every other species of that
Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2, ad 1). Because one and the same thing
same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bod-
is the subject matter of the acts of different habits, and
ies.
also of different powers, according to its different formal
Reply to Objection 3. Things done are indeed the
aspects. Now a yet greater difference of object is requisite
matter of prudence, in so far as they are the object of rea-
for a difference of powers than for a difference of habits,
son, that is, considered as true: but they are the matter of
since several habits are found in the same power, as stated
the moral virtues, in so far as they are the object of the
above ( Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 1). Consequently any difference
appetitive power, that is, considered as good.
Whether prudence appoints the end to moral virtues?
IIa IIae q. 47 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that prudence appoints
tures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures, accord-
the end to moral virtues. Since prudence is in the reason,
ing to Polit. i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are
while moral virtue is in the appetite, it seems that pru-
directed to reason as to their end. But prudence is “right
dence stands in relation to moral virtue, as reason to the
reason applied to action,” as stated above (a. 2). Therefore
appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the appetitive
all actions are directed to prudence as their end. Therefore
power. Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral
prudence appoints the end to all moral virtues.
virtues.
Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or
Objection 2. Further, man surpasses irrational beings
power that is concerned about the end, to command the
by his reason, but he has other things in common with
virtues or arts that are concerned about the means. Now
them. Accordingly the other parts of man are in relation
prudence disposes of the other moral virtues, and com-
to his reason, what man is in relation to irrational crea-
mands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them.
1421
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 3); while certain things are in the prac-12) that “moral virtue ensures the rectitude of the inten-
tical reason by way of conclusions, and such are the means
tion of the end, while prudence ensures the rectitude of
which we gather from the ends themselves. About these
the means.” Therefore it does not belong to prudence to
is prudence, which applies universal principles to the par-
appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the
ticular conclusions of practical matters. Consequently it
means.
does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral
I answer that, The end of moral virtues is human
virtues, but only to regulate the means.
good. Now the good of the human soul is to be in ac-
Reply to Objection 1. Natural reason known by the
cord with reason, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv).
name of “synderesis” appoints the end to moral virtues, as
Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of necessity pre-
stated above ( Ia, q. 79, a. 12): but prudence does not do
exist in the reason.
this for the reason given above.
Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are cer-
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
tain things naturally known, about which is “understand-
Reply to Objection 3. The end concerns the moral
ing,” and certain things of which we obtain knowledge
virtues, not as though they appointed the end, but because
through them, viz. conclusions, about which is “science,”
they tend to the end which is appointed by natural reason.
so in the practical reason, certain things pre-exist, as natu-
In this they are helped by prudence, which prepares the
rally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral
way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it follows
virtues, since the end is in practical matters what princi-
that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and
ples are in speculative matters, as stated above (q. 23, a. 7,
moves them: yet “synderesis” moves prudence, just as the
ad 2;
understanding of principles moves science.
Whether it belongs to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues?
IIa IIae q. 47 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong
temperance intends that man should not stray from rea-
to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues. For the
son for the sake of his concupiscences; fortitude, that he
achievement of the mean is the end of moral virtues. But
should not stray from the right judgment of reason through
prudence does not appoint the end to moral virtues, as
fear or daring. Moreover this end is appointed to man ac-
shown above (a. 6). Therefore it does not find the mean in
cording to natural reason, since natural reason dictates to
them.
each one that he should act according to reason.
Objection 2. Further, that which of itself has being,
But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in
would seem to have no cause, but its very being is its
what manner and by what means man shall obtain the
cause, since a thing is said to have being by reason of its
mean of reason in his deeds. For though the attainment
cause. Now “to follow the mean” belongs to moral virtue
of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet this mean
by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as shown above
is found by the right disposition of these things that are
(a. 5, obj. 1). Therefore prudence does not cause the mean
directed to the end.
in moral virtues.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Objection 3. Further, prudence works after the man-
Reply to Objection 2. Just as a natural agent makes
ner of reason. But moral virtue tends to the mean after
form to be in matter, yet does not make that which is es-
the manner of nature, because, as Tully states (De Invent.
sential to the form to belong to it, so too, prudence ap-
Rhet. ii, 53), “virtue is a habit like a second nature in ac-
points the mean in passions and operations, and yet does
cord with reason.” Therefore prudence does not appoint
not make the searching of the mean to belong to virtue.
the mean to moral virtues.
Reply to Objection 3. Moral virtue after the man-
On the contrary, In the foregoing definition of moral
ner of nature intends to attain the mean. Since, however,
virtue (a. 5, obj. 1) it is stated that it “follows a mean ap-
the mean as such is not found in all matters after the same
pointed by reason. . . even as a wise man decides.”
manner, it follows that the inclination of nature which ever
I answer that, The proper end of each moral virtue
works in the same manner, does not suffice for this pur-
consists precisely in conformity with right reason. For
pose, and so the ruling of prudence is required.
1422
Whether command is the chief act of prudence?
IIa IIae q. 47 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that command is not the
to action the things counselled and judged. And since this
chief act of prudence. For command regards the good to
act approaches nearer to the end of the practical reason, it
be ensued. Now Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) states that
follows that it is the chief act of the practical reason, and
it is an act of prudence “to avoid ambushes.” Therefore
consequently of prudence.
command is not the chief act of prudence.
In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
art consists in judging and not in commanding: wherefore
5) that “the prudent man takes good counsel.” Now “to
he who sins voluntarily against his craft is reputed a bet-
take counsel” and “to command” seem to be different acts,
ter craftsman than he who does so involuntarily, because
as appears from what has been said above ( Ia IIae, q. 57,
the former seems to do so from right judgment, and the
a. 6). Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.
latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is
Objection 3. Further, it seems to belong to the will
the reverse in prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5, for it is
to command and to rule, since the will has the end for
more imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lack-
its object, and moves the other powers of the soul. Now
ing in the chief act of prudence, viz. command, than to
prudence is not in the will, but in the reason. Therefore
sin involuntarily.
command is not an act of prudence.
Reply to Objection 1. The act of command extends
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10)
both to the ensuing of good and to the avoidance of evil.
that “prudence commands.”
Nevertheless Augustine ascribes “the avoidance of am-
I answer that, Prudence is “right reason applied to ac-
bushes” to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an act of
tion,” as stated above (a. 2). Hence that which is the chief
prudence that does not continue in heaven.
act of reason in regard to action must needs be the chief
Reply to Objection 2. Good counsel is required in
act of prudence. Now there are three such acts. The first is
order that the good things discovered may be applied to
“to take counsel,” which belongs to discovery, for counsel
action: wherefore command belongs to prudence which
is an act of inquiry, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 14, a. 1).
takes good counsel.
The second act is “to judge of what one has discovered,”
Reply to Objection 3. Simply to move belongs to the
and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the practi-
will: but command denotes motion together with a kind
cal reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its
of ordering, wherefore it is an act of the reason, as stated
third act is “to command,” which act consists in applying
above ( Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 1).
Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?
IIa IIae q. 47 a. 9
Objection 1.
It would seem that solicitude does
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 4:7): “Be pru-
not belong to prudence. For solicitude implies disquiet,
dent. . . and watch in prayers.” But watchfulness is the
wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that “a solicitous man is
same as solicitude. Therefore solicitude belongs to pru-
a restless man.” Now motion belongs chiefly to the appet-
dence.
itive power: wherefore solicitude does also. But prudence
I answer that, According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man
is not in the appetitive power, but in the reason, as stated
is said to be solicitous through being shrewd [solers] and
above (a. 1). Therefore solicitude does not belong to pru-
alert [citus], in so far as a man through a certain shrewd-
dence.
ness of mind is on the alert to do whatever has to be done.
Objection 2. Further, the certainty of truth seems op-
Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief act is a com-
posed to solicitude, wherefore it is related (1 Kings 9:20)
mand about what has been already counselled and judged
that Samuel said to Saul: “As for the asses which were lost
in matters of action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
three days ago, be not solicitous, because they are found.”
vi, 9) that “one should be quick in carrying out the coun-
Now the certainty of truth belongs to prudence, since it is
sel taken, but slow in taking counsel.” Hence it is that
an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude is in opposition
solicitude belongs properly to prudence, and for this rea-
to prudence rather than belonging to it.
son Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv) that “prudence
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
keeps most careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we be
3) the “magnanimous man is slow and leisurely.” Now
deceived unawares by evil counsel.”
slowness is contrary to solicitude. Since then prudence is
Reply to Objection 1. Movement belongs to the ap-
not opposed to magnanimity, for “good is not opposed to
petitive power as to the principle of movement, in accor-
good,” as stated in the Predicaments (viii) it would seem
dance however, with the direction and command of rea-
that solicitude does not belong to prudence.
son, wherein solicitude consists.
1423
Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher to be “slow and leisurely” not because he is solicitous
(Ethic. i, 3), “equal certainty should not be sought in all
about nothing, but because he is not over-solicitous about
things, but in each matter according to its proper mode.”
many things, and is trustful in matters where he ought to
And since the matter of prudence is the contingent singu-
have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them: for over-
lars about which are human actions, the certainty of pru-
much fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude,
dence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude.
since fear makes us take counsel, as stated above ( Ia IIae,
Reply to Objection 3. The magnanimous man is said
q. 44, a. 2) when we were treating of the passion of fear.
Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?
IIa IIae q. 47 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that prudence does not
obtaining a due end, it is evident that prudence regards
extend to the governing of many, but only to the govern-
not only the private good of the individual, but also the
ment of oneself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1)
common good of the multitude.
that virtue directed to the common good is justice. But
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking
prudence differs from justice. Therefore prudence is not
there of moral virtue. Now just as every moral virtue that
directed to the common good.
is directed to the common good is called “legal” justice, so
Objection 2. Further, he seems to be prudent, who
the prudence that is directed to the common good is called
seeks and does good for himself. Now those who seek the
“political” prudence, for the latter stands in the same rela-
common good often neglect their own. Therefore they are
tion to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to moral
not prudent.
virtue.
Objection 3. Further, prudence is specifically distinct
Reply to Objection 2. He that seeks the good of the
from temperance and fortitude. But temperance and forti-
many, seeks in consequence his own good, for two rea-
tude seem to be related only to a man’s own good. There-
sons. First, because the individual good is impossible
fore the same applies to prudence.
without the common good of the family, state, or king-
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 24:45): “Who,
dom. Hence Valerius Maximus says∗ of the ancient Ro-
thinkest thou, is a faithful and prudent [Douay: ‘wise’]
mans that “they would rather be poor in a rich empire than
servant whom his lord hath appointed over his family?”
rich in a poor empire.” Secondly, because, since man is a
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic.
part of the home and state, he must needs consider what
vi, 8) some have held that prudence does not extend to
is good for him by being prudent about the good of the
the common good, but only to the good of the individual,
many. For the good disposition of parts depends on their
and this because they thought that man is not bound to
relation to the whole; thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8)
seek other than his own good. But this opinion is opposed
that “any part which does not harmonize with its whole,
to charity, which “seeketh not her own” (1 Cor. 13:5):
is offensive.”
wherefore the Apostle says of himself (1 Cor. 10:33):
Reply to Objection 3. Even temperance and fortitude
“Not seeking that which is profitable to myself, but to
can be directed to the common good, hence there are pre-
many, that they may be saved.” Moreover it is contrary
cepts of law concerning them as stated in Ethic. v, 1: more
to right reason, which judges the common good to be bet-
so, however, prudence and justice, since these belong to
ter than the good of the individual.
the rational faculty which directly regards the universal,
Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to
just as the sensitive part regards singulars.
counsel, judge, and command concerning the means of
Whether prudence about one’s own good is specifically the same as that which extends IIa IIae q. 47 a. 11
to the common good?
Objection 1. It seems that prudence about one’s own
whom it is architectonic, as it were. Since then prudence
good is the same specifically as that which extends to the
is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence and po-
common good. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that
litical prudence are the same habit.
“political prudence, and prudence are the same habit, yet
Objection 3. Further, a habit is not diversified in
their essence is not the same.”
species or essence by things which are subordinate to one
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii,
another. But the particular good, which belongs to pru-
2) that “virtue is the same in a good man and in a good
dence simply so called, is subordinate to the common
ruler.” Now political prudence is chiefly in the ruler, in
good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore pru-
∗ Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv, 6
1424
dence and political prudence differ neither specifically nor Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher means, not
essentially.
that political prudence is substantially the same habit as
On the contrary, “Political prudence,” which is di-
any kind of prudence, but that it is the same as the pru-
rected to the common good of the state, “domestic econ-
dence which is directed to the common good. This is
omy” which is of such things as relate to the common
called “prudence” in respect of the common notion of pru-
good of the household or family, and “monastic economy”
dence, i.e. as being right reason applied to action, while
which is concerned with things affecting the good of one
it is called “political,” as being directed to the common
person, are all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner
good.
there are different kinds of prudence, corresponding to the
Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher declares
above differences of matter.
(Polit. iii, 2), “it belongs to a good man to be able to rule
I answer that, As stated above (a. 5; q. 54, a. 2, ad
well and to obey well,” wherefore the virtue of a good
1), the species of habits differ according to the difference
man includes also that of a good ruler. Yet the virtue of
of object considered in its formal aspect. Now the for-
the ruler and of the subject differs specifically, even as the
mal aspect of all things directed to the end, is taken from
virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated by the same
the end itself, as shown above ( Ia IIae, Prolog.; Ia IIae,
authority (Polit. iii, 2).
q. 102, a. 1), wherefore the species of habits differ by their
Reply to Objection 3. Even different ends, one of
relation to different ends. Again the individual good, the
which is subordinate to the other, diversify the species of
good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom
a habit, thus for instance, habits directed to riding, soldier-
are different ends. Wherefore there must needs be differ-
ing, and civic life, differ specifically although their ends
ent species of prudence corresponding to these different
are subordinate to one another. In like manner, though the
ends, so that one is “prudence” simply so called, which is
good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the
directed to one’s own good; another, “domestic prudence”
many, that does not prevent this difference from making
which is directed to the common good of the home; and a
the habits differ specifically; but it follows that the habit
third, “political prudence,” which is directed to the com-
which is directed to the last end is above the other habits
mon good of the state or kingdom.
and commands them.
Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?
IIa IIae q. 47 a. 12
Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not in
fore it is proper to a man to reason and be prudent in so
subjects but only in their rulers. For the Philosopher says
far as he has a share in ruling and governing. But it is evi-
(Polit. iii, 2) that “prudence alone is the virtue proper to
dent that the subject as subject, and the slave as slave, are
a ruler, while other virtues are common to subjects and
not competent to rule and govern, but rather to be ruled
rulers, and the prudence of the subject is not a virtue but a
and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a
true opinion.”
slave as slave, nor of a subject as subject.
Objection 2. Further, it is stated in Polit. i, 5 that
Since, however, every man, for as much as he is ra-
“a slave is not competent to take counsel.” But prudence
tional, has a share in ruling according to the judgment of
makes a man take good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore
reason, he is proportionately competent to have prudence.
prudence is not befitting slaves or subjects.
Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is in the ruler “af-
Objection 3. Further, prudence exercises command,
ter the manner of a mastercraft” (Ethic. vi, 8), but in the
as stated above (a. 8). But command is not in the compe-
subjects, “after the manner of a handicraft.”
tency of slaves or subjects but only of rulers. Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. The saying of the Philosopher
prudence is not in subjects but only in rulers.
is to be understood strictly, namely, that prudence is not
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
the virtue of a subject as such.
8) that there are two kinds of political prudence, one of
Reply to Objection 2. A slave is not capable of tak-
which is “legislative” and belongs to rulers, while the
ing counsel, in so far as he is a slave (for thus he is the
other “retains the common name political,” and is about
instrument of his master), but he does take counsel in so
“individual actions.” Now it belongs also to subjects to
far as he is a rational animal.
perform these individual actions. Therefore prudence is
Reply to Objection 3. By prudence a man commands
not only in rulers but also in subjects.
not only others, but also himself, in so far as the reason is
I answer that, Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling
said to command the lower powers.
and governing belong properly to the reason; and there-
1425
Whether prudence can be in sinners?
IIa IIae q. 47 a. 13
Objection 1. It would seem that there can be prudence
a good judgment, even about things concerning life as a
in sinners. For our Lord said (Lk. 16:8): “The children
whole, but fails to make an effective command.
of this world are more prudent [Douay: ‘wiser’] in their
The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes
generation than the children of light.” Now the children
counsel, judges and commands aright in respect of the
of this world are sinners. Therefore there be prudence in
good end of man’s whole life: and this alone is prudence
sinners.
simply so-called, and cannot be in sinners, whereas the
Objection 2. Further, faith is a more excellent virtue
first prudence is in sinners alone, while imperfect pru-
than prudence. But there can be faith in sinners. Therefore
dence is common to good and wicked men, especially that
there can be prudence also.
which is imperfect through being directed to a particular
Objection 3. Further, according to Ethic. vi, 7, “we
end, since that which is imperfect on account of a failing
say that to be of good counsel is the work of prudent man
in the chief act, is only in the wicked.
especially.” Now many sinners can take good counsel.
Reply to Objection 1. This saying of our Lord is to be
Therefore sinners can have prudence.
understood of the first prudence, wherefore it is not said
On the contrary, The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi,
that they are prudent absolutely, but that they are prudent
12) that “it is impossible for a man be prudent unless he be
in “their generation.”
good.” Now no inner is a good man. Therefore no sinner
Reply to Objection 2. The nature of faith consists not
is prudent.
in conformity with the appetite for certain right actions,
I answer that, Prudence is threefold. There is a false
but in knowledge alone. On the other hand prudence im-
prudence, which takes its name from its likeness to true
plies a relation to a right appetite. First because its princi-
prudence. For since a prudent man is one who disposes
ples are the ends in matters of action; and of such ends
well of the things that have to be done for a good end,
one forms a right estimate through the habits of moral
whoever disposes well of such things as are fitting for an
virtue, which rectify the appetite: wherefore without the
evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he takes
moral virtues there is no prudence, as shown above ( Ia
for an end, is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus
IIae, q. 58, a. 5); secondly because prudence commands
man is called “a good robber,” and in this way may speak
right actions, which does not happen unless the appetite
of “a prudent robber,” by way of similarity, because he
be right. Wherefore though faith on account of its object
devises fitting ways of committing robbery. This is the
is more excellent than prudence, yet prudence, by its very
prudence of which the Apostle says (Rom. 8:6): “The
nature, is more opposed to sin, which arises from a disor-
prudence [Douay: ‘wisdom’] of the flesh is death,” be-
der of the appetite.
cause, to wit, it places its ultimate end in the pleasures of
Reply to Objection 3. Sinners can take good counsel
the flesh.
for an evil end, or for some particular good, but they do
The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because
not perfectly take good counsel for the end of their whole
it devises fitting ways of obtaining a good end; and yet
life, since they do not carry that counsel into effect. Hence
it is imperfect, from a twofold source. First, because the
they lack prudence which is directed to the good only; and
good which it takes for an end, is not the common end of
yet in them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12)
all human life, but of some particular affair; thus when a
there is “cleverness,”∗ i.e. natural diligence which may
man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of sail-
be directed to both good and evil; or “cunning,”† which is
ing a ship, he is called a prudent businessman, or a pru-
directed only to evil, and which we have stated above, to
dent sailor; secondly, because he fails in the chief act of
be “false prudence” or “prudence of the flesh.”
prudence, as when a man takes counsel aright, and forms
Whether prudence is in all who have grace?
IIa IIae q. 47 a. 14
Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not in
Yet many have grace who do not take good counsel, and
all who have grace. Prudence requires diligence, that one
need to be guided by the counsel of others. Therefore not
may foresee aright what has to be done. But many who
all who have grace, have prudence
have grace have not this diligence. Therefore not all who
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii,
have grace have prudence.
2) that “young people are not obviously prudent.” Yet
Objection 2. Further, a prudent man is one who takes
many young people have grace. Therefore prudence is
good counsel, as stated above (a. 8, obj. 2; a. 13, obj. 3).
not to be found in all who have grace.
∗ deinotike
† panourgia
1426
On the contrary, No man has grace unless he be vir-Reply to Objection 2.
Those who require to be
tuous. Now no man can be virtuous without prudence, for
guided by the counsel of others, are able, if they have
Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46) that “the other virtues can-
grace, to take counsel for themselves in this point at least,
not be virtues at all unless they effect prudently what they
that they require the counsel of others and can discern
desire to accomplish.” Therefore all who have grace have
good from evil counsel.
prudence.
Reply to Objection 3. Acquired prudence is caused
I answer that, The virtues must needs be connected
by the exercise of acts, wherefore “its acquisition de-
together, so that whoever has one has all, as stated above
mands experience and time” (Ethic. ii, 1), hence it can-
( Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1). Now whoever has grace has charity,
not be in the young, neither in habit nor in act. On the
so that he must needs have all the other virtues, and hence,
other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infu-
since prudence is a virtue, as shown above (a. 4), he must,
sion. Wherefore, in children who have been baptized but
of necessity, have prudence also.
have not come to the use of reason, there is prudence as
Reply to Objection 1. Diligence is twofold: one is
to habit but not as to act, even as in idiots; whereas in
merely sufficient with regard to things necessary for sal-
those who have come to the use of reason, it is also as to
vation; and such diligence is given to all who have grace,
act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This by
whom “His unction teacheth of all things” (1 Jn. 2:27).
practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as
There is also another diligence which is more than suffi-
the other virtues. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that
cient, whereby a man is able to make provision both for
“strong meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom
himself and for others, not only in matters necessary for
have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and
salvation, but also in all things relating to human life; and
evil.”
such diligence as this is not in all who have grace.
Whether prudence is in us by nature?
IIa IIae q. 47 a. 15
Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is in us by
either are known naturally, as shown above (a. 6): except
nature. The Philosopher says that things connected with
that the common principles of prudence are more connat-
prudence “seem to be natural,” namely “synesis, gnome”∗
ural to man; for as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x,
and the like, but not those which are connected with spec-
7) “the life which is according to the speculative reason
ulative wisdom. Now things belonging to the same genus
is better than that which is according to man”: whereas
have the same kind of origin. Therefore prudence also is
the secondary universal principles, whether of the spec-
in us from nature.
ulative or of the practical reason, are not inherited from
Objection 2. Further, the changes of age are accord-
nature, but are acquired by discovery through experience,
ing to nature. Now prudence results from age, according
or through teaching.
to Job 12:12: “In the ancient is wisdom, and in length of
On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of par-
days prudence.” Therefore prudence is natural.
ticulars which are the matter of action, we must make a
Objection 3. Further, prudence is more consistent
further distinction, because this matter of action is either
with human nature than with that of dumb animals. Now
an end or the means to an end. Now the right ends of
there are instances of a certain natural prudence in dumb
human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a natural in-
animals, according to the Philosopher (De Hist. Anim.
clination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated
viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural.
above ( Ia IIae, q. 51, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 63, a. 1) that some,
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1)
from a natural inclination, have certain virtues whereby
that “intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by
they are inclined to right ends; and consequently they also
teaching; it therefore demands experience and time.” Now
have naturally a right judgment about such like ends.
prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (a. 4).
But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from
Therefore prudence is in us, not by nature, but by teach-
being fixed, are of manifold variety according to the va-
ing and experience.
riety of persons and affairs. Wherefore since the inclina-
I answer that, As shown above (a. 3), prudence in-
tion of nature is ever to something fixed, the knowledge of
cludes knowledge both of universals, and of the singular
those means cannot be in man naturally, although, by rea-
matters of action to which prudence applies the univer-
son of his natural disposition, one man has a greater apti-
sal principles. Accordingly, as regards the knowledge of
tude than another in discerning them, just as it happens
universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of specu-
with regard to the conclusions of speculative sciences.
lative science, because the primary universal principles of
Since then prudence is not about the ends, but about the
∗ synesis and gnome, Cf. Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 6
1427
means, as stated above (a. 6; Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 5), it follows not only because their natural disposition calms the move-that prudence is not from nature.
ment of the sensitive passions, but also because of their
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking
long experience.
there of things relating to prudence, in so far as they are
Reply to Objection 3. Even in dumb animals there
directed to ends. Wherefore he had said before (Ethic.
are fixed ways of obtaining an end, wherefore we observe
vi, 5,11) that “they are the principles of the ou heneka”∗, that all the animals of a same species act in like manner.
namely, the end; and so he does not mention euboulia
But this is impossible in man, on account of his reason,
among them, because it takes counsel about the means.
which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently
Reply to Objection 2. Prudence is rather in the old,
extends to an infinity of singulars.
Whether prudence can be lost through forgetfulness?
IIa IIae q. 47 a. 16
Objection 1. It would seem that prudence can be lost
cipal act is one of command, whereby a man applies the
through forgetfulness. For since science is about nec-
knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and oper-
essary things, it is more certain than prudence which is
ation. Hence prudence is not taken away directly by for-
about contingent matters of action. But science is lost by
getfulness, but rather is corrupted by the passions. For the
forgetfulness. Much more therefore is prudence.
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “pleasure and sorrow
Objection 2. Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
pervert the estimate of prudence”: wherefore it is writ-
ii, 3) “the same things, but by a contrary process, engen-
ten (Dan. 13:56): “Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust
der and corrupt virtue.” Now the engendering of prudence
hath subverted thy heart,” and (Ex. 23:8): “Neither shalt
requires experience which is made up “of many memo-
thou take bribes which blind even the prudent [Douay:
ries,” as he states at the beginning of his Metaphysics (i,
‘wise’].”
1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory,
Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so
it seems that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.
far as the latter’s command depends on knowledge which
Objection 3. Further, there is no prudence without
may be forgotten.
knowledge of universals. But knowledge of universals
Reply to Objection 1. Science is in the reason only:
can be lost through forgetfulness. Therefore prudence can
hence the comparison fails, as stated above†.
also.
Reply to Objection 2. The experience required by
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5)
prudence results not from memory alone, but also from
that “forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence.”
the practice of commanding aright.
I answer that, Forgetfulness regards knowledge only,
Reply to Objection 3. Prudence consists chiefly, not
wherefore one can forget art and science, so as to lose
in the knowledge of universals, but in applying them to
them altogether, because they belong to the reason. But
action, as stated above (a. 3). Wherefore forgetting the
prudence consists not in knowledge alone, but also in an
knowledge of universals does not destroy the principal
act of the appetite, because as stated above (a. 8), its prin-
part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above.
∗ Literally, ‘for the sake of which’ (are the means)
† Cf. Ia IIae, q. 53, a. 1
1428
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 48
Of the Parts of Prudence
(In One Article)
We must now consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Which are the parts of prudence?
(2) Of its integral parts;
(3) Of its subjective parts;
(4) Of its potential parts.
Whether three parts of prudence are fittingly assigned?
IIa IIae q. 48 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the parts of pru-
tential,” as the nutritive and sensitive powers are parts of
dence are assigned unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet.
the soul. Accordingly, parts can be assigned to a virtue in
ii, 53) assigns three parts of prudence, namely, “mem-
three ways. First, in likeness to integral parts, so that the
ory,” “understanding” and “foresight.”
Macrobius (In
things which need to concur for the perfect act of a virtue,
Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus ascribes
are called the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of all
to prudence six parts, namely, “reasoning,” “understand-
the things mentioned above, eight may be taken as parts
ing,” “circumspection,” “foresight,” “docility” and “cau-
of prudence, namely, the six assigned by Macrobius; with
tion.” Aristotle says (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11) that “good coun-
the addition of a seventh, viz. “memory” mentioned by
sel,” “synesis” and “gnome” belong to prudence. Again
Tully; and eustochia or “shrewdness” mentioned by Arisunder the head of prudence he mentions “conjecture,”
totle. For the “sense” of prudence is also called “under-
“shrewdness,” “sense” and “understanding.” And another
standing”: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11):
Greek philosopher∗ says that ten things are connected
“Of such things one needs to have the sense, and this is
with prudence, namely, “good counsel,” “shrewdness,”
understanding.” Of these eight, five belong to prudence
“foresight,” “regnative†,” “military,” “political” and “do-
as a cognitive virtue, namely, “memory,” “reasoning,”
mestic prudence,” “dialectics,” “rhetoric” and “physics.”
“understanding,” “docility” and “shrewdness”: while the
Therefore it seems that one or the other enumeration is
three others belong thereto, as commanding and apply-
either excessive or deficient.
ing knowledge to action, namely, “foresight,” “circum-
Objection 2. Further, prudence is specifically distinct
spection” and “caution.” The reason of their difference
from science. But politics, economics, logic, rhetoric,
is seen from the fact that three things may be observed
physics are sciences. Therefore they are not parts of pru-
in reference to knowledge. In the first place, knowledge
dence.
itself, which, if it be of the past, is called “memory,” if
Objection 3. Further, the parts do not exceed the
of the present, whether contingent or necessary, is called
whole. Now the intellective memory or intelligence, rea-
“understanding” or “intelligence.” Secondly, the acquir-
son, sense and docility, belong not only to prudence but
ing of knowledge, which is caused either by teaching, to
also to all the cognitive habits. Therefore they should not
which pertains “docility,” or by “discovery,” and to this
be set down as parts of prudence.
belongs to eustochia, i.e. “a happy conjecture,” of which Objection 4. Further, just as counselling, judging and
“shrewdness” is a part, which is a “quick conjecture of
commanding are acts of the practical reason, so also is us-
the middle term,” as stated in Poster. i, 9. Thirdly, the
ing, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 16, a. 1 ). Therefore,
use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed from things
just as “eubulia” which refers to counsel, is connected
known to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this
with prudence, and “synesis” and “gnome” which refer to
belongs to “reasoning.” And the reason, in order to com-
judgment, so also ought something to have been assigned
mand aright, requires to have three conditions. First, to
corresponding to use.
order that which is befitting the end, and this belongs to
Objection 5. Further, solicitude pertains to prudence,
“foresight”; secondly, to attend to the circumstances of
as stated above (q. 47, a. 9). Therefore solicitude also
the matter in hand, and this belongs to “circumspection”;
should have been mentioned among the parts of prudence.
thirdly, to avoid obstacles, and this belongs to “caution.”
I answer that, Parts are of three kinds, namely, “inte-
The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species.
gral,” as wall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house;
In this way the parts of prudence, if we take them prop-
“subjective,” as ox and lion are parts of animal; and “po-
erly, are the prudence whereby a man rules himself, and
∗ Andronicus; Cf. q. 80, obj. 4
† Regnativa
1429
the prudence whereby a man governs a multitude, which nected with it, which are directed to certain secondary
differ specifically as stated above (q. 47, a. 11). Again,
acts or matters, not having, as it were, the whole power
the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided
of the principal virtue. In this way the parts of prudence
into various species according to the various kinds of mul-
are “good counsel,” which concerns counsel, “synesis,”
titude. There is the multitude which is united together for
which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occur-
some particular purpose; thus an army is gathered together
rence, and “gnome,” which concerns judgment in matters
to fight, and the prudence that governs this is called “mil-
of exception to the law: while “prudence” is about the
itary.” There is also the multitude that is united together
chief act, viz. that of commanding.
for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a home or
Reply to Objection 1. The various enumerations dif-
family, and this is ruled by “domestic prudence”: and such
fer, either because different kinds of parts are assigned,
again is the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling prin-
or because that which is mentioned in one enumera-
ciple of which is “regnative prudence” in the ruler, and
tion includes several mentioned in another enumeration.
“political prudence,” simply so called, in the subjects.
Thus Tully includes “caution” and “circumspection” un-
If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as
der “foresight,” and “reasoning,” “docility” and “shrewd-
including also speculative knowledge, as stated above
ness” under “understanding.”
(q. 47, a. 2, ad 2) then its parts include “dialectics,”
Reply to Objection 2. Here domestic and civic pru-
“rhetoric” and “physics,” according to three methods of
dence are not to be taken as sciences, but as kinds of pru-
prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the attaining
dence. As to the other three, the reply may be gathered
of science by demonstration, which belongs to “physics”
from what has been said.
(if physics be understood to comprise all demonstrative
Reply to Objection 3. All these things are reckoned
sciences). The second method is to arrive at an opinion
parts of prudence, not by taking them altogether, but in
through probable premises, and this belongs to “dialec-
so far as they are connected with things pertaining to pru-
tics.” The third method is to employ conjectures in order
dence.
to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade somewhat,
Reply to Objection 4.
Right command and right
and this belongs to “rhetoric.” It may be said, however,
use always go together, because the reason’s command
that these three belong also to prudence properly so called,
is followed by obedience on the part of the lower powers,
since it argues sometimes from necessary premises, some-
which pertain to use.
times from probabilities, and sometimes from conjectures.
Reply to Objection 5. Solicitude is included under
The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues con-
foresight.
1430
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 49
Of Each Quasi-Integral Part of Prudence
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Memory;
(2) Understanding or Intelligence;
(3) Docility;
(4) Shrewdness;
(5) Reason;
(6) Foresight;
(7) Circumspection;
(8) Caution.
Whether memory is a part of prudence?
IIa IIae q. 49 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that memory is not a part
in our nature, while its perfection comes through practice
of prudence. For memory, as the Philosopher proves (De
or grace, so too, as Tully says in his Rhetoric†, memory
Memor. et Remin. i), is in the sensitive part of the soul:
not only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and
whereas prudence is in the rational part (Ethic. vi, 5).
diligence.
Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
There are four things whereby a man perfects his
Objection 2. Further, prudence is acquired and per-
memory. First, when a man wishes to remember a thing,
fected by experience, whereas memory is in us from na-
he should take some suitable yet somewhat unwonted il-
ture. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
lustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us more, and
Objection 3.
Further, memory regards the past,
so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind;
whereas prudence regards future matters of action, about
the mind; and this explains why we remember better what
which counsel is concerned, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2,7.
we saw when we were children. Now the reason for the
Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
necessity of finding these illustrations or images, is that
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53)
simple and spiritual impressions easily slip from the mind,
places memory among the parts of prudence.
unless they be tied as it were to some corporeal image,
I answer that, Prudence regards contingent matters
because human knowledge has a greater hold on sensible
of action, as stated above (q. 47, a. 5). Now in such like
objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sen-
matters a man can be directed, not by those things that are
sitive part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes
simply and necessarily true, but by those which occur in
to retain in his memory he must carefully consider and
the majority of cases: because principles must be propor-
set in order, so that he may pass easily from one memory
tionate to their conclusions, and “like must be concluded
to another. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memor. et
from like” (Ethic. vi∗). But we need experience to dis-
Remin. ii): “Sometimes a place brings memories back to
cover what is true in the majority of cases: wherefore the
us: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that “intellectual virtue is
to the other.” Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest
engendered and fostered by experience and time.” Now
about the things we wish to remember, because the more
experience is the result of many memories as stated in
a thing is impressed on the mind, the less it is liable to
Metaph. i, 1, and therefore prudence requires the mem-
slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric‡ that
ory of many things. Hence memory is fittingly accounted
“anxiety preserves the figures of images entire.” Fourthly,
a part of prudence.
we should often reflect on the things we wish to remem-
Reply to Objection 1.
As stated above (q. 47,
ber. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that “re-
Aa. 3,6), prudence applies universal knowledge to par-
flection preserves memories,” because as he remarks (De
ticulars which are objects of sense: hence many things
Memoria ii) “custom is a second nature”: wherefore when
belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite for pru-
we reflect on a thing frequently, we quickly call it to mind,
dence, and memory is one of them.
through passing from one thing to another by a kind of
Reply to Objection 2. Just as aptitude for prudence is
natural order.
∗ Anal. Post. i. 32
† Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16,24
‡ Ad
Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii.
1431
Reply to Objection 3. It behooves us to argue, as it the future.
were, about the future from the past; wherefore memory
of the past is necessary in order to take good counsel for
Whether understanding∗ is a part of prudence?
IIa IIae q. 49 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that understanding is not
minates, as in a conclusion, in the particular matter of ac-
a part of prudence. When two things are members of a di-
tion, to which, as stated above (q. 47, Aa. 3,6), it applies
vision, one is not part of the other. But intellectual virtue
the knowledge of some universal principle. Now a singu-
is divided into understanding and prudence, according to
lar conclusion is argued from a universal and a singular
Ethic. vi, 3. Therefore understanding should not be reck-
proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of prudence must
oned a part of prudence.
proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is cog-
Objection 2.
Further, understanding is numbered
nizant of universals, and this belongs to the understanding
among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and corresponds to
which is an intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally
faith, as stated above (q. 8, Aa. 1,8). But prudence is a
not only speculative principles, but also practical univer-
virtue other than faith, as is clear from what has been said
sal principles, such as “One should do evil to no man,”
above (q. 4, a. 8; Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 2). Therefore under-
as shown above (q. 47, a. 6). The other understanding,
standing does not pertain to prudence.
as stated in Ethic. vi, 11, is cognizant of an extreme, i.e.
Objection 3. Further, prudence is about singular mat-
of some primary singular and contingent practical matter,
ters of action (Ethic. vi, 7): whereas understanding takes
viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in
cognizance of universal and immaterial objects (De An-
the syllogism of prudence, as stated above (q. 47, Aa. 3,6).
ima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not a part of pru-
Now this primary singular is some singular end, as stated
dence.
in the same place. Wherefore the understanding which is
On the contrary, Tully† accounts “intelligence” a part
a part of prudence is a right estimate of some particular
of prudence, and Macrobius‡ mentions “understanding,”
end.
which comes to the same.
Reply to Objection 2. The understanding which is a
I answer that, Understanding denotes here, not the
gift of the Holy Ghost, is a quick insight into divine things,
intellectual power, but the right estimate about some final
as shown above (q. 8, Aa. 1,2). It is in another sense that
principle, which is taken as self-evident: thus we are said
it is accounted a part of prudence, as stated above.
to understand the first principles of demonstrations. Now
Reply to Objection 3. The right estimate about a par-
every deduction of reason proceeds from certain state-
ticular end is called both “understanding,” in so far as its
ments which are taken as primary: wherefore every pro-
object is a principle, and “sense,” in so far as its object is
cess of reasoning must needs proceed from some under-
a particular. This is what the Philosopher means when he
standing. Therefore since prudence is right reason applied
says (Ethic. v, 11): “Of such things we need to have the
to action, the whole process of prudence must needs have
sense, and this is understanding.” But this is to be under-
its source in understanding. Hence it is that understanding
stood as referring, not to the particular sense whereby we
is reckoned a part of prudence.
know proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby
Reply to Objection 1. The reasoning of prudence ter-
we judge of a particular.
Whether docility should be accounted a part of prudence?
IIa IIae q. 49 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that docility should not
their natural disposition. Therefore it is not a part of pru-
be accounted a part of prudence. For that which is a nec-
dence.
essary condition of every intellectual virtue, should not
Objection 3.
Further, docility is in the disciple:
be appropriated to one of them. But docility is requisite
whereas prudence, since it makes precepts, seems rather
for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it should not be
to belong to teachers, who are also called “preceptors.”
accounted a part of prudence.
Therefore docility is not a part of prudence.
Objection 2. Further, that which pertains to a human
On the contrary, Macrobius§ following the opinion
virtue is in our power, since it is for things that are in our
of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence.
power that we are praised or blamed. Now it is not in our
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2, ad 1; q. 47, a. 3) power to be docile, for this is befitting to some through
prudence is concerned with particular matters of action,
∗ Otherwise intuition; Aristotle’s word is nous
† De Invent. Rhet. ii,
53
‡ In Somn. Scip. i, 8
§ In Somn. Scip. i, 8
1432
and since such matters are of infinite variety, no one man Reply to Objection 1. Although docility is useful for
can consider them all sufficiently; nor can this be done
every intellectual virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly,
quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence in matters
for the reason given above.
of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught
Reply to Objection 2. Man has a natural aptitude for
by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane
docility even as for other things connected with prudence.
understanding of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore
Yet his own efforts count for much towards the attainment
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): “It is right to pay no
of perfect docility: and he must carefully, frequently and
less attention to the undemonstrated assertions and opin-
reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the learned,
ions of such persons as are experienced, older than we are,
neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising
and prudent, than to their demonstrations, for their expe-
them through pride.
rience gives them an insight into principles.” Thus it is
Reply to Objection 3. By prudence man makes pre-
written (Prov. 3:5): “Lean not on thy own prudence,” and
cepts not only for others, but also for himself, as stated
(Ecclus. 6:35): “Stand in the multitude of the ancients”
above (q. 47, a. 12, ad 3). Hence as stated (Ethic. vi, 11),
(i.e. the old men), “that are wise, and join thyself from
even in subjects, there is place for prudence; to which
thy heart to their wisdom.” Now it is a mark of docility
docility pertains. And yet even the learned should be
to be ready to be taught: and consequently docility is fit-
docile in some respects, since no man is altogether self-
tingly reckoned a part of prudence
sufficient in matters of prudence, as stated above.
Whether shrewdness is part of prudence?
IIa IIae q. 49 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that shrewdness is not
a happy conjecture about any matter, while shrewdness is
a part of prudence. For shrewdness consists in easily
“an easy and rapid conjecture in finding the middle term”
finding the middle term for demonstrations, as stated in
(Poster. i, 34). Nevertheless the philosopher† who calls
Poster. i, 34. Now the reasoning of prudence is not a
shrewdness a part of prudence, takes it for eustochia, in demonstration since it deals with contingencies. There-general, hence he says: “Shrewdness is a habit whereby
fore shrewdness does not pertain to prudence.
congruities are discovered rapidly.”
Objection 2. Further, good counsel pertains to pru-
Reply to Objection 1. Shrewdness is concerned with
dence according to Ethic. vi, 5,7,9. Now there is no place
the discovery of the middle term not only in demonstra-
in good counsel for shrewdness∗ which is a kind of eu-
tive, but also in practical syllogisms, as, for instance,
stochia, i.e. “a happy conjecture”: for the latter is “unrea-when two men are seen to be friends they are reckoned to
soning and rapid,” whereas counsel needs to be slow, as
be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher says (Poster.
stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore shrewdness should not be
i, 34). In this way shrewdness belongs to prudence.
accounted a part of prudence.
Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher adduces the
Objection 3.
Further, shrewdness as stated above
true reason (Ethic. vi, 9) to prove that euboulia, i.e. good (q. 48) is a “happy conjecture.” Now it belongs to rhetori-counsel, is not eustochia, which is commended for grasp-cians to make use of conjectures. Therefore shrewdness
ing quickly what should be done. Now a man may take
belongs to rhetoric rather than to prudence.
good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing,
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): “A solici-
and yet this does not discount the utility of a happy con-
tous man is one who is shrewd and alert [solers citus].”
jecture in taking good counsel: indeed it is sometimes a
But solicitude belongs to prudence, as stated above (q. 47,
necessity, when, for instance, something has to be done
a. 9). Therefore shrewdness does also.
without warning. It is for this reason that shrewdness is
I answer that, Prudence consists in a right estimate
fittingly reckoned a part of prudence.
about matters of action. Now a right estimate or opinion
Reply to Objection 3. Rhetoric also reasons about
is acquired in two ways, both in practical and in specu-
practical matters, wherefore nothing hinders the same
lative matters, first by discovering it oneself, secondly by
thing belonging both to rhetoric and prudence. Never-
learning it from others. Now just as docility consists in a
theless, conjecture is taken here not only in the sense in
man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from
which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applica-
another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to ac-
ble to all matters whatsoever wherein man is said to con-
quire a right estimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be
jecture the truth.
taken for eustochia, of which it is a part. For eustochia is
∗ Ethic. vi, 9; Poster. i, 34
† Andronicus; Cf. q. 48, obj. 1
1433
Whether reason should be reckoned a part of prudence?
IIa IIae q. 49 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that reason should not be
Reply to Objection 1. Reason denotes here, not the
reckoned a part of prudence. For the subject of an acci-
power of reason, but its good use.
dent is not a part thereof. But prudence is in the reason as
Reply to Objection 2. The certitude of reason comes
its subject (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore reason should not be
from the intellect. Yet the need of reason is from a defect
reckoned a part of prudence.
in the intellect, since those things in which the intellec-
Objection 2. Further, that which is common to many,
tive power is in full vigor, have no need for reason, for
should not be reckoned a part of any one of them; or if it
they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as do
be so reckoned, it should be reckoned a part of that one to
God and the angels. On the other hand particular matters
which it chiefly belongs. Now reason is necessary in all
of action, wherein prudence guides, are very far from the
the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom and science,
condition of things intelligible, and so much the farther, as
which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason
they are less certain and fixed. Thus matters of art, though
should not be reckoned a part of prudence
they are singular, are nevertheless more fixed and certain,
Objection 3. Further, reason as a power does not dif-
wherefore in many of them there is no room for counsel
fer essentially from the intelligence, as stated above ( Ia,
on account of their certitude, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3.
q. 79, a. 8). If therefore intelligence be reckoned a part of
Hence, although in certain other intellectual virtues rea-
prudence, it is superfluous to add reason.
son is more certain than in prudence, yet prudence above
On the contrary, Macrobius∗, following the opinion
all requires that man be an apt reasoner, so that he may
of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.
rightly apply universals to particulars, which latter are var-
I answer that, The work of prudence is to take good
ious and uncertain.
counsel, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Now counsel is a re-
Reply to Objection 3. Although intelligence and rea-
search proceeding from certain things to others. But this is
son are not different powers, yet they are named after dif-
the work of reason. Wherefore it is requisite for prudence
ferent acts. For intelligence takes its name from being an
that man should be an apt reasoner. And since the things
intimate penetration of the truth†, while reason is so called
required for the perfection of prudence are called requisite
from being inquisitive and discursive. Hence each is ac-
or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason
counted a part of reason as explained above (a. 2; q. 47,
should be numbered among these parts.
a. 2 ,3).
Whether foresight‡ should be accounted a part of prudence?
IIa IIae q. 49 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that foresight should not
I answer that, As stated above (q. 47, a. 1, ad 2,
be accounted a part of prudence. For nothing is part of
Aa. 6,13), prudence is properly about the means to an
itself. Now foresight seems to be the same as prudence,
end, and its proper work is to set them in due order to
because according to Isidore (Etym. x), “a prudent man is
the end. And although certain things are necessary for an
one who sees from afar [porro videns]”: and this is also
end, which are subject to divine providence, yet nothing
the derivation of “providentia [foresight],” according to
is subject to human providence except the contingent mat-
Boethius (De Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part
ters of actions which can be done by man for an end. Now
of prudence.
the past has become a kind of necessity, since what has
Objection 2.
Further, prudence is only practical,
been done cannot be undone. In like manner, the present
whereas foresight may be also speculative, because “see-
as such, has a kind of necessity, since it is necessary that
ing,” whence we have the word “to foresee,” has more to
Socrates sit, so long as he sits.
do with speculation than operation. Therefore foresight is
Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can
not a part of prudence.
be directed by man to the end of human life, are the mat-
Objection 3. Further, the chief act of prudence is to
ter of prudence: and each of these things is implied in the
command, while its secondary act is to judge and to take
word foresight, for it implies the notion of something dis-
counsel. But none of these seems to be properly implied
tant, to which that which occurs in the present has to be
by foresight. Therefore foresight is not part of prudence.
directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence.
On the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Mac-
Reply to Objection 1. Whenever many things are req-
robius, who number foresight among the parts of pru-
uisite for a unity, one of them must needs be the principal
dence, as stated above (q. 48).
to which all the others are subordinate. Hence in every
∗ In Somn. Scip. i
† Cf. IIa IIae, q. 8, a. 1
‡ “Providentia,” which
may be translated either “providence” or “foresight.”
1434
whole one part must be formal and predominant, whence tant, since they are everywhere and always, though they
the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the prin-
are distant from us, in so far as we fail to know them.
cipal of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is
Hence foresight does not apply properly to speculative,
required for prudence, is necessary precisely that some
but only to practical matters.
particular thing may be rightly directed to its end. Hence
Reply to Objection 3. Right order to an end which is
it is that the very name of prudence is taken from foresight
included in the notion of foresight, contains rectitude of
[providentia] as from its principal part.
counsel, judgment and command, without which no right
Reply to Objection 2. Speculation is about universal
order to the end is possible.
and necessary things, which, in themselves, are not dis-
Whether circumspection can be a part of prudence?
IIa IIae q. 49 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that circumspection can-
combinations of circumstances, it happens that a thing is
not be a part of prudence. For circumspection seems to
good in itself and suitable to the end, and nevertheless
signify looking at one’s surroundings. But these are of
becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by reason of some
infinite number, and cannot be considered by the reason
combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of love
wherein is prudence. Therefore circumspection should
to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way
not be reckoned a part of prudence.
to arouse love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flat-
Objection 2. Further, circumstances seem to be the
tery arise in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable
concern of moral virtues rather than of prudence. But
to the end. Hence the need of circumspection in prudence,
circumspection seems to denote nothing but attention to
viz. of comparing the means with the circumstances.
circumstances. Therefore circumspection apparently be-
Reply to Objection 1. Though the number of pos-
longs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.
sible circumstances be infinite, the number of actual cir-
Objection 3. Further, whoever can see things afar off
cumstances is not; and the judgment of reason in matters
can much more see things that are near. Now foresight
of action is influenced by things which are few in number
enables a man to look on distant things. Therefore there is
Reply to Objection 2. Circumstances are the con-
no need to account circumspection a part of prudence in
cern of prudence, because prudence has to fix them; on
addition to foresight.
the other hand they are the concern of moral virtues, in so
On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius,
far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing of circum-
quoted above (q. 48).
stances.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), it belongs to
Reply to Objection 3. Just as it belongs to foresight to prudence chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and
look on that which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it
this is not done aright unless both the end be good, and
belongs to circumspection to consider whether it be suit-
the means good and suitable.
able to the end in view of the circumstances. Now each of
Since, however, prudence, as stated above (q. 47, a. 3)
these presents a difficulty of its own, and therefore each is
is about singular matters of action, which contain many
reckoned a distinct part of prudence.
Whether caution should be reckoned a part of prudence?
IIa IIae q. 49 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that caution should not be
impossible. But no man can take precautions against all
reckoned a part of prudence. For when no evil is possible,
possible evils. Therefore caution does not belong to pru-
no caution is required. Now no man makes evil use of
dence.
virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). There-
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): “See
fore caution does not belong to prudence which directs the
how you walk cautiously [Douay: ‘circumspectly’].”
virtues.
I answer that, The things with which prudence is con-
Objection 2. Further, to foresee good and to avoid
cerned, are contingent matters of action, wherein, even
evil belong to the same faculty, just as the same art gives
as false is found with true, so is evil mingled with good,
health and cures ill-health. Now it belongs to foresight to
on account of the great variety of these matters of action,
foresee good, and consequently, also to avoid evil. There-
wherein good is often hindered by evil, and evil has the
fore caution should not be accounted a part of prudence,
appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution,
distinct from foresight.
so that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.
Objection 3. Further, no prudent man strives for the
Reply to Objection 1. Caution is required in moral
1435
acts, that we may be on our guard, not against acts of grasped by reason, and against them caution is directed,
virtue, but against the hindrance of acts of virtue.
either that they may be avoided altogether, or that they
Reply to Objection 2. It is the same in idea, to en-
may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and
sue good and to avoid the opposite evil, but the avoidance
by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number,
of outward hindrances is different in idea. Hence caution
cannot be grasped by reason, nor is man able to take pre-
differs from foresight, although they both belong to the
cautions against them, although by exercising prudence he
one virtue of prudence.
is able to prepare against all the surprises of chance, so as
Reply to Objection 3. Of the evils which man has to
to suffer less harm thereby.
avoid, some are of frequent occurrence; the like can be
1436
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 50
Of the Subjective Parts of Prudence
(In Four Articles)
We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence. And since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man rules himself (q. 47, seqq.), it remains for us to discuss the species of prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative?
(2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of prudence?
(4) Whether military prudence is?
Whether a species of prudence is regnative?
IIa IIae q. 50 a. 1
Objection 1.
It would seem that regnative should
end. Hence prudence in its special and most perfect sense,
not be reckoned a species of prudence. For regnative
belongs to a king who is charged with the government of
prudence is directed to the preservation of justice, since
a city or kingdom: for which reason a species of prudence
according to Ethic. v, 6 the prince is the guardian of
is reckoned to be regnative.
justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to justice
Reply to Objection 1. All matters connected with
rather than to prudence.
moral virtue belong to prudence as their guide, wherefore
Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher
“right reason in accord with prudence” is included in the
(Polit. iii, 5) a kingdom [regnum] is one of six species of
definition of moral virtue, as stated above (q. 47, a. 5, ad
government. But no species of prudence is ascribed to the
1; Ia IIae, q. 58, a. 2, ad 4). For this reason also the exe-
other five forms of government, which are “aristocracy,”
cution of justice in so far as it is directed to the common
“polity,” also called “timocracy”∗, “tyranny,” “oligarchy”
good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guid-
and “democracy.” Therefore neither should a regnative
ance of prudence. Hence these two virtues—prudence and
species be ascribed to a kingdom.
justice—belong most properly to a king, according to Jer.
Objection 3. Further, lawgiving belongs not only to
23:5: “A king shall reign and shall be wise, and shall ex-
kings, but also to certain others placed in authority, and
ecute justice and judgment in the earth.” Since, however,
even to the people, according to Isidore (Etym. v). Now
direction belongs rather to the king, and execution to his
the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a part of prudence to
subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species of pru-
be “legislative.” Therefore it is not becoming to substitute
dence which is directive, rather than to justice which is
regnative prudence in its place.
executive.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11)
Reply to Objection 2.
A kingdom is the best of
that “prudence is a virtue which is proper to the prince.”
all governments, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10: wherefore
Therefore a special kind of prudence is regnative.
the species of prudence should be denominated rather
I answer that, As stated above (q. 47, Aa. 8,10), it be-
from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under regnative
longs to prudence to govern and command, so that wher-
all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse
ever in human acts we find a special kind of governance
forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accord-
and command, there must be a special kind of prudence.
ingly, do not pertain to prudence.
Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind of
Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher names regna-
governance in one who has to govern not only himself but
tive prudence after the principal act of a king which is to
also the perfect community of a city or kingdom; because
make laws, and although this applies to the other forms of
a government is the more perfect according as it is more
government, this is only in so far as they have a share of
universal, extends to more matters, and attains a higher
kingly government.
∗ Cf. Ethic. viii, 10
1437
Whether political prudence is fittingly accounted a part of prudence?
IIa IIae q. 50 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that political prudence is
actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not
not fittingly accounted a part of prudence. For regnative
in their power but in the power of their movers. On the
is a part of political prudence, as stated above (a. 1). But
other hand, men who are slaves or subjects in any sense,
a part should not be reckoned a species with the whole.
are moved by the commands of others in such a way that
Therefore political prudence should not be reckoned a part
they move themselves by their free-will; wherefore some
of prudence.
kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so
Objection 2. Further, the species of habits are distin-
that they may direct themselves in obeying their superi-
guished by their various objects. Now what the ruler has
ors; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is
to command is the same as what the subject has to exe-
called political.
cute. Therefore political prudence as regards the subjects,
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, regnative is
should not be reckoned a species of prudence distinct from
the most perfect species of prudence, wherefore the pru-
regnative prudence.
dence of subjects, which falls short of regnative prudence,
Objection 3. Further, each subject is an individual
retains the common name of political prudence, even as in
person. Now each individual person can direct himself
logic a convertible term which does not denote the essence
sufficiently by prudence commonly so called. Therefore
of a thing retains the name of “proper.”
there is no need of a special kind of prudence called polit-
Reply to Objection 2. A different aspect of the object
ical.
diversifies the species of a habit, as stated above (q. 47,
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8)
a. 5). Now the same actions are considered by the king,
that “of the prudence which is concerned with the state
but under a more general aspect, as by his subjects who
one kind is a master-prudence and is called legislative;
obey: since many obey one king in various departments.
another kind bears the common name political, and deals
Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political
with individuals.”
prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to
I answer that, A slave is moved by his master, and a
handicraft.
subject by his ruler, by command, but otherwise than as
Reply to Objection 3. Man directs himself by pru-
irrational and inanimate beings are set in motion by their
dence commonly so called, in relation to his own good,
movers. For irrational and inanimate beings are moved
but by political prudence, of which we speak, he directs
only by others and do not put themselves in motion, since
himself in relation to the common good.
they have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own
Whether a part of prudence should be reckoned to be domestic?
IIa IIae q. 50 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that domestic should not
ment of a multitude, “one of which is domestic, another
be reckoned a part of prudence. For, according to the
legislative, and another political.”
Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) “prudence is directed to a good
I answer that, Different aspects of an object, in re-
life in general”: whereas domestic prudence is directed
spect of universality and particularity, or of totality and
to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to Ethic. i, 1.
partiality, diversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such
Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic.
diversity one act of virtue is principal as compared with
Objection 2. Further, as stated above (q. 47, a. 13)
another. Now it is evident that a household is a mean be-
prudence is only in good people. But domestic prudence
tween the individual and the city or kingdom, since just
may be also in wicked people, since many sinners are
as the individual is part of the household, so is the house-
provident in governing their household. Therefore do-
hold part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as
mestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of pru-
prudence commonly so called which governs the individ-
dence.
ual, is distinct from political prudence, so must domestic
Objection 3. Further, just as in a kingdom there is a
prudence be distinct from both.
ruler and subject, so also is there in a household. If there-
Reply to Objection 1. Riches are compared to do-
fore domestic like political is a species of prudence, there
mestic prudence, not as its last end, but as its instrument,
should be a paternal corresponding to regnative prudence.
as stated in Polit. i, 3. On the other hand, the end of po-
Now there is no such prudence. Therefore neither should
litical prudence is “a good life in general” as regards the
domestic prudence be accounted a species of prudence.
conduct of the household. In Ethic. i, 1 the Philosopher
On the contrary, The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi,
speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way
8) that there are various kinds of prudence in the govern-
of example and in accordance with the opinion of many.
1438
Reply to Objection 2. Some sinners may be provi-Reply to Objection 3. The father has in his household
dent in certain matters of detail concerning the disposition
an authority like that of a king, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10, of their household, but not in regard to “a good life in gen-but he has not the full power of a king, wherefore paternal
eral” as regards the conduct of the household, for which
government is not reckoned a distinct species of prudence,
above all a virtuous life is required.
like regnative prudence.
Whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence?
IIa IIae q. 50 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that military prudence
to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to withstand out-
should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence
ward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she
is distinct from art, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Now military
has provided animals not only with the concupiscible fac-
prudence seems to be the art of warfare, according to the
ulty, whereby they are moved to that which is conducive
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore military prudence
to their well-being, but also with the irascible power,
should not be accounted a species of prudence.
whereby the animal withstands an assailant. Therefore
Objection 2. Further, just as military business is con-
in those things also which are in accordance with reason,
tained under political affairs, so too are many other mat-
there should be not only “political” prudence, which dis-
ters, such as those of tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth.
poses in a suitable manner such things as belong to the
But there are no species of prudence corresponding to
common good, but also a “military” prudence, whereby
other affairs in the state. Neither therefore should any be
hostile attacks are repelled.
assigned to military business.
Reply to Objection 1. Military prudence may be an
Objection 3. Further, the soldiers’ bravery counts for
art, in so far as it has certain rules for the right use of cer-a great deal in warfare. Therefore military prudence per-
tain external things, such as arms and horses, but in so far
tains to fortitude rather than to prudence.
as it is directed to the common good, it belongs rather to
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 24:6): “War is
prudence.
managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where
Reply to Objection 2. Other matters in the state are
there are many counsels.” Now it belongs to prudence to
directed to the profit of individuals, whereas the business
take counsel. Therefore there is great need in warfare for
of soldiering is directed to the service belongs to fortitude,
that species of prudence which is called “military.”
but the direction, protection of the entire common good.
I answer that, Whatever things are done according to
Reply to Objection 3. The execution of military ser-
art or reason, should be made to conform to those which
vice belongs to fortitude, but the direction, especially in
are in accordance with nature, and are established by the
so far as it concerns the commander-in-chief, belongs to
Divine Reason. Now nature has a twofold tendency: first,
prudence.
1439
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 51
Of the Virtues Which Are Connected with Prudence
(In Four Articles)
In due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with prudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether euboulia, is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?
(3) Whether synesis is a special virtue?
(4) Whether gnome is a special virtue?
∗
Whether euboulia (deliberating well) is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 51 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that euboulia (deliberat-euboulia (deliberating well) is a human virtue.
ing well) is not a virtue. For, according to Augustine (De
Reply to Objection 1. There is no good counsel ei-
Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) “no man makes evil use of virtue.”
ther in deliberating for an evil end, or in discovering evil
Now some make evil use of euboulia (deliberating well)
means for attaining a good end, even as in speculative
or good counsel, either through devising crafty counsels
matters, there is no good reasoning either in coming to
in order to achieve evil ends, or through committing sin in
a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from
order that they may achieve good ends, as those who rob
false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle
that they may give alms. Therefore euboulia (deliberating term. Hence both the aforesaid processes are contrary to
well) is not a virtue.
euboulia (deliberating well), as the Philosopher declares Objection 2. Further, virtue is a perfection, according
(Ethic. vi, 9).
to Phys. vii. But euboulia (deliberating well) is concerned Reply to Objection 2. Although virtue is essentially a
with counsel, which implies doubt and research, and these
perfection, it does not follow that whatever is the matter of
are marks of imperfection. Therefore euboulia (deliberat-a virtue implies perfection. For man needs to be perfected
ing well) is not a virtue.
by virtues in all his parts, and this not only as regards the
Objection 3. Further, virtues are connected with one
acts of reason, of which counsel is one, but also as regards
another, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65). Now euboulia
the passions of the sensitive appetite, which are still more
(deliberating well) is not connected with the other virtues,
imperfect.
since many sinners take good-counsel, and many godly
It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection
men are slow in taking counsel. Therefore euboulia (de-
according to the mode of man, who is unable by simple
liberating well) is not a virtue.
insight to comprehend with certainty the truth of things,
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher
especially in matters of action which are contingent.
(Ethic. vi, 9) euboulia (deliberating well) “is a right coun-Reply to Objection 3. In no sinner as such is euboulia selling.” Now the perfection of virtue consists in right
(deliberating well) to be found: since all sin is contrary to
reason. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is a virtue.
taking good counsel. For good counsel requires not only
I answer that, As stated above (q. 47, a. 4) the nature
the discovery or devising of fit means for the end, but also
of a human virtue consists in making a human act good.
other circumstances. Such are suitable time, so that one be
Now among the acts of man, it is proper to him to take
neither too slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the
counsel, since this denotes a research of the reason about
mode of taking counsel, so that one be firm in the coun-
the actions he has to perform and whereof human life con-
sel taken, and other like due circumstances, which sinners
sists, for the speculative life is above man, as stated in
fail to observe when they sin. On the other hand, every
Ethic. x. But euboulia (deliberating well) signifies good-virtuous man takes good counsel in those things which are
ness of counsel, for it is derived from the eu, good, and directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does not
boule, counsel, being “a good counsel” or rather “a distake good counsel in other particular matters, for instance
position to take good counsel.” Hence it is evident that
in matters of trade, or warfare, or the like.
∗ These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of deliberating well euboulia, of judging well according to common law synesis, and of judging well according to general law gnome, respectively.
1440
Whether euboulia (deliberating well) is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?
IIa IIae q. 51 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that euboulia (deliberat-wherefore all these belong to the same virtue of charity.
ing well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence. For, ac-
Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are
cording to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), the “prudent man
diverse, nor have they the same kind of goodness: since
is, seemingly, one who takes good counsel.” Now this
it is owing to different causes that a man acquires good
belongs to euboulia (deliberating well) as stated above.
counsel, good judgment, or good command, inasmuch as
Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not distinct from these are sometimes separated from one another. Con-prudence.
sequently euboulia (deliberating well) which makes man
Objection 2. Further, human acts to which human
take good counsel must needs be a distinct virtue from
virtues are directed, are specified chiefly by their end, as
prudence, which makes man command well. And since
stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 18, Aa. 4,6).
counsel is directed to command as to that which is prin-
Now euboulia (deliberating well) and prudence are di-
cipal, so euboulia (deliberating well) is directed to pru-rected to the same end, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9, not in-
dence as to a principal virtue, without which it would be
deed to some particular end, but to the common end of all
no virtue at all, even as neither are the moral virtues with-
life. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not a dis-out prudence, nor the other virtues without charity.
tinct virtue from prudence.
Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to prudence to take
Objection 3. Further, in speculative sciences, research
good counsel by commanding it, to euboulia (deliberating and decision belong to the same science. Therefore in
well) by eliciting it.
like manner these belong to the same virtue in practical
Reply to Objection 2. Different acts are directed in
matters. Now research belongs to euboulia (deliberating different degrees to the one end which is “a good life in
well), while decision belongs to prudence. There euboulia
general”∗: for counsel comes first, judgment follows, and
(deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence.
command comes last. The last named has an immediate
On the contrary, Prudence is preceptive, according to
relation to the last end: whereas the other two acts are
Ethic. vi, 10. But this does not apply to euboulia (delib-related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have certain
erating well). Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is a proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel being the
distinct virtue from prudence.
discovery of what has to be done, and the end of judgment,
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), virtue is prop-
certainty. Hence this proves not that euboulia (deliberaterly directed to an act which it renders good; and con-
ing well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence, but that it
sequently virtues must differ according to different acts,
is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a principal virtue.
especially when there is a different kind of goodness in
Reply to Objection 3. Even in speculative matters
the acts. For, if various acts contained the same kind of
the rational science of dialectics, which is directed to re-
goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus the
search and discovery, is distinct from demonstrative sci-
goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same,
ence, which decides the truth.
Whether synesis (judging well according to common law) is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 51 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that synesis is not a virtue.
wicked man errs. If therefore synesis (judging well ac-
Virtues are not in us by nature, according to Ethic. ii,
cording to common law) be reckoned a virtue directed
1. But synesis (judging well according to common law)
to good judgment, it seems that there is no need for any
is natural to some, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi,
other virtue directed to good command: and consequently
11). Therefore synesis (judging well according to com-
prudence would be superfluous, which is not reasonable.
mon law) is not a virtue.
Therefore synesis (judging well according to common
Objection 2. Further, as stated in the same book (10),
law) is not a virtue.
synesis (judging well according to common law) is noth-
On the contrary, Judgment is more perfect than coun-
ing but “a faculty of judging.” But judgment without com-
sel. But euboulia, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much
mand can be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is only
more, therefore, is synesis (judging well according to
in the good, it seems that synesis (judging well according common law) a virtue, as being good judgment.
to common law) is not a virtue.
I answer that, synesis (judging well according to Objection 3. Further, there is never a defective com-common law) signifies a right judgment, not indeed about
mand, unless there be a defective judgment, at least in
speculative matters, but about particular practical matters,
a particular matter of action; for it is in this that every
about which also is prudence. Hence in Greek some, in re-
∗ Ethic. vi, 5
1441
spect of synesis (judging well according to common law) ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted and mis-are said to be synetoi, i.e. “persons of sense,” or eusynetoi, shapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to
i.e. “men of good sense,” just as on the other hand, those
receive things just as they are in reality, is radically due
who lack this virtue are called asynetoi, i.e. “senseless.”
to nature, but, as to its consummation, is due to practice
Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the
or to a gift of grace, and this in two ways. First directly,
same cause, must correspond to different virtues. And it
on the part of the cognitive power itself, for instance, be-
is evident that goodness of counsel and goodness of judg-
cause it is imbued, not with distorted, but with true and
ment are not reducible to the same cause, for many can
correct ideas: this belongs to synesis (judging well ac-take good counsel, without having good sense so as to
cording to common law) which in this respect is a special
judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good
virtue. Secondly indirectly, through the good disposition
at research, through their reason being quick at arguing
of the appetitive power, the result being that one judges
from one thing to another (which seems to be due to a
well of the objects of appetite: and thus a good judgment
disposition of their power of imagination, which has a fa-
of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but this
cility in forming phantasms), and yet such persons some-
judgment is about the ends, whereas synesis (judging well times lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in
according to common law) is rather about the means.
the intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition
Reply to Objection 2. In wicked men there may be
of the common sense which fails to judge aright). Hence
right judgment of a universal principle, but their judg-
there is need, besides euboulia (deliberating well), for an-ment is always corrupt in the particular matter of action,
other virtue, which judges well, and this is called synesis as stated above (q. 47, a. 13).
(judging well according to common law).
Reply to Objection 3. Sometimes after judging aright
Reply to Objection 1. Right judgment consists in the
we delay to execute or execute negligently or inordinately.
cognitive power apprehending a thing just as it is in real-
Hence after the virtue which judges aright there is a fur-
ity, and this is due to the right disposition of the apprehen-
ther need of a final and principal virtue, which commands
sive power. Thus if a mirror be well disposed the forms of
aright, and this is prudence.
bodies are reflected in it just as they are, whereas if it be
Whether gnome (judging well according to general law) is a special virtue?
IIa IIae q. 51 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that gnome (judging well is a special virtue.
according to general law) is not a special virtue distinct
I answer that cognitive habits differ according to
from synesis (judging well according to common law).
higher and lower principles: thus in speculative matters
For a man is said, in respect of synesis (judging well ac-wisdom considers higher principles than science does, and
cording to common law), to have good judgment. Now no
consequently is distinguished from it; and so must it be
man can be said to have good judgment, unless he judge
also in practical matters. Now it is evident that what is
aright in all things. Therefore synesis (judging well ac-beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is some-
cording to common law) extends to all matters of judg-
times reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus
ment, and consequently there is no other virtue of good
monstrous births of animals are beside the order of the ac-
judgment called gnome (judging well according to gen-
tive seminal force, and yet they come under the order of
eral law).
a higher principle, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher
Objection 2. Further, judgment is midway between
still, of Divine Providence. Hence by considering the ac-
counsel and precept. Now there is only one virtue of good
tive seminal force one could not pronounce a sure judg-
counsel, viz. euboulia (deliberating well) and only one ment on such monstrosities, and yet this is possible if we
virtue of good command, viz. prudence. Therefore there
consider Divine Providence.
is only one virtue of good judgment, viz. synesis (judging Now it happens sometimes that something has to be
well according to common law).
done which is not covered by the common rules of ac-
Objection 3. Further, rare occurrences wherein there
tions, for instance in the case of the enemy of one’s coun-
is need to depart from the common law, seem for the most
try, when it would be wrong to give him back his deposit,
part to happen by chance, and with such things reason is
or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of
not concerned, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. Now all the intel-
such matters according to higher principles than the com-
lectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore there is
mon laws, according to which synesis (judging according no intellectual virtue about such matters.
to common law) judges: and corresponding to such higher
On the contrary, The Philosopher concludes (Ethic.
principles it is necessary to have a higher virtue of judg-
vi, 11) that gnome (judging well according to general law) ment, which is called gnome (judging according to gen-1442
eral law), and which denotes a certain discrimination in which the research of counsel belongs is one for all, but
judgment.
not so synesis (judging well according to common law)
Reply to Objection 1. Synesis (judging well accord-whose act is judicial. Command considers in all matters
ing to common law) judges rightly about all actions that
the one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only
are covered by the common rules: but certain things have
one.
to be judged beside these common rules, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to Divine Provi-
Reply to Objection 2. Judgment about a thing should
dence alone to consider all things that may happen be-
be formed from the proper principles thereof, whereas re-
side the common course. On the other hand, among men,
search is made by employing also common principles.
he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of
Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which
such things by his reason: this belongs to gnome (judging aims at research proceeds from common principles; while
well according to general law), which denotes a certain
demonstration which tends to judgment, proceeds from
discrimination in judgment.
proper principles. Hence euboulia (deliberating well) to 1443
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 52
Of the Gift of Counsel
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the gift of counsel which corresponds to prudence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost?
(2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence?
(3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?
(4) Whether the fifth beatitude, “Blessed are the merciful,” etc. corresponds to the gift of counsel?
Whether counsel should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?
IIa IIae q. 52 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that counsel should not
of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature
be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The gifts
through time and place, and the spiritual creature through
of the Holy Ghost are given as a help to the virtues, ac-
time, but not through place, as Augustine declares (Gen.
cording to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49). Now for the pur-
ad lit. viii, 20,22). Again, it is proper to the rational crea-
pose of taking counsel, man is sufficiently perfected by
ture to be moved through the research of reason to perform
the virtue of prudence, or even of euboulia (deliberating any particular action, and this research is called counsel.
well), as is evident from what has been said (q. 47, a. 1,
Hence the Holy Ghost is said to move the rational creature
ad 2; q. 51, Aa. 1,2). Therefore counsel should not be
by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned among
reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2.
Further, the difference between the
Reply to Objection 1. Prudence or euboulia (delib-seven gifts of the Holy Ghost and the gratuitous graces
erating well), whether acquired or infused, directs man
seems to be that the latter are not given to all, but are di-
in the research of counsel according to principles that the
vided among various people, whereas the gifts of the Holy
reason can grasp; hence prudence or euboulia (deliberat-Ghost are given to all who have the Holy Ghost. But coun-
ing well) makes man take good counsel either for himself
sel seems to be one of those things which are given by the
or for another. Since, however, human reason is unable to
Holy Ghost specially to certain persons, according to 1
grasp the singular and contingent things which may occur,
Macc. 2:65: “Behold. . . your brother Simon is a man of
the result is that “the thoughts of mortal men are fearful,
counsel.” Therefore counsel should be numbered among
and our counsels uncertain” (Wis. 9:14). Hence in the re-
the gratuitous graces rather than among the seven gifts of
search of counsel, man requires to be directed by God who
the Holy Ghost.
comprehends all things: and this is done through the gift
Objection 3.
Further, it is written (Rom.
8:14):
of counsel, whereby man is directed as though counseled
“Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons
by God, just as, in human affairs, those who are unable to
of God.” But counselling is not consistent with being led
take counsel for themselves, seek counsel from those who
by another. Since then the gifts of the Holy Ghost are
are wiser.
most befitting the children of God, who “have received
Reply to Objection 2. That a man be of such good
the spirit of adoption of sons,” it would seem that coun-
counsel as to counsel others, may be due to a gratuitous
sel should not be numbered among the gifts of the Holy
grace; but that a man be counselled by God as to what he
Ghost.
ought to do in matters necessary for salvation is common
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): ”(The Spirit
to all holy persons.
of the Lord) shall rest upon him. . . the spirit of counsel,
Reply to Objection 3. The children of God are moved
and of fortitude.”
by the Holy Ghost according to their mode, without prej-
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 1),
udice to their free-will which is the “faculty of will and
the gifts of the Holy Ghost are dispositions whereby the
reason”∗. Accordingly the gift of counsel is befitting the
soul is rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy
children of God in so far as the reason is instructed by the
Ghost. Now God moves everything according to the mode
Holy Ghost about what we have to do.
∗ Sent. iii, D, 24
1444
Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to the virtue of prudence?
IIa IIae q. 52 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of counsel
a higher principle of movement, as a body through being
does not fittingly correspond to the virtue of prudence.
moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the rectitude
For “the highest point of that which is underneath touches
of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a
that which is above,” as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom.
lower motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason
vii), even as a man comes into contact with the angel in re-
is the supreme rule of all human rectitude. Consequently
spect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are inferior to
prudence, which denotes rectitude of reason, is chiefly
the gifts, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 8). Since, then, perfected and helped through being ruled and moved by
counsel is the first and lowest act of prudence, while com-
the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift of counsel, as
mand is its highest act, and judgment comes between, it
stated above (a. 1). Therefore the gift of counsel corre-
seems that the gift corresponding to prudence is not coun-
sponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it.
sel, but rather a gift of judgment or command.
Reply to Objection 1. To judge and command be-
Objection 2. Further, one gift suffices to help one
longs not to the thing moved, but to the mover. Where-
virtue, since the higher a thing is the more one it is, as
fore, since in the gifts of the Holy Ghost, the position of
proved in De Causis. Now prudence is helped by the gift
the human mind is of one moved rather than of a mover,
of knowledge, which is not only speculative but also prac-
as stated above (a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 1), it follows that
tical, as shown above (q. 9, a. 3). Therefore the gift of
it would be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to pru-
counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.
dence by the name of command or judgment rather than
Objection 3. Further, it belongs properly to prudence
of counsel whereby it is possible to signify that the coun-
to direct, as stated above (q. 47, a. 8). But it belongs to
selled mind is moved by another counselling it.
the gift of counsel that man should be directed by God, as
Reply to Objection 2. The gift of knowledge does not
stated above (a. 1). Therefore the gift of counsel does not
directly correspond to prudence, since it deals with spec-
correspond to the virtue of prudence.
ulative matters: yet by a kind of extension it helps it. On
On the contrary, The gift of counsel is about what
the other hand the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence
has to be done for the sake of the end. Now prudence is
directly, because it is concerned about the same things.
about the same matter. Therefore they correspond to one
Reply to Objection 3.
The mover that is moved,
another.
moves through being moved. Hence the human mind,
I answer that, A lower principle of movement is
from the very fact that it is directed by the Holy Ghost,
helped chiefly, and is perfected through being moved by
is enabled to direct itself and others.
Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?
IIa IIae q. 52 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of counsel
or not to have won.”
does not remain in heaven. For counsel is about what has
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 68,
to be done for the sake of an end. But in heaven nothing
a. 1), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected with the
will have to be done for the sake of an end, since there
motion of the rational creature by God. Now we must
man possesses the last end. Therefore the gift of counsel
observe two points concerning the motion of the human
is not in heaven.
mind by God. First, that the disposition of that which is
Objection 2. Further, counsel implies doubt, for it is
moved, differs while it is being moved from its disposition
absurd to take counsel in matters that are evident, as the
when it is in the term of movement. Indeed if the mover
Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 3). Now all doubt will
is the principle of the movement alone, when the move-
cease in heaven. Therefore there is no counsel in heaven.
ment ceases, the action of the mover ceases as regards
Objection 3. Further, the saints in heaven are most
the thing moved, since it has already reached the term of
conformed to God, according to 1 Jn. 3:2, “When He
movement, even as a house, after it is built, ceases being
shall appear, we shall be like to Him.” But counsel is not
built by the builder. On the other hand, when the mover
becoming to God, according to Rom. 11:34, “Who hath
is cause not only of the movement, but also of the form to
been His counsellor?” Therefore neither to the saints in
which the movement tends, then the action of the mover
heaven is the gift of counsel becoming.
does not cease even after the form has been attained: thus
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xvii, 12):
the sun lightens the air even after it is lightened. In this
“When either the guilt or the righteousness of each na-
way, then, God causes in us virtue and knowledge, not
tion is brought into the debate of the heavenly Court, the
only when we first acquire them, but also as long as we
guardian of that nation is said to have won in the conflict,
persevere in them: and it is thus that God causes in the
1445
blessed a knowledge of what is to be done, not as though Accordingly the gift of counsel is in the blessed, in
they were ignorant, but by continuing that knowledge in
so far as God preserves in them the knowledge that they
them.
have, and enlightens them in their nescience of what has
Nevertheless there are things which the blessed,
to be done.
whether angels or men, do not know: such things are not
Reply to Objection 1. Even in the blessed there are
essential to blessedness, but concern the government of
acts directed to an end, or resulting, as it were, from their
things according to Divine Providence. As regards these,
attainment of the end, such as the acts of praising God,
we must make a further observation, namely, that God
or of helping on others to the end which they themselves
moves the mind of the blessed in one way, and the mind of
have attained, for example the ministrations of the angels,
the wayfarer, in another. For God moves the mind of the
and the prayers of the saints. In this respect the gift of
wayfarer in matters of action, by soothing the pre-existing
counsel finds a place in them.
anxiety of doubt; whereas there is simple nescience in the
Reply to Objection 2. Doubt belongs to counsel ac-
mind of the blessed as regards the things they do not know.
cording to the present state of life, but not to that counsel
From this nescience the angel’s mind is cleansed, accord-
which takes place in heaven. Even so neither have the
ing to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), nor does there pre-
theological virtues quite the same acts in heaven as on the
cede in them any research of doubt, for they simply turn
way thither.
to God; and this is to take counsel of God, for as Augus-
Reply to Objection 3. Counsel is in God, not as re-
tine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) “the angels take counsel of
ceiving but as giving it: and the saints in heaven are con-
God about things beneath them”: wherefore the instruc-
formed to God, as receivers to the source whence they
tion which they receive from God in such matters is called
receive.
“counsel.”
Whether the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, corresponds to the gift of counsel?
IIa IIae q. 52 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the fifth beatitude,
and to give.”
which is that of mercy, does not correspond to the gift of
I answer that, Counsel is properly about things use-
counsel. For all the beatitudes are acts of virtue, as stated
ful for an end. Hence such things as are of most use for
above ( Ia IIae, q. 69, a. 1). Now we are directed by coun-
an end, should above all correspond to the gift of coun-
sel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the fifth beatitude does
sel. Now such is mercy, according to 1 Tim. 4:8, “Godli-
not correspond more than any other to counsel.
ness∗ is profitable to all things.” Therefore the beatitude
Objection 2. Further, precepts are given about matters
of mercy specially corresponds to the gift of counsel, not
necessary for salvation, while counsel is given about mat-
as eliciting but as directing mercy.
ters which are not necessary for salvation. Now mercy is
Reply to Objection 1. Although counsel directs in all
necessary for salvation, according to James 2:13, “Judg-
the acts of virtue, it does so in a special way in works of
ment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy.” On
mercy, for the reason given above.
the other hand poverty is not necessary for salvation, but
Reply to Objection 2. Counsel considered as a gift of
belongs to the life of perfection, according to Mat. 19:21.
the Holy Ghost guides us in all matters that are directed to
Therefore the beatitude of poverty corresponds to the gift
the end of eternal life whether they be necessary for salva-
of counsel, rather than to the beatitude of mercy.
tion or not, and yet not every work of mercy is necessary
Objection 3. Further, the fruits result from the beati-
for salvation.
tudes, for they denote a certain spiritual delight resulting
Reply to Objection 3. Fruit denotes something ulti-
from perfect acts of virtue. Now none of the fruits corre-
mate. Now the ultimate in practical matters consists not
spond to the gift of counsel, as appears from Gal. 5:22, 23.
in knowledge but in an action which is the end. Hence
Therefore neither does the beatitude of mercy correspond
nothing pertaining to practical knowledge is numbered
to the gift of counsel.
among the fruits, but only such things as pertain to action,
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
in which practical knowledge is the guide. Among these
iv): “Counsel is befitting the merciful, because the one
we find “goodness” and “benignity” which correspond to
remedy is to be delivered from evils so great, to pardon,
mercy.
∗ ‘Pietas,’ which our English word ‘pity,’ which is the same as mercy; see note on IIa IIae, q. 30, a. 1
1446
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 53
Of Imprudence
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to prudence. For Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3): “There are vices opposed to every virtue, not only vices that are in manifest opposition to virtue, as temerity is opposed to prudence, but also vices which have a kind of kinship and not a true but a spurious likeness to virtue; thus in opposition to prudence we have craftiness.”
Accordingly we must consider first of all those vices which are in evident opposition to prudence, those namely which are due to a defect either of prudence or of those things which are requisite for prudence, and secondly those vices which have a false resemblance to prudence, those namely which are due to abuse of the things required for prudence. And since solicitude pertains to prudence, the first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Of imprudence; (2) Of negligence which is opposed to solicitude.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Concerning imprudence, whether it is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) Of precipitation or temerity;
(4) Of thoughtlessness;
(5) Of inconstancy;
(6) Concerning the origin of these vices.
Whether imprudence is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 53 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that imprudence is not a
for instance, whereas the right reason of prudence acts
sin. For every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine∗;
by taking counsel, the imprudent man despises counsel,
whereas imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes
and the same applies to the other conditions which re-
to be imprudent. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
quire consideration in the act of prudence. In this way
Objection 2. Further, none but original sin comes to
imprudence is a sin in respect of prudence considered un-
man with his birth. But imprudence comes to man with
der its proper aspect, since it is not possible for a man
his birth, wherefore the young are imprudent; and yet it
to act against prudence, except by infringing the rules on
is not original sin which is opposed to original justice.
which the right reason of prudence depends. Wherefore, if
Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
this should happen through aversion from the Divine Law,
Objection 3. Further, every sin is taken away by re-
it will be a mortal sin, as when a man acts precipitately
pentance. But imprudence is not taken away by repen-
through contempt and rejection of the Divine teaching:
tance. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
whereas if he act beside the Law and without contempt,
On the contrary, The spiritual treasure of grace is not
and without detriment to things necessary for salvation, it
taken away save by sin. But it is taken away by impru-
will be a venial sin.
dence, according to Prov. 21:20, “There is a treasure to
Reply to Objection 1. No man desires the deformity
be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just, and the im-
of imprudence, but the rash man wills the act of impru-
prudent [Douay: ‘foolish’] man shall spend it.” Therefore
dence, because he wishes to act precipitately. Hence the
imprudence is a sin.
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “he who sins willingly
I answer that, Imprudence may be taken in two ways,
against prudence is less to be commended.”
first, as a privation, secondly, as a contrary. Properly
Reply to Objection 2. This argument takes impru-
speaking it is not taken as a negation, so as merely to sig-
dence in the negative sense. It must be observed however
nify the absence of prudence, for this can be without any
that lack of prudence or of any other virtue is included
sin. Taken as a privation, imprudence denotes lack of that
in the lack of original justice which perfected the entire
prudence which a man can and ought to have, and in this
soul. Accordingly all such lack of virtue may be ascribed
sense imprudence is a sin by reason of a man’s negligence
to original sin.
in striving to have prudence.
Reply to Objection 3. Repentance restores infused
Imprudence is taken as a contrary, in so far as the
prudence, and thus the lack of this prudence ceases; but
movement or act of reason is in opposition to prudence:
acquired prudence is not restored as to the habit, although
∗ De Vera Relig. xiv
1447
the contrary act is taken away, wherein properly speaking the sin of imprudence consists.
Whether imprudence is a special sin?
IIa IIae q. 53 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that imprudence is not a
nected with it, and correspond to the several acts of rea-
special sin. For whoever sins, acts against right reason,
son. Thus, by defect of “counsel” to which euboulia (de-i.e. against prudence. But imprudence consists in acting
liberating well) corresponds, “precipitation” or “temerity”
against prudence, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore impru-
is a species of imprudence; by defect of “judgment,” to
dence is not a special sin.
which synesis (judging well according to common law)
Objection 2. Further, prudence is more akin to moral
and gnome (judging well according to general law) re-
action than knowledge is. But ignorance which is opposed
fer, there is “thoughtlessness”; while “inconstancy” and
to knowledge, is reckoned one of the general causes of
“negligence” correspond to the “command” which is the
sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be reckoned
proper act of prudence. Thirdly, this may be taken by op-
among those causes.
position to those things which are requisite for prudence,
Objection 3. Further, sin consists in the corruption
which are the quasi-integral parts of prudence. Since how-
of the circumstances of virtue, wherefore Dionysius says
ever all these things are intended for the direction of the
(Div. Nom. iv) that “evil results from each single defect.”
aforesaid three acts of reason, it follows that all the op-
Now many things are requisite for prudence; for instance,
posite defects are reducible to the four parts mentioned
reason, intelligence docility, and so on, as stated above
above. Thus incautiousness and incircumspection are in-
(Qq. 48,49). Therefore there are many species of impru-
cluded in “thoughtlessness”; lack of docility, memory, or
dence, so that it is not a special sin.
reason is referable to “precipitation”; improvidence, lack
On the contrary, Imprudence is opposed to prudence,
of intelligence and of shrewdness, belong to “negligence”
as stated above (a. 1). Now prudence is a special virtue.
and “inconstancy.”
Therefore imprudence too is one special vice.
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers gen-
I answer that, A vice or sin may be styled general
erality by participation.
in two ways; first, absolutely, because, to wit, it is gen-
Reply to Objection 2. Since knowledge is further re-
eral in respect of all sins; secondly, because it is general
moved from morality than prudence is, according to their
in respect of certain vices, which are its species. In the
respective proper natures, it follows that ignorance has the
first way, a vice may be said to be general on two counts:
nature of mortal sin, not of itself, but on account either of
first, essentially, because it is predicated of all sins: and in a preceding negligence, or of the consequent result, and
this way imprudence is not a general sin, as neither is pru-
for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes of
dence a general virtue: since it is concerned with special
sin. On the other hand imprudence, by its very nature, de-
acts, namely the very acts of reason: secondly, by partic-
notes a moral vice; and for this reason it can be called a
ipation; and in this way imprudence is a general sin: for,
special sin.
just as all the virtues have a share of prudence, in so far
Reply to Objection 3. When various circumstances
as it directs them, so have all vices and sins a share of im-
are corrupted for the same motive, the species of sin is
prudence, because no sin can occur, without some defect
not multiplied: thus it is the same species of sin to take
in an act of the directing reason, which defect belongs to
what is not one’s own, where one ought not, and when one
imprudence.
ought not. If, however, there be various motives, there are
If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not sim-
various species: for instance, if one man were to take an-
ply but in some particular genus, that is, as containing sev-
other’s property from where he ought not, so as to wrong a
eral species of sin, then imprudence is a general sin. For
sacred place, this would constitute the species called sac-
it contains various species in three ways. First, by op-
rilege, while if another were to take another’s property
position to the various subjective parts of prudence, for
when he ought not, merely through the lust of possession,
just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the in-
this would be a case of simple avarice. Hence the lack
dividual, from other kinds that govern communities, as
of those things which are requisite for prudence, does not
stated above (q. 48; q. 50, a. 7 ), so also we distinguish
constitute a diversity of species, except in so far as they
various kinds of imprudence. Secondly, in respect of the
are directed to different acts of reason, as stated above.
quasi-potential parts of prudence, which are virtues con-
1448
Whether precipitation is a sin included in imprudence?
IIa IIae q. 53 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that precipitation is not a
the action performed by the body; while the steps that in-
sin included in imprudence. Imprudence is opposed to the
tervene by which one ought to descend in orderly fashion
virtue of prudence; whereas precipitation is opposed to the
are “memory” of the past, “intelligence” of the present,
gift of counsel, according to Gregory, who says (Moral. ii,
“shrewdness” in considering the future outcome, “reason-
49) that the gift of “counsel is given as a remedy to pre-
ing” which compares one thing with another, “docility”
cipitation.” Therefore precipitation is not a sin contained
in accepting the opinions of others. He that takes coun-
under imprudence.
sel descends by these steps in due order, whereas if a man
Objection 2. Further, precipitation seemingly pertains
is rushed into action by the impulse of his will or of a
to rashness. Now rashness implies presumption, which
passion, without taking these steps, it will be a case of
pertains to pride. Therefore precipitation is not a vice con-
precipitation. Since then inordinate counsel pertains to
tained under imprudence.
imprudence, it is evident that the vice of precipitation is
Objection 3. Further, precipitation seems to denote
contained under imprudence.
inordinate haste. Now sin happens in counselling not only
Reply to Objection 1. Rectitude of counsel belongs
through being over hasty but also through being over slow,
to the gift of counsel and to the virtue of prudence; al-
so that the opportunity for action passes by, and through
beit in different ways, as stated above (q. 52, a. 2), and
corruption of other circumstances, as stated in Ethic. vi,
consequently precipitation is opposed to both.
9. Therefore there is no reason for reckoning precipitation
Reply to Objection 2. Things are said to be done
as a sin contained under imprudence, rather than slow-
rashly when they are not directed by reason: and this may
ness, or something else of the kind pertaining to inordi-
happen in two ways; first through the impulse of the will
nate counsel.
or of a passion, secondly through contempt of the direct-
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 4:19): “The way
ing rule; and this is what is meant by rashness properly
of the wicked is darksome, they know not where they fall.”
speaking, wherefore it appears to proceed from that root
Now the darksome ways of ungodliness belong to impru-
of pride, which refuses to submit to another’s ruling. But
dence. Therefore imprudence leads a man to fall or to be
precipitation refers to both, so that rashness is contained
precipitate.
under precipitation, although precipitation refers rather to
I answer that, Precipitation is ascribed metaphori-
the first.
cally to acts of the soul, by way of similitude to bodily
Reply to Objection 3. Many things have to be con-
movement. Now a thing is said to be precipitated as re-
sidered in the research of reason; hence the Philosopher
gards bodily movement, when it is brought down from
declares (Ethic. vi, 9) that “one should be slow in taking
above by the impulse either of its own movement or of
counsel.” Hence precipitation is more directly opposed to
another’s, and not in orderly fashion by degrees. Now the
rectitude of counsel than over slowness is, for the latter
summit of the soul is the reason, and the base is reached in
bears a certain likeness to right counsel.
Whether thoughtlessness is a special sin included in prudence?
IIa IIae q. 53 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that thoughtlessness is not
has been counselled, and “command”∗. Now thought pre-
a special sin included in imprudence. For the Divine law
cedes all these acts, since it belongs also to the specula-
does not incite us to any sin, according to Ps. 18:8, “The
tive intellect. Therefore thoughtlessness is not a special
law of the Lord is unspotted”; and yet it incites us to be
sin contained under imprudence.
thoughtless, according to Mat. 10:19, “Take no thought
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 4:25): “Let thy
how or what to speak.” Therefore thoughtlessness is not a
eyes look straight on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy
sin.
steps.” Now this pertains to prudence, while the contrary
Objection 2. Further, whoever takes counsel must
pertains to thoughtlessness. Therefore thoughtlessness is
needs give thought to many things. Now precipitation
a special sin contained under imprudence.
is due to a defect of counsel and therefore to a defect
I answer that, Thought signifies the act of the in-
of thought. Therefore precipitation is contained under
tellect in considering the truth about. something. Now
thoughtlessness: and consequently thoughtlessness is not
just as research belongs to the reason, so judgment be-
a special sin.
longs to the intellect. Wherefore in speculative matters
Objection 3. Further, prudence consists in acts of the
a demonstrative science is said to exercise judgment, in
practical reason, viz. “counsel,” “judgment” about what
so far as it judges the truth of the results of research by
∗ Cf. q. 47, a. 8
1449
tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable prin-we can only turn our eyes to God,” according to 2 Paral
ciples. Hence thought pertains chiefly to judgment; and
20:12: else if man, instead of doing what he can, were to
consequently the lack of right judgment belongs to the
be content with awaiting God’s assistance, he would seem
vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, to wit, as one fails to
to tempt God.
judge rightly through contempt or neglect of those things
Reply to Objection 2. All thought about those things
on which a right judgment depends. It is therefore evident
of which counsel takes cognizance, is directed to the for-
that thoughtlessness is a sin.
mation of a right judgment, wherefore this thought is
Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord did not forbid us to
perfected in judgment. Consequently thoughtlessness is
take thought, when we have the opportunity, about what
above all opposed to the rectitude of judgment.
we ought to do or say, but, in the words quoted, He en-
Reply to Objection 3. Thoughtlessness is to be taken
courages His disciples, so that when they had no opportu-
here in relation to a determinate matter, namely, that of
nity of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge
human action, wherein more things have to be thought
or through a sudden call, they should trust in the guid-
about for the purpose of right judgment, than in specula-
ance of God alone, because “as we know not what to do,
tive matters, because actions are about singulars.
Whether inconstancy is a vice contained under prudence?
IIa IIae q. 53 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that inconstancy is not a
fail to do this, it is due to its own weakness in not standing
vice contained under imprudence. For inconstancy con-
to the good purpose it has conceived; hence inconstancy,
sists seemingly in a lack of perseverance in matters of dif-
as to its completion, is due to a defect in the reason. Now
ficulty. But perseverance in difficult matters belongs to
just as all rectitude of the practical reason belongs in some
fortitude. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to fortitude
degree to prudence, so all lack of that rectitude belongs to
rather than to prudence.
imprudence. Consequently inconstancy, as to its comple-
Objection 2.
Further, it is written (James 3:16):
tion, belongs to imprudence. And just as precipitation is
“Where jealousy [Douay: ‘envy’] and contention are,
due to a defect in the act of counsel, and thoughtlessness
there are inconstancy and every evil work.” But jealousy
to a defect in the act of judgment, so inconstancy arises
pertains to envy. Therefore inconstancy pertains not to
from a defect in the act of command. For a man is stated
imprudence but to envy.
to be inconstant because his reason fails in commanding
Objection 3. Further, a man would seem to be in-
what has been counselled and judged.
constant who fails to persevere in what he has proposed
Reply to Objection 1. The good of prudence is shared
to do. Now this is a mark of “incontinency” in pleasur-
by all the moral virtues, and accordingly perseverance in
able matters, and of “effeminacy” or “squeamishness” in
good belongs to all moral virtues, chiefly, however, to for-
unpleasant matters, according to Ethic. vii, 1. Therefore
titude, which suffers a greater impulse to the contrary.
inconstancy does not pertain to imprudence.
Reply to Objection 2. Envy and anger, which are the
On the contrary, It belongs to prudence to prefer the
source of contention, cause inconstancy on the part of the
greater good to the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater
appetite, to which power the origin of inconstancy is due,
good belongs to imprudence. Now this is inconstancy.
as stated above.
Therefore inconstancy belongs to imprudence.
Reply to Objection 3. Continency and perseverance
I answer that, Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a
seem to be not in the appetitive power, but in the reason.
definite good purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal
For the continent man suffers evil concupiscences, and the
is in the appetite, for a man does not withdraw from a
persevering man suffers grievous sorrows (which points to
previous good purpose, except on account of something
a defect in the appetitive power); but reason stands firm, in
being inordinately pleasing to him: nor is this withdrawal
the continent man, against concupiscence, and in the per-
completed except through a defect of reason, which is de-
severing man, against sorrow. Hence continency and per-
ceived in rejecting what before it had rightly accepted.
severance seem to be species of constancy which pertains
And since it can resist the impulse of the passions, if it
to reason; and to this power inconstancy pertains also.
1450
Whether the aforesaid vices arise from lust?
IIa IIae q. 53 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the aforesaid vices do
dence and of every intellectual virtue consists in abstrac-
not arise from lust. For inconstancy arises from envy, as
tion from sensible objects. Wherefore, since the aforesaid
stated above (a. 5, ad 2). But envy is a distinct vice from
vices involve a defect of prudence and of the practical rea-
lust.
son, as stated above (Aa. 2,5), it follows that they arise
Objection 2. Further, it is written (James 1:8): “A
chiefly from lust.
double-minded man is inconstant in all his ways.” Now
Reply to Objection 1. Envy and anger cause incon-
duplicity does not seem to pertain to lust, but rather to de-
stancy by drawing away the reason to something else;
ceitfulness, which is a daughter of covetousness, accord-
whereas lust causes inconstancy by destroying the judg-
ing to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore the aforesaid
ment of reason entirely.
Hence the Philosopher says
vices do not arise from lust.
(Ethic. vii, 6) that “the man who is incontinent through
Objection 3. Further, the aforesaid vices are con-
anger listens to reason, yet not perfectly, whereas he who
nected with some defect of reason. Now spiritual vices
is incontinent through lust does not listen to it at all.”
are more akin to the reason than carnal vices. Therefore
Reply to Objection 2. Duplicity also is something
the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual vices rather than
resulting from lust, just as inconstancy is, if by duplicity
from carnal vices.
we understand fluctuation of the mind from one thing to
On the contrary, Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 45)
another. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. act 1, sc. 1) that
that the aforesaid vices arise from lust.
“love leads to war, and likewise to peace and truce.”
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi,
Reply to Objection 3. Carnal vices destroy the judg-
5) “pleasure above all corrupts the estimate of prudence,”
ment of reason so much the more as they lead us away
and chiefly sexual pleasure which absorbs the mind, and
from reason.
draws it to sensible delight. Now the perfection of pru-
1451
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 54
Of Negligence
(In Three Articles)
We must now consider negligence, under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether negligence is a special sin?
(2) To which virtue is it opposed?
(3) Whether negligence is a mortal sin?
Whether negligence is a special sin?
IIa IIae q. 54 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that negligence is not a
sexual matters, while some vices are special on account
special sin. For negligence is opposed to diligence. But
of their having a special kind of act which extends to all
diligence is required in every virtue. Therefore negligence
kinds of matter, and such are all vices affecting an act
is not a special sin.
of reason, since every act of reason extends to any kind
Objection 2. Further, that which is common to every
of moral matter. Since then solicitude is a special act of
sin is not a special sin. Now negligence is common to
reason, as stated above (q. 47, a. 9), it follows that negli-
every sin, because he who sins neglects that which with-
gence, which denotes lack of solicitude, is a special sin.
draws him from sin, and he who perseveres in sin neglects
Reply to Objection 1. Diligence seems to be the same
to be contrite for his sin. Therefore negligence is not a
as solicitude, because the more we love [diligimus] a thing
special sin.
the more solicitous are we about it. Hence diligence, no
Objection 3. Further, every special sin had a determi-
less than solicitude, is required for every virtue, in so far
nate matter. But negligence seems to have no determinate
as due acts of reason are requisite for every virtue.
matter: since it is neither about evil or indifferent things
Reply to Objection 2. In every sin there must needs
(for no man is accused of negligence if he omit them), nor
be a defect affecting an act of reason, for instance a de-
about good things, for if these be done negligently, they
fect in counsel or the like. Hence just as precipitation is
are no longer good. Therefore it seems that negligence is
a special sin on account of a special act of reason which
not a special vice.
is omitted, namely counsel, although it may be found in
On the contrary, Sins committed through negli-
any kind of sin; so negligence is a special sin on account
gence, are distinguished from those which are committed
of the lack of a special act of reason, namely solicitude,
through contempt.
although it is found more or less in all sins.
I answer that, Negligence denotes lack of due solici-
Reply to Objection 3. Properly speaking the matter
tude. Now every lack of a due act is sinful: wherefore it
of negligence is a good that one ought to do, not that it is a
is evident that negligence is a sin, and that it must needs
good when it is done negligently, but because on account
have the character of a special sin according as solicitude
of negligence it incurs a lack of goodness, whether a due
is the act of a special virtue. For certain sins are spe-
act be entirely omitted through lack of solicitude, or some
cial through being about a special matter, as lust is about
due circumstance be omitted.
Whether negligence is opposed to prudence?
IIa IIae q. 54 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that negligence is not op-
of reason. But negligence does not imply a defect of coun-
posed to prudence. For negligence seems to be the same
sel, for that is “precipitation,” nor a defect of judgment,
as idleness or laziness, which belongs to sloth, according
since that is “thoughtlessness,” nor a defect of command,
to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Now sloth is not opposed
because that is “inconstancy.” Therefore negligence does
to prudence, but to charity, as stated above (q. 35, a. 3).
not pertain to imprudence.
Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.
Objection 4. Further, it is written (Eccles. 7:19): “He
Objection 2. Further, every sin of omission seems
that feareth God, neglecteth nothing.” But every sin is
to be due to negligence. But sins of omission are not
excluded by the opposite virtue. Therefore negligence is
opposed to prudence, but to the executive moral virtues.
opposed to fear rather than to prudence.
Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 20:7): “A bab-
Objection 3. Further, imprudence relates to some act
bler and a fool [imprudens] will regard no time.” Now this
1452
is due to negligence. Therefore negligence is opposed to nal act, for it consists in failing to perform an act which is
prudence.
due. Hence it is opposed to justice, and is an effect of neg-
I answer that, Negligence is directly opposed to solic-
ligence, even as the execution of a just deed is the effect
itude. Now solicitude pertains to the reason, and rectitude
of right reason.
of solicitude to prudence. Hence, on the other hand, negli-
Reply to Objection 3. Negligence regards the act of
gence pertains to imprudence. This appears from its very
command, which solicitude also regards. Yet the negli-
name, because, as Isidore observes (Etym. x) “a negligent
gent man fails in regard to this act otherwise than the in-
man is one who fails to choose [nec eligens]”: and the
constant man: for the inconstant man fails in command-
right choice of the means belongs to prudence. Therefore
ing, being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the
negligence pertains to imprudence.
negligent man fails through lack of a prompt will.
Reply to Objection 1. Negligence is a defect in the
Reply to Objection 4. The fear of God helps us to
internal act, to which choice also belongs: whereas idle-
avoid all sins, because according to Prov. 15:27, “by the
ness and laziness denote slowness of execution, yet so that
fear of the Lord everyone declineth from evil.” Hence fear
idleness denotes slowness in setting about the execution,
makes us avoid negligence, yet not as though negligence
while laziness denotes remissness in the execution itself.
were directly opposed to fear, but because fear incites man
Hence it is becoming that laziness should arise from sloth,
to acts of reason. Wherefore also it has been stated above (
which is “an oppressive sorrow,” i.e. hindering, the mind
Ia IIae, q. 44, a. 2) when we were treating of the passions,
from action∗.
that “fear makes us take counsel.”
Reply to Objection 2. Omission regards the exter-
Whether negligence can be a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 54 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that negligence cannot
from the charity of God, such negligence is a mortal sin,
be a mortal sin. For a gloss of Gregory† on Job 9:28,
and this is the case chiefly when negligence is due to con-
“I feared all my works,” etc. says that “too little love of
tempt.
God aggravates the former,” viz. negligence. But wher-
But if negligence consists in the omission of an act or
ever there is mortal sin, the love of God is done away with
circumstance that is not necessary for salvation, it is not a
altogether. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.
mortal but a venial sin, provided the negligence arise, not
Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Ecclus. 7:34, “For
from contempt, but from some lack of fervor, to which
thy negligences purify thyself with a few,” says: “Though
venial sin is an occasional obstacle.
the offering be small it cleanses the negligences of many
Reply to Objection 1. Man may be said to love God
sins.” Now this would not be, if negligence were a mortal
less in two ways. First through lack of the fervor of char-
sin. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.
ity, and this causes the negligence that is a venial sin: sec-
Objection 3. Further, under the law certain sacrifices
ondly through lack of charity itself, in which sense we
were prescribed for mortal sins, as appears from the book
say that a man loves God less when he loves Him with a
of Leviticus. Yet no sacrifice was prescribed for negli-
merely natural love; and this causes the negligence that is
gence. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.
a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 19:16): “He that
Reply to Objection 2. According to the same author-
neglecteth his own life [Vulg.: ‘way’] shall die.”
ity (gloss), a small offering made with a humble mind and
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2, ad 3), negli-
out of pure love, cleanses man not only from venial but
gence arises out of a certain remissness of the will, the
also from mortal sin.
result being a lack of solicitude on the part of the reason
Reply to Objection 3. When negligence consists in
in commanding what it should command, or as it should
the omission of that which is necessary for salvation, it is
command. Accordingly negligence may happen to be a
drawn to the other more manifest genus of sin. Because
mortal sin in two ways. First on the part of that which is
those sins that consist of inward actions, are more hidden,
omitted through negligence. If this be either an act or a
wherefore no special sacrifices were prescribed for them
circumstance necessary for salvation, it will be a mortal
in the Law, since the offering of sacrifices was a kind of
sin. Secondly on the part of the cause: for if the will be
public confession of sin, whereas hidden sins should not
so remiss about Divine things, as to fall away altogether
be confessed in public.
∗ Cf. q. 35, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 35, a. 8
† Moral. ix. 34
1453
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 55
Of Vices Opposed to Prudence by Way of Resemblance
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider those vices opposed to prudence, which have a resemblance thereto. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether craftiness is a special sin?
(4) Of guile;
(5) Of fraud;
(6) Of solicitude about temporal things;
(7) Of solicitude about the future;
(8) Of the origin of these vices.
Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 55 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that prudence of the flesh
dendo], as stated above (q. 47, a. 1; q. 49, a. 6), which can
is not a sin. For prudence is more excellent than the other
extend to evil things also. Therefore, although prudence is
moral virtues, since it governs them all. But no justice or
taken simply in a good sense, yet, if something be added,
temperance is sinful. Neither therefore is any prudence a
it may be taken in a bad sense: and it is thus that prudence
sin.
of the flesh is said to be a sin.
Objection 2. Further, it is not a sin to act prudently
Reply to Objection 2. The flesh is on account of the
for an end which it is lawful to love. But it is lawful to
soul, as matter is on account of the form, and the instru-
love the flesh, “for no man ever hated his own flesh” (Eph.
ment on account of the principal agent. Hence the flesh is
5:29). Therefore prudence of the flesh is not a sin.
loved lawfully, if it be directed to the good of the soul as
Objection 3. Further, just as man is tempted by the
its end. If, however, a man place his last end in a good of
flesh, so too is he tempted by the world and the devil. But
the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it
no prudence of the world, or of the devil is accounted a
is thus that the prudence of the flesh is directed to the love
sin. Therefore neither should any prudence of the flesh be
of the flesh.
accounted among sins.
Reply to Objection 3.
The devil tempts us, not
On the contrary, No man is an enemy to God save for
through the good of the appetible object, but by way of
wickedness according to Wis. 14:9, “To God the wicked
suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence implies direction
and his wickedness are hateful alike.” Now it is written
to some appetible end, we do not speak of “prudence of
(Rom. 8:7): “The prudence [Vulg.: ‘wisdom’] of the flesh
the devil,” as of a prudence directed to some evil end,
is an enemy to God.” Therefore prudence of the flesh is a
which is the aspect under which the world and the flesh
sin.
tempt us, in so far as worldly or carnal goods are proposed
I answer that, As stated above (q. 47, a. 13), pru-
to our appetite. Hence we speak of “carnal” and again of
dence regards things which are directed to the end of life
“worldly” prudence, according to Lk. 16:8, “The children
as a whole. Hence prudence of the flesh signifies properly
of this world are more prudent [Douay: ‘wiser’] in their
the prudence of a man who looks upon carnal goods as
generation,” etc. The Apostle includes all in the “pru-
the last end of his life. Now it is evident that this is a sin, dence of the flesh,” because we covet the external things
because it involves a disorder in man with respect to his
of the world on account of the flesh.
last end, which does not consist in the goods of the body,
We may also reply that since prudence is in a certain
as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 2, a. 5). Therefore prudence of
sense called “wisdom,” as stated above (q. 47, a. 2, ad 1),
the flesh is a sin.
we may distinguish a threefold prudence corresponding to
Reply to Objection 1. Justice and temperance in-
the three kinds of temptation. Hence it is written (James
clude in their very nature that which ranks them among
3:15) that there is a wisdom which is “earthly, sensual and
the virtues, viz. equality and the curbing of concupis-
devilish,” as explained above (q. 45, a. 1, ad 1), when we
cence; hence they are never taken in a bad sense. On the
were treating of wisdom.
other hand prudence is so called from foreseeing [provi-
1454
Whether prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 55 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that prudence of the flesh
of the flesh, it is a mortal sin, because he turns away from
is a mortal sin. For it is a mortal sin to rebel against the
God by so doing, since he cannot have several last ends,
Divine law, since this implies contempt of God. Now “the
as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 5).
prudence [Douay: ‘wisdom’] of the flesh. . . is not subject
If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as
to the law of God” (Rom. 8:7). Therefore prudence of the
corresponding to particular prudence, it is a venial sin. For
flesh is a mortal sin.
it happens sometimes that a man has an inordinate affec-
Objection 2.
Further, every sin against the Holy
tion for some pleasure of the flesh, without turning away
Ghost is a mortal sin. Now prudence of the flesh seems
from God by a mortal sin; in which case he does not place
to be a sin against the Holy Ghost, for “it cannot be sub-
the end of his whole life in carnal pleasure. To apply one-
ject to the law of God” (Rom. 8:7), and so it seems to be
self to obtain this pleasure is a venial sin and pertains to
an unpardonable sin, which is proper to the sin against the
prudence of the flesh. But if a man actually refers the care
Holy Ghost. Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal
of the flesh to a good end, as when one is careful about
sin.
one’s food in order to sustain one’s body, this is no longer
Objection 3. Further, the greatest evil is opposed to
prudence of the flesh, because then one uses the care of
the greatest good, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10. Now pru-
the flesh as a means to an end.
dence of the flesh is opposed to that prudence which is the
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking of
chief of the moral virtues. Therefore prudence of the flesh
that carnal prudence whereby a man places the end of his
is chief among mortal sins, so that it is itself a mortal sin.
whole life in the goods of the flesh, and this is a mortal
On the contrary, That which diminishes a sin has not
sin.
of itself the nature of a mortal sin. Now the thought-
Reply to Objection 2. Prudence of the flesh does not
ful quest of things pertaining to the care of the flesh,
imply a sin against the Holy Ghost. For when it is stated
which seems to pertain to carnal prudence, diminishes
that “it cannot be subject to the law of God,” this does
sin∗. Therefore prudence of the flesh has not of itself the
not mean that he who has prudence of the flesh, cannot
nature of a mortal sin.
be converted and submit to the law of God, but that car-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 47, a. 2, ad 1; a. 13), nal prudence itself cannot be subject to God’s law, even as
a man is said to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, i.e.
neither can injustice be just, nor heat cold, although that
in relation to the end of life as a whole. Secondly, rela-
which is hot may become cold.
tively, i.e. in relation to some particular end; thus a man
Reply to Objection 3. Every sin is opposed to pru-
is said to be prudent in business or something else of the
dence, just as prudence is shared by every virtue. But it
kind. Accordingly if prudence of the flesh be taken as
does not follow that every sin opposed to prudence is most
corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so
grave, but only when it is opposed to prudence in some
that a man place the last end of his whole life in the care
very grave matter.
Whether craftiness is a special sin?
IIa IIae q. 55 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that craftiness is not a spe-
to hide one’s thoughts by artifice, to conceal one’s mean-
cial sin. For the words of Holy Writ do not induce anyone
ing by words, to represent error as truth, to make out the
to sin; and yet they induce us to be crafty, according to
truth to be false,” and further on he adds: “This prudence
Prov. 1:4, “To give craftiness [Douay: ‘subtlety’] to little
is acquired by the young, it is learnt at a price by chil-
ones.” Therefore craftiness is not a sin.
dren.” Now the above things seem to belong to craftiness.
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 13:16): “The
Therefore craftiness is not distinct from carnal or worldly
crafty [Douay: ‘prudent’] man doth all things with coun-
prudence, and consequently it seems not to be a special
sel.” Therefore, he does so either for a good or for an evil
sin.
end. If for a good end, there is no sin seemingly, and if for
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 4:2): “We
an evil end, it would seem to pertain to carnal or worldly
renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in
prudence. Therefore craftiness is not a special sin distinct
craftiness, nor adulterating the word of God.” Therefore
from prudence of the flesh.
craftiness is a sin.
Objection 3. Further, Gregory expounding the words
I answer that, Prudence is “right reason applied to
of Job 12, “The simplicity of the just man is laughed to
action,” just as science is “right reason applied to knowl-
scorn,” says (Moral. x, 29): “The wisdom of this world is
edge.” In speculative matters one may sin against rec-
∗ Cf. Prov. 6:30
1455
titude of knowledge in two ways: in one way when the Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine observes (Con-reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to be
tra Julian. iv, 3) just as prudence is sometimes improperly
true; in another way when the reason proceeds from false
taken in a bad sense, so is craftiness sometimes taken in
premises, that appear to be true, either to a true or to a
a good sense, and this on account of their mutual resem-
false conclusion. Even so a sin may be against prudence,
blance. Properly speaking, however, craftiness is taken in
through having some resemblance thereto, in two ways.
a bad sense, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. vi, 12.
First, when the purpose of the reason is directed to an end
Reply to Objection 2. Craftiness can take counsel
which is good not in truth but in appearance, and this per-
both for a good end and for an evil end: nor should a good
tains to prudence of the flesh; secondly, when, in order
end be pursued by means that are false and counterfeit
to obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man uses
but by such as are true. Hence craftiness is a sin if it be
means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit, and
directed to a good end.
this belongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently
Reply to Objection 3. Under “worldly prudence”
a sin opposed to prudence, and distinct from prudence of
Gregory included everything that can pertain to false pru-
the flesh.
dence, so that it comprises craftiness also.
Whether guile is a sin pertaining to craftiness?
IIa IIae q. 55 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that guile is not a sin per-
belongs to prudence. Secondly the adopting of such like
taining to craftiness. For sin, especially mortal, has no
ways may be considered with regard to their actual exe-
place in perfect men. Yet a certain guile is to be found in
cution, and in this way it belongs to guile. Hence guile
them, according to 2 Cor. 12:16, “Being crafty I caught
denotes a certain execution of craftiness, and accordingly
you by guile.” Therefore guile is not always a sin.
belongs thereto.
Objection 2. Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly
Reply to Objection 1. Just as craftiness is taken prop-
to the tongue, according to Ps. 5:11, “They dealt deceit-
erly in a bad sense, and improperly in a good sense, so too
fully with their tongues.” Now craftiness like prudence is
is guile which is the execution of craftiness.
in the very act of reason. Therefore guile does not pertain
Reply to Objection 2. The execution of craftiness
to craftiness.
with the purpose of deceiving, is effected first and fore-
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Prov. 12:20):
most by words, which hold the chief place among those
“Guile [Douay: ‘Deceit’] is in the heart of them that think
signs whereby a man signifies something to another man,
evil things.” But the thought of evil things does not al-
as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), hence guile
ways pertain to craftiness. Therefore guile does not seem
is ascribed chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in
to belong to craftiness.
deeds, according to Ps. 104:25, “And to deal deceitfully
On the contrary, Craftiness aims at lying in wait, ac-
with his servants.” Guile is also in the heart, according to
cording to Eph. 4:14, “By cunning craftiness by which
Ecclus. 19:23, “His interior is full of deceit,” but this is
they lie in wait to deceive”: and guile aims at this also.
to devise deceits, according to Ps. 37:13: “They studied
Therefore guile pertains to craftiness.
deceits all the day long.”
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), it belongs to
Reply to Objection 3. Whoever purposes to do some
craftiness to adopt ways that are not true but counterfeit
evil deed, must needs devise certain ways of attaining his
and apparently true, in order to attain some end either
purpose, and for the most part he devises deceitful ways,
good or evil. Now the adopting of such ways may be
whereby the more easily to obtain his end. Nevertheless
subjected to a twofold consideration; first, as regards the
it happens sometimes that evil is done openly and by vi-
process of thinking them out, and this belongs properly to
olence without craftiness and guile; but as this is more
craftiness, even as thinking out right ways to a due end
difficult, it is of less frequent occurrence.
Whether fraud pertains to craftiness?
IIa IIae q. 55 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that fraud does not pertain
fraud does not belong to craftiness.
to craftiness. For a man does not deserve praise if he al-
Objection 2. Further, fraud seems to consist in un-
lows himself to be deceived, which is the object of crafti-
lawfully taking or receiving external things, for it is writ-
ness; and yet a man deserves praise for allowing himself
ten (Acts 5:1) that “a certain man named Ananias with
to be defrauded, according to 1 Cor. 6:1, “Why do you
Saphira his wife, sold a piece of land, and by fraud kept
not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?” Therefore
back part of the price of the land.” Now it pertains to
1456
injustice or illiberality to take possession of or retain excution of craftiness, whether this be effected by words, or
ternal things unjustly. Therefore fraud does not belong to
by deeds, whereas “fraud” belongs more properly to the
craftiness which is opposed to prudence.
execution of craftiness by deeds.
Objection 3.
Further, no man employs craftiness
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle does not coun-
against himself. But the frauds of some are against them-
sel the faithful to be deceived in their knowledge, but to
selves, for it is written (Prov. 1:18) concerning some “that
bear patiently the effect of being deceived, and to endure
they practice frauds [Douay: ‘deceits’] against their own
wrongs inflicted on them by fraud.
souls.” Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness.
Reply to Objection 2. The execution of craftiness
On the contrary, The object of fraud is to deceive,
may be carried out by another vice, just as the execution
according to Job 13:9, “Shall he be deceived as a man,
of prudence by the virtues: and accordingly nothing hin-
with your fraudulent [Douay: ‘deceitful’] dealings?” Now
ders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or illiberality.
craftiness is directed to the same object. Therefore fraud
Reply to Objection 3. Those who commit frauds,
pertains to craftiness.
do not design anything against themselves or their own
I answer that, Just as “guile” consists in the execu-
souls; it is through God’s just judgment that what they
tion of craftiness, so also does “fraud.” But they seem to
plot against others, recoils on themselves, according to
differ in the fact that “guile” belongs in general to the exe-
Ps. 7:16, “He is fallen into the hole he made.”
Whether it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters?
IIa IIae q. 55 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem lawful to be solicitous
make such things their end, or for the sake of these things
about temporal matters. Because a superior should be so-
to do whatever they were commanded to do in preaching
licitous for his subjects, according to Rom. 12:8, “He that
the Gospel.” Secondly, solicitude about temporal things
ruleth, with solicitude.” Now according to the Divine or-
may be unlawful, through too much earnestness in en-
dering, man is placed over temporal things, according to
deavoring to obtain temporal things, the result being that
Ps. 8:8, “Thou hast subjected all things under his feet,”
a man is drawn away from spiritual things which ought to
etc. Therefore man should be solicitous about temporal
be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written
things.
(Mat. 13:22) that “the care of this world. . . chokes up the
Objection 2. Further, everyone is solicitous about the
word.” Thirdly, through over much fear, when, to wit, a
end for which he works. Now it is lawful for a man to
man fears to lack necessary things if he do what he ought
work for the temporal things whereby he sustains life,
to do. Now our Lord gives three motives for laying aside
wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 3:10): “If any man
this fear. First, on account of the yet greater favors be-
will not work, neither let him eat.” Therefore it is lawful
stowed by God on man, independently of his solicitude,
to be solicitous about temporal things.
viz. his body and soul (Mat. 6:26); secondly, on ac-
Objection 3. Further, solicitude about works of mercy
count of the care with which God watches over animals
is praiseworthy, according to 2 Tim. 1:17, “When he was
and plants without the assistance of man, according to
come to Rome, he carefully sought me.” Now solicitude
the requirements of their nature; thirdly, because of Di-
about temporal things is sometimes connected with works
vine providence, through ignorance of which the gentiles
of mercy; for instance, when a man is solicitous to watch
are solicitous in seeking temporal goods before all oth-
over the interests of orphans and poor persons. Therefore
ers. Consequently He concludes that we should be solici-
solicitude about temporal things is not unlawful.
tous most of all about spiritual goods, hoping that tempo-
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 6:31): “Be not
ral goods also may be granted us according to our needs,
solicitous. . . saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we
if we do what we ought to do.
drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed?” And yet such
Reply to Objection 1. Temporal goods are subjected
things are very necessary.
to man that he may use them according to his needs, not
I answer that, Solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor
that he may place his end in them and be over solicitous
to obtain something. Now it is evident that the endeavor
about them.
is more earnest when there is fear of failure, so that there
Reply to Objection 2. The solicitude of a man who
is less solicitude when success is assured. Accordingly
gains his bread by bodily labor is not superfluous but pro-
solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful in three
portionate; hence Jerome says on Mat. 6:31, “Be not so-
ways. First on the part of the object of solicitude; that is, if licitous,” that “labor is necessary, but solicitude must be
we seek temporal things as an end. Hence Augustine says
banished,” namely superfluous solicitude which unsettles
(De Operibus Monach. xxvi): “When Our Lord said: ‘Be
the mind.
not solicitous,’ etc.. . . He intended to forbid them either to Reply to Objection 3. In the works of mercy solici-1457
tude about temporal things is directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful, unless it be superfluous.
Whether we should be solicitous about the future?
IIa IIae q. 55 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that we should be solici-
itude about the vintage to the time of autumn. Accord-
tous about the future. For it is written (Prov. 6:6-8): “Go
ingly if a man were solicitous about the vintage during
to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways and learn
the summer, he would be needlessly forestalling the solic-
wisdom; which, although she hath no guide, nor mas-
itude belonging to a future time. Hence Our Lord forbids
ter. . . provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and
such like excessive solicitude, saying: “Be. . . not solici-
gathereth her food in the harvest.” Now this is to be so-
tous for tomorrow,” wherefore He adds, “for the morrow
licitous about the future. Therefore solicitude about the
will be solicitous for itself,” that is to say, the morrow will future is praiseworthy.
have its own solicitude, which will be burden enough for
Objection 2. Further, solicitude pertains to prudence.
the soul. This is what He means by adding: “Sufficient
But prudence is chiefly about the future, since its principal
for the day is the evil thereof,” namely, the burden of so-
part is “foresight of future things,” as stated above (q. 49,
licitude.
a. 6, ad 1). Therefore it is virtuous to be solicitous about
Reply to Objection 1. The ant is solicitous at a befit-
the future.
ting time, and it is this that is proposed for our example.
Objection 3. Further, whoever puts something by that
Reply to Objection 2. Due foresight of the future be-
he may keep it for the morrow, is solicitous about the fu-
longs to prudence. But it would be an inordinate foresight
ture. Now we read (Jn. 12:6) that Christ had a bag for
or solicitude about the future, if a man were to seek tem-
keeping things in, which Judas carried, and (Acts 4:34-
poral things, to which the terms “past” and “future” apply,
37) that the Apostles kept the price of the land, which had
as ends, or if he were to seek them in excess of the needs
been laid at their feet. Therefore it is lawful to be solici-
of the present life, or if he were to forestall the time for
tous about the future.
solicitude.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 6:34): “Be
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Serm.
not. . . solicitous for tomorrow”; where “tomorrow” stands
Dom. in Monte ii, 17), “when we see a servant of God
for the future, as Jerome says in his commentary on this
taking thought lest he lack these needful things, we must
passage.
not judge him to be solicitous for the morrow, since even
I answer that, No work can be virtuous, unless it be
Our Lord deigned for our example to have a purse, and
vested with its due circumstances, and among these is the
we read in the Acts of the Apostles that they procured the
due time, according to Eccles. 8:6, “There is a time and
necessary means of livelihood in view of the future on ac-
opportunity for every business”; which applies not only
count of a threatened famine. Hence Our Lord does not
to external deeds but also to internal solicitude. For every
condemn those who according to human custom, provide
time has its own fitting proper solicitude; thus solicitude
themselves with such things, but those who oppose them-
about the crops belongs to the summer time, and solic-
selves to God for the sake of these things.”
Whether these vices arise from covetousness?
IIa IIae q. 55 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that these vices do not
Objection 3. Further, men make use of stratagems
arise from covetousness. As stated above (q. 43, a. 6) lust
not only in laying hold of other people’s goods, but
is the chief cause of lack of rectitude in the reason. Now
also in plotting murders, the former of which pertains
these vices are opposed to right reason, i.e. to prudence.
to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use of
Therefore they arise chiefly from lust; especially since the
stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. There-
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “Venus is full of guile
fore the aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness,
and her girdle is many colored” and that “he who is incon-
but also from anger.
tinent in desire acts with cunning.”
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states
Objection 2. Further, these vices bear a certain resem-
that fraud is a daughter of covetousness.
blance to prudence, as stated above (q. 47, a. 13). Now,
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3; q. 47, a. 13),
since prudence is in the reason, the more spiritual vices
carnal prudence and craftiness, as well as guile and fraud,
seem to be more akin thereto, such as pride and vain-
bear a certain resemblance to prudence in some kind of
glory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from
use of the reason. Now among all the moral virtues it is
pride rather than from covetousness.
justice wherein the use of right reason appears chiefly, for
1458
justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the undue use of Reply to Objection 2. To do anything by stratagem
reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice, the
seems to be due to pusillanimity: because a magnanimous
chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid
man wishes to act openly, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vices arise chiefly from covetousness.
iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride resembles or apes magnanim-
Reply to Objection 1. On account of the vehemence
ity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use of
of pleasure and of concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses
fraud and guile, do not arise directly from pride, but rather
the reason from exercising its act: whereas in the afore-
from covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets lit-
said vices there is some use of reason, albeit inordinate.
tle by excellence.
Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust. When
Reply to Objection 3. Anger’s movement is sudden,
the Philosopher says that “Venus is full of guile,” he is
hence it acts with precipitation, and without counsel, con-
referring to a certain resemblance, in so far as she car-
trary to the use of the aforesaid vices, though these use
ries man away suddenly, just as he is moved in deceitful
counsel inordinately. That men use stratagems in plotting
actions, yet not by means of craftiness but rather by the
murders, arises not from anger but rather from hatred, be-
vehemence of concupiscence and pleasure; wherefore he
cause the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the
adds that “Venus doth cozen the wits of the wisest man”∗.
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2,3)†.
∗ Cf. Iliad xiv, 214-217
† Cf. Ethic. vii, 6
1459
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 56
Of the Precepts Relating to Prudence
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the precepts relating to prudence, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) The precepts of prudence;
(2) The precepts relating to the opposite vices.
Whether the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence?
IIa IIae q. 56 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of the
ing under the purview of natural reason. Now foremost
decalogue should have included a precept of prudence.
among the things dictated by natural reason are the ends of
For the chief precepts should include a precept of the chief
human life, which are to the practical order what naturally
virtue. Now the chief precepts are those of the decalogue.
known principles are to the speculative order, as shown
Since then prudence is the chief of the moral virtues, it
above (q. 47, a. 6). Now prudence is not about the end,
seems that the precepts of the decalogue should have in-
but about the means, as stated above (q. 47, a. 6). Hence
cluded a precept of prudence.
it was not fitting that the precepts of the decalogue should
Objection 2. Further, the teaching of the Gospel con-
include a precept relating directly to prudence. And yet
tains the Law especially with regard to the precepts of the
all the precepts of the decalogue are related to prudence,
decalogue. Now the teaching of the Gospel contains a pre-
in so far as it directs all virtuous acts.
cept of prudence (Mat. 10:16): “Be ye. . . prudent [Douay:
Reply to Objection 1. Although prudence is simply
‘wise’] as serpents.” Therefore the precepts of the deca-
foremost among all the moral virtues, yet justice, more
logue should have included a precept of prudence.
than any other virtue, regards its object under the aspect of
Objection 3. Further, the other lessons of the Old
something due, which is a necessary condition for a pre-
Testament are directed to the precepts of the decalogue:
cept, as stated above (q. 44, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 99, Aa. 1,5).
wherefore it is written (Malach. 4:4): “Remember the law
Hence it behooved the chief precepts of the Law, which
of Moses My servant, which I commanded him in Horeb.”
are those of the decalogue, to refer to justice rather than
Now the other lessons of the Old Testament include pre-
to prudence.
cepts of prudence; for instance (Prov. 3:5): “Lean not
Reply to Objection 2. The teaching of the Gospel
upon thy own prudence”; and further on (Prov. 4:25):
is the doctrine of perfection. Therefore it needed to in-
“Let thine eyelids go before thy steps.” Therefore the Law
struct man perfectly in all matters relating to right con-
also should have contained a precept of prudence, espe-
duct, whether ends or means: wherefore it behooved the
cially among the precepts of the decalogue.
Gospel teaching to contain precepts also of prudence.
The contrary however appears to anyone who goes
Reply to Objection 3. Just as the rest of the teach-
through the precepts of the decalogue.
ing of the Old Testament is directed to the precepts of the
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 3;
decalogue as its end, so it behooved man to be instructed
a. 5, ad 1) when we were treating of precepts, the com-
by the subsequent lessons of the Old Testament about the
mandments of the decalogue being given to the whole
act of prudence which is directed to the means.
people, are a matter of common knowledge to all, as com-
Whether the prohibitive precepts relating to the vices opposed to prudence are fit-IIa IIae q. 56 a. 2
tingly propounded in the Old Law?
Objection 1. It would seem that the prohibitive pre-
calumniate thy neighbor,” and (Dt. 25:13): “Thou shalt
cepts relating to the vices opposed to prudence are unfit-
not have divers weights in thy bag, a greater and a less.”
tingly propounded in the Old Law. For such vices as im-
Therefore there should have also been prohibitive precepts
prudence and its parts which are directly opposed to pru-
about the vices directly opposed to prudence.
dence are not less opposed thereto, than those which bear
Objection 2. Further, there is room for fraud in other
a certain resemblance to prudence, such as craftiness and
things than in buying and selling. Therefore the Law un-
vices connected with it. Now the latter vices are forbidden
fittingly forbade fraud solely in buying and selling.
in the Law: for it is written (Lev. 19:13): “Thou shalt not
Objection 3. Further, there is the same reason for pre-
1460
scribing an act of virtue as for prohibiting the act of a opposed to prudence, do not pertain to injustice in the
contrary vice. But acts of prudence are not prescribed in
same way as the execution of craftiness, and so they are
the Law. Therefore neither should any contrary vices have
not forbidden in the Law, as fraud and guile are, which
been forbidden in the Law.
latter pertain to injustice
The contrary, however, appears from the precepts of
Reply to Objection 2. All guile and fraud committed
the Law which are quoted in the first objection.
in matters of injustice, can be understood to be forbidden
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), justice, above
in the prohibition of calumny (Lev. 19:13). Yet fraud and
all, regards the aspect of something due, which is a neces-
guile are wont to be practiced chiefly in buying and sell-
sary condition for a precept, because justice tends to ren-
ing, according to Ecclus. 26:28, “A huckster shall not be
der that which is due to another, as we shall state further
justified from the sins of the lips”: and it is for this rea-
on (q. 58, a. 2). Now craftiness, as to its execution, is com-
son that the Law contained a special precept forbidding
mitted chiefly in matters of justice, as stated above (q. 55,
fraudulent buying and selling.
a. 8): and so it was fitting that the Law should contain
Reply to Objection 3. All the precepts of the Law
precepts forbidding the execution of craftiness, in so far
that relate to acts of justice pertain to the execution of
as this pertains to injustice, as when a man uses guile and
prudence, even as the precepts prohibitive of stealing,
fraud in calumniating another or in stealing his goods.
calumny and fraudulent selling pertain to the execution
Reply to Objection 1. Those vices that are manifestly
of craftiness.
1461
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 57
Of Right
(In Four Articles)
After considering prudence we must in due sequence consider justice, the consideration of which will be fourfold: (1) Of justice;
(2) Of its parts;
(3) Of the corresponding gift;
(4) Of the precepts relating to justice.
Four points will have to be considered about justice: (1) Right; (2) Justice itself; (3) Injustice; (4) Judgment.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether right is the object of justice?
(2) Whether right is fittingly divided into natural and positive right?
(3) Whether the right of nations is the same as natural right?
(4) Whether right of dominion and paternal right are distinct species?
Whether right is the object of justice?
IIa IIae q. 57 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that right is not the ob-
the works of the other virtues, and to which the intention
ject of justice. For the jurist Celsus says∗ that “right is the of the virtue tends as to its proper object, depends on its
art of goodness and equality.” Now art is not the object
relation to the agent only, whereas the right in a work of
of justice, but is by itself an intellectual virtue. Therefore
justice, besides its relation to the agent, is set up by its
right is not the object of justice.
relation to others. Because a man’s work is said to be just
Objection 2. Further, “Law,” according to Isidore
when it is related to some other by way of some kind of
(Etym. v, 3), “is a kind of right.” Now law is the ob-
equality, for instance the payment of the wage due for a
ject not of justice but of prudence, wherefore the Philoso-
service rendered. And so a thing is said to be just, as hav-
pher† reckons “legislative” as one of the parts of prudence.
ing the rectitude of justice, when it is the term of an act
Therefore right is not the object of justice.
of justice, without taking into account the way in which
Objection 3. Further, justice, before all, subjects man
it is done by the agent: whereas in the other virtues noth-
to God: for Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that
ing is declared to be right unless it is done in a certain
“justice is love serving God alone, and consequently gov-
way by the agent. For this reason justice has its own spe-
erning aright all things subject to man.” Now right [jus]
cial proper object over and above the other virtues, and
does not pertain to Divine things, but only to human af-
this object is called the just, which is the same as “right.”
fairs, for Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that “ ‘fas’ is the Divine Hence it is evident that right is the object of justice.
law, and ‘jus,’ the human law.” Therefore right is not the
Reply to Objection 1. It is usual for words to be
object of justice.
distorted from their original signification so as to mean
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that “ ‘jus’
something else: thus the word “medicine” was first em-
[right] is so called because it is just.” Now the “just” is
ployed to signify a remedy used for curing a sick person,
the object of justice, for the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
and then it was drawn to signify the art by which this is
v, 1) that “all are agreed in giving the name of justice to
done. In like manner the word “jus” [right] was first of all
the habit which makes men capable of doing just actions.”
used to denote the just thing itself, but afterwards it was
I answer that, It is proper to justice, as compared with transferred to designate the art whereby it is known what
the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with oth-
is just, and further to denote the place where justice is ad-
ers: because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name
ministered, thus a man is said to appear “in jure”‡, and
implies; indeed we are wont to say that things are adjusted
yet further, we say even that a man, who has the office of
when they are made equal, for equality is in reference
exercising justice, administers the jus even if his sentence
of one thing to some other. On the other hand the other
be unjust.
virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit him
Reply to Objection 2. Just as there pre-exists in the
in relation to himself. Accordingly that which is right in
mind of the craftsman an expression of the things to be
∗ Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 1
† Ethic. vi, 8
‡ In English we
speak of a court of law, a barrister at law, etc.
1462
made externally by his craft, which expression is called Reply to Objection 3. Since justice implies equality,
the rule of his craft, so too there pre-exists in the mind
and since we cannot offer God an equal return, it follows
an expression of the particular just work which the reason
that we cannot make Him a perfectly just repayment. For
determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence. If
this reason the Divine law is not properly called “jus” but
this rule be expressed in writing it is called a “law,” which
“fas,” because, to wit, God is satisfied if we accomplish
according to Isidore (Etym. v, 1) is “a written decree”:
what we can. Nevertheless justice tends to make man re-
and so law is not the same as right, but an expression of
pay God as much as he can, by subjecting his mind to Him
right.
entirely.
Whether right is fittingly divided into natural right and positive right?
IIa IIae q. 57 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that right is not fittingly
to another person, or when this is decreed by the prince
divided into natural right and positive right.
For that
who is placed over the people, and acts in its stead, and
which is natural is unchangeable, and is the same for all.
this is called “positive right.”
Now nothing of the kind is to be found in human affairs,
Reply to Objection 1. That which is natural to one
since all the rules of human right fail in certain cases, nor
whose nature is unchangeable, must needs be such al-
do they obtain force everywhere. Therefore there is no
ways and everywhere. But man’s nature is changeable,
such thing as natural right.
wherefore that which is natural to man may sometimes
Objection 2. Further, a thing is called “positive” when
fail. Thus the restitution of a deposit to the depositor is
it proceeds from the human will. But a thing is not just,
in accordance with natural equality, and if human nature
simply because it proceeds from the human will, else a
were always right, this would always have to be observed;
man’s will could not be unjust. Since then the “just” and
but since it happens sometimes that man’s will is unrigh-
the “right” are the same, it seems that there is no positive
teous there are cases in which a deposit should not be re-
right.
stored, lest a man of unrighteous will make evil use of the
Objection 3. Further, Divine right is not natural right, thing deposited: as when a madman or an enemy of the
since it transcends human nature. In like manner, neither
common weal demands the return of his weapons.
is it positive right, since it is based not on human, but
Reply to Objection 2. The human will can, by com-
on Divine authority. Therefore right is unfittingly divided
mon agreement, make a thing to be just provided it be not,
into natural and positive.
of itself, contrary to natural justice, and it is in such mat-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7)
ters that positive right has its place. Hence the Philosopher
that “political justice is partly natural and partly legal,” i.e.
says (Ethic. v, 7) that “in the case of the legal just, it does established by law.
not matter in the first instance whether it takes one form
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) the “right” or
or another, it only matters when once it is laid down.” If,
the “just” is a work that is adjusted to another person ac-
however, a thing is, of itself, contrary to natural right, the
cording to some kind of equality. Now a thing can be
human will cannot make it just, for instance by decreeing
adjusted to a man in two ways: first by its very nature,
that it is lawful to steal or to commit adultery. Hence it is
as when a man gives so much that he may receive equal
written (Is. 10:1): “Woe to them that make wicked laws.”
value in return, and this is called “natural right.” In an-
Reply to Objection 3. The Divine right is that which
other way a thing is adjusted or commensurated to another
is promulgated by God. Such things are partly those that
person, by agreement, or by common consent, when, to
are naturally just, yet their justice is hidden to man, and
wit, a man deems himself satisfied, if he receive so much.
partly are made just by God’s decree. Hence also Divine
This can be done in two ways: first by private agreement,
right may be divided in respect of these two things, even
as that which is confirmed by an agreement between pri-
as human right is. For the Divine law commands certain
vate individuals; secondly, by public agreement, as when
things because they are good, and forbids others, because
the whole community agrees that something should be
they are evil, while others are good because they are pre-
deemed as though it were adjusted and commensurated
scribed, and others evil because they are forbidden.
1463
Whether the right of nations is the same as the natural right?
IIa IIae q. 57 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the right of nations
spect of its adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested
is the same as the natural right. For all men do not agree
use of the land, it has a certain commensuration to be the
save in that which is natural to them. Now all men agree
property of one and not of another man, as the Philosopher
in the right of nations; since the jurist∗ “the right of na-
shows (Polit. ii, 2).
tions is that which is in use among all nations.” Therefore
Now it belongs not only to man but also to other ani-
the right of nations is the natural right.
mals to apprehend a thing absolutely: wherefore the right
Objection 2. Further, slavery among men is natural,
which we call natural, is common to us and other animals
for some are naturally slaves according to the Philosopher
according to the first kind of commensuration. But the
(Polit. i, 2). Now “slavery belongs to the right of nations,”
right of nations falls short of natural right in this sense, as as Isidore states (Etym. v, 4). Therefore the right of nathe jurist† says because “the latter is common to all ani-
tions is a natural right.
mals, while the former is common to men only.” On the
Objection 3. Further, right as stated above (a. 2) is
other hand to consider a thing by comparing it with what
divided into natural and positive. Now the right of nations
results from it, is proper to reason, wherefore this same
is not a positive right, since all nations never agreed to de-
is natural to man in respect of natural reason which dic-
cree anything by common agreement. Therefore the right
tates it. Hence the jurist Gaius says (Digest. i, 1; De Just.
of nations is a natural right.
et Jure i, 9): “whatever natural reason decrees among all
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4) that “right
men, is observed by all equally, and is called the right of
is either natural, or civil, or right of nations,” and conse-
nations.” This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
quently the right of nations is distinct from natural right.
Reply to Objection 2. Considered absolutely, the fact
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the natural right that this particular man should be a slave rather than an-or just is that which by its very nature is adjusted to or
other man, is based, not on natural reason, but on some
commensurate with another person. Now this may hap-
resultant utility, in that it is useful to this man to be ruled pen in two ways; first, according as it is considered ab-by a wiser man, and to the latter to be helped by the for-
solutely: thus a male by its very nature is commensurate
mer, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). Wherefore
with the female to beget offspring by her, and a parent is
slavery which belongs to the right of nations is natural in
commensurate with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly a
the second way, but not in the first.
thing is naturally commensurate with another person, not
Reply to Objection 3. Since natural reason dictates
according as it is considered absolutely, but according to
matters which are according to the right of nations, as im-
something resultant from it, for instance the possession of
plying a proximate equality, it follows that they need no
property. For if a particular piece of land be considered
special institution, for they are instituted by natural reason
absolutely, it contains no reason why it should belong to
itself, as stated by the authority quoted above
one man more than to another, but if it be considered in re-
Whether paternal right and right of dominion should be distinguished as special IIa IIae q. 57 a. 4
species?
Objection 1. It would seem that “paternal right” and
master and the father pertain to a household, as stated in
“right of dominion” should not be distinguished as spe-
Polit. i, 2.
cial species. For it belongs to justice to render to each
Objection 3. Further, there are many other differences
one what is his, as Ambrose states (De Offic. i, 24). Now
of degrees among men, for instance some are soldiers,
right is the object of justice, as stated above (a. 1). There-
some are priests, some are princes. Therefore some spe-
fore right belongs to each one equally; and we ought not
cial kind of right should be allotted to them.
to distinguish the rights of fathers and masters as distinct
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) dis-
species.
tinguishes right of dominion, paternal right and so on as
Objection 2. Further, the law is an expression of what
species distinct from civil right.
is just, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2). Now a law looks to the
I answer that, Right or just depends on commensu-
common good of a city or kingdom, as stated above ( Ia
ration with another person. Now “another” has a twofold
IIae, q. 90, a. 2), but not to the private good of an individ-
signification. First, it may denote something that is other
ual or even of one household. Therefore there is no need
simply, as that which is altogether distinct; as, for exam-
for a special right of dominion or paternal right, since the
ple, two men neither of whom is subject to the other, and
∗ Ulpian: Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i
† Digest. i, 1; De Just. et
Jure i
1464
both of whom are subjects of the ruler of the state; and to each one his right, the distinction between individuals
between these according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6)
being presupposed: for if a man gives himself his due,
there is the “just” simply. Secondly a thing is said to be
this is not strictly called “just.” And since what belongs
other from something else, not simply, but as belonging in
to the son is his father’s, and what belongs to the slave is
some way to that something else: and in this way, as re-
his master’s, it follows that properly speaking there is not
gards human affairs, a son belongs to his father, since he
justice of father to son, or of master to slave.
is part of him somewhat, as stated in Ethic. viii, 12, and a
Reply to Objection 2. A son, as such, belongs to his
slave belongs to his master, because he is his instrument,
father, and a slave, as such, belongs to his master; yet
as stated in Polit. i, 2‡. Hence a father is not compared to
each, considered as a man, is something having separate
his son as to another simply, and so between them there is
existence and distinct from others. Hence in so far as each
not the just simply, but a kind of just, called “paternal.” In
of them is a man, there is justice towards them in a way:
like manner neither is there the just simply, between mas-
and for this reason too there are certain laws regulating the
ter and servant, but that which is called “dominative.” A
relations of father to his son, and of a master to his slave;
wife, though she is something belonging to the husband,
but in so far as each is something belonging to another,
since she stands related to him as to her own body, as the
the perfect idea of “right” or “just” is wanting to them.
Apostle declares (Eph. 5:28), is nevertheless more dis-
Reply to Objection 3. All other differences between
tinct from her husband, than a son from his father, or a
one person and another in a state, have an immediate rela-
slave from his master: for she is received into a kind of
tion to the community of the state and to its ruler, where-
social life, that of matrimony, wherefore according to the
fore there is just towards them in the perfect sense of jus-
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is more scope for justice
tice. This “just” however is distinguished according to
between husband and wife than between father and son,
various offices, hence when we speak of “military,” or
or master and slave, because, as husband and wife have
“magisterial,” or “priestly” right, it is not as though such
an immediate relation to the community of the household,
rights fell short of the simply right, as when we speak of
as stated in Polit. i, 2,5, it follows that between them there
“paternal” right, or right of “dominion,” but for the rea-
is “domestic justice” rather than “civic.”
son that something proper is due to each class of person
Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to justice to render
in respect of his particular office.
‡ Cf. Ethic. viii, 11
1465
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 58
Of Justice
(In Twelve Articles)
We must now consider justice. Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) What is justice?
(2) Whether justice is always towards another?
(3) Whether it is a virtue?
(4) Whether it is in the will as its subject?
(5) Whether it is a general virtue?
(6) Whether, as a general virtue, it is essentially the same as every virtue?
(7) Whether there is a particular justice?
(8) Whether particular justice has a matter of its own?
(9) Whether it is about passions, or about operations only?
(10) Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?
(11) Whether the act of justice is to render to everyone his own?
(12) Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?
Whether justice is fittingly defined as being the perpetual and constant will to render IIa IIae q. 58 a. 1
to each one his right?
Objection 1. It would seem that lawyers have unfit-
be defined by means of the good act bearing on the mat-
tingly defined justice as being “the perpetual and constant
ter proper to that virtue. Now the proper matter of justice
will to render to each one his right”∗. For, according to the
consists of those things that belong to our intercourse with
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1), justice is a habit which makes
other men, as shall be shown further on (a. 2). Hence the
a man “capable of doing what is just, and of being just
act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object is
in action and in intention.” Now “will” denotes a power,
indicated in the words, “Rendering to each one his right,”
or also an act. Therefore justice is unfittingly defined as
since, as Isidore says (Etym. x), “a man is said to be just
being a will.
because he respects the rights [jus] of others.”
Objection 2. Further, rectitude of the will is not the
Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter
will; else if the will were its own rectitude, it would fol-
whatever be virtuous, it requires to be voluntary, stable,
low that no will is unrighteous. Yet, according to Anselm
and firm, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that
(De Veritate xii), justice is rectitude. Therefore justice is
in order for an act to be virtuous it needs first of all to be
not the will.
done “knowingly,” secondly to be done “by choice,” and
Objection 3. Further, no will is perpetual save God’s.
“for a due end,” thirdly to be done “immovably.” Now
If therefore justice is a perpetual will, in God alone will
the first of these is included in the second, since “what
there be justice.
is done through ignorance is involuntary” (Ethic. iii, 1).
Objection 4. Further, whatever is perpetual is con-
Hence the definition of justice mentions first the “will,”
stant, since it is unchangeable. Therefore it is needless
in order to show that the act of justice must be voluntary;
in defining justice, to say that it is both “perpetual” and
and mention is made afterwards of its “constancy” and
“constant.”
“perpetuity” in order to indicate the firmness of the act.
Objection 5. Further, it belongs to the sovereign to
Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice;
give each one his right. Therefore, if justice gives each
save that the act is mentioned instead of the habit, which
one his right, it follows that it is in none but the sovereign: takes its species from that act, because habit implies rela-which is absurd.
tion to act. And if anyone would reduce it to the proper
Objection 6. Further, Augustine says (De Moribus
form of a definition, he might say that “justice is a habit
Eccl. xv) that “justice is love serving God alone.” There-
whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant
fore it does not render to each one his right.
and perpetual will”: and this is about the same definition
I answer that, The aforesaid definition of justice is fit-as that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says
ting if understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit
that “justice is a habit whereby a man is said to be capable
that is the principle of a good act, a virtue must needs
of doing just actions in accordance with his choice.”
∗ Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 10
1466
Reply to Objection 1. Will here denotes the act, not requisite that one should have the will to observe justice
the power: and it is customary among writers to define
at all times and in all cases.
habits by their acts: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan.
Reply to Objection 4. Since “perpetual” does not im-
xl) that “faith is to believe what one sees not.”
ply perpetuity of the act of the will, it is not superfluous to Reply to Objection 2. Justice is the same as rectitude,
add “constant”: for while the “perpetual will” denotes the
not essentially but causally; for it is a habit which rectifies purpose of observing justice always, “constant” signifies
the deed and the will.
a firm perseverance in this purpose.
Reply to Objection 3. The will may be called perpet-
Reply to Objection 5. A judge renders to each one
ual in two ways. First on the part of the will’s act which
what belongs to him, by way of command and direction,
endures for ever, and thus God’s will alone is perpetual.
because a judge is the “personification of justice,” and
Secondly on the part of the subject, because, to wit, a man
“the sovereign is its guardian” (Ethic. v, 4). On the other
wills to do a certain thing always. and this is a necessary
hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs to him,
condition of justice. For it does not satisfy the conditions
by way of execution.
of justice that one wish to observe justice in some partic-
Reply to Objection 6. Just as love of God includes
ular matter for the time being, because one could scarcely
love of our neighbor, as stated above (q. 25, a. 1), so too
find a man willing to act unjustly in every case; and it is
the service of God includes rendering to each one his due.
Whether justice is always towards one another?
IIa IIae q. 58 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that justice is not always
a. 1) this otherness which justice demands must needs be
towards another. For the Apostle says (Rom. 3:22) that
between beings capable of action. Now actions belong
“the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ.” Now faith
to supposits∗ and wholes and, properly speaking, not to
does not concern the dealings of one man with another.
parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that
Neither therefore does justice.
the hand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat
Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De
makes a thing hot, but fire by heat, although such expres-
Moribus Eccl. xv), “it belongs to justice that man should
sions may be employed metaphorically. Hence, justice
direct to the service of God his authority over the things
properly speaking demands a distinction of supposits, and
that are subject to him.” Now the sensitive appetite is sub-
consequently is only in one man towards another. Never-
ject to man, according to Gn. 4:7, where it is written:
theless in one and the same man we may speak metaphori-
“The lust thereof,” viz. of sin, “shall be under thee, and
cally of his various principles of action such as the reason,
thou shalt have dominion over it.” Therefore it belongs to
the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were
justice to have dominion over one’s own appetite: so that
so many agents: so that metaphorically in one and the
justice is towards oneself.
same man there is said to be justice in so far as the reason
Objection 3. Further, the justice of God is eternal.
commands the irascible and concupiscible, and these obey
But nothing else is co-eternal with God. Therefore justice
reason; and in general in so far as to each part of man is
is not essentially towards another.
ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the Philosopher
Objection 4. Further, man’s dealings with himself
(Ethic. v, 11) calls this “metaphorical justice.”
need to be rectified no less than his dealings with another.
Reply to Objection 1. The justice which faith works
Now man’s dealings are rectified by justice, according to
in us, is that whereby the ungodly is justified it consists
Prov. 11:5, “The justice of the upright shall make his way
in the due coordination of the parts of the soul, as stated
prosperous.” Therefore justice is about our dealings not
above ( Ia IIae, q. 113, a. 1) where we were treating
only with others, but also with ourselves.
of the justification of the ungodly. Now this belongs to
On the contrary, Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that “the metaphorical justice, which may be found even in a man
object of justice is to keep men together in society and
who lives all by himself.
mutual intercourse.” Now this implies relationship of one
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
man to another. Therefore justice is concerned only about
Reply to Objection 3. God’s justice is from eternity
our dealings with others.
in respect of the eternal will and purpose (and it is chiefly
I answer that, As stated above (q. 57, a. 1) since jus-
in this that justice consists); although it is not eternal as
tice by its name implies equality, it denotes essentially re-
regards its effect, since nothing is co-eternal with God.
lation to another, for a thing is equal, not to itself, but to
Reply to Objection 4. Man’s dealings with himself
another. And forasmuch as it belongs to justice to rectify
are sufficiently rectified by the rectification of the pas-
human acts, as stated above (q. 57, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 113,
sions by the other moral virtues. But his dealings with
∗ Cf. Ia, q. 29, a. 2
1467
others need a special rectification, not only in relation to are directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special
the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom they
virtue, and this is justice.
Whether justice is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 58 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that justice is not a virtue.
human acts are regulated. Hence, since justice regulates
For it is written (Lk. 17:10): “When you shall have done
human operations, it is evident that it renders man’s oper-
all these things that are commanded you, say: We are un-
ations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7), good
profitable servants; we have done that which we ought to
men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as
do.” Now it is not unprofitable to do a virtuous deed: for
he says again (De Officiis i, 7) “the luster of virtue appears
Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): “We look to a profit that
above all in justice.”
is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition
Reply to Objection 1. When a man does what he
of godliness.” Therefore to do what one ought to do, is not
ought, he brings no gain to the person to whom he does
a virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of justice. Therefore
what he ought, but only abstains from doing him a harm.
justice is not a virtue.
He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what
Objection 2. Further, that which is done of necessity,
he ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to act vir-
is not meritorious. But to render to a man what belongs
tuously. Hence it is written (Wis. 8:7) that Divine wisdom
to him, as justice requires, is of necessity. Therefore it is
“teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and for-
not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous actions that we gain
titude, which are such things as men (i.e. virtuous men)
merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue.
can have nothing more profitable in life.”
Objection 3. Further, every moral virtue is about mat-
Reply to Objection 2. Necessity is twofold. One
ters of action. Now those things which are wrought exter-
arises from “constraint,” and this removes merit, since it
nally are not things concerning behavior but concerning
runs counter to the will. The other arises from the obliga-
handicraft, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix)∗.
tion of a “command,” or from the necessity of obtaining
Therefore since it belongs to justice to produce externally
an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end
a deed that is just in itself, it seems that justice is not a
of virtue without doing some particular thing. The latter
moral virtue.
necessity does not remove merit, when a man does volun-
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral.
ii, 49)
tarily that which is necessary in this way. It does however
that “the entire structure of good works is built on four
exclude the credit of supererogation, according to 1 Cor.
virtues,” viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice
9:16, “If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me, for a
I answer that, A human virtue is one “which renders
necessity lieth upon me.”
a human act and man himself goodӠ, and this can be ap-
Reply to Objection 3. Justice is concerned about ex-
plied to justice. For a man’s act is made good through
ternal things, not by making them, which pertains to art,
attaining the rule of reason, which is the rule whereby
but by using them in our dealings with other men.
Whether justice is in the will as its subject?
IIa IIae q. 58 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that justice is not in the
will as its subject, but in the irascible and concupiscible.
will as its subject. For justice is sometimes called truth.
On the contrary, Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that
But truth is not in the will, but in the intellect. Therefore
“justice is rectitude of the will observed for its own sake.”
justice is not in the will as its subject.
I answer that, The subject of a virtue is the power
Objection 2. Further, justice is about our dealings
whose act that virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does
with others. Now it belongs to the reason to direct one
not aim at directing an act of the cognitive power, for we
thing in relation to another. Therefore justice is not in the
are not said to be just through knowing something aright.
will as its subject but in the reason.
Hence the subject of justice is not the intellect or reason
Objection 3. Further, justice is not an intellectual
which is a cognitive power. But since we are said to be just
virtue, since it is not directed to knowledge; wherefore it
through doing something aright, and because the proxi-
follows that it is a moral virtue. Now the subject of moral
mate principle of action is the appetitive power, justice
virtue is the faculty which is “rational by participation,”
must needs be in some appetitive power as its subject.
viz. the irascible and the concupiscible, as the Philoso-
Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which
pher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore justice is not in the
is in the reason and the sensitive appetite which follows
∗ Didot ed., viii, 8
† Ethic. ii, 6
1468
on sensitive apprehension, and is divided into the irasci-hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the name of
ble and the concupiscible, as stated in the Ia, q. 81, a. 2.
truth.
Again the act of rendering his due to each man cannot
Reply to Objection 2.
The will is borne towards
proceed from the sensitive appetite, because sensitive ap-
its object consequently on the apprehension of reason:
prehension does not go so far as to be able to consider
wherefore, since the reason directs one thing in relation to
the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to
another, the will can will one thing in relation to another,
the reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or
and this belongs to justice.
concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will: hence the
Reply to Objection 3. Not only the irascible and con-
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) defines justice by an act of the
cupiscible parts are “rational by participation,” but the en-
will, as may be seen above (a. 1).
tire “appetitive” faculty, as stated in Ethic. i, 13, because
Reply to Objection 1. Since the will is the rational
all appetite is subject to reason. Now the will is contained
appetite, when the rectitude of the reason which is called
in the appetitive faculty, wherefore it can be the subject of
truth is imprinted on the will on account of its nighness
moral virtue.
to the reason, this imprint retains the name of truth; and
Whether justice is a general virtue?
IIa IIae q. 58 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that justice is not a gen-
good of the whole. It follows therefore that the good of
eral virtue. For justice is specified with the other virtues,
any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to
according to Wis. 8:7, “She teacheth temperance and pru-
himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons,
dence, and justice, and fortitude.” Now the “general” is
is referable to the common good, to which justice directs:
not specified or reckoned together with the species con-
so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as tained under the same “general.” Therefore justice is not
it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that
a general virtue.
justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to
Objection 2. Further, as justice is accounted a car-
the law to direct to the common good, as stated above (
dinal virtue, so are temperance and fortitude. Now nei-
Ia IIae, q. 90, a. 2), it follows that the justice which is in
ther temperance nor fortitude is reckoned to be a general
this way styled general, is called “legal justice,” because
virtue. Therefore neither should justice in any way be
thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs the
reckoned a general virtue.
acts of all the virtues to the common good.
Objection 3. Further, justice is always towards others,
Reply to Objection 1. Justice is specified or enumer-
as stated above (a. 2 ). But a sin committed against one’s
ated with the other virtues, not as a general but as a special
neighbor cannot be a general sin, because it is condivided
virtue, as we shall state further on (Aa. 7,12).
with sin committed against oneself. Therefore neither is
Reply to Objection 2. Temperance and fortitude are
justice a general virtue.
in the sensitive appetite, viz. in the concupiscible and iras-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1)
cible. Now these powers are appetitive of certain particu-
that “justice is every virtue.”
lar goods, even as the senses are cognitive of particulars.
I answer that, Justice, as stated above (a. 2) directs
On the other hand justice is in the intellective appetite as
man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen
its subject, which can have the universal good as its ob-
in two ways: first as regards his relation with individuals,
ject, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence
secondly as regards his relations with others in general, in
justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or
so far as a man who serves a community, serves all those
fortitude.
who are included in that community. Accordingly justice
Reply to Objection 3. Things referable to oneself are
in its proper acceptation can be directed to another in both
referable to another, especially in regard to the common
these senses. Now it is evident that all who are included in
good. Wherefore legal justice, in so far as it directs to the
a community, stand in relation to that community as parts
common good, may be called a general virtue: and in like
to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so
manner injustice may be called a general sin; hence it is
that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the
written (1 Jn. 3:4) that all “sin is iniquity.”
1469
Whether justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue?
IIa IIae q. 58 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that justice, as a gen-
son that the genus belongs to the essence of the species,
eral virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue. For the
and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is said
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that “virtue and legal jus-
to be general “virtually”; thus a universal cause is general
tice are the same as all virtue, but differ in their mode of
in relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in rela-
being.” Now things that differ merely in their mode of be-
tion to all bodies that are illumined, or transmuted by its
ing or logically do not differ essentially. Therefore justice
power; and in this sense there is no need for that which is
is essentially the same as every virtue.
“general” to be essentially the same as those things in re-
Objection 2. Further, every virtue that is not essen-
lation to which it is general, since cause and effect are not
tially the same as all virtue is a part of virtue. Now the
essentially the same. Now it is in the latter sense that, ac-
aforesaid justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v.
cording to what has been said (a. 5), legal justice is said to
1) “is not a part but the whole of virtue.” Therefore the
be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as it directs the acts aforesaid justice is essentially the same as all virtue.
of the other virtues to its own end, and this is to move all
Objection 3. Further, the essence of a virtue does
the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may
not change through that virtue directing its act to some
be called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts
higher end even as the habit of temperance remains essen-
of all the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal jus-
tially the same even though its act be directed to a Divine
tice, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the acts of all
common good. Accordingly, just as charity which regards
the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the com-
the Divine good as its proper object, is a special virtue
mon good of the multitude, which transcends the good of
in respect of its essence, so too legal justice is a special
one single individual. Therefore it seems that legal justice
virtue in respect of its essence, in so far as it regards the
is essentially all virtue.
common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the
Objection 4. Further, every good of a part can be di-
sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft, while
rected to the good of the whole, so that if it be not thus
it is secondarily and administratively in his subjects.
directed it would seem without use or purpose. But that
However the name of legal justice can be given to
which is in accordance with virtue cannot be so. There-
every virtue, in so far as every virtue is directed to
fore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue, that
the common good by the aforesaid legal justice, which
does not belong to general justice, which directs to the
though special essentially is nevertheless virtually gen-
common good; and so it seems that general justice is es-
eral. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially the
sentially the same as all virtue.
same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1)
is in this sense that the Philosopher speaks.
that “many are able to be virtuous in matters affecting
Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objec-
themselves, but are unable to be virtuous in matters relat-
tions are manifest.
ing to others,” and (Polit. iii, 2) that “the virtue of the good Reply to Objection 3. This argument again takes leman is not strictly the same as the virtue of the good cit-
gal justice for the virtue commanded by legal justice.
izen.” Now the virtue of a good citizen is general justice,
Reply to Objection 4. Every virtue strictly speak-
whereby a man Is directed to the common good. There-
ing directs its act to that virtue’s proper end: that it
fore general justice is not the same as virtue in general,
should happen to be directed to a further end either al-
and it is possible to have one without the other.
ways or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue consid-
I answer that, A thing is said to be “general” in two
ered strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to
ways. First, by “predication”: thus “animal” is general in
that end. Consequently there must be one supreme virtue
relation to man and horse and the like: and in this sense
essentially distinct from every other virtue, which directs
that which is general must needs be essentially the same
all the virtues to the common good; and this virtue is legal
as the things in relation to which it is general, for the rea-
justice.
Whether there is a particular besides a general justice?
IIa IIae q. 58 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a partic-
justice.
ular besides a general justice. For there is nothing super-
Objection 2. Further, the species of a virtue does not
fluous in the virtues, as neither is there in nature. Now
vary according to “one” and “many.” But legal justice
general justice directs man sufficiently in all his relations
directs one man to another in matters relating to the mul-
with other men. Therefore there is no need for a particular
titude, as shown above (Aa. 5,6). Therefore there is not
1470
another species of justice directing one man to another in besides legal justice there is need for particular justice to
matters relating to the individual.
direct man in his relations to other individuals.
Objection 3. Further, between the individual and the
Reply to Objection 1. Legal justice does indeed di-
general public stands the household community. Conse-
rect man sufficiently in his relations towards others. As
quently, if in addition to general justice there is a partic-
regards the common good it does so immediately, but as
ular justice corresponding to the individual, for the same
to the good of the individual, it does so mediately. Where-
reason there should be a domestic justice directing man
fore there is need for particular justice to direct a man im-
to the common good of a household: and yet this is not
mediately to the good of another individual.
the case. Therefore neither should there be a particular
Reply to Objection 2. The common good of the realm
besides a legal justice.
and the particular good of the individual differ not only in
On the contrary, Chrysostom in his commentary on
respect of the “many” and the “few,” but also under a for-
Mat. 5:6, “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after
mal aspect. For the aspect of the “common” good differs
justice,” says (Hom. xv in Matth.): “By justice He signi-
from the aspect of the “individual” good, even as the as-
fies either the general virtue, or the particular virtue which
pect of “whole” differs from that of “part.” Wherefore the
is opposed to covetousness.”
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that “they are wrong who
I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), legal justice is
maintain that the State and the home and the like differ
not essentially the same as every virtue, and besides le-
only as many and few and not specifically.”
gal justice which directs man immediately to the common
Reply to Objection 3. The household community, ac-
good, there is a need for other virtues to direct him imme-
cording to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2), differs in respect
diately in matters relating to particular goods: and these
of a threefold fellowship; namely “of husband and wife,
virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual
father and son, master and slave,” in each of which one
person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice
person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore between
there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in rela-
such persons there is not justice simply, but a species of
tion to himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too
justice, viz. “domestic” justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 6.
Whether particular justice has a special matter?
IIa IIae q. 58 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that particular justice
passions of the soul, but also external actions, and also
has no special matter. Because a gloss on Gn. 2:14,
those external things of which man can make use. And yet
“The fourth river is Euphrates,” says: “Euphrates signifies
it is in respect of external actions and external things by
‘fruitful’; nor is it stated through what country it flows,
means of which men can communicate with one another,
because justice pertains to all the parts of the soul.” Now
that the relation of one man to another is to be consid-
this would not be the case, if justice had a special mat-
ered; whereas it is in respect of internal passions that we
ter, since every special matter belongs to a special power.
consider man’s rectitude in himself. Consequently, since
Therefore particular justice has no special matter.
justice is directed to others, it is not about the entire mat-
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii,
ter of moral virtue, but only about external actions and
qu. 61) that “the soul has four virtues whereby, in this
things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in so
life, it lives spiritually, viz. temperance, prudence, forti-
far as one man is related to another through them.
tude and justice;” and he says that “the fourth is justice,
Reply to Objection 1. It is true that justice belongs
which pervades all the virtues.” Therefore particular jus-
essentially to one part of the soul, where it resides as in its tice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no spe-subject; and this is the will which moves by its command
cial matter.
all the other parts of the soul; and accordingly justice be-
Objection 3. Further, justice directs man sufficiently
longs to all the parts of the soul, not directly but by a kind
in matters relating to others. Now a man can be directed
of diffusion.
to others in all matters relating to this life. Therefore the
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 61,
matter of justice is general and not special.
Aa. 3,4), the cardinal virtues may be taken in two ways:
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v,
first as special virtues, each having a determinate matter;
2) particular justice to be specially about those things
secondly, as certain general modes of virtue. In this lat-
which belong to social life.
ter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted: for he
I answer that, Whatever can be rectified by reason
says that “prudence is knowledge of what we should seek
is the matter of moral virtue, for this is defined in refer-
and avoid, temperance is the curb on the lust for fleeting
ence to right reason, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
pleasures, fortitude is strength of mind in bearing with
ii, 6). Now the reason can rectify not only the internal
passing trials, justice is the love of God and our neigh-
1471
bor which pervades the other virtues, that is to say, is the directed to another man, which belongs to the specific na-common principle of the entire order between one man
ture of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external actions, are
and another.”
capable of being directed to another man. Consequently
Reply to Objection 3.
A man’s internal passions
it does not follow that the matter of justice is general.
which are a part of moral matter, are not in themselves
Whether justice is about the passions?
IIa IIae q. 58 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that justice is about the
the principal end in respect of which we say that this is an
passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that
evil, and that a good”: and in this way too they belong to
“moral virtue is about pleasure and pain.” Now pleasure
justice, since “a man is not just unless he rejoice in just
or delight, and pain are passions, as stated above∗ when
actions” (Ethic. i, 8).
we were treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being
Reply to Objection 2. External operations are as it
a moral virtue, is about the passions.
were between external things, which are their matter, and
Objection 2. Further, justice is the means of rectifying internal passions, which are their origin. Now it happens
a man’s operations in relation to another man. Now such
sometimes that there is a defect in one of these, without
like operations cannot be rectified unless the passions be
there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may steal an-
rectified, because it is owing to disorder of the passions
other’s property, not through the desire to have the thing,
that there is disorder in the aforesaid operations: thus sex-
but through the will to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man
ual lust leads to adultery, and overmuch love of money
may covet another’s property without wishing to steal it.
leads to theft. Therefore justice must needs be about the
Accordingly the directing of operations in so far as they
passions.
tend towards external things, belongs to justice, but in so
Objection 3. Further, even as particular justice is to-
far as they arise from the passions, it belongs to the other
wards another person so is legal justice. Now legal justice
moral virtues which are about the passions. Hence justice
is about the passions, else it would not extend to all the
hinders theft of another’s property, in so far as stealing is
virtues, some of which are evidently about the passions.
contrary to the, equality that should be maintained in ex-
Therefore justice is about the passions.
ternal things, while liberality hinders it as resulting from
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1)
an immoderate desire for wealth. Since, however, external
that justice is about operations.
operations take their species, not from the internal pas-
I answer that, The true answer to this question may
sions but from external things as being their objects, it
be gathered from a twofold source. First from the subject
follows that, external operations are essentially the matter
of justice, i.e. from the will, whose movements or acts
of justice rather than of the other moral virtues.
are not passions, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 22, a. 3; Ia
Reply to Objection 3. The common good is the end
IIae, q. 59, a. 4), for it is only the sensitive appetite whose of each individual member of a community, just as the
movements are called passions. Hence justice is not about
good of the whole is the end of each part. On the other
the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in
hand the good of one individual is not the end of another
the irascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part
individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to
of the matter, because justice is about man’s relations with
the common good, is more capable of extending to the in-
another, and we are not directed immediately to another
ternal passions whereby man is disposed in some way or
by the internal passions. Therefore justice is not about the
other in himself, than particular justice which is directed
passions.
to the good of another individual: although legal justice
Reply to Objection 1. Not every moral virtue is about
extends chiefly to other virtues in the point of their exter-
pleasure and pain as its proper matter, since fortitude is
nal operations, in so far, to wit, as “the law commands us
about fear and daring: but every moral virtue is directed
to perform the actions of a courageous person. . . the ac-
to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be acquired, for, as the
tions of a temperate person. . . and the actions of a gentle
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), “pleasure and pain are
person” (Ethic. v, 5).
∗ Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 31, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 35, a. 1
1472
Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?
IIa IIae q. 58 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that the mean of justice
thing to another, but merely by comparison with the virtu-
is not the real mean. For the generic nature remains entire
ous man himself, so that with them the mean is only that
in each species. Now moral virtue is defined (Ethic. ii,
which is fixed by reason in our regard.
6) to be “an elective habit which observes the mean fixed,
On the other hand, the matter of justice is external op-
in our regard, by reason.” Therefore justice observes the
eration, in so far as an operation or the thing used in that
rational and not the real mean.
operation is duly proportionate to another person, where-
Objection 2. Further, in things that are good simply,
fore the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of
there is neither excess nor defect, and consequently nei-
equality between the external thing and the external per-
ther is there a mean; as is clearly the case with the virtues,
son. Now equality is the real mean between greater and
according to Ethic. ii, 6. Now justice is about things that
less, as stated in Metaph. x∗: wherefore justice observes
are good simply, as stated in Ethic. v. Therefore justice
the real mean.
does not observe the real mean.
Reply to Objection 1. This real mean is also the ra-
Objection 3. Further, the reason why the other virtues
tional mean, wherefore justice satisfies the conditions of a
are said to observe the rational and not the real mean, is
moral virtue.
because in their case the mean varies according to differ-
Reply to Objection 2. We may speak of a thing being
ent persons, since what is too much for one is too little
good simply in two ways. First a thing may be good in
for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case in
every way: thus the virtues are good; and there is neither
justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the
mean nor extremes in things that are good simply in this
same punishment as one who strikes a private individual.
sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply through
Therefore justice also observes, not the real, but the ratio-
being good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may
nal mean.
become evil through being abused. Such are riches and
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6;
honors; and in the like it is possible to find excess, defi-
v, 4) that the mean of justice is to be taken according to
ciency and mean, as regards men who can use them well
“arithmetical” proportion, so that it is the real mean.
or ill: and it is in this sense that justice is about things that I answer that, As stated above (a. 9; Ia IIae, q. 59,
are good simply.
a. 4), the other moral virtues are chiefly concerned with
Reply to Objection 3. The injury inflicted bears a
the passions, the regulation of which is gauged entirely
different proportion to a prince from that which it bears
by a comparison with the very man who is the subject of
to a private person: wherefore each injury requires to be
those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are vested
equalized by vengeance in a different way: and this im-
with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in
plies a real and not merely a rational diversity.
such like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one
Whether the act of justice is to render to each one his own?
IIa IIae q. 58 a. 11
Objection 1. It would seem that the act of justice is
distribution of things. Therefore the act of justice is not
not to render to each one his own. For Augustine (De
sufficiently described by saying that it consists in render-
Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to justice the act of succoring the
ing to each one his own.
needy. Now in succoring the needy we give them what is
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): “It
not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of justice does not
is justice that renders to each one what is his, and claims
consist in rendering to each one his own.
not another’s property; it disregards its own profit in order
Objection 2. Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that
to preserve the common equity.”
“beneficence which we may call kindness or liberality, be-
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 8,10), the mat-
longs to justice.” Now it pertains to liberality to give to
ter of justice is an external operation in so far as either
another of one’s own, not of what is his. Therefore the
it or the thing we use by it is made proportionate to some
act of justice does not consist in rendering to each one his
other person to whom we are related by justice. Now each
own.
man’s own is that which is due to him according to equal-
Objection 3. Further, it belongs to justice not only to
ity of proportion. Therefore the proper act of justice is
distribute things duly, but also to repress injurious actions,
nothing else than to render to each one his own.
such as murder, adultery and so forth. But the rendering
Reply to Objection 1.
Since justice is a cardinal
to each one of what is his seems to belong solely to the
virtue, other secondary virtues, such as mercy, liberality
∗ Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf. Ethic. v, 4
1473
and the like are connected with it, as we shall state further is extended to whatever is excessive, and whatever is defion (q. 80, a. 1). Wherefore to succor the needy, which
cient is called “loss.” The reason for this is that justice is
belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally beneficent,
first of all and more commonly exercised in voluntary in-
which pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction as-
terchanges of things, such as buying and selling, wherein
cribed to justice as to their principal virtue.
those expressions are properly employed; and yet they are
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
transferred to all other matters of justice. The same ap-
Reply to Objection 3.
As the Philosopher states
plies to the rendering to each one of what is his own.
(Ethic. v, 4), in matters of justice, the name of “profit”
Whether justice stands foremost among all moral virtues?
IIa IIae q. 58 a. 12
Objection 1. It would seem that justice does not stand
moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite, whereunto ap-
foremost among all the moral virtues. Because it belongs
pertain the passions which are the matter of the other
to justice to render to each one what is his, whereas it be-
moral virtues. The second reason is taken from the object,
longs to liberality to give of one’s own, and this is more
because the other virtues are commendable in respect of
virtuous. Therefore liberality is a greater virtue than jus-
the sole good of the virtuous person himself, whereas jus-
tice.
tice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being
Objection 2. Further, nothing is adorned by a less
well disposed towards another, so that justice is somewhat
excellent thing than itself. Now magnanimity is the or-
the good of another person, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Hence
nament both of justice and of all the virtues, according
the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9): “The greatest virtues
to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is more excellent
must needs be those which are most profitable to other
than justice.
persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing good to oth-
Objection 3. Further, virtue is about that which is
ers. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the
“difficult” and “good,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. But for-
brave and the just, since bravery is useful to others in war-
titude is about more difficult things than justice is, since
fare, and justice is useful to others both in warfare and in
it is about dangers of death, according to Ethic. iii, 6.
time of peace.”
Therefore fortitude is more excellent than justice.
Reply to Objection 1. Although the liberal man gives
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): “Justice
of his own, yet he does so in so far as he takes into con-
is the most resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name
sideration the good of his own virtue, while the just man
to a good man.”
gives to another what is his, through consideration of the
I answer that, If we speak of legal justice, it is evi-
common good. Moreover justice is observed towards all,
dent that it stands foremost among all the moral virtues,
whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again liberality
for as much as the common good transcends the individ-
which gives of a man’s own is based on justice, whereby
ual good of one person. In this sense the Philosopher de-
one renders to each man what is his.
clares (Ethic. v, 1) that “the most excellent of the virtues
Reply to Objection 2. When magnanimity is added to
would seem to be justice, and more glorious than either
justice it increases the latter’s goodness; and yet without
the evening or the morning star.” But, even if we speak
justice it would not even be a virtue.
of particular justice, it excels the other moral virtues for
Reply to Objection 3. Although fortitude is about the
two reasons. The first reason may be taken from the sub-
most difficult things, it is not about the best, for it is only ject, because justice is in the more excellent part of the
useful in warfare, whereas justice is useful both in war and
soul, viz. the rational appetite or will, whereas the other
in peace, as stated above.
1474
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 59
Of Injustice
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether injustice is a special vice?
(2) Whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds?
(3) Whether one can suffer injustice willingly?
(4) Whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus?
Whether injustice is a special virtue?
IIa IIae q. 59 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that injustice is not a spe-
sin. Thus too all vices, as being repugnant to the common
cial vice. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:4): “All sin is iniq-
good, have the character of injustice, as though they arose
uity∗.” Now iniquity would seem to be the same as injus-
from injustice, in accord with what has been said above
tice, because justice is a kind of equality, so that injustice
about justice (q. 58, Aa. 5,6). Secondly we speak of in-
is apparently the same as inequality or iniquity. Therefore
justice in reference to an inequality between one person
injustice is not a special sin.
and another, when one man wishes to have more goods,
Objection 2. Further, no special sin is contrary to all
riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such as toil
the virtues. But injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for
and losses, and thus injustice has a special matter and is a
as regards adultery it is opposed to chastity, as regards
particular vice opposed to particular justice.
murder it is opposed to meekness, and in like manner as
Reply to Objection 1. Even as legal justice is referred
regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is not a special
to human common good, so Divine justice is referred to
sin.
the Divine good, to which all sin is repugnant, and in this
Objection 3. Further, injustice is opposed to justice
sense all sin is said to be iniquity.
which is in the will. But every sin is in the will, as Augus-
Reply to Objection 2. Even particular justice is indi-
tine declares (De Duabus Anim. x). Therefore injustice is
rectly opposed to all the virtues; in so far, to wit, as even
not a special sin.
external acts pertain both to justice and to the other moral
On the contrary, Injustice is contrary to justice. But
virtues, although in different ways as stated above (q. 58,
justice is a special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special
a. 9, ad 2).
vice.
Reply to Objection 3. The will, like the reason, ex-
I answer that, Injustice is twofold. First there is il-
tends to all moral matters, i.e. passions and those external
legal injustice which is opposed to legal justice: and this
operations that relate to another person. On the other hand
is essentially a special vice, in so far as it regards a spe-
justice perfects the will solely in the point of its extending
cial object, namely the common good which it contemns;
to operations that relate to another: and the same applies
and yet it is a general vice, as regards the intention, since
to injustice.
contempt of the common good may lead to all kinds of
Whether a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing?
IIa IIae q. 59 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that a man is called unjust
a just man is no less capable of doing what is unjust than
through doing an unjust thing. For habits are specified by
an unjust man. But this opinion would not be false un-
their objects, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2). Now
less it were proper to the unjust man to do what is unjust.
the proper object of justice is the just, and the proper ob-
Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that
ject of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a man should be
he does an unjust thing.
called just through doing a just thing, and unjust through
Objection 3. Further, every virtue bears the same rela-
doing an unjust thing.
tion to its proper act, and the same applies to the contrary
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
vices. But whoever does what is intemperate, is said to be
v, 9) that they hold a false opinion who maintain that it is
intemperate. Therefore whoever does an unjust thing, is
in a man’s power to do suddenly an unjust thing, and that
said to be unjust.
∗ Vulg.: ‘Whosoever committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity’
1475
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) arises from a habit, because whenever a man has a habit,
that “a man may do an unjust thing without being unjust.”
whatever befits that habit is, of itself, pleasant to him. Ac-
I answer that, Even as the object of justice is some-
cordingly, to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice
thing equal in external things, so too the object of injustice
is proper to the unjust man, in which sense the unjust man
is something unequal, through more or less being assigned
is one who has the habit of injustice: but a man may do
to some person than is due to him. To this object the habit
what is unjust, unintentionally or through passion, with-
of injustice is compared by means of its proper act which
out having the habit of injustice.
is called an injustice. Accordingly it may happen in two
Reply to Objection 1. A habit is specified by its ob-
ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not unjust:
ject in its direct and formal acceptation, not in its material
first, on account of a lack of correspondence between the
and indirect acceptation.
operation and its proper object. For the operation takes
Reply to Objection 2. It is not easy for any man to
its species and name from its direct and not from its in-
do an unjust thing from choice, as though it were pleasing
direct object: and in things directed to an end the direct
for its own sake and not for the sake of something else:
is that which is intended, and the indirect is what is be-
this is proper to one who has the habit, as the Philosopher
side the intention. Hence if a man do that which is unjust,
declares (Ethic. v, 9).
without intending to do an unjust thing, for instance if he
Reply to Objection 3. The object of temperance is
do it through ignorance, being unaware that it is unjust,
not something established externally, as is the object of
properly speaking he does an unjust thing, not directly,
justice: the object of temperance, i.e. the temperate thing,
but only indirectly, and, as it were, doing materially that
depends entirely on proportion to the man himself. Con-
which is unjust: hence such an operation is not called an
sequently what is accidental and unintentional cannot be
injustice. Secondly, this may happen on account of a lack
said to be temperate either materially or formally. In like
of proportion between the operation and the habit. For
manner neither can it be called intemperate: and in this
an injustice may sometimes arise from a passion, for in-
respect there is dissimilarity between justice and the other
stance, anger or desire, and sometimes from choice, for
moral virtues; but as regards the proportion between op-
instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of
eration and habit, there is similarity in all respects.
one’s complacency. In the latter case properly speaking it
Whether we can suffer injustice willingly?
IIa IIae q. 59 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that one can suffer injus-
I answer that, Action by its very nature proceeds
tice willingly. For injustice is inequality, as stated above
from an agent, whereas passion as such is from another:
(a. 2). Now a man by injuring himself, departs from equal-
wherefore the same thing in the same respect cannot be
ity, even as by injuring another. Therefore a man can do
both agent and patient, as stated in Phys. iii, 1; viii, 5.
an injustice to himself, even as to another. But whoever
Now the proper principle of action in man is the will,
does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily. There-
wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does
fore a man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it
voluntarily, and on the other hand a man suffers prop-
be inflicted by himself.
erly what he suffers against his will, since in so far as
Objection 2. Further, no man is punished by the civil
he is willing, he is a principle in himself, and so, consid-
law, except for having committed some injustice. Now
ered thus, he is active rather than passive. Accordingly
suicides were formerly punished according to the law of
we must conclude that properly and strictly speaking no
the state by being deprived of an honorable burial, as the
man can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an
Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man can
injustice save involuntarily; but that accidentally and ma-
do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen
terially so to speak, it is possible for that which is unjust
that a man suffers injustice voluntarily.
in itself either to be done involuntarily (as when a man
Objection 3. Further, no man does an injustice save
does anything unintentionally), or to be suffered voluntar-
to one who suffers that injustice. But it may happen that
ily (as when a man voluntarily gives to another more than
a man does an injustice to one who wishes it, for instance
he owes him).
if he sell him a thing for more than it is worth. Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. When one man gives voluntar-
a man may happen to suffer an injustice voluntarily.
ily to another that which he does not owe him, he causes
On the contrary, To suffer an injustice and to do an
neither injustice nor inequality. For a man’s ownership
injustice are contraries. Now no man does an injustice
depends on his will, so there is no disproportion if he for-
against his will. Therefore on the other hand no man suf-
feit something of his own free-will, either by his own or
fers an injustice except against his will.
by another’s action.
1476
Reply to Objection 2. An individual person may be ternal action. Now in the point of doing and suffering
considered in two ways. First, with regard to himself; and
injustice, the material element is that which is done exter-
thus, if he inflict an injury on himself, it may come under
nally, considered in itself, as stated above (a. 2), and the
the head of some other kind of sin, intemperance for in-
formal and essential element is on the part of the will of
stance or imprudence, but not injustice; because injustice
agent and patient, as stated above (a. 2). Accordingly we
no less than justice, is always referred to another person.
must reply that injustice suffered by one man and injustice
Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belong-
done by another man always accompany one another, in
ing to the State as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as
the material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a
His creature and image; and thus a man who kills himself,
man can do an injustice with the intention of doing an in-
does an injury not indeed to himself, but to the State and
justice, and yet the other man does not suffer an injustice,
to God. Wherefore he is punished in accordance with both
because he suffers voluntarily; and on the other hand a
Divine and human law, even as the Apostle declares in re-
man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an injustice against
spect of the fornicator (1 Cor. 3:17): “If any man violate
his will, while the man who does the injury unknowingly,
the temple of God, him shall God destroy.”
does an injustice, not formally but only materially.
Reply to Objection 3. Suffering is the effect of ex-
Whether whoever does an injustice sins mortally?
IIa IIae q. 59 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that not everyone who
when we were treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal
does an injustice sins mortally. For venial sin is opposed
sin is one that is contrary to charity which gives life to the
to mortal sin. Now it is sometimes a venial sin to do an
soul. Now every injury inflicted on another person is of
injury: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 8) in reference
itself contrary to charity, which moves us to will the good
to those who act unjustly: “Whatever they do not merely
of another. And so since injustice always consists in an
in ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter.”
injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that to do
Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mor-
an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus.
tally.
Reply to Objection 1. This saying of the Philoso-
Objection 2. Further, he who does an injustice in a
pher is to be understood as referring to ignorance of fact,
small matter, departs but slightly from the mean. Now this
which he calls “ignorance of particular circumstances”†,
seems to be insignificant and should be accounted among
and which deserves pardon, and not to ignorance of the
the least of evils, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ii, 9).
law which does not excuse: and he who does an injustice
Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mor-
through ignorance, does no injustice except accidentally,
tally.
as stated above (a. 2)
Objection 3. Further, charity is the “mother of all the
Reply to Objection 2. He who does an injustice in
virtues”∗, and it is through being contrary thereto that a
small matters falls short of the perfection on an unjust
sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to the
deed, in so far as what he does may be deemed not al-
other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a
together contrary to the will of the person who suffers
mortal sin to do an injustice.
therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some
On the contrary, Whatever is contrary to the law of
such thing from another man, in which case it is probable
God is a mortal sin. Now whoever does an injustice does
that the latter is not hurt or displeased.
that which is contrary to the law of God, since it amounts
Reply to Objection 3. The sins which are contrary
either to theft, or to adultery, or to murder, or to something
to the other virtues are not always hurtful to another per-
of the kind, as will be shown further on (q. 64, seqq.).
son, but imply a disorder affecting human passions; hence
Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.
there is no comparison.
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 12, a. 5),
∗ Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23
† Ethic. iii, 1
1477
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 60
Of Judgment
(In Six Articles)
In due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether judgment is an act of justice?
(2) Whether it is lawful to judge?
(3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions?
(4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably?
(5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written law?
(6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped?
Whether judgment is an act of justice?
IIa IIae q. 60 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that judgment is not an
who is the personification of justice.”
act of justice. The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that
Reply to Objection 1. The word “judgment,” from
“everyone judges well of what he knows,” so that judg-
its original meaning of a right decision about what is just,
ment would seem to belong to the cognitive faculty. Now
has been extended to signify a right decision in any mat-
the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence. There-
ter whether speculative or practical. Now a right judg-
fore judgment belongs to prudence rather than to justice,
ment in any matter requires two things. The first is the
which is in the will, as stated above (q. 58, a. 4).
virtue itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way,
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15):
judgment is an act of reason, because it belongs to the
“The spiritual man judgeth all things.” Now man is made
reason to pronounce or define. The other is the disposi-
spiritual chiefly by the virtue of charity, which “is poured
tion of the one who judges, on which depends his aptness
forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us”
for judging aright. In this way, in matters of justice, judg-
(Rom. 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to charity rather
ment proceeds from justice, even as in matters of forti-
than to justice.
tude, it proceeds from fortitude. Accordingly judgment is
Objection 3. Further, it belongs to every virtue to
an act of justice in so far as justice inclines one to judge
judge aright of its proper matter, because “the virtuous
aright, and of prudence in so far as prudence pronounces
man is the rule and measure in everything,” according to
judgment: wherefore synesis (judging well according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore judgment does
common law) which belongs to prudence is said to “judge
not belong to justice any more than to the other moral
rightly,” as stated above (q. 51, a. 3).
virtues.
Reply to Objection 2. The spiritual man, by reason
Objection 4. Further, judgment would seem to belong
of the habit of charity, has an inclination to judge aright of
only to judges. But the act of justice is to be found in ev-
all things according to the Divine rules; and it is in con-
ery just man. Since then judges are not the only just men,
formity with these that he pronounces judgment through
it seems that judgment is not the proper act of justice.
the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces judg-
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:15): “Until jus-
ment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the
tice be turned into judgment.”
ruling of the law.
I answer that, Judgment properly denotes the act of a
Reply to Objection 3. The other virtues regulate man
judge as such. Now a judge [judex] is so called because
in himself, whereas justice regulates man in his dealings
he asserts the right [jus dicens] and right is the object of
with others, as shown above (q. 58, a. 2). Now man is
justice, as stated above (q. 57, a. 1). Consequently the
master in things concerning himself, but not in matters re-
original meaning of the word “judgment” is a statement
lating to others. Consequently where the other virtues are
or decision of the just or right. Now to decide rightly
in question, there is no need for judgment other than that
about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from
of a virtuous man, taking judgment in its broader sense, as
the virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides rightly
explained above (ad 1). But in matters of justice, there is
about matters relating to chastity. Therefore judgment,
further need for the judgment of a superior, who is “able to
which denotes a right decision about what is just, belongs
reprove both, and to put his hand between both”∗. Hence
properly to justice. For this reason the Philosopher says
judgment belongs more specifically to justice than to any
(Ethic. v, 4) that “men have recourse to a judge as to one
other virtue.
∗ Job 9:33
1478
Reply to Objection 4. Justice is in the sovereign as a trative virtue. Hence judgment, which denotes a decision
master-virtue†, commanding and prescribing what is just;
of what is just, belongs to justice, considered as existing
while it is in the subjects as an executive and adminis-
chiefly in one who has authority.
Whether it is lawful to judge?
IIa IIae q. 60 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to judge. For
tive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden mat-
nothing is punished except what is unlawful. Now those
ter, and then it is called judgment by “suspicion” or “rash”
who judge are threatened with punishment, which those
judgment.
who judge not will escape, according to Mat. 7:1, “Judge
Reply to Objection 1. In these words our Lord for-
not, and ye shall not be judged.” Therefore it is unlawful
bids rash judgment which is about the inward intention,
to judge.
or other uncertain things, as Augustine states (De Serm.
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Rom. 14:4): “Who
Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids judgment about
art thou that judgest another man’s servant. To his own
Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply
lord he standeth or falleth.” Now God is the Lord of all.
believe, since they are above us, as Hilary declares in his
Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.
commentary on Mat. 5. Or again according to Chrysos-
Objection 3. Further, no man is sinless, according
tom∗, He forbids the judgment which proceeds not from
to 1 Jn. 1:8, “If we say that we have no sin, we de-
benevolence but from bitterness of heart.
ceive ourselves.” Now it is unlawful for a sinner to judge,
Reply to Objection 2. A judge is appointed as God’s
according to Rom. 2:1, “Thou art inexcusable, O man,
servant; wherefore it is written (Dt. 1:16): “Judge that
whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest
which is just,” and further on (Dt. 1:17), “because it is the
another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same
judgment of God.”
things which thou judgest.” Therefore to no man is it law-
Reply to Objection 3. Those who stand guilty of
ful to judge.
grievous sins should not judge those who are guilty of the
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 16:18): “Thou shalt
same or lesser sins, as Chrysostom† says on the words of
appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates. . . that they
Mat. 7:1, “Judge not.” Above all does this hold when
may judge the people with just judgment.”
such sins are public, because there would be an occasion
I answer that, Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an
of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however they
act of justice. Now it follows from what has been stated
are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent neces-
above (a. 1, ad 1,3) that three conditions are requisite for a
sity for the judge to pronounce judgment, because it is
judgment to be an act of justice: first, that it proceed from
his duty, he can reprove or judge with humility and fear.
the inclination of justice; secondly, that it come from one
Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19):
who is in authority; thirdly, that it be pronounced accord-
“If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as another
ing to the right ruling of prudence. If any one of these be
man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to
lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First,
strive against it together with us.” And yet it is not through
when it is contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it
acting thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve
is called “perverted” or “unjust”: secondly, when a man
to be condemned once again, but when, in condemning
judges about matters wherein he has no authority, and this
another, he shows himself to be equally deserving of con-
is called judgment “by usurpation”: thirdly, when the rea-
demnation on account of another or a like sin.
son lacks certainty, as when a man, without any solid mo-
Whether it is unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions?
IIa IIae q. 60 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not unlawful to
judgment would be lawful, if it were not lawful to judge
form a judgment from suspicions. For suspicion is seem-
from suspicions.
ingly an uncertain opinion about an evil, wherefore the
Objection 2. Further, a man does his neighbor an
Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that suspicion is about
injury by judging him unlawfully. But an evil suspicion
both the true and the false. Now it is impossible to have
consists in nothing more than a man’s opinion, and conse-
any but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars.
quently does not seem to pertain to the injury of another
Since then human judgment is about human acts, which
man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not un-
are about singular and contingent matters, it seems that no
lawful.
† Cf. q. 58, a. 6
∗ Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross
† Hom. xxiv
1479
Objection 3. Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently sus-be reducible to an injustice, since judgment is an act of
picion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it
justice, as stated above (a. 1). Now an injustice is always
goes, the more vicious it is.
a mortal sin according to its genus, as stated above (q. 59,
Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first
a. 4). Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would
degree is when a man begins to doubt of another’s good-
always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this is
ness from slight indications. This is a venial and a light
false, because “we cannot avoid suspicions,” according to
sin; for “it belongs to human temptation without which no
a gloss of Augustine (Tract. xc in Joan.) on 1 Cor. 4:5,
man can go through this life,” according to a gloss on 1
“Judge not before the time.” Therefore a judgment based
Cor. 4:5, “Judge not before the time.” The second degree
on suspicion would seem not to be unlawful.
is when a man, from slight indications, esteems another
On the contrary, Chrysostom∗ in comment on the
man’s wickedness as certain. This is a mortal sin, if it
words of Mat. 7:1, “Judge not,” etc., says: “By this com-
be about a grave matter, since it cannot be without con-
mandment our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove
tempt of one’s neighbor. Hence the same gloss goes on to
others from kindly motives, but that Christian should de-
say: “If then we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are
spise Christian by boasting his own righteousness, by hat-
human, we must nevertheless restrain our judgment, and
ing and condemning others for the most part on mere sus-
refrain from forming a definite and fixed opinion.” The
picion.”
third degree is when a judge goes so far as to condemn a
I answer that, As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii),
man on suspicion: this pertains directly to injustice, and
suspicion denotes evil thinking based on slight indica-
consequently is a mortal sin.
tions, and this is due to three causes. First, from a man
Reply to Objection 1. Some kind of certainty is found
being evil in himself, and from this very fact, as though
in human acts, not indeed the certainty of a demonstration,
conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to think
but such as is befitting the matter in point, for instance
evil of others, according to Eccles. 10:3, “The fool when
when a thing is proved by suitable witnesses.
he walketh in the way, whereas he himself is a fool, es-
Reply to Objection 2. From the very fact that a man
teemeth all men fools.” Secondly, this is due to a man
thinks evil of another without sufficient cause, he despises
being ill-disposed towards another: for when a man hates
him unduly, and therefore does him an injury.
or despises another, or is angry with or envious of him, he
Reply to Objection 3. Since justice and injustice
is led by slight indications to think evil of him, because
are about external operations, as stated above (q. 58,
everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, this is
Aa. 8,10,11; q. 59, a. 1, ad 3), the judgment of suspicion
due to long experience: wherefore the Philosopher says
pertains directly to injustice when it is betrayed by exter-
(Rhet. ii, 13) that “old people are very suspicious, for
nal action, and then it is a mortal sin, as stated above. The
they have often experienced the faults of others.” The first
internal judgment pertains to justice, in so far as it is re-
two causes of suspicion evidently connote perversity of
lated to the external judgment, even as the internal to the
the affections, while the third diminishes the nature of sus-
external act, for instance as desire is related to fornication, picion, in as much as experience leads to certainty which
or anger to murder.
Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?
IIa IIae q. 60 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that doubts should not
Objection 3. Further, man should love his neighbor as
be interpreted for the best.
Because we should judge
himself. Now with regard to himself, a man should inter-
from what happens for the most part. But it happens
pret doubtful matters for the worst, according to Job 9:28,
for the most part that evil is done, since “the number of
“I feared all my works.” Therefore it seems that doubtful
fools is infinite” (Eccles. 1:15), “for the imagination and
matters affecting one’s neighbor should be interpreted for
thought of man’s heart are prone to evil from his youth”
the worst.
(Gn. 8:21). Therefore doubts should be interpreted for the
On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 14:3, “He that
worst rather than for the best.
eateth not, let him not judge him that eateth,” says:
Objection 2.
Further, Augustine says (De Doctr.
“Doubts should be interpreted in the best sense.”
Christ. i, 27) that “he leads a godly and just life who is
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3, ad 2), things
sound in his estimate of things, and turns neither to this
from the very fact that a man thinks ill of another with-
side nor to that.” Now he who interprets a doubtful point
out sufficient cause, he injures and despises him. Now no
for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should not
man ought to despise or in any way injure another man
be done.
without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have
∗ Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St.
John of the Cross
1480
evident indications of a person’s wickedness, we ought to worthy of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be
deem him good, by interpreting for the best whatever is
good, and deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil.
doubtful about him.
For this reason we ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim
Reply to Objection 1. He who interprets doubtful
at judging a man good, unless there is evident proof of the
matters for the best, may happen to be deceived more
contrary. And though we may judge falsely, our judgment
often than not; yet it is better to err frequently through
in thinking well of another pertains to our good feeling
thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less frequently
and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither does
through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in
it pertain to the intellect’s perfection to know the truth of
the latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.
contingent singulars in themselves.
Reply to Objection 2. It is one thing to judge of
Reply to Objection 3. One may interpret something
things and another to judge of men. For when we judge of
for the worst or for the best in two ways. First, by a kind
things, there is no question of the good or evil of the thing
of supposition; and thus, when we have to apply a rem-
about which we are judging, since it will take no harm no
edy to some evil, whether our own or another’s, in order
matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there
for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a
is question of the good of the person who judges, if he
cure, it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if
judge truly, and of his evil if he judge falsely because “the
a remedy be efficacious against a worse evil, much more
true is the good of the intellect, and the false is its evil,” as is it efficacious against a lesser evil. Secondly we may
stated in Ethic. vi, 2, wherefore everyone should strive to
interpret something for the best or for the worst, by de-
make his judgment accord with things as they are. On the
ciding or determining, and in this case when judging of
other hand when we judge of men, the good and evil in our
things we should try to interpret each thing according as
judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the person
it is, and when judging of persons, to interpret things for
about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed
the best as stated above.
Whether we should always judge according to the written law?
IIa IIae q. 60 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not always
laws are written for the purpose of manifesting both these
to judge according to the written law. For we ought al-
rights, but in different ways. For the written law does in-
ways to avoid judging unjustly. But written laws some-
deed contain natural right, but it does not establish it, for
times contain injustice, according to Is. 10:1, “Woe to
the latter derives its force, not from the law but from na-
them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write
ture: whereas the written law both contains positive right,
injustice.” Therefore we ought not always to judge ac-
and establishes it by giving it force of authority.
cording to the written law.
Hence it is necessary to judge according to the written
Objection 2.
Further, judgment has to be formed
law, else judgment would fall short either of the natural or
about individual happenings. But no written law can cover
of the positive right.
each and every individual happening, as the Philosopher
Reply to Objection 1. Just as the written law does not
declares (Ethic. v, 10). Therefore it seems that we are not
give force to the natural right, so neither can it diminish or
always bound to judge according to the written law.
annul its force, because neither can man’s will change na-
Objection 3. Further, a law is written in order that the ture. Hence if the written law contains anything contrary
lawgiver’s intention may be made clear. But it happens
to the natural right, it is unjust and has no binding force.
sometimes that even if the lawgiver himself were present
For positive right has no place except where “it matters
he would judge otherwise. Therefore we ought not always
not,” according to the natural right, “whether a thing be
to judge according to the written law.
done in one way or in another”; as stated above (q. 57,
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig.
a. 2, ad 2). Wherefore such documents are to be called,
xxxi): “In these earthly laws, though men judge about
not laws, but rather corruptions of law, as stated above (
them when they are making them, when once they are es-
Ia IIae, q. 95, a. 2): and consequently judgment should
tablished and passed, the judges may judge no longer of
not be delivered according to them.
them, but according to them.”
Reply to Objection 2. Even as unjust laws by their
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), judgment is
very nature are, either always or for the most part, con-
nothing else but a decision or determination of what is
trary to the natural right, so too laws that are rightly es-
just. Now a thing becomes just in two ways: first by the
tablished, fail in some cases, when if they were observed
very nature of the case, and this is called “natural right,”
they would be contrary to the natural right. Wherefore in
secondly by some agreement between men, and this is
such cases judgment should be delivered, not according to
called “positive right,” as stated above (q. 57, a. 2). Now
the letter of the law, but according to equity which the law-
1481
giver has in view. Hence the jurist says∗: “By no reason cases even the lawgiver himself would decide otherwise;
of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for us to interpret and if he had foreseen the case, he might have provided
harshly, and render burdensome, those useful measures
for it by law.
which have been enacted for the welfare of man.” In such
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
Whether judgment is rendered perverse by being usurped?
IIa IIae q. 60 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that judgment is not ren-
pronounced by other than the public authority.
dered perverse by being usurped. For justice is rectitude
Reply to Objection 1. When the truth is declared
in matters of action. Now truth is not impaired, no matter
there is no obligation to accept it, and each one is free to
who tells it, but it may suffer from the person who ought
receive it or not, as he wishes. On the other hand judgment
to accept it. Therefore again justice loses nothing, no mat-
implies an obligation, wherefore it is unjust for anyone to
ter who declares what is just, and this is what is meant by
be judged by one who has no public authority.
judgment.
Reply to Objection 2. Moses seems to have slain the
Objection 2. Further, it belongs to judgment to pun-
Egyptian by authority received as it were, by divine in-
ish sins. Now it is related to the praise of some that they
spiration; this seems to follow from Acts 7:24, 25, where
punished sins without having authority over those whom
it is said that “striking the Egyptian. . . he thought that his they punished; such as Moses in slaying the Egyptian (Ex.
brethren understood that God by his hand would save Is-
2:12), and Phinees the son of Eleazar in slaying Zambri
rael [Vulg.: ‘them’].” Or it may be replied that Moses
the son of Salu (Num. 25:7-14), and “it was reputed to
slew the Egyptian in order to defend the man who was
him unto justice” (Ps. 105:31). Therefore usurpation of
unjustly attacked, without himself exceeding the limits of
judgment pertains not to injustice.
a blameless defence. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic.
Objection 3. Further, spiritual power is distinct from
i, 36) that “whoever does not ward off a blow from a fel-
temporal. Now prelates having spiritual power sometimes
low man when he can, is as much in fault as the striker”;
interfere in matters concerning the secular power. There-
and he quotes the example of Moses. Again we may re-
fore usurped judgment is not unlawful.
ply with Augustine (QQ. Exod. qu. 2)∗ that just as “the
Objection 4. Further, even as the judge requires au-
soil gives proof of its fertility by producing useless herbs
thority in order to judge aright, so also does he need jus-
before the useful seeds have grown, so this deed of Moses
tice and knowledge, as shown above (a. 1, ad 1,3; a. 2).
was sinful although it gave a sign of great fertility,” in so
But a judgment is not described as unjust, if he who judges
far, to wit, as it was a sign of the power whereby he was
lacks the habit of justice or the knowledge of the law. Nei-
to deliver his people.
ther therefore is it always unjust to judge by usurpation,
With regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this
i.e. without authority.
out of zeal for God by Divine inspiration; or because
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 14:4): “Who art
though not as yet high-priest, he was nevertheless the
thou that judgest another man’s servant?”
high-priest’s son, and this judgment was his concern as
I answer that, Since judgment should be pronounced
of the other judges, to whom this was commanded†.
according to the written law, as stated above (a. 5), he that
Reply to Objection 3. The secular power is subject to
pronounces judgment, interprets, in a way, the letter of the
the spiritual, even as the body is subject to the soul. Con-
law, by applying it to some particular case. Now since it
sequently the judgment is not usurped if the spiritual au-
belongs to the same authority to interpret and to make a
thority interferes in those temporal matters that are subject
law, just as a law cannot be made save by public author-
to the spiritual authority or which have been committed to
ity, so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by
the spiritual by the temporal authority.
public authority, which extends over those who are sub-
Reply to Objection 4. The habits of knowledge and
ject to the community. Wherefore even as it would be
justice are perfections of the individual, and consequently
unjust for one man to force another to observe a law that
their absence does not make a judgment to be usurped, as
was not approved by public authority, so too it is unjust,
in the absence of public authority which gives a judgment
if a man compels another to submit to a judgment that is
its coercive force.
∗ Digest. i, 3; De leg. senatusque consult. 25
∗ Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 70
† Ex. 22:20; Lev. 20; Dt. 13,17
1482
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 61
Of the Parts of Justice
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts, which are the species of justice, i.e. distributive and commutative justice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts, i.e. the virtues connected with justice. The first consideration will be twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices. And since restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice, we must consider (1) the distinction between commutative and distributive justice; (2) restitution.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and commutative?
(2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way?
(3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold?
(4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as counter-passion?
Whether two species of justice are suitably assigned, viz. commutative and distribu-IIa IIae q. 61 a. 1
tive?
Objection 1. It would seem that the two species of
tions, the other, commutations.”
justice are unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and com-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 58, Aa. 7,8), par-
mutative. That which is hurtful to the many cannot be
ticular justice is directed to the private individual, who is
a species of justice, since justice is directed to the com-
compared to the community as a part to the whole. Now
mon good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of
a twofold order may be considered in relation to a part. In
the many, if the goods of the community are distributed
the first place there is the order of one part to another, to
among many, both because the goods of the commu-
which corresponds the order of one private individual to
nity would be exhausted, and because the morals of men
another. This order is directed by commutative justice,
would be corrupted. For Tully says (De Offic. ii, 15):
which is concerned about the mutual dealings between
“He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to
two persons. In the second place there is the order of
expect that he will receive again.” Therefore distribution
the whole towards the parts, to which corresponds the or-
does not belong to any species of justice.
der of that which belongs to the community in relation to
Objection 2. Further, the act of justice is to render to each single person. This order is directed by distributive
each one what is his own, as stated above (q. 58, a. 2). But
justice, which distributes common goods proportionately.
when things are distributed, a man does not receive what
Hence there are two species of justice, distributive and
was his, but becomes possessed of something which be-
commutative.
longed to the community. Therefore this does not pertain
Reply to Objection 1. Just as a private individual is
to justice.
praised for moderation in his bounty, and blamed for ex-
Objection 3.
Further, justice is not only in the
cess therein, so too ought moderation to be observed in the
sovereign, but also in the subject, as stated above (q. 58,
distribution of common goods, wherein distributive jus-
a. 6). But it belongs exclusively to the sovereign to dis-
tice directs.
tribute. Therefore distribution does not always belong to
Reply to Objection 2. Even as part and whole are
justice.
somewhat the same, so too that which pertains to the
Objection 4. Further, “Distributive justice regards
whole, pertains somewhat to the part also: so that when
common goods” (Ethic. v, 4). Now matters regarding the
the goods of the community are distributed among a num-
community pertain to legal justice. Therefore distributive
ber of individuals each one receives that which, in a way,
justice is a part, not of particular, but of legal justice.
is his own.
Objection 5.
Further, unity or multitude do not
Reply to Objection 3. The act of distributing the
change the species of a virtue. Now commutative jus-
goods of the community, belongs to none but those who
tice consists in rendering something to one person, while
exercise authority over those goods; and yet distributive
distributive justice consists in giving something to many.
justice is also in the subjects to whom those goods are
Therefore they are not different species of justice.
distributed in so far as they are contented by a just distri-
On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns two parts
bution. Moreover distribution of common goods is some-
to justice and says (Ethic. v, 2) that “one directs distribu-
times made not to the state but to the members of a family,
1483
and such distribution can be made by authority of a private to particular individuals by way of distribution.
individual.
Reply to Objection 5. Distributive and commutative
Reply to Objection 4. Movement takes its species
justice differ not only in respect of unity and multitude,
from the term “whereunto.” Hence it belongs to legal jus-
but also in respect of different kinds of due: because com-
tice to direct to the common good those matters which
mon property is due to an individual in one way, and his
concern private individuals: whereas on the contrary it
personal property in another way.
belongs to particular justice to direct the common good
Whether the mean is to be observed in the same way in distributive as in commutative IIa IIae q. 61 a. 2
justice?
Objection 1. It would seem that the mean in distribu-
cal proportion,” wherein equality depends not on quantity
tive justice is to be observed in the same way as in com-
but on proportion. For example we say that 6 is to 4 as 3
mutative justice. For each of these is a kind of particular
is to 2, because in either case the proportion equals 1-1/2;
justice, as stated above (a. 1). Now the mean is taken in
since the greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its
the same way in all the parts of temperance or fortitude.
half: whereas the equality of excess is not one of quantity,
Therefore the mean should also be observed in the same
because 6 exceeds 4 by 2, while 3 exceeds 2 by 1.
way in both distributive and commutative justice.
On the other hand in commutations something is paid
Objection 2. Further, the form of a moral virtue con-
to an individual on account of something of his that has
sists in observing the mean which is determined in accor-
been received, as may be seen chiefly in selling and buy-
dance with reason. Since, then, one virtue has one form,
ing, where the notion of commutation is found primarily.
it seems that the mean for both should be the same.
Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, so that
Objection 3. Further, in order to observe the mean in
the one person should pay back to the other just so much
distributive justice we have to consider the various deserts
as he has become richer out of that which belonged to the
of persons. Now a person’s deserts are considered also in
other. The result of this will be equality according to the
commutative justice, for instance, in punishments; thus
“arithmetical mean” which is gauged according to equal
a man who strikes a prince is punished more than one
excess in quantity. Thus 5 is the mean between 6 and 4,
who strikes a private individual. Therefore the mean is
since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded by the former,
observed in the same way in both kinds of justice.
by 1. Accordingly if, at the start, both persons have 5, and
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4)
one of them receives 1 out of the other’s belongings, the
that the mean in distributive justice is observed accord-
one that is the receiver, will have 6, and the other will be
ing to “geometrical proportion,” whereas in commutative
left with 4: and so there will be justice if both be brought
justice it follows “arithmetical proportion.”
back to the mean, 1 being taken from him that has 6, and
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), in distributive
given to him that has 4, for then both will have 5 which is
justice something is given to a private individual, in so far
the mean.
as what belongs to the whole is due to the part, and in a
Reply to Objection 1. In the other moral virtues the
quantity that is proportionate to the importance of the po-
rational, not the real mean, is to be followed: but justice
sition of that part in respect of the whole. Consequently
follows the real mean; wherefore the mean, in justice, de-
in distributive justice a person receives all the more of the
pends on the diversity of things.
common goods, according as he holds a more prominent
Reply to Objection 2. Equality is the general form
position in the community. This prominence in an aristo-
of justice, wherein distributive and commutative justice
cratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oli-
agree: but in one we find equality of geometrical propor-
garchy according to wealth, in a democracy according to
tion, whereas in the other we find equality of arithmetical
liberty, and in various ways according to various forms of
proportion.
community. Hence in distributive justice the mean is ob-
Reply to Objection 3. In actions and passions a per-
served, not according to equality between thing and thing,
son’s station affects the quantity of a thing: for it is a
but according to proportion between things and persons:
greater injury to strike a prince than a private person.
in such a way that even as one person surpasses another,
Hence in distributive justice a person’s station is consid-
so that which is given to one person surpasses that which
ered in itself, whereas in commutative justice it is consid-
is allotted to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
ered in so far as it causes a diversity of things.
v, 3,4) that the mean in the latter case follows “geometri-
1484
Whether there is a different matter for both kinds of justice?
IIa IIae q. 61 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a differ-
son, or work against his will, and this may be done se-
ent matter for both kinds of justice. Diversity of matter
cretly by fraud, or openly by violence. In either case the
causes diversity of virtue, as in the case of fortitude and
offence may be committed against the other man’s chattel
temperance. Therefore, if distributive and commutative
or person, or against a person connected with him. If the
justice have different matters, it would seem that they are
offence is against his chattel and this be taken secretly, it
not comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice.
is called “theft,” if openly, it is called “robbery.” If it be
Objection 2. Further, the distribution that has to do
against another man’s person, it may affect either the very
with distributive justice is one of “wealth or of honors,
substance of his person, or his dignity. If it be against the
or of whatever can be distributed among the members of
substance of his person, a man is injured secretly if he is
the community” (Ethic. v, 2), which very things are the
treacherously slain, struck or poisoned, and openly, if he
subject matter of commutations between one person and
is publicly slain, imprisoned, struck or maimed. If it be
another, and this belongs to commutative justice. There-
against his personal dignity, a man is injured secretly by
fore the matters of distributive and commutative justice
false witness, detractions and so forth, whereby he is de-
are not distinct.
prived of his good name, and openly, by being accused
Objection 3. Further, if the matter of distributive jus-
in a court of law, or by public insult. If it be against a
tice differs from that of commutative justice, for the rea-
personal connection, a man is injured in the person of his
son that they differ specifically, where there is no specific
wife, secretly (for the most part) by adultery, in the per-
difference, there ought to be no diversity of matter. Now
son of his slave, if the latter be induced to leave his mas-
the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) reckons commutative jus-
ter: which things can also be done openly. The same ap-
tice as one species, and yet this has many kinds of matter.
plies to other personal connections, and whatever injury
Therefore the matter of these species of justice is, seem-
may be committed against the principal, may be commit-
ingly, not of many kinds.
ted against them also. Adultery, however, and inducing a
On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. v, 2 that “one
slave to leave his master are properly injuries against the
kind of justice directs distributions, and another commu-
person; yet the latter, since a slave is his master’s chat-
tations.”
tel, is referred to theft. Voluntary commutations are when
I answer that, As stated above (q. 51, Aa. 8,10), jus-
a man voluntarily transfers his chattel to another person.
tice is about certain external operations, namely distribu-
And if he transfer it simply so that the recipient incurs no
tion and commutation. These consist in the use of cer-
debt, as in the case of gifts, it is an act, not of justice but tain externals, whether things, persons or even works: of
of liberality. A voluntary transfer belongs to justice in so
things, as when one man takes from or restores to another
far as it includes the notion of debt, and this may occur
that which is his; of persons, as when a man does an injury
in many ways. First when one man simply transfers his
to the very person of another, for instance by striking or
thing to another in exchange for another thing, as happens
insulting him, or even by showing respect for him; and of
in selling and buying. Secondly when a man transfers his
works, as when a man justly exacts a work of another, or
thing to another, that the latter may have the use of it with
does a work for him. Accordingly, if we take for the mat-
the obligation of returning it to its owner. If he grant the
ter of each kind of justice the things themselves of which
use of a thing gratuitously, it is called “usufruct” in things
the operations are the use, the matter of distributive and
that bear fruit; and simply “borrowing” on “loan” in things
commutative justice is the same, since things can be dis-
that bear no fruit, such as money, pottery, etc.; but if not
tributed out of the common property to individuals, and
even the use is granted gratis, it is called “letting” or “hir-
be the subject of commutation between one person and
ing.” Thirdly, a man transfers his thing with the inten-
another; and again there is a certain distribution and pay-
tion of recovering it, not for the purpose of its use, but
ment of laborious works.
that it may be kept safe, as in a “deposit,” or under some
If, however, we take for the matter of both kinds of jus-
obligation, as when a man pledges his property, or when
tice the principal actions themselves, whereby we make
one man stands security for another. In all these actions,
use of persons, things, and works, there is then a dif-
whether voluntary or involuntary, the mean is taken in the
ference of matter between them. For distributive justice
same way according to the equality of repayment. Hence
directs distributions, while commutative justice directs
all these actions belong to the one same species of jus-
commutations that can take place between two persons.
tice, namely commutative justice. And this suffices for
of these some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are
the Replies to the Objections.
involuntary when anyone uses another man’s chattel, per-
1485
Whether the just is absolutely the same as retaliation?
IIa IIae q. 61 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the just is absolutely
on a basis of equality according to the requirements of
the same as retaliation. For the judgment of God is abso-
commutative justice, namely that the meed of passion be
lutely just. Now the judgment of God is such that a man
equal to the action. Now there would not always be equal-
has to suffer in proportion with his deeds, according to
ity if passion were in the same species as the action. Be-
Mat. 7:2: “With what measure you judge, you shall be
cause, in the first place, when a person injures the person
judged: and with what measure you mete, it shall be mea-
of one who is greater, the action surpasses any passion of
sured to you again.” Therefore the just is absolutely the
the same species that he might undergo, wherefore he that
same as retaliation.
strikes a prince, is not only struck back, but is much more
Objection 2. Further, in either kind of justice some-
severely punished. In like manner when a man despoils
thing is given to someone according to a kind of equal-
another of his property against the latter’s will, the ac-
ity. In distributive justice this equality regards personal
tion surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of that
dignity, which would seem to depend chiefly on what a
thing, because the man who caused another’s loss, him-
person has done for the good of the community; while in
self would lose nothing, and so he is punished by making
commutative justice it regards the thing in which a person
restitution several times over, because not only did he in-
has suffered loss. Now in respect of either equality there
jure a private individual, but also the common weal, the
is retaliation in respect of the deed committed. Therefore
security of whose protection he has infringed. Nor again
it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retal-
would there be equality of passion in voluntary commu-
iation.
tations, were one always to exchange one’s chattel for an-
Objection 3. Further, the chief argument against re-
other man’s, because it might happen that the other man’s
taliation is based on the difference between the voluntary
chattel is much greater than our own: so that it becomes
and the involuntary; for he who does an injury involun-
necessary to equalize passion and action in commutations
tarily is less severely punished. Now voluntary and in-
according to a certain proportionate commensuration, for
voluntary taken in relation to ourselves, do not diversify
which purpose money was invented. Hence retaliation
the mean of justice since this is the real mean and does
is in accordance with commutative justice: but there is
not depend on us. Therefore it would seem that the just is
no place for it in distributive justice, because in distribu-
absolutely the same as retaliation.
tive justice we do not consider the equality between thing
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Ethic. v,
and thing or between passion and action (whence the ex-
5) that the just is not always the same as retaliation.
pression ‘contrapassum’), but according to proportion be-
I answer that, Retaliation [contrapassum] denotes
tween things and persons, as stated above (a. 2).
equal passion repaid for previous action; and the expres-
Reply to Objection 1. This form of the Divine judg-
sion applies most properly to injurious passions and ac-
ment is in accordance with the conditions of commutative
tions, whereby a man harms the person of his neighbor;
justice, in so far as rewards are apportioned to merits, and
for instance if a man strike, that he be struck back. This
punishments to sins.
kind of just is laid down in the Law (Ex. 21:23,24): “He
Reply to Objection 2. When a man who has served
shall render life for life, eye for eye,” etc. And since also
the community is paid for his services, this is to be re-
to take away what belongs to another is to do an unjust
ferred to commutative, not distributive, justice. Because
thing, it follows that secondly retaliation consists in this
distributive justice considers the equality, not between the
also, that whosoever causes loss to another, should suffer
thing received and the thing done, but between the thing
loss in his belongings. This just loss is also found in the
received by one person and the thing received by another
Law (Ex. 22:1): “If any man steal an ox or a sheep, and
according to the respective conditions of those persons.
kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox and four Reply to Objection 3. When the injurious action is
sheep for one sheep.” Thirdly retaliation is transferred to
voluntary, the injury is aggravated and consequently is
voluntary commutations, where action and passion are on
considered as a greater thing. Hence it requires a greater
both sides, although voluntariness detracts from the nature
punishment in repayment, by reason of a difference, not
of passion, as stated above (q. 59, a. 3).
on part, but on the part of the thing.
In all these cases, however, repayment must be made
1486
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 62
Of Restitution
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider restitution, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) of what is it an act?
(2) Whether it is always of necessity for salvation to restore what one has taken away?
(3) Whether it is necessary to restore more than has been taken away?
(4) Whether it is necessary to restore what one has not taken away?
(5) Whether it is necessary to make restitution to the person from whom something has been taken?
(6) Whether the person who has taken something away is bound to restore it?
(7) Whether any other person is bound to restitution?
(8) Whether one is bound to restore at once?
Whether restitution is an act of commutative justice?
IIa IIae q. 62 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that restitution is not an
Reply to Objection 1. That which is not due to an-
act of commutative justice. For justice regards the notion
other is not his properly speaking, although it may have
of what is due. Now one may restore, even as one may
been his at some time: wherefore it is a mere gift rather
give, that which is not due. Therefore restitution is not the
than a restitution, when anyone renders to another what is
act of any part of justice.
not due to him. It is however somewhat like a restitution,
Objection 2. Further, that which has passed away and
since the thing itself is materially the same; yet it is not
is no more cannot be restored. Now justice and injustice
the same in respect of the formal aspect of justice, which
are about certain actions and passions, which are unendur-
considers that thing as belonging to this particular man:
ing and transitory. Therefore restitution would not seem
and so it is not restitution properly so called.
to be the act of a part of justice.
Reply to Objection 2. In so far as the word restitution
Objection 3.
Further, restitution is repayment of
denotes something done over again, it implies identity of
something taken away. Now something may be taken
object. Hence it would seem originally to have applied
away from a man not only in commutation, but also in
chiefly to external things, which can pass from one per-
distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man less
son to another, since they remain the same both substan-
than his due. Therefore restitution is not more an act of
tially and in respect of the right of dominion. But, even as
commutative than of distributive justice.
the term “commutation” has passed from such like things
On the contrary, Restitution is opposed to taking
to those actions and passions which confer reverence or
away. Now it is an act of commutative injustice to take
injury, harm or profit on another person, so too the term
away what belongs to another. Therefore to restore it is
“restitution” is applied, to things which though they be
an act of that justice which directs commutations.
transitory in reality, yet remain in their effect; whether
I answer that, To restore is seemingly the same as
this touch his body, as when the body is hurt by being
to reinstate a person in the possession or dominion of his
struck, or his reputation, as when a man remains defamed
thing, so that in restitution we consider the equality of jus-
or dishonored by injurious words.
tice attending the payment of one thing for another, and
Reply to Objection 3. Compensation is made by the
this belongs to commutative justice. Hence restitution is
distributor to the man to whom less was given than his
an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one person
due, by comparison of thing with thing, when the latter
having what belongs to another, either with his consent,
receives so much the more according as he received less
for instance on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in
than his due: and consequently it pertains to commutative
robbery or theft.
justice.
1487
Whether restitution of what has been taken away is necessary for salvation?
IIa IIae q. 62 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not necessary
stance if one man has deprived another of a limb, he must
to restore what has been taken away. For that which is
make compensation either in money or in honor, the con-
impossible is not necessary for salvation. But sometimes
dition of either party being duly considered according to
it is impossible to restore what has been taken, as when
the judgment of a good man.
a man has taken limb or life. Therefore it does not seem
Reply to Objection 2. There are three ways in which
necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from
one may take away another’s good name. First, by say-
another.
ing what is true, and this justly, as when a man reveals
Objection 2. Further, the commission of a sin is not
another’s sin, while observing the right order of so doing,
necessary for salvation, for then a man would be in a
and then he is not bound to restitution. Secondly, by say-
dilemma. But sometimes it is impossible, without sin, to
ing what is untrue and unjustly, and then he is bound to
restore what has been taken, as when one has taken away
restore that man’s good name, by confessing that he told
another’s good name by telling the truth. Therefore it is
an untruth. Thirdly, by saying what is true, but unjustly,
not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken
as when a man reveals another’s sin contrarily to the right
from another.
order of so doing, and then he is bound to restore his good
Objection 3. Further, what is done cannot be undone.
name as far as he can, and yet without telling an untruth;
Now sometimes a man loses his personal honor by being
for instance by saying that he spoke ill, or that he defamed
unjustly insulted. Therefore that which has been taken
him unjustly; or if he be unable to restore his good name,
from him cannot be restored to him: so that it is not nec-
he must compensate him otherwise, the same as in other
essary for salvation to restore what one has taken.
cases, as stated above (ad 1).
Objection 4. Further, to prevent a person from obtain-
Reply to Objection 3. The action of the man who has
ing a good thing is seemingly the same as to take it away
defamed another cannot be undone, but it is possible, by
from him, since “to lack little is almost the same as to lack
showing him deference, to undo its effect, viz. the lower-
nothing at all,” as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5). Now
ing of the other man’s personal dignity in the opinion of
when anyone prevents a man from obtaining a benefice or
other men.
the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore the benefice,
Reply to Objection 4. There are several ways of pre-
since this would be sometimes impossible. Therefore it is
venting a man from obtaining a benefice. First, justly: for
not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.
instance, if having in view the honor of God or the good
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced.
of the Church, one procures its being conferred on a more
cxliii): “Unless a man restore what he has purloined, his
worthy subject, and then there is no obligation whatever
sin is not forgiven.”
to make restitution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly,
I answer that, Restitution as stated above (a. 1) is
if the intention is to injure the person whom one hinders,
an act of commutative justice, and this demands a cer-
through hatred, revenge or the like. In this case, if before
tain equality. Wherefore restitution denotes the return of
the benefice has been definitely assigned to anyone, one
the thing unjustly taken; since it is by giving it back that
prevents its being conferred on a worthy subject by coun-
equality is reestablished. If, however, it be taken away
seling that it be not conferred on him, one is bound to
justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no need
make some compensation, after taking account of the cir-
for restitution, for justice consists in equality. Since there-
cumstances of persons and things according to the judg-
fore the safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation,
ment of a prudent person: but one is not bound in equiv-
it follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what
alent, because that man had not obtained the benefice and
has been taken unjustly.
might have been prevented in many ways from obtaining
Reply to Objection 1. When it is impossible to re-
it. If, on the other hand, the benefice had already been
pay the equivalent, it suffices to repay what one can, as
assigned to a certain person, and someone, for some un-
in the case of honor due to God and our parents, as the
due cause procures its revocation, it is the same as though
Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Wherefore when that
he had deprived a man of what he already possessed,
which has been taken cannot be restored in equivalent,
and consequently he would be bound to compensation in
compensation should be made as far as possible: for in-
equivalent, in proportion, however, to his means.
1488
Whether it suffices to restore the exact amount taken?
IIa IIae q. 62 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not sufficient
void of injustice, as is the case in loans. The other is the
to restore the exact amount taken. For it is written (Ex.
sin of injustice, which is consistent with equality on the
22:1): “If a man shall steal an ox or a sheep and kill or
part of the thing, as when a person intends to use violence
sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep
but fails.
for one sheep.” Now everyone is bound to keep the com-
As regards the first, the remedy is applied by making
mandments of the Divine law. Therefore a thief is bound
restitution, since thereby equality is re-established; and
to restore four- or fivefold.
for this it is enough that a man restore just so much as
Objection 2. Further, “What things soever were writ-
he has belonging to another. But as regards the sin, the
ten, were written for our learning” (Rom. 15:4). Now
remedy is applied by punishment, the infliction of which
Zachaeus said (Lk. 19:8) to our Lord: “If I have wronged
belongs to the judge: and so, until a man is condemned by
any man of any thing, I restore him fourfold.” Therefore a
the judge, he is not bound to restore more than he took,
man is bound to restore several times over the amount he
but when once he is condemned, he is bound to pay the
has taken unjustly.
penalty.
Objection 3. Further, no one can be unjustly deprived
Hence it is clear how to answer the First Objection:
of what he is not bound to give. Now a judge justly de-
because this law fixes the punishment to be inflicted by
prives a thief of more than the amount of his theft, under
the judge. Nor is this commandment to be kept now, be-
the head of damages. Therefore a man is bound to pay
cause since the coming of Christ no man is bound to keep
it, and consequently it is not sufficient to restore the exact
the judicial precepts, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 104,
amount.
a. 3). Nevertheless the same might be determined by hu-
On the contrary, Restitution re-establishes equality
man law, and then the same answer would apply.
where an unjust taking has caused inequality. Now equal-
Reply to Objection 2. Zachaeus said this being will-
ity is restored by repaying the exact amount taken. There-
ing to do more than he was bound to do; hence he had
fore there is no obligation to restore more than the exact
said already: “Behold. . . the half of my goods I give to the
amount taken.
poor.”
I answer that, When a man takes another’s thing un-
Reply to Objection 3. By condemning the man justly,
justly, two things must be considered. One is the inequal-
the judge can exact more by way of damages; and yet this
ity on the part of the thing, which inequality is sometimes
was not due before the sentence.
Whether a man is bound to restore what he has not taken?
IIa IIae q. 62 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that a man is bound to
gather where I have not strewed.” Therefore it is just that
restore what he has not taken. For he that has inflicted a
one should restore to a man also, something that one has
loss on a man is bound to remove that loss. Now it hap-
not taken.
pens sometimes that the loss sustained is greater than the
On the contrary, Restitution belongs to justice, be-
thing taken: for instance, if you dig up a man’s seeds, you
cause it re-establishes equality. But if one were to restore
inflict on the sower a loss equal to the coming harvest, and
what one did not take, there would not be equality. There-
thus you would seem to be bound to make restitution ac-
fore it is not just to make such a restitution.
cordingly. Therefore a man is bound to restore what he
I answer that, Whoever brings a loss upon another
has not taken.
person, seemingly, takes from him the amount of the loss,
Objection 2. Further, he who retains his creditor’s
since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) loss is so
money beyond the stated time, would seem to occasion
called from a man having “less”∗ than his due. Therefore
his loss of all his possible profits from that money, and yet
a man is bound to make restitution according to the loss
he does not really take them. Therefore it seems that a
he has brought upon another.
man is bound to restore what he did not take.
Now a man suffers a loss in two ways. First, by be-
Objection 3. Further, human justice is derived from
ing deprived of what he actually has; and a loss of this
Divine justice. Now a man is bound to restore to God
kind is always to be made good by repayment in equiva-
more than he has received from Him, according to Mat.
lent: for instance if a man damnifies another by destroying
25:26, “Thou knewest that I reap where I sow not, and
his house he is bound to pay him the value of the house.
∗ The derivation is more apparent in English than in Latin, where
‘damnum’ stands for ‘loss,’ and ‘minus’ for ‘less.’ Aristotle merely says that to have more than your own is called ‘gain,’ and to have less than you started with is called ‘loss.’
1489
Secondly, a man may damnify another by preventing him Objections: because the sower of the seed in the field, has
from obtaining what he was on the way to obtain. A loss
the harvest, not actually but only virtually. In like manner
of this kind need not be made good in equivalent; because
he that has money has the profit not yet actually but only
to have a thing virtually is less than to have it actually,
virtually: and both may be hindered in many ways.
and to be on the way to obtain a thing is to have it merely
Reply to Objection 3. God requires nothing from us
virtually or potentially, and so were he to be indemnified
but what He Himself has sown in us. Hence this say-
by receiving the thing actually, he would be paid, not the
ing is to be understood as expressing either the shameful
exact value taken from him, but more, and this is not nec-
thought of the lazy servant, who deemed that he had re-
essary for salvation, as stated above. However he is bound
ceived nothing from the other, or the fact that God expects
to make some compensation, according to the condition of
from us the fruit of His gifts, which fruit is from Him and
persons and things.
from us, although the gifts themselves are from God with-
From this we see how to answer the First and Second
out us.
Whether restitution must always be made to the person from whom a thing has been IIa IIae q. 62 a. 5
taken?
Objection 1. It would seem that restitution need not
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 13:7): “Ren-
always be made to the person from whom a thing has been
der. . . to all men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due, taken. For it is not lawful to injure anyone. Now it would
custom to whom custom.”
sometimes be injurious to the man himself, or to others,
I answer that, Restitution re-establishes the equal-
were one to restore to him what has been taken from him;
ity of commutative justice, which equality consists in the
if, for instance, one were to return a madman his sword.
equalizing of thing to thing, as stated above (a. 2; q. 58,
Therefore restitution need not always be made to the per-
a. 10). Now this equalizing of things is impossible, un-
son from whom a thing has been taken.
less he that has less than his due receive what is lacking to
Objection 2. Further, if a man has given a thing un-
him: and for this to be done, restitution must be made to
lawfully, he does not deserve to recover it. Now some-
the person from whom a thing has been taken.
times a man gives unlawfully that which another accepts
Reply to Objection 1. When the thing to be restored
unlawfully, as in the case of the giver and receiver who are
appears to be grievously injurious to the person to whom it
guilty of simony. Therefore it is not always necessary to
is to be restored, or to some other, it should not be restored
make restitution to the person from whom one has taken
to him there and then, because restitution is directed to the
something.
good of the person to whom it is made, since all posses-
Objection 3. Further, no man is bound to do what is
sions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who re-
impossible. Now it is sometimes impossible to make resti-
tains another’s property must not appropriate it, but must
tution to the person from whom a thing has been taken,
either reserve it, that he may restore it at a fitting time, or either because he is dead, or because he is too far away, or
hand it over to another to keep it more securely.
because he is unknown to us. Therefore restitution need
Reply to Objection 2. A person may give a thing un-
not always be made to the person from whom a thing has
lawfully in two ways. First through the giving itself being
been taken.
illicit and against the law, as is the case when a man gives
Objection 4. Further, we owe more compensation to
a thing simoniacally. Such a man deserves to lose what
one from whom we have received a greater favor. Now
he gave, wherefore restitution should not be made to him:
we have received greater favors from others (our parents
and, since the receiver acted against the law in receiving,
for instance) than from a lender or depositor. Therefore
he must not retain the price, but must use it for some pious
sometimes we ought to succor some other person rather
object. Secondly a man gives unlawfully, through giving
than make restitution to one from whom we have taken
for an unlawful purpose, albeit the giving itself is not un-
something.
lawful, as when a woman receives payment for fornica-
Objection 5. Further, it is useless to restore a thing
tion: wherefore she may keep what she has received. If,
which reverts to the restorer by being restored. Now if a
however, she has extorted overmuch by fraud or deceit,
prelate has unjustly taken something from the Church and
she would be bound to restitution.
makes restitution to the Church, it reverts into his hands,
Reply to Objection 3. If the person to whom resti-
since he is the guardian of the Church’s property. There-
tution is due is unknown altogether, restitution must be
fore he ought not to restore to the Church from whom he
made as far as possible, for instance by giving an alms for
has taken: and so restitution should not always be made
his spiritual welfare (whether he be dead or living): but
to the person from whom something has been taken away
not without previously making a careful inquiry about his
1490
person. If the person to whom restitution is due be dead, Reply to Objection 5. There are three ways in which
restitution should be made to his heir, who is looked upon
a prelate can rob the Church of her property. First by lay-
as one with him. If he be very far away, what is due to him
ing hands on Church property which is committed, not to
should be sent to him, especially if it be of great value and
him but to another; for instance, if a bishop appropriates
can easily be sent: else it should be deposited in a safe
the property of the chapter. In such a case it is clear that
place to be kept for him, and the owner should be advised
he is bound to restitution, by handing it over to those who
of the fact.
are its lawful owners. Secondly by transferring to another
Reply to Objection 4. A man is bound, out of his own
person (for instance a relative or a friend) Church prop-
property, to succor his parents, or those from whom he has
erty committed to himself: in which case he must make
received greater benefits; but he ought not to compensate
restitution to the Church, and have it under his own care,
a benefactor out of what belongs to others; and he would
so as to hand it over to his successor. Thirdly, a prelate
be doing this if he were to compensate one with what is
may lay hands on Church property, merely in intention,
due to another. Exception must be made in cases of ex-
when, to wit, he begins to have a mind to hold it as his
treme need, for then he could and should even take what
own and not in the name of the Church: in which case he
belongs to another in order to succor a parent.
must make restitution by renouncing his intention.
Whether he that has taken a thing is always bound to restitution?
IIa IIae q. 62 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that he who has taken
gain nothing thereby, is bound to compensate the injured
a thing is not always bound to restore it. Restitution re-
person, so too he that is guilty of theft or robbery, is bound
establishes the equality of justice, by taking away from
to make compensation for the loss incurred, although he
him that has more and giving to him that has less. Now
be no better off; and in addition he must be punished for
it happens sometimes that he who has taken that which
the injustice committed. Secondly, a man takes another’s
belongs to another, no longer has it, through its having
property for his own profit but without committing an in-
passed into another’s hands. Therefore it should be re-
jury, i.e. with the consent of the owner, as in the case of a
stored, not by the person that took it, but by the one that
loan: and then, the taker is bound to restitution, not only
has it.
by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the taking,
Objection 2. Further, no man is bound to reveal his
even if he has lost the thing: for he is bound to compen-
own crime. But by making restitution a man would some-
sate the person who has done him a favor, and he would
times reveal his crime, as in the case of theft. Therefore he
not be doing so if the latter were to lose thereby. Thirdly,
that has taken a thing is not always bound to restitution.
a man takes another’s property without injury to the latter
Objection 3. Further, the same thing should not be re-
or profit to himself, as in the case of a deposit; where-
stored several times. Now sometimes several persons take
fore he that takes a thing thus, incurs no obligation on ac-
a thing at the same time, and one of them restores it in
count of the taking, in fact by taking he grants a favor; but
its entirety. Therefore he that takes a thing is not always
he is bound to restitution on account of the thing taken.
bound to restitution.
Consequently if this thing be taken from him without any
On the contrary, He that has sinned is bound to satis-
fault on his part, he is not bound to restitution, although he
faction. Now restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore
would be, if he were to lose the thing through a grievous
he that has taken a thing is bound to restore it.
fault on his part.
I answer that, With regard to a man who has taken an-
Reply to Objection 1. The chief end of restitution is,
other’s property, two points must be considered: the thing
not that he who has more than his due may cease to have
taken, and the taking. By reason of the thing taken, he
it, but that he who has less than his due may be compen-
is bound to restore it as long as he has it in his posses-
sated. Wherefore there is no place for restitution in those
sion, since the thing that he has in addition to what is his,
things which one man may receive from another without
should be taken away from him, and given to him who
loss to the latter, as when a person takes a light from an-
lacks it according to the form of commutative justice. On
other’s candle. Consequently although he that has taken
the other hand, the taking of the thing that is another’s
something from another, may have ceased to have what
property, may be threefold. For sometimes it is injurious,
he took, through having transferred it to another, yet since
i.e. against the will of the owner, as in theft and robbery:
that other is deprived of what is his, both are bound to
in which case the thief is bound to restitution not only by
restitution, he that took the thing, on account of the inju-
reason of the thing, but also by reason of the injurious
rious taking, and he that has it, on account of the thing.
action, even though the thing is no longer in his posses-
Reply to Objection 2. Although a man is not bound
sion. For just as a man who strikes another, though he
to reveal his crime to other men, yet is he bound to reveal
1491
it to God in confession; and so he may make restitution to reason that when he has received sufficient compen-of another’s property through the priest to whom he con-
sation from one, the others are not bound to any further
fesses.
restitution in his regard: rather ought they to refund the
Reply to Objection 3. Since restitution is chiefly di-
person who has made restitution, who, nevertheless, may
rected to the compensation for the loss incurred by the per-
excuse them from so doing.
son from whom a thing has been taken unjustly, it stands
Whether restitution is binding on those who have not taken?
IIa IIae q. 62 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that restitution is not
are expressed as follows:
binding on those who have not taken. For restitution is
“By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by
a punishment of the taker. Now none should be punished
receiving, by participation, by silence, by not preventing,
except the one who sinned. Therefore none are bound to
by not denouncing.”
restitution save the one who has taken.
It must be observed, however, that in five of these
Objection 2. Further, justice does not bind one to in-
cases the cooperator is always bound to restitution. First,
crease another’s property. Now if restitution were binding
in the case of command: because he that commands is the
not only on the man who takes a thing but also on all those
chief mover, wherefore he is bound to restitution princi-
who cooperate with him in any way whatever, the person
pally. Secondly, in the case of consent; namely of one
from whom the thing was taken would be the gainer, both
without whose consent the robbery cannot take place.
because he would receive restitution many times over, and
Thirdly, in the case of receiving; when, to wit, a man is
because sometimes a person cooperates towards a thing
a receiver of thieves, and gives them assistance. Fourthly,
being taken away from someone, without its being taken
in the case of participation; when a man takes part in the
away in effect. Therefore the others are not bound to resti-
theft and in the booty. Fifthly, he who does not prevent the
tution.
theft, whereas he is bound to do so; for instance, persons
Objection 3. Further, no man is bound to expose him-
in authority who are bound to safeguard justice on earth,
self to danger, in order to safeguard another’s property.
are bound to restitution, if by their neglect thieves prosper,
Now sometimes a man would expose himself to the dan-
because their salary is given to them in payment of their
ger of death, were he to betray a thief, or withstand him.
preserving justice here below.
Therefore one is not bound to restitution, through not be-
In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not al-
traying or withstanding a thief.
ways bound to restitution: because counsel and flattery
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:32): “They
are not always the efficacious cause of robbery. Hence the
who do such things are worthy of death, and not only they
counsellor or flatterer is bound to restitution, only when
that do them, but also they that consent to them that do
it may be judged with probability that the unjust taking
them.” Therefore in like manner they that consent are
resulted from such causes.
bound to restitution.
Reply to Objection 1. Not only is he bound to resti-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), a person is
tution who commits the sin, but also he who is in any way
bound to restitution not only on account of someone else’s
cause of the sin, whether by counselling, or by command-
property which he has taken, but also on account of the in-
ing, or in any other way whatever.
jurious taking. Hence whoever is cause of an unjust taking
Reply to Objection 2. He is bound chiefly to restitu-
is bound to restitution. This happens in two ways, directly
tion, who is the principal in the deed; first of all, the “com-
and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces another to
mander”; secondly, the “executor,” and in due sequence,
take, and this in three ways. First, on the part of the tak-
the others: yet so that, if one of them make restitution, an-
ing, by moving a man to take, either by express command,
other is not bound to make restitution to the same person.
counsel, or consent, or by praising a man for his courage
Yet those who are principals in the deed, and who took
in thieving. Secondly, on the part of the taker, by giving
possession of the thing, are bound to compensate those
him shelter or any other kind of assistance. Thirdly, on the
who have already made restitution. When a man com-
part of the thing taken, by taking part in the theft or rob-
mands an unjust taking that does not follow, no restitution
bery, as a fellow evil-doer. Indirectly, when a man does
has to be made, since its end is chiefly to restore the prop-
not prevent another from evil-doing (provided he be able
erty of the person who has been unjustly injured.
and bound to prevent him), either by omitting the com-
Reply to Objection 3. He that fails to denounce a
mand or counsel which would hinder him from thieving
thief or does not withstand or reprehend him is not al-
or robbing, or by omitting to do what would have hin-
ways bound to restitution, but only when he is obliged,
dered him, or by sheltering him after the deed. All these
in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case of earthly
1492
princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; for may maintain justice.
they are invested with public authority, in order that they
Whether a man is bound to immediate restitution, or may he put it off?
IIa IIae q. 62 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that a man is not bound to
will, is to deprive him of the use of what belongs to him,
immediate restitution, and can lawfully delay to restore.
and to do him an injury. Now it is clear that it is wrong to
For affirmative precepts do not bind for always. Now the
remain in sin even for a short time; and one is bound to re-
necessity of making restitution is binding through an af-
nounce one’s sin at once, according to Ecclus. 21:2, “Flee
firmative precept. Therefore a man is not bound to imme-
from sin as from the face of a serpent.” Consequently one
diate restitution.
is bound to immediate restitution, if possible, or to ask for
Objection 2. Further, no man is bound to do what is
a respite from the person who is empowered to grant the
impossible. But it is sometimes impossible to make resti-
use of the thing.
tution at once. Therefore no man is bound to immediate
Reply to Objection 1. Although the precept about the
restitution.
making of restitution is affirmative in form, it implies a
Objection 3. Further, restitution is an act of virtue,
negative precept forbidding us to withhold another’s prop-
viz. of justice. Now time is one of the circumstances
erty.
requisite for virtuous acts. Since then the other circum-
Reply to Objection 2. When one is unable to restore
stances are not determinate for acts of virtue, but are de-
at once, this very inability excuses one from immediate
terminable according to the dictate of prudence, it seems
restitution: even as a person is altogether excused from
that neither in restitution is there any fixed time, so that a
making restitution if he is altogether unable to make it.
man be bound to restore at once.
He is, however, bound either himself or through another
On the contrary, All matters of restitution seem to
to ask the person to whom he owes compensation to grant
come under one head. Now a man who hires the services
him a remission or a respite.
of a wage-earner, must not delay compensation, as ap-
Reply to Objection 3. Whenever the omission of a
pears from Lev. 19:13, “The wages of him that hath been
circumstance is contrary to virtue that circumstance must
hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the morning.”
be looked upon as determinate, and we are bound to ob-
Therefore neither is it lawful, in other cases of restitution,
serve it: and since delay of restitution involves a sin of un-
to delay, and restitution should be made at once.
just detention which is opposed to just detention, it stands
I answer that, Even as it is a sin against justice to
to reason that the time is determinate in the point of resti-
take another’s property, so also is it to withhold it, since,
tution being immediate.
to withhold the property of another against the owner’s
1493
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 63
Of Respect of Persons
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid parts of justice. First we shall consider respect of persons which is opposed to distributive justice; secondly we shall consider the vices opposed to commutative justice.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether respect of persons is a sin?
(2) Whether it takes place in the dispensation of spiritualities?
(3) Whether it takes place in showing honor?
(4) Whether it takes place in judicial sentences?
Whether respect of persons is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 63 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that respect of persons is
worthy of it, but simply because he is this person. And
not a sin. For the word “person” includes a reference to
any circumstance that does not amount to a reason why
personal dignity∗. Now it belongs to distributive justice to
this man be worthy of this gift, is to be referred to his per-
consider personal dignity. Therefore respect of persons is
son: for instance if a man promote someone to a prelacy
not a sin.
or a professorship, because he is rich or because he is a
Objection 2. Further, in human affairs persons are of
relative of his, it is respect of persons. It may happen,
more importance than things, since things are for the ben-
however, that a circumstance of person makes a man wor-
efit of persons and not conversely. But respect of things is
thy as regards one thing, but not as regards another: thus
not a sin. Much less, therefore, is respect of persons.
consanguinity makes a man worthy to be appointed heir
Objection 3. Further, no injustice or sin can be in
to an estate, but not to be chosen for a position of eccle-
God. Yet God seems to respect persons, since of two men
siastical authority: wherefore consideration of the same
circumstanced alike He sometimes upraises one by grace,
circumstance of person will amount to respect of persons
and leaves the other in sin, according to Mat. 24:40: “Two
in one matter and not in another. It follows, accordingly,
shall be in a bed [Vulg.: ‘field’†, one shall be taken, and
that respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice in
one shall be left.” Therefore respect of persons is not a
that it fails to observe due proportion. Now nothing but
sin.
sin is opposed to virtue: and therefore respect of persons
On the contrary, Nothing but sin is forbidden in the
is a sin.
Divine law. Now respect of persons is forbidden, Dt. 1:17:
Reply to Objection 1. In distributive justice we con-
“Neither shall you respect any man’s person.” Therefore
sider those circumstances of a person which result in dig-
respect of persons is a sin.
nity or right, whereas in respect of persons we consider
I answer that, Respect of persons is opposed to dis-
circumstances that do not so result.
tributive justice. For the equality of distributive justice
Reply to Objection 2.
Persons are rendered pro-
consists in allotting various things to various persons in
portionate to and worthy of things which are distributed
proportion to their personal dignity. Accordingly, if one
among them, by reason of certain things pertaining to cir-
considers that personal property by reason of which the
cumstances of person, wherefore such conditions ought to
thing allotted to a particular person is due to him, this is
be considered as the proper cause. But when we consider
respect not of the person but of the cause. Hence a gloss
the persons themselves, that which is not a cause is con-
on Eph. 6:9, “There is no respect of persons with God
sidered as though it were; and so it is clear that although
[Vulg.: ‘Him’],” says that “a just judge regards causes,
persons are more worthy, absolutely speaking, yet they are
not persons.” For instance if you promote a man to a pro-
not more worthy in this regard.
fessorship on account of his having sufficient knowledge,
Reply to Objection 3. There is a twofold giving. one
you consider the due cause, not the person; but if, in con-
belongs to justice, and occurs when we give a man his due:
ferring something on someone, you consider in him not
in such like givings respect of persons takes place. The
the fact that what you give him is proportionate or due to
other giving belongs to liberality, when one gives gratis
him, but the fact that he is this particular man (e.g. Peter
that which is not a man’s due: such is the bestowal of the
or Martin), then there is respect of the person, since you
gifts of grace, whereby sinners are chosen by God. In such
give him something not for some cause that renders him
a giving there is no place for respect of persons, because
∗ Cf. Ia, q. 29, a. 3, ad 2
† ‘Bed’ is the reading of Luk. 17:34
1494
anyone may, without injustice, give of his own as much as
“Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?. . . Take what is
he will, and to whom he will, according to Mat. 20:14,15,
thine, and go thy way.”
Whether respect of persons takes place in the dispensation of spiritual goods?
IIa IIae q. 63 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that respect of persons
that the less holy and less learned man may conduce more
does not take place in the dispensation of spiritual goods.
to the common good, on account of worldly authority or
For it would seem to savor of respect of persons if a man
activity, or something of the kind. And since the dispen-
confers ecclesiastical dignity or benefice on account of
sation of spiritualities is directed chiefly to the common
consanguinity, since consanguinity is not a cause whereby
good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7, “The manifestation of the
a man is rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice. Yet
Spirit is given to every man unto profit,” it follows that in
this apparently is not a sin, for ecclesiastical prelates are
the dispensation of spiritualities the simply less good are
wont to do so. Therefore the sin of respect of persons does
sometimes preferred to the better, without respect of per-
not take place in the conferring of spiritual goods.
sons, just as God sometimes bestows gratuitous graces on
Objection 2. Further, to give preference to a rich man
the less worthy.
rather than to a poor man seems to pertain to respect of
Reply to Objection 1. We must make a distinction
persons, according to James 2:2,3. Nevertheless dispensa-
with regard to a prelate’s kinsfolk: for sometimes they are
tions to marry within forbidden degrees are more readily
less worthy, both absolutely speaking, and in relation to
granted to the rich and powerful than to others. Therefore
the common good: and then if they are preferred to the
the sin of respect of persons seems not to take place in the
more worthy, there is a sin of respect of persons in the
dispensation of spiritual goods.
dispensation of spiritual goods, whereof the ecclesiastical
Objection 3. Further, according to jurists∗ it suffices
superior is not the owner, with power to give them away as
to choose a good man, and it is not requisite that one
he will, but the dispenser, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, “Let a
choose the better man. But it would seem to savor of
man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the
respect of persons to choose one who is less good for a
dispensers of the mysteries of God.” Sometimes however
higher position. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin
the prelate’s kinsfolk are as worthy as others, and then
in spiritual matters.
without respect of persons he can lawfully give preference
Objection 4. Further, according to the law of the
to his kindred since there is at least this advantage, that he
Church (Cap. Cum dilectus.) the person to be chosen
can trust the more in their being of one mind with him in
should be “a member of the flock.” Now this would seem
conducting the business of the Church. Yet he would have
to imply respect of persons, since sometimes more com-
to forego so doing for fear of scandal, if anyone might take
petent persons would be found elsewhere. Therefore re-
an example from him and give the goods of the Church to
spect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters.
their kindred without regard to their deserts.
On the contrary, It is written (James 2:1): “Have not
Reply to Objection 2. Dispensations for contracting
the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ. . . with respect of per-
marriage came into use for the purpose of strengthening
sons.” On these words a gloss of Augustine says: “Who is
treaties of peace: and this is more necessary for the com-
there that would tolerate the promotion of a rich man to a
mon good in relation to persons of standing, so that there
position of honor in the Church, to the exclusion of a poor
is no respect of persons in granting dispensations more
man more learned and holier?Ӡ
readily to such persons.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), respect of per-
Reply to Objection 3. In order that an election be not
sons is a sin, in so far as it is contrary to justice. Now
rebutted in a court of law, it suffices to elect a good man,
the graver the matter in which justice is transgressed, the
nor is it necessary to elect the better man, because oth-
more grievous the sin: so that, spiritual things being of
erwise every election might have a flaw. But as regards
greater import than temporal, respect of persons is a more
the conscience of an elector, it is necessary to elect one
grievous sin in dispensing spiritualities than in dispens-
who is better, either absolutely speaking, or in relation to
ing temporalities. And since it is respect of persons when
the common good. For if it is possible to have one who is
something is allotted to a person out of proportion to his
more competent for a post, and yet another be preferred, it
deserts, it must be observed that a person’s worthiness
is necessary to have some cause for this. If this cause have
may be considered in two ways. First, simply and abso-
anything to do with the matter in point, he who is elected
lutely: and in this way the man who abounds the more in
will, in this respect, be more competent; and if that which
the spiritual gifts of grace is the more worthy. Secondly,
is taken for cause have nothing to do with the matter, it
in relation to the common good; for it happens at times
will clearly be respect of persons.
∗ Cap. Cum dilectus.
† Augustine, Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii.
1495
Reply to Objection 4. The man who is taken from this reason it was commanded (Dt. 17:15): “Thou mayest
among the members of a particular Church, is generally
not make a man of another nation king, who is not thy
speaking more useful as regards the common good, since
brother.”
he loves more the Church wherein he was brought up. For
Whether respect of persons takes place in showing honor and respect?
IIa IIae q. 63 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that respect of persons
ever honors the rich for their riches, sins,” and in like man-
does not take place in showing honor and respect. For
ner, if a man be honored for other causes that do not render
honor is apparently nothing else than “reverence shown to
him worthy of honor. Now this savors of respect of per-
a person in recognition of his virtue,” as the Philosopher
sons. Therefore it is a sin to respect persons in showing
states (Ethic. i, 5). Now prelates and princes should be
honor.
honored although they be wicked, even as our parents, of
I answer that, To honor a person is to recognize him
whom it is written (Ex. 20:12): “Honor thy father and thy
as having virtue, wherefore virtue alone is the due cause
mother.” Again masters, though they be wicked, should be
of a person being honored. Now it is to be observed that
honored by their servants, according to 1 Tim. 6:1: “Who-
a person may be honored not only for his own virtue, but
ever are servants under the yoke, let them count their mas-
also for another’s: thus princes and prelates, although they
ters worthy of all honor.” Therefore it seems that it is not
be wicked, are honored as standing in God’s place, and as
a sin to respect persons in showing honor.
representing the community over which they are placed,
Objection 2. Further, it is commanded (Lev. 19:32):
according to Prov. 26:8, “As he that casteth a stone into
“Rise up before the hoary head, and, honor the person of
the heap of Mercury, so is he that giveth honor to a fool.”
the aged man.” But this seems to savor of respect of per-
For, since the gentiles ascribed the keeping of accounts to
sons, since sometimes old men are not virtuous; according
Mercury, “the heap of Mercury” signifies the casting up of
to Dan. 13:5: “Iniquity came out from the ancients of the
an account, when a merchant sometimes substitutes a peb-
people∗.” Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons in
ble‡ for one hundred marks. So too, is a fool honored if he
showing honor.
stand in God’s place or represent the whole community:
Objection 3. Further, on the words of James 2:1,
and in the same way parents and masters should be hon-
“Have not the faith. . . with respect of persons,” a gloss of
ored, on account of their having a share of the dignity of
Augustine† says: “If the saying of James, ‘If there shall
God Who is the Father and Lord of all. The aged should
come into your assembly a man having a golden ring,’
be honored, because old age is a sign of virtue, though
etc., refer to our daily meetings, who sins not here, if how-
this sign fail at times: wherefore, according to Wis. 4:8,9,
ever he sin at all?” Yet it is respect of persons to honor the
“venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted
rich for their riches, for Gregory says in a homily (xxviii
by the number of years; but the understanding of a man is
in Evang.): “Our pride is blunted, since in men we honor,
gray hairs, and a spotless life is old age.” The rich ought
not the nature wherein they are made to God’s image, but
to be honored by reason of their occupying a higher posi-
wealth,” so that, wealth not being a due cause of honor,
tion in the community: but if they be honored merely for
this will savor of respect of persons. Therefore it is not a
their wealth, it will be the sin of respect of persons.
sin to respect persons in showing honor.
Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
On the contrary, A gloss on James 2:1, says: “Who-
Whether the sin of respect of persons takes place in judicial sentences?
IIa IIae q. 63 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of respect of
pronouncing penalties, since a heavier punishment is in-
persons does not take place in judicial sentences. For re-
flicted on one who injures the person of a prince than on
spect of persons is opposed to distributive justice, as stated
one who injures the person of others. Therefore respect of
above (a. 1): whereas judicial sentences seem to pertain
persons does not take place in judicial sentences.
chiefly to commutative justice. Therefore respect of per-
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:10): “In
sons does not take place in judicial sentences.
judging be merciful to the fatherless.” But this seems to
Objection 2. Further, penalties are inflicted according
imply respect of the person of the needy. Therefore in
to a sentence. Now it is not a sin to respect persons in
judicial sentences respect of persons is not a sin.
∗ Vulg.: ‘Iniquity came out of Babylon from the ancient judges, that seemed to govern the people.’
† Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii. ‡ ‘Lapillus’
or ‘calculus’ whence the English word ‘calculate’
1496
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 18:5): “It is not him. Secondly, it may be considered in view of the form
good to accept the person in judgment§.”
of judgment, in as much as, even in commutative justice,
I answer that, As stated above (q. 60, a. 1), judgment
the judge takes from one and gives to another, and this be-
is an act of justice, in as much as the judge restores to
longs to distributive justice. In this way respect of persons
the equality of justice, those things which may cause an
may take place in any judgment.
opposite inequality. Now respect of persons involves a
Reply to Objection 2.
When a person is more
certain inequality, in so far as something is allotted to a
severely punished on account of a crime committed
person out of that proportion to him in which the equality
against a greater person, there is no respect of persons, be-
of justice consists. Wherefore it is evident that judgment
cause the very difference of persons causes, in that case,
is rendered corrupt by respect of persons.
a diversity of things, as stated above (q. 58, a. 10, ad 3;
Reply to Objection 1. A judgment may be looked at
q. 61, a. 2, ad 3).
in two ways. First, in view of the thing judged, and in this
Reply to Objection 3. In pronouncing judgment one
way judgment is common to commutative and distributive
ought to succor the needy as far as possible, yet without
justice: because it may be decided by judgment how some
prejudice to justice: else the saying of Ex. 23:3 would
common good is to be distributed among many, and how
apply: “Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in judgment.”
one person is to restore to another what he has taken from
§ Vulg.: ‘It is not good to accept the person of the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment.’
1497
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 64
Of Murder
(In Eight Articles)
In due sequence we must consider the vices opposed to commutative justice. We must consider (1) those sins that are committed in relation to involuntary commutations; (2) those that are committed with regard to voluntary commutations. Sins are committed in relation to involuntary commutations by doing an injury to one’s neighbor against his will: and this can be done in two ways, namely by deed or by word. By deed when one’s neighbor is injured either in his own person, or in a person connected with him, or in his possessions.
We must therefore consider these points in due order, and in the first place we shall consider murder whereby a man inflicts the greatest injury on his neighbor. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a sin to kill dumb animals or even plants?(2) Whether it is lawful to kill a sinner?
(3) Whether this is lawful to a private individual, or to a public person only?
(4) Whether this is lawful to a cleric?
(5) Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?
(6) Whether it is lawful to kill a just man?
(7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?
(8) Whether accidental homicide is a mortal sin?
Whether it is unlawful to kill any living thing?
IIa IIae q. 64 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to kill any living
lastly a man, so too things, like the plants, which merely
thing. For the Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): “They that re-
have life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for
sist the ordinance of God purchase to themselves damna-
man. Wherefore it is not unlawful if man use plants for
tion∗.” Now Divine providence has ordained that all liv-
the good of animals, and animals for the good of man, as
ing things should be preserved, according to Ps. 146:8,9,
the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3).
“Who maketh grass to grow on the mountains. . . Who
Now the most necessary use would seem to consist in
giveth to beasts their food.” Therefore it seems unlawful
the fact that animals use plants, and men use animals, for
to take the life of any living thing.
food, and this cannot be done unless these be deprived of
Objection 2. Further, murder is a sin because it de-
life: wherefore it is lawful both to take life from plants
prives a man of life. Now life is common to all animals
for the use of animals, and from animals for the use of
and plants. Hence for the same reason it is apparently a
men. In fact this is in keeping with the commandment
sin to slay dumb animals and plants.
of God Himself: for it is written (Gn. 1:29,30): “Behold
Objection 3. Further, in the Divine law a special pun-
I have given you every herb. . . and all trees. . . to be your
ishment is not appointed save for a sin. Now a special
meat, and to all beasts of the earth”: and again (Gn. 9:3):
punishment had to be inflicted, according to the Divine
“Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat to you.”
law, on one who killed another man’s ox or sheep (Ex.
Reply to Objection 1. According to the Divine ordi-
22:1). Therefore the slaying of dumb animals is a sin.
nance the life of animals and plants is preserved not for
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20):
themselves but for man. Hence, as Augustine says (De
“When we hear it said, ‘Thou shalt not kill,’ we do not
Civ. Dei i, 20), “by a most just ordinance of the Creator,
take it as referring to trees, for they have no sense, nor to
both their life and their death are subject to our use.”
irrational animals, because they have no fellowship with
Reply to Objection 2. Dumb animals and plants are
us. Hence it follows that the words, ‘Thou shalt not kill’
devoid of the life of reason whereby to set themselves in
refer to the killing of a man.”
motion; they are moved, as it were by another, by a kind of
I answer that, There is no sin in using a thing for
natural impulse, a sign of which is that they are naturally
the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is
enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others.
such that the imperfect are for the perfect, even as in the
Reply to Objection 3. He that kills another’s ox, sins,
process of generation nature proceeds from imperfection
not through killing the ox, but through injuring another
to perfection. Hence it is that just as in the generation
man in his property. Wherefore this is not a species of the
of a man there is first a living thing, then an animal, and
sin of murder but of the sin of theft or robbery.
∗ Vulg.: ‘He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase themselves damnation.’
1498
Whether it is lawful to kill sinners?
IIa IIae q. 64 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to kill men who
Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord commanded them
have sinned. For our Lord in the parable (Mat. 13) for-
to forbear from uprooting the cockle in order to spare the
bade the uprooting of the cockle which denotes wicked
wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when the wicked cannot
men according to a gloss. Now whatever is forbidden by
be slain without the good being killed with them, either
God is a sin. Therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner.
because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because
Objection 2. Further, human justice is conformed to
they have many followers, so that they cannot be killed
Divine justice. Now according to Divine justice sinners
without danger to the good, as Augustine says (Contra
are kept back for repentance, according to Ezech. 33:11,
Parmen. iii, 2). Wherefore our Lord teaches that we
“I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked
should rather allow the wicked to live, and that vengeance
turn from his way and live.” Therefore it seems altogether
is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that
unjust to kill sinners.
the good be put to death together with the wicked. When,
Objection 3. Further, it is not lawful, for any good
however, the good incur no danger, but rather are pro-
end whatever, to do that which is evil in itself, according
tected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the
to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii) and the Philosopher
latter may be lawfully put to death.
(Ethic. ii, 6). Now to kill a man is evil in itself, since we
Reply to Objection 2. According to the order of His
are bound to have charity towards all men, and “we wish
wisdom, God sometimes slays sinners forthwith in order
our friends to live and to exist,” according to Ethic. ix, 4.
to deliver the good, whereas sometimes He allows them
Therefore it is nowise lawful to kill a man who has sinned.
time to repent, according as He knows what is expedient
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:18): “Wizards
for His elect. This also does human justice imitate ac-
thou shalt not suffer to live”; and (Ps. 100:8): “In the
cording to its powers; for it puts to death those who are
morning I put to death all the wicked of the land.”
dangerous to others, while it allows time for repentance to
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), it is lawful to kill those who sin without grievously harming others.
dumb animals, in so far as they are naturally directed to
Reply to Objection 3. By sinning man departs from
man’s use, as the imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now
the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the
every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect,
dignity of his manhood, in so far as he is naturally free,
wherefore every part is naturally for the sake of the whole.
and exists for himself, and he falls into the slavish state of
For this reason we observe that if the health of the whole
the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is useful
body demands the excision of a member, through its being
to others. This is expressed in Ps. 48:21: “Man, when he
decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both
was in honor, did not understand; he hath been compared
praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now
to senseless beasts, and made like to them,” and Prov.
every individual person is compared to the whole com-
11:29: “The fool shall serve the wise.” Hence, although it
munity, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous
be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his dig-
and infectious to the community, on account of some sin,
nity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even
it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in or-
as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast,
der to safeguard the common good, since “a little leaven
and is more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1
corrupteth the whole lump” (1 Cor. 5:6).
and Ethic. vii, 6).
Whether it is lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned?
IIa IIae q. 64 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem lawful for a private indi-
is lawful for any private individual to kill a man who has
vidual to kill a man who has sinned. For nothing unlawful
sinned.
is commanded in the Divine law. Yet, on account of the
Objection 3. Further, a man, though a private individ-
sin of the molten calf, Moses commanded (Ex. 32:27):
ual, deserves praise for doing what is useful for the com-
“Let every man kill his brother, and friend, and neighbor.”
mon good. Now the slaying of evildoers is useful for the
Therefore it is lawful for private individuals to kill a sin-
common good, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore it is de-
ner.
serving of praise if even private individuals kill evil-doers.
Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a. 2, ad 3), man, On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i)∗:
on account of sin, is compared to the beasts. Now it is
“A man who, without exercising public authority, kills an
lawful for any private individual to kill a wild beast, espe-
evil-doer, shall be judged guilty of murder, and all the
cially if it be harmful. Therefore for the same reason, it
more, since he has dared to usurp a power which God has
∗ Can. Quicumque percutit, caus. xxiii, qu. 8
1499
not given him.”
not to have done this themselves, but rather He by whose
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), it is lawful to
authority they acted thus: just as a soldier slays the foe by
kill an evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare
the authority of his sovereign, and the executioner slays
of the whole community, so that it belongs to him alone
the robber by the authority of the judge.
who has charge of the community’s welfare. Thus it be-
Reply to Objection 2. A beast is by nature distinct
longs to a physician to cut off a decayed limb, when he
from man, wherefore in the case of a wild beast there is
has been entrusted with the care of the health of the whole
no need for an authority to kill it; whereas, in the case of
body. Now the care of the common good is entrusted to
domestic animals, such authority is required, not for their
persons of rank having public authority: wherefore they
sake, but on account of the owner’s loss. On the other
alone, and not private individuals, can lawfully put evil-
hand a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from
doers to death.
good men; hence a public authority is requisite in order to
Reply to Objection 1. The person by whose authority
condemn him to death for the common good.
a thing is done really does the thing as Dionysius declares
Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful for any private in-
(Coel. Hier. iii). Hence according to Augustine (De Civ.
dividual to do anything for the common good, provided it
Dei i, 21), “He slays not who owes his service to one who
harm nobody: but if it be harmful to some other, it cannot
commands him, even as a sword is merely the instrument
be done, except by virtue of the judgment of the person
to him that wields it.” Wherefore those who, at the Lord’s
to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken from the
command, slew their neighbors and friends, would seem
parts for the welfare of the whole.
Whether it is lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers?
IIa IIae q. 64 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem lawful for clerics to kill
two reasons. First, because they are chosen for the min-
evil-doers. For clerics especially should fulfil the precept
istry of the altar, whereon is represented the Passion of
of the Apostle (1 Cor. 4:16): “Be ye followers of me as I
Christ slain “Who, when He was struck did not strike
also am of Christ,” whereby we are called upon to imitate
[Vulg.: ‘When He suffered, He threatened not’]” (1 Pet.
God and His saints. Now the very God whom we worship
2:23). Therefore it becomes not clerics to strike or kill:
puts evildoers to death, according to Ps. 135:10, “Who
for ministers should imitate their master, according to Ec-
smote Egypt with their firstborn.” Again Moses made the
clus. 10:2, “As the judge of the people is himself, so also
Levites slay twenty-three thousand men on account of the
are his ministers.” The other reason is because clerics are
worship of the calf (Ex. 32), the priest Phinees slew the
entrusted with the ministry of the New Law, wherein no
Israelite who went in to the woman of Madian (Num. 25),
punishment of death or of bodily maiming is appointed:
Samuel killed Agag king of Amalec (1 Kings 15), Elias
wherefore they should abstain from such things in order
slew the priests of Baal (3 Kings 18), Mathathias killed the
that they may be fitting ministers of the New Testament.
man who went up to the altar to sacrifice (1 Mac. 2); and,
Reply to Objection 1. God works in all things with-
in the New Testament, Peter killed Ananias and Saphira
out exception whatever is right, yet in each one according
(Acts 5). Therefore it seems that even clerics may kill
to its mode. Wherefore everyone should imitate God in
evil-doers.
that which is specially becoming to him. Hence, though
Objection 2. Further, spiritual power is greater than
God slays evildoers even corporally, it does not follow that
the secular and is more united to God. Now the secu-
all should imitate Him in this. As regards Peter, he did not
lar power as “God’s minister” lawfully puts evil-doers to
put Ananias and Saphira to death by his own authority or
death, according to Rom. 13:4. Much more therefore may
with his own hand, but published their death sentence pro-
clerics, who are God’s ministers and have spiritual power,
nounced by God. The Priests or Levites of the Old Testa-
put evil-doers to death.
ment were the ministers of the Old Law, which appointed
Objection 3. Further, whosoever lawfully accepts an
corporal penalties, so that it was fitting for them to slay
office, may lawfully exercise the functions of that office.
with their own hands.
Now it belongs to the princely office to slay evildoers,
Reply to Objection 2. The ministry of clerics is con-
as stated above (a. 3). Therefore those clerics who are
cerned with better things than corporal slayings, namely
earthly princes may lawfully slay malefactors.
with things pertaining to spiritual welfare, and so it is not
On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 3:2,3): “It be-
fitting for them to meddle with minor matters.
hooveth. . . a bishop to be without crime∗. . . not given to
Reply to Objection 3. Ecclesiastical prelates accept
wine, no striker.”
the office of earthly princes, not that they may inflict cap-
I answer that, It is unlawful for clerics to kill, for
ital punishment themselves, but that this may be carried
∗ Vulg.: ‘blameless.’ ‘Without crime’ is the reading in Tit. 1:7
1500
into effect by others in virtue of their authority.
Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?
IIa IIae q. 64 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem lawful for a man to kill
sentence of death and life, according to Dt. 32:39, “I will
himself. For murder is a sin in so far as it is contrary to
kill and I will make to live.”
justice. But no man can do an injustice to himself, as is
Reply to Objection 1. Murder is a sin, not only be-
proved in Ethic. v, 11. Therefore no man sins by killing
cause it is contrary to justice, but also because it is op-
himself.
posed to charity which a man should have towards him-
Objection 2. Further, it is lawful, for one who exer-
self: in this respect suicide is a sin in relation to oneself.
cises public authority, to kill evil-doers. Now he who ex-
In relation to the community and to God, it is sinful, by
ercises public authority is sometimes an evil-doer. There-
reason also of its opposition to justice.
fore he may lawfully kill himself.
Reply to Objection 2. One who exercises public au-
Objection 3. Further, it is lawful for a man to suffer
thority may lawfully put to death an evil-doer, since he
spontaneously a lesser danger that he may avoid a greater:
can pass judgment on him. But no man is judge of him-
thus it is lawful for a man to cut off a decayed limb even
self. Wherefore it is not lawful for one who exercises pub-
from himself, that he may save his whole body. Now
lic authority to put himself to death for any sin whatever:
sometimes a man, by killing himself, avoids a greater evil,
although he may lawfully commit himself to the judgment
for example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. There-
of others.
fore a man may kill himself.
Reply to Objection 3. Man is made master of himself
Objection 4. Further, Samson killed himself, as re-
through his free-will: wherefore he can lawfully dispose
lated in Judges 16, and yet he is numbered among the
of himself as to those matters which pertain to this life
saints (Heb. 11). Therefore it is lawful for a man to kill
which is ruled by man’s free-will. But the passage from
himself.
this life to another and happier one is subject not to man’s
Objection 5. Further, it is related (2 Mac. 14:42) that
free-will but to the power of God. Hence it is not lawful
a certain Razias killed himself, “choosing to die nobly
for man to take his own life that he may pass to a happier
rather than to fall into the hands of the wicked, and to suf-
life, nor that he may escape any unhappiness whatsoever
fer abuses unbecoming his noble birth.” Now nothing that
of the present life, because the ultimate and most fear-
is done nobly and bravely is unlawful. Therefore suicide
some evil of this life is death, as the Philosopher states
is not unlawful.
(Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore to bring death upon oneself in
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20):
order to escape the other afflictions of this life, is to adopt
“Hence it follows that the words ‘Thou shalt not kill’ refer
a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser. In like manner it is to the killing of a man—not another man; therefore, not
unlawful to take one’s own life on account of one’s hav-
even thyself. For he who kills himself, kills nothing else
ing committed a sin, both because by so doing one does
than a man.”
oneself a very great injury, by depriving oneself of the
I answer that, It is altogether unlawful to kill one-
time needful for repentance, and because it is not lawful
self, for three reasons. First, because everything natu-
to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the public
rally loves itself, the result being that everything natu-
authority. Again it is unlawful for a woman to kill herself
rally keeps itself in being, and resists corruptions so far
lest she be violated, because she ought not to commit on
as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the inclina-
herself the very great sin of suicide, to avoid the lesser
tion of nature, and to charity whereby every man should
sir; of another. For she commits no sin in being violated
love himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as be-
by force, provided she does not consent, since “without
ing contrary to the natural law and to charity. Secondly,
consent of the mind there is no stain on the body,” as the
because every part, as such, belongs to the whole. Now
Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident that fornication
every man is part of the community, and so, as such, he
and adultery are less grievous sins than taking a man’s, es-
belongs to the community. Hence by killing himself he in-
pecially one’s own, life: since the latter is most grievous,
jures the community, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
because one injures oneself, to whom one owes the great-
v, 11). Thirdly, because life is God’s gift to man, and is
est love. Moreover it is most dangerous since no time is
subject to His power, Who kills and makes to live. Hence
left wherein to expiate it by repentance. Again it is not
whoever takes his own life, sins against God, even as he
lawful for anyone to take his own life for fear he should
who kills another’s slave, sins against that slave’s master,
consent to sin, because “evil must not be done that good
and as he who usurps to himself judgment of a matter not
may come” (Rom. 3:8) or that evil may be avoided es-
entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to pronounce
pecially if the evil be of small account and an uncertain
1501
event, for it is uncertain whether one will at some future Reply to Objection 5. It belongs to fortitude that a
time consent to a sin, since God is able to deliver man
man does not shrink from being slain by another, for the
from sin under any temptation whatever.
sake of the good of virtue, and that he may avoid sin. But
Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine says (De Civ.
that a man take his own life in order to avoid penal evils
Dei i, 21), “not even Samson is to be excused that he
has indeed an appearance of fortitude (for which reason
crushed himself together with his enemies under the ru-
some, among whom was Razias, have killed themselves
ins of the house, except the Holy Ghost, Who had wrought
thinking to act from fortitude), yet it is not true fortitude,
many wonders through him, had secretly commanded him
but rather a weakness of soul unable to bear penal evils,
to do this.” He assigns the same reason in the case of cer-
as the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7) and Augustine (De Civ.
tain holy women, who at the time of persecution took their
Dei 22,23) declare.
own lives, and who are commemorated by the Church.
Whether it is lawful to kill the innocent?
IIa IIae q. 64 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that in some cases it is
of the community. Therefore it is in no way lawful to slay
lawful to kill the innocent. The fear of God is never man-
the innocent.
ifested by sin, since on the contrary “the fear of the Lord
Reply to Objection 1. God is Lord of death and life,
driveth out sin” (Ecclus. 1:27). Now Abraham was com-
for by His decree both the sinful and the righteous die.
mended in that he feared the Lord, since he was willing
Hence he who at God’s command kills an innocent man
to slay his innocent son. Therefore one may, without sin,
does not sin, as neither does God Whose behest he exe-
kill an innocent person.
cutes: indeed his obedience to God’s commands is a proof
Objection 2. Further, among those sins that are com-
that he fears Him.
mitted against one’s neighbor, the more grievous seem to
Reply to Objection 2. In weighing the gravity of a sin
be those whereby a more grievous injury is inflicted on
we must consider the essential rather than the accidental.
the person sinned against. Now to be killed is a greater
Wherefore he who kills a just man, sins more grievously
injury to a sinful than to an innocent person, because the
than he who slays a sinful man: first, because he injures
latter, by death, passes forthwith from the unhappiness of
one whom he should love more, and so acts more in op-
this life to the glory of heaven. Since then it is lawful in
position to charity: secondly, because he inflicts an injury
certain cases to kill a sinful man, much more is it lawful
on a man who is less deserving of one, and so acts more
to slay an innocent or a righteous person.
in opposition to justice: thirdly, because he deprives the
Objection 3. Further, what is done in keeping with
community of a greater good: fourthly, because he de-
the order of justice is not a sin. But sometimes a man
spises God more, according to Lk. 10:16, “He that de-
is forced, according to the order of justice, to slay an in-
spiseth you despiseth Me.” On the other hand it is acci-
nocent person: for instance, when a judge, who is bound
dental to the slaying that the just man whose life is taken
to judge according to the evidence, condemns to death a
be received by God into glory.
man whom he knows to be innocent but who is convicted
Reply to Objection 3. If the judge knows that man
by false witnesses; and again the executioner, who in obe-
who has been convicted by false witnesses, is innocent he
dience to the judge puts to death the man who has been
must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses with great care,
unjustly sentenced.
so as to find a motive for acquitting the innocent: but if
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 23:7): “The inno-
he cannot do this he should remit him for judgment by a
cent and just person thou shalt not put to death.”
higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin
I answer that, An individual man may be considered
if he pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence,
in two ways: first, in himself; secondly, in relation to
for it is not he that puts the innocent man to death, but they
something else. If we consider a man in himself, it is
who stated him to be guilty. He that carries out the sen-
unlawful to kill any man, since in every man though he be
tence of the judge who has condemned an innocent man,
sinful, we ought to love the nature which God has made,
if the sentence contains an inexcusable error, he should
and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as
not obey, else there would be an excuse for the executions
stated above (a. 2) the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful
of the martyrs: if however it contain no manifest injus-
in relation to the common good, which is corrupted by sin.
tice, he does not has no right to discuss the judgment of
On the other hand the life of righteous men preserves and
his superior; nor is it he who slays the innocent man, but
forwards the common good, since they are the chief part
the judge whose minister he is.
1502
Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?
IIa IIae q. 64 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that nobody may lawfully
according to what is intended, and not according to what
kill a man in self-defense. For Augustine says to Publi-
is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained
cola (Ep. xlvii): “I do not agree with the opinion that one
above (q. 43, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 12, a. 1). Accordingly the act
may kill a man lest one be killed by him; unless one be
of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of
a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one does it not
one’s life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. There-
for oneself but for others, having the power to do so, pro-
fore this act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life, vided it be in keeping with one’s person.” Now he who
is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to
kills a man in self-defense, kills him lest he be killed by
keep itself in “being,” as far as possible. And yet, though
him. Therefore this would seem to be unlawful.
proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered
Objection 2. Further, he says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5):
unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. Where-
“How are they free from sin in sight of Divine providence,
fore if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary
who are guilty of taking a man’s life for the sake of these
violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force
contemptible things?” Now among contemptible things
with moderation his defense will be lawful, because ac-
he reckons “those which men may forfeit unwillingly,” as
cording to the jurists†, “it is lawful to repel force by force, appears from the context (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): and the chief
provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless de-
of these is the life of the body. Therefore it is unlawful for
fense.” Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit
any man to take another’s life for the sake of the life of his
the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing
own body.
the other man, since one is bound to take more care of
Objection 3. Further, Pope Nicolas∗ says in the Dec-
one’s own life than of another’s. But as it is unlawful to
retals: “Concerning the clerics about whom you have con-
take a man’s life, except for the public authority acting for
sulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in self-
the common good, as stated above (a. 3), it is not lawful
defense, as to whether, after making amends by repenting,
for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except
they may return to their former state, or rise to a higher
for such as have public authority, who while intending to
degree; know that in no case is it lawful for them to kill
kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good,
any man under any circumstances whatever.” Now clerics
as in the case of a soldier fighting against the foe, and in
and laymen are alike bound to observe the moral precepts.
the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although
Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen to kill anyone in
even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.
self-defense.
Reply to Objection 1. The words quoted from Augus-
Objection 4. Further, murder is a more grievous sin
tine refer to the case when one man intends to kill another
than fornication or adultery. Now nobody may lawfully
to save himself from death. The passage quoted in the
commit simple fornication or adultery or any other mortal
Second Objection is to be understood in the same sense.
sin in order to save his own life; since the spiritual life is
Hence he says pointedly, “for the sake of these things,”
to be preferred to the life of the body. Therefore no man
whereby he indicates the intention. This suffices for the
may lawfully take another’s life in self-defense in order to
Reply to the Second Objection.
save his own life.
Reply to Objection 3. Irregularity results from the
Objection 5. Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, act though sinless of taking a man’s life, as appears in the
according to Mat. 7:17. Now self-defense itself seems
case of a judge who justly condemns a man to death. For
to be unlawful, according to Rom. 12:19: “Not defend-
this reason a cleric, though he kill a man in self-defense,
ing [Douay: ‘revenging’] yourselves, my dearly beloved.”
is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him, but to defend
Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man, is also
himself.
unlawful.
Reply to Objection 4. The act of fornication or adul-
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:2): “If a thief
tery is not necessarily directed to the preservation of one’s
be found breaking into a house or undermining it, and be
own life, as is the act whence sometimes results the taking
wounded so as to die; he that slew him shall not be guilty
of a man’s life.
of blood.” Now it is much more lawful to defend one’s
Reply to Objection 5. The defense forbidden in this
life than one’s house. Therefore neither is a man guilty of
passage is that which comes from revengeful spite. Hence
murder if he kill another in defense of his own life.
a gloss says: “Not defending yourselves—that is, not
I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having
striking your enemy back.”
two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other
Whether one is guilty of murder through killing some-
is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species
one by chance?
∗ Nicolas I, Dist. 1, can. De his clericis
† Cap. Significasti, De
Homicid. volunt. vel casual.
1503
Objection 1. It would seem that one is guilty of mur-Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and
der through killing someone by chance. For we read (Gn.
directly voluntary and intended, is voluntary and intended
4:23,24) that Lamech slew a man in mistake for a wild
accidentally, according as that which removes an obstacle
beast‡, and that he was accounted guilty of murder. There-
is called an accidental cause. Wherefore he who does not
fore one incurs the guilt of murder through killing a man
remove something whence homicide results whereas he
by chance.
ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of voluntary homi-
Objection 2.
Further, it is written (Ex.
21:22):
cide. This happens in two ways: first when a man causes
“If. . . one strike a woman with child, and she miscarry
another’s death through occupying himself with unlawful
indeed. . . if her death ensue thereupon, he shall render
things which he ought to avoid: secondly, when he does
life for life.” Yet this may happen without any intention
not take sufficient care. Hence, according to jurists, if a
of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty of murder
man pursue a lawful occupation and take due care, the re-
through killing someone by chance.
sult being that a person loses his life, he is not guilty of
Objection 3. Further, the Decretals∗ contain several
that person’s death: whereas if he be occupied with some-
canons prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide.
thing unlawful, or even with something lawful, but with-
Now penalty is not due save for guilt. Therefore he who
out due care, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if
kills a man by chance, incurs the guilt of murder.
his action results in someone’s death.
On the contrary, Augustine says to Publicola (Ep.
Reply to Objection 1. Lamech did not take sufficient
xlvii): “When we do a thing for a good and lawful pur-
care to avoid taking a man’s life: and so he was not ex-
pose, if thereby we unintentionally cause harm to anyone,
cused from being guilty of homicide.
it should by no means be imputed to us.” Now it some-
Reply to Objection 2. He that strikes a woman with
times happens by chance that a person is killed as a result
child does something unlawful: wherefore if there results
of something done for a good purpose. Therefore the per-
the death either of the woman or of the animated fetus, he
son who did it is not accounted guilty.
will not be excused from homicide, especially seeing that
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys.
death is the natural result of such a blow.
ii, 6) “chance is a cause that acts beside one’s intention.”
Reply to Objection 3. According to the canons a
Hence chance happenings, strictly speaking, are neither
penalty, is inflicted on those who cause death unintention-
intended nor voluntary. And since every sin is voluntary,
ally, through doing something unlawful, or failing to take
according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv) it follows
sufficient care.
that chance happenings, as such, are not sins.
‡ The text of the Bible does not say so, but this was the Jewish traditional commentary on Gn. 4:23
∗ Dist. 1
1504
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 65
Of Other Injuries Committed On the Person
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider other sinful injuries committed on the person. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The mutilation of members;
(2) Blows;
(3) Imprisonment;
(4) Whether the sins that consist in inflicting such like injuries are aggravated through being perpetrated on persons connected with others?
Whether in some cases it may be lawful to maim anyone?
IIa IIae q. 65 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that in no case can it be
body, it may nevertheless be directed to the good of the
lawful to maim anyone. For Damascene says (De Fide
community, in so far as it is applied to a person as a pun-
Orth. iv, 20) that “sin consists in departing from what is
ishment for the purpose of restraining sin. Hence just as
according to nature, towards that which is contrary to na-
by public authority a person is lawfully deprived of life
ture.” Now according to nature it is appointed by God that
altogether on account of certain more heinous sins, so is
a man’s body should be entire in its members, and it is
he deprived of a member on account of certain lesser sins.
contrary to nature that it should be deprived of a member.
But this is not lawful for a private individual, even with the
Therefore it seems that it is always a sin to maim a person.
consent of the owner of the member, because this would
Objection 2. Further, as the whole soul is to the whole
involve an injury to the community, to whom the man and
body, so are the parts of the soul to the parts of the body
all his parts belong. If, however, the member be decayed
(De Anima ii, 1). But it is unlawful to deprive a man of
and therefore a source of corruption to the whole body,
his soul by killing him, except by public authority. There-
then it is lawful with the consent of the owner of the mem-
fore neither is it lawful to maim anyone, except perhaps
ber, to cut away the member for the welfare of the whole
by public authority.
body, since each one is entrusted with the care of his own
Objection 3. Further, the welfare of the soul is to be
welfare. The same applies if it be done with the consent
preferred to the welfare of the body. Now it is not law-
of the person whose business it is to care for the welfare
ful for a man to maim himself for the sake of the soul’s
of the person who has a decayed member: otherwise it is
welfare: since the council of Nicea∗ punished those who
altogether unlawful to maim anyone.
castrated themselves that they might preserve chastity.
Reply to Objection 1. Nothing prevents that which is
Therefore it is not lawful for any other reason to maim
contrary to a particular nature from being in harmony with
a person.
universal nature: thus death and corruption, in the physi-
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 21:24): “Eye for
cal order, are contrary to the particular nature of the thing
eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.”
corrupted, although they are in keeping with universal na-
I answer that, Since a member is part of the whole
ture. In like manner to maim anyone, though contrary to
human body, it is for the sake of the whole, as the imper-
the particular nature of the body of the person maimed, is
fect for the perfect. Hence a member of the human body is
nevertheless in keeping with natural reason in relation to
to be disposed of according as it is expedient for the body.
the common good.
Now a member of the human body is of itself useful to
Reply to Objection 2. The life of the entire man is not
the good of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may hap-
directed to something belonging to man; on the contrary
pen to be hurtful, as when a decayed member is a source
whatever belongs to man is directed to his life. Hence
of corruption to the whole body. Accordingly so long as
in no case does it pertain to a person to take anyone’s
a member is healthy and retains its natural disposition, it
life, except to the public authority to whom is entrusted
cannot be cut off without injury to the whole body. But
the procuring of the common good. But the removal of
as the whole of man is directed as to his end to the whole
a member can be directed to the good of one man, and
of the community of which he is a part, as stated above
consequently in certain cases can pertain to him.
(q. 61, a. 1; q. 64, Aa. 2,5), it may happen that although
Reply to Objection 3. A member should not be re-
the removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole
moved for the sake of the bodily health of the whole, un-
∗ P. I, sect. 4, can. i
1505
less otherwise nothing can be done to further the good of stroying evil thoughts, for a man is accursed who maims
the whole. Now it is always possible to further one’s spir-
himself, since they are murderers who do such things.”
itual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member, be-
And further on he says: “Nor is lust tamed thereby, on
cause sin is always subject to the will: and consequently
the contrary it becomes more importunate, for the seed
in no case is it allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid
springs in us from other sources, and chiefly from an in-
any sin whatever. Hence Chrysostom, in his exposition
continent purpose and a careless mind: and temptation is
on Mat. 19:12 (Hom. lxii in Matth.), “There are eunuchs
curbed not so much by cutting off a member as by curbing
who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of
one’s thoughts.”
heaven,” says: “Not by maiming themselves, but by de-
Whether it is lawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their slaves?
IIa IIae q. 65 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for parents to
subject to his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for
strike their children, or masters their slaves. For the Apos-
a man to strike another, unless he have some power over
tle says (Eph. 6:4): “You, fathers, provoke not your chil-
the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject to
dren to anger”; and further on (Eph. 9:6): “And you,
the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his
masters, do the same thing to your slaves [Vulg.: ‘to
master, a parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master
them’] forbearing threatenings.” Now some are provoked
his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction.
to anger by blows, and become more troublesome when
Reply to Objection 1. Since anger is a desire for
threatened. Therefore neither should parents strike their
vengeance, it is aroused chiefly when a man deems him-
children, nor masters their slaves.
self unjustly injured, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii).
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x,
Hence when parents are forbidden to provoke their chil-
9) that “a father’s words are admonitory and not coercive.”
dren to anger, they are not prohibited from striking their
Now blows are a kind of coercion. Therefore it is unlaw-
children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting
ful for parents to strike their children.
blows on them without moderation. The command that
Objection 3. Further, everyone is allowed to impart
masters should forbear from threatening their slaves may
correction, for this belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as
be understood in two ways. First that they should be slow
stated above (q. 32, a. 2). If, therefore, it is lawful for par-to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation of correc-
ents to strike their children for the sake of correction, for
tion; secondly, that they should not always carry out their
the same reason it will be lawful for any person to strike
threats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful
anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same con-
forgiveness temper the judgment whereby they threatened
clusion follows.
punishment.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 13:24): “He
Reply to Objection 2. The greater power should ex-
that spareth the rod hateth his son,” and further on (Prov.
ercise the greater coercion. Now just as a city is a perfect
23:13): “Withhold not correction from a child, for if thou
community, so the governor of a city has perfect coercive
strike him with the rod, he shall not die. Thou shalt beat
power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable punishments
him with the rod, and deliver his soul from hell.” Again
such as death and mutilation. On the other hand the father
it is written (Ecclus. 33:28): “Torture and fetters are for a
and the master who preside over the family household,
malicious slave.”
which is an imperfect community, have imperfect coer-
I answer that, Harm is done a body by striking it,
cive power, which is exercised by inflicting lesser punish-
yet not so as when it is maimed: since maiming destroys
ments, for instance by blows, which do not inflict irrepara-
the body’s integrity, while a blow merely affects the sense
ble harm.
with pain, wherefore it causes much less harm than cut-
Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful for anyone to im-
ting off a member. Now it is unlawful to do a person a
part correction to a willing subject. But to impart it to an
harm, except by way of punishment in the cause of justice.
unwilling subject belongs to those only who have charge
Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is
over him. To this pertains chastisement by blows.
1506
Whether it is lawful to imprison a man?
IIa IIae q. 65 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to imprison a
binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention.
man. An act which deals with undue matter is evil in
Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way de-
its genus, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 2). Now
tain a man, unless it be done according to the order of jus-
man, having a free-will, is undue matter for imprisonment
tice, either in punishment, or as a measure of precaution
which is inconsistent with free-will. Therefore it is un-
against some evil.
lawful to imprison a man.
Reply to Objection 1. A man who abuses the power
Objection 2. Further, human justice should be ruled
entrusted to him deserves to lose it, and therefore when
by Divine justice. Now according to Ecclus. 15:14, “God
a man by sinning abuses the free use of his members, he
left man in the hand of his own counsel.” Therefore it
becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment.
seems that a man ought not to be coerced by chains or
Reply to Objection 2. According to the order of His
prisons.
wisdom God sometimes restrains a sinner from accom-
Objection 3. Further, no man should be forcibly pre-
plishing a sin, according to Job 5:12: “Who bringeth to
vented except from doing an evil deed; and any man can
nought the designs of the malignant, so that their hand
lawfully prevent another from doing this. If, therefore, it
cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes
were lawful to imprison a man, in order to restrain him
He allows them to do what they will.” In like manner,
from evil deeds, it would be lawful for anyone to put a
according to human justice, men are imprisoned, not for
man in prison; and this is clearly false. Therefore the same
every sin but for certain ones.
conclusion follows.
Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful for anyone to re-
On the contrary, We read in Lev. 24 that a man was
strain a man for a time from doing some unlawful deed
imprisoned for the sin of blasphemy.
there and then: as when a man prevents another from
I answer that, In the goods three things may be con-
throwing himself over a precipice, or from striking an-
sidered in due order. First, the substantial integrity of
other. But to him alone who has the right of disposing
the body, and this is injured by death or maiming. Sec-
in general of the actions and of the life of another does it
ondly, pleasure or rest of the senses, and to this striking or
belong primarily to imprison or fetter, because by so do-
anything causing a sense of pain is opposed. Thirdly, the
ing he hinders him from doing not only evil but also good
movement or use of the members, and this is hindered by
deeds.
Whether the sin is aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated IIa IIae q. 65 a. 4
on those who are connected with others?
Objection 1. It would seem that the sin is not aggra-
the will of the principal person, as in the case of adultery
vated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated
which pleases the woman but not the husband. Now these
on those who are connected with others. Such like in-
injuries are sinful in so far as they consist in an involun-
juries take their sinful character from inflicting an injury
tary commutation. Therefore such like injuries are of a
on another against his will. Now the evil inflicted on a
less sinful nature.
man’s own person is more against his will than that which
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 28:32) as though
is inflicted on a person connected with him. Therefore an
indicating an aggravating circumstance: “Thy sons and
injury inflicted on a person connected with another is less
thy daughters shall be given to another people, thy eyes
grievous.
looking on∗.”
Objection 2. Further, Holy Writ reproves those espe-
I answer that, Other things being equal, an injury is
cially who do injuries to orphans and widows: hence it is
a more grievous sin according as it affects more persons;
written (Ecclus. 35:17): “He will not despise the prayers
and hence it is that it is a more grievous sin to strike or
of the fatherless, nor the widow when she poureth out her
injure a person in authority than a private individual, be-
complaint.” Now the widow and the orphan are not con-
cause it conduces to the injury of the whole community,
nected with other persons. Therefore the sin is not ag-
as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 73, a. 9). Now when an injury
gravated through an injury being inflicted on one who is
is inflicted on one who is connected in any way with an-
connected with others.
other, that injury affects two persons, so that, other things
Objection 3. Further, the person who is connected
being equal, the sin is aggravated by this very fact. It may
has a will of his own just as the principal person has, so
happen, however, that in view of certain circumstances, a
that something may be voluntary for him and yet against
sin committed against one who is not connected with any
∗ Vulg.: ‘May thy sons and thy daughters be given,’ etc.
1507
other person, is more grievous, on account of either the such persons is more grievous to them since they have no
dignity of the person, or the greatness of the injury.
one to turn to for relief.
Reply to Objection 1. An injury inflicted on a per-
Reply to Objection 3. The fact that the wife volun-
son connected with others is less harmful to the persons
tarily consents to the adultery, lessens the sin and injury,
with whom he is connected, than if it were perpetrated
so far as the woman is concerned, for it would be more
immediately on them, and from this point of view it is a
grievous, if the adulterer oppressed her by violence. But
less grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury of the
this does not remove the injury as affecting her husband,
person with whom he is connected, is added to the sin of
since “the wife hath not power of her own body; but the
which a man is guilty through injuring the other one in
husband” (1 Cor. 7:4). The same applies to similar cases.
himself.
of adultery, however, as it is opposed not only to justice
Reply to Objection 2. Injuries done to widows and
but also to chastity, we shall speak in the treatise on Tem-
orphans are more insisted upon both through being more
perance (q. 154, a. 8).
opposed to mercy, and because the same injury done to
1508
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 66
Of Theft and Robbery
(In Nine Articles)
We must now consider the sins opposed to justice, whereby a man injures his neighbor in his belongings; namely theft and robbery.
Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is natural to man to possess external things?
(2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess something as his own?
(3) Whether theft is the secret taking of another’s property?
(4) Whether robbery is a species of sin distinct from theft?
(5) Whether every theft is a sin?
(6) Whether theft is a mortal sin?
(7) Whether it is lawful to thieve in a case of necessity?
(8) Whether every robbery is a mortal sin?
(9) Whether robbery is a more grievous sin than theft?
Whether it is natural for man to possess external things?
IIa IIae q. 66 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not natural for
their use, and in this way, man has a natural dominion
man to possess external things. For no man should as-
over external things, because, by his reason and will, he is
cribe to himself that which is God’s. Now the dominion
able to use them for his own profit, as they were made on
over all creatures is proper to God, according to Ps. 23:1,
his account: for the imperfect is always for the sake of the
“The earth is the Lord’s,” etc. Therefore it is not natural
perfect, as stated above (q. 64, a. 1). It is by this argument
for man to possess external things.
that the Philosopher proves (Polit. i, 3) that the possession
Objection 2. Further, Basil in expounding the words
of external things is natural to man. Moreover, this natural
of the rich man (Lk. 12:18), “I will gather all things that
dominion of man over other creatures, which is competent
are grown to me, and my goods,” says∗: “Tell me: which
to man in respect of his reason wherein God’s image re-
are thine? where did you take them from and bring them
sides, is shown forth in man’s creation (Gn. 1:26) by the
into being?” Now whatever man possesses naturally, he
words: “Let us make man to our image and likeness: and
can fittingly call his own. Therefore man does not natu-
let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea,” etc.
rally possess external things.
Reply to Objection 1. God has sovereign dominion
Objection 3. Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin.
over all things: and He, according to His providence, di-
i†) “dominion denotes power.” But man has no power over
rected certain things to the sustenance of man’s body. For
external things, since he can work no change in their na-
this reason man has a natural dominion over things, as re-
ture. Therefore the possession of external things is not
gards the power to make use of them.
natural to man.
Reply to Objection 2. The rich man is reproved for
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 8:8): “Thou hast
deeming external things to belong to him principally, as
subjected all things under his feet.”
though he had not received them from another, namely
I answer that, External things can be considered in
from God.
two ways. First, as regards their nature, and this is not
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the
subject to the power of man, but only to the power of God
dominion over external things as regards their nature.
Whose mere will all things obey. Secondly, as regards
Such a dominion belongs to God alone, as stated above.
Whether it is lawful for a man to possess a thing as his own?
IIa IIae q. 66 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for a man to
property is contrary to this community of goods. There-
possess a thing as his own. For whatever is contrary to
fore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external
the natural law is unlawful. Now according to the natural
thing to himself.
law all things are common property: and the possession of
Objection 2. Further, Basil in expounding the words
∗ Hom. in Luc. xii, 18
† De Fide, ad Gratianum, i, 1
1509
of the rich man quoted above (a. 1, obj. 2), says: “The rich would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one
who deem as their own property the common goods they
thing indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful
have seized upon, are like to those who by going before-
state is ensured to man if each one is contented with his
hand to the play prevent others from coming, and appro-
own. Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise more
priate to themselves what is intended for common use.”
frequently where there is no division of the things pos-
Now it would be unlawful to prevent others from obtain-
sessed.
ing possession of common goods. Therefore it is unlawful
The second thing that is competent to man with regard
to appropriate to oneself what belongs to the community.
to external things is their use. In this respect man ought
Objection 3. Further, Ambrose says∗, and his words
to possess external things, not as his own, but as common,
are quoted in the Decretals†: “Let no man call his own that
so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others
which is common property”: and by “common” he means
in their need. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17,18):
external things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it
“Charge the rich of this world. . . to give easily, to commu-
seems unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing
nicate to others,” etc.
to himself.
Reply to Objection 1. Community of goods is as-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres., haer.
cribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates
40): “The ‘Apostolici’ are those who with extreme ar-
that all things should be possessed in common and that
rogance have given themselves that name, because they
nothing should be possessed as one’s own: but because
do not admit into their communion persons who are mar-
the division of possessions is not according to the nat-
ried or possess anything of their own, such as both monks
ural law, but rather arose from human agreement which
and clerics who in considerable number are to be found
belongs to positive law, as stated above (q. 57, Aa. 2,3).
in the Catholic Church.” Now the reason why these peo-
Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the
ple are heretics was because severing themselves from the
natural law, but an addition thereto devised by human rea-
Church, they think that those who enjoy the use of the
son.
above things, which they themselves lack, have no hope
Reply to Objection 2. A man would not act unlaw-
of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to maintain that it
fully if by going beforehand to the play he prepared the
is unlawful for a man to possess property.
way for others: but he acts unlawfully if by so doing he
I answer that, Two things are competent to man in re-
hinders others from going. In like manner a rich man does
spect of exterior things. One is the power to procure and
not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in taking pos-
dispense them, and in this regard it is lawful for man to
session of something which at first was common property,
possess property. Moreover this is necessary to human life
and gives others a share: but he sins if he excludes others
for three reasons. First because every man is more care-
indiscriminately from using it. Hence Basil says (Hom.
ful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is
in Luc. xii, 18): “Why are you rich while another is poor,
common to many or to all: since each one would shirk
unless it be that you may have the merit of a good stew-
the labor and leave to another that which concerns the
ardship, and he the reward of patience?”
community, as happens where there is a great number of
Reply to Objection 3. When Ambrose says: “Let no
servants. Secondly, because human affairs are conducted
man call his own that which is common,” he is speaking
in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with tak-
of ownership as regards use, wherefore he adds: “He who
ing care of some particular thing himself, whereas there
spends too much is a robber.”
Whether the essence of theft consists in taking another’s thing secretly?
IIa IIae q. 66 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not essential to
are embodied in the Decretals§: “It is no less a crime to
theft to take another’s thing secretly. For that which di-
take from him that has, than to refuse to succor the needy
minishes a sin, does not, apparently, belong to the essence
when you can and are well off.” Therefore just as theft
of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends to diminish a sin, just
consists in taking another’s thing, so does it consist in
as, on the contrary, it is written as indicating an aggravat-
keeping it back.
ing circumstance of the sin of some (Is. 3:9): “They have
Objection 3. Further, a man may take by stealth from
proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not
another, even that which is his own, for instance a thing
hid it.” Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should
that he has deposited with another, or that has been taken
consist in taking another’s thing secretly.
away from him unjustly. Therefore it is not essential to
Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says‡: and his words
theft that it should consist in taking another’s thing se-
∗ Serm. lxiv, de temp.
† Dist. xlvii., Can. Sicut hi.
‡ Serm. lxiv,
de temp., a. 2, obj. 3, Can. Sicut hi.
§ Dist. xlvii
1510
cretly.
secretly.”
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym.
x): “ ‘Fur’
Reply to Objection 1. Secrecy is sometimes a cause
[thief] is derived from ‘furvus’ and so from ‘fuscus’
of sin, as when a man employs secrecy in order to commit
[dark], because he takes advantage of the night.”
a sin, for instance in fraud and guile. In this way it does
I answer that, Three things combine together to con-
not diminish sin, but constitutes a species of sin: and thus
stitute theft. The first belongs to theft as being contrary
it is in theft. In another way secrecy is merely a circum-
to justice, which gives to each one that which is his, so
stance of sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both because it is
that it belongs to theft to take possession of what is an-
a sign of shame, and because it removes scandal.
other’s. The second thing belongs to theft as distinct from
Reply to Objection 2. To keep back what is due to
those sins which are committed against the person, such as
another, inflicts the same kind of injury as taking a thing
murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft
unjustly: wherefore an unjust detention is included in an
to be about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is
unjust taking.
another’s not as a possession but as a part (for instance, if
Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents that which
he amputates a limb), or as a person connected with him
belongs to one person simply, from belonging to another
(for instance, if he carry off his daughter or his wife), it is in some respect: thus a deposit belongs simply to the denot strictly speaking a case of theft. The third difference
positor, but with regard to its custody it is the depositary’s, is that which completes the nature of theft, and consists in
and the thing stolen is the thief’s, not simply, but as re-
a thing being taken secretly: and in this respect it belongs
gards its custody.
properly to theft that it consists in “taking another’s thing
Whether theft and robbery are sins of different species?
IIa IIae q. 66 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that theft and robbery
justice, in as much as one man does another an injustice.
are not sins of different species. For theft and robbery
Now “no man suffers an injustice willingly,” as stated in
differ as “secret” and “manifest”: because theft is taking
Ethic. v, 9. Wherefore theft and robbery derive their sinful
something secretly, while robbery is to take something vi-
nature, through the taking being involuntary on the part of
olently and openly. Now in the other kinds of sins, the
the person from whom something is taken. Now the invol-
secret and the manifest do not differ specifically. There-
untary is twofold, namely, through violence and through
fore theft and robbery are not different species of sin.
ignorance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore the sinful
Objection 2. Further, moral actions take their species
aspect of robbery differs from that of theft: and conse-
from the end, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3; q. 18,
quently they differ specifically.
a. 6). Now theft and robbery are directed to the same end,
Reply to Objection 1. In the other kinds of sin the
viz. the possession of another’s property. Therefore they
sinful nature is not derived from something involuntary,
do not differ specifically.
as in the sins opposed to justice: and so where there is a
Objection 3. Further, just as a thing is taken by force
different kind of involuntary, there is a different species of
for the sake of possession, so is a woman taken by force
sin.
for pleasure: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that “he
Reply to Objection 2. The remote end of robbery and
who commits a rape is called a corrupter, and the vic-
theft is the same. But this is not enough for identity of
tim of the rape is said to be corrupted.” Now it is a case
species, because there is a difference of proximate ends,
of rape whether the woman be carried off publicly or se-
since the robber wishes to take a thing by his own power,
cretly. Therefore the thing appropriated is said to be taken
but the thief, by cunning.
by force, whether it be done secretly or publicly. There-
Reply to Objection 3. The robbery of a woman can-
fore theft and robbery do not differ.
not be secret on the part of the woman who is taken:
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) distin-
wherefore even if it be secret as regards the others from
guishes theft from robbery, and states that theft is done in
whom she is taken, the nature of robbery remains on the
secret, but that robbery is done openly.
part of the woman to whom violence is done.
I answer that, Theft and robbery are vices contrary to
1511
Whether theft is always a sin?
IIa IIae q. 66 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that theft is not always
13:44) it is said of the finder of the treasure hidden in a
a sin. For no sin is commanded by God, since it is writ-
field that he bought the field, as though he purposed thus
ten (Ecclus. 15:21): “He hath commanded no man to do
to acquire the right of possessing the whole treasure. On
wickedly.” Yet we find that God commanded theft, for
the other Land the treasure-trove may be nearly in some-
it is written (Ex. 12:35,36): “And the children of Israel
one’s possession: and then if anyone take it with the in-
did as the Lord had commanded Moses [Vulg.: ‘as Moses
tention, not of keeping it but of returning it to the owner
had commanded’]. . . and they stripped the Egyptians.”
who does not look upon such things as unappropriated, he
Therefore theft is not always a sin.
is not guilty of theft. In like manner if the thing found
Objection 2. Further, if a man finds a thing that is
appears to be unappropriated, and if the finder believes it
not his and takes it, he seems to commit a theft, for he
to be so, although he keep it, he does not commit a theft§.
takes another’s property. Yet this seems lawful according
In any other case the sin of theft is committed¶: where-
to natural equity, as the jurists hold.∗ Therefore it seems
fore Augustine says in a homily (Serm. clxxviii; De Verb.
that theft is not always a sin.
Apost.): “If thou hast found a thing and not returned it,
Objection 3. Further, he that takes what is his own
thou hast stolen it” (Dig. xiv, 5, can. Si quid invenisti).
does not seem to sin, because he does not act against jus-
Reply to Objection 3. He who by stealth takes his
tice, since he does not destroy its equality. Yet a man com-
own property which is deposited with another man bur-
mits a theft even if he secretly take his own property that
dens the depositary, who is bound either to restitution, or
is detained by or in the safe-keeping of another. Therefore
to prove himself innocent. Hence he is clearly guilty of
it seems that theft is not always a sin.
sin, and is bound to ease the depositary of his burden. On
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 20:15): “Thou
the other hand he who, by stealth, takes his own prop-
shalt not steal.”
erty, if this be unjustly detained by another, he sins in-
I answer that, If anyone consider what is meant by
deed; yet not because he burdens the retainer, and so he
theft, he will find that it is sinful on two counts. First,
is not bound to restitution or compensation: but he sins
because of its opposition to justice, which gives to each
against general justice by disregarding the order of jus-
one what is his, so that for this reason theft is contrary to
tice and usurping judgment concerning his own property.
justice, through being a taking of what belongs to another.
Hence he must make satisfaction to God and endeavor to
Secondly, because of the guile or fraud committed by the
allay whatever scandal he may have given his neighbor by
thief, by laying hands on another’s property secretly and
acting this way.
cunningly. Wherefore it is evident that every theft is a sin.
Whether theft is a mortal sin?
Reply to Objection 1. It is no theft for a man to take
Objection 1. It would seem that theft is not a mortal
another’s property either secretly or openly by order of a
sin. For it is written (Prov. 6:30): “The fault is not so
judge who has commanded him to do so, because it be-
great when a man hath stolen.” But every mortal sin is a
comes his due by the very fact that it is adjudicated to him
great fault. Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.
by the sentence of the court. Hence still less was it a theft
Objection 2. Further, mortal sin deserves to be pun-
for the Israelites to take away the spoils of the Egyptians
ished with death. But in the Law theft is punished not by
at the command of the Lord, Who ordered this to be done
death but by indemnity, according to Ex. 22:1, “If any
on account of the ill-treatment accorded to them by the
man steal an ox or a sheep. . . he shall restore have oxen
Egyptians without any cause: wherefore it is written sig-
for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep.” Therefore theft
nificantly (Wis. 10:19): “The just took the spoils of the
is not a mortal sin.
wicked.”
Objection 3. Further, theft can be committed in small
Reply to Objection 2. With regard to treasure-trove
even as in great things. But it seems unreasonable for a
a distinction must be made. For some there are that were
man to be punished with eternal death for the theft of a
never in anyone’s possession, for instance precious stones
small thing such as a needle or a quill. Therefore theft is
and jewels, found on the seashore, and such the finder is
not a mortal sin.
allowed to keep†. The same applies to treasure hidden un-
On the contrary, No man is condemned by the Divine
derground long since and belonging to no man, except that
judgment save for a mortal sin. Yet a man is condemned
according to civil law the finder is bound to give half to
for theft, according to Zech. 5:3, “This is the curse that
the owner of the land, if the treasure trove be in the land of
goeth forth over the face of the earth; for every thief shall
another person‡. Hence in the parable of the Gospel (Mat.
be judged as is there written.” Therefore theft is a mortal
∗ See loc. cit. in Reply.
† Dig. I, viii, De divis. rerum: Inst. II, i, De
rerum divis.
‡ Inst. II, i, 39: Cod. X, xv, De Thesauris
§ Inst. II, i,
47
¶ Dig. XLI, i, De acquirend, rerum dominio, 9: Inst. II, i, 48
1512
sin.
against sinners “according to truth” (Rom. 2:2). Where-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 59, a. 4; Ia IIae,
fore, according to the judgment of the present life the
q. 72, a. 5), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to char-
death punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but
ity as the spiritual life of the soul. Now charity consists
only for such as inflict an irreparable harm, or again for
principally in the love of God, and secondarily in the love
such as contain some horrible deformity. Hence according
of our neighbor, which is shown in our wishing and doing
to the present judgment the pain of death is not inflicted
him well. But theft is a means of doing harm to our neigh-
for theft which does not inflict an irreparable harm, except
bor in his belongings; and if men were to rob one another
when it is aggravated by some grave circumstance, as in
habitually, human society would be undone. Therefore
the case of sacrilege which is the theft of a sacred thing, of
theft, as being opposed to charity, is a mortal sin.
peculation, which is theft of common property, as Augus-
Reply to Objection 1. The statement that theft is not a
tine states (Tract. 1, Super Joan.), and of kidnaping which
great fault is in view of two cases. First, when a person is
is stealing a man, for which the pain of death is inflicted
led to thieve through necessity. This necessity diminishes
(Ex. 21:16).
or entirely removes sin, as we shall show further on (a. 7).
Reply to Objection 3. Reason accounts as nothing
Hence the text continues: “For he stealeth to fill his hun-
that which is little: so that a man does not consider him-
gry soul.” Secondly, theft is stated not to be a great fault in self injured in very little matters: and the person who takes
comparison with the guilt of adultery, which is punished
such things can presume that this is not against the will of
with death. Hence the text goes on to say of the thief that
the owner. And if a person take such like very little things,
“if he be taken, he shall restore sevenfold. . . but he that is he may be proportionately excused from mortal sin. Yet if
an adulterer. . . shall destroy his own soul.”
his intention is to rob and injure his neighbor, there may
Reply to Objection 2. The punishments of this life
be a mortal sin even in these very little things, even as
are medicinal rather than retributive. For retribution is
there may be through consent in a mere thought.
reserved to the Divine judgment which is pronounced
Whether it is lawful to steal through stress of need?
IIa IIae q. 66 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to steal through
sion and appropriation of things which are based on hu-
stress of need. For penance is not imposed except on one
man law, do not preclude the fact that man’s needs have
who has sinned. Now it is stated (Extra, De furtis, Cap. Si
to be remedied by means of these very things. Hence
quis): “If anyone, through stress of hunger or nakedness,
whatever certain people have in superabundance is due,
steal food, clothing or beast, he shall do penance for three
by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor. For
weeks.” Therefore it is not lawful to steal through stress
this reason Ambrose∗ says, and his words are embodied
of need.
in the Decretals (Dist. xlvii, can. Sicut ii): “It is the hun-
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii,
gry man’s bread that you withhold, the naked man’s cloak
6) that “there are some actions whose very name implies
that you store away, the money that you bury in the earth
wickedness,” and among these he reckons theft. Now that
is the price of the poor man’s ransom and freedom.”
which is wicked in itself may not be done for a good end.
Since, however, there are many who are in need, while
Therefore a man cannot lawfully steal in order to remedy
it is impossible for all to be succored by means of the
a need.
same thing, each one is entrusted with the stewardship of
Objection 3. Further, a man should love his neighbor
his own things, so that out of them he may come to the
as himself. Now, according to Augustine (Contra Men-
aid of those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the need be
dac. vii), it is unlawful to steal in order to succor one’s
so manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present
neighbor by giving him an alms. Therefore neither is it
need must be remedied by whatever means be at hand (for
lawful to steal in order to remedy one’s own needs.
instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and
On the contrary, In cases of need all things are com-
there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a
mon property, so that there would seem to be no sin in
man to succor his own need by means of another’s prop-
taking another’s property, for need has made it common.
erty, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this prop-
I answer that, Things which are of human right can-
erly speaking theft or robbery.
not derogate from natural right or Divine right. Now ac-
Reply to Objection 1. This decretal considers cases
cording to the natural order established by Divine Provi-
where there is no urgent need.
dence, inferior things are ordained for the purpose of suc-
Reply to Objection 2. It is not theft, properly speak-
coring man’s needs by their means. Wherefore the divi-
ing, to take secretly and use another’s property in a case
∗ Loc. cit., a. 2, obj. 3
1513
of extreme need: because that which he takes for the sup-Reply to Objection 3. In a case of a like need a man
port of his life becomes his own property by reason of that
may also take secretly another’s property in order to suc-
need.
cor his neighbor in need.
Whether robbery may be committed without sin?
IIa IIae q. 66 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that robbery may be com-
either by fighting against the enemy, or against the citi-
mitted without sin. For spoils are taken by violence, and
zens, by punishing evil-doers: and whatever is taken by
this seems to belong to the essence of robbery, accord-
violence of this kind is not the spoils of robbery, since it
ing to what has been said (a. 4). Now it is lawful to take
is not contrary to justice. On the other hand to take other
spoils from the enemy; for Ambrose says (De Patriarch.
people’s property violently and against justice, in the ex-
4∗): “When the conqueror has taken possession of the
ercise of public authority, is to act unlawfully and to be
spoils, military discipline demands that all should be re-
guilty of robbery; and whoever does so is bound to resti-
served for the sovereign,” in order, to wit, that he may
tution.
distribute them. Therefore in certain cases robbery is law-
Reply to Objection 1. A distinction must be made in
ful.
the matter of spoils. For if they who take spoils from the
Objection 2. Further, it is lawful to take from a man
enemy, are waging a just war, such things as they seize in
what is not his. Now the things which unbelievers have
the war become their own property. This is no robbery, so
are not theirs, for Augustine says (Ep. ad Vincent. Donat.
that they are not bound to restitution. Nevertheless even
xciii.): “You falsely call things your own, for you do not
they who are engaged in a just war may sin in taking spoils
possess them justly, and according to the laws of earthly
through cupidity arising from an evil intention, if, to wit,
kings you are commanded to forfeit them.” Therefore it
they fight chiefly not for justice but for spoil. For Augus-
seems that one may lawfully rob unbelievers.
tine says (De Verb. Dom. xix; Serm. lxxxii) that “it is
Objection 3. Further, earthly princes violently extort
a sin to fight for booty.” If, however, those who take the
many things from their subjects: and this seems to savor
spoil, are waging an unjust war, they are guilty of robbery,
of robbery. Now it would seem a grievous matter to say
and are bound to restitution.
that they sin in acting thus, for in that case nearly every
Reply to Objection 2.
Unbelievers possess their
prince would be damned. Therefore in some cases rob-
goods unjustly in so far as they are ordered by the laws
bery is lawful.
of earthly princes to forfeit those goods. Hence these may
On the contrary, Whatever is taken lawfully may be
be taken violently from them, not by private but by public
offered to God in sacrifice and oblation. Now this can-
authority.
not be done with the proceeds of robbery, according to Is.
Reply to Objection 3. It is no robbery if princes ex-
61:8, “I am the Lord that love judgment, and hate robbery
act from their subjects that which is due to them for the
in a holocaust.” Therefore it is not lawful to take anything
safe-guarding of the common good, even if they use vio-
by robbery.
lence in so doing: but if they extort something unduly by
I answer that, Robbery implies a certain violence and
means of violence, it is robbery even as burglary is. Hence
coercion employed in taking unjustly from a man that
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 4): “If justice be disre-
which is his. Now in human society no man can exer-
garded, what is a king but a mighty robber? since what
cise coercion except through public authority: and, conse-
is a robber but a little king?” And it is written (Ezech.
quently, if a private individual not having public authority
22:27): “Her princes in the midst of her, are like wolves
takes another’s property by violence, he acts unlawfully
ravening the prey.” Wherefore they are bound to restitu-
and commits a robbery, as burglars do. As regards princes,
tion, just as robbers are, and by so much do they sin more
the public power is entrusted to them that they may be the
grievously than robbers, as their actions are fraught with
guardians of justice: hence it is unlawful for them to use
greater and more universal danger to public justice whose
violence or coercion, save within the bounds of justice—
wardens they are.
∗ De Abraham i, 3
1514
Whether theft is a more grievous sin than robbery?
IIa IIae q. 66 a. 8
Objection 1.
It would seem that theft is a more
part of the person from whom something is taken: yet
grievous sin than robbery. For theft adds fraud and guile
so that in theft the involuntariness is due to ignorance,
to the taking of another’s property: and these things are
whereas in robbery it is due to violence. Now a thing
not found in robbery. Now fraud and guile are sinful in
is more involuntary through violence than through igno-
themselves, as stated above (q. 55, Aa. 4,5). Therefore
rance, because violence is more directly opposed to the
theft is a more grievous sin than robbery.
will than ignorance. Therefore robbery is a more grievous
Objection 2. Further, shame is fear about a wicked
sin than theft. There is also another reason, since robbery
deed, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Now men are more ashamed
not only inflicts a loss on a person in his things, but also
of theft than of robbery. Therefore theft is more wicked
conduces to the ignominy and injury of his person, and
than robbery.
this is of graver import than fraud or guile which belong
Objection 3. Further, the more persons a sin injures
to theft. Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
the more grievous it would seem to be. Now the great and
Reply to Objection 2. Men who adhere to sensible
the lowly may be injured by theft: whereas only the weak
things think more of external strength which is evidenced
can be injured by robbery, since it is possible to use vio-
in robbery, than of internal virtue which is forfeit through
lence towards them. Therefore the sin of theft seems to be
sin: wherefore they are less ashamed of robbery than of
more grievous than the sin of robbery.
theft.
On the contrary, According to the laws robbery is
Reply to Objection 3. Although more persons may
more severely punished than theft.
be injured by theft than by robbery, yet more grievous in-
I answer that, Robbery and theft are sinful, as stated
juries may be inflicted by robbery than by theft: for which
above (Aa. 4,6), on account of the involuntariness on the
reason also robbery is more odious.
1515
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 67
Of the Injustice of a Judge, in Judging
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider those vices opposed to commutative justice, that consist in words injurious to our neighbors.
We shall consider (1) those which are connected with judicial proceedings, and (2) injurious words uttered extrajudicially.
Under the first head five points occur for our consideration: (1) The injustice of a judge in judging; (2) The injustice of the prosecutor in accusing; (3) The injustice of the defendant in defending himself; (4) The injustice of the witnesses in giving evidence; (5) The injustice of the advocate in defending.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a man can justly judge one who is not his subject?
(2) Whether it is lawful for a judge, on account of the evidence, to deliver judgment in opposition to the truth which is known to him?
(3) Whether a judge can justly sentence a man who is not accused?
(4) Whether he can justly remit the punishment?
Whether a man can justly judge one who is not subject to his jurisdiction?
IIa IIae q. 67 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that a man can justly
ment would be of no effect. Now coercive power is not
judge one who is not subject to his jurisdiction. For it
exercised in human affairs, save by those who hold public
is stated (Dan. 13) that Daniel sentenced the ancients who
authority: and those who have this authority are accounted
were convicted of bearing false witness. But these an-
the superiors of those over whom they preside whether by
cients were not subject to Daniel; indeed they were judges
ordinary or by delegated authority. Hence it is evident
of the people. Therefore a man may lawfully judge one
that no man can judge others than his subjects and this in
that is not subject to his jurisdiction.
virtue either of delegated or of ordinary authority.
Objection 2. Further, Christ was no man’s subject,
Reply to Objection 1.
In judging those ancients
indeed He was “King of kings and Lord of lords” (Apoc.
Daniel exercised an authority delegated to him by Divine
19:16).
Yet He submitted to the judgment of a man.
instinct. This is indicated where it is said (Dan. 13:45)
Therefore it seems that a man may lawfully judge one that
that “the Lord raised up the. . . spirit of a young boy.”
is not subject to his jurisdiction.
Reply to Objection 2. In human affairs a man may
Objection 3. Further, according to the law∗ a man
submit of his own accord to the judgment of others al-
is tried in this or that court according to his kind of of-
though these be not his superiors, an example of which is
fense. Now sometimes the defendant is not the subject
when parties agree to a settlement by arbitrators. Where-
of the man whose business it is to judge in that particular
fore it is necessary that the arbitrator should be upheld by
place, for instance when the defendant belongs to another
a penalty, since the arbitrators through not exercising au-
diocese or is exempt. Therefore it seems that a man may
thority in the case, have not of themselves full power of
judge one that is not his subject.
coercion. Accordingly in this way did Christ of his own
On the contrary, Gregory† in commenting on Dt.
accord submit to human judgment: and thus too did Pope
23:25, “If thou go into thy friend’s corn,” etc. says: “Thou
Leo‡ submit to the judgment of the emperor§.
mayest not put the sickle of judgment to the corn that is
Reply to Objection 3. The bishop of the defendant’s
entrusted to another.”
diocese becomes the latter’s superior as regards the fault
I answer that, A judge’s sentence is like a particular
committed, even though he be exempt: unless perchance
law regarding some particular fact. Wherefore just as a
the defendant offend in a matter exempt from the bishop’s
general law should have coercive power, as the Philoso-
authority, for instance in administering the property of an
pher states (Ethic. x, 9), so too the sentence of a judge
exempt monastery. But if an exempt person commits a
should have coercive power, whereby either party is com-
theft, or a murder or the like, he may be justly condemned
pelled to comply with the judge’s sentence; else the judg-
by the ordinary.
∗ Cap. Licet ratione, de Foro Comp.
† Regist. xi, epist. 64
‡ Leo IV
§ Can. Nos si incompetenter, caus. ii, qu. 7
1516
Whether it is lawful for a judge to pronounce judgment against the truth that he IIa IIae q. 67 a. 2
knows, on account of evidence to the contrary?
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for a judge to
with these things, and not according to his private opinion.
pronounce judgment against the truth that he knows, on
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1; q. 60, Aa. 2,6)
account of evidence to the contrary. For it is written (Dt.
it is the duty of a judge to pronounce judgment in as
17:9): “Thou shalt come to the priests of the Levitical
much as he exercises public authority, wherefore his judg-
race, and to the judge that shall be at that time; and thou
ment should be based on information acquired by him,
shalt ask of them, and they shall show thee the truth of
not from his knowledge as a private individual, but from
the judgment.” Now sometimes certain things are alleged
what he knows as a public person. Now the latter knowl-
against the truth, as when something is proved by means
edge comes to him both in general and in particular —
of false witnesses. Therefore it is unlawful for a judge
in general through the public laws, whether Divine or
to pronounce judgment according to what is alleged and
human, and he should admit no evidence that conflicts
proved in opposition to the truth which he knows.
therewith—in some particular matter, through documents
Objection 2. Further, in pronouncing judgment a man
and witnesses, and other legal means of information,
should conform to the Divine judgment, since “it is the
which in pronouncing his sentence, he ought to follow
judgment of God” (Dt. 1:17). Now “the judgment of God
rather than the information he has acquired as a private
is according to the truth” (Rom. 2:2), and it was foretold
individual. And yet this same information may be of use
of Christ (Is. 11:3,4): “He shall not judge according to
to him, so that he can more rigorously sift the evidence
the sight of the eyes, nor reprove according to the hear-
brought forward, and discover its weak points. If, how-
ing of the ears. But He shall judge the poor with justice,
ever, he is unable to reject that evidence juridically, he
and shall reprove with equity for the meek of the earth.”
must, as stated above, follow it in pronouncing sentence.
Therefore the judge ought not to pronounce judgment ac-
Reply to Objection 1. The reason why, in the pas-
cording to the evidence before him if it be contrary to what
sage quoted, it is stated that the judges should first of all
he knows himself.
be asked their reasons, is to make it clear that the judges
Objection 3. Further, the reason why evidence is re-
ought to judge the truth in accordance with the evidence.
quired in a court of law, is that the judge may have a faith-
Reply to Objection 2. To judge belongs to God in
ful record of the truth of the matter, wherefore in matters
virtue of His own power: wherefore His judgment is based
of common knowledge there is no need of judicial pro-
on the truth which He Himself knows, and not on knowl-
cedure, according to 1 Tim. 5:24, “Some men’s sins are
edge imparted by others: the same is to be said of Christ,
manifest, going before to judgment.” Consequently, if the
Who is true God and true man: whereas other judges do
judge by his personal knowledge is aware of the truth, he
not judge in virtue of their own power, so that there is no
should pay no heed to the evidence, but should pronounce
comparison.
sentence according to the truth which he knows.
Reply to Objection 3. The Apostle refers to the case
Objection 4. Further, the word “conscience” denotes
where something is well known not to the judge alone, but
application of knowledge to a matter of action as stated in
both to him and to others, so that the guilty party can by
the Ia, q. 79, a. 13. Now it is a sin to act contrary to one’s
no means deny his guilt (as in the case of notorious crim-
knowledge. Therefore a judge sins if he pronounces sen-
inals), and is convicted at once from the evidence of the
tence according to the evidence but against his conscience
fact. If, on the other hand, it be well known to the judge,
of the truth.
but not to others, or to others, but not to the judge, then it
On the contrary, Augustine∗ says in his commentary
is necessary for the judge to sift the evidence.
on the Psalter: “A good judge does nothing according to
Reply to Objection 4. In matters touching his own
his private opinion but pronounces sentence according to
person, a man must form his conscience from his own
the law and the right.” Now this is to pronounce judgment
knowledge, but in matters concerning the public author-
according to what is alleged and proved in court. There-
ity, he must form his conscience in accordance with the
fore a judge ought to pronounce judgment in accordance
knowledge attainable in the public judicial procedure.
∗ Ambrose, Super Ps. 118, serm. 20
1517
Whether a judge may condemn a man who is not accused?
IIa IIae q. 67 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that a judge may pass sen-
accuser, according to Acts 25:16: “It is not the custom
tence on a man who is not accused. For human justice is
of the Romans to condemn any man, before that he who
derived from Divine justice. Now God judges the sinner
is accused have his accusers present, and have liberty to
even though there be no accuser. Therefore it seems that
make his answer, to clear himself of the crimes” of which
a man may pass sentence of condemnation on a man even
he is accused.
though there be no accuser.
Reply to Objection 1. God, in judging man, takes
Objection 2. Further, an accuser is required in judi-
the sinner’s conscience as his accuser, according to Rom.
cial procedure in order that he may relate the crime to the
2:15, “Their thoughts between themselves accusing, or
judge. Now sometimes the crime may come to the judge’s
also defending one another”; or again, He takes the evi-
knowledge otherwise than by accusation; for instance, by
dence of the fact as regards the deed itself, according to
denunciation, or by evil report, or through the judge him-
Gn. 4:10, “The voice of thy brother’s blood crieth to Me
self being an eye-witness. Therefore a judge may con-
from the earth.”
demn a man without there being an accuser.
Reply to Objection 2. Public disgrace takes the place
Objection 3. Further, the deeds of holy persons are
of an accuser. Hence a gloss on Gn. 4:10, “The voice
related in Holy Writ, as models of human conduct. Now
of thy brother’s blood,” etc. says: “There is no need of
Daniel was at the same time the accuser and the judge of
an accuser when the crime committed is notorious.” In
the wicked ancients (Dan. 13). Therefore it is not contrary
a case of denunciation, as stated above (q. 33, a. 7), the
to justice for a man to condemn anyone as judge while be-
amendment, not the punishment, of the sinner is intended:
ing at the same time his accuser.
wherefore when a man is denounced for a sin, nothing is
On the contrary, Ambrose in his commentary on 1
done against him, but for him, so that no accuser is re-
Cor. 5:2, expounding the Apostle’s sentence on the forni-
quired. The punishment that is inflicted is on account of
cator, says that “a judge should not condemn without an
his rebellion against the Church, and since this rebellion
accuser, since our Lord did not banish Judas, who was a
is manifest, it stands instead of an accuser. The fact that
thief, yet was not accused.”
the judge himself was an eye-witness, does not authorize
I answer that, A judge is an interpreter of justice.
him to proceed to pass sentence, except according to the
Wherefore, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), “men
order of judicial procedure.
have recourse to a judge as to one who is the personifica-
Reply to Objection 3. God, in judging man, proceeds
tion of justice.” Now, as stated above (q. 58, a. 2 ), justice
from His own knowledge of the truth, whereas man does
is not between a man and himself but between one man
not, as stated above (a. 2). Hence a man cannot be accuser,
and another. Hence a judge must needs judge between
witness and judge at the same time, as God is. Daniel was
two parties, which is the case when one is the prosecutor,
at once accuser and judge, because he was the executor of
and the other the defendant. Therefore in criminal cases
the sentence of God, by whose instinct he was moved, as
the judge cannot sentence a man unless the latter has an
stated above (a. 1, ad 1).
Whether the judge can lawfully remit the punishment?
IIa IIae q. 67 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the judge can law-
guilty man from his punishment.
fully remit the punishment. For it is written (James 2:13):
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 13:8,9) concern-
“Judgment without mercy” shall be done “to him that hath
ing anyone who would persuade a man to serve strange
not done mercy.” Now no man is punished for not doing
gods: “Neither let thy eye spare him to pity and conceal
what he cannot do lawfully. Therefore any judge can law-
him, but thou shalt presently put him to death”: and of the
fully do mercy by remitting the punishment.
murderer it is written (Dt. 19:12,13): “He shall die. Thou
Objection 2. Further, human judgment should imitate
shalt not pity him.”
the Divine judgment. Now God remits the punishment to
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has
sinners, because He desires not the death of the sinner, ac-
been said (Aa. 2,3), with regard to the question in point,
cording to Ezech. 18:23. Therefore a human judge also
two things may be observed in connection with a judge.
may lawfully remit the punishment to one who repents.
One is that he has to judge between accuser and defen-
Objection 3. Further, it is lawful for anyone to do
dant, while the other is that he pronounces the judicial
what is profitable to some one and harmful to none. Now
sentence, in virtue of his power, not as a private individ-
the remission of his punishment profits the guilty man and
ual but as a public person. Accordingly on two counts
harms nobody. Therefore the judge can lawfully loose a
a judge is hindered from loosing a guilty person from his
1518
punishment. First on the part of the accuser, whose right it Reply to Objection 1. There is a place for the judge’s
sometimes is that the guilty party should be punished—for
mercy in matters that are left to the judge’s discretion, be-
instance on account of some injury committed against the
cause in like matters a good man is slow to punish as the
accuser—because it is not in the power of a judge to remit
Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But in matters that are
such punishment, since every judge is bound to give each
determined in accordance with Divine or human laws, it
man his right. Secondly, he finds a hindrance on the part
is not left to him to show mercy.
of the commonwealth, whose power he exercises, and to
Reply to Objection 2. God has supreme power of
whose good it belongs that evil-doers should be punished.
judging, and it concerns Him whatever is done sinfully
Nevertheless in this respect there is a difference be-
against anyone. Therefore He is free to remit the pun-
tween judges of lower degree and the supreme judge, i.e.
ishment, especially since punishment is due to sin chiefly
the sovereign, to whom the entire public authority is en-
because it is done against Him. He does not, however,
trusted. For the inferior judge has no power to exempt a
remit the punishment, except in so far as it becomes His
guilty man from punishment against the laws imposed on
goodness, which is the source of all laws.
him by his superior. Wherefore Augustine in commenting
Reply to Objection 3. If the judge were to remit pun-
on John 19:11, “Thou shouldst not have any power against
ishment inordinately, he would inflict an injury on the
Me,” says (Tract. cxvi in Joan.): “The power which God
community, for whose good it behooves ill-deeds to be
gave Pilate was such that he was under the power of Cae-
punished, in order that. men may avoid sin. Hence the
sar, so that he was by no means free to acquit the per-
text, after appointing the punishment of the seducer, adds
son accused.” On the other hand the sovereign who has
(Dt. 13:11): “That all Israel hearing may fear, and may do
full authority in the commonwealth, can lawfully remit
no more anything like this.” He would also inflict harm
the punishment to a guilty person, provided the injured
on the injured person; who is compensated by having his
party consent to the remission, and that this do not seem
honor restored in the punishment of the man who has in-
detrimental to the public good.
jured him.
1519
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 68
Of Matters Concerning Unjust Accusation
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider matters pertaining to unjust accusation. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether a man is bound to accuse?
(2) Whether the accusation should be made in writing?
(3) How is an accusation vitiated?
(4) How should those be punished who have accused a man wrongfully?
Whether a man is bound to accuse?
IIa IIae q. 68 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that a man is not bound
either to the amendment of the sinner, or to the good of
to accuse. For no man is excused on account of sin from
the commonwealth whose calm is ensured by the punish-
fulfilling a Divine precept, since he would thus profit by
ment of evil-doers. The former of these is intended in de-
his sin. Yet on account of sin some are disqualified from
nunciation, as stated, whereas the second regards properly
accusing, such as those who are excommunicate or of evil
accusation. Hence in the case of a crime that conduces to
fame, or who are accused of grievous crimes and are not
the injury of the commonwealth, a man is bound to accu-
yet proved to be innocent∗. Therefore a man is not bound
sation, provided he can offer sufficient proof, since it is
by a Divine precept to accuse.
the accuser’s duty to prove: as, for example, when any-
Objection 2. Further, every duty depends on charity
one’s sin conduces to the bodily or spiritual corruption of
which is “the end of the precept”†: wherefore it is written
the community. If, however, the sin be not such as to af-
(Rom. 13:8): “Owe no man anything, but to love one an-
fect the community, or if he cannot offer sufficient proof,
other.” Now that which belongs to charity is a duty that
a man is not bound to attempt to accuse, since no man is
man owes to all both of high and of low degree, both su-
bound to do what he cannot duly accomplish.
periors and inferiors. Since therefore subjects should not
Reply to Objection 1. Nothing prevents a man being
accuse their superiors, nor persons of lower degree, those
debarred by sin from doing what men are under an obli-
of a higher degree, as shown in several chapters (Decret.
gation to do: for instance from meriting eternal life, and
II, qu. vii), it seems that it is no man’s duty to accuse.
from receiving the sacraments of the Church. Nor does
Objection 3. Further, no man is bound to act against
a man profit by this: indeed it is a most grievous fault to
the fidelity which he owes his friend; because he ought
fail to do what one is bound to do, since virtuous acts are
not to do to another what he would not have others do
perfections of man.
to him. Now to accuse anyone is sometimes contrary to
Reply to Objection 2. Subjects are debarred from ac-
the fidelity that one owes a friend; for it is written (Prov.
cusing their superiors, “if it is not the affection of charity
11:13): “He that walketh deceitfully, revealeth secrets; but
but their own wickedness that leads them to defame and
he that is faithful, concealeth the thing committed to him
disparage the conduct of their superiors”‡ —or again if the
by his friend.” Therefore a man is not bound to accuse.
subject who wishes to accuse his superior is himself guilty
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 5:1): “If any one
of crime§. Otherwise, provided they be in other respects
sin, and hear the voice of one swearing, and is a witness
qualified to accuse, it is lawful for subjects to accuse their
either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he
superiors out of charity.
do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity.”
Reply to Objection 3. It is contrary to fidelity to make I answer that, As stated above (q. 33, Aa. 6,7; q. 67,
known secrets to the injury of a person; but not if they be
a. 3, ad 2), the difference between denunciation and accu-
revealed for the good of the community, which should al-
sation is that in denunciation we aim at a brother’s amend-
ways be preferred to a private good. Hence it is unlawful
ment, whereas in accusation we intend the punishment of
to receive any secret in detriment to the common good:
his crime. Now the punishments of this life are sought,
and yet a thing is scarcely a secret when there are suffi-
not for their own sake, because this is not the final time of
cient witnesses to prove it.
retribution, but in their character of medicine, conducing
∗ 1 Tim. 1:5
† Can. Definimus, caus. iv, qu. 1; caus. vi, qu. 1
‡ Append. Grat. ad can. Sunt nonnulli, caus. ii, qu. 7
§ Decret. II, qu. vii,
can. Praesumunt.
1520
Whether it is necessary for the accusation to be made in writing?
IIa IIae q. 68 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem unnecessary for the ac-
been said and with what qualifications, when he comes
cusation to be made in writing. For writing was devised
to pronounce sentence, unless it were drawn up in writ-
as an aid to the human memory of the past. But an ac-
ing. Hence it has with reason been established that the ac-
cusation is made in the present. Therefore the accusation
cusation, as well as other parts of the judicial procedure,
needs not to be made in writing.
should be put into writing.
Objection 2. Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu.
Reply to Objection 1. Words are so many and so var-
viii, can. Per scripta) that “no man may accuse or be ac-
ious that it is difficult to remember each one. A proof
cused in his absence.” Now writing seems to be useful
of this is the fact that if a number of people who have
in the fact that it is a means of notifying something to
heard the same words be asked what was said, they will
one who is absent, as Augustine declares (De Trin. x, 1).
not agree in repeating them, even after a short time. And
Therefore the accusation need not be in writing: and all
since a slight difference of words changes the sense, even
the more that the canon declares that “no accusation in
though the judge’s sentence may have to be pronounced
writing should be accepted.”
soon afterwards, the certainty of judgment requires that
Objection 3. Further, a man’s crime is made known
the accusation be drawn up in writing.
by denunciation, even as by accusation. Now writing is
Reply to Objection 2. Writing is needed not only on
unnecessary in denunciation. Therefore it is seemingly
account of the absence of the person who has something
unnecessary in accusation.
to notify, or of the person to whom something is notified,
On the contrary, It is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii,
but also on account of the delay of time as stated above
can. Accusatorum) that “the role of accuser must never be
(ad 1). Hence when the canon says, “Let no accusation
sanctioned without the accusation be in writing.”
be accepted in writing” it refers to the sending of an ac-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 67, a. 3), when
cusation by one who is absent: but it does not exclude the
the process in a criminal case goes by way of accusa-
necessity of writing when the accuser is present.
tion, the accuser is in the position of a party, so that the
Reply to Objection 3. The denouncer does not bind
judge stands between the accuser and the accused for the
himself to give proofs: wherefore he is not punished if he
purpose of the trial of justice, wherein it behooves one
is unable to prove. For this reason writing is unnecessary
to proceed on certainties, as far as possible. Since how-
in a denunciation: and it suffices that the denunciation be
ever verbal utterances are apt to escape one’s memory,
made verbally to the Church, who will proceed, in virtue
the judge would be unable to know for certain what had
of her office, to the correction of the brother.
Whether an accusation is rendered unjust by calumny, collusion or evasion?
IIa IIae q. 68 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that an accusation is not
accusation.” But this can be done without injustice: for
rendered unjust by calumny, collusion or evasion. For
it is stated there also: “If a man repent of having made a
according to Decret. II, qu. iii∗, “calumny consists in
wicked accusation and inscription† in a matter which he
falsely charging a person with a crime.” Now sometimes
cannot prove, and come to an understanding with the in-
one man falsely accuses another of a crime through igno-
nocent party whom he has accused, let them acquit one
rance of fact which excuses him. Therefore it seems that
another.” Therefore evasion does not render an accusation
an accusation is not always rendered unjust through being
unjust.
slanderous.
On the contrary, It is stated by the same authority:
Objection 2. Further, it is stated by the same authority
“The rashness of accusers shows itself in three ways. For
that “collusion consists in hiding the truth about a crime.”
they are guilty either of calumny, or of collusion, or of
But seemingly this is not unlawful, because one is not
evasion.”
bound to disclose every crime, as stated above (a. 1; q. 33,
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), accusation is or-
a. 7). Therefore it seems that an accusation is not rendered
dered for the common good which it aims at procuring by
unjust by collusion.
means of knowledge of the crime. Now no man ought to
Objection 3. Further, it is stated by the same authority injure a person unjustly, in order to promote the common
that “evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from an
good. Wherefore a man may sin in two ways when mak-
∗ Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.
† The accuser was
bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation.
The effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.
1521
ing an accusation: first through acting unjustly against the on account of an error for which he is not to blame. All
accused, by charging him falsely with the commission of
these things must be weighed according to the judge’s pru-
a crime, i.e. by calumniating him; secondly, on the part of
dence, lest he should declare a man to have been guilty of
the commonwealth, whose good is intended chiefly in an
calumny, who through levity of mind or an error for which
accusation, when anyone with wicked intent hinders a sin
he is not to be blamed has uttered a false accusation.
being punished. This again happens in two ways: first by
Reply to Objection 2. Not everyone who hides the
having recourse to fraud in making the accusation. This
truth about a crime is guilty of collusion, but only he who
belongs to collusion [prevaricatio] for “he that is guilty of
deceitfully hides the matter about which he makes the ac-
collusion is like one who rides astraddle [varicator], be-
cusation, by collusion with the defendant, dissembling his
cause he helps the other party, and betrays his own side”‡.
proofs, and admitting false excuses.
Secondly by withdrawing altogether from the accusation.
Reply to Objection 3. Evasion consists in withdraw-
This is evasion [tergiversatio] for by desisting from what
ing altogether from the accusation, by renouncing the in-
he had begun he seems to turn his back [tergum vertere].
tention of accusing, not anyhow, but inordinately. There
Reply to Objection 1. A man ought not to proceed to
are two ways, however, in which a man may rightly desist
accuse except of what he is quite certain about, wherein
from accusing without committing a sin —in one way, in
ignorance of fact has no place. Yet he who falsely charges
the very process of accusation, if it come to his knowl-
another with a crime is not a calumniator unless he gives
edge that the matter of his accusation is false, and then by
utterance to false accusations out of malice. For it hap-
mutual consent the accuser and the defendant acquit one
pens sometimes that a man through levity of mind pro-
another—in another way, if the accusation be quashed by
ceeds to accuse someone, because he believes too readily
the sovereign to whom belongs the care of the common
what he hears, and this pertains to rashness; while, on the
good, which it is intended to procure by the accusation.
other hand sometimes a man is led to make an accusation
Whether an accuser who fails to prove his indictment is bound to the punishment of IIa IIae q. 68 a. 4
retaliation?
Objection 1. It would seem that the accuser who fails
taliation.
to prove his indictment is not bound to the punishment of
On the contrary, Pope Hadrian I says (Cap. lii): “He
retaliation. For sometimes a man is led by a just error to
that fails to prove his accusation, must himself suffer the
make an accusation, in which case the judge acquit the
punishment which his accusation inferred.”
accuser, as stated in Decret. II, qu. iii.∗ Therefore the
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), in a case, where
accuser who fails to prove his indictment is not bound to
the procedure is by way of accusation, the accuser holds
the punishment of retaliation.
the position of a party aiming at the punishment of the ac-
Objection 2. Further, if the punishment of retaliation
cused. Now the duty of the judge is to establish the equal-
ought to be inflicted on one who has accused unjustly, this
ity of justice between them: and the equality of justice
will be on account of the injury he has done to someone—
requires that a man should himself suffer whatever harm
but not on account of any injury done to the person of the
he has intended to be inflicted on another, according to
accused, for in that case the sovereign could not remit this
Ex. 21:24, “Eye for eye, tooth for tooth.” Consequently
punishment, nor on account of an injury to the common-
it is just that he who by accusing a man has put him in
wealth, because then the accused could not acquit him.
danger of being punished severely, should himself suffer
Therefore the punishment of retaliation is not due to one
a like punishment.
who has failed to prove his accusation.
Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
Objection 3. Further, the one same sin does not de-
v, 5) justice does not always require counterpassion, be-
serve a twofold punishment, according to Nahum 1:9†:
cause it matters considerably whether a man injures an-
“God shall not judge the same thing a second time.” But
other voluntarily or not. Voluntary injury deserves pun-
he who fails to prove his accusation, incurs the punish-
ishment, involuntary deserves forgiveness. Hence when
ment due to defamation‡, which punishment even the
the judge becomes aware that a man has made a false ac-
Pope seemingly cannot remit, according to a statement
cusation, not with a mind to do harm, but involuntarily
of Pope Gelasius§: “Although we are able to save souls
through ignorance or a just error, he does not impose the
by Penance, we are unable to remove the defamation.”
punishment of retaliation.
Therefore he is not bound to suffer the punishment of re-
Reply to Objection 2. He who accuses wrongfully
‡ Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.
∗ Append. Grat., ad
can. Si quem poenituerit.
† Septuagint version
‡ Can. Infames,
caus. vi, qu. 1
§ Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.
1522
sins both against the person of the accused and against the on the commonwealth: and this cannot be condoned by
commonwealth; wherefore he is punished on both counts.
the accused, although it can be remitted by the sovereign,
This is the meaning of what is written (Dt. 19:18-20):
who has charge of the commonwealth.
“And when after most diligent inquisition, they shall find
Reply to Objection 3. The accuser deserves the pun-
that the false witness hath told a lie against his brother:
ishment of retaliation in compensation for the harm he at-
then shall render to him as he meant to do to his brother,”
tempts to inflict on his neighbor: but the punishment of
and this refers to the injury done to the person: and after-
disgrace is due to him for his wickedness in accusing an-
wards, referring to the injury done to the commonwealth,
other man calumniously. Sometimes the sovereign remits
the text continues: “And thou shalt take away the evil out
the punishment, and not the disgrace, and sometimes he
of the midst of thee, that others hearing may fear, and may
removes the disgrace also: wherefore the Pope also can re-
not dare to do such things.” Specially, however, does he
move this disgrace. When Pope Gelasius says: “We can-
injure the person of the accused, if he accuse him falsely.
not remove the disgrace,” he may mean either the disgrace
Wherefore the accused, if innocent, may condone the in-
attaching to the deed [infamia facti], or that sometimes it
jury done to himself, particularly if the accusation were
is not expedient to remove it, or again he may be refer-
made not calumniously but out of levity of mind. But if
ring to the disgrace inflicted by the civil judge, as Gratian
the accuser desist from accusing an innocent man, through
states (Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.).
collusion with the latter’s adversary, he inflicts an injury
1523
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 69
Of Sins Committed Against Justice On the Part of the Defendant (In Four Articles)
We must now consider those sins which are committed against justice on the part of the defendant. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a mortal sin to deny the truth which would lead to one’s condemnation?
(2) Whether it is lawful to defend oneself with calumnies?
(3) Whether it is lawful to escape condemnation by appealing?
(4) Whether it is lawful for one who has been condemned to defend himself by violence if he be able to do so?
Whether one can, without a mortal sin, deny the truth which would lead to one’s IIa IIae q. 69 a. 1
condemnation?
Objection 1. It would seem one can, without a mortal
ity extend. Again, the judge, as stated above (q. 67 , a. 1),
sin, deny the truth which would lead to one’s condem-
is the superior in relation to the person whom he judges.
nation. For Chrysostom says (Hom. xxxi super Ep. ad
Therefore the accused is in duty bound to tell the judge
Heb.): “I do not say that you should lay bare your guilt
the truth which the latter exacts from him according to the
publicly, nor accuse yourself before others.” Now if the
form of law. Hence if he refuse to tell the truth which he
accused were to confess the truth in court, he would lay
is under obligation to tell, or if he mendaciously deny it,
bare his guilt and be his own accuser. Therefore he is not
he sins mortally. If, on the other hand, the judge asks of
bound to tell the truth: and so he does not sin mortally if
him that which he cannot ask in accordance with the order
he tell a lie in court.
of justice, the accused is not bound to satisfy him, and he
Objection 2. Further, just as it is an officious lie when may lawfully escape by appealing or otherwise: but it is
one tells a lie in order to rescue another man from death,
not lawful for him to lie.
so is it an officious lie when one tells a lie in order to free Reply to Objection 1. When a man is examined by
oneself from death, since one is more bound towards one-
the judge according to the order of justice, he does not lay
self than towards another. Now an officious lie is consid-
bare his own guilt, but his guilt is unmasked by another,
ered not a mortal but a venial sin. Therefore if the accused
since the obligation of answering is imposed on him by
denies the truth in court, in order to escape death, he does
one whom he is bound to obey.
not sin mortally.
Reply to Objection 2. To lie, with injury to another
Objection 3. Further, every mortal sin is contrary to
person, in order to rescue a man from death is not a purely
charity, as stated above (q. 24, a. 12). But that the accused
officious lie, for it has an admixture of the pernicious lie:
lie by denying himself to be guilty of the crime laid to
and when a man lies in court in order to exculpate himself,
his charge is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the
he does an injury to one whom he is bound to obey, since
love we owe God, nor as to the love due to our neighbor.
he refuses him his due, namely an avowal of the truth.
Therefore such a lie is not a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3. He who lies in court by deny-
On the contrary, Whatever is opposed to the glory of
ing his guilt, acts both against the love of God to whom
God is a mortal sin, because we are bound by precept to
judgment belongs, and against the love of his neighbor,
“do all to the glory of God” (1 Cor. 10:31). Now it is to
and this not only as regards the judge, to whom he refuses
the glory of God that the accused confess that which is
his due, but also as regards his accuser, who is punished
alleged against him, as appears from the words of Josue
if he fail to prove his accusation. Hence it is written (Ps.
to Achan, “My son, give glory to the Lord God of Israel,
140:4): “Incline not my heart to evil words, to make ex-
and confess and tell me what thou hast done, hide it not”
cuses in sins”: on which words a gloss says: “Shameless
(Joshua 7:19). Therefore it is a mortal sin to lie in order
men are wont by lying to deny their guilt when they have
to cover one’s guilt.
been found out.” And Gregory in expounding Job 31:33,
I answer that, Whoever acts against the due order of
“If as a man I have hid my sin,” says (Moral. xxii, 15): “It
justice, sins mortally, as stated above (q. 59, a. 4). Now it
is a common vice of mankind to sin in secret, by lying to
belongs to the order of justice that a man should obey his
hide the sin that has been committed, and when convicted
superior in those matters to which the rights of his author-
to aggravate the sin by defending oneself.”
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Whether it is lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies?
IIa IIae q. 69 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem lawful for the accused
longs to craftiness, which is exercised by fraud and guile,
to defend himself with calumnies. Because, according to
as shown above (q. 55, Aa. 3, seqq.). His conduct in
civil law (Cod. II, iv, De transact. 18), when a man is
the former case is praiseworthy, in the latter sinful. Ac-
on trial for his life it is lawful for him to bribe his adver-
cordingly it is lawful for the accused to defend himself by
sary. Now this is done chiefly by defending oneself with
withholding the truth that he is not bound to avow, by suit-
calumnies. Therefore the accused who is on trial for his
able means, for instance by not answering such questions
life does not sin if he defend himself with calumnies.
as he is not bound to answer. This is not to defend himself
Objection 2. Further, an accuser who is guilty of col-
with calumnies, but to escape prudently. But it is unlawful
lusion with the accused, is punishable by law (Decret. II,
for him, either to utter a falsehood, or to withhold a truth
qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Yet no punishment is
that he is bound to avow, or to employ guile or fraud, be-
imposed on the accused for collusion with the accuser.
cause fraud and guile have the force of a lie, and so to use
Therefore it would seem lawful for the accused to defend
them would be to defend oneself with calumnies.
himself with calumnies.
Reply to Objection 1. Human laws leave many things
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Prov. 14:16): “A
unpunished, which according to the Divine judgment are
wise man feareth and declineth from evil, the fool leapeth
sins, as, for example, simple fornication; because human
over and is confident.” Now what is done wisely is no
law does not exact perfect virtue from man, for such virtue
sin. Therefore no matter how a man declines from evil, he
belongs to few and cannot be found in so great a num-
does not sin.
ber of people as human law has to direct. That a man is
On the contrary, In criminal cases an oath has to
sometimes unwilling to commit a sin in order to escape
be taken against calumnious allegations (Extra, De jura-
from the death of the body, the danger of which threatens
mento calumniae, cap. Inhaerentes): and this would not
the accused who is on trial for his life, is an act of per-
be the case if it were lawful to defend oneself with calum-
fect virtue, since “death is the most fearful of all temporal
nies. Therefore it is not lawful for the accused to defend
things” (Ethic. iii, 6). Wherefore if the accused, who is
himself with calumnies.
on trial for his life, bribes his adversary, he sins indeed by
I answer that, It is one thing to withhold the truth, and inducing him to do what is unlawful, yet the civil law does
another to utter a falsehood. The former is lawful some-
not punish this sin, and in this sense it is said to be lawful.
times, for a man is not bound to divulge all truth, but only
Reply to Objection 2. If the accuser is guilty of col-
such as the judge can and must require of him according to
lusion with the accused and the latter is guilty, he incurs
the order of justice; as, for instance, when the accused is
punishment, and so it is evident that he sins. Wherefore,
already disgraced through the commission of some crime,
since it is a sin to induce a man to sin, or to take part in
or certain indications of his guilt have already been dis-
a sin in any way—for the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32), that
covered, or again when his guilt is already more or less
“they. . . are worthy of death. . . that consent” to those who
proven. On the other hand it is never lawful to make a
sin—it is evident that the accused also sins if he is guilty
false declaration.
of collusion with his adversary. Nevertheless according
As regards what he may do lawfully, a man can em-
to human laws no punishment is inflicted on him, for the
ploy either lawful means, and such as are adapted to the
reason given above.
end in view, which belongs to prudence; or he can use un-
Reply to Objection 3. The wise man hides himself
lawful means, unsuitable to the proposed end, and this be-
not by slandering others but by exercising prudence.
Whether it is lawful for the accused to escape judgment by appealing?
IIa IIae q. 69 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for the accused
is unlawful to appeal from the judges chosen by common
to escape judgment by appealing. The Apostle says (Rom.
consent. Much less therefore is it lawful to appeal from
13:1): “Let every soul be subject to the higher powers.”
ordinary judges.
Now the accused by appealing refuses to be subject to a
Objection 3. Further, whatever is lawful once is al-
higher power, viz. the judge. Therefore he commits a sin.
ways lawful. But it is not lawful to appeal after the tenth
Objection 2. Further, ordinary authority is more bind-
day∗, nor a third time on the same point†. Therefore it
ing than that which we choose for ourselves. Now ac-
would seem that an appeal is unlawful in itself.
cording to the Decretals (II, qu. vi, cap. A judicibus) it
On the contrary, Paul appealed to Caesar (Acts 25).
∗ Can. Anteriorum, caus. ii, qu. 6
† Can. Si autem, caus. ii, qu. 6
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I answer that, There are two motives for which a unjust.” Hence the Apostle also rebuked those who went
man appeals. First through confidence in the justice of his
to law before unbelievers (1 Cor. 6:6).
cause, seeing that he is unjustly oppressed by the judge,
Reply to Objection 2. It is due to a man’s own fault
and then it is lawful for him to appeal, because this is a
or neglect that, of his own accord, he submits to the judg-
prudent means of escape. Hence it is laid down (Decret.
ment of one in whose justice he has no confidence. More-
II, qu. vi, can. Omnis oppressus): “All those who are
over it would seem to point to levity of mind for a man
oppressed are free, if they so wish, to appeal to the judg-
not to abide by what he has once approved of. Hence it is
ment of the priests, and no man may stand in their way.”
with reason that the law refuses us the faculty of appealing
Secondly, a man appeals in order to cause a delay, lest
from the decision of judges of our own choice, who have
a just sentence be pronounced against him. This is to de-
no power save by virtue of the consent of the litigants.
fend oneself calumniously, and is unlawful as stated above
On the other hand the authority of an ordinary judge de-
(a. 2). For he inflicts an injury both on the judge, whom he
pends, not on the consent of those who are subject to his
hinders in the exercise of his office, and on his adversary,
judgment, but on the authority of the king or prince who
whose justice he disturbs as far as he is able. Hence it is
appointed him. Hence, as a remedy against his unjust op-
laid down (II, qu. vi, can. Omnino puniendus): “Without
pression, the law allows one to have recourse to appeal,
doubt a man should be punished if his appeal be declared
so that even if the judge be at the same time ordinary and
unjust.”
chosen by the litigants, it is lawful to appeal from his de-
Reply to Objection 1. A man should submit to the
cision, since seemingly his ordinary authority occasioned
lower authority in so far as the latter observes the order of
his being chosen as arbitrator. Nor is it to be imputed as
the higher authority. If the lower authority departs from
a fault to the man who consented to his being arbitrator,
the order of the higher, we ought not to submit to it, for
without adverting to the fact that he was appointed ordi-
instance “if the proconsul order one thing and the emperor
nary judge by the prince.
another,” according to a gloss on Rom. 13:2. Now when
Reply to Objection 3. The equity of the law so guards
a judge oppresses anyone unjustly, in this respect he de-
the interests of the one party that the other is not op-
parts from the order of the higher authority, whereby he is
pressed. Thus it allows ten days for appeal to be made,
obliged to judge justly. Hence it is lawful for a man who
this being considered sufficient time for deliberating on
is oppressed unjustly, to have recourse to the authority of
the expediency of an appeal. If on the other hand there
the higher power, by appealing either before or after sen-
were no fixed time limit for appealing, the certainty of
tence has been pronounced. And since it is to be presumed
judgment would ever be in suspense, so that the other
that there is no rectitude where true faith is lacking, it is
party would suffer an injury. The reason why it is not
unlawful for a Catholic to appeal to an unbelieving judge,
allowed to appeal a third time on the same point, is that it
according to Decretals II, qu. vi, can. Catholicus: “The
is not probable that the judges would fail to judge justly
Catholic who appeals to the decision of a judge of another
so many times.
faith shall be excommunicated, whether his case be just or
Whether a man who is condemned to death may lawfully defend himself if he can?
IIa IIae q. 69 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that a man who is con-
liver them that are led to death: and those that are drawn to
demned to death may lawfully defend himself if he can.
death forbear not to deliver.” Now a man is under greater
For it is always lawful to do that to which nature inclines
obligation to himself than to another. Therefore it is law-
us, as being of natural right, so to speak. Now, to resist
ful for a condemned man to defend himself from being
corruption is an inclination of nature not only in men and
put to death.
animals but also in things devoid of sense. Therefore if he
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): “He
can do so, the accused, after condemnation, may lawfully
that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God:
resist being put to death.
and they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation.”
Objection 2. Further, just as a man, by resistance, es-
Now a condemned man, by defending himself, resists the
capes the death to which he has been condemned, so does
power in the point of its being ordained by God “for the
he by flight. Now it is lawful seemingly to escape death
punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of the goodӠ.
by flight, according to Ecclus. 9:18, “Keep thee far from
Therefore he sins in defending himself.
the man that hath power to kill [and not to quicken]”∗.
I answer that, A man may be condemned to death in
Therefore it is also lawful for the accused to resist.
two ways. First justly, and then it is not lawful for the
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Prov. 24:11): “De-
condemned to defend himself, because it is lawful for the
∗ The words in the brackets are not in the Vulgate
† 1 Pet. 2:14
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judge to combat his resistance by force, so that on his part Reply to Objection 2. When a man is condemned
the fight is unjust, and consequently without any doubt he
to death, he has not to kill himself, but to suffer death:
sins.
wherefore he is not bound to do anything from which
Secondly a man is condemned unjustly: and such
death would result, such as to stay in the place whence
a sentence is like the violence of robbers, according to
he would be led to execution. But he may not resist those
Ezech. 22:21, “Her princes in the midst of her are like
who lead him to death, in order that he may not suffer
wolves ravening the prey to shed blood.” Wherefore even
what is just for him to suffer. Even so, if a man were con-
as it is lawful to resist robbers, so is it lawful, in a like
demned to die of hunger, he does not sin if he partakes
case, to resist wicked princes; except perhaps in order to
of food brought to him secretly, because to refrain from
avoid scandal, whence some grave disturbance might be
taking it would be to kill himself.
feared to arise.
Reply to Objection 3. This saying of the wise man
Reply to Objection 1. Reason was given to man that
does not direct that one should deliver a man from death
he might ensue those things to which his nature inclines,
in opposition to the order of justice: wherefore neither
not in all cases, but in accordance with the order of rea-
should a man deliver himself from death by resisting
son. Hence not all self-defense is lawful, but only such as
against justice.
is accomplished with due moderation.
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SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 70
Of Injustice with Regard to the Person of the Witness
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider injustice with regard to the person of the witness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a man is bound to give evidence?
(2) Whether the evidence of two or three witnesses suffices?
(3) Whether a man’s evidence may be rejected without any fault on his part?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to bear false witness?
Whether a man is bound to give evidence?
IIa IIae q. 70 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that a man is not bound to
is bound to give evidence. Even if his evidence is not
give evidence. Augustine say (QQ. Gn. 1:26)∗, that when
demanded, he is bound to do what he can to declare the
Abraham said of his wife (Gn. 20:2), “She is my sister,”
truth to someone who may profit thereby. For it is written
he wished the truth to be concealed and not a lie be told.
(Ps. 81:4): “Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy from
Now, by hiding the truth a man abstains from giving evi-
the hand of the sinner”; and (Prov. 24:11): “Deliver them
dence. Therefore a man is not bound to give evidence.
that are led to death”; and (Rom. 1:32): “They are wor-
Objection 2. Further, no man is bound to act deceit-
thy of death, not only they that do them, but they also that
fully. Now it is written (Prov. 11:13): “He that walketh
consent to them that do them,” on which words a gloss
deceitfully revealeth secrets, but he that is faithful con-
says: “To be silent when one can disprove is to consent.”
cealeth the thing committed to him by his friend.” There-
In matters pertaining to a man’s condemnation, one is not
fore a man is not always bound to give evidence, espe-
bound to give evidence, except when one is constrained by
cially on matters committed to him as a secret by a friend.
a superior in accordance with the order of justice; since if
Objection 3. Further, clerics and priests, more than
the truth of such a matter be concealed, no particular in-
others, are bound to those things that are necessary for
jury is inflicted on anyone. Or, if some danger threatens
salvation. Yet clerics and priests are forbidden to give ev-
the accuser, it matters not since he risked the danger of his
idence when a man is on trial for his life. Therefore it is
own accord: whereas it is different with the accused, who
not necessary for salvation to give evidence.
incurs the danger against his will.
On the contrary, Augustine† says: “Both he who
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of con-
conceals the truth and he who tells a lie are guilty, the for-
cealment of the truth in a case when a man is not com-
mer because he is unwilling to do good, the latter because
pelled by his superior’s authority to declare the truth, and
he desires to hurt.”
when such concealment is not specially injurious to any
I answer that, We must make a distinction in the mat-
person.
ter of giving evidence: because sometimes a certain man’s
Reply to Objection 2. A man should by no means
evidence is necessary, and sometimes not. If the necessary
give evidence on matters secretly committed to him in
evidence is that of a man subject to a superior whom, in
confession, because he knows such things, not as man but
matters pertaining to justice, he is bound to obey, without
as God’s minister: and the sacrament is more binding than
doubt he is bound to give evidence on those points which
any human precept. But as regards matters committed to
are required of him in accordance with the order of justice,
man in some other way under secrecy, we must make a
for instance on manifest things or when ill-report has pre-
distinction. Sometimes they are of such a nature that one
ceded. If however he is required to give evidence on other
is bound to make them known as soon as they come to
points, for instance secret matters, and those of which no
our knowledge, for instance if they conduce to the spiri-
ill-report has preceded, he is not bound to give evidence.
tual or corporal corruption of the community, or to some
On the other hand, if his evidence be required by authority
grave personal injury, in short any like matter that a man is
of a superior whom he is bound to obey, we must make a
bound to make known either by giving evidence or by de-
distinction: because if his evidence is required in order to
nouncing it. Against such a duty a man cannot be obliged
deliver a man from an unjust death or any other penalty,
to act on the plea that the matter is committed to him under
or from false defamation, or some loss, in such cases he
secrecy, for he would break the faith he owes to another.
∗ Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 33,34
† Can. Quisquis, caus. xi, qu. 3, cap.
Falsidicus; cf. Isidore, Sentent. iii, 55
1528
On the other hand sometimes they are such as one is not ural right.
bound to make known, so that one may be under obliga-
Reply to Objection 3. It is unbecoming for ministers
tion not to do so on account of their being committed to
of the altar to slay a man or to cooperate in his slaying, as
one under secrecy. In such a case one is by no means
stated above (q. 64, a. 4); hence according to the order of
bound to make them known, even if the superior should
justice they cannot be compelled to give evidence when a
command; because to keep faith is of natural right, and a
man is on trial for his life.
man cannot be commanded to do what is contrary to nat-
Whether the evidence of two or three persons suffices?
IIa IIae q. 70 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the evidence of two
(De Coelo i, 1), “we reckon ‘all’ and ‘whole’ to consist
or three persons is not sufficient. For judgment requires
of three parts.” Now we have a triple voucher when two
certitude. Now certitude of the truth is not obtained by
agree with the prosecutor: hence two witnesses are re-
the assertions of two or three witnesses, for we read that
quired; or for the sake of greater certitude three, which is
Naboth was unjustly condemned on the evidence of two
the perfect number. Wherefore it is written (Eccles. 4:12):
witnesses (3 Kings 21). Therefore the evidence of two or
“A threefold cord is not easily broken”: and Augustine,
three witnesses does not suffice.
commenting on Jn. 8:17, “The testimony of two men is
Objection 2. Further, in order for evidence to be cred-
true,” says (Tract. xxxvi) that “there is here a mystery by
ible it must agree. But frequently the evidence of two or
which we are given to understand that Trinity wherein is
three disagrees in some point. Therefore it is of no use for
perpetual stability of truth.”
proving the truth in court.
Reply to Objection 1. No matter how great a num-
Objection 3. Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu.
ber of witnesses may be determined, the evidence might
iv, can. Praesul.): “A bishop shall not be condemned save
sometimes be unjust, since is written (Ex. 23:2): “Thou
on the evidence of seventy-two witnesses; nor a cardinal
shalt not follow the multitude to do evil.” And yet the fact
priest of the Roman Church, unless there be sixty-four
that in so many it is not possible to have certitude with-
witnesses. Nor a cardinal deacon of the Roman Church,
out fear of error, is no reason why we should reject the
unless there be twenty-seven witnesses; nor a subdeacon,
certitude which can probably be had through two or three
an acolyte, an exorcist, a reader or a doorkeeper without
witnesses, as stated above.
seven witnesses.” Now the sin of one who is of higher dig-
Reply to Objection 2. If the witnesses disagree cer-
nity is more grievous, and consequently should be treated
tain principal circumstances which change the substance
more severely. Therefore neither is the evidence of two or
of the fact, for instance in time, place, or persons, which
three witnesses sufficient for the condemnation of other
are chiefly in question, their evidence is of no weight, be-
persons.
cause if they disagree in such things, each one would seem
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 17:6): “By the
to be giving distinct evidence and to be speaking of differ-
mouth of two or three witnesses shall he die that is to be
ent facts. For instance, one say that a certain thing hap-
slain,” and further on (Dt. 19:15): “In the mouth of two or
pened at such and such a time or place, while another says
three witnesses every word shall stand.”
it happened at another time or place, they seem not to be
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic.
speaking of the same event. The evidence is not weak-
i, 3), “we must not expect to find certitude equally in
ened if one witness says that he does not remember, while
every matter.” For in human acts, on which judgments
the other attests to a determinate time or place And if on
are passed and evidence required, it is impossible to have
such points as these the witness for prosecution and de-
demonstrative certitude, because they a about things con-
fense disagree altogether, and if they be equal in number
tingent and variable. Hence the certitude of probability
on either side, and of equal standing, the accused should
suffices, such as may reach the truth in the greater num-
have the benefit of the doubt, because the judge ought to
ber, cases, although it fail in the minority. No it is proba-
be more inclined to acquit than to condemn, except per-
ble that the assertion of sever witnesses contains the truth
haps in favorable suits, such as a pleading for liberty and
rather than the assertion of one: and since the accused
the like. If, however, the witnesses for the same side dis-
is the only one who denies, while several witness affirm
agree, the judge ought to use his own discretion in discern-
the same as the prosecutor, it is reasonably established
ing which side to favor, by considering either the number
both by Divine and by human law, that the assertion of
of witnesses, or their standing, or the favorableness of the
several witnesses should be upheld. Now all multitude
suit, or the nature of the business and of the evidence
is comprised of three elements, the beginning, the mid-
Much more ought the evidence of one witness to be
dle and the end. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher
rejected if he contradict himself when questioned about
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what he has seen and about what he knows; not, however, cernment of the judge.
if he contradict himself when questioned about matters of
Reply to Objection 3. This passage refers specially
opinion and report, since he may be moved to answer dif-
to the bishops, priests, deacons and clerics of the Roman
ferently according to the different things he has seen and
Church, on account of its dignity: and this for three rea-
heard.
sons. First because in that Church those men ought to be
On the other hand if there be discrepancy of evidence
promoted whose sanctity makes their evidence of more
in circumstances not touching the substance of the fact,
weight than that of many witnesses. Secondly, because
for instance, whether the weather were cloudy or fine,
those who have to judge other men, often have many op-
whether the house were painted or not, or such like mat-
ponents on account of their justice, wherefore those who
ters, such discrepancy does not weaken the evidence, be-
give evidence against them should not be believed indis-
cause men are not wont to take much notice of such things,
criminately, unless they be very numerous. Thirdly, be-
wherefore they easily forget them.
Indeed, a discrep-
cause the condemnation of any one of them would de-
ancy of this kind renders the evidence more credible, as
tract in public opinion from the dignity and authority of
Chrysostom states (Hom. i in Matth.), because if the wit-
that Church, a result which would be more fraught with
nesses agreed in every point, even in the minutest of de-
danger than if one were to tolerate a sinner in that same
tails, they would seem to have conspired together to say
Church, unless he were very notorious and manifest, so
the same thing: but this must be left to the prudent dis-
that a grave scandal would arise if he were tolerated.
Whether a man’s evidence can be rejected without any fault of his?
IIa IIae q. 70 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that a man’s evidence
on account of some fault of his, as in the case of unbe-
ought not to be rejected except on account of some fault.
lievers and persons of evil repute, as well as those who
For it a penalty on some that their evidence is inadmis-
are guilty of a public crime and who are not allowed even
sible, as in the case of those who are branded with in-
to accuse; sometimes, without any fault on his part, and
famy. Now a penalty must not be inflicted save for a fault.
this owing either to a defect in the reason, as in the case
Therefore it would seem that no man’s evidence ought to
of children, imbeciles and women, or to personal feeling,
be rejected save on account of a fault.
as in the case of enemies, or persons united by family or
Objection 2. Further, “Good is to be presumed of ev-
household ties, or again owing to some external condi-
ery one, unless the contrary appear”∗. Now it pertains
tion, as in the case of poor people, slaves, and those who
to a man’s goodness that he should give true evidence.
are under authority, concerning whom it is to be presumed
Since therefore there can be no proof of the contrary, un-
that they might easily be induced to give evidence against
less there be some fault of his, it would seem that no man’s
the truth.
evidence should be rejected save for some fault.
Thus it is manifest that a person’s evidence may be
Objection 3. Further, no man is rendered unfit for
rejected either with or without some fault of his.
things necessary for salvation except by some sin. But it
Reply to Objection 1. If a person is disqualified from
is necessary for salvation to give true evidence, as stated
giving evidence this is done as a precaution against false
above (a. 1). Therefore no man should be excluded from
evidence rather than as a punishment. Hence the argument
giving evidence save for some fault.
does not prove.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Regist. xiii, 44): “As
Reply to Objection 2. Good is to be presumed of ev-
to the bishop who is said to have been accused by his ser-
eryone unless the contrary appear, provided this does not
vants, you are to know that they should by no means have
threaten injury to another: because, in that case, one ought
been heard”: which words are embodied in the Decretals
to be careful not to believe everyone readily, according to
II, qu. 1, can. Imprimis.
1 Jn. 4:1: “Believe not every spirit.”
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the author-
Reply to Objection 3. To give evidence is necessary
ity of evidence is not infallible but probable; and conse-
for salvation, provided the witness be competent, and the
quently the evidence for one side is weakened by whatever
order of justice observed. Hence nothing hinders certain
strengthens the probability of the other. Now the reliabil-
persons being excused from giving evidence, if they be
ity of a person’s evidence is weakened, sometimes indeed
considered unfit according to law.
∗ Cap. Dudum, de Praesumpt.
1530
Whether it is always a mortal sin to give false evidence?
IIa IIae q. 70 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not always a mor-
ness against thy neighbor.” For one does nothing against
tal sin to give false evidence. For a person may happen to
a man by preventing him from doing someone an injury,
give false evidence, through ignorance of fact. Now such
but only by taking away his justice. Thirdly, owing to the
ignorance excuses from mortal sin. Therefore the giving
falsehood itself, by reason of which every lie is a sin: on
of false evidence is not always a mortal sin.
this account, the giving of false evidence is not always a
Objection 2. Further, a lie that benefits someone and
mortal sin.
hurts no man is officious, and this is not a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1. In giving evidence a man ought
Now sometimes a lie of this kind occurs in false evidence,
not to affirm as certain, as though he knew it, that about
as when a person gives false evidence in order to save a
which he is not certain and he should confess his doubt
man from death, or from an unjust sentence which threat-
in doubtful terms, and that which he is certain about, in
ens him through other false witnesses or a perverse judge.
terms of certainty. Owing however to the frailty of the hu-
Therefore in such cases it is not a mortal sin to give false
man memory, a man sometimes thinks he is certain about
evidence.
something that is not true; and then if after thinking over
Objection 3. Further, a witness is required to take an
the matter with due care he deems himself certain about
oath in order that he may fear to commit a mortal sin of
that false thing, he does not sin mortally if he asserts it,
perjury. But this would not be necessary, if it were already
because the evidence which he gives is not directly an in-
a mortal sin to give false evidence. Therefore the giving
tentionally, but accidentally contrary to what he intends.
of false evidence is not always mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2. An unjust judgment is not a
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 19:5): “A false
judgment, wherefore the false evidence given in an unjust
witness shall not be unpunished.”
judgment, in order to prevent injustice is not a mortal sin
I answer that, False evidence has a threefold defor-
by virtue of the judgment, but only by reason of the oath
mity. The first is owing to perjury, since witnesses are ad-
violated.
mitted only on oath and on this count it is always a mor-
Reply to Objection 3. Men abhor chiefly those sin
tal sin. Secondly, owing to the violation of justice, and
that are against God, as being most grievous and among
on this account it is a mortal sin generically, even as any
them is perjury: whereas they do not abhor so much sins
kind of injustice. Hence the prohibition of false evidence
against their neighbor. Consequently, for the greater cer-
by the precept of the decalogue is expressed in this form
titude of evidence, the witness is required to take a oath.
when it is said (Ex. 20:16), “Thou shalt not bear false wit-
1531
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 71
Of Injustice in Judgment On the Part of Counsel
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the injustice which takes place in judgment on the part of counsel, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor?
(2) Whether certain persons should be prohibited from exercising the office of advocate?
(3) Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?
(4) Whether he sins if he accept a fee for defending a suit?
Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor?
IIa IIae q. 71 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that an advocate is bound
other circumstance, by a kind of chance are more closely
to defend the suits of the poor. For it is written (Ex. 23:5):
united to us.” He says “by reason of place,” because one
“If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lie underneath
is not bound to search throughout the world for the needy
his burden, thou shalt not pass by, but shall lift him up with
that one may succor them; and it suffices to do works of
him.” Now no less a danger threatens the poor man whose
mercy to those one meets with. Hence it is written (Ex.
suit is being unjustly prejudiced, than if his ass were to lie
23:4): “If thou meet thy enemy’s ass going astray, bring it
underneath its burden. Therefore an advocate is bound to
back to him.” He says also “by reason of time,” because
defend the suits of the poor.
one is not bound to provide for the future needs of others,
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says in a homily (ix
and it suffices to succor present needs. Hence it is written
in Evang.): “Let him that hath understanding beware lest
(1 Jn. 3:17): “He that. . . shall see his brother in need, and
he withhold his knowledge; let him that hath abundance
shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity
of wealth watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let
of God abide in him?” Lastly he says, “or any other cir-
him who is a servant to art share his skill with his neigh-
cumstance,” because one ought to show kindness to those
bor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the
especially who are by any tie whatever united to us, ac-
wealthy plead the cause of the poor: for the slightest gift
cording to 1 Tim. 5:8, “If any man have not care of his
you have received will be reputed a talent.” Now every
own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied
man is bound, not to hide but faithfully to dispense the
the faith and is worse than an infidel.”
talent committed to him; as evidenced by the punishment
It may happen however that these circumstances con-
inflicted on the servant who hid his talent (Mat. 25:30).
cur, and then we have to consider whether this particular
Therefore an advocate is bound to plead for the poor.
man stands in such a need that it is not easy to see how he
Objection 3. Further, the precept about performing
can be succored otherwise, and then one is bound to be-
works of mercy, being affirmative, is binding according to
stow the work of mercy on him. If, however, it is easy to
time and place, and this is chiefly in cases of need. Now
see how he can be otherwise succored, either by himself,
it seems to be a case of need when the suit of a poor man
or by some other person still more closely united to him,
is being prejudiced. Therefore it seems that in such a case
or in a better position to help him, one is not bound so
an advocate is bound to defend the poor man’s suit.
strictly to help the one in need that it would be a sin not to
On the contrary, He that lacks food is no less in need
do so: although it would be praiseworthy to do so where
than he that lacks an advocate. Yet he that is able to give
one is not bound to. Therefore an advocate is not always
food is not always bound to feed the needy. Therefore nei-
bound to defend the suits of the poor, but only when the
ther is an advocate always bound to defend the suits of the
aforesaid circumstances concur, else he would have to put
poor.
aside all other business, and occupy himself entirely in
I answer that, Since defense of the poor man’s suit
defending the suits of poor people. The same applies to a
belongs to the works of mercy, the answer to this inquiry
physician with regard to attendance on the sick.
is the same as the one given above with regard to the other
Reply to Objection 1. So long as the ass lies under
works of mercy (q. 32, Aa. 5,9). Now no man is suffi-
the burden, there is no means of help in this case, unless
cient to bestow a work of mercy on all those who need
those who are passing along come to the man’s aid, and
it. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i,
therefore they are bound to help. But they would not be
28), “since one cannot do good to all, we ought to con-
so bound if help were possible from another quarter.
sider those chiefly who by reason of place, time, or any
Reply to Objection 2. A man is bound to make good
1532
use of the talent bestowed on him, according to the oppor-Reply to Objection 3. Not every need is such that it
tunities afforded by time, place, and other circumstances,
is one’s duty to remedy it, but only such as we have stated
as stated above.
above.
Whether it is fitting that the law should debar certain persons from the office of ad-IIa IIae q. 71 a. 2
vocate?
Objection 1. It would seem unfitting for the law to
gether debarred from being advocates either in their own
debar certain persons from the office of advocate. For no
or in another’s cause. The becomingness of exercising
man should be debarred from doing works of mercy. Now
this office is removed in two ways. First, through a man
it belongs to the works of mercy to defend a man’s suit, as
being engaged in higher things. Wherefore it is unfitting
stated above (a. 1). Therefore no man should be debarred
that monks or priests should be advocates in any cause
from this office.
whatever, or that clerics should plead in a secular court,
Objection 2. Further, contrary causes have not, seem-
because such persons are engaged in Divine things. Sec-
ingly, the same effect. Now to be busy with Divine things
ondly, on account of some personal defect, either of body
and to be busy about sin are contrary to one another.
(for instance a blind man whose attendance in a court of
Therefore it is unfitting that some should be debarred from
justice would be unbecoming) or of soul, for it ill be-
the office of advocate, on account of religion, as monks
comes one who has disdained to be just himself, to plead
and clerics, while others are debarred on account of sin,
for the justice of another. Wherefore it is unbecoming
as persons of ill-repute and heretics.
that persons of ill repute, unbelievers, and those who have
Objection 3. Further, a man should love his neighbor
been convicted of grievous crimes should be advocates.
as himself. Now it is a duty of love for an advocate to
Nevertheless this unbecomingness is outweighed by ne-
plead a person’s cause. Therefore it is unfitting that cer-
cessity: and for this reason such persons can plead either
tain persons should be debarred from pleading the cause
their own cause or that of persons closely connected with
of others, while they are allowed to advocate their own
them. Moreover, clerics can be advocates in the cause of
cause.
their own church, and monks in the cause of their own
On the contrary, According to Decretals III, qu. vii,
monastery, if the abbot direct them to do so.
can. Infames, many persons are debarred from the office
Reply to Objection 1. Certain persons are sometimes
of advocate.
debarred by unbecomingness, and others by inability from
I answer that, In two ways a person is debarred from
performing works of mercy: for not all the works of mercy
performing a certain act: first because it is impossible
are becoming to all persons: thus it ill becomes a fool to
to him, secondly because it is unbecoming to him: but,
give counsel, or the ignorant to teach.
whereas the man to whom a certain act is impossible, is
Reply to Objection 2. Just as virtue is destroyed by
absolutely debarred from performing it, he to whom an act
“too much” and “too little,” so does a person become in-
is unbecoming is not debarred altogether, since necessity
competent by “more” and “less.” For this reason some,
may do away with its unbecomingness. Accordingly some
like religious and clerics, are debarred from pleading in
are debarred from the office of advocate because it is im-
causes, because they are above such an office; and others
possible to them through lack of sense—either interior, as
because they are less than competent to exercise it, such
in the case of madmen and minors—or exterior, as in the
as persons of ill-repute and unbelievers.
case of the deaf and dumb. For an advocate needs to have
Reply to Objection 3. The necessity of pleading the
both interior skill so that he may be able to prove the jus-
causes of others is not so pressing as the necessity of
tice of the cause he defends, and also speech and hearing,
pleading one’s own cause, because others are able to help
that he may speak and hear what is said to him. Conse-
themselves otherwise: hence the comparison fails.
quently those who are defective in these points, are alto-
Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?
IIa IIae q. 71 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that an advocate does not
be praised, if he defends an unjust cause.
sin by defending an unjust cause. For just as a physician
Objection 2. Further, it is always lawful to desist from proves his skill by healing a desperate disease, so does an
committing a sin. Yet an advocate is punished if he throws
advocate prove his skill, if he can defend an unjust cause.
up his brief (Decret. II, qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.).
Now a physician is praised if he heals a desperate malady.
Therefore an advocate does not sin by defending an un-
Therefore an advocate also commits no sin, but ought to
just cause, when once he has undertaken its defense.
1533
Objection 3. Further, it would seem to be a greater sin cause unknowingly, thinking it just, he is to be excused
for an advocate to use unjust means in defense of a just
according to the measure in which ignorance is excusable.
cause (e.g. by producing false witnesses, or alleging false
Reply to Objection 1. The physician injures no man
laws), than to defend an unjust cause, since the former is a
by undertaking to heal a desperate malady, whereas the
sin against the form, the latter against the matter of justice.
advocate who accepts service in an unjust cause, unjustly
Yet it is seemingly lawful for an advocate to make use of
injures the party against whom he pleads unjustly. Hence
such underhand means, even as it is lawful for a soldier to
the comparison fails. For though he may seem to deserve
lay ambushes in a battle. Therefore it would seem that an
praise for showing skill in his art, nevertheless he sins by
advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause.
reason of injustice in his will, since he abuses his art for
On the contrary, It is said (2 Paralip.
19:2):
an evil end.
“Thou helpest the ungodly. . . and therefore thou didst de-
Reply to Objection 2. If an advocate believes from
serve. . . the wrath of the Lord.” Now an advocate by de-
the outset that the cause is just, and discovers afterwards
fending an unjust cause, helps the ungodly. Therefore he
while the case is proceeding that it is unjust, he ought not
sins and deserves the wrath of the Lord.
to throw up his brief in such a way as to help the other
I answer that, It is unlawful to cooperate in an evil
side, or so as to reveal the secrets of his client to the other deed, by counseling, helping, or in any way consenting,
party. But he can and must give up the case, or induce
because to counsel or assist an action is, in a way, to do
his client to give way, or make some compromise without
it, and the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32) that “they. . . are wor-
prejudice to the opposing party.
thy of death, not only they that do” a sin, “but they also
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 40, a. 3),
that consent to them that do” it. Hence it was stated above
it is lawful for a soldier, or a general to lay ambushes in
(q. 62, a. 7), that all such are bound to restitution. Now
a just war, by prudently concealing what he has a mind to
it is evident that an advocate provides both assistance and
do, but not by means of fraudulent falsehoods, since we
counsel to the party for whom he pleads. Wherefore, if
should keep faith even with a foe, as Tully says (De offic.
knowingly he defends an unjust cause, without doubt he
iii, 29). Hence it is lawful for an advocate, in defending
sins grievously, and is bound to restitution of the loss un-
his case, prudently to conceal whatever might hinder its
justly incurred by the other party by reason of the assis-
happy issue, but it is unlawful for him to employ any kind
tance he has provided. If, however, he defends an unjust
of falsehood.
Whether it is lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading?
IIa IIae q. 71 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for an advocate
and a lawyer his advice.”
to take a fee for pleading. Works of mercy should not be
I answer that, A man may justly receive payment for
done with a view to human remuneration, according to Lk.
granting what he is not bound to grant. Now it is evident
14:12, “When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not
that an advocate is not always bound to consent to plead,
thy friends. . . nor thy neighbors who are rich: lest perhaps
or to give advice in other people’s causes. Wherefore, if
they also invite thee again, and a recompense be made to
he sell his pleading or advice, he does not act against jus-
thee.” Now it is a work of mercy to plead another’s cause,
tice. The same applies to the physician who attends on a
as stated above (a. 1 ). Therefore it is not lawful for an
sick person to heal him, and to all like persons; provided,
advocate to take payment in money for pleading.
however, they take a moderate fee, with due considera-
Objection 2. Further, spiritual things are not to be
tion for persons, for the matter in hand, for the labor en-
bartered with temporal things. But pleading a person’s
tailed, and for the custom of the country. If, however, they
cause seems to be a spiritual good since it consists in us-
wickedly extort an immoderate fee, they sin against jus-
ing one’s knowledge of law. Therefore it is not lawful for
tice. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that
an advocate to take a fee for pleading.
“it is customary to demand from them restitution of what
Objection 3. Further, just as the person of the advo-
they have extorted by a wicked excess, but not what has
cate concurs towards the pronouncement of the verdict, so
been given to them in accordance with a commendable
do the persons of the judge and of the witness. Now, ac-
custom.”
cording to Augustine (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.), “the judge
Reply to Objection 1. Man is not bound to do gratu-
should not sell a just sentence, nor the witness true ev-
itously whatever he can do from motives of mercy: else
idence.” Therefore neither can an advocate sell a just
no man could lawfully sell anything, since anything may
pleading.
be given from motives of mercy. But when a man does
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Mace-
give a thing out of mercy, he should seek, not a human,
don.) that “an advocate may lawfully sell his pleading,
but a Divine reward. In like manner an advocate, when
1534
he mercifully pleads the cause of a poor man, should have dence. Now justice and truth do not incline to one side
in view not a human but a Divine meed; and yet he is not
rather than to the other: and consequently judges receive
always bound to give his services gratuitously.
out of the public funds a fixed pay for their labor; and
Reply to Objection 2. Though knowledge of law is
witnesses receive their expenses (not as payment for giv-
something spiritual, the use of that knowledge is accom-
ing evidence, but as a fee for their labor) either from both
plished by the work of the body: hence it is lawful to take
parties or from the party by whom they are adduced, be-
money in payment of that use, else no craftsman would be
cause no man “serveth as a soldier at any time at his own
allowed to make profit by his art.
charge∗” (1 Cor. 9:7). On the other hand an advocate de-
Reply to Objection 3. The judge and witnesses are
fends one party only, and so he may lawfully accept fee
common to either party, since the judge is bound to pro-
from the party he assists.
nounce a just verdict, and the witness to give true evi-
∗ Vulg.: ‘Who serveth as a soldier,’
1535
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 72
Of Reviling
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider injuries inflicted by words uttered extrajudicially. We shall consider (1) reviling, (2) backbiting, (3) tale bearing, (4) derision, (5) cursing.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is reviling?
(2) Whether every reviling is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether one ought to check revilers?
(4) Of the origin of reviling.
Whether reviling consists in words?
IIa IIae q. 72 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that reviling does not con-
Wherefore a gloss on Rom. 1:30, “contumelious, proud,”
sist in words. Reviling implies some injury inflicted on
says: “The contumelious are those who by word or deed
one’s neighbor, since it is a kind of injustice. But words
revile and shame others.”
seem to inflict no injury on one’s neighbor, either in his
Reply to Objection 1. Our words, if we consider them
person, or in his belongings. Therefore reviling does not
in their essence, i.e. as audible sound injure no man, ex-
consist in words.
cept perhaps by jarring of the ear, as when a person speaks
Objection 2. Further, reviling seems to imply dis-
too loud. But, considered as signs conveying something
honor. But a man can be dishonored or slighted by deeds
to the knowledge of others, they may do many kinds of
more than by words. Therefore it seems that reviling con-
harm. Such is the harm done to a man to the detriment of
sists, not in words but in deeds.
his honor, or of the respect due to him from others. Hence
Objection 3. Further, a dishonor inflicted by words
the reviling is greater if one man reproach another in the
is called a railing or a taunt. But reviling seems to differ
presence of many: and yet there may still be reviling if
from railing or taunt. Therefore reviling does not consist
he reproach him by himself. in so far as the speaker acts
in words.
unjustly against the respect due to the hearer.
On the contrary, Nothing, save words, is perceived
Reply to Objection 2. One man slights another by
by the hearing. Now reviling is perceived by the hearing
deeds in so far as such deeds cause or signify that which
according to Jer. 20:10, “I heard reviling [Douay: ‘con-
is against that other man’s honor. In the former case it is
tumelies’] on every side.” Therefore reviling consists in
not a matter of reviling but of some other kind of injustice,
words.
of which we have spoken above (Qq. 64,65,66): where as
I answer that, Reviling denotes the dishonoring of a
in the latter case there is reviling, in so far as deeds have
person, and this happens in two ways: for since honor re-
the significant force of words.
sults from excellence, one person dishonors another, first,
Reply to Objection 3. Railing and taunts consist in
by depriving him of the excellence for which he is hon-
words, even as reviling, because by all of them a man’s
ored. This is done by sins of deed, whereof we have spo-
faults are exposed to the detriment of his honor. Such
ken above (q. 64, seqq.). Secondly, when a man publishes
faults are of three kinds. First, there is the fault of guilt,
something against another’s honor, thus bringing it to the
which is exposed by “reviling” words. Secondly, there
knowledge of the latter and of other men. This reviling
is the fault of both guilt and punishment, which is ex-
properly so called, and is done I some kind of signs. Now,
posed by “taunts” [convicium], because “vice” is com-
according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), “com-
monly spoken of in connection with not only the soul but
pared with words all other signs are very few, for words
also the body. Hence if one man says spitefully to another
have obtained the chief place among men for the purpose
that he is blind, he taunts but does not revile him: whereas
of expressing whatever the mind conceives.” Hence re-
if one man calls another a thief, he not only taunts but also
viling, properly speaking consists in words: wherefore,
reviles him. Thirdly, a man reproaches another for his in-
Isidore says (Etym. x) that a reviler [contumeliosus] “is
feriority or indigence, so as to lessen the honor due to him
hasty and bursts out [tumet] in injurious words.” Since,
for any kind of excellence. This is done by “upbraiding”
however, things are also signified by deeds, which on
words, and properly speaking, occurs when one spitefully
this account have the same significance as words, it fol-
reminds a man that one has succored him when he was in
lows that reviling in a wider sense extends also to deeds.
need. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 20:15): “He will give a
1536
few things and upbraid much.” Nevertheless these terms are sometimes employed one for the other.
Whether reviling or railing is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 72 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that reviling or railing is
dishonoring him, but rather perhaps of correcting him or
not a mortal sin. For no mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now
with some like purpose, he utters a railing or reviling not
railing is the act of a virtue, viz. of wittiness eutrapelia∗
formally and essentially, but accidentally and materially,
to which it pertains to rail well, according to the Philoso-
in so far to wit as he says that which might be a railing
pher (Ethic. iv, 8). Therefore railing or reviling is not a
or reviling. Hence this may be sometimes a venial sin,
mortal sin.
and sometimes without any sin at all. Nevertheless there
Objection 2. Further, mortal sin is not to be found
is need of discretion in such matters, and one should use
in perfect men; and yet these sometimes give utterance to
such words with moderation, because the railing might be
railing or reviling. Thus the Apostle says (Gal. 3:1): “O
so grave that being uttered inconsiderately it might dis-
senseless Galatians!,” and our Lord said (Lk. 24:25): “O
honor the person against whom it is uttered. In such a
foolish and slow of heart to believe!” Therefore railing or
case a man might commit a mortal sin, even though he
reviling is not a mortal sin.
did not intend to dishonor the other man: just as were a
Objection 3. Further, although that which is a venial
man incautiously to injure grievously another by striking
sin by reason of its genus may become mortal, that which
him in fun, he would not be without blame.
is mortal by reason of its genus cannot become venial, as
Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to wittiness to utter
stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 88, Aa. 4,6). Hence if by reason
some slight mockery, not with intent to dishonor or pain
of its genus it were a mortal sin to give utterance to railing
the person who is the object of the mockery, but rather
or reviling, it would follow that it is always a mortal sin.
with intent to please and amuse: and this may be without
But this is apparently untrue, as may be seen in the case of
sin, if the due circumstances be observed. on the other
one who utters a reviling word indeliberately or through
hand if a man does not shrink from inflicting pain on the
slight anger. Therefore reviling or railing is not a mortal
object of his witty mockery, so long as he makes others
sin, by reason of its genus.
laugh, this is sinful, as stated in the passage quoted.
On the contrary, Nothing but mortal sin deserves the
Reply to Objection 2. Just as it is lawful to strike a
eternal punishment of hell. Now railing or reviling de-
person, or damnify him in his belongings for the purpose
serves the punishment of hell, according to Mat. 5:22,
of correction, so too, for the purpose of correction, may
“Whosoever shall say to his brother. . . Thou fool, shall be
one say a mocking word to a person whom one has to cor-
in danger of hell fire.” Therefore railing or reviling is a
rect. It is thus that our Lord called the disciples “foolish,”
mortal sin.
and the Apostle called the Galatians “senseless.” Yet, as
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), words are in-
Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19), “sel-
jurious to other persons, not as sounds, but as signs, and
dom and only when it is very necessary should we have
this signification depends on the speaker’s inward inten-
recourse to invectives, and then so as to urge God’s ser-
tion. Hence, in sins of word, it seems that we ought to
vice, not our own.”
consider with what intention the words are uttered. Since
Reply to Objection 3. Since the sin of railing or revil-
then railing or reviling essentially denotes a dishonoring,
ing depends on the intention of the utterer, it may happen
if the intention of the utterer is to dishonor the other man,
to be a venial sin, if it be a slight railing that does not
this is properly and essentially to give utterance to rail-
inflict much dishonor on a man, and be uttered through
ing or reviling: and this is a mortal sin no less than theft
lightness of heart or some slight anger, without the fixed
or robbery, since a man loves his honor no less than his
purpose of dishonoring him, for instance when one in-
possessions. If, on the other hand, a man says to another
tends by such a word to give but little pain.
a railing or reviling word, yet with the intention, not of
Whether one ought to suffer oneself to be reviled?
IIa IIae q. 72 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not to suf-
reviled, but rather reply to the reviler.
fer oneself to be reviled. For he that suffers himself to
Objection 2. Further, one ought to love oneself more
be reviled, encourages the reviler. But one ought not to
than another. Now one ought not to suffer another to be
do this. Therefore one ought not to suffer oneself to be
reviled, wherefore it is written (Prov. 26:10): “He that
∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 60, a. 5
1537
putteth a fool to silence appeaseth anger.” Therefore nei-chiefly for two reasons. First, for the good of the reviler;
ther should one suffer oneself to be reviled.
namely, that his daring may be checked, and that he may
Objection 3. Further, a man is not allowed to revenge
not repeat the attempt, according to Prov. 26:5, “Answer
himself, for it is said: “Vengeance belongeth to Me, I will
a fool according to his folly, lest he imagine himself to be
repayӠ. Now by submitting to be reviled a man revenges
wise.” Secondly, for the good of many who would be pre-
himself, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad
vented from progressing in virtue on account of our being
Rom.): “If thou wilt be revenged, be silent; thou hast dealt
reviled. Hence Gregory says (Hom. ix, Super Ezech.):
him a fatal blow.” Therefore one ought not by silence to
“Those who are so placed that their life should be an ex-
submit to reviling words, but rather answer back.
ample to others, ought, if possible, to silence their detrac-
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 37:13): “They that
tors, lest their preaching be not heard by those who could
sought evils to me spoke vain things,” and afterwards (Ps.
have heard it, and they continue their evil conduct through
37:14) he says: “But I as a deaf man, heard not; and as a
contempt of a good life.”
dumb man not opening his mouth.”
Reply to Objection 1. The daring of the railing re-
I answer that, Just as we need patience in things done
viler should be checked with moderation, i.e. as a duty of
against us, so do we need it in those said against us. Now
charity, and not through lust for one’s own honor. Hence
the precepts of patience in those things done against us
it is written (Prov. 26:4): “Answer not a fool according to
refer to the preparedness of the mind, according to Au-
his folly, lest thou be like him.”
gustine’s (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) exposition on
Reply to Objection 2. When one man prevents an-
our Lord’s precept, “If one strike thee on thy right cheek,
other from being reviled there is not the danger of lust for
turn to him also the other”∗: that is to say, a man ought
one’s own honor as there is when a man defends himself
to be prepared to do so if necessary. But he is not always
from being reviled: indeed rather would it seem to pro-
bound to do this actually: since not even did our Lord do
ceed from a sense of charity.
so, for when He received a blow, He said: “Why strik-
Reply to Objection 3. It would be an act of revenge
est thou Me?” (Jn. 18:23). Consequently the same ap-
to keep silence with the intention of provoking the reviler
plies to the reviling words that are said against us. For we
to anger, but it would be praiseworthy to be silent, in order
are bound to hold our minds prepared to submit to be re-
to give place to anger. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 8:4):
viled, if it should be expedient. Nevertheless it sometimes
“Strive not with a man that is full of tongue, and heap not
behooves us to withstand against being reviled, and this
wood upon his fire.”
Whether reviling arises from anger?
IIa IIae q. 72 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that reviling does not arise
viling is closely connected with anger’s end, which is re-
from anger. For it is written (Prov. 11:2): “Where pride
venge: since the easiest way for the angry man to take
is, there shall also be reviling [Douay: ‘reproach’].” But
revenge on another is to revile him. Therefore reviling
anger is a vice distinct from pride. Therefore reviling does
arises chiefly from anger.
not arise from anger.
Reply to Objection 1. Reviling is not directed to the
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 20:3): “All
end of pride which is excellency. Hence reviling does not
fools are meddling with revilings [Douay: ‘reproaches’].”
arise directly from pride. Nevertheless pride disposes a
Now folly is a vice opposed to wisdom, as stated above
man to revile, in so far as those who think themselves to
(q. 46, a. 1); whereas anger is opposed to meekness.
excel, are more prone to despise others and inflict injuries
Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
on them, because they are more easily angered, through
Objection 3.
Further, no sin is diminished by its
deeming it an affront to themselves whenever anything is
cause. But the sin of reviling is diminished if one gives
done against their will.
vent to it through anger: for it is a more grievous sin to
Reply to Objection 2.
According to the Philoso-
revile out of hatred than out of anger. Therefore reviling
pher (Ethic. vii, 6) “anger listens imperfectly to reason”:
does not arise from anger.
wherefore an angry man suffers a defect of reason, and in
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that
this he is like the foolish man. Hence reviling arises from
“anger gives rise to revilings.”
folly on account of the latter’s kinship with anger.
I answer that, While one sin may arise from various
Reply to Objection 3. According to the Philosopher
causes, it is nevertheless said to have its source chiefly in
(Rhet. ii, 4) “an angry man seeks an open offense, but
that one from which it is wont to arise most frequently,
he who hates does not worry about this.” Hence reviling
through being closely connected with its end. Now re-
which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger rather
† Heb. 10:30
∗ The words as quoted by St. Thomas are a blending
of Mat. 5:39 and Lk. 6:29
1538
than to hatred.
1539
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 73
Of Backbiting∗
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider backbiting, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is backbiting?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Of its comparison with other sins;
(4) Whether it is a sin to listen to backbiting?
Whether backbiting is suitably defined as the blackening of another’s character by IIa IIae q. 73 a. 1
secret words?
Objection 1. It would seem that backbiting is not as
words secretly, he, for his own part, causes his hearers to
defined by some†, “the blackening of another’s good name
have a bad opinion of the person against whom he speaks.
by words uttered in secret.” For “secretly” and “openly”
For the backbiter apparently intends and aims at being be-
are circumstances that do not constitute the species of a
lieved. It is therefore evident that backbiting differs from
sin, because it is accidental to a sin that it be known by
reviling in two points: first, in the way in which the words
many or by few. Now that which does not constitute the
are uttered, the reviler speaking openly against someone,
species of a sin, does not belong to its essence, and should
and the backbiter secretly; secondly, as to the end in view,
not be included in its definition. Therefore it does not be-
i.e. as regards the injury inflicted, the reviler injuring a
long to the essence of backbiting that it should be done by
man’s honor, the backbiter injuring his good name.
secret words.
Reply to Objection 1. In involuntary commutations,
Objection 2. Further, the notion of a good name im-
to which are reduced all injuries inflicted on our neighbor,
plies something known to the public. If, therefore, a per-
whether by word or by deed, the kind of sin is differen-
son’s good name is blackened by backbiting, this cannot
tiated by the circumstances “secretly” and “openly,” be-
be done by secret words, but by words uttered openly.
cause involuntariness itself is diversified by violence and
Objection 3. Further, to detract is to subtract, or to
by ignorance, as stated above (q. 65, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 6,
diminish something already existing. But sometimes a
Aa. 5,8).
man’s good name is blackened, even without subtracting
Reply to Objection 2. The words of a backbiter are
from the truth: for instance, when one reveals the crimes
said to be secret, not altogether, but in relation to the per-
which a man has in truth committed. Therefore not every
son of whom they are said, because they are uttered in his
blackening of a good name is backbiting.
absence and without his knowledge. On the other hand,
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 10:11): “If
the reviler speaks against a man to his face. Wherefore if
a serpent bite in silence, he is nothing better that back-
a man speaks ill of another in the presence of several, it is
biteth.”
a case of backbiting if he be absent, but of reviling if he
I answer that, Just as one man injures another by deed
alone be present: although if a man speak ill of an absent
in two ways—openly, as by robbery or by doing him any
person to one man alone, he destroys his good name not
kind of violence—and secretly, as by theft, or by a crafty
altogether but partly.
blow, so again one man injures another by words in two
Reply to Objection 3. A man is said to backbite [de-
ways—in one way, openly, and this is done by reviling
trehere] another, not because he detracts from the truth,
him, as stated above (q. 72, a. 1)—and in another way se-
but because he lessens his good name. This is done some-
cretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact
times directly, sometimes indirectly.
Directly, in four
that one man openly utters words against another man,
ways: first, by saying that which is false about him; sec-
he would appear to think little of him, so that for this
ondly, by stating his sin to be greater than it is; thirdly, by reason he dishonors him, so that reviling is detrimental
revealing something unknown about him; fourthly, by as-
to the honor of the person reviled. On the other hand,
cribing his good deeds to a bad intention. Indirectly, this
he that speaks against another secretly, seems to respect
is done either by gainsaying his good, or by maliciously
rather than slight him, so that he injures directly, not his
concealing it, or by diminishing it.
honor but his good name, in so far as by uttering such
∗ or Detraction
† Albert the Great, Sum. Theol. II, cxvii.
1540
Whether backbiting is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 73 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that backbiting is not a
it happens sometimes that a man utters words, whereby
mortal sin. For no act of virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to
someone’s good name is tarnished, and yet he does not
reveal an unknown sin, which pertains to backbiting, as
intend this, but something else. This is not backbiting
stated above (a. 1, ad 3), is an act of the virtue of char-
strictly and formally speaking, but only materially and ac-
ity, whereby a man denounces his brother’s sin in order
cidentally as it were. And if such defamatory words be
that he may amend: or else it is an act of justice, whereby
uttered for the sake of some necessary good, and with at-
a man accuses his brother. Therefore backbiting is not a
tention to the due circumstances, it is not a sin and cannot
mortal sin.
be called backbiting. But if they be uttered out of light-
Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Prov. 24:21, “Have
ness of heart or for some unnecessary motive, it is not a
nothing to do with detractors,” says: “The whole human
mortal sin, unless perchance the spoken word be of such
race is in peril from this vice.” But no mortal sin is to be
a grave nature, as to cause a notable injury to a man’s
found in the whole of mankind, since many refrain from
good name, especially in matters pertaining to his moral
mortal sin: whereas they are venial sins that are found in
character, because from the very nature of the words this
all. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.
would be a mortal sin. And one is bound to restore a man
Objection 3. Further, Augustine in a homily On the
his good name, no less than any other thing one has taken
Fire of Purgatory∗ reckons it a slight sin “to speak ill with-
from him, in the manner stated above (q. 62, a. 2) when
out hesitation or forethought.” But this pertains to back-
we were treating of restitution.
biting. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, it is not back-
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:30): “Back-
biting to reveal a man’s hidden sin in order that he may
biters, hateful to God,” which epithet, according to a
mend, whether one denounce it, or accuse him for the
gloss, is inserted, “lest it be deemed a slight sin because it
good of public justice.
consists in words.”
Reply to Objection 2. This gloss does not assert
I answer that, As stated above (q. 72, a. 2), sins of
that backbiting is to be found throughout the whole of
word should be judged chiefly from the intention of the
mankind, but “almost,” both because “the number of fools
speaker. Now backbiting by its very nature aims at black-
is infinite,Ӡ and few are they that walk in the way of sal-
ening a man’s good name. Wherefore, properly speaking,
vation,‡ and because there are few or none at all who do
to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in order to
not at times speak from lightness of heart, so as to injure
blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter
someone’s good name at least slightly, for it is written
to blacken a man’s good name, because of all temporal
(James 3:2): “If any man offend not in word, the same is
things a man’s good name seems the most precious, since
a perfect man.”
for lack of it he is hindered from doing many things well.
Reply to Objection 3. Augustine is referring to the
For this reason it is written (Ecclus. 41:15): “Take care of
case when a man utters a slight evil about someone, not
a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than
intending to injure him, but through lightness of heart or
a thousand treasures precious and great.” Therefore back-
a slip of the tongue.
biting, properly speaking, is a mortal sin. Nevertheless
Whether backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one’s neighbor?
IIa IIae q. 73 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that backbiting is the
is absolutely the gravest of all.
gravest of all sins committed against one’s neighbor. Be-
Objection 2.
Further, backbiting is apparently a
cause a gloss on Ps. 108:4, “Instead of making me a return
graver sin than reviling, because a man can withstand re-
of love they detracted me,” a gloss says: “Those who de-
viling, but not a secret backbiting. Now backbiting is
tract Christ in His members and slay the souls of future
seemingly a graver sin than adultery, because adultery
believers are more guilty than those who killed the flesh
unites two persons in one flesh, whereas reviling severs
that was soon to rise again.” From this it seems to fol-
utterly those who were united. Therefore backbiting is
low that backbiting is by so much a graver sin than mur-
more grievous than adultery: and yet of all other sins a
der, as it is a graver matter to kill the soul than to kill the man commits against his neighbor, adultery is most grave.
body. Now murder is the gravest of the other sins that are
Objection 3. Further, reviling arises from anger, while
committed against one’s neighbor. Therefore backbiting
backbiting arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral.
∗ Serm. civ in the appendix to St. Augustine’s work
† Eccles. 1:15
‡ Cf. Mat. 7:14
1541
xxxi, 45). But envy is a graver sin than anger. Therefore deliberately than if he sins through weakness or careless-backbiting is a graver sin than reviling; and so the same
ness. In this respect sins of word have a certain levity, in
conclusion follows as before.
so far as they are apt to occur through a slip of the tongue,
Objection 4. Further, the gravity of a sin is measured
and without much forethought.
by the gravity of the defect that it causes. Now backbit-
Reply to Objection 1. Those who detract Christ by
ing causes a most grievous defect, viz. blindness of mind.
hindering the faith of His members, disparage His God-
For Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 2): “What else do back-
head, which is the foundation of our faith. Wherefore this
biters but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt into their
is not simple backbiting but blasphemy.
eyes, so that the more they breathe of detraction, the less
Reply to Objection 2. Reviling is a more grievous sin
they see of the truth?” Therefore backbiting is the most
than backbiting, in as much as it implies greater contempt
grievous sin committed against one’s neighbor.
of one’s neighbor: even as robbery is a graver sin than
On the contrary, It is more grievous to sin by deed
theft, as stated above (q. 66, a. 9). Yet reviling is not a
than by word. But backbiting is a sin of word, while adul-
more grievous sin than adultery. For the gravity of adul-
tery, murder, and theft are sins of deed. Therefore back-
tery is measured, not from its being a union of bodies,
biting is not graver than the other sins committed against
but from being a disorder in human generation. More-
one’s neighbor.
over the reviler is not the sufficient cause of unfriendli-
I answer that, The essential gravity of sins commit-
ness in another man, but is only the occasional cause of
ted against one’s neighbor must be weighed by the injury
division among those who were united, in so far, to wit,
they inflict on him, since it is thence that they derive their
as by declaring the evils of another, he for his own part
sinful nature. Now the greater the good taken away, the
severs that man from the friendship of other men, though
greater the injury. And while man’s good is threefold,
they are not forced by his words to do so. Accordingly a
namely the good of his soul, the good of his body, and the
backbiter is a murderer “occasionally,” since by his words
good of external things; the good of the soul, which is the
he gives another man an occasion for hating or despising
greatest of all, cannot be taken from him by another save
his neighbor. For this reason it is stated in the Epistle of
as an occasional cause, for instance by an evil persuasion,
Clement∗, that “backbiters are murderers,” i.e. occasion-
which does not induce necessity. On the other hand the
ally; because “he that hateth his brother is a murderer” (1
two latter goods, viz. of the body and of external things,
Jn. 3:15).
can be taken away by violence. Since, however, the goods
Reply to Objection 3.
Anger seeks openly to be
of the body excel the goods of external things, those sins
avenged, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2): wherefore
which injure a man’s body are more grievous than those
backbiting which takes place in secret, is not the daughter
which injure his external things. Consequently, among
of anger, as reviling is, but rather of envy, which strives
other sins committed against one’s neighbor, murder is the
by any means to lessen one’s neighbor’s glory. Nor does
most grievous, since it deprives man of the life which he
it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous than
already possesses: after this comes adultery, which is con-
reviling: since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater sin,
trary to the right order of human generation, whereby man
just as anger gives birth to murder and blasphemy. For the
enters upon life. In the last place come external goods,
origin of a sin depends on its inclination to an end, i.e. on
among which a man’s good name takes precedence of
the thing to which the sin turns, whereas the gravity of a
wealth because it is more akin to spiritual goods, where-
sin depends on what it turns away from.
fore it is written (Prov. 22:1): “A good name is better than
Reply to Objection 4. Since “a man rejoiceth in the
great riches.” Therefore backbiting according to its genus
sentence of his mouth” (Prov. 15:23), it follows that a
is a more grievous sin than theft, but is less grievous than
backbiter more and more loves and believes what he says,
murder or adultery. Nevertheless the order may differ by
and consequently more and more hates his neighbor, and
reason of aggravating or extenuating circumstances.
thus his knowledge of the truth becomes less and less.
The accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in
This effect however may also result from other sins per-
relation to the sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins
taining to hate of one’s neighbor.
Whether it is a grave sin for the listener to suffer the backbiter?
IIa IIae q. 73 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the listener who suf-
Gregory says (Hom. ix, super Ezech): “Just as we ought
fers a backbiter does not sin grievously. For a man is not
not to incite the tongue of backbiters, lest they perish, so
under greater obligations to others than to himself. But it
ought we to suffer them with equanimity when they have
is praiseworthy for a man to suffer his own backbiters: for
been incited by their own wickedness, in order that our
∗ Ad Jacob. Ep. i
1542
merit may be the greater.” Therefore a man does not sin if indeed, but much less than the backbiter, and, as a rule
he does not withstand those who backbite others.
venially. Sometimes too this may be a mortal sin, either
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:30): “In
because it is his official duty to cor. rect the backbiter, or
no wise speak against the truth.” Now sometimes a per-
by reason of some consequent danger; or on account of
son tells the truth while backbiting, as stated above (a. 1,
the radical reason for which human fear may sometimes
ad 3). Therefore it seems that one is not always bound to
be a mortal sin, as stated above (q. 19, a. 3).
withstand a backbiter.
Reply to Objection 1. No man hears himself back-
Objection 3. Further, no man should hinder what is
bitten, because when a man is spoken evil of in his hear-
profitable to others. Now backbiting is often profitable
ing, it is not backbiting, properly speaking, but reviling, as
to those who are backbitten: for Pope Pius∗ says†: “Not
stated above (a. 1, ad 2). Yet it is possible for the detrac-
unfrequently backbiting is directed against good persons,
tions uttered against a person to come to his knowledge
with the result that those who have been unduly exalted
through others telling him, and then it is left to his dis-
through the flattery of their kindred, or the favor of others,
cretion whether he will suffer their detriment to his good
are humbled by backbiting.” Therefore one ought not to
name, unless this endanger the good of others, as stated
withstand backbiters.
above (q. 72, a. 3). Wherefore his patience may deserve
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii):
commendation for as much as he suffers patiently being
“Take care not to have an itching tongue, nor tingling ears,
detracted himself. But it is not left to his discretion to per-
that is, neither detract others nor listen to backbiters.”
mit an injury to be done to another’s good name, hence
I answer that, According to the Apostle (Rom. 1:32),
he is accounted guilty if he fails to resist when he can, for
they “are worthy of death. . . not only they that” commit
the same reason whereby a man is bound to raise another
sins, “but they also that consent to them that do them.”
man’s ass lying “underneath his burden,” as commanded
Now this happens in two ways. First, directly, when, to
in Dt. 21:4‡.
wit, one man induces another to sin, or when the sin is
Reply to Objection 2. One ought not always to with-
pleasing to him: secondly, indirectly, that is, if he does
stand a backbiter by endeavoring to convince him of false-
not withstand him when he might do so, and this happens
hood, especially if one knows that he is speaking the truth:
sometimes, not because the sin is pleasing to him, but on
rather ought one to reprove him with words, for that he
account of some human fear.
sins in backbiting his brother, or at least by our pained
Accordingly we must say that if a man list ens to back-
demeanor show him that we are displeased with his back-
biting without resisting it, he seems to consent to the back-
biting, because according to Prov. 25:23, “the north wind
biter, so that he becomes a participator in his sin. And if
driveth away rain, as doth a sad countenance a backbiting
he induces him to backbite, or at least if the detraction be
tongue.”
pleasing to him on account of his hatred of the person de-
Reply to Objection 3. The profit one derives from
tracted, he sins no less than the detractor, and sometimes
being backbitten is due, not to the intention of the back-
more. Wherefore Bernard says (De Consid. ii, 13): “It
biter, but to the ordinance of God Who produces good out
is difficult to say which is the more to be condemned the
of every evil. Hence we should none the less withstand
backbiter or he that listens to backbiting.” If however the
backbiters, just as those who rob or oppress others, even
sin is not pleasing to him, and he fails to withstand the
though the oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by
backbiter, through fear negligence, or even shame, he sins
patience.
∗ St. Pius I
† Append. Grat. ad can. Oves, caus. vi, qu. 1
‡ Ex. 23:5
1543
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 74
Of Tale-Bearing∗
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider tale-bearing: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?
(2) Which of the two is the more grievous?
Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?
IIa IIae q. 74 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that tale-bearing is not a
forward those evils especially about his neighbor which
distinct sin from backbiting. Isidore says (Etym. x): “The
are likely to defame him, or at least to depreciate his good
susurro [tale-bearer] takes his name from the sound of his
name: whereas a tale-bearer intends to sever friendship, as
speech, for he speaks disparagingly not to the face but into
appears from the gloss quoted above and from the saying
the ear.” But to speak of another disparagingly belongs
of Prov. 26:20, “Where the tale-bearer is taken away, con-
to backbiting. Therefore tale-bearing is not a distinct sin
tentions shall cease.” Hence it is that a tale-bearer speaks
from backbiting.
such ill about his neighbors as may stir his hearer’s mind
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Lev. 19:16): “Thou
against them, according to Ecclus. 28:11, “A sinful man
shalt not be an informer [Douay: ‘a detractor’] nor a tale-
will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst
bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’] among the people.” But an
of them that are at peace.”
informer is apparently the same as a backbiter. Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. A tale-bearer is called a back-
neither does tale-bearing differ from backbiting.
biter in so far as he speaks ill of another; yet he differs
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 28:15):
from a backbiter since he intends not to speak ill as such,
“The tale-bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’] and the double-
but to say anything that may stir one man against another,
tongued is accursed.” But a double-tongued man is appar-
though it be good simply, and yet has a semblance of evil
ently the same as a backbiter, because a backbiter speaks
through being unpleasant to the hearer.
with a double tongue, with one in your absence, with an-
Reply to Objection 2. An informer differs from a
other in your presence. Therefore a tale-bearer is the same
tale-bearer and a backbiter, for an informer is one who
as a backbiter.
charges others publicly with crimes, either by accusing or
On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 1:29,30, “Tale-
by railing them, which does not apply to a backbiter or
bearers, backbiters [Douay: ‘whisperers, detractors’]”
tale-bearer.
says: “Tale-bearers sow discord among friends; back-
Reply to Objection 3. A double-tongued person is
biters deny or disparage others’ good points.”
properly speaking a tale-bearer. For since friendship is
I answer that, The tale-bearer and the backbiter agree
between two, the tale-bearer strives to sever friendship on
in matter, and also in form or mode of speaking, since
both sides. Hence he employs a double tongue towards
they both speak evil secretly of their neighbor: and for
two persons, by speaking ill of one to the other: wherefore
this reason these terms are sometimes used one for the
it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): “The tale-bearer [Douay:
other. Hence a gloss on Ecclus. 5:16, “Be not called a
‘whisperer’] and the double-tongued is accursed,” and
tale-bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’]” says: “i.e. a backbiter.”
then it is added, “for he hath troubled many that were
They differ however in end, because the backbiter intends
peace.”
to blacken his neighbor’s good name, wherefore he brings
Whether backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing?
IIa IIae q. 74 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that backbiting is a graver
they are unpleasant to the hearer. Therefore backbiting is
sin than tale-bearing. For sins of word consist in speaking
a graver sin than tale-bearing.
evil. Now a backbiter speaks of his neighbor things that
Objection 2. Further, he that deprives. a man of his
are evil simply, for such things lead to the loss or depre-
good name, deprives him not merely of one friend, but
ciation of his good name: whereas a tale-bearer is only
of many, because everyone is minded to scorn the friend-
intent on saying what is apparently evil, because to wit
ship of a person with a bad name. Hence it is reproached
∗ ‘Susurratio,’ i.e. Whispering
† King Josaphat
1544
against a certain individual† (2 Paralip 19:2): “Thou art most necessary to him that he may be fitted for friendship.
joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord.” But
Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than backbiting or
tale-bearing deprives one of only one friend. Therefore
even reviling, because a friend is better than honor, and
backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing.
to be loved is better than to be honored, according to the
Objection 3.
Further,
it is written (James
Philosopher (Ethic. viii).
4:11):
“He that backbiteth [Douay:,‘detracteth’] his
Reply to Objection 1. The species and gravity of a
brother. . . detracteth the law,” and consequently God the
sin depend on the end rather than on the material object,
giver of the law. Wherefore the sin of backbiting seems
wherefore, by reason of its end, tale-bearing is worse than
to be a sin against God, which is most grievous, as stated
backbiting, although sometimes the backbiter says worse
above (q. 20, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 73, a. 3). On the other hand
things.
the sin of tale-bearing is against one’s neighbor. Therefore
Reply to Objection 2. A good name is a disposition
the sin of backbiting is graver than the sin of tale-bearing.
for friendship, and a bad name is a disposition for enmity.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 5:17): “An evil
But a disposition falls short of the thing for which it dis-
mark of disgrace is upon the double-tongued; but to the
poses. Hence to do anything that leads to a disposition
tale-bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’] hatred, and enmity, and
for enmity is a less grievous sin than to do what conduces
reproach.”
directly to enmity.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 73, a. 3; Ia IIae,
Reply to Objection 3. He that backbites his brother,
q. 73, a. 8), sins against one’s neighbor are the more
seems to detract the law, in so far as he despises the pre-
grievous, according as they inflict a greater injury on him:
cept of love for one’s neighbor: while he that strives to
and an injury is so much the greater, according to the
sever friendship seems to act more directly against this
greatness of the good which it takes away. Now of all
precept. Hence the latter sin is more specially against
one’s external goods a friend takes the first place, since
God, because “God is charity” (1 Jn. 4:16), and for this
“no man can live without friends,” as the Philosopher de-
reason it is written (Prov. 6:16): “Six things there are,
clares (Ethic. viii, 1). Hence it is written (Ecclus. 6:15):
which the Lord hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth,”
“Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend.” Again,
and the seventh is “he (Prov. 6:19) that soweth discord
a man’s good name whereof backbiting deprives him, is
among brethren.”
1545
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 75
Of Derision∗
(In Two Articles)
We must now speak of derision, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether derision is a special sin distinct from the other sins whereby one’s neighbor is injured by words?
(2) Whether derision is a mortal sin?
Whether derision is a special sin distinct from those already mentioned?
IIa IIae q. 75 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that derision is not a spe-
of derision is distinct from the foregoing sins.
cial sin distinct from those mentioned above. For laughing
Reply to Objection 1. Laughing to scorn and deri-
to scorn is apparently the same as derision. But laughing
sion agree as to the end but differ in mode, because deri-
to scorn pertains to reviling. Therefore derision would
sion is done with the “mouth,” i.e. by words and laughter,
seem not to differ from reviling.
while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the nose, as
Objection 2. Further, no man is derided except for
a gloss says on Ps. 2:4, “He that dwelleth in heaven shall
something reprehensible which puts him to shame. Now
laugh at them”: and such a distinction does not differenti-
such are sins; and if they be imputed to a person publicly,
ate the species. Yet they both differ from reviling, as being
it is a case of reviling, if privately, it amounts to backbit-
shamed differs from being dishonored: for to be ashamed
ing or tale-bearing. Therefore derision is not distinct from
is “to fear dishonor,” as Damascene states (De Fide Orth.
the foregoing vices.
ii, 15).
Objection 3. Further, sins of this kind are distin-
Reply to Objection 2. For doing a virtuous deed a
guished by the injury they inflict on one’s neighbor. Now
man deserves both respect and a good name in the eyes
the injury inflicted on a man by derision affects either his
of others, and in his own eyes the glory of a good con-
honor, or his good name, or is detrimental to his friend-
science, according to 2 Cor. 1:12, “Our glory is this, the
ship. Therefore derision is not a sin distinct from the fore-
testimony of our conscience.” Hence, on the other hand,
going.
for doing a reprehensible, i.e. a vicious action, a man for-
On the contrary, Derision is done in jest, wherefore
feits his honor and good name in the eyes of others—and
it is described as “making fun.” Now all the foregoing are
for this purpose the reviler and the backbiter speak of an-
done seriously and not in jest. Therefore derision differs
other person—while in his own eyes, he loses the glory
from all of them.
of his conscience through being confused and ashamed at
I answer that, As stated above (q. 72, a. 2), sins of
reprehensible deeds being imputed to him—and for this
word should be weighed chiefly by the intention of the
purpose the derider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly
speaker, wherefore these sins are differentiated according
evident that derision agrees with the foregoing vices as to
to the various intentions of those who speak against an-
the matter but differs as to the end.
other. Now just as the railer intends to injure the honor
Reply to Objection 3. A secure and calm conscience
of the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good
is a great good, according to Prov. 15:15, “A secure mind
name, and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the
is like a continual feast.” Wherefore he that disturbs an-
derider intends to shame the person he derides. And since
other’s conscience by confounding him inflicts a special
this end is distinct from the others, it follows that the sin
injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of sin.
Whether derision can be a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 75 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that derision cannot be a
Objection 2. Further, the greatest derision would ap-
mortal sin. Every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But
pear to be that which is done as an injury to God. But
derision does not seem contrary to charity, for sometimes
derision is not always a mortal sin when it tends to the in-
it takes place in jest among friends, wherefore it is known
jury of God: else it would be a mortal sin to relapse into a
as “making fun.” Therefore derision cannot be a mortal
venial sin of which one has repented. For Isidore says (De
sin.
Sum. Bon. ii, 16) that “he who continues to do what he
∗ or Mockery
1546
has repented of, is a derider and not a penitent.” It would and all the more grievous according as a greater respect is
likewise follow that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin, because,
due to the person derided.
according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 15) “the ostrich signi-
Consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to de-
fies the hypocrite, who derides the horse, i.e. the just man,
ride God and the things of God, according to Is. 37:23,
and his rider, i.e. God.” Therefore derision is not a mortal
“Whom hast thou reproached, and whom hast thou blas-
sin.
phemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy voice?”
Objection 3. Further, reviling and backbiting seem to
and he replies: “Against the Holy One of Israel.” In the
be graver sins than derision, because it is more to do a
second place comes derision of one’s parents, wherefore
thing seriously than in jest. But not all backbiting or re-
it is written (Prov. 30:17): “The eye that mocketh at his
viling is a mortal sin. Much less therefore is derision a
father, and that despiseth the labor of his mother in bear-
mortal sin.
ing him, let the ravens of the brooks pick it out, and the
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 3:34): “He de-
young eagles eat it.” Further, the derision of good per-
rideth [Vulg.: ‘shall scorn’] the scorners.” But God’s deri-
sons is grievous, because honor is the reward of virtue,
sion is eternal punishment for mortal sin, as appears from
and against this it is written (Job 12:4): “The simplicity
the words of Ps. 2:4, “He that dwelleth in heaven shall
of the just man is laughed to scorn.” Such like derision
laugh at them.” Therefore derision is a mortal sin.
does very much harm: because it turns men away from
I answer that, The object of derision is always some
good deeds, according to Gregory (Moral. xx, 14), “Who
evil or defect. Now when an evil is great, it is taken, not
when they perceive any good points appearing in the acts
in jest, but seriously: consequently if it is taken in jest or
of others, directly pluck them up with the hand of a mis-
turned to ridicule (whence the terms ‘derision’ and ‘jest-
chievous reviling.”
ing’), this is because it is considered to be slight. Now an
Reply to Objection 1. Jesting implies nothing con-
evil may be considered to be slight in two ways: first, in
trary to charity in relation to the person with whom one
itself, secondly, in relation to the person. When anyone
jests, but it may imply something against charity in rela-
makes game or fun of another’s evil or defect, because
tion to the person who is the object of the jest, on account
it is a slight evil in itself, this is a venial sin by reason
of contempt, as stated above.
of its genus. on the other hand this defect may be con-
Reply to Objection 2. Neither he that relapses into
sidered as a slight evil in relation to the person, just as
a sin of which he has repented, nor a hypocrite, derides
we are wont to think little of the defects of children and
God explicitly, but implicitly, in so far as either’s behav-
imbeciles: and then to make game or fun of a person, is
ior is like a derider’s. Nor is it true that to commit a venial to scorn him altogether, and to think him so despicable
sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, but only dispos-
that his misfortune troubles us not one whit, but is held
itively and imperfectly.
as an object of derision. In this way derision is a mortal
Reply to Objection 3. Derision considered in itself
sin, and more grievous than reviling, which is also done
is less grievous than backbiting or reviling, because it
openly: because the reviler would seem to take another’s
does not imply contempt, but jest. Sometimes however
evil seriously; whereas the derider does so in fun, and so
it includes greater contempt than reviling does, as stated
would seem the more to despise and dishonor the other
above, and then it is a grave sin.
man. Wherefore, in this sense, derision is a grievous sin,
1547
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 76
Of Cursing
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether one may lawfully curse another?
(2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature?
(3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin?
(4) Of its comparison with other sins.
Whether it is lawful to curse anyone?
IIa IIae q. 76 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to curse any-
of cause, and this belongs to God first and foremost, since
one. For it is unlawful to disregard the command of the
He made all things by His word, according to Ps. 32:9,
Apostle in whom Christ spoke, according to 2 Cor. 13:3.
“He spoke and they were made”; while secondarily it be-
Now he commanded (Rom. 12:14), “Bless and curse not.”
longs to man, who, by his word, commands others and
Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone.
thus moves them to do something: it is for this purpose
Objection 2. Further, all are bound to bless God, ac-
that we employ verbs in the imperative mood. Thirdly,
cording to Dan. 3:82, “O ye sons of men, bless the Lord.”
“speaking” is related to the thing spoken by expressing
Now the same mouth cannot both bless God and curse
the sentiments of one who desires that which is expressed
man, as proved in the third chapter of James. Therefore
in words; and for this purpose we employ the verb in the
no man may lawfully curse another man.
optative mood.
Objection 3. Further, he that curses another would
Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speak-
seem to wish him some evil either of fault or of punish-
ing which is by way of simple assertion of evil, and con-
ment, since a curse appears to be a kind of imprecation.
sider the other two kinds. And here we must observe that
But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone, indeed we are
to do something and to will it are consequent on one an-
bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil. There-
other in the matter of goodness and wickedness, as shown
fore it is unlawful for any man to curse.
above ( Ia IIae, q. 20, a. 3). Hence in these two ways of
Objection 4. Further, the devil exceeds all in malice
evil speaking, by way of command and by way of desire,
on account of his obstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse
there is the same aspect of lawfulness and unlawfulness,
the devil, as neither is it lawful to curse oneself; for it is
for if a man commands or desires another’s evil, as evil,
written (Ecclus. 21:30): “While the ungodly curseth the
being intent on the evil itself, then evil speaking will be
devil, he curseth his own soul.” Much less therefore is it
unlawful in both ways, and this is what is meant by curs-
lawful to curse a man.
ing. On the other hand if a man commands or desires
Objection 5. Further, a gloss on Num. 23:8, “How
another’s evil under the aspect of good, it is lawful; and it
shall I curse whom God hath not cursed?” says: “There
may be called cursing, not strictly speaking, but acciden-
cannot be a just cause for cursing a sinner if one be igno-
tally, because the chief intention of the speaker is directed
rant of his sentiments.” Now one man cannot know an-
not to evil but to good.
other man’s sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by God.
Now evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring
Therefore no man may lawfully curse another.
it, under the aspect of a twofold good. Sometimes under
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 27:26): “Cursed
the aspect of just, and thus a judge lawfully curses a man
be he that abideth not in the words of this law.” Moreover
whom he condemns to a just penalty: thus too the Church
Eliseus cursed the little boys who mocked him (4 Kings
curses by pronouncing anathema. In the same way the
2:24).
prophets in the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on
I answer that, To curse [maledicere] is the same as to
sinners, as though conforming their will to Divine justice,
speak ill [malum dicere]. Now “speaking” has a threefold
although such like imprecation may be taken by way of
relation to the thing spoken. First, by way of assertion,
foretelling. Sometimes evil is spoken under the aspect of
as when a thing is expressed in the indicative mood: in
useful, as when one wishes a sinner to suffer sickness or
this way “maledicere” signifies simply to tell someone of
hindrance of some kind, either that he may himself re-
another’s evil, and this pertains to backbiting, wherefore
form, or at least that he may cease from harming others.
tellers of evil [maledici] are sometimes called backbiters.
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle forbids cursing
Secondly, speaking is related to the thing spoken, by way
strictly so called with an evil intent: and the same answer
1548
applies to the Second Objection.
curses the devil on account of his guilt, for the same rea-
Reply to Objection 3. To wish another man evil un-
son he judges himself worthy of being cursed; and in this
der the aspect of good, is not opposed to the sentiment
sense he is said to curse his own soul.
whereby one wishes him good simply, in fact rather is it
Reply to Objection 5. Although the sinner’s senti-
in conformity therewith.
ments cannot be perceived in themselves, they can be per-
Reply to Objection 4. In the devil both nature and
ceived through some manifest sin, which has to be pun-
guilt must be considered. His nature indeed is good and is
ished. Likewise although it is not possible to know whom
from God nor is it lawful to curse it. On the other hand his
God curses in respect of final reprobation, it is possible to
guilt is deserving of being cursed, according to Job 3:8,
know who is accursed of God in respect of being guilty of
“Let them curse it who curse the day.” Yet when a sinner
present sin.
Whether it is lawful to curse an irrational creature?
IIa IIae q. 76 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that it is unlawful to curse
to the rational creature in several ways. First by way of
an irrational creature. Cursing would seem to be lawful
ministration, in so far as irrational creatures minister to
chiefly in its relation to punishment. Now irrational crea-
the needs of man. In this sense the Lord said to man (Gn.
tures are not competent subjects either of guilt or of pun-
3:17): “Cursed is the earth in thy work,” so that its bar-
ishment. Therefore it is unlawful to curse them.
renness would be a punishment to man. Thus also David
Objection 2. Further, in an irrational creature there is cursed the mountains of Gelboe, according to Gregory’s
nothing but the nature which God made. But it is unlaw-
expounding (Moral. iv, 3). Again the irrational creature
ful to curse this even in the devil, as stated above (a. 1).
is related to the rational creature by way of signification:
Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational crea-
and thus our Lord cursed the fig tree in signification of
ture.
Judea. Thirdly, the irrational creature is related to rational
Objection 3. Further, irrational creatures are either
creatures as something containing them, namely by way
stable, as bodies, or transient, as the seasons. Now, ac-
of time or place: and thus Job cursed the day of his birth,
cording to Gregory (Moral. iv, 2), “it is useless to curse
on account of the original sin which he contracted in birth,
what does not exist, and wicked to curse what exists.”
and on account of the consequent penalties. In this sense
Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational crea-
also we may understand David to have cursed the moun-
ture.
tains of Gelboe, as we read in 2 Kings 1:21, namely on
On the contrary, our Lord cursed the fig tree, as re-
account of the people slaughtered there.
lated in Mat. 21:19; and Job cursed his day, according to
But to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures
Job 3:1.
of God, is a sin of blasphemy; while to curse them con-
I answer that, Benediction and malediction, properly
sidered in themselves is idle and vain and consequently
speaking, regard things to which good or evil may hap-
unlawful.
pen, viz. rational creatures: while good and evil are said
From this the Replies to the objections may easily be
to happen to irrational creatures in relation to the rational
gathered.
creature for whose sake they are. Now they are related
Whether cursing is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 76 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that cursing is not a mor-
On the contrary, Nothing save mortal sin excludes
tal sin. For Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purga-
one from the kingdom of God. But cursing excludes from
tory∗ reckons cursing among slight sins. But such sins are
the kingdom of God, according to 1 Cor. 6:10, “Nor curs-
venial. Therefore cursing is not a mortal but a venial Sin.
ers [Douay: ‘railers’], nor extortioners shall possess the
Objection 2. Further, that which proceeds from a
kingdom of God.” Therefore cursing is a mortal sin.
slight movement of the mind does not seem to be gener-
I answer that, The evil words of which we are speak-
ically a mortal sin. But cursing sometimes arises from a
ing now are those whereby evil is uttered against someone
slight movement. Therefore cursing is not a mortal sin.
by way of command or desire. Now to wish evil to another
Objection 3. Further, evil deeds are worse than evil
man, or to conduce to that evil by commanding it, is, of
words. But evil deeds are not always mortal sins. Much
its very nature, contrary to charity whereby we love our
less therefore is cursing a mortal sin.
neighbor by desiring his good. Consequently it is a mor-
∗ Serm. civ in the appendix of St. Augustine’s works
1549
tal sin, according to its genus, and so much the graver, sentiments of the person who utters the curse; because he
as the person whom we curse has a greater claim on our
may say such words through some slight movement, or in
love and respect. Hence it is written (Lev. 20:9): “He that
jest, or without deliberation, and sins of word should be
curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die.”
weighed chiefly with regard to the speaker’s intention, as
It may happen however that the word uttered in curs-
stated above (q. 72, a. 2).
ing is a venial sin either through the slightness of the evil
From this the Replies to the Objections may be easily
invoked on another in cursing him, or on account of the
gathered.
Whether cursing is a graver sin than backbiting?
IIa IIae q. 76 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that cursing is a graver sin
it belongs to the evil-speaker, as we understand it here, to
than backbiting. Cursing would seem to be a kind of blas-
speak evil of punishment, and not evil of fault except un-
phemy, as implied in the canonical epistle of Jude (verse
der the aspect of punishment. But the mode of speaking is
9) where it is said that “when Michael the archangel, dis-
not the same, for in the case of the four vices mentioned
puting with the devil, contended about the body of Moses,
above, evil of fault is spoken by way of assertion, whereas
he durst not bring against him the judgment of blasphemy
in the case of cursing evil of punishment is spoken, either
[Douay: ‘railing speech’],” where blasphemy stands for
by causing it in the form of a command, or by wishing it.
cursing, according to a gloss. Now blasphemy is a graver
Now the utterance itself of a person’s fault is a sin, in as
sin than backbiting. Therefore cursing is a graver sin than
much as it inflicts an injury on one’s neighbor, and it is
backbiting.
more grievous to inflict an injury, than to wish to inflict it, Objection 2. Further, murder is more grievous than
other things being equal.
backbiting, as stated above (q. 73, a. 3). But cursing is on
Hence backbiting considered in its generic aspect is a
a par with the sin of murder; for Chrysostom says (Hom.
graver sin than the cursing which expresses a mere desire;
xix, super Matth.): “When thou sayest: ‘Curse him down
while the cursing which is expressed by way of command,
with his house, away with everything,’ you are no better
since it has the aspect of a cause, will be more or less
than a murderer.” Therefore cursing is graver than back-
grievous than backbiting, according as it inflicts an injury
biting.
more or less grave than the blackening of a man’s good
Objection 3. Further, to cause a thing is more than
name. Moreover this must be taken as applying to these
to signify it. But the curser causes evil by commanding
vices considered in their essential aspects: for other ac-
it, whereas the backbiter merely signifies an evil already
cidental points might be taken into consideration, which
existing. Therefore the curser sins more grievously than
would aggravate or extenuate the aforesaid vices.
the backbiter.
Reply to Objection 1. To curse a creature, as such,
On the contrary, It is impossible to do well in back-
reflects on God, and thus accidentally it has the character
biting, whereas cursing may be either a good or an evil
of blasphemy; not so if one curse a creature on account of
deed, as appears from what has been said (a. 1). There-
its fault: and the same applies to backbiting.
fore backbiting is graver than cursing.
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (a. 3), cursing,
I answer that, As stated in the Ia, q. 48, a. 5, evil is in one way, includes the desire for evil, where if the curser
twofold, evil of fault, and evil of punishment; and of the
desire the evil of another’s violent death, he does not dif-
two, evil of fault is the worse ( Ia, q. 48, a. 6). Hence to
fer, in desire, from a murderer, but he differs from him in
speak evil of fault is worse than to speak evil of punish-
so far as the external act adds something to the act of the
ment, provided the mode of speaking be the same. Ac-
will.
cordingly it belongs to the reviler, the tale-bearer, the
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers curs-
backbiter and the derider to speak evil of fault, whereas
ing by way of command.
1550
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 77
Of Cheating, Which Is Committed in Buying and Selling
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider those sins which relate to voluntary commutations. First, we shall consider cheating, which is committed in buying and selling: secondly, we shall consider usury, which occurs in loans. In connection with the other voluntary commutations no special kind of sin is to be found distinct from rapine and theft.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Of unjust sales as regards the price; namely, whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?
(2) Of unjust sales on the part of the thing sold;
(3) Whether the seller is bound to reveal a fault in the thing sold?
(4) Whether it is lawful in trading to sell a thing at a higher price than was paid for it?
Whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?
IIa IIae q. 77 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that it is lawful to sell
him. Hence Tully says (De Offic. iii, 15): “Contracts
a thing for more than its worth. In the commutations of
should be entirely free from double-dealing: the seller
human life, civil laws determine that which is just. Now
must not impose upon the bidder, nor the buyer upon one
according to these laws it is just for buyer and seller to de-
that bids against him.”
ceive one another (Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend. 8,15):
But, apart from fraud, we may speak of buying and
and this occurs by the seller selling a thing for more than
selling in two ways. First, as considered in themselves,
its worth, and the buyer buying a thing for less than its
and from this point of view, buying and selling seem to
worth. Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than
be established for the common advantage of both parties,
its worth
one of whom requires that which belongs to the other, and
Objection 2. Further, that which is common to all
vice versa, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3). Now
would seem to be natural and not sinful. Now Augustine
whatever is established for the common advantage, should
relates that the saying of a certain jester was accepted by
not be more of a burden to one party than to another, and
all, “You wish to buy for a song and to sell at a premium,”
consequently all contracts between them should observe
which agrees with the saying of Prov. 20:14, “It is naught,
equality of thing and thing. Again, the quality of a thing
it is naught, saith every buyer: and when he is gone away,
that comes into human use is measured by the price given
then he will boast.” Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing
for it, for which purpose money was invented, as stated
for more than its worth.
in Ethic. v, 5. Therefore if either the price exceed the
Objection 3. Further, it does not seem unlawful if
quantity of the thing’s worth, or, conversely, the thing ex-
that which honesty demands be done by mutual agree-
ceed the price, there is no longer the equality of justice:
ment. Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13),
and consequently, to sell a thing for more than its worth,
in the friendship which is based on utility, the amount of
or to buy it for less than its worth, is in itself unjust and
the recompense for a favor received should depend on the
unlawful.
utility accruing to the receiver: and this utility sometimes
Secondly we may speak of buying and selling, consid-
is worth more than the thing given, for instance if the re-
ered as accidentally tending to the advantage of one party,
ceiver be in great need of that thing, whether for the pur-
and to the disadvantage of the other: for instance, when
pose of avoiding a danger, or of deriving some particular
a man has great need of a certain thing, while an other
benefit. Therefore, in contracts of buying and selling, it is
man will suffer if he be without it. In such a case the just
lawful to give a thing in return for more than its worth.
price will depend not only on the thing sold, but on the
On the contrary, It is written (Mat.
7:12): “All
loss which the sale brings on the seller. And thus it will
things. . . whatsoever you would that men should do to
be lawful to sell a thing for more than it is worth in it-
you, do you also to them.” But no man wishes to buy a
self, though the price paid be not more than it is worth to
thing for more than its worth. Therefore no man should
the owner. Yet if the one man derive a great advantage
sell a thing to another man for more than its worth.
by becoming possessed of the other man’s property, and
I answer that, It is altogether sinful to have recourse
the seller be not at a loss through being without that thing,
to deceit in order to sell a thing for more than its just price, the latter ought not to raise the price, because the advan-because this is to deceive one’s neighbor so as to injure
tage accruing to the buyer, is not due to the seller, but to
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a circumstance affecting the buyer. Now no man should the Divine law, it is reckoned unlawful if the equality of
sell what is not his, though he may charge for the loss he
justice be not observed in buying and selling: and he who
suffers.
has received more than he ought must make compensation
On the other hand if a man find that he derives great
to him that has suffered loss, if the loss be considerable. I
advantage from something he has bought, he may, of his
add this condition, because the just price of things is not
own accord, pay the seller something over and above: and
fixed with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind
this pertains to his honesty.
of estimate, so that a slight addition or subtraction would
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 96,
not seem to destroy the equality of justice.
a. 2) human law is given to the people among whom there
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says “this jester,
are many lacking virtue, and it is not given to the virtuous
either by looking into himself or by his experience of oth-
alone. Hence human law was unable to forbid all that is
ers, thought that all men are inclined to wish to buy for
contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it to prohibit what-
a song and sell at a premium. But since in reality this
ever is destructive of human intercourse, while it treats
is wicked, it is in every man’s power to acquire that jus-
other matters as though they were lawful, not by approv-
tice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination.”
ing of them, but by not punishing them. Accordingly, if
And then he gives the example of a man who gave the just
without employing deceit the seller disposes of his goods
price for a book to a man who through ignorance asked
for more than their worth, or the buyer obtain them for less
a low price for it. Hence it is evident that this common
than their worth, the law looks upon this as licit, and pro-
desire is not from nature but from vice, wherefore it is
vides no punishment for so doing, unless the excess be too
common to many who walk along the broad road of sin.
great, because then even human law demands restitution
Reply to Objection 3. In commutative justice we con-
to be made, for instance if a man be deceived in regard to
sider chiefly real equality. On the other hand, in friendship
more than half the amount of the just price of a thing∗.
based on utility we consider equality of usefulness, so that
On the other hand the Divine law leaves nothing un-
the recompense should depend on the usefulness accruing,
punished that is contrary to virtue. Hence, according to
whereas in buying it should be equal to the thing bought.
Whether a sale is rendered unlawful through a fault in the thing sold?
IIa IIae q. 77 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that a sale is not rendered
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 11):
unjust and unlawful through a fault in the thing sold. For
“It is manifestly a rule of justice that a good man should
less account should be taken of the other parts of a thing
not depart from the truth, nor inflict an unjust injury on
than of what belongs to its substance. Yet the sale of a
anyone, nor have any connection with fraud.”
thing does not seem to be rendered unlawful through a
I answer that, A threefold fault may be found per-
fault in its substance: for instance, if a man sell instead of
taining to the thing which is sold. One, in respect of the
the real metal, silver or gold produced by some chemical
thing’s substance: and if the seller be aware of a fault in
process, which is adapted to all the human uses for which
the thing he is selling, he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, so
silver and gold are necessary, for instance in the making
that the sale is rendered unlawful. Hence we find it writ-
of vessels and the like. Much less therefore will it be an
ten against certain people (Is. 1:22), “Thy silver is turned
unlawful sale if the thing be defective in other ways.
into dross, thy wine is mingled with water”: because that
Objection 2. Further, any fault in the thing, affecting
which is mixed is defective in its substance.
the quantity, would seem chiefly to be opposed to justice
Another defect is in respect of quantity which is
which consists in equality. Now quantity is known by be-
known by being measured: wherefore if anyone know-
ing measured: and the measures of things that come into
ingly make use of a faulty measure in selling, he is guilty
human use are not fixed, but in some places are greater, in
of fraud, and the sale is illicit. Hence it is written (Dt.
others less, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 7). There-
25:13,14): “Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag,
fore just as it is impossible to avoid defects on the part of
a greater and a less: neither shall there be in thy house a
the thing sold, it seems that a sale is not rendered unlawful
greater bushel and a less,” and further on (Dt. 25:16): “For
through the thing sold being defective.
the Lord. . . abhorreth him that doth these things, and He
Objection 3. Further, the thing sold is rendered de-
hateth all injustice.”
fective by lacking a fitting quality. But in order to know
A third defect is on the part of the quality, for instance,
the quality of a thing, much knowledge is required that is
if a man sell an unhealthy animal as being a healthy one:
lacking in most buyers. Therefore a sale is not rendered
and if anyone do this knowingly he is guilty of a fraudu-
unlawful by a fault (in the thing sold).
lent sale, and the sale, in consequence, is illicit.
∗ Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend. 2,8
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In all these cases not only is the man guilty of a fraud-longer in its condition of purity than counterfeit gold. If
ulent sale, but he is also bound to restitution. But if any of
however real gold were to be produced by alchemy, it
the foregoing defects be in the thing sold, and he knows
would not be unlawful to sell it for the genuine article,
nothing about this, the seller does not sin, because he does
for nothing prevents art from employing certain natural
that which is unjust materially, nor is his deed unjust,
causes for the production of natural and true effects, as
as shown above (q. 59, a. 2). Nevertheless he is bound
Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) of things produced by the
to compensate the buyer, when the defect comes to his
art of the demons.
knowledge. Moreover what has been said of the seller
Reply to Objection 2. The measures of salable com-
applies equally to the buyer. For sometimes it happens
modities must needs be different in different places, on
that the seller thinks his goods to be specifically of lower
account of the difference of supply: because where there
value, as when a man sells gold instead of copper, and
is greater abundance, the measures are wont to be larger.
then if the buyer be aware of this, he buys it unjustly and
However in each place those who govern the state must
is bound to restitution: and the same applies to a defect in
determine the just measures of things salable, with due
quantity as to a defect in quality.
consideration for the conditions of place and time. Hence
Reply to Objection 1. Gold and silver are costly not
it is not lawful to disregard such measures as are estab-
only on account of the usefulness of the vessels and other
lished by public authority or custom.
like things made from them, but also on account of the ex-
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Civ.
cellence and purity of their substance. Hence if the gold
Dei xi, 16) the price of things salable does not depend
or silver produced by alchemists has not the true specific
on their degree of nature, since at times a horse fetches a
nature of gold and silver, the sale thereof is fraudulent
higher price than a slave; but it depends on their useful-
and unjust, especially as real gold and silver can produce
ness to man. Hence it is not necessary for the seller or
certain results by their natural action, which the counter-
buyer to be cognizant of the hidden qualities of the thing
feit gold and silver of alchemists cannot produce. Thus
sold, but only of such as render the thing adapted to man’s
the true metal has the property of making people joyful,
use, for instance, that the horse be strong, run well and
and is helpful medicinally against certain maladies. More-
so forth. Such qualities the seller and buyer can easily
over real gold can be employed more frequently, and lasts
discover.
Whether the seller is bound to state the defects of the thing sold?
IIa IIae q. 77 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the seller is not bound
Objection 4. Further, if one were bound to tell the
to state the defects of the thing sold. Since the seller does
faults of what one offers for sale, this would only be in
not bind the buyer to buy, he would seem to leave it to
order to lower the price. Now sometimes the price would
him to judge of the goods offered for sale. Now judgment
be lowered for some other reason, without any defect in
about a thing and knowledge of that thing belong to the
the thing sold: for instance, if the seller carry wheat to
same person. Therefore it does not seem imputable to the
a place where wheat fetches a high price, knowing that
seller if the buyer be deceived in his judgment, and be hur-
many will come after him carrying wheat; because if the
ried into buying a thing without carefully inquiring into its
buyers knew this they would give a lower price. But ap-
condition.
parently the seller need not give the buyer this informa-
Objection 2. Further, it seems foolish for anyone to
tion. Therefore, in like manner, neither need he tell him
do what prevents him carrying out his work. But if a man
the faults of the goods he is selling.
states the defects of the goods he has for sale, he prevents
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 10):
their sale: wherefore Tully (De Offic. iii, 13) pictures a
“In all contracts the defects of the salable commodity must
man as saying: “Could anything be more absurd than for
be stated; and unless the seller make them known, al-
a public crier, instructed by the owner, to cry: ‘I offer this
though the buyer has already acquired a right to them, the
unhealthy horse for sale?’ ” Therefore the seller is not
contract is voided on account of the fraudulent action.”
bound to state the defects of the thing sold.
I answer that, It is always unlawful to give anyone an
Objection 3. Further, man needs more to know the
occasion of danger or loss, although a man need not al-
road of virtue than to know the faults of things offered for
ways give another the help or counsel which would be for
sale. Now one is not bound to offer advice to all or to tell
his advantage in any way; but only in certain fixed cases,
them the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, though
for instance when someone is subject to him, or when he
one should not tell anyone what is false. Much less there-
is the only one who can assist him. Now the seller who
fore is a seller bound to tell the faults of what he offers for offers goods for sale, gives the buyer an occasion of loss
sale, as though he were counseling the buyer.
or danger, by the very fact that he offers him defective
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goods, if such defect may occasion loss or danger to the Reply to Objection 2. There is no need to publish be-buyer—loss, if, by reason of this defect, the goods are
forehand by the public crier the defects of the goods one is
of less value, and he takes nothing off the price on that
offering for sale, because if he were to begin by announc-
account—danger, if this defect either hinder the use of the
ing its defects, the bidders would be frightened to buy,
goods or render it hurtful, for instance, if a man sells a
through ignorance of other qualities that might render the
lame for a fleet horse, a tottering house for a safe one, rot-
thing good and serviceable. Such defect ought to be stated
ten or poisonous food for wholesome. Wherefore if such
to each individual that offers to buy: and then he will be
like defects be hidden, and the seller does not make them
able to compare the various points one with the other, the
known, the sale will be illicit and fraudulent, and the seller
good with the bad: for nothing prevents that which is de-
will be bound to compensation for the loss incurred.
fective in one respect being useful in many others.
On the other hand, if the defect be manifest, for in-
Reply to Objection 3. Although a man is not bound
stance if a horse have but one eye, or if the goods though
strictly speaking to tell everyone the truth about matters
useless to the buyer, be useful to someone else, provided
pertaining to virtue, yet he is so bound in a case when, un-
the seller take as much as he ought from the price, he is
less he tells the truth, his conduct would endanger another
not bound to state the defect of the goods, since perhaps
man in detriment to virtue: and so it is in this case.
on account of that defect the buyer might want him to al-
Reply to Objection 4. The defect in a thing makes it
low a greater rebate than he need. Wherefore the seller
of less value now than it seems to be: but in the case cited,
may look to his own indemnity, by withholding the defect
the goods are expected to be of less value at a future time,
of the goods.
on account of the arrival of other merchants, which was
Reply to Objection 1.
Judgment cannot be pro-
not foreseen by the buyers. Wherefore the seller, since he
nounced save on what is manifest: for “a man judges of
sells his goods at the price actually offered him, does not
what he knows” (Ethic. i, 3). Hence if the defects of
seem to act contrary to justice through not stating what is
the goods offered for sale be hidden, judgment of them is
going to happen. If however he were to do so, or if he
not sufficiently left with the buyer unless such defects be
lowered his price, it would be exceedingly virtuous on his
made known to him. The case would be different if the
part: although he does not seem to be bound to do this as
defects were manifest.
a debt of justice.
Whether, in trading, it is lawful to sell a thing at a higher price than what was paid IIa IIae q. 77 a. 4
for it?
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful, in
poor has become wealthy, or who, from being a nobody
trading, to sell a thing for a higher price than we paid for
has become a celebrity.” Now trading would net seem to
it. For Chrysostom∗ says on Mat. 21:12: “He that buys
be forbidden to clerics except on account of its sinfulness.
a thing in order that he may sell it, entire and unchanged,
Therefore it is a sin in trading, to buy at a low price and to
at a profit, is the trader who is cast out of God’s temple.”
sell at a higher price.
Cassiodorus speaks in the same sense in his commentary
On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps.
on Ps. 70:15, “Because I have not known learning, or
70:15, “Because I have not known learning,”‡ says: “The
trading” according to another version†: “What is trade,”
greedy tradesman blasphemes over his losses; he lies and
says he, “but buying at a cheap price with the purpose of
perjures himself over the price of his wares. But these are
retailing at a higher price?” and he adds: “Such were the
vices of the man, not of the craft, which can be exercised
tradesmen whom Our Lord cast out of the temple.” Now
without these vices.” Therefore trading is not in itself un-
no man is cast out of the temple except for a sin. There-
lawful.
fore such like trading is sinful.
I answer that, A tradesman is one whose business
Objection 2. Further, it is contrary to justice to sell
consists in the exchange of things.
According to the
goods at a higher price than their worth, or to buy them
Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), exchange of things is twofold;
for less than their value, as shown above (a. 1). Now if
one, natural as it were, and necessary, whereby one com-
you sell a thing for a higher price than you paid for it, you
modity is exchanged for another, or money taken in ex-
must either have bought it for less than its value, or sell
change for a commodity, in order to satisfy the needs of
it for more than its value. Therefore this cannot be done
life. Such like trading, properly speaking, does not belong
without sin.
to tradesmen, but rather to housekeepers or civil servants
Objection 3. Further, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii):
who have to provide the household or the state with the
“Shun, as you would the plague, a cleric who from being
necessaries of life. The other kind of exchange is either
∗ Hom. xxxviii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom
† The Septuagint
‡ Cf. obj. 1
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that of money for money, or of any commodity for money, as a last end, but for the sake of some other end which is
not on account of the necessities of life, but for profit, and
necessary or virtuous, as stated above.
this kind of exchange, properly speaking, regards trades-
Reply to Objection 2. Not everyone that sells at a
men, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3). The for-
higher price than he bought is a tradesman, but only he
mer kind of exchange is commendable because it supplies
who buys that he may sell at a profit. If, on the contrary,
a natural need: but the latter is justly deserving of blame,
he buys not for sale but for possession, and afterwards,
because, considered in itself, it satisfies the greed for gain, for some reason wishes to sell, it is not a trade transaction
which knows no limit and tends to infinity. Hence trading,
even if he sell at a profit. For he may lawfully do this,
considered in itself, has a certain debasement attaching
either because he has bettered the thing, or because the
thereto, in so far as, by its very nature, it does not imply a
value of the thing has changed with the change of place or
virtuous or necessary end. Nevertheless gain which is the
time, or on account of the danger he incurs in transferring
end of trading, though not implying, by its nature, any-
the thing from one place to another, or again in having it
thing virtuous or necessary, does not, in itself, connote
carried by another. In this sense neither buying nor selling
anything sinful or contrary to virtue: wherefore nothing
is unjust.
prevents gain from being directed to some necessary or
Reply to Objection 3. Clerics should abstain not only
even virtuous end, and thus trading becomes lawful. Thus,
from things that are evil in themselves, but even from
for instance, a man may intend the moderate gain which
those that have an appearance of evil. This happens in
he seeks to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his house-
trading, both because it is directed to worldly gain, which
hold, or for the assistance of the needy: or again, a man
clerics should despise, and because trading is open to so
may take to trade for some public advantage, for instance,
many vices, since “a merchant is hardly free from sins of
lest his country lack the necessaries of life, and seek gain,
the lips”∗ (Ecclus. 26:28). There is also another reason,
not as an end, but as payment for his labor.
because trading engages the mind too much with worldly
Reply to Objection 1. The saying of Chrysostom
cares, and consequently withdraws it from spiritual cares;
refers to the trading which seeks gain as a last end. This
wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:4): “No man be-
is especially the case where a man sells something at a
ing a soldier to God entangleth himself with secular busi-
higher price without its undergoing any change. For if he
nesses.” Nevertheless it is lawful for clerics to engage in
sells at a higher price something that has changed for the
the first mentioned kind of exchange, which is directed
better, he would seem to receive the reward of his labor.
to supply the necessaries of life, either by buying or by
Nevertheless the gain itself may be lawfully intended, not
selling.
∗ ‘A merchant is hardly free from negligence, and a huckster shall not be justified from the sins of the lips’
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SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 78
Of the Sin of Usury
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the sin of usury, which is committed in loans: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin to take money as a price for money lent, which is to receive usury?
(2) Whether it is lawful to lend money for any other kind of consideration, by way of payment for the loan?
(3) Whether a man is bound to restore just gains derived from money taken in usury?
(4) Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?
Whether it is a sin to take usury for money lent?
IIa IIae q. 78 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not a sin to take
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:25): “If thou
usury for money lent. For no man sins through following
lend money to any of thy people that is poor, that dwelleth
the example of Christ. But Our Lord said of Himself (Lk.
with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon them as an extor-
19:23): “At My coming I might have exacted it,” i.e. the
tioner, nor oppress them with usuries.”
money lent, “with usury.” Therefore it is not a sin to take
I answer that, To take usury for money lent is unjust
usury for lending money.
in itself, because this is to sell what does not exist, and
Objection 2. Further, according to Ps. 18:8, “The
this evidently leads to inequality which is contrary to jus-
law of the Lord is unspotted,” because, to wit, it forbids
tice. In order to make this evident, we must observe that
sin. Now usury of a kind is allowed in the Divine law,
there are certain things the use of which consists in their
according to Dt. 23:19,20: “Thou shalt not fenerate to thy
consumption: thus we consume wine when we use it for
brother money, nor corn, nor any other thing, but to the
drink and we consume wheat when we use it for food.
stranger”: nay more, it is even promised as a reward for
Wherefore in such like things the use of the thing must
the observance of the Law, according to Dt. 28:12: “Thou
not be reckoned apart from the thing itself, and whoever
shalt fenerate∗ to many nations, and shalt not borrow of
is granted the use of the thing, is granted the thing itself
any one.” Therefore it is not a sin to take usury.
and for this reason, to lend things of this kin is to trans-
Objection 3. Further, in human affairs justice is de-
fer the ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted to sell
termined by civil laws. Now civil law allows usury to be
wine separately from the use of the wine, he would be
taken. Therefore it seems to be lawful.
selling the same thing twice, or he would be selling what
Objection 4. Further, the counsels are not binding un-
does not exist, wherefore he would evidently commit a sin
der sin. But, among other counsels we find (Lk. 6:35):
of injustice. In like manner he commits an injustice who
“Lend, hoping for nothing thereby.” Therefore it is not a
lends wine or wheat, and asks for double payment, viz.
sin to take usury.
one, the return of the thing in equal measure, the other,
Objection 5. Further, it does not seem to be in itself
the price of the use, which is called usury.
sinful to accept a price for doing what one is not bound
On the other hand, there are things the use of which
to do. But one who has money is not bound in every case
does not consist in their consumption: thus to use a house
to lend it to his neighbor. Therefore it is lawful for him
is to dwell in it, not to destroy it. Wherefore in such things
sometimes to accept a price for lending it.
both may be granted: for instance, one man may hand
Objection 6. Further, silver made into coins does not
over to another the ownership of his house while reserv-
differ specifically from silver made into a vessel. But it
ing to himself the use of it for a time, or vice versa, he
is lawful to accept a price for the loan of a silver vessel.
may grant the use of the house, while retaining the own-
Therefore it is also lawful to accept a price for the loan of
ership. For this reason a man may lawfully make a charge
a silver coin. Therefore usury is not in itself a sin.
for the use of his house, and, besides this, revendicate the
Objection 7. Further, anyone may lawfully accept a
house from the person to whom he has granted its use, as
thing which its owner freely gives him. Now he who ac-
happens in renting and letting a house.
cepts the loan, freely gives the usury. Therefore he who
Now money, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v,
lends may lawfully take the usury.
5; Polit. i, 3) was invented chiefly for the purpose of ex-
∗ ‘Faeneraberis’—‘Thou shalt lend upon usury.’ The Douay version has simply ‘lend.’ The objection lays stress on the word ‘faeneraberis’: hence the necessity of rendering it by ‘fenerate.’
1556
change: and consequently the proper and principal use of things according to natural reason and civil law which are
money is its consumption or alienation whereby it is sunk
consumed by being used, do not admit of usufruct,” and
in exchange. Hence it is by its very nature unlawful to
that “the senate did not (nor could it) appoint a usufruct to
take payment for the use of money lent, which payment
such things, but established a quasi-usufruct,” namely by
is known as usury: and just as a man is bound to restore
permitting usury. Moreover the Philosopher, led by natu-
other ill-gotten goods, so is he bound to restore the money
ral reason, says (Polit. i, 3) that “to make money by usury
which he has taken in usury.
is exceedingly unnatural.”
Reply to Objection 1. In this passage usury must be
Reply to Objection 4. A man is not always bound to
taken figuratively for the increase of spiritual goods which
lend, and for this reason it is placed among the counsels.
God exacts from us, for He wishes us ever to advance in
Yet it is a matter of precept not to seek profit by lending:
the goods which we receive from Him: and this is for our
although it may be called a matter of counsel in compari-
own profit not for His.
son with the maxims of the Pharisees, who deemed some
Reply to Objection 2. The Jews were forbidden to
kinds of usury to be lawful, just as love of one’s enemies
take usury from their brethren, i.e. from other Jews. By
is a matter of counsel. Or again, He speaks here not of
this we are given to understand that to take usury from
the hope of usurious gain, but of the hope which is put
any man is evil simply, because we ought to treat every
in man. For we ought not to lend or do any good deed
man as our neighbor and brother, especially in the state
through hope in man, but only through hope in God.
of the Gospel, whereto all are called. Hence it is said
Reply to Objection 5. He that is not bound to lend,
without any distinction in Ps. 14:5: “He that hath not put
may accept repayment for what he has done, but he must
out his money to usury,” and (Ezech. 18:8): “Who hath
not exact more. Now he is repaid according to equality of
not taken usury∗.” They were permitted, however, to take
justice if he is repaid as much as he lent. Wherefore if he
usury from foreigners, not as though it were lawful, but in
exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has no other
order to avoid a greater evil, lest, to wit, through avarice to use but the consumption of its substance, he exacts a price
which they were prone according to Is. 56:11, they should
of something non-existent: and so his exaction is unjust.
take usury from the Jews who were worshippers of God.
Reply to Objection 6. The principal use of a silver
Where we find it promised to them as a reward, “Thou
vessel is not its consumption, and so one may lawfully
shalt fenerate to many nations,” etc., fenerating is to be
sell its use while retaining one’s ownership of it. On the
taken in a broad sense for lending, as in Ecclus. 29:10,
other hand the principal use of silver money is sinking it
where we read: “Many have refused to fenerate, not out
in exchange, so that it is not lawful to sell its use and at
of wickedness,” i.e. they would not lend. Accordingly the
the same time expect the restitution of the amount lent.
Jews are promised in reward an abundance of wealth, so
It must be observed, however, that the secondary use of
that they would be able to lend to others.
silver vessels may be an exchange, and such use may not
Reply to Objection 3.
Human laws leave certain
be lawfully sold. In like manner there may be some sec-
things unpunished, on account of the condition of those
ondary use of silver money; for instance, a man might
who are imperfect, and who would be deprived of many
lend coins for show, or to be used as security.
advantages, if all sins were strictly forbidden and punish-
Reply to Objection 7. He who gives usury does not
ments appointed for them. Wherefore human law has per-
give it voluntarily simply, but under a certain necessity, in
mitted usury, not that it looks upon usury as harmonizing
so far as he needs to borrow money which the owner is
with justice, but lest the advantage of many should be hin-
unwilling to lend without usury.
dered. Hence it is that in civil law† it is stated that “those
Whether it is lawful to ask for any other kind of consideration for money lent?
IIa IIae q. 78 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that one may ask for some
straits is to do him a favor for which he should be grate-
other kind of consideration for money lent. For everyone
ful. Therefore the recipient of a loan, is bound by a natural
may lawfully seek to indemnify himself. Now sometimes
debt to repay something. Now it does not seem unlawful
a man suffers loss through lending money. Therefore he
to bind oneself to an obligation of the natural law. There-
may lawfully ask for or even exact something else besides
fore it is not unlawful, in lending money to anyone, to
the money lent.
demand some sort of compensation as condition of the
Objection 2. Further, as stated in Ethic. v, 5, one is
loan.
in duty bound by a point of honor, to repay anyone who
Objection 3. Further, just as there is real remunera-
has done us a favor. Now to lend money to one who is in
tion, so is there verbal remuneration, and remuneration by
∗ Vulg.: ‘If a man. . . hath not lent upon money, nor taken any increase. . . he is just.’
† Inst. II, iv, de Usufructu
1557
service, as a gloss says on Is. 33:15, “Blessed is he that also happen that the borrower avoids a greater loss than
shaketh his hands from all bribes‡.” Now it is lawful to
the lender incurs, wherefore the borrower may repay the
accept service or praise from one to whom one has lent
lender with what he has gained. But the lender cannot en-
money. Therefore in like manner it is lawful to accept any
ter an agreement for compensation, through the fact that
other kind of remuneration.
he makes no profit out of his money: because he must not
Objection 4. Further, seemingly the relation of gift to
sell that which he has not yet and may be prevented in
gift is the same as of loan to loan. But it is lawful to accept many ways from having.
money for money given. Therefore it is lawful to accept
Reply to Objection 2. Repayment for a favor may
repayment by loan in return for a loan granted.
be made in two ways. In one way, as a debt of justice;
Objection 5. Further, the lender, by transferring his
and to such a debt a man may be bound by a fixed con-
ownership of a sum of money removes the money fur-
tract; and its amount is measured according to the favor
ther from himself than he who entrusts it to a merchant or
received. Wherefore the borrower of money or any such
craftsman. Now it is lawful to receive interest for money
thing the use of which is its consumption is not bound to
entrusted to a merchant or craftsman. Therefore it is also
repay more than he received in loan: and consequently it
lawful to receive interest for money lent.
is against justice if he be obliged to pay back more. In
Objection 6. Further, a man may accept a pledge for
another way a man’s obligation to repayment for favor re-
money lent, the use of which pledge he might sell for a
ceived is based on a debt of friendship, and the nature of
price: as when a man mortgages his land or the house
this debt depends more on the feeling with which the fa-
wherein he dwells. Therefore it is lawful to receive inter-
vor was conferred than on the greatness of the favor itself.
est for money lent.
This debt does not carry with it a civil obligation, involv-
Objection 7. Further, it sometimes happens that a man
ing a kind of necessity that would exclude the spontaneous
raises the price of his goods under guise of loan, or buys
nature of such a repayment.
another’s goods at a low figure; or raises his price through
Reply to Objection 3. If a man were, in return for
delay in being paid, and lowers his price that he may be
money lent, as though there had been an agreement tacit
paid the sooner. Now in all these cases there seems to
or expressed, to expect or exact repayment in the shape
be payment for a loan of money: nor does it appear to
of some remuneration of service or words, it would be the
be manifestly illicit. Therefore it seems to be lawful to
same as if he expected or exacted some real remuneration,
expect or exact some consideration for money lent.
because both can be priced at a money value, as may be
On the contrary, Among other conditions requisite
seen in the case of those who offer for hire the labor which
in a just man it is stated (Ezech. 18:17) that he “hath not
they exercise by work or by tongue. If on the other hand
taken usury and increase.”
the remuneration by service or words be given not as an
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic.
obligation, but as a favor, which is not to be appreciated
iv, 1), a thing is reckoned as money “if its value can be
at a money value, it is lawful to take, exact, and expect it.
measured by money.” Consequently, just as it is a sin
Reply to Objection 4. Money cannot be sold for a
against justice, to take money, by tacit or express agree-
greater sum than the amount lent, which has to be paid
ment, in return for lending money or anything else that is
back: nor should the loan be made with a demand or ex-
consumed by being used, so also is it a like sin, by tacit or
pectation of aught else but of a feeling of benevolence
express agreement to receive anything whose price can be
which cannot be priced at a pecuniary value, and which
measured by money. Yet there would be no sin in receiv-
can be the basis of a spontaneous loan. Now the obliga-
ing something of the kind, not as exacting it, nor yet as
tion to lend in return at some future time is repugnant to
though it were due on account of some agreement tacit or
such a feeling, because again an obligation of this kind
expressed, but as a gratuity: since, even before lending the
has its pecuniary value. Consequently it is lawful for the
money, one could accept a gratuity, nor is one in a worse
lender to borrow something else at the same time, but it is
condition through lending.
unlawful for him to bind the borrower to grant him a loan
On the other hand it is lawful to exact compensation
at some future time.
for a loan, in respect of such things as are not appreciated
Reply to Objection 5. He who lends money transfers
by a measure of money, for instance, benevolence, and
the ownership of the money to the borrower. Hence the
love for the lender, and so forth.
borrower holds the money at his own risk and is bound to
Reply to Objection 1. A lender may without sin enter
pay it all back: wherefore the lender must not exact more.
an agreement with the borrower for compensation for the
On the other hand he that entrusts his money to a mer-
loss he incurs of something he ought to have, for this is
chant or craftsman so as to form a kind of society, does
not to sell the use of money but to avoid a loss. It may
not transfer the ownership of his money to them, for it re-
‡ Vulg.: ‘Which of you shall dwell with everlasting burnings?. . . He that shaketh his hands from all bribes.’
1558
mains his, so that at his risk the merchant speculates with at a higher price than that which is just, so that he may
it, or the craftsman uses it for his craft, and consequently
wait for the buyer to pay, it is manifestly a case of usury:
he may lawfully demand as something belonging to him,
because this waiting for the payment of the price has the
part of the profits derived from his money.
character of a loan, so that whatever he demands beyond
Reply to Objection 6. If a man in return for money
the just price in consideration of this delay, is like a price
lent to him pledges something that can be valued at a
for a loan, which pertains to usury. In like manner if a
price, the lender must allow for the use of that thing to-
buyer wishes to buy goods at a lower price than what is
wards the repayment of the loan. Else if he wishes the
just, for the reason that he pays for the goods before they
gratuitous use of that thing in addition to repayment, it is
can be delivered, it is a sin of usury; because again this
the same as if he took money for lending, and that is usury,
anticipated payment of money has the character of a loan,
unless perhaps it were such a thing as friends are wont to
the price of which is the rebate on the just price of the
lend to one another gratis, as in the case of the loan of a
goods sold. On the other hand if a man wishes to allow
book.
a rebate on the just price in order that he may have his
Reply to Objection 7. If a man wish to sell his goods
money sooner, he is not guilty of the sin of usury.
Whether a man is bound to restore whatever profits he has made out of money gotten IIa IIae q. 78 a. 3
by usury?
Objection 1. It would seem that a man is bound to re-
some of his own goods be injured through the lender re-
store whatever profits he has made out of money gotten by
taining them: for then he is bound to make good the loss.
usury. For the Apostle says (Rom. 11:16): “If the root be
On the other hand, there are certain things whose use
holy, so are the branches.” Therefore likewise if the root
is not their consumption: such things admit of usufruct,
be rotten so are the branches. But the root was infected
for instance house or land property and so forth. Where-
with usury. Therefore whatever profit is made therefrom
fore if a man has by usury extorted from another his house
is infected with usury. Therefore he is bound to restore it.
or land, he is bound to restore not only the house or land
Objection 2.
Further, it is laid down (Extra, De
but also the fruits accruing to him therefrom, since they
Usuris, in the Decretal: ‘Cum tu sicut asseris’): “Prop-
are the fruits of things owned by another man and conse-
erty accruing from usury must be sold, and the price re-
quently are due to him.
paid to the persons from whom the usury was extorted.”
Reply to Objection 1. The root has not only the char-
Therefore, likewise, whatever else is acquired from usuri-
acter of matter, as money made by usury has; but has also
ous money must be restored.
somewhat the character of an active cause, in so far as it
Objection 3. Further, that which a man buys with the
administers nourishment. Hence the comparison fails.
proceeds of usury is due to him by reason of the money
Reply to Objection 2.
Further, Property acquired
he paid for it. Therefore he has no more right to the thing
from usury does not belong to the person who paid usury,
purchased than to the money he paid. But he was bound
but to the person who bought it. Yet he that paid usury
to restore the money gained through usury. Therefore he
has a certain claim on that property just as he has on the
is also bound to restore what he acquired with it.
other goods of the usurer. Hence it is not prescribed that
On the contrary, A man may lawfully hold what he
such property should be assigned to the persons who paid
has lawfully acquired. Now that which is acquired by the
usury, since the property is perhaps worth more than what
proceeds of usury is sometimes lawfully acquired. There-
they paid in usury, but it is commanded that the property
fore it may be lawfully retained.
be sold, and the price be restored, of course according to
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), there are certain the amount taken in usury.
things whose use is their consumption, and which do not
Reply to Objection 3. The proceeds of money taken
admit of usufruct, according to law (ibid., ad 3). Where-
in usury are due to the person who acquired them not by
fore if such like things be extorted by means of usury, for
reason of the usurious money as instrumental cause, but
instance money, wheat, wine and so forth, the lender is
on account of his own industry as principal cause. Where-
not bound to restore more than he received (since what is
fore he has more right to the goods acquired with usurious
acquired by such things is the fruit not of the thing but of
money than to the usurious money itself.
human industry), unless indeed the other party by losing
1559
Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?
IIa IIae q. 78 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful to
his sin of swearing by demons, but to his good compact
borrow money under a condition of usury. For the Apos-
whereby he kept his word. If however he were to induce
tle says (Rom. 1:32) that they “are worthy of death. . . not
him to swear by false gods, he would sin.
only they that do” these sins, “but they also that consent
Accordingly we must also answer to the question in
to them that do them.” Now he that borrows money under
point that it is by no means lawful to induce a man to lend
a condition of usury consents in the sin of the usurer, and
under a condition of usury: yet it is lawful to borrow for
gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he sins also.
usury from a man who is ready to do so and is a usurer
Objection 2.
Further, for no temporal advantage
by profession; provided the borrower have a good end in
ought one to give another an occasion of committing a sin:
view, such as the relief of his own or another’s need. Thus
for this pertains to active scandal, which is always sinful,
too it is lawful for a man who has fallen among thieves to
as stated above (q. 43, a. 2). Now he that seeks to borrow
point out his property to them (which they sin in taking)
from a usurer gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he is
in order to save his life, after the example of the ten men
not to be excused on account of any temporal advantage.
who said to Ismahel (Jer. 41:8): “Kill us not: for we have
Objection 3.
Further, it seems no less necessary
stores in the field.”
sometimes to deposit one’s money with a usurer than to
Reply to Objection 1. He who borrows for usury does
borrow from him. Now it seems altogether unlawful to
not consent to the usurer’s sin but makes use of it. Nor is
deposit one’s money with a usurer, even as it would be
it the usurer’s acceptance of usury that pleases him, but
unlawful to deposit one’s sword with a madman, a maiden
his lending, which is good.
with a libertine, or food with a glutton. Neither therefore
Reply to Objection 2. He who borrows for usury
is it lawful to borrow from a usurer.
gives the usurer an occasion, not for taking usury, but for
On the contrary, He that suffers injury does not sin,
lending; it is the usurer who finds an occasion of sin in
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11), wherefore jus-
the malice of his heart. Hence there is passive scandal on
tice is not a mean between two vices, as stated in the same
his part, while there is no active scandal on the part of the
book (ch. 5). Now a usurer sins by doing an injury to the
person who seeks to borrow. Nor is this passive scandal a
person who borrows from him under a condition of usury.
reason why the other person should desist from borrowing
Therefore he that accepts a loan under a condition of usury
if he is in need, since this passive scandal arises not from
does not sin.
weakness or ignorance but from malice.
I answer that, It is by no means lawful to induce a
Reply to Objection 3. If one were to entrust one’s
man to sin, yet it is lawful to make use of another’s sin for
money to a usurer lacking other means of practising usury;
a good end, since even God uses all sin for some good,
or with the intention of making a greater profit from his
since He draws some good from every evil as stated in the
money by reason of the usury, one would be giving a sin-
Enchiridion (xi). Hence when Publicola asked whether it
ner matter for sin, so that one would be a participator in
were lawful to make use of an oath taken by a man swear-
his guilt. If, on the other hand, the usurer to whom one
ing by false gods (which is a manifest sin, for he gives
entrusts one’s money has other means of practising usury,
Divine honor to them) Augustine (Ep. xlvii) answered
there is no sin in entrusting it to him that it may be in safer that he who uses, not for a bad but for a good purpose, the
keeping, since this is to use a sinner for a good purpose.
oath of a man that swears by false gods, is a party, not to
1560
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 79
Of the Quasi-Integral Parts of Justice
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the quasi-integral parts of justice, which are “to do good,” and “to decline from evil,” and the opposite vices. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether these two are parts of justice?
(2) Whether transgression is a special sin?
(3) Whether omission is a special sin?
(4) Of the comparison between omission and transgression.
Whether to decline from evil and to do good are parts of justice?
IIa IIae q. 79 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that to decline from evil
Now these two are said to be quasi-integral parts of
and to do good are not parts of justice. For it belongs to
general or of special justice, because each is required for
every virtue to perform a good deed and to avoid an evil
the perfect act of justice. For it belongs to justice to estab-
one. But parts do not exceed the whole. Therefore to
lish equality in our relations with others, as shown above
decline from evil and to do good should not be reckoned
(q. 58, a. 2): and it pertains to the same cause to estab-
parts of justice, which is a special kind of virtue.
lish and to preserve that which it has established. Now a
Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Ps. 33:15, “Turn
person establishes the equality of justice by doing good,
away from evil and do good,” says: “The former,” i.e. to
i.e. by rendering to another his due: and he preserves the
turn away from evil, “avoids sin, the latter,” i.e. to do
already established equality of justice by declining from
good, “deserves the life and the palm.” But any part of a
evil, that is by inflicting no injury on his neighbor.
virtue deserves the life and the palm. Therefore to decline
Reply to Objection 1. Good and evil are here con-
from evil is not a part of justice.
sidered under a special aspect, by which they are appro-
Objection 3. Further, things that are so related that
priated to justice. The reason why these two are reck-
one implies the other, are not mutually distinct as parts
oned parts of justice under a special aspect of good and
of a whole. Now declining from evil is implied in doing
evil, while they are not reckoned parts of any other moral
good: since no one does evil and good at the same time.
virtue, is that the other moral virtues are concerned with
Therefore declining from evil and doing good are not parts
the passions wherein to do good is to observe the mean,
of justice.
which is the same as to avoid the extremes as evils: so
On the contrary, Augustine (De Correp. et Grat. i)
that doing good and avoiding evil come to the same, with
declares that “declining from evil and doing good” belong
regard to the other virtues. On the other hand justice is
to the justice of the law.
concerned with operations and external things, wherein
I answer that, If we speak of good and evil in general,
to establish equality is one thing, and not to disturb the
it belongs to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and
equality established is another.
in this sense they cannot be reckoned parts of justice, ex-
Reply to Objection 2. To decline from evil, consid-
cept justice be taken in the sense of “all virtue”∗. And yet
ered as a part of justice, does not denote a pure negation,
even if justice be taken in this sense it regards a certain
viz.“not to do evil”; for this does not deserve the palm, but
special aspect of good; namely, the good as due in respect
only avoids the punishment. But it implies a movement
of Divine or human law.
of the will in repudiating evil, as the very term “decline”
On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue
shows. This is meritorious; especially when a person re-
regards good as due to one’s neighbor. And in this sense
sists against an instigation to do evil.
it belongs to special justice to do good considered as due
Reply to Objection 3. Doing good is the completive
to one’s neighbor, and to avoid the opposite evil, that,
act of justice, and the principal part, so to speak, thereof.
namely, which is hurtful to one’s neighbor; while it be-
Declining from evil is a more imperfect act, and a sec-
longs to general justice to do good in relation to the com-
ondary part of that virtue. Hence it is a. material part, so
munity or in relation to God, and to avoid the opposite
to speak, thereof, and a necessary condition of the formal
evil.
and completive part.
∗ Cf. q. 58, a. 5
1561
Whether transgression is a special sin?
IIa IIae q. 79 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that transgression is not a
the species of sin, because man transgresses a Divine pre-
special sin. For no species is included in the definition of
cept by any species of mortal sin. But if we consider it
its genus. Now transgression is included in the definition
formally, namely under its special aspect of an act against
of sin; because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that sin is
a negative precept, it is a special sin in two ways. First,
“a transgression of the Divine law.” Therefore transgres-
in so far as it is opposed to those kinds of sin that are op-
sion is not a species of sin.
posed to the other virtues: for just as it belongs properly
Objection 2. Further, no species is more comprehen-
to legal justice to consider a precept as binding, so it be-
sive than its genus. But transgression is more compre-
longs properly to a transgression to consider a precept as
hensive than sin, because sin is a “word, deed or desire
an object of contempt. Secondly, in so far as it is distinct
against the law of God,” according to Augustine (Contra
from omission which is opposed to an affirmative precept.
Faust. xxii, 27), while transgression is also against nature,
Reply to Objection 1. Even as legal justice is “all
or custom. Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.
virtue” (q. 58, a. 5) as regards its subject and matter, so
Objection 3. Further, no species contains all the parts
legal injustice is materially “all sin.” It is in this way that into which its genus is divided. Now the sin of transgres-Ambrose defined sin, considering it from the point of view
sion extends to all the capital vices, as well as to sins of
of legal injustice.
thought, word and deed. Therefore transgression is not a
Reply to Objection 2. The natural inclination con-
special sin.
cerns the precepts of the natural law. Again, a laudable
On the contrary, It is opposed to a special virtue,
custom has the force of a precept; since as Augustine says
namely justice.
in an epistle On the Fast of the Sabbath (Ep. xxxvi), “a
I answer that, The term transgression is derived from
custom of God’s people should be looked upon as law.”
bodily movement and applied to moral actions. Now a
Hence both sin and transgression may be against a laud-
person is said to transgress in bodily movement, when he
able custom and against a natural inclination.
steps [graditur] beyond [trans] a fixed boundary—and it is
Reply to Objection 3. All these species of sin may
a negative precept that fixes the boundary that man must
include transgression, if we consider them not under their
not exceed in his moral actions. Wherefore to transgress,
proper aspects, but under a special aspect, as stated above.
properly speaking, is to act against a negative precept.
The sin of omission, however, is altogether distinct from
Now materially considered this may be common to all
the sin of transgression.
Whether omission is a special sin?
IIa IIae q. 79 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that omission is not a
a special virtue. But it is not possible to assign any spe-
special sin. For every sin is either original or actual. Now
cial virtue to which omission is opposed, both because
omission is not original sin, for it is not contracted through
the good of any virtue can be omitted, and because jus-
origin nor is it actual sin, for it may be altogether without
tice to which it would seem more particularly opposed, al-
act, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 5) when we were
ways requires an act, even in declining from evil, as stated
treating of sins in general. Therefore omission is not a
above (a. 1, ad 2), while omission may be altogether with-
special sin.
out act. Therefore omission is not a special sin.
Objection 2. Further, every sin is voluntary. Now
On the contrary, It is written (James 4:17): “To
omission sometimes is not voluntary but necessary, as
him. . . who knoweth to do good and doth it not, to him
when a woman is violated after taking a vow of virginity,
it is sin.”
or when one lose that which one is under an obligation to
I answer that, omission signifies the non-fulfilment
restore, or when a priest is bound to say Mass, and is pre-
of a good, not indeed of any good, but of a good that is
vented from doing so. Therefore omission is not always a
due. Now good under the aspect of due belongs prop-
sin.
erly to justice; to legal justice, if the thing due depends
Objection 3. Further, it is possible to fix the time
on Divine or human law; to special justice, if the due is
when any special sin begins. But this is not possible in
something in relation to one’s neighbor. Wherefore, in
the case of omission, since one is not altered by not doing
the same way as justice is a special virtue, as stated above
a thing, no matter when the omission occurs, and yet the
(q. 58, Aa. 6,7), omission is a special sin distinct from the
omission is not always sinful. Therefore omission is not a
sins which are opposed to the other virtues; and just as
special sin.
doing good, which is the opposite of omitting it, is a spe-
Objection 4. Further, every special sin is opposed to
cial part of justice, distinct from avoiding evil, to which
1562
transgression is opposed, so too is omission distinct from and at that time the sin of omission begins. But it may
transgression.
happen that then one is unable to do what one ought, and
Reply to Objection 2. Omission is not original but
if this inability is without any fault on his part, he does not actual sin, not as though it had some act essential to it,
omit his duty, as stated above (ad 2; Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 5).
but for as much as the negation of an act is reduced to
On the other hand if this inability is due to some previous
the genus of act, and in this sense non-action is a kind of
fault of his (for instance, if a man gets drunk at night, and
action, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 6, ad 1).
cannot get up for matins, as he ought to), some say that
Reply to Objection 2. Omission, as stated above, is
the sin of omission begins when he engages in an action
only of such good as is due and to which one is bound.
that is illicit and incompatible with the act to which he
Now no man is bound to the impossible: wherefore no
is bound. But this does not seem to be true, for suppos-
man sins by omission, if he does not do what he cannot.
ing one were to rouse him by violence and that he went
Accordingly she who is violated after vowing virginity, is
to matins, he would not omit to go, so that, evidently, the
guilty of an omission, not through not having virginity,
previous drunkenness was not an omission, but the cause
but through not repenting of her past sin, or through not
of an omission. Consequently, we must say that the omis-
doing what she can to fulfil her vow by observing conti-
sion begins to be imputed to him as a sin, when the time
nence. Again a priest is not bound to say Mass, except he
comes for the action; and yet this is on account of a pre-
have a suitable opportunity, and if this be lacking, there
ceding cause by reason of which the subsequent omission
is no omission. And in like manner, a person is bound
becomes voluntary.
to restitution, supposing he has the wherewithal; if he has
Reply to Objection 4. Omission is directly opposed
not and cannot have it, he is not guilty of an omission,
to justice, as stated above; because it is a non-fulfilment of
provided he does what he can. The same applies to other
a good of virtue, but only under the aspect of due, which
similar cases.
pertains to justice. Now more is required for an act to be
Reply to Objection 3. Just as the sin of transgression
virtuous and meritorious than for it to be sinful and de-
is opposed to negative precepts which regard the avoid-
meritorious, because “good results from an entire cause,
ance of evil, so the sin of omission is opposed to affirma-
whereas evil arises from each single defect”∗. Wherefore
tive precepts, which regard the doing of good. Now affir-
the merit of justice requires an act, whereas an omission
mative precepts bind not for always, but for a fixed time,
does not.
Whether a sin of omission is more grievous than a sin of transgression?
IIa IIae q. 79 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that a sin of omission
of sense, which is inflicted for the sin of transgression,
is more grievous than a sin of transgression. For “delic-
as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiii super Matth.). Now
tum” would seem to signify the same as “derelictum”†,
punishment is proportionate to fault. Therefore the sin of
and therefore is seemingly the same as an omission. But
omission is graver than the sin of transgression.
“delictum” denotes a more grievous offence than trans-
On the contrary, It is easier to refrain from evil deeds gression, because it deserves more expiation as appears
than to accomplish good deeds. Therefore it is a graver
from Lev.
5.
Therefore the sin of omission is more
sin not to refrain from an evil deed, i.e. “to transgress,”
grievous than the sin of transgression.
than not to accomplish a good deed, which is “to omit.”
Objection 2. Further, the greater evil is opposed to the I answer that, The gravity of a sin depends on its re-greater good, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 10).
moteness from virtue. Now contrariety is the greatest re-
Now to do good is a more excellent part of justice, than
moteness, according to Metaph. x‡. Wherefore a thing
to decline from evil, to which transgression is opposed, as
is further removed from its contrary than from its simple
stated above (a. 1, ad 3). Therefore omission is a graver
negation; thus black is further removed from white than
sin than transgression.
not-white is, since every black is not-white, but not con-
Objection 3. Further, sins of transgression may be ei-
versely. Now it is evident that transgression is contrary
ther venial or mortal. But sins of omission seem to be
to an act of virtue, while omission denotes the negation
always mortal, since they are opposed to an affirmative
thereof: for instance it is a sin of omission, if one fail to
precept. Therefore omission would seem to be a graver
give one’s parents due reverence, while it is a sin of trans-
sin than transgression.
gression to revile them or injure them in any way. Hence it
Objection 4. Further, the pain of loss which consists
is evident that, simply and absolutely speaking, transgres-
in being deprived of seeing God and is inflicted for the
sion is a graver sin than omission, although a particular
sin of omission, is a greater punishment than the pain
omission may be graver than a particular transgression.
∗ Dionysius, De Div. Nom. iv
† Augustine, QQ. in Levit., qu. xx
‡ Didot. ed. ix, 4
1563
Reply to Objection 1. “Delictum” in its widest sense character of mortal sin. Transgression and omission, how-denotes any kind of omission; but sometimes it is taken
ever, may be taken broadly for any infringement of an af-
strictly for the omission of something concerning God, or
firmative or negative precept, disposing to the opposite of
for a man’s intentional and as it were contemptuous dere-
such precept: and so taking both in a broad sense they
liction of duty: and then it has a certain gravity, for which
may be venial sins.
reason it demands a greater expiation.
Reply to Objection 4. To the sin of transgression
Reply to Objection 2. The opposite of “doing good”
there correspond both the pain of loss on account of the
is both “not doing good,” which is an omission, and “do-
aversion from God, and the pain of sense, on account of
ing evil,” which is a transgression: but the first is opposed
the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. In like man-
by contradiction, the second by contrariety, which implies
ner omission deserves not only the pain of loss, but also
greater remoteness: wherefore transgression is the more
the pain of sense, according to Mat. 7:19, “Every tree
grievous sin.
that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down, and
Reply to Objection 3. Just as omission is opposed to
shall be cast into the fire”; and this on account of the root
affirmative precepts, so is transgression opposed to nega-
from which it grows, although it does not necessarily im-
tive precepts: wherefore both, strictly speaking, have the
ply conversion to any mutable good.
1564
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 80
Of the Potential Parts of Justice
(In One Article)
We must now consider the potential parts of justice, namely the virtues annexed thereto; under which head there are two points of consideration:
(1) What virtues are annexed to justice?
(2) The individual virtues annexed to justice.
Whether the virtues annexed to justice are suitably enumerated?
IIa IIae q. 80 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the virtues annexed to
dering to another his due according to equality, as stated
justice are unsuitably enumerated Tully∗ reckons six, viz.
above (q. 58, a. 11). Wherefore in two ways may a virtue
“religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance, truth.”
directed to another person fall short of the perfection of
Now revenge is seemingly a species of commutative jus-
justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of equality;
tice whereby revenge is taken for injuries inflicted, as
secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due. For cer-
stated above (q. 61, a. 4). Therefore it should not be reck-
tain virtues there are which render another his due, but are
oned among the virtues annexed to justice.
unable to render the equal due. In the first place, what-
Objection 2. Further, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip.
ever man renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal,
i, 8) reckons seven, viz. “innocence, friendship, concord,
as though man rendered to God as much as he owes Him,
piety, religion, affection, humanity,” several of which are
according to Ps. 115:12, “What shall I render to the Lord
omitted by Tully. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice
for all the things that He hath rendered to me?” In this
would seem to be insufficiently enumerated.
respect “religion” is annexed to justice since, according to
Objection 3. Further, others reckon five parts of jus-
Tully (De invent. ii, 53), it consists in offering service and
tice, viz. “obedience” in respect of one’s superiors, “disci-
ceremonial rites or worship to “some superior nature that
pline” with regard to inferiors, “equity” as regards equals,
men call divine.” Secondly, it is not possible to make to
“fidelity” and “truthfulness” towards all; and of these
one’s parents an equal return of what one owes to them, as
“truthfulness” alone is mentioned by Tully. Therefore he
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 14); and thus “piety”
would seem to have enumerated insufficiently the virtues
is annexed to justice, for thereby, as Tully says (De invent.
annexed to justice.
ii, 53), a man “renders service and constant deference to
Objection 4.
Further, the peripatetic Andronicus†
his kindred and the well-wishers of his country.” Thirdly,
reckons nine parts annexed to justice viz. “liberality, kind-
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man is unable
liness, revenge, commonsense,‡ piety, gratitude, holiness,
to offer an equal meed for virtue, and thus “observance” is
just exchange” and “just lawgiving”; and of all these it is
annexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (De in-
evident that Tully mentions none but “revenge.” There-
vent. ii, 53) in the “deference and honor rendered to those
fore he would appear to have made an incomplete enu-
who excel in worth.”
meration.
A falling short of the just due may be considered
Objection 5. Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) men-
in respect of a twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore
tions epieikeia as being annexed to justice: and yet seem-the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13) assigns a corresponding
ingly it is not included in any of the foregoing enumera-
twofold just. The legal due is that which one is bound
tions. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice are insuffi-
to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due
ciently enumerated.
is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal
I answer that, Two points must be observed about
virtue. On the other hand, the moral due is that to which
the virtues annexed to a principal virtue. The first is that
one is bound in respect of the rectitude of virtue: and since
these virtues have something in common with the princi-
a due implies necessity, this kind of due has two degrees.
pal virtue; and the second is that in some respect they fall
For one due is so necessary that without it moral rectitude
short of the perfection of that virtue. Accordingly since
cannot be ensured: and this has more of the character of
justice is of one man to another as stated above (q. 58,
due. Moreover this due may be considered from the point
a. 2), all the virtues that are directed to another person
of view of the debtor, and in this way it pertains to this
may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to jus-
kind of due that a man represent himself to others just
tice. Now the essential character of justice consists in ren-
as he is, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is
∗ De Invent. ii, 53
† De Affectibus
‡ eugnomosyne
1565
annexed “truth,” whereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, because, as stated above, they have little of the nature of a
53), present, past and future things are told without per-
due.
version. It may also be considered from the point of view
Reply to Objection 3. “Obedience” is included in
of the person to whom it is due, by comparing the reward
observance, which Tully mentions, because both rever-
he receives with what he has done—sometimes in good
ential honor and obedience are due to persons who ex-
things; and then annexed to justice we have “gratitude”
cel. “Faithfulness whereby a man’s acts agree with his
which “consists in recollecting the friendship and kindli-
words”∗, is contained in “truthfulness” as to the obser-
ness shown by others, and in desiring to pay them back,”
vance of one’s promises: yet “truthfulness” covers a wider
as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53)—and sometimes in evil
ground, as we shall state further on (q. 109, Aa. 1,3). “Dis-
things, and then to justice is annexed “revenge,” whereby,
cipline” is not due as a necessary duty, because one is un-
as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53), “we resist force, in-
der no obligation to an inferior as such, although a supe-
jury or anything obscure§ by taking vengeance or by self-
rior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferi-
defense.”
ors, according to Mat. 24:45, “A faithful and wise servant,
There is another due that is necessary in the sense that
whom his lord hath appointed over his family”: and for
it conduces to greater rectitude, although without it recti-
this reason it is omitted by Tully. It may, however, be in-
tude may be ensured. This due is the concern of “liberal-
cluded in humanity mentioned by Macrobius; and equity
ity,” “affability” or “friendship,” or the like, all of which
under epieikeia or under “friendship.”
Tully omits in the aforesaid enumeration because there is
Reply to Objection 4. This enumeration contains
little of the nature of anything due in them.
some belonging to true justice. To particular justice be-
Reply to Objection 1. The revenge taken by author-
longs “justice of exchange,” which he describes as “the
ity of a public power, in accordance with a judge’s sen-
habit of observing equality in commutations.” To legal
tence, belongs to commutative justice: whereas the re-
justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes
venge which a man takes on his own initiative, though
“legislative justice,” which he describes as “the science
not against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from
of political commutations relating to the community.” As
a judge, belongs to the virtue annexed to justice.
regards things which have to be done in particular cases
Reply to Objection 2. Macrobius appears to have
beside the general laws, he mentions “common sense” or
considered the two integral parts of justice, namely, “de-
“good judgment†,” which is our guide in such like matters,
clining from evil,” to which “innocence” belongs, and
as stated above (q. 51, a. 4) in the treatise on prudence:
“doing good,” to which the six others belong. Of these,
wherefore he says that it is a “voluntary justification,” be-
two would seem to regard relations between equals,
cause by his own free will man observes what is just ac-
namely, “friendship” in the external conduct and “con-
cording to his judgment and not according to the written
cord” internally; two regard our relations toward supe-
law. These two are ascribed to prudence as their director,
riors, namely, “piety” to parents, and “religion” to God;
and to justice as their executor. Eusebeia [piety] means while two regard our relations towards inferiors, namely,
“good worship” and consequently is the same as religion,
“condescension,” in so far as their good pleases us, and
wherefore he says that it is the science of “the service of
“humanity,” whereby we help them in their needs. For
God” (he speaks after the manner of Socrates who said
Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man is said to be “humane,
that ‘all the virtues are sciences’)‡: and “holiness” comes
through having a feeling of love and pity towards men:
to the same, as we shall state further on (q. 81, a. 8). Eu-this gives its name to humanity whereby we uphold one
charistia (gratitude) means “good thanksgiving,” and is another.” In this sense “friendship” is understood as di-mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says (Etym.
recting our external conduct towards others, from which
x) that “a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord
point of view the Philosopher treats of it in Ethic. iv, 6.
to do good, and is of gentle speech”: and Andronicus too
“Friendship” may also be taken as regarding properly the
says that “kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence.”
affections, and as the Philosopher describes it in Ethic.
“Liberality” would seem to pertain to “humanity.”
viii and ix. In this sense three things pertain to friend-
Reply to Objection 5. Epieikeia is annexed, not to ship, namely, “benevolence” which is here called “affec-particular but to legal justice, and apparently is the same
tion”; “concord,” and “beneficence” which is here called
as that which goes by the name of eugnomosyne [common
“humanity.” These three, however, are omitted by Tully,
sense].
§ St. Thomas read ‘obscurum,’ and explains it as meaning ‘derogatory,’ infra q. 108, a. 2. Cicero, however, wrote ‘obfuturum,’ i.e. ‘hurtful.’
∗ Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7
† St. Thomas indicates the Greek derivation: eugnomosyne quasi ‘bona gnome.’
‡ Aristotle, Ethic. vi,
13
1566
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 81
Of Religion
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, in so far as our present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, (2) piety, (3) observance, (4) gratitude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friendship, (8) liberality, (9) epieikeia.
Of the other virtues that have been mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of concord and the like, and partly in this treatise on justice, for instance, of right commutations and of innocence. of legislative justice we spoke in the treatise on prudence.
Religion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in itself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether religion regards only our relation to God?
(2) Whether religion is a virtue?
(3) Whether religion is one virtue?
(4) Whether religion is a special virtue?
(5) Whether religion is a theological virtue?
(6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?
(7) Whether religion has any external actions?
(8) Whether religion is the same as holiness?
Whether religion directs man to God alone?
IIa IIae q. 81 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that religion does not di-
neighbor, according to the saying of Cato∗, “Worship thy
rect man to God alone. It is written (James 1:27): “Re-
parents.” Therefore religion directs us also to our neigh-
ligion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is
bor, and not only to God.
this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribula-
Objection 5. Further, all those who are in the state of
tion, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world.” Now
grace are subject to God. Yet not all who are in a state of
“to visit the fatherless and widows” indicates an order be-
grace are called religious, but only those who bind them-
tween oneself and one’s neighbor, and “to keep oneself
selves by certain vows and observances, and to obedience
unspotted from this world” belongs to the order of a man
to certain men. Therefore religion seemingly does not de-
within himself. Therefore religion does not imply order
note a relation of subjection of man to God.
to God alone.
On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that “reli-
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
gion consists in offering service and ceremonial rites to a
x, 1) that “since in speaking Latin not only unlettered but
superior nature that men call divine.”
even most cultured persons ere wont to speak of religion
I answer that, as Isidore says (Etym. x), “according
as being exhibited, to our human kindred and relations as
to Cicero, a man is said to be religious from ‘religio,’ be-
also to those who are linked with us by any kind of tie,
cause he often ponders over, and, as it were, reads again
that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a ques-
[relegit], the things which pertain to the worship of God,”
tion of Divine worship, so that we be able to say without
so that religion would seem to take its name from read-
hesitation that religion is nothing else but the worship of
ing over those things which belong to Divine worship be-
God.” Therefore religion signifies a relation not only to
cause we ought frequently to ponder over such things in
God but also to our kindred.
our hearts, according to Prov. 3:6, “In all thy ways think
Objection 3. Further, seemingly “latria” pertains to
on Him.” According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3) it
religion. Now “latria signifies servitude,” as Augustine
may also take its name from the fact that “we ought to seek
states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). And we are bound to serve not
God again, whom we had lost by our neglectӠ. Or again,
only God, but also our neighbor, according to Gal. 5:13,
religion may be derived from “religare” [to bind together],
“By charity of the spirit serve one another.” Therefore re-
wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55): “May reli-
ligion includes a relation to one’s neighbor also.
gion bind us to the one Almighty God.” However, whether
Objection 4. Further, worship belongs to religion.
religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a re-
Now man is said to worship not only God, but also his
peated choice of what has been lost through negligence,
∗ Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae
† St. Augustine plays on the
words ‘reeligere,’ i.e. to choose over again, and ‘negligere,’ to neglect or despise.
1567
or from being a bond, it denotes properly a relation to must needs be a special kind of service. Now it is evi-God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound as to
dent that lordship belongs to God in a special and singular
our unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should
way, because He made all things, and has supreme domin-
be resolutely directed as to our last end; and Whom we
ion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is due
lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by
to Him, which is known as “latria” in Greek; and therefore
believing in Him and confessing our faith.
it belongs to religion.
Reply to Objection 1. Religion has two kinds of acts.
Reply to Objection 4. We are said to worship those
Some are its proper and immediate acts, which it elic-
whom we honor, and to cultivate∗: a man’s memory or
its, and by which man is directed to God alone, for in-
presence: we even speak of cultivating things that are be-
stance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has other
neath us, thus a farmer [agricola] is one who cultivates the
acts, which it produces through the medium of the virtues
land, and an inhabitant [incola] is one who cultivates the
which it commands, directing them to the honor of God,
place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor is
because the virtue which is concerned with the end, com-
due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also
mands the virtues which are concerned with the means.
is due a special kind of worship, which in Greek is Euse-
Accordingly “to visit the fatherless and widows in their
beia or Theosebeia, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, tribulation” is an act of religion as commanding, and an
1).
act of mercy as eliciting; and “to keep oneself unspotted
Reply to Objection 5. Although the name “religious”
from this world” is an act of religion as commanding, but
may be given to all in general who worship God, yet in
of temperance or of some similar virtue as eliciting.
a special way religious are those who consecrate their
Reply to Objection 2. Religion is referred to those
whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing from
things one exhibits to one’s human kindred, if we take the
human affairs. Thus also the term “contemplative” is ap-
term religion in a broad sense, but not if we take it in its
plied, not to those who contemplate, but to those who give
proper sense. Hence, shortly before the passage quoted,
up their whole lives to contemplation. Such men sub-
Augustine says: “In a stricter sense religion seems to de-
ject themselves to man, not for man’s sake but for God’s
note, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God.”
sake, according to the word of the Apostle (Gal. 4:14),
Reply to Objection 3. Since servant implies relation
“You. . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ
to a lord, wherever there is a special kind of lordship there
Jesus.”
Whether religion is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 81 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that religion is not a
q. 55, Aa. 3,4) “a virtue is that which makes its posses-
virtue. Seemingly it belongs to religion to pay reverence
sor good, and his act good likewise,” wherefore we must
to God. But reverence is an act of fear which is a gift, as
needs say that every good act belongs to a virtue. Now it
stated above (q. 19, a. 9). Therefore religion is not a virtue
is evident that to render anyone his due has the aspect of
but a gift
good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes
Objection 2. Further, every virtue is a free exercise
suitably proportioned to him, through being ordered to
of the will, wherefore it is described as an “elective” or
him in a becoming manner. But order comes under the
voluntary “habit”†. Now, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3) “la-
aspect of good, just as mode and species, according to
tria” belongs to religion, and “latria” denotes a kind of
Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since then it belongs to re-
servitude. Therefore religion is not a virtue.
ligion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to God, it is
Objection 3. Further, according to Ethic. ii, 1, apti-
evident that religion is a virtue.
tude for virtue is in us by nature, wherefore things pertain-
Reply to Objection 1. To pay reverence to God is an
ing to virtue belong to the dictate of natural reason. Now,
act of the gift of fear. Now it belongs to religion to do cer-
it belongs to religion “to offer ceremonial worship to the
tain things through reverence for God. Hence it follows,
Godhead”‡, and ceremonial matters, as stated above ( Ia
not that religion is the same as the gift of fear, but that it
IIae, q. 99, a. 3, ad 2; Ia IIae, q. 101), do not belong to
is referred thereto as to something more excellent; for the
the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is not a
gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as stated
virtue.
above (q. 9, a. 1, ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 8).
On the contrary, It is enumerated with the other
Reply to Objection 2. Even a slave can voluntarily
virtues, as appears from what has been said above (q. 80).
do his duty by his master, and so “he makes a virtue of
I answer that, As stated above (q. 58, a. 3; Ia IIae,
necessityӤ, by doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner,
∗ In the Latin the same word ‘colere’ stands for ‘worship’ and
‘cultivate’
† Ethic. ii, 6
‡ Cf. a. 1
§ Jerome, Ep. liv, ad Furiam.
1568
to render due service to God may be an act of virtue, in so ence for God. But that he should do this or that determi-far as man does so voluntarily.
nate thing does not belong to the dictate of natural reason,
Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to the dictate of nat-
but is established by Divine or human law.
ural reason that man should do something through rever-
Whether religion is one virtue?
IIa IIae q. 81 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that religion is not one
is My honor?” For it belongs to a father to beget and to
virtue. Religion directs us to God, as stated above (a. 1).
govern. Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue.
Now in God there are three Persons; and also many at-
Reply to Objection 1. The three Divine Persons are
tributes, which differ at least logically from one another.
the one principle of the creation and government of things,
Now a logical difference in the object suffices for a differ-
wherefore they are served by one religion. The different
ence of virtue, as stated above (q. 50, a. 2, ad 2). Therefore
aspects of the attributes concur under the aspect of first
religion is not one virtue.
principle, because God produces all things, and governs
Objection 2. Further, of one virtue there is seemingly
them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness.
one act, since habits are distinguished by their acts. Now
Wherefore religion is one virtue.
there are many acts of religion, for instance to worship,
Reply to Objection 2. By the one same act man both
to serve, to vow, to pray, to sacrifice and many such like.
serves and worships God, for worship regards the excel-
Therefore religion is not one virtue.
lence of God, to Whom reverence is due: while service
Objection 3. Further, adoration belongs to religion.
regards the subjection of man who, by his condition, is un-
Now adoration is paid to images under one aspect, and
der an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these
under another aspect to God Himself. Since, then, a dif-
two belong all acts ascribed to religion, because, by them
ference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it would seem that
all, man bears witness to the Divine excellence and to his
religion is not one virtue.
own subjection to God, either by offering something to
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:5): “One God
God, or by assuming something Divine.
[Vulg.: ‘Lord’], one faith.” Now true religion professes
Reply to Objection 3. The worship of religion is paid
faith in one God. Therefore religion is one virtue.
to images, not as considered in themselves, nor as things,
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2, ad but as images leading us to God incarnate. Now move-1), habits are differentiated according to a different aspect
ment to an image as image does not stop at the image, but
of the object. Now it belongs to religion to show reverence
goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither “latria”
to one God under one aspect, namely, as the first princi-
nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that
ple of the creation and government of things. Wherefore
religious worship is paid to the images of Christ.
He Himself says (Malach. 1:6): “If. . . I be a father, where
Whether religion is a special virtue, distinct from the others?
IIa IIae q. 81 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that religion is not a spe-
bor. Therefore religion is not a special virtue.
cial virtue distinct from the others. Augustine says (De
On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice, dis-
Civ. Dei x, 6): “Any action whereby we are united to
tinct from the other parts.
God in holy fellowship, is a true sacrifice.” But sacri-
I answer that, Since virtue is directed to the good,
fice belongs to religion. Therefore every virtuous deed
wherever there is a special aspect of good, there must be a
belongs to religion; and consequently religion is not a spe-
special virtue. Now the good to which religion is directed,
cial virtue.
is to give due honor to God. Again, honor is due to some-
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31):
one under the aspect of excellence: and to God a singular
“Do all to the glory of God.” Now it belongs to religion
excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses all
to do anything in reverence of God, as stated above (a. 1,
things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him
ad 2; a. 2). Therefore religion is not a special virtue.
is special honor due: even as in human affairs we see that
Objection 3. Further, the charity whereby we love
different honor is due to different personal excellences,
God is not distinct from the charity whereby we love our
one kind of honor to a father, another to the king, and so
neighbor. But according to Ethic. viii, 8 “to be honored
on. Hence it is evident that religion is a special virtue.
is almost to be loved.” Therefore the religion whereby
Reply to Objection 1. Every virtuous deed is said to
we honor God is not a special virtue distinct from obser-
be a sacrifice, in so far as it is done out of reverence of
vance, or “dulia,” or piety whereby we honor our neigh-
God. Hence this does not prove that religion is a general
1569
virtue, but that it commands all other virtues, as stated but the object of honor and reverence is something excel-above (a. 1, ad 1).
lent. Now God’s goodness is communicated to the crea-
Reply to Objection 2. Every deed, in so far as it is
ture, but the excellence of His goodness is not. Hence
done in God’s honor, belongs to religion, not as eliciting
the charity whereby God is loved is not distinct from the
but as commanding: those belong to religion as eliciting
charity whereby our neighbor is loved; whereas the reli-
which pertain to the reverence of God by reason of their
gion whereby God is honored, is distinct from the virtues
specific character.
whereby we honor our neighbor.
Reply to Objection 3. The object of love is the good,
Whether religion is a theological virtue?
IIa IIae q. 81 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that religion is a theolog-
Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain
ical virtue. Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that “God is
acts whereby God is worshiped, such as the offering of
worshiped by faith, hope and charity,” which are theolog-
sacrifices and so forth, are done out of reverence for God.
ical virtues. Now it belongs to religion to pay worship to
Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as
God. Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion is
Objection 2. Further, a theological virtue is one that
not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a
has God for its object. Now religion has God for its ob-
moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the
ject, since it directs us to God alone, as stated above (a. 1).
end.
Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
Reply to Objection 1. The power or virtue whose ac-
Objection 3. Further, every virtue is either theolog-
tion deals with an end, moves by its command the power
ical, or intellectual, or moral, as is clear from what has
or virtue whose action deals with matters directed to that
been said ( Ia IIae, Qq. 57,58,62). Now it is evident that
end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and char-
religion is not an intellectual virtue, because its perfec-
ity have an act in reference to God as their proper object:
tion does not depend on the consideration of truth: nor
wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of reli-
is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing
gion, which performs certain deeds directed to God: and
the mean between too much and too little. for one can-
so Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope
not worship God too much, according to Ecclus. 43:33,
and charity.
“Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for
Reply to Objection 2. Religion directs man to God
He is above all praise.” Therefore it remains that it is a
not as its object but as its end.
theological virtue.
Reply to Objection 3. Religion is neither a theologi-
On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice which
cal nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue, since it is a part is a moral virtue.
of justice, and observes a mean, not in the passions, but in
I answer that, As stated above (a. 4) religion pays due
actions directed to God, by establishing a kind of equal-
worship to God. Hence two things are to be considered in
ity in them. And when I say “equality,” I do not mean
religion: first that which it offers to God, viz. worship,
absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God
and this is by way of matter and object in religion; sec-
as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of
ondly, that to which something is offered, viz. God, to
man’s ability and God’s acceptance.
Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is
And it is possible to have too much in matters pertain-
worshiped do not reach out to God himself, as when we
ing to the Divine worship, not as regards the circumstance
believe God we reach out to Him by believing; for which
of quantity, but as regards other circumstances, as when
reason it was stated (q. 1, Aa. 1,2,4) that God is the object
Divine worship is paid to whom it is not due, or when it is
of faith, not only because we believe in a God, but because
not due, or unduly in respect of some other circumstance.
we believe God.
Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?
IIa IIae q. 81 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that religion should not
other moral virtues.
be preferred to the other moral virtues. The perfection
Objection 2. Further, what is offered by one man to
of a moral virtue consists in its observing the mean, as
another is the more praiseworthy, according as the person
stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But religion fails to observe the
it is offered to is in greater need: wherefore it is written
mean of justice, since it does not render an absolute equal
(Is. 57:7): “Deal thy bread to the hungry.” But God needs
to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than the
nothing that we can offer Him, according to Ps. 15:2, “I
1570
have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my as stated above (a. 5; q. 4, a. 7), are about matters that
goods.” Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy
are ordered to God as their end. And religion approaches
than the other virtues whereby man’s needs are relieved.
nearer to God than the other moral virtues, in so far as its
Objection 3. Further, the greater. the obligation to
actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor
do a thing, the less praise does it deserve, according to 1
of God. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.
Cor. 9:16, “If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me:
Reply to Objection 1. Virtue is praised because of
a necessity lieth upon me.” Now the more a thing is due,
the will, not because of the ability: and therefore if a man
the greater the obligation of paying it. Since, then, what
fall short of equality which is the mean of justice, through
is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him,
lack of ability, his virtue deserves no less praise, provided
it would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the
there be no failing on the part of his will.
other human virtues.
Reply to Objection 2. In offering a thing to a man on
On the contrary, The precepts pertaining to religion
account of its usefulness to him, the more needy the man
are given precedence (Ex. 20) as being of greatest impor-
the more praiseworthy the offering, because it is more use-
tance. Now the order of precepts is proportionate to the
ful: whereas we offer a thing to God not on account of its
order of virtues, since the precepts of the Law prescribe
usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His glory, and on
acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief of the moral
account of its usefulness to us.
virtues.
Reply to Objection 3. Where there is an obligation to
I answer that, Whatever is directed to an end takes
do a thing it loses the luster of supererogation, but not the
its goodness from being ordered to that end; so that the
merit of virtue, provided it be done voluntarily. Hence the
nearer it is to the end the better it is. Now moral virtues,
argument proves nothing.
Whether religion has an external act?
IIa IIae q. 81 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that religion has not an
for His sake (because He is of Himself full of glory to
external act. It is written (Jn. 4:24): “God is a spirit,
which no creature can add anything), but for our own sake,
and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in
because by the very fact that we revere and honor God, our
truth.” Now external acts pertain, not to the spirit but to
mind is subjected to Him; wherein its perfection consists,
the body. Therefore religion, to which adoration belongs,
since a thing is perfected by being subjected to its supe-
has acts that are not external but internal.
rior, for instance the body is perfected by being quick-
Objection 2. Further, the end of religion is to pay God
ened by the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the
reverence and honor. Now it would savor of irreverence
sun. Now the human mind, in order to be united to God,
towards a superior, if one were to offer him that which
needs to be guided by the sensible world, since “invisible
properly belongs to his inferior. Since then whatever man
things. . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things
offers by bodily actions, seems to be directed properly to
that are made,” as the Apostle says (Rom. 1:20). Where-
the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of inferior
fore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of
creatures, it would seem unbecoming to employ them in
corporeal things, that man’s mind may be aroused thereby,
showing reverence to God.
as by signs, to the spiritual acts by means of which he is
Objection 3. Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10)
united to God. Therefore the internal acts of religion take
commends Seneca for finding fault with those who offered
precedence of the others and belong to religion essentially,
to idols those things that are wont to be offered to men, be-
while its external acts are secondary, and subordinate to
cause, to wit, that which befits mortals is unbecoming to
the internal acts.
immortals. But such things are much less becoming to the
Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord is speaking of that
true God, Who is “exalted above all gods”∗. Therefore it
which is most important and directly intended in the wor-
would seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions.
ship of God.
Therefore religion has no bodily actions.
Reply to Objection 2. These external things are of-
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:3): “My heart
fered to God, not as though He stood in need of them,
and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.” Now just as
according to Ps. 49:13, “Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks?
internal actions belong to the heart, so do external actions
or shall I drink the blood of goats?” but as signs of the
belong to the members of the flesh. Therefore it seems
internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves ac-
that God ought to be worshiped not only by internal but
ceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x,
also by external actions.
5): “The visible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign
I answer that, We pay God honor and reverence, not
of the invisible sacrifice.”
∗ Ps. 94:3
1571
Reply to Objection 3. Idolaters are ridiculed for of-were of themselves acceptable to the idols; and still more
fering to idols things pertaining to men, not as signs arous-
because they were foolish and wicked.
ing them to certain spiritual things, but as though they
Whether religion is the same as sanctity?
IIa IIae q. 81 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that religion is not the
purity is necessary in order that the mind be applied to
same as sanctity. Religion is a special virtue, as stated
God, since the human mind is soiled by contact with infe-
above (a. 4): whereas sanctity is a general virtue, because
rior things, even as all things depreciate by admixture with
it makes us faithful, and fulfil our just obligations to God,
baser things, for instance, silver by being mixed with lead.
according to Andronicus∗. Therefore sanctity is not the
Now in order for the mind to be united to the Supreme Be-
same as religion.
ing it must be withdrawn from inferior things: and hence
Objection 2. Further, sanctity seems to denote a kind
it is that without purity the mind cannot be applied to God.
of purity. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) that “sanc-
Wherefore it is written (Heb. 12:14): “Follow peace with
tity is free from all uncleanness, and is perfect and alto-
all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see
gether unspotted purity.” Now purity would seem above
God.” Again, firmness is required for the mind to be ap-
all to pertain to temperance which repels bodily unclean-
plied to God, for it is applied to Him as its last end and
ness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would seem
first beginning, and such things must needs be most im-
that sanctity is not the same as religion.
movable. Hence the Apostle said (Rom. 8:38,39): “I am
Objection 3. Further, things that are opposite mem-
sure that neither death, nor life. . . shall separate me† from
bers of a division are not identified with one another. But
the love of God.”
in an enumeration given above (q. 80, ad 4) of the parts
Accordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind ap-
of justice, sanctity is reckoned as distinct from religion.
plies itself and its acts to God: so that it differs from re-
Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.
ligion not essentially but only logically. For it takes the
On the contrary, It is written (Lk.
1:74,75):
name of religion according as it gives God due service in
“That. . . we may serve Him. . . in holiness and justice.”
matters pertaining specially to the Divine worship, such as
Now, “to serve God” belongs to religion, as stated above
sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is called sanc-
(a. 1, ad 3; a. 3, ad 2). Therefore religion is the same as
tity, according as man refers to God not only these but
sanctity.
also the works of the other virtues, or according as man
I answer that, The word “sanctity” seems to have two
by means of certain good works disposes himself to the
significations. In one way it denotes purity; and this sig-
worship of God
nification fits in with the Greek, for hagios means “un-Reply to Objection 1. Sanctity is a special virtue ac-
soiled.” In another way it denotes firmness, wherefore in
cording to its essence; and in this respect it is in a way
olden times the term “sancta” was applied to such things
identified with religion. But it has a certain generality,
as were upheld by law and were not to be violated. Hence
in so far as by its command it directs the acts of all the
a thing is said to be sacred [sancitum] when it is ratified
virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice is said to
by law. Again, in Latin, this word “sanctus” may be con-
be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all the nected with purity, if it be resolved into “sanguine tinc-virtues to the common good.
tus, since, in olden times, those who wished to be puri-
Reply to Objection 2. Temperance practices purity,
fied were sprinkled with the victim’s blood,” according to
yet not so as to have the character of sanctity unless it be
Isidore (Etym. x). In either case the signification requires
referred to God. Hence of virginity itself Augustine says
sanctity to be ascribed to those things that are applied to
(De Virgin. viii) that “it is honored not for what it is, but
the Divine worship; so that not only men, but also the
for being consecrated to God.”
temple, vessels and such like things are said to be sanc-
Reply to Objection 3. Sanctity differs from religion
tified through being applied to the worship of God. For
as explained above, not really but logically.
∗ De Affectibus
† Vulg.: ‘shall be able to separate us’
1572
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 82
Of Devotion
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the acts of religion. First, we shall consider the interior acts, which, as stated above, are its principal acts; secondly, we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary. The interior acts of religion are seemingly devotion and prayer. Accordingly we shall treat first of devotion, and afterwards of prayer.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether devotion is a special act?
(2) Whether it is an act of religion?
(3) Of the cause of devotion?
(4) Of its effect?
Whether devotion is a special act?
IIa IIae q. 82 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that devotion is not a spe-
two Decii (Decad. I, viii, 9; x, 28). Hence devotion is
cial act. That which qualifies other acts is seemingly not a
apparently nothing else but the will to give oneself read-
special act. Now devotion seems to qualify other acts, for
ily to things concerning the service of God. Wherefore it
it is written (2 Paralip 29:31): “All the multitude offered
is written (Ex. 35:20,21) that “the multitude of the chil-
victims, and praises, and holocausts with a devout mind.”
dren of Israel. . . offered first-fruits to the Lord with a most Therefore devotion is not a special act.
ready and devout mind.” Now it is evident that the will to
Objection 2. Further, no special kind of act is com-
do readily what concerns the service of God is a special
mon to various genera of acts. But devotion is common to
kind of act. Therefore devotion is a special act of the will.
various genera of acts, namely, corporal and spiritual acts:
Reply to Objection 1. The mover prescribes the mode
for a person is said to meditate devoutly and to genuflect
of the movement of the thing moved. Now the will moves
devoutly. Therefore devotion is not a special act.
the other powers of the soul to their acts, and the will, in
Objection 3. Further, every special act belongs ei-
so far as it regards the end, moves both itself and whatever
ther to an appetitive or to a cognitive virtue or power.
is directed to the end, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 3).
But devotion belongs to neither, as may be seen by go-
Wherefore, since devotion is an act of the will whereby
ing through the various species of acts of either faculty, as
a man offers himself for the service of God Who is the
enumerated above ( Ia, Qq. 78, seqq.; Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 4).
last end, it follows that devotion prescribes the mode to
Therefore devotion is not a special act.
human acts, whether they be acts of the will itself about
On the contrary, Merits are acquired by acts as stated
things directed to the end, or acts of the other powers that
above ( Ia IIae, q. 21, Aa. 34). But devotion has a special
are moved by the will.
reason for merit. Therefore devotion is a special act.
Reply to Objection 2. Devotion is to be found in var-
I answer that, Devotion is derived from “devote”∗;
ious genera of acts, not as a species of those genera, but
wherefore those persons are said to be “devout” who, in
as the motion of the mover is found virtually in the move-
a way, devote themselves to God, so as to subject them-
ments of the things moved.
selves wholly to Him. Hence in olden times among the
Reply to Objection 3. Devotion is an act of the ap-
heathens a devotee was one who vowed to his idols to suf-
petitive part of the soul, and is a movement of the will, as
fer death for the safety of his army, as Livy relates of the
stated above.
Whether devotion is an act of religion?
IIa IIae q. 82 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that devotion is not an
devotion is an act of charity rather than of religion.
act of religion. Devotion, as stated above (a. 1), consists
Objection 2. Further, charity precedes religion; and
in giving oneself up to God. But this is done chiefly by
devotion seems to precede charity; since, in the Scrip-
charity, since according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) “the
tures, charity is represented by fire, while devotion is sig-
Divine love produces ecstasy, for it takes the lover away
nified by fatness which is the material of fire†. Therefore
from himself and gives him to the beloved.” Therefore
devotion is not an act of religion.
∗ The Latin ‘devovere’ means ‘to vow’
† Cant. 8:6; Ps. 52:6
1573
Objection 3. Further, by religion man is directed to Reply to Objection 1. It belongs immediately to char-God alone, as stated above (q. 81, a. 1). But devotion is
ity that man should give himself to God, adhering to Him
directed also to men; for we speak of people being devout
by a union of the spirit; but it belongs immediately to re-
to certain holy men, and subjects are said to be devoted to
ligion, and, through the medium of religion, to charity
their masters; thus Pope Leo says‡ that the Jews “out of
which is the principle of religion, that man should give
devotion to the Roman laws,” said: “We have no king but
himself to God for certain works of Divine worship.
Caesar.” Therefore devotion is not an act of religion.
Reply to Objection 2. Bodily fatness is produced by
On the contrary, Devotion is derived from “devo-
the natural heat in the process of digestion, and at the
vere,” as stated (a. 1). But a vow is an act of religion.
same time the natural heat thrives, as it were, on this fat-
Therefore devotion is also an act of religion.
ness. In like manner charity both causes devotion (inas-
I answer that, It belongs to the same virtue, to will
much as love makes one ready to serve one’s friend) and
to do something, and to have the will ready to do it, be-
feeds on devotion. Even so all friendship is safeguarded
cause both acts have the same object. For this reason the
and increased by the practice and consideration of friendly
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1): “It is justice whereby men
deeds.
both will end do just actions.” Now it is evident that to do
Reply to Objection 3. Devotion to God’s holy ones,
what pertains to the worship or service of God, belongs
dead or living, does not terminate in them, but passes on
properly to religion, as stated above (q. 81). Wherefore
to God, in so far as we honor God in His servants. But the
it belongs to that virtue to have the will ready to do such
devotion of subjects to their temporal masters is of another
things, and this is to be devout. Hence it is evident that
kind, just as service of a temporal master differs from the
devotion is an act of religion.
service of God.
Whether contemplation or meditation is the cause of devotion?
IIa IIae q. 82 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that contemplation or
trinsic cause on our part must needs be meditation or con-
meditation is not the cause of devotion. No cause hinders
templation. For it was stated above (a. 1) that devotion is
its effect. But subtle considerations about abstract matters
an act of the will to the effect that man surrenders himself
are often a hindrance to devotion. Therefore contempla-
readily to the service of God. Now every act of the will
tion or meditation is not the cause of devotion.
proceeds from some consideration, since the object of the
Objection 2.
Further, if contemplation were the
will is a good understood. Wherefore Augustine says (De
proper and essential cause of devotion, the higher ob-
Trin. ix, 12; xv, 23) that “the will arises from the intelli-
jects of contemplation would arouse greater devotion. But
gence.” Consequently meditation must needs be the cause
the contrary is the case: since frequently we are urged to
of devotion, in so far as through meditation man conceives
greater devotion by considering Christ’s Passion and other
the thought of surrendering himself to God’s service. In-
mysteries of His humanity than by considering the great-
deed a twofold consideration leads him thereto. The one
ness of His Godhead. Therefore contemplation is not the
is the consideration of God’s goodness and loving kind-
proper cause of devotion.
ness, according to Ps. 72:28, “It is good for me to adhere
Objection 3.
Further, if contemplation were the
to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God”: and this
proper cause of devotion, it would follow that those who
consideration wakens love∗ which is the proximate cause
are most apt for contemplation, are also most apt for de-
of devotion. The other consideration is that of man’s own
votion. Yet the contrary is to be noticed, for devotion is
shortcomings, on account of which he needs to lean on
frequently found in men of simplicity and members of the
God, according to Ps. 120:1,2, “I have lifted up my eyes
female sex, who are defective in contemplation. There-
to the mountains, from whence help shall come to me: my
fore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion.
help is from the Lord, Who made heaven and earth”; and
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 38:4): “In my med-
this consideration shuts out presumption whereby man is
itation a fire shall flame out.” But spiritual fire causes de-
hindered from submitting to God, because he leans on His
votion. Therefore meditation is the cause of devotion.
strength.
I answer that, The extrinsic and chief cause of devo-
Reply to Objection 1.
The consideration of such
tion is God, of Whom Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 9:55,
things as are of a nature to awaken our love† of God,
says that “God calls whom He deigns to call, and whom
causes devotion; whereas the consideration of foreign
He wills He makes religious: the profane Samaritans, had
matters that distract the mind from such things is a hin-
He so willed, He would have made devout.” But the in-
drance to devotion.
‡ Serm. viii, De Pass. Dom.
∗ ‘Dilectio,’ the interior act of charity;
cf. q. 27
† ‘Dilectio,’ the interior act of charity; cf. q. 27
1574
Reply to Objection 2. Matters concerning the God-leading us thither as a guiding hand, although devotion
head are, in themselves, the strongest incentive to love
itself has for its object matters concerning the Godhead.
[‘dilectio,’ the interior act of charity; cf. q. 27] and con-
Reply to Objection 3.
Science and anything else
sequently to devotion, because God is supremely lovable.
conducive to greatness, is to man an occasion of self-
Yet such is the weakness of the human mind that it needs
confidence, so that he does not wholly surrender him-
a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge, but also to
self to God. The result is that such like things some-
the love of Divine things by means of certain sensible ob-
times occasion a hindrance to devotion; while in simple
jects known to us. Chief among these is the humanity
souls and women devotion abounds by repressing pride.
of Christ, according to the words of the Preface‡, “that
If, however, a man perfectly submits to God his science
through knowing God visibly, we may be caught up to
or any other perfection, by this very fact his devotion is
the love of things invisible.” Wherefore matters relating
increased.
to Christ’s humanity are the chief incentive to devotion,
Whether joy is an effect of devotion?
IIa IIae q. 82 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that joy is not an effect
41:3, “My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God,”
of devotion. As stated above (a. 3, ad 2), Christ’s Passion
and afterwards it is said (Ps. 41:4): “My tears have been
is the chief incentive to devotion. But the consideration
my bread,” etc. Secondarily devotion is caused as stated
thereof causes an affliction of the soul, according to Lam.
(a. 3), by the consideration of one’s own failings; for this
3:19, “Remember my poverty. . . the wormwood and the
consideration regards the term from which man withdraws
gall,” which refers to the Passion, and afterwards (Lam.
by the movement of his devout will, in that he trusts not
3:20) it is said: “I will be mindful and remember, and my
in himself, but subjects himself to God. This consider-
soul shall languish within me.” Therefore delight or joy is
ation has an opposite tendency to the first: for it is of
not the effect of devotion.
a nature to cause sorrow directly (when one thinks over
Objection 2. Further, devotion consists chiefly in an
one’s own failings), and joy accidentally, namely, through
interior sacrifice of the spirit. But it is written (Ps. 50:19): hope of the Divine assistance. It is accordingly evident
“A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit.” Therefore afflic-
that the first and direct effect of devotion is joy, while the
tion is the effect of devotion rather than gladness or joy.
secondary and accidental effect is that “sorrow which is
Objection 3. Further, Gregory of Nyssa says (De
according to God”‡.
Homine xii)∗ that “just as laughter proceeds from joy, so
Reply to Objection 1. In the consideration of Christ’s
tears and groans are signs of sorrow.” But devotion makes
Passion there is something that causes sorrow, namely, the
some people shed tears. Therefore gladness or joy is not
human defect, the removal of which made it necessary for
the effect of devotion.
Christ to suffer§; and there is something that causes joy,
On the contrary, We say in the Collect†: “That we
namely, God’s loving-kindness to us in giving us such a
who are punished by fasting may be comforted by a holy
deliverance.
devotion.”
Reply to Objection 2. The spirit which on the one
I answer that, The direct and principal effect of de-
hand is afflicted on account of the defects of the present
votion is the spiritual joy of the mind, though sorrow is
life, on the other hand is rejoiced, by the consideration of
its secondary and indirect effect. For it has been stated
God’s goodness, and by the hope of the Divine help.
(a. 3) that devotion is caused by a twofold consideration:
Reply to Objection 3.
Tears are caused not only
chiefly by the consideration of God’s goodness, because
through sorrow, but also through a certain tenderness of
this consideration belongs to the term, as it were, of the
the affections, especially when one considers something
movement of the will in surrendering itself to God, and
that gives joy mixed with pain. Thus men are wont to shed
the direct result of this consideration is joy, according to
tears through a sentiment of piety, when they recover their
Ps. 76:4, “I remembered God, and was delighted”; but
children or dear friends, whom they thought to have lost.
accidentally this consideration causes a certain sorrow in
In this way tears arise from devotion.
those who do not yet enjoy God fully, according to Ps.
‡ Preface for Christmastide
∗ Orat. funebr. de Placilla Imp.
† Thursday after fourth Sunday of Lent
‡ 2 Cor. 7:10
§ Lk. 24:25
1575
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 83
Of Prayer
(In Seventeen Articles)
We must now consider prayer, under which head there are seventeen points of inquiry: (1) Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive power?
(2) Whether it is fitting to pray to God?
(3) Whether prayer is an act of religion?
(4) Whether we ought to pray to God alone?
(5) Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?
(6) Whether we ought to ask for temporal things when we pray?
(7) Whether we ought to pray for others?
(8) Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?
(9) Of the seven petitions of the Lord’s Prayer;
(10) Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?
(11) Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?
(12) Whether prayer should be vocal?
(13) Whether attention is requisite in prayer?
(14) Whether prayer should last a long time?
(15) Whether prayer is meritorious?∗
(16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by praying?†
(17) of the different kinds of prayer.
Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive power?
IIa IIae q. 83 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that prayer is an act of
I answer that, According to Cassiodorus‡ “prayer
the appetitive power. It belongs to prayer to be heard.
[oratio] is spoken reason [oris ratio].” Now the specula-
Now it is the desire that is heard by God, according to Ps.
tive and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative
9:38, “The Lord hath heard the desire of the poor.” There-
merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical rea-
fore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the appetitive
son not only apprehends but causes. Now one thing is the
power: and therefore prayer is also.
cause of another in two ways: first perfectly, when it ne-
Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
cessitates its effect, and this happens when the effect is
iii): “It is useful to begin everything with prayer, because
wholly subject to the power of the cause; secondly im-
thereby we surrender ourselves to God and unite ourselves
perfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the reason
to Him.” Now union with God is effected by love which
that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of the
belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore prayer belongs
cause. Accordingly in this way the reason is cause of cer-
to the appetitive power.
tain things in two ways: first, by imposing necessity; and
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher states (De An-
in this way it belongs to reason, to command not only the
ima iii, 6) that there are two operations of the intellective
lower powers and the members of the body, but also hu-
part. Of these the first is “the understanding of indivisi-
man subjects, which indeed is done by commanding; sec-
bles,” by which operation we apprehend what a thing is:
ondly, by leading up to the effect, and, in a way, disposing
while the second is “synthesis” and “analysis,” whereby
to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to be
we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may
done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals
be added, namely, “reasoning,” whereby we proceed from
or its superiors. Now both of these, namely, to command
the known to the unknown. Now prayer is not reducible to
and to ask or beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that
any of these operations. Therefore it is an operation, not
man proposes something to be effected by something else,
of the intellective, but of the appetitive power.
wherefore they pertain to the reason to which it belongs to
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that “to pray
set in order. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. i,
is to speak.” Now speech belongs to the intellect. There-
13) that the “reason exhorts us to do what is best.”
fore prayer is an act, not of the appetitive, but of the intel-
lective power.
∗ Art. 16
† Art. 15
‡ Comment. in Ps. 38:13
1576
Now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer§
to God through being moved by the will of charity, as it
as signifying a beseeching or petition, in which sense Au-
were, and this in two ways. First, on the part of the object
gustine¶: says (De Verb. Dom.) that “prayer is a petition,”
of our petition, because when we pray we ought princi-
and Damascene states (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that “to pray
pally to ask to be united to God, according to Ps. 26:4,
is to ask becoming things of God.” Accordingly it is evi-
“One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek af-
dent that prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason.
ter, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days
Reply to Objection 1. The Lord is said to hear the de-
of my life.” Secondly, on the part of the petitioner, who
sire of the poor, either because desire is the cause of their
ought to approach the person whom he petitions, either
petition, since a petition is like the interpreter of a desire, locally, as when he petitions a man, or mentally, as when
or in order to show how speedily they are heard, since no
he petitions God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii)
sooner do the poor desire something than God hears them
that “when we call upon God in our prayers, we unveil our
before they put up a prayer, according to the saying of Is.
mind in His presence”: and in the same sense Damascene
65:24, “And it shall come to pass, that before they call, I
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that “prayer is the raising up
will hear.”
of the mind to God.”
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above ( Ia, q. 82,
Reply to Objection 3. These three acts belong to the
a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 1, ad 3), the will moves the reason
speculative reason, but to the practical reason it belongs
to its end: wherefore nothing hinders the act of reason,
in addition to cause something by way of command or of
under the motion of the will, from tending to an end such
petition, as stated above.
as charity which is union with God. Now prayer tends
Whether it is becoming to pray?
IIa IIae q. 83 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that it is unbecoming to
vine providence, or through the compelling influence of
pray. Prayer seems to be necessary in order that we may
the stars, or on account of the connection of causes: and
make our needs known to the person to whom we pray.
this opinion also excluded the utility of prayer. There was
But according to Mat. 6:32, “Your Father knoweth that
a third opinion of those who held that human affairs are
you have need of all these things.” Therefore it is not be-
indeed ruled by Divine providence, and that they do not
coming to pray to God.
happen of necessity; yet they deemed the disposition of
Objection 2. Further, by prayer we bend the mind of
Divine providence to be changeable, and that it is changed
the person to whom we pray, so that he may do what is
by prayers and other things pertaining to the worship of
asked of him. But God’s mind is unchangeable and in-
God. All these opinions were disproved in the
flexible, according to 1 Kings 15:29, “But the Triumpher
Ia, q. 19, Aa. 7,8; Ia, q. 22, Aa. 2,4; Ia, q. 115, a. 6;
in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repen-
Ia, q. 116. Wherefore it behooves us so to account for the
tance.” Therefore it is not fitting that we should pray to
utility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on human
God.
affairs subject to Divine providence, nor to imply change-
Objection 3. Further, it is more liberal to give to one
ableness on the part of the Divine disposition.
that asks not, than to one who asks because, according to
In order to throw light on this question we must con-
Seneca (De Benefic. ii, 1), “nothing is bought more dearly
sider that Divine providence disposes not only what ef-
than what is bought with prayers.” But God is supremely
fects shall take place, but also from what causes and
liberal. Therefore it would seem unbecoming to pray to
in what order these effects shall proceed. Now among
God.
other causes human acts are the causes of certain effects.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 18:1): “We ought
Wherefore it must be that men do certain actions. not that
always to pray, and not to faint.”
thereby they may change the Divine disposition, but that
I answer that, Among the ancients there was a three-
by those actions they may achieve certain effects accord-
fold error concerning prayer. Some held that human af-
ing to the order of the Divine disposition: and the same
fairs are not ruled by Divine providence; whence it would
is to be said of natural causes. And so is it with regard
follow that it is useless to pray and to worship God at all:
to prayer. For we pray not that we may change the Di-
of these it is written (Malach. 3:14): “You have said: He
vine disposition, but that we may impetrate that which
laboreth in vain that serveth God.” Another opinion held
God has disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers in other
that all things, even in human affairs, happen of neces-
words “that by asking, men may deserve to receive what
sity, whether by reason of the unchangeableness of Di-
Almighty God from eternity has disposed to give,” as Gre-
§ This last paragraph refers to the Latin word ‘oratio’ [prayer] which originally signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from
‘os,’ ‘oris’ (the mouth).
¶ Rabanus, De Univ. vi, 14
1577
gory says (Dial. i, 8)
on us out of His liberality, even without our asking for
Reply to Objection 1. We need to pray to God, not in
them: but that He wishes to bestow certain things on us
order to make known to Him our needs or desires but that
at our asking, is for the sake of our good, namely, that
we ourselves may be reminded of the necessity of having
we may acquire confidence in having recourse to God,
recourse to God’s help in these matters.
and that we may recognize in Him the Author of our
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, our motive in
goods. Hence Chrysostom says∗: “Think what happiness
praying is, not Divine disposition, we may change the Di-
is granted thee, what honor bestowed on thee, when thou
vine disposition, but that, by our prayers, we may obtain
conversest with God in prayer, when thou talkest with
what God has appointed.
Christ, when thou askest what thou wilt, whatever thou
Reply to Objection 3.
God bestows many things
desirest.”
Whether prayer is an act of religion?
IIa IIae q. 83 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that prayer is not an act of
to Him, and by praying confesses that he needs Him as
religion. Since religion is a part of justice, it resides in the the Author of his goods. Hence it is evident that prayer is
will as in its subject. But prayer belongs to the intellec-
properly an act of religion.
tive part, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore prayer seems to
Reply to Objection 1. The will moves the other pow-
be an act, not of religion, but of the gift of understanding
ers of the soul to its end, as stated above (q. 82, a. 1, ad 1), whereby the mind ascends to God.
and therefore religion, which is in the will, directs the acts
Objection 2. Further, the act of “latria” falls under a
of the other powers to the reverence of God. Now among
necessity of precept. But prayer does not seem to come
the other powers of the soul the intellect is the highest,
under a necessity of precept, but to come from the mere
and the nearest to the will; and consequently after devo-
will, since it is nothing else than a petition for what we
tion which belongs to the will, prayer which belongs to the
will. Therefore prayer seemingly is not an act of religion.
intellective part is the chief of the acts of religion, since by Objection 3. Further, it seems to belong to religion
it religion directs man’s intellect to God.
that one “offers worship end ceremonial rites to the God-
Reply to Objection 2. It is a matter of precept not
headӠ. But prayer seems not to offer anything to God, but
only that we should ask for what we desire, but also that
to. ask to obtain something from Him. Therefore prayer
we should desire aright. But to desire comes under a pre-
is not an act of religion.
cept of charity, whereas to ask comes under a precept of
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 140:2): “Let my
religion, which precept is expressed in Mat. 7:7, where it
prayer be directed as incense in Thy sight”: and a gloss
is said: “Ask and ye shall receive”‡.
on the passage says that “it was to signify this that under
Reply to Objection 3. By praying man surrenders
the old Law incense was said to be offered for a sweet
his mind to God, since he subjects it to Him with rev-
smell to the Lord.” Now this belongs to religion. There-
erence and, so to speak, presents it to Him, as appears
fore prayer is an act of religion.
from the words of Dionysius quoted above (a. 1, obj. 2).
I answer that, As stated above (q. 81, Aa. 2,4), it be-
Wherefore just as the human mind excels exterior things,
longs properly to religion to show honor to God, where-
whether bodily members, or those external things that are
fore all those things through which reverence is shown to
employed for God’s service, so too, prayer surpasses other
God, belong to religion. Now man shows reverence to
acts of religion.
God by means of prayer, in so far as he subjects himself
Whether we ought to pray to God alone?
IIa IIae q. 83 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to pray to
than by words, according to the saying of the Apostle (1
God alone. Prayer is an act of religion, as stated above
Cor. 14:15), “I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also
(a. 3). But God alone is to be worshiped by religion.
with the understanding”: and again because, as Augus-
Therefore we should pray to God alone.
tine says (De Cura pro mortuis xiii) the “dead, even the
Objection 2. Further, it is useless to pray to one who
saints, know not what the living, even their own children,
is ignorant of the prayer. But it belongs to God alone to
are doing.” Therefore we ought to pray to God alone.
know one’s prayer, both because frequently prayer is ut-
Objection 3. Further, if we pray to any of the saints,
tered by an interior act which God alone knows, rather
this is only because they are united to God. Now some
∗ Implicitly [Hom. ii, de Orat.: Hom. xxx in Genes. ]; Cf. Caten. Aur.
on Lk. 18
† Cicero, Rhet. ii, 53
‡ Vulg.: ‘Ask and it shall be given
you.’
1578
yet living in this world, or even some who are in Purga-Reply to Objection 1. To Him alone do we offer re-
tory, are closely united to God by grace, and yet we do
ligious worship when praying, from Whom we seek to
not pray to them. Therefore neither should we pray to the
obtain what we pray for, because by so doing we confess
saints who are in Paradise.
that He is the Author of our goods: but not to those whom
On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:1), “Call. . . if
we call upon as our advocates in God’s presence.
there be any that will answer thee, and turn to some of
Reply to Objection 2.
The dead, if we consider
the saints.”
their natural condition, do not know what takes place
I answer that, Prayer is offered to a person in two
in this world, especially the interior movements of the
ways: first, as to be fulfilled by him, secondly, as to be
heart. Nevertheless, according to Gregory (Moral. xii,
obtained through him. In the first way we offer prayer
21), whatever it is fitting the blessed should know about
to God alone, since all our prayers ought to be directed
what happens to us, even as regards the interior move-
to the acquisition of grace and glory, which God alone
ments of the heart, is made known to them in the Word:
gives, according to Ps. 83:12, “The Lord will give grace
and it is most becoming to their exalted position that they
and glory.” But in the second way we pray to the saints,
should know the petitions we make to them by word or
whether angels or men, not that God may through them
thought; and consequently the petitions which we raise to
know our petitions, but that our prayers may be effec-
them are known to them through Divine manifestation.
tive through their prayers and merits. Hence it is written
Reply to Objection 3. Those who are in this world or
(Apoc. 8:4) that “the smoke of the incense,” namely “the
in Purgatory, do not yet enjoy the vision of the Word, so
prayers of the saints ascended up before God.” This is also
as to be able to know what we think or say. Wherefore we
clear from the very style employed by the Church in pray-
do not seek their assistance by praying to them, but ask it
ing: since we beseech the Blessed Trinity “to have mercy
of the living by speaking to them.
on us,” while we ask any of the saints “to pray for us.”
Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?
IIa IIae q. 83 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to ask
because they at any rate know what is good for each one
for anything definite when we pray to God. According
whereas when we pray we frequently ask for what it had
to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), “to pray is to ask
been better for us not to obtain.” This opinion is true to a
becoming things of God”; wherefore it is useless to pray
certain extent, as to those things which may have an evil
for what is inexpedient, according to James 4:3, “You ask,
result, and which man may use ill or well, such as “riches,
and receive not: because you ask amiss.” Now according
by which,” as stated by the same authority (Fact. et Dict.
to Rom. 8:26, “we know not what we should pray for as
Memor. vii, 2), “many have come to an evil end; honors,
we ought.” Therefore we ought not to ask for anything
which have ruined many; power, of which we frequently
definite when we pray.
witness the unhappy results; splendid marriages, which
Objection 2. Further, those who ask another person
sometimes bring about the total wreck of a family.” Nev-
for something definite strive to incline his will to do what
ertheless there are certain goods which man cannot ill use,
they wish themselves. But we ought not to endeavor to
because they cannot have an evil result. Such are those
make God will what we will; on the contrary, we ought
which are the object of beatitude and whereby we merit
to strive to will what He wills, according to a gloss on Ps.
it: and these the saints seek absolutely when they pray, as
32:1, “Rejoice in the Lord, O ye just.” Therefore we ought
in Ps. 79:4, “Show us Thy face, and we shall be saved,”
not to ask God for anything definite when we pray.
and again in Ps. 118:35, “Lead me into the path of Thy
Objection 3. Further, evil things are not to be sought
commandments.”
from God; and as to good things, God Himself invites us
Reply to Objection 1. Although man cannot by him-
to take them. Now it is useless to ask a person to give you
self know what he ought to pray for, “the Spirit,” as stated
what he invites you to take. Therefore we ought not to ask
in the same passage, “helpeth our infirmity,” since by in-
God for anything definite in our prayers.
spiring us with holy desires, He makes us ask for what is
On the contrary, our Lord (Mat. 6 and Lk. 11) taught
right. Hence our Lord said (Jn. 4:24) that true adorers
His disciples to ask definitely for those things which are
“must adore. . . in spirit and in truth.”
contained in the petitions of the Lord’s Prayer.
Reply to Objection 2. When in our prayers we ask
I answer that, According to Valerius Maximus∗,
for things concerning our salvation, we conform our will
“Socrates deemed that we should ask the immortal gods
to God’s, of Whom it is written (1 Tim. 2:4) that “He will
for nothing else but that they should grant us good things,
have all men to be saved.”
∗ Fact. et Dict. Memor. vii, 2
1579
Reply to Objection 3. God so invites us to take good the body, but by pious desires and devout prayers.
things, that we may approach to them not by the steps of
Whether man ought to ask God for temporal things when he prays?
IIa IIae q. 83 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that man ought not to ask
towards beatitude, in so far, to wit, as they are the means
God for temporal things when he prays. We seek what
of supporting the life of the body, and are of service to
we ask for in prayer. But we should not seek for tempo-
us as instruments in performing acts of virtue, as also the
ral things, for it is written (Mat. 6:33): “Seek ye. . . first
Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 8). Augustine too says the
the kingdom of God, and His justice: and all these things
same to Proba (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx,
shall be added unto you,” that is to say, temporal things,
6,7) when he states that “it is not unbecoming for any-
which, says He, we are not to seek, but they will be added
one to desire enough for a livelihood, and no more; for
to what we seek. Therefore temporal things are not to be
this sufficiency is desired, not for its own sake, but for the
asked of God in prayer.
welfare of the body, or that we should desire to be clothed
Objection 2. Further, no one asks save for that which
in a way befitting one’s station, so as not to be out of keep-
he is solicitous about. Now we ought not to have solici-
ing with those among whom we have to live. Accordingly
tude for temporal things, according to the saying of Mat.
we ought to pray that we may keep these things if we have
6:25, “Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat.”
them, and if we have them not, that we may gain posses-
Therefore we ought not to ask for temporal things when
sion of them.”
we pray.
Reply to Objection 1.
We should seek temporal
Objection 3. Further, by prayer our mind should be
things not in the first but in the second place. Hence Au-
raised up to God. But by asking for temporal things, it de-
gustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 16): “When He
scends to things beneath it, against the saying of the Apos-
says that this” (i.e. the kingdom of God) “is to be sought
tle (2 Cor. 4:18), “While we look not at the things which
first, He implies that the other” (i.e. temporal goods) “is
are seen, but at the things which are not seen. For the
to be sought afterwards, not in time but in importance, this
things which are seen are temporal, but the things which
as being our good, the other as our need.”
are not seen are eternal.” Therefore man ought not to ask
Reply to Objection 2. Not all solicitude about tempo-
God for temporal things when he prays.
ral things is forbidden, but that which is superfluous and
Objection 4. Further, man ought not to ask of God
inordinate, as stated above (q. 55, a. 6).
other than good and useful things. But sometimes tempo-
Reply to Objection 3. When our mind is intent on
ral things, when we have them, are harmful, not only in a
temporal things in order that it may rest in them, it re-
spiritual sense, but also in a material sense. Therefore we
mains immersed therein; but when it is intent on them in
should not ask God for them in our prayers.
relation to the acquisition of beatitude, it is not lowered
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 30:8): “Give me
by them, but raises them to a higher level.
only the necessaries of life.”
Reply to Objection 4. From the very fact that we ask
I answer that, As Augustine says (ad Probam, de
for temporal things not as the principal object of our peti-
orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 12): “It is lawful to pray for
tion, but as subordinate to something else, we ask God for
what it is lawful to desire.” Now it is lawful to desire tem-
them in the sense that they may be granted to us in so far
poral things, not indeed principally, by placing our end
as they are expedient for salvation.
therein, but as helps whereby we are assisted in tending
Whether we ought to pray for others?
IIa IIae q. 83 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to pray
Father anything in My name He will give it you,” says
for others. In praying we ought to conform to the pattern
(Tract. cii): “Everyone is heard when he prays for him-
given by our Lord. Now in the Lord’s Prayer we make
self, not when he prays for all; wherefore He does not say
petitions for ourselves, not for others; thus we say: “Give
simply ‘He will give it,’ but ‘He will give it you. ’ ” There-
us this day our daily bread,” etc. Therefore we should not
fore it would seem that we ought not to pray for others, but
pray for others.
only for ourselves.
Objection 2. Further, prayer is offered that it may be
Objection 3. Further, we are forbidden to pray for
heard. Now one of the conditions required for prayer that
others, if they are wicked, according to Jer. 7:16, “There-
it may be heard is that one pray for oneself, wherefore
fore do not then pray for this people. . . and do not with-
Augustine in commenting on Jn. 16:23, “If you ask the
stand Me, for I will not hear thee.” On the other hand we
1580
are not bound to pray for the good, since they are heard out of charity, according to Ps. 34:13, “My prayer shall
when they pray for themselves. Therefore it would seem
be turned into my bosom, i.e. though it profit them not, I
that we ought not to pray for others.
am not deprived of my reward,” as the gloss expounds it.
On the contrary, It is written (James 5:16): “Pray one
Reply to Objection 3. We ought to pray even for sin-
for another, that you may be saved.”
ners, that they may be converted, and for the just that they
I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), when we pray
may persevere and advance in holiness. Yet those who
we ought to ask for what we ought to desire. Now we
pray are heard not for all sinners but for some: since they
ought to desire good things not only for ourselves, but also
are heard for the predestined, but not for those who are
for others: for this is essential to the love which we owe
foreknown to death; even as the correction whereby we
to our neighbor, as stated above (q. 25, Aa. 1,12; q. 27,
correct the brethren, has an effect in the predestined but
a. 2; q. 31, a. 1). Therefore charity requires us to pray for
not in the reprobate, according to Eccles. 7:14, “No man
others. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.)∗:
can correct whom God hath despised.” Hence it is writ-
“Necessity binds us to pray for ourselves, fraternal char-
ten (1 Jn. 5:16): “He that knoweth his brother to sin a sin
ity urges us to pray for others: and the prayer that fraternal
which is not to death, let him ask, and life shall be given
charity proffers is sweeter to God than that which is the
to him, who sinneth not to death.” Now just as the benefit
outcome of necessity.”
of correction must not be refused to any man so long as he
Reply to Objection 1. As Cyprian says (De orat.
lives here below, because we cannot distinguish the pre-
Dom.), “We say ‘Our Father’ and not ‘My Father,’ ‘Give
destined from the reprobate, as Augustine says (De Cor-
us’ and not ‘Give me,’ because the Master of unity did not
rep. et Grat. xv), so too no man should be denied the help
wish us to pray privately, that is for ourselves alone, for
of prayer.
He wished each one to pray for all, even as He Himself
We ought also to pray for the just for three reasons:
bore all in one.”
First, because the prayers of a multitude are more easily
Reply to Objection 2. It is a condition of prayer that
heard, wherefore a gloss on Rom. 15:30, “Help me in
one pray for oneself: not as though it were necessary in
your prayers,” says: “The Apostle rightly tells the lesser
order that prayer be meritorious, but as being necessary
brethren to pray for him, for many lesser ones, if they be
in order that prayer may not fail in its effect of impetra-
united together in one mind, become great, and it is im-
tion. For it sometimes happens that we pray for another
possible for the prayers of a multitude not to obtain” that
with piety and perseverance, and ask for things relating to
which is possible to be obtained by prayer. Secondly, that
his salvation, and yet it is not granted on account of some
many may thank God for the graces conferred on the just,
obstacle on the part of the person we are praying for, ac-
which graces conduce to the profit of many, according to
cording to Jer. 15:1, “If Moses and Samuel shall stand be-
the Apostle (2 Cor. 1:11). Thirdly, that the more perfect
fore Me, My soul is not towards this people.” And yet the
may not wax proud, seeing that they find that they need
prayer will be meritorious for the person who prays thus
the prayers of the less perfect.
Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?
IIa IIae q. 83 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to pray
pray for our enemies, but against them.
for our enemies. According to Rom. 15:4, “what things
Objection 3. Further, man’s deed should not be con-
soever were written, were written for our learning.” Now
trary to his prayer. Now sometimes men lawfully attack
Holy Writ contains many imprecations against enemies;
their enemies, else all wars would be unlawful, which is
thus it is written (Ps. 6:11): “Let all my enemies be
opposed to what we have said above (q. 40, a. 1). There-
ashamed and be. . . troubled, let them be ashamed and be
fore we should not pray for our enemies.
troubled very speedily†.” Therefore we too should pray
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:44): “Pray for
against rather than for our enemies.
them that persecute and calumniate you.”
Objection 2. Further, to be revenged on one’s ene-
I answer that, To pray for another is an act of charity, mies is harmful to them. But holy men seek vengeance of
as stated above (a. 7). Wherefore we are bound to pray
their enemies according to Apoc. 6:10, “How long. . . dost
for our enemies in the same manner as we are bound to
Thou not. . . revenge our blood on them that dwell on
love them. Now it was explained above in the treatise on
earth?” Wherefore they rejoice in being revenged on their
charity (q. 25, Aa. 8,9), how we are bound to love our en-
enemies, according to Ps. 57:11, “The just shall rejoice
emies, namely, that we must love in them their nature, not
when he shall see the revenge.” Therefore we should not
their sin. and that to love our enemies in general is a mat-
∗ Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St.
John Chrysostom
† Vulg.: ‘Let them be turned back and be ashamed.’
1581
ter of precept, while to love them in the individual is not a of sin, with the purpose, to wit, of destroying sin by the
matter of precept, except in the preparedness of the mind,
correction of men. Fourthly, by way of conformity of our
so that a man must be prepared to love his enemy even in
will to the Divine justice with regard to the damnation of
the individual and to help him in a case of necessity, or if
those who are obstinate in sin.
his enemy should beg his forgiveness. But to love one’s
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine states in the
enemies absolutely in the individual, and to assist them, is
same book (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 22), “the mar-
an act of perfection.
tyrs’ vengeance is the overthrow of the kingdom of sin,
In like manner it is a matter of obligation that we
because they suffered so much while it reigned”: or as he
should not exclude our enemies from the general prayers
says again (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. lxviii), “their prayer
which we offer up for others: but it is a matter of perfec-
for vengeance is expressed not in words but in their minds,
tion, and not of obligation, to pray for them individually,
even as the blood of Abel cried from the earth.” They re-
except in certain special cases.
joice in vengeance not for its own sake, but for the sake of
Reply to Objection 1. The imprecations contained in
Divine justice.
Holy Writ may be understood in four ways. First, accord-
Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful to attack one’s ene-
ing to the custom of the prophets “to foretell the future un-
mies, that they may be restrained from sin: and this is for
der the veil of an imprecation,” as Augustine states∗. Sec-
their own good and for the good of others. Consequently
ondly, in the sense that certain temporal evils are some-
it is even lawful in praying to ask that temporal evils be
times inflicted by God on the wicked for their correction.
inflicted on our enemies in order that they may mend their
Thirdly, because they are understood to be pronounced,
ways. Thus prayer and deed will not be contrary to one
not against the men themselves, but against the kingdom
another.
Whether the seven petitions of the Lord’s Prayer are fittingly assigned?
IIa IIae q. 83 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that the seven petitions of
Who art in heaven,” which seem to indicate a desire to
the Lord’s Prayer are not fittingly assigned. It is useless
win God’s benevolence.
to ask for that to be hallowed which is always holy. But
On the contrary, The authority of Christ, who com-
the name of God is always holy, according to Lk. 1:49,
posed this prayer, suffices.
“Holy is His name.” Again, His kingdom is everlasting,
I answer that, The Lord’s Prayer is most perfect, be-
according to Ps. 144:13, “Thy kingdom is a kingdom of
cause, as Augustine says (ad Probam Ep. cxxx, 12), “if
all ages.” Again, God’s will is always fulfilled, according
we pray rightly and fittingly, we can say nothing else but
to Isa 46:10, “All My will shall be done.” Therefore it is
what is contained in this prayer of our Lord.” For since
useless to ask for “the name of God to be hallowed,” for
prayer interprets our desires, as it were, before God, then
“His kingdom to come,” and for “His will to be done.”
alone is it right to ask for something in our prayers when it
Objection 2. Further, one must withdraw from evil
is right that we should desire it. Now in the Lord’s Prayer
before attaining good. Therefore it seems unfitting for the
not only do we ask for all that we may rightly desire, but
petitions relating to the attainment of good to be set forth
also in the order wherein we ought to desire them, so that
before those relating to the removal of evil.
this prayer not only teaches us to ask, but also directs all
Objection 3.
Further, one asks for a thing that it
our affections. Thus it is evident that the first thing to be
may be given to one. Now the chief gift of God is the
the object of our desire is the end, and afterwards what-
Holy Ghost, and those gifts that we receive through Him.
ever is directed to the end. Now our end is God towards
Therefore the petitions seem to be unfittingly assigned,
Whom our affections tend in two ways: first, by our will-
since they do not correspond to the gifts of the Holy
ing the glory of God, secondly, by willing to enjoy His
Ghost.
glory. The first belongs to the love whereby we love God
Objection 4. Further, according to Luke, only five
in Himself, while the second belongs to the love whereby
petitions are mentioned in the Lord’s Prayer, as appears
we love ourselves in God. Wherefore the first petition is
from the eleventh chapter. Therefore it was superfluous
expressed thus: “Hallowed be Thy name,” and the second
for Matthew to mention seven.
thus: “Thy kingdom come,” by which we ask to come to
Objection 5. Further, it seems useless to seek to win
the glory of His kingdom.
the benevolence of one who forestalls us by his benevo-
To this same end a thing directs us in two ways: in one
lence. Now God forestalls us by His benevolence, since
way, by its very nature, in another way, accidentally. Of
“He first hath loved us” ( 1 Jn. 4:19). Therefore it is use-
its very nature the good which is useful for an end directs
less to preface the petitions with the words our “Father
us to that end. Now a thing is useful in two ways to that
∗ De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 21
1582
end which is beatitude: in one way, directly and princi-Reply to Objection 2. Since prayer is the interpreter
pally, according to the merit whereby we merit beatitude
of desire, the order of the petitions corresponds with the
by obeying God, and in this respect we ask: “Thy will
order, not of execution, but of desire or intention, where
be done on earth as it is in heaven”; in another way in-
the end precedes the things that are directed to the end,
strumentally, and as it were helping us to merit, and in
and attainment of good precedes removal of evil.
this respect we say: “Give us this day our daily bread,”
Reply to Objection 3. Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in
whether we understand this of the sacramental Bread, the
Monte ii, 11) adapts the seven petitions to the gifts and
daily use of which is profitable to man, and in which all
beatitudes. He says: “If it is fear God whereby blessed
the other sacraments are contained, or of the bread of the
are the poor in spirit, let us ask that God’s name be hal-
body, so that it denotes all sufficiency of food, as Augus-
lowed among men with a chaste fear. If it is piety whereby
tine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 11), since the Eucharist
blessed are the meek, let us ask that His kingdom may
is the chief sacrament, and bread is the chief food: thus
come, so that we become meek and no longer resist Him.
in the Gospel of Matthew we read, “supersubstantial,” i.e.
If it is knowledge whereby blessed are they that mourn,
“principal,” as Jerome expounds it.
let us pray that His will be done, for thus we shall mourn
We are directed to beatitude accidentally by the re-
no more. If it is fortitude whereby blessed ere they that
moval of obstacles. Now there are three obstacles to our
hunger, let us pray that our daily bread be given to us. If it
attainment of beatitude. First, there is sin, which directly
is counsel whereby blessed are the merciful, let us forgive
excludes a man from the kingdom, according to 1 Cor.
the trespasses of others that our own may be forgiven. If
6:9,10, “Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, etc., shall pos-
it is understanding whereby blessed are the pure in heart,
sess the kingdom of God”; and to this refer the words,
let us pray lest we have a double heart by seeking after
“Forgive us our trespasses.” Secondly, there is temptation
worldly things which ere the occasion of our temptations.
which hinders us from keeping God’s will, and to this we
If it is wisdom whereby blessed are the peacemakers for
refer when we say: “And lead us not into temptation,”
they shall be called the children of God, let us pray to be
whereby we do not ask not to be tempted, but not to be
delivered from evil: for if we be delivered we shall by that
conquered by temptation, which is to be led into temp-
very fact become the free children of God.”
tation. Thirdly, there is the present penal state which is
Reply to Objection 4.
According to Augustine
a kind of obstacle to a sufficiency of life, and to this we
(Enchiridion cxvi), “Luke included not seven but five pe-
refer in the words, “Deliver us from evil.”
titions in the Lord’s Prayer, for by omitting it, he shows
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Serm.
that the third petition is a kind of repetition of the two that Dom. in Monte ii, 5), when we say, “Hallowed be Thy
precede, and thus helps us to understand it”; because, to
name, we do not mean that God’s name is not holy, but
wit, the will of God tends chiefly to this—that we come to
we ask that men may treat it as a holy thing,” and this per-
the knowledge of His holiness and to reign together with
tains to the diffusion of God’s glory among men. When
Him. Again the last petition mentioned by Matthew, “De-
we say, “Thy kingdom come, we do not imply that God is
liver us from evil,” is omitted by Luke, so that each one
not reigning now,” but “we excite in ourselves the desire
may know himself to be delivered from evil if he be not
for that kingdom, that it may come to us, and that we may
led into temptation.
reign therein,” as Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx,
Reply to Objection 5. Prayer is offered up to God,
11). The words, “Thy will be done rightly signify, ‘May
not that we may bend Him, but that we may excite in our-
Thy commandments be obeyed’ on earth as in heaven, i.e.
selves the confidence to ask: which confidence is excited
by men as well as by angels” (De Serm. Dom. in Monte
in us chiefly by the consideration of His charity in our
ii, 6). Hence these three petitions will be perfectly ful-
regard, whereby he wills our good—wherefore we say:
filled in the life to come; while the other four, according
“Our Father”; and of His excellence, whereby He is able
to Augustine (Enchiridion cxv), belong to the needs of the
to fulfil it—wherefore we say: “Who art in heaven.”
present life
Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?
IIa IIae q. 83 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that prayer is not proper
the Apostle says of the Holy Ghost (Rom. 8:26): “The
to the rational creature. Asking and receiving apparently
Spirit. . . asketh for us.”
belong to the same subject. But receiving is becoming
Objection 2.
Angels are above rational creatures,
also to uncreated Persons, viz. the Son and Holy Ghost.
since they are intellectual substances. Now prayer is be-
Therefore it is competent to them to pray: for the Son said
coming to the angels, wherefore we read in the Ps. 96:7:
(Jn. 14:16): “I will ask My [Vulg.: ‘the’] Father,” and
“Adore Him, all you His angels.” Therefore prayer is not
1583
proper to the rational creature.
Reply to Objection 1. Receiving belongs to the Di-
Objection 3. Further, the same subject is fitted to pray vine Persons in respect of their nature, whereas prayer be-as is fitted to call upon God, since this consists chiefly in
longs to one who receives through grace. The Son is said
prayer. But dumb animals are fitted to call upon God, ac-
to ask or pray in respect of His assumed, i.e. His human,
cording to Ps. 146:9, “Who giveth to beasts their food and
nature and not in respect of His Godhead: and the Holy
to the young ravens that call upon Him.” Therefore prayer
Ghost is said to ask, because He makes us ask.
is not proper to the rational creatures.
Reply to Objection 2. As stated in the Ia, q. 79, a. 8,
On the contrary, Prayer is an act of reason, as stated
intellect and reason are not distinct powers in us: but they
above (a. 1). But the rational creature is so called from his
differ as the perfect from the imperfect. Hence intellectual
reason. Therefore prayer is proper to the rational creature.
creatures which are the angels are distinct from rational
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) prayer is an act of creatures, and sometimes are included under them. In this
reason, and consists in beseeching a superior; just as com-
sense prayer is said to be proper to the rational creature.
mand is an act of reason, whereby an inferior is directed
Reply to Objection 3. The young ravens are said to
to something. Accordingly prayer is properly competent
call upon God, on account of the natural desire whereby
to one to whom it is competent to have reason, and a su-
all things, each in its own way, desire to attain the Divine
perior whom he may beseech. Now nothing is above the
goodness. Thus too dumb animals are said to obey God,
Divine Persons; and dumb animals are devoid of reason.
on account of the natural instinct whereby they are moved
Therefore prayer is unbecoming both the Divine Persons
by God.
and dumb animals, and it is proper to the rational creature.
Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?
IIa IIae q. 83 a. 11
Objection 1. It would seem that the saints in heaven
live, we can pray one for another; but that after we are
do not pray for us. A man’s action is more meritorious for
dead, none of our prayers for others can be heard, see-
himself than for others. But the saints in heaven do not
ing that not even the martyrs’ prayers are granted when
merit for themselves, neither do they pray for themselves,
they pray for their blood to be avenged.” But this is abso-
since they are already established in the term. Neither
lutely false, because, since prayers offered for others pro-
therefore do they pray for us.
ceed from charity, as stated above (Aa. 7,8), the greater
Objection 2. Further, the saints conform their will to
the charity of the saints in heaven, the more they pray for
God perfectly, so that they will only what God wills. Now
wayfarers, since the latter can be helped by prayers: and
what God wills is always fulfilled. Therefore it would be
the more closely they are united to God, the more are their
useless for the saints to pray for us.
prayers efficacious: for the Divine order is such that lower
Objection 3. Further, just as the saints in heaven are
beings receive an overflow of the excellence of the higher,
above, so are those in Purgatory, for they can no longer
even as the air receives the brightness of the sun. Where-
sin. Now those in Purgatory do not pray for us, on the
fore it is said of Christ (Heb. 7:25): “Going to God by
contrary we pray for them. Therefore neither do the saints
His own power. . . to make intercession for us”∗. Hence
in heaven pray for us.
Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6): “If the apostles and mar-
Objection 4. Further, if the saints in heaven pray for
tyrs while yet in the body and having to be solicitous for
us, the prayers of the higher saints would be more effica-
themselves, can pray for others, how much more now that
cious; and so we ought not to implore the help of the lower
they have the crown of victory and triumph.”
saints’ prayers but only of those of the higher saints.
Reply to Objection 1. The saints in heaven, since
Objection 5. Further, the soul of Peter is not Peter. If they are blessed, have no lack of bliss, save that of the
therefore the souls of the saints pray for us, so long as they
body’s glory, and for this they pray. But they pray for us
are separated from their bodies, we ought not to call upon
who lack the ultimate perfection of bliss: and their prayers
Saint Peter, but on his soul, to pray for us: yet the Church
are efficacious in impetrating through their previous mer-
does the contrary. The saints therefore do not pray for us,
its and through God’s acceptance.
at least before the resurrection.
Reply to Objection 2. The saints impetrate what ever
On the contrary, It is written (2 Macc. 15:14): “This
God wishes to take place through their prayers: and they
is. . . he that prayeth much for the people, and for all the
pray for that which they deem will be granted through
holy city, Jeremias the prophet of God.”
their prayers according to God’s will.
I answer that, As Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6),
Reply to Objection 3. Those who are in Purgatory
the error of Vigilantius consisted in saying that “while we
though they are above us on account of their impeccabil-
∗ Vulg.: ‘He is able to save for ever them that come to God by Him, always living to make intercession for us.’
1584
ity, yet they are below us as to the pains which they suffer: efficacious, either because he is implored with greater de-and in this respect they are not in a condition to pray, but
votion, or because God wishes to make known his sanc-
rather in a condition that requires us to pray for them.
tity.
Reply to Objection 4. It is God’s will that inferior
Reply to Objection 5. It is because the saints while
beings should be helped by all those that are above them,
living merited to pray for us, that we invoke them under
wherefore we ought to pray not only to the higher but also
the names by which they were known in this life, and by
to the lower saints; else we should have to implore the
which they are better known to us: and also in order to in-
mercy of God alone. Nevertheless it happens sometime
dicate our belief in the resurrection, according to the say-
that prayers addressed to a saint of lower degree are more
ing of Ex. 3:6, “I am the God of Abraham,” etc.
Whether prayer should be vocal?
IIa IIae q. 83 a. 12
Objection 1. It would seem that prayer ought not to be
we arouse ourselves more effectively to an increase of
vocal. As stated above (a. 4), prayer is addressed chiefly
holy desires.” Hence then alone should we use words and
to God. Now God knows the language of the heart. There-
such like signs when they help to excite the mind inter-
fore it is useless to employ vocal prayer.
nally. But if they distract or in any way impede the mind
Objection 2. Further, prayer should lift man’s mind
we should abstain from them; and this happens chiefly
to God, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2). But words, like other
to those whose mind is sufficiently prepared for devotion
sensible objects, prevent man from ascending to God by
without having recourse to those signs. Wherefore the
contemplation. Therefore we should not use words in our
Psalmist (Ps. 26:8) said: “My heart hath said to Thee:
prayers.
‘My face hath sought Thee,’ ” and we read of Anna (1
Objection 3. Further, prayer should be offered to
Kings 1:13) that “she spoke in her heart.” Secondly, the
God in secret, according to Mat. 6:6, “But thou, when
voice is used in praying as though to pay a debt, so that
thou shalt pray, enter into thy chamber, and having shut
man may serve God with all that he has from God, that is
the door, pray to thy Father in secret.” But prayer loses
to say, not only with his mind, but also with his body: and
its secrecy by being expressed vocally. Therefore prayer
this applies to prayer considered especially as satisfactory.
should not be vocal.
Hence it is written (Osee 14:3): “Take away all iniquity,
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 141:2): “I cried to
and receive the good: and we will render the calves of our
the Lord with my voice, with my voice I made supplica-
lips.” Thirdly, we have recourse to vocal prayer, through
tion to the Lord.”
a certain overflow from the soul into the body, through
I answer that, Prayer is twofold, common and indi-
excess of feeling, according to Ps. 15:9, “My heart hath
vidual. Common prayer is that which is offered to God
been glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced.”
by the ministers of the Church representing the body of
Reply to Objection 1. Vocal prayer is employed, not
the faithful: wherefore such like prayer should come to
in order to tell God something He does not know, but in
the knowledge of the whole people for whom it is offered:
order to lift up the mind of the person praying or of other
and this would not be possible unless it were vocal prayer.
persons to God.
Therefore it is reasonably ordained that the ministers of
Reply to Objection 2. Words about other matters dis-
the Church should say these prayers even in a loud voice,
tract the mind and hinder the devotion of those who pray:
so that they may come to the knowledge of all.
but words signifying some object of devotion lift up the
On the other hand individual prayer is that which is
mind, especially one that is less devout.
offered by any single person, whether he pray for him-
Reply to Objection 3. As Chrysostom says∗, “Our
self or for others; and it is not essential to such a prayer
Lord forbids one to pray in presence of others in order
as this that it be vocal. And yet the voice is employed
that one may be seen by others. Hence when you pray, do
in such like prayers for three reasons. First, in order to
nothing strange to draw men’s attention, either by shout-
excite interior devotion, whereby the mind of the person
ing so as to be heard by others, or by openly striking the
praying is raised to God, because by means of external
heart, or extending the hands, so as to be seen by many.
signs, whether of words or of deeds, the human mind is
And yet, “according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in
moved as regards apprehension, and consequently also as
Monte ii, 3), “it is not wrong to be seen by men, but to do
regards the affections. Hence Augustine says (ad Probam.
this or that in order to be seen by men.”
Ep. cxxx, 9) that “by means of words and other signs
∗ Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 1585
Whether attention is a necessary condition of prayer?
IIa IIae q. 83 a. 13
Objection 1. It would seem that attention is a neces-
intention is lacking, prayer lacks both merit and impetra-
sary condition of prayer. It is written (Jn. 4:24): “God
tion: because, as Gregory‡ says, “God hears not the prayer
is a spirit, and they that adore Him must adore Him in
of those who pay no attention to their prayer.” The third
spirit and in truth.” But prayer is not in spirit unless it be
effect of prayer is that which it produces at once; this is
attentive. Therefore attention is a necessary condition of
the spiritual refreshment of the mind, and for this effect
prayer.
attention is a necessary condition: wherefore it is written
Objection 2. Further, prayer is “the ascent of the mind
(1 Cor. 14:14): “If I pray in a tongue. . . my understanding
to God”∗. But the mind does not ascend to God if the
is without fruit.”
prayer is inattentive. Therefore attention is a necessary
It must be observed, however, that there are three
condition of prayer.
kinds of attention that can be brought to vocal prayer: one
Objection 3. Further, it is a necessary condition of
which attends to the words, lest we say them wrong, an-
prayer that it should be altogether sinless. Now if a man
other which attends to the sense of the words, and a third,
allows his mind to wander while praying he is not free of
which attends to the end of prayer, namely, God, and to
sin, for he seems to make light of God; even as if he were
the thing we are praying for. That last kind of attention is
to speak to another man without attending to what he was
most necessary, and even idiots are capable of it. More-
saying. Hence Basil says† that the “Divine assistance is to
over this attention, whereby the mind is fixed on God, is
be implored, not lightly, nor with a mind wandering hither
sometimes so strong that the mind forgets all other things,
and thither: because he that prays thus not only will not
as Hugh of St. Victor states§.
obtain what he asks, nay rather will he provoke God to
Reply to Objection 1. To pray in spirit and in truth is
anger.” Therefore it would seem a necessary condition of
to set about praying through the instigation of the Spirit,
prayer that it should be attentive.
even though afterwards the mind wander through weak-
On the contrary, Even holy men sometimes suffer
ness.
from a wandering of the mind when they pray, according
Reply to Objection 2. The human mind is unable
to Ps. 39:13, “My heart hath forsaken me.”
to remain aloft for long on account of the weakness of
I answer that, This question applies chiefly to vocal
nature, because human weakness weighs down the soul
prayer. Accordingly we must observe that a thing is nec-
to the level of inferior things: and hence it is that when,
essary in two ways. First, a thing is necessary because
while praying, the mind ascends to God by contemplation,
thereby the end is better obtained: and thus attention is
of a sudden it wanders off through weakness.
absolutely necessary for prayer. Secondly, a thing is said
Reply to Objection 3. Purposely to allow one’s mind
to be necessary when without it something cannot obtain
to wander in prayer is sinful and hinders the prayer from
its effect. Now the effect of prayer is threefold. The first is having fruit. It is against this that Augustine says in his
an effect which is common to all acts quickened by char-
Rule (Ep. ccxi): “When you pray God with psalms and
ity, and this is merit. In order to realize this effect, it is
hymns, let your mind attend to that which your lips pro-
not necessary that prayer should be attentive throughout;
nounce.” But to wander in mind unintentionally does not
because the force of the original intention with which one
deprive prayer of its fruit. Hence Basil says (De Constit.
sets about praying renders the whole prayer meritorious,
Monach. i): “If you are so truly weakened by sin that you
as is the case with other meritorious acts. The second ef-
are unable to pray attentively, strive as much as you can to
fect of prayer is proper thereto, and consists in impetra-
curb yourself, and God will pardon you, seeing that you
tion: and again the original intention, to which God looks
are unable to stand in His presence in a becoming manner,
chiefly, suffices to obtain this effect. But if the original
not through negligence but through frailty.”
Whether prayer should last a long time?
IIa IIae q. 83 a. 14
Objection 1. It would seem that prayer should not be
Now a desire is all the holier according as it is centered
continual. It is written (Mat. 6:7): “When you are pray-
on one thing, according to Ps. 26:4, “One thing I have
ing, speak not much.” Now one who prays a long time
asked of the Lord, this will I seek after.” Therefore the
needs to speak much, especially if his be vocal prayer.
shorter prayer is, the more is it acceptable to God.
Therefore prayer should not last a long time.
Objection 3.
Further, it seems to be wrong to
Objection 2.
Further, prayer expresses the desire.
transgress the limits fixed by God, especially in mat-
∗ Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii, 24
† De Constit. Monach. i
‡ Hugh St. Victor, Expos. in Reg. S. Aug. iii
§ De Modo Orandi ii
1586
ters concerning Divine worship, according to Ex. 19:21: prayer slacken and languish, through the strain being pro-
“Charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass
longed. By so doing they make it sufficiently clear not
the limits to see the Lord, and a very great multitude of
only that this attention must not be forced if we are un-
them should perish.” But God has fixed for us the limits
able to keep it up, but also that if we are able to continue,
of prayer by instituting the Lord’s Prayer (Mat. 6). There-
it should not be broken off too soon.” And just as we must
fore it is not right to prolong our prayer beyond its limits.
judge of this in private prayers by considering the atten-
Objection 4. On the contrary, It would seem that we
tion of the person praying, so too, in public prayers we
ought to pray continually. For our Lord said (Lk. 18:1):
must judge of it by considering the devotion of the peo-
“We ought always to pray, and not to faint”: and it is writ-
ple.
ten (1 Thess. 5:17): “Pray without ceasing.”
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (ad Probam.
I answer that, We may speak about prayer in two
Ep. cxxx), “to pray with many words is not the same as to
ways: first, by considering it in itself; secondly, by con-
pray long; to speak long is one thing, to be devout long is
sidering it in its cause. The not cause of prayer is the
another. For it is written that our Lord passed the whole
desire of charity, from which prayer ought to arise: and
night in prayer, and that He ‘prayed the longer’ in order
this desire ought to be in us continually, either actually
to set us an example.” Further on he says: “When pray-
or virtually, for the virtue of this desire remains in what-
ing say little, yet pray much so long as your attention is
ever we do out of charity; and we ought to “do all things
fervent. For to say much in prayer is to discuss your need
to the glory of God” (1 Cor. 10:31). From this point of
in too many words: whereas to pray much is to knock at
view prayer ought to be continual: wherefore Augustine
the door of Him we pray, by the continuous and devout
says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 9): “Faith, hope and char-
clamor of the heart. Indeed this business is frequently
ity are by themselves a prayer of continual longing.” But
done with groans rather than with words, with tears rather
prayer, considered in itself, cannot be continual, because
than with speech.”
we have to be busy about other works, and, as Augustine
Reply to Objection 2. Length of prayer consists, not
says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9), “we pray to God with our
in praying for many things, but in the affections persisting
lips at certain intervals and seasons, in order to admon-
in the desire of one thing.
ish ourselves by means of such like signs, to take note of
Reply to Objection 3. Our Lord instituted this prayer,
the amount of our progress in that desire, and to arouse
not that we might use no other words when we pray, but
ourselves more eagerly to an increase thereof.” Now the
that in our prayers we might have none but these things in
quantity of a thing should be commensurate with its end,
view, no matter how we express them or think of them.
for instance the quantity of the dose should be commensu-
Reply to Objection 4. One may pray continually, ei-
rate with health. And so it is becoming that prayer should
ther through having a continual desire, as stated above; or
last long enough to arouse the fervor of the interior desire:
through praying at certain fixed times, though interrupt-
and when it exceeds this measure, so that it cannot be con-
edly; or by reason of the effect, whether in the person who
tinued any longer without causing weariness, it should be
prays—because he remains more devout even after pray-
discontinued. Wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep.
ing, or in some other person—as when by his kindness a
cxxx): “It is said that the brethren in Egypt make frequent
man incites another to pray for him, even after he himself
but very short prayers, rapid ejaculations, as it were, lest
has ceased praying.
that vigilant and erect attention which is so necessary in
Whether prayer is meritorious?
IIa IIae q. 83 a. 15
Objection 1. It would seem that prayer is not merito-
Objection 3. Further, prayer is based chiefly on faith,
rious. All merit proceeds from grace. But prayer precedes
according to James 1:6, “But let him ask in faith, nothing
grace, since even grace is obtained by means of prayer ac-
wavering.” Now faith is not sufficient for merit, as in-
cording to Lk. 11:13, ”(How much more) will your Father
stanced in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore prayer
from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask Him!”
is not a meritorious act.
Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.
On the contrary, A gloss on the words of Ps. 34:13,
Objection 2. Further, if prayer merits anything, this
“My prayer shall be turned into my bosom,” explains them
would seem to be chiefly that which is besought in prayer.
as meaning, “if my prayer does not profit them, yet shall
Yet it does not always merit this, because even the saints’
not I be deprived of my reward.” Now reward is not due
prayers are frequently not heard; thus Paul was not heard
save to merit. Therefore prayer is meritorious.
when he besought the sting of the flesh to be removed
I answer that, As stated above (a. 13) prayer, besides
from him. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.
causing spiritual consolation at the time of praying, has a
1587
twofold efficacy in respect of a future effect, namely, effi-sin, which would be an impious prayer. And sometimes
cacy in meriting and efficacy in impetrating. Now prayer,
it is not necessary for salvation, nor yet manifestly con-
like any other virtuous act, is efficacious in meriting, be-
trary thereto; and then although he who prays may merit
cause it proceeds from charity as its root, the proper ob-
eternal life by praying, yet he does not merit to obtain
ject of which is the eternal good that we merit to enjoy.
what he asks for. Hence Augustine says (Liber. Sentent.
Yet prayer proceeds from charity through the medium of
Prosperi sent. ccxii): “He who faithfully prays God for
religion, of which prayer is an act, as stated above (a. 3),
the necessaries of this life, is both mercifully heard, and
and with the concurrence of other virtues requisite for the
mercifully not heard. For the physician knows better than
goodness of prayer, viz. humility and faith. For the of-
the sick man what is good for the disease.” For this rea-
fering of prayer itself to God belongs to religion, while
son, too, Paul was not heard when he prayed for the re-
the desire for the thing. that we pray to be accomplished
moval of the sting in his flesh, because this was not ex-
belongs to charity. Faith is necessary in reference to God
pedient. If, however, we pray for something that is useful
to Whom we pray; that is, we need to believe that we can
for our beatitude, through being conducive to salvation,
obtain from Him what we seek. Humility is necessary on
we merit it not only by praying, but also by doing other
the part of the person praying, because he recognizes his
good deeds: therefore without any doubt we receive what
neediness. Devotion too is necessary: but this belongs to
we ask for, yet when we ought to receive it: “since cer-
religion, for it is its first act and a necessary condition of
tain things are not denied us, but are deferred that they
all its secondary acts, as stated above (q. 82, Aa. 1,2).
may be granted at a suitable time,” according to Augus-
As to its efficacy in impetrating, prayer derives this
tine (Tract. cii in Joan.): and again this may be hindered
from the grace of God to Whom we pray, and Who in-
if we persevere not in asking for it. Wherefore Basil says
stigates us to pray. Wherefore Augustine says (De Verb.
(De Constit. Monast. i): “The reason why sometimes
Dom., Serm. cv, 1): “He would not urge us to ask, unless
thou hast asked and not received, is because thou hast
He were willing to give”; and Chrysostom∗ says: “He
asked amiss, either inconsistently, or lightly, or because
never refuses to grant our prayers, since in His loving-
thou hast asked for what was not good for thee, or be-
kindness He urged us not to faint in praying.”
cause thou hast ceased asking.” Since, however, a man
Reply to Objection 1. Neither prayer nor any other
cannot condignly merit eternal life for another, as stated
virtuous act is meritorious without sanctifying grace. And
above ( Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 6), it follows that sometimes
yet even that prayer which impetrates sanctifying grace
one cannot condignly merit for another things that pertain
proceeds from some grace, as from a gratuitous gift, since
to eternal life. For this reason we are not always heard
the very act of praying is “a gift of God,” as Augustine
when we pray for others, as stated above (a. 7, ad 2,3).
states (De Persever. xxiii).
Hence it is that four conditions are laid down; namely,
Reply to Objection 2. Sometimes the merit of prayer
to ask—“for ourselves—things necessary for salvation—
regards chiefly something distinct from the object of one’s
piously—perseveringly”; when all these four concur, we
petition. For the chief object of merit is beatitude, whereas
always obtain what we ask for.
the direct object of the petition of prayer extends some-
Reply to Objection 3.
Prayer depends chiefly on
times to certain other things, as stated above (Aa. 6,7).
faith, not for its efficacy in meriting, because thus it de-
Accordingly if this other thing that we ask for ourselves be
pends chiefly on charity, but for its efficacy in impetrat-
not useful for our beatitude, we do not merit it; and some-
ing, because it is through faith that man comes to know
times by asking for and desiring such things we lose merit
of God’s omnipotence and mercy, which are the source
for instance if we ask of God the accomplishment of some
whence prayer impetrates what it asks for.
Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by their prayers?
IIa IIae q. 83 a. 16
Objection 1. It would seem that sinners impetrate
what they merit, as stated above (a. 15, ad 2). But sinners
nothing from God by their prayers. It is written (Jn. 9:31):
cannot merit anything since they lack grace and charity
“We know that God doth not hear sinners”; and this agrees
which is the “power of godliness,” according to a gloss on
with the saying of Prov. 28:9, “He that turneth away his
2 Tim. 3:5, “Having an appearance indeed of godliness,
ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomina-
but denying the power thereof.” and so their prayer is im-
tion.” Now an abominable prayer impetrates nothing from
pious, and yet piety it required in order that prayer may
God. Therefore sinners impetrate nothing from God.
be impetrative, as stated above (a. 15, ad 2). Therefore
Objection 2. Further, the just impetrate from God
sinners impetrate nothing by their prayers.
∗ Cf. Catena Aurea of St. Thomas on Lk. 18. The words as quoted are not to be found in the words of Chrysostom
† Hom. xiv in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom
1588
Objection 3. Further, Chrysostom† says: “The Fa-xliv super Joan.), these words were spoken by the blind
ther is unwilling to hear the prayer which the Son has not
man before being anointed, i.e. perfectly enlightened, and
inspired.” Now in the prayer inspired by Christ we say:
consequently lack authority. And yet there is truth in the
“Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that tres-
saying if it refers to a sinner as such, in which sense also
pass against us”: and sinners do not fulfil this. Therefore
the sinner’s prayer is said to be an abomination.
either they lie in saying this, and so are unworthy to be
Reply to Objection 2. There can be no godliness in
heard, or, if they do not say it, they are not heard, because
the sinner’s prayer as though his prayer were quickened
they do not observe the form of prayer instituted by Christ.
by a habit of virtue: and yet his prayer may be godly in so
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xliv, super
far as he asks for something pertaining to godliness. Even
Joan.): “If God were not to hear sinners, the publican
so a man who has not the habit of justice is able to will
would have vainly said: Lord, be merciful to me a sin-
something just, as stated above (q. 59, a. 2). And though
ner”; and Chrysostom∗ says: “Everyone that asketh shall
his prayer is not meritorious, it can be impetrative, be-
receive, that is to say whether he be righteous or sinful.”
cause merit depends on justice, whereas impetration rests
I answer that, In the sinner, two things are to be con-
on grace.
sidered: his nature which God loves, and the sin which He
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (a. 7, ad 1)
hates. Accordingly when a sinner prays for something as
the Lord’s Prayer is pronounced in the common person of
sinner, i.e. in accordance with a sinful desire, God hears
the whole Church: and so if anyone say the Lord’s Prayer
him not through mercy but sometimes through vengeance
while unwilling to forgive his neighbor’s trespasses, he
when He allows the sinner to fall yet deeper into sin. For
lies not, although his words do not apply to him person-
“God refuses in mercy what He grants in anger,” as Au-
ally: for they are true as referred to the person of the
gustine declares (Tract. lxxiii in Joan.). On the other hand
Church, from which he is excluded by merit, and con-
God hears the sinner’s prayer if it proceed from a good
sequently he is deprived of the fruit of his prayer. Some-
natural desire, not out of justice, because the sinner does
times, however, a sinner is prepared to forgive those who
not merit to be heard, but out of pure mercy†, provided
have trespassed against him, wherefore his prayers are
however he fulfil the four conditions given above, namely,
heard, according to Ecclus. 28:2, “Forgive thy neighbor
that he beseech for himself things necessary for salvation,
if he hath hurt thee, and then shall thy sins be forgiven to
piously and perseveringly.
thee when thou prayest.”
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine states (Tract.
Whether the parts of prayer are fittingly described as supplications, prayers, inter-IIa IIae q. 83 a. 17
cessions, and thanksgivings?
Objection 1. It would seem that the parts of prayer
proach God Whom he prays: this is signified in the word
are unfittingly described as supplications, prayers, inter-
“prayer,” because prayer is “the raising up of one’s mind
cessions, and thanksgivings. Supplication would seem to
to God.” The second is that there should be a petition,
be a kind of adjuration. Yet, according to Origen (Super
and this is signified in the word “intercession.” In this
Matth. Tract. xxxv), “a man who wishes to live according
case sometimes one asks for something definite, and then
to the gospel need not adjure another, for if it be unlawful
some say it is “intercession” properly so called, or we may
to swear, it is also unlawful to adjure.” Therefore suppli-
ask for some thing indefinitely, for instance to be helped
cation is unfittingly reckoned a part of prayer.
by God, or we may simply indicate a fact, as in Jn. 11:3,
Objection 2. Further, according to Damascene (De
“Behold, he whom Thou lovest is sick,” and then they call
Fide Orth. iii, 24), “to pray is to ask becoming things
it “insinuation.” The third condition is the reason for im-
of God.” Therefore it is unfitting to distinguish “prayers”
petrating what we ask for: and this either on the part of
from “intercessions.”
God, or on the part of the person who asks. The reason of
Objection 3. Further, thanksgivings regard the past,
impetration on the part of God is His sanctity, on account
while the others regard the future. But the past precedes
of which we ask to be heard, according to Dan. 9:17,18,
the future. Therefore thanksgivings are unfittingly placed
“For Thy own sake, incline, O God, Thy ear”; and to this
after the others.
pertains “supplication” [obsecratio] which means a plead-
On the contrary, suffices the authority of the Apostle
ing through sacred things, as when we say, “Through Thy
(1 Tim. 2:1).
nativity, deliver us, O Lord.” The reason for impetration
I answer that, Three conditions are requisite for
on the part of the person who asks is “thanksgiving”; since
prayer.
First, that the person who prays should ap-
“through giving thanks for benefits received we merit to
∗ Hom. xviii of the same Opus Imperfectum
† Cf. a. 15, ad 1
1589
receive yet greater benefits,” as we say in the collect‡.
ers; thanksgiving is offered by the mind to God in ineffa-
Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 2:1 says that “in the Mass, the
ble ecstasy.” The first explanation, however, is the better.
consecration is preceded by supplication,” in which cer-
Reply to Objection 1. “Supplication” is an adjuration
tain sacred things are called to mind; that “prayers are
not for the purpose of compelling, for this is forbidden,
in the consecration itself,” in which especially the mind
but in order to implore mercy.
should be raised up to God; and that “intercessions are in
Reply to Objection 2. “Prayer” in the general sense
the petitions that follow, and thanksgivings at the end.”
includes all the things mentioned here; but when distin-
We may notice these four things in several of the
guished from the others it denotes properly the ascent to
Church’s collects. Thus in the collect of Trinity Sunday
God.
the words, “Almighty eternal God” belong to the offering
Reply to Objection 3. Among things that are diverse
up of prayer to God; the words, “Who hast given to Thy
the past precedes the future; but the one and same thing
servants,” etc. belong to thanksgiving; the words, “grant,
is future before it is past. Hence thanksgiving for other
we beseech Thee,” belong to intercession; and the words
benefits precedes intercession: but one and the same ben-
at the end, “Through Our Lord,” etc. belong to supplica-
efit is first sought, and finally, when it has been received,
tion.
we give thanks for it. Intercession is preceded by prayer
In the “Conferences of the Fathers” (ix, cap. 11, seqq.)
whereby we approach Him of Whom we ask: and prayer
we read: “Supplication is bewailing one’s sins; prayer is
is preceded by supplication, whereby through the consid-
vowing something to God; intercession is praying for oth-
eration of God’s goodness we dare approach Him.
‡ Ember Friday in September and Postcommunion of the common of a Confessor Bishop 1590
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 84
Of Adoration
(In Three Articles)
In due sequence we must consider the external acts of latria, and in the first place, adoration whereby one uses one’s body to reverence God; secondly, those acts whereby some external thing is offered to God; thirdly, those acts whereby something belonging to God is assumed.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether adoration is an act of latria?
(2) Whether adoration denotes an internal or an external act?
(3) Whether adoration requires a definite place?
Whether adoration is an act of latria or religion?
IIa IIae q. 84 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that adoration is not an
chief is adoration: yet there is one thing which is offered
act of latria or religion. The worship of religion is due
to God alone, and that is sacrifice. Hence Augustine says
to God alone. But adoration is not due to God alone:
(De Civ. Dei x, 4): “Many tokens of Divine worship are
since we read (Gn. 18:2) that Abraham adored the angels;
employed in doing honor to men, either through excessive
and (3 Kings 1:23) that the prophet Nathan, when he was
humility, or through pernicious flattery; yet so that those
come in to king David, “worshiped him bowing down to
to whom these honors are given are recognized as being
the ground.” Therefore adoration is not an act of religion.
men to whom we owe esteem and reverence and even ado-
Objection 2. Further, the worship of religion is due
ration if they be far above us. But who ever thought it his
to God as the object of beatitude, according to Augustine
duty to sacrifice to any other than one whom he either
(De Civ. Dei x, 3): whereas adoration is due to Him by
knew or deemed or pretended to be a God?” Accordingly
reason of His majesty, since a gloss on Ps. 28:2, “Adore
it was with the reverence due to an excellent creature that
ye the Lord in His holy court,” says: “We pass from these
Nathan adored David; while it was the reverence due to
courts into the court where we adore His majesty.” There-
God with which Mardochai refused to adore Aman fear-
fore adoration is not an act of latria.
ing “lest he should transfer the honor of his God to a man”
Objection 3. Further, the worship of one same reli-
(Esther 13:14).
gion is due to the three Persons. But we do not adore the
Again with the reverence due to an excellent creature
three Persons with one adoration, for we genuflect at each
Abraham adored the angels, as did also Josue (Jos. 5:15):
separate invocation of Them∗. Therefore adoration is nol
though we may understand them to have adored, with the
an act of latria.
adoration of latria, God Who appeared and spoke to them
On the contrary, are the words quoted Mat. 4:10:
in the guise of an angel. It was with the reverence due
“The Lord thy God shalt thou adore and Him only shalt
to God that John was forbidden to adore the angel (Apoc.
thou serve.”
22:9), both to indicate the dignity which he had acquired
I answer that, Adoration is directed to the reverence
through Christ, whereby man is made equal to an angel:
of the person adored. Now it is evident from what we
wherefore the same text goes on: “I am thy fellow-servant
have said (q. 81, Aa. 2,4) that it is proper to religion to
and of thy brethren”; as also to exclude any occasion of
show reverence to God. Hence the adoration whereby we
idolatry, wherefore the text continues: “Adore God.”
adore God is an act of religion.
Reply to Objection 2. Every Divine excellency is in-
Reply to Objection 1. Reverence is due to God on ac-
cluded in His majesty: to which it pertains that we should
count of His excellence, which is communicated to certain
be made happy in Him as in the sovereign good.
creatures not in equal measure, but according to a measure
Reply to Objection 3. Since there is one excellence
of proportion; and so the reverence which we pay to God,
of the three Divine Persons, one honor and reverence is
and which belongs to latria, differs from the reverence
due to them and consequently one adoration. It is to rep-
which we pay to certain excellent creatures; this belongs
resent this that where it is related (Gn. 18:2) that three
to dulia, and we shall speak of it further on (q. 103). And
men appeared to Abraham, we are told that he addressed
since external actions are signs of internal reverence, cer-
one, saying: “Lord, if I have found favor in thy sight,” etc.
tain external tokens significative of reverence are offered
The triple genuflection represents the Trinity of Persons,
to creatures of excellence, and among these tokens the
not a difference of adoration.
∗ At the adoration of the Cross, on Good Friday
1591
Whether adoration denotes an action of the body?
IIa IIae q. 84 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that adoration does not
in an exterior humbling of the body. And since in all acts
denote an act of the body. It is written (Jn. 4:23): “The
of latria that which is without is referred to that which is
true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth.”
within as being of greater import, it follows that exterior
Now what is done in spirit has nothing to do with an act
adoration is offered on account of interior adoration, in
of the body. Therefore adoration does not denote an act of
other words we exhibit signs of humility in our bodies in
the body.
order to incite our affections to submit to God, since it is
Objection 2. Further, the word adoration is taken
connatural to us to proceed from the sensible to the intel-
from “oratio” [prayer]. But prayer consists chiefly in an
ligible.
interior act, according to 1 Cor. 14:15, “I will pray with
Reply to Objection 1. Even bodily adoration is done
the spirit, I will pray also with the understanding.” There-
in spirit, in so far as it proceeds from and is directed to
fore adoration denotes chiefly a spiritual act.
spiritual devotion.
Objection 3. Further, acts of the body pertain to sensi-
Reply to Objection 2. Just as prayer is primarily in
ble knowledge: whereas we approach God not by bodily
the mind, and secondarily expressed in words, as stated
but by spiritual sense. Therefore adoration does not de-
above (q. 83, a. 12), so too adoration consists chiefly in
note an act of the body.
an interior reverence of God, but secondarily in certain
On the contrary, A gloss on Ex. 20:5, “Thou shalt
bodily signs of humility; thus when we genuflect we sig-
not adore them, nor serve them,” says: “Thou shalt nei-
nify our weakness in comparison with God, and when we
ther worship them in mind, nor adore them outwardly.”
prostrate ourselves we profess that we are nothing of our-
I answer that, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv,
selves.
12), since we are composed of a twofold nature, intel-
Reply to Objection 3. Though we cannot reach God
lectual and sensible, we offer God a twofold adoration;
with the senses, our mind is urged by sensible signs to
namely, a spiritual adoration, consisting in the internal de-
approach God.
votion of the mind; and a bodily adoration, which consists
Whether adoration requires a definite place?
IIa IIae q. 84 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that adoration does not
place is required for adoration, not chiefly, as though it
require a definite place. It is written (Jn. 4:21): “The hour
were essential thereto, but by reason of a certain fitting-
cometh, when you shall neither on this mountain, nor in
ness, like other bodily signs.
Jerusalem, adore the Father”; and the same reason seems
Reply to Objection 1. By these words our Lord fore-
to apply to other places. Therefore a definite place is not
told the cessation of adoration, both according to the rite
necessary for adoration.
of the Jews who adored in Jerusalem, and according to
Objection 2. Further, exterior adoration is directed to
the rite of the Samaritans who adored on Mount Garizim.
interior adoration. But interior adoration is shown to God
For both these rites ceased with the advent of the spiri-
as existing everywhere. Therefore exterior adoration does
tual truth of the Gospel, according to which “a sacrifice is
not require a definite place.
offered to God in every place,” as stated in Malach. 1:11.
Objection 3. Further, the same God is adored in the
Reply to Objection 2. A definite place is chosen
New as in the Old Testament. Now in the Old Testament
for adoration, not on account of God Who is adored, as
they adored towards the west, because the door of the
though He were enclosed in a place, but on account of
Tabernacle looked to the east (Ex. 26:18 seqq.). There-
the adorers; and this for three reasons. First, because the
fore for the same reason we ought now to adore towards
place is consecrated, so that those who pray there conceive
the west, if any definite place be requisite for adoration.
a greater devotion and are more likely to be heard, as may
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 56:7): “My house
be seen in the prayer of Solomon (3 Kings 8). Secondly,
shall be called the house of prayer,” which words are also
on account of the sacred mysteries and other signs of ho-
quoted (Jn. 2:16).
liness contained therein. Thirdly, on account of the con-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the chief part of course of many adorers, by reason of which their prayer is
adoration is the internal devotion of the mind, while the
more likely to be heard, according to Mat. 18:20, “Where
secondary part is something external pertaining to bod-
there are two or three gathered together in My name, there
ily signs. Now the mind internally apprehends God as not
am I in the midst of them.”
comprised in a place; while bodily signs must of necessity
Reply to Objection 3.
There is a certain fitting-
be in some definite place and position. Hence a definite
ness in adoring towards the east. First, because the Di-
1592
vine majesty is indicated in the movement of the heavens Who mounteth above the heaven of heavens to the east
which is from the east. Secondly, because Paradise was
(Ps. 67:34), and is expected to come from the east, ac-
situated in the east according to the Septuagint version of
cording to Mat. 24:27, “As lightning cometh out of the
Gn. 2:8, and so we signify our desire to return to Par-
east, and appeareth even into the west; so shall also the
adise. Thirdly, on account of Christ Who is “the light
coming of the Son of Man be.”
of the world”∗, and is called “the Orient” (Zech. 6:12).
∗ Jn. 8:12; 9:5
1593
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 85
Of Sacrifice
(In Four Articles)
In due sequence we must consider those acts whereby external things are offered to God. These give rise to a twofold consideration: (1) Of things given to God by the faithful; (2) Of vows, whereby something is promised to Him.
Under the first head we shall consider sacrifices, oblations, first-fruits, and tithes. About sacrifices there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature?
(2) Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone?
(3) Whether the offering of a sacrifice is a special act of virtue?
(4) Whether all are bound to offer sacrifice?
Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature?
IIa IIae q. 85 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that offering a sacrifice to
to man is that he should employ sensible signs in order to
God is not of the natural law. Things that are of the natural
signify anything, because he derives his knowledge from
law are common among all men. Yet this is not the case
sensibles. Hence it is a dictate of natural reason that man
with sacrifices: for we read of some, e.g. Melchisedech
should use certain sensibles, by offering them to God in
(Gn. 14:18), offering bread and wine in sacrifice, and of
sign of the subjection and honor due to Him, like those
certain animals being offered by some, and others by oth-
who make certain offerings to their lord in recognition of
ers. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is not of the natu-
his authority. Now this is what we mean by a sacrifice,
ral law.
and consequently the offering of sacrifice is of the natural
Objection 2.
Further, things that are of the natu-
law.
ral law were observed by all just men. Yet we do not
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 95,
read that Isaac offered sacrifice; nor that Adam did so,
a. 2), certain things belong generically to the natural law,
of whom nevertheless it is written (Wis. 10:2) that wis-
while their determination belongs to the positive law; thus
dom “brought him out of his sin.” Therefore the offering
the natural law requires that evildoers should be punished;
of sacrifice is not of the natural law.
but that this or that punishment should be inflicted on
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x,
them is a matter determined by God or by man. In like
5,19) that sacrifices are offered in signification of some-
manner the offering of sacrifice belongs generically to the
thing. Now words which are chief among signs, as he
natural law, and consequently all are agreed on this point,
again says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), “signify, not by
but the determination of sacrifices is established by God
nature but by convention,” according to the Philosopher
or by man, and this is the reason for their difference.
(Peri Herm. i, 2). Therefore sacrifices are not of the natu-
Reply to Objection 2. Adam, Isaac and other just men
ral law.
offered sacrifice to God in a manner befitting the times in
On the contrary, At all times and among all nations
which they lived, according to Gregory, who says (Moral.
there has always been the offering of sacrifices. Now that
iv, 3) that in olden times original sin was remitted through
which is observed by all is seemingly natural. Therefore
the offering of sacrifices. Nor does Scripture mention all
the offering of sacrifices is of the natural law.
the sacrifices of the just, but only those that have some-
I answer that, Natural reason tells man that he is sub-
thing special connected with them. Perhaps the reason
ject to a higher being, on account of the defects which
why we read of no sacrifice being offered by Adam may
he perceives in himself, and in which he needs help and
be that, as the origin of sin is ascribed to him, the origin
direction from someone above him: and whatever this su-
of sanctification ought not to be represented as typified
perior being may be, it is known to all under the name
in him. Isaac was a type of Christ, being himself offered
of God. Now just as in natural things the lower are natu-
in sacrifice; and so there was no need that he should be
rally subject to the higher, so too it is a dictate of natural
represented as offering a sacrifice.
reason in accordance with man’s natural inclination that
Reply to Objection 3. It is natural to man to express
he should tender submission and honor, according to his
his ideas by signs, but the determination of those signs
mode, to that which is above man. Now the mode befitting
depends on man’s pleasure.
1594
Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone?
IIa IIae q. 85 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that sacrifice should not
as its beginning by creation, and its end by beatification:
be offered to the most high God alone. Since sacrifice
and according to the true faith God alone is the creator of
ought to be offered to God, it would seem that it ought
our souls, as stated in the Ia, q. 90, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 118,
to be offered to all such as are partakers of the Godhead.
a. 2, while in Him alone the beatitude of our soul con-
Now holy men are made “partakers of the Divine nature,”
sists, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 8; Ia IIae, q. 2,
according to 2 Pet. 1:4; wherefore of them is it written
a. 8; Ia IIae, q. 3, Aa. 1,7,8). Wherefore just as to God
(Ps. 81:6): “I have said, You are gods”: and angels too
alone ought we to offer spiritual sacrifice, so too ought
are called “sons of God,” according to Job 1:6. Thus sac-
we to offer outward sacrifices to Him alone: even so “in
rifice should be offered to all these.
our prayers and praises we proffer significant words to
Objection 2.
Further, the greater a person is the
Him to Whom in our hearts we offer the things which we
greater the honor due to him from man. Now the angels
designate thereby,” as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x,
and saints are far greater than any earthly princes: and yet
19). Moreover we find that in every country the people
the subjects of the latter pay them much greater honor, by
are wont to show the sovereign ruler some special sign
prostrating before them, and offering them gifts, than is
of honor, and that if this be shown to anyone else, it is a
implied by offering an animal or any other thing in sacri-
crime of high-treason. Therefore, in the Divine law, the
fice. Much more therefore may one offer sacrifice to the
death punishment is assigned to those who offer Divine
angels and saints.
honor to another than God.
Objection 3. Further, temples and altars are raised for
Reply to Objection 1. The name of the Godhead is
the offering of sacrifices. Yet temples and altars are raised
communicated to certain ones, not equally with God, but
to angels and saints. Therefore sacrifices also may be of-
by participation; hence neither is equal honor due to them.
fered to them.
Reply to Objection 2. The offering of a sacrifice is
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:20): “He that
measured not by the value of the animal killed, but by its
sacrificeth to gods shall be put to death, save only to the
signification, for it is done in honor of the sovereign Ruler
Lord.”
of the whole universe. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), a sacrifice is of-Civ. Dei x, 19), “the demons rejoice, not in the stench of
fered in order that something may be represented. Now
corpses, but in receiving divine honors.”
the sacrifice that is offered outwardly represents the in-
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Civ.
ward spiritual sacrifice, whereby the soul offers itself to
Dei viii, 19), “we do not raise temples and priesthoods to
God according to Ps. 50:19, “A sacrifice to God is an af-
the martyrs, because not they but their God is our God.
flicted spirit,” since, as stated above (q. 81, a. 7; q. 84,
Wherefore the priest says not: I offer sacrifice to thee, Pe-
a. 2), the outward acts of religion are directed to the in-
ter or Paul. But we give thanks to God for their triumphs,
ward acts. Again the soul offers itself in sacrifice to God
and urge ourselves to imitate them.”
Whether the offering of sacrifice is a special act of virtue?
IIa IIae q. 85 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the offering of sacri-
the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite
fice is not a special act of virtue. Augustine says (De Civ.
virtue.
Dei x, 6): “A true sacrifice is any work done that we may
Objection 3. Further, a sacrifice is apparently any-
cleave to God in holy fellowship.” But not every good
thing offered to God. Now many things are offered to
work is a special act of some definite virtue. Therefore
God, such as devotion, prayer, tithes, first-fruits, obla-
the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite
tions, and holocausts. Therefore sacrifice does not appear
virtue.
to be a special act of a definite virtue.
Objection 2. Further, the mortification of the body
On the contrary, The law contains special precepts
by fasting belongs to abstinence, by continence belongs
about sacrifices, as appears from the beginning of Leviti-
to chastity, by martyrdom belongs to fortitude. Now all
cus.
these things seem to be comprised in the offering of sac-
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18,
rifice, according to Rom. 12:1, “Present your bodies a
Aa. 6,7), where an act of one virtue is directed to the end
living sacrifice.” Again the Apostle says (Heb. 13:16):
of another virtue it partakes somewhat of its species; thus
“Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sac-
when a man thieves in order to commit fornication, his
rifices God’s favor is obtained.” Now it belongs to charity,
theft assumes, in a sense, the deformity of fornication, so
mercy and liberality to do good and to impart. Therefore
that even though it were not a sin otherwise, it would be
1595
a sin from the very fact that it was directed to fornication.
his body’s good, which is, so to speak, offered to God in
Accordingly, sacrifice is a special act deserving of praise
martyrdom, and abstinence or continency. The third is the
in that it is done out of reverence for God; and for this
good which consists of external things: and of these we
reason it belongs to a definite virtue, viz. religion. But it
offer a sacrifice to God, directly when we offer our pos-
happens that the acts of the other virtues are directed to
session to God immediately, and indirectly when we share
the reverence of God, as when a man gives alms of his
them with our neighbor for God’s sake.
own things for God’s sake, or when a man subjects his
Reply to Objection 3. A “sacrifice,” properly speak-
own body to some affliction out of reverence for God; and
ing, requires that something be done to the thing which is
in this way the acts also of other virtues may be called
offered to God, for instance animals were slain and burnt,
sacrifices. On the other hand there are acts that are not
the bread is broken, eaten, blessed. The very word signi-
deserving of praise save through being done out of rever-
fies this, since “sacrifice” is so called because a man does
ence for God: such acts are properly called sacrifices, and
something sacred [facit sacrum]. On the other hand an
belong to the virtue of religion.
“oblation” is properly the offering of something to God
Reply to Objection 1. The very fact that we wish to
even if nothing be done thereto, thus we speak of offer-
cling to God in a spiritual fellowship pertains to reverence
ing money or bread at the altar, and yet nothing is done to
for God: and consequently the act of any virtue assumes
them. Hence every sacrifice is an oblation, but not con-
the character of a sacrifice through being done in order
versely. “First-fruits” are oblations, because they were of-
that we may cling to God in holy fellowship.
fered to God, according to Dt. 26, but they are not a sacri-
Reply to Objection 2. Man’s good is threefold. There
fice, because nothing sacred was done to them. “Tithes,”
is first his soul’s good which is offered to God in a certain
however, are neither a sacrifice nor an oblation, prop-
inward sacrifice by devotion, prayer and other like inte-
erly speaking, because they are not offered immediately
rior acts: and this is the principal sacrifice. The second is
to God, but to the ministers of Divine worship.
Whether all are bound to offer sacrifices?
IIa IIae q. 85 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that all are not bound to
the New or the Old Law, as for those who were not under
offer sacrifices. The Apostle says (Rom. 3:19): “What
the Law. For those who are under the Law are bound to
things soever the Law speaketh, it speaketh to them that
offer certain definite sacrifices according to the precepts
are in the Law.” Now the law of sacrifices was not given
of the Law, whereas those who were not under the Law
to all, but only to the Hebrew people. Therefore all are
were bound to perform certain outward actions in God’s
not bound to offer sacrifices.
honor, as became those among whom they dwelt, but not
Objection 2. Further, sacrifices are offered to God in
definitely to this or that action. The other outward sacri-
order to signify something. But not everyone is capable
fice is when the outward actions of the other virtues are
of understanding these significations. Therefore not all
performed out of reverence for God; some of which are a
are bound to offer sacrifices.
matter of precept; and to these all are bound, while oth-
Objection 3. Further, priests∗ are so called because
ers are works of supererogation, and to these all are not
they offer sacrifice to God. But all are not priests. There-
bound.
fore not all are bound to offer sacrifices.
Reply to Objection 1. All were not bound to offer
On the contrary, The offering of sacrifices of is of
those particular sacrifices which were prescribed in the
the natural law, as stated above (a. 1). Now all are bound
Law: but they were bound to some sacrifices inward or
to do that which is of the natural law. Therefore all are
outward, as stated above.
bound to offer sacrifice to God.
Reply to Objection 2. Though all do not know ex-
I answer that, Sacrifice is twofold, as stated above
plicitly the power of the sacrifices, they know it implicitly,
(a. 2). The first and principal is the inward sacrifice, which
even as they have implicit faith, as stated above (q. 2, AA
all are bound to offer, since all are obliged to offer to God
6,7).
a devout mind. The other is the outward sacrifice, and
Reply to Objection 3. The priests offer those sacri-
this again is twofold. There is a sacrifice which is de-
fices which are specially directed to the Divine worship,
serving of praise merely through being offered to God in
not only for themselves but also for others. But there are
protestation of our subjection to God: and the obligation
other sacrifices, which anyone can offer to God for him-
of offering this sacrifice was not the same for those under
self as explained above (Aa. 2,3).
∗ ‘Sacerdotes’: Those who give or administer sacred things (sacra dantes): cf. 1 Cor. 4:1
1596
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 86
Of Oblations and First-Fruits
(In Four Articles)
We must next consider oblations and first-fruits. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether any oblations are necessary as a matter of precept?
(2) To whom are oblations due?
(3) of what things they should be made?
(4) In particular, as to first-fruits, whether men are bound to offer them?
Whether men are under a necessity of precept to make oblations?
IIa IIae q. 86 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that men are not bound by
tion of sacrifice to the Lord, his offering shall be of fine
precept to make oblations. Men are not bound, at the time
flour.” If, on the other hand, it be offered with a view to its of the Gospel, to observe the ceremonial precepts of the
remaining entire and being deputed to the worship of God
Old Law, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 103, Aa. 3 ,4). Now
or to the use of His ministers, it will be an oblation and
the offering of oblations is one of the ceremonial precepts
not a sacrifice. Accordingly it is essential to oblations of
of the Old Law, since it is written (Ex. 23:14): “Three
this kind that they be offered voluntarily, according to Ex.
times every year you shall celebrate feasts with Me,” and
25:2, of “every man that offereth of his own accord you
further on (Ex. 23:15): “Thou shalt not appear empty be-
shall take them.” Nevertheless it may happen in four ways
fore Me.” Therefore men are not now under a necessity of
that one is bound to make oblations. First, on account
precept to make oblations.
of a previous agreement: as when a person is granted a
Objection 2. Further, before they are made, oblations
portion of Church land, that he may make certain obla-
depend on man’s will, as appears from our Lord’s say-
tions at fixed times, although this has the character of rent.
ing (Mat. 5:23), “If. . . thou offer thy gift at the altar,” as Secondly, by reason of a previous assignment or promise;
though this were left to the choice of the offerer: and when
as when a man offers a gift among the living, or by will
once oblations have been made, there is no way of offer-
bequeaths to the Church something whether movable or
ing them again. Therefore in no way is a man under a
immovable to be delivered at some future time. Thirdly,
necessity of precept to make oblations.
on account of the need of the Church, for instance if her
Objection 3. Further, if anyone is bound to give a
ministers were without means of support. Fourthly, on
certain thing to the Church, and fails to give it, he can
account of custom; for the faithful are bound at certain
be compelled to do so by being deprived of the Church’s
solemn feasts to make certain customary oblations. In the
sacraments. But it would seem unlawful to refuse the
last two cases, however, the oblation remains voluntary, as
sacraments of the Church to those who refuse to make
regards, to wit, the quantity or kind of the thing offered.
oblations according to a decree of the sixth council∗,
Reply to Objection 1. Under the New Law men are
quoted I, qu. i, can. Nullus: “Let none who dispense
not bound to make oblations on account of legal solemni-
Holy Communion exact anything of the recipient, and if
ties, as stated in Exodus, but on account of certain other
they exact anything let them be deposed.” Therefore it is
reasons, as stated above.
not necessary that men should make oblations.
Reply to Objection 2. Some are bound to make obla-
On the contrary, Gregory says†: “Let every Christian
tions, both before making them, as in the first, third, and.
take care that he offer something to God at the celebration
fourth cases, and after they have made them by assign-
of Mass.”
ment or promise: for they are bound to offer in reality that
I answer that, As stated above (q. 85, a. 3, ad 3),
which has been already offered to the Church by way of
the term “oblation” is common to all things offered for
assignment.
the Divine worship, so that if a thing be offered to be de-
Reply to Objection 3. Those who do not make the
stroyed in worship of God, as though it were being made
oblations they are bound to make may be punished by be-
into something holy, it is both an oblation and a sacrifice.
ing deprived of the sacraments, not by the priest himself to
Wherefore it is written (Ex. 29:18): “Thou shalt offer the
whom the oblations should be made, lest he seem to exact,
whole ram for a burnt-offering upon the altar; it is an obla-
something for bestowing the sacraments, but by someone
tion to the Lord, a most sweet savor of the victim of the
superior to him.
Lord”; and (Lev. 2:1): “When anyone shall offer an obla-
∗ Can. Trullan, xxiii
† Gregory VII; Concil. Roman. v, can. xii
1597
Whether oblations are due to priests alone?
IIa IIae q. 86 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that oblations are not due
the people offer to God concern the priests, not only as
to priests alone. For chief among oblations would seem
regards their turning them to their own use, but also as re-
to be those that are deputed to the sacrifices of victims.
gards the faithful dispensation thereof, by spending them
Now whatever is given to the poor is called a “victim in
partly on things appertaining to the Divine worship, partly
Scripture according to Heb. 13:16, “Do not forget to do
on things touching their own livelihood (since they that
good and to impart, for by such victims [Douay: ‘sacri-
serve the altar partake with the altar, according to 1 Cor.
fices’] God’s favor is obtained. Much more therefore are
9:13), and partly for the good of the poor, who, as far as
oblations due to the poor.
possible, should be supported from the possessions of the
Objection 2. Further, in many parishes monks have a
Church: for our Lord had a purse for the use of the poor,
share in the oblations. Now “the case of clerics is distinct
as Jerome observes on Mat. 17:26, “That we may not
from the case of monks,” as Jerome states∗. Therefore
scandalize them.”
oblations art not due to priests alone.
Reply to Objection 1. Whatever is given to the poor
Objection 3. Further, lay people with the consent of
is not a sacrifice properly speaking; yet it is called a sacri-
the Church buy oblations such as loaves and so forth, and
fice in so far as it is given to them for God’s sake. In like
they do so for no other reason than that they may make use
manner, and for the same reason, it can be called an obla-
thereof themselves. Therefore oblations may have refer-
tion, though not properly speaking, since it is not given
ence to the laity.
immediately to God. Oblations properly so called fall to
On the contrary, A canon of Pope Damasus† quoted
the use of the poor, not by the dispensation of the offerers,
X, qu. i‡, says: “None but the priests whom day by day
but by the dispensation of the priests.
we see serving the Lord may eat and drink of the obla-
Reply to Objection 2. Monks or other religious may
tions which are offered within the precincts of the Holy
receive oblations under three counts. First, as poor, ei-
Church: because in the Old Testament the Lord forbade
ther by the dispensation of the priests, or by ordination of
the children of Israel to eat the sacred loaves, with the ex-
the Church; secondly, through being ministers of the altar,
ception of Aaron and his sons” (Lev. 24:8,9).
and then they can accept oblations that are freely offered;
I answer that, The priest is appointed mediator and
thirdly, if the parishes belong to them, and they can accept
stands, so to speak, “between” the people and God, as we
oblations, having a right to them as rectors of the Church.
read of Moses (Dt. 5:5), wherefore it belongs to him to set
Reply to Objection 3. Oblations when once they are
forth the Divine teachings and sacraments before the peo-
consecrated, such as sacred vessels and vestments, cannot
ple; and besides to offer to the Lord things appertaining
be granted to the use of the laity: and this is the mean-
to the people, their prayers, for instance, their sacrifices
ing of the words of Pope Damasus. But those which are
and oblations. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 5:1): “Every
unconsecrated may be allowed to the use of layfolk by
high priest taken from among men is ordained for men
permission of the priests, whether by way of gift or by
in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up
way of sale.
gifts and sacrifices for sins.” Hence the oblations which
Whether a man may make oblations of whatever he lawfully possesses?
IIa IIae q. 86 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that a man may not make
a dog he has lawfully sold. Therefore it is not lawful to
oblations of whatever he lawfully possesses. According to
make an oblation of whatever we possess lawfully.
human law§ “the whore’s is a shameful trade in what she
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Malachi 1:8): “If
does but not in what she takes,” and consequently what
you offer the lame and the sick, is it not evil?” Yet an ani-
she takes she possesses lawfully. Yet it is not lawful for
mal though lame or sick is a lawful possession. Therefore
her to make an oblation with her gains, according to Dt.
it would seem that not of every lawful possession may one
23:18, “Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet. . . in the make an oblation.
house of the Lord thy God.” Therefore it is not lawful to
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 3:9): “Honor the
make an oblation of whatever one possesses lawfully.
Lord with thy substance.” Now whatever a man possesses
Objection 2. Further, in the same passage it is for-
lawfully belongs to his substance. Therefore he may make
bidden to offer “the price of a dog” in the house of God.
oblations of whatever he possesses lawfully.
But it is evident that a man possesses lawfully the price of
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.
∗ Ep. xiv, ad Heliod.
† Damasus I
‡ Can. Hanc consuetudinem
§ Dig. xii, v, de Condict. ob. turp. vel iniust. caus. 4
1598
Serm. cxiii), “shouldst thou plunder one weaker than Reply to Objection 2. According to the Law, a dog
thyself and give some of the spoil to the judge, if he
was deemed an unclean animal. Yet other unclean animals
should pronounce in thy favor, such is the force of jus-
were redeemed and their price could be offered, according
tice that even thou wouldst not be pleased with him: and
to Lev. 27:27, “If it be an unclean animal, he that offer-
if this should not please thee, neither does it please thy
eth it shall redeem it.” But a dog was neither offered nor
God.” Hence it is written (Ecclus. 34:21): “The offer-
redeemed, both because idolaters used dogs in sacrifices
ing of him that sacrificeth of a thing wrongfully gotten
to their idols, and because they signify robbery, the pro-
is stained.” Therefore it is evident that an oblation must
ceeds of which cannot be offered in oblation. However,
not be made of things unjustly acquired or possessed. In
this prohibition ceased under the New Law.
the Old Law, however, wherein the figure was predomi-
Reply to Objection 3. The oblation of a blind or lame
nant, certain things were reckoned unclean on account of
animal was declared unlawful for three reasons. First, on
their signification, and it was forbidden to offer them. But
account of the purpose for which it was offered, wherefore
in the New Law all God’s creatures are looked upon as
it is written (Malach. 1:8): “If you offer the blind in sacri-
clean, as stated in Titus 1:15: and consequently anything
fice, is it not evil?” and it behooved sacrifices to be with-
that is lawfully possessed, considered in itself, may be of-
out blemish. Secondly, on account of contempt, where-
fered in oblation. But it may happen accidentally that one
fore the same text goes on (Malach. 1:12): “You have pro-
may not make an oblation of what one possesses lawfully;
faned” My name, “in that you say: The table of the Lord is
for instance if it be detrimental to another person, as in the
defiled and that which is laid thereupon is contemptible.”
case of a son who offers to God the means of supporting
Thirdly, on account of a previous vow, whereby a man
his father (which our Lord condemns, Mat. 15:5), or if it
has bound himself to offer without blemish whatever he
give rise to scandal or contempt, or the like.
has vowed: hence the same text says further on (Malach.
Reply to Objection 1. In the Old Law it was forbid-
1:14): “Cursed is the deceitful man that hath in his flock
den to make an offering of the hire of a strumpet on ac-
a male, and making a vow offereth in sacrifice that which
count of its uncleanness, and in the New Law, on account
is feeble to the Lord.” The same reasons avail still in the
of scandal, lest the Church seem to favor sin if she accept
New Law, but when they do not apply the unlawfulness
oblations from the profits of sin.
ceases.
Whether men are bound to pay first-fruits?
IIa IIae q. 86 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that men are not bound
taking the basket containing the first-fruits from the hand
to pay first-fruits. After giving the law of the first-born
of him that bringeth the first-fruits, shall set it before the
the text continues (Ex. 13:9): “It shall be as a sign in
altar of the Lord thy God,” and further on (Dt. 26:10) he
thy hand,” so that, apparently, it is a ceremonial precept.
is commanded to say: “Therefore now I offer the first-
But ceremonial precepts are not to be observed in the New
fruits of the land, which the Lord hath given me.” Now
Law. Neither therefore ought first-fruits to be paid.
the first-fruits were offered for a special reason, namely,
Objection 2. Further, first-fruits were offered to the
in recognition of the divine favor, as though man acknowl-
Lord for a special favor conferred on that people, where-
edged that he had received the fruits of the earth from
fore it is written (Dt. 26:2,3): “Thou shalt take the first of
God, and that he ought to offer something to God in re-
all thy fruits. . . and thou shalt go to the priest that shall be turn, according to 1 Paral 29:14, “We have given Thee
in those days, and say to him: I profess this day before the
what we received of Thy hand.” And since what we offer
Lord thy God, that I am come into the land, for which He
God ought to be something special, hence it is that man
swore to our fathers, that He would give it us.” Therefore
was commanded to offer God his first-fruits, as being a
other nations are not bound to pay first-fruits.
special part of the fruits of the earth: and since a priest
Objection 3. That which one is bound to do should be
is “ordained for the people “in the things that appertain to
something definite. But neither in the New Law nor in the
God” (Heb. 5:1), the first-fruits offered by the people were
Old do we find mention of a definite amount of first-fruits.
granted to the priest’s use.” Wherefore it is written (Num.
Therefore one is not bound of necessity to pay them.
18:8): “The Lord said to Aaron: Behold I have given thee
On the contrary, It is laid down (16, qu. vii, can.
the charge of My first-fruits.” Now it is a point of natural
Decimas): “We confirm the right of priests to tithes and
law that man should make an offering in God’s honor out
first-fruits, and everybody must pay them.”
of the things he has received from God, but that the offer-
I answer that, First-fruits are a kind of oblation, be-
ing should be made to any particular person, or out of his
cause they are offered to God with a certain profession
first-fruits, or in such or such a quantity, was indeed deter-
(Dt. 26); where the same passage continues: “The priest
mined in the Old Law by divine command; but in the New
1599
Law it is fixed by the declaration of the Church, in virtue which the Lord hath given me,” which second motive is
of which men are bound to pay first-fruits according to
common among all people. We may also reply that just
the custom of their country and the needs of the Church’s
as God granted the land of promise to the Jews by a spe-
ministers.
cial favor, so by a general favor He bestowed the lordship
Reply to Objection 1. The ceremonial observances
of the earth on the whole of mankind, according to Ps.
were properly speaking signs of the future, and conse-
113:24, “The earth He has given to the children of men.”
quently they ceased when the foreshadowed truth was ac-
Reply to Objection 3. As Jerome says∗: “According
tually present. But the offering of first-fruits was for a
to the tradition of the ancients the custom arose for those
sign of a past favor, whence arises the duty of acknowl-
who had most to give the priests a fortieth part, and those
edgment in accordance with the dictate of natural reason.
who had least, one sixtieth, in lieu of first-fruits.” Hence
Hence taken in a general sense this obligation remains.
it would seem that first-fruits should vary between these
Reply to Objection 2. First-fruits were offered in the
limits according to the custom of one’s country. And it
Old Law, not only on account of the favor of the promised
was reasonable that the amount of first-fruits should not
land given by God, but also on account of the favor of the
be fixed by law, since, as stated above, first-fruits are of-
fruits of the earth, which were given by God. Hence it
fered by way of oblation, a condition of which is that it
is written (Dt. 26:10): “I offer the first-fruits of the land
should be voluntary.
∗ Comment. in Ezech. 45:13,14; cf. Cap. Decimam, de Decim. Primit. et Oblat.
1600
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 87
Of Tithes
(In Four Articles)
Next we must consider tithes, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether men are bound by precept to pay tithes?
(2) Of what things ought tithes to be paid?
(3) To whom ought they to be paid?
(4) Who ought to pay tithes?
Whether men are bound to pay tithes under a necessity of precept?
IIa IIae q. 87 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that men are not bound
Objection 4.
Further, in the Old Law men were
by precept to pay tithes. The commandment to pay tithes
bound to pay three kinds of tithe. For it is written (Num.
is contained in the Old Law (Lev. 27:30), “All tithes of
18:23,24): “The sons of Levi. . . shall. . . be content with
the land, whether of corn or of the fruits of trees, are the
the oblation of tithes, which I have separated for their uses
Lord’s,” and further on (Lev. 27:32): “Of all the tithes
and necessities.” Again, there were other tithes of which
of oxen and sheep and goats, that pass under the shep-
we read (Dt. 14:22,23): “Every year thou shalt set aside
herd’s rod, every tenth that cometh shall be sanctified to
the tithes of all thy fruits, that the earth bringeth forth year the Lord.” This cannot be reckoned among the moral pre-by year; and thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God in the
cepts, because natural reason does not dictate that one
place which He shall choose.” And there were yet other
ought to give a tenth part, rather than a ninth or eleventh.
tithes, of which it is written (Dt. 14:28): “The third year
Therefore it is either a judicial or a ceremonial precept.
thou shalt separate another tithe of all things that grow
Now, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 103, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 104,
to thee at that time, and shalt lay it up within thy gates.
a. 3), during the time of grace men are hound neither to
And the Levite that hath no other part nor possession with
the ceremonial nor to the judicial precepts of the Old Law.
thee, and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow,
Therefore men are not bound now to pay tithes.
that are within thy gates, shall. . . eat and be filled.” Now
Objection 2. Further, during the time of grace men
during the time of grace men are not bound to pay the sec-
are bound only to those things which were commanded
ond and third tithes. Neither therefore are they bound to
by Christ through the Apostles, according to Mat. 28:20,
pay the first.
“Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have
Objection 5. Further, a debt that is due without any
commanded you”; and Paul says (Acts 20:27): “I have
time being fixed for its payment, must be paid at once un-
not spared to declare unto you all the counsel of God.”
der pain of sin. Accordingly if during the time of grace
Now neither in the teaching of Christ nor in that of the
men are bound, under necessity of precept, to pay tithes
apostles is there any mention of the paying of tithes: for
in those countries where tithes are not paid, they would
the saying of our Lord about tithes (Mat. 23:23), “These
all be in a state of mortal sin, and so would also be the
things you ought to have done” seems to refer to the past
ministers of the Church for dissembling. But this seems
time of legal observance: thus Hilary says (Super Matth.
unreasonable. Therefore during the time of grace men are
can. xxiv): “The tithing of herbs, which was useful in
not bound under necessity of precept to pay tithes.
foreshadowing the future, was not to be omitted.” There-
On the contrary, Augustine∗, whose words are
fore during the time of grace men are not bound to pay
quoted 16, qu. i†, says: “It is a duty to pay tithes, and
tithes.
whoever refuses to pay them takes what belongs to an-
Objection 3. Further, during the time of grace, men
other.”
are not more bound to the legal observances than before
I answer that, In the Old Law tithes were paid for
the Law. But before the Law tithes were given, by reason
the sustenance of the ministers of God. Hence it is writ-
not of a precept but of a vow. For we read (Gn. 28:20,22)
ten (Malach. 3:10): “Bring all the tithes into My [Vulg.:
that Jacob “made a vow” saying: “If God shall be with
‘the’] store-house that there may be meat in My house.”
me, and shall keep me in the way by which I walk. . . of
Hence the precept about the paying of tithes was partly
all the things that Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes
moral and instilled in the natural reason; and partly judi-
to Thee.” Neither, therefore, during the time of grace are
cial, deriving its force from its divine institution. Because
men bound to pay tithes.
natural reason dictates that the people should administer
∗ Append. Serm. cclxxcii
† Can. Decimae
1601
the necessaries of life to those who minister the divine Law the authority of the Church has established the pay-worship for the welfare of the whole people even as it is
ment of tithe; thus showing a certain kindliness, lest the
the people’s duty to provide a livelihood for their rulers
people of the New Law should give less to the ministers
and soldiers and so forth. Hence the Apostle proves this
of the New Testament than did the people of the Old Law
from human custom, saying (1 Cor. 9:7): “Who serveth
to the ministers of the Old Testament; for the people of
as a soldier at any time at his own charge? Who planteth
the New Law are under greater obligations, according to
a vineyard and eateth not of the fruit thereof?” But the
Mat. 5:20, “Unless your justice abound more than that
fixing of the proportion to be offered to the ministers of
of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the
divine worship does not belong to the natural law, but
kingdom of heaven,” and, moreover, the ministers of the
was determined by divine institution, in accordance with
New Testament are of greater dignity than the ministers of
the condition of that people to whom the law was be-
the Old Testament, as the Apostle shows (2 Cor. 3:7,8).
ing given. For they were divided into twelve tribes, and
Accordingly it is evident that man’s obligation to pay
the twelfth tribe, namely that of Levi, was engaged ex-
tithes arises partly from natural law, partly from the insti-
clusively in the divine ministry and had no possessions
tution of the Church; who, nevertheless, in consideration
whence to derive a livelihood: and so it was becomingly
of the requirements of time and persons might ordain the
ordained that the remaining eleven tribes should give one-
payment of some other proportion.
tenth part of their revenues to the Levites‡ that the latter
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
might live respectably; and also because some, through
Reply to Objection 2.
The precept about paying
negligence, would disregard this precept. Hence, so far
tithes, in so far as it was a moral precept, was given in the
as the tenth part was fixed, the precept was judicial, since
Gospel by our Lord when He said (Mat. 10:10)∗: “The
all institutions established among this people for the spe-
workman is worthy of his hire,” and the Apostle says the
cial purpose of preserving equality among men, in ac-
same (1 Cor. 9:4 seqq.). But the fixing of the particular
cordance with this people’s condition, are called “judicial
proportion is left to the ordinance of the Church.
precepts.” Nevertheless by way of consequence these in-
Reply to Objection 3. Before the time of the Old Law
stitutions foreshadowed something in the future, even as
the ministry of the divine worship was not entrusted to
everything else connected with them, according to 1 Cor.
any particular person; although it is stated that the first-
12, “All these things happened to them in figure.” In this
born were priests, and that they received a double portion.
respect they had something in common with the “cere-
For this very reason no particular portion was directed
monial precepts,” which were instituted chiefly that they
to be given to the ministers of the divine worship: but
might be signs of the future. Hence the precept about pay-
when they met with one, each man of his own accord gave
ing tithes foreshadowed something in the future. For ten
him what he deemed right. Thus Abraham by a kind of
is, in a way, the perfect number (being the first numeri-
prophetic instinct gave tithes to Melchisedech, the priest
cal limit, since the figures do not go beyond ten but begin
of the Most High God, according to Gn. 14:20, and again
over again from one), and therefore he that gave a tenth,
Jacob made a vow to give tithes†, although he appears to
which is the sign of perfection, reserving the nine other
have vowed to do so, not by paying them to ministers, but
parts for himself, acknowledged by a sign that imperfec-
for the purpose of the divine worship, for instance for the
tion was his part, and that the perfection which was to
fulfilling of sacrifices, hence he said significantly: “I will
come through Christ was to be hoped for from God. Yet
offer tithes to Thee.”
this proves it to be, not a ceremonial but a judicial precept,
Reply to Objection 4. The second kind of tithe, which
as stated above.
was reserved for the offering of sacrifices, has no place in
There is this difference between the ceremonial and
the New Law, since the legal victims had ceased. But the
judicial precepts of the Law, as we stated above ( Ia IIae,
third kind of tithe which they had to eat with the poor, is
q. 104, a. 3), that it is unlawful to observe the ceremo-
increased in the New Law, for our Lord commanded us
nial precepts at the time of the New Law, whereas there
to give to the poor not merely the tenth part, but all our
is no sin in keeping the judicial precepts during the time
surplus, according to Lk. 11:41: “That which remaineth,
of grace although they are not binding. Indeed they are
give alms.” Moreover the tithes that are given to the min-
bound to be observed by some, if they be ordained by the
isters of the Church should be dispensed by them for the
authority of those who have power to make laws. Thus it
use of the poor.
was a judicial precept of the Old Law that he who stole
Reply to Objection 5. The ministers of the Church
a sheep should restore four sheep (Ex. 22:1), and if any
ought to be more solicitous for the increase of spiritual
king were to order this to be done his subjects would be
goods in the people, than for the amassing of temporal
bound to obey. In like manner during the time of the New
goods: and hence the Apostle was unwilling to make use
‡ Num. 18:21
∗ The words as quoted are from Lk. 10:7: Matthew
has ‘meat’ instead of ‘hire’
† Gn. 28:20
1602
of the right given him by the Lord of receiving his liveli-mand them without scandal, on account of their having
hood from those to whom he preached the Gospel, lest he
fallen into desuetude, or for some other reason. Never-
should occasion a hindrance to the Gospel of Christ‡. Nor
theless those who do not give tithes in places where the
did they sin who did not contribute to his upkeep, else the
Church does not demand them are not in a state of damna-
Apostle would not have omitted to reprove them. In like
tion, unless they be obstinate, and unwilling to pay even
manner the ministers of the Church rightly refrain from
if tithes were demanded of them.
demanding the Church’s tithes, when they could not de-
Whether men are bound to pay tithes of all things?
IIa IIae q. 87 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that men are not bound
tithes must be paid on whatever one possesses.
to give tithes of all things. The paying of tithes seems
Reply to Objection 1. In accordance with the condi-
to be an institution of the Old Law. Now the Old Law
tion of that people there was a special reason why the Old
contains no precept about personal tithes, viz. those that
Law did not include a precept about personal tithes; be-
are payable on property acquired by one’s own act, for in-
cause, to wit, all the other tribes had certain possessions
stance by commerce or soldiering. Therefore no man is
wherewith they were able to provide a sufficient liveli-
bound to pay tithes on such things.
hood for the Levites who had no possessions, but were not
Objection 2. Further, it is not right to make oblations
forbidden to make a profit out of other lawful occupations
of that which is ill-gotten, as stated above (q. 86, a. 3).
as the other Jews did. On the other hand the people of the
Now oblations, being offered to God immediately, seem
New Law are spread abroad throughout the world, and
to be more closely connected with the divine worship than
many of them have no possessions, but live by trade, and
tithes which are offered to the ministers. Therefore neither
these would contribute nothing to the support of God’s
should tithes be paid on ill-gotten goods.
ministers if they did not pay tithes on their trade profits.
Objection 3. Further, in the last chapter of Leviticus
Moreover the ministers of the New Law are more strictly
(30,32) the precept of paying tithes refers only to “corn,
forbidden to occupy themselves in money-making trades,
fruits of trees” and animals “that pass under the shep-
according to 2 Tim. 2:4, “No man being a soldier to God,
herd’s rod.” But man derives a revenue from other smaller
entangleth himself with secular business.” Wherefore in
things, such as the herbs that grow in his garden and so
the New Law men are bound to pay personal tithes, ac-
forth. Therefore neither on these things is a man bound to
cording to the custom of their country and the needs of
pay tithes.
the ministers: hence Augustine, whose words are quoted
Objection 4. Further, man cannot pay except what is
16, qu. 1, cap. Decimae, says†: “Tithes must be paid on
in his power. Now a man does not always remain in pos-
the profits of soldiering, trade or craft.”
session of all his profit from land and stock, since some-
Reply to Objection 2. Things are ill-gotten in two
times he loses them by theft or robbery; sometimes they
ways. First, because the getting itself was unjust: such,
are transferred to another person by sale; sometimes they
for instance, are things gotten by robbery, theft or usury:
are due to some other person, thus taxes are due to princes,
and these a man is bound to restore, and not to pay tithes
and wages due to workmen. Therefore one ought not to
on them. If, however, a field be bought with the profits
pay tithes on such like things.
of usury, the usurer is bound to pay tithes on the produce,
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 28:22): “Of all
because the latter is not gotten usuriously but given by
things that Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to
God. On the other hand certain things are said to be ill-
Thee.”
gotten, because they are gotten of a shameful cause, for
I answer that, In judging about a thing we should
instance of whoredom or stage-playing, and the like. Such
look to its principle. Now the principle of the payment
things a man is not bound to restore, and consequently he
of tithes is the debt whereby carnal things are due to those
is bound to pay tithes on them in the same way as other
who sow spiritual things, according to the saying of the
personal tithes. Nevertheless the Church must not accept
Apostle (1 Cor. 9:11), “If we have sown unto you spiritual
the tithe so long as those persons remain in sin, lest she
things, is it a great matter if we reap your carnal things?”
appear to have a share in their sins: but when they have
[thus implying that on the contrary “it is no great matter
done penance, tithes may be accepted from them on these
if we reap your carnal things”]∗. For this debt is the prin-
things.
ciple on which is based the commandment of the Church
Reply to Objection 3. Things directed to an end must
about the payment of tithes. Now whatever man possesses
be judged according to their fittingness to the end. Now
comes under the designation of carnal things. Therefore
the payment of tithes is due not for its own sake, but for
‡ 1 Cor. 9:12
∗ The phrase in the brackets is omitted in the Leonine
edition
† Append. Serm. cclxxvii
1603
the sake of the ministers, to whose dignity it is unbecom-except perhaps by reason of the custom of one’s country.
ing that they should demand minute things with careful
Reply to Objection 4. A man is not bound to pay
exactitude, for this is reckoned sinful according to the
tithes on what he has lost by theft or robbery, before he
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2). Hence the Old Law did not
recovers his property: unless he has incurred the loss
order the payment of tithes on such like minute things,
through his own fault or neglect, because the Church
but left it to the judgment of those who are willing to pay,
ought not to be the loser on that account. If he sell wheat
because minute things are counted as nothing. Wherefore
that has not been tithed, the Church can command the
the Pharisees who claimed for themselves the perfect jus-
tithes due to her, both from the buyer who has a thing
tice of the Law, paid tithes even on these minute things:
due to the Church, and from the seller, because so far
nor are they reproved by our Lord on that account, but
as he is concerned he has defrauded the Church: yet if
only because they despised greater, i.e. spiritual, precepts;
one pays, the other is not bound. Tithes are due on the
and rather did He show them to be deserving of praise in
fruits of the earth, in so far as these fruits are the gift of
this particular, when He said (Mat. 23:23): “These things
God. Wherefore tithes do not come under a tax, nor are
you ought to have done,” i.e. during the time of the Law,
they subject to workmen’s wages. Hence it is not right to
according to Chrysostom’s‡ commentary. This also seems
deduct one’s taxes and the wages paid to workmen, before
to denote fittingness rather than obligation. Therefore now
paying tithes: but tithes must be paid before anything else
too men are not bound to pay tithes on such minute things,
on one’s entire produce.
Whether tithes should be paid to the clergy?
IIa IIae q. 87 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that tithes should not be
regard to tithes: namely, the right to receive tithes, and
paid to the clergy. Tithes were paid to the Levites in the
the things given in the name of tithes. The right to re-
Old Testament, because they had no portion in the peo-
ceive tithes is a spiritual thing, for it arises from the debt
ple’s possessions, according to Num. 18:23,24. But in
in virtue of which the ministers of the altar have a right
the New Testament the clergy have possessions not only
to the expenses of their ministry, and temporal things are
ecclesiastical, but sometimes also patrimonial: moreover
due to those who sow spiritual things. This debt concerns
they receive first-fruits, and oblations for the living and
none but the clergy who have care of souls, and so they
the dead. Therefore it is unnecessary to pay tithes to them.
alone are competent to have this right.
Objection 2. Further, it sometimes happens that a man
On the other hand the things given in the name of
dwells in one parish, and farms in another; or a shepherd
tithes are material, wherefore they may come to be used
may take his flock within the bounds of one parish during
by anyone, and thus it is that they fall into the hands of the
one part of the year, and within the bounds of one parish
laity.
during one part of the year, and within the bounds of an-
Reply to Objection 1. In the Old Law, as stated above
other parish during the other part of the year; or he may
(a. 1, ad 4), special tithes were earmarked for the assis-
have his sheepfold in one parish, and graze the sheep in
tance of the poor. But in the New Law the tithes are given
another. Now in all these and similar cases it seems im-
to the clergy, not only for their own support, but also that
possible to decide to which clergy the tithes ought to be
the clergy may use them in assisting the poor. Hence they
paid. Therefore it would seem that no fixed tithe ought to
are not unnecessary; indeed Church property, oblations
be paid to the clergy.
and first-fruits as well as tithes are all necessary for this
Objection 3. Further, it is the general custom in cer-
same purpose.
tain countries for the soldiers to hold the tithes from the
Reply to Objection 2. Personal tithes are due to the
Church in fee; and certain religious receive tithes. There-
church in whose parish a man dwells, while predial tithes
fore seemingly tithes are not due only to those of the
seem more reasonably to belong to the church within
clergy who have care of souls.
whose bounds the land is situated. The law, however, pre-
On the contrary, It is written (Num. 18:21): “I have
scribes that in this matter a custom that has obtained for
given to the sons of Levi all the tithes of Israel for a pos-
a long time must be observed∗. The shepherd who grazes
session, for the ministry wherewith they serve Me in the
his flock at different seasons in two parishes, should pay
Tabernacle.” Now the clergy are the successors of the sons
tithe proportionately to both churches. And since the fruit
of Levi in the New Testament. Therefore tithes are due to
of the flock is derived from the pasture, the tithe of the
the clergy alone.
flock is due to the church in whose lands the flock grazes,
I answer that, Two things have to be considered with
rather than to the church on whose land the fold is situ-
‡ Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom
∗ Cap. Cum sint, and Cap. Ad apostolicae, de Decimis,
etc.
1604
ated.
through being granted to them in fee by the Church, or it
Reply to Objection 3. Just as the Church can hand
may be the succoring of the poor; thus certain tithes have
over to a layman the things she receives under the title of
been granted by way of alms to certain lay religious, or to
tithe, so too can she allow him to receive tithes that are yet
those that have no care of souls. Some religious, however,
to be paid, the right of receiving being reserved to the min-
are competent to receive tithes, because they have care of
isters of the Church. The motive may be either the need
souls.
of the Church, as when tithes are due to certain soldiers
Whether the clergy also are bound to pay tithes?
IIa IIae q. 87 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that clerics also are bound
ing ecclesiastical property, are not bound to pay tithes;
to pay tithes. By common law∗ the parish church should
whereas from some other cause through holding property
receive the tithes on the lands which are in its territory.
in their own right, either by inheriting it from their kin-
Now it happens sometimes that the clergy have certain
dred, or by purchase, or in any other similar manner, they
lands of their own on the territory of some parish church,
are bound to the payment of tithes.
or that one church has ecclesiastical property on the terri-
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear, be-
tory of another. Therefore it would seem that the clergy
cause the clergy like anyone else are bound to pay tithes
are bound to pay predial tithes.
on their own lands to the parish church, even though they
Objection 2. Further, some religious are clerics; and
be the clergy of that same church, because to possess a
yet they are bound to pay tithes to churches on account of
thing as one’s private property is not the same as possess-
the lands which they cultivate even with their own hands†.
ing it in common. But church lands are not tithable, even
Therefore it would seem that the clergy are not immune
though they be within the boundaries of another parish.
from the payment of tithes.
Reply to Objection 2. Religious who are clerics, if
Objection 3. Further, in the eighteenth chapter of
they have care of souls, and dispense spiritual things to
Numbers (26,28), it is prescribed not only that the Levites
the people, are not bound to pay tithes, but they may re-
should receive tithes from the people, but also that they
ceive them. Another reason applies to other religious, who
should themselves pay tithes to the high-priest. Therefore
though clerics do not dispense spiritual things to the peo-
the clergy are bound to pay tithes to the Sovereign Pontiff,
ple; for according to the ordinary law they are bound to
no less than the laity are bound to pay tithes to the clergy.
pay tithes, but they are somewhat exempt by reason of
Objection 4. Further, tithes should serve not only for
various concessions granted by the Apostolic See¶.
the support of the clergy, but also for the assistance of
Reply to Objection 3. In the Old Law first-fruits were
the poor. Therefore, if the clergy are exempt from pay-
due to the priests, and tithes to the Levites; and since
ing tithes, so too are the poor. Yet the latter is not true.
the Levites were below the priests, the Lord commanded
Therefore the former is false.
that the former should pay the high-priest “the tenth part
On the contrary, A decretal of Pope Paschal‡ says:
of the tenth”k instead of first-fruits: wherefore for the
“It is a new form of exaction when the clergy demand
same reason the clergy are bound now to pay tithes to the
tithes from the clergyӤ.
Sovereign Pontiff, if he demanded them. For natural rea-
I answer that, The cause of giving cannot be the cause
son dictates that he who has charge of the common estate
of receiving, as neither can the cause of action be the cause
of a multitude should be provided with all goods, so that
of passion; yet it happens that one and the same person is
he may be able to carry out whatever is necessary for the
giver and receiver, even as agent and patient, on account
common welfare.
of different causes and from different points of view. Now
Reply to Objection 4. Tithes should be employed for
tithes are due to the clergy as being ministers of the altar
the assistance of the poor, through the dispensation of the
and sowers of spiritual things among the people. Where-
clergy. Hence the poor have no reason for accepting tithes,
fore those members of the clergy as such, i.e. as hav-
but they are bound to pay them.
∗ Cap. Cum homines, de Decimis, etc.
† Cap. Ex parte, and Cap. Nuper.
‡ Paschal II
§ Cap. Novum genus, de Decimis, etc.
¶ Cap.
Ex multiplici, Ex parte, and Ad audientiam, de Decimis, etc.
k Num. 18:26
1605
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 88
Of Vows
(In Twelve Articles)
We must now consider vows, whereby something is promised to God. Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) What is a vow?
(2) What is the matter of a vow?
(3) Of the obligation of vows;
(4) Of the use of taking vows;
(5) Of what virtue is it an act?
(6) Whether it is more meritorious to do a thing from a vow, than without a vow?
(7) Of the solemnizing of a vow;
(8) Whether those who are under another’s power can take vows?
(9) Whether children may be bound by vow to enter religion?
(10) Whether a vow is subject to dispensation or commutation?
(11) Whether a dispensation can be granted in a solemn vow of continence?
(12) Whether the authority of a superior is required in a dispensation from a vow?
Whether a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will?
IIa IIae q. 88 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that a vow consists in
some particular thing. Now one man binds himself to an-
nothing but a purpose of the will. According to some∗, “a
other by means of a promise, which is an act of the reason
vow is a conception of a good purpose after a firm delib-
to which faculty it belongs to direct. For just as a man by
eration of the mind, whereby a man binds himself before
commanding or praying, directs, in a fashion, what others
God to do or not to do a certain thing.” But the concep-
are to do for him, so by promising he directs what he him-
tion of a good purpose and so forth, may consist in a mere
self is to do for another. Now a promise between man and
movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a mere
man can only be expressed in words or any other outward
purpose of the will.
signs; whereas a promise can be made to God by the mere
Objection 2. Further, the very word vow seems to be
inward thought, since according to 1 Kings 16:7, “Man
derived from “voluntas” [will], for one is said to do a thing
seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the
“proprio voto” [by one’s own vow] when one does it vol-
heart.” Yet we express words outwardly sometimes, ei-
untarily. Now to “purpose” is an act of the will, while to
ther to arouse ourselves, as was stated above with regard
“promise” is an act of the reason. Therefore a vow con-
to prayer (q. 83, a. 12), or to call others to witness, so that sists in a mere act of the will.
one may refrain from breaking the vow, not only through
Objection 3. Further, our Lord said (Lk. 9:62): “No
fear of God, but also through respect of men. Now a
man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is
promise is the outcome from a purpose of doing some-
fit for the kingdom of God.” Now from the very fact that a
thing: and a purpose presupposes deliberation, since it is
man has a purpose of doing good, he puts his hand to the
the act of a deliberate will. Accordingly three things are
plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting from
essential to a vow: the first is deliberation. the second is a
his good purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God.
purpose of the will; and the third is a promise, wherein is
Therefore by a mere good purpose a man is bound before
completed the nature of a vow. Sometimes, however, two
God, even without making a promise; and consequently it
other things are added as a sort of confirmation of the vow,
would seem that a vow consists in a mere purpose of the
namely, pronouncement by word of mouth, according to
will.
Ps. 65:13, “I will pay Thee my vows which my lips have
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3): “If thou
uttered”; and the witnessing of others. Hence the Master
hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an un-
says (Sent. iv, D, 38) that a vow is “the witnessing of a
faithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him.” Therefore
spontaneous promise and ought to be made to God and
to vow is to promise, and a vow is a promise.
about things relating to God”: although the “witnessing”
I answer that, A vow denotes a binding to do or omit
may strictly refer to the inward protestation.
∗ William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, xxviii, qu. 1; Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38
1606
Reply to Objection 1. The conceiving of a good pur-Reply to Objection 3. He that puts his hand to the
pose is not confirmed by the deliberation of the mind, un-
plough does something already; while he that merely pur-
less the deliberation lead to a promise.
poses to do something does nothing so far. When, how-
Reply to Objection 2. Man’s will moves the reason
ever, he promises, he already sets about doing, although
to promise something relating to things subject to his will,
he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that puts his
and a vow takes its name from the will forasmuch as it
hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he
proceeds from the will as first mover.
stretches out his hand for the purpose of ploughing.
Whether a vow should always be about a better good?
IIa IIae q. 88 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that a vow need not be
lutely but on the supposition of an end—for instance if
always about a better good. A greater good is one that
salvation be unattainable without it—it may be the matter
pertains to supererogation. But vows are not only about
of a vow in so far as it is done voluntarily, but not in so far matters of supererogation, but also about matters of salva-as there is a necessity for doing it. But that which is not
tion: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil and
necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the supposition of an
his pomps, and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on
end, is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most prop-
Ps. 75:12, “Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God”; and
erly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater
Jacob vowed (Gn. 28:21) that the Lord should be his God.
good in comparison with that which is universally neces-
Now this above all is necessary for salvation. Therefore
sary for salvation. Therefore, properly speaking, a vow is
vows are not only about a better good.
said to be about a better good.
Objection 2. Further, Jephte is included among the
Reply to Objection 1. Renouncing the devil’s pomps
saints (Heb. 11:32). Yet he killed his innocent daughter
and keeping the faith of Christ are the matter of baptismal
on account of his vow (Judges 11). Since, then, the slay-
vows, in so far as these things are done voluntarily, al-
ing of an innocent person is not a better good, but is in
though they are necessary for salvation. The same answer
itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may be made not only
applies to Jacob’s vow: although it may also be explained
about a better good, but also about something unlawful.
that Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his God,
Objection 3. Further, things that tend to be harmful
by giving Him a special form of worship to which he was
to the person, or that are quite useless, do not come under
not bound, for instance by offering tithes and so forth as
the head of a better good. Yet sometimes vows are made
mentioned further on in the same passage.
about immoderate vigils or fasts which tend to injure the
Reply to Objection 2. Certain things are good, what-
person: and sometimes vows are about indifferent matters
ever be their result; such are acts of virtue, and these can
and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is
be, absolutely speaking, the matter of a vow: some are
not always about a better good.
evil, whatever their result may be; as those things which
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 23:22): “If thou
are sins in themselves, and these can nowise be the matter
wilt not promise thou shalt be without sin.”
of a vow: while some, considered in themselves, are good,
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), a vow is a
and as such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may have
promise made to God. Now a promise is about some-
an evil result, in which case the vow must not be kept. It
thing that one does voluntarily for someone else: since it
was thus with the vow of Jephte, who as related in Judges
would be not a promise but a threat to say that one would
11:30,31, “made a vow to the Lord, saying: If Thou wilt
do something against someone. In like manner it would
deliver the children of Ammon into my hands, whosoever
be futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to
shall first come forth out of the doors of my house, and
him. Wherefore, as every sin is against God, and since no
shall meet me when I return in peace. . . the same will I
work is acceptable to God unless it be virtuous, it follows
offer a holocaust to the Lord.” For this could have an evil
that nothing unlawful or indifferent, but only some act of
result if, as indeed happened, he were to be met by some
virtue, should be the matter of a vow. But as a vow denotes
animal which it would be unlawful to sacrifice, such as an
a voluntary promise, while necessity excludes voluntari-
ass or a human being. Hence Jerome says∗: “In vowing
ness, whatever is absolutely necessary, whether to be or
he was foolish, through lack of discretion, and in keep-
not to be, can nowise be the matter of a vow. For it would
ing his vow he was wicked.” Yet it is premised (Judges
be foolish to vow that one would die or that one would not
11:29) that “the Spirit of the Lord came upon him,” be-
fly.
cause his faith and devotion, which moved him to make
On the other hand, if a thing be necessary. not abso-
that vow, were from the Holy Ghost; and for this reason
∗ Implicitly 1 Contra Jovin.: Comment. in Micheam vi, viii: Comment.
in Jerem. vii. The quotation is from Peter Comestor, Hist. Scholast.
1607
he is reckoned among the saints, as also by reason of the
“Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to
victory which he obtained, and because it is probable that
God,” adds, “your reasonable service.” Since, however,
he repented of his sinful deed, which nevertheless fore-
man is easily mistaken in judging of matters concerning
shadowed something good.
himself, such vows as these are more fittingly kept or dis-
Reply to Objection 3. The mortification of one’s own
regarded according to the judgment of a superior, yet so
body, for instance by vigils and fasting, is not acceptable
that, should a man find that without doubt he is seriously
to God except in so far as it is an act of virtue; and this
burdened by keeping such a vow, and should he be un-
depends on its being done with due discretion, namely,
able to appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it.
that concupiscence be curbed without overburdening na-
As to vows about vain and useless things they should be
ture. on this condition such things may be the matter
ridiculed rather than kept.
of a vow. Hence the Apostle after saying (Rom. 12:1),
Whether all vows are binding?
IIa IIae q. 88 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that vows are not all bind-
displeaseth HimӤ.
ing. For man needs things that are done by another, more
Reply to Objection 1. Honesty demands that a man
than God does, since He has no need for our goods (Ps.
should keep any promise he makes to another man, and
15:2). Now according to the prescription of human laws∗
this obligation is based on the natural law. But for a man
a simple promise made to a man is not binding; and this
to be under a civil obligation through a promise he has
seems to be prescribed on account of the changeableness
made, other conditions are requisite. And although God
of the human will. Much less binding therefore is a simple
needs not our goods, we are under a very great obligation
promise made to God, which we call a vow.
to Him: so that a vow made to Him is most binding.
Objection 2. Further, no one is bound to do what is
Reply to Objection 2. If that which a man has vowed
impossible. Now sometimes that which a man has vowed
becomes impossible to him through any cause whatsoever,
becomes impossible to him, either because it depends on
he must do what he can, so that he have at least a will
another’s decision, as when, for instance, a man vows to
ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has vowed to en-
enter a monastery, the monks of which refuse to receive
ter a monastery, he must endeavor to the best of his power
him: or on account of some defect arising, for instance
to be received there. And if his intention was chiefly to
when a woman vows virginity, and afterwards is deflow-
bind himself to enter the religious life, so that, in conse-
ered; or when a man vows to give a sum of money, and
quence, he chose this particular form of religious life, or
afterwards loses it. Therefore a vow is not always bind-
this place, as being most agreeable to him, he is bound,
ing.
should he be unable to be received there, to enter the re-
Objection 3. Further, if a man is bound to pay some-
ligious life elsewhere. But if his principal intention is to
thing, he must do so at once. But a man is not bound to
bind himself to this particular kind of religious life, or to
pay his vow at once, especially if it be taken under a con-
this particular place, because the one or the other pleases
dition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore a vow is not
him in some special way, he is not bound to enter another
always binding.
religious house, if they are unwilling to receive him into
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3,4): “What-
this particular one. on the other hand, if he be rendered
soever thou hast vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to
incapable of fulfilling his vow through his own fault, he
vow, than after a vow not to perform the things promised.”
is bound over and above to do penance for his past fault:
I answer that, For one to be accounted faithful one
thus if a woman has vowed virginity and is afterwards vi-
must keep one’s promises. Wherefore, according to Au-
olated, she is bound not only to observe what is in her
gustine† faith takes its name “from a man’s deed agreeing
power, namely, perpetual continency, but also to repent of
with his word”‡. Now man ought to be faithful to God
what she has lost by sinning.
above all, both on account of God’s sovereignty, and on
Reply to Objection 3. The obligation of a vow is
account of the favors he has received from God. Hence
caused by our own will and intention, wherefore it is writ-
man is obliged before all to fulfill the vows he has made
ten (Dt. 23:23): “That which is once gone out of thy lips,
to God, since this is part of the fidelity he owes to God.
thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou hast promised to
On the other hand, the breaking of a vow is a kind of in-
the Lord thy God, and hast spoken with thy own will and
fidelity. Wherefore Solomon gives the reason why vows
with thy own mouth.” Wherefore if in taking a vow, it is
should be paid to God, because “an unfaithful. . . promise
one’s intention and will to bind oneself to fulfil it at once,
∗ Dig. L. xii, de pollicitat., i
† Ep. xxxii, 2: De Mendac. xx
‡ ‘Fides. . . fiunt dicta’ Cicero gives the same etymology (De Offic. i, 7)
§ Eccles. 5:3
1608
one is bound to fulfil it immediately. But if one intend to it is written (Dt. 23:21): “When thou hast made a vow to
fulfil it at a certain time, or under a certain condition, one
the Lord thy God thou shalt not delay to pay it: because
is not bound to immediate fulfilment. And yet one ought
the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall
not to delay longer than one intended to bind oneself, for
be imputed to thee for a sin.”
Whether it is expedient to take vows?
IIa IIae q. 88 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not expedient to
gustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.), so also
take vows. It is not expedient to anyone to deprive him-
a promise whereby we vow something to God, does not
self of the good that God has given him. Now one of the
conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be assured by
greatest goods that God has given man is liberty whereof
us, but it conduces to our profit, in so far as by vowing we
he seems to be deprived by the necessity implicated in a
fix our wills immovably on that which it is expedient to
vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to take
do. Hence it is expedient to take vows.
vows.
Reply to Objection 1. Even as one’s liberty is not
Objection 2. Further, no one should expose himself to
lessened by one being unable to sin, so, too, the necessity
danger. But whoever takes a vow exposes himself to dan-
resulting from a will firmly fixed to good does not lessen
ger, since that which, before taking a vow, he could omit
the liberty, as instanced in God and the blessed. Such is
without danger, becomes a source of danger to him if he
the necessity implied by a vow, bearing a certain resem-
should not fulfil it after taking the vow. Hence Augustine
blance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence, Augus-
says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): “Since thou hast
tine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.) that “happy
vowed, thou hast bound thyself, thou canst not do oth-
is the necessity that compels us to do the better things.”
erwise. If thou dost not what thou hast vowed thou wilt
Reply to Objection 2. When danger arises from the
not be as thou wouldst have been hadst thou not vowed.
deed itself, this deed is not expedient, for instance that one
For then thou wouldst have been less great, not less good:
cross a river by a tottering bridge: but if the danger arise
whereas now if thou breakest faith with God (which God
through man’s failure in the deed, the latter does not cease
forbid) thou art the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have
to be expedient: thus it is expedient to mount on horse-
been happier, hadst thou kept thy vow.” Therefore it is not
back, though there be the danger of a fall from the horse:
expedient to take vows.
else it would behoove one to desist from all good things,
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16):
that may become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is
“Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ.” But we do
written (Eccles. 11:4): “He that observeth the wind shall
not read that either Christ or the Apostles took any vows.
not sow, and he that considereth the clouds shall never
Therefore it would seem inexpedient to take vows.
reap.” Now a man incurs danger, not from the vow itself,
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 75:12): “Vow ye
but from his fault, when he changes his mind by breaking
and pay to the Lord your God.”
his vow. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment.
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2), a vow is a
et Paulin.): “Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather
promise made to God. Now one makes a promise to a man
rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest
under one aspect, and to God under another. Because we
lawfully have done to thy detriment.”
promise something to a man for his own profit; since it
Reply to Objection 3. It was incompetent for Christ,
profits him that we should be of service to him, and that
by His very nature, to take a vow, both because He was
we should at first assure him of the future fulfilment of
God, and because, as man, His will was firmly fixed on the
that service: whereas we make promises to God not for
good, since He was a “comprehensor.” By a kind of simil-
His but for our own profit. Hence Augustine says (Ep.
itude, however, He is represented as saying (Ps. 21:26):
cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): “He is a kind and not a
“I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear Him,”
needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our payments,
when He is speaking of His body, which is the Church.
but makes those who pay Him grow rich in Him.” And
The apostles are understood to have vowed things per-
just as what we give God is useful not to Him but to us,
taining to the state of perfection when “they left all things
since “what is given Him is added to the giver,” as Au-
and followed Christ.”
1609
Whether a vow is an act of latria or religion?
IIa IIae q. 88 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that a vow is not an act
a promise is nothing else than a directing of the thing
of latria or religion. Every act of virtue is matter for a
promised to the person to whom the promise is made.
vow. Now it would seem to pertain to the same virtue to
Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the wor-
promise a thing and to do it. Therefore a vow pertains to
ship or service of God. And thus it is clear that to take a
any virtue and not to religion especially.
vow is properly an act of latria or religion.
Objection 2. Further, according to Tully (De Invent.
Reply to Objection 1. The matter of a vow is some-
ii, 53) it belongs to religion to offer God worship and cer-
times the act of another virtue, as, for instance, keeping
emonial rites. But he who takes a vow does not yet offer
the fast or observing continency; while sometimes it is
something to God, but only promises it. Therefore, a vow
an act of religion, as offering a sacrifice or praying. But
is not an act of religion.
promising either of them to God belongs to religion, for
Objection 3. Further, religious worship should be of-
the reason given above. Hence it is evident that some
fered to none but God. But a vow is made not only to God,
vows belong to religion by reason only of the promise
but also to the saints and to one’s superiors, to whom re-
made to God, which is the essence of a vow, while oth-
ligious vow obedience when they make their profession.
ers belong thereto by reason also of the thing promised,
Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.
which is the matter of the vow.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 19:21): ”(The
Reply to Objection 2. He who promises something
Egyptians) shall worship Him with sacrifices and offer-
gives it already in as far as he binds himself to give it: even ings and they shall make vows to the Lord, and perform
as a thing is said to be made when its cause is made, be-
them.” Now, the worship of God is properly the act of
cause the effect is contained virtually in its cause. This is
religion or latria. Therefore, a vow is an act of latria or
why we thank not only a giver, but also one who promises
religion.
to give.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 81, a. 1, ad 1), ev-
Reply to Objection 3. A vow is made to God alone,
ery act of virtue belongs to religion or latria by way of
whereas a promise may be made to a man also: and this
command, in so far as it is directed to the reverence of
very promise of good, which is fore made to a man, may
God which is the proper end of latria. Now the direction
be the matter of a vow, and in so far as it is a virtuous
of other actions to their end belongs to the commanding
act. This is how we are to understand vows whereby we
virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore the
vow something to the saints or to one’s superiors: so that
direction of the acts of any virtue to the service of God is
the promise made to the saints or to one’s superiors is the
the proper act of latria.
matter of the vow, in so far as one vows to God to fulfil
Now, it is evident from what has been said above
what one has promised to the saints or one’s superiors.
(Aa. 1,2) that a vow is a promise made to God, and that
Whether it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do something in fulfilment of a IIa IIae q. 88 a. 6
vow, than without a vow?
Objection 1. It would seem that it is more praisewor-
v∗. Therefore, it is better to do something without a vow,
thy and meritorious to do a thing without a vow than in
than in fulfilment of a vow.
fulfilment of a vow. Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. ii):
Objection 3. Further, a vow is necessary for the pur-
“We should abstain or fast without putting ourselves un-
pose of fixing the will on that which is vowed, as stated
der the necessity of fasting, lest that which we are free to
above (a. 4). But the will cannot be more fixed on a thing
do be done without devotion and unwillingly.” Now he
than when it actually does that thing. Therefore it is no
who vows to fast puts himself under the necessity of fast-
better to do a thing in fulfilment of a vow than without a
ing. Therefore it would be better for him to fast without
vow.
taking the vow.
On the contrary, A gloss on the words of Ps. 75:12,
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 9:7):
“Vow ye and pay,” says: “Vows are counseled to the will.”
“Everyone as he hath determined in his heart, not with
But a counsel is about none but a better good. Therefore
sadness, or of necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver.”
it is better to do a deed in fulfilment of a vow than without
Now some fulfil sorrowfully what they have vowed: and
a vow: since he that does it without a vow fulfils only one
this seems to be due to the necessity arising from the vow,
counsel, viz. the counsel to do it, whereas he that does it
for necessity is a cause of sorrow according to Metaph.
with a vow, fulfils two counsels, viz. the counsel to vow
∗ Ed. Did. iv, 5
1610
and the counsel to do it.
Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted should
I answer that, For three reasons it is better and more
be understood as referring to necessity of coercion which
meritorious to do one and the same deed with a vow than
causes an act to be involuntary and excludes devotion.
without. First, because to vow, as stated above (a. 5) is an
Hence he says pointedly: “Lest that which we are free
act of religion which is the chief of the moral virtues. Now
to do be done without devotion and unwillingly.” On the
the more excellent the virtue the better and more merito-
other hand the necessity resulting from a vow is caused
rious the deed. Wherefore the act of an inferior virtue is
by the immobility of the will, wherefore it strengthens the
the better the more meritorious for being commanded by a
will and increases devotion. Hence the argument does not
superior virtue, whose act it becomes through being com-
conclude.
manded by it, just as the act of faith or hope is better if it
Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher,
be commanded by charity. Hence the works of the other
necessity of coercion, in so far as it is opposed to the will,
moral virtues (for instance, fasting, which is an act of ab-
causes sorrow. But the necessity resulting from a vow,
stinence; and being continent, which is an act of chastity)
in those who are well disposed, in so far as it strength-
are better and more meritorious, if they be done in fulfil-
ens the will, causes not sorrow but joy. Hence Augustine
ment of a vow, since thus they belong to the divine wor-
says (Ep. ad Arment. et Paulin. cxxcii): “Repent not
ship, being like sacrifices to God. Wherefore Augustine
of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst
says (De Virg. viii) that “not even is virginity honorable
no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to
as such, but only when it is consecrated to God, and cher-
thy detriment.” If, however, the very deed, considered in
ished by godly continence.”
itself, were to become disagreeable and involuntary after
Secondly, because he that vows something and does
one has taken the vow, the will to fulfil it remaining withal,
it, subjects himself to God more than he that only does it;
it is still more meritorious than if it were done without the
for he subjects himself to God not only as to the act, but
vow, since the fulfilment of a vow is an act of religion
also as to the power, since in future he cannot do some-
which is a greater virtue than abstinence, of which fasting
thing else. Even so he gives more who gives the tree with
is an act.
its fruit, than he that gives the fruit only, as Anselm∗ ob-
Reply to Objection 3. He who does something with-
serves (De Simil. viii). For this reason, we thank even
out having vowed it has an immovable will as regards the
those who promise, as stated above (a. 5, ad 2).
individual deed which he does and at the time when he
Thirdly, because a vow fixes the will on the good im-
does it; but his will does not remain altogether fixed for
movably and to do anything of a will that is fixed on the
the time to come, as does the will of one who makes a
good belongs to the perfection of virtue, according to the
vow: for the latter has bound his will to do something,
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 4), just as to sin with an obstinate
both before he did that particular deed, and perchance to
mind aggravates the sin, and is called a sin against the
do it many times.
Holy Ghost, as stated above (q. 14, a. 2).
Whether a vow is solemnized by the reception of holy orders, and by the profession of IIa IIae q. 88 a. 7
a certain rule?
Objection 1. It would seem that a vow is not solem-
or in the profession of a certain rule does not belong to the
nized by the reception of holy orders and by the profes-
condition of a vow.
sion of a certain rule. As stated above (a. 1), a vow is
Objection 3. Further, a solemn vow seems to be the
a promise made to God. Now external actions pertain-
same as a public vow. Now many other vows may be
ing to solemnity seem to be directed, not to God, but to
made in public besides that which is pronounced in re-
men. Therefore they are related to vows accidentally: and
ceiving holy orders or in professing a certain rule; which
consequently a solemnization of this kind is not a proper
latter, moreover, may be made in private. Therefore not
circumstance of a vow.
only these vows are solemn.
Objection 2. Further, whatever belongs to the con-
On the contrary, These vows alone are an impedi-
dition of a thing, would seem to be applicable to all in
ment to the contract of marriage, and annul marriage if it
which that thing is found. Now many things may be the
be contracted, which is the effect of a solemn vow, as we
subject of a vow, which have no connection either with
shall state further on in the Third Part of this work†.
holy orders, or to any particular rule: as when a man vows
I answer that, The manner in which a thing is solem-
a pilgrimage, or something of the kind. Therefore the sol-
nized depends on its nature [conditio]: thus when a man
emnization that takes place in the reception of holy orders
takes up arms he solemnizes the fact in one way, namely,
∗ Eadmer
† Suppl., q. 53, a. 2
1611
with a certain display of horses and arms and a concourse God is the author, though man is the minister, according
of soldiers, while a marriage is solemnized in another way,
to Num. 6:27, “They shall invoke My name upon the chil-
namely, the array of the bridegroom and bride and the
dren of Israel, and I will bless them.” Hence a solemn
gathering of their kindred. Now a vow is a promise made
vow is more binding with God than a simple vow, and he
to God: wherefore, the solemnization of a vow consists in
who breaks a solemn vow sins more grievously. When it
something spiritual pertaining to God; i.e. in some spir-
is said that a simple vow is no less binding than a solemn
itual blessing or consecration which, in accordance with
vow, this refers to the fact that the transgressor of either
the institution of the apostles, is given when a man makes
commits a mortal sin.
profession of observing a certain rule, in the second de-
Reply to Objection 2. It is not customary to solem-
gree after the reception of holy orders, as Dionysius states
nize particular acts, but the embracing of a new state, as
(Eccl. Hier. vi). The reason of this is that solemniza-
we have said above. Hence when a man vows particular
tion is not wont to be employed, save when a man gives
deeds, such as a pilgrimage, or some special fast, such a
himself up entirely to some particular thing. For the nup-
vow is not competent to be solemnized, but only such as
tial solemnization takes place only when the marriage is
the vow whereby a man entirely devotes himself to the di-
celebrated, and when the bride and bridegroom mutually
vine ministry or service: and yet many particular works
deliver the power over their bodies to one another. In like
are included under this vow as under a universal.
manner a vow is solemnized when a man devotes himself
Reply to Objection 3. Through being pronounced in
to the divine ministry by receiving holy orders, or em-
public vows may have a certain human solemnity, but not
braces the state of perfection by renouncing the world and
a spiritual and divine solemnity, as the aforesaid vows
his own will by the profession of a certain rule.
have, even when they are pronounced before a few per-
Reply to Objection 1. This kind of solemnization re-
sons. Hence the publicity of a vow differs from its solem-
gards not only men but also God in so far as it is accom-
nization.
panied by a spiritual consecration or blessing, of which
Whether those who are subject to another’s power are hindered from taking vows?
IIa IIae q. 88 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that those who are sub-
power cannot bind themselves by vow.
ject to another’s power are not hindered from taking vows.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), a vow is a
The lesser bond is surpassed by the greater. Now the obli-
promise made to God. Now no man can firmly bind him-
gation of one man subject to another is a lesser bond than
self by a promise to do what is in another’s power, but only
a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God. There-
to that which is entirely in his own power. Now whoever
fore those who are subject to another’s power are not hin-
is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is subject
dered from taking vows.
to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but
Objection 2. Further, children are under their parents’
it depends on the will of the other. And therefore without
power. Yet children may make religious profession even
the consent of his superior he cannot bind himself firmly
without the consent of their parents. Therefore one is not
by a vow in those matters wherein he is subject to another.
hindered from taking vows, through being subject to an-
Reply to Objection 1. Nothing but what is virtuous
other’s power.
can be the subject of a promise made to God, as stated
Objection 3. Further, to do is more than to promise.
above (a. 2). Now it is contrary to virtue for a man to of-
But religious who are under the power of their superiors
fer to God that which belongs to another, as stated above
can do certain things such as to say some psalms, or ab-
(q. 86, a. 3). Hence the conditions necessary for a vow
stain from certain things. Much more therefore seemingly
are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under an-
can they promise such things to God by means of vows.
other’s power vows that which is in that other’s power, ex-
Objection 4. Further, whoever does what he cannot
cept under the condition that he whose power it concerns
do lawfully sins. But subjects do not sin by taking vows,
does not gainsay it.
since nowhere do we find this forbidden. Therefore it
Reply to Objection 2. As soon as a man comes of age,
would seem that they can lawfully take vows.
if he be a freeman he is in his own power in all matters
On the contrary, It is commanded (Num. 30:4-6) that
concerning his person, for instance with regard to binding
“if a woman vow any thing. . . being in her father’s house,
himself by vow to enter religion, or with regard to con-
and yet but a girl in age,” she is not bound by the vow, un-
tracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as re-
less her father consent: and the same is said there (Num.
gards the arrangements of the household, so that in these
30:7-9) of the woman that has a husband. Therefore in
matters he cannot vow anything that shall be valid without
like manner other persons that are subject to another’s
the consent of his father.
1612
A slave, through being in his master’s power, even as thing, no vow of a religious stands without the consent of
regards his personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow
his superior, as neither does the vow of a girl while in (her
to enter religion, since this would withdraw him from his
father’s) house without his consent; nor of a wife, without
master’s service.
the consent of her husband.
Reply to Objection 3. A religious is subject to his
Reply to Objection 4. Although the vow of one who
superior as to his actions connected with his profession
is subject to another’s power does not stand without the
of his rule. Wherefore even though one may be able to
consent of the one to whom he is subject, he does not sin
do something now and then, when one is not being occu-
by vowing; because his vow is understood to contain the
pied with other things by one’s superior, yet since there is
requisite condition, providing, namely, that his superior
no time when his superior cannot occupy him with some-
approve or do not gainsay it.
Whether children can bind themselves by vow to enter religion?
IIa IIae q. 88 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that children cannot bind
of madness or imbecility. Secondly, through the maker of
themselves by vow to enter religion. Since a vow re-
a vow being subject to another’s power, as stated above
quires deliberation of the mind, it is fitting that those alone (a. 8). Now these two circumstances concur in children
should vow who have the use of reason. But this is lacking
before the age of puberty, because in most instances they
in children just as in imbeciles and madmen. Therefore
are lacking in reason, and besides are naturally under the
just as imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to
care of their parents, or guardians in place of their parents:
anything by vow, so neither, seemingly, can children bind
wherefore in both events their vows are without force. It
themselves by vow to enter religion.
happens, however, through a natural disposition which is
Objection 2. Further, that which can be validly done
not subject to human laws, that the use of reason is accel-
by one cannot be annulled by another. Now a vow to en-
erated in some, albeit few, who on this account are said to
ter religion made by a boy or girl before the age of pu-
be capable of guile: and yet they are not, for this reason,
berty can be revoked by the parents or guardian (20, qu.
exempt in any way from the care of their parents; for this
ii, cap. Puella). Therefore it seems that a boy or girl can-
care is subject to human law, which takes into account that
not validly make a vow before the age of fourteen.
which is of most frequent occurrence.
Objection 3. Further, according to the rule of Blessed
Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have
Benedict∗ and a statute of Innocent IV, a year’s probation
not reached the years of puberty and have not attained the
is granted to those who enter religion, so that probation
use of reason can nowise bind themselves to anything by
may precede the obligation of the vow. Therefore it seems
vow. If, however, they attain the use of reason, before
unlawful, before the year of probation, for children to be
reaching the years of puberty, they can for their own part,
bound by vow to enter religion.
bind themselves by vow; but their vows can be annulled
On the contrary, That which is not done aright is in-
by their parents, under whose care they are still subject.
valid without being annulled by anyone. But the vow pro-
Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile
nounced by a maiden, even before attaining the age of pu-
before the years of puberty, they cannot be bound by a
berty, is valid, unless it be annulled by her parents within
solemn religious vow, on account of the Church’s decree†
a year (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore even before
which considers the majority of cases. But after the years
attaining to puberty children can lawfully and validly be
of puberty have been reached, they can bind themselves
bound by a vow to enter religion.
by religious vows, simple or solemn, without the consent
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has
of their parents.
been said above (a. 7), vows are of two kinds, simple
Reply to Objection 1. This argument avails in the
and solemn. And since, as stated in the same article,
case of children who have not yet reached the use of rea-
the solemnization of a vow consists in a spiritual bless-
son: for their vows then are invalid, as stated above.
ing and consecration bestowed through the ministry of
Reply to Objection 2. The vows of persons subject
the Church, it follows that it comes under the Church’s
to another’s power contain an implied condition, namely,
dispensation. Now a simple vow takes its efficacy from
that they be not annulled by the superior. This condi-
the deliberation of the mind, whereby one intends to put
tion renders them licit and valid if it be fulfilled, as stated oneself under an obligation. That such an obligation be
above.
of no force may happen in two ways. First, through de-
Reply to Objection 3. This argument avails in the
fect of reason, as in madmen and imbeciles, who cannot
case of solemn vows which are taken in profession.
bind themselves by vow so long as they remain in a state
∗ Ch. 58
† Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et transeunt. ad Relig.
1613
Whether vows admit of dispensation?
IIa IIae q. 88 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that vows are not subject
as is clear from what has been said above (a. 2). There-
to dispensation. It is less to have a vow commuted than to
fore it is necessary, in such a case, to decide that the vow
be dispensed from keeping it. But a vow cannot be com-
is not to be observed. And if it be decided absolutely that
muted, according to Lev. 27:9,10, “A beast that may be
a particular vow is not to be observed, this is called a “dis-
sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall be holy,
pensation” from that vow; but if some other obligation be
and cannot be changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a
imposed in lieu of that which was to have been observed,
worse for a better.” Much less, therefore, do vows admit
the vow is said to be “commuted.” Hence it is less to com-
of dispensation.
mute a vow than to dispense from a vow: both, however,
Objection 2. Further, no man can grant a dispensation
are in the power of the Church.
in matters concerning the natural law and in the Divine
Reply to Objection 1. An animal that could be law-
precepts, especially those of the First Table, since these
fully sacrificed was deemed holy from the very moment
aim directly at the love of God, which is the last end of
that it was the subject of a vow, being, as it were, dedi-
the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a vow is a matter of
cated to the worship of God: and for this reason it could
the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine law, as
not be changed: even so neither may one now exchange
shown above (a. 3), and belongs to the precepts of the First
for something better, or worse, that which one has vowed,
Table since it is an act of religion. Therefore vows do not
if it be already consecrated, e.g. a chalice or a house.
admit of dispensation.
On the other hand, an animal that could not be sacrificed,
Objection 3. Further, the obligation of a vow is based
through not being the lawful matter of a sacrifice, could
on the fidelity which a man owes to God, as stated above
and had to be bought back, as the law requires. Even so,
(a. 3). But no man can dispense in such a matter as this.
vows can be commuted now, if no consecration has inter-
Neither, therefore, can any one grant a dispensation from
vened.
a vow.
Reply to Objection 2. Even as man is bound by nat-
On the contrary, That which proceeds from the com-
ural law and Divine precept to fulfil his vow, so, too, is
mon will of many has apparently greater stability than that
he bound under the same heads to obey the law or com-
which proceeds from the individual will of some one per-
mands of his superiors. And yet when he is dispensed
son. Now the law which derives its force from the com-
from keeping a human law, this does not involve disobe-
mon will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore it
dience to that human law, for this would be contrary to the
seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man.
natural law and the Divine command; but it amounts to
I answer that, The dispensation from a vow is to be
this—that what was law is not law in this particular case.
taken in the same sense as a dispensation given in the ob-
Even so, when a superior grants a dispensation, that which
servance of a law because, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 96,
was contained under a vow is by his authority no longer so
a. 6; Ia IIae, q. 97, a. 4), a law is made with an eye to that
contained, in so far as he decides that in this case such and
which is good in the majority of instances. But since, in
such a thing is not fitting matter for a vow. Consequently
certain cases this is not good, there is need for someone to
when an ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from
decide that in that particular case the law is not to be ob-
a vow, he does not dispense him from keeping a precept
served. This is properly speaking to dispense in the law:
of the natural or of the Divine law, but he pronounces a
for a dispensation would seem to denote a commensurate
decision on a matter to which a man had bound himself of
distribution or application of some common thing to those
his own accord, and of which he was unable to consider
that are contained under it, in the same way as a person is
every circumstance.
said to dispense food to a household.
Reply to Objection 3. The fidelity we owe to God
In like manner a person who takes a vow makes a law
does not require that we fulfil that which it would be
for himself as it were, and binds himself to do something
wrong or useless to vow, or which would be an obstacle
which in itself and in the majority of cases is a good. But
to the greater good whereunto the dispensation from that
it may happen that in some particular case this is simply
vow would conduce. Hence the dispensation from a vow
evil, or useless, or a hindrance to a greater good: and this
is not contrary to the fidelity due to God.
is essentially contrary to that which is the matter of a vow,
1614
Whether it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency?
IIa IIae q. 88 a. 11
Objection 1. It would seem that it is possible to be
man overcomes a foe within himself, or to the fact that
dispensed from a solemn vow of continency. As stated
by continency man is perfectly conformed to Christ in re-
above, one reason for granting a dispensation from a vow
spect of purity of both body and soul. But this reason
is if it be an obstacle to a greater good. But a vow of con-
does not seem to be cogent since the goods of the soul,
tinency, even though it be solemn, may be an obstacle to
such as contemplation and prayer, far surpass the goods
a greater good, since the common good is more God-like
of the body and still more conform us to God, and yet one
than the good of an individual. Now one man’s conti-
may be dispensed from a vow of prayer or contemplation.
nency may be an obstacle to the good of the whole com-
Therefore, continency itself absolutely considered seems
munity, for instance, in the case where, if certain persons
no reason why the solemn vow thereof cannot be a matter
who have vowed continency were to marry, the peace of
of dispensation; especially seeing that the Apostle (1 Cor.
their country might be procured. Therefore it seems that
7:34) exhorts us to be continent on account of contempla-
it is possible to be dispensed even from a solemn vow of
tion, when he says that the unmarried woman. . . “thinketh
continency.
on the things of God [Vulg.: ‘the Lord’],” and since the
Objection 2. Further, religion is a more excellent
end is of more account than the means.
virtue than chastity. Now if a man vows an act of religion,
Consequently others† find the reason for this in the
e.g. to offer sacrifice to God he can be dispensed from that
perpetuity and universality of this vow. For they assert
vow. Much more, therefore, can he be dispensed from the
that the vow of continency cannot be canceled, save by
vow of continency which is about an act of chastity.
something altogether contrary thereto, which is never law-
Objection 3. Further, just as the observance of a vow
ful in any vow. But this is evidently false, because just as
of abstinence may be a source of danger to the person, so
the practice of carnal intercourse is contrary to continency,
too may be the observance of a vow of continency. Now
so is eating flesh or drinking wine contrary to abstinence
one who takes a vow of abstinence can be dispensed from
from such things, and yet these latter vows may be a mat-
that vow if it prove a source of danger to his body. There-
ter for dispensation.
fore for the same reason one may be dispensed from a vow
For this reason others‡ maintain that one may be dis-
of continency.
pensed even from a solemn vow of continency, for the
Objection 4. Further, just as the vow of continency is
sake of some common good or common need, as in the
part of the religious profession, whereby the vow is sol-
case of the example given above (obj. 1), of a country
emnized, so also are the vows of poverty and obedience.
being restored to peace through a certain marriage to be
But it is possible to be dispensed from the vows of poverty
contracted. Yet since the Decretal quoted says explic-
and obedience, as in the case of those who are appointed
itly that “not even the Sovereign Pontiff can dispense a
bishops after making profession. Therefore it seems that
monk from keeping chastity,” it follows seemingly, that
it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of conti-
we must maintain that, as stated above (a. 10, ad 1; cf.
nency.
Lev. 27:9,10,28), whatsoever has once been sanctified to
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 26:20): “No
the Lord cannot be put to any other use. For no ecclesi-
price is worthy of a continent soul.”
astical prelate can make that which is sanctified to lose its
Further, (Extra, De Statu Monach.)
at the end of
consecration, not even though it be something inanimate,
the Decretal, Cum ad Monasterium it is stated that the
for instance a consecrated chalice to be not consecrated,
“renouncing of property, like the keeping of chastity, is
so long as it remains entire. Much less, therefore, can a
so bound up with the monastic rule, that not even the
prelate make a man that is consecrated to God cease to
Sovereign Pontiff can disperse from its observance.”
be consecrated, so long as he lives. Now the solemnity
I answer that, Three things may be considered in a
of a vow consists in a kind of consecration or blessing
solemn vow of continency: first, the matter of the vow,
of the person who takes the vow, as stated above (a. 7).
namely, continency; secondly, the perpetuity of the vow,
Hence no prelate of the Church can make a man, who has
namely, when a person binds himself by vow to the per-
pronounced a solemn vow, to be quit of that to which he
petual observance of chastity: thirdly, the solemnity of
was consecrated, e.g. one who is a priest, to be a priest
the vow. Accordingly, some∗ say that the solemn vow
no more, although a prelate may, for some particular rea-
cannot be a matter of dispensation, on account of the con-
son, inhibit him from exercising his order. In like manner
tinency itself for which no worthy price can be found, as
the Pope cannot make a man who has made his religious
is stated by the authority quoted above. The reason for
profession cease to be a religious, although certain jurists
this is assigned by some to the fact that by continency
have ignorantly held the contrary.
∗ William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III. vii. 1, qu. 5 † Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38
‡ Innocent IV, on the above decretal
1615
We must therefore consider whether continency is es-poral prayer or of temporal abstinence. But the fact that
sentially bound up with the purpose for which the vow is
no dispensation can be granted from a vow of continency
solemnized. because if not, the solemnity of the conse-
solemnized by profession is due, not to its being an act of
cration can remain without the obligation of continency,
chastity, but because through the religious profession it is
but not if continency is essentially bound up with that for
already an act of religion.
which the vow is solemnized. Now the obligation of ob-
Reply to Objection 3. Food is directly ordered to the
serving continency is connected with Holy orders, not es-
upkeep of the person, therefore abstinence from food may
sentially but by the institution of the Church; wherefore it
be a direct source of danger to the person: and so on this
seems that the Church can grant a dispensation from the
count a vow of abstinence is a matter of dispensation. On
vow of continency solemnized by the reception of Holy
the other hand sexual intercourse is directly ordered to the
Orders. on the other hand the obligation of observing;
upkeep not of the person but of the species, wherefore to
continency is an essential condition of the religious state,
abstain from such intercourse by continency does not en-
whereby a man renounces the world and binds himself
danger the person. And if indeed accidentally it prove a
wholly to God’s service, for this is incompatible with mat-
source of danger to the person, this danger may be obvi-
rimony, in which state a man is under the obligation of
ated by some other means, for instance by abstinence, or
taking to himself a wife, of begetting children, of looking
other corporal remedies.
after his household, and of procuring whatever is neces-
Reply to Objection 4. A religious who is made a
sary for these purposes. Wherefore the Apostle says (1
bishop is no more absolved from his vow of poverty than
Cor. 7:33) that “he that is with a wife, is solicitous for the
from his vow of continency, since he must have nothing of
things of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is
his own and must hold himself as being the dispenser of
divided.” Hence the “monk” takes his name from “unity”§
the common goods of the Church. In like manner neither
in contrast with this division. For this reason the Church
is he dispensed from his vow of obedience; it is an acci-
cannot dispense from a vow solemnized by the religious
dent that he is not bound to obey if he have no superior;
profession; and the reason assigned by the Decretal is be-
just as the abbot of a monastery, who nevertheless is not
cause “chastity is bound up with the monastic rule.”
dispensed from his vow of obedience.
Reply to Objection 1. Perils occasioned by human af-
The passage of Ecclesiasticus, which is put forward in
fairs should be obviated by human means, not by turning
the contrary sense, should be taken as meaning that nei-
divine things to a human use. Now a professed religious is
ther fruitfulness of the of the flesh nor any bodily good is
dead to the world and lives to God, and so he must not be
to be compared with continency, which is reckoned one
called back to the human life on the pretext of any human
of the goods of the soul, as Augustine declares (De Sanct.
contingency.
Virg. viii). Wherefore it is said pointedly “of a continent
Reply to Objection 2. A vow of temporal continency
soul,” not “of a continent body.”
can be a matter of dispensation, as also a vow of tem-
Whether the authority of a prelate is required for commutation or the dispensation of IIa IIae q. 88 a. 12
a vow?
Objection 1. It would seem that the authority of a
when anyone rightly determines of his own authority that
prelate is not required for the commutation or dispensa-
in his case a vow is not to be kept, he would seem not to
tion of a vow. A person may enter religion without the
be bound; since a vow need not be kept if it have an evil
authority of a superior prelate. Now by entering religion
result (a. 2, ad 2). Therefore the Authority of a prelate is
one is absolved from the vows he made in the world, even
not required that one may be dispensed from a vow.
from the vow of making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land∗.
Objection 3. Further, if it belongs to a prelate’s power Therefore the commutation or dispensation of a vow is
to grant dispensations from vows, on the same count it is
possible without the authority of a superior prelate.
competent to all prelates, but it does not belong to all to
Objection 2. Further, to dispense anyone from a vow
dispense from every vow. Therefore it does not belong to
seems to consist in deciding in what circumstances he
the power of a prelate to dispense from vows.
need not keep that vow. But if the prelate is at fault in
On the contrary, A vow binds one to do something,
his decision, the person who took the vow does not seem
even as a law does. Now the superior’s authority is requi-
to be absolved from his vow, since no prelate can grant a
site for a dispensation from a precept of the law, as stated
dispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping
above ( Ia IIae, q. 96, a. 6; Ia IIae, q. 97, a. 4). Therefore
one’s vows, as stated above (a. 10, ad 2; a. 11). Likewise,
it is likewise required in a dispensation from a vow.
§ The Greek monos
∗ Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.
1616
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2), a vow is a of conscience, whenever his superior tells him to.
promise made to God about something acceptable to Him.
But this opinion is based on a false supposition: be-
Now if you promise something to anyone it depends on
cause a spiritual prelate being, not a master, but a dis-
his decision whether he accept what you promise. Again
penser, his power is given “unto edification, not for de-
in the Church a prelate stands in God’s place. Therefore a
struction” (2 Cor. 10:8), and consequently, just as he can-
commutation or dispensation of vows requires the author-
not command that which is in itself displeasing to God,
ity of a prelate who in God’s stead declares what is accept-
namely, sin, so neither can he forbid what is in itself pleas-
able to God, according to 2 Cor. 2:10: “For. . . have par-
ing to God, namely, works of virtue. Therefore absolutely
doned. . . for your sakes. . . in the person of Christ.” And
speaking man can vow them. But it does belong to a
he says significantly “for your sakes,” since whenever we
prelate to decide what is the more virtuous and the more
ask a prelate for a dispensation we should do so to honor
acceptable to God. Consequently in matters presenting
Christ in Whose person he dispenses, or to promote the
no difficulty, the prelate’s dispensation would not excuse
interests of the Church which is His Body.
one from sin: for instance, if a prelate were to dispense
Reply to Objection 1. All other vows are about some
a person from a vow to enter the religious life, without
particular works, whereas by the religious life a man con-
any apparent cause to prevent him from fulfilling his vow.
secrates his whole life to God’s service. Now the particu-
But if some cause were to appear, giving rise, at least, to
lar is included in the universal, wherefore a Decretal∗ says
doubt, he could hold to the prelate’s decision whether of
that “a man is not deemed a vow-breaker if he exchange
commutation or of dispensation. He could not, however,
a temporal service for the perpetual service of religion.”
follow his own judgment in the matter, because he does
And yet a man who enters religion is not bound to ful-
not stand in the place of God; except perhaps in the case
fil the vows, whether of fasting or of praying or the like,
when the thing he has vowed is clearly unlawful, and he
which he made when in the world, because by entering
is unable to have recourse to the prelate.
religion he dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable to
Reply to Objection 3. Since the Sovereign Pontiff
the religious life that each one should have his own ob-
holds the place of Christ throughout the whole Church, he
servances, and because the burden of religion is onerous
exercises absolute power of dispensing from all vows that
enough without requiring the addition of other burdens.
admit of dispensation. To other and inferior prelates is the
Reply to Objection 2. Some have held that prelates
power committed of dispensing from those vows that are
can dispense from vows at their will, for the reason that
commonly made and frequently require dispensation, in
every vow supposes as a condition that the superior prelate
order that men may easily have recourse to someone; such
be willing; thus it was stated above (a. 8) that the vow of a
are the vows of pilgrimage (Cap. de Peregin., de Voto et
subject, e.g. of a slave or a son, supposes this condition, if
Voti redempt.), fasting and the like, and of pilgrimage to
“the father or master consent,” or “does not dissent.” And
the Holy Land, are reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff†.
thus a subject might break his vow without any remorse
∗ Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.
† Cap. Ex multa
1617
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 89
Of Oaths
(In Ten Articles)
We must now consider those external acts of religion, whereby something Divine is taken by man: and this is either a sacrament or the Name of God. The place for treating of the taking of a sacrament will be in the Third Part of this work: of the taking of God’s Name we shall treat now. The Name of God is taken by man in three ways. First, by way of oath in order to confirm one’s own assertion: secondly, by way of adjuration as an inducement to others: thirdly, by way of invocation for the purpose of prayer or praise. Accordingly we must first treat of oaths: and under this head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) What is an oath?
(2) Whether it is lawful?
(3) What are the accompanying conditions of an oath?
(4) Of what virtue is it an act?
(5) Whether oaths are desirable, and to be employed frequently as something useful and good?
(6) Whether it is lawful to swear by a creature?
(7) Whether an oath is binding?
(8) Which is more binding, an oath or a vow?
(9) Whether an oath is subject to dispensation?
(10) Who may lawfully swear, and when?
Whether to swear is to call God to witness?
IIa IIae q. 89 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that to swear is not to call
true. But particular contingent facts regarding man can-
God to witness. Whoever invokes the authority of Holy
not be confirmed by a necessary reason, wherefore propo-
Writ calls God to witness, since it is His word that Holy
sitions regarding such things are wont to be confirmed by
Writ contains. Therefore, if to swear is to call God to wit-
witnesses. Now a human witness does not suffice to con-
ness, whoever invoked the authority of Holy Writ would
firm such matters for two reasons. First, on account of
swear. But this is false Therefore the antecedent is false
man’s lack of truth, for many give way to lying, accord-
also.
ing to Ps. 16:10, “Their mouth hath spoken lies [Vulg.:
Objection 2. Further, one does not pay anything to
‘proudly’].” Secondly, on account of this lack of knowl-
a person by calling him to witness. But he who swears
edge, since he can know neither the future, nor secret
by God pays something to Him for it is written (Mat.
thoughts, nor distant things: and yet men speak about such
5:33): “Thou shall pay [Douay: ‘perform’] thy oaths to
things, and our everyday life requires that we should have
the Lord”; and Augustine says∗ that to swear [jurare] is
some certitude about them. Hence the need to have re-
“to pay the right [jus reddere] of truth to God.” Therefore
course to a Divine witness, for neither can God lie, nor is
to swear is not to call God to witness.
anything hidden from Him. Now to call God to witness
Objection 3. Further, the duties of a judge differ from
is named “jurare” [to swear] because it is established as
the duties of a witness, as shown above (Qq. 67,70). Now
though it were a principle of law [jure] that what a man as-
sometimes a man, by swearing, implores the Divine judg-
serts under the invocation of God as His witness should be
ment, according to Ps. 7:5, “If I have rendered to them
accepted as true. Now sometimes God is called to witness
that repaid me evils, let me deservedly fall empty before
when we assert present or past events, and this is termed
my enemies.” Therefore to swear is not to call God to
a “declaratory oath”; while sometimes God is called to
witness.
witness in confirmation of something future, and this is
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on per-
termed a “promissory oath.” But oaths are not employed
jury (Serm. clxxx): “When a man says: ‘By God,’ what
in order to substantiate necessary matters, and such as
else does he mean but that God is his witness?”
come under the investigation of reason; for it would seem
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), oaths
absurd in a scientific discussion to wish to prove one’s
are taken for the purpose of confirmation. Now specula-
point by an oath.
tive propositions receive confirmation from reason, which
Reply to Objection 1. It is one thing to employ a
proceeds from principles known naturally and infallibly
Divine witness already given, as when one adduces the
∗ Serm. clxxx
1618
authority of Holy Scripture; and another to implore God In one way He reveals the truth simply, either by inward
to bear witness, as in an oath.
inspiration, or by unveiling the facts, namely, by making
Reply to Objection 2. A man is said to pay his oaths
public what was hitherto secret: in another way by pun-
to God because he performs what he swears to do, or be-
ishing the lying witness, and then He is at once judge and
cause, from the very fact that he calls upon God to wit-
witness, since by punishing the liar He makes known his
ness, he recognizes Him as possessing universal knowl-
lie. Hence oaths are of two kinds: one is a simple contes-
edge and unerring truth.
tation of God, as when a man says “God is my witness,”
Reply to Objection 3. A person is called to give wit-
or, “I speak before God,” or, “By God,” which has the
ness, in order that he may make known the truth about
same meaning, as Augustine states∗; the other is by curs-
what is alleged. Now there are two ways in which God
ing, and consists in a man binding himself or something
makes known whether the alleged facts are true or not.
of his to punishment if what is alleged be not true.
Whether it is lawful to swear?
IIa IIae q. 89 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful to
good man in this manner. Moreover, he is in danger of
swear. Nothing forbidden in the Divine Law is lawful.
committing perjury, because man easily offends in words,
Now swearing is forbidden (Mat. 5:34), “But I say to you
according to James 3:2, “If any man offend not in word,
not to swear at all”; and (James 5:12), “Above all things,
the same is a perfect man.” Wherefore it is written (Ec-
my brethren, swear not.” Therefore swearing is unlawful.
clus. 23:9): “Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swear-
Objection 2. Further, whatever comes from an evil
ing, for in it there are many falls.”
seems to be unlawful, because according to Mat. 7:18,
Reply to Objection 1. Jerome, commenting on Mat.
“neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit.” Now
5:34, says: “Observe that our Saviour forbade us to swear,
swearing comes from an evil, for it is written (Mat. 5:37):
not by God, but by heaven and earth. For it is known that
“But let your speech be: Yea, yea: No, no. And that which
the Jews have this most evil custom of swearing by the el-
is over and above these is of evil.” Therefore swearing is
ements.” Yet this answer does not suffice, because James
apparently unlawful.
adds, “nor by any other oath.” Wherefore we must reply
Objection 3. Further, to seek a sign of Divine Prov-
that, as Augustine states (De Mendacio xv), “when the
idence is to tempt God, and this is altogether unlawful,
Apostle employs an oath in his epistles, he shows how we
according to Dt. 6:16, “Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy
are to understand the saying, ‘I say to you, not to swear at
God.” Now he that swears seems to seek a sign of Divine
all’; lest, to wit, swearing lead us to swear easily and from
Providence, since he asks God to bear witness, and this
swearing easily, we contract the habit, and, from swear-
must be by some evident effect. Therefore it seems that
ing habitually, we fall into perjury. Hence we find that he
swearing is altogether unlawful.
swore only when writing, because thought brings caution
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:13): “Thou shalt
and avoids hasty words.”
fear the Lord thy God. . . and shalt swear by His name.”
Reply to Objection 2. According to Augustine (De
I answer that, Nothing prevents a thing being good
Serm. Dom. in Monte i. 17): “If you have to swear, note
in itself, and yet becoming a source of evil to one who
that the necessity arises from the infirmity of those whom
makes use thereof unbecomingly: thus to receive the Eu-
you convince, which infirmity is indeed an evil. Accord-
charist is good, and yet he that receives it “unworthily,
ingly He did not say: ‘That which is over and above is
eateth and drinketh judgment to himself” (1 Cor. 11:29).
evil,’ but ‘is of evil.’ For you do no evil; since you make
Accordingly in answer to the question in point it must be
good use of swearing, by persuading another to a useful
stated that an oath is in itself lawful and commendable.
purpose: yet it ‘comes of the evil’ of the person by whose
This is proved from its origin and from its end. From its
infirmity you are forced to swear.”
origin, because swearing owes its introduction to the faith
Reply to Objection 3. He who swears tempts not
whereby man believes that God possesses unerring truth
God, because it is not without usefulness and necessity
and universal knowledge and foresight of all things: and
that he implores the Divine assistance. Moreover, he does
from its end, since oaths are employed in order to justify
not expose himself to danger, if God be unwilling to bear
men, and to put an end to controversy (Heb. 6:16).
witness there and then: for He certainly will bear witness
Yet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that makes
at some future time, when He “will bring to light the hid-
evil use of it, that is who employs it without necessity and
den things of darkness, and will make manifest the coun-
due caution. For if a man calls God as witness, for some
sels of hearts” (1 Cor. 4:5). And this witness will be lack-
trifling reason, it would seemingly prove him to have but
ing to none who swears, neither for nor against him.
little reverence for God, since he would not treat even a
∗ See argument On the contrary
1619
Whether three accompanying conditions of an oath are suitably assigned, namely, IIa IIae q. 89 a. 3
justice, judgment, and truth?
Objection 1. It would seem that justice, judgment and
good except for one who makes good use of it. Now two
truth are unsuitably assigned as the conditions accompa-
conditions are required for the good use of an oath. First,
nying an oath. Things should not be enumerated as di-
that one swear, not for frivolous, but for urgent reasons,
verse, if one of them includes the other. Now of these
and with discretion; and this requires judgment or discre-
three, one includes another, since truth is a part of justice,
tion on the part of the person who swears. Secondly, as
according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53): and judgment
regards the point to be confirmed by oath, that it be nei-
is an act of justice, as stated above (q. 60, a. 1). Therefore
ther false, nor unlawful, and this requires both truth, so
the three accompanying conditions of an oath are unsuit-
that one employ an oath in order to confirm what is true,
ably assigned.
and justice, so that one confirm what is lawful. A rash oath
Objection 2. Further, many other things are required
lacks judgment, a false oath lacks truth, and a wicked or
for an oath, namely, devotion, and faith whereby we be-
unlawful oath lacks justice.
lieve that God knows all things and cannot lie. Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. Judgment does not signify here
the accompanying conditions of an oath are insufficiently
the execution of justice, but the judgment of discretion, as
enumerated.
stated above. Nor is truth here to be taken for the part of
Objection 3.
Further, these three are requisite in
justice, but for a condition of speech.
man’s every deed: since he ought to do nothing contrary
Reply to Objection 2. Devotion, faith and like con-
to justice and truth, or without judgment, according to 1
ditions requisite for the right manner of swearing are im-
Tim. 5:21, “Do nothing without prejudice,” i.e. without
plied by judgment: for the other two regard the things
previous judgment∗. Therefore these three should not be
sworn to as stated above. We might also reply that justice
associated with an oath any more than with other human
regards the reason for swearing.
actions.
Reply to Objection 3. There is great danger in swear-
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 4:2): “Thou shalt
ing, both on account of the greatness of God Who is called
swear: As the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and
upon to bear witness, and on account of the frailty of the
in justice”: which words Jerome expounds, saying: “Ob-
human tongue, the words of which are confirmed by oath.
serve that an oath must be accompanied by these condi-
Hence these conditions are more requisite for an oath than
tions, truth, judgment and justice.”
for other human actions.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), an oath is not
Whether an oath is an act of religion or latria?
IIa IIae q. 89 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that an oath is not an
I answer that, As appears from what has been said
act of religion, or latria. Acts of religion are about holy
above (a. 1), he that swears calls God to witness in con-
and divine things. But oaths are employed in connection
firmation of what he says. Now nothing is confirmed save
with human disputes, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:16).
by what is more certain and more powerful. Therefore in
Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria.
the very fact that a man swears by God, he acknowledges
Objection 2. Further, it belongs to religion to give
God to be more powerful, by reason of His unfailing truth
worship to God, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53).
and His universal knowledge; and thus in a way he shows
But he who swears offers nothing to God, but calls God to
reverence to God. For this reason the Apostle says (Heb.
be his witness. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion
6:16) that “men swear by one greater than themselves,”
or latria.
and Jerome commenting on Mat. 5:34, says that “he who
Objection 3. Further, the end of religion or latria is to swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he
show reverence to God. But the end of an oath is not this,
swears.” The Philosopher, too, states (Metaph. i, 3) that
but rather the confirmation of some assertion. Therefore
“to swear is to give very great honor.” Now to show rev-
swearing is not an act of religion.
erence to God belongs to religion or latria. wherefore it is
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:13): “Thou shalt
evident that an oath is an act of religion or latria.
fear the Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and thou
Reply to Objection 1. Two things may be observed
shalt swear by His name.” Now he speaks there of the
in an oath. The witness adduced, and this is Divine: and
servitude of religion. Therefore swearing is an act of reli-
the thing witnessed to, or that which makes it necessary to
gion.
call the witness, and this is human. Accordingly an oath
∗ Vulg.: ‘Observe these things without prejudice, doing nothing by declining to either side.’
1620
belongs to religion by reason of the former, and not of the Reply to Objection 3. Whatsoever we do, we should
latter.
do it in honor of God: wherefore there is no hindrance, if
Reply to Objection 2. In the very fact that a man
by intending to assure a man, we show reverence to God.
takes God as witness by way of an oath, he acknowledges
For we ought so to perform our actions in God’s honor
Him to be greater: and this pertains to the reverence and
that they may conduce to our neighbor’s good, since God
honor of God, so that he offers something to God, namely,
also works for His own glory and for our good.
reverence and honor.
Whether oaths are desirable and to be used frequently as something useful and good?
IIa IIae q. 89 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that oaths are desirable
this life; and such things are used unduly whenever they
and to be used frequently as something useful and good.
are used outside the bounds of necessity. For this reason
Just as a vow is an act of religion, so is an oath. Now
Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17): “He
it is commendable and more meritorious to do a thing by
who understands that swearing is not to be held as a good
vow, because a vow is an act of religion, as stated above
thing,” i.e. desirable for its own sake, “restrains himself
(q. 88, a. 5). Therefore for the same reason, to do or say
as far as he can from uttering oaths, unless there be urgent
a thing with an oath is more commendable, and conse-
need.”
quently oaths are desirable as being good essentially.
Reply to Objection 1. There is no parity between a
Objection 2. Further, Jerome, commenting on Mat.
vow and an oath: because by a vow we direct something
5:34, says that “he who swears either reveres or loves the
to the honor of God, so that for this very reason a vow
person by whom he swears.” Now reverence and love of
is an act of religion. On the other hand, in an oath rev-
God are desirable as something good essentially. There-
erence for the name of God is taken in confirmation of a
fore swearing is also.
promise. Hence what is confirmed by oath does not, for
Objection 3. Further, swearing is directed to the pur-
this reason, become an act of religion, since moral acts
pose of confirming or assuring. But it is a good thing for
take their species from the end.
a man to confirm his assertion. Therefore an oath is desir-
Reply to Objection 2. He who swears does indeed
able as a good thing.
make use of his reverence or love for the person by whom
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 23:12): “A
he swears: he does not, however, direct his oath to the rev-
man that sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity”: and
erence or love of that person, but to something else that is
Augustine says (De Mendacio xv) that “the Lord forbade
necessary for the present life.
swearing, in order that for your own part you might not
Reply to Objection 3. Even as a medicine is useful
be fond of it, and take pleasure in seeking occasions of
for healing, and yet, the stronger it is, the greater harm it
swearing, as though it were a good thing.”
does if it be taken unduly, so too an oath is useful indeed
I answer that, Whatever is required merely as a rem-
as a means of confirmation, yet the greater the reverence it
edy for an infirmity or a defect, is not reckoned among
demands the more dangerous it is, unless it be employed
those things that are desirable for their own sake, but
aright; for, as it is written (Ecclus. 23:13), “if he make
among those that are necessary: this is clear in the case of
it void,” i.e. if he deceive his brother, “his sin shall be
medicine which is required as a remedy for sickness. Now
upon him: and if he dissemble it,” by swearing falsely,
an oath is required as a remedy to a defect, namely, some
and with dissimulation, “he offendeth double,” [because,
man’s lack of belief in another man. Wherefore an oath is
to wit, “pretended equity is a twofold iniquity,” as Augus-
not to be reckoned among those things that are desirable
tine∗ declares]: “and if he swear in vain,” i.e. without due
for their own sake, but among those that are necessary for
cause and necessity, “he shall not be justified.”
Whether it is lawful to swear by creatures?
IIa IIae q. 89 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful to
and earth,” etc.
swear by creatures. It is written (Mat. 5:34-36): “I say
Objection 2. Further, punishment is not due save for a
to you not to swear at all, neither by heaven. . . nor by
fault. Now a punishment is appointed for one who swears
the earth. . . nor by Jerusalem. . . nor by thy head”: and
by creatures: for it is written (22, qu. i, can. Clericum):
Jerome, expounding these words, says: “Observe that the
“If a cleric swears by creatures he must be very severely
Saviour does not forbid swearing by God, but by heaven
rebuked: and if he shall persist in this vicious habit we
∗ Enarr. in Ps. lxiii, 7
1621
wish that he be excommunicated.” Therefore it is unlaw-call God to witness upon my soul.”
ful to swear by creatures.
As to Joseph’s oath by the health of Pharaoh this may
Objection 3. Further, an oath is an act of religion, as
be understood in both ways: either by way of a curse, as
stated above (a. 4). But religious worship is not due to any
though he pledged Pharao’s health to God; or by way of
creature, according to Rom. 1:23,25. Therefore it is not
contestation, as though he appealed to the truth of God’s
lawful to swear by a creature.
justice which the princes of the earth are appointed to ex-
On the contrary, Joseph swore “by the health of
ecute.
Pharaoh” (Gn. 42:16). Moreover it is customary to swear
Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord forbade us to swear
by the Gospel, by relics, and by the saints.
by creatures so as to give them the reverence due to God.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 3), there are
Hence Jerome adds that “the Jews, through swearing by
two kinds of oath. One is uttered a simple contestation or
the angels and the like, worshipped creatures with a Di-
calling God as witness: and this kind of oath, like faith, is
vine honor.”
based on God’s truth. Now faith is essentially and chiefly
In the same sense a cleric is punished, according to the
about God Who is the very truth, and secondarily about
canons (22, qu. i, can. Clericum, obj. 2), for swearing by
creatures in which God’s truth is reflected, as stated above
a creature, for this savors of the blasphemy of unbelief.
(q. 1, a. 1). In like manner an oath is chiefly referred to
Hence in the next chapter, it is said: “If any one swears by
God Whose testimony is invoked; and secondarily an ap-
God’s hair or head, or otherwise utter blasphemy against
peal by oath is made to certain creatures considered, not
God, and he be in ecclesiastical orders, let him be de-
in themselves, but as reflecting the Divine truth. Thus we
graded.”
swear by the Gospel, i.e. by God Whose truth is made
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
known in the Gospel; and by the saints who believed this
Reply to Objection 3. Religious worship is shown
truth and kept it.
to one whose testimony is invoked by oath: hence the
The other way of swearing is by cursing and in this
prohibition (Ex. 23:13): “By the name of strange gods
kind of oath a creature is adduced that the judgment of
you shall not swear.” But religious worship is not given
God may be wrought therein. Thus a man is wont to swear
to creatures employed in an oath in the ways mentioned
by his head, or by his son, or by some other thing that he
above.
loves, even as the Apostle swore (2 Cor. 1:23), saying: “I
Whether an oath has a binding force?
IIa IIae q. 89 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that an oath has no bind-
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:33): “Thou
ing force. An oath is employed in order to confirm the
shalt perform thy oaths to the Lord.”
truth of an assertion. But when a person makes an asser-
I answer that, An obligation implies something to
tion about the future his assertion is true, though it may
be done or omitted; so that apparently it regards neither
not be verified. Thus Paul lied not (2 Cor. 1:15, seqq.)
the declaratory oath (which is about something present or
though he went not to Corinth, as he had said he would (1
past), nor such oaths as are about something to be effected
Cor. 16:5). Therefore it seems that an oath is not binding.
by some other cause (as, for example, if one were to swear
Objection 2. Further, virtue is not contrary to virtue
that it would rain tomorrow), but only such as are about
(Categ. viii, 22). Now an oath is an act of virtue, as stated
things to be done by the person who swears.
above (a. 4). But it would sometimes be contrary to virtue,
Now just as a declaratory oath, which is about the fu-
or an obstacle thereto, if one were to fulfil what one has
ture or the present, should contain the truth, so too ought
sworn to do: for instance, if one were to swear to commit
the oath which is about something to be done by us in
a sin, or to desist from some virtuous action. Therefore an
the future. Yet there is a difference: since, in the oath
oath is not always binding.
that is about the past or present, this obligation affects,
Objection 3. Further, sometimes a man is compelled
not the thing that already has been or is, but the action of
against his will to promise something under oath. Now,
the swearer, in the point of his swearing to what is or was
“such a person is loosed by the Roman Pontiffs from the
already true; whereas, on the contrary, in the oath that is
bond of his oath” (Extra, De Jurejur., cap. Verum in ea
made about something to be done by us, the obligation
quaest., etc.). Therefore an oath is not always binding.
falls on the thing guaranteed by oath. For a man is bound
Objection 4. Further, no person can be under two op-
to make true what he has sworn, else his oath lacks truth.
posite obligations. Yet sometimes the person who swears
Now if this thing be such as not to be in his power,
and the person to whom he swears have opposite inten-
his oath is lacking in judgment of discretion: unless per-
tions. Therefore an oath cannot always be binding.
chance what was possible when he swore become impos-
1622
sible to him through some mishap. as when a man swore new and unforeseen emergency. An instance is the oath
to pay a sum of money, which is subsequently taken from
of Herod, who swore to the damsel, who danced before
him by force or theft. For then he would seem to be ex-
him, that he would give her what she would ask of him.
cused from fulfilling his oath, although he is bound to do
For this oath could be lawful from the outset, supposing it
what he can, as, in fact, we have already stated with re-
to have the requisite conditions, namely, that the damsel
gard to the obligation of a vow (q. 88, a. 3, ad 2). If, on
asked what it was right to grant. but the fulfilment of the
the other hand, it be something that he can do, but ought
oath was unlawful. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i,
not to, either because it is essentially evil, or because it is 50): “Sometimes it is wrong to fulfil a promise, and to
a hindrance to a good, then his oath is lacking in justice:
keep an oath; as Herod, who granted the slaying of John,
wherefore an oath must not be kept when it involves a sin
rather than refuse what he had promised.”
or a hindrance to good. For in either case “its result is
Reply to Objection 3. There is a twofold obliga-
evil”∗
tion in the oath which a man takes under compulsion:
Accordingly we must conclude that whoever swears to
one, whereby he is beholden to the person to whom he
do something is bound to do what he can for the fulfilment
promises something; and this obligation is cancelled by
of truth; provided always that the other two accompanying
the compulsion, because he that used force deserves that
conditions be present, namely, judgment and justice.
the promise made to him should not be kept. The other is
Reply to Objection 1. It is not the same with a simple
an obligation whereby a man is beholden to God, in virtue
assertion, and with an oath wherein God is called to wit-
of which he is bound to fulfil what he has promised in His
ness: because it suffices for the truth of an assertion, that
name. This obligation is not removed in the tribunal of
a person say what he proposes to do, since it is already
conscience, because that man ought rather to suffer tem-
true in its cause, namely, the purpose of the doer. But
poral loss, than violate his oath. He can, however, seek
an oath should not be employed, save in a matter about
in a court of justice to recover what he has paid, or de-
which one is firmly certain: and, consequently, if a man
nounce the matter to his superior even if he has sworn to
employ an oath, he is bound, as far as he can, to make
the contrary, because such an oath would lead to evil re-
true what he has sworn, through reverence of the Divine
sults since it would be contrary to public justice. The Ro-
witness invoked, unless it leads to an evil result, as stated.
man Pontiffs, in absolving men from oaths of this kind,
Reply to Objection 2. An oath may lead to an evil
did not pronounce such oaths to be unbinding, but relaxed
result in two ways. First, because from the very outset
the obligation for some just cause.
it has an evil result, either through being evil of its very
Reply to Objection 4. When the intention of the
nature (as, if a man were to swear to commit adultery),
swearer is not the same as the intention of the person to
or through being a hindrance to a greater good, as if a
whom he swears, if this be due to the swearer’s guile, he
man were to swear not to enter religion, or not to become
must keep his oath in accordance with the sound under-
a cleric, or that he would not accept a prelacy, suppos-
standing of the person to whom the oath is made. Hence
ing it would be expedient for him to accept, or in sim-
Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 31): “However artful a
ilar cases. For oaths of this kind are unlawful from the
man may be in wording his oath, God Who witnesses his
outset: yet with a difference: because if a man swear to
conscience accepts his oath as understood by the person
commit a sin, he sinned in swearing, and sins in keeping
to whom it is made.” And that this refers to the deceitful
his oath: whereas if a man swear not to perform a greater
oath is clear from what follows: “He is doubly guilty who
good, which he is not bound to do withal, he sins indeed in
both takes God’s name in vain, and tricks his neighbor by
swearing (through placing an obstacle to the Holy Ghost,
guile.” If, however, the swearer uses no guile, he is bound
Who is the inspirer of good purposes), yet he does not sin
in accordance with his own intention. Wherefore Gregory
in keeping his oath, though he does much better if he does
says (Moral. xxvi, 7): “The human ear takes such like
not keep it.
words in their natural outward sense, but the Divine judg-
Secondly, an oath leads to an evil result through some
ment interprets them according to our inward intention.”
Whether an oath is more binding than a vow?
IIa IIae q. 89 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that an oath is more bind-
firmed by the stronger. Now a vow is sometimes con-
ing than a vow. A vow is a simple promise: whereas an
firmed by an oath. Therefore an oath is stronger than a
oath includes, besides a promise, an appeal to God as wit-
vow.
ness. Therefore an oath is more binding than a vow.
Objection 3. Further, the obligation of a vow arises
Objection 2. Further, the weaker is wont to be con-
from the deliberation of the mind, a stated above (q. 88,
∗ Cf. Bede, Homil. xix, in Decoll. S. Joan. Bapt.
1623
a. 1); while the obligation of an oath results from the promise in His name. Now every act of infidelity includes
truth of God Whose testimony is invoked. Since therefore
an irreverence, but not conversely, because the infidelity
God’s truth is something greater than human deliberation,
of a subject to his lord would seem to be the greatest ir-
it seems that the obligation of an oath is greater than that
reverence. Hence a vow by its very nature is more binding
of a vow.
than an oath.
On the contrary, A vow binds one to God while an
Reply to Objection 1. A vow is not any kind of
oath sometimes binds one to man. Now one is more bound
promise, but a promise made to God; and to be unfaith-
to God than to man. Therefore a vow is more binding than
ful to God is most grievous.
an oath.
Reply to Objection 2. An oath is added to a vow not
I answer that, The obligation both of vow and of an
because it is more stable, but because greater stability re-
oath arises from something Divine; but in different ways.
sults from “two immutable things”∗.
For the obligation of a vow arises from the fidelity we owe
Reply to Objection 3. Deliberation of the mind gives
God, which binds us to fulfil our promises to Him. On the
a vow its stability, on the part of the person who takes the
other hand, the obligation of an oath arises from the rev-
vow: but it has a greater cause of stability on the part of
erence we owe Him which binds us to make true what we
God, to Whom the vow is offered.
Whether anyone can dispense from an oath?
IIa IIae q. 89 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that no one can dispense
tion.
from an oath. Just as truth is required for a declaratory
Reply to Objection 1. A dispensation from an oath
oath, which is about the past or the present, so too is it
does not imply a permission to do anything against the
required for a promissory oath, which is about the future.
oath: for this is impossible, since the keeping of an oath
Now no one can dispense a man from swearing to the truth
comes under a Divine precept, which does not admit of
about present or past things. Therefore neither can any-
dispensation: but it implies that what hitherto came under
one dispense a man from making truth that which he has
an oath no longer comes under it, as not being due mat-
promised by oath to do in the future.
ter for an oath, just as we have said with regard to vows
Objection 2. Further, a promissory oath is used for
(q. 88, a. 10, ad 2). Now the matter of a declaratory oath,
the benefit of the person to whom the promise is made.
which is about something past or present, has already ac-
But, apparently, he cannot release the other from his oath,
quired a certain necessity, and has become unchangeable,
since it would be contrary to the reverence of God. Much
wherefore the dispensation will regard not the matter but
less therefore can a dispensation from this oath be granted
the act itself of the oath: so that such a dispensation would
by anyone.
be directly contrary to the Divine precept. On the other
Objection 3. Further, any bishop can grant a dispensa-
hand, the matter of a promissory oath is something future,
tion from a vow, except certain vows reserved to the Pope
which admits of change, so that, to wit, in certain emer-
alone, as stated above (q. 88, a. 12, ad 3). Therefore in
gencies, it may be unlawful or hurtful, and consequently
like manner, if an oath admits of dispensation, any bishop
undue matter for an oath. Therefore a promissory oath ad-
can dispense from an oath. And yet seemingly this is to
mits of dispensation, since such dispensation regards the
be against the law†. Therefore it would seem that an oath
matter of an oath, and is not contrary to the Divine precept
does not admit of dispensation.
about the keeping of oaths.
On the contrary, A vow is more binding than an oath,
Reply to Objection 2. One man may promise some-
as stated above (a. 8). But a vow admits of dispensation
thing under oath to another in two ways. First, when he
and therefore an oath does also.
promises something for his benefit: for instance, if he
I answer that, As stated above (q. 88, a. 10), the ne-
promise to serve him, or to give him money: and from
cessity of a dispensation both from the law and from a
such a promise he can be released by the person to whom
vow arises from the fact that something which is useful
he made it: for he is understood to have already kept his
and morally good in itself and considered in general, may
promise to him when he acts towards him according to
be morally evil and hurtful in respect of some particular
his will. Secondly, one man promises another something
emergency: and such a case comes under neither law nor
pertaining to God’s honor or to the benefit of others: for
vow. Now anything morally evil or hurtful is incompati-
instance, if a man promise another under oath that he will
ble with the matter of an oath: for if it be morally evil it
enter religion, or perform some act of kindness. In this
is opposed to justice, and if it be hurtful it is contrary to
case the person to whom the promise is made cannot re-
judgment. Therefore an oath likewise admits of dispensa-
lease him that made the promise, because it was made
∗ Heb. 6:18
† Caus. XV, qu. 6, can. Auctoritatem, seqq.: Cap. Si
vero, de Jurejurando
1624
principally not to him but to God: unless perchance it in-promised under oath is manifestly lawful and beneficial.
cluded some condition, for instance, “provided he give his
An oath of this kind seemingly admits not of dispensation
consent” or some such like condition.
but of commutation, when there occurs something better
Reply to Objection 3. Sometimes that which is made
to be done for the common good, in which case the matter
the matter of a promissory oath is manifestly opposed to
would seem to belong chiefly to the power of the Pope,
justice, either because it is a sin, as when a man swears to
who has charge over the whole Church; and even of ab-
commit a murder, or because it is an obstacle to a greater
solute relaxation, for this too belongs in general to the
good, as when a man swears not to enter a religion: and
Pope in all matters regarding the administration of things
such an oath requires no dispensation. But in the former
ecclesiastical. Thus it is competent to any man to can-
case a man is bound not to keep such an oath, while in the
cel an oath made by one of his subjects in matters that
latter it is lawful for him to keep or not to keep the oath,
come under his authority: for instance, a father may an-
as stated above (a. 7, ad 2). Sometimes what is promised
nul his daughter’s oath, and a husband his wife’s (Num.
on oath is doubtfully right or wrong, useful or harmful,
30:6, seqq.), as stated above with regard to vows (q. 88,
either in itself or under the circumstance. In this case any
Aa. 8,9).
bishop can dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is
Whether an oath is voided by a condition of person or time?
IIa IIae q. 89 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that an oath is not voided
secration,’ instead of being put on his oath”: and (22, qu.
by a condition of person or time. An oath, according to the
v, can. Nullus): “Let no one in ecclesiastical orders dare
Apostle (Heb. 6:16), is employed for the purpose of con-
to swear on the Holy Gospels to a layman.”
firmation. Now it is competent to anyone to confirm his
I answer that, Two things are to be considered in an
assertion, and at any time. Therefore it would seem that
oath. One is on the part of God, whose testimony is in-
an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time.
voked, and in this respect we should hold an oath in the
Objection 2. Further, to swear by God is more than to
greatest reverence. For this reason children before the age
swear by the Gospels: wherefore Chrysostom∗ says: “If
of puberty are debarred from taking oaths†, and are not
there is a reason for swearing, it seems a small thing to
called upon to swear, because they have not yet attained
swear by God, but a great thing to swear by the Gospels.
the perfect use of reason, so as to be able to take a oath
To those who think thus, it must be said: Nonsense! the
with due reverence. Perjurers also are debarred from tak-
Scriptures were made for God’s sake, not God for the sake
ing an oath, because it is presumed from their antecedents
of the Scriptures.” Now men of all conditions and at all
that they will not treat an oath with the reverence due to it.
times are wont to swear by God. Much more, therefore, is
For this same reason, in order that oaths might be treated
it lawful to swear by the Gospels.
with due reverence the law says (22, qu. v, can. Hones-
Objection 3. Further, the same effect does not pro-
tum): “It is becoming that he who ventures to swear on
ceed from contrary causes, since contrary causes produce
holy things should do so fasting, with all propriety and
contrary effects. Now some are debarred from swearing
fear of God.”
on account of some personal defect; children, for instance,
The other thing to be considered is on the part of the
before the age of fourteen, and persons who have already
man, whose assertion is confirmed by oath. For a man’s
committed perjury. Therefore it would seem that a person
assertion needs no confirmation save because there is a
ought not to be debarred from swearing either on account
doubt about it. Now it derogates from a person’s dig-
of his dignity, as clerics, or on account of the solemnity of
nity that one should doubt about the truth of what he
the time.
says, wherefore “it becomes not persons of great dignity
Objection 4. Further, in this world no living man is
to swear.” For this reason the law says (II, qu. v, can. Si
equal in dignity to an angel: for it is written (Mat. 11:11)
quis presbyter) that “priests should not swear for trifling
that “he that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven is
reasons.” Nevertheless it is lawful for them to swear if
greater than he,” namely than John the Baptist, while yet
there be need for it, or if great good may result therefrom.
living. Now an angel is competent to swear, for it is writ-
Especially is this the case in spiritual affairs, when more-
ten (Apoc. 10:6) that the angel “swore by Him that liveth
over it is becoming that they should take oath on days of
for ever and ever.” Therefore no man ought to be excused
solemnity, since they ought then to devote themselves to
from swearing, on account of his dignity.
spiritual matters. Nor should they on such occasions take
On the contrary, It is stated (II, qu. v, can. Si quis
oaths temporal matters, except perhaps in cases grave ne-
presbyter): “Let a priest be examined ‘by his sacred con-
cessity.
∗ Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom
† Caus. XXII, qu. 5, can. Parvuli
1625
Reply to Objection 1. Some are unable to confirm thing from arising out of contrary causes, by way of su-their own assertions on account of their own defect: and
perabundance and defect. It is in this way that some are
some there are whose words should be so certain that they
debarred from swearing, through being of so great author-
need no confirmation.
ity that it is unbecoming for them to swear; while others
Reply to Objection 2. The greater the thing sworn
are of such little authority that their oaths have no stand-
by, the holier and the more binding is the oath, consid-
ing.
ered in itself, as Augustine states (Ad Public., Ep. xlvii):
Reply to Objection 4. The angel’s oath is adduced
and accordingly is a graver matter to swear by God than
not on account of any defect in the angel, as though one
the Gospels. Yet the contrary may be the case on account
ought not to credit his mere word, but in order to show
of the manner of swearing for instance, an oath by the
that the statement made issues from God’s infallible dis-
Gospels might be taken with deliberation and solemnity,
position. Thus too God is sometimes spoken of by Scrip-
and an oath by God frivolously and without deliberation.
ture as swearing, in order to express the immutability of
Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents the same
His word, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:17).
1626
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 90
Of the Taking of God’s Name by Way of Adjuration
(In Three Articles)
We must now consider the taking of God’s name by way of adjuration: under which head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?
(2) Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?
(3) Whether it is lawful to adjure irrational creatures?
Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?
IIa IIae q. 90 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful to
obligation by invoking the Divine name, whereas he can-
adjure a man. Origen says (Tract. xxxv super Matth.):
not put others under such an obligation unless they be his
“I deem that a man who wishes to live according to the
subjects, whom he can compel on the strength of the oath
Gospel should not adjure another man. For if, according
they have taken.
to the Gospel mandate of Christ, it be unlawful to swear,
Therefore, if a man by invoking the name of God, or
it is evident that neither is it lawful to adjure: and conse-
any holy thing, intends by this adjuration to put one who
quently it is manifest that the high-priest unlawfully ad-
is not his subject under an obligation to do a certain thing,
jured Jesus by the living God.”
in the same way as he would bind himself by oath, such
Objection 2. Further, whoever adjures a man, com-
an adjuration is unlawful, because he usurps over another
pels him after a fashion. But it is unlawful to compel a
a power which he has not. But superiors may bind their
man against his will. Therefore seemingly it is also un-
inferiors by this kind of adjuration, if there be need for it.
lawful to adjure a man.
If, however, he merely intend, through reverence of
Objection 3. Further, to adjure is to induce a person
the Divine name or of some holy thing, to obtain some-
to swear. Now it belongs to man’s superior to induce him
thing from the other man without putting him under any
to swear, for the superior imposes an oath on his subject.
obligation, such an adjuration may be lawfully employed
Therefore subjects cannot adjure their superiors.
in respect of anyone.
On the contrary, Even when we pray God we implore
Reply to Objection 1. Origen is speaking of an ad-
Him by certain holy things: and the Apostle too besought
juration whereby a man intends to put another under an
the faithful “by the mercy of God” (Rom. 12:1): and this
obligation, in the same way as he would bind himself by
seems to be a kind of adjuration. Therefore it is lawful to
oath: for thus did the high-priest presume to adjure our
adjure.
Lord Jesus Christ∗.
I answer that, A man who utters a promissory oath,
Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the
swearing by his reverence for the Divine name, which he
adjuration which imposes an obligation.
invokes in confirmation of his promise, binds himself to
Reply to Objection 3. To adjure is not to induce a
do what he has undertaken, and so orders himself un-
man to swear, but to employ terms resembling an oath in
changeably to do a certain thing. Now just as a man can
order to provoke another to do a certain thing.
order himself to do a certain thing, so too can he order
Moreover, we adjure God in one way and man in an-
others, by beseeching his superiors, or by commanding
other; because when we adjure a man we intend to alter
his inferiors, as stated above (q. 83, a. 1). Accordingly
his will by appealing to his reverence for a holy thing:
when either of these orderings is confirmed by something
and we cannot have such an intention in respect of God
Divine it is an adjuration. Yet there is this difference be-
Whose will is immutable. If we obtain something from
tween them, that man is master of his own actions but not
God through His eternal will, it is due, not to our merits,
of those of others; wherefore he can put himself under an
but to His goodness.
∗ Mat. 26:63
1627
Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?
IIa IIae q. 90 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to adjure the
angels, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), “the
demons. Origen says (Tract. xxxv, super Matth.): “To ad-
rebel spirit is ruled by the just spirit.” Accordingly we
jure the demons is not accordance with the power given
may repulse the demons, as being our enemies, by adjur-
by our Saviour: for this is a Jewish practice.” Now rather
ing them through the power of God’s name, lest they do
than imitate the rites of the Jews, we should use the power
us harm of soul or body, in accord with the Divine power
given by Christ. Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the
given by Christ, as recorded by Lk. 10:19: “Behold, I
demons.
have given you power to tread upon serpents and scorpi-
Objection 2. Further, many make use of necromantic
ons, and upon all the power of the enemy: and nothing
incantations when invoking the demons by something Di-
shall hurt you.”
vine: and this is an adjuration. Therefore, if it be lawful
It is not, however, lawful to adjure them for the pur-
to adjure the demons, it is lawful to make use of necro-
pose of learning something from them, or of obtaining
mantic incantations, which is evidently false. Therefore
something through them, for this would amount to hold-
the antecedent is false also.
ing fellowship with them: except perhaps when certain
Objection 3. Further, whoever adjures a person, by
holy men, by special instinct or Divine revelation, make
that very fact associates himself with him. Now it is not
use of the demons’ actions in order to obtain certain re-
lawful to have fellowship with the demons, according to
sults: thus we read of the Blessed James∗ that he caused
1 Cor. 10:20, “I would not that you should be made par-
Hermogenes to be brought to him, by the instrumentality
takers with devils.” Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the
of the demons.
demons.
Reply to Objection 1. Origen is speaking of adjura-
On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 16:17): “In My
tion made, not authoritatively by way of compulsion, but
name they shall cast out devils.” Now to induce anyone to
rather by way of a friendly appeal.
do a certain thing for the sake of God’s name is to adjure.
Reply to Objection 2. Necromancers adjure and in-
Therefore it is lawful to adjure the demons.
voke the demons in order to obtain or learn something
I answer that, As stated in the preceding article, there from them: and this is unlawful, as stated above. Where-are two ways of adjuring: one by way of prayer or induce-
fore Chrysostom, commenting on our Lord’s words to the
ment through reverence of some holy thing: the other by
unclean spirit (Mk. 1:25), “Speak no more, and go out
way of compulsion. In the first way it is not lawful to
of the man,” says: “A salutary teaching is given us here,
adjure the demons because such a way seems to savor of
lest we believe the demons, however much they speak the
benevolence or friendship, which it is unlawful to bear to-
truth.”
wards the demons. As to the second kind of adjuration,
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the
which is by compulsion, we may lawfully use it for some
adjuration whereby the demon’s help is besought in do-
purposes, and not for others. For during the course of this
ing or learning something: for this savors of fellowship
life the demons are our adversaries: and their actions are
with them. On the other hand, to repulse the demons by
not subject to our disposal but to that of God and the holy
adjuring them, is to sever oneself from their fellowship.
Whether it is lawful to adjure an irrational creature?
IIa IIae q. 90 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to adjure an ir-
since they are not masters of their own actions. The other
rational creature. An adjuration consists of spoken words.
kind of adjuration is by way of compulsion: and, seem-
But it is useless to speak to one that understands not, such
ingly, neither is it lawful to use this towards them, because
as an irrational creature. Therefore it is vain and unlawful
we have not the power to command irrational creatures,
to adjure an irrational creature.
but only He of Whom it was said (Mat. 8:27): “For the
Objection 2. Further, seemingly wherever adjuration
winds and the sea obey Him.” Therefore in no way, ap-
is admissible, swearing is also admissible. But swearing
parently, is it lawful to adjure irrational creatures.
is not consistent with an irrational creature. Therefore it
On the contrary, Simon and Jude are related to have
would seem unlawful to employ adjuration towards one.
adjured dragons and to have commanded them to with-
Objection 3. Further, there are two ways of adjuring,
draw into the desert.†
as explained above (Aa. 1,2). One is by way of appeal;
I answer that, Irrational creatures are directed to their and this cannot be employed towards irrational creatures,
own actions by some other agent. Now the action of what
∗ the Greater; cf. Apocrypha, N.T., Hist. Certam. Apost. vi, 19
† From the apocryphal Historiae Certam. Apost. vi. 19.
1628
is directed and moved is also the action of the director and so that it be referred to the director and mover of the ir-mover: thus the movement of the arrow is an operation of
rational creature, and in this sense a creature of this kind
the archer. Wherefore the operation of the irrational crea-
may be adjured in two ways. First, by way of appeal made
ture is ascribed not only to it, but also and chiefly to God,
to God, and this relates to those who work miracles by
Who disposes the movements of all things. It is also as-
calling on God: secondly, by way of compulsion, which
cribed to the devil, who, by God’s permission, makes use
relates to the devil, who uses the irrational creature for our
of irrational creatures in order to inflict harm on man.
harm. This is the kind of adjuration used in the exorcisms
Accordingly the adjuration of an irrational creature
of the Church, whereby the power of the demons is ex-
may be of two kinds. First, so that the adjuration is re-
pelled from an irrational creature. But it is not lawful to
ferred to the irrational creature in itself: and in this way it adjure the demons by beseeching them to help us.
would be vain to adjure an irrational creature. Secondly,
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
1629
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 91
Of Taking the Divine Name for the Purpose of Invoking It by Means of Praise (In Two Articles)
We must now consider the taking of the Divine name for the purpose of invoking it by prayer or praise. Of prayer we have already spoken (q. 83 ). Wherefore we must speak now of praise. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God should be praised with the lips?
(2) Whether God should be praised with song?
Whether God should be praised with the lips?
IIa IIae q. 91 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that God should not be
Consequently we need to praise God with our lips, not
praised with the lips. The Philosopher says (Ethic. 1,12):
indeed for His sake, but for our own sake; since by prais-
“The best of men ere accorded not praise, but something
ing Him our devotion is aroused towards Him, according
greater.” But God transcends the very best of all things.
to Ps. 49:23: “The sacrifice of praise shall glorify Me, and
Therefore God ought to be given, not praise, but some-
there is the way by which I will show him the salvation of
thing greater than praise: wherefore He is said (Ecclus.
God.” And forasmuch as man, by praising God, ascends
43:33) to be “above all praise.”
in his affections to God, by so much is he withdrawn from
Objection 2. Further, divine praise is part of divine
things opposed to God, according to Is. 48:9, “For My
worship, for it is an act of religion. Now God is worshiped
praise I will bridle thee lest thou shouldst perish.” The
with the mind rather than with the lips: wherefore our
praise of the lips is also profitable to others by inciting
Lord quoted against certain ones the words of Is. 29:13,
their affections towards God, wherefore it is written (Ps.
“This people. . . honors [Vulg.: ‘glorifies’] Me with their
33:2): “His praise shall always be in my mouth,” and far-
lips, but their heart is far from Me.” Therefore the praise
ther on: “Let the meek hear and rejoice. O magnify the
of God lies in the heart rather than on the lips.
Lord with me.”
Objection 3. Further, men are praised with the lips
Reply to Objection 1. We may speak of God in two
that they may be encouraged to do better: since just as
ways. First, with regard to His essence; and thus, since He
being praised makes the wicked proud, so does it incite
is incomprehensible and ineffable, He is above all praise.
the good to better things. Wherefore it is written (Prov.
In this respect we owe Him reverence and the honor of
27:21): “As silver is tried in the fining-pot. . . so a man is
latria; wherefore Ps. 64:2 is rendered by Jerome in his
tried by the mouth of him that praiseth.” But God is not
Psalter∗: “Praise to Thee is speechless, O God,” as re-
incited to better things by man’s words, both because He
gards the first, and as to the second, “A vow shall be paid
is unchangeable, and because He is supremely good, and
to Thee.” Secondly, we may speak of God as to His ef-
it is not possible for Him to grow better. Therefore God
fects which are ordained for our good. In this respect we
should not be praised with the lips.
owe Him praise; wherefore it is written (Is. 63:7): “I will
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 62:6): “My mouth
remember the tender mercies of the Lord, the praise of
shall praise Thee with joyful lips.”
the Lord for all the things that the Lord hath bestowed
I answer that, We use words, in speaking to God, for
upon us.” Again, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): “Thou
one reason, and in speaking to man, for another reason.
wilt find that all the sacred hymns,” i.e. divine praises “of
For when speaking to man we use words in order to tell
the sacred writers, are directed respectively to the Blessed
him our thoughts which are unknown to him. Wherefore
Processions of the Thearchy,” i.e. of the Godhead, “show-
we praise a man with our lips, in order that he or others
ing forth and praising the names of God.”
may learn that we have a good opinion of him: so that in
Reply to Objection 2. It profits one nothing to praise
consequence we may incite him to yet better things; and
with the lips if one praise not with the heart. For the heart
that we may induce others, who hear him praised, to think
speaks God’s praises when it fervently recalls “the glori-
well of him, to reverence him, and to imitate him. On
ous things of His worksӠ. Yet the outward praise of the
the other hand we employ words, in speaking to God, not
lips avails to arouse the inward fervor of those who praise,
indeed to make known our thoughts to Him Who is the
and to incite others to praise God, as stated above.
searcher of hearts, but that we may bring ourselves and
Reply to Objection 3. We praise God, not for His
our hearers to reverence Him.
benefit, but for ours as stated.
∗ Translated from the Hebrew
† Cf. Ecclus. 17:7,8
1630
Whether God should be praised with song?
IIa IIae q. 91 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that God should not be
Philosopher state (Polit. viii, 5), and also Boethius (De
praised with song. For the Apostle says (Col. 3:16):
Musica, prologue). Hence the use of music in the divine
“Teaching and admonishing one another in psalms, hymns
praises is a salutary institution, that the souls of the faint-
and spiritual canticles.” Now we should employ nothing
hearted may be the more incited to devotion. Wherefore
in the divine worship, save what is delivered to us on the
Augustine say (Confess. x, 33): “I am inclined to approve
authority of Scripture. Therefore it would seem that, in
of the usage of singing in the church, that so by the de-
praising God, we should employ, not corporal but spiri-
light of the ears the faint-hearted may rise to the feeling
tual canticles.
of devotion”: and he says of himself (Confess. ix, 6): “I
Objection 2. Further, Jerome in his commentary on
wept in Thy hymns and canticles, touched to the quick by
Eph. 5:19, “Singing and making melody in your hearts
the voices of Thy sweet-attuned Church.”
to the Lord,” says: “Listen, young men whose duty it
Reply to Objection 1. The name of spiritual canticle
is to recite the office in church: God is to be sung not
may be given not only to those that are sung inwardly in
with the voice but with the heart. Nor should you, like
spirit, but also to those that are sung outwardly with the
play-actors, ease your throat and jaws with medicaments,
lips, inasmuch as such like canticles arouse spiritual de-
and make the church resound with theatrical measures and
votion.
airs.” Therefore God should not be praised with song.
Reply to Objection 2. Jerome does not absolutely
Objection 3. Further, the praise of God is competent
condemn singing, but reproves those who sing theatrically
to little and great, according to Apoc. 14, “Give praise
in church not in order to arouse devotion, but in order to
to our God, all ye His servants; and you that fear Him,
show off, or to provoke pleasure. Hence Augustine says
little and great.” But the great, who are in the church,
(Confess. x, 33): “When it befalls me to be more moved
ought not to sing: for Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44): “I
by the voice than by the words sung, I confess to have
hereby ordain that in this See the ministers of the sacred
sinned penally, and then had rather not hear the singer.”
altar must not sing” (Cf. Decret., dist. xcii., cap. In sancta
Reply to Objection 3. To arouse men to devotion by
Romana Ecclesia). Therefore singing is unsuitable to the
teaching and preaching is a more excellent way than by
divine praises.
singing. Wherefore deacons and prelates, whom it be-
Objection 4. Further, in the Old Law God was praised
comes to incite men’s minds towards God by means of
with musical instruments and human song, according to
preaching and teaching, ought not to be instant in singing,
Ps. 32:2,3: “Give praise to the Lord on the harp, sing to
lest thereby they be withdrawn from greater things. Hence
Him with the psaltery, the instrument of ten strings. Sing
Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44): “It is a most discred-
to Him a new canticle.” But the Church does not make
itable custom for those who have been raised to the dia-
use of musical instruments such as harps and psalteries, in
conate to serve as choristers, for it behooves them to give
the divine praises, for fear of seeming to imitate the Jews.
their whole time to the duty of preaching and to taking
Therefore in like manner neither should song be used in
charge of the alms.”
the divine praises.
Reply to Objection 4. As the Philosopher says (Polit.
Objection 5. Further, the praise of the heart is more
viii, 6), “Teaching should not be accompanied with a flute
important than the praise of the lips. But the praise of the
or any artificial instrument such as the harp or anything
heart is hindered by singing, both because the attention
else of this kind: but only with such things as make good
of the singers is distracted from the consideration of what
hearers.” For such like musical instruments move the soul
they are singing, so long as they give all their attention to
to pleasure rather than create a good disposition within it.
the chant, and because others are less able to understand
In the Old Testament instruments of this description were
the thing that are sung than if they were recited without
employed, both because the people were more coarse and
chant. Therefore chants should not be employed in the
carnal—so that they needed to be aroused by such instru-
divine praises.
ments as also by earthly promises—and because these ma-
On the contrary, Blessed Ambrose established
terial instruments were figures of something else.
singing in the Church of Milan, a Augustine relates (Con-
Reply to Objection 5. The soul is distracted from that
fess. ix).
which is sung by a chant that is employed for the purpose
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the praise of
of giving pleasure. But if the singer chant for the sake of
the voice is necessary in order to arouse man’s devotion
devotion, he pays more attention to what he says, both be-
towards God. Wherefore whatever is useful in conducing
cause he lingers more thereon, and because, as Augustine
to this result is becomingly adopted in the divine praises.
remarks (Confess. x, 33), “each affection of our spirit,
Now it is evident that the human soul is moved in vari-
according to its variety, has its own appropriate measure
ous ways according to various melodies of sound, as the
in the voice, and singing, by some hidden correspondence
1631
wherewith it is stirred.” The same applies to the hearers, they understand why it is sung, namely, for God’s glory:
for even if some of them understand not what is sung, yet
and this is enough to arouse their devotion.
1632
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 92
Of Superstition
(In Two Articles)
In due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to religion. First we shall consider those which agree with religion in giving worship to God; secondly, we shall treat of those vices which are manifestly contrary to religion, through showing contempt of those things that pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the head of superstition, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly we must consider in the first place, superstition and its parts, and afterwards irreligion and its parts.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether superstition is a vice opposed to religion?
(2) Whether it has several parts or species?
Whether superstition is a vice contrary to religion?
IIa IIae q. 92 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that superstition is not a
not through tending to something greater than the virtue,
vice contrary to religion. One contrary is not included in
but possibly to something less, and yet it goes beyond the
the definition of the other. But religion is included in the
mean of virtue, through doing something to whom it ought
definition of superstition: for the latter is defined as being
not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as regards
“immoderate observance of religion,” according to a gloss
other circumstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv,
on Col. 2:23, “Which things have indeed a show of wis-
1,2,3).
dom in superstition.” Therefore superstition is not a vice
Accordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion
contrary to religion.
by excess, not that it offers more to the divine worship
Objection 2. Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): “Ci-
than true religion, but because it offers divine worship ei-
cero∗ states that the superstitious were so called because
ther to whom it ought not, or in a manner it ought not.
they spent the day in praying and offering sacrifices that
Reply to Objection 1. Just as we speak metaphor-
their children might survive [superstites] them.” But this
ically of good among evil things—thus we speak of a
may be done even in accordance with true religious wor-
good thief—so too sometimes the names of the virtues
ship. Therefore superstition is not a vice opposed to reli-
are employed by transposition in an evil sense. Thus pru-
gion.
dence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to
Objection 3. Further, superstition seems to denote an
Lk. 16:8, “The children of this world are more prudent
excess. But religion admits of no excess, since, as stated
[Douay: ‘wiser’] in their generation than the children of
above (q. 81, a. 5, ad 3), there is no possibility of render-
light.” It is in this way that superstition is described as
ing to God, by religion, the equal of what we owe Him.
religion.
Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion.
Reply to Objection 2. The etymology of a word dif-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord.
fers from its meaning. For its etymology depends on what
Serm. ix): “Thou strikest the first chord in the worship of
it is taken from for the purpose of signification: whereas
one God, and the beast of superstition hath fallen.” Now
its meaning depends on the thing to which it is applied
the worship of one God belongs to religion. Therefore
for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ
superstition is contrary to religion.
sometimes: for “lapis” [a stone] takes its name from hurt-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 81, a. 5), religion is ing the foot [laedere pedem], but this is not its meaning,
a moral virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean,
else iron, since it hurts the foot, would be a stone. In like
as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 64, a. 1). Therefore a twofold
manner it does not follow that “superstition” means that
vice is opposed to a moral virtue. One by way of excess,
from which the word is derived.
the other by way of deficiency. Again, the mean of virtue
Reply to Objection 3. Religion does not admit of
may be exceeded, not only with regard to the circum-
excess, in respect of absolute quantity, but it does admit
stance called “how much,” but also with regard to other
of excess in respect of proportionate quantity, in so far,
circumstances: so that, in certain virtues such as magna-
to wit, as something may be done in divine worship that
nimity and magnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue,
ought not to be done.
∗ De Natura Deorum ii, 28
1633
Whether there are various species of superstition?
IIa IIae q. 92 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there are not vari-
in the first place to give reverence to God, and in this re-
ous species of superstition. According to the Philosopher
spect the first species of this genus is “idolatry,” which
(Topic. i, 13), “if one contrary includes many kinds, so
unduly gives divine honor to a creature. The second end
does the other.” Now religion, to which superstition is
of religion is that man may be taught by God Whom he
contrary, does not include various species; but all its acts
worships; and to this must be referred “divinatory” su-
belong to the one species. Therefore neither has supersti-
perstition, which consults the demons through compacts
tion various species.
made with them, whether tacit or explicit. Thirdly, the
Objection 2. Further, opposites relate to one same
end of divine worship is a certain direction of human acts
thing. But religion, to which superstition is opposed, re-
according to the precepts of God the object of that wor-
lates to those things whereby we are directed to God, as
ship: and to this must be referred the superstition of cer-
stated above (q. 81, a. 1). Therefore superstition, which
tain “observances.”
is opposed to religion, is not specified according to div-
Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ.
inations of human occurrences, or by the observances of
ii, 20), where he says that “anything invented by man for
certain human actions.
making and worshipping idols is superstitious,” and this
Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Col. 2:23, “Which
refers to the first species. Then he goes on to say, “or
things have. . . a show of wisdom in superstition,” adds:
any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the
“that is to say in a hypocritical religion.”
Therefore
purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens,” which
hypocrisy should be reckoned a species of superstition.
refers to the second species; and a little further on he adds:
On the contrary, Augustine assigns the various
“To this kind belong all sorts of amulets and such like,”
species of superstition (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20).
and this refers to the third species.
I answer that, As stated above, sins against religion
Reply to Objection 1. As Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
consist in going beyond the mean of virtue in respect of
iv), “good results from a cause that is one and entire,
certain circumstances (a. 1). For as we have stated ( Ia
whereas evil arises from each single defect.” Wherefore
IIae, q. 72, a. 9), not every diversity of corrupt circum-
several vices are opposed to one virtue, as stated above
stances differentiates the species of a sin, but only that
(a. 1; q. 10, a. 5). The saying of the Philosopher is true of
which is referred to diverse objects, for diverse ends: since
opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity.
it is in this respect that moral acts are diversified specif-
Reply to Objection 2. Divinations and certain obser-
ically, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 18,
vances come under the head of superstition, in so far as
Aa. 2,6).
they depend on certain actions of the demons: and thus
Accordingly the species of superstition are differenti-
they pertain to compacts made with them.
ated, first on the part of the mode, secondly on the part of
Reply to Objection 3. Hypocritical religion is taken
the object. For the divine worship may be given either to
here for “religion as applied to human observances,” as
whom it ought to be given, namely, to the true God, but
the gloss goes on to explain. Wherefore this hypocritical
“in an undue mode,” and this is the first species of super-
religion is nothing else than worship given to God in an
stition; or to whom it ought not to be given, namely, to any
undue mode: as, for instance, if a man were, in the time
creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of supersti-
of grace, to wish to worship God according to the rite of
tion, divided into many species in respect of the various
the Old Law. It is of religion taken in this sense that the
ends of divine worship. For the end of divine worship is
gloss speaks literally.
1634
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 93
Of Superstition Consisting in Undue Worship of the True God
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat (1) Of the superstition which consists in giving undue worship to the true God; (2) Of the superstition of idolatry; (3) of divinatory superstition; (4) of the superstition of observances.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God?
(2) Whether there can be anything superfluous therein?
Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God?
IIa IIae q. 93 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be any-
this worship will be pernicious.
thing pernicious in the worship of the true God. It is writ-
Now this happens in two ways. In the first place, it
ten (Joel 2:32): “Everyone that shall call upon the name
happens on the part of the thing signified, through the
of the Lord shall be saved.” Now whoever worships God
worship signifying something discordant therefrom: and
calls upon His name. Therefore all worship of God is con-
in this way, at the time of the New Law, the mysteries
ducive to salvation, and consequently none is pernicious.
of Christ being already accomplished, it is pernicious to
Objection 2. Further, it is the same God that is wor-
make use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the
shiped by the just in any age of the world. Now before
mysteries of Christ were foreshadowed as things to come:
the giving of the Law the just worshiped God in what-
just as it would be pernicious for anyone to declare that
ever manner they pleased, without committing mortal sin:
Christ has yet to suffer. In the second place, falsehood in
wherefore Jacob bound himself by his own vow to a spe-
outward worship occurs on the part of the worshiper, and
cial kind of worship, as related in Genesis 28. Therefore
especially in common worship which is offered by min-
now also no worship of God is pernicious.
isters impersonating the whole Church. For even as he
Objection 3. Further, nothing pernicious is tolerated
would be guilty of falsehood who would, in the name of
in the Church. Yet the Church tolerates various rites of
another person, proffer things that are not committed to
divine worship: wherefore Gregory, replying to Augus-
him, so too does a man incur the guilt of falsehood who,
tine, bishop of the English (Regist. xi, ep. 64), who stated
on the part of the Church, gives worship to God contrary
that there existed in the churches various customs in the
to the manner established by the Church or divine author-
celebration of Mass, wrote: “I wish you to choose care-
ity, and according to ecclesiastical custom. Hence Am-
fully whatever you find likely to be most pleasing to God,
brose† says: “He is unworthy who celebrates the mystery
whether in the Roman territory, or in the land of the Gauls,
otherwise than Christ delivered it.” For this reason, too,
or in any part of the Church.” Therefore no way of wor-
a gloss on Col. 2:23 says that superstition is “the use of
shiping God is pernicious.
human observances under the name of religion.”
On the contrary, Augustine∗ in a letter to Jerome
Reply to Objection 1. Since God is truth, to invoke
(and the words are quoted in a gloss on Gal. 2:14) says
God is to worship Him in spirit and truth, according to Jn.
that “after the Gospel truth had been preached the legal
4:23. Hence a worship that contains falsehood, is incon-
observances became deadly,” and yet these observances
sistent with a salutary calling upon God.
belonged to the worship of God. Therefore there can be
Reply to Objection 2. Before the time of the Law the
something deadly in the divine worship.
just were instructed by an inward instinct as to the way
I answer that, As Augustine states (Cont. Mendac.
of worshiping God, and others followed them. But after-
xiv), “a most pernicious lie is that which is uttered in mat-
wards men were instructed by outward precepts about this
ters pertaining to Christian religion.” Now it is a lie if one
matter, and it is wicked to disobey them.
signify outwardly that which is contrary to the truth. But
Reply to Objection 3. The various customs of the
just as a thing is signified by word, so it is by deed: and
Church in the divine worship are in no way contrary to
it is in this signification by deed that the outward worship
the truth: wherefore we must observe them, and to disre-
of religion consists, as shown above (q. 81, a. 7). Conse-
gard them is unlawful.
quently, if anything false is signified by outward worship,
∗ Jerome (Ep. lxxv, ad Aug.) See Opp. August. Ep. lxxxii
† Comment. in 1 ad1 Cor. 11:27, quoted in the gloss of Peter Lombard 1635
Whether there can be any excess in the worship of God?
IIa IIae q. 93 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be ex-
a man may do conducing to God’s glory, and subjecting
cess in the worship of God. It is written (Ecclus. 43:32):
his mind to God, and his body, too, by a moderate curb-
“Glorify the Lord as much as ever you can, for He will
ing of the concupiscences, is not excessive in the divine
yet far exceed.” Now the divine worship is directed to the
worship, provided it be in accordance with the command-
glorification of God. Therefore there can be no excess in
ments of God and of the Church, and in keeping with the
it.
customs of those among whom he lives.
Objection 2. Further, outward worship is a profes-
On the other hand if that which is done be, in itself,
sion of inward worship, “whereby God is worshiped with
not conducive to God’s glory, nor raise man’s mind to
faith, hope, and charity,” as Augustine says (Enchiridion
God, nor curb inordinate concupiscence, or again if it be
iii). Now there can be no excess in faith, hope, and charity.
not in accordance with the commandments of God and of
Neither, therefore, can there be in the worship of God.
the Church, or if it be contrary to the general custom—
Objection 3. Further, to worship God consists in of-
which, according to Augustine∗, “has the force of law”—
fering to Him what we have received from Him. But we
all this must be reckoned excessive and superstitious, be-
have received all our goods from God. Therefore if we do
cause consisting, as it does, of mere externals, it has no
all that we possibly can for God’s honor, there will be no
connection with the internal worship of God. Hence Au-
excess in the divine worship.
gustine (De Vera Relig. iii) quotes the words of Lk. 17:21,
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
“The kingdom of God is within you,” against the “super-
ii, 18) “that the good and true Christian rejects also super-
stitious,” those, to wit, who pay more attention to exter-
stitious fancies, from Holy Writ.” But Holy Writ teaches
nals.
us to worship God. Therefore there can be superstition by
Reply to Objection 1. The glorification of God im-
reason of excess even in the worship of God.
plies that what is done is done for God’s glory: and this
I answer that, A thing is said to be in excess in two
excludes the excess denoted by superstition.
ways. First, with regard to absolute quantity, and in this
Reply to Objection 2. Faith, hope and charity subject
way there cannot be excess in the worship of God, because
the mind to God, so that there can be nothing excessive in
whatever man does is less than he owes God. Secondly,
them. It is different with external acts, which sometimes
a thing is in excess with regard to quantity of proportion,
have no connection with these virtues.
through not being proportionate to its end. Now the end
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers ex-
of divine worship is that man may give glory to God, and
cess by way of absolute quantity.
submit to Him in mind and body. Consequently, whatever
∗ Ad Casulan. Ep. xxxvi
1636
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 94
Of Idolatry
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider idolatry: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition?
(2) Whether it is a sin?
(3) Whether it is the gravest sin?
(4) Of the cause of this sin.
Whether idolatry is rightly reckoned a species of superstition?
IIa IIae q. 94 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that idolatry is not rightly
to superstition to exceed the due mode of divine worship,
reckoned a species of superstition. Just as heretics are
and this is done chiefly when divine worship is given to
unbelievers, so are idolaters. But heresy is a species of
whom it should not be given. Now it should be given to
unbelief, as stated above (q. 11, a. 1). Therefore idolatry
the most high uncreated God alone, as stated above (q. 81,
is also a species of unbelief and not of superstition.
a. 1) when we were treating of religion. Therefore it is su-
Objection 2. Further, latria pertains to the virtue of re-perstition to give worship to any creature whatsoever.
ligion to which superstition is opposed. But latria, appar-
Now just as this divine worship was given to sensi-
ently, is univocally applied to idolatry and to that which
ble creatures by means of sensible signs, such as sacri-
belongs to the true religion. For just as we speak univo-
fices, games, and the like, so too was it given to a crea-
cally of the desire of false happiness, and of the desire of
ture represented by some sensible form or shape, which
true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak univocally of
is called an “idol.” Yet divine worship was given to idols
the worship of false gods, which is called idolatry, and of
in various ways. For some, by means of a nefarious art,
the worship of the true God, which is the latria of true re-
constructed images which produced certain effects by the
ligion. Therefore idolatry is not a species of superstition.
power of the demons: wherefore they deemed that the im-
Objection 3. Further, that which is nothing cannot be
ages themselves contained something God-like, and con-
the species of any genus. But idolatry, apparently, is noth-
sequently that divine worship was due to them. This was
ing: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:4): “We know that
the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus∗, as Augustine states
an idol is nothing in the world,” and further on (1 Cor.
(De Civ. Dei viii, 23): while others gave divine worship
10:19): “What then? Do I say that what is offered in sac-
not to the images, but to the creatures represented thereby.
rifice to idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything?”
The Apostle alludes to both of these (Rom. 1:23,25). For,
implying an answer in the negative. Now offering things
as regards the former, he says: “They changed the glory
to idols belongs properly to idolatry. Therefore since idol-
of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of
atry is like to nothing, it cannot be a species of supersti-
a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts,
tion.
and of creeping things,” and of the latter he says: “Who
Objection 4. Further, it belongs to superstition to give worshipped and served the creature rather than the Cre-divine honor to whom that honor is not due. Now di-
ator.”
vine honor is undue to idols, just as it is undue to other
These latter were of three ways of thinking. For some
creatures, wherefore certain people are reproached (Rom.
deemed certain men to have been gods, whom they wor-
1:25) for that they “worshipped and served the creature
shipped in the images of those men: for instance, Jupiter,
rather than the Creator.” Therefore this species of super-
Mercury, and so forth. Others again deemed the whole
stition is unfittingly called idolatry, and should rather be
world to be one god, not by reason of its material sub-
named “worship of creatures.”
stance, but by reason of its soul, which they believed to be
On the contrary, It is related (Acts 17:16) that when
God, for they held God to be nothing else than a soul gov-
Paul awaited Silas and Timothy at Athens, “his spirit was
erning the world by movement and reason: even as a man
stirred within him seeing the whole city given to idola-
is said to be wise in respect not of his body but of his soul.
try,” and further on (Acts 17:22) he says: “Ye men of
Hence they thought that divine worship ought to be given
Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too supersti-
to the whole world and to all its parts, heaven, air, water,
tious.” Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition.
and to all such things: and to these they referred the names
I answer that, As stated above (q. 92, a. 2), it belongs of their gods, as Varro asserted, and Augustine relates (De
∗ De Natura Deorum, ad Asclep
1637
Civ. Dei vii, 5). Lastly, others, namely, the Platonists, said heresy is a species of unbelief, but idolatry is a species of
that there is one supreme god, the cause of all things. Af-
superstition.
ter him they placed certain spiritual substances created by
Reply to Objection 2. The term latria may be taken in
the supreme god. These they called “gods,” on account of
two senses. In one sense it may denote a human act per-
their having a share of the godhead; but we call them “an-
taining to the worship of God: and then its signification
gels.” After these they placed the souls of the heavenly
remains the same, to whomsoever it be shown, because,
bodies, and beneath these the demons which they stated
in this sense, the thing to which it is shown is not included
to be certain animal denizens of the air, and beneath these
in its definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally,
again they placed human souls, which they believed to be
whether to true religion or to idolatry, just as the payment
taken up into the fellowship of the gods or of the demons
of a tax is univocally the same, whether it is paid to the
by reason of the merit of their virtue. To all these they
true or to a false king. In another sense latria denotes the
gave divine worship, as Augustine relates (De Civ . . Dei
same as religion, and then, since it is a virtue, it is essen-
xviii, 14).
tial thereto that divine worship be given to whom it ought
The last two opinions were held to belong to “natu-
to be given; and in this way latria is applied equivocally to
ral theology” which the philosophers gathered from their
the latria of true religion, and to idolatry: just as prudence
study of the world and taught in the schools: while the
is applied equivocally to the prudence that is a virtue, and
other, relating to the worship of men, was said to belong
to that which is carnal.
to “mythical theology” which was wont to be represented
Reply to Objection 3. The saying of the Apostle that
on the stage according to the fancies of poets. The re-
“an idol is nothing in the world” means that those images
maining opinion relating to images was held to belong to
which were called idols, were not animated, or possessed
“civil theology,” which was celebrated by the pontiffs in
of a divine power, as Hermes maintained, as though they
the temples∗.
were composed of spirit and body. In the same sense we
Now all these come under the head of the superstition
must understand the saying that “what is offered in sacri-
of idolatry. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
fice to idols is not anything,” because by being thus sac-
ii, 20): “Anything invented by man for making and wor-
rificed the sacrificial flesh acquired neither sanctification,
shipping idols, or for giving Divine worship to a creature
as the Gentiles thought, nor uncleanness, as the Jews held.
or any part of a creature, is superstitious.”
Reply to Objection 4. It was owing to the general
Reply to Objection 1. Just as religion is not faith,
custom among the Gentiles of worshipping any kind of
but a confession of faith by outward signs, so superstition
creature under the form of images that the term “idola-
is a confession of unbelief by external worship. Such a
try” was used to signify any worship of a creature, even
confession is signified by the term idolatry, but not by the
without the use of images.
term heresy, which only means a false opinion. Therefore
Whether idolatry is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 94 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that idolatry is not a sin.
faith inwardly. Therefore it seems that we may worship
Nothing is a sin that the true faith employs in worshipping
idols outwardly without prejudice to the divine worship.
God. Now the true faith employs images for the divine
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 20:5): “Thou shalt
worship: since both in the Tabernacle were there images
not adore them,” i.e. outwardly, “nor serve them,” i.e. in-
of the cherubim, as related in Ex. 25, and in the Church
wardly, as a gloss explains it: and it is a question of graven
are images set up which the faithful worship. Therefore
things and images. Therefore it is a sin to worship idols
idolatry, whereby idols are worshipped, is not a sin.
whether outwardly or inwardly.
Objection 2. Further, reverence should be paid to ev-
I answer that, There has been a twofold error in this
ery superior. But the angels and the souls of the blessed
matter. For some† have thought that to offer sacrifices and
are our superiors. Therefore it will be no sin to pay them
other things pertaining to latria, not only to God but also
reverence by worship, of sacrifices or the like.
to the others aforesaid, is due and good in itself, since they
Objection 3. Further, the most high God should be
held that divine honor should be paid to every superior na-
honored with an inward worship, according to Jn. 4:24,
ture, as being nearer to God. But this is unreasonable. For
“God. . . they must adore. . . in spirit and in truth”: and Au-
though we ought to revere all superiors, yet the same rev-
gustine says (Enchiridion iii), that “God is worshipped by
erence is not due to them all: and something special is due
faith, hope and charity.” Now a man may happen to wor-
to the most high God Who excels all in a singular manner:
ship idols outwardly, and yet not wander from the true
and this is the worship of latria.
∗ De Civ. Dei vi, 5
† The School of Plato
1638
Nor can it be said, as some have maintained, that gods, and the sovereign good.” This error was embraced
“these visible sacrifices are fitting with regard to other
also by certain heretics∗, who affirmed that it is not wrong
gods, and that to the most high God, as being better than
for one who is seized in time of persecution to worship
those others, better sacrifices, namely, the service of a
idols outwardly so long as he keeps the faith in his heart.
pure mind, should be offered”‡. The reason is that, as
But this is evidently false. For since outward worship
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), “external sacrifices
is a sign of the inward worship, just as it is a wicked lie to
are signs of internal, just as audible words are signs of
affirm the contrary of what one holds inwardly of the true
things. Wherefore, just as by prayer and praise we utter
faith so too is it a wicked falsehood to pay outward wor-
significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts
ship to anything counter to the sentiments of one’s heart.
the things they signify, so too in our sacrifices we ought to
Wherefore Augustine condemns Seneca (De Civ. Dei vi,
realize that we should offer a visible sacrifice to no other
10) in that “his worship of idols was so much the more
than to Him Whose invisible sacrifice we ourselves should
infamous forasmuch as the things he did dishonestly were
be in our hearts.”
so done by him that the people believed him to act hon-
Others held that the outward worship of latria should
estly.”
be given to idols, not as though it were something good
Reply to Objection 1. Neither in the Tabernacle or
or fitting in itself, but as being in harmony with the gen-
Temple of the Old Law, nor again now in the Church are
eral custom. Thus Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) quotes
images set up that the worship of latria may be paid to
Seneca as saying: “We shall adore,” says he, “in such a
them, but for the purpose of signification, in order that
way as to remember that our worship ss in accordance
belief in the excellence of angels and saints may be im-
with custom rather than with the reality”: and (De Vera
pressed and confirmed in the mind of man. It is different
Relig. v) Augustine says that “we must not seek religion
with the image of Christ, to which latria is due on account
from the philosophers, who accepted the same things for
of His Divinity, as we shall state in the IIIa, q. 25, a. 3.
sacred, as did the people; and gave utterance in the schools
The Replies to the Second and Third Objections are
to various and contrary opinions about the nature of their
evident from what has been said above.
Whether idolatry is the gravest of sins?
IIa IIae q. 94 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that idolatry is not the
vice of heretical depravity is more grievous than idolatry.
gravest of sins. The worst is opposed to the best (Ethic.
Objection 5. Further, a gloss of Jerome on Gal. 4:9,
viii, 10). But interior worship, which consists of faith,
“How turn you again to the weak and needy elements?”
hope and charity, is better than external worship. There-
says: “The observance of the Law, to which they were
fore unbelief, despair and hatred of God, which are op-
then addicted, was a sin almost equal to the worship of
posed to internal worship, are graver sins than idolatry,
idols, to which they had been given before their conver-
which is opposed to external worship.
sion.” Therefore idolatry is not the most grievous sin.
Objection 2. Further, the more a sin is against God
On the contrary, A gloss on the saying of Lev. 15:25,
the more grievous it is. Now, seemingly, a man acts more
about the uncleanness of a woman suffering from an issue
directly against God by blaspheming, or denying the faith,
of blood, says: “Every sin is an uncleanness of the soul,
than by giving God’s worship to another, which pertains
but especially idolatry.”
to idolatry. Therefore blasphemy and denial of the faith
I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be consid-
are more grievous sins than idolatry.
ered in two ways. First, on the part of the sin itself, and
Objection 3. Further, it seems that lesser evils are
thus idolatry is the most grievous sin. For just as the most
punished with greater evils. But the sin of idolatry was
heinous crime in an earthly commonwealth would seem
punished with the sin against nature, as stated in Rom.
to be for a man to give royal honor to another than the
1:26. Therefore the sin against nature is a graver sin than
true king, since, so far as he is concerned, he disturbs
idolatry.
the whole order of the commonwealth, so, in sins that are
Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust.
committed against God, which indeed are the greater sins,
xx, 5): “Neither do we say that you,” viz. the Manichees,
the greatest of all seems to be for a man to give God’s
“are pagans, or a sect of pagans, but that you bear a certain
honor to a creature, since, so far as he is concerned, he
likeness to them since you worship many gods: and yet
sets up another God in the world, and lessens the divine
you are much worse than they are, for they worship things
sovereignty. Secondly, the gravity of a sin may be con-
that exist, but should not be worshiped as gods, whereas
sidered on the part of the sinner. Thus the sin of one that
you worship things that exist not at all.” Therefore the
sins knowingly is said to be graver than the sin of one that
‡ Augustine, as quoted below
∗ The Helcesaitae
1639
sins through ignorance: and in this way nothing hinders against nature is less grievous than the sin of idolatry. But
heretics, if they knowingly corrupt the faith which they
since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting pun-
have received, from sinning more grievously than idol-
ishment of the sin of idolatry, in order that, as by idolatry
aters who sin through ignorance. Furthermore other sins
man abuses the order of the divine honor, so by the sin
may be more grievous on account of greater contempt on
against nature he may suffer confusion from the abuse of
the part of the sinner.
his own nature.
Reply to Objection 1. Idolatry presupposes internal
Reply to Objection 4. Even as to the genus of the
unbelief, and to this it adds undue worship. But in a case
sin, the Manichean heresy is more grievous than the sin of
of external idolatry without internal unbelief, there is an
other idolaters, because it is more derogatory to the divine
additional sin of falsehood, as stated above (a. 2).
honor, since they set up two gods in opposition to one
Reply to Objection 2. Idolatry includes a grievous
another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies about
blasphemy, inasmuch as it deprives God of the singleness
God. It is different with other heretics, who confess their
of His dominion and denies the faith by deeds.
belief in one God and worship Him alone.
Reply to Objection 3. Since it is essential to punish-
Reply to Objection 5. The observance of the Law
ment that it be against the will, a sin whereby another sin
during the time of grace is not quite equal to idolatry as
is punished needs to be more manifest, in order that it may
to the genus of the sin, but almost equal, because both are
make the man more hateful to himself and to others; but
species of pestiferous superstition.
it need not be a more grievous sin: and in this way the sin
Whether the cause of idolatry was on the part of man?
IIa IIae q. 94 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the cause of idola-
man.
try was not on the part of man. In man there is nothing
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:14): “By the
but either nature, virtue, or guilt. But the cause of idola-
vanity of men they,” i.e. idols, “came into the world.”
try could not be on the part of man’s nature, since rather
I answer that, Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was
does man’s natural reason dictate that there is one God,
a dispositive cause; this was on the part of man, and in
and that divine worship should not be paid to the dead or
three ways. First, on account of his inordinate affections,
to inanimate beings. Likewise, neither could idolatry have
forasmuch as he gave other men divine honor, through
its cause in man on the part of virtue, since “a good tree
either loving or revering them too much. This cause is
cannot bring forth evil fruit,” according to Mat. 7:18: nor
assigned (Wis. 14:15): “A father being afflicted with bit-
again could it be on the part of guilt, because, according to
ter grief, made to himself the image of his son, who was
Wis. 14:27, “the worship of abominable idols is the cause
quickly taken away: and him who then had died as a man
and the beginning and end of all evil.” Therefore idolatry
he began to worship as a god.” The same passage goes
has no cause on the part of man.
on to say (Wis. 14:21) that “men serving either their af-
Objection 2. Further, those things which have a cause
fection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name
in man are found among men at all times. Now idola-
[Vulg.: ‘names’],” i.e. of the Godhead, “to stones and
try was not always, but is stated∗ to have been originated
wood.” Secondly, because man takes a natural pleasure
either by Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to
in representations, as the Philosopher observes (Poet. iv),
worship fire, or by Ninus, who caused the statue of his fa-
wherefore as soon as the uncultured man saw human im-
ther Bel to be worshiped. Among the Greeks, as related
ages skillfully fashioned by the diligence of the crafts-
by Isidore (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus was the first to set
man, he gave them divine worship; hence it is written
up statues of men: and the Jews say that Ismael was the
(Wis. 13:11-17): “If an artist, a carpenter, hath cut down
first to make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to
a tree, proper for his use, in the wood. . . and by the skill
a great extent in the sixth age. Therefore idolatry had no
of his art fashioneth it, and maketh it like the image of a
cause on the part of man.
man. . . and then maketh prayer to it, inquiring concerning
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
his substance, and his children, or his marriage.” Thirdly,
xxi, 6): “It was not possible to learn, for the first time, ex-
on account of their ignorance of the true God, inasmuch
cept from their” (i.e. the demons’) “teaching, what each
as through failing to consider His excellence men gave
of them desired or disliked, and by what name to invite or
divine worship to certain creatures, on account of their
compel him: so as to give birth to the magic arts and their
beauty or power, wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:1,2):
professors”: and the same observation seems to apply to
“All men. . . neither by attending to the works have ac-
idolatry. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of
knowledged who was the workman, but have imagined
∗ Peter Comestor, Hist. Genes. xxxvii, xl
1640
either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of produce at some time, either through leading expressly
the stars, or the great water, or the sun and the moon, to
to that sin by causing it, or through being an occasion
be the gods that rule the world.”
thereof, either as a beginning or as an end, in so far as
The other cause of idolatry was completive, and this
certain sins were employed in the worship of idols; such
was on the part of the demons, who offered themselves
as homicides, mutilations, and so forth. Nevertheless cer-
to be worshipped by men, by giving answers in the idols,
tain sins may precede idolatry and dispose man thereto.
and doing things which to men seemed marvelous. Hence
Reply to Objection 2. There was no idolatry in the
it is written (Ps. 95:5): “All the gods of the Gentiles are
first age, owing to the recent remembrance of the creation
devils.”
of the world, so that man still retained in his mind the
Reply to Objection 1. The dispositive cause of idol-
knowledge of one God. In the sixth age idolatry was ban-
atry was, on the part of man, a defect of nature, either
ished by the doctrine and power of Christ, who triumphed
through ignorance in his intellect, or disorder in his affec-
over the devil.
tions, as stated above; and this pertains to guilt. Again,
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the
idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning and end of all
consummative cause of idolatry.
sin, because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does not
1641
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 95
Of Superstition in Divinations
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider superstition in divinations, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether divination is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a species of superstition?
(3) Of the species of divination;
(4) Of divination by means of demons;
(5) Of divination by the stars;
(6) Of divination by dreams;
(7) Of divination by auguries and like observances;
(8) Of divination by lots.
Whether divination is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 95 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that divination is not a
tell things concerning rains and droughts, and physicians,
sin. Divination is derived from something “divine”: and
concerning health and death. Again, other causes, consid-
things that are divine pertain to holiness rather than to sin.
ered in themselves, are indifferent; and this is chiefly the
Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin.
case in the rational powers, which stand in relation to op-
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb.
posites, according to the Philosopher∗. Such like effects,
i, 1): “Who dares to say that learning is an evil?” and
as also those which ensue from natural causes by chance
again: “I could nowise admit that intelligence can be an
and in the minority of instances, cannot be foreknown
evil.” But some arts are divinatory, as the Philosopher
from a consideration of their causes, because these causes
states (De Memor. i): and divination itself would seem to
have no determinate inclination to produce these effects.
pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it
Consequently such like effects cannot be foreknown un-
seems that divination is not a sin.
less they be considered in themselves. Now man cannot
Objection 3. Further, there is no natural inclination
consider these effects in themselves except when they are
to evil; because nature inclines only to its like. But men
present, as when he sees Socrates running or walking: the
by natural inclination seek to foreknow future events; and
consideration of such things in themselves before they oc-
this belongs to divination. Therefore divination is not a
cur is proper to God, Who alone in His eternity sees the
sin.
future as though it were present, as stated in the Ia, q. 14,
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): “Nei-
a. 13; Ia, q. 57, a. 3; Ia, q. 86, a. 4. Hence it is written
ther let there be found among you. . . any one that consul-
(Is. 41:23): “Show the things that are to come hereafter,
teth pythonic spirits, or fortune tellers”: and it is stated in and we shall know that ye are gods.” Therefore if anyone
the Decretals (26, qu. v, can. Qui divinationes): “Those
presume to foreknow or foretell such like future things by
who seek for divinations shall be liable to a penance
any means whatever, except by divine revelation, he man-
of five years’ duration, according to the fixed grades of
ifestly usurps what belongs to God. It is for this reason
penance.”
that certain men are called divines: wherefore Isidore says
I answer that, Divination denotes a foretelling of the
(Etym. viii, 9): “They are called divines, as though they
future. The future may be foreknown in two ways: first in
were full of God. For they pretend to be filled with the
its causes, secondly in itself. Now the causes of the future
Godhead, and by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future
are threefold: for some produce their effects, of necessity
to men.”
and always; and such like future effects can be foreknown
Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man fore-
and foretold with certainty, from considering their causes,
tells things that happen of necessity, or in the majority of
even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes
instances, for the like can be foreknown by human reason:
produce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for
nor again if anyone knows other contingent future things,
the most part, yet they rarely fail: and from such like
through divine revelation: for then he does not divine, i.e.
causes their future effects can be foreknown, not indeed
cause something divine, but rather receives something di-
with certainty, but by a kind of conjecture, even as as-
vine. Then only is a man said to divine, when he usurps
trologers by considering the stars can foreknow and fore-
to himself, in an undue manner, the foretelling of future
∗ Metaph. viii, 2,5,8
1642
events: and this is manifestly a sin. Consequently divina-foreknowledge of future events that occur of necessity or
tion is always a sin; and for this reason Jerome says in his
frequently, and these do not pertain to divination. But
commentary on Mic. 3:9, seqq. that “divination is always
there are no true arts or sciences for the knowledge of
taken in an evil sense.”
other future events, but only vain inventions of the devil’s
Reply to Objection 1. Divination takes its name not
deceit, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 8).
from a rightly ordered share of something divine, but from
Reply to Objection 3. Man has a natural inclination
an undue usurpation thereof, as stated above.
to know the future by human means, but not by the undue
Reply to Objection 2. There are certain arts for the
means of divination.
Whether divination is a species of superstition?
IIa IIae q. 95 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that divination is not
pressly invoked that the future may be made known, or be-
a species of superstition. The same thing cannot be a
cause the demons thrust themselves into futile searchings
species of diverse genera. Now divination is apparently
of the future, in order to entangle men’s minds with vain
a species of curiosity, according to Augustine (De Vera
conceits. Of this kind of vanity it is written (Ps. 39:5):
Relig. xxxviii)∗. Therefore it is not, seemingly, a species
“Who hath not regard to vanities and lying follies.” Now
of superstition.
it is vain to seek knowledge of the future, when one tries
Objection 2. Further, just as religion is due worship,
to get it from a source whence it cannot be foreknown.
so is superstition undue worship. But divination does not
Therefore it is manifest that divination is a species of su-
seem to pertain to undue worship. Therefore it does not
perstition.
pertain to superstition.
Reply to Objection 1. Divination is a kind of curios-
Objection 3. Further, superstition is opposed to reli-
ity with regard to the end in view, which is foreknowledge
gion. But in true religion nothing is to be found corre-
of the future; but it is a kind of superstition as regards the
sponding as a contrary to divination. Therefore divination
mode of operation.
is not a species of superstition.
Reply to Objection 2. This kind of divination pertains
On the contrary, Origen says in his Peri Archon†:
to the worship of the demons, inasmuch as one enters into
“There is an operation of the demons in the administer-
a compact, tacit or express with the demons.
ing of foreknowledge, comprised, seemingly, under the
Reply to Objection 3. In the New Law man’s mind is
head of certain arts exercised by those who have enslaved
restrained from solicitude about temporal things: where-
themselves to the demons, by means of lots, omens, or the
fore the New Law contains no institution for the fore-
observance of shadows. I doubt not that all these things
knowledge of future events in temporal matters.
On
are done by the operation of the demons.” Now, according
the other hand in the Old Law, which contained earthly
to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20,23), “whatever re-
promises, there were consultations about the future in
sults from fellowship between demons and men is super-
connection with religious matters. Hence where it is writ-
stitious.” Therefore divination is a species of superstition.
ten (Is. 8:19): “And when they shall say to you: Seek
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1; Qq. 92,94), su-
of pythons and of diviners, who mutter in their enchant-
perstition denotes undue divine worship. Now a thing per-
ments,” it is added by way of answer: “Should not the
tains to the worship of God in two ways: in one way, it is
people seek of their God, a vision for the living and the
something offered to God; as a sacrifice, an oblation, or
dead?‡”
something of the kind: in another way, it is something
In the New Testament, however, there were some pos-
divine that is assumed, as stated above with regard to an
sessed of the spirit of prophecy, who foretold many things
oath (q. 89, a. 4, ad 2). Wherefore superstition includes
about future events.
not only idolatrous sacrifices offered to demons, but also
In the New Testament, however, there were some pos-
recourse to the help of the demons for the purpose of do-
sessed of the spirit of prophecy, who foretold many things
ing or knowing something. But all divination results from
about future events.
the demons’ operation, either because the demons are ex-
∗ Cf. De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23,24; De Divin. Daem. 3
† The quotation is from his sixteenth homily on the Book of Numbers
‡ Vulg.: ‘seek of
their God, for the living of the dead?’
1643
Whether we ought to distinguish several species of divination?
IIa IIae q. 95 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that we should not distin-
vocation of the demons is of two kinds. The first is when,
guish several species of divination. Where the formality
with a view to obtain knowledge of the future, we take ob-
of sin is the same, there are not seemingly several species
servations in the disposition of certain things. If one en-
of sin. Now there is one formality of sin in all divina-
deavor to know the future by observing the position and
tions, since they consist in entering into compact with the
movements of the stars, this belongs to “astrologers,” who
demons in order to know the future. Therefore there are
are also called “genethliacs,” because they take note of
not several species of divination.
the days on which people are born. If one observe the
Objection 2. Further, a human act takes it species
movements and cries of birds or of any animals, or the
from its end, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3; Ia IIae,
sneezing of men, or the sudden movements of limbs, this
q. 18, a. 6). But all divination is directed to one end,
belongs in general to “augury,” which is so called from
namely, the foretelling of the future. Therefore all div-
the chattering of birds [avium garritu], just as “auspice” is
inations are of one species.
derived from watching birds [avium inspectione]. These
Objection 3. Further, signs do not vary the species
are chiefly wont to be observed in birds, the former by the
of a sin, for whether one detracts by word writing or ges-
ear, the latter by the eye. If, however, these observations
tures, it is the same species of sin. Now divinations seem
have for their object men’s words uttered unintentionally,
to differ merely according to the various signs whence the
which someone twist so as to apply to the future that he
foreknowledge of the future is derived. Therefore there
wishes to foreknow, then it is called an “omen”: and as
are not several species of divination.
Valerius Maximus∗ remarks, “the observing of omens has
On the contrary, Isidore enumerates various species
a touch of religion mingled with it, for it is believed to be
of divination (Etym. viii, 9).
founded not on a chance movement, but on divine prov-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), all divinations
idence. It was thus that when the Romans were deliber-
seek to acquire foreknowledge of future events, by means
ating whether they would change their position, a centu-
of some counsel and help of a demon, who is either ex-
rion happened to exclaim at the time: ‘Standard-bearer,
pressly called upon to give his help, or else thrusts him-
fix the banner, we had best stand here’: and on hearing
self in secretly, in order to foretell certain future things
these words they took them as an omen, and abandoned
unknown to men, but known to him in such manners as
their intention of advancing further.” If, however, the ob-
have been explained in the Ia, q. 57, a. 3. When demons
servation regards the dispositions, that occur to the eye, of
are expressly invoked, they are wont to foretell the future
figures in certain bodies, there will be another species of
in many ways. Sometimes they offer themselves to hu-
divination: for the divination that is taken from observing
man sight and hearing by mock apparitions in order to
the lines of the hand is called “chiromancy,” i.e. divination
foretell the future: and this species is called “prestigia-
of the hand (because cheir is the Greek for hand): while tion” because man’s eyes are blindfolded [praestringun-the divination which is taken from signs appearing in the
tur]. Sometimes they make use of dreams, and this is
shoulder-blades of an animal is called “spatulamancy.”
called “divination by dreams”: sometimes they employ
To this second species of divination, which is with-
apparitions or utterances of the dead, and this species
out express invocation of the demons, belongs that which
is called “necromancy,” for as Isidore observes (Etym.
is practiced by observing certain things done seriously by
viii) in Greek, nekron “means dead and manteia divina-men in the research of the occult, whether by drawing lots,
tion, because after certain incantations and the sprinkling
which is called “geomancy”; or by observing the shapes
of blood, the dead seem to come to life, to divine and
resulting from molten lead poured into water; or by ob-
to answer questions.” Sometimes they foretell the future
serving which of several sheets of paper, with or without
through living men, as in the case of those who are pos-
writing upon them, a person may happen to draw; or by
sessed: this is divination by “pythons,” of whom Isidore
holding out several unequal sticks and noting who takes
says that “pythons are so called from Pythius Apollo, who
the greater or the lesser. or by throwing dice, and observ-
was said to be the inventor of divination.” Sometimes they
ing who throws the highest score; or by observing what
foretell the future by means of shapes or signs which ap-
catches the eye when one opens a book, all of which are
pear in inanimate beings. If these signs appear in some
named “sortilege.”
earthly body such as wood, iron or polished stone, it is
Accordingly it is clear that there are three kinds of div-
called “geomancy,” if in water “hydromancy,” if in the air
ination. The first is when the demons are invoked openly,
“aeromancy,” if in fire “pyromancy,” if in the entrails of
this comes under the head of “necromancy”; the second
animals sacrificed on the altars of demons, “aruspicy.”
is merely an observation of the disposition or movement
The divination which is practiced without express in-
of some other being, and this belongs to “augury”; while
∗ De Dict. Fact. Memor. i, 5
1644
the third consists in doing something in order to discover its general formality. But the various species are distin-the occult; and this belongs to “sortilege.” Under each of
guished by their proper objects or matters, according as
these many others are contained, as explained above.
the knowledge of the occult is sought in various things.
Reply to Objection 1. In all the aforesaid there is the
Reply to Objection 3. The things observed by divin-
same general, but not the same special, character of sin:
ers are considered by them, not as signs expressing what
for it is much more grievous to invoke the demons than to
they already know, as happens in detraction, but as prin-
do things that deserve the demons’ interference.
ciples of knowledge. Now it is evident that diversity of
Reply to Objection 2. Knowledge of the future or
principles diversifies the species, even in demonstrative
of the occult is the ultimate end whence divination takes
sciences.
Whether divination practiced by invoking the demons is unlawful?
IIa IIae q. 95 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that divination practiced
something prejudicial to the salvation of mankind. Hence
by invoking the demons is not unlawful. Christ did noth-
Athanasius, commenting on the words of Lk. 4:35, “He
ing unlawful, according to 1 Pet. 2:22, “Who did no sin.”
rebuked him, saying: Hold thy peace,” says: “Although
Yet our Lord asked the demon: “What is thy name?” and
the demon confessed the truth, Christ put a stop to his
the latter replied: “My name is Legion, for we are many”
speech, lest together with the truth he should publish his
(Mk. 5:9). Therefore it seems lawful to question the
wickedness and accustom us to care little for such things,
demons about the occult.
however much he may seem to speak the truth. For it
Objection 2. Further, the souls of the saints do not en-
is wicked, while we have the divine Scriptures, to seek
courage those who ask unlawfully. Yet Samuel appeared
knowledge from the demons.”
to Saul when the latter inquired of the woman that had a
Reply to Objection 1. According to Bede’s commen-
divining spirit, concerning the issue of the coming war (1
tary on Lk. 8:30, “Our Lord inquired, not through igno-
Kings 28:8, sqq.). Therefore the divination that consists
rance, but in order that the disease, which he tolerated,
in questioning demons is not unlawful.
being made public, the power of the Healer might shine
Objection 3. Further, it seems lawful to seek the truth
forth more graciously.” Now it is one thing to question
from one who knows, if it be useful to know it. But it
a demon who comes to us of his own accord (and it is
is sometimes useful to know what is hidden from us, and
lawful to do so at times for the good of others, especially
can be known through the demons, as in the discovery of
when he can be compelled, by the power of God, to tell
thefts. Therefore divination by questioning demons is not
the truth) and another to invoke a demon in order to gain
unlawful.
from him knowledge of things hidden from us.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): “Nei-
Reply to Objection 2. According to Augustine (Ad
ther let there be found among you. . . anyone that consul-
Simplic. ii, 3), “there is nothing absurd in believing that
teth soothsayers. . . nor. . . that consulteth pythonic spirits.”
the spirit of the just man, being about to smite the king
I answer that, All divination by invoking demons
with the divine sentence, was permitted to appear to him,
is unlawful for two reasons. The first is gathered from
not by the sway of magic art or power, but by some oc-
the principle of divination, which is a compact made ex-
cult dispensation of which neither the witch nor Saul was
pressly with a demon by the very fact of invoking him.
aware. Or else the spirit of Samuel was not in reality
This is altogether unlawful; wherefore it is written against
aroused from his rest, but some phantom or mock appari-
certain persons (Is. 28:15): “You have said: We have
tion formed by the machinations of the devil, and styled
entered into a league with death, and we have made a
by Scripture under the name of Samuel, just as the im-
covenant with hell.” And still more grievous would it be
ages of things are wont to be called by the names of those
if sacrifice were offered or reverence paid to the demon
things.”
invoked. The second reason is gathered from the result.
Reply to Objection 3. No temporal utility can com-
For the demon who intends man’s perdition endeavors, by
pare with the harm to spiritual health that results from the
his answers, even though he sometimes tells the truth, to
research of the unknown by invoking the demon.
accustom men to believe him, and so to lead him on to
1645
Whether divination by the stars is unlawful?
IIa IIae q. 95 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that divination by the stars
they be ascribed to some common higher cause of a cor-
is not unlawful. It is lawful to foretell effects by observ-
poreal nature, although they are referable to a common
ing their causes: thus a physician foretells death from the
higher cause, which is divine providence. on the con-
disposition of the disease. Now the heavenly bodies are
trary the appointment of the movements and positions of
the cause of what takes place in the world, according to
the heavenly bodies by divine providence is on a differ-
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore divination by the
ent principle from the appointment of the occurrence of
stars is not unlawful.
future contingencies, because the former are appointed on
Objection 2. Further, human science originates from
a principle of necessity, so that they always occur in the
experiments, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i,
same way, whereas the latter are appointed on a principle
1). Now it has been discovered through many experi-
of contingency, so that the manner of their occurrence is
ments that the observation of the stars is a means whereby
variable. Consequently it is impossible to acquire fore-
some future events may be known beforehand. Therefore
knowledge of the future from an observation of the stars,
it would seem not unlawful to make use of this kind of
except in so far as effects can be foreknown from their
divination.
causes.
Objection 3. Further, divination is declared to be un-
Now two kinds of effects escape the causality of heav-
lawful in so far as it is based on a compact made with the
enly bodies. In the first place all effects that occur acci-
demons. But divination by the stars contains nothing of
dentally, whether in human affairs or in the natural or-
the kind, but merely an observation of God’s creatures.
der, since, as it is proved in Metaph. vi∗, an acciden-
Therefore it would seem that this species of divination is
tal being has no cause, least of all a natural cause, such
not unlawful.
as is the power of a heavenly body, because what occurs
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 3):
accidentally, neither is a “being” properly speaking, nor
“Those astrologers whom they call mathematicians, I con-
is “one”—for instance, that an earthquake occur when a
sulted without scruple; because they seemed to use no
stone falls, or that a treasure be discovered when a man
sacrifice, nor to pray to any spirit for their divinations
digs a grave—for these and like occurrences are not one
which art, however, Christian and true piety rejects and
thing, but are simply several things. Whereas the opera-
condemns.”
tion of nature has always some one thing for its term, just
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2), the operation
as it proceeds from some one principle, which is the form
of the demon thrusts itself into those divinations which are
of a natural thing.
based on false and vain opinions, in order that man’s mind
In the second place, acts of the free-will, which is the
may become entangled in vanity and falsehood. Now one
faculty of will and reason, escape the causality of heav-
makes use of a vain and false opinion if, by observing
enly bodies. For the intellect or reason is not a body, nor
the stars, one desires to foreknow the future that cannot
the act of a bodily organ, and consequently neither is the
be forecast by their means. Wherefore we must consider
will, since it is in the reason, as the Philosopher shows
what things can be foreknown by observing the stars: and
(De Anima iii, 4,9). Now no body can make an impres-
it is evident that those things which happen of necessity
sion on an incorporeal body. Wherefore it is impossible
can be foreknown by this mean,: even so astrologers fore-
for heavenly bodies to make a direct impression on the in-
cast a future eclipse.
tellect and will: for this would be to deny the difference
However, with regard to the foreknowledge of future
between intellect and sense, with which position Aristotle
events acquired by observing the stars there have been var-
reproaches (De Anima iii, 3) those who held that “such is
ious opinions. For some have stated that the stars signify
the will of man, as is the day which the father of men and
rather than cause the things foretold by means of their ob-
of gods,” i.e. the sun or the heavens, “brings on”†.
servation. But this is an unreasonable statement: since
Hence the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause
every corporeal sign is either the effect of that for which
of the free-will’s operations. Nevertheless they can be a
it stands (thus smoke signifies fire whereby it is caused),
dispositive cause of an inclination to those operations, in
or it proceeds from the same cause, so that by signify-
so far as they make an impression on the human body, and
ing the cause, in consequence it signifies the effect (thus
consequently on the sensitive powers which are acts of
a rainbow is sometimes a sign of fair weather, in so far
bodily organs having an inclination for human acts. Since,
as its cause is the cause of fair weather). Now it cannot
however, the sensitive powers obey reason, as the Philoso-
be said that the dispositions and movements of the heav-
pher shows (De Anima iii, 11; Ethic. i, 13), this does not
enly bodies are the effect of future events; nor again can
impose any necessity on the free-will, and man is able, by
∗ Ed. Did. v, 3
† Odyssey xviii, 135
1646
his reason, to act counter to the inclination of the heavenly tion of the heavenly bodies: while there are few, namely,
bodies.
the wise alone, who moderate these inclinations by their
Accordingly if anyone take observation of the stars in
reason. The result is that astrologers in many cases foretell
order to foreknow casual or fortuitous future events, or to
the truth, especially in public occurrences which depend
know with certitude future human actions, his conduct is
on the multitude. Secondly, because of the interference of
based on a false and vain opinion; and so the operation of
the demons. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17):
the demon introduces itself therein, wherefore it will be a
“When astrologers tell the truth, it must be allowed that
superstitious and unlawful divination. On the other hand
this is due to an instinct that, unknown to man, lies hidden
if one were to apply the observation of the stars in order to
in his mind. And since this happens through the action of
foreknow those future things that are caused by heavenly
unclean and lying spirits who desire to deceive man for
bodies, for instance, drought or rain and so forth, it will
they are permitted to know certain things about temporal
be neither an unlawful nor a superstitious divination.
affairs.” Wherefore he concludes: “Thus a good Christian
Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
should beware of astrologers, and of all impious diviners,
Reply to Objection 2. That astrologers not unfre-
especially of those who tell the truth, lest his soul become
quently forecast the truth by observing the stars may be
the dupe of the demons and by making a compact of part-
explained in two ways. First, because a great number of
nership with them enmesh itself in their fellowship.”
men follow their bodily passions, so that their actions are
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
for the most part disposed in accordance with the inclina-
Whether divination by dreams is unlawful?
IIa IIae q. 95 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that divination by dreams
signs of future happenings, in so far as they are referable
is not unlawful. It is not unlawful to make use of divine
to some common cause of both dreams and future occur-
instruction. Now men are instructed by God in dreams,
rences, and in this way the future is frequently known
for it is written (Job 33:15,16): “By a dream in a vision
from dreams. We must, then, consider what is the cause
by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they are
of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of future oc-
sleeping in their beds, then He,” God to wit, “openeth the
currences, or be cognizant of them.
ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they
Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of
are to learn.” Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of
dreams is sometimes in us and sometimes outside us. The
divination by dreams.
inward cause of dreams is twofold: one regards the soul,
Objection 2. Further, those who interpret dreams,
in so far as those things which have occupied a man’s
properly speaking, make use of divination by dreams.
thoughts and affections while awake recur to his imagi-
Now we read of holy men interpreting dreams: thus
nation while asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not
Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh’s butler and of
a cause of future occurrences, so that dreams of this kind
his chief baker (Gn. 40), and Daniel interpreted the dream
are related accidentally to future occurrences, and if at any
of the king of Babylon (Dan. 2,4). Therefore divination
time they concur it will be by chance. But sometimes the
by dreams is not unlawful.
inward cause of dreams regards the body: because the in-
Objection 3. Further, it is unreasonable to deny the
ward disposition of the body leads to the formation of a
common experiences of men. Now it is the experience of
movement in the imagination consistent with that disposi-
all that dreams are significative of the future. Therefore it
tion; thus a man in whom there is abundance of cold hu-
is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams for the purpose
mors dreams that he is in the water or snow: and for this
of divination, and it is lawful to listen to them.
reason physicians say that we should take note of dreams
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10): “Neither
in order to discover internal dispositions.
let there be found among you any one that. . . observeth
In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold,
dreams.”
corporal and spiritual.
It is corporal in so far as the
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 2,6), divination
sleeper’s imagination is affected either by the surround-
is superstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false
ing air, or through an impression of a heavenly body, so
opinion. Wherefore we must consider what is true in
that certain images appear to the sleeper, in keeping with
the matter of foreknowing the future from dreams. Now
the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual cause
dreams are sometimes the cause of future occurrences; for
is sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things
instance, when a person’s mind becomes anxious through
to men in their dreams by the ministry of the angels, ac-
what it has seen in a dream and is thereby led to do some-
cording Num. 12:6, “If there be among you a prophet of
thing or avoid something: while sometimes dreams are
the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to
1647
him in a dream.” Sometimes, however, it is due to the aclation, or to some natural cause inward or outward, and so
tion of the demons that certain images appear to persons in
far as the efficacy of that cause extends. But it will be an
their sleep, and by this means they, at times, reveal certain
unlawful and superstitious divination if it be caused by a
future things to those who have entered into an unlawful
revelation of the demons, with whom a compact has been
compact with them.
made, whether explicit, through their being invoked for
Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful div-
the purpose, or implicit, through the divination extending
ination in making use of dreams for the foreknowledge of
beyond its possible limits.
the future, so long as those dreams are due to divine reve-
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Whether divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external things is IIa IIae q. 95 a. 7
unlawful?
Objection 1. It would seem that divination by au-
since dumb animals have naught but a sensitive soul, ev-
guries, omens, and by like observations of external things
ery power of which is the act of a bodily organ, their soul
is not unlawful. If it were unlawful holy men would not
is subject to the disposition of surrounding bodies, and
make use thereof. Now we read of Joseph that he paid
primarily to that of the heavenly bodies. Hence nothing
attention to auguries, for it is related (Gn.
44:5) that
prevents some of their actions from being signs of the fu-
Joseph’s steward said: “The cup which you have stolen
ture, in so far as they are conformed to the dispositions of
is that in which my lord drinketh and in which he is wont
the heavenly bodies and of the surrounding air, to which
to divine [augurari]”: and he himself afterwards said to
certain future events are due. Yet in this matter we must
his brethren (Gn. 44:15): “Know you not that there is no
observe two things: first, that such observations must not
one like me in the science of divining?” Therefore it is not
be applied to the foreknowledge of future things other
unlawful to make use of this kind of divination.
than those which can be foreknown from the movements
Objection 2. Further, birds naturally know certain
of heavenly bodies, as stated above (Aa. 5,6): secondly,
things regarding future occurrences of the seasons, ac-
that they be not applied to other matters than those which
cording to Jer. 8:7, “The kite in the air hath known her
in some way may have reference to these animals (since
time; the turtle, the swallow, and the stork have observed
they acquire through the heavenly bodies a certain natu-
the time of their coming.” Now natural knowledge is in-
ral knowledge and instinct about things necessary for their
fallible and comes from God. Therefore it seems not un-
life—such as changes resulting from rain and wind and so
lawful to make use of the birds’ knowledge in order to
forth).
know the future, and this is divination by augury.
In the second place, this instinct is produced by a spir-
Objection 3. Further, Gedeon is numbered among
itual cause, namely, either by God, as may be seen in the
the saints (Heb. 11:32). Yet Gedeon made use of an
dove that descended upon Christ, the raven that fed Elias,
omen, when he listened to the relation and interpreting of
and the whale that swallowed and vomited Jonas, or by
a dream (Judges 7:15): and Eliezer, Abraham’s servant,
demons, who make use of these actions of dumb animals
acted in like manner (Gn. 24). Therefore it seems that
in order to entangle our minds with vain opinions. This
this kind of divination is not unlawful.
seems to be true of all such like things; except omens, be-
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10): “Neither
cause human words which are taken for an omen are not
let there be found among you anyone. . . that observeth
subject to the disposition of the stars, yet are they ordered
omens.”
according to divine providence and sometimes according
I answer that, The movements or cries of birds, and
to the action of the demons.
whatever dispositions one may consider in such things,
Accordingly we must say that all such like divinations
are manifestly not the cause of future events: wherefore
are superstitious and unlawful, if they be extended beyond
the future cannot be known therefrom as from its cause.
the limits set according to the order of nature or of divine
It follows therefore that if anything future can be known
providence.
from them, it will be because the causes from which they
Reply to Objection 1.
According to Augustine∗,
proceed are also the causes of future occurrences or are
when Joseph said that there was no one like him in the
cognizant of them. Now the cause of dumb animals’ ac-
science of divining, he spoke in joke and not seriously, re-
tions is a certain instinct whereby they are inclined by a
ferring perhaps to the common opinion about him: in this
natural movement, for they are not masters of their ac-
sense also spoke his steward.
tions. This instinct may proceed from a twofold cause.
Reply to Objection 2. The passage quoted refers to
In the first place it may be due to a bodily cause. For
the knowledge that birds have about things concerning
∗ QQ. in Genes., qu. cxlv
1648
them; and in order to know these things it is not unlaw-and interpretation of a dream, seeing therein an omen, or-
ful to observe their cries and movements: thus from the
dered by divine providence for his instruction. In like
frequent cawing of crows one might say that it will rain
manner Eliezer listened to the damsel’s words, having pre-
soon.
viously prayed to God.
Reply to Objection 3. Gedeon listened to the recital
Whether divination by drawing lots is unlawful?
IIa IIae q. 95 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that divination by draw-
tation”; if one seeks to know what is going to happen,
ing lots is not unlawful, because a gloss of Augustine on
it is called “sortilege of divination.” Now the actions of
Ps. 30:16, “My lots are in Thy hands,” says: “It is not
man that are required for sortilege and their results are not
wrong to cast lots, for it is a means of ascertaining the
subject to the dispositions of the stars. Wherefore if any-
divine will when a man is in doubt.”
one practicing sortilege is so minded as though the hu-
Objection 2. There is, seemingly, nothing unlawful
man acts requisite for sortilege depended for their result
in the observances which the Scriptures relate as being
on the dispositions of the stars, his opinion is vain and
practiced by holy men. Now both in the Old and in the
false, and consequently is not free from the interference
New Testament we find holy men practicing the casting
of the demons, so that a divination of this kind is supersti-
of lots. For it is related (Jos. 7:14, sqq.) that Josue, at the tious and unlawful.
Lord’s command, pronounced sentence by lot on Achan
Apart from this cause, however, the result of sortile-
who had stolen of the anathema. Again Saul, by drawing
gious acts must needs be ascribed to chance, or to some
lots, found that his son Jonathan had eaten honey (1 Kings
directing spiritual cause. If we ascribe it to chance, and
14:58, sqq.): Jonas, when fleeing from the face of the
this can only take place in “sortilege of allotment,” it does
Lord, was discovered and thrown into the sea (Jonah 1:7,
not seem to imply any vice other than vanity, as in the
sqq.): Zacharias was chosen by lot to offer incense (Lk.
case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the di-
1:9): and the apostles by drawing lots elected Matthias to
vision of something or other, are willing to draw lots for
the apostleship (Acts 1:26). Therefore it would seem that
its division, thus leaving to chance what portion each is to
divination by lots is not unlawful.
receive.
Objection 3.
Further, fighting with the fists, or
If, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a
“monomachy,” i.e. single combat as it is called, and trial
spiritual cause, it is sometimes ascribed to demons. Thus
by fire and water, which are called “popular” trials, seem
we read (Ezech. 21:21) that “the king of Babylon stood in
to come under the head of sortilege, because something
the highway, at the head of two ways, seeking divination,
unknown is sought by their means. Yet these practices
shuffling arrows; he inquired of the idols, and consulted
seem to be lawful, because David is related to have en-
entrails”: sortilege of this kind is unlawful, and forbidden
gaged in single combat with the Philistine (1 Kings 17:32,
by the canons.
sqq.). Therefore it would seem that divination by lot is not
Sometimes, however, the decision is left to God, ac-
unlawful.
cording to Prov. 16:33, “Lots are cast into the lap, but
On the contrary, It is written in the Decretals (XXVI,
they are disposed of by the Lord”: sortilege of this kind is
qu. v, can. Sortes): “We decree that the casting of lots, by
not wrong in itself, as Augustine declares∗.
which means you make up your mind in all your undertak-
Yet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First,
ings, and which the Fathers have condemned, is nothing
if one have recourse to lots without any necessity: for this
but divination and witchcraft. For which reason we wish
would seem to amount to tempting God. Hence Ambrose,
them to be condemned altogether, and henceforth not to
commenting on the words of Lk. 1:8, says: “He that is
be mentioned among Christians, and we forbid the prac-
chosen by lot is not bound by the judgment of men.” Sec-
tice thereof under pain of anathema.”
ondly, if even in a case of necessity one were to have re-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), sortilege con-
course to lots without reverence. Hence, on the Acts of the
sists, properly speaking, in doing something, that by ob-
Apostles, Bede says (Super Act. Apost. i): “But if any-
serving the result one may come to the knowledge of
one, compelled by necessity, thinks that he ought, after
something unknown. If by casting lots one seeks to know
the apostles’ example, to consult God by casting lots, let
what is to be given to whom, whether it be a possession,
him take note that the apostles themselves did not do so,
an honor, a dignity, a punishment, or some action or other,
except after calling together the assembly of the brethren
it is called “sortilege of allotment”; if one seeks to know
and pouring forth prayer to God.” Thirdly, if the Divine
what ought to be done, it is called “sortilege of consul-
oracles be misapplied to earthly business. Hence Augus-
∗ Enarr. ii in Ps. xxx, serm. 2; cf. obj. 1
1649
tine says (ad inquisit. Januar. ii; Ep. lv): “Those who tell on thee, thou couldst not act more justly than in choosing
fortunes from the Gospel pages, though it is to be hoped
by lot to whom thou shalt give that which thou canst not
that they do so rather than have recourse to consulting the
give to both.”
demons, yet does this custom also displease me, that any-
This suffices for the Reply to the First and Second Ob-
one should wish to apply the Divine oracles to worldly
jections.
matters and to the vain things of this life.” Fourthly, if
Reply to Objection 3. The trial by hot iron or boiling
anyone resort to the drawing of lots in ecclesiastical elec-
water is directed to the investigation of someone’s hidden
tions, which should be carried out by the inspiration of the
sin, by means of something done by a man, and in this it
Holy Ghost. Wherefore, as Bede says (Super Act. Apost.
agrees with the drawing of lots. But in so far as a miracu-
i): “Before Pentecost the ordination of Matthias was de-
lous result is expected from God, it surpasses the common
cided by lot,” because as yet the fulness of the Holy Ghost
generality of sortilege. Hence this kind of trial is rendered
was not yet poured forth into the Church: “whereas the
unlawful, both because it is directed to the judgment of
same deacons were ordained not by lot but by the choice
the occult, which is reserved to the divine judgment, and
of the disciples.” It is different with earthly honors, which
because such like trials are not sanctioned by divine au-
are directed to the disposal of earthly things: in elections
thority. Hence we read in a decree of Pope Stephen V∗:
of this kind men frequently have recourse to lots, even as
“The sacred canons do not approve of extorting a con-
in the distribution of earthly possessions.
fession from anyone by means of the trial by hot iron or
If, however, there be urgent necessity it is lawful to
boiling water, and no one must presume, by a supersti-
seek the divine judgment by casting lots, provided due
tious innovation, to practice what is not sanctioned by the
reverence be observed. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad
teaching of the holy fathers. For it is allowable that public
Honor. ccxxviii), “If, at a time of persecution, the minis-
crimes should be judged by our authority, after the cul-
ters of God do not agree as to which of them is to remain
prit has made spontaneous confession, or when witnesses
at his post lest all should flee, and which of them is to
have been approved, with due regard to the fear of God;
flee, lest all die and the Church be forsaken, should there
but hidden and unknown crimes must be left to Him Who
be no other means of coming to an agreement, so far as I
alone knows the hearts of the children of men.” The same
can see, they must be chosen by lot.” Again he says (De
would seem to apply to the law concerning duels, save
Doctr. Christ. xxviii): “If thou aboundest in that which
that it approaches nearer to the common kind of sortilege,
it behooves thee to give to him who hath not, and which
since no miraculous effect is expected thereupon, unless
cannot be given to two; should two come to you, neither of
the combatants be very unequal in strength or skill.
whom surpasses the other either in need or in some claim
∗ II, qu. v., can. Consuluist i
1650
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 96
Of Superstition in Observances
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider superstition in observances, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Of observances for acquiring knowledge, which are prescribed by the magic art; (2) Of observances for causing alterations in certain bodies;
(3) Of observances practiced in fortune-telling;
(4) Of wearing sacred words at the neck.
Whether it be unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art?
IIa IIae q. 96 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not unlawful to
tain shapes, and muttering certain strange words, and so
practice the observances of the magic art. A thing is said
forth.
Wherefore this art does not make use of these
to be unlawful in two ways. First, by reason of the genus
things as causes, but as signs; not however as signs in-
of the deed, as murder and theft: secondly, through being
stituted by God, as are the sacramental signs. It follows,
directed to an evil end, as when a person gives an alms for
therefore, that they are empty signs, and consequently a
the sake of vainglory. Now the observances of the magic
kind of “agreement or covenant made with the demons for
art are not evil as to the genus of the deed, for they consist
the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens”‡.
in certain fasts and prayers to God; moreover, they are di-
Wherefore the magic art is to be absolutely repudiated and
rected to a good end, namely, the acquisition of science.
avoided by Christian, even as other arts of vain and nox-
Therefore it is not unlawful to practice these observances.
ious superstition, as Augustine declares (De Doctr. Christ.
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Dan. 1:17) that
ii, 23). This art is also useless for the acquisition of sci-
“to the children” who abstained, “God gave knowledge,
ence. For since it is not intended by means of this art to
and understanding in every book, and wisdom.” Now the
acquire science in a manner connatural to man, namely,
observances of the magic art consist in certain fasts and
by discovery and instruction, the consequence is that this
abstinences. Therefore it seems that this art achieves its
effect is expected either from God or from the demons.
results through God: and consequently it is not unlawful
Now it is certain that some have received wisdom and sci-
to practice it.
ence infused into them by God, as related of Solomon (3
Objection 3.
Further, seemingly, as stated above
Kings 3 and 2 Paralip 1). Moreover, our Lord said to His
(a. 1), the reason why it is wrong to inquire of the demons
disciples (Lk. 21:15): “I will give you a mouth and wis-
concerning the future is because they have no knowledge
dom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to resist
of it, this knowledge being proper to God. Yet the demons
and gainsay.” However, this gift is not granted to all, or in
know scientific truths: because sciences are about things
connection with any particular observance, but according
necessary and invariable, and such things are subject to
to the will of the Holy Ghost, as stated in 1 Cor. 12:8,
human knowledge, and much more to the knowledge of
“To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom,
demons, who are of keener intellect, as Augustine says∗.
to another the word of knowledge, according to the same
Therefore it seems to be no sin to practice the magic art,
Spirit,” and afterwards it is said (1 Cor. 12:11): “All these
even though it achieve its result through the demons.
things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every-
On the contrary, It is written (Dt.
18:10,11):
one according as He will.” On the other hand it does not
“Neither let there be found among you. . . anyone. . . that
belong to the demons to enlighten the intellect, as stated
seeketh the truth from the dead”: which search relies on
in the Ia, q. 109, a. 3. Now the acquisition of knowledge
the demons’ help. Now through the observances of the
and wisdom is effected by the enlightening of the intellect,
magic art, knowledge of the truth is sought “by means of
wherefore never did anyone acquire knowledge by means
certain signs agreed upon by compact with the demonsӠ.
of the demons. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 9):
Therefore it is unlawful to practice the notary art.
“Porphyry confesses that the intellectual soul is in no way
I answer that, The magic art is both unlawful and
cleansed by theurgic inventions,” i.e. the operations “of
futile. It is unlawful, because the means it employs for
the demons, so as to be fitted to see its God, and discern
acquiring knowledge have not in themselves the power
what is true,” such as are all scientific conclusions. The
to cause science, consisting as they do in gazing cer-
demons may, however, be able by speaking to men to ex-
∗ Gen. ad lit. ii, 17; De Divin. Daemon. 3,4
† Augustine, De Doctr.
Christ. ii, 20; see above q. 92, a. 2
‡ Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii,
20; see above q. 92, a. 2
1651
press in words certain teachings of the sciences, but this Gentiles. Hence as a reward for their obedience they re-is not what is sought by means of magic.
ceived knowledge from God, according to Ps. 118:100,
Reply to Objection 1. It is a good thing to acquire
“I have had understanding above the ancients, because I
knowledge, but it is not good to acquire it by undue
have sought Thy commandments.”
means, and it is to this end that the magic art tends.
Reply to Objection 3. To seek knowledge of the fu-
Reply to Objection 2. The abstinence of these chil-
ture from the demons is a sin not only because they are
dren was not in accordance with a vain observance of
ignorant of the future, but also on account of the fellow-
the notary art, but according to the authority of the di-
ship entered into with them, which also applies to the case
vine law, for they refused to be defiled by the meat of
in point.
Whether observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquir-IIa IIae q. 96 a. 2
ing health or the like, are unlawful?
Objection 1. It would seem that observances directed
Civ. Dei xxi, 6): “The demons are allured by means of
to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring
creatures, which were made, not by them, but by God.
health, or the like, are lawful. It is lawful to make use
They are enticed by various objects differing according to
of the natural forces of bodies in order to produce their
the various things in which they delight, not as animals
proper effects. Now in the physical order things have cer-
by meat, but as spirits by signs, such as are to each one’s
tain occult forces, the reason of which man is unable to as-
liking, by means of various kinds of stones, herbs, trees,
sign; for instance that the magnet attracts iron, and many
animals, songs and rites.”
like instances, all of which Augustine enumerates (De Civ.
Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing superstitious
Dei xxi, 5,7). Therefore it would seem lawful to employ
or unlawful in employing natural things simply for the
such like forces for the alteration of bodies.
purpose of causing certain effects such as they are thought
Objection 2. Further, artificial bodies are subject to
to have the natural power of producing. But if in addition
the heavenly bodies, just as natural bodies are. Now nat-
there be employed certain characters, words, or any other
ural bodies acquire certain occult forces resulting from
vain observances which clearly have no efficacy by nature,
their species through the influence of the heavenly bod-
it will be superstitious and unlawful.
ies. Therefore artificial bodies, e.g. images, also acquire
Reply to Objection 2. The natural forces of natural
from the heavenly bodies a certain occult force for the
bodies result from their substantial forms which they ac-
production of certain effects. Therefore it is not unlawful
quire through the influence of heavenly bodies; where-
to make use of them and of such like things.
fore through this same influence they acquire certain ac-
Objection 3. Further, the demons too are able to alter
tive forces. On the other hand the forms of artificial bod-
bodies in many ways, as Augustine states (De Trin. iii,
ies result from the conception of the craftsman; and since
8,9). But their power is from God. Therefore it is lawful
they are nothing else but composition, order and shape,
to make use of their power for the purpose of producing
as stated in Phys. i, 5, they cannot have a natural active
these alterations.
force. Consequently, no force accrues to them from the
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
influence of heavenly bodies, in so far as they are arti-
ii, 20) that “to superstition belong the experiments of
ficial, but only in respect of their natural matter. Hence
magic arts, amulets and nostrums condemned by the med-
it is false, what Porphyry held, according to Augustine
ical faculty, consisting either of incantations or of certain
(De Civ. Dei x, 11), that “by herbs, stones, animals, cer-
cyphers which they call characters, or of any kind of thing
tain particular sounds, words, shapes and devices, or again
worn or fastened on.”
by certain movements of the stars observed in the course
I answer that, In things done for the purpose of pro-
of the heavens it is possible for men to fashion on earth
ducing some bodily effect we must consider whether they
forces capable of carrying into effect the various disposi-
seem able to produce that effect naturally: for if so it will
tions of the stars,” as though the results of the magic arts
not be unlawful to do so, since it is lawful to employ nat-
were to be ascribed to the power of the heavenly bodies.
ural causes in order to produce their proper effects. But,
In fact as Augustine adds (De Civ. Dei x, 11), “all these
if they seem unable to produce those effects naturally, it
things are to be ascribed to the demons, who delude the
follows that they are employed for the purpose of produc-
souls that are subject to them.”
ing those effects, not as causes but only as signs, so that
Wherefore those images called astronomical also de-
they come under the head of “compact by tokens entered
rive their efficacy from the actions of the demons: a sign
into with the demons”∗. Wherefore Augustine says (De
of this is that it is requisite to inscribe certain characters on
∗ Augustine, De Doctr. Christ.; see above q. 92, a. 2
1652
them which do not conduce to any effect naturally, since Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to the domain of the
shape is not a principle of natural action. Yet astronom-
divine majesty, to Whom the demons are subject, that God
ical images differ from necromantic images in this, that
should employ them to whatever purpose He will. But
the latter include certain explicit invocations and trick-
man has not been entrusted with power over the demons,
ery, wherefore they come under the head of explicit agree-
to employ them to whatsoever purpose he will; on the con-
ments made with the demons: whereas in the other images
trary, it is appointed that he should wage war against the
there are tacit agreements by means of tokens in certain
demons. Hence in no way is it lawful for man to make use
shapes or characters.
of the demons’ help by compacts either tacit or express.
Whether observances directed to the purpose of fortune-telling are unlawful?
IIa IIae q. 96 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that observances directed
malice of the demons, who strive to entangle men’s minds
to the purpose of fortune-telling are not unlawful. Sick-
with such like trifles. Accordingly it is evident that all
ness is one of the misfortunes that occur to man. Now
these observances are superstitious and unlawful: they are
sickness in man is preceded by certain symptoms, which
apparently remains of idolatry, which authorized the ob-
the physician observes. Therefore it seems not unlawful
servance of auguries, of lucky and unlucky days which is
to observe such like signs.
allied to divination by the stars, in respect of which one
Objection 2. Further, it is unreasonable to deny that
day differentiated from another: except that these obser-
which nearly everybody experiences. Now nearly every-
vances are devoid of reason and art, wherefore they are
one experiences that certain times, or places, hearing of
yet more vain and superstitious.
certain words meetings of men or animals, uncanny or
Reply to Objection 1. The causes of sickness are
ungainly actions, are presages of good or evil to come.
seated in us, and they produce certain signs of sickness
Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe these things.
to come, which physicians lawfully observe. Wherefore
Objection 3. Further, human actions and occurrences
it is not unlawful to consider a presage of future events as
are disposed by divine providence in a certain order: and
proceeding from its cause; as when a slave fears a flogging
this order seems to require that precedent events should
when he sees his master’s anger. Possibly the same might
be signs of subsequent occurrences: wherefore, according
be said if one were to fear for child lest it take harm from
to the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:6), the things that happened to
the evil eye, of which we have spoken in the Ia, q. 117,
the fathers of old are signs of those that take place in our
a. 3, ad 2. But this does not apply to this kind of obser-
time. Now it is not unlawful to observe the order that pro-
vances.
ceeds from divine providence. Therefore it is seemingly
Reply to Objection 2. That men have at first expe-
not unlawful to observe these presages.
rienced a certain degree of truth in these observances is
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
due to chance. But afterwards when a man begins to
ii, 20) that “a thousand vain observances are comprised
entangle his mind with observances of this kind, many
under the head of compacts entered into with the demons:
things occur in connection with them through the trick-
for instance, the twitching of a limb; a stone, a dog, or
ery of the demons, “so that men, through being entangled
a boy coming between friends walking together; kicking
in these observances, become yet more curious, and more
the door-post when anyone passes in front of one’s house;
and more embroiled in the manifold snares of a pernicious
to go back to bed if you happen to sneeze while putting on
error,” as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23).
your shoes; to return home if you trip when going forth;
Reply to Objection 3. Among the Jewish people of
when the rats have gnawed a hole in your clothes, to fear
whom Christ was to be born, not only words but also
superstitiously a future evil rather than to regret the actual
deeds were prophetic, as Augustine states (Contra Faust.
damage.”
iv, 2; xxii, 24). Wherefore it is lawful to apply those deeds
I answer that, Men attend to all these observances,
to our instruction, as signs given by God. Not all things,
not as causes but as signs of future events, good or evil.
however, that occur through divine providence are ordered
Nor do they observe them as signs given by God, since
so as to be signs of the future. Hence the argument does
these signs are brought forward, not on divine authority,
not prove.
but rather by human vanity with the cooperation of the
1653
Whether it is unlawful to wear divine words at the neck?
IIa IIae q. 96 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not unlawful
something unlawful. Hence Chrysostom says† that “many
to wear divine words at the neck. Divine words are no
now after the example of the Pharisees who enlarged their
less efficacious when written than when uttered. But it
fringes, invent and write Hebrew names of angels, and
is lawful to utter sacred words for the purpose of pro-
fasten them to their persons. Such things seem fearsome
ducing certain effects; (for instance, in order to heal the
to those who do not understand them.” Again, one should
sick), such as the “Our Father” or the “Hail Mary,” or in
take care lest it contain anything false, because in that case
any way whatever to call on the Lord’s name, according
also the effect could not be ascribed to God, Who does not
to Mk. 16:17,18, “In My name they shall cast out dev-
bear witness to a falsehood.
ils, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall take up
In the second place, one should beware lest besides
serpents.” Therefore it seems to be lawful to wear sacred
the sacred words it contain something vain, for instance
words at one’s neck, as a remedy for sickness or for any
certain written characters, except the sign of the Cross; or
kind of distress.
if hope be placed in the manner of writing or fastening,
Objection 2. Further, sacred words are no less effica-
or in any like vanity, having no connection with reverence
cious on the human body than on the bodies of serpents
for God, because this would be pronounced superstitious:
and other animals. Now certain incantations are effica-
otherwise, however, it is lawful. Hence it is written in the
cious in checking serpents, or in healing certain other an-
Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, cap. Non liceat Christianis): “In
imals: wherefore it is written (Ps. 57:5): “Their madness
blending together medicinal herbs, it is not lawful to make
is according to the likeness of a serpent, like the deaf asp
use of observances or incantations, other than the divine
that stoppeth her ears, which will not hear the voice of the
symbol, or the Lord’s Prayer, so as to give honor to none
charmers, nor of the wizard that charmeth wisely.” There-
but God the Creator of all.”
fore it is lawful to wear sacred words as a remedy for men.
Reply to Objection 1. It is indeed lawful to pro-
Objection 3. Further, God’s word is no less holy than
nounce divine words, or to invoke the divine name, if one
the relics of the saints; wherefore Augustine says (Lib. L.
do so with a mind to honor God alone, from Whom the
Hom. xxvi) that “God’s word is of no less account than
result is expected: but it is unlawful if it be done in con-
the Body of Christ.” Now it is lawful for one to wear the
nection with any vain observance.
relics of the saints at one’s neck, or to carry them about
Reply to Objection 2. Even in the case of incantations
one in any way for the purpose of self-protection. There-
of serpents or any animals whatever, if the mind attend ex-
fore it is equally lawful to have recourse to the words of
clusively to the sacred words and to the divine power, it
Holy Writ, whether uttered or written, for one’s protec-
will not be unlawful. Such like incantations, however, of-
tion.
ten include unlawful observances, and rely on the demons
Objection 4. On the other hand, Chrysostom says
for their result, especially in the case of serpents, because
(Hom. xliii in Matth.)∗: “Some wear round their necks a
the serpent was the first instrument employed by the devil
passage in writing from the Gospel. Yet is not the Gospel
in order to deceive man. Hence a gloss on the passage
read in church and heard by all every day? How then, if it
quoted says: “Note that Scripture does not commend ev-
does a man no good to have the Gospels in his ears, will
erything whence it draws its comparisons, as in the case of
he find salvation by wearing them round his neck? More-
the unjust judge who scarcely heard the widow’s request.”
over, where is the power of the Gospel? In the shapes of
Reply to Objection 3. The same applies to the wear-
the letters or in the understanding of the sense? If in the
ing of relics, for if they be worn out of confidence in God,
shapes, you do well to wear them round your neck; if in
and in the saints whose relics they are, it will not be un-
the understanding, you will then do better to bear them in
lawful. But if account were taken in this matter of some
your heart than to wear them round your neck.”
vain circumstance (for instance that the casket be three-
I answer that, In every incantation or wearing of writ-
cornered, or the like, having no bearing on the reverence
ten words, two points seem to demand caution. The first
due to God and the saints), it would be superstitious and
is the thing said or written, because if it is connected with
unlawful.
invocation of the demons it is clearly superstitious and un-
Reply to Objection 4. Chrysostom is speaking the
lawful. In like manner it seems that one should beware
case in which more attention is paid the written characters
lest it contain strange words, for fear that they conceal
than to the understanding of the words.
∗ Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom’s works, and falsely ascribed to him
† Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in
Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom’s works, falsely ascribed to him 1654
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 97
Of the Temptation of God
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion, through lack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary thereto, so that they come under the head of irreligion. Such are the vices which pertain to contempt or irreverence for God and holy things. Accordingly we shall consider: (1) Vices pertaining directly to irreverence for God; (2) Vices pertaining to irreverence for holy things. With regard to the first we shall consider the temptation whereby God is tempted, and perjury, whereby God’s name is taken with irreverence. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) In what the temptation of God consists;
(2) Whether it is a sin?
(3) To what virtue it is opposed;
(4) Of its comparison with other vices.
Whether the temptation of God consists in certain deeds, wherein the expected result IIa IIae q. 97 a. 1
is ascribed to the power of God alone?
Objection 1. It would seem that the temptation of
tempt God when it has to strive to escape from that which
God does not consist in certain deeds wherein the result
it needs to avoid.” From this it would seem that the temp-
is expected from the power of God alone. Just as God
tation of God consists in omitting to do what one can in
is tempted by man so is man tempted by God, man, and
order to escape from danger, and relying on the assistance
demons. But when man is tempted the result is not al-
of God alone.
ways expected from his power. Therefore neither is God
I answer that, Properly speaking, to tempt is to test
tempted when the result is expected from His power alone.
the person tempted. Now we put a person to the test
Objection 2. Further, all those who work miracles by
by words or by deeds. By words, that we may find out
invoking the divine name look for an effect due to God’s
whether he knows what we ask, or whether he can and
power alone. Therefore, if the temptation of God con-
will grant it: by deeds, when, by what we do, we probe
sisted in such like deeds, all who work miracles would
another’s prudence, will or power. Either of these may
tempt God.
happen in two ways. First, openly, as when one declares
Objection 3. Further, it seems to belong to man’s
oneself a tempter: thus Samson (Judges 14:12) proposed
perfection that he should put aside human aids and put
a riddle to the Philistines in order to tempt them. In the
his hope in God alone. Hence Ambrose, commenting on
second place it may be done with cunning and by stealth,
Lk. 9:3, “Take nothing for your journey,” etc. says: “The
as the Pharisees tempted Christ, as we read in Mat. 22:15,
Gospel precept points out what is required of him that an-
sqq. Again this is sometimes done explicitly, as when any-
nounces the kingdom of God, namely, that he should not
one intends, by word or deed, to put some person to the
depend on worldly assistance, and that, taking assurance
test; and sometimes implicitly, when, to wit, though he
from his faith, he should hold himself to be the more able
does not intend to test a person, yet that which he does
to provide for himself, the less he seeks these things.” And
or says can seemingly have no other purpose than putting
the Blessed Agatha said: “I have never treated my body
him to a test.
with bodily medicine, I have my Lord Jesus Christ, Who
Accordingly, man tempts God sometimes by words,
restores all things by His mere word.”∗ But the temptation
sometimes by deeds. Now we speak with God in words
of God does not consist in anything pertaining to perfec-
when we pray. Hence a man tempts God explicitly in his
tion. Therefore the temptation of God does not consist
prayers when he asks something of God with the intention
in such like deeds, wherein the help of God alone is ex-
of probing God’s knowledge, power or will. He tempts
pected.
God explicitly by deeds when he intends, by whatever he
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii,
does, to experiment on God’s power, good will or wis-
36): “Christ who gave proof of God’s power by teaching
dom. But He will tempt God implicitly, if, though he does
and reproving openly, yet not allowing the rage of His en-
not intend to make an experiment on God, yet he asks for
emies to prevail against Him, nevertheless by fleeing and
or does something which has no other use than to prove
hiding, instructed human weakness, lest it should dare to
God’s power, goodness or knowledge. Thus when a man
∗ Office of St. Agatha, eighth Responsory (Dominican Breviary).
1655
wishes his horse to gallop in order to escape from the en-Reply to Objection 2. When saints work miracles by
emy, this is not giving the horse a trial: but if he make
their prayers, they are moved by a motive of necessity or
the horse gallop with out any useful purpose, it seems to
usefulness to ask for that which is an effect of the divine
be nothing else than a trial of the horse’s speed; and the
power.
same applies to all other things. Accordingly when a man
Reply to Objection 3. The preachers of God’s king-
in his prayers or deeds entrusts himself to the divine assis-
dom dispense with temporal aids, so as to be freer to give
tance for some urgent or useful motive, this is not to tempt
their time to the word of God: wherefore if they depend
God: for it is written (2 Paralip 20:12): “As we know not
on God alone, it does not follow that they tempt God. But
what to do, we can only turn our eyes to Thee.” But if
if they were to neglect human assistance without any use-
this be done without any useful or urgent motive, this is
ful or urgent motive, they would be tempting God. Hence
to tempt God implicitly. Wherefore a gloss on Dt. 6:16,
Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 36) says that “Paul fled,
“Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God,” says: “A man
not through ceasing to believe in God, but lest he should
tempts God, if having the means at hand, without reason
tempt God, were he not to flee when he had the means
he chooses a dangerous course, trying whether he can be
of flight.” The Blessed Agatha had experience of God’s
delivered by God.”
kindness towards her, so that either she did not suffer such
Reply to Objection 1. Man also is sometimes tempted
sickness as required bodily medicine, or else she felt her-
by means of deeds, to test his ability or knowledge or will
self suddenly cured by God.
to uphold or oppose those same deeds.
Whether it is a sin to tempt God?
IIa IIae q. 97 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not a sin to tempt I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), to tempt a per-God. For God has not commanded sin. Yet He has com-
son is to put him to a test. Now one never tests that of
manded men to try, which is the same as to tempt, Him:
which one is certain. Wherefore all temptation proceeds
for it is written (Malach. 3:10): “Bring all the tithes into
from some ignorance or doubt, either in the tempter (as
the storehouse, that there may be meat in My house; and
when one tests a thing in order to know its qualities), or
try Me in this, saith the Lord, if I open not unto you the
in others (as when one tests a thing in order to prove it
flood-gates of heaven.” Therefore it seems not to be a sin
to others), and in this latter way God is said to tempt us.
to tempt God.
Now it is a sin to be ignorant of or to doubt that which
Objection 2. Further, a man is tempted not only in
pertains to God’s perfection. Wherefore it is evident that
order to test his knowledge and his power, but also to try
it is a sin to tempt God in order that the tempter himself
his goodness or his will. Now it is lawful to test the di-
may know God’s power.
vine goodness or will, for it is written (Ps. 33:9): “O taste
On the other hand, if one were to test that which per-
and see that the Lord is sweet,” and (Rom. 12:2): “That
tains to the divine perfection, not in order to know it one-
you may prove what is the good, and the acceptable, and
self, but to prove it to others: this is not tempting God,
the perfect will of God.” Therefore it is not a sin to tempt
provided there be just motive of urgency, or a pious mo-
God.
tive of usefulness, and other requisite conditions. For thus
Objection 3. Further, Scripture never blames a man
did the apostles ask the Lord that signs might be wrought
for ceasing from sin, but rather for committing a sin. Now
in the name of Jesus Christ, as related in Acts 4:30, in or-
Achaz is blamed because when the Lord said: “Ask thee a
der, to wit, that Christ’s power might be made manifest to
sign of the Lord thy God,” he replied: “I will not ask, and
unbelievers.
I will not tempt the Lord,” and then it was said to him: “Is
Reply to Objection 1. The paying of tithes was pre-
it a small thing for you to be grievous to men, that you are
scribed in the Law, as stated above (q. 87, a. 1). Hence
grievous to my God also?” (Is. 7:11-13). And we read of
there was a motive of urgency to pay it, through the obli-
Abraham (Gn. 15:8) that he said to the Lord: “Whereby
gation of the Law, and also a motive of usefulness, as
may I know that I shall possess it?” namely, the land
stated in the text quoted—“that there may be meat in
which God had promised him. Again Gedeon asked God
God’s house”: wherefore they did not tempt God by pay-
for a sign of the victory promised to him (Judges 6:36,
ing tithes. The words that follow, “and try Me,” are not to
sqq.). Yet they were not blamed for so doing. Therefore it
be understood causally, as though they had to pay tithes
is not a sin to tempt God.
in order to try if “God would open the flood-gates of
On the contrary, It is forbidden in God’s Law, for it
heaven,” but consecutively, because, to wit, if they paid
is written (Dt. 6:10): “Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy
tithes, they would prove by experience the favors which
God.”
God would shower upon them.
1656
Reply to Objection 2. There is a twofold knowledge him to do so, and because it was a matter relating to the
of God’s goodness or will. One is speculative and as to
common good. Abraham asked for a sign through the
this it is not lawful to doubt or to prove whether God’s will
divine instinct, and so he did not sin. Gedeon seems to
be good, or whether God is sweet. The other knowledge
have asked a sign through weakness of faith, wherefore
of God’s will or goodness is effective or experimental and
he is not to be excused from sin, as a gloss observes:
thereby a man experiences in himself the taste of God’s
just as Zachary sinned in saying to the angel (Lk. 1:18):
sweetness, and complacency in God’s will, as Dionysius
“Whereby shall I know this?” so that he was punished for
says of Hierotheos (Div. Nom. ii) that “he learnt divine
his unbelief.
thing through experience of them.” It is in this way that we
It must be observed, however, that there are two ways
are told to prove God’s will, and to taste His sweetness.
of asking God for a sign: first in order to test God’s power
Reply to Objection 3. God wished to give a sign to
or the truth of His word, and this of its very nature per-
Achaz, not for him alone, but for the instruction of the
tains to the temptation of God. Secondly, in order to be
whole people. Hence he was reproved because, by re-
instructed as to what is God’s pleasure in some particular
fusing to ask a sign, he was an obstacle to the common
matter; and this nowise comes under the head of tempta-
welfare. Nor would he have tempted God by asking, both
tion of God.
because he would have asked through God commanding
Whether temptation of God is opposed to the virtue of religion?
IIa IIae q. 97 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the temptation of God
opposed to religion. Now it is evident that to tempt a per-
is not opposed to the virtue of religion. The temptation of
son pertains to irreverence for him: since no one presumes
God is sinful, because a man doubts God, as stated above
to tempt one of whose excellence he is sure. Hence it is
(a. 2). Now doubt about God comes under the head of un-
manifest that to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion.
belief, which is opposed to faith. Therefore temptation of
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 81, a. 7), it
God is opposed to faith rather than to religion.
belongs to religion to declare one’s faith by certain signs
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 18:23):
indicative of reverence towards God. Consequently it be-
“Before prayer prepare thy soul, and be not as a man that
longs to irreligion that, through doubtful faith, a man does
tempteth God. Such a man,” that is, who tempts God,
things indicative of irreverence towards God. To tempt
says the interlinear gloss, “prays for what God taught him
God is one of these; wherefore it is a species of irreligion.
to pray for, yet does not what God has commanded him to
Reply to Objection 2. He that prepares not his soul
do.” Now this pertains to imprudence which is opposed to
before prayer by forgiving those against whom he has any-
hope. Therefore it seems that temptation of God is a sin
thing, or in some other way disposing himself to devotion,
opposed to hope.
does not do what he can to be heard by God, wherefore he
Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Ps. 77:18, “And they
tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this im-
tempted God in their hearts,” says that “to tempt God is to
plicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption
pray to Him deceitfully, with simplicity in our words and
or indiscretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves pre-
wickedness in our hearts.” Now deceit is opposed to the
sumptuously and without due care in matters relating to
virtue of truth. Therefore temptation of God is opposed,
God implies irreverence towards Him. For it is written
not to religion, but to truth.
(1 Pet. 5:6): “Be you humbled. . . under the mighty hand
On the contrary, According to the gloss quoted above
of God,” and (2 Tim. 2:15): “Carefully study to present
“to tempt God is to pray to Him inordinately.” Now to
thyself approved unto God.” Therefore also this kind of
pray to God becomingly is an act of religion as stated
temptation is a species of irreligion.
above (q. 83, a. 15). Therefore to tempt God is a sin op-
Reply to Objection 3. A man is said to pray deceit-
posed to religion.
fully, not in relation to God, Who knows the secrets of the
I answer that, As clearly shown above (q. 81, a. 5),
heart, but in relation to man. Wherefore deceit is acciden-
the end of religion is to pay reverence to God. Where-
tal to the temptation of God, and consequently it does not
fore whatever pertains directly to irreverence for God is
follow that to tempt God is directly opposed to the truth.
1657
Whether the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition?
IIa IIae q. 97 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the temptation of God
more grievous is that which is the more opposed to the
is a graver sin than superstition. The greater sin receives
reverence due to God. Now it is less opposed to this rev-
the greater punishment. Now the sin of tempting God was
erence that one should doubt the divine excellence than
more severely punished in the Jews than was the sin of
that one should hold the contrary for certain. For just as
idolatry; and yet the latter is the chief form of superstition: a man is more of an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his
since for the sin of idolatry three thousand men of their
error, than if he doubt the truth of faith, so, too, a man acts number were slain, as related in Ex. 32:28∗, whereas for
more against the reverence due to God, if by his deeds he
the sin of temptation they all without exception perished
professes an error contrary to the divine excellence, than
in the desert, and entered not into the land of promise,
if he expresses a doubt. Now the superstitious man pro-
according to Ps. 94:9, “Your fathers tempted Me,” and
fesses an error, as shown above (q. 94, a. 1, ad 1), whereas
further on, “so I swore in My wrath that they should not
he who tempts God by words or deeds expresses a doubt
enter into My rest.” Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin
of the divine excellence, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore
than superstition.
the sin of superstition is graver than the sin of tempting
Objection 2. Further, the more a sin is opposed to
God.
virtue the graver it would seem to be. Now irreligion,
Reply to Objection 1. The sin of idolatry was not
of which the temptation of God is a species, is more op-
punished in the above manner, as though it were a suffi-
posed to the virtue of religion, than superstition which
cient punishment; because a more severe punishment was
bears some likeness to religion. Therefore to tempt God
reserved in the future for that sin, for it is written (Ex.
is a graver sin than superstition.
32:34): “And I, in the day of revenge, will visit this sin
Objection 3. Further, it seems to be a greater sin to
also of theirs.”
behave disrespectfully to one’s parents, than to pay others
Reply to Objection 2. Superstition bears a likeness to
the respect we owe to our parents. Now God should be
religion, as regards the material act which it pays just as
honored by us as the Father of all (Malach. 1:6). There-
religion does. But, as regards the end, it is more contrary
fore. temptation of God whereby we behave irreverently
to religion than the temptation of God, since it implies
to God, seems to be a greater sin than idolatry, whereby
greater irreverence for God, as stated.
we give to a creature the honor we owe to God.
Reply to Objection 3. It belongs essentially to the
On the contrary, A gloss on Dt. 17:2, “When there
divine excellence that it is singular and incommunicable.
shall be found among you,” etc. says: “The Law detests
Consequently to give divine reverence to another is the
error and idolatry above all: for it is a very great sin to
same as to do a thing opposed to the divine excellence.
give to a creature the honor that belongs to the Creator.”
There is no comparison with the honor due to our parents,
I answer that, Among sins opposed to religion, the
which can without sin be given to others.
∗ Septuagint version. The Vulgate has “twenty-three thousand.”
1658
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 98
Of Perjury
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider perjury: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether falsehood is necessary for perjury?
(2) Whether perjury is always a sin?
(3) Whether it is always a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer?
Whether it is necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false?
IIa IIae q. 98 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not necessary
from falsehood. Consequently falsehood is essential to
for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false.
perjury.
As stated above (q. 89, a. 3), an oath should be accompa-
Reply to Objection 1. As Jerome says on Jer. 4:2,
nied by judgment and justice no less than by truth. Since
“whichever of these three be lacking, there is perjury,”
therefore perjury is incurred through lack of truth, it is
but in different order. For first and chiefly perjury con-
incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as when one
sists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated in the Article.
swears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, as when
Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for in
one swears to something unjust.
whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for
Objection 2. Further, that which confirms is more
this very reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under
weighty than the thing confirmed thereby: thus in a syllo-
an obligation to do the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury
gism the premises are more weighty than the conclusion.
when judgment is lacking, since by the very fact that a
Now in an oath a man’s statement is confirmed by calling
man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the danger of lapsing
on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to consist
into falsehood.
in swearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in
Reply to Objection 2. In syllogisms the premises are
the human statement which is confirmed on oath.
of greater weight, since they are in the position of active
Objection 3.
Further, Augustine says (De Verb.
principle, as stated in Phys. ii, 3: whereas in moral matters
Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): “Men swear falsely both in
the end is of greater importance than the active principle.
deceiving others and when they are deceived themselves”;
Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man swears to
and he gives three examples. The first is: “Supposing
the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from
a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true,
that kind of perversity in an oath, that deprives the oath of
whereas it is false”; the second is: “Take the instance of
its end, by swearing what is false.
another who knows the statement to be false, and swears
Reply to Objection 3. Moral acts proceed from the
to it as though it were true”; and the third is: “Take an-
will, whose object is the apprehended good. Wherefore
other, who thinks his statement false, and swears to its
if the false be apprehended as true, it will be materially
being true, while perhaps it is true,” of whom he says af-
false, but formally true, as related to the will. If some-
terwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore one may be a
thing false be apprehended as false, it will be false both
perjurer while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood
materially and formally. If that which is true be appre-
is not necessary for perjury.
hended as false, it will be materially true, and formally
On the contrary, Perjury is defined “a falsehood con-
false. Hence in each of these cases the conditions required
firmed by oath”∗.
for perjury are to be found in some way, on account of
I answer that, As stated above (q. 92, a. 2), moral acts some measure of falsehood. Since, however, that which
take their species from their end. Now the end of an oath
is formal in anything is of greater importance than that
is the confirmation of a human assertion. To this confirma-
which is material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking
tion falsehood is opposed: since an assertion is confirmed
it true is not so much of a perjurer as he that swears to
by being firmly shown to be true; and this cannot happen
the truth thinking it false. For Augustine says (De Verb.
to that which is false. Hence falsehood directly annuls
Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): “It depends how the asser-
the end of an oath: and for this reason, that perversity in
tion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is not guilty
swearing, which is called perjury, takes its species chiefly
except the mind be guilty.”
∗ Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. iv, 5
1659
Whether all perjury is sinful?
IIa IIae q. 98 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that not all perjury is sin-
to call Him to witness to a falsehood, because by so doing
ful. Whoever does not fulfil what he has confirmed on
one implies either that God ignores the truth or that He is
oath is seemingly a perjurer. Yet sometimes a man swears
willing to bear witness to a falsehood. Therefore perjury
he will do something unlawful (adultery, for instance, or
is manifestly a sin opposed to religion, to which it belongs
murder): and if he does it, he commits a sin. If there-
to show reverence to God.
fore he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it would
Reply to Objection 1. He that swears to do what is
follow that he is perplexed.
unlawful is thereby guilty of perjury through lack of jus-
Objection 2. Further, no man sins by doing what is
tice: though, if he fails to keep his oath, he is not guilty
best. Yet sometimes by committing a perjury one does
of perjury in this respect, since that which he swore to do
what is best: as when a man swears not to enter religion,
was not a fit matter of an oath.
or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore not all
Reply to Objection 2. A person who swears not to
perjury is sinful.
enter religion, or not to give an alms, or the like, is guilty
Objection 3. Further, he that swears to do another’s
of perjury through lack of judgment. Hence when he does
will would seem to be guilty of perjury unless he do it.
that which is best it is not an act of perjury, but contrary
Yet it may happen sometimes that he sins not, if he do not
thereto: for the contrary of that which he is doing could
the man’s will: for instance, if the latter order him to do
not be a matter of an oath.
something too hard and unbearable. Therefore seemingly
Reply to Objection 3.
When one man swears or
not all perjury is sinful.
promises to do another’s will, there is to be understood
Objection 4. Further, a promissory oath extends to fu-
this requisite condition—that the thing commanded be
ture, just as a declaratory oath extends to past and present
lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or immoderate.
things. Now the obligation of an oath may be removed
Reply to Objection 4. An oath is a personal act, and
by some future occurrence: thus a state may swear to ful-
so when a man becomes a citizen of a state, he is not
fil some obligation, and afterwards other citizens come
bound, as by oath, to fulfil whatever the state has sworn
on the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may
to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of fidelity, the nature
swear to keep the statutes of a certain church, and after-
of which obligation is that he should take his share of the
wards new statutes are made. Therefore seemingly he that
state’s burdens if he takes a share of its goods.
breaks an oath does not sin.
The canon who swears to keep the statutes that have
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost.
force in some particular “college” is not bound by his oath
Jacobi; Serm. cxxx), in speaking of perjury: “See how
to keep any that may be made in the future, unless he in-
you should detest this horrible beast and exterminate it
tends to bind himself to keep all, past and future. Never-
from all human business.”
theless he is bound to keep them by virtue of the statutes
I answer that, As stated above (q. 89, a. 1), to swear
themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force, as
is to call God as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God
stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 96, a. 4).
Whether all perjury is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 98 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that not all perjury is a
thing to swear by God than by the Gospels.” Now it is not
mortal sin. It is laid down (Extra, De Jurejur, cap. Verum):
always a mortal sin to swear by God to something false;
“Referring to the question whether an oath is binding on
for instance, if we were to employ such an oath in fun or
those who have taken one in order to safeguard their life
by a slip of the tongue in the course of an ordinary conver-
and possessions, we have no other mind than that which
sation. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to break
our predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have
an oath that has been taken solemnly on the Gospels.
had, and who absolved such persons from the obligations
Objection 3. Further, according to the Law a man in-
of their oath. Henceforth, that discretion may be observed,
curs infamy through committing perjury (VI, qu. i, cap.
and in order to avoid occasions of perjury, let them not be
Infames). Now it would seem that infamy is not incurred
told expressly not to keep their oath: but if they should
through any kind of perjury, as it is prescribed in the case
not keep it, they are not for this reason to be punished as
of a declaratory oath violated by perjury†. Therefore,
for a mortal sin.” Therefore not all perjury is a mortal sin.
seemingly, not all perjury is a mortal sin.
obj. 2. Further, as Chrysostom∗ says, “it is a greater
On the contrary, Every sin that is contrary to a divine
∗ Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum on St. Matthew, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom
† Cap. Cum dilectus, de Ord. Cognit.
1660
precept is a mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a diment is to be inflicted on them.
vine precept, for it is written (Lev. 19:12): “Thou shalt
Reply to Objection 2. He that swears falsely in fun is
not swear falsely by My name.” Therefore it is a mortal
nonetheless irreverent to God, indeed, in a way, he is more
sin.
so, and consequently is not excused from mortal sin. He
I answer that, According to the teaching of the
that swears falsely by a slip of tongue, if he adverts to the
Philosopher (Poster. i, 2), “that which causes a thing to be
fact that he is swearing, and that he is swearing to some-
such is yet more so.” Now we know that an action which
thing false, is not excused from mortal sin, as neither is
is, by reason of its very nature, a venial sin, or even a good
he excused from contempt of God. If, however, he does
action, is a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt of God.
not advert to this, he would seem to have no intention of
Wherefore any action that of its nature, implies contempt
swearing, and consequently is excused from the sin of per-
of God is a mortal sin. Now perjury, of its very nature
jury.
implies contempt of God, since, as stated above (a. 2), the
It is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly
reason why it is sinful is because it is an act of irreverence
by the Gospels, than to swear by God in ordinary conver-
towards God. Therefore it is manifest that perjury, of its
sation, both on account of scandal and on account of the
very nature, is a mortal sin.
greater deliberation. But if we consider them equally in
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 89, a. 7,
comparison with one another, it is more grievous to com-
ad 3), coercion does not deprive a promissory oath of its
mit perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the
binding force, as regards that which can be done law-
Gospels.
fully. Wherefore he who fails to fulfil an oath which he
Reply to Objection 3. Not every sin makes a man in-
took under coercion is guilty of perjury and sins mortally.
famous in the eye of the law. Wherefore, if a man who
Nevertheless the Sovereign Pontiff can, by his authority,
has sworn falsely in a declaratory oath be not infamous in
absolve a man from an obligation even of an oath, espe-
the eye of the law, but only when he has been so declared
cially if the latter should have been coerced into taking the
by sentence in a court of law, it does not follow that he
oath through such fear as may overcome a high-principled
has not sinned mortally. The reason why the law attaches
man.
infamy rather to one who breaks a promissory oath taken
When, however, it is said that these persons are not to
solemnly is that he still has it in his power after he has
be punished as for a mortal sin, this does not mean that
sworn to substantiate his oath, which is not the case in a
they are not guilty of mortal sin, but that a lesser punish-
declaratory oath.
Whether he sins who demands an oath of a perjurer?
IIa IIae q. 98 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that he who demands an
swear falsely so is it to swear by false gods. Yet it is law-
oath of a perjurer commits a sin. Either he knows that
ful to take advantage of an oath of one who has sworn
he swears truly, or he knows that he swears falsely. If he
by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii).
knows him to swear truly, it is useless for him to demand
Therefore it is lawful to demand an oath from one who
an oath: and if he believes him to swear falsely, for his
swears falsely.
own part he leads him into sin. Therefore nowise seem-
I answer that, As regards a person who demands an
ingly should one enjoin an oath on another person.
oath from another, a distinction would seem to be neces-
Objection 2. Further, to receive an oath from a person
sary. For either he demands the oath on his own account
is less than to impose an oath on him. Now it would seem
and of his own accord, or he demands it on account of
unlawful to receive an oath from a person, especially if
the exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If a man de-
he swear falsely, because he would then seem to consent
mands an oath on his own account as a private individual,
in his sin. Much less therefore would it seem lawful to
we must make a distinction, as does Augustine (de Per-
impose an oath on one who swears falsely.
juriis. serm. clxxx): “For if he knows not that the man
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Lev. 5:1): “If any-
will swear falsely, and says to him accordingly: ‘Swear
one sin, and hear the voice of one swearing falsely∗, and is
to me’ in order that he may be credited, there is no sin:
a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy
yet it is a human temptation” (because, to wit, it proceeds
to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity.” Hence from his weakness in doubting whether the man will speak
it would seem that when a man knows another to be swear-
the truth). “This is the evil whereof Our Lord says (Mat.
ing falsely, he is bound to denounce him. Therefore it is
5:37): That which is over and above these, is of evil. But
not lawful to demand an oath of such a man.
if he knows the man to have done so,” i.e. the contrary
Objection 4. On the other hand, Just as it is a sin to
of what he swears to, “and yet forces him to swear, he is
∗ ‘Falsely’ is not in the Vulgate’
1661
a murderer: for the other destroys himself by his perjury, Lev, qu. i), Moses in the passage quoted did not state to
but it is he who urged the hand of the slayer.”
whom one man had to denounce another’s perjury: where-
If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a pub-
fore it must be understood that the matter had to be de-
lic person, in accordance with the requirements of the law,
nounced “to those who would do the perjurer good rather
on the requisition of a third person: he does not seem to
than harm.” Again, neither did he state in what order
be at fault, if he demands an oath of a person, whether he
the denunciation was to be made: wherefore seemingly
knows that he will swear falsely or truly, because seem-
the Gospel order should be followed, if the sin of perjury
ingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at
should be hidden, especially when it does not tend to an-
whose instance he demands it.
other person’s injury: because if it did, the Gospel order
Reply to Objection 1. This argument avails in the
would not apply to the case, as stated above (q. 33, a. 7;
case of one who demands an oath on his own account. Yet
q. 68, a. 1).
he does not always know that the other will swear truly or
Reply to Objection 4. It is lawful to make use of an
falsely, for at times he has doubts about the fact, and be-
evil for the sake of good, as God does, but it is not lawful
lieves he will swear truly. In such a case he exacts an oath
to lead anyone to do evil. Consequently it is lawful to ac-
in order that he may be more certain.
cept the oath of one who is ready to swear by false gods,
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (ad Public.
but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by false gods.
serm. xlvii), “though we are forbidden to swear, I do not
Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who swears
remember ever to have read in the Holy Scriptures that we
falsely by the true God, because an oath of this kind lacks
must not accept oaths from others.” Hence he that accepts
the good of faith, which a man makes use of in the oath
an oath does not sin, except perchance when of his own
of one who swears truly by false gods, as Augustine says
accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will
(ad Public. Ep. xlvii). Hence when a man swears falsely
swear falsely.
by the true God his oath seems to lack any good that one
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (QQ. Super
may use lawfully.
1662
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 99
Of Sacrilege
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion, whereby sacred things are treated with irreverence.
We shall consider (1) Sacrilege; (2) Simony.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is sacrilege?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) Of the species of sacrilege;
(4) Of the punishment of sacrilege.
Whether sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing?
IIa IIae q. 99 a. 1
Objection 1.
It would seem that sacrilege is not
fore whatever pertains to irreverence for sacred things is
the violation of a sacred thing. It is stated (XVII, qu.
an injury to God, and comes under the head of sacrilege.
iv∗): “They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about the
Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher
sovereign’s decision, and doubt whether the person cho-
(Ethic. i, 2) the common good of the nation is a divine
sen by the sovereign be worthy of honor.” Now this seems
thing, wherefore in olden times the rulers of a common-
to have no connection with anything sacred. Therefore
wealth were called divines, as being the ministers of di-
sacrilege does not denote the violation of something sa-
vine providence, according to Wis. 6:5, “Being minis-
cred.
ters of His kingdom, you have not judged rightly.” Hence
Objection 2. Further, it is stated further on† that if any by an extension of the term, whatever savors of irrever-man shall allow the Jews to hold public offices, “he must
ence for the sovereign, such as disputing his judgment,
be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege.” Yet pub-
and questioning whether one ought to follow it, is called
lic offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. There-
sacrilege by a kind of likeness.
fore it seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation
Reply to Objection 2. Christians are sanctified by
of a sacred thing.
faith and the sacraments of Christ, according to 1 Cor.
Objection 3. Further, God’s power is greater than
6:11, “But you are washed, but you are sanctified.”
man’s. Now sacred things receive their sacred character
Wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 2:9): “You are a chosen
from God. Therefore they cannot be violated by man: and
generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased
so a sacrilege would not seem to be the violation of a sa-
people.” Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian
cred thing.
people, for instance that unbelievers should be put in au-
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that “a man
thority over it, is an irreverence for a sacred thing, and is
is said to be sacrilegious because he selects,” i.e. steals,
reasonably called a sacrilege.
“sacred things.”
Reply to Objection 3. Violation here means any kind
I answer that, As stated above (q. 81, a. 5; Ia IIae,
of irreverence or dishonor. Now as “honor is in the person
q. 101, a. 4), a thing is called “sacred” through being de-
who honors and not in the one who is honored” (Ethic. i,
puted to the divine worship. Now just as a thing acquires
5), so again irreverence is in the person who behaves ir-
an aspect of good through being deputed to a good end, so
reverently even though he do no harm to the object of his
does a thing assume a divine character through being de-
irreverence. Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates the
puted to the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence
sacred thing, though the latter be not violated in itself.
is due to it, which reverence is referred to God. There-
Whether sacrilege is a special sin?
IIa IIae q. 99 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that sacrilege not a special
in every sin, because sin is “a word, deed or desire con-
sin. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv) “They are guilty of sacrilege
trary to the law of God,” according to Augustine (Contra
who through ignorance sin against the sanctity of the law,
Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general sin.
violate and defile it by their negligence.” But this is done
Objection 2. Further, no special sin is comprised un-
∗ Append. Gratian, on can. Si quis suadente
† Append. Gratian, on
can. Constituit.
1663
der different kinds of sin. Now sacrilege comprised under Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 3), “When the purple has
different kinds of sin, for instance under murder, if one
been made into a royal robe, we pay it honor and homage,
kill a priest under lust, as the violation of a consecrate vir-
and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned to death,” as
gin, or of any woman in a sacred place under theft, if one
acting against the king: and in the same way if a man vio-
steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not a special
late a sacred thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to
sin.
the reverence due to God and consequently he is guilty of
Objection 3. Further, every special sin is to found
irreligion.
apart from other sins as the Philosopher states, in speak-
Reply to Objection 1. Those are said to sin against
ing of special justice (Ethic. v, 11). But, seemingly, sac-
the sanctity of the divine law who assail God’s law, as
rilege is not to be found apart from other sins; for it is
heretics and blasphemers do. These are guilty of unbelief,
sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as stated
through not believing in God; and of sacrilege, through
in the preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special
perverting the words of the divine law.
sin.
Reply to Objection 2. Nothing prevents one specific
On the contrary, That which is opposed to a special
kind of sin being found in various generic kinds of sin,
virtue is a special sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special
inasmuch as various sins are directed to the end of one
virtue, namely religion, to which it belongs to reverence
sin, just as happens in the case of virtues commanded by
God and divine things. Therefore sacrilege is a special
one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin a man acts
sin.
counter to reverence due to sacred things, he commits a
I answer that, Wherever we find a special aspect of
sacrilege formally; although his act contains various kinds
deformity, there must needs be a special sin; because the
of sin materially.
species of a thing is derived chiefly from its formal as-
Reply to Objection 3. Sacrilege is sometimes found
pect, and not from its matter or subject. Now in sacrilege
apart from other sins, through its act having no other de-
we find a special aspect of deformity, namely, the viola-
formity than the violation of a sacred thing: for instance,
tion of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently. Hence it
if a judge were to take a person from a sacred place for he
is a special sin.
might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere.
Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to
Whether the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things?
IIa IIae q. 99 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the species of sacri-
by their objects. Now the sacred thing is the object of
lege are not distinguished according to the sacred things.
sacrilege, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore the species of
Material diversity does not differentiate species, if the for-
sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things.
mal aspect remains the same. Now there would seem to
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the sin of sacri-
be the same formal aspect of sin in all violations of sa-
lege consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing.
cred things, and that the only difference is one of matter.
Now reverence is due to a sacred thing by reason of its
Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished
holiness: and consequently the species of sacrilege must
thereby.
needs be distinguished according to the different aspects
Objection 2. Further, it does not seem possible that
of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated irrever-
things belonging to the same species should at the same
ently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred
time differ specifically. Now murder, theft, and unlawful
thing that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacri-
intercourse, are different species of sin. Therefore they
lege.
cannot belong to the one same species of sacrilege: and
Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons,
consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege are dis-
namely, those who are consecrated to the divine worship,
tinguished in accordance with the species of other sins,
but also to sacred places and to certain other sacred things.
and not according to the various sacred things.
And the holiness of a place is directed to the holiness of
Objection 3. Further, among sacred things sacred per-
man, who worships God in a holy place. For it is written
sons are reckoned. If, therefore, one species of sacrilege
(2 Macc. 5:19): “God did not choose the people for the
arises from the violation of a sacred person, it would fol-
place’s sake, but the place for the people’s sake.” Hence
low that every sin committed by a sacred person is a sac-
sacrilege committed against a sacred person is a graver sin
rilege, since every sin violates the person of the sinner.
than that which is committed against a sacred place. Yet
Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned ac-
in either species there are various degrees of sacrilege, ac-
cording to the sacred things.
cording to differences of sacred persons and places.
On the contrary, Acts and habits are distinguished
In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which
1664
is committed against other sacred things, has various difference.
degrees, according to the differences of sacred things.
Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders two things
Among these the highest place belongs to the sacraments
from belonging to one species in one respect, and to
whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the sacrament
different species in another respect. Thus Socrates and
of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore
Plato belong to the one species, “animal,” but differ in
the sacrilege that is committed against this sacrament is
the species “colored thing,” if one be white and the other
the gravest of all. The second place, after the sacraments,
black. In like manner it is possible for two sins to differ
belongs to the vessels consecrated for the administration
specifically as to their material acts, and to belong to the
of the sacraments; also sacred images, and the relics of the
same species as regards the one formal aspect of sacri-
saints, wherein the very persons of the saints, so to speak,
lege: for instance, the violation of a nun by blows or by
are reverenced and honored. After these come things con-
copulation.
nected with the apparel of the Church and its ministers;
Reply to Objection 3. Every sin committed by a sa-
and those things, whether movable or immovable, that are
cred person is a sacrilege materially and accidentally as it
deputed to the upkeep of the ministers. And whoever sins
were. Hence Jerome∗ says that “a trifle on a priest’s lips
against any one of the aforesaid incurs the crime of sacri-
is a sacrilege or a blasphemy.” But formally and properly
lege.
speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacri-
Reply to Objection 1. There is not the same aspect
lege only when it is committed against his holiness, for
of holiness in all the aforesaid: wherefore the diversity
instance if a virgin consecrated to God be guilty of forni-
of sacred things is not only a material, but also a formal
cation: and the same is to be said of other instances.
Whether the punishment of sacrilege should be pecuniary?
IIa IIae q. 99 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the punishment of
neth by the same. . . he may be tormented” (Wis. 11:17).
sacrilege should not be pecuniary. A pecuniary punish-
In this respect the fitting punishment of one guilty of sac-
ment is not wont to be inflicted for a criminal fault. But
rilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred thing, is
sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it is punished by
excommunication§ whereby sacred things are withheld
capital sentence according to civil law†. Therefore sacri-
from him. The second point to be considered is utility.
lege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.
For punishments are inflicted as medicines, that men be-
Objection 2. Further, the same sin should not receive
ing deterred thereby may desist from sin. Now it would
a double punishment, according to Nahum 1:9, “There
seem that the sacrilegious man, who reverences not sacred
shall not rise a double affliction.” But sacrilege is pun-
things, is not sufficiently deterred from sinning by sacred
ished with excommunication; major excommunication,
things being withheld from him, since he has no care for
for violating a sacred person, and for burning or destroy-
them. Wherefore according to human laws he is sentenced
ing a church, and minor excommunication for other sacri-
to capital punishment, and according to the statutes of the
leges. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecu-
Church, which does not inflict the death of the body, a pe-
niary punishment.
cuniary punishment is inflicted, in order that men may be
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:5):
deterred from sacrilege, at least by temporal punishments.
“Neither have we taken an occasion of covetousness.” But
Reply to Objection 1. The Church inflicts not the
it seems to involve an occasion of covetousness that a pe-
death of the body, but excommunication in its stead.
cuniary punishment should be exacted for the violation of
Reply to Objection 2. When one punishment is not
a sacred thing. Therefore this does not seem to be a fitting
sufficient to deter a man from sin, a double punishment
punishment of sacrilege.
must be inflicted. Wherefore it was necessary to inflict
On the contrary, It is written‡: “If anyone contuma-
some kind of temporal punishment in addition to the pun-
ciously or arrogantly take away by force an escaped slave
ishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those
from the confines of a church he shall pay nine hundred
who despise spiritual things.
soldi”: and again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis
Reply to Objection 3. If money were exacted with-
inventus, can. 21): “Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege
out a reasonable cause, this would seem to involve an oc-
shall pay thirty pounds of tried purest silver.”
casion of covetousness. But when it is exacted for the
I answer that, In the award of punishments two points
purpose of man’s correction, it has a manifest utility, and
must be considered. First equality, in order that the pun-
consequently involves no occasion of avarice.
ishment may be just, and that “by what things a man sin-
∗ The quotation is from St. Bernard, De Consideration, ii, 13
† Dig. xlviii, 13; Cod. i, 3, de Episc. et Cleric.
‡ XVII, qu. iv, can. Si quis
contumax
§ Append. Gratian. on can. Si quis contumax, quoted above
1665
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 100
On Simony
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider simony, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) What is simony?
(2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments?
(3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions?
(4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals?
(5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man guilty of simony, or also oral remuneration or remuneration by service?
(6) Of the punishment of simony.
Whether simony is an intentional will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected IIa IIae q. 100 a. 1
with a spiritual thing?
Objection 1. It would seem that simony is not “an ex-
simony is defined insufficiently.
press will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected
Objection 6. Further, anything connected with spiri-
with a spiritual thing.” Simony is heresy, since it is writ-
tual things is itself spiritual. Therefore it is superfluous to ten (I, qu. i∗): “The impious heresy of Macedonius and
add “or connected with spiritual things.”
of those who with him impugned the Holy Ghost, is more
Objection 7. Further, according to some, the Pope
endurable than that of those who are guilty of simony:
cannot commit simony: yet he can buy or sell something
since the former in their ravings maintained that the Holy
spiritual. Therefore simony is not the will to buy or sell
Spirit of Father and Son is a creature and the slave of God,
something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing.
whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their
On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Regist.‡): “None
own slave. For every master sells what he has just as he
of the faithful is ignorant that buying or selling altars,
wills, whether it be his slave or any other of his posses-
tithes, or the Holy Ghost is the heresy of simony.”
sions.” But unbelief, like faith, is an act not of the will but I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 2)
of the intellect, as shown above (q. 10, a. 2). Therefore
an act is evil generically when it bears on undue matter.
simony should not be defined as an act of the will.
Now a spiritual thing is undue matter for buying and sell-
Objection 2. Further, to sin intentionally is to sin
ing for three reasons. First, because a spiritual thing can-
through malice, and this is to sin against the Holy Ghost.
not be appraised at any earthly price, even as it is said
Therefore, if simony is an intentional will to sin, it would
concerning wisdom (Prov. 3:15), “she is more precious
seem that it is always a sin against the Holy Ghost.
than all riches, and all things that are desired, are not to
Objection 3. Further, nothing is more spiritual than
be compared with her”: and for this reason Peter, in con-
the kingdom of heaven. But it is lawful to buy the king-
demning the wickedness of Simon in its very source, said
dom of heaven: for Gregory says in a homily (v, in Ev.):
(Acts 8:20): “Keep thy money to thyself to perish with
“The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you pos-
thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may
sess.” Therefore simony does not consist in a will to buy
be purchased with money.”
something spiritual.
Secondly, because a thing cannot be due matter for
Objection 4. Further, simony takes its name from Si-
sale if the vendor is not the owner thereof, as appears from
mon the magician, of whom we read (Acts 8:18,19) that
the authority quoted (obj. 1). Now ecclesiastical superiors
“he offered the apostles money” that he might buy a spir-
are not owners, but dispensers of spiritual things, accord-
itual power, in order, to wit, “that on whomsoever he im-
ing to 1 Cor. 4:1, “Let a man so account of us as of the
posed his hand they might receive the Holy Ghost.” But
ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the ministers of
we do not read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore
God.”
simony is not the will to sell a spiritual thing.
Thirdly, because sale is opposed to the source of spir-
Objection 5. Further, there are many other volun-
itual things, since they flow from the gratuitous will of
tary commutations besides buying and selling, such as ex-
God. Wherefore Our Lord said (Mat. 10:8): “Freely have
change and transaction†. Therefore it would seem that
you received, freely give.”
∗ Can. Eos qui per pecunias. † A kind of legal compromise—Oxford Dictionary
‡ Caus. I, qu. i, can. Presbyter, qu. iii, can. Altare
1666
Therefore by buying or selling a spiritual thing, a man buy a spiritual power in order that afterwards he might sell
treats God and divine things with irreverence, and conse-
it. For it is written (I, qu. iii∗), that “Simon the magician
quently commits a sin of irreligion.
wished to buy the gift of the Holy Ghost, in order that he
Reply to Objection 1. Just as religion consists in a
might make money by selling the signs to be wrought by
kind of protestation of faith, without, sometimes, faith be-
him.” Hence those who sell spiritual things are likened in
ing in one’s heart, so too the vices opposed to religion
intention to Simon the magician: while those who wish
include a certain protestation of unbelief without, some-
to buy them are likened to him in act. Those who sell
times, unbelief being in the mind. Accordingly simony is
them imitate, in act, Giezi the disciple of Eliseus, of whom
said to be a “heresy,” as regards the outward protestation,
we read (4 Kings 5:20-24) that he received money from
since by selling a gift of the Holy Ghost a man declares,
the leper who was healed: wherefore the sellers of spir-
in a way, that he is the owner of a spiritual gift; and this is itual things may be called not only “simoniacs” but also
heretical. It must, however, be observed that Simon Ma-
“giezites.”
gus, besides wishing the apostles to sell him a grace of
Reply to Objection 5. The terms “buying” and “sell-
the Holy Ghost for money, said that the world was not
ing” cover all kinds of non-gratuitous contracts. Where-
created by God, but by some heavenly power, as Isidore
fore it is impossible for the exchange or agency of
states (Etym. viii, 5): and so for this reason simoniacs are
prebends or ecclesiastical benefices to be made by author-
reckoned with other heretics, as appears from Augustine’s
ity of the parties concerned without danger of committing
book on heretics.
simony, as laid down by law†. Nevertheless the superior,
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 58, a. 4),
in virtue of his office, can cause these exchanges to be
justice, with all its parts, and consequently all the oppo-
made for useful or necessary reasons.
site vices, is in the will as its subject. Hence simony is
Reply to Objection 6. Even as the soul lives by itself,
fittingly defined from its relation to the will. This act is
while the body lives through being united to the soul; so,
furthermore described as “express,” in order to signify that
too, certain things are spiritual by themselves, such as the
it proceeds from choice, which takes the principal part in
sacraments and the like, while others are called spiritual,
virtue and vice. Nor does everyone sin against the Holy
through adhering to those others. Hence (I, qu. iii, cap.
Ghost that sins from choice, but only he who chooses sin
Siquis objecerit) it is stated that “spiritual things do not
through contempt of those things whereby man is wont to
progress without corporal things, even as the soul has no
be withdrawn from sin, as stated above (q. 14, a. 1).
bodily life without the body.”
Reply to Objection 3. The kingdom of heaven is said
Reply to Objection 7. The Pope can be guilty of the
to be bought when a man gives what he has for God’s
vice of simony, like any other man, since the higher a
sake. But this is to employ the term “buying” in a wide
man’s position the more grievous is his sin. For although
sense, and as synonymous with merit: nor does it reach to
the possessions of the Church belong to him as dispenser
the perfect signification of buying, both because neither
in chief, they are not his as master and owner. Therefore,
“the sufferings of this time,” nor any gift or deed of ours,
were he to accept money from the income of any church
“are worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that
in exchange for a spiritual thing, he would not escape be-
shall be revealed in us” (Rom. 8:18), and because merit
ing guilty of the vice of simony. In like manner he might
consists chiefly, not in an outward gift, action or passion,
commit simony by accepting from a layman moneys not
but in an inward affection.
belonging to the goods of the Church.
Reply to Objection 4. Simon the magician wished to
Whether it is always unlawful to give money for the sacraments?
IIa IIae q. 100 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not always un-
priests receive a prebend or money for singing masses.
lawful to give money for the sacraments. Baptism is the
Much more therefore is it lawful to buy or sell the other
door of the sacraments, as we shall state in the IIIa, q. 68,
sacraments.
a. 6; IIIa, q. 73, a. 3. But seemingly it is lawful in cer-
Objection 3. Further, the sacrament of Penance is a
tain cases to give money for Baptism, for instance if a
necessary sacrament consisting chiefly in the absolution.
priest were unwilling to baptize a dying child without be-
But some persons demand money when absolving from
ing paid. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell
excommunication. Therefore it is not always unlawful to
the sacraments.
buy or sell a sacrament.
Objection 2. Further, the greatest of the sacraments is
Objection 4. Further, custom makes that which oth-
the Eucharist, which is consecrated in the Mass. But some
erwise were sinful to be not sinful; thus Augustine says
∗ Can. Salvator
† Cap. Quaesitum, de rerum Permutat.; cap. Super,
de Transact.
1667
(Contra Faust. xxii, 47) that “it was no crime to have sev-the water from the priest, because it is merely a bodily
eral wives, so long as it was the custom.” Now it is the
element. But if it were an adult in danger of death that
custom in some places to give something in the conse-
wished to be baptized, and the priest were unwilling to
cration of bishops, blessings of abbots, ordinations of the
baptize him without being paid, he ought, if possible, to
clergy, in exchange for the chrism, holy oil, and so forth.
be baptized by someone else. And if he is unable to have
Therefore it would seem that it is not unlawful.
recourse to another, he must by no means pay a price for
Objection 5.
Further, it happens sometimes that
Baptism, and should rather die without being baptized,
someone maliciously hinders a person from obtaining a
because for him the baptism of desire would supply the
bishopric or some like dignity. But it is lawful for a man
lack of the sacrament.
to make good his grievance. Therefore it is lawful, seem-
Reply to Objection 2. The priest receives money, not
ingly, in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a
as the price for consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing
like ecclesiastical dignity.
the Mass (for this would be simoniacal), but as payment
Objection 6. Further, marriage is a sacrament. But
for his livelihood, as stated above.
sometimes money is given for marriage. Therefore it is
Reply to Objection 3. The money exacted of the per-
lawful to sell a sacrament.
son absolved is not the price of his absolution (for this
On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i∗): “Whosoever
would be simoniacal), but a punishment of a past crime
shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from
for which he was excommunicated.
the priesthood.”
Reply to Objection 4. As stated above, “custom does
I answer that, The sacraments of the New Law are of
not prevail over natural or divine law” whereby simony is
all things most spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of
forbidden. Wherefore the custom, if such there be, of de-
spiritual grace, on which no price can be set, and which
manding anything as the price of a spiritual thing, with the
is essentially incompatible with a non-gratuitous giving.
intention of buying or selling it, is manifestly simoniacal,
Now the sacraments are dispensed through the ministers
especially when the demand is made of a person unwill-
of the Church, whom the people are bound to support, ac-
ing to pay. But if the demand be made in payment of a
cording to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:13), “Know
stipend recognized by custom it is not simoniacal, pro-
you not, that they who work in the holy place, eat the
vided there be no intention of buying or selling, but only
things that are of the holy place; and they that serve the
of doing what is customary, and especially if the demand
altar, partake with the altar?”
be acceded to voluntarily. In all these cases, however, one
Accordingly we must answer that to receive money for
must beware of anything having an appearance of simony
the spiritual grace of the sacraments, is the sin of simony,
or avarice, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Thess.
which cannot be excused by any custom whatever, since
5:22), “From all appearance of evil restrain yourselves.”
“custom does not prevail over natural or divine law”†.
Reply to Objection 5. It would be simoniacal to buy
Now by money we are to understand anything that has
off the opposition of one’s rivals, before acquiring the
a pecuniary value, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 1).
right to a bishopric or any dignity or prebend, by elec-
On the other hand, to receive anything for the support of
tion, appointment or presentation, since this would be to
those who administer the sacraments, in accordance with
use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual thing. But
the statutes of the Church and approved customs, is not
it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust
simony, nor is it a sin. For it is received not as a price of
opposition, after one has already acquired that right.
goods, but as a payment for their need. Hence a gloss of
Reply to Objection 6. Some‡ say that it is lawful to
Augustine on 1 Tim. 5:17, “Let the priests that rule well,”
give money for Matrimony because no grace is conferred
says: “They should look to the people for a supply to their
thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we shall state
need, but to the Lord for the reward of their ministry.”
in the Third Part of the work§. Wherefore we must re-
Reply to Objection 1. In a case of necessity any-
ply that Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the Church,
one may baptize. And since nowise ought one to sin, if
but also an office of nature. Consequently it is lawful to
the priest be unwilling to baptize without being paid, one
give money for Matrimony considered as an office of na-
must act as though there were no priest available for the
ture, but unlawful if it be considered as a sacrament of the
baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the child
Church. Hence, according to the law¶, it is forbidden to
can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be
demand anything for the Nuptial Blessing.
baptized by anyone else. He could, however, lawfully buy
∗ Can. Qui per pecunias
† Cap. Cum tanto, de Consuetud.; cf. Ia IIae, q. 97, a. 3
‡ Innocent IV on Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia
§ Suppl., q. 42, a. 3
¶ Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia
1668
Whether it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions?
IIa IIae q. 100 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that it is lawful to give and re-
for then there would be an appearance of simony. But af-
ceive money for spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a
ter the spiritual things have been freely bestowed, then the
spiritual action. But something used to be given of old for
statutory and customary offerings and other dues may be
the use of prophecy, as appears from 1 Kings 9:7,8, and
exacted from those who are unwilling but able to pay, if
3 Kings 14:3. Therefore it would seem that it is lawful to
the superior authorize this to be done.
give and receive money for a spiritual action.
Reply to Objection 1. As Jerome says in his com-
Objection 2. Further, prayer, preaching, divine praise,
mentary on Mic. 3:9, certain gifts were freely offered to
are most spiritual actions. Now money is given to holy
the good prophets, for their livelihood, but not as a price
persons in order to obtain the assistance of their prayers,
for the exercise of their gift of prophecy. Wicked prophets,
according to Lk. 16:9, “Make unto you friends of the
however, abused this exercise by demanding payment for
mammon of iniquity.” To preachers also, who sow spiri-
it.
tual things, temporal things are due according to the Apos-
Reply to Objection 2. Those who give alms to the
tle (1 Cor. 9:14). Moreover, something is given to those
poor in order to obtain from them the assistance of their
who celebrate the divine praises in the ecclesiastical of-
prayers do not give with the intent of buying their prayers;
fice, and make processions: and sometimes an annual in-
but by their gratuitous beneficence inspire the poor with
come is assigned to them. Therefore it is lawful to receive
the mind to pray for them freely and out of charity. Tem-
something for spiritual actions.
poral things are due to the preacher as means for his sup-
Objection 3. Further, science is no less spiritual than
port, not as a price of the words he preaches. Hence a
power. Now it is lawful to receive money for the use of
gloss on 1 Tim. 5:11, “Let the priests that rule well,”
science: thus a lawyer may sell his just advocacy, a physi-
says: “Their need allows them to receive the wherewithal
cian his advice for health, and a master the exercise of his
to live, charity demands that this should be given to them:
teaching. Therefore in like manner it would seem lawful
yet the Gospel is not for sale, nor is a livelihood the ob-
for a prelate to receive something for the use of his spiri-
ject of preaching: for if they sell it for this purpose, they
tual power, for instance, for correction, dispensation, and
sell a great thing for a contemptible price.” In like manner
so forth.
temporal things are given to those who praise God by cel-
Objection 4. Further, religion is the state of spiritual ebrating the divine office whether for the living or for the
perfection. Now in certain monasteries something is de-
dead, not as a price but as a means of livelihood; and the
manded from those who are received there. Therefore it
same purpose is fulfilled when alms are received for mak-
is lawful to demand something for spiritual things.
ing processions in funerals. Yet it is simoniacal to do such
On the contrary, It is stated (I, qu. i∗): “It is abso-
things by contract, or with the intention of buying or sell-
lutely forbidden to make a charge for what is acquired by
ing. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were
the consolation of invisible grace, whether by demanding
decreed in any church that no procession would take place
a price or by seeking any kind of return whatever.” Now
at a funeral unless a certain sum of money were paid, be-
all these spiritual things are acquired through an invisible
cause such an ordinance would preclude the free granting
grace. Therefore it is not lawful to charge a price or return
of pious offices to any person. The ordinance would be
for them.
more in keeping with the law, if it were decreed that this
I answer that, Just as the sacraments are called spiri-
honor would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms,
tual, because they confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain
because this would not preclude its being granted to oth-
other things are called spiritual, because they flow from
ers. Moreover, the former ordinance has the appearance
spiritual grace and dispose thereto. And yet these things
of an exaction, whereas the latter bears a likeness to a gra-
are obtainable through the ministry of men, according to
tuitous remuneration.
1 Cor. 9:7, “Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his
Reply to Objection 3. A person to whom a spiritual
own charges? Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the
power is entrusted is bound by virtue of his office to ex-
milk of the flock?” Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy
ercise the power entrusted to him in dispensing spiritual
that which is spiritual in such like actions; but to receive or things. Moreover, he receives a statutory payment from
give something for the support of those who minister spir-
the funds of the Church as a means of livelihood. There-
itual things in accordance with the statutes of the Church
fore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his
and approved customs is lawful, yet in such wise that there
spiritual power, this would imply, not a hiring of his la-
be no intention of buying or selling, and that no pressure
bor (which he is bound to give, as a duty arising out of
be brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give, by
the office he has accepted), but a sale of the very use of
withholding spiritual things that ought to be administered,
a spiritual grace. For this reason it is unlawful for him to
∗ Can. Quidquid invisibilis
1669
receive anything for any dispensing whatever, or for al-any feasts.
lowing someone else to take his duty, or for correcting his
Reply to Objection 4. It is unlawful to exact or re-
subjects, or for omitting to correct them. On the other
ceive anything as price for entering a monastery: but,
hand it is lawful for him to receive “procurations,” when
in the case of small monasteries, that are unable to sup-
he visits his subjects, not as a price for correcting them,
port so many persons, it is lawful, while entrance to the
but as a means of livelihood. He that is possessed of sci-
monastery is free, to accept something for the support of
ence, without having taken upon himself the obligation
those who are about to be received into the monastery, if
of using it for the benefit of others can lawfully receive
its revenues are insufficient. In like manner it is lawful to
a price for his learning or advice, since this is not a sale
be easier in admitting to a monastery a person who has
of truth or science, but a hiring of labor. If, on the other
proved his regard for that monastery by the generosity of
hand, he be so bound by virtue of his office, this would
his alms: just as, on the other hand, it is lawful to incite
amount to a sale of the truth, and consequently he would
a person’s regard for a monastery by means of temporal
sin grievously. For instance, those who in certain churches
benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced to enter
are appointed to instruct the clerics of that church and
the monastery; although it is unlawful to agree to give or
other poor persons, and are in receipt of an ecclesiastical
receive something for entrance into a monastery (I, qu. ii,
benefice for so doing, are not allowed to receive anything
cap. Quam pio).
in return, either for teaching, or for celebrating or omitting
Whether it is lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things?
IIa IIae q. 100 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem lawful to receive money
I answer that, A thing may be annexed to spiritual
for things annexed to spiritual things. Seemingly all tem-
things in two ways. First, as being dependent on spiri-
poral things are annexed to spiritual things, since temporal
tual things. Thus to have to spiritual things, because it
things ought to be sought for the sake of spiritual things.
is not competent save to those who hold a clerical of-
If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what is annexed to spir-
fice. Hence such things can by no means exist apart from
itual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything temporal,
spiritual things. Consequently it is altogether unlawful
and this is clearly false.
to sell such things, because the sale thereof implies the
Objection 2. Further, nothing would seem to be more
sale of things spiritual. Other things are annexed to spir-
annexed to spiritual things than consecrated vessels. Yet
itual things through being directed thereto, for instance
it is lawful to sell a chalice for the ransom of prisoners,
the right of patronage, which is directed to the presen-
according to Ambrose (De Offic. ii, 28). Therefore it is
tation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices; and sacred
lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things.
vessels, which are directed to the use of the sacraments.
Objection 3.
Further, things annexed to spiritual
Wherefore such things as these do not presuppose spiri-
things include right of burial, right of patronage, and, ac-
tual things, but precede them in the order of time. Hence
cording to ancient writers, right of the first-born (because
in a way they can be sold, but not as annexed to spiritual
before the Lord the first-born exercised the priestly of-
things.
fice), and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham bought
Reply to Objection 1. All things temporal are an-
from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place (Gn. 23:8,
nexed to spiritual things, as to their end, wherefore it is
sqq.), and Jacob bought from Esau the right of the first-
lawful to sell temporal things, but their relation to spiri-
born (Gn. 25:31, sqq.). Again the right of patronage
tual things cannot be the matter of a lawful sale.
is transferred with the property sold, and is granted “in
Reply to Objection 2. Sacred vessels also are an-
fee.” Tithes are granted to certain soldiers, and can be re-
nexed to spiritual things as to their end, wherefore their
deemed. Prelates also at times retain for themselves the
consecration cannot be sold. Yet their material can be sold
revenues of prebends of which they have the presentation,
for the needs of the Church or of the poor provided they
although a prebend is something annexed to a spiritual
first be broken, after prayer has been said over them, since
thing. Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spir-
when once broken, they are considered to be no longer sa-
itual things.
cred vessels but mere metal: so that if like vessels were to
On the contrary, Pope Paschal∗ says (cf. I, qu. iii,
be made out of the same material they would have to be
cap. Si quis objecerit): “Whoever sells one of two such
consecrated again.
things, that the one is unproductive without the other,
Reply to Objection 3. We have no authority for sup-
leaves neither unsold.
Wherefore let no person sell a
posing that the double cave which Abraham bought for
church, or a prebend, or anything ecclesiastical.”
a burial place was consecrated for that purpose: where-
∗ Paschal II
1670
fore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used for sinned by selling his birthright, yet Jacob sinned not in
burial, in order to turn it into a sepulchre: even so it would
buying, because he is understood to have freed himself of
be lawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a ceme-
his grievance.
tery or even a church. Nevertheless because even among
The right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct
the Gentiles burial places are looked upon as religious,
sale, nor can it be granted “in fee,” but is transferred with
if Ephron intended to accept the price as payment for a
the property sold or granted.
burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham did not
The spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to
sin in buying, because he intended merely to buy an or-
layfolk, but merely the temporal commodities which are
dinary plot of ground. Even now, it is lawful in a case
granted in the name of tithe, as stated above (q. 87, a. 3).
of necessity to sell or buy land on which there has previ-
With regard to the granting of benefices it must, how-
ously been a church, as we have also said with regard to
ever, be observed, that it is not unlawful for a bishop, be-
sacred vessels (Reply obj. 2). Or again, Abraham is to be
fore presenting a person to a benefice, to decide, for some
excused because he thus freed himself of a grievance. For
reason, to retain part of the revenues of the benefice in
although Ephron offered him the burial place for nothing,
question, and to spend it on some pious object. But, on
Abraham deemed that he could not accept it gratis without
the other hand, if he were to require part of the revenues
prejudice to himself.
of that benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary, it
The right of the first-born was due to Jacob by rea-
would be the same as though he demanded payment from
son of God’s choice, according to Malach.
1:2,3, “I
him, and he would not escape the guilt of simony.
have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.” Wherefore Esau
Whether it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or IIa IIae q. 100 a. 5
for an oral remuneration?
Objection 1. It would seem that it is lawful to grant
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the term
spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or an
“money” denotes “anything that can have a pecuniary
oral remuneration. Gregory says (Regist. iii, ep. 18): “It
value.” Now it is evident that a man’s service is directed
is right that those who serve the interests of the Church
to some kind of usefulness, which has a pecuniary value,
should be rewarded.” Now an equivalent of service de-
wherefore servants are hired for a money wage. There-
notes serving the interests of the Church. Therefore it
fore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to
seems lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices for ser-
be rendered is the same as to grant it for the money, re-
vices received.
ceived or promised, at which that service could be valued.
Objection 2.
Further, to confer an ecclesiastical
If likewise, to grant a person’s request for the bestowal of
benefice for service received seems to indicate a carnal
a temporary favor is directed to some kind of usefulness
intention, no less than to do so on account of kinship. Yet
which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just as a man
the latter seemingly is not simoniacal since it implies no
contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any
buying or selling. Therefore neither is the former simoni-
eternal thing which comes under the head of “real remu-
acal.
neration,” so too does he contract it, by receiving “oral
Objection 3. Further, that which is done only at an-
remuneration” or an “equivalent in service rendered.”
other’s request would seem to be done gratis: so that ap-
Reply to Objection 1. If a cleric renders a prelate a
parently it does not involve simony, which consists in buy-
lawful service, directed to spiritual things (e.g. to the good
ing or selling. Now oral remuneration denotes the confer-
of the Church, or benefit of her ministers), he becomes
ring of an ecclesiastical benefice at some person’s request.
worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice by reason of the de-
Therefore this is not simoniacal.
votion that led him to render the service, as he would by
Objection 4.
Further, hypocrites perform spiritual
reason of any other good deed. Hence this is not a case of
deeds in order that they may receive human praise, which
remuneration for service rendered, such as Gregory has in
seems to imply oral remuneration: and yet hypocrites are
mind. But if the service be unlawful, or directed to car-
not said to be guilty of simony. Therefore oral remunera-
nal things (e.g. a service rendered to the prelate for the
tion does not entail simony.
profit of his kindred, or the increase of his patrimony, or
On the contrary, Pope Urban∗ says: “Whoever grants
the like), it will be a case of remuneration for service ren-
or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the purpose for
dered, and this will be simony.
which they were instituted but for his own profit, in con-
Reply to Objection 2. The bestowal of a spiritual
sideration of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in
thing gratis on a person by reason of kinship or of any
service rendered or money received, is guilty of simony.”
carnal affection is unlawful and carnal, but not simonia-
∗ Urban II, Ep. xvii ad Lucium
1671
cal: since nothing is received in return, wherefore it does account of which a spiritual thing is granted to the person
not imply a contract of buying and selling, on which si-
for whom the request is made. Nevertheless there may be
mony is based. But to present a person to an ecclesias-
simony in the intention, if one look, not to the worthiness
tical benefice with the understanding or intention that he
of the person, but to human favor. If, however, a person
provide for one’s kindred from the revenue is manifest si-
asks for himself, that he may obtain the cure of souls, his
mony.
very presumption renders him unworthy, and so his re-
Reply to Objection 3. Oral remuneration denotes ei-
quest is made for an unworthy person. But, if one be in
ther praise that pertains to human favor, which has its
need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an ecclesiastical
price, or a request whereby man’s favor is obtained or the
benefice without the cure of souls.
contrary avoided. Hence if one intend this chiefly one
Reply to Objection 4. A hypocrite does not give a
commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an un-
spiritual thing for the sake of praise, he only makes a show
worthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one’s chief
of it, and under false pretenses stealthily purloins rather
intention wherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if
than buys human praise: so that seemingly the hypocrite
the request be made for a worthy person, the deed itself is
is not guilty of simony.
not simoniacal, because it is based on a worthy cause, on
Whether those who are guilty of simony are fittingly punished by being deprived of IIa IIae q. 100 a. 6
what they have acquired by simony?
Objection 1. It would seem that those who are guilty
mission to a monastery by simony, and there takes the
of simony are not fittingly punished by being deprived of
solemn vow of profession. But no one should be freed
what they have acquired by simony. Simony is commit-
from the obligation of a vow on account of a fault he has
ted by acquiring spiritual things in return for a remuner-
committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the
ation. Now certain spiritual things cannot be lost when
monastic state which he has acquired by simony.
once acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by
Objection 6. Further, in this world external punish-
a consecration. Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for
ment is not inflicted for the internal movements of the
a person to be deprived of what he has acquired simonia-
heart, whereof God alone is the judge. Now simony is
cally.
committed in the mere intention or will, wherefore it is
Objection 2. Further, it sometimes happens that one
defined in reference to the will, as stated above (a. 1, ad
who has obtained the episcopate by simony commands a
2). Therefore a person should not always be deprived of
subject of his to receive orders from him: and apparently
what he has acquired by simony.
the subject should obey, so long as the Church tolerates
Objection 7. Further, to be promoted to greater dig-
him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not
nity is much less than to retain that which one has already
the power to give. Therefore a bishop does not lose his
received. Now sometimes those who are guilty of simony
episcopal power, if he has acquired it by simony.
are, by dispensation, promoted to greater dignity. There-
Objection 3.
Further, no one should be punished
fore they should not always be deprived of what they have
for what was done without his knowledge and consent,
received.
since punishment is due for sin which is voluntary, as was
On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis
shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 74, Aa. 1,2; Ia IIae, q. 77, a. 7).
Episcopus): “He that has been ordained shall profit noth-
Now it happens sometimes that a person acquires some-
ing from his ordination or promotion that he has acquired
thing spiritual, which others have procured for him with-
by the bargain, but shall forfeit the dignity or cure that he
out his knowledge and consent. Therefore he should not
has acquired with his money.”
be punished by being deprived of what has been bestowed
I answer that, No one can lawfully retain that which
on him.
he has acquired against the owner’s will. For instance,
Objection 4. Further, no one should profit by his own
if a steward were to give some of his lord’s property to
sin. Yet, if a person who has acquired an ecclesiastical
a person, against his lord’s will and orders, the recipi-
benefice by simony, were to restore what he has received,
ent could not lawfully retain what he received. Now Our
this would sometimes turn to the profit of those who had
Lord, Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of
a share in his simony; for instance, when a prelate and his
churches, ordered spiritual things to be given gratis, ac-
entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore
cording to Mat. 10:8, “Freely have you received, freely
that which has been acquired by simony ought not always
give.” Wherefore whosoever acquires spiritual things in
to be restored.
return for a remuneration cannot lawfully retain them.
Objection 5. Further, sometimes a person obtains ad-
Moreover, those who are guilty of simony, by either sell-
1672
ing or buying spiritual things, as well as those who act as one buys a thing of a person who cannot sell it. Where-go-between, are sentenced to other punishments, namely,
fore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives Or-
infamy and deposition, if they be clerics, and excommu-
ders or an ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only
nication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i, cap. Si quis
is he deprived of what he has received, by forfeiting the
Episcopus∗.
exercise of his order, and resigning the benefice and the
Reply to Objection 1. He that has received a sacred
fruits acquired therefrom, but also in addition to this he is
Order simoniacally, receives the character of the Order on
punished by being marked with infamy. Moreover, he is
account of the efficacy of the sacrament: but he does not
bound to restore not only the fruit actually acquired, but
receive the grace nor the exercise of the Order, because he
also such as could have been acquired by a careful posses-
has received the character by stealth as it were, and against
sor (which, however, is to be understood of the net fruits,
the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended,
allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of
by virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, that
the fruits), excepting those fruits that have been expended
he should not busy himself about exercising his Order, and
for the good of the Church.
as regards others, namely, that no one may communicate
On the other hand, if a man’s promotion be procured
with him in the exercise of his Order, whether his sin be
simoniacally by others, without his knowledge and con-
public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the money which he
sent, he forfeits the exercise of his Order, and is bound to
basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains it.
resign the benefice obtained together with fruits still ex-
Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having
tant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits which he has
conferred Orders simoniacally, or through having simoni-
consumed, since he possessed them in good faith. Excep-
acally granted or received a benefice, or through having
tion must be made in the case when his promotion has
been a go-between in a simoniacal transaction, if he has
been deceitfully procured by an enemy of his; or when he
done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of the law, as re-
expressly opposes the transaction, for then he is not bound
gards both himself and others; but if he has acted in secret
to resign, unless subsequently he agree to the transaction,
he is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself
by paying what was promised.
alone, and not as regards others.
Reply to Objection 4. Money, property, or fruits si-
Reply to Objection 2. One ought not to receive Or-
moniacally received, must be restored to the Church that
ders from a bishop one knows to have been promoted
has incurred loss by their transfer, notwithstanding the
simoniacally, either on account of his command or for
fact that the prelate or a member of the chapter of that
fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders
church was at fault, since others ought not to be the losers
from him do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even
by his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible,
though they are ignorant of his being guilty of simony;
the guilty parties be not the gainers. But if the prelate and
and they need to receive a dispensation. Some, however,
the entire chapter be at fault, restitution must be made,
maintain that one ought to receive Orders in obedience to
with the consent of superior authority, either to the poor
his command unless one can prove him to be guilty of
or to some other church.
simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order with-
Reply to Objection 5. If there are any persons who
out a dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement,
have been simoniacally admitted into a monastery, they
because no one should obey a man to the extent of com-
must quit: and if the simony was committed with their
municating with him in an unlawful action. Now he that
knowledge since the holding of the General Council∗,
is, by virtue of the law, suspended as regards both him-
they must be expelled from their monastery without hope
self and others, confers Orders unlawfully: wherefore no
of return, and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule,
one should communicate with him, by receiving Orders
or in some house of the same order, if a stricter one be
from him for any cause whatever. If, however, one be not
not found. If, however, this took place before the Council,
certain on the point, one ought not to give credence to an-
they must be placed in other houses of the same order. If
other’s sin, and so one ought with a good conscience to re-
this cannot be done, they must be received into monaster-
ceive Orders from him. And if the bishop has been guilty
ies of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they
of simony otherwise than by a simoniacal promotion, and
wander about the world, but they must not be admitted to
the fact be a secret, one can receive Orders from him be-
their former rank, and must be assigned a lower place.
cause he is not suspended as regards others, but only as
On the other hand, if they were received simonia-
regards himself, as stated above (ad 1).
cally, without their knowledge, whether before or after the
Reply to Objection 3. To be deprived of what one
Council, then after quitting they may be received again,
has received is not only the punishment of a sin, but is
their rank being changed as stated.
also sometimes the effect of acquiring unjustly, as when
Reply to Objection 6. In God’s sight the mere will
∗ Qu. iii, can. Si quis praebendas
∗ Fourth Lateran Council, A.D.
1215, held by Innocent III
1673
makes a man guilty of simony; but as regards the external he has received simoniacally, so that he will receive either
ecclesiastical punishment he is not punished as a simo-
the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with
niac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound to repent of
the laity, or a greater dispensation, allowing him after do-
his evil intention.
ing penance to retain his order in some other Church; or
Reply to Objection 7. The Pope alone can grant a dis-
again a greater dispensation, allowing him to remain in
pensation to one who has knowingly received a benefice
the same Church, but in minor orders; or a full dispensa-
(simoniacally). In other cases the bishop also can dis-
tion allowing him to exercise even the major orders in the
pense, provided the beneficiary first of all renounce what
same Church, but not to accept a prelacy.
1674
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 101
Of Piety
(In Four Articles)
After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which will render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly four points of inquiry arise with regard to piety:
(1) To whom does piety extend?
(2) What does piety make one offer a person?
(3) Whether piety is a special virtue?
(4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion?
Whether piety extends to particular human individuals?
IIa IIae q. 101 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that piety does not extend to
are our parents and our country, that have given us birth
particular human individuals. For Augustine says (De Civ.
and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to
Dei x) that piety denotes, properly speaking, the worship
his parents and his country, after God. Wherefore just as
of God, which the Greeks designate by the term eusebeia.
it belongs to religion to give worship to God, so does it
But the worship of God does not denote relation to man,
belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship to
but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend defi-
one’s parents and one’s country.
nitely to certain human individuals.
The worship due to our parents includes the worship
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): “Piety,
given to all our kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who
on her day, provides a banquet, because she fills the in-
descend from the same parents, according to the Philoso-
most recesses of the heart with works of mercy.” Now the
pher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship given to our country
works of mercy are to be done to all, according to Augus-
includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to all the
tine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore piety does not extend
friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to
definitely to certain special persons.
these.
Objection 3. Further, in human affairs there are many
Reply to Objection 1. The greater includes the lesser:
other mutual relations besides those of kindred and citi-
wherefore the worship due to God includes the worship
zenship, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), and
due to our parents as a particular. Hence it is written
on each of them is founded a kind of friendship, which
(Malach. 1:6): “If I be a father, where is My honor?”
would seem to be the virtue of piety, according to a gloss
Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine
on 2 Tim. 3:5, “Having an appearance indeed of piety
worship.
[Douay: ‘godliness’].” Therefore piety extends not only
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Civ.
to one’s kindred and fellow-citizens.
Dei x), “the term piety is often used in connection with
On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that
works of mercy, in the language of the common people;
“it is by piety that we do our duty towards our kindred
the reason for which I consider to be the fact that God
and well-wishers of our country and render them faithful
Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing
service.”
to Him than sacrifices. This custom has led to the appli-
I answer that, Man becomes a debtor to other men
cation of the word ‘pious’ to God Himself.”
in various ways, according to their various excellence and
Reply to Objection 3. The relations of a man with
the various benefits received from them. on both counts
his kindred and fellow-citizens are more referable to the
God holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, and
principles of his being than other relations: wherefore the
is for us the first principle of being and government. In the
term piety is more applicable to them.
second place, the principles of our being and government
Whether piety provides support for our parents?
IIa IIae q. 101 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that piety does not provide
fore it does not belong to piety to provide support for one’s
support for our parents. For, seemingly, the precept of
parents.
the decalogue, “Honor thy father and mother,” belongs to
Objection 2. Further, a man is bound to lay up for
piety. But this prescribes only the giving of honor. There-
those whom he is bound to support. Now according to the
1675
Apostle (2 Cor. 12:14), “neither ought the children to lay reverence or honor, because, as Augustine says (De Civ.
up for the parents.” Therefore piety does not oblige them
Dei x), “we are said to give homage to those whose mem-
to support their parents.
ory or presence we honor.”
Objection 3. Further, piety extends not only to one’s
Reply to Objection 1. According to our Lord’s in-
parents, but also to other kinsmen and to one’s fellow-
terpretation (Mat. 15:3-6) the honor due to our parents
citizens, as stated above (a. 1). But one is not bound to
includes whatever support we owe them; and the reason
support all one’s kindred and fellow-citizens. Therefore
for this is that support is given to one’s father because it is neither is one bound to support one’s parents.
due to him as to one greater.
On the contrary, our Lord (Mat. 15:3-6) reproved
Reply to Objection 2. Since a father stands in the re-
the Pharisees for hindering children from supporting their
lation of principle, and his son in the relation of that which
parents.
is from a principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to
I answer that, We owe something to our parents in
support his son: and consequently he is bound to support
two ways: that is to say, both essentially, and accidentally.
him not only for a time, but for all his life, and this is to lay We owe them essentially that which is due to a father as
by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow something on
such: and since he is his son’s superior through being the
his father is accidental, arising from some momentary ne-
principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence and
cessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay
service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it befits by as for a long time beforehand, because naturally par-him to receive in respect of something accidental to him,
ents are not the successors of their children, but children
for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his children should of their parents.
visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that Reply to Objection 3.
As Tully says (De Invent.
they should support him; and so on in like instance, all of
Rhet. ii), “we offer homage and duty to all our kindred
which come under the head of service due. Hence Tully
and to the well-wishers of our country”; not, however,
says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “piety gives both duty and
equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and to others ac-
homage”: “duty” referring to service, and “homage” to
cording to our means and their personal claims.
Whether piety is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?
IIa IIae q. 101 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that piety is not a special virtue much as it pays duty and homage to our parents and coun-distinct from other virtues. For the giving of service and
try, and to those who are related thereto. Therefore piety
homage to anyone proceeds from love. But it belongs to
is a special virtue.
piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct virtue from charity.
Reply to Objection 1. Just as religion is a protesta-
Objection 2. Further, it is proper to religion to give
tion of faith, hope and charity, whereby man is primar-
worship to God. But piety also gives worship to God, ac-
ily directed to God, so again piety is a protestation of the
cording to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x). Therefore piety is
charity we bear towards our parents and country.
not distinct from religion.
Reply to Objection 2. God is the principle of our be-
Objection 3. Further, piety, whereby we give our
ing and government in a far more excellent manner than
country worship and duty, seems to be the same as le-
one’s father or country. Hence religion, which gives wor-
gal justice, which looks to the common good. But legal
ship to God, is a distinct virtue from piety, which pays
justice is a general virtue, according to the Philosopher
homage to our parents and country.
But things relat-
(Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore piety is not a special virtue.
ing to creatures are transferred to God as the summit of
On the contrary, It is accounted by Tully (De Invent.
excellence and causality, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
Rhet. ii) as a part of justice.
i): wherefore, by way of excellence, piety designates the
I answer that, A special virtue is one that regards an
worship of God, even as God, by way of excellence, is
object under a special aspect. Since, then, the nature of
called “Our Father.”
justice consists in rendering another person his due, wher-
Reply to Objection 3. Piety extends to our country
ever there is a special aspect of something due to a person,
in so far as the latter is for us a principle of being: but
there is a special virtue. Now a thing is indebted in a spe-
legal justice regards the good of our country, considered
cial way to that which is its connatural principle of being
as the common good: wherefore legal justice has more of
and government. And piety regards this principle, inas-
the character of a general virtue than piety has.
1676
Whether the duties of piety towards one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of IIa IIae q. 101 a. 4
religion?
Objection 1. It seems that the duties of piety towards
to piety to pay duty and homage to one’s parents accord-
one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of religion.
ing to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that man
For Our Lord said (Lk. 14:26): “If any man come to Me,
should tend to worship his father rather than God, but, as
and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and chil-
Ambrose says on Lk. 12:52, “the piety of divine religion
dren, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life also,
takes precedence of the claims of kindred.”
he cannot be My disciple.” Hence it is said in praise of
Accordingly, if the worship of one’s parents take one
James and John (Mat. 4:22) that they left “their nets and
away from the worship of God it would no longer be an act
father, and followed” Christ. Again it is said in praise of
of piety to pay worship to one’s parents to the prejudice of
the Levites (Dt. 33:9): “Who hath said to his father, and
God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad Heliod.): “Though thou
to his mother: I do not know you; and to his brethren:
trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy mother,
I know you not; and their own children they have not
turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of
known. These have kept Thy word.” Now a man who
the cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in
knows not his parents and other kinsmen, or who even
this matter.” Therefore in such a case the duties of piety
hates them, must needs omit the duties of piety. There-
towards one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of
fore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of
the worship religion gives to God. If, however, by pay-
religion.
ing the services due to our parents, we are not withdrawn
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Lk. 9:59,60) that in from the service of God, then will it be an act of piety,
answer to him who said: “Suffer me first to go and bury
and there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of
my father,” Our Lord replied: “Let the dead bury their
religion.
dead: but go thou, and preach the kingdom of God.” Now
Reply to Objection 1. Gregory expounding this say-
the latter pertains to religion, while it is a duty of piety
ing of our Lord says (Hom. xxxvii in Ev.) that “when we
to bury one’s father. Therefore a duty of piety should be
find our parents to be a hindrance in our way to God, we
omitted for the sake of religion.
must ignore them by hating and fleeing from them.” For
Objection 3. Further, God is called “Our Father” by
if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the
excellence. Now just as we worship our parents by pay-
service of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon
ing them the duties of piety so do we worship God by
and hate them. It is in this sense that the Levites are said
religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted
to have not known their kindred, because they obeyed the
for the sake of the worship of religion.
Lord’s command, and spared not the idolaters (Ex. 32).
Objection 4. Further, religious are bound by a vow
James and John are praised for leaving their parents and
which they may not break to fulfil the observances of reli-
following our Lord, not that their father incited them to
gion. Now in accordance with those observances they are
evil, but because they deemed it possible for him to find
hindered from supporting their parents, both on the score
another means of livelihood, if they followed Christ.
of poverty, since they have nothing of their own, and on
Reply to Objection 2. Our Lord forbade the disci-
the score of obedience, since they may not leave the clois-
ple to bury his father because, according to Chrysostom
ter without the permission of their superior. Therefore the
(Hom. xxviii in Matth.), “Our Lord by so doing saved
duties of piety towards one’s parents should be omitted
him from many evils, such as the sorrows and worries
for the sake of religion.
and other things that one anticipates under these circum-
On the contrary, Our Lord reproved the Pharisees
stances. For after the burial the will had to be read, the
(Mat. 15:3-6) who taught that for the sake of religion one
estate had to be divided, and so forth: but chiefly, because
ought to refrain from paying one’s parents the honor we
there were others who could see to the funeral.” Or, ac-
owe them.
cording to Cyril’s commentary on Lk. 9, “this disciple’s
I answer that, Religion and piety are two virtues.
request was, not that he might bury a dead father, but that
Now no virtue is opposed to another virtue, since accord-
he might support a yet living father in the latter’s old age,
ing to the Philosopher, in his book on the Categories (Cap.
until at length he should bury him. This is what Our Lord
De oppos.), “good is not opposed to good.” Therefore it
did not grant, because there were others, bound by the du-
is impossible that religion and piety mutually hinder one
ties of kindred, to take care of him.”
another, so that the act of one be excluded by the act of
Reply to Objection 3. Whatever we give our parents
the other. Now, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 7, a. 2; Ia
out of piety is referred by us to God; just as other works of
IIae, q. 18, a. 3), the act of every virtue is limited by the
mercy which we perform with regard to any of our neigh-
circumstances due thereto, and if it overstep them it will
bors are offered to God, according to Mat. 25:40: “As
be an act no longer of virtue but of vice. Hence it belongs
long as you did it to one of. . . My least. . . you did it to
1677
Me.” Accordingly, if our carnal parents stand in need of ered aright, would be to tempt God: since, while having
our assistance, so that they have no other means of sup-
human means at hand, he would be exposing his parents
port, provided they incite us to nothing against God, we
to danger, in the hope of God’s assistance. on the other
must not abandon them for the sake of religion. But if we
hand, if the parents can find means of livelihood with-
cannot devote ourselves to their service without sin, or if
out him, it is lawful for him to abandon them and enter
they can be supported without our assistance, it is lawful
religion, because children are not bound to support their
to forego their service, so as to give more time to religion.
parents except in cases of necessity, as stated above. He
Reply to Objection 4. We must speak differently of
that has already made his profession in religion is deemed
one who is yet in the world, and of one who has made his
to be already dead to the world: wherefore he ought not,
profession in religion. For he that is in the world, if he
under pretext of supporting his parents, to leave the clois-
has parents unable to find support without him, he must
ter where he is buried with Christ, and busy himself once
not leave them and enter religion, because he would be
more with worldly affairs. Nevertheless he is bound, sav-
breaking the commandment prescribing the honoring of
ing his obedience to his superiors, and his religious state
parents. Some say, however, that even then he might aban-
withal, to make points efforts for his parents’ support.
don them, and leave them in God’s care. But this, consid-
1678
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 102
Of Observance, Considered in Itself, and of Its Parts
(In Three Articles)
We must now consider observance and its parts, the considerations of which will manifest the contrary vices.
Under the head of observance there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?
(2) What does observance offer?
(3) Of its comparison with piety.
Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?
IIa IIae q. 102 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that observance is not a special
of government with regard to certain things: for instance,
virtue, distinct from other virtues. For virtues are distin-
the governor of a state in civil matters, the commander of
guished by their objects. But the object of observance is
an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of
not distinct from the object of piety: for Tully says (De
learning, and so forth. Hence it is that all such persons are
Invent. Rhet. ii) that “it is by observance that we pay
designated as “fathers,” on account of their being charged
worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of
with like cares: thus the servants of Naaman said to him (4
dignity.” But worship and honor are paid also by piety to
Kings 5:13): “Father, if the prophet had bid thee do some
our parents, who excel in dignity. Therefore observance
great thing,” etc.
is not a distinct virtue from piety.
Therefore, just as, in a manner, religion, whereby wor-
Objection 2. Further, just as honor and worship are
ship is given to find piety, whereby we worship our so un-
due to those that are in a position of dignity, so also are
der piety we find observance, whereby worship and honor
they due to those who excel in science and virtue. But
are paid to persons in positions of dignity.
there is no special virtue whereby we pay honor and wor-
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 101, a. 3, ad
ship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore
2), religion goes by the name of piety by way of superem-
observance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those
inence, although piety properly so called is distinct from
who excel in dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from
religion; and in the same way piety can be called obser-
other virtues.
vance by way of excellence, although observance properly
Objection 3. Further, we have many duties towards
speaking is distinct from piety.
those who are in a position of dignity, the fulfilment of
Reply to Objection 2. By the very fact of being in a
which is required by law, according to Rom. 13:7, “Ren-
position of dignity a man not only excels as regards his
der. . . to all men their dues: tribute to whom tribute is
position, but also has a certain power of governing sub-
due,” etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements of the
jects, wherefore it is fitting that he should be considered
law belongs to legal justice, or even to special justice.
as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor of others.
Therefore observance is not by itself a special virtue dis-
On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of
tinct from other virtues.
science and virtue does not give him the character of a
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons
principle in relation to others, but merely a certain excel-
observance along with the other parts of justice, which are
lence in himself. Wherefore a special virtue is appointed
special virtues.
for the payment of worship and honor to persons in po-
I answer that, As explained above (q. 101, Aa. 1,3;
sitions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch as science, virtue and
q. 80), according to the various excellences of those per-
all like things render a man fit for positions of dignity, the
sons to whom something is due, there must needs be a
respect which is paid to anyone on account of any excel-
corresponding distinction of virtues in a descending or-
lence whatever belongs to the same virtue.
der. Now just as a carnal father partakes of the character
Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to special justice,
of principle in a particular way, which character is found
properly speaking, to pay the equivalent to those to whom
in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some
we owe anything. Now this cannot be done to the vir-
way, exercises providence in one respect, partakes of the
tuous, and to those who make good use of their posi-
character of father in a particular way, since a father is the
tion of dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor to
principle of generation, of education, of learning and of
our parents. Consequently these matters belong to an an-
whatever pertains to the perfection of human life: while
nexed virtue, and not to special justice, which is a princi-
a person who is in a position of dignity is as a principle
pal virtue.
1679
Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above (q. 58, a. 6).
Whether it belongs to observance to pay worship and honor to those who are in posi-IIa IIae q. 102 a. 2
tions of dignity?
Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to obser-
cellence and power over that which is moved. Wherefore,
vance to pay worship and honor to persons in positions of
a person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold
dignity. For according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x), we
consideration: first, in so far as he obtains excellence of
are said to worship those persons whom we hold in honor,
position, together with a certain power over subjects: sec-
so that worship and honor would seem to be the same.
ondly, as regards the exercise of his government. In re-
Therefore it is unfitting to define observance as paying
spect of his excellence there is due to him honor, which
worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity.
is the recognition of some kind of excellence; and in re-
Objection 2. Further, it belongs to justice that we pay
spect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him
what we owe: wherefore this belongs to observance also,
worship, consisting in rendering him service, by obeying
since it is a part of justice. Now we do not owe worship
his commands, and by repaying him, according to one’s
and honor to all persons in positions of dignity, but only
faculty, for the benefits we received from him.
to those who are placed over us. Therefore observance is
Reply to Objection 1. Worship includes not only
unfittingly defined as giving worship and honor to all.
honor, but also whatever other suitable actions are con-
Objection 3. Further, not only do we owe honor to
nected with the relations between man and man.
persons of dignity who are placed over us; we owe them
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 80), debt
also fear and a certain payment of remuneration, accord-
is twofold. One is legal debt, to pay which man is com-
ing to Rom. 13:7, “Render. . . to all men their dues; tribute
pelled by law; and thus man owes honor and worship to
to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to
those persons in positions of dignity who are placed over
whom fear; honor to whom honor.” Moreover, we owe
him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a
them reverence and subjection, according to Heb. 13:17,
certain honesty: it is in this way that we owe worship and
“Obey your prelates, and be subject to them.” Therefore
honor to persons in positions of dignity even though we
observance is not fittingly defined as paying worship and
be not their subjects.
honor.
Reply to Objection 3. Honor is due to the excel-
On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii)
lence of persons in positions of dignity, on account of
that “it is by observance that we pay worship and honor to
their higher rank: while fear is due to them on account of
those who excel in some kind of dignity.”
their power to use compulsion: and to the exercise of their
I answer that, It belongs to persons in positions of
government there is due both obedience, whereby subjects
dignity to govern subjects. Now to govern is to move cer-
are moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes,
tain ones to their due end: thus a sailor governs his ship
which are a repayment of their labor.
by steering it to port. But every mover has a certain ex-
Whether observance is a greater virtue than piety?
IIa IIae q. 102 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that observance is a greater
than piety, which pays worship to one’s kindred.
virtue than piety. For the prince to whom worship is paid
Objection 3. Further honor and reverence are due to
by observance is compared to a father who is worshiped
the virtuous in the first place after God. Now honor and
by piety, as a universal to a particular governor; because
reverence are paid to the virtuous by the virtue of obser-
the household which a father governs is part of the state
vance, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). Therefore observance
which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is
takes the first place after religion.
greater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore
On the contrary, The precepts of the Law prescribe
observance is a greater virtue than piety.
acts of virtue. Now, immediately after the precepts of re-
Objection 2. Further, persons in positions of dignity
ligion, which belong to the first table, follows the precept
take care of the common good. Now our kindred pertain
of honoring our parents which refers to piety. Therefore
to the private good, which we ought to set aside for the
piety follows immediately after religion in the order of
common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy to expose
excellence.
oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the com-
I answer that, Something may be paid to persons in
mon good. Therefore observance, whereby worship is
positions of dignity in two ways. First, in relation to
paid to persons in positions of dignity, is a greater virtue
the common good, as when one serves them in the ad-
1680
ministration of the affairs of the state. This no longer father as a universal to a particular power, as regards ex-belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays worship
ternal government, but not as regards the father being a
not only to one’s father but also to one’s fatherland. Sec-
principle of generation: for in this way the father should
ondly, that which is paid to persons in positions of dignity
be compared with the divine power from which all things
refers specially to their personal usefulness or renown,
derive their being.
and this belongs properly to observance, as distinct from
Reply to Objection 2. In so far as persons in po-
piety. Therefore in comparing observance with piety we
sitions of dignity are related to the common good, their
must needs take into consideration the different relations
worship does not pertain to observance, but to piety, as
in which other persons stand to ourselves, which relations
stated above.
both virtues regard. Now it is evident that the persons
Reply to Objection 3. The rendering of honor or wor-
of our parents and of our kindred are more substantially
ship should be proportionate to the person to whom it is
akin to us than persons in positions of dignity, since birth
paid not only as considered in himself, but also as com-
and education, which originate in the father, belong more
pared to those who pay them. Wherefore, though virtu-
to one’s substance than external government, the princi-
ous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy
ple of which is seated in those who are in positions of
of honor than the persons of one’s parents, yet children
dignity. For this reason piety takes precedence of obser-
are under a greater obligation, on account of the benefits
vance, inasmuch as it pays worship to persons more akin
they have received from their parents and their natural kin-
to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound.
ship with them, to pay worship and honor to their parents
Reply to Objection 1. The prince is compared to the
than to virtuous persons who are not of their kindred.
1681
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 103
Of Dulia
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider (1) dulia, whereby we pay honor and other things pertaining thereto to those who are in a higher position; (2) obedience, whereby we obey their commands.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing?
(2) Whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position?
(3) Whether dulia, which pays honor and worship to those who are above us, is a special virtue, distinct from latria?
(4) Whether it contains several species?
Whether honor denotes something corporal?
IIa IIae q. 103 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that honor does not denote
bowing, saluting, and so forth, or by external things, as by
something corporal. For honor is showing reverence in
offering gifts, erecting statues, and the like. Accordingly
acknowledgment of virtue, as may be gathered from the
honor consists of signs, external and corporal.
Philosopher (Ethic.
i, 5).
Now showing reverence is
Reply to Objection 1. Reverence is not the same as
something spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as
honor: but on the one hand it is the primary motive for
stated above (q. 81, a. 2, ad 1). Therefore honor is some-
showing honor, in so far as one man honors another out of
thing spiritual.
the reverence he has for him; and on the other hand, it is
Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher
the end of honor, in so far as a person is honored in order
(Ethic. iv, 3), “honor is the reward of virtue.” Now, since
that he may be held in reverence by others.
virtue consists chiefly of spiritual things, its reward is not
Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher
something corporal, for the reward is more excellent than
(Ethic. iv, 3), honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue:
the merit. Therefore honor does not consist of corporal
yet nothing in human and corporal things can be greater
things.
than honor, since these corporal things themselves are em-
Objection 3. Further, honor is distinct from praise, as
ployed as signs in acknowledgment of excelling virtue. It
also from glory. Now praise and glory consist of exter-
is, however, due to the good and the beautiful, that they
nal things. Therefore honor consists of things internal and
may be made known, according to Mat. 5:15, “Neither do
spiritual.
men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but upon a
On the contrary, Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim.
candlestick, that it may shine to all that are in the house.”
5:3, “Honor widows that are widows indeed,” and (1 Tim.
In this sense honor is said to be the reward of virtue.
5:17), “let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of
Reply to Objection 3. Praise is distinguished from
double honor” etc. says (Ep. ad Ageruch.): “Honor here
honor in two ways. First, because praise consists only of
stands either for almsgiving or for remuneration.” Now
verbal signs, whereas honor consists of any external signs,
both of these pertain to spiritual things. Therefore honor
so that praise is included in honor. Secondly, because by
consists of corporal things.
paying honor to a person we bear witness to a person’s ex-
I answer that, Honor denotes a witnessing to a per-
celling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we
son’s excellence. Therefore men who wish to be hon-
bear witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus
ored seek a witnessing to their excellence, according to
we praise one that works well for an end. On the other
the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5; viii, 8). Now witness is borne
hand, honor is given even to the best, which is not referred
either before God or before man. Before God, Who is the
to an end, but has already arrived at the end, according to
searcher of hearts, the witness of one’s conscience suf-
the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5).
fices. wherefore honor, so far as God is concerned, may
Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the re-
consist of the mere internal movement of the heart, for
sult of our bearing witness to a person’s goodness is that
instance when a man acknowledges either God’s excel-
his goodness becomes clear to the knowledge of many.
lence or another man’s excellence before God. But, as
The word “glory” signifies this, for “glory” is the same as
regards men, one cannot bear witness, save by means of
kleria, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on Rom. 16:27
signs, either by words, as when one proclaims another’s
observes that glory is “clear knowledge together with
excellence by word of mouth, or by deeds, for instance by
praise.”
1682
Whether honor is properly due to those who are above us?
IIa IIae q. 103 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that honor is not properly due to
more excellent than they, but also in itself, or in relation
those who are above us. For an angel is above any human
to other persons, and in this way honor is always due to a
wayfarer, according to Mat. 11:11, “He that is lesser in
person, on account of some excellence or superiority.
the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist.”
For the person honored has no need to be more excel-
Yet an angel forbade John when the latter wished to honor
lent than those who honor him; it may suffice for him to
him (Apoc. 22:10). Therefore honor is not due to those
be more excellent than some others, or again he may be
who are above us.
more excellent than those who honor him in some respect
Objection 2. Further, honor is due to a person in ac-
and not simply.
knowledgment of his virtue, as stated above (a. 1; q. 63,
Reply to Objection 1. The angel forbade John to pay
a. 3). But sometimes those who are above us are not vir-
him, not any kind of honor, but the honor of adoration and
tuous. Therefore honor is not due to them, as neither is it
latria, which is due to God. Or again, he forbade him to
due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in the
pay the honor of dulia, in order to indicate the dignity of
order of nature.
John himself, for which Christ equaled him to the angels
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 12:10):
“according to the hope of glory of the children of God”:
“With honor preventing one another,” and we read (1 Pet.
wherefore he refused to be honored by him as though he
2:17): “Honor all men.” But this would not be so if honor
were superior to him.
were due to those alone who are above us. Therefore
Reply to Objection 2. A wicked superior is honored
honor is not due properly to those who are above us.
for the excellence, not of his virtue but of his dignity, as
Objection 4. Further, it is written (Tob. 1:16) that
being God’s minister, and because the honor paid to him is
Tobias “had ten talents of silver of that which he had
paid to the whole community over which he presides. As
been honored by the king”: and we read (Esther 6:11)
for the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and should
that Assuerus honored Mardochaeus, and ordered it to be
be looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honor.
proclaimed in his presence: “This honor is he worthy of
Reply to Objection 3. In every man is to be found
whom the king hath a mind to honor.” Therefore honor
something that makes it possible to deem him better than
is paid to those also who are beneath us, and it seems, in
ourselves, according to Phil. 2:3, “In humility, let each
consequence, that honor is not due properly to those who
esteem others better than themselves,” and thus, too, we
are above us.
should all be on the alert to do honor to one another.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 12)
Reply to Objection 4. Private individuals are some-
that “honor is due to the best.”
times honored by kings, not that they are above them in
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), honor is nothing
the order of dignity but on account of some excellence
but an acknowledgment of a person’s excelling goodness.
of their virtue: and in this way Tobias and Mardochaeus
Now a person’s excellence may be considered, not only in
were honored by kings.
relation to those who honor him, in the point of his being
Whether dulia is a special virtue distinct from latria?
IIa IIae q. 103 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that dulia is not a special virtue
whereby one is moved towards the thing represented by
distinct from latria. For a gloss on Ps. 7:1, “O Lord my
the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being made
God, in Thee have I put my trust,” says: “Lord of all by
to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis.
His power, to Whom dulia is due; God by creation, to
2:22,23) that “they esteemed not the honor of holy souls,
Whom we owe latria.” Now the virtue directed to God as
for God created man incorruptible, and to the image of
Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to Him as
His own likeness He made him.” Therefore dulia is not a
God. Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria.
distinct virtue from latria whereby God is honored.
Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x),
(Ethic. viii, 8), “to be loved is like being honored.” Now
that “the homage due to man, of which the Apostle spoke
the charity with which we love God is the same as that
when he commanded servants to obey their masters and
whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia whereby
which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct from latria which
we honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria
denotes the homage that consists in the worship of God.”
with which we honor God.
I answer that, According to what has been stated
Objection 3. Further, the movement whereby one is
above (q. 101, a. 3), where there are different aspects of
moved towards an image is the same as the movement
that which is due, there must needs be different virtues
1683
to render those dues. Now servitude is due to God and neighbor is God, since that which we love in our neighbor
to man under different aspects: even as lordship is com-
through charity is God alone. Wherefore the charity with
petent to God and to man under different aspects. For
which we love God is the same as that with which we love
God has absolute and paramount lordship over the crea-
our neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct from
ture wholly and singly, which is entirely subject to His
charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is
power: whereas man partakes of a certain likeness to the
loved. In like manner, since there is one reason for serv-
divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a particular
ing God and another for serving man, and for honoring the
power over some man or creature. Wherefore dulia, which
one or the other, latria and dulia are not the same virtue.
pays due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from
Reply to Objection 3. Movement towards an image
latria, which pays due service to the lordship of God. It is,
as such is referred to the thing represented by the image:
moreover, a species of observance, because by observance
yet not every movement towards an image is referred to
we honor all those who excel in dignity, while dulia prop-
the image as such, and consequently sometimes the move-
erly speaking is the reverence of servants for their master,
ment to the image differs specifically from the movement
dulia being the Greek for servitude.
to the thing. Accordingly we must reply that the honor or
Reply to Objection 1. Just as religion is called piety
subjection of dulia regards some dignity of a man abso-
by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Father by
lutely. For though, in respect of that dignity, man is made
way of excellence, so again latria is called dulia by way
to the image or likeness of God, yet in showing reverence
of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Lord by way of ex-
to a person, one does not always refer this to God actually.
cellence. Now the creature does not partake of the power
Or we may reply that the movement towards an image
to create by reason of which latria is due to God: and so
is, after a fashion, towards the thing, yet the movement to-
this gloss drew a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in
wards the thing need not be towards its image. Wherefore
respect of creation, which is not communicated to a crea-
reverence paid to a person as the image of God redounds
ture, but dulia in respect of lordship, which is communi-
somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the reverence
cated to a creature.
that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to
Reply to Objection 2. The reason why we love our
His image.
Whether dulia has various species?
IIa IIae q. 103 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that dulia has various species.
fore is dulia.
For by dulia we show honor to our neighbor. Now dif-
I answer that, Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one
ferent neighbors are honored under different aspects, for
way it may be taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence
instance king, father and master, as the Philosopher states
paid to anyone on account of any kind of excellence, and
(Ethic. ix, 2). Since this difference of aspect in the object
thus it comprises piety and observance, and any similar
differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia is
virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken
divided into specifically different virtues.
in this sense it will have parts differing specifically from
Objection 2. Further, the mean differs specifically
one another. In another way it may be taken in a strict
from the extremes, as pale differs from white and black.
sense as denoting the reverence of a servant for his lord,
Now hyperdulia is apparently a mean between latria and
for dulia signifies servitude, as stated above (a. 3). Taken
dulia: for it is shown towards creatures having a special
in this sense it is not divided into different species, but is
affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin as being
one of the species of observance, mentioned by Tully (De
the mother of God. Therefore it seems that there are dif-
Invent. Rhet. ii), for the reason that a servant reveres his
ferent species of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other
lord under one aspect, a soldier his commanding officer
hyperdulia.
under another, the disciple his master under another, and
Objection 3. Further, just as in the rational creature
so on in similar cases.
we find the image of God, for which reason it is honored,
Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes dulia in a
so too in the irrational creature we find the trace of God.
wide sense.
Now the aspect of likeness denoted by an image differs
Reply to Objection 2.
Hyperdulia is the highest
from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we must
species of dulia taken in a wide sense, since the greatest
distinguish a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the
reverence is that which is due to a man by reason of his
more since honor is shown to certain irrational creatures,
having an affinity to God.
as, for instance, to the wood of the Holy Cross.
Reply to Objection 3. Man owes neither subjection
On the contrary, Dulia is condivided with latria. But
nor honor to an irrational creature considered in itself, in-
latria is not divided into different species. Neither there-
deed all such creatures are naturally subject to man. As
1684
to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay to it is the same ceives the same honor as the king himself, according to
as that which we pay to Christ, just as the king’s robe re-
Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv).
1685
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 104
Of Obedience
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether one man is bound to obey another?
(2) Whether obedience is a special virtue?
(3) Of its comparison with other virtues;
(4) Whether God must be obeyed in all things?
(5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?
(6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power?
Whether one man is bound to obey another?
IIa IIae q. 104 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that one man is not bound to
order the lower natural things need to be subject to the
obey another. For nothing should be done contrary to the
movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in virtue
divine ordinance. Now God has so ordered that man is
of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound
ruled by his own counsel, according to Ecclus. 15:14,
to obey their superiors.
“God made man from the beginning, and left him in the
Reply to Objection 1. God left man in the hand of
hand of his own counsel.” Therefore one man is not bound
his own counsel, not as though it were lawful to him to
to obey another.
do whatever he will, but because, unlike irrational crea-
Objection 2. Further, if one man were bound to obey
tures, he is not compelled by natural necessity to do what
another, he would have to look upon the will of the per-
he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding from
son commanding him, as being his rule of conduct. Now
his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his
God’s will alone, which is always right, is a rule of human
own counsel in doing other things, so too has he in the
conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God.
point of obeying his superiors. For Gregory says (Moral.
Objection 3. Further, the more gratuitous the service
xxxv), “When we humbly give way to another’s voice, we
the more is it acceptable. Now what a man does out of
overcome ourselves in our own hearts.”
duty is not gratuitous. Therefore if a man were bound
Reply to Objection 2. The will of God is the first
in duty to obey others in doing good deeds, for this very
rule whereby all rational wills are regulated: and to this
reason his good deeds would be rendered less acceptable
rule one will approaches more than another, according to
through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man
a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of the one man
is not bound to obey another.
who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will
On the contrary, It is prescribed (Heb. 13:17): “Obey
of this other man who obeys him.
your prelates and be subject to them.”
Reply to Objection 3. A thing may be deemed gra-
I answer that, Just as the actions of natural things
tuitous in two ways. In one way on the part of the deed
proceed from natural powers, so do human actions pro-
itself, because, to wit, one is not bound to do it; in another
ceed from the human will. In natural things it behooved
way, on the part of the doer, because he does it of his own
the higher to move the lower to their actions by the excel-
free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy
lence of the natural power bestowed on them by God: and
and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the
so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower
will. Wherefore although obedience be a duty, if one obey
by their will in virtue of a divinely established authority.
with a prompt will, one’s merit is not for that reason di-
Now to move by reason and will is to command. Where-
minished, especially before God, Who sees not only the
fore just as in virtue of the divinely established natural
outward deed, but also the inward will.
Whether obedience is a special virtue?
IIa IIae q. 104 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that obedience is not a special
fore obedience is not a special virtue.
virtue. For disobedience is contrary to obedience. But
Objection 2. Further, every special virtue is either
disobedience is a general sin, because Ambrose says (De
theological or moral. But obedience is not a theological
Parad. viii) that “sin is to disobey the divine law.” There-
virtue, since it is not comprised under faith, hope or char-
1686
ity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since it does not hold the mean a precept; and for disobedience that one treat the precept
between excess and deficiency, for the more obedient one
with actual contempt. On the other hand, if obedience be
is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a
taken in a wide sense for the performance of any action
special virtue.
that may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the
Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv)
omission of that action through any intention whatever,
that “obedience is the more meritorious and praiseworthy,
then obedience will be a general virtue, and disobedience
the less it holds its own.” But every special virtue is the
a general sin.
more to be praised the more it holds its own, since virtue
Reply to Objection 2. Obedience is not a theologi-
requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as stated in
cal virtue, for its direct object is not God, but the precept
Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
of any superior, whether expressed or inferred, namely, a
Objection 4. Further, virtues differ in species accord-
simple word of the superior, indicating his will, and which
ing to their objects. Now the object of obedience would
the obedient subject obeys promptly, according to Titus
seem to be the command of a superior, of which, appar-
3:1, “Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to obey
ently, there are as many kinds as there are degrees of su-
at a word,” etc.
periority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue, com-
It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of jus-
prising many special virtues.
tice, and it observes the mean between excess and defi-
On the contrary, obedience is reckoned by some to
ciency. Excess thereof is measured in respect, not of quan-
be a part of justice, as stated above (q. 80).
tity, but of other circumstances, in so far as a man obeys
I answer that, A special virtue is assigned to all good
either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he ought
deeds that have a special reason of praise: for it belongs
not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion
properly to virtue to render a deed good. Now obedience
(q. 92, a. 2). We may also reply that as in justice, ex-
to a superior is due in accordance with the divinely estab-
cess is in the person who retains another’s property, and
lished order of things, as shown above (a. 1), and there-
deficiency in the person who does not receive his due, ac-
fore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and
cording to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4), so too obedience
order, as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii)∗. Again,
observes the mean between excess on the part of him who
this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by rea-
fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds
son of its object. For while subjects have many obliga-
in fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the
tions towards their superiors, this one, that they are bound
superior, who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in
to obey their commands, stands out as special among the
this way obedience will be a mean between two forms of
rest. Wherefore obedience is a special virtue, and its spe-
wickedness, as was stated above concerning justice (q. 58,
cific object is a command tacit or express, because the su-
a. 10).
perior’s will, however it become known, is a tacit precept,
Reply to Objection 3. Obedience, like every virtue
and a man’s obedience seems to be all the more prompt,
requires the will to be prompt towards its proper object,
forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the express com-
but not towards that which is repugnant to it. Now the
mand as soon as he understands his superior’s will.
proper object of obedience is a precept, and this proceeds
Reply to Objection 1.
Nothing prevents the one
from another’s will. Wherefore obedience make a man’s
same material object from admitting two special aspects
will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker,
to which two special virtues correspond: thus a soldier,
namely, of the precept. If that which is prescribed to him
by defending his king’s fortress, fulfils both an act of for-
is willed by him for its own sake apart from its being pre-
titude, by facing the danger of death for a good end, and
scribed, as happens in agreeable matters, he tends towards
an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord.
it at once by his own will and seems to comply, not on ac-
Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience con-
count of the precept, but on account of his own will. But if
siders, occurs in acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of
that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own sake,
virtue, since not all acts of virtue are a matter of precept,
but, considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as hap-
as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 96, a. 3). Moreover, certain
pens in disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that
things are sometimes a matter of precept, and pertain to
it is not fulfilled except on account of the precept. Hence
no other virtue, such things for instance as are not evil
Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that “obedience perishes or
except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedi-
diminishes when it holds its own in agreeable matters,”
ence be taken in its proper sense, as considering formally
because, to wit, one’s own will seems to tend principally,
and intentionally the aspect of precept, it will be a special
not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to the ful-
virtue, and disobedience a special sin: because in this way
filment of one’s own desire; but that “it increases in dis-
it is requisite for obedience that one perform an act of jus-
agreeable or difficult matters,” because there one’s own
tice or of some other virtue with the intention of fulfilling
will tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must
∗ Cf. Ia, q. 5, a. 5
1687
be understood as regards outward appearances: for, on according to the various aspects of excellence. Obedi-the other hand, according to the judgment of God, Who
ence, on the other hand, regards the precept of the person
searches the heart, it may happen that even in agreeable
that excels, and therefore admits of only one aspect. And
matters obedience, while holding its own, is nonetheless
since obedience is due to a person’s precept on account
praiseworthy, provided the will of him that obeys tend no
of reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is
less devotedly† to the fulfilment of the precept.
of one species, though the causes from which it proceeds
Reply to Objection 4. Reverence regards directly the
differ specifically.
person that excels: wherefore it admits a various species
Whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues?
IIa IIae q. 104 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that obedience is the greatest
dle place, and the highest are the goods of the soul; and
of the virtues. For it is written (1 Kings 15:22): “Obedi-
among these the chief, in a way, is the will, in so far as,
ence is better than sacrifices.” Now the offering of sacri-
by his will, man makes use of all other goods. There-
fices belongs to religion, which is the greatest of all moral
fore, properly speaking, the virtue of obedience, whereby
virtues, as shown above (q. 81, a. 6). Therefore obedience
we contemn our own will for God’s sake, is more praise-
is the greatest of all virtues.
worthy than the other moral virtues, which contemn other
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv)
goods for the sake of God.
that “obedience is the only virtue that ingrafts virtues in
Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that “obedience
the soul and protects them when ingrafted.” Now the
is rightly preferred to sacrifices, because by sacrifices an-
cause is greater than the effect. Therefore obedience is
other’s body is slain whereas by obedience we slay our
greater than all the virtues.
own will.” Wherefore even any other acts of virtue are
Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv)
meritorious before God through being performed out of
that “evil should never be done out of obedience: yet
obedience to God’s will. For were one to suffer even mar-
sometimes for the sake of obedience we should lay aside
tyrdom, or to give all one’s goods to the poor, unless one
the good we are doing.” Now one does not lay aside a
directed these things to the fulfilment of the divine will,
thing except for something better. Therefore obedience,
which pertains directly to obedience, they could not be
for whose sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is
meritorious: as neither would they be if they were done
better than other virtues.
without charity, which cannot exist apart from obedience.
On the contrary, obedience deserves praise because
For it is written (1 Jn. 2:4,5): “He who saith that he
it proceeds from charity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv)
knoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a
that “obedience should be practiced, not out of servile
liar. . . but he that keepeth His word, in him in very deed
fear, but from a sense of charity, not through fear of pun-
the charity of God is perfected”: and this because friends
ishment, but through love of justice.” Therefore charity is
have the same likes and dislikes.
a greater virtue than obedience.
Reply to Objection 1. Obedience proceeds from rev-
I answer that, Just as sin consists in man contemn-
erence, which pays worship and honor to a superior, and
ing God and adhering to mutable things, so the merit of
in this respect it is contained under different virtues, al-
a virtuous act consists in man contemning created goods
though considered in itself, as regarding the aspect of pre-
and adhering to God as his end. Now the end is greater
cept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, in so far as it
than that which is directed to the end. Therefore if a man
proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a
contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to
way, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from
God, his virtue derives greater praise from his adhering
reverence for one’s parents, it is contained under piety;
to God than from his contemning earthly things. And so
and in so far as it proceeds from reverence for God, it
those, namely the theological, virtues whereby he adheres
comes under religion, and pertains to devotion, which is
to God in Himself, are greater than the moral virtues,
the principal act of religion. Wherefore from this point
whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in or-
of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God than to of-
der to adhere to God.
fer sacrifice, as well as because, “in a sacrifice we slay
Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which
another’s body, whereas by obedience we slay our own
a man contemns that he may adhere to God, the greater
will,” as Gregory says (Moral. xxxv). As to the special
the virtue. Now there are three kinds of human goods that
case in which Samuel spoke, it would have been better for
man may contemn for God’s sake. The lowest of these
Saul to obey God than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals
are external goods, the goods of the body take the mid-
of the Amalekites against the commandment of God.
† Cf. q. 82, a. 2
1688
Reply to Objection 2. All acts of virtue, in so far as virtuous acts: and in this way obedience is not prior to all
they come under a precept, belong to obedience. Where-
virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature.
fore according as acts of virtue act causally or disposi-
Reply to Objection 3. There are two kinds of good.
tively towards their generation and preservation, obedi-
There is that to which we are bound of necessity, for in-
ence is said to ingraft and protect all virtues. And yet
stance to love God, and so forth: and by no means may
it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all
such a good be set aside on account of obedience. But
virtues absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though
there is another good to which man is not bound of ne-
an act of virtue come under a precept, one may never-
cessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for
theless perform that act of virtue without considering the
the sake of obedience to which we are bound of necessity,
aspect of precept. Consequently, if there be any virtue,
since we ought not to do good by falling into sin. Yet as
whose object is naturally prior to the precept, that virtue
Gregory remarks (Moral. xxxv), “he who forbids his sub-
is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue
jects any single good, must needs allow them many others,
is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime nature of
lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from star-
divine authority, by reason of which the power to com-
vation, through being deprived of every good.” Thus the
mand is competent to God. Secondly, because infusion of
loss of one good may be compensated by obedience and
grace and virtues may precede, even in point of time, all
other goods.
Whether God ought to be obeyed in all things?
IIa IIae q. 104 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that God need not be obeyed in
bound to obey the divine command.
all things. For it is written (Mat. 9:30,31) that our Lord
Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord in telling the blind
after healing the two blind men commanded them, saying:
men to conceal the miracle had no intention of binding
“See that no man know this. But they going out spread His
them with the force of a divine precept, but, as Gregory
fame abroad in all that country.” Yet they are not blamed
says (Moral. xix), “gave an example to His servants who
for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to
follow Him that they might wish to hide their virtue and
obey God in all things.
yet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order
Objection 2. Further, no one is bound to do anything
that others might profit by their example.”
contrary to virtue. Now we find that God commanded cer-
Reply to Objection 2. Even as God does nothing con-
tain things contrary to virtue: thus He commanded Abra-
trary to nature (since “the nature of a thing is what God
ham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22); and the Jews
does therein,” according to a gloss on Rom. 11), and yet
to steal the property of the Egyptians (Ex. 11), which
does certain things contrary to the wonted course of na-
things are contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself
ture; so to God can command nothing contrary to virtue
a woman who was an adulteress (Osee 3), and this is con-
since virtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in
trary to chastity. Therefore God is not to be obeyed in all
conformity with God’s will and obedience to His com-
things.
mand, although it be contrary to the wonted mode of
Objection 3. Further, whoever obeys God conforms
virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to Abra-
his will to the divine will even as to the thing willed. But
ham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice,
we are not bound in all things to conform our will to the
since God is the author of life an death. Nor again was
divine will as to the thing willed, as stated above ( Ia IIae,
it contrary to justice that He commanded the Jews to take
q. 19, a. 10). Therefore man is not bound to obey God in
things belonging to the Egyptians, because all things are
all things.
His, and He gives them to whom He will. Nor was it
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 24:7): “All things
contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take an
that the Lord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obe-
adulteress, because God Himself is the ordainer of hu-
dient.”
man generation, and the right manner of intercourse with
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), he who obeys
woman is that which He appoints. Hence it is evident that
is moved by the command of the person he obeys, just as
the persons aforesaid did not sin, either by obeying God
natural things are moved by their motive causes. Now just
or by willing to obey Him.
a God is the first mover of all things that are moved nat-
Reply to Objection 3. Though man is not always
urally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, as shown
bound to will what God wills, yet he is always bound to
above ( Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 6). Therefore just as all natural
will what God wills him to will. This comes to man’s
things are subject to the divine motion by a natural neces-
knowledge chiefly through God’s command, wherefore
sity so too all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are
man is bound to obey God’s commands in all things.
1689
Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?
IIa IIae q. 104 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that subjects are bound to obey
regard the former and serve the latter? Therefore if the
their superiors in all things. For the Apostle says (Col.
emperor commands one thing and God another, you must
3:20): “Children, obey your parents in all things,” and
disregard the former and obey God.” Secondly, a subject
farther on (Col. 3:22): “Servants, obey in all things your
is not bound to obey his superior if the latter command
masters according to the flesh.” Therefore in like man-
him to do something wherein he is not subject to him. For
ner other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all
Seneca says (De Beneficiis iii): “It is wrong to suppose
things.
that slavery falls upon the whole man: for the better part
Objection 2. Further, superiors stand between God
of him is excepted.” His body is subjected and assigned to
and their subjects, according to Dt. 5:5, “I was the me-
his master but his soul is his own. Consequently in mat-
diator and stood between the Lord and you at that time,
ters touching the internal movement of the will man is not
to show you His words.” Now there is no going from ex-
bound to obey his fellow-man, but God alone.
treme to extreme, except through that which stands be-
Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in
tween. Therefore the commands of a superior must be
things that have to be done externally by means of the
esteemed the commands of God, wherefore the Apostle
body: and yet, since by nature all men are equal, he is not
says (Gal. 4:14): “You. . . received me as an angel of God,
bound to obey another man in matters touching the nature
even as Christ Jesus” and (1 Thess. 2:13): “When you
of the body, for instance in those relating to the support
had received of us the word of the hearing of God, you
of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore
received it, not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the
servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children
word of God.” Therefore as man is bound to obey God in
their parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of
all things, so is he bound to obey his superiors.
remaining in the state of virginity or the like. But in mat-
Objection 3. Further, just as religious in making their
ters concerning the disposal of actions and human affairs,
profession take vows of chastity and poverty, so do they
a subject is bound to obey his superior within the sphere of
also vow obedience. Now a religious is bound to observe
his authority; for instance a soldier must obey his general
chastity and poverty in all things. Therefore he is also
in matters relating to war, a servant his master in matters
bound to obey in all things.
touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 5:29): “We ought
his father in matters relating to the conduct of his life and
to obey God rather than men.” Now sometimes the things
the care of the household; and so forth.
commanded by a superior are against God. Therefore su-
Reply to Objection 1. When the Apostle says “in all
periors are not to be obeyed in all things.
things,” he refers to matters within the sphere of a father’s
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,4), he who
or master’s authority.
obeys is moved at the bidding of the person who com-
Reply to Objection 2. Man is subject to God simply
mands him, by a certain necessity of justice, even as a
as regards all things, both internal and external, wherefore
natural thing is moved through the power of its mover by
he is bound to obey Him in all things. On the other hand,
a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by
inferiors are not subject to their superiors in all things, but its mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a
only in certain things and in a particular way, in respect of
hindrance arising from the stronger power of some other
which the superior stands between God and his subjects,
mover; thus wood is not burnt by fire if a stronger force
whereas in respect of other matters the subject is imme-
of water intervene. Secondly, through lack of order in the
diately under God, by Whom he is taught either by the
movable with regard to its mover, since, though it is sub-
natural or by the written law.
ject to the latter’s action in one respect, yet it is not sub-
Reply to Objection 3. Religious profess obedience
ject thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes
as to the regular mode of life, in respect of which they
subject to the action of heat, as regards being heated, but
are subject to their superiors: wherefore they are bound
not as regards being dried up or consumed. In like man-
to obey in those matters only which may belong to the
ner there are two reasons, for which a subject may not be
regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for sal-
bound to obey his superior in all things. First on account
vation. If they be willing to obey even in other matters,
of the command of a higher power. For as a gloss says on
this will belong to the superabundance of perfection; pro-
Rom. 13:2, “They that resist [Vulg.: ‘He that resisteth’]
vided, however, such things be not contrary to God or to
the power, resist the ordinance of God” (cf. St. Augus-
the rule they profess, for obedience in this case would be
tine, De Verb. Dom. viii). “If a commissioner issue an
unlawful.
order, are you to comply, if it is contrary to the bidding
Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedi-
of the proconsul? Again if the proconsul command one
ence; one, sufficient for salvation, and consisting in obey-
thing, and the emperor another, will you hesitate, to dis-
ing when one is bound to obey: secondly, perfect obedi-
1690
ence, which obeys in all things lawful: thirdly, indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful.
Whether Christians are bound to obey the secular powers?
IIa IIae q. 104 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that Christians are not bound to
I answer that, Faith in Christ is the origin and cause
obey the secular power. For a gloss on Mat. 17:25, “Then
of justice, according to Rom. 3:22, “The justice of God
the children are free,” says: “If in every kingdom the chil-
by faith of Jesus Christ:” wherefore faith in Christ does
dren of the king who holds sway over that kingdom are
not void the order of justice, but strengthens it.” Now the
free, then the children of that King, under Whose sway
order of justice requires that subjects obey their superiors,
are all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom.” Now
else the stability of human affairs would cease. Hence
Christians, by their faith in Christ, are made children of
faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from the obli-
God, according to Jn. 1:12: “He gave them power to be
gation of obeying secular princes.
made the sons of God, to them that believe in His name.”
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 5), sub-
Therefore they are not bound to obey the secular power.
jection whereby one man is bound to another regards the
Objection 2.
Further, it is written (Rom.
7:4):
body; not the soul, which retains its liberty. Now, in this
“You. . . are become dead to the law by the body of Christ,”
state of life we are freed by the grace of Christ from de-
and the law mentioned here is the divine law of the Old
fects of the soul, but not from defects of the body, as the
Testament. Now human law whereby men are subject to
Apostle declares by saying of himself (Rom. 7:23) that
the secular power is of less account than the divine law of
in his mind he served the law of God, but in his flesh the
the Old Testament. Much more, therefore, since they have
law of sin. Wherefore those that are made children of
become members of Christ’s body, are men freed from the
God by grace are free from the spiritual bondage of sin,
law of subjection, whereby they were under the power of
but not from the bodily bondage, whereby they are held
secular princes.
bound to earthly masters, as a gloss observes on 1 Tim.
Objection 3. Further, men are not bound to obey rob-
6:1, “Whosoever are servants under the yoke,” etc.
bers, who oppress them with violence. Now, Augustine
Reply to Objection 2. The Old Law was a figure of
says (De Civ. Dei iv): “Without justice, what else is a
the New Testament, and therefore it had to cease on the
kingdom but a huge robbery?” Since therefore the author-
advent of truth. And the comparison with human law does
ity of secular princes is frequently exercised with injus-
not stand because thereby one man is subject to another.
tice, or owes its origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems
Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his fellow-man.
that Christians ought not to obey secular princes.
Reply to Objection 3. Man is bound to obey secu-
On the contrary, It is written (Titus 3:1): “Admon-
lar princes in so far as this is required by order of jus-
ish them to be subject to princes and powers,” and (1 Pet.
tice. Wherefore if the prince’s authority is not just but
2:13,14): “Be ye subject. . . to every human creature for
usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his subjects
God’s sake: whether it be to the king as excelling, or to
are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally,
governors as sent by him.”
in order to avoid scandal or danger.
1691
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 105
Of Disobedience
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider disobedience, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
Whether disobedience is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 105 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that disobedience is not a mor-
the commands of a superior is a mortal sin, as being con-
tal sin. For every sin is a disobedience, as appears from
trary to the love of God, according to Rom. 13:2, “He that
Ambrose’s definition given above (q. 104, a. 2, obj. 1).
resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God.” It is
Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, every sin
also contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it withdraws
would be mortal.
from the superior who is our neighbor the obedience that
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that
is his due.
disobedience is born of vainglory. But vainglory is not a
Reply to Objection 1. The definition given by Am-
mortal sin. Neither therefore is disobedience.
brose refers to mortal sin, which has the character of per-
Objection 3. Further, a person is said to be disobe-
fect sin. Venial sin is not disobedience, because it is not
dient when he does not fulfil a superior’s command. But
contrary to a precept, but beside it. Nor again is every
superiors often issue so many commands that it is seldom,
mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially, but only
if ever, possible to fulfil them. Therefore if disobedience
when one contemns a precept, since moral acts take their
were a mortal sin, it would follow that man cannot avoid
species from the end. And when a thing is done contrary
mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is
to a precept, not in contempt of the precept, but with some
not a mortal sin.
other purpose, it is not a sin of disobedience except mate-
On the contrary, The sin of disobedience to parents
rially, and belongs formally to another species of sin.
is reckoned (Rom. 1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2) among other mortal
Reply to Objection 2. Vainglory desires display of
sins.
excellence. And since it seems to point to a certain ex-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 24, a. 12; Ia IIae,
cellence that one be not subject to another’s command, it
q. 72, a. 5; Ia IIae, q. 88, a. 1), a mortal sin is one that
follows that disobedience arises from vainglory. But there
is contrary to charity which is the cause of spiritual life.
is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out of venial
Now by charity we love God and our neighbor. The char-
sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal.
ity of God requires that we obey His commandments, as
Reply to Objection 3. No one is bound to do the im-
stated above (q. 24, a. 12). Therefore to be disobedient to
possible: wherefore if a superior makes a heap of precepts
the commandments of God is a mortal sin, because it is
and lays them upon his subjects, so that they are unable to
contrary to the love of God.
fulfil them, they are excused from sin. Wherefore superi-
Again, the commandments of God contain the precept
ors should refrain from making a multitude of precepts.
of obedience to superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to
Whether disobedience is the most grievous of sins?
IIa IIae q. 105 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that disobedience is the most
sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against the Holy
grievous of sins. For it is written (1 Kings 15:23): “It
Ghost, and consequently is the most grievous of sins.
is like the sin of witchcraft to rebel, and like the crime
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19)
of idolatry to refuse to obey.” But idolatry is the most
that “by the disobedience of one man, many were made
grievous of sins, as stated above (q. 94, a. 3). Therefore
sinners.” Now the cause is seemingly greater than its ef-
disobedience is the most grievous of sins.
fect. Therefore disobedience seems to be a more grievous
Objection 2. Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost
sin than the others that are caused thereby.
is one that removes the obstacles of sin, as stated above
On the contrary, Contempt of the commander is a
(q. 14, a. 2). Now disobedience makes a man contemn a
more grievous sin than contempt of his command. Now
precept which, more than anything, prevents a man from
some sins are against the very person of the commander,
1692
such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore disobedience is God’s precept, from the very nature of disobedience is
not the most grievous of sins.
more grievous than a sin committed against a man, apart
I answer that, Not every disobedience is equally a
from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say
sin: for one disobedience may be greater than another, in
this because whoever sins against his neighbor acts also
two ways. First, on the part of the superior commanding,
against God’s commandment. And if the divine precept
since, although a man should take every care to obey each
be contemned in a yet graver matter, the sin is still more
superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a higher than a
grievous. The disobedience that contains contempt of a
lower authority, in sign of which the command of a lower
man’s precept is less grievous than the sin which con-
authority is set aside if it be contrary to the command of
temns the man who made the precept, because reverence
a higher authority. Consequently the higher the person
for the person commanding should give rise to reverence
who commands, the more grievous is it to disobey him:
for his command. In like manner a sin that directly in-
so that it is more grievous to disobey God than man. Sec-
volves contempt of God, such as blasphemy, or the like, is
ondly, on the part of the things commanded. For the per-
more grievous (even if we mentally separate the disobedi-
son commanding does not equally desire the fulfilment of
ence from the sin) than would be a sin involving contempt
all his commands: since every such person desires above
of God’s commandment alone.
all the end, and that which is nearest to the end. Where-
Reply to Objection 1. This comparison of Samuel is
fore disobedience is the more grievous, according as the
one, not of equality but of likeness, because disobedience
unfulfilled commandment is more in the intention of the
redounds to the contempt of God just as idolatry does,
person commanding. As to the commandments of God, it
though the latter does so more.
is evident that the greater the good commanded, the more
Reply to Objection 2. Not every disobedience is sin
grievous the disobedience of that commandment, because
against the Holy Ghost, but only that which obstinacy is
since God’s will is essentially directed to the good, the
added: for it is not the contempt of any obstacle to sin that
greater the good the more does God wish it to be fulfilled.
constitutes sin against the Holy Ghost, else the contempt
Consequently he that disobeys the commandment of the
of any good would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, since
love of God sins more grievously than one who disobeys
any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin
the commandment of the love of our neighbor. On the
against the Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those
other hand, man’s will is not always directed to the greater
goods which lead directly to repentance and the remission
good: hence, when we are bound by a mere precept of
of sins.
man, a sin is more grievous, not through setting aside a
Reply to Objection 3. The first sin of our first par-
greater good, but through setting aside that which is more
ent, from which sin was transmitted to a men, was not
in the intention of the person commanding.
disobedience considered as a special sin, but pride, from
Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must
which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the Apostle
correspond with the various degrees of precepts: be-
in these words seems to take disobedience in its relation
cause the disobedience in which there is contempt of
to every sin.
1693
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 106
Of Thankfulness or Gratitude
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and ingratitude. Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?
(2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent?
(3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors?
(4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred?
(5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor received or the disposition of the giver?
(6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received?
Whether thankfulness is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?
IIa IIae q. 106 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that thankfulness is not a spe-
fourthly it is found in a benefactor, from whom we have
cial virtue, distinct from other virtue. For we have re-
received particular and private favors, on account of which
ceived the greatest benefits from God, and from our par-
we are under particular obligation to him.
ents. Now the honor which we pay to God in return be-
Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father,
longs to the virtue of religion, and the honor with which
or a person excelling in dignity, is not the same as what
we repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety. There-
we owe a benefactor from whom we have received some
fore thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other
particular favor, it follows that after religion, whereby we
virtues.
pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we worship
Objection 2. Further, proportionate repayment be-
our parents, and observance, whereby we worship per-
longs to commutative justice, according to the Philoso-
sons excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or grati-
pher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose of giving thanks is
tude, whereby we give thanks to our benefactors. And
repayment (Ethic. 5,4). Therefore thanksgiving, which
it is distinct from the foregoing virtues, just as each of
belongs to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore grati-
these is distinct from the one that precedes, as falling short
tude is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues.
thereof.
Objection 3. Further, acknowledgment of favor re-
Reply to Objection 1. Just as religion is superex-
ceived is requisite for the preservation of friendship, ac-
celling piety, so is it excelling thankfulness or grati-
cording to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13; ix, 1). Now
tude: wherefore giving thanks to God was reckoned above
friendship is associated with all the virtues, since they are
(q. 83, a. 17) among things pertaining to religion.
the reason for which man is loved. Therefore thankfulness
Reply to Objection 2. Proportionate repayment be-
or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors received,
longs to commutative justice, when it answers to the legal
is not a special virtue.
due; for instance when it is contracted that so much be
On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special
paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to the
part of justice (De Invent. Rhet. ii).
virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 60, a. 3),
debt, and is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is
the nature of the debt to be paid must needs vary accord-
less thankful when compelled, as Seneca observes (De
ing to various causes giving rise to the debt, yet so that
Beneficiis iii).
the greater always includes the lesser. Now the cause of
Reply to Objection 3. Since true friendship is based
debt is found primarily and chiefly in God, in that He is
on virtue, whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend
the first principle of all our goods: secondarily it is found
is an obstacle to friendship, and whatever in him is virtu-
in our father, because he is the proximate principle of our
ous is an incentive to friendship. In this way friendship is
begetting and upbringing: thirdly it is found in the person
preserved by repayment of favors, although repayment of
that excels in dignity, from whom general favors proceed;
favors belongs specially to the virtue of gratitude.
1694
Whether the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent?
IIa IIae q. 106 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that the innocent is more bound
than the penitent.
to give thanks to God than the penitent. For the greater
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 7:43): “To whom
the gift one has received from God, the more one is bound
more is forgiven, he loveth more∗.” Therefore for the
to give Him thanks. Now the gift of innocence is greater
same reason he is bound to greater thanksgiving.
than that of justice restored. Therefore it seems that the
I answer that, Thanksgiving [gratiarum actio] in the
innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the
recipient corresponds to the favor [gratia] of the giver: so
penitent.
that when there is greater favor on the part of the giver,
Objection 2. Further, a man owes love to his bene-
greater thanks are due on the part of the recipient. Now
factor just as he owes him gratitude. Now Augustine says
a favor is something bestowed “gratis”: wherefore on the
(Confess. ii): “What man, weighing his own infirmity,
part of the giver the favor may be greater on two counts.
would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to his own
First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and in this
strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he
way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he
had less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins
receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speak-
to those that turn to Thee?” And farther on he says: “And
ing, a more continuous gift, other things being equal. Sec-
for this let him love Thee as much, yea and more, since by
ondly, a favor may be said to be greater, because it is
Whom he sees me to have been recovered from such deep
given more gratuitously; and in this sense the penitent
torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been from
is more bound to give thanks than the innocent, because
the like torpor of sin preserved.” Therefore the innocent
what he receives from God is more gratuitously given:
is also more bound to give thanks than the penitent.
since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has
Objection 3. Further, the more a gratuitous favor is
received grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed
continuous, the greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now
on the innocent is, considered absolutely, greater, yet the
the favor of divine grace is more continuous in the inno-
gift bestowed on the penitent is greater in relation to him:
cent than in the penitent. For Augustine says (Confess.
even as a small gift bestowed on a poor man is greater to
iii): “To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy, that
him than a great gift is to a rich man. And since actions
Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy
are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to take
grace I ascribe also whatsoever I have not done of evil;
note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is
for what might I not have done?. . . Yea, all I confess to
such absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in
have been forgiven me, both what evils I committed by
treating of the voluntary and the involuntary.
my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance committed
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
not.” Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks
Whether a man is bound to give thanks to every benefactor?
IIa IIae q. 106 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that the a man is not bound to
does a good turn to his master. Therefore gratitude is not
give thanks to every benefactor. For a man may benefit
due to every benefactor .
himself just as he may harm himself, according to Ec-
Objection 5. Further, no one is bound to do what he
clus. 14:5, “He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be
cannot do equitably and advantageously. Now it happens
good?” But a man cannot thank himself, since thanksgiv-
at times that the benefactor is very well off, and it would
ing seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore
be of no advantage to him to be repaid for a favor he has
thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor.
bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the benefactor
Objection 2. Further, gratitude is a repayment of an
from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would
act of grace. But some favors are granted without grace,
not seem equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a
and are rudely, slowly and grudgingly given. Therefore
favor may be a poor man, and is quite unable to repay.
gratitude is not always due to a benefactor.
Therefore seemingly a man is not always bound to repay-
Objection 3. Further, no thanks are due to one who
ment for favors received.
works for his own profit. But sometimes people bestow
Objection 6. Further, no one is bound to do for an-
favors for their own profit. Therefore thanks are not due
other what is inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now some-
to them.
times it happens that repayment of a favor would be hurt-
Objection 4. Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for
ful or useless to the person repaid. Therefore favors are
all that he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave
not always to be repaid by gratitude.
∗ Vulg.: ‘To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less’ Lk. 7:47
1695
On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 5:18): “In all a kindness, unless the giver has been the loser thereby.”
things give thanks.”
Reply to Objection 4. As Seneca observes (De Benef.
I answer that, Every effect turns naturally to its cause; iii), “when a slave does what is wont to be demanded of a
wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that “God turns
slave, it is part of his service: when he does more than a
all things to Himself because He is the cause of all”: for
slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as soon as he does
the effect must needs always be directed to the end of the
anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that be his
agent. Now it is evident that a benefactor, as such, is cause
motive, it is no longer called service.” Wherefore grati-
of the beneficiary. Hence the natural order requires that
tude is due even to a slave, when he does more than his
he who has received a favor should, by repaying the fa-
duty.
vor, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each.
Reply to Objection 5. A poor man is certainly not
And, as stated above with regard to a father (q. 31, a. 3;
ungrateful if he does what he can. For since kindness de-
q. 101, a. 2), a man owes his benefactor, as such, honor
pends on the heart rather than on the deed, so too grat-
and reverence, since the latter stands to him in the relation
itude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says (De
of principle; but accidentally he owes him assistance or
Benef. ii): “Who receives a favor gratefully, has already
support, if he need it.
begun to pay it back: and that we are grateful for favors
Reply to Objection 1. In the words of Seneca (1
received should be shown by the outpourings of the heart,
Benef. v), “just as a man is liberal who gives not to him-
not only in his hearing but everywhere.” From this it is ev-
self but to others, and gracious who forgives not himself
ident that however well off a man may be, it is possible to
but others, and merciful who is moved, not by his own
thank him for his kindness by showing him reverence and
misfortunes but by another’s, so too, no man confers a fa-
honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14):
vor on himself, he is but following the bent of his nature,
“He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is
which moves him to resist what hurts him, and to seek
in want should be repaid with money”: and Seneca writes
what is profitable.” Wherefore in things that one does for
(De Benef. vi): “There are many ways of repaying those
oneself, there is no place for gratitude or ingratitude, since
who are well off, whatever we happen to owe them; such
a man cannot deny himself a thing except by keeping it.
as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable and pleasant
Nevertheless things which are properly spoken of in rela-
conversation without flattery.” Therefore there is no need
tion to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to
for a man to desire neediness or distress in his benefac-
oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding justice (Ethic.
tor before repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says
v, 11), in so far, to wit, as the various parts of man are
(De Benef. vi), “it were inhuman to desire this in one from
considered as though they were various persons.
whom you have received no favor; how much more so to
Reply to Objection 2. It is the mark of a happy dispo-
desire it in one whose kindness has made you his debtor!”
sition to see good rather than evil. Wherefore if someone
If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue,
has conferred a favor, not as he ought to have conferred
nevertheless he should be repaid according to his state,
it, the recipient should not for that reason withhold his
that he may return to virtue if possible. But if he be so
thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the favor had
wicked as to be incurable, then his heart has changed,
been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for, as
and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness,
Seneca remarks (De Benef. ii.) “promptness enhances,
as heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin,
delay discounts a favor.”
the kindness he has shown should be held in memory, as
Reply to Objection 3. As Seneca observes (De Benef.
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3).
vi), “it matters much whether a person does a kindness to
Reply to Objection 6. As stated in the preceding re-
us for his own sake, or for ours, or for both his and ours.
ply, repayment of a favor depends chiefly on the affection
He that considers himself only, and benefits because can-
of the heart: wherefore repayment should be made in such
not otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a man who
a way as to prove most beneficial. If, however, through the
seeks fodder for his cattle.” And farther on: “If he has
benefactor’s carelessness it prove detrimental to him, this
done it for me in common with himself, having both of us
is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca
in his mind, I am ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless
observes (De Benef. vii): “It is my duty to repay, and not
I rejoice that what was profitable to him is profitable to me
to keep back and safeguard my repayment.”
also. It is the height of malevolence to refuse to recognize
1696
Whether a man is bound to repay a favor at once?
IIa IIae q. 106 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that a man is bound to repay a
(De Benef. ii): “Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive
favor at once. For we are bound to restore at once what
it graciously.” As regards the gift, one ought to wait un-
we owe, unless the term be fixed. Now there is no term
til such a time as will be convenient to the benefactor. In
prescribed for the repayment of favors, and yet this repay-
fact, if instead of choosing a convenient time, one wished
ment is a duty, as stated above (a. 3). Therefore a man is
to repay at once, favor for favor, it would not seem to be a
bound to repay a favor at once.
virtuous, but a constrained repayment. For, as Seneca ob-
Objection 2. Further, a good action would seem to
serves (De Benef. iv), “he that wishes to repay too soon,
be all the more praiseworthy according as it is done with
is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is ungrate-
greater earnestness. Now earnestness seems to make a
ful.”
man do his duty without any delay. Therefore it is appar-
Reply to Objection 1. A legal debt must be paid at
ently more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once.
once, else the equality of justice would not be preserved,
Objection 3. Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that
if one kept another’s property without his consent. But
“it is proper to a benefactor to act freely and quickly.”
a moral debt depends on the equity of the debtor: and
Now repayment ought to equal the favor received. There-
therefore it should be repaid in due time according as the
fore it should be done at once.
rectitude of virtue demands.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. iv): “He
Reply to Objection 2. Earnestness of the will is not
that hastens to repay, is animated with a sense, not of grat-
virtuous unless it be regulated by reason; wherefore it
itude but of indebtedness.”
is not praiseworthy to forestall the proper time through
I answer that, Just as in conferring a favor two things
earnestness.
are to be considered, namely, the affection of the heart and
Reply to Objection 3. Favors also should be con-
the gift, so also must these things be considered in repay-
ferred at a convenient time and one should no longer de-
ing the favor. As regards the affection of the heart, re-
lay when the convenient time comes; and the same is to
payment should be made at once, wherefore Seneca says
be observed in repaying favors.
Whether in giving thanks we should look at the benefactor’s disposition or at the IIa IIae q. 106 a. 5
deed?
Objection 1.
It seems that in repaying favors we
On the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs,
should not look at the benefactor’s disposition but at the
though in different ways, to friendship and likewise to the
deed. For repayment is due to beneficence, and benefi-
virtue of gratitude when it has the character of a moral
cence consists in deeds, as the word itself denotes. There-
debt. For in the repayment of friendship we have to con-
fore in repaying favors we should look at the deed.
sider the cause of friendship; so that in the friendship that
Objection 2. Further, thanksgiving, whereby we re-
is based on the useful, repayment should be made accord-
pay favors, is a part of justice. But justice considers equal-
ing to the usefulness accruing from the favor conferred,
ity between giving and taking. Therefore also in repaying
and in the friendship based on virtue repayment should be
favors we should consider the deed rather than the dispo-
made with regard for the choice or disposition of the giver,
sition of the benefactor.
since this is the chief requisite of virtue, as stated in Ethic.
Objection 3. Further, no one can consider what he
viii, 13. And likewise, since gratitude regards the favor
does not know. Now God alone knows the interior dispo-
inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis, and this regards the dis-
sition. Therefore it is impossible to repay a favor accord-
position of the giver, it follows again that repayment of a
ing to the benefactor’s disposition.
favor depends more on the disposition of the giver than on
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. i): “We
the effect.
are sometimes under a greater obligation to one who has
Reply to Objection 1. Every moral act depends on the
given little with a large heart, and has bestowed a small
will. Hence a kindly action, in so far as it is praiseworthy
favor, yet willingly.”
and is deserving of gratitude, consists materially in the
I answer that, The repayment of a favor may belong
thing done, but formally and chiefly in the will. Hence
to three virtues, namely, justice, gratitude and friendship.
Seneca says (De Benef. i): “A kindly action consists not
It belongs to justice when the repayment has the charac-
in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the giver or doer.”
ter of a legal debt, as in a loan and the like: and in such
Reply to Objection 2. Gratitude is a part of justice,
cases repayment must be made according to the quantity
not indeed as a species is part of a genus, but by a kind of
received.
reduction to the genus of justice, as stated above (q. 80).
1697
Hence it does not follow that we shall find the same kind man also can know it. It is thus that a benefactor’s dis-of debt in both virtues.
position is known by the way in which he does the kindly
Reply to Objection 3. God alone sees man’s disposi-
action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and read-
tion in itself: but in so far as it is shown by certain signs,
ily.
Whether the repayment of gratitude should surpass the favor received?
IIa IIae q. 106 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that there is no need for the re-
Wherefore the beneficiary is under a moral obligation to
payment of gratitude to surpass the favor received. For it
bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not seem
is not possible to make even equal repayment to some, for
to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity
instance, one’s parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
of the favor received: because so long as he repays less or
viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt the impossible.
an equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but
Therefore gratitude for a favor does not tend to something
only to return what he has received. Therefore gratitude
yet greater.
always inclines, as far as possible, to pay back something
Objection 2. Further, if one person repays another
more.
more than he has received by his favor, by that very fact
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 3, ad 5;
he gives him something his turn, as it were. But the lat-
a. 5), in repaying favors we must consider the disposition
ter owes him repayment for the favor which in his turn
rather than the deed. Accordingly, if we consider the ef-
the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that first
fect of beneficence, which a son receives from his parents
conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repay-
namely, to be and to live, the son cannot make an equal
ment, and so on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive
repayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). But
at the indefinite, since “the indefinite removes the nature
if we consider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then
of good” (Metaph. ii, text. 8). Therefore repayment of
it is possible for the son to pay back something greater to
gratitude should not surpass the favor received.
his father, as Seneca declares (De Benef. iii). If, however,
Objection 3. Further, justice consists in equality. But
he were unable to do so, the will to pay back would be
“more” is excess of equality. Since therefore excess is
sufficient for gratitude.
sinful in every virtue, it seems that to repay more than the
Reply to Objection 2. The debt of gratitude flows
favor received is sinful and opposed to justice.
from charity, which the more it is paid the more it is due,
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5):
according to Rom. 13:8, “Owe no man anything, but to
“We should repay those who are gracious to us, by be-
love one another.” Wherefore it is not unreasonable if the
ing gracious to them return,” and this is done by repaying
obligation of gratitude has no limit.
more than we have received. Therefore gratitude should
Reply to Objection 3. As in injustice, which is a car-
incline to do something greater.
dinal virtue, we consider equality of things, so in gratitude
I answer that, As stated above (a. 5), gratitude regards we consider equality of wills. For while on the one hand
the favor received according the intention of the benefac-
the benefactor of his own free-will gave something he was
tor; who seems be deserving of praise, chiefly for having
not bound to give, so on the other hand the beneficiary re-
conferred the favor gratis without being bound to do so.
pays something over and above what he has received.
1698
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 107
Of Ingratitude
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider ingratitude, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether ingratitude is always a sin?
(2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin?
(3) Whether every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful?
Whether ingratitude is always a sin?
IIa IIae q. 107 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that ingratitude is not always a
Wherefore it is evident that every ingratitude is a sin.
sin. For Seneca says (De Benef. iii) that “he who does
Reply to Objection 1. Gratitude regards a favor re-
not repay a favor is ungrateful.” But sometimes it is im-
ceived: and he that helps another to commit a sin does
possible to repay a favor without sinning, for instance if
him not a favor but an injury: and so no thanks are due
one man has helped another to commit a sin. Therefore,
to him, except perhaps on account of his good will, sup-
since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that
posing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to
ingratitude is not always a sin.
help him in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In
Objection 2. Further, every sin is in the power of the
such a case the repayment due to him is not that he should
person who commits it: because, according to Augustine
be helped to commit a sin, because this would be repaying
(De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i), “no man sins in what he
not good but evil, and this is contrary to gratitude.
cannot avoid.” Now sometimes it is not in the power of
Reply to Objection 2. No man is excused from in-
the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance when he has
gratitude through inability to repay, for the very reason
not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in
that the mere will suffices for the repayment of the debt of
our power, and yet Seneca declares (De Benef. iii) that “to
gratitude, as stated above (q. 106, a. 6, ad 1).
forget a kindness is the height of ingratitude.” Therefore
Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingrati-
ingratitude is not always a sin.
tude, not indeed the forgetfulness that arises from a natu-
Objection 3. Further, there would seem to be no re-
ral defect, that is not subject to the will, but that which
payment in being unwilling to owe anything, according to
arises from negligence.
For, as Seneca observes (De
the Apostle (Rom. 13:8), “Owe no man anything.” Yet
Benef. iii), “when forgetfulness of favors lays hold of a
“an unwilling debtor is ungrateful,” as Seneca declares
man, he has apparently given little thought to their repay-
(De Benef. iv). Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.
ment.”
On the contrary, Ingratitude is reckoned among other
Reply to Objection 3. The debt of gratitude flows
sins (2 Tim. 3:2), where it is written: “Disobedient to par-
from the debt of love, and from the latter no man should
ents, ungrateful, wicked.” etc.
wish to be free. Hence that anyone should owe this debt
I answer that, As stated above (q. 106, a. 4, ad 1, a. 6) unwillingly seems to arise from lack of love for his benea debt of gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now
factor.
a thing is a sin from the fact of its being contrary to virtue.
Whether ingratitude is a special sin?
IIa IIae q. 107 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that ingratitude is not a spe-
Objection 3. Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. iii):
cial sin. For whoever sins acts against God his sovereign
“It is ungrateful to take no notice of a kindness, it is un-
benefactor. But this pertains to ingratitude. Therefore in-
grateful not to repay one, but it is the height of ingratitude
gratitude is not a special sin.
to forget it.” Now these do not seem to belong to the same
Objection 2. Further, no special sin is contained under
species of sin. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.
different kinds of sin. But one can be ungrateful by com-
On the contrary, Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude
mitting different kinds of sin, for instance by calumny,
or thankfulness, which is a special virtue. Therefore it is
theft, or something similar committed against a benefac-
a special sin.
tor. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.
I answer that, Every vice is denominated from a de-
1699
ficiency of virtue, because deficiency is more opposed to is first in the order of destruction, it follows that the first virtue: thus illiberality is more opposed to liberality than
degree of ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a fa-
prodigality is. Now a vice may be opposed to the virtue
vor, the second when he declines to notice or indicate that
of gratitude by way of excess, for instance if one were to
he has received a favor, while the third and supreme de-
show gratitude for things for which gratitude is not due,
gree is when a man fails to recognize the reception of a
or sooner than it is due, as stated above (q. 106, a. 4).
favor, whether by forgetting it or in any other way. More-
But still more opposed to gratitude is the vice denoting
over, since opposite affirmation includes negation, it fol-
deficiency of gratitude, because the virtue of gratitude,
lows that it belongs to the first degree of ingratitude to
as stated above (q. 106, a. 6), inclines to return some-
return evil for good, to the second to find fault with a fa-
thing more. Wherefore ingratitude is properly denomi-
vor received, and to the third to esteem kindness as though
nated from being a deficiency of gratitude. Now every
it were unkindness.
deficiency or privation takes its species from the opposite
Reply to Objection 1. In every sin there is material
habit: for blindness and deafness differ according to the
ingratitude to God, inasmuch as a man does something
difference of sight and hearing. Therefore just as gratitude
that may pertain to ingratitude. But formal ingratitude is
or thankfulness is one special virtue, so also is ingratitude
when a favor is actually contemned, and this is a special
one special sin.
sin.
It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their
Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders the formal as-
order to the things required for gratitude. The first of
pect of some special sin from being found materially in
these is to recognize the favor received, the second to ex-
several kinds of sin, and in this way the aspect of ingrati-
press one’s appreciation and thanks, and the third to repay
tude is to be found in many kinds of sin.
the favor at a suitable place and time according to one’s
Reply to Objection 3. These three are not different
means. And since what is last in the order of generation
species but different degrees of one special sin.
Whether ingratitude is always a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 107 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that ingratitude is always a mor-
above (a. 2), a man may be ungrateful in two ways: first,
tal sin. For one ought to be grateful to God above all. But
by mere omission, for instance by failing to recognize the
one is not ungrateful to God by committing a venial sin:
favor received, or to express his appreciation of it or to
else every man would be guilty of ingratitude. Therefore
pay something in return, and this is not always a mortal
no ingratitude is a venial sin.
sin, because, as stated above (q. 106, a. 6), the debt of
Objection 2. Further, a sin is mortal through being
gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which,
contrary to charity, as stated above (q. 24, a. 12). But in-
however, he is not bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do
gratitude is contrary to charity, since the debt of gratitude
so, he does not sin mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin,
proceeds from that virtue, as stated above (q. 106, a. 1, ad
because it arises either from some kind of negligence or
3; a. 6, ad 2). Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin.
from some disinclination to virtue in him. And yet ingrati-
Objection 3. Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii):
tude of this kind may happen to be a mortal sin, by reason
“Between the giver and the receiver of a favor there is this
either of inward contempt, or of the kind of thing with-
law, that the former should forthwith forget having given,
held, this being needful to the benefactor, either simply,
and the latter should never forget having received.” Now,
or in some case of necessity.
seemingly, the reason why the giver should forget is that
Secondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not
he may be unaware of the sin of the recipient, should the
only omits to pay the debt of gratitude, but does the con-
latter prove ungrateful; and there would be no necessity
trary. This again is sometimes mortal and sometimes a
for that if ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingrati-
venial sin, according to the kind of thing that is done.
tude is always a mortal sin.
It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude
Objection 4. On the contrary, No one should be put
arises from a mortal sin, it has the perfect character of in-
in the way of committing a mortal sin. Yet, according
gratitude, and when it arises from venial sin, it has the
to Seneca (De Benef. ii), “sometimes it is necessary to
imperfect character.
deceive the person who receives assistance, in order that
Reply to Objection 1. By committing a venial sin one
he may receive without knowing from whom he has re-
is not ungrateful to God to the extent of incurring the guilt
ceived.” But this would seem to put the recipient in the
of perfect ingratitude: but there is something of ingrati-
way of ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always a
tude in a venial sin, in so far as it removes a virtuous act
mortal sin.
of obedience to God.
I answer that, As appears from what we have said
Reply to Objection 2. When ingratitude is a venial
1700
sin it is not contrary to, but beside charity: since it does Reply to Objection 4. He that is unaware of a fa-not destroy the habit of charity, but excludes some act
vor conferred on him is not ungrateful, if he fails to re-
thereof.
pay it, provided he be prepared to do so if he knew. It
Reply to Objection 3. Seneca also says (De Benef.
is nevertheless commendable at times that the object of a
vii): “When we say that a man after conferring a favor
favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to
should forget about it, it is a mistake to suppose that we
avoid vainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into
mean him to shake off the recollection of a thing so very
a house secretly, wishing to avoid popularity: and because
praiseworthy. When we say: He must not remember it, we
the kindness is all the greater through the benefactor wish-
mean that he must not publish it abroad and boast about
ing not to shame the person on whom he is conferring the
it.”
favor.
Whether favors should be withheld from the ungrateful?
IIa IIae q. 107 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that favors should withheld
be deprived of our favor. The second is, what ought his
from the ungrateful. For it is written (Wis. 16:29): “The
benefactor to do? For in the first place he should not eas-
hope of the unthankful shall melt away as the winter’s
ily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks
ice.” But this hope would not melt away unless favors
(De Benef. iii), “a man is often grateful although he re-
were withheld from him. Therefore favors should be with-
pays not,” because perhaps he has not the means or the
held from the ungrateful.
opportunity of repaying. Secondly, he should be inclined
Objection 2. Further, no one should afford another an
to turn his ungratefulness into gratitude, and if he does not
occasion of committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiv-
achieve this by being kind to him once, he may by being
ing a favor is given an occasion of ingratitude. Therefore
so a second time. If, however, the more he repeats his fa-
favors should not be bestowed on the ungrateful.
vors, the more ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he
Objection 3. Further, “By what things a man sinneth,
should cease from bestowing his favors upon him.
by the same also he is tormented” (Wis. 11:17). Now he
Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted speaks of
that is ungrateful when he receives a favor sins against the
what the ungrateful man deserves to suffer.
favor. Therefore he should be deprived of the favor.
Reply to Objection 2. He that bestows a favor on an
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 6:35) that “the
ungrateful person affords him an occasion not of sin but
Highest. . . is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil.” Now
of gratitude and love. And if the recipient takes therefrom
we should prove ourselves His children by imitating Him
an occasion of ingratitude, this is not to be imputed to the
(Lk. 6:36). Therefore we should not withhold favors from
bestower.
the ungrateful.
Reply to Objection 3. He that bestows a favor must
I answer that, There are two points to be considered
not at once act the part of a punisher of ingratitude, but
with regard to an ungrateful person. The first is what he
rather that of a kindly physician, by healing the ingrati-
deserves to suffer and thus it is certain that he deserves to
tude with repeated favors.
1701
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 108
Of Vengeance
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider vengeance, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether vengeance is lawful?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Of the manner of taking vengeance;
(4) On whom should vengeance be taken?
Whether vengeance is lawful?
IIa IIae q. 108 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that vengeance is not lawful.
day and night?” as if to say: “He will indeed.” Therefore
For whoever usurps what is God’s sins. But vengeance
vengeance is not essentially evil and unlawful.
belongs to God, for it is written (Dt.
32:35, Rom.
I answer that, Vengeance consists in the infliction of
12:19): “Revenge to Me, and I will repay.” Therefore all
a penal evil on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the
vengeance is unlawful.
matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the
Objection 2. Further, he that takes vengeance on a
avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil
man does not bear with him. But we ought to bear with
of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests there,
the wicked, for a gloss on Cant 2:2, “As the lily among the
then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take
thorns,” says: “He is not a good man that cannot bear with
pleasure in another’s evil belongs to hatred, which is con-
a wicked one.” Therefore we should not take vengeance
trary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men.
on the wicked.
Nor is it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who
Objection 3. Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting
has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man ex-
punishment, which is the cause of servile fear. But the
cused for hating one that hates him: for a man may not sin
New Law is not a law of fear, but of love, as Augustine
against another just because the latter has already sinned
states (Contra Adamant. xvii). Therefore at least in the
against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which
New Testament all vengeance is unlawful.
was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Rom. 12:21):
Objection 4. Further, a man is said to avenge himself
“Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good.”
when he takes revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself.
If, however, the avenger’s intention be directed chiefly
But, seemingly, it is unlawful even for a judge to punish
to some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment
those who have wronged him: for Chrysostom∗ says: “Let
of the person who has sinned (for instance that the sinner
us learn after Christ’s example to bear our own wrongs
may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and oth-
with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God’s wrongs, not
ers be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God
even by listening to them.” Therefore vengeance seems
honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other
to be unlawful.
due circumstances be observed.
Objection 5. Further, the sin of a multitude is more
Reply to Objection 1. He who takes vengeance on
harmful than the sin of only one: for it is written (Ecclus.
the wicked in keeping with his rank and position does not
26:5-7): “Of three things my heart hath been afraid. . . the
usurp what belongs to God but makes use of the power
accusation of a city, and the gathering together of the
granted him by God. For it is written (Rom. 13:4) of the
people, and a false calumny.” But vengeance should not
earthly prince that “he is God’s minister, an avenger to ex-
be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Mat.
ecute wrath upon him that doeth evil.” If, however, a man
13:29,30, “Lest perhaps. . . you root up the wheat. . . suffer
takes vengeance outside the order of divine appointment,
both to grow,” says that “a multitude should not be excom-
he usurps what is God’s and therefore sins.
municated, nor should the sovereign.” Neither therefore is
Reply to Objection 2. The good bear with the wicked
any other vengeance lawful.
by enduring patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they
On the contrary, We should look to God for noth-
themselves receive from them: but they do not bear with
ing save what is good and lawful. But we are to look to
them as to endure the wrongs they inflict on God and their
God for vengeance on His enemies: for it is written (Lk.
neighbor. For Chrysostom† says: “It is praiseworthy to
18:7): “Will not God revenge His elect who cry to Him
be patient under our own wrongs, but to overlook God’s
∗ Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed to St.
Chrysostom
† Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely as-
cribed to St. Chrysostom
1702
wrongs is most wicked.”
in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the children of
Reply to Objection 3. The law of the Gospel is the
Israel (Ex. 14), and the people of Sodom were entirely de-
law of love, and therefore those who do good out of love,
stroyed (Gn. 19)—or as regards part of the multitude, as
and who alone properly belong to the Gospel, ought not
may be seen in the punishment of those who worshipped
to be terrorized by means of punishment, but only those
the calf.
who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though
Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many mak-
they belong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it
ing amends, the severity of vengeance should be brought
in merit.
to bear on a few of the principals, whose punishment fills
Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes a wrong done to
the rest with fear; thus the Lord (Num 25) commanded
a person reflects on God and the Church: and then it is
the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin of the
the duty of that person to avenge the wrong. For exam-
multitude.
ple, Elias made fire descend on those who were come to
On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a
seize him (4 Kings 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys
part of the multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty
that mocked him (4 Kings 2); and Pope Sylverius excom-
can be separated from the innocent, vengeance should be
municated those who sent him into exile (XXIII, Q. iv,
wrought on them: provided, however, that this can be
Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far as the wrong inflicted
done without scandal to others; else the multitude should
on a man affects his person, he should bear it patiently if
be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the
this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to
sovereign, whom the multitude follow. For his sin should
be understood as referring to preparedness of the mind, as
be borne with, if it cannot be punished without scandal
Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i).
to the multitude: unless indeed his sin were such, that it
Reply to Objection 5. When the whole multitude
would do more harm to the multitude, either spiritually
sins, vengeance must be taken on them, either in respect
or temporally, than would the scandal that was feared to
of the whole multitude—thus the Egyptians were drowned
arise from his punishment.
Whether vengeance is a special virtue?
IIa IIae q. 108 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that vengeance is not a special
for which reason animals have the irascible power distinct
and distinct virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for
from the concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending
their good deeds, so are the wicked punished for their evil
himself against wrongs, lest they be inflicted on him, or he
deeds. Now the rewarding of the good does not belong
avenges those which have already been inflicted on him,
to a special virtue, but is an act of commutative justice.
with the intention, not of harming, but of removing the
Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be ac-
harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says
counted a special virtue.
(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by “vengeance we resist force, or
Objection 2. Further, there is no need to appoint a
wrong, and in general whatever is obscure”∗ ”(i.e. deroga-
special virtue for an act to which a man is sufficiently dis-
tory), either by self-defense or by avenging it.” Therefore
posed by the other virtues. Now man is sufficiently dis-
vengeance is a special virtue.
posed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to avenge evil.
Reply to Objection 1. Just as repayment of a legal
Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special
debt belongs to commutative justice, and as repayment
virtue.
of a moral debt, arising from the bestowal of a particular
Objection 3. Further, there is a special vice opposed
favor, belongs to the virtue of gratitude, so too the punish-
to every special virtue. But seemingly no special vice is
ment of sins, so far as it is the concern of public justice,
opposed to vengeance. Therefore it is not a special virtue.
is an act of commutative justice; while so far as it is con-
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons
cerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom
it a part of justice.
a wrong is resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge.
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii,
Reply to Objection 2.
Fortitude disposes to
1), aptitude to virtue is in us by nature, but the comple-
vengeance by removing an obstacle thereto, namely, fear
ment of virtue is in us through habituation or some other
of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting the fervor of
cause. Hence it is evident that virtues perfect us so that we
love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far as
follow in due manner our natural inclinations, which be-
a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor,
long to the natural right. Wherefore to every definite nat-
because charity makes him regard them as his own. Now
ural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now
every act of virtue proceeds from charity as its root, since,
there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm,
according to Gregory (Hom. xxvii in Ev.), “there are no
∗ ‘Obscurum’ Cicero wrote ‘obfuturum’ but the sense is the same as St.
Thomas gives in the parenthesis
1703
green leaves on the bough of good works, unless charity while the other is a vice by way of deficiency and consists
be the root.”
in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written (Prov.
Reply to Objection 3.
Two vices are opposed to
13:24): “He that spareth the rod hateth his son.” But the
vengeance: one by way of excess, namely, the sin of cru-
virtue of vengeance consists in observing the due measure
elty or brutality, which exceeds the measure in punishing:
of vengeance with regard to all the circumstances.
Whether vengeance should be wrought by means of punishments customary among IIa IIae q. 108 a. 3
men?
Objection 1. It seems that vengeance should not be
such as riches, his country and his good name. Where-
wrought by means of punishments customary among men.
fore, according to Augustine’s reckoning (De Civ. Dei
For to put a man to death is to uproot him. But our Lord
xxi), “Tully writes that the laws recognize eight kinds
forbade (Mat. 13:29) the uprooting of the cockle, whereby
of punishment”: namely, “death,” whereby man is de-
the children of the wicked one are signified. Therefore
prived of life; “stripes,” “retaliation,” or the loss of eye
sinners should not be put to death.
for eye, whereby man forfeits his bodily safety; “slavery,”
Objection 2. Further, all who sin mortally seem to
and “imprisonment,” whereby he is deprived of freedom;
be deserving of the same punishment. Therefore if some
“exile” whereby he is banished from his country; “fines,”
who sin mortally are punished with death, it seems that
whereby he is mulcted in his riches; “ignominy,” whereby
all such persons should be punished with death: and this
he loses his good name.
is evidently false.
Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord forbids the uproot-
Objection 3. Further, to punish a man publicly for his
ing of the cockle, when there is fear lest the wheat be up-
sin seems to publish his sin: and this would seem to have
rooted together with it. But sometimes the wicked can be
a harmful effect on the multitude, since the example of sin
uprooted by death, not only without danger, but even with
is taken by them as an occasion for sin. Therefore it seems
great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a case the
that the punishment of death should not be inflicted for a
punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners.
sin.
Reply to Objection 2. All who sin mortally are de-
On the contrary, These punishments are fixed by the
serving of eternal death, as regards future retribution,
divine law as appears from what we have said above ( Ia
which is in accordance with the truth of the divine judg-
IIae, q. 105, a. 2).
ment. But the punishments of this life are more of a
I answer that, Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so
medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death
far as it tends to the prevention of evil. Now some who
is inflicted on those sins alone which conduce to the grave
are not influenced by motive of virtue are prevented from
undoing of others.
committing sin, through fear of losing those things which
Reply to Objection 3. The very fact that the punish-
they love more than those they obtain by sinning, else fear
ment, whether of death or of any kind that is fearsome to
would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance
man, is made known at the same time as the sin, makes
for sin should be taken by depriving a man of what he
man’s will avers to sin: because the fear of punishment is
loves most. Now the things which man loves most are
greater than the enticement of the example of sin.
life, bodily safety, his own freedom, and external goods
Whether vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily?
IIa IIae q. 108 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that vengeance should be taken
people of Israel were delivered into the hands of their en-
on those who have sinned involuntarily. For the will of
emies for the sin of Achan, and that the same people were
one man does not follow from the will of another. Yet
overthrown by the Philistines on account of the sin of the
one man is punished for another, according to Ex. 20:5,
sons of Heli (1 Kings 4). Therefore a person is to be pun-
“I am. . . God. . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers ished without having deserved it voluntarily.
upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation.”
Objection 2.
Further, nothing is voluntary except
Thus for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was curse (Gn.
what is in a man’s power. But sometimes a man is pun-
9:25) and for the sin of Giezi, his descendants were struck
ished for what is not in his power; thus a man is removed
with leprosy (4 Kings 5). Again the blood of Christ lays
from the administration of the Church on account of being
the descendants of the Jews under the ban of punishment,
infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an epis-
for they said (Mat. 27:25): “His blood be upon us and
copal see on account of the depravity or evil of the people.
upon our children.” Moreover we read (Josue 7) that the
Therefore vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins.
1704
Objection 3. Further, ignorance makes an act invol-Reply to Objection 1. A man is never condemned
untary. Now vengeance is sometimes taken on the igno-
to a spiritual punishment for another man’s sin, because
rant. Thus the children of the people of Sodom, though
spiritual punishment affects the soul, in respect of which
they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their par-
each man is master of himself. But sometimes a man is
ents (Gn. 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Ab-
condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the sin
iron their children were swallowed up together with them
of another, and this for three reasons. First, because one
(Num 16). Moreover, dumb animals, which are devoid of
man may be the temporal goods of another, and so he may
reason, were commanded to be slain on account of the sin
be punished in punishment of the latter: thus children, as
of the Amalekites (1 Kings 15). Therefore vengeance is
to the body, are a belonging of their father, and slaves are
sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involun-
a possession of their master. Secondly, when one person’s
tarily.
sin is transmitted to another, either by “imitation,” as chil-
Objection 4. Further, compulsion is most opposed
dren copy the sins of their parents, and slaves the sins of
to voluntariness. But a man does not escape the debt of
their masters, so as to sin with greater daring; or by way
punishment through being compelled by fear to commit
of “merit,” as the sinful subjects merit a sinful superior,
a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those
according to Job 34:30, “Who maketh a man that is a hyp-
who have deserved it involuntarily.
ocrite to reign for the sins of the people?” Hence the peo-
Objection 5. Further Ambrose says on Lk. 5 that “the
ple of Israel were punished for David’s sin in numbering
ship in which Judas was, was in distress”; wherefore “Pe-
the people (2 Kings 24). This may also happen through
ter, who was calm in the security of his own merits, was in
some kind of “consent” or “connivance”: thus sometimes
distress about those of others.” But Peter did not will the
even the good are punished in temporal matters together
sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes punished
with the wicked, for not having condemned their sins, as
without having voluntarily deserved it.
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9). Thirdly, in order to
On the contrary, Punishment is due to sin. But every
mark the unity of human fellowship, whereby one man is
sin is voluntary according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii;
bound to be solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in or-
Retract. i). Therefore vengeance should be taken only on
der to inculcate horror of sin, seeing that the punishment
those who have deserved it voluntarily.
of one affects all, as though all were one body, as Augus-
I answer that, Punishment may be considered in two
tine says in speaking of the sin of Achan (QQ. sup. Josue
ways. First, under the aspect of punishment, and in this
viii). The saying of the Lord, “Visiting the iniquity of the
way punishment is not due save for sin, because by means
fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth gener-
of punishment the equality of justice is restored, in so far
ation,” seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity,
as he who by sinning has exceeded in following his own
since He does not take vengeance forthwith, but waits for
will suffers something that is contrary to this will. Where-
some future time, in order that the descendants at least
fore, since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original
may mend their ways; yet should the wickedness of the
sin, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 81, a. 1), it follows that
descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary to take
no one is punished in this way, except for something done
vengeance on them.
voluntarily. Secondly, punishment may be considered as
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine states (QQ. sup.
a medicine, not only healing the past sin, but also pre-
Josue viii), human judgment should conform to the divine
serving from future sin, or conducing to some good, and
judgment, when this is manifest, and God condemns men
in this way a person is sometimes punished without any
spiritually for their own sins. But human judgment can-
fault of his own, yet not without cause.
not be conformed to God’s hidden judgments, whereby
It must, however, be observed that a medicine never
He punishes certain persons in temporal matters without
removes a greater good in order to promote a lesser; thus
any fault of theirs, since man is unable to grasp the rea-
the medicine of the body never blinds the eye, in order to
sons of these judgments so as to know what is expedient
repair the heel: yet sometimes it is harmful in lesser things
for each individual. Wherefore according to human judg-
that it may be helpful in things of greater consequence.
ment a man should never be condemned without fault of
And since spiritual goods are of the greatest consequence,
his own to an inflictive punishment, such as death, muti-
while temporal goods are least important, sometimes a
lation or flogging. But a man may be condemned, even
person is punished in his temporal goods without any fault
according to human judgment, to a punishment of forfei-
of his own. Such are many of the punishments inflicted by
ture, even without any fault on his part, but not without
God in this present life for our humiliation or probation.
cause: and this in three ways.
But no one is punished in spiritual goods without any fault
First, through a person becoming, without any fault of
on his part, neither in this nor in the future life, because
his, disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good:
in the latter punishment is not medicinal, but a result of
thus for being infected with leprosy a man is removed
spiritual condemnation.
from the administration of the Church: and for bigamy, or
1705
through pronouncing a death sentence a man is hindered person, and because this is for their good lest, should
from receiving sacred orders.
they be spared, they might imitate the sins of their par-
Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits
ents, and thus deserve to be punished still more severely.
is not his own but common property: thus that an episco-
Vengeance is wrought on dumb animals and any other ir-
pal see be attached to a certain church belongs to the good
rational creatures, because in this way their owners are
of the whole city, and not only to the good of the clerics.
punished; and also in horror of sin.
Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend
Reply to Objection 4. An act done through compul-
on the good of another: thus in the crime of high treason
sion of fear is not involuntary simply, but has an admixture
a son loses his inheritance through the sin of his parent.
of voluntariness, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 6, Aa. 5,6).
Reply to Objection 3.
By the judgment of God
Reply to Objection 5. The other apostles were dis-
children are punished in temporal matters together with
tressed about the sin of Judas, in the same way as the mul-
their parents, both because they are a possession of their
titude is punished for the sin of one, in commendation of
parents, so that their parents are punished also in their
unity, as state above (Reply obj. 1,2).
1706
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 109
Of Truth
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto. Concerning truth there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether truth is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether it is a part of justice?
(4) Whether it inclines to that which is less?
Whether truth is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 109 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that truth is not a virtue. For
be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and
the first of virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since
virtue is “that which makes its possessor good, and ren-
then the object precedes the habit and the act, it seems
ders his action good.”
that truth is not a virtue, but something prior to virtue.
Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes truth in
Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher
the first sense.
(Ethic. iv, 7), it belongs to truth that a man should state
Reply to Objection 2. To state that which concerns
things concerning himself to be neither more nor less than
oneself, in so far as it is a statement of what is true, is
they are. But this is not always praiseworthy—neither in
good generically. Yet this does not suffice for it to be an
good things, since according to Prov. 27:2, “Let another
act of virtue, since it is requisite for that purpose that it
praise thee, and not thy own mouth”—nor even in evil
should also be clothed with the due circumstances, and if
things, because it is written in condemnation of certain
these be not observed, the act will be sinful. Accordingly
people (Is. 3:9): “They have proclaimed abroad their sin
it is sinful to praise oneself without due cause even for that
as Sodom, and they have not hid it.” Therefore truth is not
which is true: and it is also sinful to publish one’s sin, by
a virtue.
praising oneself on that account, or in any way proclaim-
Objection 3. Further, every virtue is either theolog-
ing it uselessly.
ical, or intellectual, or moral. Now truth is not a theo-
Reply to Objection 3. A person who says what is
logical virtue, because its object is not God but temporal
true, utters certain signs which are in conformity with
things. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by “truth
things; and such signs are either words, or external ac-
we faithfully represent things as they are were, or will be.”
tions, or any external thing. Now such kinds of things are
Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues, but their
the subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for the latter
end. Nor again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean
are concerned with the use of the external members, in so
between excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the
far as this use is put into effect at the command of the will.
truth, the better it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue.
Wherefore truth is neither a theological, nor an intellec-
On the contrary, The Philosopher both in the Second
tual, but a moral virtue. And it is a mean between excess
and in the Fourth Book of Ethics places truth among the
and deficiency in two ways. First, on the part of the ob-
other virtues.
ject, secondly, on the part of the act. On the part of the ob-
I answer that, Truth can be taken in two ways. First,
ject, because the true essentially denotes a kind of equal-
for that by reason of which a thing is said to be true, and
ity, and equal is a mean between more and less. Hence for
thus truth is not a virtue, but the object or end of a virtue:
the very reason that a man says what is true about him-
because, taken in this way, truth is not a habit, which is the
self, he observes the mean between one that says more
genus containing virtue, but a certain equality between the
than the truth about himself, and one that says less than
understanding or sign and the thing understood or signi-
the truth. On the part of the act, to observe the mean is to
fied, or again between a thing and its rule, as stated in the
tell the truth, when one ought, and as one ought. Excess
Ia, q. 16, a. 1;
consists in making known one’s own affairs out of season,
Ia, q. 21, a. 2. Secondly, truth may stand for that by
and deficiency in hiding them when one ought to make
which a person says what is true, in which sense one is
them known.
said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must needs
1707
Whether truth is a special virtue?
IIa IIae q. 109 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that truth is not a special virtue.
vertible as to subject, since every true thing is good, and
For the true and the good are convertible. Now goodness
every good thing is true. But considered logically, they
is not a special virtue, in fact every virtue is goodness, be-
exceed one another, even as the intellect and will exceed
cause “it makes its possessor good.” Therefore truth is not
one another. For the intellect understands the will and
a special virtue.
many things besides, and the will desires things pertain-
Objection 2. Further, to make known what belongs to
ing to the intellect, and many others. Wherefore the “true”
oneself is an act of truth as we understand it here. But this
considered in its proper aspect as a perfection of the intel-
belongs to every virtue, since every virtuous habit is made
lect is a particular good, since it is something appetible:
known by its own act. Therefore truth is not a special
and in like manner the “good” considered in its proper as-
virtue.
pect as the end of the appetite is something true, since it
Objection 3. Further, the truth of life is the truth
is something intelligible. Therefore since virtue includes
whereby one lives aright, and of which it is written (Is.
the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth to be a spe-
38:3): “I beseech Thee. . . remember how I have walked
cial virtue, just as the “true” is a special good; yet it is not before Thee in truth, and with a perfect heart.” Now one
possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather,
lives aright by any virtue, as follows from the definition
considered logically, it is the genus of virtue.
of virtue given above ( Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 4). Therefore truth
Reply to Objection 2. The habits of virtue and vice
is not a special virtue.
take their species from what is directly intended, and not
Objection 4. Further, truth seems to be the same as
from that which is accidental and beside the intention.
simplicity, since hypocrisy is opposed to both. But sim-
Now that a man states that which concerns himself, be-
plicity is not a special virtue, since it rectifies the inten-
longs to the virtue of truth, as something directly intended:
tion, and that is required in every virtue. Therefore neither
although it may belong to other virtues consequently and
is truth a special virtue.
beside his principal intention. For the brave man intends
On the contrary, It is numbered together with other
to act bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting
virtues (Ethic. ii, 7).
bravely is a consequence beside his principal intention.
I answer that, The nature of human virtue consists in
Reply to Objection 3. The truth of life is the truth
making a man’s deed good. Consequently whenever we
whereby a thing is true, not whereby a person says what
find a special aspect of goodness in human acts, it is nec-
is true. Life like anything else is said to be true, from the
essary that man be disposed thereto by a special virtue.
fact that it attains its rule and measure, namely, the divine
And since according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii) good
law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity to that
consists in order, it follows that a special aspect of good
law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue.
will be found where there is a special order. Now there
Reply to Objection 4. Simplicity is so called from
is a special order whereby our externals, whether words
its opposition to duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows
or deeds, are duly ordered in relation to some thing, as
one thing outwardly while having another in his heart: so
sign to thing signified: and thereto man is perfected by
that simplicity pertains to this virtue. And it rectifies the
the virtue of truth. Wherefore it is evident that truth is a
intention, not indeed directly (since this belongs to every
special virtue.
virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a man pre-
Reply to Objection 1. The true and the good are con-
tends one thing and intends another.
Whether truth is a part of justice?
IIa IIae q. 109 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that truth is not a part of justice.
For truth of life comprises all virtues, as stated above (a. 2, For it seems proper to justice to give another man his due.
ad 3): truth of justice is the same as justice, so that it is
But, by telling the truth, one does not seem to give an-
not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine belongs rather to
other man his due, as is the case in all the foregoing parts
the intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise a part of
of justice. Therefore truth is not a part of justice.
justice.
Objection 2. Further, truth pertains to the intellect:
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons
whereas justice is in the will, as stated above (q. 58, a. 4).
truth among the parts of justice.
Therefore truth is not a part of justice.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 80), a virtue is
Objection 3. Further, according to Jerome truth is
annexed to justice, as secondary to a principal virtue,
threefold, namely, “truth of life,” “truth of justice,” and
through having something in common with justice, while
“truth of doctrine.” But none of these is a part of justice.
falling short from the perfect virtue thereof. Now the
1708
virtue of truth has two things in common with justice. In tude regulated according to the rule of the divine law; and
the first place it is directed to another, since the manifesta-
in this way the truth of justice differs from the truth of life, tion, which we have stated to be an act of truth, is directed
because by the truth of life a man lives aright in himself,
to another, inasmuch as one person manifests to another
whereas by the truth of justice a man observes the recti-
the things that concern himself. In the second place, jus-
tude of the law in those judgments which refer to another
tice sets up a certain equality between things, and this the
man: and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to
virtue of truth does also, for it equals signs to the things
do with the truth of which we speak now, as neither has
which concern man himself. Nevertheless it falls short of
the truth of life. In another way the truth of justice may
the proper aspect of justice, as to the notion of debt: for
be understood as referring to the fact that, out of justice, a
this virtue does not regard legal debt, which justice con-
man manifests the truth, as for instance when a man con-
siders, but rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of equity, fesses the truth, or gives true evidence in a court of justice.
one man owes another a manifestation of the truth. There-
This truth is a particular act of justice, and does not per-
fore truth is a part of justice, being annexed thereto as a
tain directly to this truth of which we are now speaking,
secondary virtue to its principal.
because, to wit, in this manifestation of the truth a man’s
Reply to Objection 1. Since man is a social animal,
chief intention is to give another man his due. Hence the
one man naturally owes another whatever is necessary for
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing this virtue:
the preservation of human society. Now it would be im-
“We are not speaking of one who is truthful in his agree-
possible for men to live together, unless they believed one
ments, nor does this apply to matters in which justice or
another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence the
injustice is questioned.”
virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as be-
The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifesta-
ing due.
tion of truths relating to science wherefore neither does
Reply to Objection 2. Truth, as known, belongs to
this truth directly pertain to this virtue, but only that truth the intellect. But man, by his own will, whereby he uses
whereby a man, both in life and in speech, shows himself
both habits and members, utters external signs in order to
to be such as he is, and the things that concern him, not
manifest the truth, and in this way the manifestation of the
other, and neither greater nor less, than they are. Never-
truth is an act of the will.
theless since truths of science, as known by us, are some-
Reply to Objection 3. The truth of which we are
thing concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense
speaking now differs from the truth of life, as stated in
the truth of doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as
the preceding a. 2, ad 3.
any other kind of truth whereby a man manifests, by word
We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one
or deed, what he knows.
way we refer to the fact that justice itself is a certain recti-Whether the virtue of truth inclines rather to that which is less?
IIa IIae q. 109 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that the virtue of truth does not
for that which is greater seems to amount to an addition
incline to that which is less. For as one incurs falsehood
thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant to truth
by saying more, so does one by saying less: thus it is no
than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible
more false that four are five, than that four are three. But
with the denial of truth, whereas it is compatible with ad-
“every falsehood is in itself evil, and to be avoided,” as the
dition. Therefore it seems that truth should incline to that
Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore the virtue of
which is greater rather than to that which is less.
truth does not incline to that which is less rather than to
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7)
that which is greater.
that “by this virtue a man declines rather from the truth
Objection 2. Further, that a virtue inclines to the one
towards that which is less.”
extreme rather than to the other, is owing to the fact that
I answer that, There are two ways of declining from
the virtue’s mean is nearer to the one extreme than to the
the truth to that which is less. First, by affirming, as when
other: thus fortitude is nearer to daring than to timidity.
a man does not show the whole good that is in him, for
But the mean of truth is not nearer to one extreme than
instance science, holiness and so forth. This is done with-
to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of equality,
out prejudice to truth, since the lesser is contained in the
holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more
greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to what is less.
incline to that which is less.
For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), “this seems to
Objection 3. Further, to forsake the truth for that
be more prudent because exaggerations give annoyance.”
which is less seems to amount to a denial of the truth,
For those who represent themselves as being greater than
since this is to subtract therefrom; and to forsake the truth
they are, are a source of annoyance to others, since they
1709
seem to wish to surpass others: whereas those who make would imply falsehood. And yet this would be less repug-less account of themselves are a source of pleasure, since
nant to the truth, not indeed as regards the proper aspect of
they seem to defer to others by their moderation. Hence
truth, but as regards the aspect of prudence, which should
the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:6): “Though I should have a
be safeguarded in all the virtues. For since it is fraught
mind to glory, I shall not be foolish: for I will say the truth.
with greater danger and is more annoying to others, it is
But I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that
more repugnant to prudence to think or boast that one has
which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from me.”
what one has not, than to think or say that one has not
Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying,
what one has.
so as to say that what is in us is not. In this way it does not This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
belong to this virtue to incline to what is less, because this
1710
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 110
Of the Vices Opposed to Truth, and First of Lying
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (1) lying: (2) dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the opposite vice. Concerning lying there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to truth?
(2) Of the species of lying;
(3) Whether lying is always a sin?
(4) Whether it is always a mortal sin?
Whether lying is always opposed to truth?
IIa IIae q. 110 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that lying is not always opposed
is the result. But when this manifestation or statement is
to truth. For opposites are incompatible with one another.
a moral act, it must needs be voluntary, and dependent
But lying is compatible with truth, since that speaks the
on the intention of the will. Now the proper object of a
truth, thinking it to be false, lies, according to Augustine
manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And
(Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying is not opposed to
the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of
truth.
which is that a falsehood may be told; while the other is
Objection 2. Further, the virtue of truth applies not
the proper effect of a false statement, namely, that some-
only to words but also to deeds, since according to the
one may be deceived.
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by this virtue one tells the truth
Accordingly if these three things concur, namely,
both in one’s speech and in one’s life. But lying applies
falsehood of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and
only to words, for Augustine says (Contra Mend. xii) that
finally the intention to deceive, then there is falsehood—
“a lie is a false signification by words.” Accordingly, it
materially, since what is said is false, formally, on account
seems that lying is not directly opposed to the virtue of
of the will to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of
truth.
the will to impart a falsehood.
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Men-
However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from
dac. iii) that the “liar’s sin is the desire to deceive.” But
formal falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person in-
this is not opposed to truth, but rather to benevolence or
tends to say what is false; wherefore also the word “men-
justice. Therefore lying is not opposed to truth.
dacium” [lie] is derived from its being in opposition to the
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mend. x):
“mind.” Consequently if one says what is false, thinking it
“Let no one doubt that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in or-
to be true, it is false materially, but not formally, because
der to deceive. Wherefore a false statement uttered with
the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker so that
intent to deceive is a manifest lie.” But this is opposed to
it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker’s
truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth.
intention is accidental for which reason it cannot be a spe-
I answer that, A moral act takes its species from two
cific difference. If, on the other hand, one utters’ false-
things, its object, and its end: for the end is the object of
hood formally, through having the will to deceive, even if
the will, which is the first mover in moral acts. And the
what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary
power moved by the will has its own object, which is the
and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth
proximate object of the voluntary act, and stands in rela-
accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie.
tion to the will’s act towards the end, as material to formal,
That a person intends to cause another to have a false
as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, Aa. 6,7).
opinion, by deceiving him, does not belong to the species
Now it has been said above (q. 109, a. 1, ad 3) that the
of lying, but to perfection thereof, even as in the physical
virtue of truth—and consequently the opposite vices—
order, a thing acquires its species if it has its form, even
regards a manifestation made by certain signs: and this
though the form’s effect be lacking; for instance a heavy
manifestation or statement is an act of reason comparing
body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come down
sign with the thing signified; because every representa-
in accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it
tion consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the
is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to the
reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest some-
virtue of truth.
thing, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but
Reply to Objection 1. We judge of a thing according
they do something by natural instinct, and a manifestation
to what is in it formally and essentially rather than accord-
1711
ing to what is in it materially and accidentally. Hence it is And so when it is said that “a lie is a false signification
more in opposition to truth, considered as a moral virtue,
by words,” the term “words” denotes every kind of sign.
to tell the truth with the intention of telling a falsehood
Wherefore if a person intended to signify something false
than to tell a falsehood with the intention of telling the
by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying.
truth.
Reply to Objection 3. The desire to deceive belongs
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Doctr.
to the perfection of lying, but not to its species, as neither
Christ. ii), words hold the chief place among other signs.
does any effect belong to the species of its cause.
Whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, jocose, and mischievous lies?
IIa IIae q. 110 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that lies are not sufficiently di-
kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the truth, and
vided into “officious,” “jocose” and “mischievous” lies.
this belongs to “boasting,” and the lie which stops short
For a division should be made according to that which
of the truth, and this belongs to “irony.” This division is
pertains to a thing by reason of its nature, as the Philoso-
an essential division of lying itself, because lying as such
pher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part. Animal i, 3).
is opposed to truth, as stated in the preceding Article: and
But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from a
truth is a kind of equality, to which more and less are in
moral act is something beside and accidental to the species
essential opposition.
of that act, so that an indefinite number of effects can re-
Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their na-
sult from one act. Now this division is made according
ture as sins, and with regard to those things that aggravate
to the intention of the effect: for a “jocose” lie is told in
or diminish the sin of lying, on the part of the end in-
order to make fun, an “officious” lie for some useful pur-
tended. Now the sin of lying is aggravated, if by lying a
pose, and a “mischievous” lie in order to injure someone.
person intends to injure another, and this is called a “mis-
Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in this way.
chievous” lie, while the sin of lying is diminished if it be
Objection 2.
Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac.
directed to some good—either of pleasure and then it is a
xiv) gives eight kinds of lies. The first is “in religious
“jocose” lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the “offi-
doctrine”; the second is “a lie that profits no one and in-
cious” lie, whereby it is intended to help another person,
jures someone”; the third “profits one party so as to injure
or to save him from being injured. In this way lies are
another”; the fourth is “told out of mere lust of lying and
divided into the three kinds aforesaid.
deceiving”; the fifth is “told out of the desire to please”;
Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with
the sixth “injures no one, and profits /someone in saving
respect to their relation to some end, whether or not this
his money”; the seventh “injures no one and profits some-
increase or diminish their gravity: and in this way the divi-
one in saving him from death”; the eighth “injures no one,
sion comprises eight kinds, as stated in the Second Objec-
and profits someone in saving him from defilement of the
tion. Here the first three kinds are contained under “mis-
body.” Therefore it seems that the first division of lies is
chievous” lies, which are either against God, and then we
insufficient.
have the lie “in religious doctrine,” or against man, and
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7)
this either with the sole intention of injuring him, and then
divides lying into “boasting,” which exceeds the truth in
it is the second kind of lie, which “profits no one, and in-
speech, and “irony,” which falls short of the truth by say-
jures someone”; or with the intention of injuring one and
ing something less: and these two are not contained under
at the same time profiting another, and this is the third
any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore it seems
kind of lie, “which profits one, and injures another.” Of
that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate.
these the first is the most grievous, because sins against
On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 5:7, “Thou wilt de-
God are always more grievous, as stated above ( Ia IIae,
stroy all that speak a lie,” says “that there are three kinds
q. 73, a. 3): and the second is more grievous than the third,
of lies; for some are told for the wellbeing and conve-
since the latter’s gravity is diminished by the intention of
nience of someone; and there is another kind of lie that is
profiting another.
told in fun; but the third kind of lie is told out of malice.”
After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we
The first of these is called an officious lie, the second a
have a fourth, which has its own measure of gravity with-
jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies are
out addition or diminution; and this is the lie which is told
divided into these three kinds.
“out of mere lust of lying and deceiving.” This proceeds
I answer that, Lies may be divided in three ways.
from a habit, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7)
First, with respect to their nature as lies: and this is the
that “the liar, when he lies from habit, delights in lying.”
proper and essential division of lying. In this way, ac-
The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the
cording to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), lies are of two
sin of lying. For the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is
1712
told “with a desire to please”: and the remaining three are Now it is evident that the greater the good intended,
comprised under the officious lie, wherein something use-
the more is the sin of lying diminished in gravity. Where-
ful to another person is intended. This usefulness regards
fore a careful consideration of the matter will show that
either external things, and then we have the sixth kind of
these various kinds of lies are enumerated in their order
lie, which “profits someone in saving his money”; or his
of gravity: since the useful good is better than the plea-
body, and this is the seventh kind, which “saves a man
surable good, and life of the body than money, and virtue
from death”; or the morality of his virtue, and this is the
than the life of the body.
eighth kind, which “saves him from unlawful defilement
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
of his body.”
Whether every lie is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 110 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it we find hyperbolical expressions in Holy Writ. Therefore
is evident that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of
not every lie is a sin.
the Gospel. Yet they seem to have told something false:
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 7:14): “Be not
since their accounts of the words of Christ and of others
willing to make any manner of lie.”
often differ from one another: wherefore seemingly one
I answer that, An action that is naturally evil in re-
of them must have given an untrue account. Therefore not
spect of its genus can by no means be good and lawful,
every lie is a sin.
since in order for an action to be good it must be right
Objection 2. Further, no one is rewarded by God for
in every respect: because good results from a complete
sin. But the midwives of Egypt were rewarded by God
cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Diony-
for a lie, for it is stated that “God built them houses” (Ex.
sius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in respect
1:21). Therefore a lie is not a sin.
of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter.
Objection 3. Further, the deeds of holy men are re-
For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is
lated in Sacred Writ that they may be a model of human
unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words some-
life. But we read of certain very holy men that they lied.
thing that is not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says
Thus (Gn. 12 and 20) we are told that Abraham said of
(Ethic. iv, 7) that “lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied when he
while truthfulness is good and worthy of praise.” There-
said that he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gn.
fore every lie is a sin, as also Augustine declares (Contra
27:27-29). Again, Judith is commended (Judith 15:10,11)
Mend. i).
although she lied to Holofernes. Therefore not every lie is
Reply to Objection 1. It is unlawful to hold that
a sin.
any false assertion is contained either in the Gospel or in
Objection 4. Further, one ought to choose the lesser
any canonical Scripture, or that the writers thereof have
evil in order to avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts
told untruths, because faith would be deprived of its cer-
off a limb, lest the whole body perish. Yet less harm is
titude which is based on the authority of Holy Writ. That
done by raising a false opinion in a person’s mind, than
the words of certain people are variously reported in the
by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore a man may
Gospel and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie.
lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or
Hence Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. ii): “He that
another from being killed.
has the wit to understand that in order to know the truth it
Objection 5. Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what
is necessary to get at the sense, will conclude that he must
one has promised. Yet one is not bound to keep all one’s
not be the least troubled, no matter by what words that
promises: for Isidore says (Synonym. ii): “Break your
sense is expressed.” Hence it is evident, as he adds (De
faith when you have promised ill.” Therefore not every lie
Consens. Evang. ii), that “we must not judge that some-
is a sin.
one is lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same
Objection 6. Further, apparently a lie is a sin because
way and in the same words a thing which they remember
thereby we deceive our neighbor: wherefore Augustine
to have seen or heard.”
says (Lib. De Mend. xxi): “Whoever thinks that there is
Reply to Objection 2. The midwives were rewarded,
any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives himself shame-
not for their lie, but for their fear of God, and for their
fully, since he deems himself an honest man when he de-
good-will, which latter led them to tell a lie. Hence it is
ceives others.” Yet not every lie is a cause of deception,
expressly stated (Ex. 2:21): “And because the midwives
since no one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of
feared God, He built them houses.” But the subsequent lie
this kind are told, not with the intention of being believed,
was not meritorious.
but merely for the sake of giving pleasure. Hence again
Reply to Objection 3. In Holy Writ, as Augustine ob-
1713
serves (Lib. De Mend. v), the deeds of certain persons are not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any
related as examples of perfect virtue: and we must not be-
danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth
lieve that such persons were liars. If, however, any of their
prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra
statements appear to be untruthful, we must understand
Mend. x).
such statements to have been figurative and prophetic.
Reply to Objection 5. A man does not lie, so long
Hence Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v): “We must be-
as he has a mind to do what he promises, because he
lieve that whatever is related of those who, in prophetical
does not speak contrary to what he has in mind: but if
times, are mentioned as being worthy of credit, was done
he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without
and said by them prophetically.” As to Abraham “when he
faith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused
said that Sara was his sister, he wished to hide the truth,
for two reasons. First, if he has promised something ev-
not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since she was the idently unlawful, because he sinned in promise, and did
daughter of his father,” Augustine says (QQ. Super. Gen.
well to change his mind. Secondly, if circumstances have
xxvi; Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii). Wherefore
changed with regard to persons and the business in hand.
Abraham himself said (Gn. 20:12): “She is truly my sis-
For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man to be bound
ter, the daughter of my father, and not the daughter of my
to keep a promise, it is necessary for everything to remain
mother,” being related to him on his father’s side. Jacob’s
unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising—
assertion that he was Esau, Isaac’s first-born, was spoken
since he promised what he had in his mind, due circum-
in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the latter’s birthright
stances being taken for granted—nor was he faithless in
was due to him by right: and he made use of this mode
not keeping his promise, because circumstances are no
of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order
longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he did not
to signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, i.e.
go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go (2 Cor. 1),
the Gentiles, should supplant the first-born, i.e. the Jews.
did not lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented
Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not
him.
on account of perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous
Reply to Objection 6. An action may be considered
disposition, seeing that it was owing to some praisewor-
in two ways. First, in itself, secondly, with regard to the
thy sentiment that they were moved to do certain undue
agent. Accordingly a jocose lie, from the very genus of
things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for lying to
the action, is of a nature to deceive; although in the in-
Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which
tention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, nor does it
end she exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also
deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any similarity
say that her words contain truth in some mystical sense.
in the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions,
Reply to Objection 4. A lie is sinful not only because
with which we meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augus-
it injures one’s neighbor, but also on account of its inordi-
tine says (Lib. De Mend. v), “it is not a lie to do or say
nateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not al-
a thing figuratively: because every statement must be re-
lowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward
ferred to the thing stated: and when a thing is done or said
off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful
figuratively, it states what those to whom it is tendered
to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case
understand it to signify.”
of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is
Whether every lie is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 110 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty of
it is written (Ps. 6:7): “Thou wilt destroy all that speak a
iniquity.” Now no one is said to break his faith or “to be
lie,” and (Wis. 1:11): “The mouth that belieth killeth the
guilty of iniquity,” for a venial sin. Therefore no lie is a
soul.” Now mortal sin alone causes destruction and death
venial sin.
of the soul. Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.
Objection 4. Further, the eternal reward is not lost
Objection 2. Further, whatever is against a precept of
save for a mortal sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward
the decalogue is a mortal sin. Now lying is against this
was lost, being exchanged for a temporal meed. For Gre-
precept of the decalogue: “Thou shalt not bear false wit-
gory says (Moral. xviii) that “we learn from the reward
ness.” Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.
of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the
Objection 3.
Further, Augustine says (De Doctr.
reward which they deserved for their kindness, and which
Christ. i, 36): “Every liar breaks his faith in lying, since
they might have received in eternal life, dwindled into a
forsooth he wishes the person to whom he lies to have
temporal meed on account of the lie of which they were
faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith with him, when
guilty.” Therefore even an officious lie, such as was that
1714
of the midwives, which seemingly is the least of lies, is a scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: and thus
mortal sin.
again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not
Objection 5. Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend.
deterred through scandal from lying publicly.
xvii) that “it is a precept of perfection, not only not to lie
Reply to Objection 1. The passages quoted refer to
at all, but not even to wish to lie.” Now it is a mortal sin
the mischievous lie, as a gloss explains the words of Ps.
to act against a precept. Therefore every lie of the per-
5:7, “Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie.”
fect is a mortal sin: and consequently so also is a lie told
Reply to Objection 2. Since all the precepts of the
by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be worse off
decalogue are directed to the love of God and our neigh-
than others.
bor, as stated above (q. 44, a. 1, ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 5, On the contrary, Augustine says on Ps. 5:7, “Thou
ad 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the decalogue, in
wilt destroy,” etc.: “There are two kinds of lie, that are not
so far as it is contrary to the love of God and our neigh-
grievously sinful yet are not devoid of sin, when we lie
bor. Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false witness
either in joking, or for the sake of our neighbor’s good.”
against our neighbor.
But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore jocose and
Reply to Objection 3. Even a venial sin can be called
officious lies are not mortal sins.
“iniquity” in a broad sense, in so far as it is beside the
I answer that, A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one
equity of justice; wherefore it is written (1 Jn. 3:4): “Ev-
that is contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union
ery sin is iniquity∗.” It is in this sense that Augustine is
with God, as stated above (q. 24, a. 12; q. 35, a. 3). Now a
speaking.
lie may be contrary to charity in three ways: first, in itself; Reply to Objection 4. The lie of the midwives may
secondly, in respect of the evil intended; thirdly, acciden-
be considered in two ways. First as regards their feel-
tally.
ing of kindliness towards the Jews, and their reverence
A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of
and fear of God, for which their virtuous disposition is
its false signification. For if this be about divine things, it commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Whereis contrary to the charity of God, whose truth one hides or
fore Jerome (in his exposition of Is. 65:21, ‘And they
corrupts by such a lie; so that a lie of this kind is opposed
shall build houses’) explains that God “built them spiritual
not only to the virtue of charity, but also to the virtues of
houses.” Secondly, it may be considered with regard to
faith and religion: wherefore it is a most grievous and a
the external act of lying. For thereby they could merit, not
mortal sin. If, however, the false signification be about
indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal meed,
something the knowledge of which affects a man’s good,
the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the de-
for instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to
formity of their lie, though this was inconsistent with their
moral conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on
meriting an eternal reward. It is in this sense that we must
one’s neighbor, since it causes him to have a false opin-
understand the words of Gregory, and not that they mer-
ion, wherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love
ited by that lie to lose the eternal reward as though they
of our neighbor, and consequently is a mortal sin. On the
had already merited it by their preceding kindliness, as
other hand, if the false opinion engendered by the lie be
the objection understands the words to mean.
about some matter the knowledge of which is of no con-
Reply to Objection 5. Some say that for the perfect
sequence, then the lie in question does no harm to one’s
every lie is a mortal sin. But this assertion is unreasonable.
neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived as to some
For no circumstance causes a sin to be infinitely more
contingent particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore
grievous unless it transfers it to another species. Now a
a lie of this kind, considered in itself, is not a mortal sin.
circumstance of person does not transfer a sin to another
As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to
species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed
charity, through being told with the purpose of injuring
to that person, for instance if it be against his vow: and
God, and this is always a mortal sin, for it is opposed to
this cannot apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore
religion; or in order to injure one’s neighbor, in his per-
an officious or a jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect
son, his possessions or his good name, and this also is a
men, except perhaps accidentally on account of scandal.
mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one’s neighbor,
We may take in this sense the saying of Augustine that
and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of
“it is a precept of perfection not only not to lie at all, but
committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not
not even to wish to lie”: although Augustine says this not
contrary to charity, neither will the lie, considered under
positively but dubiously, for he begins by saying: “Unless
this aspect, be a mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie,
perhaps it is a precept,” etc. Nor does it matter that they
where some little pleasure is intended, or in an officious
are placed in a position to safeguard the truth: because
lie, where the good also of one’s neighbor is intended.
they are bound to safeguard the truth by virtue of their of-
Accidentally a lie may be contrary to charity by reason of
fice in judging or teaching, and if they lie in these matters
∗ Vulg.: ‘And sin is iniquity.’
1715
their lie will be a mortal sin: but it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in other matters.
1716
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 111
Of Dissimulation and Hypocrisy
(In Four Articles)
In due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypocrisy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether all dissimulation is a sin?
(2) Whether hypocrisy is dissimulation?
(3) Whether it is opposed to truth?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
Whether all dissimulation is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 111 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that not all dissimulation is a
also is it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or
sin. For it is written (Lk. 24:28) that our Lord “pretended
things to signify the contrary of what is in oneself, and
[Douay: ‘made as though’] he would go farther”; and Am-
this is what is properly denoted by dissimulation. Con-
brose in his book on the Patriarchs (De Abraham i) says
sequently dissimulation is properly a lie told by the signs
of Abraham that he “spoke craftily to his servants, when
of outward deeds. Now it matters not whether one lie in
he said” (Gn. 22:5): “I and the boy will go with speed as
word or in any other way, as stated above (q. 110, a. 1,
far as yonder, and after we have worshipped, will return
obj. 2). Wherefore, since every lie is a sin, as stated above
to you.” Now to pretend and to speak craftily savor of dis-
(q. 110, a. 3), it follows that also all dissimulation is a sin.
simulation: and yet it is not to be said that there was sin
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De QQ.
in Christ or Abraham. Therefore not all dissimulation is a
Evang. ii), “To pretend is not always a lie: but only when
sin.
the pretense has no signification, then it is a lie. When,
Objection 2. Further, no sin is profitable. But accord-
however, our pretense refers to some signification, there
ing to Jerome, in his commentary on Gal. 2:11, “When
is no lie, but a representation of the truth.” And he cites
Peter [Vulg.: ‘Cephas’] was come to Antioch:—The ex-
figures of speech as an example, where a thing is “pre-
ample of Jehu, king of Israel, who slew the priest of Baal,
tended,” for we do not mean it to be taken literally but
pretending that he desired to worship idols, should teach
as a figure of something else that we wish to say. In this
us that dissimulation is useful and sometimes to be em-
way our Lord “pretended He would go farther,” because
ployed”; and David “changed his countenance before”
He acted as if wishing to go farther; in order to signify
Achis, king of Geth (1 Kings 21:13). Therefore not all
something figuratively either because He was far from
dissimulation is a sin.
their faith, according to Gregory (Hom. xxiii in Ev.); or,
Objection 3. Further, good is contrary to evil. There-
as Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), because, “as He
fore if it is evil to simulate good, it is good to simulate
was about to go farther away from them by ascending into
evil.
heaven, He was, so to speak, held back on earth by their
Objection 4. Further, it is written in condemnation of
hospitality.”
certain people (Is. 3:9): “They have proclaimed abroad
Abraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose
their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it.” Now it per-
(De Abraham i) says that Abraham “foretold what he
tains to dissimulation to hide one’s sin. Therefore it is
knew not”: for he intended to return alone after sacrificing
reprehensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is never
his son: but by his mouth the Lord expressed what He was
reprehensible to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation is not
about to do. It is evident therefore that neither dissembled.
a sin.
Reply to Objection 2. Jerome employs the term “sim-
On the contrary, A gloss on Is. 16:14, “In three
ulation” in a broad sense for any kind of pretense. David’s
years,” etc., says: “Of the two evils it is less to sin openly
change of countenance was a figurative pretense, as a
than to simulate holiness.” But to sin openly is always a
gloss observes in commenting on the title of Ps. 33, “I
sin. Therefore dissimulation is always a sin.
will bless the Lord at all times.” There is no need to ex-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 109, a. 3; q. 110,
cuse Jehu’s dissimulation from sin or lie, because he was
a. 1), it belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself
a wicked man, since he departed not from the idolatry of
outwardly by outward signs to be such as one is. Now
Jeroboam (4 Kings 10:29,31). And yet he is praised withal
outward signs are not only words, but also deeds. Ac-
and received an earthly reward from God, not for his dis-
cordingly just as it is contrary to truth to signify by words
simulation, but for his zeal in destroying the worship of
something different from that which is in one’s mind, so
Baal.
1717
Reply to Objection 3. Some say that no one may pre-Reply to Objection 4. Just as a man lies when he sig-
tend to be wicked, because no one pretends to be wicked
nifies by word that which he is not, yet lies not when he
by doing good deeds, and if he do evil deeds, he is evil.
refrains from saying what he is, for this is sometimes law-
But this argument proves nothing. Because a man might
ful; so also does a man dissemble, when by outward signs
pretend to be evil, by doing what is not evil in itself but
of deeds or things he signifies that which he is not, yet he
has some appearance of evil: and nevertheless this dissim-
dissembles not if he omits to signify what he is. Hence
ulation is evil, both because it is a lie, and because it gives one may hide one’s sin without being guilty of dissimu-scandal; and although he is wicked on this account, yet
lation. It is thus that we must understand the saying of
his wickedness is not the wickedness he simulates. And
Jerome on the words of Isa. 3:9, that the “second remedy
because dissimulation is evil in itself, its sinfulness is not
after shipwreck is to hide one’s sin,” lest, to wit, others be
derived from the thing simulated, whether this be good or
scandalized thereby.
evil.
Whether hypocrisy is the same as dissimulation?
IIa IIae q. 111 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that hypocrisy is not the same
plexion of the person they simulate, at one time under the
as dissimulation. For dissimulation consists in lying by
guise of a man, at another under the guise of a woman, so
deeds. But there may be hypocrisy in showing outwardly
as to deceive the people in their acting.” Hence Augus-
what one does inwardly, according to Mat. 6:2, “When
tine says (De Serm. Dom. ii) that “just as hypocrites by
thou dost an alms-deed sound not a trumpet before thee,
simulating other persons act the parts of those they are not
as the hypocrites do.” Therefore hypocrisy is not the same
(since he that acts the part of Agamemnon is not that man
as dissimulation.
himself but pretends to be), so too in the Church and in
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7):
every department of human life, whoever wishes to seem
“Some there are who wear the habit of holiness, yet are
what he is not is a hypocrite: for he pretends to be just
unable to attain the merit of perfection. We must by no
without being so in reality.”
means deem these to have joined the ranks of the hyp-
We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissim-
ocrites, since it is one thing to sin from weakness, and
ulation, not, however, any form of dissimulation, but only
another to sin from malice.” Now those who wear the
when one person simulates another, as when a sinner sim-
habit of holiness, without attaining the merit of perfection,
ulates the person of a just man.
are dissemblers, since the outward habit signifies works
Reply to Objection 1. The outward deed is a natural
of perfection. Therefore dissimulation is not the same as
sign of the intention. Accordingly when a man does good
hypocrisy.
works pertaining by their genus to the service of God, and
Objection 3. Further, hypocrisy consists in the mere
seeks by their means to please, not God but man, he sim-
intention. For our Lord says of hypocrites (Mat. 23:5) that
ulates a right intention which he has not. Wherefore Gre-
“all their works they do for to be seen of men”: and Gre-
gory says (Moral.) that “hypocrites make God’s interests
gory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that “they never consider what
subservient to worldly purposes, since by making a show
it is that they do, but how by their every action they may
of saintly conduct they seek, not to turn men to God, but
please men.” But dissimulation consists, not in the mere
to draw to themselves the applause of their approval:” and
intention, but in the outward action: wherefore a gloss on
so they make a lying pretense of having a good intention,
Job 36:13, “Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath
which they have not, although they do not pretend to do a
of God,” says that “the dissembler simulates one thing
good deed without doing it.
and does another: he pretends chastity, and delights in
Reply to Objection 2. The habit of holiness, for in-
lewdness, he makes a show of poverty and fills his purse.”
stance the religious or the clerical habit, signifies a state
Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation.
whereby one is bound to perform works of perfection.
On the contrary,
Isidore says (Etym.
x):
And so when a man puts on the habit of holiness, with
“ ‘Hypocrite’ is a Greek word corresponding to the Latin
the intention of entering the state of perfection, if he fail
‘simulator,’ for whereas he is evil within,” he “shows him-
through weakness, he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite,
self outwardly as being good; hypo denoting falsehood, because he is not bound to disclose his sin by laying aside
and krisis, judgment.”
the habit of holiness. If, however, he were to put on the
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), “the word
habit of holiness in order to make a show of righteousness,
hypocrite is derived from the appearance of those who
he would be a hypocrite and a dissembler.
come on to the stage with a disguised face, by changing
Reply to Objection 3. In dissimulation, as in a lie,
the color of their complexion, so as to imitate the com-
there are two things: one by way of sign, the other by
1718
way of thing signified. Accordingly the evil intention in or any sensible objects are considered in every dissimula-hypocrisy is considered as a thing signified, which does
tion and lie as a sign.
not tally with the sign: and the outward words, or deeds,
Whether hypocrisy is contrary to the virtue of truth?
IIa IIae q. 111 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to
The indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy
the virtue of truth. For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there
may be considered in relation to any accident, for instance
is a sign and a thing signified. Now with regard to neither
a remote end, or an instrument of action, or anything else
of these does it seem to be opposed to any special virtue:
of that kind.
for a hypocrite simulates any virtue, and by means of any
Reply to Objection 1. The hypocrite in simulating
virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer and alms deeds, as
a virtue regards it as his end, not in respect of its exis-
stated in Mat. 6:1-18. Therefore hypocrisy is not specially
tence, as though he wished to have it, but in respect of
opposed to the virtue of truth.
appearance, since he wishes to seem to have it. Hence
Objection 2. Further, all dissimulation seems to pro-
his hypocrisy is not opposed to that virtue, but to truth,
ceed from guile, wherefore it is opposed to simplicity.
inasmuch as he wishes to deceive men with regard to that
Now guile is opposed to prudence as above stated (q. 55,
virtue. And he performs acts of that virtue, not as intend-
a. 4). Therefore, hypocrisy which is dissimulation is not
ing them for their own sake, but instrumentally, as signs
opposed to truth, but rather to prudence or simplicity.
of that virtue, wherefore his hypocrisy has not, on that
Objection 3. Further, the species of moral acts is
account, a direct opposition to that virtue.
taken from their end. Now the end of hypocrisy is the
Reply to Objection 2.
As stated above (q. 55,
acquisition of gain or vainglory: wherefore a gloss on
Aa. 3,4,5), the vice directly opposed to prudence is cun-
Job 27:8, “What is the hope of the hypocrite, if through
ning, to which it belongs to discover ways of achieving
covetousness he take by violence,” says: “A hypocrite
a purpose, that are apparent and not real: while it ac-
or, as the Latin has it, a dissimulator, is a covetous thief:
complishes that purpose, by guile in words, and by fraud
for through desire of being honored for holiness, though
in deeds: and it stands in relation to prudence, as guile
guilty of wickedness, he steals praise for a life which is
and fraud to simplicity. Now guile and fraud are directed
not his.”∗ Therefore since covetousness or vainglory is not
chiefly to deception, and sometimes secondarily to injury.
directly opposed to truth, it seems that neither is hypocrisy
Wherefore it belongs directly to simplicity to guard one-
or dissimulation.
self from deception, and in this way the virtue of sim-
On the contrary, All dissimulation is a lie, as stated
plicity is the same as the virtue of truth as stated above
above (a. 1). Now a lie is directly opposed to truth. There-
(q. 109, a. 2, ad 4). There is, however, a mere logical
fore dissimulation or hypocrisy is also.
difference between them, because by truth we mean the
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph.
concordance between sign and thing signified, while sim-
text.
13, 24, x), “contrariety is opposition as regards
plicity indicates that one does not tend to different things,
form,” i.e. the specific form. Accordingly we must re-
by intending one thing inwardly, and pretending another
ply that dissimulation or hypocrisy may be opposed to a
outwardly.
virtue in two ways, in one way directly, in another way
Reply to Objection 3. Gain or glory is the remote
indirectly. Its direct opposition or contrariety is to be con-
end of the dissembler as also of the liar. Hence it does
sidered with regard to the very species of the act, and this
not take its species from this end, but from the proximate
species depends on that act’s proper object. Wherefore
end, which is to show oneself other than one is. Where-
since hypocrisy is a kind of dissimulation, whereby a man
fore it sometimes happens to a man to pretend great things
simulates a character which is not his, as stated in the pre-
of himself, for no further purpose than the mere lust of
ceding article, it follows that it is directly opposed to truth hypocrisy, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), and as
whereby a man shows himself in life and speech to be
also we have said above with regard to lying (q. 110, a. 2).
what he is, as stated in Ethic. iv, 7.
∗ The quotation is from St. Gregory’s Moralia, Bk XVIII.
1719
Whether hypocrisy is always a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 111 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that hypocrisy is always a mor-
says (Moral. xxxi, 17). But vainglory is not always a
tal sin. For Jerome says on Is. 16:14: “Of the two evils
mortal sin. Neither therefore is hypocrisy.
it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness”: and a
I answer that, There are two things in hypocrisy, lack
gloss on Job 1:21∗, “As it hath pleased the Lord,” etc.,
of holiness, and simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a
says that “pretended justice is no justice, but a twofold
hypocrite we mean a person whose intention is directed
sin”: and again a gloss on Lam. 4:6, “The iniquity. . . of
to both the above, one, namely, who cares not to be holy
my people is made greater than the sin of Sodom,” says:
but only to appear so, in which sense Sacred Scripture is
“He deplores the sins of the soul that falls into hypocrisy,
wont to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a mor-
which is a greater iniquity than the sin of Sodom.” Now
tal sin: for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save
the sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy is
through mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we mean one
always a mortal sin.
who intends to simulate holiness, which he lacks through
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,
mortal sin, then, although he is in mortal sin, whereby he
8) that hypocrites sin out of malice. But this is most
is deprived of holiness, yet, in his case, the dissimulation
grievous, for it pertains to the sin against the Holy Ghost.
itself is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes a venial
Therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally.
sin. This will depend on the end in view; for if this be
Objection 3.
Further, no one deserves the anger
contrary to the love of God or of his neighbor, it will be
of God and exclusion from seeing God, save on ac-
a mortal sin: for instance if he were to simulate holiness
count of mortal sin. Now the anger of God is deserved
in order to disseminate false doctrine, or that he may ob-
through hypocrisy according to Job 36:13, “Dissemblers
tain ecclesiastical preferment, though unworthy, or that he
and crafty men prove the wrath of God”: and the hypocrite
may obtain any temporal good in which he fixes his end.
is excluded from seeing God, according to Job 13:16,
If, however, the end intended be not contrary to charity,
“No hypocrite shall come before His presence.” There-
it will be a venial sin, as for instance when a man takes
fore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.
pleasure in the pretense itself: of such a man it is said in
On the contrary, Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it
Ethic. iv, 7 that “he would seem to be vain rather than
is a kind of dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin
evil”; for the same applies to simulation as to a lie.
to lie by deed. Neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal
It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the
sin.
perfection of holiness which is not necessary for spiritual
Further, the intention of a hypocrite is to appear to
welfare. Simulation of this kind is neither a mortal sin
be good. But this is not contrary to charity. Therefore
always, nor is it always associated with mortal sin.
hypocrisy is not of itself a mortal sin.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Further, hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory
∗ St. Augustine on Ps. 63:7
1720
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 112
Of Boasting
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts of lying according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7).
Under the first head, namely, boasting, there are two points of inquiry: (1) To which virtue is it opposed?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
Whether boasting is opposed to the virtue of truth?
IIa IIae q. 112 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that boasting is not opposed to
of me.” In another way a man uplifts himself in words,
the virtue of truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But it
by speaking of himself above that which he is in reality.
is possible to boast even without lying, as when a man
And since we should judge of things as they are in them-
makes a show of his own excellence. Thus it is written
selves, rather than as others deem them to be, it follows
(Esther 1:3,4) that Assuerus “made a great feast. . . that he
that boasting denotes more properly the uplifting of self
might show the riches of the glory” and “of his kingdom,
above what one is in oneself, than the uplifting of self
and the greatness and boasting of his power.” Therefore
above what others think of one: although in either case it
boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth.
may be called boasting. Hence boasting properly so called
Objection 2. Further, boasting is reckoned by Gre-
is opposed to truth by way of excess.
gory (Moral. xxiii, 4) to be one of the four species of
Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes boasting
pride, “when,” to wit, “a man boasts of having what he has
as exceeding men’s opinion.
not.” Hence it is written (Jer. 48:29,30): “We have heard
Reply to Objection 2. The sin of boasting may be
the pride of Moab, he is exceeding proud: his haughti-
considered in two ways. First, with regard to the species
ness, and his arrogancy, and his pride, and the loftiness of
of the act, and thus it is opposed to truth; as stated (in the
his heart. I know, saith the Lord, his boasting, and that the
body of the article and q. 110, a. 2). Secondly, with re-
strength thereof is not according to it.” Moreover, Gregory
gard to its cause, from which more frequently though not
says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that boasting arises from vainglory.
always it arises: and thus it proceeds from pride as its in-
Now pride and vainglory are opposed to the virtue of hu-
wardly moving and impelling cause. For when a man is
mility. Therefore boasting is opposed, not to truth, but to
uplifted inwardly by arrogance, it often results that out-
humility.
wardly he boasts of great things about himself; though
Objection 3.
Further, boasting seems to be occa-
sometimes a man takes to boasting, not from arrogance,
sioned by riches; wherefore it is written (Wis. 5:8): “What
but from some kind of vanity, and delights therein, be-
hath pride profited us? or what advantage hath the boast-
cause he is a boaster by habit. Hence arrogance, which is
ing of riches brought us?” Now excess of riches seems
an uplifting of self above oneself, is a kind of pride; yet it
to belong to the sin of covetousness, which is opposed to
is not the same as boasting, but is very often its cause. For
justice or liberality. Therefore boasting is not opposed to
this reason Gregory reckons boasting among the species
truth.
of pride. Moreover, the boaster frequently aims at ob-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7;
taining glory through his boasting, and so, according to
iv, 7), that boasting is opposed to truth.
Gregory, it arises from vainglory considered as its end.
I answer that, “Jactantia” [boasting] seems properly
Reply to Objection 3. Wealth also causes boasting,
to denote the uplifting of self by words: since if a man
in two ways. First, as an occasional cause, inasmuch as
wishes to throw [jactare] a thing far away, he lifts it up
a man prides himself on his riches. Hence (Prov. 8:18)
high. And to uplift oneself, properly speaking, is to talk
“riches” are significantly described as “proud” [Douay:
of oneself above oneself∗. This happens in two ways. For
‘glorious’]. Secondly, as being the end of boasting, since
sometimes a man speaks of himself, not above what he is
according to Ethic. iv, 7, some boast, not only for the sake
in himself, but above that which he is esteemed by men
of glory, but also for the sake of gain. Such people invent
to be: and this the Apostle declines to do when he says
stories about themselves, so as to make profit thereby; for
(2 Cor. 12:6): “I forbear lest any man should think of me
instance, they pretend to be skilled in medicine, wisdom,
above that which he seeth in me, or anything he heareth
or divination.
∗ Or ‘tall-talking’ as we should say in English
1721
Whether boasting is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 112 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For as told of the Pharisee who said (Lk. 18:11): “I am not
it is written (Prov. 28:25): “He that boasteth, and puffeth
as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, as also
himself, stirreth up quarrels.” Now it is a mortal sin to
is this publican.” Sometimes it is a venial sin, when, to
stir up quarrels, since God hates those that sow discord,
wit, a man boasts of things that are against neither God
according to Prov. 6:19. Therefore boasting is a mortal
nor his neighbor. Secondly, it may be considered with re-
sin.
gard to its cause, namely, pride, or the desire of gain or of
Objection 2. Further, whatever is forbidden in God’s
vainglory: and then if it proceeds from pride or from such
law is a mortal sin. Now a gloss on Ecclus. 6:2, “Extol
vainglory as is a mortal sin, then the boasting will also be
not thyself in the thoughts of thy soul,” says: “This is a
a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a venial sin. Sometimes,
prohibition of boasting and pride.” Therefore boasting is
however, a man breaks out into boasting through desire of
a mortal sin.
gain, and for this very reason he would seem to be aim-
Objection 3. Further, boasting is a kind of lie. But it is ing at the deception and injury of his neighbor: wherefore
neither an officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from
boasting of this kind is more likely to be a mortal sin.
the end of lying; for according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that “a man who
iv, 7), “the boaster pretends to something greater than he
boasts for the sake of gain, is viler than one who boasts for
is, sometimes for no further purpose, sometimes for the
the sake of glory or honor.” Yet it is not always a mortal
sake of glory or honor, sometimes for the sake of money.”
sin because the gain may be such as not to injure another
Thus it is evident that it is neither an officious nor a jo-
man.
cose lie, and consequently it must be a mischievous lie.
Reply to Objection 1. To boast in order to stir quar-
Therefore seemingly it is always a mortal sin.
rels is a mortal sin. But it happens sometimes that boasts
On the contrary, Boasting arises from vainglory, ac-
are the cause of quarrels, not intentionally but acciden-
cording to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17). Now vainglory
tally: and consequently boasting will not be a mortal sin
is not always a mortal sin, but is sometimes a venial sin
on that account.
which only the very perfect avoid.
For Gregory says
Reply to Objection 2. This gloss speaks of boasting
(Moral.
viii, 30) that “it belongs to the very perfect,
as arising from pride that is a mortal sin.
by outward deeds so to seek the glory of their author,
Reply to Objection 3. Boasting does not always in-
that they are not inwardly uplifted by the praise awarded
volve a mischievous lie, but only where it is contrary to
them.” Therefore boasting is not always a mortal sin.
the love of God or our neighbor, either in itself or in its
I answer that, As stated above (q. 110, a. 4), a mortal
cause. That a man boast, through mere pleasure in boast-
sin is one that is contrary to charity. Accordingly boast-
ing, is an inane thing to do, as the Philosopher remarks
ing may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, as a
(Ethic. iv, 7): wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless
lie, and thus it is sometimes a mortal, and sometimes a
perchance he were to prefer this to the love of God, so as
venial sin. It will be a mortal sin when a man boasts of
to contemn God’s commandments for the sake of boast-
that which is contrary to God’s glory—thus it is said in
ing: for then it would be against the charity of God, in
the person of the king of Tyre (Ezech. 28:2): “Thy heart
Whom alone ought our mind to rest as in its last end.
is lifted up, and thou hast said: I am God”—or contrary
To boast for the sake of glory or gain seen to involve
to the love of our neighbor, as when a man while boast-
an officious lie: provided it be do without injury to others,
ing of himself breaks out into invectives against others,
for then it would once become a mischievous lie.
1722
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 113
Irony∗
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider irony, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether irony is a sin?
(2) Of its comparison with boasting.
Whether irony is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 113 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that irony, which consists in
to irony, and is always a sin.
belittling oneself, is not a sin. For no sin arises from
Reply to Objection 1. There is a twofold wisdom
one’s being strengthened by God: and yet this leads one
and a twofold folly. For there is a wisdom according to
to belittle oneself, according to Prov. 30:1,2: “The vi-
God, which has human or worldly folly annexed to it, ac-
sion which the man spoke, with whom is God, and who
cording to 1 Cor. 3:18, “If any man among you seem to
being strengthened by God, abiding with him, said, I am
be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may
the most foolish of men.” Also it is written (Amos 7:14):
be wise.” But there is another wisdom that is worldly,
“Amos answered. . . I am not a prophet.” Therefore irony,
which as the same text goes on to say, “is foolishness with
whereby a man belittles himself in words, is not a sin.
God.” Accordingly, he that is strengthened by God ac-
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says in a letter to Au-
knowledges himself to be most foolish in the estimation
gustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xii): “It is the mark
of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which
of a well-disposed mind to acknowledge one’s fault when
human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted continues,
one is not guilty.” But all sin is inconsistent with a well-
“and the wisdom of men is not with me,” and farther on,
disposed mind. Therefore irony is not a sin.
“and I have known the science of the saints”†.
Objection 3. Further, it is not a sin to shun pride.
It may also be replied that “the wisdom of men” is that
But “some belittle themselves in words, so as to avoid
which is acquired by human reason, while the “wisdom of
pride,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). There-
the saints” is that which is received by divine inspiration.
fore irony is not a sin.
Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost.,
wit, he was not of the race of prophets: hence the text goes
Serm. xxix): “If thou liest on account of humility, if thou
on, “nor am I the son of a prophet.”
wert not a sinner before lying, thou hast become one by
Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to a well-disposed
lying.”
mind that a man tend to perfect righteousness, and con-
I answer that, To speak so as to belittle oneself may
sequently deem himself guilty, not only if he fall short of
occur in two ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when
common righteousness, which is truly a sin, but also if he
a man conceals the greater things in himself, but discov-
fall short of perfect righteousness, which sometimes is not
ers and asserts lesser things of himself the presence of
a sin. But he does not call sinful that which he does not
which in himself he perceives. To belittle oneself in this
acknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie of irony.
way does not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in respect of
Reply to Objection 3. A man should not commit one
its genus, except through corruption of one of its circum-
sin in order to avoid another: and so he ought not to lie in
stances. Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking
any way at all in order to avoid pride. Hence Augustine
the truth, for instance by ascribing to himself something
says (Tract. xliii in Joan.): “Shun not arrogance so as to
mean the existence of which in himself he does not per-
forsake truth”: and Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 3) that “it
ceive, or by denying something great of himself, which
is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies.”
nevertheless he perceives himself to possess: this pertains
∗ Irony Here Must Be Given the Signification of the Greek Eironia, Whence It Is Derived: Dissimulation of One’s Own Good Points.
† Vulg.:
‘and I have not known the science of the saints’
1723
Whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting?
IIa IIae q. 113 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that irony is not a less grievous
spect the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that “boasting is
sin than boasting. For each of them is a sin through for-
a more grievous sin than irony.”
saking truth, which is a kind of equality. But one does
Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles
not forsake truth by exceeding it any more than by dimin-
himself for some other motive, for instance that he may
ishing it. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than
deceive cunningly: and then irony is more grievous.
boasting.
Reply to Objection 1.
This argument applies to
Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher
irony and boasting, according as a lie is considered to be
(Ethic. iv, 7), irony sometimes is boasting. But boasting
grievous in itself or on account of its matter: for it has
is not irony. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than
been said that in this way they are equal.
boasting.
Reply to Objection 2. Excellence is twofold: one
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Prov. 26:25):
is in temporal, the other in spiritual things. Now it hap-
“When he shall speak low, trust him not: because there
pens at times that a person, by outward words or signs,
are seven mischiefs in his heart.” Now it belongs to irony
pretends to be lacking in external things, for instance by
to speak low. Therefore it contains a manifold wicked-
wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the
ness.
kind, and that he intends by so doing to make a show
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7):
of some spiritual excellence. Thus our Lord said of cer-
“Those who speak with irony and belittle themselves are
tain men (Mat. 6:16) that “they disfigure their faces that
more gracious, seemingly, in their manners.”
they may appear unto men to fast.” Wherefore such per-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 110, Aa. 2,4), one
sons are guilty of both vices, irony and boasting, although
lie is more grievous than another, sometimes on account
in different respects, and for this reason they sin more
of the matter which it is about—thus a lie about a matter
grievously. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that
of religious doctrine is most grievous—and sometimes on
it is “the practice of boasters both to make overmuch of
account of the motive for sinning; thus a mischievous lie
themselves, and to make very little of themselves”: and
is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now irony
for the same reason it is related of Augustine that he was
and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words,
unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly or
or by any other outward signs, namely, about matters af-
too shabby, because by both do men seek glory.
fecting the person: so that in this respect they are equal.
Reply to Objection 3. According to the words of
But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler
Ecclus.
19:23, “There is one that humbleth himself
motive, namely, the desire of gain or honor: whereas irony
wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit,” and it is in
arises from a man’s averseness, albeit inordinate, to be
this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who, through
disagreeable to others by uplifting himself: and in this re-
deceitful humility, “speaks low” wickedly.
1724
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 114
Of the Friendliness Which Is Called Affability
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a special virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
Whether friendliness is a special virtue?
IIa IIae q. 114 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that friendliness is not a special the affection whereby one man loves another and may re-virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that “the
sult from any virtue. We have stated above, in treating of
perfect friendship is that which is on account of virtue.”
charity (q. 23, a. 1, a. 3, ad 1; Qq. 25,26), what things be-
Now any virtue is the cause of friendship: “since the good
long to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another
is lovable to all,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv).
friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or
Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a conse-
deeds; this has not the perfect nature of friendship, but
quence of every virtue.
bears a certain likeness thereto, in so far as a man behaves
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
in a becoming manner towards those with whom he is in
6) of this kind of friend that he “takes everything in a right
contact.
manner both from those he loves and from those who are
Reply to Objection 2. Every man is naturally every
not his friends.” Now it seems to pertain to simulation that
man’s friend by a certain general love; even so it is written
a person should show signs of friendship to those whom
(Ecclus. 13:19) that “every beast loveth its like.” This love
he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue. There-
is signified by signs of friendship, which we show out-
fore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.
wardly by words or deeds, even to those who are strangers
Objection 3. Further, virtue “observes the mean ac-
or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this:
cording as a wise man decides” (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it
because we do not show them signs of perfect friendship,
is written (Eccles. 7:5): “The heart of the wise is where
for we do not treat strangers with the same intimacy as
there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is
those who are united to us by special friendship.
mirth”: wherefore “it belongs to a virtuous man to be
Reply to Objection 3. When it is said that “the heart
most wary of pleasure” (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of
of the wise is where there is mourning” it is not that he
friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), “is
may bring sorrow to his neighbor, for the Apostle says
essentially desirous of sharing pleasures, but fears to give
(Rom. 14:15): “If, because of thy meat, thy brother be
pain.” Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.
grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity”: but
On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about
that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful, accord-
acts of virtue. Now it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): “Make
ing to Ecclus. 7:38, “Be not wanting in comforting them
thyself affable to the congregation of the poor.” There-
that weep, and walk with them that mourn.” Again, “the
fore affability, which is what we mean by friendship, is a
heart of fools is where there is mirth,” not that they may
special virtue.
gladden others, but that they may enjoy others’ gladness.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 109, a. 2; Ia IIae,
Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his plea-
q. 55, a. 3), since virtue is directed to good, wherever there
sures with those among whom he dwells, not lustful plea-
is a special kind of good, there must needs be a special
sures, which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures, according
kind of virtue. Now good consists in order, as stated above
to Ps. 132:1, “Behold how good and how pleasant it is for
(q. 109, a. 2). And it behooves man to be maintained in
brethren to dwell together in unity.”
a becoming order towards other men as regards their mu-
Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6),
tual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and
for the sake of some good that will result, or in order
words, so that they behave towards one another in a be-
to avoid some evil, the virtuous man will sometimes not
coming manner. Hence the need of a special virtue that
shrink from bringing sorrow to those among whom he
maintains the becomingness of this order: and this virtue
lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8): “Although
is called friendliness.
I made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent,” and
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher speaks of a
further on (2 Cor. 7:9), “I am glad; not because you were
twofold friendship in his Ethics. One consists chiefly in
made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful
1725
unto repentance.” For this reason we should not show a written (Ecclus. 7:26): “Hast thou daughters? Have a care
cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in order that
of their body, and show not thy countenance gay towards
we may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin,
them.”
and in a way encourage them to sin further. Hence it is
Whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice?
IIa IIae q. 114 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that this kind of friendship is
we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell, un-
not a part of justice. For justice consists in giving another
less at times, for some reason, it be necessary to displease
man his due. But this virtue does not consist in doing that,
them for some good purpose.
but in behaving agreeably towards those among whom we
Reply to Objection 1. As we have said above (q. 109,
live. Therefore this virtue is not a part of justice.
a. 3, ad 1), because man is a social animal he owes his
Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher
fellow-man, in equity, the manifestation of truth without
(Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue is concerned about the joys and
which human society could not last. Now as man could
sorrows of those who dwell in fellowship. Now it belongs
not live in society without truth, so likewise, not with-
to temperance to moderate the greatest pleasures, as stated
out joy, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no
above ( Ia IIae, q. 60, a. 5; Ia IIae, q. 61, a. 3). Therefore
one could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless.
this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of justice.
Therefore, a certain natural equity obliges a man to live
Objection 3. Further, to give equal things to those
agreeably with his fellow-men; unless some reason should
who are unequal is contrary to justice, as stated above
oblige him to sadden them for their good.
(q. 59, Aa. 1,2). Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to temperance to
iv, 6), this virtue “treats in like manner known and un-
curb pleasures of the senses. But this virtue regards the
known, companions and strangers.” Therefore this virtue
pleasures of fellowship, which have their origin in the rea-
rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto.
son, in so far as one man behaves becomingly towards an-
On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) ac-
other. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as though they
counts friendship a part of justice.
were noisome.
I answer that, This virtue is a part of justice, being
Reply to Objection 3. This saying of the Philosopher
annexed to it as to a principal virtue. Because in common
does not mean that one ought to converse and behave in
with justice it is directed to another person, even as jus-
the same way with acquaintances and strangers, since, as
tice is: yet it falls short of the notion of justice, because
he says (Ethic. iv, 6), “it is not fitting to please and dis-
it lacks the full aspect of debt, whereby one man is bound
please intimate friends and strangers in the same way.”
to another, either by legal debt, which the law binds him
This likeness consists in this, that we ought to behave to-
to pay, or by some debt arising out of a favor received.
wards all in a fitting manner.
For it regards merely a certain debt of equity, namely, that
1726
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 115
Of Flattery
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue: (1) Flattery, and (2) Quarreling. Concerning flattery there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether flattery is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
Whether flattery is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 115 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that flattery is not a sin. For
all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing oth-
flattery consists in words of praise offered to another in
ers by words or deeds in their ordinary behavior towards
order to please him. But it is not a sin to praise a person,
their fellows.
according to Prov. 31:28, “Her children rose up and called
Reply to Objection 1. One may praise a person both
her blessed: her husband, and he praised her.” Moreover,
well and ill, according as one observes or omits the due
there is no evil in wishing to please others, according to 1
circumstances. For if while observing other due circum-
Cor. 10:33, “I. . . in all things please all men.” Therefore
stances one were to wish to please a person by praising
flattery is not a sin.
him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may strive
Objection 2. Further, evil is contrary to good, and
to make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid
blame to praise. But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither,
virtue of friendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one
then, is it a sin to praise good, which seems to belong to
wished to praise a person for things in which he ought not
flattery. Therefore flattery is not a sin.
to be praised; since perhaps they are evil, according to Ps.
Objection 3. Further, detraction is contrary to flattery.
9:24, “The sinner is praised in the desires of his soul”; or
Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is
they may be uncertain, according to Ecclus. 27:8, “Praise
a remedy against flattery. “It must be observed,” says he,
not a man before he speaketh,” and again (Ecclus. 11:2),
“that by the wonderful moderation of our Ruler, we are
“Praise not a man for his beauty”; or because there may
often allowed to be rent by detractions but are uplifted
be fear lest human praise should incite him to vainglory,
by immoderate praise, so that whom the voice of the flat-
wherefore it is written, (Ecclus. 11:30), “Praise not any
terer upraises, the tongue of the detractor may humble.”
man before death.” Again, in like manner it is right to
But detraction is an evil, as stated above (q. 73, Aa. 2,3).
wish to please a man in order to foster charity, so that he
Therefore flattery is a good.
may make spiritual progress therein. But it would be sin-
On the contrary, A gloss on Ezech. 13:18, “Woe to
ful to wish to please men for the sake of vainglory or gain,
them that sew cushions under every elbow,” says, “that is
or to please them in something evil, according to Ps. 52:6,
to say, sweet flattery.” Therefore flattery is a sin.
“God hath scattered the bones of them that please men,”
I answer that, As stated above (q. 114, a. 1, ad 3),
and according to the words of the Apostle (Gal. 1:10), “If
although the friendship of which we have been speaking,
I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ.”
or affability, intends chiefly the pleasure of those among
Reply to Objection 2. Even to blame evil is sinful,
whom one lives, yet it does not fear to displease when it
if due circumstances be not observed; and so too is it to
is a question of obtaining a certain good, or of avoiding a
praise good.
certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish always
Reply to Objection 3. Nothing hinders two vices be-
to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode
ing contrary to one another. Wherefore even as detraction
of pleasing, and would therefore sin by excess. If he do
is evil, so is flattery, which is contrary thereto as regards
this with the mere intention of pleasing he is said to be
what is said, but not directly as regards the end. Because
“complaisant,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv,
flattery seeks to please the person flattered, whereas the
6): whereas if he do it with the intention of making some
detractor seeks not the displeasure of the person defamed,
gain out of it, he is called a “flatterer” or “adulator.” As a
since at times he defames him in secret, but seeks rather
rule, however, the term “flattery” is wont to be applied to
his defamation.
1727
Whether flattery is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 115 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encour-according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), “a thing is evil
ages to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to
because it is harmful.” But flattery is most harmful, ac-
Is. 5:20. “Woe to you that call evil good.” Secondly, by
cording to Ps. 9:24, “For the sinner is praised in the de-
reason of the intention, as when one man flatters another,
sires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed. The sinner
so that by deceiving him he may injure him in body or in
hath provoked the Lord.” Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad
soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is written (Prov.
Celant): “Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as
27:6): “Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceit-
flattery”: and a gloss on Ps. 69:4, “Let them be presently
ful kisses of an enemy.” Thirdly, by way of occasion, as
turned away blushing for shame that say to me: ‘Tis well,
when the praise of a flatterer, even without his intending
‘Tis well,” says: “The tongue of the flatterer harms more
it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. In this case it is
than the sword of the persecutor.” Therefore flattery is a
necessary to consider, whether the occasion were given or
most grievous sin.
taken, and how grievous the consequent downfall, as may
Objection 2. Further, whoever does harm by words,
be understood from what has been said above concerning
harms himself no less than others: wherefore it is written
scandal (q. 43, Aa. 3,4). If, however, one man flatters an-
(Ps. 36:15): “Let their sword enter into their own hearts.”
other from the mere craving to please others, or again in
Now he that flatters another induces him to sin mortally:
order to avoid some evil, or to acquire something in a case
hence a gloss on Ps. 140:5, “Let not the oil of the sinner
of necessity, this is not contrary to charity. Consequently
fatten my head,” says: “The false praise of the flatterer
it is not a mortal but a venial sin.
softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth
Reply to Objection 1. The passages quoted speak of
and renders it susceptive of vice.” Much more, therefore,
the flatterer who praises another’s sin. Flattery of this
does the flatterer sin in himself.
kind is said to harm more than the sword of the perse-
Objection 3. Further, it is written in the Decretals (D.
cutor, since it does harm to goods that are of greater con-
XLVI, Cap. 3): “The cleric who shall be found to spend
sequence. namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm
his time in flattery and treachery shall be degraded from
so efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays
his office.” Now such a punishment as this is not inflicted
effectively, being a sufficient cause of death; whereas no
save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a mortal sin.
one by flattering can be a sufficient cause of another’s sin-
On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory
ning, as was shown above (q. 43, a. 1, ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 73,
(xli, de Sanctis) reckons among slight sins, “if one desire
a. 8, ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 80, a. 1).
to flatter any person of higher standing, whether of one’s
Reply to Objection 2. This argument applies to one
own choice, or out of necessity.”
that flatters with the intention of doing harm: for such a
I answer that, As stated above (q. 112, a. 2), a mortal
man harms himself more than others, since he harms him-
sin is one that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is some-
self, as the sufficient cause of sinning, whereas he is only
times contrary to charity and sometimes not. It is contrary
the occasional cause of the harm he does to others.
to charity in three ways. First, by reason of the very mat-
Reply to Objection 3. The passage quoted refers to
ter, as when one man praises another’s sin: for this is con-
the man who flatters another treacherously, in order to de-
trary to the love of God, against Whose justice he speaks,
ceive him.
1728
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 116
Of Quarreling
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider quarreling; concerning which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship?
(2) Of its comparison with flattery?
Whether quarreling is opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability?
IIa IIae q. 116 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that quarreling is not opposed to
and this seems to pertain to discord, which is contrary
the virtue of friendship or affability. For quarreling seems
to charity. Whereas at times contradiction arises by rea-
to pertain to discord, just as contention does. But discord
son of the speaker being a person to whom someone
is opposed to charity, as stated above (q. 37, a. 1). There-
does not fear to be disagreeable: whence arises quarrel-
fore quarreling is also.
ing, which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or af-
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 26:21): “An
fability, to which it belongs to behave agreeably towards
angry man stirreth up strife.” Now anger is opposed to
those among whom we dwell. Hence the Philosopher says
meekness. Therefore strife or quarreling is also.
(Ethic. iv, 6) that “those who are opposed to everything
Objection 3. Further, it is written (James 4:1): “From
with the intent of being disagreeable, and care for nobody,
whence are wars and quarrels [Douay: ‘contentions’]
are said to be peevish and quarrelsome.”
among you? Are they not hence, from your concupis-
Reply to Objection 1. Contention pertains rather to
cences which war in your members?”
Now it would
the contradiction of discord, while quarreling belongs to
seem contrary to temperance to follow one’s concupis-
the contradiction which has the intention of displeasing.
cences. Therefore it seems that quarreling is opposed not
Reply to Objection 2. The direct opposition of virtues
to friendship but to temperance.
to vices depends, not on their causes, since one vice may
On the contrary, The Philosopher opposes quarreling
arise from many causes, but on the species of their acts.
to friendship (Ethic. iv, 6).
And although quarreling arises at times from anger, it may
I answer that, Quarreling consists properly in words,
arise from many other causes, hence it does not follow that
when, namely, one person contradicts another’s words.
it is directly opposed to meekness.
Now two things may be observed in this contradiction.
Reply to Objection 3. James speaks there of con-
For sometimes contradiction arises on account of the per-
cupiscence considered as a general evil whence all vices
son who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with
arise. Thus, a gloss on Rom. 7:7 says: “The law is good,
him from lack of that love which unites minds together,
since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil.”
Whether quarreling is a more grievous sin than flattery?
IIa IIae q. 116 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that quarreling is a less grievous Objection 3. Further, shame is fear of what is vile,
sin than the contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is
the more harm a sin does the more grievous it seems to
more ashamed to be a flatterer than a quarreler. Therefore
be. Now flattery does more harm than quarreling, for it
quarreling is a less grievous sin than flattery.
is written (Is. 3:12): “O My people, they that call thee
On the contrary, The more a sin is inconsistent with
blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of
the spiritual state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now
thy steps.” Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than
quarreling seems to be more inconsistent with the spiritual
quarreling.
state: for it is written (1 Tim. 3:2,3) that it “behooveth a
Objection 2. Further, there appears to be a certain
bishop to be. . . not quarrelsome”; and (2 Tim. 3:24): “The
amount of deceit in flattery, since the flatterer says one
servant of the Lord must not wrangle.” Therefore quarrel-
thing, and thinks another: whereas the quarrelsome man
ing seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery.
is without deceit, for he contradicts openly. Now he that
I answer that, We can speak of each of these sins in
sins deceitfully is a viler man, according to the Philoso-
two ways. In one way we may consider the species of ei-
pher (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous
ther sin, and thus the more a vice is at variance with the
sin than quarreling.
opposite virtue the more grievous it is. Now the virtue
1729
of friendship has a greater tendency to please than to dis-ness of a man has its source in his reason: wherefore
please: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giv-
the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the rea-
ing displeasure sins more grievously than the adulator or
son, are viler, although spiritual sins are more grievous,
flatterer, who exceeds in giving pleasure. In another way
since they proceed from greater contempt. In like man-
we may consider them as regards certain external motives,
ner, sins that are committed through deceit are viler, in
and thus flattery sometimes more grievous, for instance
so far as they seem to arise from a certain weakness, and
when one intends by deception to acquire undue honor or
from a certain falseness of the reason, although sins that
gain: while sometimes quarreling is more grievous; for
are committed openly proceed sometimes from a greater
instance, when one intends either to deny the truth, or to
contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied by
hold up the speaker to contempt.
deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling, through
Reply to Objection 1. Just as the flatterer may do
proceeding from greater contempt, is apparently more
harm by deceiving secretly, so the quarreler may do harm
grievous.
sometimes by assailing openly. Now, other things being
Reply to Objection 3. As stated in the objection,
equal, it is more grievous to harm a person openly, by vi-
shame regards the vileness of a sin; wherefore a man is
olence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a
not always more ashamed of a more grievous sin, but of a
more grievous sin than theft, as stated above (q. 66, a. 9).
viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more ashamed of flattery
Reply to Objection 2.
In human acts, the more
than of quarreling, although quarreling is more grievous.
grievous is not always the more vile. For the comeli-
1730
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 117
Of Liberality
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, namely, covetousness and prodigality.
Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether liberality is a virtue?
(2) What is its matter?
(3) Of its act;
(4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather than to take?
(5) Whether liberality is a part of justice?
(6) Of its comparison with other virtues.
Whether liberality is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 117 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that liberality is not a virtue.
suffices for one man to have few things. Wherefore the
For no virtue is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it
liberal man commendably spends more on others than on
is a natural inclination for one to provide for oneself more
himself. Nevertheless we are bound to be more provident
than for others: and yet it pertains to the liberal man to do
for ourselves in spiritual goods, in which each one is able
the contrary, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
to look after himself in the first place. And yet it does not
iv, 1), “it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to him-
belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to attend
self, so that he leaves for himself the lesser things.” There-
so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those be-
fore liberality is not a virtue.
longing to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i):
Objection 2.
Further, man sustains life by means
“It is a commendable liberality not to neglect your rela-
of riches, and wealth contributes to happiness instrumen-
tives if you know them to be in want.”
tally, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Since, then, every virtue is
Reply to Objection 2. It does not belong to a lib-
directed to happiness, it seems that the liberal man is not
eral man so to give away his riches that nothing is left
virtuous, for the Philosopher says of him (Ethic. iv, 1) that
for his own support, nor the wherewithal to perform those
“he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but
acts of virtue whereby happiness is acquired. Hence the
to give it away.”
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “the liberal man does
Objection 3. Further, the virtues are connected with
not neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain
one another. But liberality does not seem to be connected
people”; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that “Our Lord
with the other virtues: since many are virtuous who can-
does not wish a man to pour out his riches all at once, but
not be liberal, for they have nothing to give; and many
to dispense them: unless he do as Eliseus did, who slew
give or spend liberally who are not virtuous otherwise.
his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be bound by
Therefore liberality is not a virtue.
any household cares.” For this belongs to the state of per-
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that “the
fection, of which we shall speak farther on (q. 184, q. 186,
Gospel contains many instances in which a just liberality
a. 3).
is inculcated.” Now in the Gospel nothing is taught that
It must be observed, however, that the very act of giv-
does not pertain to virtue. Therefore liberality is a virtue.
ing away one’s possessions liberally, in so far as it is an
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii,
act of virtue, is directed to happiness.
19), “it belongs to virtue to use well the things that we
Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
can use ill.” Now we may use both well and ill, not only
iv, 1), “those who spend much on intemperance are not
the things that are within us, such as the powers and the
liberal but prodigal”; and likewise whoever spends what
passions of the soul, but also those that are without, such
he has for the sake of other sins. Hence Ambrose says (De
as the things of this world that are granted us for our liveli-
Offic. i): “If you assist to rob others of their possessions,
hood. Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use these
your honesty is not to be commended, nor is your liberal-
things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue.
ity genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather than
Reply to Objection 1. According to Ambrose (Serm.
of pity.” Wherefore those who lack other virtues, though
lxiv de Temp.) and Basil (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18) ex-
they spend much on certain evil works, are not liberal.
cess of riches is granted by God to some, in order that
Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending
they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship. But it
much on good uses, without having the habit of liberal-
1731
ity: even as men perform works of other virtues, before (Ethic. iv, 1): “Liberality is proportionate to a man’s sub-having the habit of virtue, though not in the same way as
stance,” i.e. his means, “for it consists, not in the quantity
virtuous people, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1). In
given, but in the habit of the giver”: and Ambrose says
like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being
(De Offic. i) that “it is the heart that makes a gift rich or
liberal, although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says
poor, and gives things their value.”
Whether liberality is about money?
IIa IIae q. 117 a. 2
Objection 1.
It seems that liberality is not about
ship, and shows his mind to be free of attachment thereto.
money. For every moral virtue is about operations and
Now those things which are the subject of a man’s free-
passions. Now it is proper to justice to be about opera-
handedness towards others are the goods he possesses,
tions, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Therefore, since liberality
which are denoted by the term “money.” Therefore the
is a moral virtue, it seems that it is about passions and not
proper matter of liberality is money.
about money.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 1, ad 3),
Objection 2. Further, it belongs to a liberal man to
liberality depends not on the quantity given, but on the
make use of any kind of wealth. Now natural riches are
heart of the giver. Now the heart of the giver is disposed
more real than artificial riches, according to the Philoso-
according to the passions of love and desire, and conse-
pher (Polit. i, 5,6). Therefore liberality is not chiefly about quently those of pleasure and sorrow, towards the things
money.
given. Hence the interior passions are the immediate mat-
Objection 3. Further, different virtues have different
ter of liberality, while exterior money is the object of those
matter, since habits are distinguished by their objects. But
same passions.
external things are the matter of distributive and commu-
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says in his book
tative justice. Therefore they are not the matter of liberal-
De Disciplina Christi (Tract. de divers, i), everything
ity.
whatsoever man has on earth, and whatsoever he owns,
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
goes by the name of “ ‘pecunia’ [money], because in olden
1) that “liberality seems to be a mean in the matter of
times men’s possessions consisted entirely of ‘pecora’
money.”
[flocks].” And the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): “We
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic.
give the name of money to anything that can be valued in
iv, 1) it belongs to the liberal man to part with things.
currency.”
Hence liberality is also called open-handedness [largitas],
Reply to Objection 3. Justice establishes equality in
because that which is open does not withhold things but
external things, but has nothing to do, properly speaking,
parts of them. The term “liberality” seems also to al-
with the regulation of internal passions: wherefore money
lude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing he
is in one way the matter of liberality, and in another way
frees it [liberat], so to speak, from his keeping and owner-
of justice.
Whether using money is the act of liberality?
IIa IIae q. 117 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that using money is not the act
of money belongs to liberality.
of liberality. For different virtues have different acts. But
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1):
using money is becoming to other virtues, such as justice
“In whatever matter a man is virtuous, he will make the
and magnificence. Therefore it is not the proper act of
best use of that matter: Therefore he that has the virtue
liberality.
with regard to money will make the best use of riches.”
Objection 2. Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not
Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good use of
only to give but also to receive and keep. But receiving
money is the act of liberality.
and keeping do not seem to be connected with the use of
I answer that, The species of an act is taken from its
money. Therefore using money seems to be unsuitably
object, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 2). Now the
assigned as the proper act of liberality.
object or matter of liberality is money and whatever has
Objection 3. Further, the use of money consists not
a money value, as stated in the foregoing Article (ad 2).
only in giving it but also in spending it. But the spending
And since every virtue is consistent with its object, it fol-
of money refers to the spender, and consequently is not an
lows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is consistent
act of liberality: for Seneca says (De Benef. v): “A man is
with money. Now money comes under the head of useful
not liberal by giving to himself.” Therefore not every use
goods, since all external goods are directed to man’s use.
1732
Hence the proper act of liberality is making use of money order to make fitting use of it.
or riches.
Reply to Objection 3. As stated (a. 2, ad 1), the inter-
Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to liberality to make
nal passions whereby man is affected towards money are
good use of riches as such, because riches are the proper
the proximate matter of liberality. Hence it belongs to lib-
matter of liberality. On the other hand it belongs to justice
erality before all that a man should not be prevented from
to make use of riches under another aspect, namely, that of
making any due use of money through an inordinate affec-
debt, in so far as an external thing is due to another. And
tion for it. Now there is a twofold use of money: one con-
it belongs to magnificence to make use of riches under a
sists in applying it to one’s own use, and would seem to
special aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed for
come under the designation of costs or expenditure; while
the fulfilment of some great deed. Hence magnificence
the other consists in devoting it to the use of others, and
stands in relation to liberality as something in addition
comes under the head of gifts. Hence it belongs to liber-
thereto, as we shall explain farther on (q. 134).
ality that one be not hindered by an immoderate love of
Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to a virtuous man
money, either from spending it becomingly, or from mak-
not only to make good use of his matter or instrument, but
ing suitable gifts. Therefore liberality is concerned with
also to provide opportunities for that good use. Thus it be-
giving and spending, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
longs to a soldier’s fortitude not only to wield his sword
iv, 1). The saying of Seneca refers to liberality as regards
against the foe, but also to sharpen his sword and keep it
giving: for a man is not said to be liberal for the reason
in its sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to liberality not only to
that he gives something to himself.
use money, but also to keep it in preparation and safety in
Whether it belongs to a liberal man chiefly to give?
IIa IIae q. 117 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to a lib-
than use: while the keeping of money, in so far as it is
eral man chiefly to give. For liberality, like all other moral
directed to facilitate the use of money, is like a habit.
virtues, is regulated by prudence. Now it seems to be-
Now in parting with a thing —for instance, when we
long very much to prudence that a man should keep his
throw something—the farther we put it away the greater
riches. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that
the force [virtus] employed. Hence parting with money
“those who have not earned money, but have received the
by giving it to others proceeds from a greater virtue than
money earned by others, spend it more liberally, because
when we spend it on ourselves. But it is proper to a virtue
they have not experienced the want of it.” Therefore it
as such to tend to what is more perfect, since “virtue is a
seems that giving does not chiefly belong to the liberal
kind of perfection” (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). Therefore a
man.
liberal man is praised chiefly for giving.
Objection 2. Further, no man is sorry for what he in-
Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to prudence to keep
tends chiefly to do, nor does he cease from doing it. But a
money, lest it be stolen or spent uselessly. But to spend it
liberal man is sometimes sorry for what he has given, nor
usefully is not less but more prudent than to keep it use-
does he give to all, as stated in Ethic. iv, 1. Therefore it
fully: since more things have to be considered in money’s
does not belong chiefly to a liberal man to give.
use, which is likened to movement, than in its keeping,
Objection 3. Further, in order to accomplish what he
which is likened to rest. As to those who, having received
intends chiefly, a man employs all the ways he can. Now
money that others have earned, spend it more liberally,
a liberal man is not a beggar, as the Philosopher observes
through not having experienced the want of it, if their in-
(Ethic. iv, 1); and yet by begging he might provide him-
experience is the sole cause of their liberal expenditure
self with the means of giving to others. Therefore it seems
they have not the virtue of liberality. Sometimes, how-
that he does not chiefly aim at giving.
ever, this inexperience merely removes the impediment
Objection 4. Further, man is bound to look after him-
to liberality, so that it makes them all the more ready to
self rather than others. But by spending he looks after
act liberally, because, not unfrequently, the fear of want
himself, whereas by giving he looks after others. There-
that results from the experience of want hinders those who
fore it belongs to a liberal man to spend rather than to
have acquired money from using it up by acting with lib-
give.
erality; as does likewise the love they have for it as being
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1)
their own effect, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv,
that “it belongs to a liberal man to surpass in giving.”
1).
I answer that, It is proper to a liberal man to use
Reply to Objection 2. As stated in this and the pre-
money. Now the use of money consists in parting with
ceding Article, it belongs to liberality to make fitting use
it. For the acquisition of money is like generation rather
of money, and consequently to give it in a fitting manner,
1733
since this is a use of money. Again, every virtue is grieved same thing is not the principle of both action and passion.
by whatever is contrary to its act, and avoids whatever hin-
Hence, since liberality is a principle of giving, it does not
ders that act. Now two things are opposed to suitable giv-
belong to the liberal man to be ready to receive, and still
ing; namely, not giving what ought suitably to be given,
less to beg. Hence the verse:
and giving something unsuitably. Wherefore the liberal
‘In this world he that wishes to be pleasing to many
man is grieved at both: but especially at the former, since
Should give often, take seldom, ask never.’ But he makes
it is more opposed to his proper act. For this reason, too,
provision in order to give certain things according as lib-
he does not give to all: since his act would be hindered
erality requires; such are the fruits of his own possessions,
were he to give to everyone: for he would not have the
for he is careful about realizing them that he may make a
means of giving to those to whom it were fitting for him
liberal use thereof.
to give.
Reply to Objection 4. To spend on oneself is an incli-
Reply to Objection 3. Giving and receiving are re-
nation of nature; hence to spend money on others belongs
lated to one another as action and passion.
Now the
properly to a virtue.
Whether liberality is a part of justice?
IIa IIae q. 117 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that liberality is not a part of
concerned with external things, and so is justice, albeit
justice. For justice regards that which is due. Now the
under a different aspect, a stated in this Article and above
more a thing is due the less liberally is it given. Therefore
(a. 2, ad 3). Hence it is that liberality is reckoned by some
liberality is not a part of justice, but is incompatible with
to be a part of justice, being annexed thereto as to a prin-
it.
cipal virtue.
Objection 2. Further, justice is about operation as
Reply to Objection 1. Although liberality does no
stated above (q. 58, a. 9; Ia IIae, q. 60, Aa. 2,3): whereas
consider the legal due that justice considers, it considers a
liberality is chiefly about the love and desire of money,
certain moral due. This due is based on a certain fitting-
which are passions. Therefore liberality seems to belong
ness and not on an obligation: so that it answers to the
to temperance rather than to justice.
idea of due in the lowest degree.
Objection 3. Further, it belongs chiefly to liberality to Reply to Objection 2. Temperance is about concu-give becomingly, as stated (a. 4). But giving becomingly
piscence in pleasures of the body. But the concupiscence
belongs to beneficence and mercy, which pertain to char-
and delight in money is not referable to the body but rather
ity, as state above (Qq. 30,31). Therefore liberality is a
to the soul. Hence liberality does not properly pertain to
part of charity rather than of justice.
temperance.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): “Justice
Reply to Objection 3. The giving of beneficence and
has to do with the fellowship of mankind. For the notion
mercy proceeds from the fact that a man has a certain af-
of fellowship is divided into two parts, justice and benef-
fection towards the person to whom he gives: wherefore
icence, also called liberality or kind-heartedness.” There-
this giving belongs to charity or friendship. But the giv-
fore liberality pertains to justice.
ing of liberality arises from a person being affected in a
I answer that, Liberality is not a species of justice,
certain way towards money, in that he desires it not nor
since justice pays another what is his whereas liberality
loves it: so that when it is fitting he gives it not only to his gives another what is one’s own. There are, however, two
friends but also to those whom he knows not. Hence it be-
points in which it agrees with justice: first, that it is di-
long not to charity, but to justice, which is about external
rected chiefly to another, as justice is; secondly, that it is
things.
Whether liberality is the greatest of the virtues?
IIa IIae q. 117 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that liberality is the greatest of be greatest is to be best.” Now the nature of goodness
the virtues. For every virtue of man is a likeness to the di-
seems to pertain mostly to liberality, since “the good is
vine goodness. Now man is likened chiefly by liberality to
self-communicative,” according to Dionysius (Div. Nom.
God, “Who giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth
iv). Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that “justice re-
not” (James 1:5). Therefore liberality is the greatest of the
clines to severity, liberality to goodness.” Therefore liber-
virtues.
ality is the greatest of virtues.
Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De
Objection 3. Further, men are honored and loved on
Trin. vi, 8), “in things that are great, but not in bulk, to
account of virtue. Now Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that
1734
“bounty above all makes a man famous”: and the Philoso-ality is ordained to a good consequently, and in this way
pher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “among the virtuous the liberal
it is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by reason of
are the most beloved.” Therefore liberality is the greatest
his not being a lover of money, it follows that a man read-
of virtues.
ily makes use of it, whether for himself. Or for the good
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that
of others, or for God’s glory. Thus it derives a certain
“justice seems to be more excellent than liberality, al-
excellence from being useful in many ways. Since, how-
though liberality is more pleasing.” The Philosopher also
ever, we should judge of things according to that which
says (Rhet. i, 9) that “brave and just men are honored
is competent to them primarily and in respect of their na-
chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal.”
ture, rather than according to that which pertains to them
I answer that, Every virtue tends towards a good;
consequently, it remains to be said that liberality is not the
wherefore the greater virtue is that which tends towards
greatest of virtues.
the greater good. Now liberality tends towards a good in
Reply to Objection 1. God’s giving proceeds from
two ways: in one way, primarily and of its own nature;
His love for those to whom He gives, not from His af-
in another way, consequently. Primarily and of its very
fection towards the things He gives, wherefore it seems
nature it tends to set in order one’s own affection towards
to pertain to charity, the greatest of virtues, rather than to
the possession and use of money. In this way temperance,
liberality.
which moderates desires and pleasures relating to one’s
Reply to Objection 2. Every virtue shares the nature
own body, takes precedence of liberality: and so do for-
of goodness by giving forth its own act: and the acts of
titude and justice, which, in a manner, are directed to the
certain other virtues are better than money which liberal-
common good, one in time of peace, the other in time of
ity gives forth.
war: while all these are preceded by those virtues which
Reply to Objection 3. The friendship whereby a lib-
are directed to the Divine good. For the Divine good
eral man is beloved is not that which is based on virtue, as
surpasses all manner of human good; and among human
though he were better than others, but that which is based
goods the public good surpasses the good of the individ-
on utility, because he is more useful in external goods,
ual; and of the last named the good of the body surpasses
which as a rule men desire above all others. For the same
those goods that consist of external things. Again, liber-
reason he becomes famous.
1735
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 118
Of the Vices Opposed to Liberality, and in the First Place, of Covetousness (In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to liberality: and (1) covetousness; (2) prodigality.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether covetousness is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) To which virtue it is opposed;
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(5) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
(6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin?
(7) Whether it is a capital vice?
(8) Of its daughters.
Whether covetousness is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 118 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not aa
whatever is directed to an end must needs be commensu-
sin. For covetousness [avaritia] denotes a certain greed
rate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commen-
for gold [aeris aviditas∗], because, to wit, it consists in
surate with health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i,
a desire for money, under which all external goods may
6). External goods come under the head of things use-
be comprised. . Now it is not a sin to desire external
ful for an end, as stated above (q. 117, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 2
goods: since man desires them naturally, both because
, a. 1). Hence it must needs be that man’s good in their
they are naturally subject to man, and because by their
respect consists in a certain measure, in other words, that
means man’s life is sustained (for which reason they are
man seeks, according to a certain measure, to have exter-
spoken of as his substance). Therefore covetousness is not
nal riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live
a sin.
in keeping with his condition of life. Wherefore it will be
Objection 2. Further, every sin is against either God,
a sin for him to exceed this measure, by wishing to ac-
or one’s neighbor, or oneself, as stated above ( Ia IIae,
quire or keep them immoderately. This is what is meant
q. 72, a. 4). But covetousness is not, properly speaking,
by covetousness, which is defined as “immoderate love of
a sin against God: since it is opposed neither to religion
possessing.” It is therefore evident that covetousness is a
nor to the theological virtues, by which man is directed to
sin.
God. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this pertains
Reply to Objection 1. It is natural to man to desire
properly to gluttony and lust, of which the Apostle says
external things as means to an end: wherefore this desire
(1 Cor. 6:18): “He that committeth fornication sinneth
is devoid of sin, in so far as it is held in check by the
against his own body.” In like manner neither is it appar-
rule taken from the nature of the end. But covetousness
ently a sin against one’s neighbor, since a man harms no
exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin.
one by keeping what is his own. Therefore covetousness
Reply to Objection 2. Covetousness may signify im-
is not a sin.
moderation about external things in two ways. First, so as
Objection 3. Further, things that occur naturally are
to regard immediately the acquisition and keeping of such
not sins. Now covetousness comes naturally to old age
things, when, to wit, a man acquires or keeps them more
and every kind of defect, according to the Philosopher
than is due. In this way it is a sin directly against one’s
(Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
neighbor, since one man cannot over-abound in external
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 13:5): “Let your
riches, without another man lacking them, for temporal
manners be without covetousness, contented with such
goods cannot be possessed by many at the same time. Sec-
things as you have.”
ondly, it may signify immoderation in the internal affec-
I answer that, In whatever things good consists in a
tion which a man has for riches when, for instance, a man
due measure, evil must of necessity ensue through excess
loves them, desires them, or delights in them, immoder-
or deficiency of that measure. Now in all things that are
ately. In this way by covetousness a man sins against him-
for an end, the good consists in a certain measure: since
self, because it causes disorder in his affections, though
∗ The Latin for covetousness “avaritia” is derived from “aveo” to desire; but the Greek philargyria signifies literally “love of money”: and it is to this that St. Thomas is alluding (cf. a. 2, obj. 2)
1736
not in his body as do the sins of the flesh.
power in human nature. Hence though old people seek
As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God,
more greedily the aid of external things, just as everyone
just as all mortal sins, inasmuch as man contemns things
that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they are
eternal for the sake of temporal things.
not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of
Reply to Objection 3. Natural inclinations should
reason with regard to riches.
be regulated according to reason, which is the governing
Whether covetousness is a special sin?
IIa IIae q. 118 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a spe-
the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful good.
cial sin. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): “Cov-
And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good,
etousness, which in Greek is called philargyria, applies since they are desired under the aspect of being useful to
not only to silver or money, but also to anything that is
man. Consequently covetousness is a special sin, foras-
desired immoderately.” Now in every sin there is immod-
much as it is an immoderate love of having possessions,
erate desire of something, because sin consists in turning
which are comprised under the name of money, whence
away from the immutable good, and adhering to mutable
covetousness [avaritia] is denominated.
goods, as state above ( Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 6, obj. 3). There-
Since, however, the verb “to have,” which seems to
fore covetousness is a general sin.
have been originally employed in connection with pos-
Objection 2. Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x),
sessions whereof we are absolute masters, is applied to
“the covetous [avarus] man” is so called because he is
many other things (thus a man is said to have health, a
“greedy for brass [avidus aeris],” i.e. money: wherefore
wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in De Praedicamen-
in Greek covetousness is called philargyria, i.e. “love of tis), consequently the term “covetousness” has been am-silver.” Now silver, which stands for money, signifies all
plified to denote all immoderate desire for having any-
external goods the value of which can be measured by
thing whatever. Thus Gregory says in a homily (xvi in
money, as stated above (q. 117, a. 2, ad 2). Therefore
Ev.) that “covetousness is a desire not only for money, but
covetousness is a desire for any external thing: and con-
also for knowledge and high places, when prominence is
sequently seems to be a general sin.
immoderately sought after.” In this way covetousness is
Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Rom. 7:7, “For I had
not a special sin: and in this sense Augustine speaks of
not known concupiscence,” says: “The law is good, since
covetousness in the passage quoted in the First Objection.
by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil.” Now the
Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First Objec-
law seems to forbid especially the concupiscence of cov-
tion.
etousness: hence it is written (Ex. 20:17): “Thou shalt
Reply to Objection 2. All those external things that
not covet thy neighbor’s goods.” Therefore the concupis-
are subject to the uses of human life are comprised under
cence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness is a
the term “money,” inasmuch as they have the aspect of
general sin.
useful good. But there are certain external goods that can
On the contrary, Covetousness is numbered together
be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so
with other special sins (Rom. 1:29), where it is written:
forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Where-
“Being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, cov-
fore the desire for such things is not properly called cov-
etousness” [Douay: ‘avarice’], etc.
etousness, in so far as it is a special vice.
I answer that, Sins take their species from their ob-
Reply to Objection 3. This gloss speaks of the inor-
jects, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 72, a. 1). Now the object
dinate concupiscence for anything whatever. For it is easy
of a sin is the good towards which an inordinate appetite
to understand that if it is forbidden to covet another’s pos-
tends. Hence where there is a special aspect of good in-
sessions it is also forbidden to covet those things that can
ordinately desired, there is a special kind of sin. Now
be obtained by means of those possessions.
Whether covetousness is opposed to liberality?
IIa IIae q. 118 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not op-
etousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same
posed to liberality. For Chrysostom, commenting on Mat.
(Ethic. v, 2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to
5:6, “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,”
liberality.
says, (Hom. xv in Matth.) that there are two kinds of
Objection 2. Further, the sin of covetousness consists
justice, one general, and the other special, to which cov-
in a man’s exceeding the measure in the things he pos-
1737
sesses. But this measure is appointed by justice. There-way covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moder-
fore covetousness is directly opposed to justice and not to
ates these affections, as stated above (q. 117, a. 2, ad 3,
liberality.
a. 3, ad 3, a. 6). In this sense covetousness is spoken
Objection 3. Further, liberality is a virtue that ob-
of (2 Cor. 9:5): “That they would. . . prepare this bless-
serves the mean between two contrary vices, as the
ing before promised, to be ready, so as a blessing, not as
Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7; iv, 1). But covetousness
covetousness,” where a gloss observes: “Lest they should
has no contrary and opposite sin, according to the Philoso-
regret what they had given, and give but little.”
pher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore covetousness is not op-
Reply to Objection 1. Chrysostom and the Philoso-
posed to liberality.
pher are speaking of covetousness in the first sense: cov-
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:9): “A cov-
etousness in the second sense is called illiberality∗ by the
etous man shall not be satisfied with money, and he that
Philosopher.
loveth riches shall have no fruits from them.” Now not to
Reply to Objection 2. It belongs properly to justice
be satisfied with money and to love it inordinately are op-
to appoint the measure in the acquisition and keeping of
posed to liberality, which observes the mean in the desire
riches from the point of view of legal due, so that a man
of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality.
should neither take nor retain another’s property. But lib-
I answer that, Covetousness denotes immoderation
erality appoints the measure of reason, principally in the
with regard to riches in two ways. First, immediately in
interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking
respect of the acquisition and keeping of riches. In this
and keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in
way a man obtains money beyond his due, by stealing
so far as these proceed from the interior affection, looking
or retaining another’s property. This is opposed to jus-
at the matter from the point of view not of the legal but of
tice, and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech.
the moral debt, which latter depends on the rule of reason.
22:27): “Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves
Reply to Objection 3. Covetousness as opposed to
ravening the prey to shed blood. . . and to run after gains
justice has no opposite vice: since it consists in having
through covetousness.” Secondly, it denotes immodera-
more than one ought according to justice, the contrary of
tion in the interior affections for riches; for instance, when
which is to have less than one ought, and this is not a sin
a man loves or desires riches too much, or takes too much
but a punishment. But covetousness as opposed to liber-
pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. In this
ality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it.
Whether covetousness is always a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 118 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is always
covetousness, which is lust for money, is a mortal sin.
a mortal sin. For no one is worthy of death save for a
On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 3:12, “If any man
mortal sin. But men are worthy of death on account of
build upon this foundation,” says (cf. St. Augustine, De
covetousness. For the Apostle after saying (Rom. 1:29):
Fide et Oper. xvi) that “he builds wood, hay, stubble, who
“Being filled with all iniquity. . . fornication, covetousness
thinks in the things of the world, how he may please the
[Douay: ‘avarice’],” etc. adds (Rom. 1:32): “They who
world,” which pertains to the sin of covetousness. Now he
do such things are worthy of death.” Therefore covetous-
that builds wood, hay, stubble, sins not mortally but ve-
ness is a mortal sin.
nially, for it is said of him that “he shall be saved, yet so
Objection 2. Further, the least degree of covetous-
as by fire.” Therefore covetousness is some times a venial
ness is to hold to one’s own inordinately. But this seem-
sin.
ingly is a mortal sin: for Basil says (Serm. super. Luc.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3) covetousness is
xii, 18): “It is the hungry man’s bread that thou keepest
twofold. In one way it is opposed to justice, and thus it
back, the naked man’s cloak that thou hoardest, the needy
is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. For in this sense
man’s money that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest
covetousness consists in the unjust taking or retaining of
as many as thou mightest succor.”
another’s property, and this belongs to theft or robbery,
Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another,
which are mortal sins, as stated above (q. 66, Aa. 6,8).
since it is contrary to the love of our neighbor. Much more
Yet venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by
therefore is all covetousness a mortal sin.
reason of imperfection of the act, as stated above (q. 66,
Objection 3. Further, no one is struck with spiritual
a. 6, ad 3), when we were treating of theft.
blindness save through a mortal sin, for this deprives a
In another way covetousness may be take as opposed
man of the light of grace. But, according to Chrysostom†,
to liberality: in which sense it denotes inordinate love
“Lust for money brings darkness on the soul.” Therefore
of riches. Accordingly if the love of riches becomes so
∗ aneleutheria
† Hom. xv in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed
to St. Chrysostom
1738
great as to be preferred to charity, in such wise that a man, gether with mortal sins, by reason of the aspect under
through love of riches, fear not to act counter to the love
which it is a mortal sin.
of God and his neighbor, covetousness will then be a mor-
Reply to Objection 2. Basil is speaking of a case
tal sin. If, on the other hand, the inordinate nature of his
wherein a man is bound by a legal debt to give of his goods
love stops short of this, so that although he love riches too
to the poor, either through fear of their want or on account
much, yet he does not prefer the love of them to the love of
of his having too much.
God, and is unwilling for the sake of riches to do anything
Reply to Objection 3. Lust for riches, properly speak-
in opposition to God or his neighbor, then covetousness is
ing, brings darkness on the soul, when it puts out the light
a venial sin.
of charity, by preferring the love of riches to the love of
Reply to Objection 1. Covetousness is numbered to-
God.
Whether covetousness is the greatest of sins?
IIa IIae q. 118 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is the great-
man’s use, and this seems to belong to covetousness. Sec-
est of sins. For it is written (Ecclus. 10:9): “Nothing is
ondly, the degrees of sin may be considered on the part of
more wicked than a covetous man,” and the text continues:
the good to which the human appetite is inordinately sub-
“There is not a more wicked thing than to love money: for
jected; and then the lesser the good, the more deformed
such a one setteth even his own soul to sale.” Tully also
is the sin: for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower
says (De Offic. i, under the heading, ‘True magnanimity
than to a higher good. Now the good of external things is
is based chiefly on two things’): “Nothing is so narrow or
the lowest of human goods: since it is less than the good of
little minded as to love money.” But this pertains to cov-
the body, and this is less than the good of the soul, which is
etousness. Therefore covetousness is the most grievous of
less than the Divine good. From this point of view the sin
sins.
of covetousness, whereby the human appetite is subjected
Objection 2. Further, the more a sin is opposed to
even to external things, has in a way a greater deformity.
charity, the more grievous it is. Now covetousness is most
Since, however, corruption or privation of good is the for-
opposed to charity: for Augustine says (Qq. 83, qu. 36)
mal element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is
that “greed is the bane of charity.” Therefore covetousness
the material element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged
is the greatest of sins.
from the point of view of the good corrupted, rather than
Objection 3. Further, the gravity of a sin is indicated
from that of the good to which the appetite is subjected.
by its being incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy
Hence we must assert that covetousness is not simply the
Ghost is said to be most grievous, because it is irremis-
most grievous of sins.
sible. But covetousness is an incurable sin: hence the
Reply to Objection 1. These authorities speak of cov-
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “old age and help-
etousness on the part of the good to which the appetite is
lessness of any kind make men illiberal.” Therefore cov-
subjected. Hence (Ecclus. 10:10) it is given as a rea-
etousness is the most grievous of sins.
son that the covetous man “setteth his own soul to sale”;
Objection 4. Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:5)
because, to wit, he exposes his soul—that is, his life—
that covetousness is “a serving of idols.” Now idolatry is
to danger for the sake of money. Hence the text contin-
reckoned among the most grievous sins. Therefore cov-
ues: “Because while he liveth he hath cast away”—that
etousness is also.
is, despised—“his bowels,” in order to make money. Tully
On the contrary, Adultery is a more grievous sin
also adds that it is the mark of a “narrow mind,” namely,
than theft, according to Prov. 6:30. But theft pertains
that one be willing to be subject to money.
to covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not the most
Reply to Objection 2. Augustine is taking greed gen-
grievous of sins.
erally, in reference to any temporal good, not in its special
I answer that, Every sin, from the very fact that it
acceptation for covetousness: because greed for any tem-
is an evil, consists in the corruption or privation of some
poral good is the bane of charity, inasmuch as a man turns
good: while, in so far as it is voluntary, it consists in the
away from the Divine good through cleaving to a temporal
desire of some good. Consequently the order of sins may
good.
be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the good
Reply to Objection 3. The sin against the Holy Ghost
that is despised or corrupted by sin, and then the greater
is incurable in one way, covetousness in another. For
the good the graver the sin. From this point of view a sin
the sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable by reason of
that is against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin
contempt: for instance, because a man contemns God’s
that is committed against a man’s person, and after this
mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby
comes a sin against external things, which are deputed to
man’s sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind
1739
points to the greater gravity of the sin. on the other hand, idolatry on account of a certain likeness that it bears to
covetousness is incurable on the part of a human defect;
it: because the covetous man, like the idolater, subjects
a thing which human nature ever seeks to remedy, since
himself to an external creature, though not in the same
the more deficient one is the more one seeks relief from
way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external crea-
external things, and consequently the more one gives way
ture by paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man
to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an indi-
subjects himself to an external creature by desiring it im-
cation not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being
moderately for use, not for worship. Hence it does not
somewhat more dangerous.
follow that covetousness is as grievous a sin as idolatry.
Reply to Objection 4. Covetousness is compared to
Whether covetousness is a spiritual sin?
IIa IIae q. 118 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a spiri-
are those which are consummated in the mere apprehen-
tual sin. For spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods.
sion of the soul. Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those
But the matter of covetousness is bodily goods, namely,
which are consummated in carnal pleasures, while spiri-
external riches. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual
tual sins are consummated in pleasures of the spirit with-
sin.
out pleasure of the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the
Objection 2. Further, spiritual sin is condivided with
covetous man takes pleasure in the consideration of him-
sin of the flesh. Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of
self as a possessor of riches. Therefore covetousness is a
the flesh, for it results from the corruption of the flesh, as
spiritual sin.
instanced in old people who, through corruption of carnal
Reply to Objection 1. Covetousness with regard to a
nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore covetousness is
bodily object seeks the pleasure, not of the body but only
not a spiritual sin.
of the soul, forasmuch as a man takes pleasure in the fact
Objection 3. Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which that he possesses riches: wherefore it is not a sin of the
man’s body is disordered, according to the saying of the
flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a mean be-
Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), “He that committeth fornication
tween purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure
sinneth against his own body.” Now covetousness disturbs
in respect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excel-
man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom (Hom. xxix
lence), and purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily
in Matth.) compares the covetous man to the man who
pleasure in respect of a bodily object.
was possessed by the devil (Mk. 5) and was troubled in
Reply to Objection 2. Movement takes its species
body. Therefore covetousness seems not to be a spiritual
from the term “whereto” and not from the term “where-
sin.
from.” Hence a vice of the flesh is so called from its tend-
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers
ing to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from its originating
covetousness among spiritual vices.
in some defect of the flesh.
I answer that, Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: Reply to Objection 3. Chrysostom compares a cov-and all the affections or passions of the soul have their
etous man to the man who was possessed by the devil, not
term in pleasure and sorrow, according to the Philosopher
that the former is troubled in the flesh in the same way
(Ethic. ii, 5). Now some pleasures are carnal and some
as the latter, but by way of contrast, since while the pos-
spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those which are consum-
sessed man, of whom we read in Mk. 5, stripped himself,
mated in the carnal senses—for instance, the pleasures of
the covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches.
the table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual pleasures
Whether covetousness is a capital vice?
IIa IIae q. 118 a. 7
Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a cap-
But this does not apply to covetousness: since riches have
ital vice. For covetousness is opposed to liberality as the
the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something directed
mean, and to prodigality as extreme. But neither is liberal-
to an end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness
ity a principal virtue, nor prodigality a capital vice. There-
is not a capital vice.
fore covetousness also should not be reckoned a capital
Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that
vice.
“covetousness arises sometimes from pride, sometimes
Objection 2. Further, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 84,
from fear. For there are those who, when they think that
Aa. 3,4), those vices are called capital which have prin-
they lack the needful for their expenses, allow the mind
cipal ends, to which the ends of other vices are directed.
to give way to covetousness. And there are others who,
1740
wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for dance with reason, but vice is perfected in accordance
other people’s property.” Therefore covetousness arises
with the inclination of the sensitive appetite. Now reason
from other vices instead of being a capital vice in respect
and sensitive appetite do not belong chiefly to the same
of other vices.
genus, and consequently it does not follow that principal
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons cov-
vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although
etousness among the capital vices.
liberality is not a principal virtue, since it does not re-
I answer that, As stated in the Second Objection, a
gard the principal good of the reason, yet covetousness is
capital vice is one which under the aspect of end gives rise
a principal vice, because it regards money, which occu-
to other vices: because when an end is very desirable, the
pies a principal place among sensible goods, for the rea-
result is that through desire thereof man sets about doing
son given in the Article.
many things either good or evil. Now the most desirable
On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end
end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human
that is desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to re-
life, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, Aa. 4,7,8): wherefore
sult from a lack of reason. Hence the Philosopher says
the more a thing is furnished with the conditions of hap-
(Ethic. iv, 1) that “a prodigal man is a fool rather than a
piness, the more desirable it is. Also one of the conditions
knave.”
of happiness is that it be self-sufficing, else it would not
Reply to Objection 2. It is true that money is directed
set man’s appetite at rest, as the last end does. Now riches
to something else as its end: yet in so far as it is useful
give great promise of self-sufficiency, as Boethius says
for obtaining all sensible things, it contains, in a way, all
(De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to the
things virtually. Hence it has a certain likeness to happi-
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we “use money in token
ness, as stated in the Article.
of taking possession of something,” and again it is writ-
Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents a capital vice
ten (Eccles. 10:19): “All things obey money.” Therefore
from arising sometimes out of other vices, as stated above
covetousness, which is desire for money, is a capital vice.
(q. 36, a. 4, ad 1; Ia IIae, q. 84, a. 4), provided that itself Reply to Objection 1. Virtue is perfected in accor-be frequently the source of others.
Whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility IIa IIae q. 118 a. 8
to mercy are daughters of covetousness?
Objection 1.
It seems that the daughters of cov-
usurers, gamblers, despoilers of the dead, and robbers.”
etousness are not as commonly stated, namely, “treach-
Therefore it seems that the aforesaid enumeration is in-
ery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and
sufficient.
insensibility to mercy.” For covetousness is opposed to
Objection 5.
Further, tyrants use much violence
liberality, as stated above (a. 3). Now treachery, fraud,
against their subjects. But the Philosopher says (Ethic.
and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to reli-
iv, 1) that “tyrants who destroy cities and despoil sacred
gion, restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the
places are not to be called illiberal,” i.e. covetous. There-
beloved object, violence to justice, insensibility to mercy.
fore violence should not be reckoned a daughter of cov-
Therefore these vices have no connection with covetous-
etousness.
ness.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to
Objection 2. Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood
covetousness the daughters mentioned above.
seem to pertain to the same thing, namely, the deceiving
I answer that, The daughters of covetousness are the
of one’s neighbor. Therefore they should not be reckoned
vices which arise therefrom, especially in respect of the
as different daughters of covetousness.
desire of an end. Now since covetousness is excessive
Objection 3. Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut.)
love of possessing riches, it exceeds in two things. For
enumerates nine daughters of covetousness; which are
in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in this re-
“lying, fraud, theft, perjury, greed of filthy lucre, false
spect covetousness gives rise to “insensibility to mercy,”
witnessing, violence, inhumanity, rapacity.” Therefore the
because, to wit, a man’s heart is not softened by mercy
former reckoning of daughters is insufficient.
to assist the needy with his riches‡. In the second place
Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1)
it belongs to covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in
mentions many kinds of vices as belonging to covetous-
this respect covetousness may be considered in two ways.
ness which he calls illiberality, for he speaks of those who
First as in the thought [affectu]. In this way it gives rise to are “sparing, tight-fisted, skinflints∗, misers†, who do il-
“restlessness,” by hindering man with excessive anxiety
liberal deeds,” and of those who “batten on whoredom,
and care, for “a covetous man shall not be satisfied with
∗ kyminopristes
† kimbikes
‡ See q. 30, a. 1
1741
money” (Eccles. 5:9). Secondly, it may be considered in same as insensibility to mercy.
the execution [effectu]. In this way the covetous man, in
Reply to Objection 4. The vices mentioned by Aris-
acquiring other people’s goods, sometimes employs force,
totle are species rather than daughters of illiberality or
which pertains to “violence,” sometimes deceit, and then
covetousness. For a man may be said to be illiberal or
if he has recourse to words, it is “falsehood,” if it be mere
covetous through a defect in giving. If he gives but little
words, “perjury” if he confirm his statement by oath; if
he is said to be “sparing”; if nothing, he is “tightfisted”:
he has recourse to deeds, and the deceit affects things, we
if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be kymino-
have “fraud”; if persons, then we have “treachery,” as in
pristes [skinflint], a cumin-seller, as it were, because he the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through covetous-makes a great fuss about things of little value. Some-
ness.
times a man is said to be illiberal or covetous, through
Reply to Objection 1. There is no need for the daugh-
an excess in receiving, and this in two ways. In one way,
ters of a capital sin to belong to that same kind of vice:
through making money by disgraceful means, whether in
because a sin of one kind allows of sins even of a different
performing shameful and servile works by means of illib-
kind being directed to its end; seeing that it is one thing for eral practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds,
a sin to have daughters, and another for it to have species.
such as whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where
Reply to Objection 2. These three are distinguished
one ought to have given gratis, as in the case of usury, or
as stated in the Article.
by laboring much to make little profit. In another way,
Reply to Objection 3. These nine are reducible to the
in making money by unjust means, whether by using vi-
seven aforesaid. For lying and false witnessing are com-
olence on the living, as robbers do, or by despoiling the
prised under falsehood, since false witnessing is a special
dead, or by preying on one’s friends, as gamblers do.
kind of lie, just as theft is a special kind of fraud, where-
Reply to Objection 5. Just as liberality is about mod-
fore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of filthy lucre
erate sums of money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants
belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under vio-
who take great things by violence, are said to be, not illib-
lence, since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the
eral, but unjust.
1742
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 119
Of Prodigality
(In Three Articles)
We must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?
(2) Whether prodigality is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a graver sin that covetousness?
Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?
IIa IIae q. 119 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that prodigality is not oppo-
Reply to Objection 1. Nothing prevents opposites
site to covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in
from being in the same subject in different respects. For a
the same subject. But some are at the same time prodi-
thing is denominated more from what is in it principally.
gal and covetous. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to
Now just as in liberality, which observes the mean, the
covetousness.
principal thing is giving, to which receiving and retain-
Objection 2. Further, opposites relate to one same
ing are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality
thing.
But covetousness, as opposed to liberality, re-
regard principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in
lates to certain passions whereby man is affected towards
giving is said to be “prodigal,” while he who is deficient
money: whereas prodigality does not seem to relate to
in giving is said to be “covetous.” Now it happens some-
any passions of the soul, since it is not affected towards
times that a man is deficient in giving, without exceeding
money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodi-
in receiving, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1).
gality is not opposite to covetousness.
And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man ex-
Objection 3. Further, sin takes its species chiefly from ceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the
its end, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 3). Now prodi-
same time exceeds in receiving. This may be due either
gality seems always to be directed to some unlawful end,
to some kind of necessity, since while exceeding in giv-
for the sake of which the prodigal squanders his goods.
ing he is lacking in goods of his own, so that he is driven
Especially is it directed to pleasures, wherefore it is stated
to acquire unduly, and this pertains to covetousness; or it
(Lk. 15:13) of the prodigal son that he “wasted his sub-
may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he gives not
stance living riotously.” Therefore it seems that prodigal-
for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares
ity is opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than
not whence or how he receives. Wherefore he is prodigal
to covetousness and liberality.
and covetous in different respects.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7;
Reply to Objection 2. Prodigality regards passions
iv, 1) that prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiber-
in respect of money, not as exceeding, but as deficient in
ality, to which we give here the name of covetousness.
them.
I answer that, In morals vices are opposed to one an-
Reply to Objection 3. The prodigal does not always
other and to virtue in respect of excess and deficiency.
exceed in giving for the sake of pleasures which are the
Now covetousness and prodigality differ variously in re-
matter of temperance, but sometimes through being so
spect of excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards affection
disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes on
for riches, the covetous man exceeds by loving them more
account of something else. More frequently, however, he
than he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less
inclines to intemperance, both because through spending
careful of them than he ought: and as regards external ac-
too much on other things he becomes fearless of spending
tion, prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in
on objects of pleasure, to which the concupiscence of the
retaining and acquiring, while covetousness, on the con-
flesh is more prone; and because through taking no plea-
trary, denotes deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring
sure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of
and retaining. Hence it is evident that prodigality is op-
the body. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) “that
posed to covetousness.
many a prodigal ends in becoming intemperate.”
1743
Whether prodigality is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 119 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good inor-the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:10): “Covetousness [Douay:
dinately, namely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to
‘desire of money’] is the root of all evils.” But it is not the satisfy his own will in giving. But to one that reviews the
root of prodigality, since this is opposed to it. Therefore
passage correctly, it is evident that the Apostle is speaking
prodigality is not a sin.
literally of the desire of riches, for he had said previously
Objection 2.
Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim.
(1 Tim. 6:9): “They that will become rich,” etc. In this
6:17,18): “Charge the rich of this world. . . to give easily,
sense covetousness is said to be “the root of all evils,” not
to communicate to others.” Now this is especially what
that all evils always arise from covetousness, but because
prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.
there is no evil that does not at some time arise from cov-
Objection 3.
Further, it belongs to prodigality to
etousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of
exceed in giving and to be deficient in solicitude about
covetousness, as when a man is prodigal in going to great
riches. But this is most becoming to the perfect, who fulfil
expense in order to curry favor with certain persons from
the words of Our Lord (Mat. 6:34), “Be not. . . solicitous
whom he may receive riches.
for tomorrow,” and (Mat. 19:21), “Sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’]
Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle bids the rich to be
thou hast, and give to the poor.” Therefore prodigality is
ready to give and communicate their riches, according as
not a sin.
they ought. The prodigal does not do this: since, as the
On the contrary, The prodigal son is held to blame
Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 1), “his giving is neither
for his prodigality.
good, nor for a good end, nor according as it ought to be.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the opposition
For sometimes they give much to those who ought to be
between prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and
poor, namely, to buffoons and flatterers, whereas to the
deficiency; either of which destroys the mean of virtue.
good they give nothing.”
Now a thing is vicious and sinful through corrupting the
Reply to Objection 3. The excess in prodigality con-
good of virtue. Hence it follows that prodigality is a sin.
sists chiefly, not in the total amount given, but in the
Reply to Objection 1. Some expound this saying of
amount over and above what ought to be given. Hence
the Apostle as referring, not to actual covetousness, but
sometimes the liberal man gives more than the prodigal
to a kind of habitual covetousness, which is the concu-
man, if it be necessary. Accordingly we must reply that
piscence of the “fomes”∗, whence all sins arise. Others
those who give all their possessions with the intention of
say that he is speaking of a general covetousness with
following Christ, and banish from their minds all solic-
regard to any kind of good: and in this sense also it is
itude for temporal things, are not prodigal but perfectly
evident that prodigality arises from covetousness; since
liberal.
Whether prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness?
IIa IIae q. 119 a. 3
Objection 1.
It seems that prodigality is a more
we ascribe prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the
grievous sin than covetousness. For by covetousness a
Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore prodigality
man injures his neighbor by not communicating his goods
is a more grievous sin than covetousness.
to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures himself, be-
Objection 3. Further, prudence is chief among the
cause the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “the wasting
moral virtues, as stated above (q. 56, a. 1, ad 1; Ia IIae,
of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an
q. 61, a. 2, ad 1). Now prodigality is more opposed to pru-
undoing of his very being.” Now he that injures himself
dence than covetousness is: for it is written (Prov. 21:20):
sins more grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5, “He that
“There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling
is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?” Therefore
of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it”: and the
prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that “it is the mark of a
Objection 2. Further, a disorder that is accompanied
fool to give too much and receive nothing.” Therefore
by a laudable circumstance is less sinful. Now the disor-
prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.
der of covetousness is sometimes accompanied by a laud-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6)
able circumstance, as in the case of those who are unwill-
that “the prodigal seems to be much better than the illib-
ing to spend their own, lest they be driven to accept from
eral man.”
others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is accompa-
I answer that, Prodigality considered in itself is a
nied by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as
less grievous sin than covetousness, and this for three rea-
∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 81, a. 3, ad 2
1744
sons. First, because covetousness differs more from the against himself, through deficiency in spending: where-opposite virtue: since giving, wherein the prodigal ex-
fore it is written (Eccles. 6:2): “A man to whom God
ceeds, belongs to liberality more than receiving or retain-
hath given riches. . . yet doth not give him the power to eat
ing, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly, be-
thereof.” Nevertheless the prodigal man exceeds in this,
cause the prodigal man is of use to the many to whom
that he injures both himself and others yet so as to profit
he gives, while the covetous man is of use to no one, not
some; whereas the covetous man profits neither others nor
even to himself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 6. Thirdly, because
himself, since he does not even use his own goods for his
prodigality is easily cured. For not only is the prodigal on
own profit.
the way to old age, which is opposed to prodigality, but
Reply to Objection 2. In speaking of vices in general,
he is easily reduced to a state of want, since much use-
we judge of them according to their respective natures:
less spending impoverishes him and makes him unable to
thus, with regard to prodigality we note that it consumes
exceed in giving. Moreover, prodigality is easily turned
riches to excess, and with regard to covetousness that it
into virtue on account of its likeness thereto. On the other
retains them to excess. That one spend too much for the
hand, the covetous man is not easily cured, for the reason
sake of intemperance points already to several additional
given above (q. 118, a. 5, ad 3).
sins, wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as stated
Reply to Objection 1. The difference between the
in Ethic. iv, 1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain
prodigal and the covetous man is not that the former sins
from taking what belongs to others, although this appears
against himself and the latter against another. For the
in itself to call for praise, yet on account of the motive for
prodigal sins against himself by spending that which is
which he does so it calls for blame, since he is unwilling
his, and his means of support, and against others by spend-
to accept from others lest he be forced to give to others.
ing the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to
Reply to Objection 3. All vices are opposed to pru-
the clergy, who are the dispensers of the Church’s goods,
dence, even as all virtues are directed by prudence: where-
that belong to the poor whom they defraud by their prodi-
fore if a vice be opposed to prudence alone, for this very
gal expenditure. In like manner the covetous man sins
reason it is deemed less grievous.
against others, by being deficient in giving; and he sins
1745
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 120
Of “Epikeia” or Equity
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider “epikeia,” under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether “epikeia” is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
Whether “epikeia” ∗ is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 120 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that “epikeia” is not a virtue.
tain cases it will frustrate the equality of justice and be
For no virtue does away with another virtue. Yet “epikeia”
injurious to the common good, which the law has in view.
does away with another virtue, since it sets aside that
Thus the law requires deposits to be restored, because in
which is just according to law, and seemingly is opposed
the majority of cases this is just. Yet it happens sometimes
to severity. Therefore “epikeia” is not a virtue.
to be injurious—for instance, if a madman were to put his
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Vera Re-
sword in deposit, and demand its delivery while in a state
lig. xxxi): “With regard to these earthly laws, although
of madness, or if a man were to seek the return of his de-
men pass judgment on them when they make them, yet,
posit in order to fight against his country. In these and
when once they are made and established, the judge must
like cases it is bad to follow the law, and it is good to set
pronounce judgment not on them but according to them.”
aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates of jus-
But seemingly “epikeia” pronounces judgment on the law,
tice and the common good. This is the object of “epikeia”
when it deems that the law should not be observed in some
which we call equity. Therefore it is evident that “epikeia”
particular case. Therefore “epikeia” is a vice rather than a
is a virtue.
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1. “Epikeia” does not set aside
Objection 3.
Further, apparently it belongs to
that which is just in itself but that which is just as by law
“epikeia” to consider the intention of the lawgiver, as
established. Nor is it opposed to severity, which follows
the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But it belongs to
the letter of the law when it ought to be followed. To fol-
the sovereign alone to interpret the intention of the law-
low the letter of the law when it ought not to be followed is
giver, wherefore the Emperor says in the Codex of Laws
sinful. Hence it is written in the Codex of Laws and Con-
and Constitutions, under Law i: “It is fitting and lawful
stitutions under Law v: “Without doubt he transgresses
that We alone should interpret between equity and law.”
the law who by adhering to the letter of the law strives to
Therefore the act of “epikeia” is unlawful: and conse-
defeat the intention of the lawgiver.”
quently “epikeia” is not a virtue.
Reply to Objection 2. It would be passing judgment
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states
on a law to say that it was not well made; but to say that
it to be a virtue.
the letter of the law is not to be observed in some partic-
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 96, a. 6),
ular case is passing judgment not on the law, but on some
when we were treating of laws, since human actions, with
particular contingency.
which laws are concerned, are composed of contingent
Reply to Objection 3. Interpretation is admissible in
singulars and are innumerable in their diversity, it was not
doubtful cases where it is not allowed to set aside the let-
possible to lay down rules of law that would apply to ev-
ter of the law without the interpretation of the sovereign.
ery single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to what
But when the case is manifest there is need, not of inter-
commonly happens: although if the law be applied to cer-
pretation, but of execution.
Whether “epikeia” is a part of justice?
IIa IIae q. 120 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that “epikeia” is not a part of
justice, since its operation is beside that which is estab-
justice. For, as stated above (q. 58, a. 7), justice is twofold, lished by law. Therefore it seems that “epikeia” is not a
particular and legal. Now “epikeia” is not a part of partic-
part of justice.
ular justice, since it extends to all virtues, even as legal
Objection 2. Further, a more principal virtue is not as-
justice does. In like manner, neither is it a part of legal
signed as the part of a less principal virtue: for it is to the
∗ epieikeia
1746
cardinal virtue, as being principal, that secondary virtues legal justice is subject to the direction of “epikeia.” Hence
are assigned as parts. Now “epikeia” seems to be a more
“epikeia” is by way of being a higher rule of human ac-
principal virtue than justice, as implied by its name: for it
tions.
is derived from epi, i.e. “above,” and dikaion, i.e. “just.”
Reply to Objection 1. Epikeia corresponds properly
Therefore “epikeia” is not a part of justice.
to legal justice, and in one way is contained under it, and
Objection 3. Further, it seems that “epikeia” is the
in another way exceeds it. For if legal justice denotes that
same as modesty. For where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5),
which complies with the law, whether as regards the let-
“Let your modesty be known to all men,” the Greek has
ter of the law, or as regards the intention of the lawgiver,
epieikeia∗. Now, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), which is of more account, then “epikeia” is the more immodesty is a part of temperance. Therefore “epikeia” is
portant part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote
not a part of justice.
merely that which complies with the law with regard to
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10)
the letter, then “epikeia” is a part not of legal justice but
that “epikeia is a kind of justice.”
of justice in its general acceptation, and is condivided with
I answer that, As stated above (q. 48), a virtue has
legal justice, as exceeding it.
three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A
Reply to Objection 2.
As the Philosopher states
subjective part is one of which the whole is predicated es-
(Ethic. v, 10), “epikeia is better than a certain,” namely,
sentially, and it is less than the whole. This may happen
legal, “justice,” which observes the letter of the law: yet
in two ways. For sometimes one thing is predicated of
since it is itself a kind of justice, it is not better than all many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox:
justice.
and sometimes one thing is predicated of many according
Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to “epikeia” to mod-
to priority and posteriority, as “being” of substance and
erate something, namely, the observance of the letter of
accident.
the law. But modesty, which is reckoned a part of tem-
Accordingly, “epikeia” is a part of justice taken in a
perance, moderates man’s outward life—for instance, in
general sense, for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher
his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the term
states (Ethic. v, 10). Wherefore it is evident that “epikeia”
epieikeia is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds is a subjective part of justice; and justice is predicated of
of moderation.
it with priority to being predicated of legal justice, since
∗ to epieikes
1747
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 121
Of Piety
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely, piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it?
Whether piety is a gift?
IIa IIae q. 121 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that piety is not a gift. For the
to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost.
gifts differ from the virtues, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, Reply to Objection 1. The piety that pays duty and
a. 1). But piety is a virtue, as stated above (q. 101, a. 3).
worship to a father in the flesh is a virtue: but the piety
Therefore piety is not a gift.
that is a gift pays this to God as Father.
Objection 2. Further, the gifts are more excellent than
Reply to Objection 2. To pay worship to God as
the virtues, above all the moral virtues, as above ( Ia IIae,
Creator, as religion does, is more excellent than to pay
q. 68, a. 8). Now among the parts of justice religion is
worship to one’s father in the flesh, as the piety that is
greater than piety. Therefore if any part of justice is to
a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as Father is
be accounted a gift, it seems that religion should be a gift
yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator
rather than piety.
and Lord. Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of
Objection 3. Further, the gifts and their acts remain in piety: while the gift of piety is greater than religion.
heaven, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 6). But the act of Reply to Objection 3. As by the virtue of piety man
piety cannot remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral.
pays duty and worship not only to his father in the flesh,
i) that “piety fills the inmost recesses of the heart with
but also to all his kindred on account of their being re-
works of mercy”: and so there will be no piety in heaven
lated to his father so by the gift of piety he pays worship
since there will be no unhappiness∗. Therefore piety is
and duty not only to God, but also to all men on account
not a gift.
of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety
On the contrary, It is reckoned among the gifts in the
to honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures
eleventh chapter of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: ‘godliness’]†
whether one understands them or not, as Augustine says
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 1; Ia (De Doctr. Christ. ii). Consequently it also assists those
IIae, q. 69, Aa. 1,3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habit-
who are in a state of unhappiness. And although this act
ual dispositions of the soul, rendering it amenable to the
has no place in heaven, especially after the Day of Judg-
motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost moves us
ment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is to
to this effect among others, of having a filial affection to-
revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all
wards God, according to Rom. 8:15, “You have received
that this act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, “Be-
the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Fa-
hold how they are numbered among the children of God.”
ther).” And since it belongs properly to piety to pay duty
The saints will also mutually honor one another. Now,
and worship to one’s father, it follows that piety, whereby,
however, before the Judgment Day, the saints have pity
at the Holy Ghost’s instigation, we pay worship and duty
on those also who are living in this unhappy state.
Whether the second beatitude, “Blessed are the meek,” corresponds to the gift of IIa IIae q. 121 a. 2
piety?
Objection 1.
It seems that the second beatitude,
(a. 1, obj. 3), the works of mercy belong to piety. There-
“Blessed are the meek,” does not correspond to the gift
fore the second beatitude does not pertain to the gift of
of piety. For piety is the gift corresponding to justice, to
piety.
which rather belongs the fourth beatitude, “Blessed are
Objection 2. Further, the gift of piety is directed by
they that hunger and thirst after justice,” or the fifth beat-
the gift of knowledge, which is united to it in the enumer-
itude, “Blessed are the merciful,” since as stated above
ation of the gifts (Is. 11). Now direction and execution
∗ Cf. q. 30, a. 1
† “Pietas,” whence our English word “pity,” which
is the same as mercy.
1748
extend to the same matter. Since, then, the third beati-congruity may be observed in keeping with the special na-
tude, “Blessed are they that mourn,” corresponds to the
ture of each gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt
gift of knowledge, it seems that the second beatitude cor-
the beatitudes to the gifts according to their objects and
responds to piety.
acts: and thus the fourth and fifth beatitudes would cor-
Objection 3. Further, the fruits correspond to the beat-
respond to piety, rather than the second. Yet the second
itudes and gifts, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 70, a. 2). Now
beatitude has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as
among the fruits, goodness and benignity seem to agree
meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety.
with piety rather than mildness, which pertains to meek-
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
ness. Therefore the second beatitude does not correspond
Reply to Objection 2. Taking the beatitudes and gifts
to the gift of piety.
according to their proper natures, the same beatitude must
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
needs correspond to knowledge and piety: but taking them
Monte i): “Piety is becoming to the meek.”
according to their order, different beatitudes correspond
I answer that, In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts
to them, although a certain congruity may be observed, as
a twofold congruity may be observed. One is according
stated above.
to the order in which they are given, and Augustine seems
Reply to Objection 3. In the fruits goodness and be-
to have followed this: wherefore he assigns the first beati-
nignity may be directly ascribed to piety; and mildness
tude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and the second beati-
indirectly in so far as it removes obstacles to acts of piety,
tude, “Blessed are the meek,” to piety, and so on. Another
as stated above.
1749
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 122
Of the Precepts of Justice
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?
(2) Of the first precept of the decalogue;
(3) Of the second;
(4) Of the third;
(5) Of the fourth;
(6) Of the other six.
Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?
IIa IIae q. 122 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that the precepts of the deca-
is essential to a precept, appears in justice, which is of
logue are not precepts of justice. For the intention of a
one towards another. Because in those matters that relate
lawgiver is “to make the citizens virtuous in respect of
to himself it would seem at a glance that man is master of
every virtue,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore, accord-
himself, and that he may do as he likes: whereas in mat-
ing to Ethic. v, 1, “the law prescribes about all acts of
ters that refer to another it appears manifestly that a man is
all virtues.” Now the precepts of the decalogue are the
under obligation to render to another that which is his due.
first. principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the
Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to
precepts of the decalogue do not pertain to justice alone.
justice. Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts
Objection 2. Further, it would seem that to justice
of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth
belong especially the judicial precepts, which are condi-
precept is about acts of piety, which is the second part of
vided with the moral precepts, as stated above ( Ia IIae,
justice; and the six remaining are about justice commonly
q. 99, a. 4). But the precepts of the decalogue are moral
so called, which is observed among equals.
precepts, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 3). Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. The intention of the law is to
the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice.
make all men virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by
Objection 3. Further, the Law contains chiefly pre-
first of all giving them precepts about those things where
cepts about acts of justice regarding the common good,
the notion of duty is most manifest, as stated above.
for instance about public officers and the like. But there
Reply to Objection 2. The judicial precepts are de-
is no mention of these in the precepts of the decalogue.
terminations of the moral precepts, in so far as these are
Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do
directed to one’s neighbor, just as the ceremonial precepts
not properly belong to justice.
are determinations of the moral precepts in so far as these
Objection 4. Further, the precepts of the decalogue
are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are contained
are divided into two tables, corresponding to the love of
in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the
God and the love of our neighbor, both of which regard the
precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice.
virtue of charity. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue
Reply to Objection 3. Things that concern the com-
belong to charity rather than to justice.
mon good must needs be administered in different ways
On the contrary, Seemingly justice is the sole virtue
according to the difference of men. Hence they were to
whereby we are directed to another. Now we are directed
be given a place not among the precepts of the decalogue,
to another by all the precepts of the decalogue, as is evi-
but among the judicial precepts.
dent if one consider each of them. Therefore all the pre-
Reply to Objection 4. The precepts of the decalogue
cepts of the decalogue pertain to justice.
pertain to charity as their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5,
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are the
“The end of the commandment is charity”: but they be-
first principles of the Law: and the natural reason assents
long to justice, inasmuch as they refer immediately to acts
to them at once, as to principles that are most evident.
of justice.
Now it is altogether evident that the notion of duty, which
1750
Whether the first precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?
IIa IIae q. 122 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that the first precept of the decaduly directed to God, Who is the last end of man’s will.
logue is unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to
The second thing to be observed in the order of gener-
God than to his father in the flesh, according to Heb. 12:9,
ation is that in the first place contraries and obstacles have
“How much more shall we [Vulg.: ‘shall we not much
to be removed. Thus the farmer first purifies the soil, and
more’] obey the Father of spirits and live?” Now the pre-
afterwards sows his seed, according to Jer. 4:3, “Break
cept of piety, whereby man honors his father, is expressed
up anew your fallow ground, and sow not upon thorns.”
affirmatively in these words: “Honor thy father and thy
Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in re-
mother.” Much more, therefore, should the first precept
ligion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now
of religion, whereby all honor God, be expressed affirma-
the chief obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false
tively, especially as affirmation is naturally prior to nega-
god, according to Mat. 6:24, “You cannot serve God and
tion.
mammon.” Therefore in the first precept of the Law the
Objection 2. Further, the first precept of the deca-
worship of false gods is excluded.
logue pertains to religion, as stated above (a. 1). Now reli-
Reply to Objection 1. In point of fact there is one
gion, since it is one virtue, has one act. Yet in the first pre-affirmative precept about religion, namely: “Remember
cept three acts are forbidden: since we read first: “Thou
that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day.” Still the negative
shalt not have strange gods before Me”; secondly, “Thou
precepts had to be given first, so that by their means the
shalt not make to thyself any graven thing”; and thirdly,
obstacles to religion might be removed. For though af-
“Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them.” Therefore
firmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process
the first precept is unfittingly expressed.
of generation, negation, whereby obstacles are removed,
Objection 3.
Further, Augustine says (De decem
comes first, as stated in the Article. Especially is this true
chord. ix) that “the first precept forbids the sin of super-
in matters concerning God, where negation is preferable
stition.” But there are many wicked superstitions besides
to affirmation, on account of our insufficiency, as Diony-
idolatry, as stated above (q. 92, a. 2). Therefore it was
sius observes (Coel. Hier. ii).
insufficient to forbid idolatry alone.
Reply to Objection 2. People worshiped strange gods
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
in two ways. For some served certain creatures as gods
I answer that, It pertains to law to make men good,
without having recourse to images. Hence Varro says that
wherefore it behooved the precepts of the Law to be set
for a long time the ancient Romans worshiped gods with-
in order according to the order of generation, the order,
out using images: and this worship is first forbidden by
to wit, of man’s becoming good. Now two things must
the words, “Thou shalt not have strange gods.” Among
be observed in the order of generation. The first is that
others the worship of false gods was observed by using
the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the certain images: and so the very making of images was
generation of an animal the first thing to be formed is the
fittingly forbidden by the words, “Thou shalt not make
heart, and in building a home the first thing to be set up
to thyself any graven thing,” as also the worship of those
is the foundation: and in the goodness of the soul the first
same images, by the words, “Thou shalt not adore them,”
part is goodness of the will, the result of which is that a
etc.
man makes good use of every other goodness. Now the
Reply to Objection 3. All other kinds of supersti-
goodness of the will depends on its object, which is its
tion proceed from some compact, tacit or explicit, with
end. Wherefore since man was to be directed to virtue
the demons; hence all are understood to be forbidden by
by means of the Law, the first thing necessary was, as it
the words, “Thou shalt not have strange gods.”
were, to lay the foundation of religion, whereby man is
Whether the second precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?
IIa IIae q. 122 a. 3
Objection 1.
It seems that the second precept of
as though they forbade a false confession of faith, which,
the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For this precept,
like error, is an act of unbelief. Now unbelief precedes su-
“Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain” is thus
perstition, as faith precedes religion. Therefore this pre-
explained by a gloss on Ex. 20:7: “Thou shalt not deem
cept should have preceded the first, whereby superstition
the Son of God to be a creature,” so that it forbids an error
is forbidden.
against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Dt. 5:11,
Objection 2. Further, the name of God is taken for
“Thou shalt not take the name of. . . thy God in vain, ”
many purposes —for instance, those of praise, of work-
adds, i.e. “by giving the name of God to wood or stone,”
ing miracles, and generally speaking in conjunction with
1751
all we say or do, according to Col. 3:17, “All whatso-we have acknowledged.
ever you do in word or in work. . . do ye in the name of
For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is
the Lord.” Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of
placed before the second precept, which forbids perjury
God’s name in vain seems to be more universal than the
that pertains to irreligion.
precept forbidding superstition, and thus should have pre-
Reply to Objection 1. These expositions are mys-
ceded it.
tical. The literal explanation is that which is given Dt.
Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Ex. 20:7 expounds
5:11: “Thou shalt not take the name of. . . thy God in vain,”
the precept, “Thou shalt not take the name of. . . thy God
namely, “by swearing on that which is not∗.”
in vain,” namely, by swearing to nothing. Hence this pre-
Reply to Objection 2. This precept does not forbid
cept would seem to forbid useless swearing, that is to say,
all taking of the name of God, but properly the taking of
swearing without judgment. But false swearing, which
God’s name in confirmation of a man’s word by way of an
is without truth, and unjust swearing, which is without
oath, because men are wont to take God’s name more fre-
justice, are much more grievous. Therefore this precept
quently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that
should rather have forbidden them.
in consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name
Objection 4. Further, blasphemy or any word or deed
is forbidden by this precept: and it is in this sense that we
that is an insult to God is much more grievous than per-
are to take the explanation quoted in the First Objection.
jury.
Therefore blasphemy and other like sins should
Reply to Objection 3. To swear to nothing means to
rather have been forbidden by this precept.
swear to that which is not. This pertains to false swear-
Objection 5. Further, God’s names are many. There-
ing, which is chiefly called perjury, as stated above (q. 98,
fore it should not have been said indefinitely: “Thou shalt
a. 1, ad 3). For when a man swears to that which is false,
not take the name of. . . thy God in vain.”
his swearing is vain in itself, since it is not supported by
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
the truth. on the other hand, when a man swears without
I answer that, In one who is being instructed in virtue
judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is
it is necessary to remove obstacles to true religion before
no vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part
establishing him in true religion. Now a thing is opposed
of the swearer.
to true religion in two ways. First, by excess, when, to
Reply to Objection 4. Just as when we instruct a man
wit, that which belongs to religion is given to others than
in some science, we begin by putting before him certain
to whom it is due, and this pertains to superstition. Sec-
general maxims, even so the Law, which forms man to
ondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to wit, God
virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the decalogue,
is contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, as
which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by pro-
stated above (q. 97, in the preamble, and in the Article that
hibition or by command, to those things which are of most
follows). Now superstition hinders religion by preventing
common occurrence in the course of human life. Hence
man from acknowledging God so as to worship Him: and
the precepts of the decalogue include the prohibition of
when a man’s mind is engrossed in some undue worship,
perjury, which is of more frequent occurrence than blas-
he cannot at the same time give due worship to God, ac-
phemy, since man does not fall so often into the latter sin.
cording to Is. 28:20, “The bed is straitened, so that one
Reply to Objection 5. Reverence is due to the Divine
must fall out,” i.e. either the true God or a false god must
names on the part of the thing signified, which is one, and
fall out from man’s heart, “and a short covering cannot
not on the part of the signifying words, which are many.
cover both.” On the other hand, irreligion hinders reli-
Hence it is expressed in the singular: “Thou shalt not take
gion by preventing man from honoring God after he has
the name of. . . thy God in vain”: since it matters not in
acknowledged Him. Now one must first of all acknowl-
which of God’s names perjury is committed.
edge God with a view to worship, before honoring Him
Whether the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, IIa IIae q. 122 a. 4
is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1. It seems that the third precept of the
forbids, not to heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile
decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is
works,” i.e. “to burden oneself with sin.” Taken literally it
unfittingly expressed. For this, understood spiritually, is a
is a ceremonial precept, for it is written (Ex. 31:13): “See
general precept: since Bede in commenting on Lk. 13:14,
that you keep My Sabbath: because it is a sign between
“The ruler of the synagogue being angry that He had
Me and you in your generations.” Now the precepts of
healed on the Sabbath,” says (Comment. iv): “The Law
the decalogue are both spiritual and moral. Therefore it is
∗ Vulg.: ‘for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His name upon a vain thing’
1752
unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue.
earth. . . and rested on the seventh day.”
Objection 2. Further, the ceremonial precepts of the
Reply to Objection 1. The precept about hallowing
Law contain “sacred things, sacrifices, sacraments and ob-
the Sabbath, understood literally, is partly oral and partly
servances,” as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 101, a. 4). Now
ceremonial. It is a moral precept in the point of com-
sacred things comprised not only sacred days, but also sa-
manding man to aside a certain time to be given to Divine
cred places and sacred vessels, and so on. Moreover, there
things. For there is in man a natural inclination to set aside
were many sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore
a certain time for each necessary thing, such as refresh-
it was unfitting to omit all other ceremonial observances
ment of the body, sleep, and so forth. Hence according
and to mention only that of the Sabbath.
to the dictate of reason, man sets aside a certain time for
Objection 3. Further, whoever breaks a precept of
spiritual refreshment, by which man’s mind is refreshed
the decalogue, sins. But in the Old Law some who broke
in God. And thus to have a certain time set aside for occu-
the observances of the Sabbath did not sin—for instance,
pying oneself with Divine things is the matter of a moral
those who circumcised their sons on the eighth day, and
precept. But, in so far as this precept specializes the time
the priests who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also
as a sign representing the Creation of the world, it is a cer-
Elias (3 Kings 19), who journeyed for forty days unto the
emonial precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its
mount of God, Horeb, must have traveled on a Sabbath:
allegorical signification, as representative of Christ’s rest
the priests also who carried the ark of the Lord for seven
in the tomb on the seventh day: also in its moral signifi-
days, as related in Josue 7, must be understood to have
cation, as representing cessation from all sinful acts, and
carried it on a Sabbath. Again it is written (Lk. 13:15):
the mind’s rest in God, in which sense, too, it is a general
“Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath day loose his
precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its analogical
ox or his ass. . . and lead them to water?” Therefore it is
signification, as foreshadowing the enjoyment of God in
unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue.
heaven. Hence the precept about hallowing the Sabbath is
Objection 4. Further, the precepts of the decalogue
placed among the precepts of the decalogue, as a moral,
have to be observed also under the New Law. Yet in the
but not as a ceremonial precept.
New Law this precept is not observed, neither in the point
Reply to Objection 2. The other ceremonies of the
of the Sabbath day, nor as to the Lord’s day, on which
Law are signs of certain particular Divine works: but the
men cook their food, travel, fish, and do many like things.
observance of the Sabbath is representative of a general
Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath is
boon, namely, the production of all creatures. Hence it
unfittingly expressed.
was fitting that it should be placed among the general pre-
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
cepts of the decalogue, rather than any other ceremonial
I answer that, The obstacles to true religion being re-
precept of the Law.
moved by the first and second precepts of the decalogue,
Reply to Objection 3. Two things are to be observed
as stated above (Aa. 2,3), it remained for the third precept
in the hallowing of the Sabbath. One of these is the end:
to be given whereby man is established in true religion.
and this is that man occupy himself with Divine things,
Now it belongs to religion to give worship to God: and
and is signified in the words: “Remember that thou keep
just as the Divine scriptures teach the interior worship un-
holy the Sabbath day.” For in the Law those things are
der the guise of certain corporal similitudes, so is external
said to be holy which are applied to the Divine worship.
worship given to God under the guise of sensible signs.
The other thing is cessation from work, and is signified in
And since for the most part man is induced to pay interior
the words (Ex. 20:11), “On the seventh day. . . thou shalt
worship, consisting in prayer and devotion, by the inte-
do no work.” The kind of work meant appears from Lev.
rior prompting of the Holy Ghost, a precept of the Law
23:3, “You shall do no servile work on that day∗.” Now
as necessary respecting the exterior worship that consists
servile work is so called from servitude: and servitude is
in sensible signs. Now the precepts of the decalogue are,
threefold. One, whereby man is the servant of sin, accord-
so to speak, first and common principles of the Law, and
ing to Jn. 8:34, “Whosoever committeth sin is the servant
consequently the third precept of the decalogue describes
of sin,” and in this sense all sinful acts are servile. An-
the exterior worship of God as the sign of a universal boon
other servitude is whereby one man serves another. Now
that concerns all. This universal boon was the work of the
one man serves another not with his mind but with his
Creation of the world, from which work God is stated to
body, as stated above (q. 104, Aa. 5,6, ad 1). Wherefore
have rested on the seventh day: and sign of this we are
in this respect those works are called servile whereby one
commanded to keep holy seventh day—that is, to set it
man serves another. The third is the servitude of God; and
aside as a day to be given to God. Hence after the pre-
in this way the work of worship, which pertains to the ser-
cept about the hallowing of the Sabbath the reason for
vice of God, may be called a servile work. In this sense
it is given: “For in six days the Lord made heaven and
servile work is not forbidden on the Sabbath day, because
∗ Vulg.: ‘You shall do no work on that day’
1753
that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath obser-
“Deliver them that are led to death”: secondarily as re-
vance: since man abstains from other works on the Sab-
gards avoiding damage to one’s property, according to Dt.
bath day in order that he may occupy himself with works
22:1, “Thou shalt not pass by if thou seest thy brother’s
connected with God’s service. For this reason, according
ox or his sheep go astray, but thou shalt bring them back
to Jn. 7:23, “a man† receives circumcision on the Sab-
to thy brother.” Hence a corporal work pertaining to the
bath day, that the law of Moses may not be broken”: and
preservation of one’s own bodily well-being does not pro-
for this reason too we read (Mat. 12:5), that “on the Sab-
fane the Sabbath: for it is not against the observance of the
bath days the priests in the temple break the Sabbath,”
Sabbath to eat and do such things as preserve the health
i.e. do corporal works on the Sabbath, “and are without
of the body. For this reason the Machabees did not pro-
blame.” Accordingly, the priests in carrying the ark on the
fane the Sabbath when they fought in self-defense on the
Sabbath did not break the precept of the Sabbath obser-
Sabbath day (1 Macc. 2), nor Elias when he fled from the
vance. In like manner it is not contrary to the observance
face of Jezabel on the Sabbath. For this same reason our
of the Sabbath to exercise any spiritual act, such as teach-
Lord (Mat. 12:3) excused His disciples for plucking the
ing by word or writing. Wherefore a gloss on Num 28
ears of corn on account of the need which they suffered.
says that “smiths and like craftsmen rest on the Sabbath
In like manner a bodily work that is directed to the bodily
day, but the reader or teacher of the Divine law does not
well-being of another is not contrary to the observance of
cease from his work. Yet he profanes not the Sabbath,
the Sabbath: wherefore it is written (Jn. 7:23): “Are you
even as the priests in the temple break the Sabbath, and
angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the
are without blame.” On the other hand, those works that
Sabbath day?” And again, a bodily work that is done to
are called servile in the first or second way are contrary
avoid an imminent damage to some external thing does
to the observance of the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder
not profane the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord says (Mat.
man from applying himself to Divine things. And since
12:11): “What man shall there be among you, that hath
man is hindered from applying himself to Divine things
one sheep, and if the same fall into a pit on the Sabbath
rather by sinful than by lawful albeit corporal works, it
day, will he not take hold on it and lift it up?”
follows that to sin on a feast day is more against this pre-
Reply to Objection 4. In the New Law the observance
cept than to do some other but lawful bodily work. Hence
of the Lord’s day took the place of the observance of the
Augustine says (De decem chord. iii): “It would be better
Sabbath, not by virtue of the precept but by the institution
if the Jew did some useful work on his farm than spent
of the Church and the custom of Christian people. For this
his time seditiously in the theatre: and their womenfolk
observance is not figurative, as was the observance of the
would do better to be making linen on the Sabbath than to
Sabbath in the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to work
be dancing lewdly all day in their feasts of the new moon.”
on the Lord’ day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and
It is not, however, against this precept to sin venially on
certain works are permitted on the Lord’s day which were
the Sabbath, because venial sin does not destroy holiness.
forbidden on the Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and
Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual
so forth. And again in the New Law, dispensation is more
worship of God, are said to be servile in so far as they
easily granted than in the Old, in the matter of certain for-
belong properly to servants; while they are not said to be
bidden works, on account of their necessity, because the
servile, in so far as they are common to those who serve
figure pertains to the protestation of truth, which it is un-
and those who are free. Moreover, everyone, be he servant
lawful to omit even in small things; while works, consid-
or free, is bound to provide necessaries both for himself
ered in themselves, are changeable in point of place and
and for his neighbor, chiefly in respect of things pertaining
time.
to the well-being of the body, according to Prov. 24:11,
Whether the fourth precept, about honoring one’s parents, is fittingly expressed?
IIa IIae q. 122 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that the fourth precept, about
one’s parents, but also to one’s country, and also to other
honoring one’s parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this
blood kindred, and to the well-wishers of our country, as
is the precept pertaining to piety. Now, just as piety is
stated above (q. 101, Aa. 1,2). Therefore it was unfitting
a part of justice, so are observance, gratitude, and others
for this precept to mention only the honoring of one’s fa-
of which we have spoken (Qq. 101,102, seq.). Therefore
ther and mother.
it seems that there should not have been given a special
Objection 3. Further, we owe our parents not merely
precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others.
honor but also support. Therefore the mere honoring of
Objection 2. Further, piety pays worship not only to
one’s parents is unfittingly prescribed.
† Vulg.: ‘If a man,’ etc.
1754
Objection 4. Further, sometimes those who honor one’s parents as such, whereas support and so forth are
their parents die young, and on the contrary those who
due to them accidentally, for instance, because they are
honor them not live a long time. Therefore it was unfit-
in want, in slavery, or the like, as stated above (q. 101,
ting to supplement this precept with the promise, “That
a. 2 ). And since that which belongs to a thing by nature
thou mayest be long-lived upon earth.”
precedes that which is accidental, it follows that among
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
the first precepts of the Law, which are the precepts of
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are di-
the decalogue, there is a special precept of honoring our
rected to the love of God and of our neighbor. Now to our
parents: and this honor, as a kind of principle, is under-
parents, of all our neighbors, we are under the greatest
stood to comprise support and whatever else is due to our
obligation. Hence, immediately after the precepts direct-
parents.
ing us to God, a place is given to the precept directing
Reply to Objection 4. A long life is promised to those
us to our parents, who are the particular principle of our
who honor their parents not only as to the life to come, but
being, just as God is the universal principle: so that this
also as to the present life, according to the saying of the
precept has a certain affinity to the precepts of the First
Apostle (1 Tim. 4:8): “Piety [Douay: ‘godliness’] is prof-
Table.
itable to all things, having promise of the life that now is
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 101, a. 2),
and of that which is to come.” And with reason. Because
piety directs us to pay the debt due to our parents, a debt
the man who is grateful for a favor deserves, with a certain
which is common to all. Hence, since the precepts of
congruity, that the favor should be continued to him, and
the decalogue are general precepts, they ought to contain
he who is ungrateful for a favor deserves to lose it. Now
some reference to piety rather than to the other parts of
we owe the favor of bodily life to our parents after God:
justice, which regard some special debt.
wherefore he that honors his parents deserves the prolon-
Reply to Objection 2. The debt to one’s parents pre-
gation of his life, because he is grateful for that favor:
cedes the debt to one’s kindred and country since it is
while he that honors not his parents deserves to be de-
because we are born of our parents that our kindred and
prived of life because he is ungrateful for the favor. How-
country belong to us. Hence, since the precepts of the
ever, present goods or evils are not the subject of merit
decalogue are the first precepts of the Law, they direct
or demerit except in so far as they are directed to a future
man to his parents rather than to his country and other kin-
reward, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 12). Where-
dred. Nevertheless this precept of honoring our parents is
fore sometimes in accordance with the hidden design of
understood to command whatever concerns the payment
the Divine judgments, which regard chiefly the future re-
of debt to any person, as secondary matter included in the
ward, some, who are dutiful to their parents, are sooner
principal matter.
deprived of life, while others, who are undutiful to their
Reply to Objection 3. Reverential honor is due to
parents, live longer.
Whether the other six precepts of the decalogue are fittingly expressed?
IIa IIae q. 122 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that the other six precepts of the and contentions among you? Are they not. . . from your
decalogue are unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient
concupiscences which war in your members?” Now the
for salvation that one refrain from injuring one’s neigh-
concupiscence of the sensuality is not forbidden by a pre-
bor; but it is required that one pay one’s debts, according
cept of the decalogue, otherwise first movements would
to Rom. 13:7, “Render. . . to all men their dues.” Now the
be mortal sins, as they would be against a precept of the
last six precepts merely forbid one to injure one’s neigh-
decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence of the will forbidden,
bor. Therefore these precepts are unfittingly expressed.
since it is included in every sin. Therefore it is unfitting
Objection 2.
Further, these precepts forbid mur-
for the precepts of the decalogue to include some that for-
der, adultery, stealing and bearing false witness.
But
bid concupiscence.
many other injuries can be inflicted on one’s neighbor,
Objection 4. Further, murder is a more grievous sin
as appears from those which have been specified above
than adultery or theft. But there is no precept forbidding
(Qq. 72, seq.). Therefore it seems that the aforesaid pre-
the desire of murder. Therefore neither was it fitting to
cepts are unfittingly expressed.
have precepts forbidding the desire of theft and of adul-
Objection 3. Further, concupiscence may be taken in
tery.
two ways. First as denoting an act of the will, as in Wis.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
6:21, “The desire [concupiscentia] of wisdom bringeth to
I answer that, Just as by the parts of justice a man
the everlasting kingdom”: secondly, as denoting an act of
pays that which is due to certain definite persons, to whom
the sensuality, as in James 4:1, “From whence are wars
he is bound for some special reason, so too by justice
1755
properly so called he pays that which is due to all in gen-principal of all. Those that are inflicted on a person con-
eral. Hence, after the three precepts pertaining to religion,
nected with one’s neighbor, especially by way of lust, are
whereby man pays what is due God, and after the fourth
understood to be forbidden together with adultery: those
precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is due
that come under the head of damage done to property are
to his parents—which duty includes the paying of all that
understood to be forbidden together with theft: and those
is due for any special reason—it was necessary in due se-
that are comprised under speech, such as detractions, in-
quence to give certain precepts pertaining to justice prop-
sults, and so forth, are understood to be forbidden together
erly so called, which pays to all indifferently what is due
with the bearing of false witness, which is more directly
to them.
opposed to justice.
Reply to Objection 1. Man is bound towards all per-
Reply to Objection 3. The precepts forbidding con-
sons in general to inflict injury on no one: hence the nega-
cupiscence do not include the prohibition of first move-
tive precepts, which forbid the doing of those injuries that
ments of concupiscence, that do not go farther than the
can be inflicted on one’s neighbor, had to be given a place,
bounds of sensuality. The direct object of their prohibi-
as general precepts, among the precepts of the decalogue.
tion is the consent of the will, which is directed to deed or
On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are
pleasure.
paid in different ways to different people: hence it did not
Reply to Objection 4. Murder in itself is an object
behoove to include affirmative precepts about those duties
not of concupiscence but of horror, since it has not in it-
among the precepts of the decalogue.
self the aspect of good. On the other hand, adultery has
Reply to Objection 2. All other injuries that are in-
the aspect of a certain kind of good, i.e. of something
flicted on our neighbor are reducible to those that are for-
pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good, i.e. of some-
bidden by these precepts, as taking precedence of others
thing useful: and good of its very nature has the aspect
in point of generality and importance. For all injuries that
of something concupiscible. Hence the concupiscence of
are inflicted on the person of our neighbor are understood
theft and adultery had to be forbidden by special precepts,
to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the
but not the concupiscence of murder.
1756
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 123
Of Fortitude
(In Twelve Articles)
After considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude. We must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude; (2) its parts; (3) the gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to it.
Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered: (1) Fortitude itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom; (3) the vices opposed to fortitude.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fortitude is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring?
(4) Whether it is only about fear of death?
(5) Whether it is only in warlike matters?
(6) Whether endurance is its chief act?
(7) Whether its action is directed to its own good?
(8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action?
(9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?
(10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action?
(11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue?
(12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues.
Whether fortitude is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 123 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a virtue.
renders his work good.” Hence human virtue, of which we
For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:9): “Virtue is perfected in
are speaking now, is that which makes a man good, and
infirmity.” But fortitude is contrary to infirmity. Therefore
tenders his work good. Now man’s good is to be in accor-
fortitude is not a virtue.
dance with reason, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv,
Objection 2. Further, if it is a virtue, it is either the-22). Wherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man
ological, intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not con-
good, to make his work accord with reason. This happens
tained among the theological virtues, nor among the in-
in three ways: first, by rectifying reason itself, and this is
tellectual virtues, as may be gathered from what we have
done by the intellectual virtues; secondly, by establishing
said above ( Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 3). Nei-
the rectitude of reason in human affairs, and this belongs
ther, apparently, is it contained among the moral virtues,
to justice; thirdly, by removing the obstacles to the es-
since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7,8): “Some
tablishment of this rectitude in human affairs. Now the
seem to be brave through ignorance; or through experi-
human will is hindered in two ways from following the
ence, as soldiers,” both of which cases seem to pertain to
rectitude of reason. First, through being drawn by some
act rather than to moral virtue, “and some are called brave
object of pleasure to something other than what the rec-
on account of certain passions”; for instance, on account
titude of reason requires; and this obstacle is removed by
of fear of threats, or of dishonor, or again on account of
the virtue of temperance. Secondly, through the will be-
sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does not act from
ing disinclined to follow that which is in accordance with
passion but from choice, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 55,
reason, on account of some difficulty that presents itself.
a. 4). Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.
In order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the mind is
Objection 3. Further, human virtue resides chiefly in
requisite, whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty even
the soul, since it is a “good quality of the mind,” as stated
as a man, by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes
above (Ethic. iii, 7,8). But fortitude, seemingly, resides in
bodily obstacles.
the body, or at least results from the temperament of the
Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far
body. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not a virtue.
as it conforms man to reason.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv, xxi,
Reply to Objection 1. The virtue of the soul is per-
xxii) numbers fortitude among the virtues.
fected, not in the infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic.
of the body, of which the Apostle was speaking. Now
ii, 6) “virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and
it belongs to fortitude of the mind to bear bravely with
1757
infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue of think little of the dangers of battle, as they reckon them-patience or fortitude, as also to acknowledge one’s own
selves capable of defending themselves against them; thus
infirmity, and this belongs to the perfection that is called
Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i), “No man fears to do what
humility.
he is confident of having learned to do well.” Secondly,
Reply to Objection 2. Sometimes a person performs
a man performs an act of fortitude without having the
the exterior act of a virtue without having the virtue, and
virtue, through the impulse of a passion, whether of sor-
from some other cause than virtue. Hence the Philoso-
row that he wishes to cast off, or again of anger. Thirdly,
pher (Ethic. iii, 8) mentions five ways in which people
through choice, not indeed of a due end, but of some tem-
are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through per-
poral advantage to be obtained, such as honor, pleasure,
forming acts of fortitude without having the virtue. This
or gain, or of some disadvantage to be avoided, such as
may be done in three ways. First, because they tend to
blame, pain, or loss.
that which is difficult as though it were not difficult: and
Reply to Objection 3. The fortitude of the soul which
this again happens in three ways, for sometimes this is
is reckoned a virtue, as explained in the Reply to the First
owing to ignorance, through not perceiving the greatness
Objection, is so called from its likeness to fortitude of the
of the danger; sometimes it is owing to the fact that one is
body. Nor is it inconsistent with the notion of virtue, that
hopeful of overcoming dangers—when, for instance, one
a man should have a natural inclination to virtue by rea-
has often experienced escape from danger; and sometimes
son of his natural temperament, as stated above ( Ia IIae,
this is owing to a certain science and art, as in the case of
q. 63, a. 1).
soldiers who, through skill and practice in the use of arms,
Whether fortitude is a special virtue?
IIa IIae q. 123 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a special
only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it
virtue. For it is written (Wis. 7:7): “She teacheth tem-
is most difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dan-
perance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude,” where
gers. Therefore Tully says (Rhet. ii), that “fortitude is
the text has “virtue” for “fortitude.” Since then the term
deliberate facing of dangers and bearing of toils.” In this
“virtue” is common to all virtues, it seems that fortitude is
sense fortitude is reckoned a special virtue, because it has
a general virtue.
a special matter.
Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i):
Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher
“Fortitude is not lacking in courage, for alone she defends
(De Coelo i, 116) the word virtue refers to the extreme
the honor of the virtues and guards their behests. She it
limit of a power. Now a natural power is, in one sense, the
is that wages an inexorable war on all vice, undeterred by
power of resisting corruptions, and in another sense is a
toil, brave in face of dangers, steeled against pleasures,
principle of action, as stated in Metaph. v, 17. And since
unyielding to lusts, avoiding covetousness as a deformity
this latter meaning is the more common, the term “virtue,”
that weakens virtue”; and he says the same further on in
as denoting the extreme limit of such a power, is a com-
connection with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any
mon term, for virtue taken in a general sense is nothing
special virtue. Therefore fortitude is not a special virtue.
else than a habit whereby one acts well. But as denoting
Objection 3. Further, fortitude would seem to derive
the extreme limit of power in the first sense, which sense is
its name from firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to
more specific, it is applied to a special virtue, namely for-
stand firm, as stated in Ethic. ii. Therefore fortitude is a
titude, to which it belongs to stand firm against all kinds
general virtue.
of assaults.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it
Reply to Objection 2. Ambrose takes fortitude in a
among the other virtues.
broad sense, as denoting firmness of mind in face of as-
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 61,
saults of all kinds. Nevertheless even as a special virtue
Aa. 3,4), the term “fortitude” can be taken in two ways.
with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the assaults
First, as simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and
of all vices. For he that can stand firm in things that are
in this sense it is a general virtue, or rather a condition
most difficult to bear, is prepared, in consequence, to re-
of every virtue, since as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii),
sist those which are less difficult.
it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly and immov-
Reply to Objection 3. This objection takes fortitude
ably. Secondly, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness
in the first sense.
1758
Whether fortitude is about fear and dying?
IIa IIae q. 123 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not about fear
but also moderately to withstand them, when, to wit, it is
and daring. For Gregory says (Moral. vii): “The forti-
necessary to dispel them altogether in order to free one-
tude of the just man is to overcome the flesh, to withstand
self therefrom for the future, which seems to come under
self-indulgence, to quench the lusts of the present life.”
the notion of daring. Therefore fortitude is about fear and
Therefore fortitude seems to be about pleasures rather
daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.
than about fear and daring.
Reply to Objection 1. Gregory is speaking then of the
Objection 2. Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii),
fortitude of the just man, as to its common relation to all
that it belongs to fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil.
virtues. Hence he first of all mentions matters pertaining
But this seemingly has nothing to do with the passions of
to temperance, as in the words quoted, and then adds that
fear and daring, but rather with a man’s toilsome deeds
which pertains properly to fortitude as a special virtue, by
and external dangers. Therefore fortitude is not about fear
saying: “To love the trials of this life for the sake of an
and daring.
eternal reward.”
Objection 3. Further, not only daring, but also hope,
Reply to Objection 2. Dangers and toils do not with-
is opposed to fear, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 45, a. 1, ad
draw the will from the course of reason, except in so far
2) in the treatise on passions. Therefore fortitude should
as they are an object of fear. Hence fortitude needs to be
not be about daring any more than about hope.
immediately about fear and daring, but mediately about
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7;
dangers and toils, these being the objects of those pas-
iii, 9) that fortitude is about fear and daring.
sions.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), it belongs to
Reply to Objection 3. Hope is opposed to fear on the
the virtue of fortitude to remove any obstacle that with-
part of the object, for hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas
draws the will from following the reason. Now to be with-
daring is about the same object, and is opposed to fear by
drawn from something difficult belongs to the notion of
way of approach and withdrawal, as stated above ( Ia IIae,
fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil that entails
q. 45, a. 1). And since fortitude properly regards those
difficulty, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 42, Aa. 3,5) in the
temporal evils that withdraw one from virtue, as appears
treatise on passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear
from Tully’s definition quoted in the Second Objection,
of difficult things, which can withdraw the will from fol-
it follows that fortitude properly is about fear and daring
lowing the reason. And it behooves one not only firmly
and not about hope, except in so far as it is connected with
to bear the assault of these difficulties by restraining fear,
daring, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 45, a. 2).
Whether fortitude is only about dangers of death?
IIa IIae q. 123 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not only about
drawn from the good of reason through fear of bodily
dangers of death. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl.
evil. Now it behooves one to hold firmly the good of rea-
xv) that “fortitude is love bearing all things readily for the
son against every evil whatsoever, since no bodily good
sake of the object beloved”: and (Music. vi) he says that
is equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude
fortitude is “the love which dreads no hardship, not even
of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the
death.” Therefore fortitude is not only about danger of
good of reason in face of the greatest evils: because he
death, but also about other afflictions.
that stands firm against great things, will in consequence
Objection 2. Further, all the passions of the soul need
stand firm against less things, but not conversely. More-
to be reduced to a mean by some virtue. Now there is no
over it belongs to the notion of virtue that it should regard
other virtue reducing fears to a mean. Therefore fortitude
something extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily evils
is not only about fear of death, but also about other fears.
is death, since it does away all bodily goods. Wherefore
Objection 3. Further, no virtue is about extremes. But
Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxii) that “the soul is
fear of death is about an extreme, since it is the greatest
shaken by its fellow body, with fear of toil and pain, lest
of fears, as stated in Ethic. iii. Therefore the virtue of
the body be stricken and harassed with fear of death lest
fortitude is not about fear of death.
it be done away and destroyed.” Therefore the virtue of
On the contrary, Andronicus says that “fortitude is a
fortitude is about the fear of dangers of death.
virtue of the irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by
Reply to Objection 1. Fortitude behaves well in bear-
the fear of death.”
ing all manner of adversity: yet a man is not reckoned
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), it belongs to the brave simply through bearing any kind of adversity, but
virtue of fortitude to guard the will against being with-
only through bearing well even the greatest evils; while
1759
through bearing others he is said to be brave in a restricted the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love
sense.
one’s own life is natural: and hence the necessity of a spe-
Reply to Objection 2. Since fear is born of love, any
cial virtue modifying the fear of death.
virtue that moderates the love of certain goods must in
Reply to Objection 3. In virtues the extreme con-
consequence moderate the fear of contrary evils: thus lib-
sists in exceeding right reason: wherefore to undergo the
erality, which moderates the love of money, as a conse-
greatest dangers in accordance with reason is not contrary
quence, moderates the fear of losing it, and the same is
to virtue.
Whether fortitude is properly about dangers of death in battle?
IIa IIae q. 123 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not properly
by a just fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there about dangers of death in battle. For martyrs above all are
is the general combat, for instance, of those who fight in
commended for their fortitude. But martyrs are not com-
battle; secondly, there is the private combat, as when a
mended in connection with battle. Therefore fortitude is
judge or even private individual does not refrain from giv-
not properly about dangers of death in battle.
ing a just judgment through fear of the impending sword,
Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that
or any other danger though it threaten death. Hence it be-
“fortitude is applicable both to warlike and to civil mat-
longs to fortitude to strengthen the mind against dangers
ters”: and Tully (De Offic. i), under the heading, “That it
of death, not only such as arise in a general battle, but also
pertains to fortitude to excel in battle rather than in civil
such as occur in singular combat, which may be called by
life,” says: “Although not a few think that the business of
the general name of battle. Accordingly it must be granted
war is of greater importance than the affairs of civil life,
that fortitude is properly about dangers of death occurring
this opinion must be qualified: and if we wish to judge
in battle.
the matter truly, there are many things in civil life that are
Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger
more important and more glorious than those connected
of any other kind of death; especially since man may be
with war.” Now greater fortitude is about greater things.
in danger of any kind of death on account of virtue: thus
Therefore fortitude is not properly concerned with death
may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend through fear
in battle.
of deadly infection, or not refuse to undertake a journey
Objection 3. Further, war is directed to the preser-
with some godly object in view through fear of shipwreck
vation of a country’s temporal peace: for Augustine says
or robbers.
(De Civ. Dei xix) that “wars are waged in order to insure
Reply to Objection 1. Martyrs face the fight that is
peace.” Now it does not seem that one ought to expose
waged against their own person, and this for the sake of
oneself to the danger of death for the temporal peace of
the sovereign good which is God; wherefore their forti-
one’s country, since this same peace is the occasion of
tude is praised above all. Nor is it outside the genus of
much license in morals. Therefore it seems that the virtue
fortitude that regards warlike actions, for which reason
of fortitude is not about the danger of death in battle.
they are said to have been valiant in battle.∗
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii)
Reply to Objection 2. Personal and civil business is
that fortitude is chiefly about death in battle.
differentiated from the business of war that regards gen-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 4), fortitude
eral wars. However, personal and civil affairs admit of
strengthens a man’s mind against the greatest danger,
dangers of death arising out of certain conflicts which are
which is that of death. Now fortitude is a virtue; and it
private wars, and so with regard to these also there may
is essential to virtue ever to tend to good; wherefore it is
be fortitude properly so called.
in order to pursue some good that man does not fly from
Reply to Objection 3. The peace of the state is good
the danger of death. But the dangers of death arising out
in itself, nor does it become evil because certain persons
of sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the
make evil use of it. For there are many others who make
like, do not seem to come on a man through his pursuing
good use of it; and many evils prevented by it, such as
some good. on the other hand, the dangers of death which
murders and sacrileges, are much greater than those which
occur in battle come to man directly on account of some
are occasioned by it, and which belong chiefly to the sins
good, because, to wit, he is defending the common good
of the flesh.
∗ Office of Martyrs, ex. Heb. xi. 34.
1760
Whether endurance is the chief act of fortitude?
IIa IIae q. 123 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that endurance is not the chief
fear. Therefore the principal act of fortitude is endurance,
act of fortitude. For virtue “is about the difficult and the
that is to stand immovable in the midst of dangers rather
good” (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is more difficult to attack
than to attack them.
than to endure. Therefore endurance is not the chief act of
Reply to Objection 1. Endurance is more difficult
fortitude.
than aggression, for three reasons.
First, because en-
Objection 2. Further, to be able to act on another
durance seemingly implies that one is being attacked by
seems to argue greater power than not to be changed by
a stronger person, whereas aggression denotes that one is
another. Now to attack is to act on another, and to endure
attacking as though one were the stronger party; and it
is to persevere unchangeably. Since then fortitude denotes
is more difficult to contend with a stronger than with a
perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to fortitude to
weaker. Secondly, because he that endures already feels
attack rather than to endure.
the presence of danger, whereas the aggressor looks upon
Objection 3. Further, one contrary is more distant
danger as something to come; and it is more difficult to
from the other than its mere negation. Now to endure is
be unmoved by the present than by the future. Thirdly,
merely not to fear, whereas to attack denotes a movement
because endurance implies length of time, whereas ag-
contrary to that of fear, since it implies pursuit. Since then
gression is consistent with sudden movements; and it is
fortitude above all withdraws the mind from fear, it seems
more difficult to remain unmoved for a long time, than
that it regards attack rather than endurance.
to be moved suddenly to something arduous. Hence the
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9)
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that “some hurry to meet
that “certain persons are” said to be brave chiefly because
danger, yet fly when the danger is present; this is not the
they endure affliction.
behavior of a brave man.”
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), and according
Reply to Objection 2. Endurance denotes indeed a
to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 9), “fortitude is more con-
passion of the body, but an action of the soul cleaving
cerned to allay fear, than to moderate daring.” For it is
most resolutely [fortissime] to good, the result being that
more difficult to allay fear than to moderate daring, since
it does not yield to the threatening passion of the body.
the danger which is the object of daring and fear, tends by
Now virtue concerns the soul rather than the body.
its very nature to check daring, but to increase fear. Now
Reply to Objection 3. He that endures fears not,
to attack belongs to fortitude in so far as the latter mod-
though he is confronted with the cause of fear, whereas
erates daring, whereas to endure follows the repression of
this cause is not present to the aggressor.
Whether the brave man acts for the sake of the good of his habit?
IIa IIae q. 123 a. 7
Objection 1. It seems that the brave man does not act
than what is directed to the end. Therefore the brave man
for the sake of the good of his habit. For in matters of
does not act for the sake of the good of his habit.
action the end, though first in intention, is last in execu-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7)
tion. Now the act of fortitude, in the order of execution,
that “to the brave man fortitude itself is a good”: and such
follows the habit of fortitude. Therefore it is impossible
is his end.
for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his
I answer that, An end is twofold: proximate and ul-
habit.
timate. Now the proximate end of every agent is to intro-
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii):
duce a likeness of that agent’s form into something else:
“We love virtues for the sake of happiness, and yet some
thus the end of fire in heating is to introduce the like-
make bold to counsel us to be virtuous,” namely by saying
ness of its heat into some passive matter, and the end of
that we should desire virtue for its own sake, “without lov-
the builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of his
ing happiness. If they succeed in their endeavor, we shall
art. Whatever good ensues from this, if it be intended,
surely cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer
may be called the remote end of the agent. Now just as
love that for the sake of which alone we love virtue.” But
in things made, external matter is fashioned by art, so in
fortitude is a virtue. Therefore the act of fortitude is di-
things done, human deeds are fashioned by prudence. Ac-
rected not to fortitude but to happiness.
cordingly we must conclude that the brave man intends as
Objection 3.
Further, Augustine says (De Morib.
his proximate end to reproduce in action a likeness of his
Eccl. xv) that “fortitude is love ready to bear all things
habit, for he intends to act in accordance with his habit:
for God’s sake.” Now God is not the habit of fortitude,
but his remote end is happiness or God.
but something better, since the end must needs be better
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the
1761
First Objection proceeds as though the very essence of a act, as stated. The other two objections consider the ulti-habit were its end, instead of the likeness of the habit in
mate end.
Whether the brave man delights in his act?
IIa IIae q. 123 a. 8
Objection 1. It seems that the brave man delights in
thought of losing his life, and for bodily pain. Hence we
his act. For “delight is the unhindered action of a connat-
read (2 Macc. 6:30) that Eleazar said: “I suffer grievous
ural habit” (Ethic. x, 4,6,8). Now the brave deed proceeds
pains in body: but in soul am well content to suffer these
from a habit which acts after the manner of nature. There-
things because I fear Thee.”
fore the brave man takes pleasure in his act.
Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insen-
Objection 2. Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal.
sible to the spiritual delight of virtue, without the copi-
5:22, “But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace,”
ous assistance of God’s grace, which has more strength to
says that deeds of virtue are called “fruits because they
raise the soul to the Divine things in which it delights, than
refresh man’s mind with a holy and pure delight.” Now
bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the Blessed Tiburtius,
the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he takes
while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that he
pleasure in his act.
felt as though he were walking on roses.
Objection 3. Further, the weaker is overcome by the
Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from be-
stronger. Now the brave man has a stronger love for the
ing entirely overcome by bodily pain. And the delight
good of virtue than for his own body, which he exposes to
of virtue overcomes spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man
the danger of death. Therefore the delight in the good of
prefers the good of virtue to the life of the body and to
virtue banishes the pain of the body; and consequently the
whatever appertains thereto. Hence the Philosopher says
brave man does all things with pleasure.
(Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that “it is not necessary for a brave man On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9)
to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for
that “the brave man seems to have no delight in his act.”
him not to be sad.”
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 31,
Reply to Objection 1. The vehemence of the action or
Aa. 3,4,5) where we were treating of the passions, plea-
passion of one power hinders the action of another power:
sure is twofold; one is bodily, resulting from bodily con-
wherefore the pain in his senses hinders the mind of the
tact, the other is spiritual, resulting from an apprehension
brave man from feeling delight in its proper operation.
of the soul. It is the latter which properly results from
Reply to Objection 2. Deeds of virtue are delightful
deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of
chiefly on account of their end; yet they can be painful by
reason. Now the principal act of fortitude is to endure,
their nature, and this is principally the case with fortitude.
not only certain things that are unpleasant as apprehended
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that “to perform
by the soul—for instance, the loss of bodily life, which
deeds with pleasure does not happen in all virtues, except
the virtuous man loves not only as a natural good, but
in so far as one attains the end.”
also as being necessary for acts of virtue, and things con-
Reply to Objection 3. In the brave man spiritual sor-
nected with them—but also to endure things unpleasant
row is overcome by the delight of virtue. Yet since bodily
in respect of bodily contact, such as wounds and blows.
pain is more sensible, and the sensitive apprehension is
Hence the brave man, on one side, has something that af-
more in evidence to man, it follows that spiritual pleasure
fords him delight, namely as regards spiritual pleasure, in
in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in the pres-
the act itself of virtue and the end thereof: while, on the
ence of great bodily pain.
other hand, he has cause for both spiritual sorrow, in the
Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?
IIa IIae q. 123 a. 9
Objection 1. It seems that fortitude does not deal
happen; he takes measures beforehand, and looks out as
chiefly with sudden occurrences. For it would seem that
from the conning-tower of his mind, so as to encounter the
things occur suddenly when they are unforeseen. But
future by his forethought, lest he should say afterwards:
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “fortitude is the de-
This befell me because I did not think it could possibly
liberate facing of danger, and bearing of toil.” Therefore
happen.” But it is not possible to be prepared for the future
fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings.
in the case of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation
Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i):
of fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings.
“The brave man is not unmindful of what may be likely to
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
1762
8) that the “brave man is of good hope.” But hope looks edge.” The other thing to be considered in the operation of
forward to the future, which is inconsistent with sudden
fortitude regards the display of the virtuous habit: and in
occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is not
this way fortitude is chiefly about sudden occurrences, be-
concerned with sudden happenings.
cause according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) the habit
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8)
of fortitude is displayed chiefly in sudden dangers: since a
that “fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death.”
habit works by way of nature. Wherefore if a person with-
I answer that, Two things must be considered in the
out forethought does that which pertains to virtue, when
operation of fortitude. One is in regard to its choice: and
necessity urges on account of some sudden danger, this is
thus fortitude is not about sudden occurrences: because
a very strong proof that habitual fortitude is firmly seated
the brave man chooses to think beforehand of the dan-
in his mind.
gers that may arise, in order to be able to withstand them,
Yet is it possible for a person even without the habit of
or to bear them more easily: since according to Gregory
fortitude, to prepare his mind against danger by long fore-
(Hom. xxv in Evang.), “the blow that is foreseen strikes
thought: in the same way as a brave man prepares himself
with less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly
when necessary. This suffices for the Replies to the Ob-
wrongs, if we are forearmed with the shield of foreknowl-
jections.
Whether the brave man makes use of anger in his action?
IIa IIae q. 123 a. 10
Objection 1. It seems that the brave man does not use
to virtuous men both anger and the other passions of the
anger in his action. For no one should employ as an in-
soul albeit modified by reason. And possibly they differed
strument of his action that which he cannot use at will.
not in reality but in their way of speaking. For the Peri-
Now man cannot use anger at will, so as to take it up and
patetics, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 2), gave the
lay it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher says
name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive ap-
(De Memoria ii), when a bodily passion is in movement,
petite, however they may comport themselves. And since
it does not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore a
the sensitive appetite is moved by the command of reason,
brave man should not employ anger for his action.
so that it may cooperate by rendering action more prompt,
Objection 2. Further, if a man is competent to do
they held that virtuous persons should employ both anger
a thing by himself, he should not seek the assistance of
and the other passions of the soul, modified according to
something weaker and more imperfect.
Now the rea-
the dictate of reason. On the other hand, the Stoics gave
son is competent to achieve by itself deeds of fortitude,
the name of passions to certain immoderate emotions of
wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De Ira
the sensitive appetite, wherefore they called them sick-
i): “Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared
nesses or diseases, and for this reason severed them alto-
for action but also to accomplish it. In fact is there greater
gether from virtue.
folly than for reason to seek help from anger? the stead-
Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger
fast from the unstaid, the trusty from the untrustworthy,
for his action, but not immoderate anger.
the healthy from the sick?” Therefore a brave man should
Reply to Objection 1. Anger that is moderated in ac-
not make use of anger.
cordance with reason is subject to the command of reason:
Objection 3. Further, just as people are more earnest
so that man uses it at his will, which would not be the case
in doing deeds of fortitude on account of anger, so are they
were it immoderate.
on account of sorrow or desire; wherefore the Philosopher
Reply to Objection 2. Reason employs anger for its
says (Ethic. iii, 8) that wild beasts are incited to face dan-
action, not as seeking its assistance, but because it uses
ger through sorrow or pain, and adulterous persons dare
the sensitive appetite as an instrument, just as it uses the
many things for the sake of desire. Now fortitude em-
members of the body. Nor is it unbecoming for the instru-
ploys neither sorrow nor desire for its action. Therefore
ment to be more imperfect than the principal agent, even
in like manner it should not employ anger.
as the hammer is more imperfect than the smith. More-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8)
over, Seneca was a follower of the Stoics, and the above
that “anger helps the brave.”
words were aimed by him directly at Aristotle.
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 2),
Reply to Objection 3. Whereas fortitude, as stated
concerning anger and the other passions there was a dif-
above (a. 6), has two acts, namely endurance and aggres-
ference of opinion between the Peripatetics and the Sto-
sion, it employs anger, not for the act of endurance, be-
ics. For the Stoics excluded anger and all other passions
cause the reason by itself performs this act, but for the act
of the soul from the mind of a wise or good man: whereas
of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the
the Peripatetics, of whom Aristotle was the chief, ascribed
other passions, since it belongs to anger to strike at the
1763
cause of sorrow, so that it directly cooperates with forti-I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 61,
tude in attacking. On the other hand, sorrow by its very
Aa. 3,4), those virtues are said to be cardinal or princi-
nature gives way to the thing that hurts; though acciden-
pal which have a foremost claim to that which belongs to
tally it helps in aggression, either as being the cause of
the virtues in common. And among other conditions of
anger, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 47, a. 3), or as making
virtue in general one is that it is stated to “act steadfastly,”
a person expose himself to danger in order to escape from
according to Ethic. ii, 4. Now fortitude above all lays
sorrow. In like manner desire, by its very nature, tends to
claim to praise for steadfastness. Because he that stands
a pleasurable good, to which it is directly contrary to with-
firm is so much the more praised, as he is more strongly
stand danger: yet accidentally sometimes it helps one to
impelled to fall or recede. Now man is impelled to recede
attack, in so far as one prefers to risk dangers rather than
from that which is in accordance with reason, both by the
lack pleasure. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5):
pleasing good and the displeasing evil. But bodily pain
“Of all the cases in which fortitude arises from a passion,
impels him more strongly than pleasure. For Augustine
the most natural is when a man is brave through anger,
says (Qq. 83, qu. 36): “There is none that does not shun
making his choice and acting for a purpose,” i.e. for a due
pain more than he desires pleasure. For we perceive that
end; “this is true fortitude.”
even the most untamed beasts are deterred from the great-
Whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue?
est pleasures by the fear of pain.” And among the pains of
Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal
the mind and dangers those are mostly feared which lead
virtue. For, as stated above (a. 10), anger is closely allied
to death, and it is against them that the brave man stands
with fortitude. Now anger is not accounted a principal
firm. Therefore fortitude is a cardinal virtue.
passion; nor is daring which belongs to fortitude. There-
Reply to Objection 1. Daring and anger do not co-
fore neither should fortitude be reckoned a cardinal virtue.
operate with fortitude in its act of endurance, wherein its
Objection 2. Further, the object of virtue is good. But
steadfastness is chiefly commended: for it is by that act
the direct object of fortitude is not good, but evil, for it is that the brave man curbs fear, which is a principal pas-endurance of evil and toil, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet.
sion, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 25, a. 4).
ii). Therefore fortitude is not a cardinal virtue.
Reply to Objection 2. Virtue is directed to the good
Objection 3. Further, the cardinal virtues are about
of reason which it behooves to safeguard against the on-
those things upon which human life is chiefly occupied,
slaught of evils. And fortitude is directed to evils of the
just as a door turns upon a hinge [cardine]. But fortitude
body, as contraries which it withstands, and to the good of
is about dangers of death which are of rare occurrence in
reason, as the end, which it intends to safeguard.
human life. Therefore fortitude should not be reckoned a
Reply to Objection 3. Though dangers of death are of
cardinal or principal virtue.
rare occurrence, yet the occasions of those dangers occur
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxii), Ambrose in
frequently, since on account of justice which he pursues,
his commentary on Lk. 6:20, and Augustine (De Moribus
and also on account of other good deeds, man encounters
Eccl. xv), number fortitude among the four cardinal or
mortal adversaries.
principal virtues.
Whether fortitude excels among all other virtues?
IIa IIae q. 123 a. 11
Objection 1. It seems that fortitude excels among all
Objection 5. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i,
other virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i): “Fortitude
19): “Those virtues must needs be greatest which are most
is higher, so to speak, than the rest.”
profitable to others.” Now liberality seems to be more use-
Objection 2. Further, virtue is about that which is
ful than fortitude. Therefore it is a greater virtue.
difficult and good. But fortitude is about most difficult
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), “In
things. Therefore it is the greatest of the virtues.
things that are great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be
Objection 3. Further, the person of a man is more ex-
good”: wherefore the better a virtue the greater it is. Now
cellent than his possessions. But fortitude is about a man’s
reason’s good is man’s good, according to Dionysius (Div.
person, for it is this that a man exposes to the danger of
Nom. iv) prudence, since it is a perfection of reason, has
death for the good of virtue: whereas justice and the other
the good essentially: while justice effects this good, since
moral virtues are about other and external things. There-
it belongs to justice to establish the order of reason in all
fore fortitude is the chief of the moral virtues.
human affairs: whereas the other virtues safeguard this
Objection 4. On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i):
good, inasmuch as they moderate the passions, lest they
“Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues and gives its
lead man away from reason’s good. As to the order of the
name to a good man.”
latter, fortitude holds the first place, because fear of dan-
1764
gers of death has the greatest power to make man recede good rather than the difficult. Hence the greatness of a
from the good of reason: and after fortitude comes tem-
virtue is measured according to its goodness rather than
perance, since also pleasures of touch excel all others in
its difficulty.
hindering the good of reason. Now to be a thing essen-
Reply to Objection 3. A man does not expose his
tially ranks before effecting it, and the latter ranks before
person to dangers of death except in order to safeguard
safeguarding it by removing obstacles thereto. Wherefore
justice: wherefore the praise awarded to fortitude depends
among the cardinal virtues, prudence ranks first, justice
somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i)
second, fortitude third, temperance fourth, and after these
that “fortitude without justice is an occasion of injustice;
the other virtues.
since the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress
Reply to Objection 1. Ambrose places fortitude be-
the weaker.”
fore the other virtues, in respect of a certain general utility, The Fourth argument is granted.
inasmuch as it is useful both in warfare, and in matters re-
Reply to Objection 5. Liberality is useful in confer-
lating to civil or home life. Hence he begins by saying
ring certain particular favors: whereas a certain general
(De Offic. i): “Now we come to treat of fortitude, which
utility attaches to fortitude, since it safeguards the whole
being higher so to speak than the others, is applicable both
order of justice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9)
to warlike and to civil matters.”
that “just and brave men are most beloved, because they
Reply to Objection 2. Virtue essentially regards the
are most useful in war and peace.”
1765
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 124
Of Martyrdom
(In Five Articles)
We must now consider martyrdom, under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?
(2) Of what virtue is it the act?
(3) Concerning the perfection of this act;
(4) The pain of martyrdom;
(5) Its cause.
Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?
IIa IIae q. 124 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act
tarily. Since, however, Scripture contains no proof of this,
of virtue. For all acts of virtue are voluntary. But mar-
it is better to say that these babes in being slain obtained
tyrdom is sometimes not voluntary, as in the case of the
by God’s grace the glory of martyrdom which others ac-
Innocents who were slain for Christ’s sake, and of whom
quire by their own will. For the shedding of one’s blood
Hillary says (Super Matth. i) that “they attained the ripe
for Christ’s sake takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore
age of eternity through the glory of martyrdom.” There-
just as in the case of baptized children the merit of Christ
fore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.
is conducive to the acquisition of glory through the bap-
Objection 2. Further, nothing unlawful is an act of
tismal grace, so in those who were slain for Christ’s sake
virtue. Now it is unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above
the merit of Christ’s martyrdom is conducive to the acqui-
(q. 64, a. 5), and yet martyrdom is achieved by so do-
sition of the martyr’s palm. Hence Augustine says in a
ing: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that “during
sermon on the Epiphany (De Diversis lxvi), as though he
persecution certain holy women, in order to escape from
were addressing them: “A man that does not believe that
those who threatened their chastity, threw themselves into
children are benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt
a river, and so ended their lives, and their martyrdom is
of your being crowned in suffering for Christ. You were
honored in the Catholic Church with most solemn vener-
not old enough to believe in Christ’s future sufferings, but
ation.” Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.
you had a body wherein you could endure suffering of
Objection 3. Further, it is praiseworthy to offer one-
Christ Who was to suffer.”
self to do an act of virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to
Reply to Objection 2. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i)
court martyrdom, rather would it seem to be presumptu-
that “possibly the Church was induced by certain credible
ous and rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.
witnesses of Divine authority thus to honor the memory
On the contrary, The reward of beatitude is not due
of those holy women∗.”
save to acts of virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since
Reply to Objection 3. The precepts of the Law are
it is written (Mat. 5:10): “Blessed are they that suffer
about acts of virtue. Now it has been stated ( Ia IIae,
persecution for justice’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of
q. 108, a. 1, ad 4) that some of the precepts of the Divine
heaven.” Therefore martyrdom is an act of virtue.
Law are to be understood in reference to the preparation of
I answer that, As stated above (q. 123, Aa. 1,3), it
the mind, in the sense that man ought to be prepared to do
belongs to virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason.
such and such a thing, whenever expedient. In the same
Now the good of reason consists in the truth as its proper
way certain things belong to an act of virtue as regards the
object, and in justice as its proper effect, as shown above
preparation of the mind, so that in such and such a case a
(q. 109, Aa. 1,2; q. 123, a. 12). And martyrdom consists
man should act according to reason. And this observation
essentially in standing firmly to truth and justice against
would seem very much to the point in the case of martyr-
the assaults of persecution. Hence it is evident that mar-
dom, which consists in the right endurance of sufferings
tyrdom is an act of virtue.
unjustly inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an oc-
Reply to Objection 1. Some have said that in the case
casion of acting unjustly: yet if anyone act unjustly, one
of the Innocents the use of their free will was miraculously
ought to endure it in moderation.
accelerated, so that they suffered martyrdom even volun-
∗ Cf. q. 64, a. 1, ad 2
1766
Whether martyrdom is an act of fortitude?
IIa IIae q. 124 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act of
to faith and justice notwithstanding the threatening dan-
fortitude. For the Greek martyr signifies a witness. Now ger of death, the imminence of which is moreover due to
witness is borne to the faith of Christ. according to Acts
a kind of particular contest with his persecutors. Hence
1:8, “You shall be witnesses unto Me,” etc. and Maximus
Cyprian says in a sermon (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): “The
says in a sermon: “The mother of martyrs is the Catholic
crowd of onlookers wondered to see an unearthly battle,
faith which those glorious warriors have sealed with their
and Christ’s servants fighting erect, undaunted in speech,
blood.” Therefore martyrdom is an act of faith rather than
with souls unmoved, and strength divine.” Wherefore it
of fortitude.
is evident that martyrdom is an act of fortitude; for which
Objection 2.
Further, a praiseworthy act belongs
reason the Church reads in the office of Martyrs: They
chiefly to the virtue which inclines thereto, is manifested
“became valiant in battle”∗.
thereby, and without which the act avails nothing. Now
Reply to Objection 1. Two things must be considered
charity is the chief incentive to martyrdom: Thus Max-
in the act of fortitude. one is the good wherein the brave
imus says in a sermon: “The charity of Christ is victorious
man is strengthened, and this is the end of fortitude; the
in His martyrs.” Again the greatest proof of charity lies
other is the firmness itself, whereby a man does not yield
in the act of martyrdom, according to Jn. 15:13, “Greater
to the contraries that hinder him from achieving that good,
love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for
and in this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as
his friends.” Moreover without charity martyrdom avails
civic fortitude strengthens a man’s mind in human jus-
nothing, according to 1 Cor. 13:3, “If I should deliver my
tice, for the safeguarding of which he braves the danger
body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me
of death, so gratuitous fortitude strengthens man’s soul
nothing.” Therefore martyrdom is an act of charity rather
in the good of Divine justice, which is “through faith in
than of fortitude.
Christ Jesus,” according to Rom. 3:22. Thus martyrdom
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says in a sermon on
is related to faith as the end in which one is strengthened,
St. Cyprian: “It is easy to honor a martyr by singing his
but to fortitude as the eliciting habit.
praises, but it is a great thing to imitate his faith and pa-
Reply to Objection 2. Charity inclines one to the act
tience.” Now that which calls chiefly for praise in a vir-
of martyrdom, as its first and chief motive cause, being the
tuous act, is the virtue of which it is the act. Therefore
virtue commanding it, whereas fortitude inclines thereto
martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of fortitude.
as being its proper motive cause, being the virtue that elic-
On the contrary, Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf.
its it. Hence martyrdom is an act of charity as command-
ii): “Blessed martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you?
ing, and of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it
Most valiant warriors, how shall I find words to proclaim
manifests both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meri-
the strength of your courage?” Now a person is praised
torious, like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it
on account of the virtue whose act he performs. There-
avails not without charity.
fore martyrdom is an act of fortitude.
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 123, a. 6),
I answer that, As stated above (q. 123, a. 1, seqq.),
the chief act of fortitude is endurance: to this and not
it belongs to fortitude to strengthen man in the good of
to its secondary act, which is aggression, martyrdom be-
virtue, especially against dangers, and chiefly against dan-
longs. And since patience serves fortitude on the part of
gers of death, and most of all against those that occur
its chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is that martyrs are
in battle. Now it is evident that in martyrdom man is
also praised for their patience.
firmly strengthened in the good of virtue, since he cleaves
Whether martyrdom is an act of the greatest perfection?
IIa IIae q. 124 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act of
lay down our lives for the brethren.” Therefore martyrdom
the greatest perfection. For seemingly that which is a mat-
does not pertain to perfection.
ter of counsel and not of precept pertains to perfection, be-
Objection 2. Further, it seems to point to greater per-
cause, to wit, it is not necessary for salvation. But it would
fection that a man give his soul to God, which is done by
seem that martyrdom is necessary for salvation, since the
obedience, than that he give God his body, which is done
Apostle says (Rom. 10:10), “With the heart we believe
by martyrdom: wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxv)
unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto
that “obedience is preferable to all sacrifices.” Therefore
salvation,” and it is written (1 Jn. 3:16), that “we ought to
martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection.
∗ Heb. 11:34
1767
Objection 3. Further, it would seem better to do good life itself most, and on the other hand he hates death more
to others than to maintain oneself in good, since the “good
than anything, especially when it is accompanied by the
of the nation is better than the good of the individual,”
pains of bodily torment, “from fear of which even dumb
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now he that
animals refrain from the greatest pleasures,” as Augustine
suffers martyrdom profits himself alone, whereas he that
observes (Qq. 83, qu. 36). And from this point of view it
teaches does good to many. Therefore the act of teach-
is clear that martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts
ing and guiding subjects is more perfect than the act of
in respect of its genus, as being the sign of the greatest
martyrdom.
charity, according to Jn. 15:13: “Greater love than this no
On the contrary, Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin. xlvi)
man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.”
prefers martyrdom to virginity which pertains to perfec-
Reply to Objection 1. There is no act of perfection,
tion. Therefore martyrdom seems to belong to perfection
which is a matter of counsel, but what in certain cases is a
in the highest degree.
matter of precept, as being necessary for salvation. Thus
I answer that, We may speak of an act of virtue in
Augustine declares (De Adult. Conjug. xiii) that a man
two ways. First, with regard to the species of that act, as
is under the obligation of observing continency, through
compared to the virtue proximately eliciting it. In this way
the absence or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not con-
martyrdom, which consists in the due endurance of death,
trary to the perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it
cannot be the most perfect of virtuous acts, because en-
be necessary for salvation, since there are cases when it
durance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only in
is not necessary for salvation to suffer martyrdom; thus
so far as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of
we read of many holy martyrs who through zeal for the
virtue, such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of
faith or brotherly love gave themselves up to martyrdom
virtue being the end is better.
of their own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be
A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in
understood as referring to the preparation of the mind.
comparison with its first motive cause, which is the love of
Reply to Objection 2. Martyrdom embraces the high-
charity, and it is in this respect that an act comes to belong
est possible degree of obedience, namely obedience unto
to the perfection of life, since, as the Apostle says (Col.
death; thus we read of Christ (Phil. 2:8) that He became
3:14), that “charity. . . is the bond of perfection.” Now, of
“obedient unto death.” Hence it is evident that martyrdom
all virtuous acts martyrdom is the greatest proof of the
is of itself more perfect than obedience considered abso-
perfection of charity: since a man’s love for a thing is
lutely.
proved to be so much the greater, according as that which
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers mar-
he despises for its sake is more dear to him, or that which
tyrdom according to the proper species of its act, whence
he chooses to suffer for its sake is more odious. But it is
it derives no excellence over all other virtuous acts; thus
evident that of all the goods of the present life man loves
neither is fortitude more excellent than all virtues.
Whether death is essential to martyrdom?
IIa IIae q. 124 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that death is not essential to
the name of martyr should be accorded to a woman who
martyrdom. For Jerome says in a sermon on the Assump-
forfeits the integrity of the flesh for the sake of Christ’s
tion (Epist. ad Paul. et Eustoch.): “I should say rightly
faith, rather than if she were to forfeit even the life of the
that the Mother of God was both virgin and martyr, al-
body: wherefore also Lucy said: “If thou causest me to
though she ended her days in peace”: and Gregory says
be violated against my will, my chastity will gain me a
(Hom. iii in Evang.): “Although persecution has ceased to
twofold crown.”
offer the opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not with-
Objection 3. Further, martyrdom is an act of forti-
out its martyrdom, since even if we no longer yield the life
tude. But it belongs to fortitude to brave not only death
of the body to the sword, yet do we slay fleshly desires in
but also other hardships, as Augustine declares (Music.
the soul with the sword of the spirit.” Therefore there can
vi). Now there are many other hardships besides death,
be martyrdom without suffering death.
which one may suffer for Christ’s faith, namely imprison-
Objection 2. Further, we read of certain women as
ment, exile, being stripped of one’s goods, as mentioned
commended for despising life for the sake of safeguard-
in Heb. 10:34, for which reason we celebrate the mar-
ing the integrity of the flesh: wherefore seemingly the in-
tyrdom of Pope Saint Marcellus, notwithstanding that he
tegrity of chastity is preferable to the life of the body. Now
died in prison. Therefore it is not essential to martyrdom
sometimes the integrity of the flesh has been forfeited or
that one suffer the pain of death.
has been threatened in confession of the Christian faith,
Objection 4. Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act,
as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore it seems that
as stated above (a. 2, ad 1; a. 3). Now it cannot be a mer-
1768
itorious act after death. Therefore it is before death; and tegrity of the flesh, or is condemned to forfeit it under pre-consequently death is not essential to martyrdom.
text of the Christian faith, it is not evident to men whether
On the contrary, Maximus says in a sermon on the
she suffers this for love of the Christian faith, or rather
martyrs that “in dying for the faith he conquers who would
through contempt of chastity. Wherefore in the sight of
have been vanquished in living without faith.”
men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and conse-
I answer that As stated above (a. 2), a martyr is so
quently this is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the
called as being a witness to the Christian faith, which
sight of God, however, Who searcheth the heart, this may
teaches us to despise things visible for the sake of things
be deemed worthy of a reward, as Lucy said.
invisible, as stated in Heb. 11. Accordingly it belongs to
Reply to Objection 3.
As stated above (q. 123,
martyrdom that a man bear witness to the faith in showing
Aa. 4,5), fortitude regards danger of death chiefly, and
by deed that he despises all things present, in order to ob-
other dangers consequently; wherefore a person is not
tain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains
called a martyr merely for suffering imprisonment, or ex-
the life of the body he does not show by deed that he de-
ile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except in so far as these
spises all things relating to the body. For men are wont to
result in death.
despise both their kindred and all they possess, and even
Reply to Objection 4. The merit of martyrdom is
to suffer bodily pain, rather than lose life. Hence Satan
not after death, but in the voluntary endurance of death,
testified against Job (Job 2:4): “Skin for skin, and all that
namely in the fact that a person willingly suffers being put
a man hath he will give for his soul” [Douay: ‘life’] i.e.
to death. It happens sometimes, however, that a man lives
for the life of his body. Therefore the perfect notion of
for some time after being mortally wounded for Christ’s
martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ’s
sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other
sake.
kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued
Reply to Objection 1. The authorities quoted, and the
until death ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious
like that one may meet with, speak of martyrdom by way
while a man is in this state, and at the very time that he is
of similitude.
suffering these hardships.
Reply to Objection 2. When a woman forfeits the in-
Whether faith alone is the cause of martyrdom?
IIa IIae q. 124 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that faith alone is the cause of
Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.
martyrdom. For it is written (1 Pet. 4:15,16): “Let none of
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:10): “Blessed
you suffer as a murderer, or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter are they that suffer persecution for justice’ sake,” which
of other men’s things. But if as a Christian, let him not
pertains to martyrdom, according to a gloss, as well as
be ashamed, but let him glorify God in this name.” Now
Jerome’s commentary on this passage. Now not only faith
a man is said to be a Christian because he holds the faith
but also the other virtues pertain to justice. Therefore
of Christ. Therefore only faith in Christ gives the glory of
other virtues can be the cause of martyrdom.
martyrdom to those who suffer.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 4), martyrs are so
Objection 2. Further, a martyr is a kind of witness.
called as being witnesses, because by suffering in body
But witness is borne to the truth alone. Now one is not
unto death they bear witness to the truth; not indeed to any
called a martyr for bearing witness to any truth, but only
truth, but to the truth which is in accordance with godli-
for witnessing to the Divine truth, otherwise a man would
ness, and was made known to us by Christ: wherefore
be a martyr if he were to die for confessing a truth of ge-
Christ’s martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the
ometry or some other speculative science, which seems
truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the
ridiculous. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyr-
truth of faith.
dom.
But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief,
Objection 3.
Further, those virtuous deeds would
but also outward profession, which is expressed not only
seem to be of most account which are directed to the com-
by words, whereby one confesses the faith, but also by
mon good, since “the good of the nation is better than
deeds, whereby a person shows that he has faith, accord-
the good of the individual,” according to the Philosopher
ing to James 2:18, “I will show thee, by works, my faith.”
(Ethic. i, 2). If, then, some other good were the cause of
Hence it is written of certain people (Titus 1:16): “They
martyrdom, it would seem that before all those would be
profess that they know God but in their works they deny
martyrs who die for the defense of their country. Yet this
Him.” Thus all virtuous deeds, inasmuch as they are re-
is not consistent with Church observance, for we do not
ferred to God, are professions of the faith whereby we
celebrate the martyrdom of those who die in a just war.
come to know that God requires these works of us, and
1769
rewards us for them: and in this way they can be the head of witnessing to the faith.
cause of martyrdom. For this reason the Church celebrates
Reply to Objection 2. The truth of other sciences has
the martyrdom of Blessed John the Baptist, who suffered
no connection with the worship of the Godhead: hence
death, not for refusing to deny the faith, but for reproving
it is not called truth according to godliness, and conse-
adultery.
quently the confession thereof cannot be said to be the
Reply to Objection 1. A Christian is one who is
direct cause of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie is a sin,
Christ’s. Now a person is said to be Christ’s, not only
as stated above (q. 110, Aa. 3,4), avoidance of a lie, to
through having faith in Christ, but also because he is ac-
whatever truth it may be contrary, may be the cause of
tuated to virtuous deeds by the Spirit of Christ, according
martyrdom inasmuch as a lie is a sin against the Divine
to Rom. 8:9, “If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he
Law.
is none of His”; and again because in imitation of Christ
Reply to Objection 3. The good of one’s country is
he is dead to sins, according to Gal. 5:24, “They that are
paramount among human goods: yet the Divine good,
Christ’s have crucified their flesh with the vices and con-
which is the proper cause of martyrdom, is of more ac-
cupiscences.” Hence to suffer as a Christian is not only to
count than human good. Nevertheless, since human good
suffer in confession of the faith, which is done by words,
may become Divine, for instance when it is referred to
but also to suffer for doing any good work, or for avoiding
God, it follows that any human good in so far as it is re-
any sin, for Christ’s sake, because this all comes under the
ferred to God, may be the cause of martyrdom.
1770
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 125
Of Fear∗
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: (1) Fear; (2) Fearlessness; (3) Daring.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it?
Whether fear is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 125 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is to be shunned more than others; and among things to be
a passion, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 4; q. 42). Now
sought after, that some are to be sought after more than
we are neither praised nor blamed for passions, as stated
others. Moreover, the more a good is to be sought after,
in Ethic. ii. Since then every sin is blameworthy, it seems
the more is the opposite evil to be shunned. The result
that fear is not a sin.
is that reason dictates that certain goods are to be sought
Objection 2. Further, nothing that is commanded in
after more than certain evils are to be avoided. Accord-
the Divine Law is a sin: since the “law of the Lord is
ingly when the appetite shuns what the reason dictates that
unspotted” (Ps. 18:8). Yet fear is commanded in God’s
we should endure rather than forfeit others that we should
law, for it is written (Eph. 6:5): “Servants, be obedient to
rather seek for, fear is inordinate and sinful. On the other
them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear
hand, when the appetite fears so as to shun what reason
and trembling.” Therefore fear is not a sin.
requires to be shunned, the appetite is neither inordinate
Objection 3. Further, nothing that is naturally in man
nor sinful.
is a sin, for sin is contrary to nature according to Dam-
Reply to Objection 1. Fear in its generic acceptation
ascene (De Fide Orth. iii). Now fear is natural to man:
denotes avoidance in general. Hence in this way it does
wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that “a man
not include the notion of good or evil: and the same ap-
would be insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not even
plies to every other passion. Wherefore the Philosopher
earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear.” There-
says that passions call for neither praise nor blame, be-
fore fear is not a sin. .
cause, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are
On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 10:28): “Fear
angry or afraid, but only those who behave thus in an or-
ye not them that kill the body,” and it is written (Ezech.
dinate or inordinate manner.
2:6): “Fear not, neither be thou afraid of their words.”
Reply to Objection 2. The fear which the Apostle
I answer that, A human act is said to be a sin on ac-
inculcates is in accordance with reason, namely that ser-
count of its being inordinate, because the good of a hu-
vants should fear lest they be lacking in the service they
man act consists in order, as stated above (q. 109, a. 2;
owe their masters.
q. 114, a. 1). Now this due order requires that the appetite
Reply to Objection 3. Reason dictates that we should
be subject to the ruling of reason. And reason dictates
shun the evils that we cannot withstand, and the endurance
that certain things should be shunned and some sought af-
of which profits us nothing. Hence there is no sin in fear-
ter. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are
ing them.
Whether the sin of fear is contrary to fortitude?
IIa IIae q. 125 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that the sin of fear is not con-
Lord,” says that “it is human fear whereby we dread to
trary to fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of
suffer carnal dangers, or to lose worldly goods.” Again a
death, as stated above (q. 123, Aa. 4,5). But the sin of
gloss on Mat. 27:44, “He prayed the third time, saying
fear is not always connected with dangers of death, for
the selfsame word,” says that “evil fear is threefold, fear
a gloss on Ps. 127:1, “Blessed are all they that fear the
of death, fear of pain, and fear of contempt.” Therefore
∗ St. Thomas Calls This Vice Indifferently ‘Fear’ or ‘Timidity.’ the Translation Requires One to Adhere to These Terms On Account of the Connection with the Passion of Fear. Otherwise ‘Cowardice’ Would Be a Better Rendering.
1771
the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude.
this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards dangers of
Objection 2. Further, the chief reason why a man is
death. For this reason timidity is said to be antonomasti-
commended for fortitude is that he exposes himself to the
cally∗ opposed to fortitude.
danger of death. Now sometimes a man exposes himself
Reply to Objection 1. The passages quoted refer to
to death through fear of slavery or shame. Thus Augustine
inordinate fear in its generic acceptation, which can be
relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order not to be Cae-
opposed to various virtues.
sar’s slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of
Reply to Objection 2.
Human acts are estimated
fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being
chiefly with reference to the end, as stated above ( Ia IIae,
opposed thereto.
q. 1, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 6): and it belongs to a brave
Objection 3. Further, all despair arises from fear. But
man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a
despair is opposed not to fortitude but to hope, as stated
good. But a man who exposes himself to danger of death
above (q. 20, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 4). Neither therefore is in order to escape from slavery or hardships is overcome
the sin of fear opposed to fortitude.
by fear, which is contrary to fortitude. Hence the Philoso-
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7)
pher says (Ethic. iii, 7), that “to die in order to escape
states that timidity is opposed to fortitude.
poverty, lust, or something disagreeable is an act not of
I answer that, As stated above (q. 19, a. 3; Ia IIae,
fortitude but of cowardice: for to shun hardships is a mark
q. 43, a. 1), all fear arises from love; since no one fears
of effeminacy.”
save what is contrary to something he loves. Now love
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 45,
is not confined to any particular kind of virtue or vice:
a. 2), fear is the beginning of despair even as hope is the
but ordinate love is included in every virtue, since every
beginning of daring. Wherefore, just as fortitude which
virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue; while in-
employs daring in moderation presupposes hope, so on
ordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate
the other hand despair proceeds from some kind of fear.
love gives use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner
It does not follow, however, that any kind of despair re-
inordinate fear is included in every sin; thus the covetous
sults from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the
man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss
same kind. Now the despair that is opposed to hope is re-
of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest fear of all is that
ferred to another kind, namely to Divine things; whereas
which has the danger of death for its object, as we find
the fear that is opposed to fortitude regards dangers of
proved in Ethic. iii, 6. Wherefore the inordinateness of
death. Hence the argument does not prove.
Whether fear is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 125 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, On the contrary, For mortal sin alone is the pain
as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 1), fear is in the irasci-
of hell due: and yet this is due to the fearful, accord-
ble faculty which is a part of the sensuality. Now there is
ing to Apoc. 21:8, “But the fearful and unbelieving and
none but venial sin in the sensuality, as stated above ( Ia
the abominable,” etc., “shall have their portion in the
IIae, q. 74, a. 4). Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.
pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the second
Objection 2. Further, every mortal sin turns the heart
death.” Therefore fear is a mortal sin.
wholly from God. But fear does not this, for a gloss on
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), fear is a sin
Judges 7:3, “Whosoever is fearful,” etc., says that “a man
through being inordinate, that is to say, through shunning
is fearful when he trembles at the very thought of conflict;
what ought not to be shunned according to reason. Now
yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart, but that he can
sometimes this inordinateness of fear is confined to the
rally and take courage.” Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.
sensitive appetites, without the accession of the rational
Objection 3. Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only
appetite’s consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but
from perfection but also from a precept. But fear does not
only a venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of
make one lapse from a precept, but only from perfection;
fear reaches to the rational appetite which is called the
for a gloss on Dt. 20:8, “What man is there that is fearful
will, which deliberately shuns something against the dic-
and fainthearted?” says: “We learn from this that no man
tate of reason: and this inordinateness of fear is sometimes
can take up the profession of contemplation or spiritual
a mortal, sometimes a venial sin. For if a man through fear
warfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches.”
of the danger of death or of any other temporal evil is so
Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.
disposed as to do what is forbidden, or to omit what is
∗ Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so timidity, which is inordinate fear of any evil, is employed to denote inordinate fear of the danger of death.
1772
commanded by the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin: fied that one cannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus
otherwise it is a venial sin.
sometimes a man sins mortally by consenting to concu-
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers fear
piscence, and is turned aside from accomplishing what he
as confined to the sensuality.
purposed doing.
Reply to Objection 2. This gloss also can be under-
Reply to Objection 3. This gloss speaks of the fear
stood as referring to the fear that is confined within the
that turns man aside from a good that is necessary, not
sensuality. Or better still we may reply that a man is terri-
for the fulfilment of a precept, but for the perfection of a
fied with his whole heart when fear banishes his courage
counsel. Such like fear is not a mortal sin, but is some-
beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it
times venial: and sometimes it is not a sin, for instance
may happen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terri-
when one has a reasonable cause for fear.
Whether fear excuses from sin?
IIa IIae q. 125 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that fear does not excuse from
through fear a man were to avoid evils which according to
sin. For fear is a sin, as stated above (a. 1). But sin does
reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which ac-
not excuse from sin, rather does it aggravate it. Therefore
cording to reason are more to be avoided, he could not be
fear does not excuse from sin.
wholly excused from sin, because such like fear would be
Objection 2. Further, if any fear excuses from sin,
inordinate. Now the evils of the soul are more to be feared
most of all would this be true of the fear of death, to
than the evils of the body. and evils of the body more than
which, as the saying is, a courageous man is subject. Yet
evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to incur
this fear, seemingly, is no excuse, because, since death
evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the
comes, of necessity, to all, it does not seem to be an ob-
body, such as blows or death, or evils of external things,
ject of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.
such as loss of money; or if one were to endure evils of
Objection 3. Further, all fear is of evil, either tempo-
the body in order to avoid loss of money, one would not
ral or spiritual. Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse
be wholly excused from sin. Yet one’s sin would be ex-
sin, because instead of inducing one to sin, it withdraws
tenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear is less
one from sin: and fear of temporal evil does not excuse
voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is un-
from sin, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
der a certain necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the
6), “one should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor any-
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) says that these things that are
thing that is not a result of one’s own wickedness.” There-
done through fear are not simply voluntary, but a mixture
fore it seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin.
of voluntary and involuntary.
On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (I, q. 1, Reply to Objection 1. Fear excuses, not in the point
Cap. Constat.): “A man who has been forcibly and un-
of its sinfulness, but in the point of its involuntariness.
willingly ordained by heretics, has an ostensible excuse.”
Reply to Objection 2. Although death comes, of ne-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), fear is sinful
cessity, to all, yet the shortening of temporal life is an evil in so far as it runs counter to the order of reason. Now
and consequently an object of fear.
reason judges certain evils to be shunned rather than oth-
Reply to Objection 3. According to the opinion of
ers. Wherefore it is no sin not to shun what is less to be
Stoics, who held temporal goods not to be man’s goods, it
shunned in order to avoid what reason judges to be more
follows in consequence that temporal evils are not man’s
avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than
evils, and that therefore they are nowise to be feared. But
the loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be ex-
according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these temporal
cused from sin if through fear of death he were to promise
things are goods of the least account, and this was also the
or give something to a robber, and yet he would be guilty
opinion of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are in-
of sin were he to give to sinners, rather than to the good to
deed to be feared; but not so much that one ought for their
whom he should give in preference. On the other hand, if
sake to renounce that which is good according to virtue.
1773
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 126
Of Fearlessness
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless?
(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
Whether fearlessness is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 126 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that fearlessness is not a sin.
desire to free from present stress. Hence it may happen
For that which is reckoned to the praise of a just man is
that a man fears death and other temporal evils less than
not a sin. Now it is written in praise of the just man (Prov.
he ought, for the reason that he loves them∗ less than he
28:1): “The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread.”
ought. But that he fear none of these things cannot result
Therefore it is not a sin to be without fear.
from an entire lack of love, but only from the fact that he
Objection 2. Further, nothing is so fearful as death,
thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted by the evils con-
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought
trary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the result of
not to fear even death, according to Mat. 10:28, “Fear ye
pride of soul presuming on self and despising others, ac-
not them that kill the body,” etc., nor anything that can be
cording to the saying of Job 41:24,25: “He [Vulg.: ‘who’]
inflicted by man, according to Is. 51:12, “Who art thou,
was made to fear no one, he beholdeth every high thing”:
that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man?” Therefore
and sometimes it happens through a defect in the reason;
it is not a sin to be fearless.
thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that the “Celts,
Objection 3. Further, fear is born of love, as stated
through lack of intelligence, fear nothing.Ӡ It is therefore
above (q. 125, a. 2). Now it belongs to the perfection of
evident that fearlessness is a vice, whether it result from
virtue to love nothing earthly, since according to Augus-
lack of love, pride of soul, or dullness of understanding:
tine (De Civ. Dei xiv), “the love of God to the abasement
yet the latter is excused from sin if it be invincible.
of self makes us citizens of the heavenly city.” Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. The just man is praised for be-
it is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing earthly.
ing without fear that withdraws him from good; not that
On the contrary, It is said of the unjust judge (Lk.
he is altogether fearless, for it is written (Ecclus. 1:28):
18:2) that “he feared not God nor regarded man.”
“He that is without fear cannot be justified.”
I answer that, Since fear is born of love, we must
Reply to Objection 2. Death and whatever else can be
seemingly judge alike of love and fear. Now it is here a
inflicted by mortal man are not to be feared so that they
question of that fear whereby one dreads temporal evils,
make us forsake justice: but they are to be feared as hin-
and which results from the love of temporal goods. And
dering man in acts of virtue, either as regards himself, or
every man has it instilled in him by nature to love his
as regards the progress he may cause in others. Hence it is
own life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so
written (Prov. 14:16): “A wise man feareth and declineth
in due measure, that is, to love these things not as plac-
from evil.”
ing his end therein, but as things to be used for the sake
Reply to Objection 3. Temporal goods are to be de-
of his last end. Hence it is contrary to the natural incli-
spised as hindering us from loving and serving God, and
nation, and therefore a sin, to fall short of loving them
on the same score they are not to be feared; wherefore it
in due measure. Nevertheless, one never lapses entirely
is written (Ecclus. 34:16): “He that feareth the Lord shall
from this love: since what is natural cannot be wholly lost:
tremble at nothing.” But temporal goods are not to be de-
for which reason the Apostle says (Eph. 5:29): “No man
spised, in so far as they are helping us instrumentally to
ever hated his own flesh.” Wherefore even those that slay
attain those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.
themselves do so from love of their own flesh, which they
∗ Viz. the contrary goods. One would expect ‘se’ instead of ‘ea.’ We should then read: For the reason that he loves himself less than he ought.
† “A man would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there were nothing that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea, as is said to be the case with the Celts.”
1774
Whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude?
IIa IIae q. 126 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that fearlessness is not opposed
about which it is concerned. Hence it belongs to forti-
to fortitude. For we judge of habits by their acts. Now
tude that man should moderate his fear according to rea-
no act of fortitude is hindered by a man being fearless:
son, namely that he should fear what he ought, and when
since if fear be removed, one is both brave to endure, and
he ought, and so forth. Now this mode of reason may be
daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is not opposed to
corrupted either by excess or by deficiency. Wherefore
fortitude.
just as timidity is opposed to fortitude by excess of fear,
Objection 2. Further, fearlessness is a vice, either
in so far as a man fears what he ought not, and as he ought
through lack of due love, or on account of pride, or by
not, so too fearlessness is opposed thereto by deficiency
reason of folly. Now lack of due love is opposed to char-
of fear, in so far as a man fears not what he ought to fear.
ity, pride is contrary to humility, and folly to prudence or
Reply to Objection 1. The act of fortitude is to en-
wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not opposed
dure death without fear, and to be aggressive, not anyhow,
to fortitude.
but according to reason: this the fearless man does not do.
Objection 3. Further, vices are opposed to virtue and
Reply to Objection 2. Fearlessness by its specific na-
extremes to the mean. But one mean has only one extreme
ture corrupts the mean of fortitude, wherefore it is op-
on the one side. Since then fortitude has fear opposed to
posed to fortitude directly. But in respect of its causes
it on the one side and daring on the other, it seems that
nothing hinders it from being opposed to other virtues.
fearlessness is not opposed thereto.
Reply to Objection 3. The vice of daring is opposed
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii) reckons
to fortitude by excess of daring, and fearlessness by defi-
fearlessness to be opposed to fortitude.
ciency of fear. Fortitude imposes the mean on each pas-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 123, a. 3), for-
sion. Hence there is nothing unreasonable in its having
titude is concerned about fear and daring. Now every
different extremes in different respects.
moral virtue observes the rational mean in the matter
1775
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 127
Of Daring∗
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider daring; and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether daring is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
Whether daring is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 127 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that daring is not a sin. For
account the passion is sinful. Again, the names of the pas-
it is written (Job 39:21) concerning the horse, by which
sions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess, thus
according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi) the godly preacher is
we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger,
denoted, that “he goeth forth boldly to meet armed men†.”
in which case it is sinful, and in the same way daring as
But no vice redounds to a man’s praise. Therefore it is not
implying excess is accounted a sin.
a sin to be daring.
Reply to Objection 1. The daring spoken of there is
Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher
that which is moderated by reason, for in that sense it be-
(Ethic. vi, 9), “one should take counsel in thought, and
longs to the virtue of fortitude.
do quickly what has been counseled.” But daring helps
Reply to Objection 2. It is praiseworthy to act quickly
this quickness in doing. Therefore daring is not sinful but
after taking counsel, which is an act of reason. But to
praiseworthy.
wish to act quickly before taking counsel is not praise-
Objection 3. Further, daring is a passion caused by
worthy but sinful; for this would be to act rashly, which is
hope, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 45, a. 2) when we were
a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above (q. 58, a. 3).
treating of the passions. But hope is accounted not a sin
Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is so far
but a virtue. Neither therefore should daring be accounted
praiseworthy as it is directed by reason.
a sin.
Reply to Objection 3.
Some vices are unnamed,
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 8:18): “Go not
and so also are some virtues, as the Philosopher remarks
on the way with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his
(Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 4,5,6). Hence the names of certain pas-
evils.” Now no man’s fellowship is to be avoided save on
sions have to be applied to certain vices and virtues: and in
account of sin. Therefore daring is a sin.
order to designate vices we employ especially the names
I answer that, Daring, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 23, of those passions the object of which is an evil, as in the
a. 1; q. 55), is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes
case of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and love
moderated according to reason, and sometimes it lacks
have a good for this object, and so we use them rather to
moderation, either by excess or by deficiency, and on this
designate virtues.
Whether daring is opposed to fortitude?
IIa IIae q. 127 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that daring is not opposed to
Objection 3. Further, fortitude is concerned about
fortitude. For excess of daring seems to result from pre-
fear and daring, as stated above (q. 123, a. 3). Now since
sumption of mind.
But presumption pertains to pride
timidity is opposed to fortitude in respect of an excess of
which is opposed to humility. Therefore daring is opposed
fear, there is another vice opposed to timidity in respect of
to humility rather than to fortitude.
a lack of fear. If then, daring is opposed to fortitude, in the Objection 2. Further, daring does not seem to call for
point of excessive daring, there will likewise be a vice op-
blame, except in so far as it results in harm either to the
posed to it in the point of deficient daring. But there is no
daring person who puts himself in danger inordinately, or
such vice. Therefore neither should daring be accounted
to others whom he attacks with daring, or exposes to dan-
a vice in opposition to fortitude.
ger. But this seemingly pertains to injustice. Therefore
On the contrary, The Philosopher in both the Second
daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to fortitude
and Third Books of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed
but to justice.
to fortitude.
∗ Excessive Daring or Foolhardiness † Vulg.: ‘he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth to meet armed men’
1776
I answer that, As stated above (q. 126, a. 2), it be-Reply to Objection 2. Just as the direct opposition
longs to a moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the
of a vice does not depend on its cause, so neither does it
matter about which it is concerned. Wherefore every vice
depend on its effect. Now the harm done by daring is its
that denotes lack of moderation in the matter of a moral
effect. Wherefore neither does the opposition of daring
virtue is opposed to that virtue, as immoderate to mod-
depend on this.
erate. Now daring, in so far as it denotes a vice, implies
Reply to Objection 3. The movement of daring con-
excess of passion, and this excess goes by the name of dar-
sists in a man taking the offensive against that which is
ing. Wherefore it is evident that it is opposed to the virtue
in opposition to him: and nature inclines him to do this
of fortitude which is concerned about fear and daring, as
except in so far as such inclination is hindered by the fear
stated above (q. 122, a. 3).
of receiving harm from that source. Hence the vice which
Reply to Objection 1. Opposition between vice and
exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only
virtue does not depend chiefly on the cause of the vice but
timidity. Yet daring does not always accompany so great
on the vice’s very species. Wherefore it is not necessary
a lack of timidity, for as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
that daring be opposed to the same virtue as presumption
7), “the daring are precipitate and eager to meet danger,
which is its cause.
yet fail when the danger is present,” namely through fear.
1777
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 128
Of the Parts of Fortitude
(In One Article)
We must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we shall consider what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall treat of each part.
Whether the parts of fortitude are suitably assigned?
IIa IIae q. 128 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that the parts of fortitude are
to overcome; the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man
unsuitably assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii)
act bravely through being unaccustomed to danger. Now
assigns four parts to fortitude, namely “magnificence,”
these kinds of fortitude are not comprised under any of the
“confidence,” “patience,” and “perseverance.” Now mag-
above enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the
nificence seems to pertain to liberality; since both are con-
parts of fortitude are unfitting.
cerned about money, and “a magnificent man must needs
I answer that, As stated above (q. 48), a virtue can
be liberal,” as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But
have three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and poten-
liberality is a part of justice, as stated above (q. 117, a. 5).
tial. But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot have
Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of
subjective parts, since it is not divided into several specif-
fortitude.
ically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special matter.
Objection 2. Further, confidence is apparently the
However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts
same as hope. But hope does not seem to pertain to forti-
assigned to it: integral parts, with regard to those things
tude, but is rather a virtue by itself. Therefore confidence
the concurrence of which is requisite for an act of forti-
should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
tude; and potential parts, because what fortitude practices
Objection 3. Further, fortitude makes a man behave
in face of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of death,
aright in face of danger. But magnificence and confidence
certain other virtues practice in the matter of certain mi-
do not essentially imply any relation to danger. Therefore
nor hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude
they are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude.
as secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated
Objection 4. Further, according to Tully (De Invent.
above (q. 123, Aa. 3,6), the act of fortitude is twofold,
Rhet. ii) patience denotes endurance of hardships, and he
aggression and endurance. Now two things are required
ascribes the same to fortitude. Therefore patience is the
for the act of aggression. The first regards preparation of
same as fortitude and not a part thereof.
the mind, and consists in one’s having a mind ready for
Objection 5. Further, that which is a requisite to ev-
aggression. In this respect Tully mentions “confidence,”
ery virtue should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue.
of which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “with this
But perseverance is required in every virtue: for it is writ-
the mind is much assured and firmly hopeful in great and
ten (Mat. 24:13): “He that shall persevere to the end he
honorable undertakings.” The second regards the accom-
shall be saved.” Therefore perseverance should not be ac-
plishment of the deed, and consists in not failing to ac-
counted a part of fortitude.
complish what one has confidently begun. In this respect
Objection 6. Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i)
Tully mentions “magnificence,” which he describes as be-
reckons seven parts of fortitude, namely “magnanimity,
ing “the discussion and administration,” i.e. accomplish-
confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, forbear-
ment “of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad
ance, stability.” Andronicus also reckons seven virtues
and noble purpose of mind,” so as to combine execution
annexed to fortitude, and these are, “courage, strength
with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be
of will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnifi-
confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dan-
cence.” Therefore it seems that Tully’s reckoning of the
gers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, be-
parts of fortitude is incomplete.
cause without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if
Objection 7. Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons
they be referred to other matters involving less hardship,
five parts of fortitude. The first is “civic” fortitude, which
they will be virtues specifically distinct from fortitude, but
produces brave deeds through fear of dishonor or punish-
annexed thereto as secondary virtues to principal: thus
ment; the second is “military” fortitude, which produces
“magnificence” is referred by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv)
brave deeds as a result of warlike art or experience; the
to great expenses, and “magnanimity,” which seems to be
third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds resulting
the same as confidence, to great honors. Again, two things
from passion, especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude
are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance.
which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed
The first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall
1778
away from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threat-appetite stretching forth to great things by desire, and this
ening evil. In this respect he mentions “patience,” which
belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated above ( Ia
he describes as “the voluntary and prolonged endurance
IIae, q. 40, a. 2) that hope presupposes love and desire of
of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or
the thing hoped for.
profit.” The other is that by the prolonged suffering of
A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the
hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage, ac-
certitude of hope; while magnanimity refers to the mag-
cording to Heb. 12:3, “That you be not wearied, fainting
nitude of the thing hoped for. Now hope has no firm-
in your minds.” In this respect he mentions “persever-
ness unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes one,
ance,” which accordingly he describes as “the fixed and
for one’s own part, would hope for something, but hope
continued persistence in a well considered purpose.” If
is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear
these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude,
is somewhat contrary to hope, as stated above, ( Ia IIae,
they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be re-
q. 40, a. 4, ad 1). Hence Macrobius adds security, which
ferred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct
banishes fear. He adds a third, namely constancy, which
from fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to prin-
may be comprised under magnificence. For in performing
cipal.
deeds of magnificence one needs to have a constant mind.
Reply to Objection 1. Magnificence in the matter of
For this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not
liberality adds a certain greatness: this is connected with
only in accomplishing great things, but also in discussing
the notion of difficulty which is the object of the irascible
them generously in the mind. Constancy may also per-
faculty, that is perfected chiefly by fortitude: and to this
tain to perseverance, so that one may be called persevering
virtue, in this respect, it belongs.
through not desisting on account of delays, and constant
Reply to Objection 2. Hope whereby one confides
through not desisting on account of any other obstacles.
in God is accounted a theological virtue, as stated above
Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to
(q. 17, a. 5; Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 3). But by confidence which
amount to the same as the above. For with Tully and Mac-
here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in him-
robius he mentions “perseverance” and “magnificence,”
self, yet under God withal.
and with Macrobius, “magnanimity.” “Strength of will”
Reply to Objection 3. To venture on anything great
is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that
seems to involve danger, since to fail in such things is very
“strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to at-
disastrous. Wherefore although magnificence and confi-
tempt what ought to be attempted, and to endure what rea-
dence are referred to the accomplishment of or venturing
son says should be endured”—i.e. good courage seems to
on any other great things, they have a certain connection
be the same as assurance, for he defines it as “strength
with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger.
of soul in the accomplishment of its purpose.” Manli-
Reply to Objection 4. Patience endures not only dan-
ness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says
gers of death, with which fortitude is concerned, without
that “manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of
excessive sorrow, but also any other hardships or dangers.
virtue.” Besides magnificence he mentions andragathia,
In this respect it is accounted a virtue annexed to forti-
i.e. manly goodness which we may render “strenuous-
tude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an integral
ness.” For magnificence consists not only in being con-
part thereof.
stant in the accomplishment of great deeds, which be-
Reply to Objection 5. Perseverance as denoting per-
longs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly
sistence in a good deed unto the end, may be a circum-
prudence and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this
stance of every virtue, but it is reckoned a part of fortitude
belongs to andragathia, strenuousness: wherefore he says in the sense stated in the body of the Article.
that andragathia is the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks Reply to Objection 6. Macrobius reckons the four
out profitable works.
aforesaid mentioned by Tully, namely “confidence, mag-
Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be
nificence, forbearance,” which he puts in the place of pa-
reduced to the four principal parts mentioned by Tully.
tience, and “firmness,” which he substitutes for persever-
Reply to Objection 7. The five mentioned by Aristo-
ance. And he adds three, two of which, namely “magna-
tle fall short of the true notion of virtue, for though they
nimity” and “security,” are comprised by Tully under the
concur in the act of fortitude, they differ as to motive, as
head of confidence. But Macrobius is more specific in his
stated above (q. 123, a. 1, ad 2); wherefore they are not
enumeration. Because confidence denotes a man’s hope
reckoned parts but modes of fortitude.
for great things: and hope for anything presupposes an
1779
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 129
Of Magnanimity∗
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including, however, the other parts under those mentioned by Tully, with the exception of confidence, for which we shall substitute magnanimity, of which Aristotle treats.
Accordingly we shall consider (1) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence; (3) Patience; (4) Perseverance. As regards the first we shall treat (1) of magnanimity; (2) of its contrary vices. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether magnanimity is about honors?
(2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honors?
(3) Whether it is a virtue?
(4) Whether it is a special virtue?
(5) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
(6) Of its relation to confidence;
(7) Of its relation to assurance;
(8) Of its relation to goods of fortune.
Whether magnanimity is about honors?
IIa IIae q. 129 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not about
two ways: in one way proportionately, in another abso-
honors. For magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as
lutely. An act may be called great proportionately, even
its very name shows, since “magnanimity” signifies great-
if it consist in the use of some small or ordinary thing, if,
ness of mind, and “mind” denotes the irascible part, as ap-
for instance, one make a very good use of it: but an act
pears from De Anima iii, 42, where the Philosopher says
is simply and absolutely great when it consists in the best
that “in the sensitive appetite are desire and mind,” i.e.
use of the greatest thing.
the concupiscible and irascible parts. But honor is a con-
The things which come into man’s use are external
cupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore
things, and among these honor is the greatest simply, both
it seems that magnanimity is not about honors.
because it is the most akin to virtue, since it is an attesta-
Objection 2. Further, since magnanimity is a moral
tion to a person’s virtue, as stated above (q. 103, Aa. 1,2);
virtue, it must needs be about either passions or opera-
and because it is offered to God and to the best; and again
tions. Now it is not about operations, for then it would
because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid shame,
be a part of justice: whence it follows that it is about pas-
men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be
sions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore magnanimity
magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely
is not about honors.
and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of
Objection 3.
Further, the nature of magnanimity
things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore that
seems to regard pursuit rather than avoidance, for a man is
magnanimity is about honors.
said to be magnanimous because he tends to great things.
Reply to Objection 1. Good and evil absolutely con-
But the virtuous are praised not for desiring honors, but
sidered regard the concupiscible faculty, but in so far as
for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about
the aspect of difficult is added, they belong to the irasci-
honors.
ble. Thus it is that magnanimity regards honor, inasmuch,
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3)
to wit, as honor has the aspect of something great or diffi-
that “magnanimity is about honor and dishonor.”
cult.
I answer that, Magnanimity by its very name denotes
Reply to Objection 2. Although honor is neither a
stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue
passion nor an operation, yet it is the object of a passion,
bears a relationship to two things, first to the matter about
namely hope, which tends to a difficult good. Wherefore
which is the field of its activity, secondly to its proper act, magnanimity is immediately about the passions of hope,
which consists in the right use of such matter. And since
and mediately about honor as the object of hope: even so,
a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man
we have stated (q. 123, Aa. 4,5) with regard to fortitude
is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded
that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the
to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in
object of fear and daring.
∗ Not in the Ordinary Restricted Sense but As Explained by the Author 1780
Reply to Objection 3. Those are worthy of praise who ing of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors
despise riches in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming
in the sense that a man strives to do what is deserving of
in order to obtain them, nor have too great a desire for
honor, yet not so as to think much of the honor accorded
them. If, however, one were to despise honors so as not to
by man.
care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserv-
Whether magnanimity is essentially about great honors?
IIa IIae q. 129 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not essen-
appetite, which is the seat of the passions, is naturally sub-
tially about great honors. For the proper matter of mag-
ject to reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about
nanimity is honor, as stated above (a. 1). But great and
these passions regard only that which is great in such pas-
little are accidental to honor. Therefore it is not essential
sions: thus fortitude is about very great fear and daring;
to magnanimity to be about great honors.
temperance about the concupiscence of the greatest plea-
Objection 2. Further, just as magnanimity is about
sures, and likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On
honor, so is meekness about anger. But it is not essential
the other hand, some passions have great power of resis-
to meekness to be about either great or little anger. There-
tance to reason arising from the external things themselves
fore neither is it essential to magnanimity to be about great
that are the objects of those passions: such are the love or
honor.
desire of money or of honor. And for these it is necessary
Objection 3. Further, small honor is less aloof from
to have a virtue not only regarding that which is greatest
great honor than is dishonor. But magnanimity is well or-
in those passions, but also about that which is ordinary or
dered in relation to dishonor, and consequently in relation
little: because things external, though they be little, are
to small honors also. Therefore it is not only about great
very desirable, as being necessary for human life. Hence
honors.
with regard to the desire of money there are two virtues,
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7)
one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely lib-
that magnanimity is about great honors.
erality, and another about large sums of money, namely
I answer that According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii,
“magnificence.”
17, 18), virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to un-
In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one
derstand the perfection of a power, and that it regards the
about ordinary honors. This virtue has no name, but is
extreme limit of that power, as stated in De Coelo i, 116.
denominated by its extremes, which are philotimia, i.e.
Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in every
love of honor, and aphilotimia, i.e. without love of honor: operation of that power, but in such operations as are great
for sometimes a man is commended for loving honor, and
or difficult: for every power, however imperfect, can ex-
sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both
tend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it is essen-
these things may be done in moderation. But with regard
tial to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as
to great honors there is “magnanimity.” Wherefore we
stated in Ethic. ii, 3.
must conclude that the proper matter of magnanimity is
Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the
great honor, and that a magnanimous man tends to such
same) in an act of virtue may be considered from two
things as are deserving of honor.
points of view. First, from the point of view of reason,
Reply to Objection 1. Great and little are accidental
in so far as it is difficult to find and establish the ratio-
to honor considered in itself: but they make a great dif-
nal means in some particular matter: and this difficulty is
ference in their relation to reason, the mode of which has
found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also of
to be observed in the use of honor, for it is much more
justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter,
difficult to observe it in great than in little honors.
which may involve a certain opposition to the moderation
Reply to Objection 2. In anger and other matters only
of reason, which moderation has to be applied thereto:
that which is greatest presents any notable difficulty, and
and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral virtues,
about this alone is there any need of a virtue. It is different which are about the passions, because the passions resist
with riches and honors which are things existing outside
reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4).
the soul.
Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that
Reply to Objection 3. He that makes good use of
the greatness of this power of resistance to reason arises
great things is much more able to make good use of little
chiefly in some cases from the passions themselves, and
things. Accordingly the magnanimous man looks upon
in others from the things that are the objects of the pas-
great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even
sions. The passions themselves have no great power of
little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit,
resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive
man cannot sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be
1781
honored by God. Hence he is not uplifted by great honors, tle. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonor, but
because he does not deem them above him; rather does he
despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve
despise them, and much more such as are ordinary or lit-
it.
Whether magnanimity is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 129 a. 3
Objection 1.
It seems that magnanimity is not a
Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher again says
virtue. For every moral virtue observes the mean. But
(Ethic. iv, 3), “the magnanimous in point of quantity goes
magnanimity observes not the mean but the greater ex-
to extremes,” in so far as he tends to what is greatest,
treme: because the “magnanimous man deems himself
“but in the matter of becomingness, he follows the mean,”
worthy of the greatest things” (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore
because he tends to the greatest things according to rea-
magnanimity is not a virtue.
son, for “he deems himself worthy in accordance with his
Objection 2. Further, he that has one virtue has them
worth” (Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpass his
all, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1). But one may have
deserts.
a virtue without having magnanimity: since the Philoso-
Reply to Objection 2.
The mutual connection of
pher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that “whosoever is worthy of little
the virtues does not apply to their acts, as though every
things and deems himself worthy of them, is temperate,
one were competent to practice the acts of all the virtues.
but he is not magnanimous.” Therefore magnanimity is
Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming to ev-
not a virtue.
ery virtuous man, but only to great men. on the other hand,
Objection 3. Further, “Virtue is a good quality of the
as regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and
mind,” as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 4). But mag-
grace, all virtues are connected together, since their habits
nanimity implies certain dispositions of the body: for the
reside together in the soul, either in act or by way of a
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of “a magnanimous man
proximate disposition thereto. Thus it is possible for one
that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his utterance
to whom the act of magnanimity is not competent, to have
calm.” Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed to prac-
Objection 4. Further, no virtue is opposed to another
tice that act if it were competent to him according to his
virtue. But magnanimity is opposed to humility, since
state.
“the magnanimous deems himself worthy of great things,
Reply to Objection 3. The movements of the body
and despises others,” according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore
are differentiated according to the different apprehensions
magnanimity is not a virtue.
and emotions of the soul. And so it happens that to mag-
Objection 5. Further, the properties of every virtue
nanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by way of
are praiseworthy. But magnanimity has certain properties
bodily movements. For quickness of movement results
that call for blame. For, in the first place, the magnani-
from a man being intent on many things which he is in
mous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is remiss and
a hurry to accomplish, whereas the magnanimous is in-
slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony∗ towards many;
tent only on great things; these are few and require great
fourthly, he is unable to associate with others; fifthly, be-
attention, wherefore they call for slow movement. Like-
cause he holds to the barren things rather than to those that
wise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to
are fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
those who are quick to quarrel about anything, and this
On the contrary, It is written in praise of certain men
becomes not the magnanimous who are busy only about
(2 Macc. 15:18): “Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas’
great things.
And just as these dispositions of bodily
companions, and the greatness of courage [animi magni-
movements are competent to the magnanimous man ac-
tudinem] with which they fought for their country, was
cording to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who
afraid to try the matter by the sword.” Now, only deeds of
are naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions
virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity which
are found naturally.
consists in greatness of courage is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 4. There is in man something
I answer that, The essence of human virtue con-
great which he possesses through the gift of God; and
sists in safeguarding the good of reason in human affairs,
something defective which accrues to him through the
for this is man’s proper good. Now among external hu-
weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a
man things honors take precedence of all others, as stated
man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration
above (a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 11, a. 2, obj. 3). Therefore magna-
of the gifts he holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed
nimity, which observes the mode of reason in great hon-
with great virtue, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect
ors, is a virtue.
works of virtue; and the same is to be said of the use of
∗ Cf. q. 113
1782
any other good, such as science or external fortune. On the to excel, even as in the acts of other virtues. Again, in
other hand, humility makes a man think little of himself
the second place, it is said that he is remiss and slow of
in consideration of his own deficiency, and magnanimity
action, not that he is lacking in doing what becomes him,
makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from
but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of
God’s gifts: since he does not think so much of others as to
works, but only with great works, such as are becoming
do anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us
to him. He is also said, in the third place, to employ irony,
honor others and esteem them better than ourselves, in so
not as opposed to truth, and so as either to say of him-
far as we see some of God’s gifts in them. Hence it is writ-
self vile things that are not true, or deny of himself great
ten of the just man (Ps. 14:4): “In his sight a vile person
things that are true, but because he does not disclose all his
is contemned†,” which indicates the contempt of magna-
greatness, especially to the large number of those who are
nimity, “but he honoreth them that fear the Lord,” which
beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore
3), “it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards
evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to
persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards
one another, although they seem to tend in contrary direc-
the middle class.” In the fourth place, it is said that he
tions, because they proceed according to different consid-
cannot associate with others: this means that he is not at
erations.
home with others than his friends: because he altogether
Reply to Objection 5. These properties in so far as
shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to littleness of
they belong to a magnanimous man call not for blame,
mind. But he associates with all, both great and little, ac-
but for very great praise. For in the first place, when it is
cording as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also said,
said that the magnanimous is not mindful of those from
fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed
whom he has received favors, this points to the fact that
any, but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the
he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others un-
virtuous to the useful, as being greater: since the useful
less he repay them with yet greater favor; this belongs to
is sought in order to supply a defect which is inconsistent
the perfection of gratitude, in the act of which he wishes
with magnanimity.
Whether magnanimity is a special virtue?
IIa IIae q. 129 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a spe-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 123, a. 2), it be-
cial virtue. For no special virtue is operative in every
longs to a special virtue to establish the mode of reason in
virtue. But the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 3) that “what-
a determinate matter. Now magnanimity establishes the
ever is great in each virtue belongs to the magnanimous.”
mode of reason in a determinate matter, namely honors,
Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.
as stated above (Aa. 1,2): and honor, considered in itself,
Objection 2. Further, the acts of different virtues are
is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity consid-
not ascribed to any special virtue. But the acts of differ-
ered in itself is a special virtue.
ent virtues are ascribed to the magnanimous man. For it
Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as
is stated in Ethic. iv, 3 that “it belongs to the magnani-
stated above (q. 103, a. 1, ad 2), it follows that by reason
mous not to avoid reproof” (which is an act of prudence),
of its matter it regards all the virtues.
“nor to act unjustly” (which is an act of justice), “that he
Reply to Objection 1. Magnanimity is not about any
is ready to do favors” (which is an act of charity), “that he
kind of honor, but great honor. Now, as honor is due to
gives his services readily” (which is an act of liberality),
virtue, so great honor is due to a great deed of virtue.
that “he is truthful” (which is an act of truthfulness), and
Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great
that “he is not given to complaining” (which is an act of
deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to what
patience). Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.
is worthy of great honors.
Objection 3. Further, every virtue is a special orna-
Reply to Objection 2. Since the magnanimous tends
ment of the soul, according to the saying of Is. 61:10,
to great things, it follows that he tends chiefly to things
“He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation,” and
that involve a certain excellence, and shuns those that im-
afterwards he adds, “and as a bride adorned with her jew-
ply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a man is
els.” But magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues,
beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows
as stated in Ethic. iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general
himself ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as
virtue.
acts of the other virtues. on the other hand, it is a proof of
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) dis-
defect, that a man thinks so much of certain external goods
tinguishes it from the other virtues.
or evils, that for their sake he abandons and gives up jus-
† Douay: ‘The malignant is brought to nothing, but he glorifieth,’ etc.
1783
tice or any virtue whatever. Again, all concealment of the they are contrary to his excellence or greatness.
truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be the outcome
Reply to Objection 3. Every virtue derives from its
of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes a
species a certain luster or adornment which is proper to
defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to
each virtue: but further adornment results from the very
external evils. Wherefore these and like things the mag-
greatness of a virtuous deed, through magnanimity which
nanimous man avoids under a special aspect, inasmuch as
makes all virtues greater as stated in Ethic. iv, 3.
Whether magnanimity is a part of fortitude?
IIa IIae q. 129 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a part
because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal.
of fortitude. For a thing is not a part of itself. But mag-
Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
nanimity appears to be the same as fortitude. For Seneca
v, 1,3), “to lack evil is looked upon as a good,” wherefore
says (De Quat. Virtut.): “If magnanimity, which is also
not to be overcome by a grievous evil, such as the danger
called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou shalt live in great as-
of death, is looked upon as though it were the obtaining
surance”: and Tully says (De Offic. i): “If a man is brave
of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and the
we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far
latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magna-
removed from deception.” Therefore magnanimity is not
nimity may be considered as identical. Since, however,
a part of fortitude.
there is a difference as regards the difficulty on the part of
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3)
either of the aforesaid, it follows that properly speaking
says that a magnanimous man is not philokindynos, that is, magnanimity, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7),
a lover of danger. But it belongs to a brave man to expose
is a distinct virtue from fortitude.
himself to danger. Therefore magnanimity has nothing in
Reply to Objection 2. A man is said to love danger
common with fortitude so as to be called a part thereof.
when he exposes himself to all kinds of dangers, which
Objection 3. Further, magnanimity regards the great
seems to be the mark of one who thinks “many” the same
in things to be hoped for, whereas fortitude regards the
as “great.” This is contrary to the nature of a magnani-
great in things to be feared or dared. But good is of more
mous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to dan-
import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is a more impor-
ger for the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But
tant virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part thereof.
for things that are truly great, a magnanimous man is most
On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and
ready to expose himself to danger, since he does some-
Andronicus reckon magnanimity as a part of fortitude.
thing great in the act of fortitude, even as in the acts of the I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 61, a. 3),
other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7)
a principal virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a
that the magnanimous man is not mikrokindynos, i.e. en-
general mode of virtue in a principal matter. Now one of
dangering himself for small things, but megalokindynos, the general modes of virtue is firmness of mind, because
i.e. endangering himself for great things. And Seneca
“a firm standing is necessary in every virtue,” according to
says (De Quat. Virtut.): “Thou wilt be magnanimous if
Ethic. ii. And this is chiefly commended in those virtues
thou neither seekest dangers like a rash man, nor fearest
that tend to something difficult, in which it is most dif-
them like a coward. For nothing makes the soul a coward
ficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult
save the consciousness of a wicked life.”
it is to stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more
Reply to Objection 3. Evil as such is to be avoided:
principal is the virtue which makes the mind firm in that
and that one has to withstand it is accidental; in so far,
matter.
to wit, as one has to suffer an evil in order to safeguard
Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of
a good. But good as such is to be desired, and that one
death, wherein fortitude confirms the mind, than in hop-
avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to wit, as it is deemed ing for or obtaining the greatest goods, wherein the mind
to surpass the ability of the one who desires it. Now that
is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as man loves his life
which is so essentially is always of more account than
above all things, so does he fly from dangers of death more
that which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in
than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity
evil things is always more opposed to firmness of mind
agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some
than the difficult in good things. Hence the virtue of for-
difficult matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it con-
titude takes precedence of the virtue of magnanimity. For
firms the mind about a matter wherein it is easier to stand
though good is simply of more import than evil, evil is of
firm. Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude,
more import in this particular respect.
1784
Whether confidence belongs to magnanimity?
IIa IIae q. 129 a. 6
Objection 1. It seems that confidence does not belong
hope arising from some observation which gives one a
to magnanimity. For a man may have assurance not only
strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good, it fol-
in himself, but also in another, according to 2 Cor. 3:4,5,
lows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.
“Such confidence we have, through Christ towards God,
Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves,
iv, 3), it belongs to the “magnanimous to need nothing,”
as of ourselves.” But this seems inconsistent with the idea
for need is a mark of the deficient. But this is to be under-
of magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to
stood according to the mode of a man, hence he adds “or
magnanimity.
scarcely anything.” For it surpasses man to need nothing
Objection 2. Further, confidence seems to be opposed
at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine assistance,
to fear, according to Is. 12:2, “I will deal confidently and
secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally
will not fear.” But to be without fear seems more akin to
a social animal, for he is sufficient by himself to provide
fortitude. Therefore confidence also belongs to fortitude
for his own life. Accordingly, in so far as he needs others,
rather than to magnanimity.
it belongs to a magnanimous man to have confidence in
Objection 3. Further, reward is not due except to
others, for it is also a point of excellence in a man that he
virtue. But a reward is due to confidence, according to
should have at hand those who are able to be of service to
Heb. 3:6, where it is said that we are the house of Christ,
him. And in so far as his own ability goes, it belongs to a
“if we hold fast the confidence and glory of hope unto the
magnanimous man to be confident in himself.
end.” Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from mag-
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 23,
nanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius
a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 4), when we were treating of the
enumerates it with magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i).
passions, hope is directly opposed to despair, because the
On the contrary, Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to
latter is about the same object, namely good. But as re-
substitute confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in
gards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because
the preceding Question (ad 6) and in the prologue to this.
the latter’s object is evil. Now confidence denotes a cer-
I answer that, Confidence takes its name from “fides”
tain strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even
[faith]: and it belongs to faith to believe something and in
as hope is. Since, however, fortitude properly strengthens
somebody. But confidence belongs to hope, according to
a man in respect of evil, and magnanimity in respect of
Job 11:18, “Thou shalt have confidence, hope being set
the obtaining of good, it follows that confidence belongs
before thee.” Wherefore confidence apparently denotes
more properly to magnanimity than to fortitude. Yet be-
chiefly that a man derives hope through believing the word
cause hope causes daring, which belongs to fortitude, it
of one who promises to help him. Since, however, faith
follows in consequence that confidence pertains to forti-
signifies also a strong opinion, and since one may come
tude.
to have a strong opinion about something, not only on ac-
Reply to Objection 3. Confidence, as stated above,
count of another’s statement, but also on account of some-
denotes a certain mode of hope: for confidence is hope
thing we observe in another, it follows that confidence
strengthened by a strong opinion. Now the mode applied
may denote the hope of having something, which hope we
to an affection may call for commendation of the act, so
conceive through observing something either in oneself—
that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws
for instance, through observing that he is healthy, a man
it to a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly
is confident that he will live long. or in another, for in-
speaking, confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it
stance, through observing that another is friendly to him
may denote the conditions of a virtue. For this reason
and powerful, a man is confident that he will receive help
it is reckoned among the parts of fortitude, not as an an-
from him.
nexed virtue, except as identified with magnanimity by
Now it has been stated above (a. 1, ad 2) that mag-
Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral part, as stated
nanimity is chiefly about the hope of something difficult.
in the preceding Question.
Wherefore, since confidence denotes a certain strength of
Whether security belongs to magnanimity?
IIa IIae q. 129 a. 7
Objection 1. It seems that security does not belong
seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude does not
to magnanimity. For security, as stated above (q. 128, ad
belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. Nei-
6), denotes freedom from the disturbance of fear. But for-
ther therefore does security belong to magnanimity.
titude does this most effectively. Wherefore security is
Objection 2. Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a
1785
man “is said to be secure because he is without care.”
Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear di-
But this seems to be contrary to virtue, which has a care
rectly regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs
for honorable things, according to 2 Tim. 2:15, “Care-
immediately to magnanimity, so security belongs imme-
fully study to present thyself approved unto God.” There-
diately to fortitude.
fore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does
It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause
great things in all the virtues.
of daring, so is fear the cause of despair, as stated above
Objection 3. Further, virtue is not its own reward.
when we were treating of the passion ( Ia IIae, q. 45, a. 2).
But security is accounted the reward of virtue, according
Wherefore as confidence belongs indirectly to fortitude,
to Job 11:14,18, “If thou wilt put away from thee the in-
in so far as it makes use of daring, so security belongs
iquity that is in thy hand. . . being buried thou shalt sleep
indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes despair.
secure.” Therefore security does not belong to magnanim-
Reply to Objection 1.
Fortitude is chiefly com-
ity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.
mended, not because it banishes fear, which belongs to
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the
security, but because it denotes a firmness of mind in the
heading: “Magnanimity consists of two things,” that “it
matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same
belongs to magnanimity to give way neither to a troubled
as fortitude, but is a condition thereof.
mind, nor to man, nor to fortune.” But a man’s security
Reply to Objection 2. Not all security is worthy of
consists in this. Therefore security belongs to magnanim-
praise but only when one puts care aside, as one ought,
ity.
and in things when one should not fear: in this way it is a
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5),
condition of fortitude and of magnanimity.
“fear makes a man take counsel,” because, to wit he takes
Reply to Objection 3. There is in the virtues a cer-
care to avoid what he fears. Now security takes its name
tain likeness to, and participation of, future happiness, as
from the removal of this care, of which fear is the cause:
stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 5, Aa. 3,7). Hence nothing hin-
wherefore security denotes perfect freedom of the mind
ders a certain security from being a condition of a virtue,
from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope.
although perfect security belongs to virtue’s reward.
Whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity?
IIa IIae q. 129 a. 8
Objection 1. It seems that goods of fortune do not
plishment of something great as its end. Now goods of
conduce to magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira
fortune conduce to both these things. For since honor is
i: De vita beata xvi): “virtue suffices for itself.” Now mag-
conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also
nanimity takes every virtue great, as stated above (a. 4, ad
by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the
3). Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce to magna-
highest esteem, the result is that they show greater honor
nimity.
to those who possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of
Objection 2. Further, no virtuous man despises what
fortune are useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds:
is helpful to him. But the magnanimous man despises
since we can easily accomplish things by means of riches,
whatever pertains to goods of fortune: for Tully says (De
power and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of for-
Offic. i) under the heading: “Magnanimity consists of
tune conduce to magnanimity.
two things,” that “a great soul is commended for despis-
Reply to Objection 1. Virtue is said to be sufficient
ing external things.” Therefore a magnanimous man is not
for itself, because it can be without even these external
helped by goods of fortune.
goods; yet it needs them in order to act more expedi-
Objection 3. Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that
tiously.
“it belongs to a great soul so to bear what seems trouble-
Reply to Objection 2. The magnanimous man de-
some, as nowise to depart from his natural estate, or from
spises external goods, inasmuch as he does not think them
the dignity of a wise man.” And Aristotle says (Ethic.
so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming for
iv, 3) that “a magnanimous man does not grieve at mis-
their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he
fortune.” Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to
esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous
goods of fortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what
deeds.
is helpful to him. Therefore external goods of fortune do
Reply to Objection 3. If a man does not think much
not conduce to magnanimity.
of a thing, he is neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3)
very grieved at losing it. Wherefore, since the magnani-
that “good fortune seems to conduce to magnanimity.”
mous man does not think much of external goods, that is
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), magnanimity
goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them if
regards two things: honor as its matter, and the accom-
he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.
1786
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 130
Of Presumption
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the first place, those that are opposed thereto by excess. These are three, namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we shall consider pusillanimity which is opposed to it by way of deficiency. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether presumption is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
Whether presumption is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 130 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that presumption is not a sin.
ity. Hence it is vicious and sinful, as being contrary to the
For the Apostle says: “Forgetting the things that are be-
natural order, that any one should assume to do what is
hind, I stretch forth [Vulg.: ‘and stretching forth’] myself
above his power: and this is what is meant by presump-
to those that are before.” But it seems to savor of pre-
tion, as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident that
sumption that one should tend to what is above oneself.
presumption is a sin.
Therefore presumption is not a sin.
Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders that which
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i,
is above the active power of a natural thing, and yet not
7) “we should not listen to those who would persuade
above the passive power of that same thing: thus the air
us to relish human things because we are men, or mor-
is possessed of a passive power by reason of which it can
tal things because we are mortal, but we should relish
be so changed as to obtain the action and movement of
those that make us immortal”: and (Metaph. i) “that man
fire, which surpass the active power of air. Thus too it
should pursue divine things as far as possible.” Now di-
would be sinful and presumptuous for a man while in a
vine and immortal things are seemingly far above man.
state of imperfect virtue to attempt the immediate accom-
Since then presumption consists essentially in tending to
plishment of what belongs to perfect virtue. But it is not
what is above oneself, it seems that presumption is some-
presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to advance
thing praiseworthy, rather than a sin.
towards perfect virtue. In this way the Apostle stretched
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:5):
himself forth to the things that were before him, namely
“Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves,
continually advancing forward.
as of ourselves.” If then presumption, by which one strives
Reply to Objection 2. Divine and immortal things
at that for which one is not sufficient, be a sin, it seems that surpass man according to the order of nature. Yet man
man cannot lawfully even think of anything good: which
is possessed of a natural power, namely the intellect,
is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin.
whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 37:3): “O
In this respect the Philosopher says that “man ought to
wicked presumption, whence camest thou?” and a gloss
pursue immortal and divine things,” not that he should do
answers: “From a creature’s evil will.” Now all that comes
what it becomes God to do, but that he should be united
of the root of an evil will is a sin. Therefore presumption
to Him in intellect and will.
is a sin.
Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
I answer that, Since whatever is according to nature,
iii, 3), “what we can do by the help of others we can do
is ordered by the Divine Reason, which human reason
by ourselves in a sense.” Hence since we can think and
ought to imitate, whatever is done in accordance with hu-
do good by the help of God, this is not altogether above
man reason in opposition to the order established in gen-
our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous for a man to at-
eral throughout natural things is vicious and sinful. Now
tempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would
it is established throughout all natural things, that every
be presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without
action is commensurate with the power of the agent, nor
confidence in God’s assistance.
does any natural agent strive to do what exceeds its abil-
1787
Whether presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
IIa IIae q. 130 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that presumption is not opposed
charity, or rather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere
to magnanimity by excess. For presumption is accounted
God. Nevertheless, in so far as this contempt exceeds the
a species of the sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above
proportion to one’s own ability, it can be opposed to mag-
(q. 14, a. 2; q. 21, a. 1). But the sin against the Holy Ghost
nanimity.
is not opposed to magnanimity, but to charity. Neither
Reply to Objection 2. Presumption, like magnanim-
therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity.
ity, seems to tend to something great. For we are not, as
Objection 2. Further, it belongs to magnanimity that
a rule, wont to call a man presumptuous for going beyond
one should deem oneself worthy of great things. But a
his powers in something small. If, however, such a man
man is said to be presumptuous even if he deem himself
be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption is not
worthy of small things, if they surpass his ability. There-
opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about
fore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity.
ordinary honor, as stated above (q. 129, a. 2).
Objection 3. Further, the magnanimous man looks
Reply to Objection 3. No one attempts what is above
upon external goods as little things. Now according to the
his ability, except in so far as he deems his ability greater
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), “on account of external fortune
than it is. In this one may err in two ways. First only
the presumptuous disdain and wrong others, because they
as regards quantity, as when a man thinks he has greater
deem external goods as something great.” Therefore pre-
virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has. Secondly,
sumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but
as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself
only by deficiency.
great, and worthy of great things, by reason of something
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7;
that does not make him so, for instance by reason of riches
iv, 3) that the “vain man,” i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag,
or goods of fortune. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
which with us denotes a presumptuous man, “is opposed
iv, 3), “those who have these things without virtue, nei-
to the magnanimous man by excess.”
ther justly deem themselves worthy of great things, nor
I answer that, As stated above (q. 129, a. 3, ad 1),
are rightly called magnanimous.”
magnanimity observes the means, not as regards the quan-
Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in
tity of that to which it tends, but in proportion to our own
excess of his ability, is sometimes in very truth something
ability: for it does not tend to anything greater than is be-
great, simply as in the case of Peter, whose intent was to
coming to us.
suffer for Christ, which has exceeded his power; while
Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which
sometimes it is something great, not simply, but only in
he tends, does not exceed the magnanimous, but some-
the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly clothes, de-
times falls far short of him: but he does exceed in pro-
spising and wronging others. This savors of an excess
portion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous man
of magnanimity, not in any truth, but in people’s opin-
does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is
ion. Hence Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.) that “when
opposed to magnanimity by excess.
magnanimity exceeds its measure, it makes a man high-
Reply to Objection 1. It is not every presumption
handed, proud, haughty restless, and bent on excelling in
that is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, but that
all things, whether in words or in deeds, without any con-
by which one contemns the Divine justice through inor-
siderations of virtue.” Thus it is evident that the presump-
dinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter kind of
tuous man sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in
presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as
reality, although in appearance he surpasses him.
it implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to
1788
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 131
Of Ambition
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider ambition: and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
Whether ambition is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 131 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that ambition is not a sin. For
lence which he has not: this is to desire more than his
ambition denotes the desire of honor. Now honor is in
share of honor. Secondly, when a man desires honor for
itself a good thing, and the greatest of external goods:
himself without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man’s
wherefore those who care not for honor are reproved.
appetite rests in honor itself, without referring it to the
Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it something de-
profit of others. Since then ambition denotes inordinate
serving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably desired.
desire of honor, it is evident that it is always a sin.
Objection 2. Further, anyone may, without sin, desire
Reply to Objection 1. The desire for good should be
what is due to him as a reward. Now honor is the reward
regulated according to reason, and if it exceed this rule it
of virtue, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, will be sinful. In this way it is sinful to desire honor in dis-14). Therefore ambition of honor is not a sin.
accord with the order of reason. Now those are reproved
Objection 3. Further, that which heartens a man to
who care not for honor in accordance with reason’s dictate
do good and disheartens him from doing evil, is not a sin.
that they should avoid what is contrary to honor.
Now honor heartens men to do good and to avoid evil;
Reply to Objection 2. Honor is not the reward of
thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that “with the
virtue, as regards the virtuous man, in this sense that he
bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor, and the brave
should seek for it as his reward: since the reward he seeks
in honor”: and Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that “honor
is happiness, which is the end of virtue. But it is said to
fosters the arts.” Therefore ambition is not a sin.
be the reward of virtue as regards others, who have noth-
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:5) that “char-
ing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous;
ity is not ambitious, seeketh not her own.” Now nothing
which honor derives greatness from the very fact that it
is contrary to charity, except sin. Therefore ambition is a
bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that it is not an
sin.
adequate reward, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 103, Aa. 1,2),
Reply to Objection 3. Just as some are heartened to
honor denotes reverence shown to a person in witness of
do good and disheartened from doing evil, by the desire of
his excellence. Now two things have to be considered with
honor, if this be desired in due measure; so, if it be desired
regard to man’s honor. The first is that a man has not from
inordinately, it may become to man an occasion of doing
himself the thing in which he excels, for this is, as it were,
many evil things, as when a man cares not by what means
something Divine in him, wherefore on this count honor is
he obtains honor. Wherefore Sallust says (Catilin.) that
due principally, not to him but to God. The second point
“the good as well as the wicked covet honors for them-
that calls for observation is that the thing in which man
selves, but the one,” i.e. the good, “go about it in the right
excels is given to him by God, that he may profit others
way,” whereas “the other,” i.e. the wicked, “through lack
thereby: wherefore a man ought so far to be pleased that
of the good arts, make use of deceit and falsehood.” Yet
others bear witness to his excellence, as this enables him
they who, merely for the sake of honor, either do good or
to profit others.
avoid evil, are not virtuous, according to the Philosopher
Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three
(Ethic. iii, 8), where he says that they who do brave things
ways. First, when a man desires recognition of an excel-
for the sake of honor are not truly brave.
1789
Whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
IIa IIae q. 131 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that ambition is not opposed
nanimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered.
to magnanimity by excess. For one mean has only one
Reply to Objection 1.
Magnanimity regards two
extreme opposed to it on the one side. Now presump-
things. It regards one as its end, in so far as it is some great tion is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated above
deed that the magnanimous man attempts in proportion to
(q. 130, a. 2). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by
his ability. In this way presumption is opposed to mag-
excess.
nanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man at-
Objection 2. Further, magnanimity is about honors;
tempts great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that
whereas ambition seems to regard positions of dignity: for
magnanimity regards is its matter, viz. honor, of which it
it is written (2 Macc. 4:7) that “Jason ambitiously sought
makes right use: and in this way ambition is opposed to
the high priesthood.” Therefore ambition is not opposed
magnanimity by excess. Nor is it impossible for one mean
to magnanimity.
to be exceeded in various respects.
Objection 3. Further, ambition seems to regard out-
Reply to Objection 2. Honor is due to those who are
ward show: for it is written (Acts 25:27) that “Agrippa
in a position of dignity, on account of a certain excellence
and Berenice. . . with great pomp [ambitione]. . . had en-
of their estate: and accordingly inordinate desire for po-
tered into the hall of audience”∗, and (2 Para. 16:14) that
sitions of dignity pertains to ambition. For if a man were
when Asa died they “burned spices and. . . ointments over
to have an inordinate desire for a position of dignity, not
his body” with very great pomp [ambitione]. But magna-
for the sake of honor, but for the sake of a right use of a
nimity is not about outward show. Therefore ambition is
dignity exceeding his ability, he would not be ambitious
not opposed to magnanimity.
but presumptuous.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) that “the
Reply to Objection 3. The very solemnity of out-
more a man exceeds in magnanimity, the more he desires
ward worship is a kind of honor, wherefore in such cases
himself alone to dominate others.” But this pertains to
honor is wont to be shown. This is signified by the words
ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an excess of mag-
of James 2:2,3: “If there shall come into your assem-
nanimity.
bly a man having a golden ring, in fine apparel. . . and
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), ambition signi-
you. . . shall say to him: Sit thou here well,” etc. Where-
fies inordinate love of honor. Now magnanimity is about
fore ambition does not regard outward worship, except in
honors and makes use of them in a becoming manner.
so far as this is a kind of honor.
Wherefore it is evident that ambition is opposed to mag-
∗ ‘Praetorium.’ The Vulgate has ‘auditorium,’ but the meaning is the same 1790
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 132
Of Vainglory
(In Five Articles)
We must now consider vainglory: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether desire of glory is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital vice?
(5) Of its daughters.
Whether the desire of glory is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 132 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that the desire of glory is not a
is clear simply can be seen by many, and by those who are
sin. For no one sins in being likened to God: in fact we
far away, it follows that the word glory properly denotes
are commanded (Eph. 5:1): “Be ye. . . followers of God,
that somebody’s good is known and approved by many,
as most dear children.” Now by seeking glory man seems
according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.)†: “I must not
to imitate God, Who seeks glory from men: wherefore it
boast while I am addressing one man.”
is written (Is. 43:6,7): “Bring My sons from afar, and My
But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not
daughters from the ends of the earth. And every one that
only consists in the knowledge of many, but also in the
calleth on My name, I have created him for My glory.”
knowledge of few, or of one, or of oneself alone, as when
Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.
one considers one’s own good as being worthy of praise.
Objection 2. Further, that which incites a mar to do
Now it is not a sin to know and approve one’s own good:
good is apparently not a sin. Now the desire of glory in-
for it is written (1 Cor. 2:12): “Now we have received
cites men to do good. For Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i)
not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God
that “glory inflames every man to strive his utmost”: and
that we may know the things that are given us from God.”
in Holy Writ glory is promised for good works, according
Likewise it is not a sin to be willing to approve one’s own
to Rom. 2:7: “To them, indeed, who according to patience
good works: for it is written (Mat. 5:16): “Let your light
in good work. . . glory and honor”∗. Therefore the desire
shine before men.” Hence the desire for glory does not,
for glory is not a sin.
of itself, denote a sin: but the desire for empty or vain
Objection 3. Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii)
glory denotes a sin: for it is sinful to desire anything vain,
that glory is “consistent good report about a person, to-
according to Ps. 4:3, “Why do you love vanity, and seek
gether with praise”: and this comes to the same as what
after lying?”
Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii), viz. that glory is,
Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on
“as it were, clear knowledge with praise.” Now it is no sin
the part of the thing for which one seeks glory: as when
to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to
a man seeks glory for that which is unworthy of glory, for
call for praise, according to Ecclus. 41:15, “Take care of a
instance when he seeks it for something frail and perish-
good name,” and Rom. 12:17, “Providing good things not
able: secondly, on the part of him from whom he seeks
only in the sight of God, but also in the sight of all men.”
glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain:
Therefore the desire of vainglory is not a sin.
thirdly, on the part of the man himself who seeks glory,
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v):
for that he does not refer the desire of his own glory to a
“He is better advised who acknowledges that even the love
due end, such as God’s honor, or the spiritual welfare of
of praise is sinful.”
his neighbor.
I answer that, Glory signifies a certain clarity, where-
Reply to Objection 1.
As Augustine says on Jn.
fore Augustine says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan.) that
13:13, “You call Me Master and Lord; and you say well”
to be “glorified is the same as to be clarified.” Now clar-
(Tract. lviii in Joan.): “Self-complacency is fraught with
ity and comeliness imply a certain display: wherefore the
danger of one who has to beware of pride. But He Who
word glory properly denotes the display of something as
is above all, however much He may praise Himself, does
regards its seeming comely in the sight of men, whether it
not uplift Himself. For knowledge of God is our need, not
be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since, however, that which
His: nor does any man know Him unless he be taught of
∗ Vulg.: ‘Who will render to every man according to his works, to them indeed who . . . seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life.’
† The quotation is from Livy: Hist., Lib. XXII C, 39
1791
Him Who knows.” It is therefore evident that God seeks proves (De Civ. Dei v).
glory, not for His own sake, but for ours. In like man-
Reply to Objection 3. It is requisite for man’s perfec-
ner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the good of
tion that he should know himself; but not that he should be
others, according to Mat. 5:16, “That they may see your
known by others, wherefore it is not to be desired in itself.
good works, and glorify your Father Who is in heaven.”
It may, however, be desired as being useful for something,
Reply to Objection 2. That which we receive from
either in order that God may be glorified by men, or that
God is not vain but true glory: it is this glory that is
men may become better by reason of the good they know
promised as a reward for good works, and of which it
to be in another man, or in order that man, knowing by the
is written (2 Cor. 10:17,18): “He that glorieth let him
testimony of others’ praise the good which is in him, may
glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself
himself strive to persevere therein and to become better.
is approved, but he whom God commendeth.” It is true
In this sense it is praiseworthy that a man should “take
that some are heartened to do works of virtue, through de-
care of his good name,” and that he should “provide good
sire for human glory, as also through the desire for other
things in the sight of God and men”: but not that he should
earthly goods. Yet he is not truly virtuous who does vir-
take an empty pleasure in human praise.
tuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as Augustine
Whether vainglory is opposed to magnanimity?
IIa IIae q. 132 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is not opposed
in moderation. Wherefore inordinate desire of glory is di-
to magnanimity. For, as stated above (a. 1), vainglory
rectly opposed to magnanimity.
consists in glorying in things that are not, which per-
Reply to Objection 1. To think so much of little
tains to falsehood; or in earthly and perishable things,
things as to glory in them is itself opposed to magnanim-
which pertains to covetousness; or in the testimony of
ity. Wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic.
men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to im-
iv) that honor is of little account to him. In like manner
prudence. Now these vices are not contrary to magnanim-
he thinks little of other things that are sought for honor’s
ity. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent
Objection 2. Further, vainglory is not, like pusilla-
with magnanimity to glory in things that are not; where-
nimity, opposed to magnanimity by way of deficiency,
fore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that he
for this seems inconsistent with vainglory. Nor is it op-
cares more for truth than for opinion. Again it is incom-
posed to it by way of excess, for in this way presumption
patible with magnanimity for a man to glory in the testi-
and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above
mony of human praise, as though he deemed this some-
(q. 130, a. 2; q. 131, a. 2): and these differ from vainglory.
thing great; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man
Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
(Ethic. iv), that he cares not to be praised. And so, when
Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Phil. 2:3, “Let noth-
a man looks upon little things as though they were great,
ing be done through contention, neither by vainglory,”
nothing hinders this from being contrary to magnanimity,
says: “Some among them were given to dissension and
as well as to other virtues.
restlessness, contending with one another for the sake of
Reply to Objection 2. He that is desirous of vainglory
vainglory.” But contention∗ is not opposed to magnanim-
does in truth fall short of being magnanimous, because he
ity. Neither therefore is vainglory.
glories in what the magnanimous man thinks little of, as
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the
stated in the preceding Reply. But if we consider his es-
heading, “Magnanimity consists in two things: We should
timate, he is opposed to the magnanimous man by way
beware of the desire for glory, since it enslaves the mind,
of excess, because the glory which he seeks is something
which a magnanimous man should ever strive to keep un-
great in his estimation, and he tends thereto in excess of
trammeled.” Therefore it is opposed to magnanimity.
his deserts.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 103, a. 1, ad 3),
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 127, a. 2,
glory is an effect of honor and praise: because from the
ad 2), the opposition of vices does not depend on their
fact that a man is praised, or shown any kind of rever-
effects. Nevertheless contention, if done intentionally, is
ence, he acquires charity in the knowledge of others. And
opposed to magnanimity: since no one contends save for
since magnanimity is about honor, as stated above (q. 129,
what he deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher says
Aa. 1,2), it follows that it also is about glory: seeing that
(Ethic.
iv, 3) that the magnanimous man is not con-
as a man uses honor moderately, so too does he use glory
tentious, because nothing is great in his estimation.
∗ Cf. q. 38
1792
Whether vainglory is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 132 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin.
not received it?” Or again when a man prefers to God the
For nothing precludes the eternal reward except a mortal
temporal good in which he glories: for this is forbidden
sin. Now vainglory precludes the eternal reward: for it
(Jer. 9:23,24): “Let not the wise man glory in his wis-
is written (Mat. 6:1): “Take heed, that you do not give
dom, and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and
justice before men, to be seen by them: otherwise you
let not the rich man glory in his riches. But let him that
shall not have a reward of your Father Who is in heaven.”
glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth
Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.
Me.” Or again when a man prefers the testimony of man
Objection 2. Further, whoever appropriates to himself
to God’s; thus it is written in reproval of certain people
that which is proper to God, sins mortally. Now by desir-
(Jn. 12:43): “For they loved the glory of men more than
ing vainglory, a man appropriates to himself that which is
the glory of God.”
proper to God. For it is written (Is. 42:8): “I will not give
In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity,
My glory to another,” and (1 Tim. 1:17): “To. . . the only
on the part of the one who glories, in that he refers his
God be honor and glory.” Therefore vainglory is a mortal
intention to glory as his last end: so that he directs even
sin.
virtuous deeds thereto, and, in order to obtain it, forbears
Objection 3. Further, apparently a sin is mortal if it
not from doing even that which is against God. In this way
be most dangerous and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of
it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
this kind, because a gloss of Augustine on 1 Thess. 2:4,
v, 14) that “this vice,” namely the love of human praise,
“God, Who proveth our hearts,” says: “Unless a man war
“is so hostile to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory
against the love of human glory he does not perceive its
more than it fears or loves God, that our Lord said (Jn.
baneful power, for though it be easy for anyone not to de-
5:44): How can you believe, who receive glory one from
sire praise as long as one does not get it, it is difficult not to another, and the glory which is from God alone, you do
take pleasure in it, when it is given.” Chrysostom also says
not seek?”
(Hom. xix in Matth.) that “vainglory enters secretly, and
If, however, the love of human glory, though it be
robs us insensibly of all our inward possessions.” There-
vain, be not inconsistent with charity, neither as regards
fore vainglory is a mortal sin.
the matter gloried in, nor as to the intention of him that
On the contrary, Chrysostom says∗ that “while other
seeks glory, it is not a mortal but a venial sin.
vices find their abode in the servants of the devil, vain-
Reply to Objection 1. No man, by sinning, merits
glory finds a place even in the servants of Christ.” Yet in
eternal life: wherefore a virtuous deed loses its power to
the latter there is no mortal sin. Therefore vainglory is not
merit eternal life, if it be done for the sake of vainglory,
a mortal sin.
even though that vainglory be not a mortal sin. On the
I answer that, As stated above (q. 24, a. 12; q. 110,
other hand when a man loses the eternal reward simply
a. 4; q. 112, a. 2 ), a sin is mortal through being contrary
through vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act,
to charity. Now the sin of vainglory, considered in itself,
vainglory is a mortal sin.
does not seem to be contrary to charity as regards the love
Reply to Objection 2. Not every man that is desirous
of one’s neighbor: yet as regards the love of God it may
of vainglory, desires the excellence which belongs to God
be contrary to charity in two ways. In one way, by reason
alone. For the glory due to God alone differs from the
of the matter about which one glories: for instance when
glory due to a virtuous or rich man.
one glories in something false that is opposed to the rev-
Reply to Objection 3. Vainglory is stated to be a dan-
erence we owe God, according to Ezech. 28:2, “Thy heart
gerous sin, not only on account of its gravity, but also be-
is lifted up, and Thou hast said: I am God,” and 1 Cor.
cause it is a disposition to grave sins, in so far as it renders 4:7, “What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if
man presumptuous and too self-confident: and so it grad-
thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst
ually disposes a man to lose his inward goods.
Whether vainglory is a capital vice?
IIa IIae q. 132 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is not a capital
Objection 2.
Further, honor would seem to take
vice. For a vice that always arises from another vice is
precedence of glory, for this is its effect. Now ambition
seemingly not capital. But vainglory always arises from
which is inordinate desire of honor is not a capital vice.
pride. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.
Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory.
∗ Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom
1793
Objection 3.
Further, a capital vice has a certain
good is naturally loved and honored by all. Wherefore,
prominence. But vainglory seems to have no prominence,
just as by the glory which is in God’s sight man acquires
neither as a sin, because it is not always a mortal sin, nor
honor in Divine things, so too by the glory which is in
considered as an appetible good, since human glory is ap-
the sight of man he acquires excellence in human things.
parently a frail thing, and is something outside man him-
Hence on account of its close connection with excellence,
self. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.
which men desire above all, it follows that it is most de-
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers
sirable. And since many vices arise from the inordinate
vainglory among the seven capital vices.
desire thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital vice.
I answer that, The capital vices are enumerated in
Reply to Objection 1. It is not impossible for a cap-
two ways. For some reckon pride as one of their number:
ital vice to arise from pride, since as stated above (in the
and these do not place vainglory among the capital vices.
body of the Article and Ia IIae, q. 84, a. 2) pride is the
Gregory, however (Moral. xxxi), reckons pride to be the
queen and mother of all the vices.
queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which is the immedi-
Reply to Objection 2. Praise and honor, as stated
ate offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice: and
above (a. 2), stand in relation to glory as the causes from
not without reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on
which it proceeds, so that glory is compared to them as
(q. 152, Aa. 1,2), denotes inordinate desire of excellence.
their end. For the reason why a man loves to be honored
But whatever good one may desire, one desires a certain
and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain
perfection and excellence therefrom: wherefore the end of
renown in the knowledge of others.
every vice is directed to the end of pride, so that this vice
Reply to Objection 3. Vainglory stands prominent
seems to exercise a kind of causality over the other vices,
under the aspect of desirability, for the reason given
and ought not to be reckoned among the special sources
above, and this suffices for it to be reckoned a capital vice.
of vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods
Nor is it always necessary for a capital vice to be a mortal
that are the means whereby man acquires honor, glory
sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin, inasmuch as
seems to be the most conducive to that effect, inasmuch
venial sin can dispose man thereto.
as it denotes the manifestation of a man’s goodness: since
Whether the daughters of vainglory are suitably reckoned to be disobedience, boast-IIa IIae q. 132 a. 5
fulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and love of novelties?
Objection 1. It seems that the daughters of vainglory
a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 84, Aa. 3,4), the vices which by their
are unsuitably reckoned to be “disobedience, boastful-
very nature are such as to be directed to the end of a cer-
ness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and ec-
tain capital vice, are called its daughters. Now the end of
centricity∗.” For according to Gregory (Moral. xxiii)
vainglory is the manifestation of one’s own excellence, as
boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride.
stated above (Aa. 1,4): and to this end a man may tend in
Now pride does not arise from vainglory, rather is it
two ways. In one way directly, either by words, and this is
the other way about, as Gregory says (Moral.
xxxi).
boasting, or by deeds, and then if they be true and call for
Therefore boastfulness should not be reckoned among the
astonishment, it is love of novelties which men are wont
daughters of vainglory.
to wonder at most; but if they be false, it is hypocrisy.
Objection 2. Further, contention and discord seem to
In another way a man strives to make known his excel-
be the outcome chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital
lence by showing that he is not inferior to another, and
vice condivided with vainglory. Therefore it seems that
this in four ways. First, as regards the intellect, and thus
they are not the daughters of vainglory.
we have “obstinacy,” by which a man is too much attached
Objection 3. Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix
to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is
in Matth.) that vainglory is always evil, but especially in
better. Secondly, as regards the will, and then we have
philanthropy, i.e. mercy. And yet this is nothing new, for
“discord,” whereby a man is unwilling to give up his own
it is an established custom among men. Therefore eccen-
will, and agree with others. Thirdly, as regards “speech,”
tricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter of
and then we have “contention,” whereby a man quarrels
vainglory.
noisily with another. Fourthly as regards deeds, and this
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory
is “disobedience,” whereby a man refuses to carry out the
(Moral. xxxi), who there assigns the above daughters to
command of his superiors.
vainglory.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 112, a. 1,
I answer that, As stated above (q. 34, a. 5; q. 35,
ad 2), boasting is reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its
∗ Praesumptio novitatum, literally ‘presumption of novelties’
1794
interior cause, which is arrogance: but outward boasting, to the will and words of others.
according to Ethic. iv, is directed sometimes to gain, but
Reply to Objection 3. Vainglory is reproved in con-
more often to glory and honor, and thus it is the result of
nection with almsdeeds on account of the lack of charity
vainglory.
apparent in one who prefers vainglory to the good of his
Reply to Objection 2. Anger is not the cause of dis-
neighbor, seeing that he does the latter for the sake of the
cord and contention, except in conjunction with vainglory,
former. But a man is not reproved for presuming to give
in that a man thinks it a glorious thing for him not to yield
alms as though this were something novel.
1795
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 133
Of Pusillanimity
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin?
(2) To what virtue is it opposed?
Whether pusillanimity is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 133 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin.
buried in the earth the money he had received from his
For every sin makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes
master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted fear,
a man good. But a fainthearted man is not evil, as the
was punished by his master (Mat. 25; Lk. 19).
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore pusillanimity is
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher calls those
not a sin.
evil who injure their neighbor: and accordingly the faint-
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
hearted is said not to be evil, because he injures no one,
3) that “a fainthearted man is especially one who is wor-
save accidentally, by omitting to do what might be prof-
thy of great goods, yet does not deem himself worthy of
itable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i) that if “they
them.” Now no one is worthy of great goods except the
who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be
virtuous, since as the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3),
judged strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate
“none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honor.” There-
to the good they might have done had they been less retir-
fore the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently pusil-
ing.”
lanimity is not a sin.
Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders a person who
Objection 3. Further, “Pride is the beginning of all
has a virtuous habit from sinning venially and without
sin” (Ecclus. 10:15). But pusillanimity does not pro-
losing the habit, or mortally and with loss of the habit
ceed from pride, since the proud man sets himself above
of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a man, by
what he is, while the fainthearted man withdraws from
reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy of doing
the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not
certain great things that are worthy of great honor, and
a sin.
yet through not trying to make use of his virtue, he sins
Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
sometimes venially, sometimes mortally.
3) that “he who deems himself less worthy than he is, is
Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is wor-
said to be fainthearted.” Now sometimes holy men deem
thy of great things in proportion to his ability for virtue,
themselves less worthy than they are; for instance, Moses
ability which he derives either from a good natural dispo-
and Jeremias, who were worthy of the office God chose
sition, or from science, or from external fortune, and if he
them for, which they both humbly declined (Ex. 3:11; Jer.
fails to use those things for virtue, he becomes guilty of
1:6). Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
pusillanimity.
On the contrary, Nothing in human conduct is to be
Reply to Objection 3. Even pusillanimity may in
avoided save sin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for
some way be the result of pride: when, to wit, a man
it is written (Col. 3:21): “Fathers, provoke not your chil-
clings too much to his own opinion, whereby he thinks
dren to indignation, lest they be discouraged.” Therefore
himself incompetent for those things for which he is com-
pusillanimity is a sin.
petent. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:16): “The sluggard
I answer that, Whatever is contrary to a natural in-
is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sen-
clination is a sin, because it is contrary to a law of nature.
tences.” For nothing hinders him from depreciating him-
Now everything has a natural inclination to accomplish an
self in some things, and having a high opinion of him-
action that is commensurate with its power: as is evident
self in others. Wherefore Gregory says (Pastoral. i) of
in all natural things, whether animate or inanimate. Now
Moses that “perchance he would have been proud, had he
just as presumption makes a man exceed what is propor-
undertaken the leadership of a numerous people without
tionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can,
misgiving: and again he would have been proud, had he
so pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is pro-
refused to obey the command of his Creator.”
portionate to his power, by refusing to tend to that which
Reply to Objection 4. Moses and Jeremias were wor-
is commensurate thereto. Wherefore as presumption is a
thy of the office to which they were appointed by God, but
sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it is that the servant who
their worthiness was of Divine grace: yet they, consider-
1796
ing the insufficiency of their own weakness, demurred; though not obstinately lest they should fall into pride.
Whether pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity?
IIa IIae q. 133 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that pusillanimity is not op-
same subject. For just as the magnanimous man tends
posed to magnanimity. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.,
to great things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillan-
3) that “the fainthearted man knows not himself: for he
imous man shrinks from great things out of littleness of
would desire the good things, of which he is worthy, if
soul. Secondly, it may be considered in reference to its
he knew himself.” Now ignorance of self seems opposed
cause, which on the part of the intellect is ignorance of
to prudence. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to pru-
one’s own qualification, and on the part of the appetite
dence.
is the fear of failure in what one falsely deems to exceed
Objection 2.
Further our Lord calls the servant
one’s ability. Thirdly, it may be considered in reference
wicked and slothful who through pusillanimity refused to
to its effect, which is to shrink from the great things of
make use of the money. Moreover the Philosopher says
which one is worthy. But, as stated above (q. 132, a. 2,
(Ethic. iv, 3) that the fainthearted seem to be slothful.
ad 3), opposition between vice and virtue depends rather
Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of pru-
on their respective species than on their cause or effect.
dence, as stated above (q. 47, a. 9). Therefore pusillanim-
Hence pusillanimity is directly opposed to magnanimity.
ity is not opposed to magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers pusil-
Objection 3. Further, pusillanimity seems to proceed
lanimity as proceeding from a cause in the intellect. Yet
from inordinate fear: hence it is written (Is. 35:4): “Say
it cannot be said properly that it is opposed to prudence,
to the fainthearted: Take courage and fear not.” It also
even in respect of its cause: because ignorance of this kind
seems to proceed from inordinate anger, according to Col.
does not proceed from indiscretion but from laziness in
3:21, “Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation,
considering one’s own ability, according to Ethic. iv, 3, or
lest they be discouraged.” Now inordinate fear is opposed
in accomplishing what is within one’s power.
to fortitude, and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore
Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers pusil-
pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.
lanimity from the point of view of its effect.
Objection 4. Further, the vice that is in opposition to
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the
a particular virtue is the more grievous according as it is
point of view of cause. Nor is the fear that causes pusilla-
more unlike that virtue. Now pusillanimity is more unlike
nimity always a fear of the dangers of death: wherefore it
magnanimity than presumption is. Therefore if pusilla-
does not follow from this standpoint that pusillanimity is
nimity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows that it is a
opposed to fortitude. As regards anger, if we consider it
more grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary
under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man
to the saying of Ecclus. 37:3, “O wicked presumption,
is roused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanim-
whence camest thou?” Therefore pusillanimity is not op-
ity, which disheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it
posed to magnanimity.
away. If, however, we consider the causes of anger, which
On the contrary, Pusillanimity and magnanimity dif-
are injuries inflicted whereby the soul of the man who suf-
fer as greatness and littleness of soul, as their very names
fers them is disheartened, it conduces to pusillanimity.
denote. Now great and little are opposites. Therefore
Reply to Objection 4. According to its proper species
pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity.
pusillanimity is a graver sin than presumption, since
I answer that, Pusillanimity may be considered in
thereby a man withdraws from good things, which is a
three ways. First, in itself; and thus it is evident that by
very great evil according to Ethic. iv. Presumption, how-
its very nature it is opposed to magnanimity, from which
ever, is stated to be “wicked” on account of pride whence
it differs as great and little differ in connection with the
it proceeds.
1797
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 134
Of Magnificence
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it. With regard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether magnificence is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) What is its matter?
(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
Whether magnificence is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 134 a. 1
Objection 1.
It seems that magnificence is not a
whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to
virtue. For whoever has one virtue has all the virtues, as
the very notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a
stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1). But one may have the
virtue.
other virtues without having magnificence: because the
Reply to Objection 1. Not every liberal man is mag-
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “not every liberal man
nificent as regards his actions, because he lacks the where-
is magnificent.” Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.
withal to perform magnificent deeds. Nevertheless every
Objection 2. Further, moral virtue observes the mean,
liberal man has the habit of magnificence, either actually
according to Ethic. ii, 6. But magnificence does not seem-
or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as ex-
ingly observe the mean, for it exceeds liberality in great-
plained above (q. 129, a. 3, ad 2), as also ( Ia IIae, q. 65,
ness. Now “great” and “little” are opposed to one another
a. 1) when we were treating of the connection of virtues.
as extremes, the mean of which is “equal,” as stated in
Reply to Objection 2. It is true that magnificence ob-
Metaph. x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean,
serves the extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing
but the extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue.
done: yet it observes the mean, if we consider the rule of
Objection 3. Further, no virtue is opposed to a nat-
reason, which it neither falls short of nor exceeds, as we
ural inclination, but on the contrary perfects it, as stated
have also said of magnanimity (q. 129, a. 3, ad 1).
above (q. 108, a. 2; q. 117, a. 1, obj. 1). Now according to
Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to magnificence
the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2) the “magnificent man is not
to do something great. But that which regards a man’s
lavish towards himself”: and this is opposed to the nat-
person is little in comparison with that which regards Di-
ural inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore
vine things, or even the affairs of the community at large.
magnificence is not a virtue.
Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend princi-
Objection 4. Further, according to the Philosopher
pally to be lavish towards himself, not that he does not
(Ethic. vi, 4) “act is right reason about things to be made.”
seek his own good, but because to do so is not something
Now magnificence is about things to be made, as its very
great. Yet if anything regarding himself admits of great-
name denotes∗. Therefore it is an act rather than a virtue.
ness, the magnificent man accomplishes it magnificently:
On the contrary, Human virtue is a participation of
for instance, things that are done once, such as a wedding,
Divine power. But magnificence [virtutis] belongs to Di-
or the like; or things that are of a lasting nature; thus it
vine power, according to Ps. 47:35: “His magnificence
belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a
and His power is in the clouds.” Therefore magnificence
suitable dwelling, as stated in Ethic. iv.
is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 4. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
I answer that, According to De Coelo i, 16, “we
vi, 5) “there must needs be a virtue of act,” i.e. a moral
speak of virtue in relation to the extreme limit of a thing’s
virtue, whereby the appetite is inclined to make good use
power,” not as regards the limit of deficiency, but as re-
of the rule of act: and this is what magnificence does.
gards the limit of excess, the very nature of which de-
Hence it is not an act but a virtue.
notes something great. Wherefore to do something great,
∗ Magnificence= magna facere—i.e. to make great things
1798
Whether magnificence is a special virtue?
IIa IIae q. 134 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a spe-
special virtue.
cial virtue. For magnificence would seem to consist in
If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from
doing something great. But it may belong to any virtue to
doing something great, the doing [facere] being under-
do something great, if the virtue be great: as in the case
stood in a broad sense, it is not a special virtue.
of one who has a great virtue of temperance, for he does a
Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to every perfect
great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not
virtue to do something great in the genus of that virtue,
a special virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue.
if “doing” [facere] be taken in the broad sense, but not if
Objection 2. Further, seemingly that which tends to a
it be taken strictly, for this is proper to magnificence.
thing is the same as that which does it. But it belongs to
Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to magnanimity not
magnanimity to tend to something great, as stated above
only to tend to something great, but also to do great works
(q. 129, Aa. 1,2). Therefore it belongs to magnanimity
in all the virtues, either by making [faciendo], or by any
likewise to do something great. Therefore magnificence
kind of action, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3: yet so that mag-
is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity.
nanimity, in this respect, regards the sole aspect of great,
Objection 3. Further, magnificence seems to belong
while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, do some-
to holiness, for it is written (Ex. 15:11): “Magnificent
thing great, direct their principal intention, not to some-
[Douay: ‘glorious’] in holiness,” and (Ps. 95:6): “Holi-
thing great, but to that which is proper to each virtue: and
ness and magnificence [Douay: ‘Majesty’] in His sanc-
the greatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent
tuary.” Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated
upon the greatness of the virtue.
above (q. 81, a. 8). Therefore magnificence is apparently
On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only
the same as religion. Therefore it is not a special virtue,
to do something great, “doing” [facere] being taken in the
distinct from the others.
strict sense, but also to tend with the mind to the doing of
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons it with
great things. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that
other special virtues (Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2).
“magnificence is the discussing and administering of great
I answer that, It belongs to magnificence to do
and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble
[facere] something great, as its name implies [magnifi-
purpose of mind, discussion” referring to the inward in-
cence= magna facere—i.e. to make great things]. Now
tention, and “administration” to the outward accomplish-
“facere” may be taken in two ways, in a strict sense, and in
ment. Wherefore just as magnanimity intends something
a broad sense. Strictly “facere” means to work something
great in every matter, it follows that magnificence does
in external matter, for instance to make a house, or some-
the same in every work that can be produced in external
thing of the kind; in a broad sense “facere” is employed to
matter [factibili].
denote any action, whether it passes into external matter,
Reply to Objection 3. The intention of magnificence
as to burn or cut, or remain in the agent, as to understand
is the production of a great work. Now works done by
or will.
men are directed to an end: and no end of human works
Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the
is so great as the honor of God: wherefore magnificence
doing of something great, the doing [factio] being under-
does a great work especially in reference to the Divine
stood in the strict sense, it is then a special virtue. For the honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that
work done is produced by act: in the use of which it is
“the most commendable expenditure is that which is di-
possible to consider a special aspect of goodness, namely
rected to Divine sacrifices”: and this is the chief object of
that the work produced [factum] by the act is something
magnificence. For this reason magnificence is connected
great, namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is
with holiness, since its chief effect is directed to religion
what magnificence does. In this way magnificence is a
or holiness.
Whether the matter of magnificence is great expenditure?
IIa IIae q. 134 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that the matter of magnificence
than about expenditure. Therefore magnificence also is
is not great expenditure. For there are not two virtues
not chiefly about expenditure, but about gifts.
about the same matter. But liberality is about expenditure,
Objection 3. Further, it belongs to magnificence to
as stated above (q. 117, a. 2). Therefore magnificence is
produce an external work. But not even great expendi-
not about expenditure.
ture is always the means of producing an external work,
Objection 2. Further, “every magnificent man is lib-
for instance when one spends much in sending presents.
eral” (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is about gifts rather
Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of magnif-
1799
icence.
culty besides arising from the greatness of that same thing.
Objection 4. Further, only the rich are capable of
Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money
great expenditure. But the poor are able to possess all the
and its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of
virtues, since “the virtues do not necessarily require exter-
money in general, and magnificence, which regards that
nal fortune, but are sufficient for themselves,” as Seneca
which is great in the use of money.
says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore magnificence
Reply to Objection 2. The use of money regards
is not about great expenditure.
the liberal man in one way and the magnificent man in
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
another. For it regards the liberal man, inasmuch as it
2) that “magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to
proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money;
all transactions in money, but only to expensive ones,
wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and expen-
wherein it exceeds liberality in scale.” Therefore it is only
diture), the obstacles to which are removed by a moder-
about great expenditure.
ate love of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), it belongs to
money regards the magnificent man in relation to some
magnificence to intend doing some great work. Now for
great work which has to be produced, and this use is im-
the doing of a great work, proportionate expenditure is
possible without expenditure or outlay.
necessary, for great works cannot be produced without
Reply to Objection 3.
The magnificent man also
great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to
makes gifts of presents, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2, but not
spend much in order that some great work may be accom-
under the aspect of gift, but rather under the aspect of ex-
plished in becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher
penditure directed to the production of some work, for in-
says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “a magnificent man will produce
stance in order to honor someone, or in order to do some-
a more magnificent work with equal,” i.e. proportionate,
thing which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when
“expenditure.” Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum
he brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.
of money; and a man may be hindered from making that
Reply to Objection 4. The chief act of virtue is the in-
outlay if he love money too much. Hence the matter of
ward choice, and a virtue may have this without outward
magnificence may be said to be both this expenditure it-
fortune: so that even a poor man may be magnificent. But
self, which the magnificent man uses to produce a great
goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the ex-
work, and also the very money which he employs in going
ternal acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot
to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which
accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that
love the magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered
are great simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do
from spending much.
so in things that are great by comparison to some partic-
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 129, a. 2),
ular work; which, though little in itself, can nevertheless
those virtues that are about external things experience a
be done magnificently in proportion to its genus: for little
certain difficulty arising from the genus itself of the thing
and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says (De
about which the virtue is concerned, and another diffi-
Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.).
Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude?
IIa IIae q. 134 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a part
robius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon mag-
of fortitude. For magnificence agrees in matter with liber-
nificence to be a part of fortitude.
ality, as stated above (a. 3). But liberality is a part, not of I answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special fortitude, but of justice. Therefore magnificence is not a
virtue, cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude,
part of fortitude.
since it does not agree with this virtue in the point of mat-
Objection 2. Further, fortitude is about fear and dar-
ter: but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being annexed to
ings. But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with
it as secondary to principal virtue.
fear, but only with expenditure, which is a kind of action.
In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue,
Therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which
two things are necessary, as stated above (q. 80). The one
is about actions, rather than to fortitude.
is that the secondary virtue agree with the principal, and
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic.
the other is that in some respect it be exceeded thereby.
iv, 2) that “the magnificent man is like the man of sci-
Now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the point that
ence.” Now science has more in common with prudence
as fortitude tends to something arduous and difficult, so
than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should not be
also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated,
reckoned a part of fortitude.
like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls short
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Mac-
of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude
1800
tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore mag-person, whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence
nificence, like magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible
tends, derives its difficulty from the dispossession of one’s
part.
property, which is of much less account than danger to
Reply to Objection 2. Although magnificence does
one’s person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part
not agree with fortitude in matter, it agrees with it as the
of fortitude.
condition of its matter: since it tends to something diffi-
Reply to Objection 1. Justice regards operations in
cult in the matter of expenditure, even as fortitude tends
themselves, as viewed under the aspect of something due:
to something difficult in the matter of fear.
but liberality and magnificence regard sumptuary opera-
Reply to Objection 3. Magnificence directs the use of
tions as related to the passions of the soul, albeit in dif-
art to something great, as stated above and in the preced-
ferent ways. For liberality regards expenditure in refer-
ing Article. Now art is in the reason. Wherefore it belongs
ence to the love and desire of money, which are passions
to the magnificent man to use his reason by observing pro-
of the concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the lib-
portion of expenditure to the work he has in hand. This is
eral man from giving and spending: so that this virtue
especially necessary on account of the greatness of both
is in the concupiscible. On the other hand, magnificence
those things, since if he did not take careful thought, he
regards expenditure in reference to hope, by attaining to
would incur the risk of a great loss.
the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in a
1801
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 135
Of Meanness∗
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether meanness is a vice?
(2) Of the vice opposed to it.
Whether meanness is a vice?
IIa IIae q. 135 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that meanness is not a vice. For
he does not shrink from producing a little work, so long
just as vice moderates great things, so does it moderate lit-
as he spends little. Wherefore the Philosopher says that
tle things: wherefore both the liberal and the magnificent
“the mean man after going to great expense forfeits the
do little things. But magnificence is a virtue. Therefore
good” of the magnificent work, “for the trifle” that he is
likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a vice.
unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
man fails to observe the proportion that reason demands
2) that “careful reckoning is mean.” But careful reckon-
between expenditure and work. Now the essence of vice
ing is apparently praiseworthy, since man’s good is to be
is that it consists in failing to do what is in accordance
in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom.
with reason. Hence it is manifest that meanness is a vice.
iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.
Reply to Objection 1. Virtue moderates little things,
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
according to the rule of reason: from which rule the mean
2) that “a mean man is loth to spend money.” But this be-
man declines, as stated in the Article. For he is called
longs to covetousness or illiberality. Therefore meanness
mean, not for moderating little things, but for declining
is not a distinct vice from the others.
from the rule of reason in moderating great or little things:
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts
hence meanness is a vice.
meanness a special vice opposed to magnificence.
Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Rhet.
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3; Ia ii, 5), “fear makes us take counsel”: wherefore a mean
IIae, q. 18, a. 6), moral acts take their species from their
man is careful in his reckonings, because he has an inor-
end, wherefore in many cases they are denominated from
dinate fear of spending his goods, even in things of the
that end. Accordingly a man is said to be mean [parvifi-
least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy, but sinful
cus] because he intends to do something little [parvum].
and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate
Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad
his affections according to reason, but, on the contrary,
aliquid.) great and little are relative terms: and when we
makes use of his reason in pursuance of his inordinate af-
say that a mean man intends to do something little, this
fections.
must be understood in relation to the kind of work he does.
Reply to Objection 3. Just as the magnificent man
This may be little or great in two ways: in one way as
has this in common with the liberal man, that he spends
regards the work itself to be done, in another as regards
his money readily and with pleasure, so too the mean man
the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man intends
in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth and
principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he
slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that illiberality re-
intends the greatness of the expense, which he does not
gards ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great
shirk, so that he may produce a great work. Wherefore
expenditure, which is a more difficult accomplishment:
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 4) that “the magnificent
wherefore meanness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence
man with equal expenditure will produce a more magnif-
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “although mean-
icent result.” On the other hand, the mean man intends
ness and its contrary vice are sinful, they do not bring
principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says
shame on a man, since neither do they harm one’s neigh-
(Ethic. iv, 2) that “he seeks how he may spend least.” As
bor, nor are they very disgraceful.”
a result of this he intends to produce a little work, that is,
∗ “Parvificentia,” or Doing Mean Things, Just As “Magnificentia” Is Doing Great Things.
1802
Whether there is a vice opposed to meanness?
IIa IIae q. 135 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that there is no vice opposed
spend less than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe
to meanness. For great is opposed to little. Now, mag-
due proportion between his expenditure and his work, has
nificence is not a vice, but a virtue. Therefore no vice is
a vice opposed to it, whereby a man exceeds this same
opposed to meanness.
proportion, by spending more than is proportionate to his
Objection 2. Further, since meanness is a vice by de-
work. This vice is called in Greek banausia, so called
ficiency, as stated above (a. 1), it seems that if any vice is
from the Greek baunos, because, like the fire in the fur-opposed to meanness, it would merely consist in excessive
nace, it consumes everything. It is also called apyrokalia, spending. But those who spend much, where they ought to
i.e. lacking good fire, since like fire it consumes all, but
spend little, spend little where they ought to spend much,
not for a good purpose. Hence in Latin it may be called
according to Ethic. iv, 2, and thus they have something of
“consumptio” [waste].
meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to mean-
Reply to Objection 1. Magnificence is so called from
ness.
the great work done, but not from the expenditure being
Objection 3. Further, moral acts take their species
in excess of the work: for this belongs to the vice which
from their end, as stated above (a. 1). Now those who
is opposed to meanness.
spend excessively, do so in order to make a show of their
Reply to Objection 2. To the one same vice there is
wealth, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2. But this belongs to vain-
opposed the virtue which observes the mean, and a con-
glory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated above
trary vice. Accordingly, then, the vice of waste is opposed
(q. 131, a. 2 ). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the value of
On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philoso-
the work, by spending much where it behooved to spend
pher who (Ethic. ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a
little. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of
mean between two opposite vices.
the great work, which the magnificent man intends prin-
I answer that, Great is opposed to little. Also little
cipally, in so far as when it behooves to spend much, it
and great are relative terms, as stated above (a. 1). Now
spends little or nothing.
just as expenditure may be little in comparison with the
Reply to Objection 3. Wastefulness is opposed to
work, so may it be great in comparison with the work
meanness by the very species of its act, since it exceeds
in that it exceeds the proportion which reason requires to
the rule of reason, whereas meanness falls short of it. Yet
exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is mani-
nothing hinders this from being directed to the end of an-
fest that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to
other vice, such as vainglory or any other.
1803
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 136
Of Patience
(In Five Articles)
We must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether patience is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?
(3) Whether it can be had without grace?
(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
(5) Whether it is the same as longanimity?
Whether patience is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 136 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that patience is not a virtue. For equal mind,” i.e. without being disturbed by sorrow, “lest
the virtues are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says
he abandon with an unequal mind the goods whereby he
(De Trin. xiv). Yet patience is not there, since no evils
may advance to better things.” It is therefore evident that
have to be borne there, according to Is. 49:10 and Apoc.
patience is a virtue.
7:16, “They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the
Reply to Objection 1. The moral virtues do not re-
heat nor the sun strike them.” Therefore patience is not a
main in heaven as regards the same act that they have on
virtue.
the way, in relation, namely, to the goods of the present
Objection 2. Further, no virtue can be found in the
life, which will not remain in heaven: but they will re-
wicked, since virtue it is “that makes its possessor good.”
main in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven.
Yet patience is sometimes found in wicked men; for in-
Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and
stance, in the covetous, who bear many evils patiently
selling and other matters pertaining to the present life, but
that they may amass money, according to Eccles. 5:16,
it will remain in the point of being subject to God. In like
“All the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many
manner the act of patience, in heaven, will not consist in
cares, and in misery and in sorrow.” Therefore patience is
bearing things, but in enjoying the goods to which we had
not a virtue.
aspired by suffering. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
Objection 3. Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, xiv) that “patience itself will not be in heaven, since there
as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 70, a. 1, ad 3). But patience is
is no need for it except where evils have to be borne: yet
reckoned among the fruits (Gal. 5:22). Therefore patience
that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal.”
is not a virtue.
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Patien-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Patientia i):
tia ii; v) “properly speaking those are patient who would
“The virtue of the soul that is called patience, is so great a
rather bear evils without inflicting them, than inflict them
gift of God, that we even preach the patience of Him who
without bearing them. As for those who bear evils that
bestows it upon us.”
they may inflict evil, their patience is neither marvelous
I answer that, As stated above (q. 123, a. 1), the moral nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may mar-virtues are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safe-
vel at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call
guard the good of reason against the impulse of the pas-
them patient.”
sions. Now among the passions sorrow is strong to hinder
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 11,
the good of reason, according to 2 Cor. 7:10, “The sorrow
a. 1), the very notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works
of the world worketh death,” and Ecclus. 30:25, “Sad-
of virtue afford pleasure in themselves, as stated in Ethic.
ness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it.” Hence
i, 8. Now the names of the virtues are wont to be applied
the necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason
to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is a virtue. but
against sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this
as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a
patience does. Wherefore Augustine says (De Patientia
fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind
ii): “A man’s patience it is whereby he bears evil with an
from being overcome by sorrow.
1804
Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues?
IIa IIae q. 136 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that patience is the greatest of
among those that are a check on things that withdraw man
the virtues. For in every genus that which is perfect is the
from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check
greatest. Now “patience hath a perfect work” (James 1:4).
on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death, about
Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which
Objection 2. Further, all the virtues are directed to
temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more
the good of the soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to
than any kind of hardship, which is the object of patience.
patience; for it is written (Lk. 21:19): “In your patience
Therefore patience is not the greatest of the virtues, but
you shall possess your souls.” Therefore patience is the
falls short, not only of the theological virtues, and of pru-
greatest of the virtues.
dence and justice which directly establish man in good,
Objection 3. Further, seemingly that which is the
but also of fortitude and temperance which withdraw him
safeguard and cause of other things is greater than they
from greater obstacles to good.
are. But according to Gregory (Hom. xxxv in Evang.)
Reply to Objection 1. Patience is said to have a per-
“patience is the root and safeguard of all the virtues.”
fect work in bearing hardships: for these give rise first
Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
to sorrow, which is moderated by patience; secondly, to
On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four
anger, which is moderated by meekness; thirdly, to hatred,
virtues which Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De
which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust injury, which
Morib. Eccl. xv) call principal.
justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle is
I answer that, Virtues by their very nature are di-
the most perfect.
rected to good. For it is virtue that “makes its possessor
Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in
good, and renders the latter’s work good” (Ethic. ii, 6).
this respect, that it is more perfect simply.
Hence it follows that a virtue’s superiority and prepon-
Reply to Objection 2.
Possession denotes undis-
derance over other virtues is the greater according as it
turbed ownership; wherefore man is said to possess his
inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now
soul by patience, in so far as it removes by the root the
those virtues which are effective of good, incline a man
passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the soul.
more directly to good than those which are a check on
Reply to Objection 3. Patience is said to be the root
the things which lead man away from good: and just as
and safeguard of all the virtues, not as though it caused
among those that are effective of good, the greater is that
and preserved them directly, but merely because it re-
which establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope,
moves their obstacles.
and charity /are greater than prudence and justice); so too
Whether it is possible to have patience without grace?
IIa IIae q. 136 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that it is possible to have pa-
through much trouble and pain in order to regain health
tience without grace. For the more his reason inclines to
of the body. Now the health of the soul is not less de-
a thing, the more is it possible for the rational creature to
sirable than bodily health. Therefore in like manner one
accomplish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer evil
may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the
for the sake of good than for the sake of evil. Yet some
health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient.
suffer evil for evil’s sake, by their own virtue and with-
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 61:6): “From Him,”
out the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii)
i.e. from God, “is my patience.”
that “men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Patientia iv),
the things they love sinfully.” Much more, therefore, is it
“the strength of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain:
possible for man, without the help of grace, to bear evil
and no one willingly undertakes to bear what is painful,
for the sake of good, and this is to be truly patient.
save for the sake of that which gives pleasure.” The rea-
Objection 2. Further, some who are not in a state of
son of this is because sorrow and pain are of themselves
grace have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bod-
displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose
ily evils: hence some heathens are related to have endured
to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake
many hardships rather than betray their country or com-
of an end. Hence it follows that the good for the sake of
mit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient.
which one is willing to endure evils, is more desired and
Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience with-
loved than the good the privation of which causes the sor-
out the help of grace.
row that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man prefers
Objection 3. Further, it is quite evident that some go
the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which
1805
may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which loves dance with reason: and yet it is this that pertains to true
God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as
patience.
a virtue, is caused by charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4,
Reply to Objection 2. The good of a social virtue∗ is
“Charity is patient.”
commensurate with human nature; and consequently the
But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity
human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctify-
save through grace, according to Rom. 5:5, “The charity
ing grace, yet not without the help of God’s grace†. On
of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost
the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, where-
Who is given to us.” Therefore it is clearly impossible to
fore man cannot tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence
have patience without the help of grace.
the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 1.
The inclination of reason
Reply to Objection 3. Even the endurance of those
would prevail in human nature in the state of integrity.
evils which a man bears for the sake of his body’s health,
But in corrupt nature the inclination of concupiscence pre-
proceeds from the love a man naturally has for his own
vails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is more
flesh. Hence there is no comparison between this en-
prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the con-
durance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural
cupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for
love.
the sake of goods to come, which are desired in accor-
Whether patience is a part of fortitude?
IIa IIae q. 136 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that patience is not a part of
brave (Sent. 811).
fortitude. For a thing is not part of itself. Now patience is
Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to fortitude to en-
apparently the same as fortitude: because, as stated above
dure, not anything indeed, but that which is most difficult
(q. 123, a. 6), the proper act of fortitude is to endure; and
to endure, namely dangers of death: whereas it may per-
this belongs also to patience. For it is stated in the Liber
tain to patience to endure any kind of evil.
Sententiarum Prosperi‡ that “patience consists in endur-
Reply to Objection 2. The act of fortitude consists
ing evils inflicted by others.” Therefore patience is not a
not only in holding fast to good against the fear of future
part of fortitude.
dangers, but also in not failing through sorrow or pain oc-
Objection 2. Further, fortitude is about fear and dar-
casioned by things present; and it is in the latter respect
ing, as stated above (q. 123, a. 3), and thus it is in the iras-that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is chiefly
cible. But patience seems to be about sorrow, and conse-
about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude
quently would seem to be in the concupiscible. Therefore
avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man
patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance.
is said to be patient, not because he does not fly, but be-
Objection 3. Further, the whole cannot be without its
cause he behaves in a praiseworthy manner by suffering
part. Therefore if patience is a part of fortitude, there can
[patiendo] things which hurt him here and now, in such a
be no fortitude without patience. Yet sometimes a brave
way as not to be inordinately saddened by them. Hence
man does not endure evils patiently, but even attacks the
fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in
person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience is not a
the concupiscible faculty.
part of fortitude.
Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of for-
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons
titude, because the annexing of virtue to virtue does not re-
it a part of fortitude.
gard the subject, but the matter or the form. Nevertheless
I answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of forpatience is not to be reckoned a part of temperance, al-
titude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to prin-
though both are in the concupiscible, because temperance
cipal virtue. For it belongs to patience “to suffer with an
is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures
equal mind the evils inflicted by others,” as Gregory says
of touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures
in a homily (xxxv in Evang.). Now of those evils that are
of food and sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows
inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to endure
inflicted by other persons. Moreover it belongs to temper-
are those that are connected with the danger of death, and
ance to control these sorrows besides their contrary plea-
about these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear
sures: whereas it belongs to patience that a man forsake
that in this matter fortitude has the principal place, and
not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows,
that it lays claim to that which is principal in this matter.
however great they be.
Wherefore patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary
Reply to Objection 3. It may be granted that patience
to principal virtue, for which reason Prosper calls patience
in a certain respect is an integral part of justice, if we
∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 61, a. 5
† Cf. Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 2
‡ The quotation
is from St. Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang.
1806
consider the fact that a man may patiently endure evils God’s wrongs patiently is most wicked”: and Augustine
pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from this point
says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii) that “the pre-
of view that the objection argues. Nor is it inconsistent
cepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the com-
with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up
monwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight
against the man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysos-
against our enemies.” But in so far as patience regards all
tom§ says on Mat. 4:10, “Begone Satan,” that “it is praise-
kinds of evils, it is annexed to fortitude as secondary to
worthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to endure
principal virtue.
Whether patience is the same as longanimity? ∗
IIa IIae q. 136 a. 5
Objection 1. It seems that patience is the same as lon-
because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a
ganimity. For Augustine says (De Patientia i) that “we
nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, “Hope
speak of patience in God, not as though any evil made
that is deferred afflicteth the soul.” Hence there may be
Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked, that they
patience in bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sor-
may be converted.” Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 5:4):
rows. Accordingly longanimity and constancy are both
“The Most High is a patient rewarder.” Therefore it seems
comprised under patience, in so far as both the delay of
that patience is the same as longanimity.
the hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the
Objection 2. Further, the same thing is not contrary
toil which man endures in persistently accomplishing a
to two things. But impatience is contrary to longanimity,
good work (which regards constancy) may be considered
whereby one awaits a delay: for one is said to be impa-
under the one aspect of grievous evil.
tient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it seems that
For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defin-
patience is the same as longanimity.
ing patience, says that “patience is the voluntary and pro-
Objection 3. Further, just as time is a circumstance of
longed endurance of arduous and difficult things for the
wrongs endured, so is place. But no virtue is distinct from
sake of virtue or profit.” By saying “arduous” he refers
patience on the score of place. Therefore in like manner
to constancy in good; when he says “difficult” he refers
longanimity which takes count of time, in so far as a per-
to the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of
son waits for a long time, is not distinct from patience.
patience; and by adding “continued” or “long lasting,” he
Objection 4. On the contrary, a gloss† on Rom. 2:4,
refers to longanimity, in so far as it has something in com-
“Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and pa-
mon with patience.
tience, and longsuffering?” says: “It seems that longa-
This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second
nimity differs from patience, because those who offend
Objections.
from weakness rather than of set purpose are said to be
Reply to Objection 3. That which is a long way off
borne with longanimity: while those who take a deliber-
as to place, though distant from us, is not simply distant
ate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently.”
from things in nature, as that which is a long way off in
I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a
point of time: hence the comparison fails. Moreover, what
mind to tend to great things, so by longanimity a man
is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the point
has a mind to tend to something a long way off. Where-
of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long
fore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good,
time coming to us.
rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their
We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, how-
object, so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has
ever, that the reason for the difference assigned by this
more in common with magnanimity than with patience.
gloss is that it is hard to bear with those who sin through
Nevertheless it may have something in common with
weakness, merely because they persist a long time in evil,
patience, for two reasons. First, because patience, like
wherefore it is said that they are borne with longanimity:
fortitude, endures certain evils for the sake of good, and if
whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to
this good is awaited shortly, endurance is easier: whereas
be unendurable; for which reason those who sin through
if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult. Secondly,
pride are stated to be borne with patience.
§ Homily v. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom
∗ Longsuffering. It is necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison with magnanimity.
† Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom. ii
1807
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 137
Of Perseverance
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether perseverance is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
(3) Of its relation to constancy;
(4) Whether it needs the help of grace?
Whether perseverance is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 137 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that perseverance is not a virtue.
self), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists
For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), conti-
in enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so
nency is greater than perseverance. But continency is not
far as necessity requires.
a virtue, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Therefore perseverance
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is taking per-
is not a virtue.
severance there, as it is found in one who bears those
Objection 2. Further, “by virtue man lives aright,”
things which are most difficult to endure long. Now it
according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now ac-
is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And evils that
cording to the same authority (De Persever. i), no one can
involve danger of death, for the most part are not en-
be said to have perseverance while living, unless he per-
dured for a long time, because often they soon pass away:
severe until death. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.
wherefore it is not on this account that perseverance has its
Objection 3. Further, it is requisite of every virtue
chief title to praise. Among other evils foremost are those
that one should persist unchangeably in the work of that
which are opposed to pleasures of touch, because evils of
virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. But this is what we under-
this kind affect the necessaries of life: such are the lack of
stand by perseverance: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii)
food and the like, which at times call for long endurance.
that “perseverance is the fixed and continued persistence
Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long
in a well-considered purpose.” Therefore perseverance is
time for one who grieves not much at them, nor delights
not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue.
much in the contrary goods; as in the case of the temperate
On the contrary, Andronicus∗ says that “persever-
man, in whom these passions are not violent. But they are
ance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to
most difficult to bear for one who is strongly affected by
stand, and those to which we ought not to stand, as well
such things, through lacking the perfect virtue that moder-
as those that are indifferent.” Now a habit that directs us
ates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be taken in
to do something well, or to omit something, is a virtue.
this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something imper-
Therefore perseverance is a virtue.
fect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic.
perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of
ii, 3), “virtue is about the difficult and the good”; and so
difficult good, it is consistent in one who has even per-
where there is a special kind of difficulty or goodness,
fect virtue: for even if it is less difficult for him to persist, there is a special virtue. Now a virtuous deed may involve
yet he persists in the more perfect good. Wherefore such
goodness or difficulty on two counts. First, from the act’s
like perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue derives
very species, which is considered in respect of the proper
perfection from the aspect of good rather than from the
object of that act: secondly, from the length of time, since
aspect of difficulty.
to persist long in something difficult involves a special dif-
Reply to Objection 2. Sometimes a virtue and its act
ficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is
go by the same name: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan.
accomplished belongs to a special virtue.
lxxix): “Faith is to believe without seeing.” Yet it is pos-
Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are spe-
sible to have a habit of virtue without performing the act:
cial virtues, for the reason that the one moderates plea-
thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence without
sures of touch (which is of itself a difficult thing), while
exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who
the other moderates fear and daring in connection with
has the habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not ac-
dangers of death (which also is something difficult in it-
complish it, for instance a builder begins to build a house,
∗ Chrysippus: in De Affect.
1808
but does not complete it. Accordingly we must reply that man. Wherefore as regards these which are the principal
the term “perseverance” is sometimes used to denote the
virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished until
habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes for
the end of life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of
the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the
perseverance as denoting the consummate act of persever-
habit of perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to
ance.
carry out his choice by persisting for a time, yet completes
Reply to Objection 3. Unchangeable persistence may
not the act, through not persisting to the end. Now the end
belong to a virtue in two ways. First, on account of the in-
is twofold: one is the end of the work, the other is the
tended end that is proper to that virtue; and thus to persist
end of human life. Properly speaking it belongs to perse-
in good for a long time until the end, belongs to a special
verance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work, for
virtue called perseverance, which intends this as its spe-
instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight,
cial end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit
and the magnificent man until his work be accomplished.
to its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is conse-
There are, however, some virtues whose acts must en-
quent upon every virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a “quality
dure throughout the whole of life, such as faith, hope, and
difficult to change.”
charity, since they regard the last end of the entire life of
Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude?
IIa IIae q. 137 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that perseverance is not a part
necessity that every virtue which has a title to praise for
of fortitude. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii,
the firm endurance of something difficult must be annexed
7), “perseverance is about pains of touch.” But these be-
to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue. Now the en-
long to temperance. Therefore perseverance is a part of
durance of difficulty arising from delay in accomplishing
temperance rather than of fortitude.
a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor
Objection 2. Further, every part of a moral virtue is
is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. There-
about certain passions which that virtue moderates. Now
fore perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to
perseverance does not imply moderation of the passions:
principal virtue.
since the more violent the passions, the more praisewor-
Reply to Objection 1. The annexing of secondary to
thy is it to persevere in accordance with reason. Therefore
principal virtues depends not only on the matter∗, but also
it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue,
on the mode, because in everything form is of more ac-
but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.
count than matter. Wherefore although, as to matter, per-
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i)
severance seems to have more in common with temper-
that no one can lose perseverance; whereas one can lose
ance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more in com-
the other virtues. Therefore perseverance is greater than
mon with fortitude, in the point of standing firm against
all the other virtues. Now a principal virtue is greater than
the difficulty arising from length of time.
its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part of a virtue,
Reply to Objection 2. The perseverance of which the
but is itself a principal virtue.
Philosopher speaks (Ethic. vii, 4,7) does not moderate
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons
any passions, but consists merely in a certain firmness of
perseverance as a part of fortitude.
reason and will. But perseverance, considered as a virtue,
I answer that, As stated above (q. 123, a. 2; Ia IIae,
moderates certain passions, namely fear of weariness or
q. 61, Aa. 3,4), a principal virtue is one to which is prin-
failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like
cipally ascribed something that lays claim to the praise
fortitude, is in the irascible.
of virtue, inasmuch as it practices it in connection with
Reply to Objection 3. Augustine speaks there of per-
its own matter, wherein it is most difficult of accomplish-
severance, as denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous
ment. In accordance with this it has been stated (q. 123,
act sustained to the end, according to Mat. 24:13, “He that
a. 2) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it observes shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved.” Hence it is
firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand
incompatible with such like perseverance for it to be lost,
firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of
since it would no longer endure to the end.
∗ Cf. q. 136, a. 4, ad 2
1809
Whether constancy pertains to perseverance?
IIa IIae q. 137 a. 3
Objection 1. It seems that constancy does not pertain
ance properly makes man persist firmly in good, against
to perseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as
the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the
stated above (q. 137, a. 5): and patience differs from per-
act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good
severance. Therefore constancy does not pertain to perse-
against difficulties arising from any other external hin-
verance.
drances. Hence perseverance takes precedence of con-
Objection 2. Further, “virtue is about the difficult and stancy as a part of fortitude, because the difficulty arising
the good.” Now it does not seem difficult to be constant
from continuance of action is more intrinsic to the act of
in little works, but only in great deeds, which pertain to
virtue than that which arises from external obstacles.
magnificence. Therefore constancy pertains to magnifi-
Reply to Objection 1. External obstacles to persis-
cence rather than to perseverance.
tence in good are especially those which cause sorrow.
Objection 3. Further, if constancy pertained to per-
Now patience is about sorrow, as stated above (q. 136,
severance, it would seem nowise to differ from it, since
a. 1). Hence constancy agrees with perseverance as to end:
both denote a kind of unchangeableness. Yet they dif-
while it agrees with patience as to those things which oc-
fer: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) condivides con-
casion difficulty. Now the end is of most account: where-
stancy with firmness by which he indicates perseverance,
fore constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to pa-
as stated above (q. 128 , a. 6). Therefore constancy does
tience.
not pertain to perseverance.
Reply to Objection 2. It is more difficult to persist
On the contrary, One is said to be constant because
in great deeds: yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is diffi-
one stands to a thing. Now it belongs to perseverance
cult to persist for any length of time, if not on account of
to stand to certain things, as appears from the definition
the greatness of the deed which magnificence considers,
given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy belongs to per-
yet from its very continuance which perseverance regards.
severance.
Hence constancy may pertain to both.
I answer that, Perseverance and constancy agree as
Reply to Objection 3. Constancy pertains to perse-
to end, since it belongs to both to persist firmly in some
verance in so far as it has something in common with it:
good: but they differ as to those things which make it dif-
but it is not the same thing in the point of their difference,
ficult to persist in good. Because the virtue of persever-
as stated in the Article.
Whether perseverance needs the help of grace? ∗
IIa IIae q. 137 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that perseverance does not need
hold that perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we per-
the help of grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated
severe unto the end, in Christ.”
above (a. 1). Now according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii)
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 2; a. 2, ad 3), virtue acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the sole
perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes
inclination of virtue suffices for perseverance. Therefore
the habit of perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this
this does not need the help of grace.
way it needs the gift of habitual grace, even as the other
Objection 2. Further, the gift of Christ’s grace is
infused virtues. Secondly, it may be taken to denote the
greater than the harm brought upon us by Adam, as ap-
act of perseverance enduring until death: and in this sense
pears from Rom. 5:15, seqq. Now “before sin man was
it needs not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous
so framed that he could persevere by means of what he
help of God sustaining man in good until the end of life,
had received,” as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi).
as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 10), when we were
Much more therefore can man, after being repaired by the
treating of grace. Because, since the free-will is change-
grace of Christ, persevere without the help of a further
able by its very nature, which changeableness is not taken
grace.
away from it by the habitual grace bestowed in the present
Objection 3.
Further, sinful deeds are sometimes
life, it is not in the power of the free-will, albeit repaired
more difficult than deeds of virtue: hence it is said in
by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its
the person of the wicked (Wis. 5:7): “We. . . have walked
power to choose this: for it is often in our power to choose
through hard ways.” Now some persevere in sinful deeds
yet not to accomplish.
without the help of another. Therefore man can also per-
Reply to Objection 1. The virtue of perseverance, so
severe in deeds of virtue without the help of grace.
far as it is concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. i): “We
it is a habit, and a habit is a thing one uses at will, it does
∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 10
1810
not follow that a person who has the habit of virtue uses it great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas these, although
unchangeably until death.
the world rage against their constancy, have persevered in
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Correp.
faith.”
et Grat. xi), “it was given to the first man, not to persevere, Reply to Objection 3. Man is able by himself to fall
but to be able to persevere of his free-will: because then
into sin, but he cannot by himself arise from sin without
no corruption was in human nature to make perseverance
the help of grace. Hence by falling into sin, so far as he
difficult. Now, however, by the grace of Christ, the pre-
is concerned man makes himself to be persevering in sin,
destined receive not only the possibility of persevering,
unless he be delivered by God’s grace. On the other hand,
but perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom
by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering
no man threatened, of his own free-will rebelling against
in good, because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore
a threatening God, forfeited so great a happiness and so
he needs the help of grace for that end.
1811
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 138
Of the Vices Opposed to Perseverance
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Of effeminacy;
(2) Of pertinacity.
Whether effeminacy∗ is opposed to perseverance?
IIa IIae q. 138 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that effeminacy is not opposed
who has proved himself unbeaten by toil, to yield to plea-
to perseverance. For a gloss on 1 Cor. 6:9,10, “Nor adul-
sure.” Moreover, pleasure itself is a stronger motive of
terers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind,” ex-
attraction than sorrow, for the lack of pleasure is a motive
pounds the text thus: “Effeminate—i.e. obscene, given to
of withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure privation.
unnatural vice.” But this is opposed to chastity. Therefore
Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7),
effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance.
properly speaking an effeminate man is one who with-
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,
draws from good on account of sorrow caused by lack of
7) that “delicacy is a kind of effeminacy.” But to be deli-
pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion.
cate seems akin to intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is
Reply to Objection 1. This effeminacy is caused in
not opposed to perseverance but to temperance.
two ways. In one way, by custom: for where a man
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,
is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more difficult for
7) that “the man who is fond of amusement is effeminate.”
him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by nat-
Now immoderate fondness of amusement is opposed to
ural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less perse-
eutrapelia, which is the virtue about pleasures of play, as vering through the frailty of his temperament. This is
stated in Ethic. iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed
how women are compared to men, as the Philosopher
to perseverance.
says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore those who are passively
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7)
sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being womanish
that “the persevering man is opposed to the effeminate.”
themselves, as it were.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 137, Aa. 1,2), per-
Reply to Objection 2. Toil is opposed to bodily plea-
severance is deserving of praise because thereby a man
sure: wherefore it is only toilsome things that are a hin-
does not forsake a good on account of long endurance of
drance to pleasures. Now the delicate are those who can-
difficulties and toils: and it is directly opposed to this,
not endure toils, nor anything that diminishes pleasure.
seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on ac-
Hence it is written (Dt. 28:56): “The tender and deli-
count of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is what
cate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set
we understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be
down her foot for. . . softness [Douay: ‘niceness’].” Thus
“soft” if it readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not
delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. But properly speaking
declared to be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for
effeminacy regards lack of pleasures, while delicacy re-
walls yield to the battering-ram. Wherefore a man is not
gards the cause that hinders pleasure, for instance toil or
said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy blows. Hence
the like.
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “it is no won-
Reply to Objection 3. In play two things may be con-
der, if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming
sidered. In the first place there is the pleasure, and thus
pleasures or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he strug-
inordinate fondness of play is opposed to eutrapelia. Sec-gles against them.” Now it is evident that fear of danger
ondly, we may consider the relaxation or rest which is op-
is more impelling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore
posed to toil. Accordingly just as it belongs to effeminacy
Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading “True magna-
to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs
nimity consists of two things: It is inconsistent for one
thereto to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately.
who is not cast down by fear, to be defeated by lust, or
∗ Mollities, literally ‘softness’
1812
Whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance?
IIa IIae q. 138 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that pertinacity is not opposed
pose until he is victorious: for the ancients called ‘vicia’
to perseverance. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that per-
what we call victory.” These the Philosopher (Ethic. vii,
tinacity arises from vainglory. But vainglory is not op-
9) calls ischyrognomones, that is “head-strong,” or idio-posed to perseverance but to magnanimity, as stated above
gnomones, that is “self-opinionated,” because they abide (q. 132, a. 2). Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to per-by their opinions more than they should; whereas the ef-
severance.
feminate man does so less than he ought, and the persever-
Objection 2. Further, if it is opposed to persever-
ing man, as he ought. Hence it is clear that perseverance
ance, this is so either by excess or by deficiency. Now
is commended for observing the mean, while pertinacity
it is not opposed by excess: because the pertinacious also
is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for
yield to certain pleasure and sorrow, since according to
falling short of it.
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) “they rejoice when they
Reply to Objection 1. The reason why a man is too
prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected.” And
persistent in his own opinion, is that he wishes by this
if it be opposed by deficiency, it will be the same as ef-
means to make a show of his own excellence: wherefore
feminacy, which is clearly false. Therefore pertinacity is
this is the result of vainglory as its cause. Now it has been
nowise opposed to perseverance.
stated above (q. 127, a. 2, ad 1; q. 133, a. 2), that opposi-
Objection 3. Further, just as the persevering man per-
tion of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on
sists in good against sorrow, so too do the continent and
their species.
the temperate against pleasures, the brave against fear, and
Reply to Objection 2. The pertinacious man exceeds
the meek against anger. But pertinacity is over-persistence
by persisting inordinately in something against many dif-
in something. Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to per-
ficulties: yet he takes a certain pleasure in the end, just
severance more than to other virtues.
as the brave and the persevering man. Since, however,
On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii)
this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it too much,
that pertinacity is to perseverance as superstition is to re-
and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or
ligion. But superstition is opposed to religion, as stated
effeminate man.
above (q. 92, a. 1). Therefore pertinacity is opposed to
Reply to Objection 3. Although the other virtues per-
perseverance.
sist against the onslaught of the passions, they are not
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) “a per-
commended for persisting in the same way as persever-
son is said to be pertinacious who holds on impudently,
ance is. As to continence, its claim to praise seems to
as being utterly tenacious.” “Pervicacious” has the same
lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is
meaning, for it signifies that a man “perseveres in his pur-
directly opposed to perseverance.
1813
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 139
Of the Gift of Fortitude
(In Two Articles)
We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this is the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fortitude is a gift?
(2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
Whether fortitude is a gift?
IIa IIae q. 139 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For
Ghost, in order that he may attain the end of each work
the virtues differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue.
begun, and avoid whatever perils may threaten. This sur-
Therefore it should not be reckoned a gift.
passes human nature: for sometimes it is not in a man’s
Objection 2. Further, the acts of the gift remain in
power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or
heaven, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 6). But the
dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in
act of fortitude does not remain in heaven: for Gregory
death. But the Holy Ghost works this in man, by bring-
says (Moral. i) that “fortitude encourages the fainthearted
ing him to everlasting life, which is the end of all good
against hardships, which will be altogether absent from
deeds, and the release from all perils. A certain confi-
heaven.” Therefore fortitude is not a gift.
dence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost
Objection 3.
Further, Augustine says (De Doctr.
Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that
Christ. ii) that “it is a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has
from all the deadly pleasures of the passing show.” Now
been stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, Aa. 1,2) that the gifts
noisome pleasures and delights are the concern of tem-
regard the motion of the mind by the Holy Ghost.
perance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that
Reply to Objection 1. Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects
fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of for-
the mind in the endurance of all perils whatever; but it
titude.
does not go so far as to give confidence of overcoming all
On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the
dangers: this belongs to the fortitude that is a gift of the
other gifts of the Holy Ghost (Is. 11:2).
Holy Ghost.
I answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of
Reply to Objection 2. The gifts have not the same
mind, as stated above (q. 123, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 61, a. 3):
acts in heaven as on the way: for they exercise acts in
and this firmness of mind is required both in doing good
connection with the enjoyment of the end. Hence the act
and in enduring evil, especially with regard to goods or
of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from toil and
evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his proper
evil.
and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both
Reply to Objection 3. The gift of fortitude regards the
these respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of
virtue of fortitude not only because it consists in enduring
difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or
dangers, but also inasmuch as it consists in accomplish-
in enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude denotes a
ing any difficult work. Wherefore the gift of fortitude is
special or general virtue, as stated above (q. 123, a. 2).
directed by the gift of counsel, which seems to be con-
Yet furthermore man’s mind is moved by the Holy
cerned chiefly with the greater goods.
Whether the fourth beatitude: “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,”
IIa IIae q. 139 a. 2
corresponds to the gift of fortitude?
Objection 1.
It seems that the fourth beatitude,
Objection 2. Further, hunger and thirst after justice
“Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” does
imply a desire for good. Now this belongs properly to
not correspond to the gift of fortitude. For the gift of piety
charity, to which the gift of wisdom, and not the gift of
and not the gift of fortitude corresponds to the virtue of
fortitude, corresponds, as stated above (q. 45). Therefore
justice. Now hungering and thirsting after justice pertain
this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of fortitude, but
to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude corresponds
to the gift of wisdom.
to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude.
Objection 3. Further, the fruits are consequent upon
1814
the beatitudes, since delight is essential to beatitude, ac-receive the common designation of works of justice, but
cording to Ethic. i, 8. Now the fruits, apparently, include
furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire, which
none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore neither does any
may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.
beatitude correspond to it.
Reply to Objection 1. As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
in Matth.), we may understand here not only particular,
in Monte i): “Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty:
but also universal justice, which is related to all virtuous
since those who desire to enjoy true goods, and wish to
deeds according to Ethic. v, 1, wherein whatever is hard
avoid loving earthly and material things, must toil.”
is the object of that fortitude which is a gift.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 121, a. 2), Au-
Reply to Objection 2. Charity is the root of all the
gustine makes the beatitudes correspond to the gifts ac-
virtues and gifts, as stated above (q. 23, a. 8, ad 3; Ia IIae, cording to the order in which they are set forth, observ-q. 68, a. 4, ad 3). Hence whatever pertains to fortitude
ing at the same time a certain fittingness between them.
may also be referred to charity.
Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning
Reply to Objection 3. There are two of the fruits
the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely
which correspond sufficiently to the gift of fortitude:
fortitude.
namely, patience, which regards the enduring of evils: and
Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because,
longanimity, which may regard the long delay and accom-
as stated (a. 1 ), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it
plishment of goods.
is very difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, which
1815
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 140
Of the Precepts of Fortitude
(In Two Articles)
We must next consider the precepts of fortitude:
(1) The precepts of fortitude itself;
(2) The precepts of its parts.
Whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?
IIa IIae q. 140 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that the precepts of fortitude are cording to the requirements of those goods.
not suitably given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is
Reply to Objection 1. The Old Testament contained
more perfect than the Old Law. Yet the Old Law contains
temporal promises, while the promises of the New Tes-
precepts of fortitude (Dt. 20). Therefore precepts of forti-
tament are spiritual and eternal, according to Augustine
tude should have been given in the New Law also.
(Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there was need
Objection 2.
Further, affirmative precepts are of
for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily
greater import than negative precepts, since the affirma-
contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in
tive include the negative, but not vice versa. Therefore it
the New Testament men were to be taught how to come
is unsuitable for the Divine Law to contain none but neg-
to the possession of eternal life by fighting spiritually, ac-
ative precepts in prohibition of fear.
cording to Mat. 11:12, “The kingdom of heaven suffer-
Objection 3. Further, fortitude is one of the principal
eth violence, and the violent bear it away.” Hence Peter
virtues, as stated above (q. 123, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 61, a. 2).
commands (1 Pet. 5:8,9): “Your adversary the devil, as a
Now the precepts are directed to the virtues as to their end:
roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour:
wherefore they should be proportionate to them. There-
whom resist ye, strong in faith,” as also James 4:7: “Re-
fore the precepts of fortitude should have been placed
sist the devil, and he will fly from you.” Since, however,
among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief
men while tending to spiritual goods may be withdrawn
precepts of the Law.
from them by corporal dangers, precepts of fortitude had
On the contrary, stands Holy Writ which contains
to be given even in the New Law, that they might bravely
these precepts.
endure temporal evils, according to Mat. 10:28, “Fear ye
I answer that, Precepts of law are directed to the end
not them that kill the body.”
intended by the lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must
Reply to Objection 2. The law gives general direc-
needs be framed in various ways according to the various
tions in its precepts. But the things that have to be done
ends intended by lawgivers, so that even in human affairs
in cases of danger are not, like the things to be avoided,
there are laws of democracies, others of kingdoms, and
reducible to some common thing. Hence the precepts of
others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of
fortitude are negative rather than affirmative.
the Divine Law is that man may adhere to God: where-
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 122, a. 1),
fore the Divine Law contains precepts both of fortitude
the precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as
and of the other virtues, with a view to directing the mind
first principles, which need to be known to all from the
to God. For this reason it is written (Dt. 20:3,4): “Fear
outset. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue had to be
ye them not: because the Lord your God is in the midst of
chiefly about those acts of justice in which the notion of
you, and will fight for you against your enemies.”
duty is manifest, and not about acts of fortitude, because
As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly
it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear goods, and among them we find precepts of fortitude ac-dangers of death.
Whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?
IIa IIae q. 140 a. 2
Objection 1. It seems that the precept of the parts
the Divine Law, as also of perseverance. Therefore there
of fortitude are unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For
should also have been precepts of magnificence and mag-
just as patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, so
nanimity.
also are magnificence, magnanimity, and confidence, as
Objection 2. Further, patience is a very necessary
stated above (q. 128). Now we find precepts of patience in
virtue, since it is the guardian of the other virtues, as Gre-
1816
gory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxv). Now the other virtues cellence come under the counsels of perfection rather than
are commanded absolutely. Therefore patience should
under precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need
not have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De
of counsels, rather than of precepts about magnificence
Serm. Dom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the
and magnanimity. On the other hand, the hardships and
mind.
toils of the present life pertain to patience and persever-
Objection 3. Further, patience and perseverance are
ance, not by reason of any greatness observable in them,
parts of fortitude, as stated above (q. 128; q. 136, a. 4;
but on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence
q. 137, a. 2).
Now the precepts of fortitude are not
the need of precepts of patience and perseverance.
affirmative but only negative, as stated above (a. 1, ad
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 3, a. 2),
2). Therefore the precepts of patience and perseverance
although affirmative precepts are always binding, they are
should have been negative and not affirmative.
not binding for always, but according to place and time.
The contrary, however, follows from the way in which
Wherefore just as the affirmative precepts about the other
they are given by Holy Writ.
virtues are to be understood as to the preparedness of the
I answer that, The Divine Law instructs man per-
mind, in the sense that man be prepared to fulfil them
fectly about such things as are necessary for right liv-
when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be
ing.
Now in order to live aright man needs not only
understood in the same way.
the principal virtues, but also the secondary and annexed
Reply to Objection 3. Fortitude, as distinct from
virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not
patience and perseverance, is about the greatest dangers
only about the acts of the principal virtues, but also about
wherein one must proceed with caution; nor is it neces-
the acts of the secondary and annexed virtues.
sary to determine what is to be done in particular. On
Reply to Objection 1. Magnificence and magnanim-
the other hand, patience and perseverance are about mi-
ity do not belong to the genus of fortitude, except by rea-
nor hardships and toils, wherefore there is less danger in
son of a certain excellence of greatness which they regard
determining, especially in general, what is to be done in
in their respective matters. Now things pertaining to ex-
such cases.
1817
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 141
Of Temperance
(In Eight Articles)
In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself; (2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must consider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether temperance is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures?
(4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch?
(5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a kind of touch?
(6) What is the rule of temperance?
(7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue?
(8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues ?
Whether temperance is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 141 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that temperance is not a virtue.
sures are becoming to man which are in accordance with
For no virtue goes against the inclination of nature, since
reason. From such pleasures temperance does not with-
“there is in us a natural aptitude for virtue,” as stated in
draw him, but from those which are contrary to reason.
Ethic. ii, 1. Now temperance withdraws us from plea-
Wherefore it is clear that temperance is not contrary to
sures to which nature inclines, according to Ethic. ii, 3,8.
the inclination of human nature, but is in accord with it.
Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the animal
Objection 2. Further, virtues are connected with one
nature that is not subject to reason.
another, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1). But some
Reply to Objection 2. The temperance which fulfils
people have temperance without having the other virtues:
the conditions of perfect virtue is not without prudence,
for we find many who are temperate, and yet covetous or
while this is lacking to all who are in sin. Hence those
timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
who lack other virtues, through being subject to the op-
Objection 3. Further, to every virtue there is a corre-
posite vices, have not the temperance which is a virtue,
sponding gift, as appears from what we have said above (
though they do acts of temperance from a certain natural
Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 4). But seemingly no gift corresponds to
disposition, in so far as certain imperfect virtues are ei-
temperance, since all the gifts have been already ascribed
ther natural to man, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 63, a. 1),
to the other virtues (Qq. 8,9,19,45,52, 71,139). Therefore
or acquired by habituation, which virtues, through lack of
temperance is not a virtue.
prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated above ( Ia
On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. vi, 15):
IIae, q. 65, a. 1).
“Temperance is the name of a virtue.”
Reply to Objection 3. Temperance also has a cor-
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 3),
responding gift, namely, fear, whereby man is withheld
it is essential to virtue to incline man to good. Now the
from the pleasures of the flesh, according to Ps. 118:120:
good of man is to be in accordance with reason, as Diony-
“Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear.” The gift of fear has
sius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence human virtue is that
for its principal object God, Whom it avoids offending,
which inclines man to something in accordance with rea-
and in this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as
son. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since
stated above (q. 19, a. 9, ad 1). But it may have for its
its very name implies moderation or temperateness, which
secondary object whatever a man shuns in order to avoid
reason causes. Therefore temperance is a virtue.
offending God. Now man stands in the greatest need of
Reply to Objection 1. Nature inclines everything to
the fear of God in order to shun those things which are
whatever is becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally de-
most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance:
sires pleasures that are becoming to him. Since, however,
wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.
man as such is a rational being, it follows that those plea-
1818
Whether temperance is a special virtue?
IIa IIae q. 141 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that temperance is not a
On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomasti-
special virtue. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv)
cally, as withholding the appetite from those things which
that “it belongs to temperance to preserve one’s integrity
are most seductive to man, it is a special virtue, for thus it
and freedom from corruption for God’s sake.” But this is
has, like fortitude, a special matter.
common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a
Reply to Objection 1. Man’s appetite is corrupted
special virtue.
chiefly by those things which seduce him into forsaking
Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42)
the rule of reason and Divine law. Wherefore integrity,
that “what we observe and seek most in temperance is
which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can, like the lat-
tranquillity of soul.” But this is common to every virtue.
ter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and
Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.
secondly in a sense of excellence.
Objection 3. Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that
Reply to Objection 2. The things about which tem-
“we cannot separate the beautiful from the virtuous,” and
perance is concerned have a most disturbing effect on the
that “whatever is just is beautiful.” Now the beautiful is
soul, for the reason that they are natural to man, as we
considered as proper to temperance, according to the same
shall state further on (Aa. 4,5). Hence tranquillity of soul
authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27). Therefore temperance is
is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, although
not a special virtue.
it is a common property of all the virtues.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii,
Reply to Objection 3. Although beauty is becoming
10) reckons it a special virtue.
to every virtue, it is ascribed to temperance, by way of ex-
I answer that, It is customary in human speech to em-
cellence, for two reasons. First, in respect of the generic
ploy a common term in a restricted sense in order to des-
notion of temperance, which consists in a certain moder-
ignate the principal things to which that common term is
ate and fitting proportion, and this is what we understand
applicable: thus the word “city” is used antonomastically∗
by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Sec-
to designate Rome. . Accordingly the word “temperance”
ondly, because the things from which temperance with-
has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its
holds us, hold the lowest place in man, and are becoming
common signification: and thus temperance is not a spe-
to him by reason of his animal nature, as we shall state
cial but a general virtue, because the word “temperance”
further on (Aa. 4,5; q. 142, a. 4), wherefore it is natural
signifies a certain temperateness or moderation, which
that such things should defile him. In consequence beauty
reason appoints to human operations and passions: and
is a foremost attribute of temperance which above all hin-
this is common to every moral virtue. Yet there is a logical
ders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty† is
difference between temperance and fortitude, even if we
a special attribute of temperance: for Isidore says (Etym.
take them both as general virtues: since temperance with-
x): “An honest man is one who has no defilement, for
draws man from things which seduce the appetite from
honesty means an honorable state.” This is most applica-
obeying reason, while fortitude incites him to endure or
ble to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring
withstand those things on account of which he forsakes
most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (q. 142,
the good of reason.
a. 4).
Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures?
IIa IIae q. 141 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that temperance is not
moderate desires and pleasures, which are despised on
only about desires and pleasures. For Tully says (De In-
account of deadly pains and dangers, according to Augus-
vent. Rhet. ii, 54) that “temperance is reason’s firm and
tine (Qq. 83, qu. 36). Therefore it seems that the virtue of
moderate mastery of lust and other wanton emotions of
temperance is not chiefly about desires and pleasures.
the mind.” Now all the passions of the soul are called
Objection 3.
Further, according to Ambrose (De
emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance
Offic. i, 43) “the grace of moderation belongs to temper-
is not only about desires and pleasures.
ance”: and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27) that “it is the con-
Objection 2. Further, “Virtue is about the difficult
cern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the mind
and the good”‡. Now it seems more difficult to temper
and to enforce moderation.” Now moderation is needed,
fear, especially with regard to dangers of death, than to
not only in desires and pleasures, but also in external acts
∗ Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle
† Honesty
must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum
‡ Ethic. ii, 3
1819
and whatever pertains to the exterior. Therefore temper-the passion, viz. fear, which regards flight from bodily
ance is not only about desires and pleasures.
evils, and consequently with daring, which attacks the
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym.)∗: that “it is
objects of fear in the hope of attaining some good, so,
temperance whereby lust and desire are kept under con-
too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is
trol.”
chiefly concerned with those passions that tend towards
I answer that, As stated above (q. 123, a. 12; q. 136,
sensible goods, viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently
a. 1), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of
with the sorrows that arise from the absence of those plea-
reason against the passions that rebel against reason. Now
sures. For just as daring presupposes objects of fear, so
the movement of the soul’s passions is twofold, as stated
too such like sorrow arises from the absence of the afore-
above ( Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 2), when we were treating of the
said pleasures.
passions: the one, whereby the sensitive appetite pursues
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 23,
sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it flies from
Aa. 1,2; Ia IIae, q. 25, a. 1), when we were treating of
sensible and bodily evils.
the passions, those passions which pertain to avoidance of
The first of these movements of the sensitive ap-
evil, presuppose the passions pertaining to the pursuit of
petite rebels against reason chiefly by lack of moderation.
good; and the passions of the irascible presuppose the pas-
Because sensible and bodily goods, considered in their
sions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance di-
species, are not in opposition to reason, but are subject
rectly moderates the passions of the concupiscible which
to it as instruments which reason employs in order to at-
tend towards good, as a consequence, it moderates all the
tain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason
other passions, inasmuch as moderation of the passions
is owing to the fact that the sensitive appetite fails to tend
that precede results in moderation of the passions that fol-
towards them in accord with the mode of reason. Hence
low: since he that is not immoderate in desire is moderate
it belongs properly to moral virtue to moderate those pas-
in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the
sions which denote a pursuit of the good.
things he desires.
On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive ap-
Reply to Objection 2. Desire denotes an impulse of
petite in flying from sensible evil is mostly in opposition
the appetite towards the object of pleasure and this im-
to reason, not through being immoderate, but chiefly in
pulse needs control, which belongs to temperance. on the
respect of its flight: because, when a man flies from sen-
other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind from
sible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany the
certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind,
good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good
which fortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly
of reason. Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man
about desires, and fortitude about fears.
while flying from evil to remain firm in the good of rea-
Reply to Objection 3. External acts proceed from the
son.
internal passions of the soul: wherefore their moderation
Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by
depends on the moderation of the internal passions.
its very nature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with
Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures of touch?
IIa IIae q. 141 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that temperance is not
sires of pleasures of touch.
only about desires and pleasures of touch. For Augustine
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that “the function of temper-
3) that “one who is worthy of small things and deems him-
ance is to control and quell the desires which draw us to
self worthy of them is temperate, but he is not magnifi-
the things which withdraw us from the laws of God and
cent.” Now honors, whether small or great, of which he is
from the fruit of His goodness”; and a little further on he
speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of touch, but
adds that “it is the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily
in the soul’s apprehension. Therefore temperance is not
allurements and popular praise.” Now we are withdrawn
only about desires for pleasures of touch.
from God’s laws not only by the desire for pleasures of
Objection 3.
Further, things that are of the same
touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the other
genus would seem to pertain to the matter of a particu-
senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements,
lar virtue under one same aspect. Now all pleasures of
and again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory:
sense are apparently of the same genus. Therefore they
wherefore it is written (1 Tim. 6:10). “Desire† is the root
all equally belong to the matter of temperance.
of all evils.” Therefore temperance is not only about de-
Objection 4. Further, spiritual pleasures are greater
∗ The words quoted do not occur in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono xxxvii, xlii, and De Different. ii, 39
† ‘Cupiditas,’
which is the Douay version following the Greek philargyria renders ‘desire of money’
1820
than the pleasures of the body, as stated above ( Ia IIae, much more can he control lesser ones. Wherefore it be-q. 31, a. 5) in the treatise on the passions. Now sometimes
longs chiefly and properly to temperance to moderate de-
men forsake God’s laws and the state of virtue through
sires and pleasures of touch, and secondarily other plea-
desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance, through curios-
sures.
ity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised
Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher takes temper-
man knowledge, saying (Gn. 3:5): “Ye shall be as Gods,
ance as denoting moderation in external things, when, to
knowing good and evil.” Therefore temperance is not only
wit, a man tends to that which is proportionate to him, but
about pleasures of touch.
not as denoting moderation in the soul’s emotions, which
Objection 5. Further, if pleasures of touch were the
pertains to the virtue of temperance.
proper matter of temperance, it would follow that temper-
Reply to Objection 3. The pleasures of the other
ance is about all pleasures of touch. But it is not about all,
senses play a different part in man and in other animals.
for instance, about those which occur in games. There-
For in other animals pleasures do not result from the other
fore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of tem-
senses save in relation to sensibles of touch: thus the lion
perance.
is pleased to see the stag, or to hear its voice, in relation to On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10)
his food. On the other hand man derives pleasure from the
that “temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of
other senses, not only for this reason, but also on account
touch.”
of the becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), temperance is
temperance is about the pleasures of the other senses, in
about desires and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is
relation to pleasures of touch, not principally but conse-
about fear and daring. Now fortitude is about fear and dar-
quently: while in so far as the sensible objects of the other
ing with respect to the greatest evils whereby nature itself
senses are pleasant on account of their becomingness, as
is dissolved; and such are dangers of death. Wherefore in
when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized sound, this
like manner temperance must needs be about desires for
pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature.
the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a
Hence these passions are not of such importance that tem-
natural operation, it is so much the greater according as
perance can be referred to them antonomastically.
it results from a more natural operation. Now to animals
Reply to Objection 4. Although spiritual pleasures
the most natural operations are those which preserve the
are by their nature greater than bodily pleasures, they are
nature of the individual by means of meat and drink, and
not so perceptible to the senses, and consequently they
the nature of the species by the union of the sexes. Hence
do not so strongly affect the sensitive appetite, against
temperance is properly about pleasures of meat and drink
whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by moral
and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the
virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly
sense of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is
speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they
about pleasures of touch.
need no control, save accidentally, in so far as one spir-
Reply to Objection 1. In the passage quoted Augus-
itual pleasure is a hindrance to another greater and more
tine apparently takes temperance, not as a special virtue
binding.
having a determinate matter, but as concerned with the
Reply to Objection 5. Not all pleasures of touch re-
moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: and this
gard the preservation of nature, and consequently it does
is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may
not follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch.
also reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures,
Whether temperance is about the pleasures proper to the taste?
IIa IIae q. 141 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that temperance is about
regards the very substance of the food, whereas “savor”
pleasures proper to the taste. For pleasures of the taste
which is the proper object of the taste, is “the pleasing
result from food and drink, which are more necessary to
quality of the food.” Therefore temperance is about the
man’s life than sexual pleasures, which regard the touch.
taste rather than about the touch.
But according to what has been said (a. 4), temperance
Objection 3. Further, according to Ethic. vii, 4,7:
is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human
“temperance and intemperance are about the same things,
life. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to
and so are continence and incontinence, perseverance, and
the taste rather than about those proper to the touch.
effeminacy,” to which delicacy pertains. Now delicacy
Objection 2. Further, temperance is about the pas-
seems to regard the delight taken in savors which are the
sions rather than about things themselves. Now, accord-
object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about plea-
ing to De Anima ii, 3, “the touch is the sense of food,” as
sures proper to the taste.
1821
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) touch. Secondarily, however, temperance and intemper-that “seemingly temperance and intemperance have little
ance are about pleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inas-
if anything to do with the taste.”
much as the sensible objects of these senses conduce to
I answer that, As stated above (a. 4), temperance
the pleasurable use of the necessary things that have rela-
is about the greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the
tion to the touch. But since the taste is more akin to the
preservation of human life either in the species or in the
touch than the other senses are, it follows that temperance
individual. In these matters certain things are to be con-
is more about the taste than about the other senses.
sidered as principal and others as secondary. The prin-
Reply to Objection 1. The use of food and the plea-
cipal thing is the use itself of the necessary means, of
sure that essentially results therefrom pertain to the touch.
the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the
Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3) that “touch
species, or of food and drink which are necessary for the
is the sense of food, for food is hot or cold, wet or dry.” To
preservation of the individual: while the very use of these
the taste belongs the discernment of savors, which make
necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed
the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of its
thereto.
being suitable for nourishment.
In regard to either use we consider as secondary what-
Reply to Objection 2. The pleasure resulting from
ever makes the use more pleasurable, such as beauty and
savor is additional, so to speak, whereas the pleasure of
adornment in woman, and a pleasing savor and likewise
touch results essentially from the use of food and drink.
odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly about the plea-
Reply to Objection 3. Delicacy regards principally
sure of touch, that results essentially from the use of these
the substance of the food, but secondarily it regards its
necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the
delicious savor and the way in which it is served.
Whether the rule of temperance depends on the need of the present life?
IIa IIae q. 141 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the rule of temper-
Now the principal order of reason is that by which it di-
ance does not depend on the needs of the present life. For
rects certain things towards their end, and the good of rea-
higher things are not regulated according to lower. Now,
son consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect
as temperance is a virtue of the soul, it is above the needs
of end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the
of the body. Therefore the rule of temperance does not
end. Now all the pleasurable objects that are at man’s dis-
depend on the needs of the body.
posal, are directed to some necessity of this life as to their
Objection 2. Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins.
end. Wherefore temperance takes the need of this life, as
Therefore if the needs of the body were the rule of tem-
the rule of the pleasurable objects of which it makes use,
perance, it would be a sin against temperance to indulge
and uses them only for as much as the need of this life
in any other pleasure than those required by nature, which
requires.
is content with very little. But this would seem unreason-
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, the need of
able.
this life is regarded as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now
Objection 3. Further, no one sins in observing a rule.
it must be observed that sometimes the end of the worker
Therefore if the need of the body were the rule of temper-
differs from the end of the work, thus it is clear that the
ance, there would be no sin in using any pleasure for the
end of building is a house, whereas sometimes the end of
needs of the body, for instance, for the sake of health. But
the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of tem-
this is apparently false. Therefore the need of the body is
perance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the
not the rule of temperance.
thing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl.
whatever is useful for life is subordinate.
xxi): “In both Testaments the temperate man finds confir-
Reply to Objection 2. The need of human life may
mation of the rule forbidding him to love the things of this
be taken in two ways. First, it may be taken in the sense
life, or to deem any of them desirable for its own sake, and
in which we apply the term “necessary” to that without
commanding him to avail himself of those things with the
which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is necessary to an
moderation of a user not the attachment of a lover, in so
animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something without
far as they are requisite for the needs of this life and of his which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance
station.”
regards not only the former of these needs, but also the
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1; q. 109, a. 2;
latter. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that
q. 123, a. 12), the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in
“the temperate man desires pleasant things for the sake
the order of reason: because “man’s good is to be in ac-
of health, or for the sake of a sound condition of body.”
cord with reason,” as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv).
Other things that are not necessary for this purpose may
1822
be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance regards need according to the requirements of life, and
to health and a sound condition of body; and these tem-
this depends not only on the requirements of the body,
perance makes not use of whatever, for this would be a
but also on the requirements of external things, such as
sin against temperance. But others are not a hindrance to
riches and station, and more still on the requirements of
those things, and these temperance uses moderately, ac-
good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, 11)
cording to the demands of place and time, and in keeping
that “the temperate man makes use of pleasant things pro-
with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philoso-
vided that not only they be not prejudicial to health and a
pher (Ethic. iii, 11) says that the “temperate man also de-
sound bodily condition, but also that they be not inconsis-
sires other pleasant things,” those namely that are not nec-
tent with good,” i.e. good conduct, nor “beyond his sub-
essary for health or a sound condition of body, “so long as
stance,” i.e. his means. And Augustine says (De Morib.
they are not prejudicial to these things.”
Eccl. xxi) that the “temperate man considers the need”
Reply to Objection 3. As stated (ad 2), temperance
not only “of this life” but also “of his station.”
Whether temperance is a cardinal virtue?
IIa IIae q. 141 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that temperance is not a
serves praise principally in pleasures of touch, with which
cardinal virtue. For the good of moral virtue depends on
temperance is concerned, both because these pleasures are
reason. But temperance is about those things that are fur-
most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to abstain
thest removed from reason, namely about pleasures com-
from them, and to control the desire for them, and be-
mon to us and the lower animals, as stated in Ethic. iii,
cause their objects are more necessary to the present life,
10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal
as stated above (a. 4). For this reason temperance is reck-
virtue.
oned a principal or cardinal virtue.
Objection 2. Further, the greater the impetus the more
Reply to Objection 1. The longer the range of its op-
difficult is it to control. Now anger, which is controlled by
eration, the greater is the agent’s power [virtus] shown to
meekness, seems to be more impetuous than desire, which
be: wherefore the very fact that the reason is able to mod-
is controlled by temperance. For it is written (Prov. 27:4):
erate desires and pleasures that are furthest removed from
“Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth;
it, proves the greatness of reason’s power. This is how
and who can bear the violence [impetum] of one pro-
temperance comes to be a principal virtue.
voked?” Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather
Reply to Objection 2. The impetuousness of anger is
than temperance.
caused by an accident, for instance, a painful hurt; where-
Objection 3. Further, hope as a movement of the soul
fore it soon passes, although its impetus be great. On the
takes precedence of desire and concupiscence, as stated
other hand, the impetuousness of the desire for pleasures
above ( Ia IIae, q. 25, a. 4). But humility controls the pre-
of touch proceeds from a natural cause, wherefore it is
sumption of immoderate hope. Therefore, seemingly, hu-
more lasting and more general, and consequently its con-
mility is a principal virtue rather than temperance which
trol regards a more principal virtue.
controls concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 3. The object of hope is higher
On the contrary, Gregory reckons temperance among
than the object of desire, wherefore hope is accounted the
the principal virtues (Moral. ii, 49).
principal passion in the irascible. But the objects of de-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 123, a. 11; q. 61,
sires and pleasures of touch move the appetite with greater
a. 3), a principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it
force, since they are more natural. Therefore temperance,
has a foremost claim to praise on account of one of those
which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal
things that are requisite for the notion of virtue in general.
virtue.
Now moderation, which is requisite in every virtue, de-
Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues?
IIa IIae q. 141 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that temperance is the
greatest of the virtues.
greatest of the virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i,
Objection 2. Further, the more difficult the deed the
43) that “what we observe and seek most in temperance
greater the virtue. Now it is more difficult to control de-
is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and the regard
sires and pleasures of touch than to regulate external ac-
for what is beautiful.” Now virtue deserves praise for be-
tions, the former pertaining to temperance and the latter
ing honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the
to justice. Therefore temperance is a greater virtue than
1823
justice.
justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than tem-
Objection 3. Further, seemingly the more general a
perance: while prudence and the theological virtues are
thing is, the more necessary and the better it is. Now forti-
more excellent still.
tude is about dangers of death which occur less frequently
Reply to Objection 1. Honor and beauty are espe-
than pleasures of touch, for these occur every day; so that
cially ascribed to temperance, not on account of the ex-
temperance is in more general use than fortitude. There-
cellence of the good proper to temperance, but on account
fore temperance is a more excellent virtue than fortitude.
of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it with-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9)
draws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and
that the “greatest virtues are those which are most prof-
the lower animals.
itable to others, for which reason we give the greatest
Reply to Objection 2. Since virtue is about the diffi-
honor to the brave and the just.”
cult and the good, the excellence of a virtue is considered
I answer that, As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i,
more under the aspect of good, wherein justice excels,
2) “the good of the many is more of the godlike than the
than under the aspect of difficult, wherein temperance ex-
good of the individual,” wherefore the more a virtue re-
cels.
gards the good of the many, the better it is. Now jus-
Reply to Objection 3. That which is general because
tice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than
it regards the many conduces more to the excellence of
temperance does, since justice regards the relations be-
goodness than that which is general because it occurs fre-
tween one man and another, while fortitude regards dan-
quently: fortitude excels in the former way, temperance
gers of battle which are endured for the common weal:
in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply, although
whereas temperance moderates only the desires and plea-
in some respects temperance may be described as greater
sures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident that
not only than fortitude but also than justice.
1824
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 142
Of the Vices Opposed to Temperance
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether insensibility is a sin?
(2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin?
(3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity;
(4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices?
Whether insensibility is a vice?
IIa IIae q. 142 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that insensibility is not a
It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes
vice. For those are called insensible who are deficient with
praiseworthy, and even necessary for the sake of an end,
regard to pleasures of touch. Now seemingly it is praise-
to abstain from such pleasures as result from these opera-
worthy and virtuous to be altogether deficient in such mat-
tions. Thus, for the sake of the body’s health, certain per-
ters: for it is written (Dan. 10:2,3): “In those days Daniel
sons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and sex; as also
mourned the days of three weeks, I ate no desirable bread,
for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes
and neither flesh nor wine entered my mouth, neither was
and soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures, in
I anointed with ointment.” Therefore insensibility is not a
order to fulfil their respective duties. In like manner pen-
sin.
itents, in order to recover health of soul, have recourse
Objection 2. Further, “man’s good is to be in accord
to abstinence from pleasures, as a kind of diet, and those
with reason,” according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
who are desirous of giving themselves up to contempla-
Now abstinence from all pleasures of touch is most con-
tion and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal
ducive to man’s progress in the good of reason: for it is
things. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of
written (Dan. 1:17) that “to the children” who took pulse
insensibility, because they are in accord with right reason.
for their food (Dan. 1:12), “God gave knowledge, and
Reply to Objection 1. Daniel abstained thus from
understanding in every book and wisdom.” Therefore in-
pleasures, not through any horror of pleasure as though
sensibility, which rejects these pleasures altogether, is not
it were evil in itself, but for some praiseworthy end, in
sinful.
order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights of contem-
Objection 3. Further, that which is a very effective
plation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence
means of avoiding sin would seem not to be sinful. Now
the text goes on to tell of the revelation that he received
the most effective remedy in avoiding sin is to shun plea-
immediately afterwards.
sures, and this pertains to insensibility. For the Philoso-
Reply to Objection 2. Since man cannot use his rea-
pher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that “if we deny ourselves plea-
son without his sensitive powers. which need a bodily
sures we are less liable to sin.” Therefore there is nothing
organ. as stated in the Ia, q. 84, Aa. 7,8, man needs to sus-
vicious in insensibility.
tain his body in order that he may use his reason. Now the
On the contrary, Nothing save vice is opposed to
body is sustained by means of operations that afford plea-
virtue. Now insensibility is opposed to the virtue of tem-
sure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if
perance according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11).
he abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using plea-
Therefore insensibility is a vice.
sures of the body will be greater or less, according as man
I answer that, Whatever is contrary to the natural or-
needs more or less the powers of his body in accomplish-
der is vicious. Now nature has introduced pleasure into
ing the act of reason. Wherefore it is commendable for
the operations that are necessary for man’s life. Where-
those who undertake the duty of giving themselves to con-
fore the natural order requires that man should make use
templation, and of imparting to others a spiritual good, by
of these pleasures, in so far as they are necessary for man’s
a kind of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from
well-being, as regards the preservation either of the in-
many pleasures, but not for those who are in duty bound
dividual or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were
to bodily occupations and carnal procreation.
to reject pleasure to the extent of omitting things that are
Reply to Objection 3. In order to avoid sin, pleasure
necessary for nature’s preservation, he would sin, as act-
must be shunned, not altogether, but so that it is not sought
ing counter to the order of nature. And this pertains to the
more than necessity requires.
vice of insensibility.
1825
Whether intemperance is a childish sin?
IIa IIae q. 142 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that intemperance is not
to the remedy which is applied to both. For a child is
a childish sin. For Jerome in commenting on Mat. 18:3,
corrected by being restrained; hence it is written (Prov.
“Unless you be converted, and become as little children,”
23:13,14): “Withhold not correction from a child. . . Thou
says that “a child persists not in anger, is unmindful of in-
shalt beat him with a rod, and deliver his soul from Hell.”
juries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful woman,” all
In like manner by resisting concupiscence we moderate it
of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore intem-
according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates
perance is not a childish sin.
this when he says (Music. vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted
Objection 2. Further, children have none but natural
up to spiritual things, and remain fixed “thereon, the im-
desires. Now “in respect of natural desires few sin by in-
pulse of custom,” i.e. carnal concupiscence, “is broken,
temperance,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).
and being suppressed is gradually weakened: for it was
Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.
stronger when we followed it, and though not wholly de-
Objection 3.
Further, children should be fos-
stroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it.” Hence
tered and nourished: whereas concupiscence and plea-
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that “as a child ought
sure, about which intemperance is concerned, are al-
to live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the
ways to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col.
concupiscible to accord with reason.”
3:5, “Mortify. . . your members upon the earth, which
Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes the term
are. . . concupiscence”∗, etc. Therefore intemperance is
“childish” as denoting what is observed in children. It is
not a childish sin.
not in this sense that the sin of intemperance is said to be
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12)
childish, but by way of likeness, as stated above.
that “we apply the term intemperance† to childish faults.”
Reply to Objection 2. A desire may be said to be
I answer that, A thing is said to be childish for two
natural in two ways. First, with regard to its genus, and
reasons. First, because it is becoming to children, and the
thus temperance and intemperance are about natural de-
Philosopher does not mean that the sin of intemperance is
sires, since they are about desires of food and sex, which
childish in this sense. Secondly. by way of likeness, and
are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a de-
it is in this sense that sins of intemperance are said to be
sire may be called natural with regard to the species of the
childish. For the sin of intemperance is one of unchecked
thing that nature requires for its own preservation; and in
concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three ways.
this way it does not happen often that one sins in the mat-
First, as rewards that which they both desire, for like a
ter of natural desires, for nature requires only that which
child concupiscence desires something disgraceful. This
supplies its need, and there is no sin in desiring this, save
is because in human affairs a thing is beautiful according
only where it is desired in excess as to quantity. This is
as it harmonizes with reason. Wherefore Tully says (De
the only way in which sin can occur with regard to natural
Offic. i, 27) under the heading “Comeliness is twofold,”
desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).
that “the beautiful is that which is in keeping with man’s
There are other things in respect of which sins fre-
excellence in so far as his nature differs from other ani-
quently occur, and these are certain incentives to desire
mals.” Now a child does not attend to the order of reason;
devised by human curiosity‡, such as the nice [curiosa]
and in like manner “concupiscence does not listen to rea-
preparation of food, or the adornment of women. And
son,” according to Ethic. vii, 6. Secondly, they are alike
though children do not affect these things much, yet in-
as to the result. For a child, if left to his own will, be-
temperance is called a childish sin for the reason given
comes more self-willed: hence it is written (Ecclus. 30:8):
above.
“A horse not broken becometh stubborn, and a child left
Reply to Objection 3. That which regards nature
to himself will become headstrong.” So, too, concupis-
should be nourished and fostered in children, but that
cence, if indulged, gathers strength: wherefore Augustine
which pertains to the lack of reason in them should not
says (Confess. viii, 5): “Lust served became a custom,
be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.
and custom not resisted became necessity.” Thirdly, as
∗ Vulg.: ‘your members which are upon the earth, fornication. . . concupiscence’
† Akolasia which Aristotle refers to kolazo to punish, so that its original sense would be ‘impunity’ or ‘unrestraint.’
‡ Cf. q. 167
1826
Whether cowardice∗ is a greater vice than intemperance?
IIa IIae q. 142 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that cowardice is a greater
origin in the compulsion of an external agent, so that they
vice than intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach
are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in Ethic. iii,
through being opposed to the good of virtue. Now cow-
1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are sim-
ardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a more excellent
ply voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of
virtue than temperance, as stated above (a. 2; q. 141, a. 8).
an intemperate man are more voluntary individually and
Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.
less voluntary generically. For no one would wish to be
Objection 2. Further, the greater the difficulty to be
intemperate, yet man is enticed by individual pleasures
surmounted, the less is a man to be reproached for failure,
which make of him an intemperate man. Hence the most
wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “it is no
effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell on
wonder, in fact it is pardonable, if a man is mastered by
the consideration of singulars. It is the other way about
strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains.” Now seem-
in matters relating to cowardice: because the particular
ingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other
action that imposes itself on a man is less voluntary, for
passions; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3, that “it is more
instance to cast aside his shield, and the like, whereas the
difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger,
general purpose is more voluntary, for instance to save
which would seem to be stronger than fear.” Therefore
himself by flight. Now that which is more voluntary in
intemperance, which is overcome by pleasure, is a less
the particular circumstances in which the act takes place,
grievous sin than cowardice, which is overcome by fear.
is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being
Objection 3. Further, it is essential to sin that it be
simply more voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice.
voluntary. Now cowardice is more voluntary than intem-
Thirdly, because it is easier to find a remedy for intem-
perance, since no man desires to be intemperate, whereas
perance than for cowardice, since pleasures of food and
some desire to avoid dangers of death, which pertains to
sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are of every-
cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more grievous sin
day occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger
than intemperance.
by frequent practice in their regard to become temperate;
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12)
whereas dangers of death are of rare occurrence, and it is
that “intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action
more dangerous for man to encounter them frequently in
than cowardice.” Therefore it is more sinful.
order to cease being a coward.
I answer that, one may be compared with another in
Reply to Objection 1. The excellence of fortitude in
two ways. First, with regard to the matter or object; sec-
comparison with temperance may be considered from two
ondly, on the part of the man who sins: and in both ways
standpoints. First, with regard to the end, which has the
intemperance is a more grievous sin than cowardice.
aspect of good: because fortitude is directed to the com-
First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dan-
mon good more than temperance is. And from this point
gers of death, to avoid which the principal motive is the
of view cowardice has a certain precedence over intem-
necessity of preserving life. On the other hand, intem-
perance, since by cowardice some people forsake the de-
perance is about pleasures, the desire of which is not so
fense of the common good. Secondly, with regard to the
necessary for the preservation of life, because, as stated
difficulty, because it is more difficult to endure dangers
above (a. 2, ad 2), intemperance is more about certain an-
of death than to refrain from any pleasures whatever: and
nexed pleasures or desires than about natural desires or
from this point of view there is no need for cowardice to
pleasures. Now the more necessary the motive of sin the
take precedence of intemperance. For just as it is a greater
less grievous the sin. Wherefore intemperance is a more
strength that does not succumb to a stronger force, so on
grievous vice than cowardice, on the part of the object or
the other hand to be overcome by a stronger force is proof
motive matter.
of a lesser vice, and to succumb to a weaker force, is the
In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins,
proof of a greater vice.
and this for three reasons. First, because the more sound-
Reply to Objection 2. Love of self-preservation, for
minded a man is, the more grievous his sin, wherefore sins
the sake of which one shuns perils of death, is much more
are not imputed to those who are demented. Now grave
connatural than any pleasures whatever of food and sex
fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of death, stun the
which are directed to the preservation of life. Hence it is
human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive of
more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of death,
intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin
than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex:
the graver it is. Now intemperance has more of the vol-
although the latter is more difficult to resist than anger,
untary in it than cowardice has, and this for two reasons.
sorrow, and fear, occasioned by certain other evils.
The first is because actions done through fear have their
Reply to Objection 3. The voluntary, in cowardice,
∗ Cf. q. 125
1827
depends rather on a general than on a particular consider-simply but in a restricted sense.
ation: wherefore in such cases we have the voluntary not
Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of sins?
IIa IIae q. 142 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that intemperance is not
and the lower animals, as stated above (q. 141, Aa. 2,3).
the most disgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so
Wherefore it is written (Ps. 48:21): “Man, when he was
is disgrace due to sin. Now some sins are more grievous
in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to
than intemperance: for instance murder, blasphemy, and
senseless beasts, and made like to them.” Secondly, be-
the like. Therefore intemperance is not the most disgrace-
cause it is most repugnant to man’s clarity or beauty; inas-
ful of sins.
much as the pleasures which are the matter of intemper-
Objection 2. Further, those sins which are the more
ance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and
common are seemingly less disgraceful, since men are
beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are de-
less ashamed of them. Now sins of intemperance are most
scribed as being most slavish.
common, because they are about things connected with
Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory says∗, “the sins of
the common use of human life, and in which many hap-
the flesh,” which are comprised under the head of intem-
pen to sin. Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to
perance, although less culpable, are more disgraceful. The
be most disgraceful.
reason is that culpability is measured by inordinateness in
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,
respect of the end, while disgrace regards shamefulness,
6) temperance and intemperance are about human desires
which depends chiefly on the unbecomingness of the sin
and pleasures. Now certain desires and pleasures are more
in respect of the sinner.
shameful than human desires and pleasures; such are bru-
Reply to Objection 2. The commonness of a sin di-
tal pleasures and those caused by disease as the Philoso-
minishes the shamefulness and disgrace of a sin in the
pher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not
opinion of men, but not as regards the nature of the vices
the most disgraceful of sins.
themselves.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10)
Reply to Objection 3. When we say that intemper-
that “intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach
ance is most disgraceful, we mean in comparison with hu-
than other vices.”
man vices, those, namely, that are connected with human
I answer that, Disgrace is seemingly opposed to
passions which to a certain extent are in conformity with
honor and glory. Now honor is due to excellence, as stated
human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode
above (q. 103, a. 1), and glory denotes clarity (q. 103, a. 1,
of human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless
ad 3). Accordingly intemperance is most disgraceful for
such vices are apparently reducible to the genus of intem-
two reasons. First, because it is most repugnant to hu-
perance, by way of excess: for instance, if a man delight
man excellence, since it is about pleasures common to us
in eating human flesh, or in committing the unnatural vice.
∗ Moral. xxxiii. 12
1828
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 143
Of the Parts of Temperance, in General
(In One Article)
We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular.
Whether the parts of temperance are rightly assigned?
IIa IIae q. 143 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that Tully (De Invent.
to the power of procreation, and in these as regards the
Rhet. ii, 54) unbecomingly assigns the parts of temper-
principal pleasure of the act itself of procreation, there is
ance, when he asserts them to be “continence, mildness,
“chastity,” and as to the pleasures incidental to the act, re-
and modesty.” For continence is reckoned to be distinct
sulting, for instance, from kissing, touching, or fondling,
from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is com-
we have “purity.”
prised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of
The potential parts of a principal virtue are called sec-
temperance.
ondary virtues: for while the principal virtue observes the
Objection 2. Further, mildness seemingly softens ha-
mode in some principal matter, these observe the mode in
tred or anger. But temperance is not about these things,
some other matter wherein moderation is not so difficult.
but about pleasures of touch, as stated above (q. 141, a. 4).
Now it belongs to temperance to moderate pleasures of
Therefore mildness is not a part of temperance.
touch, which are most difficult to moderate. Wherefore
Objection 3. Further, modesty concerns external ac-
any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter
tion, wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): “Let your
or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards
modesty be known to all men.” Now external actions are
something, may be reckoned a part of temperance, as a
the matter of justice, as stated above (q. 58, a. 8). There-
virtue annexed thereto.
fore modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.
This happens in three ways: first, in the inward move-
Objection 4. Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8)
ments of the soul; secondly, in the outward movements
reckons many more parts of temperance: for he says that
and actions of the body; thirdly, in outward things. Now
“temperance results in modesty, shamefacedness, absti-
besides the movement of concupiscence, which temper-
nence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness, sobriety,
ance moderates and restrains, we find in the soul three
purity.” Andronicus also says∗ that “the companions of
movements towards a particular object. In the first place
temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity,
there is the movement of the will when stirred by the im-
refinement, method, contentment.Ӡ Therefore it seems
pulse of passion: and this movement is restrained by “con-
that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.
tinence,” the effect of which is that, although a man suffer
I answer that, As stated above (Qq. 48,128), a cardi-
immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succumb to
nal virtue may have three kinds of parts, namely integral,
them. Another inward movement towards something is
subjective, and potential. The integral parts of a virtue
the movement of hope, and of the resultant daring, and
are the conditions the concurrence of which are neces-
this is moderated or restrained by “humility.” The third
sary for virtue: and in this respect there are two integral
movement is that of anger, which tends towards revenge,
parts of temperance, “shamefacedness,” whereby one re-
and this is restrained by “meekness” or “mildness.”
coils from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and
With regard to bodily movements and actions, moder-
“honesty,” whereby one loves the beauty of temperance.
ation and restraint is the effect of “modesty,” which, ac-
For, as stated above (q. 141, a. 2, ad 3), temperance more
cording to Andronicus, has three parts. The first of these
than any other virtue lays claim to a certain comeliness,
enables one to discern what to do and what not to do, and
and the vices of intemperance excel others in disgrace.
to observe the right order, and to persevere in what we
The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and
do: this he assigns to “method.” The second is that a man
the species of a virtue have to be differentiated accord-
observe decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to
ing to the difference of matter or object. Now temper-
“refinement.” The third has to do with the conversation or
ance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two kinds.
any other intercourse between a man and his friends, and
For some are directed to nourishment: and in these as
this is called “gravity.”
regards meat, there is “abstinence,” and as regards drink
With regard to external things, a twofold moderation
properly there is “sobriety.” Other pleasures are directed
has to be observed. First, we must not desire too many,
∗ De Affectibus
† ‘Per-se-sufficientiam’ which could be rendered
‘self-sufficiency,’ but for the fact that this is taken in a bad sense. See q. 169, a. 1.
1829
and to this Macrobius assigns “lowliness,” and Androni-Reply to Objection 2. Mildness or meekness is reck-
cus “contentment”; secondly, we must not be too nice in
oned a part of temperance not because of a likeness of
our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes “moder-
matter, but because they agree as to the mode of restraint
ation,” Andronicus “simplicity.”
and moderation as stated above.
Reply to Objection 1. It is true that continence dif-
Reply to Objection 3. In the matter of external action
fers from virtue, just as imperfect differs from perfect, as
justice considers what is due to another. Modesty does not
we shall state further on (q. 165, a. 1); and in this sense
consider this, but only a certain moderation. Hence it is
it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has something in com-
reckoned a part not of justice but of temperance.
mon with temperance both as to matter, since it is about
Reply to Objection 4. Under modesty Tully includes
pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of
whatever pertains to the moderation of bodily movements
restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temper-
and external things, as well as the moderation of hope
ance.
which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.
1830
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 144
Of Shamefacedness
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in the first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and honesty. With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
(2) What is its object?
(3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed?
(4) What kind of people are ashamed?
Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 144 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue.
iv, 9) that shamefacedness is not a virtue.
For it is proper to a virtue “to observe the mean as fixed
I answer that, Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict
by reason”: this is clear from the definition of virtue given
sense and in a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a per-
in Ethic. ii, 6. Now shamefacedness observes the mean in
fection, as stated in Phys. vii, 17,18. Wherefore any-
this way, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ii, 7). There-
thing that is inconsistent with perfection, though it be
fore shamefacedness is a virtue.
good, falls short of the notion of virtue. Now shame-
Objection 2. Further, whatever is praiseworthy is ei-
facedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the
ther a virtue or something connected with virtue. Now
fear of something base, namely of that which is disgrace-
shamefacedness is praiseworthy. But it is not part of a
ful. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that
virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, since it is not in the
“shamefacedness is fear of a base action.” Now just as
reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part of justice. since
hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is fear about
shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas justice
a possible and arduous evil, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 40,
is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of fortitude, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 41, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 42, a. 3), when we were because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and aggres-treating of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a
sive, while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from
virtuous habit, does not apprehend that which would be
something; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the
disgraceful and base to do, as being possible and arduous,
latter is about desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind
that is to say difficult for him to avoid; nor does he actually of fear according as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9)
do anything base, so as to be in fear of disgrace. Therefore
and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Hence it follows
shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue, since
that shamefacedness is a virtue.
it falls short of the perfection of virtue.
Objection 3. Further, the honest and the virtuous are
Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes what-
convertible according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now
ever is good and praiseworthy in human acts or passions;
shamefacedness is a part of honesty: for Ambrose says
and in this way /shamefacedness is sometimes called a
(De Offic. i, 43) that “shamefacedness is the companion
virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion.
and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness, a
Reply to Objection 1. Observing the mean is not suf-
stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and
ficient for the notion of virtue, although it is one of the
the support of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful.”
conditions included in virtue’s definition: but it is requi-
Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
site, in addition to this, that it be “an elective habit,” that Objection 4.
Further, every vice is opposed to a
is to say, operating from choice. Now shamefacedness
virtue. Now certain vices are opposed to shamefacedness,
denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its movement
namely shamelessness and inordinate prudery. Therefore
result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence
shamefacedness is a virtue.
it falls short of the notion of virtue.
Objection 5. Further, “like acts beget like habits,” ac-
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, shamefaced-
cording to Ethic. ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a
ness is fear of baseness and disgrace. Now it has been
praiseworthy act; wherefore from many such acts a habit
stated (q. 142, a. 4) that the vice of intemperance is most
results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is a virtue,
base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness pertains
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore
more to temperance than to any other virtue, by reason
shamefacedness is a virtue.
of its motive cause, which is a base action though not ac-
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7;
cording to the species of the passion, namely fear. Never-
1831
theless in so far as the vices opposed to other virtues are a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence shamelessness, in so
base and disgraceful, shamefacedness may also pertain to
far as it results from excessive love of disgraceful things,
other virtues.
is opposed to temperance.
Reply to Objection 3. Shamefacedness fosters hon-
Reply to Objection 5.
Being frequently ashamed
esty, by removing that which is contrary thereto, but not
causes the habit of an acquired virtue whereby one avoids
so as to attain to the perfection of honesty.
disgraceful things which are the object of shamefaced-
Reply to Objection 4. Every defect causes a vice, but
ness, without continuing to be ashamed in their regard:
not every good is sufficient for the notion of virtue. Con-
although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man
sequently it does not follow that whatever is directly op-
would be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of
posed to vice is a virtue, although every vice is opposed to
shamefacedness.
Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action?
IIa IIae q. 144 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that shamefacedness is
and for this reason the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that
not about a disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says
such evils are not a matter of fear.
(Ethic. iv, 9) that “shamefacedness is fear of disgrace.”
The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and
Now sometimes those who do nothing wrong suffer ig-
it consists in the reproach that attaches to a person, just
nominy, according to Ps.
67:8, “For thy sake I have
as the clarity of glory consists in a person being honored.
borne reproach, shame hath covered my face.” Therefore
And since this reproach has the character of an arduous
shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
evil, just as honor has the character of an arduous good,
Objection 2. Further, nothing apparently is disgrace-
shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards first
ful but what is sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that
and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach
are not sins, for instance when he performs a menial oc-
is properly due to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows
cupation. Therefore it seems that shamefacedness is not
that shamefacedness regards also the disgrace inherent to
properly about a disgraceful action.
vice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that “a man
Objection 3. Further, virtuous deeds are not disgrace-
is less ashamed of those defects which are not the result
ful but most beautiful according to Ethic. i, 8. Yet some-
of any fault of his own.”
times people are ashamed to do virtuous deeds, accord-
Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In
ing to Lk. 9:26, “He that shall be ashamed of Me and
one way a man refrains from vicious acts through fear of
My words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed,” etc.
reproach: in another way a man while doing a disgraceful
Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful ac-
deed avoids the public eye through fear of reproach. In
tion.
the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa (Neme-
Objection 4. Further, if shamefacedness were prop-
sius, De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person “blushing,”
erly about a disgraceful action, it would follow that the
in the latter we say that he is “ashamed.” Hence he says
more disgraceful the action the more ashamed would one
that “the man who is ashamed acts in secret, but he who
be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser sins,
blushes fears to be disgraced.”
while he glories in those which are most grievous, accord-
Reply to Objection 1. Shamefacedness properly re-
ing to Ps. 51:3, “Why dost thou glory in malice?” There-
gards disgrace as due to sin which is a voluntary defect.
fore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful
Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that “a man is
action.
more ashamed of those things of which he is the cause.”
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15)
Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is
and Gregory of Nyssa∗ say that “shamefacedness is fear
subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve
of doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done.”
it; as the Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv,
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 41, a. 2; Ia 3). Thus we find it said of the apostles (Acts 5:41) that
IIae, q. 42, a. 3), when we were treating of the passions,
“they (the apostles) went from the presence of the coun-
fear is properly about an arduous evil, one, namely, that is
cil, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer
difficult to avoid. Now disgrace is twofold. There is the
reproach for the name of Jesus.” It is owing to imper-
disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the deformity
fection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the
of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has not the
reproaches which he suffers on account of virtue, since
character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on
the more virtuous a man is, the more he despises external
the will alone does not appear to be arduous and above
things, whether good or evil. Wherefore it is written (Is.
man’s ability: wherefore it is not apprehended as fearful,
51:7): “Fear ye not the reproach of men.”
∗ Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)
1832
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 63, a. 3), upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or be-though honor is not really due save to virtue alone, yet
cause he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or
it regards a certain excellence: and the same applies to
hypocritical for doing virtuous deeds.
reproach, for though it is properly due to sin alone, yet,
Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes more grievous sins
at least in man’s opinion, it regards any kind of defect.
are less shameful, either because they are less disgraceful,
Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude,
as spiritual sins in comparison with sins of the flesh, or be-
and the like.
cause they connote a certain abundance of some temporal
Reply to Objection 3. Shamefacedness does not re-
good; thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice than of
gard virtuous deeds as such. Yet it happens accidentally
daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a semblance
that a man is ashamed of them either because he looks
of power. The same applies to other sins.
Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him?
IIa IIae q. 144 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that man is not more
person ashamed. Now a person’s attestation may be con-
shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with
sidered as being more weighty, either because he is cer-
him. For it is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that “men are more
tain of the truth or because of its effect. Certitude of the
shamefaced of those from whom they desire approbation.”
truth attaches to a person’s attestations for two reasons.
Now men desire this especially from people of the better
First on account of the rectitude of his judgement, as in
sort who are sometimes not connected with them. There-
the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man is more
fore man is not more shamefaced of those who are more
desirous of being honored and by whom he is brought to a
closely connected with him.
greater sense of shame. Hence children and the lower ani-
Objection 2.
Further, seemingly those are more
mals inspire no one with shame, by reason of their lack of
closely connected who perform like deeds. Now man is
judgment. Secondly, on account of his knowledge of the
not made ashamed of his sin by those whom he knows to
matter attested, because “everyone judges well of what is
be guilty of the same sin, because according to Rhet. ii,
known to him”∗. In this way we are more liable to be
6, “a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does him-
made ashamed by persons connected with us, since they
self.” Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who
are better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers
are most closely connected with him.
and persons entirely unknown to us, who are ignorant of
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
what we do, inspire us with no shame at all.
6) that “men take more shame from those who retail their
An attestation receives weight from its effect by rea-
information to many, such as jokers and fable-tellers.” But
son of some advantage or harm resulting therefrom;
those who are more closely connected with a man do not
wherefore men are more desirous of being honored by
retail his vices. Therefore one should not take shame
those who can be of use to them, and are more liable to
chiefly from them.
be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some
Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
harm. And for this reason again, in a certain respect, per-
6) that “men are most liable to be made ashamed by those
sons connected with us make us more ashamed, since we
among whom they have done nothing amiss; by those
are to be continually in their society, as though this en-
of whom they ask something for the first time; by those
tailed a continual harm to us: whereas the harm that comes
whose friends they wish to become.” Now these are less
from strangers and passersby ceases almost at once.
closely connected with us. Therefore man is not made
Reply to Objection 1. People of the better sort make
most ashamed by those who are more closely united to
us ashamed for the same reason as those who are more
him.
closely connected with us; because just as the attestation
On the contrary, It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that “man
of the better men carries more weight since they have a
is made most ashamed by those who are to be continually
more universal knowledge of things, and in their judg-
with him.”
ments hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of
I answer that, Since reproach is opposed to honor,
those among whom we live is more cogent since they
just as honor denotes attestation to someone’s excellence,
know more about our concerns in detail.
especially the excellence which is according to virtue, so
Reply to Objection 2. We fear not the attestation of
too reproach, the fear of which is shamefacedness, de-
those who are connected with us in the likeness of sin, be-
notes attestation to a person’s defect, especially that which
cause we do not think that they look upon our defect as
results from sin. Hence the more weighty a person’s attes-
disgraceful.
tation is considered to be, the more does he make another
Reply to Objection 3. Tale-bearers make us ashamed
∗ Ethic. i, 3
1833
on account of the harm they do by making many think ill seems greater, so that when a man notices something dis-of us.
graceful in one whom he esteemed good, he apprehends
Reply to Objection 4. Even those among whom we
it as being the more disgraceful. The reason why we are
have done no wrong, make us more ashamed, on account
made more ashamed by those of whom we ask something
of the harm that would follow, because, to wit, we should
for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be, is that
forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again because
we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our
when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition
request, or by failing to become their friends.
Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed?
IIa IIae q. 144 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that even virtuous men
them. Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as im-
can be ashamed. For contraries have contrary effects.
possible to themselves, or as easy to avoid. In this way the
Now those who excel in wickedness are not ashamed, ac-
old and the virtuous are not shamefaced. Yet they are so
cording to Jer. 3:3, “Thou hadst a harlot’s forehead, thou
disposed, that if there were anything disgraceful in them
wouldst not blush.” Therefore those who are virtuous are
they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore the Philosopher
more inclined to be ashamed.
says (Ethic. iv, 9) that “shame is in the virtuous hypothet-
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
ically.”
6) that “men are ashamed not only of vice, but also of
Reply to Objection 1. Lack of shame occurs in the
the signs of evil”: and this happens also in the virtuous.
best and in the worst men through different causes, as
Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.
stated in the Article. In the average men it is found, in
Objection 3. Further, shamefacedness is “fear of dis-
so far as they have a certain love of good, and yet are not
grace”∗. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignomin-
altogether free from evil.
ious, for instance if they are slandered, or if they suffer
Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to the virtuous man
reproach undeservedly. Therefore a virtuous man can be
to avoid not only vice, but also whatever has the sem-
ashamed.
blance of vice, according to 1 Thess. 5:22, “From all
Objection 4. Further, shamefacedness is a part of tem-
appearance of evil refrain yourselves.” The Philosopher,
perance, as stated above (q. 143). Now a part is not sepa-
too, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should avoid
rated from its whole. Since then temperance is in a virtu-
“not only what is really evil, but also those things that are
ous man, it means that shamefacedness is also.
regarded as evil.”
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9)
Reply to Objection 3.
As stated above (a. 1, ad
that a “virtuous man is not shamefaced.”
1) the virtuous man despises ignominy and reproach, as
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2) shamefaced-
being things he does not deserve, wherefore he is not
ness is fear of some disgrace. Now it may happen in two
much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain extent,
ways that an evil is not feared: first, because it is not reck-
shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason.
oned an evil; secondly because one reckons it impossible
Reply to Objection 4. Shamefacedness is a part of
with regard to oneself, or as not difficult to avoid.
temperance, not as though it entered into its essence, but
Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two
as a disposition to it: wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic.
ways. First, because the things that should make him
i, 43) that “shamefacedness lays the first foundation of
ashamed are not deemed by him to be disgraceful; and in
temperance,” by inspiring man with the horror of what-
this way those who are steeped in sin are without shame,
ever is disgraceful.
for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast of
∗ Ethic. iv, 9
1834
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 145
Of Honesty∗
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous;
(2) Its relation with the beautiful†;
(3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant;
(4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance?
Whether honesty is the same as virtue?
IIa IIae q. 145 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that honesty is not the
for the sake of something else, such as happiness which
same as virtue. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53)
is the last end; while some are desired, not only for their
that “the honest is what is desired for its own sake.” Now
own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in
virtue is desired, not for its own sake, but for the sake
themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through
of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that
them, but also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as
“happiness is the reward and the end of virtue.” Therefore
they are conducive to some more perfect good. It is thus
honesty is not the same as virtue.
that the virtues are desirable for their own sake: where-
Objection 2. Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x)
fore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52) that “some things
“honesty means an honorable state.” Now honor is due to
allure us by their own force, and attract us by their own
many things besides virtue, since “it is praise that is the
worth, such as virtue, truth, knowledge.” And this suffices
proper due of virtue” (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore honesty is
to give a thing the character of honest.
not the same as virtue.
Reply to Objection 2. Some of the things which
Objection 3. Further, the “principal part of virtue is
are honored besides virtue are more excellent than virtue,
the interior choice,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii,
namely God and happiness, and such like things are not so
13). But honesty seems to pertain rather to exterior con-
well known to us by experience as virtue which we prac-
duct, according to 1 Cor. 14:40, “Let all things be done
tice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the
decently [honeste] and according to order” among you.
name of honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue
Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
are honored, in so far as they are a help to the practice
Objection 4.
Further, honesty apparently consists
of virtue, such as rank, power, and riches§. For as the
in external wealth. According to Ecclus. 11:14, “good
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that these things “are hon-
things and evil, life and death [poverty and riches] are
ored by some people, but in truth it is only the good man
from God”‡.
But virtue does not consist in external
who is worthy of honor.” Now a man is good in respect
wealth. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
of virtue. Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as
On the contrary, Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53)
the latter is desirable for the sake of something else, while
divides honesty into the four principal virtues, into which
honor is due to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that
virtue is also divided. Therefore honesty is the same as
virtue has the character of honesty.
virtue.
Reply to Objection 3. As we have stated honest de-
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) “honesty
notes that to which honor is due. Now honor is an attes-
means an honorable state,” wherefore a thing may be said
tation to someone’s excellence, as stated above (q. 103,
to be honest through being worthy of honor. Now honor,
Aa. 1,2). But one attests only to what one knows; and
as stated above (q. 144, a. 2, ad 2), is due to excellence:
the internal choice is not made known save by external
and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according to
actions. Wherefore external conduct has the character of
his virtue, as stated in Phys. vii, 17. Therefore, properly
honesty, in so far as it reflects internal rectitude. For this
speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as virtue.
reason honesty consists radically in the internal choice,
Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher
but its expression lies in the external conduct.
(Ethic. i, 7), of those things that are desired for their own
Reply to Objection 4. It is because the excellence of
sake, some are desired for their own sake alone, and never
wealth is commonly regarded as making a man deserving
∗ Honesty Must Be Taken Here in Its Broad Sense As Synonymous with Moral Goodness, From the Point of View of Decorum.
† As honesty
here denotes moral goodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty
‡ The
words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition. For riches the Vulgate has ‘honestas’
§ Ethic. i, 8
1835
of honor, that sometimes the name of honesty is given to external prosperity.
Whether the honest is the same as the beautiful?
IIa IIae q. 145 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the honest is not the
the spiritual clarity of reason. Now this is what is meant
same as the beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived
by honesty, which we have stated (a. 1) to be the same
from the appetite, since the honest is “what is desirable for
as virtue; and it is virtue that moderates according to rea-
its own sake”∗. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty
son all that is connected with man. Wherefore “honesty
of vision to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful
is the same as spiritual beauty.” Hence Augustine says
is not the same as the honest.
(Qq. 83, qu. 30): “By honesty I mean intelligible beauty,
Objection 2. Further, beauty requires a certain clar-
which we properly designate as spiritual,” and further on
ity, which is characteristic of glory: whereas the honest
he adds that “many things are beautiful to the eye, which
regards honor. Since then honor and glory differ, as stated
it would be hardly proper to call honest.”
above (q. 103, a. 1, ad 3), it seems also that the honest and
Reply to Objection 1. The object that moves the ap-
the beautiful differ.
petite is an apprehended good. Now if a thing is perceived
Objection 3. Further, honesty is the same as virtue,
to be beautiful as soon as it is apprehended, it is taken
as stated above (a. 1). But a certain beauty is contrary to
to be something becoming and good. Hence Dionysius
virtue, wherefore it is written (Ezech. 16:15): “Trusting in
says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the beautiful and the good are
thy beauty thou playest the harlot because of thy renown.”
beloved by all.” Wherefore the honest, inasmuch as it im-
Therefore the honest is not the same as the beautiful.
plies spiritual beauty, is an object of desire, and for this
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:23,24):
reason Tully says (De Offic. i, 5): “Thou perceivest the
“Those that are our uncomely [inhonesta] parts, have
form and the features, so to speak, of honesty; and were it
more abundant comeliness [honestatem], but our comely
to be seen with the eye, would, as Plato declares, arouse a
[honesta] parts have no need.” Now by uncomely parts he
wondrous love of wisdom.”
means the baser members, and by comely parts the beau-
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 103, a. 1,
tiful members. Therefore the honest and the beautiful are
ad 3), glory is the effect of honor: because through being
apparently the same.
honored or praised, a person acquires clarity in the eyes
I answer that, As may be gathered from the words of
of others. Wherefore, just as the same thing makes a man
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), beauty or comeliness results
honorable and glorious, so is the same thing honest and
from the concurrence of clarity and due proportion. For
beautiful.
he states that God is said to be beautiful, as being “the
Reply to Objection 3. This argument applies to the
cause of the harmony and clarity of the universe.” Hence
beauty of the body: although it might be replied that to
the beauty of the body consists in a man having his bodily
be proud of one’s honesty is to play the harlot because of
limbs well proportioned, together with a certain clarity of
one’s spiritual beauty, according to Ezech. 28:17, “Thy
color. In like manner spiritual beauty consists in a man’s
heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast lost thy wis-
conduct or actions being well proportioned in respect of
dom in thy beauty.”
Whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant?
IIa IIae q. 145 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the honest does not
riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written
differ from the useful and the pleasant. For the honest is
(Ecclus. 11:14): “Poverty and riches [honestas] are from
“what is desirable for its own sake”†. Now pleasure is
God,” and (Ecclus. 13:2): “He shall take a burden upon
desired for its own sake, for “it seems ridiculous to ask
him that hath fellowship with one more honorable,” i.e.
a man why he wishes to be pleased,” as the Philosopher
richer, “than himself.” Therefore the honest differs not
remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore the honest does not differ
from the useful.
from the pleasant.
Objection 3. Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3)
Objection 2. Further, riches are comprised under the
that nothing can be useful unless it be honest: and Am-
head of useful good: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii,
brose makes the same statement (De Offic. ii, 6). There-
52): “There is a thing that attracts the desire not by any
fore the useful differs not from the honest.
force of its own, nor by its very nature, but on account
On the contrary, Augustine says (q. 83, qu. 30): “The
of its fruitfulness and utility”: and “that is money.” Now
honest is that which is desirable for its own sake: the use-
∗ Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53
† Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53
1836
ful implies reference to something else.”
referred to something else. The pleasant, however, ex-
I answer that, The honest concurs in the same subject
tends to more things than the useful and the honest: since
with the useful and the pleasant, but it differs from them
whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect,
in aspect. For, as stated above (a. 2), a thing is said to be
whereas the converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3).
honest, in so far as it has a certain beauty through being
Reply to Objection 1. A thing is said to be honest,
regulated by reason. Now whatever is regulated in accor-
if it is desired for its own sake by the rational appetite.
dance with reason is naturally becoming to man. Again, it
which tends to that which is in accordance with reason:
is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is be-
while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is desired for its
coming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleas-
own sake by the sensitive appetite.
ing to man: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to
Reply to Objection 2. Riches are denominated hon-
acts of virtue (Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is
esty according of the opinion of the many who honor
honest, since a thing may be becoming according to the
wealth: or because they are intended to be the instruments
senses, but not according to reason. A pleasing thing of
of virtuous deeds, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2).
this kind is beside man’s reason which perfects his nature.
Reply to Objection 3. Tully and Ambrose mean to
Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is referred
say that nothing incompatible with honesty can be sim-
to something else as its end namely happiness. Accord-
ply and truly useful, since it follows that it is contrary to
ingly the honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in the
man’s last end, which is a good in accordance with rea-
one subject.
son; although it may perhaps be useful in some respect,
Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said
with regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to
to be honest as having a certain excellence deserving of
say that every useful thing as such may be classed among
honor on account of its spiritual beauty: while it is said
those that are honest.
to be pleasing, as bringing rest to desire, and useful, as
Whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance?
IIa IIae q. 145 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that honesty should not
to temperance, since the latter repels that which is most
be reckoned a part of temperance. For it is not possible
disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal lusts.
for a thing to be part and whole in respect of one same
Hence by its very name temperance is most significative
thing. Now “temperance is a part of honesty,” according
of the good of reason to which it belongs to moderate
to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore honesty is
and temper evil desires. Accordingly honesty, as being
not a part of temperance.
ascribed for a special reason to temperance, is reckoned
Objection 2.
Further, it is stated (3 Esdra 3:21)
as a part thereof, not as a subjective part, nor as an an-
that “wine. . . makes all thoughts honest.” But the use of
nexed virtue, but as an integral part or condition attaching
wine, especially in excess, in which sense the passage
thereto.
quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains to intemper-
Reply to Objection 1. Temperance is accounted a
ance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not
subjective part of honesty taken in a wide sense: it is not
a part of temperance.
thus that the latter is reckoned a part of temperance.
Objection 3. Further, the honest is that which is de-
Reply to Objection 2. When a man is intoxicated,
serving of honor. Now “it is the just and the brave who
“the wine makes his thoughts honest” according to his
receive most honor,” according to the Philosopher (Rhet.
own reckoning because he deems himself great and de-
i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to temperance, but
serving of honor†.
rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar said as
Reply to Objection 3. Greater honor is due to jus-
related in 2 Macc. 6:28: “I suffer an honorable [honesta]
tice and fortitude than to temperance, because they excel
death, for the most venerable and most holy laws.”
in the point of a greater good: yet greater honor is due
On the contrary, Macrobius∗ reckons honesty a part
to temperance, because the vices which it holds in check
of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes
are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above. Thus
honesty as pertaining especially to temperance.
honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), honesty is a
to the rule given by the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23) when he
kind of spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed
says that “our uncomely parts have more abundant come-
to the beautiful: and opposites are most manifest of one
liness,” which, namely, destroys whatever is uncomely.
another. Wherefore seemingly honesty belongs especially
∗ In Somn. Scip. i
† Cf. q. 148, a. 6
1837
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 146
Of Abstinence
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those which are about pleasures of food; secondly, those which are about pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence, which is about meat and drink, and sobriety, which is specifically about drink.
With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered: (1) Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its opposite vice which is gluttony. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether abstinence is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
Whether abstinence is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 146 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that abstinence is not a virtue.
a virtuous act, but something indifferent. Secondly, it may
For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): “The kingdom of God
be taken as regulated by reason, and then it signifies either
is not in speech but in power [virtute].” Now the king-
a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is the meaning of
dom of God does not consist in abstinence, for the Apos-
Peter’s words quoted above, where he says that we ought
tle says (Rom. 14:17): “The kingdom of God is not meat
“to join abstinence with knowledge,” namely that in ab-
and drink,” where a gloss∗ observes that “justice consists
staining from food a man should act with due regard for
neither in abstaining nor in eating.” Therefore abstinence
those among whom he lives, for his own person, and for
is not a virtue.
the requirements of health.
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Confess. x,
Reply to Objection 1. The use of and abstinence from
11) addressing himself to God: “This hast Thou taught
food, considered in themselves, do not pertain to the king-
me, that I should set myself to take food as physic.” Now
dom of God, since the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:8): “Meat
it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical art to regu-
doth not commend us to God. For neither, if we eat not†,
late medicine. Therefore, in like manner, to regulate one’s
shall we have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the
food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue
more,” i.e. spiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to
but of art.
the kingdom of God, in so far as they are done reasonably
Objection 3.
Further, every virtue “observes the
through faith and love of God.
mean,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 6,7. But abstinence seem-
Reply to Objection 2. The regulation of food, in
ingly inclines not to the mean but to deficiency, since it de-
the point of quantity and quality, belongs to the art of
notes retrenchment. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.
medicine as regards the health of the body: but in the
Objection 4.
Further, no virtue excludes another
point of internal affections with regard to the good of rea-
virtue. But abstinence excludes patience: for Gregory
son, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine says (QQ.
says (Pastor. iii, 19) that “impatience not unfrequently
Evang. ii, qu. 11): “It makes no difference whatever to
dislodges the abstainer’s mind from its peaceful seclu-
virtue what or how much food a man takes, so long as he
sion.” Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that “sometimes
does it with due regard for the people among whom he
the sin of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer,” so
lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of his
that abstinence excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is
health: but it matters how readily and uncomplainingly
not a virtue.
he does without food when bound by duty or necessity to
On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 1:5,6): “Join
abstain.”
with your faith virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and
Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to temperance to bri-
with knowledge abstinence”; where abstinence is num-
dle the pleasures which are too alluring to the soul, just as
bered among other virtues.
Therefore abstinence is a
it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the soul against fears
virtue.
that deter it from the good of reason. Wherefore, just as
I answer that, Abstinence by its very name denotes
fortitude is commended on account of a certain excess,
retrenchment of food. Hence the term abstinence may be
from which all the parts of fortitude take their name, so
taken in two ways. First, as denoting retrenchment of food
temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from
absolutely, and in this way it signifies neither a virtue nor
which all its parts are denominated. Hence abstinence,
∗ Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11
† Vulg.: ‘Neither if we
eat. . . nor if we eat not’
1838
since it is a part of temperance, is named from deficiency, stinence in so far as it is not in accord with right reason.
and yet it observes the mean, in so far as it is in accord
For right reason makes one abstain as one ought, i.e. with
with right reason.
gladness of heart, and for the due end, i.e. for God’s glory
Reply to Objection 4. Those vices result from ab-
and not one’s own.
Whether abstinence is a special virtue?
IIa IIae q. 146 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that abstinence is not
reason, there is need of a special virtue. Now pleasures of
a special virtue. For every virtue is praiseworthy by it-
the table are of a nature to withdraw man from the good of
self. But abstinence is not praiseworthy by itself; for Gre-
reason, both because they are so great, and because food
gory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that “the virtue of abstinence is
is necessary to man who needs it for the maintenance of
praised only on account of the other virtues.” Therefore
life, which he desires above all other things. Therefore
abstinence is not a special virtue.
abstinence is a special virtue.
Objection 2. Further, Augustine∗ says (De Fide ad
Reply to Objection 1. Virtues are of necessity con-
Pet. xlii) that “the saints abstain from meat and drink,
nected together, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1).
not that any creature of God is evil, but merely in order
Wherefore one virtue receives help and commendation
to chastise the body.” Now this belongs to chastity, as its
from another, as justice from fortitude. Accordingly in
very name denotes. Therefore abstinence is not a special
this way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation
virtue distinct from chastity.
on account of the other virtues.
Objection 3. Further, as man should be content with
Reply to Objection 2.
The body is chastised by
moderate meat, so should he be satisfied with moder-
means of abstinence, not only against the allurements of
ate clothes, according to 1 Tim. 6:8, “Having food, and
lust, but also against those of gluttony: since by abstain-
wherewith to be covered, with these we should be [Vulg.:
ing a man gains strength for overcoming the onslaughts
‘are’] content.” Now there is no special virtue in being
of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields to
content with moderate clothes. Neither, therefore, is there
them. Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special
in abstinence which moderates food.
virtue through being a help to chastity, since one virtue
On the contrary, Macrobius† reckons abstinence as a
helps another.
special part of temperance.
Reply to Objection 3. The use of clothing was de-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 136, a. 1; q. 141,
vised by art, whereas the use of food is from nature.
a. 3) moral virtue maintains the good of reason against
Hence it is more necessary to have a special virtue for the
the onslaught of the passions: hence whenever we find a
moderation of food than for the moderation of clothing.
special motive why a passion departs from the good of
∗ Fulgentius
† In Somn. Scip. i, 8
1839
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 147
Of Fasting
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider fasting: under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue?
(2) Of what virtue is it the act?
(3) Whether it is a matter of precept?
(4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this precept?
(5) The time of fasting;
(6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once?
(7) The hour of eating for those who fast;
(8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain.
Whether fasting is an act of virtue?
IIa IIae q. 147 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that fasting is not an act
Thirdly, in order to satisfy for sins: wherefore it is writ-
of virtue. For every act of virtue is acceptable to God. But
ten (Joel 2:12): “Be converted to Me with all your heart,
fasting is not always acceptable to God, according to Is.
in fasting and in weeping and in mourning.” The same is
58:3, “Why have we fasted and Thou hast not regarded?”
declared by Augustine in a sermon (De orat. et Jejun.‡):
Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
“Fasting cleanses the soul, raises the mind, subjects one’s
Objection 2. Further, no act of virtue forsakes the
flesh to the spirit, renders the heart contrite and humble,
mean of virtue. Now fasting forsakes the mean of virtue,
scatters the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the fire of
which in the virtue of abstinence takes account of the ne-
lust, kindles the true light of chastity.”
cessity of supplying the needs of nature, whereas by fast-
Reply to Objection 1. An act that is virtuous generi-
ing something is retrenched therefrom: else those who do
cally may be rendered vicious by its connection with cer-
not fast would not have the virtue of abstinence. Therefore
tain circumstances. Hence the text goes on to say: “Be-
fasting is not an act of virtue.
hold in the day of your fast your own will is founded,”
Objection 3. Further, that which is competent to all,
and a little further on (Is. 58:4): “You fast for debates and
both good and evil, is not an act of virtue. Now such is
strife and strike with the fist wickedly.” These words are
fasting, since every one is fasting before eating. There-
expounded by Gregory (Pastor. iii, 19) as follows: “The
fore fasting is not an act of virtue.
will indicates joy and the fist anger. In vain then is the
On the contrary, It is reckoned together with other
flesh restrained if the mind allowed to drift to inordinate
virtuous acts (2 Cor. 6:5,6) where the Apostle says: “In
movements be wrecked by vice.” And Augustine says
fasting, in knowledge, in chastity, etc. [Vulg.: ‘in chastity,
(in the same sermon) that “fasting loves not many words,
in knowledge’].”
deems wealth superfluous, scorns pride, commends hu-
I answer that, An act is virtuous through being di-
mility, helps man to perceive what is frail and paltry.”
rected by reason to some virtuous [honestum]∗ good.
Reply to Objection 2. The mean of virtue is measured
Now this is consistent with fasting, because fasting is
not according to quantity but according to right reason, as
practiced for a threefold purpose. First, in order to bri-
stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Now reason judges it expedient,
dle the lusts of the flesh, wherefore the Apostle says (2
on account of some special motive, for a man to take less
Cor. 6:5,6): “In fasting, in chastity,” since fasting is the
food than would be becoming to him under ordinary cir-
guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome† “Venus
cumstances, for instance in order to avoid sickness, or in
is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not there,” that is to
order to perform certain bodily works with greater ease:
say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and drink. Sec-
and much more does reason direct this to the avoidance
ondly, we have recourse to fasting in order that the mind
of spiritual evils and the pursuit of spiritual goods. Yet
may arise more freely to the contemplation of heavenly
reason does not retrench so much from one’s food as to
things: hence it is related (Dan. 10) of Daniel that he re-
refuse nature its necessary support: thus Jerome says:§ “It
ceived a revelation from God after fasting for three weeks.
matters not whether thou art a long or a short time in de-
∗ Cf. q. 145, a. 1
† Contra Jov. ii.
‡ Serm. lxxii (ccxxx, de
Tempore)
§ The quotation is from the Corpus of Canon Law (Cap.
Non mediocriter, De Consecrationibus, dist. 5). Gratian there ascribes the quotation to St. Jerome, but it is not to be found in the saint’s works.
1840
stroying thyself, since to afflict the body immoderately, Reply to Objection 3. The fasting of nature, in re-whether by excessive lack of nourishment, or by eating or
spect of which a man is said to be fasting until he partakes
sleeping too little, is to offer a sacrifice of stolen goods.”
of food, consists in a pure negation, wherefore it cannot
In like manner right reason does not retrench so much
be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is only the fasting of one
from a man’s food as to render him incapable of fulfill-
who abstains in some measure from food for a reasonable
ing his duty. Hence Jerome says (in the same reference)
purpose. Hence the former is called natural fasting [jeju-
“Rational man forfeits his dignity, if he sets fasting before
nium jejunii]∗: while the latter is called the faster’s fast,
chastity, or night-watchings before the well-being of his
because he fasts for a purpose.
senses.”
Whether fasting is an act of abstinence?
IIa IIae q. 147 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that fasting is not an act
mean is appointed by abstinence. Wherefore it is evident
of abstinence. For Jerome† commenting on Mat. 17:20,
that fasting is an act of abstinence.
“This kind of devil” says: “To fast is to abstain not only
Reply to Objection 1. Properly speaking fasting con-
from food but also from all manner of lusts.” Now this be-
sists in abstaining from food, but speaking metaphorically
longs to every virtue. Therefore fasting is not exclusively
it denotes abstinence from anything harmful, and such es-
an act of abstinence.
pecially is sin.
Objection 2.
Further, Gregory says in a Lenten
We may also reply that even properly speaking fast-
Homily (xvi in Evang.) that “the Lenten fast is a tithe of
ing is abstinence from all manner of lust, since, as stated
the whole year.” Now paying tithes is an act of religion,
above (a. 1, ad 1), an act ceases to be virtuous by the con-
as stated above (q. 87, a. 1). Therefore fasting is an act of
junction of any vice.
religion and not of abstinence.
Reply to Objection 2. Nothing prevents the act of one
Objection 3. Further, abstinence is a part of temper-
virtue belonging to another virtue, in so far as it is directed ance, as stated above (Qq. 143,146, a. 1, ad 3). Now
to the end of that virtue, as explained above (q. 32, a. 1, ad
temperance is condivided with fortitude, to which it be-
2; q. 85, a. 3). Accordingly there is no reason why fasting
longs to endure hardships, and this seems very applicable
should not be an act of religion, or of chastity, or of any
to fasting. Therefore fasting is not an act of abstinence.
other virtue.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that
Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to fortitude as a spe-
“fasting is frugality of fare and abstinence from food.”
cial virtue, to endure, not any kind of hardship, but only
I answer that, Habit and act have the same matter.
those connected with the danger of death. To endure hard-
Wherefore every virtuous act about some particular mat-
ships resulting from privation of pleasure of touch, be-
ter belongs to the virtue that appoints the mean in that
longs to temperance and its parts: and such are the hard-
matter. Now fasting is concerned with food, wherein the
ships of fasting.
Whether fasting is a matter of precept?
IIa IIae q. 147 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that fasting is not a mat-
tian people, that is, of the free multitude, should be bound
ter of precept. For precepts are not given about works of
together in subjection to one God.” Now the liberty of the
supererogation which are a matter of counsel. Now fast-
Christian people seems to be hindered by a great number
ing is a work of supererogation: else it would have to be
of observances no less than by a great number of sacra-
equally observed at all places and times. Therefore fasting
ments. For Augustine says (Ad inquis. Januar., Ep. lv)
is not a matter of precept.
that “whereas God in His mercy wished our religion to be
Objection 2. Further, whoever infringes a precept
distinguished by its freedom and the evidence and small
commits a mortal sin. Therefore if fasting were a mat-
number of its solemn sacraments, some people render it
ter of precept, all who do not fast would sin mortally, and
oppressive with slavish burdens.” Therefore it seems that
a widespreading snare would be laid for men.
the Church should not have made fasting a matter of pre-
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig.
cept.
17) that “the Wisdom of God having taken human nature,
On the contrary, Jerome (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi) speak-
and called us to a state of freedom, instituted a few most
ing of fasting says: “Let each province keep to its own
salutary sacraments whereby the community of the Chris-
practice, and look upon the commands of the elders as
∗ Literally the ‘fast of fasting’
† The quotation is from the Ordinary
Gloss, where the reference is lacking
1841
though they were laws of the apostles.” Therefore fasting appoint certain fasts to be kept by all in common. In do-is a matter of precept.
ing this the Church does not make a precept of a matter of
I answer that, Just as it belongs to the secular au-
supererogation, but particularizes in detail that which is of
thority to make legal precepts which apply the natural
general obligation.
law to matters of common weal in temporal affairs, so it
Reply to Objection 2. Those commandments which
belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to prescribe by statute
are given under the form of a general precept, do not bind
those things that concern the common weal of the faithful
all persons in the same way, but subject to the require-
in spiritual goods.
ments of the end intended by the lawgiver. It will be a
Now it has been stated above (a. 1) that fasting is use-
mortal sin to disobey a commandment through contempt
ful as atoning for and preventing sin, and as raising the
of the lawgiver’s authority, or to disobey it in such a way
mind to spiritual things. And everyone is bound by the
as to frustrate the end intended by him: but it is not a mor-
natural dictate of reason to practice fasting as far as it is
tal sin if one fails to keep a commandment, when there is
necessary for these purposes. Wherefore fasting in gen-
a reasonable motive, and especially if the lawgiver would
eral is a matter of precept of the natural law, while the
not insist on its observance if he were present. Hence it is
fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and
that not all, who do not keep the fasts of the Church, sin
profitable to the Christian people, is a matter of precept
mortally.
of positive law established by ecclesiastical authority: the
Reply to Objection 3. Augustine is speaking there
latter is the Church fast, the former is the fast prescribed
of those things “that are neither contained in the author-
by nature.
ities of Holy Scripture, nor found among the ordinances
Reply to Objection 1. Fasting considered in itself de-
of bishops in council, nor sanctioned by the custom of
notes something not eligible but penal: yet it becomes el-
the universal Church.” On the other hand, the fasts that
igible in so far as it is useful to some end. Wherefore
are of obligation are appointed by the councils of bishops
considered absolutely it is not binding under precept, but
and are sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church.
it is binding under precept to each one that stands in need
Nor are they opposed to the freedom of the faithful, rather
of such a remedy. And since men, for the most part, need
are they of use in hindering the slavery of sin, which is
this remedy, both because “in many things we all offend”
opposed to spiritual freedom, of which it is written (Gal.
(James 3:2), and because “the flesh lusteth against the
5:13): “You, brethren, have been called unto liberty; only
spirit” (Gal. 5:17), it was fitting that the Church should
make not liberty an occasion to the flesh.”
Whether all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church?
IIa IIae q. 147 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that all are bound to keep
of the Church ought not to be omitted on account of a pil-
the fasts of the Church. For the commandments of the
grimage, or bodily works.
Church are binding even as the commandments of God,
Objection 4. Further, it is better to do a thing will-
according to Lk. 10:16, “He that heareth you heareth Me.”
ingly than through necessity, as stated in 2 Cor. 9:7. Now
Now all are bound to keep the commandments of God.
the poor are wont to fast through necessity, owing to lack
Therefore in like manner all are bound to keep the fasts
of food. Much more therefore ought they to fast willingly.
appointed by the Church.
On the contrary, It seems that no righteous man is
Objection 2. Further, children especially are seem-
bound to fast. For the commandments of the Church are
ingly not exempt from fasting, on account of their age:
not binding in opposition to Christ’s teaching. But our
for it is written (Joel 2:15): “Sanctify a fast,” and further
Lord said (Lk. 5:34) that “the children of the bridegroom
on (Joel 2:16): “Gather together the little ones, and them
cannot fast whilst the bridegroom is with them∗.” Now He
that suck the breasts.” Much more therefore are all others
is with all the righteous by dwelling in them in a special
bound to keen the fasts.
manner†, wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 28:20): “Behold
Objection 3. Further, spiritual things should be pre-
I am with you. . . even to the consummation of the world.”
ferred to temporal, and necessary things to those that are
Therefore the righteous are not bound by the command-
not necessary. Now bodily works are directed to temporal
ment of the Church to fast.
gain; and pilgrimages, though directed to spiritual things,
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 90, a. 2; Ia are not a matter of necessity. Therefore, since fasting is
IIae, q. 98, Aa. 2,6), general precepts are framed accord-
directed to a spiritual gain, and is made a necessary thing
ing to the requirements of the many. Wherefore in making
by the commandment of the Church, it seems that the fasts
such precepts the lawgiver considers what happens gener-
∗ Vulg.: ‘Can you make the children of the bridegroom fast, whilst the bridegroom is with them?’
† Cf. Ia, q. 8, a. 3
1842
ally and for the most part, and he does not intend the pre-under the necessity of starting on the pilgrimage at once,
cept to be binding on a person in whom for some special
and of making long stages, or of doing much work, either
reason there is something incompatible with observance
for one’s bodily livelihood, or for some need of the spir-
of the precept. Yet discretion must be brought to bear on
itual life, and it be impossible at the same time to keep
the point. For if the reason be evident, it is lawful for a
the fasts of the Church, one is not bound to fast: because
man to use his own judgment in omitting to fulfil the pre-
in ordering fasts the Church would not seem to have in-
cept, especially if custom be in his favor, or if it be difficult tended to prevent other pious and more necessary under-for him to have recourse to superior authority. on the other
takings. Nevertheless, in such cases one ought seemingly,
hand, if the reason be doubtful, one should have recourse
to seek the superior’s dispensation; except perhaps when
to the superior who has power to grant a dispensation in
the above course is recognized by custom, since when su-
such cases. And this must be done in the fasts appointed
periors are silent they would seem to consent.
by the Church, to which all are bound in general, unless
Reply to Objection 4.
Those poor who can pro-
there be some special obstacle to this observance.
vide themselves with sufficient for one meal are not ex-
Reply to Objection 1. The commandments of God
cused, on account of poverty, from keeping the fasts of
are precepts of the natural law, which are, of themselves,
the Church. On the other hand, those would seem to be
necessary for salvation. But the commandments of the
exempt who beg their food piecemeal, since they are un-
Church are about matters which are necessary for salva-
able at any one time to have a sufficiency of food.
tion, not of themselves, but only through the ordinance of
Reply to Objection 5. This saying of our Lord may
the Church. Hence there may be certain obstacles on ac-
be expounded in three ways. First, according to Chrysos-
count of which certain persons are not bound to keep the
tom (Hom. xxx in Matth.), who says that “the disciples,
fasts in question.
who are called children of the bridegroom, were as yet of
Reply to Objection 2. In children there is a most
a weakly disposition, wherefore they are compared to an
evident reason for not fasting, both on account of their
old garment.” Hence while Christ was with them in body
natural weakness, owing to which they need to take food
they were to be fostered with kindness rather than drilled
frequently, and not much at a time, and because they
with the harshness of fasting. According to this interpre-
need much nourishment owing to the demands of growth,
tation, it is fitting that dispensations should be granted to
which results from the residuum of nourishment. Where-
the imperfect and to beginners, rather than to the elders
fore as long as the stage of growth lasts, which as a rule
and the perfect, according to a gloss on Ps. 130:2, “As
lasts until they have completed the third period of seven
a child that is weaned is towards his mother.” Secondly,
years, they are not bound to keep the Church fasts: and
we may say with Jerome∗ that our Lord is speaking here
yet it is fitting that even during that time they should ex-
of the fasts of the observances of the Old Law. Wherefore
ercise themselves in fasting, more or less, in accordance
our Lord means to say that the apostles were not to be held
with their age. Nevertheless when some great calamity
back by the old observances, since they were to be filled
threatens, even children are commanded to fast, in sign of
with the newness of grace. Thirdly, according to Augus-
more severe penance, according to Jonah 3:7, “Let neither
tine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27), who states that fasting
men nor beasts. . . taste anything. . . nor drink water.”
is of two kinds. one pertains to those who are humbled
Reply to Objection 3.
Apparently a distinction
by disquietude, and this is not befitting perfect men, for
should be made with regard to pilgrims and working peo-
they are called “children of the bridegroom”; hence when
ple. For if the pilgrimage or laborious work can be conve-
we read in Luke: “The children of the bridegroom cannot
niently deferred or lessened without detriment to the bod-
fast†,” we read in Mat. 9:15: “The children of the bride-
ily health and such external conditions as are necessary
groom cannot mourn‡.” The other pertains to the mind
for the upkeep of bodily or spiritual life, there is no rea-
that rejoices in adhering to spiritual things: and this fast-
son for omitting the fasts of the Church. But if one be
ing is befitting the perfect.
Whether the times for the Church fast are fittingly ascribed?
IIa IIae q. 147 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the times for the
Christ.” Therefore we ought to fast immediately after the
Church fast are unfittingly appointed. For we read (Mat.
Epiphany when Christ’s baptism is celebrated.
4) that Christ began to fast immediately after being bap-
Objection 2. Further, it is unlawful in the New Law to
tized. Now we ought to imitate Christ, according to 1
observe the ceremonies of the Old Law. Now it belongs to
Cor.
4:16, “Be ye followers of me, as I also am of
the solemnities of the Old Law to fast in certain particular
∗ Bede, Comment. in Luc. v
† Hom. xiii, in Matth.
‡ Vulg.: ‘Can
the children of the bridegroom mourn?’
1843
months: for it is written (Zech. 8:19): “The fast of the body through whose lusts we transgress the Lord’s com-fourth month and the fast of the fifth, and the fast of the
mandments which are delivered to us in the Decalogue.
seventh, and the fast of the tenth shall be to the house of
Wherefore it is fitting we should punish that same body
Judah, joy and gladness and great solemnities.” Therefore
forty times. or, because, just as under the Law it was com-
the fast of certain months, which are called Ember days,
manded that tithes should be paid of things, so we strive
are unfittingly kept in the Church.
to pay God a tithe of days, for since a year is composed of
Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine (De
three hundred and sixty-six days, by punishing ourselves
Consensu Evang. ii, 27), just as there is a fast “of sorrow,”
for thirty-six days” (namely, the fasting days during the
so is there a fast “of joy.” Now it is most becoming that the
six weeks of Lent) “we pay God a tithe of our year.” Ac-
faithful should rejoice spiritually in Christ’s Resurrection.
cording to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 16) a fourth
Therefore during the five weeks which the Church solem-
reason may be added. For the Creator is the “Trinity,”
nizes on account of Christ’s Resurrection, and on Sundays
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: while the number “three”
which commemorate the Resurrection, fasts ought to be
refers to the invisible creature, since we are commanded
appointed.
to love God, with our whole heart, with our whole soul,
On the contrary, stands the general custom of the
and with our whole mind: and the number “four” refers to
Church.
the visible creature, by reason of heat, cold, wet and dry.
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,3), fasting is di-
Thus the number “ten”‡ signifies all things, and if this be
rected to two things, the deletion of sin, and the raising of
multiplied by four which refers to the body whereby we
the mind to heavenly things. Wherefore fasting ought to
make use of things, we have the number forty.
be appointed specially for those times, when it behooves
Each fast of the Ember days is composed of three days,
man to be cleansed from sin, and the minds of the faithful
on account of the number of months in each season: or on
to be raised to God by devotion: and these things are par-
account of the number of Holy orders which are conferred
ticularly requisite before the feast of Easter, when sins are
at these times.
loosed by baptism, which is solemnly conferred on Easter-
Reply to Objection 1. Christ needed not baptism for
eve, on which day our Lord’s burial is commemorated,
His own sake, but in order to commend baptism to us.
because “we are buried together with Christ by baptism
Wherefore it was competent for Him to fast, not before,
unto death” (Rom. 6:4). Moreover at the Easter festival
but after His baptism, in order to invite us to fast before
the mind of man ought to be devoutly raised to the glory
our baptism.
of eternity, which Christ restored by rising from the dead,
Reply to Objection 2. The Church keeps the Ember
and so the Church ordered a fast to be observed immedi-
fasts, neither at the very same time as the Jews, nor for the
ately before the Paschal feast; and for the same reason, on
same reasons. For they fasted in July, which is the fourth
the eve of the chief festivals, because it is then that one
month from April (which they count as the first), because
ought to make ready to keep the coming feast devoutly.
it was then that Moses coming down from Mount Sinai
Again it is the custom in the Church for Holy orders to be
broke the tables of the Law (Ex. 32), and that, accord-
conferred every quarter of the year (in sign whereof our
ing to Jer. 39:2, “the walls of the city were first broken
Lord fed four thousand men with seven loaves, which sig-
through.” In the fifth month, which we call August, they
nify the New Testament year as Jerome says∗): and then
fasted because they were commanded not to go up on to
both the ordainer, and the candidates for ordination, and
the mountain, when the people had rebelled on account
even the whole people, for whose good they are ordained,
of the spies (Num. 14): also in this month the temple of
need to fast in order to make themselves ready for the or-
Jerusalem was burnt down by Nabuchodonosor (Jer. 52)
dination. Hence it is related (Lk. 6:12) that before choos-
and afterwards by Titus. In the seventh month which we
ing His disciples our Lord “went out into a mountain to
call October, Godolias was slain, and the remnants of the
pray”: and Ambrose† commenting on these words says:
people were dispersed (Jer. 51). In the tenth month, which
“What shouldst thou do, when thou desirest to undertake
we call January, the people who were with Ezechiel in
some pious work, since Christ prayed before sending His
captivity heard of the destruction of the temple (Ezech.
apostles?”
4).
With regard to the forty day’s fast, according to Gre-
Reply to Objection 3. The “fasting of joy” proceeds
gory (Hom. xvi in Evang.) there are three reasons for
from the instigation of the Holy Ghost Who is the Spirit
the number. First, “because the power of the Decalogue
of liberty, wherefore this fasting should not be a mat-
is accomplished in the four books of the Holy Gospels:
ter of precept. Accordingly the fasts appointed by the
since forty is the product of ten multiplied by four.” Or
commandment of the Church are rather “fasts of sorrow”
“because we are composed of four elements in this mortal
which are inconsistent with days of joy. For this reason
∗ Comment. in Marc. viii
† Exposit. in Luc.
‡ Ten is the sum of
three, three, and four
1844
fasting is not ordered by the Church during the whole of opinion (thus the Manichees fast, because they deem such
the Paschal season, nor on Sundays: and if anyone were to
fasting to be of obligation)—he would not be free from
fast at these times in contradiction to the custom of Chris-
sin. Nevertheless fasting considered in itself is commend-
tian people, which as Augustine declares (Ep. xxxvi) “is
able at all times; thus Jerome wrote (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi):
to be considered as law,” or even through some erroneous
“Would that we might fast always.”
Whether it is requisite for fasting that one eat but once?
IIa IIae q. 147 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not requisite for
take one meal in the day.
fasting that one eat but once. For, as stated above (a. 2),
Reply to Objection 1. It was not possible to fix the
fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, which ob-
same quantity of food for all, on account of the vari-
serves due quantity of food not less than the number of
ous bodily temperaments, the result being that one person
meals. Now the quantity of food is not limited for those
needs more, and another less food: whereas, for the most
who fast. Therefore neither should the number of meals
part, all are able to satisfy nature by only one meal.
be limited.
Reply to Objection 2. Fasting is of two kinds∗. One
Objection 2. Further, Just as man is nourished by
is the natural fast, which is requisite for receiving the Eu-
meat, so is he by drink: wherefore drink breaks the fast,
charist. This is broken by any kind of drink, even of wa-
and for this reason we cannot receive the Eucharist after
ter, after which it is not lawful to receive the Eucharist.
drinking. Now we are not forbidden to drink at various
The fast of the Church is another kind and is called the
hours of the day. Therefore those who fast should not be
“fasting of the faster,” and this is not broken save by such
forbidden to eat several times.
things as the Church intended to forbid in instituting the
Objection 3. Further, digestives are a kind of food:
fast. Now the Church does not intend to command ab-
and yet many take them on fasting days after eating.
stinence from drink, for this is taken more for bodily re-
Therefore it is not essential to fasting to take only one
freshment, and digestion of the food consumed, although
meal.
it nourishes somewhat. It is, however, possible to sin and
On the contrary, stands the common custom of the
lose the merit of fasting, by partaking of too much drink:
Christian people.
as also by eating immoderately at one meal.
I answer that, Fasting is instituted by the Church in
Reply to Objection 3. Although digestives nourish
order to bridle concupiscence, yet so as to safeguard na-
somewhat they are not taken chiefly for nourishment, but
ture. Now only one meal is seemingly sufficient for this
for digestion. Hence one does not break one’s fast by tak-
purpose, since thereby man is able to satisfy nature; and
ing them or any other medicines, unless one were to take
yet he withdraws something from concupiscence by min-
digestives, with a fraudulent intention, in great quantity
imizing the number of meals. Therefore it is appointed by
and by way of food.
the Church, in her moderation, that those who fast should
Whether the ninth hour is suitably fixed for the faster’s meal?
IIa IIae q. 147 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the ninth hour is not
Objection 3. Further, fasting is an act of the virtue of suitably fixed for the faster’s meal. For the state of the
abstinence, as stated above (a. 2). Now the mean of moral
New Law is more perfect than the state of the Old Law.
virtue does not apply in the same way to all, since what
Now in the Old Testament they fasted until evening, for it
is much for one is little for another, as stated in Ethic. ii,
is written (Lev. 23:32): “It is a sabbath. . . you shall afflict 6. Therefore the ninth hour should not be fixed for those
your souls,” and then the text continues: “From evening
who fast.
until evening you shall celebrate your sabbaths.” Much
On the contrary, The Council of Chalons† says:
more therefore under the New Testament should the fast
“During Lent those are by no means to be credited with
be ordered until the evening.
fasting who eat before the celebration of the office of Ves-
Objection 2. Further, the fast ordered by the Church
pers,” which in the Lenten season is said after the ninth
is binding on all. But all are not able to know exactly the
hour. Therefore we ought to fast until the ninth hour.
ninth hour. Therefore it seems that the fixing of the ninth
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,3,5), fasting is
hour should not form part of the commandment to fast.
directed to the deletion and prevention of sin. Hence it
∗ Cf. a. 1, ad 3
† The quotation is from the Capitularies (Cap. 39)
of Theodulf, bishop of Orleans (760-821) and is said to be found in the Corpus Juris, Cap. Solent, dist. 1, De Consecratione
1845
ought to add something to the common custom, yet so as Reply to Objection 1. The state of the Old Testament
not to be a heavy burden to nature. Now the right and
is compared to the night, while the state of the New Tes-
common custom is for men to eat about the sixth hour:
tament is compared to the day, according to Rom. 13:12,
both because digestion is seemingly finished (the natu-
“The night is passed and the day is at hand.” Therefore
ral heat being withdrawn inwardly at night-time on ac-
in the Old Testament they fasted until night, but not in the
count of the surrounding cold of the night), and the humor
New Testament.
spread about through the limbs (to which result the heat of
Reply to Objection 2. Fasting requires a fixed hour
the day conduces until the sun has reached its zenith), and
based, not on a strict calculation, but on a rough estimate:
again because it is then chiefly that the nature of the hu-
for it suffices that it be about the ninth hour, and this is
man body needs assistance against the external heat that
easy for anyone to ascertain.
is in the air, lest the humors be parched within. Hence, in
Reply to Objection 3. A little more or a little less canorder that those who fast may feel some pain in satisfac-
not do much harm. Now it is not a long space of time from
tion for their sins, the ninth hour is suitably fixed for their the sixth hour at which men for the most part are wont to
meal.
eat, until the ninth hour, which is fixed for those who fast.
Moreover, this hour agrees with the mystery of
Wherefore the fixing of such a time cannot do much harm
Christ’s Passion, which was brought to a close at the ninth
to anyone, whatever his circumstances may be. If however
hour, when “bowing His head, He gave up the ghost” (Jn.
this were to prove a heavy burden to a man on account of
19:30): because those who fast by punishing their flesh,
sickness, age, or some similar reason, he should be dis-
are conformed to the Passion of Christ, according to Gal.
pensed from fasting, or be allowed to forestall the hour by
5:24, “They that are Christ’s, have crucified their flesh
a little.
with the vices and concupiscences.”
Whether it is fitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from flesh meat, IIa IIae q. 147 a. 8
eggs, and milk foods?
Objection 1. It would seem unfitting that those who
great incentive to lust. Such are the flesh of animals that
fast should be bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs,
take their rest on the earth, and of those that breathe the
and milk foods. For it has been stated above (a. 6) that
air and their products, such as milk from those that walk
fasting was instituted as a curb on the concupiscence of
on the earth, and eggs from birds. For, since such like an-
the flesh. Now concupiscence is kindled by drinking wine
imals are more like man in body, they afford greater plea-
more than by eating flesh; according to Prov. 20:1, “Wine
sure as food, and greater nourishment to the human body,
is a luxurious thing,” and Eph. 5:18, “Be not drunk with
so that from their consumption there results a greater sur-
wine, wherein is luxury.” Since then those who fast are
plus available for seminal matter, which when abundant
not forbidden to drink wine, it seems that they should not
becomes a great incentive to lust. Hence the Church has
be forbidden to eat flesh meat.
bidden those who fast to abstain especially from these
Objection 2. Further, some fish are as delectable to
foods.
eat as the flesh of certain animals. Now “concupiscence is
Reply to Objection 1. Three things concur in the act
desire of the delectable,” as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 30,
of procreation, namely, heat, spirit∗, and humor. Wine and
a. 1). Therefore since fasting which was instituted in or-
other things that heat the body conduce especially to heat:
der to bridle concupiscence does not exclude the eating of
flatulent foods seemingly cooperate in the production of
fish, neither should it exclude the eating of flesh meat.
the vital spirit: but it is chiefly the use of flesh meat which Objection 3. Further, on certain fasting days people
is most productive of nourishment, that conduces to the
make use of eggs and cheese. Therefore one can likewise
production of humor. Now the alteration occasioned by
make use of them during the Lenten fast.
heat, and the increase in vital spirits are of short duration,
On the contrary, stands the common custom of the
whereas the substance of the humor remains a long time.
faithful.
Hence those who fast are forbidden the use of flesh meat
I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), fasting was
rather than of wine or vegetables which are flatulent foods.
instituted by the Church in order to bridle the concupis-
Reply to Objection 2. In the institution of fasting, the cences of the flesh, which regard pleasures of touch in
Church takes account of the more common occurrences.
connection with food and sex. Wherefore the Church for-
Now, generally speaking, eating flesh meat affords more
bade those who fast to partake of those foods which both
pleasure than eating fish, although this is not always the
afford most pleasure to the palate, and besides are a very
case. Hence the Church forbade those who fast to eat flesh
∗ Cf. P. I., Q. 118, a. 1, ad 3
1846
meat, rather than to eat fish.
flesh meat is forbidden in every fast, while the Lenten fast
Reply to Objection 3. Eggs and milk foods are for-
lays a general prohibition even on eggs and milk foods.
bidden to those who fast, for as much as they originate
As to the use of the latter things in other fasts the custom
from animals that provide us with flesh: wherefore the
varies among different people, and each person is bound
prohibition of flesh meat takes precedence of the prohibi-
to conform to that custom which is in vogue with those
tion of eggs and milk foods. Again the Lenten fast is the
among whom he is dwelling. Hence Jerome says†: “Let
most solemn of all, both because it is kept in imitation of
each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the
Christ, and because it disposes us to celebrate devoutly the
commands of the elders as though they were the laws of
mysteries of our redemption. For this reason the eating of
the apostles.”
† Augustine, De Lib. Arb. iii, 18; cf. De Nat. et Grat. lxvii
1847
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 148
Of Gluttony
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider gluttony. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether gluttony is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Its species;
(5) Whether it is a capital sin?
(6) Its daughters.
Whether gluttony is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 148 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that gluttony is not a sin.
Reply to Objection 1. That which goes into man by
For our Lord said (Mat. 15:11): “Not that which goeth
way of food, by reason of its substance and nature, does
into the mouth defileth a man.” Now gluttony regards food
not defile a man spiritually. But the Jews, against whom
which goes into a man. Therefore, since every sin defiles
our Lord is speaking, and the Manichees deemed certain
a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin.
foods to make a man unclean, not on account of their sig-
Objection 2. Further, “No man sins in what he can-
nification, but by reason of their nature†. It is the inordi-
not avoid”∗. Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and
nate desire of food that defiles a man spiritually.
man cannot avoid this, for Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18):
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, the vice of
“Since in eating pleasure and necessity go together, we
gluttony does not regard the substance of food, but in the
fail to discern between the call of necessity and the seduc-
desire thereof not being regulated by reason. Wherefore
tion of pleasure,” and Augustine says (Confess. x, 31):
if a man exceed in quantity of food, not from desire of
“Who is it, Lord, that does not eat a little more than nec-
food, but through deeming it necessary to him, this per-
essary?” Therefore gluttony is not a sin.
tains, not to gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It
Objection 3. Further, in every kind of sin the first
is a case of gluttony only when a man knowingly exceeds
movement is a sin. But the first movement in taking food
the measure in eating, from a desire for the pleasures of
is not a sin, else hunger and thirst would be sinful. There-
the palate.
fore gluttony is not a sin.
Reply to Objection 3. The appetite is twofold. There
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral.
xxx, 18)
is the natural appetite, which belongs to the powers of the
that “unless we first tame the enemy dwelling within us,
vegetal soul. In these powers virtue and vice are impos-
namely our gluttonous appetite, we have not even stood
sible, since they cannot be subject to reason; wherefore
up to engage in the spiritual combat.” But man’s inward
the appetitive power is differentiated from the powers of
enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin.
secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and
I answer that, Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eat-
thirst are to be referred. Besides this there is another, the
ing and drinking, but an inordinate desire. Now desire is
sensitive appetite, and it is in the concupiscence of this
said to be inordinate through leaving the order of reason,
appetite that the vice of gluttony consists. Hence the first
wherein the good of moral virtue consists: and a thing is
movement of gluttony denotes inordinateness in the sen-
said to be a sin through being contrary to virtue. Where-
sitive appetite, and this is not without sin.
fore it is evident that gluttony is a sin.
Whether gluttony is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 148 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that gluttony is not a mor-
charity, as stated above (q. 132, a. 3). But gluttony is not
tal sin. For every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the
opposed to charity, neither as regards the love of God, nor
Decalogue: and this, apparently, does not apply to glut-
as regards the love of one’s neighbor. Therefore gluttony
tony. Therefore gluttony is not a mortal sin.
is never a mortal sin.
Objection 2. Further, every mortal sin is contrary to
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says in a sermon on
∗ Ep. lxxi, ad Lucin.
† Cf. Ia IIae, q. 102, a. 6, ad 1
1848
Purgatory‡: “Whenever a man takes more meat and drink tony be found to affect only such things as are directed to
than is necessary, he should know that this is one of the
the end, for instance when a man has too great a desire for
lesser sins.” But this pertains to gluttony. Therefore glut-
the pleasures of the palate, yet would not for their sake do
tony is accounted among the lesser, that is to say venial,
anything contrary to God’s law, it is a venial sin.
sins.
Reply to Objection 1. The vice of gluttony becomes
Objection 4. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral.
a mortal sin by turning man away from his last end: and
xxx, 18): “As long as the vice of gluttony has a hold on
accordingly, by a kind of reduction, it is opposed to the
a man, all that he has done valiantly is forfeited by him:
precept of hallowing the sabbath, which commands us to
and as long as the belly is unrestrained, all virtue comes to
rest in our last end. For mortal sins are not all directly
naught.” But virtue is not done away save by mortal sin.
opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those
Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.
which contain injustice: because the precepts of the Deca-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the vice of glut-
logue pertain specially to justice and its parts, as stated
tony properly consists in inordinate concupiscence. Now
above (q. 122, a. 1).
the order of reason in regulating the concupiscence may
Reply to Objection 2. In so far as it turns man away
be considered from two points of view. First, with re-
from his last end, gluttony is opposed to the love of God,
gard to things directed to the end, inasmuch as they may
who is to be loved, as our last end, above all things: and
be incommensurate and consequently improportionate to
only in this respect is gluttony a mortal sin.
the end; secondly, with regard to the end itself, inasmuch
Reply to Objection 3. This saying of Augustine refers
as concupiscence turns man away from his due end. Ac-
to gluttony as denoting inordinate concupiscence merely
cordingly, if the inordinate concupiscence in gluttony be
in regard of things directed to the end.
found to turn man away from the last end, gluttony will
Reply to Objection 4. Gluttony is said to bring virtue
be a mortal sin. This is the case when he adheres to the
to naught, not so much on its own account, as on account
pleasure of gluttony as his end, for the sake of which he
of the vices which arise from it. For Gregory says (Pas-
contemns God, being ready to disobey God’s command-
tor. iii, 19): “When the belly is distended by gluttony, the
ments, in order to obtain those pleasures. On the other
virtues of the soul are destroyed by lust.”
hand, if the inordinate concupiscence in the vice of glut-
Whether gluttony is the greatest of sins?
IIa IIae q. 148 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that gluttony is the great-
gory (Moral. xxxiii).
est of sins. For the grievousness of a sin is measured by
I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured
the grievousness of the punishment. Now the sin of glut-
in three ways. First and foremost it depends on the matter
tony is most grievously punished, for Chrysostom says∗:
in which the sin is committed: and in this way sins com-
“Gluttony turned Adam out of Paradise, gluttony it was
mitted in connection with Divine things are the greatest.
that drew down the deluge at the time of Noah.” Accord-
From this point of view gluttony is not the greatest sin, for
ing to Ezech. 16:49, “This was the iniquity of Sodom, thy
it is about matters connected with the nourishment of the
sister. . . fulness of bread,” etc. Therefore the sin of glut-
body. Secondly, the gravity of a sin depends on the person
tony is the greatest of all.
who sins, and from this point of view the sin of gluttony
Objection 2. Further, in every genus the cause is the
is diminished rather than aggravated, both on account of
most powerful. Now gluttony is apparently the cause of
the necessity of taking food, and on account of the diffi-
other sins, for a gloss on Ps. 135:10, “Who smote Egypt
culty of proper discretion and moderation in such matters.
with their first-born,” says: “Lust, concupiscence, pride
Thirdly, from the point of view of the result that follows,
are the first-born of gluttony.” Therefore gluttony is the
and in this way gluttony has a certain gravity, inasmuch as
greatest of sins.
certain sins are occasioned thereby.
Objection 3. Further, man should love himself in the
Reply to Objection 1. These punishments are to be
first place after God, as stated above (q. 25, a. 4). Now
referred to the vices that resulted from gluttony, or to the
man, by the vice of gluttony, inflicts an injury on him-
root from which gluttony sprang, rather than to gluttony
self: for it is written (Ecclus. 37:34): “By surfeiting many
itself. For the first man was expelled from Paradise on
have perished.” Therefore gluttony is the greatest of sins,
account of pride, from which he went on to an act of glut-
at least excepting those that are against God.
tony: while the deluge and the punishment of the people
On the contrary, The sins of the flesh, among which
of Sodom were inflicted for sins occasioned by gluttony.
gluttony is reckoned, are less culpable according to Gre-
Reply to Objection 2. This objection argues from the
‡ Cf. Append. to St. Augustine’s works: Serm. civ (xli, de sanctis)
∗ Hom. xiii in Matth.
1849
standpoint of the sins that result from gluttony. Nor is harm to his body, but the pleasure of eating: and if injury
a cause necessarily more powerful, unless it be a direct
results to his body, this is accidental. Hence this does not
cause: and gluttony is not the direct cause but the acci-
directly affect the gravity of gluttony, the guilt of which is
dental cause, as it were, and the occasion of other vices.
nevertheless aggravated, if a man incur some bodily injury
Reply to Objection 3. The glutton intends, not the
through taking too much food.
Whether the species of gluttony are fittingly distinguished?
IIa IIae q. 148 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that the species of gluttony
cence may be considered in two ways. First, with regard
are unfittingly distinguished by Gregory who says (Moral.
to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance
xxx, 18): “The vice of gluttony tempts us in five ways.
or species of food a man seeks “sumptuous”—i.e. costly
Sometimes it forestalls the hour of need; sometimes it
food; as regards its quality, he seeks food prepared too
seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the food to be
nicely—i.e. “daintily”; and as regards quantity, he ex-
daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of re-
ceeds by eating “too much.”
freshment by taking too much; sometimes we sin by the
Secondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered
very heat of an immoderate appetite”—which are con-
as to the consumption of food: either because one fore-
tained in the following verse: “Hastily, sumptuously, too
stalls the proper time for eating, which is to eat “hastily,”
much, greedily, daintily.”
or one fails to observe the due manner of eating, by eating
For the above are distinguished according to diversity
“greedily.”
of circumstance. Now circumstances, being the accidents
Isidore∗ comprises the first and second under one
of an act, do not differentiate its species. Therefore the
heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in “what”
species of gluttony are not distinguished according to the
he eats, or in “how much,” “how” or “when he eats.”
aforesaid.
Reply to Objection 1.
The corruption of various
Objection 2. Further, as time is a circumstance, so is
circumstances causes the various species of gluttony, on
place. If then gluttony admits of one species in respect
account of the various motives, by reason of which the
of time, it seems that there should likewise be others in
species of moral things are differentiated. For in him that
respect of place and other circumstances.
seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by the
Objection 3. Further, just as temperance observes due
very species of the food; in him that forestalls the time
circumstances, so do the other moral virtues. Now the
concupiscence is disordered through impatience of delay,
species of the vices opposed to the other moral virtues
and so forth.
are not distinguished according to various circumstances.
Reply to Objection 2. Place and other circumstances
Neither, therefore, are the species of gluttony distin-
include no special motive connected with eating, that can
guished thus.
cause a different species of gluttony.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory
Reply to Objection 3. In all other vices, whenever
quoted above.
different circumstances correspond to different motives,
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), gluttony denotes
the difference of circumstances argues a specific differ-
inordinate concupiscence in eating. Now two things are
ence of vice: but this does not apply to all circumstances,
to be considered in eating, namely the food we eat, and
as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 72, a. 9).
the eating thereof. Accordingly, the inordinate concupis-
Whether gluttony is a capital vice?
IIa IIae q. 148 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that gluttony is not a cap-
parently the least of sins, seeing that it is most akin to what ital vice. For capital vices denote those whence, under
is in respect of its genus, is apparently the least gluttony
the aspect of final cause, other vices originate. Now food,
is not a capital vice.
which is the matter of gluttony, has not the aspect of end,
Objection 3. Further, sin results from a man forsak-
since it is sought, not for its own sake, but for the body’s
ing the food of virtue on account of something useful to
nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
the present life, or pleasing to the senses. Now as regards
Objection 2. Further, a capital vice would seem to
goods having the aspect of utility, there is but one capital
have a certain pre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does
vice, namely covetousness. Therefore, seemingly, there
not apply to gluttony, which, in respect of its genus, is ap-
would be but one capital vice in respect of pleasures: and
∗ De Summo Bon. ii, 42
1850
this is lust, which is a greater vice than gluttony, and is is directed thereto, according to Eccles. 6:7, “All the labor
about greater pleasures. Therefore gluttony is not a capi-
of man is for his mouth.” Yet gluttony seems to be about
tal vice.
pleasures of food rather than about food itself; wherefore,
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons
as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. liii), “with such food
gluttony among the capital vices.
as is good for the worthless body, men desire to be fed,”
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 84, a. 3),
wherein namely the pleasure consists, “rather than to be
a capital vice denotes one from which, considered as fi-
filled: since the whole end of that desire is this—not to
nal cause, i.e. as having a most desirable end, other vices
thirst and not to hunger.”
originate: wherefore through desiring that end men are in-
Reply to Objection 2. In sin the end is ascertained
cited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered most
with respect to the conversion, while the gravity of sin is
desirable through having one of the conditions of happi-
determined with regard to the aversion. Wherefore it does
ness which is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is
not follow that the capital sin which has the most desirable
essential to happiness, according to Ethic. i, 8; x, 3,7,8.
end surpasses the others in gravity.
Therefore the vice of gluttony, being about pleasures of
Reply to Objection 3. That which gives pleasure is
touch which stand foremost among other pleasures, is fit-
desirable in itself: and consequently corresponding to its
tingly reckoned among the capital vices.
diversity there are two capital vices, namely gluttony and
Reply to Objection 1. It is true that food itself is di-
lust. On the other hand, that which is useful is desirable,
rected to something as its end: but since that end, namely
not in itself, but as directed to something else: wherefore
the sustaining of life, is most desirable and whereas life
seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of desir-
cannot be sustained without food, it follows that food too
ability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in respect of
is most desirable: indeed, nearly all the toil of man’s life
such things.
Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to gluttony?
IIa IIae q. 148 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that six daughters are un-
ther on the part of the soul or on the part of the body. on
fittingly assigned to gluttony, to wit, “unseemly joy, scur-
the part of the soul these results are of four kinds. First, as rility, uncleanness, loquaciousness, and dullness of mind
regards the reason, whose keenness is dulled by immod-
as regards the understanding.” For unseemly joy results
erate meat and drink, and in this respect we reckon as a
from every sin, according to Prov. 2:14, “Who are glad
daughter of gluttony, “dullness of sense in the understand-
when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked
ing,” on account of the fumes of food disturbing the brain.
things.” Likewise dullness of mind is associated with ev-
Even so, on the other hand, abstinence conduces to the
ery sin, according to Prov. 14:22, “They err that work
penetrating power of wisdom, according to Eccles. 2:3, “I
evil.” Therefore they are unfittingly reckoned to be daugh-
thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I
ters of gluttony.
might turn my mind in wisdom.” Secondly, as regards the.
Objection 2. Further, the uncleanness which is partic-
appetite, which is disordered in many ways by immoder-
ularly the result of gluttony would seem to be connected
ation in eating and drinking, as though reason were fast
with vomiting, according to Is. 28:8, “All tables were full
asleep at the helm, and in this respect “unseemly joy” is
of vomit and filth.” But this seems to be not a sin but
reckoned, because all the other inordinate passions are di-
a punishment; or even a useful thing that is a matter of
rected to joy or sorrow, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. To this we
counsel, according to Ecclus. 31:25, “If thou hast been
must refer the saying of 3 Esdra 3:20, that “wine. . . gives
forced to eat much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall
every one a confident and joyful mind.” Thirdly, as re-
refresh thee.” Therefore it should not be reckoned among
gards inordinate words, and thus we have “loquacious-
the daughters of gluttony.
ness,” because as Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), “unless
Objection 3. Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reck-
gluttons were carried away by immoderate speech, that
ons scurrility as a daughter of lust. Therefore it should not
rich man who is stated to have feasted sumptuously ev-
be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.
ery day would not have been so tortured in his tongue.”
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns
Fourthly, as regards inordinate action, and in this way we
these daughters to gluttony.
have “scurrility,” i.e. a kind of levity resulting from lack of I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2,3), gluttony
reason, which is unable not only to bridle the speech, but
consists properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and
also to restrain outward behavior. Hence a gloss on Eph.
drinking. Wherefore those vices are reckoned among the
5:4, “Or foolish talking or scurrility,” says that “fools call
daughters of gluttony, which are the results of eating and
this geniality—i.e. jocularity, because it is wont to raise
drinking immoderately. These may be accounted for ei-
a laugh.” Both of these, however, may be referred to the
1851
words which may happen to be sinful, either by reason of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that dullness of
excess which belongs to “loquaciousness,” or by reason
sense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin,
of unbecomingness, which belongs to “scurrility.”
whereas dullness of sense in speculative matters arises
On the part of the body, mention is made of “unclean-
chiefly from gluttony, for the reason given above.
ness,” which may refer either to the inordinate emission
Reply to Objection 2. Although it does one good to
of any kind of superfluities, or especially to the emission
vomit after eating too much, yet it is sinful to expose one-
of the semen. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:3, “But fornication
self to its necessity by immoderate meat or drink. How-
and all uncleanness,” says: “That is, any kind of inconti-
ever, it is no sin to procure vomiting as a remedy for sick-
nence that has reference to lust.”
ness if the physician prescribes it.
Reply to Objection 1. Joy in the act or end of sin re-
Reply to Objection 3. Scurrility proceeds from the
sults from every sin, especially the sin that proceeds from
act of gluttony, and not from the lustful act, but from the
habit, but the random riotous joy which is described as
lustful will: wherefore it may be referred to either vice.
“unseemly” arises chiefly from immoderate partaking of
1852
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 149
Of Sobriety
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely drunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is the matter of sobriety?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether the use of wine is lawful?
(4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming?
Whether drink is the matter of sobriety?
IIa IIae q. 149 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that drink is not the matter
of the measure is most deserving of praise. Such mat-
proper to sobriety. For it is written (Rom. 12:3): “Not to
ter is the drinking of intoxicants, because the measured
be more wise than it behooveth to be wise, but to be wise
use thereof is most profitable, while immoderate excess
unto sobriety.” Therefore sobriety is also about wisdom,
therein is most harmful, since it hinders the use of rea-
and not only about drink.
son even more than excessive eating. Hence it is writ-
Objection 2. Further, concerning the wisdom of God,
ten (Ecclus. 31:37,38): “Sober drinking is health to soul
it is written (Wis. 8:7) that “she teacheth sobriety [Douay:
and body; wine drunken with excess raiseth quarrels, and
‘temperance’], and prudence, and justice, and fortitude,”
wrath and many ruins.” For this reason sobriety is es-
where sobriety stands for temperance. Now temperance
pecially concerned with drink, not any kind of drink, but
is not only about drink, but also about meat and sexual
that which by reason of its volatility is liable to disturb the matters. Therefore sobriety is not only about drink.
brain, such as wine and all intoxicants. Nevertheless, so-
Objection 3. Further, sobriety would seem to take its
briety may be employed in a general sense so as to apply
name from “measure”∗. Now we ought to be guided by
to any matter, as stated above (q. 123, a. 2; q. 141, a. 2)
the measure in all things appertaining to us: for it is writ-
with regard to fortitude and temperance.
ten (Titus 2:12): “We should live soberly and justly and
Reply to Objection 1. Just as the material wine intox-
godly,” where a gloss remarks: “Soberly, in ourselves”;
icates a man as to his body, so too, speaking figuratively,
and (1 Tim. 2:9): “Women. . . in decent apparel, adorn-
the consideration of wisdom is said to be an inebriating
ing themselves with modesty and sobriety.” Consequently
draught, because it allures the mind by its delight, ac-
it would seem that sobriety regards not only the inte-
cording to Ps. 22:5, “My chalice which inebriateth me,
rior man, but also things appertaining to external apparel.
how goodly is it!” Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of
Therefore drink is not the matter proper to sobriety.
metaphor in speaking of the contemplation of wisdom.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 31:32): “Wine
Reply to Objection 2. All the things that belong prop-
taken with sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it
erly to temperance are necessary to the present life, and
moderately, thou shalt be sober.”
their excess is harmful. Wherefore it behooves one to ap-
I answer that, When a virtue is denominated from
ply a measure in all such things. This is the business of
some condition common to the virtues, the matter spe-
sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to designate
cially belonging to it is that in which it is most difficult
temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink
and most commendable to satisfy that condition of virtue:
than in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially con-
thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and temperance
cerned with drink.
about pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name
Reply to Objection 3. Although a measure is needful
from “measure,” for a man is said to be sober because he
in all things, sobriety is not properly employed in connec-
observes the “bria,” i.e. the measure. Wherefore sobriety
tion with all things, but only in those wherein there is most
lays a special claim to that matter wherein /the observance
need for a measure.
∗ ‘Bria,’ a measure, a cup; Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini’s Lexicon 1853
Whether sobriety is by itself a special virtue?
IIa IIae q. 149 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that sobriety is not by
we find a special hindrance to reason, there must needs be
itself a special virtue. For abstinence is concerned with
a special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating drink is a
both meat and drink. Now there is no special virtue about
special kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch
meat. Therefore neither is sobriety, which is about drink,
as it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to
a special virtue.
remove this hindrance to reason a special virtue, which is
Objection 2.
Further, abstinence and gluttony are
sobriety, is requisite.
about pleasures of touch as sensitive to food. Now meat
Reply to Objection 1. Meat and drink are alike ca-
and drink combine together to make food, since an animal
pable of hindering the good of reason, by embroiling the
needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment. There-
reason with immoderate pleasure: and in this respect ab-
fore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a. special virtue.
stinence is about both meat and drink alike. But intoxicat-
Objection 3. Further, just as in things pertaining to
ing drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated above,
nourishment, drink is distinguished from meat, so are
wherefore it requires a special virtue.
there various kinds of meats and of drinks. Therefore if
Reply to Objection 2. The virtue of abstinence is
sobriety is by itself a special virtue, seemingly there will
about meat and drink, considered, not as food but as a
be a special virtue corresponding to each different kind of
hindrance to reason. Hence it does not follow that special
meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it would
kinds of virtue correspond to different kinds of food.
seem that sobriety is not a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 3. In all intoxicating drinks there
On the contrary, Macrobius∗ reckons sobriety to be
is one kind of hindrance to the use of reason: so that the
a special part of temperance.
difference of drinks bears an accidental relation to virtue.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 146, a. 2), it be-
Hence this difference does not call for a difference of
longs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason
virtue. The same applies to the difference of meats.
against those things which may hinder it. Hence wherever
Whether the use of wine is altogether unlawful?
IIa IIae q. 149 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the use of wine is
(Ecclus. 31:36): “Wine drunken with moderation is the
altogether unlawful. For without wisdom, a man cannot
joy of the soul and the heart.”
be in the state of salvation: since it is written (Wis. 7:28):
I answer that, No meat or drink, considered in itself,
“God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom,”
is unlawful, according to Mat. 15:11, “Not that which
and further on (Wis. 9:19): “By wisdom they were healed,
goeth into the mouth defileth a man.” Wherefore it is
whosoever have pleased Thee, O Lord, from the begin-
not unlawful to drink wine as such. Yet it may become
ning.” Now the use of wine is a hindrance to wisdom,
unlawful accidentally. This is sometimes owing to a cir-
for it is written (Eccles. 2:3): “I thought in my heart to
cumstance on the part of the drinker, either because he is
withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind
easily the worse for taking wine, or because he is bound
to wisdom.” Therefore wine-drinking is altogether unlaw-
by a vow not to drink wine: sometimes it results from the
ful.
mode of drinking, because to wit he exceeds the measure
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21):
in drinking: and sometimes it is on account of others who
“It is good not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor
would be scandalized thereby.
anything whereby thy brother is offended or scandalized,
Reply to Objection 1. A man may have wisdom in
or made weak.” Now it is sinful to forsake the good of
two ways. First, in a general way, according as it is suffi-
virtue, as likewise to scandalize one’s brethren. Therefore
cient for salvation: and in this way it is required, in order
it is unlawful to make use of wine.
to have wisdom, not that a man abstain altogether from
Objection 3. Further, Jerome says† that “after the del-
wine, but that he abstain from its immoderate use. Sec-
uge wine and flesh were sanctioned: but Christ came in
ondly, a man may have wisdom in some degree of per-
the last of the ages and brought back the end into line with
fection: and in this way, in order to receive wisdom per-
the beginning.” Therefore it seems unlawful to use wine
fectly, it is requisite for certain persons that they abstain
under the Christian law.
altogether from wine, and this depends on circumstances
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:23):
of certain persons and places.
“Do not still drink water, but use a little wine for thy stom-
Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle does not declare
ach’s sake, and thy frequent infirmities”; and it is written
simply that it is good to abstain from wine, but that it is
∗ In Somno Scip. i, 8
† Contra Jovin. i
1854
good in the case where this would give scandal to certain ing obstacles to perfection. It is in the latter way that he
people.
withdraws some from the use of wine, that they may aim
Reply to Objection 3. Christ withdraws us from some
at perfection, even as from riches and the like.
things as being altogether unlawful, and from others as be-
Whether sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing?
IIa IIae q. 149 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that sobriety is more req-
(Titus 2:6) “Young men in like manner exhort that they
uisite in persons of greater standing. For old age gives a
be sober.”
man a certain standing; wherefore honor and reverence
I answer that, Virtue includes relationship to two
are due to the old, according to Lev. 19:32, “Rise up
things, to the contrary vices which it removes, and to the
before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged
end to which it leads. Accordingly a particular virtue is
man.” Now the Apostle declares that old men especially
more requisite in certain persons for two reasons. First,
should be exhorted to sobriety, according to Titus 2:2,
because they are more prone to the concupiscences which
“That the aged man be sober.” Therefore sobriety is most
need to be restrained by virtue, and to the vices which are
requisite in persons of standing.
removed by virtue. In this respect, sobriety is most req-
Objection 2. Further, a bishop has the highest degree
uisite in the young and in women, because concupiscence
in the Church: and the Apostle commands him to be sober,
of pleasure thrives in the young on account of the heat
according to 1 Tim. 3:2, “It behooveth. . . a bishop to be
of youth, while in women there is not sufficient strength
blameless, the husband of one wife, sober, prudent,” etc.
of mind to resist concupiscence. Hence, according to
Therefore sobriety is chiefly required in persons of high
Valerius Maximus∗ among the ancient Romans women
standing.
drank no wine. Secondly, sobriety is more requisite in
Objection 3.
Further, sobriety denotes abstinence
certain persons, as being more necessary for the opera-
from wine. Now wine is forbidden to kings, who hold the
tions proper to them. Now immoderate use of wine is a
highest place in human affairs: while it is allowed to those
notable obstacle to the use of reason: wherefore sobriety
who are in a state of affliction, according to Prov. 31:4,
is specially prescribed to the old, in whom reason should
“Give not wine to kings,” and further on (Prov. 31:6),
be vigorous in instructing others: to bishops and all minis-
“Give strong drink to them that are sad, and wine to them
ters of the Church, who should fulfil their spiritual duties
that are grieved in mind.” Therefore sobriety is more req-
with a devout mind; and to kings, who should rule their
uisite in persons of standing.
subjects with wisdom.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:11):
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
“The women in like manner, chaste. . . sober,” etc., and
∗ Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1
1855
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 150
Of Drunkenness
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider drunkenness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether drunkenness is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether it is the most grievous sin?
(4) Whether it excuses from sin?
Whether drunkenness is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 150 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that drunkenness is not a
another way drunkenness may result from inordinate con-
sin. For every sin has a corresponding contrary sin, thus
cupiscence and use of wine: in this way it is accounted
timidity is opposed to daring, and presumption to pusilla-
a sin, and is comprised under gluttony as a species un-
nimity. But no sin is opposed to drunkenness. Therefore
der its genus. For gluttony is divided into “surfeiting
drunkenness is not a sin.
[Douay:,‘rioting’] and drunkenness,” which are forbidden
Objection 2. Further, every sin is voluntary∗. But no
by the Apostle (Rom. 13:13).
man wishes to be drunk, since no man wishes to be de-
Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
prived of the use of reason. Therefore drunkenness is not
iii, 11), insensibility which is opposed to temperance “is
a sin.
not very common,” so that like its species which are op-
Objection 3. Further, whoever causes another to sin,
posed to the species of intemperance it has no name.
sins himself. Therefore, if drunkenness were a sin, it
Hence the vice opposed to drunkenness is unnamed; and
would follow that it is a sin to ask a man to drink that
yet if a man were knowingly to abstain from wine to the
which makes him drunk, which would seem very hard.
extent of molesting nature grievously, he would not be
Objection 4. Further, every sin calls for correction.
free from sin.
But correction is not applied to drunkards: for Gregory†
Reply to Objection 2. This objection regards the re-
says that “we must forbear with their ways, lest they be-
sulting defect which is involuntary: whereas immoderate
come worse if they be compelled to give up the habit.”
use of wine is voluntary, and it is in this that the sin con-
Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.
sists.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:13):
Reply to Objection 3. Even as he that is drunk is ex-
“Not in rioting and drunkenness.”
cused if he knows not the strength of the wine, so too is
I answer that, Drunkenness may be understood in two
he that invites another to drink excused from sin, if he be
ways. First, it may signify the defect itself of a man result-
unaware that the drinker is the kind of person to be made
ing from his drinking much wine, the consequence being
drunk by the drink offered. But if ignorance be lacking
that he loses the use of reason. In this sense drunken-
neither is excused from sin.
ness denotes not a sin, but a penal defect resulting from a
Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes the correction of
fault. Secondly, drunkenness may denote the act by which
a sinner is to be foregone, as stated above (q. 33, a. 6).
a man incurs this defect. This act may cause drunken-
Hence Augustine says in a letter (Ad Aurel. Episc. Ep.
ness in two ways. In one way, through the wine being too
xxii), “Meseems, such things are cured not by bitterness,
strong, without the drinker being cognizant of this: and
severity, harshness, but by teaching rather than command-
in this way too, drunkenness may occur without sin, es-
ing, by advice rather than threats. Such is the course to be
pecially if it is not through his negligence, and thus we
followed with the majority of sinners: few are they whose
believe that Noah was made drunk as related in Gn. 9. In
sins should be treated with severity.”
∗ Augustine, De Vera Relig. xiv
† Cf. Canon Denique, dist. 4 where Gratian refers to a letter of St. Gregory to St. Augustine of Canterbury 1856
Whether drunkenness is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 150 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that drunkenness is not a
accidentally and beside the intention, but from that which
mortal sin. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory∗
is directly intended. In this way drunkenness is a mor-
that “drunkenness if indulged in assiduously, is a mortal
tal sin, because then a man willingly and knowingly de-
sin.” Now assiduity denotes a circumstance which does
prives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs
not change the species of a sin; so that it cannot aggravate
virtuous deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally
a sin infinitely, and make a mortal sin of a venial sin, as
by running the risk of falling into sin. For Ambrose says
shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 88, a. 5). Therefore if drunken-
(De Patriarch.‡): “We learn that we should shun drunken-
ness /is not a mortal sin for some other reason, neither is
ness, which prevents us from avoiding grievous sins. For
it for this.
the things we avoid when sober, we unknowingly commit
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says†: “Whenever
through drunkenness.” Therefore drunkenness, properly
a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he
speaking, is a mortal sin.
should know that this is one of the lesser sins.” Now
Reply to Objection 1. Assiduity makes drunkenness
the lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness,
a mortal sin, not on account of the mere repetition of the
which is caused by immoderate drink, is a venial sin.
act, but because it is impossible for a man to become
Objection 3. Further, no mortal sin should be commit-
drunk assiduously, without exposing himself to drunken-
ted on the score of medicine. Now some drink too much
ness knowingly and willingly, since he has many times
at the advice of the physician, that they may be purged
experienced the strength of wine and his own liability to
by vomiting; and from this excessive drink drunkenness
drunkenness.
ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2. To take more meat or drink
On the contrary, We read in the Canons of the apos-
than is necessary belongs to the vice of gluttony, which is
tles (Can. xli, xlii): “A bishop, priest or deacon who
not always a mortal sin: but knowingly to take too much
is given to drunkenness or gambling, or incites others
drink to the point of being drunk, is a mortal sin. Hence
thereto, must either cease or be deposed; a subdeacon,
Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): “Drunkenness is far
reader or precentor who does these things must either give
from me: Thou wilt have mercy, that it come not near me.
them up or be excommunicated; the same applies to the
But full feeding sometimes hath crept upon Thy servant.”
laity.” Now such punishments are not inflicted save for
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 141, a. 6),
mortal sins. Therefore drunkenness is a mortal sin.
meat and drink should be moderate in accordance with the
I answer that, The sin of drunkenness, as stated in
demands of the body’s health. Wherefore, just as it hap-
the foregoing Article, consists in the immoderate use and
pens sometimes that the meat and drink which are moder-
concupiscence of wine. Now this may happen to a man
ate for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so
in three ways. First, so that he knows not the drink to
too it may happen conversely, that what is excessive for a
be immoderate and intoxicating: and then drunkenness
healthy man is moderate for one that is ailing. In this way
may be without sin, as stated above (a. 1). Secondly, so
when a man eats or drinks much at the physician’s advice
that he perceives the drink to be immoderate, but without
in order to provoke vomiting, he is not to be deemed to
knowing it to be intoxicating, and then drunkenness may
have taken excessive meat or drink. There is, however, no
involve a venial sin. Thirdly, it may happen that a man
need for intoxicating drink in order to procure vomiting,
is well aware that the drink is immoderate and intoxicat-
since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: where-
ing, and yet he would rather be drunk than abstain from
fore this is no sufficient cause for excusing a man from
drink. Such a man is a drunkard properly speaking, be-
drunkenness.
cause morals take their species not from things that occur
Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins?
IIa IIae q. 150 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that drunkenness is the
by the clergy, for it foments and fosters all the vices.”
gravest of sins.
For Chrysostom says (Hom.
lviii in
Objection 2. Further, from the very fact that a thing
Matth.) that “nothing gains the devil’s favor so much as
excludes the good of reason, it is a sin. Now this is espe-
drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the vices.” And it
cially the effect of drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is
is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv, can. Ante omnia):
the greatest of sins.
“Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided
Objection 3. Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by
∗ Serm. civ in the Appendix to St. Augustine’s works
† Serm. civ in
the Appendix to St. Augustine’s works
‡ De Abraham i.
1857
the gravity of its punishment. Now seemingly drunken-are said to find greatest favor with the devil, not for be-
ness is punished most severely; for Ambrose says§ that
ing graver than other sins, but because they occur more
“there would be no slavery, were there no drunkards.”
frequently among men.
Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.
Reply to Objection 2. The good of reason is hindered
On the contrary, According to Gregory (Moral.
in two ways: in one way by that which is contrary to rea-
xxxiii, 12), spiritual vices are greater than carnal vices.
son, in another by that which takes away the use of rea-
Now drunkenness is one of the carnal vices. Therefore it
son. Now that which is contrary to reason has more the
is not the greatest of sins.
character of an evil, than that which takes away the use of
I answer that, A thing is said to be evil because it re-
reason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken
moves a good. Wherefore the greater the good removed
away by drunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas
by an evil, the graver the evil. Now it is evident that a
the goods of virtue, which are taken away by things that
Divine good is greater than a human good. Wherefore the
are contrary to reason, are always good.
sins that are directly against God are graver than the sin
Reply to Objection 3. Drunkenness was the occa-
of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the good of
sional cause of slavery, in so far as Cham brought the
human reason.
curse of slavery on to his descendants, for having laughed
Reply to Objection 1. Man is most prone to sins of
at his father when the latter was made drunk. But slavery
intemperance, because such like concupiscences and plea-
was not the direct punishment of drunkenness.
sures are connatural to us, and for this reason these sins
Whether drunkenness excuses from sin?
IIa IIae q. 150 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that drunkenness does
through the voluntariness of the preceding act, inasmuch
not excuse from sin. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
as it was through doing something unlawful that he fell
iii, 5) that “the drunkard deserves double punishment.”
into the subsequent sin. Nevertheless, the resulting sin is
Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of excus-
diminished, even as the character of voluntariness is di-
ing from it.
minished. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii,
Objection 2. Further, one sin does not excuse another,
44) that “Lot’s guilt is to be measured, not by the incest,
but increases it. Now drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is
but by his drunkenness.”
not an excuse for sin.
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher does not say
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,
that the drunkard deserves more severe punishment, but
3) that just as man’s reason is tied by drunkenness, so is
that he deserves double punishment for his twofold sin.
it by concupiscence. But concupiscence is not an excuse
Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the law of
for sin: neither therefore is drunkenness.
a certain Pittacus, who, as stated in Polit. ii, 9, ordered
On the contrary, According to Augustine (Contra
“those guilty of assault while drunk to be more severely
Faust. xxii, 43), Lot was to be excused from incest on
punished than if they had been sober, because they do
account of drunkenness.
wrong in more ways than one.” In this, as Aristotle ob-
I answer that, Two things are to be observed in drunk-
serves (Polit. ii, 9), “he seems to have considered the ad-
enness, as stated above (a. 1), namely the resulting defect
vantage,” namely of the prevention of wrong, “rather than
and the preceding act. on the part of the resulting defect
the leniency which one should have for drunkards,” seeing
whereby the use of reason is fettered, drunkenness may
that they are not in possession of their faculties.
be an excuse for sin, in so far as it causes an act to be
Reply to Objection 2. Drunkenness may be an excuse
involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of the pre-
for sin, not in the point of its being itself a sin, but in the ceding act, a distinction would seem necessary; because,
point of the defect that results from it, as stated above.
if the drunkenness that results from that act be without
Reply to Objection 3. Concupiscence does not alto-
sin, the subsequent sin is entirely excused from fault, as
gether fetter the reason, as drunkenness does, unless per-
perhaps in the case of Lot. If, however, the preceding act
chance it be so vehement as to make a man insane. Yet the
was sinful, the person is not altogether excused from the
passion of concupiscence diminishes sin, because it is less
subsequent sin, because the latter is rendered voluntary
grievous to sin through weakness than through malice.
§ De Elia et de Jejunio v
1858
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 151
Of Chastity
(In Four Articles)
We must next consider chastity: (1) The virtue itself of chastity: (2) virginity, which is a part of chastity: (3) lust, which is the contrary vice. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether chastity is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a general virtue?
(3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence?
(4) Of its relation to purity.
Whether chastity is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 151 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that chastity is not a
a. 1). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a virtue.
virtue. For here we are treating of virtues of the soul.
Reply to Objection 1. Chastity does indeed reside in
But chastity, seemingly, belongs to the body: for a person
the soul as its subject, though its matter is in the body. For
is said to be chaste because he behaves in a certain way
it belongs to chastity that a man make moderate use of
as regards the use of certain parts of the body. Therefore
bodily members in accordance with the judgment of his
chastity is not a virtue.
reason and the choice of his will.
Objection 2. Further, virtue is “a voluntary habit,” as
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Civ.
stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But chastity, apparently, is not volun-
Dei i, 18), “so long as her mind holds to its purpose,
tary, since it can be taken away by force from a woman to
whereby she has merited to be holy even in body, not
whom violence is done. Therefore it seems that chastity
even the violence of another’s lust can deprive her body
is not a virtue.
of its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering
Objection 3. Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers.
continency.” He also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that “in the
Yet some unbelievers are chaste. Therefore chastity is not
mind there is a virtue which is the companion of fortitude,
a virtue.
whereby it is resolved to suffer any evil whatsoever rather
Objection 4. Further, the fruits are distinct from the
than consent to evil.”
virtues. But chastity is reckoned among the fruits (Gal.
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Contra Ju-
5:23). Therefore chastity is not a virtue.
lian. iv, 3), “it is impossible to have any true virtue unless
On the contrary,
Augustine says (De Decem
one be truly just; nor is it possible to be just unless one
Chord.∗):
“Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in
live by faith.” Whence he argues that in unbelievers there
virtue, since chastity is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first
is neither true chastity, nor any other virtue, because, to
onslaught of lust, while thou wishest thy wife to be victo-
wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as he adds
rious.”
(Contra Julian. iv, 3) “virtues are distinguished from vices
I answer that, Chastity takes its name from the fact
not by their functions,” i.e. their acts, “but by their ends.”
that reason “chastises” concupiscence, which, like a child,
Reply to Objection 4. Chastity is a virtue in so far
needs curbing, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12).
as it works in accordance with reason, but in so far as it
Now the essence of human virtue consists in being some-
delights in its act, it is reckoned among the fruits.
thing moderated by reason, as shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 64,
Whether chastity is a general virtue?
IIa IIae q. 151 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that chastity is a gen-
“chastisement”†.
Now every movement of the appeti-
eral virtue. For Augustine says (De Mendacio xx) that
tive part should be chastised by reason. Since, then, ev-
“chastity of the mind is the well-ordered movement of the
ery moral virtue curbs some movement of the appetite, it
mind that does not prefer the lesser to the greater things.”
seems that every moral virtue is chastity.
But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore chastity is a
Objection 3. Further, chastity is opposed to fornica-
general virtue.
tion. But fornication seems to belong to every kind of sin:
Objection 2. Further, “Chastity” takes its name from
for it is written (Ps. 72:27): “Thou shalt destroy [Vulg.:
∗ Serm. ix de Tempore
† Cf. a. 1
1859
‘hast destroyed’] all them that go awhoring from [Douay: cording to Jer. 3:1, “But thou hast prostituted thyself to
‘are disloyal to’] Thee.” Therefore chastity is a general
many lovers.” Taking chastity in this sense, it is a general
virtue.
virtue, because every virtue withdraws the human mind
On the contrary, Macrobius∗ reckons it to be a part
from delighting in a union with unlawful things. Never-
of temperance.
theless, the essence of this chastity consists principally in
I answer that, The word “chastity” is employed in
charity and the other theological virtues, whereby the hu-
two ways. First, properly; and thus it is a special virtue
man mind is united to God.
having a special matter, namely the concupiscences relat-
Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes chastity
ing to venereal pleasures. Secondly, the word “chastity” is
in the metaphorical sense.
employed metaphorically: for just as a mingling of bodies
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (a. 1; q. 142,
conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper matter
a. 2), the concupiscence of that which gives pleasure is
of chastity and of lust its contrary vice, so too the spiritual especially likened to a child, because the desire of plea-union of the mind with certain things conduces to a plea-
sure is connatural to us, especially of pleasures of touch
sure which is the matter of a spiritual chastity metaphor-
which are directed to the maintenance of nature. Hence it
ically speaking, as well as of a spiritual fornication like-
is that if the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered
wise metaphorically so called. For if the human mind de-
by consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case
light in the spiritual union with that to which it behooves
of a child left to his own will. Wherefore the concupis-
it to be united, namely God, and refrains from delighting
cence of these pleasures stands in very great need of being
in union with other things against the requirements of the
chastised: and consequently chastity is applied antono-
order established by God, this may be called a spiritual
mastically to such like concupiscences, even as fortitude
chastity, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, “I have espoused you
is about those matters wherein we stand in the greatest
to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste vir-
need of strength of mind.
gin to Christ.” If, on the other hand, the mind be united
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers spir-
to any other things whatsoever, against the prescription of
itual fornication metaphorically so called, which is op-
the Divine order, it will be called spiritual fornication, ac-
posed to spiritual chastity, as stated.
Whether chastity is a distinct virtue from abstinence?
IIa IIae q. 151 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that chastity is not a dis-
virtues.
tinct virtue from abstinence. Because where the matter is
On the contrary, The Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5,6) reckons
generically the same, one virtue suffices. Now it would
“chastity” together with “fastings” which pertain to absti-
seem that things pertaining to the same sense are of one
nence.
genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate which are
I answer that, As stated above (q. 141, a. 4), tem-
the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are
perance is properly about the concupiscences of the plea-
the matter of chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that
sures of touch: so that where there are different kinds of
chastity is not a distinct virtue from abstinence.
pleasure, there are different virtues comprised under tem-
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12)
perance. Now pleasures are proportionate to the actions
likens all vices of intemperance to childish sins, which
whose perfections they are, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4,5: and
need chastising.
Now “chastity” takes its name from
it is evident that actions connected with the use of food
“chastisement” of the contrary vices. Since then certain
whereby the nature of the individual is maintained differ
vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is
generically from actions connected with the use of matters
chastity.
venereal, whereby the nature of the species is preserved.
Objection 3. Further, the pleasures of the other senses
Therefore chastity, which is about venereal pleasures, is a
are the concern of temperance in so far as they refer to
distinct virtue from abstinence, which is about pleasures
pleasures of touch; which are the matter of temperance.
of the palate.
Now pleasures of the palate, which are the matter of ab-
Reply to Objection 1. Temperance is chiefly about
stinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are the
pleasures of touch, not as regards the sense’s judgment
matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says†, commenting
concerning the objects of touch. which judgment is of
on Titus 1:7, “Not given to wine, no striker,” etc.: “The
uniform character concerning all such objects, but as re-
belly and the organs of generation are neighbors, that the
gards the use itself of those objects, as stated in Ethic. iii, neighborhood of the organs may indicate their complicity
10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters
in vice.” Therefore abstinence and chastity are not distinct
differ in character. Wherefore there must needs be differ-
∗ In Somn. Scip. i, 8
† Ep. cxlvii ad Amand. Cf. Gratian, Dist. xliv.
1860
ent virtues, though they regard the one sense.
Reply to Objection 3. The pleasures of the other
Reply to Objection 2. Venereal pleasures are more
senses do not pertain to the maintenance of man’s nature,
impetuous, and are more oppressive on the reason than the
except in so far as they are directed to pleasures of touch.
pleasures of the palate: and therefore they are in greater
Wherefore in the matter of such pleasures there is no other
need of chastisement and restraint, since if one consent to
virtue comprised under temperance. But the pleasures of
them this increases the force of concupiscence and weak-
the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal plea-
ens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine says (So-
sures, are essentially directed to the preservation of man’s
liloq. i, 10): “I consider that nothing so casts down the
life: wherefore by their very nature they have a special
manly mind from its heights as the fondling of women,
virtue, although this virtue which is called abstinence di-
and those bodily contacts which belong to the married
rects its act to chastity as its end.
state.”
Whether purity belongs especially to chastity?
IIa IIae q. 151 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that purity does not be-
ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks (De Civ.
long especially to chastity. For Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xiv, 18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which
Dei i, 18) that “purity is a virtue of the soul.” Therefore
is adorned by the honesty† of marriage, is not devoid of
it is not something belonging to chastity, but is of itself a
shame: and this because the movement of the organs of
virtue distinct from chastity.
generation is not subject to the command of reason, as are
Objection 2. Further, “pudicitia” [purity] is derived
the movements of the other external members. Now man
from “pudor,” which is equivalent to shame. Now shame,
is ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of all the
according to Damascene∗, is about a disgraceful act, and
signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 6).
this is common to all sinful acts. Therefore purity belongs
Consequently purity regards venereal matters properly,
no more to chastity than to the other virtues.
and especially the signs thereof, such as impure looks,
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
kisses, and touches. And since the latter are more wont
12) that “every kind of intemperance is most deserving
to be observed, purity regards rather these external signs,
of reproach.” Now it would seem to belong to purity to
while chastity regards rather sexual union. Therefore pu-
avoid all that is deserving of reproach. Therefore purity
rity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct there-
belongs to all the parts of temperance, and not especially
from, but as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Never-
to chastity.
theless the one is sometimes used to designate the other.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perseverantia
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is here speaking of
xx): “We must give praise to purity, that he who has ears
purity as designating chastity.
to hear, may put to none but a lawful use the organs in-
Reply to Objection 2. Although every vice has a cer-
tended for procreation.” Now the use of these organs is
tain disgrace, the vices of intemperance are especially dis-
the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity belongs
graceful, as stated above (q. 142, a. 4).
properly to chastity.
Reply to Objection 3. Among the vices of intemper-
I answer that, As stated above (obj. 2), “pudici-
ance, venereal sins are most deserving of reproach, both
tia” [purity] takes its name from “pudor,” which signifies
on account of the insubordination of the genital organs,
shame. Hence purity must needs be properly about the
and because by these sins especially, the reason is ab-
things of which man is most ashamed. Now men are most
sorbed.
∗ De Fide Orth. ii, 15
† Cf. q. 145
1861
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 152
Of Virginity
(In Five Articles)
We must now consider virginity: and under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) In what does virginity consist?
(2) Whether it is lawful?
(3) Whether it is a virtue?
(4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage;
(5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtues.
Whether virginity consists in integrity of the flesh?
IIa IIae q. 152 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that virginity does not
the person possessed thereof is unseared by the heat
consist in integrity of the flesh. For Augustine says (De
of concupiscence which is experienced in achieving the
Nup. et Concup.)∗ that “virginity is the continual medi-
greatest bodily pleasure which is that of sexual inter-
tation on incorruption in a corruptible flesh.” But medita-
course. Hence, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 5) that “vir-
tion does not concern the flesh. Therefore virginity is not
ginal chastity is integrity free of pollution.”
situated in the flesh.
Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consid-
Objection 2. Further, virginity denotes a kind of pu-
eration. The first is on the part of the body, viz. the
rity. Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that “purity
violation of the seal of virginity. The second is the link
dwells in the soul.” Therefore virginity is not incorruption
between that which concerns the soul and that which con-
of the flesh.
cerns the body, and this is the resolution of the semen,
Objection 3. Further, the integrity of the flesh would
causing sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the part
seem to consist in the seal of virginal purity. Yet some-
of the soul, namely the purpose of attaining this pleasure.
times the seal is broken without loss of virginity. For Au-
Of these three the first is accidental to the moral act, which
gustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that “those organs may
as such must be considered in reference to the soul. The
be injured through being wounded by mischance. Physi-
second stands in the relation of matter to the moral act,
cians, too, sometimes do for the sake of health that which
since the sensible passions are the matters of moral acts.
makes one shudder to see: and a midwife has been known
But the third stands in the position of form and comple-
to destroy by touch the proof of virginity that she sought.”
ment, because the essence of morality is perfected in that
And he adds: “Nobody, I think, would be so foolish as
which concerns the reason. Since then virginity consists
to deem this maiden to have forfeited even bodily sanc-
in freedom from the aforesaid corruption, it follows that
tity, though she lost the integrity of that organ.” Therefore
the integrity of the bodily organ is accidental to virginity;
virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.
while freedom from pleasure in resolution of the semen is
Objection 4. Further, corruption of the flesh consists
related thereto materially; and the purpose of perpetually
chiefly in resolution of the semen: and this may take place
abstaining from this pleasure is the formal and completive
without copulation, whether one be asleep or awake. Yet
element in virginity.
seemingly virginity is not lost without copulation: for Au-
Reply to Objection 1. This definition of Augustine’s
gustine says (De Virgin. xiii) that “virginal integrity and
expresses directly that which is formal in virginity. For
holy continency that refrains from all sexual intercourse is
“meditation” denotes reason’s purpose; and the addition
the portion of angels.” Therefore virginity does not con-
“perpetual” does not imply that a virgin must always re-
sist in incorruption of the flesh.
tain this meditation actually, but that she should bear in
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that
mind the purpose of always persevering therein. The ma-
“virginity is continence whereby integrity of the flesh is
terial element is expressed indirectly by the words “on in-
vowed, consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator
corruption in a corruptible body.” This is added to show
of both soul and flesh.”
the difficulty of virginity: for if the flesh were incorrupt-
I answer that, Virginity takes its name apparently
ible, it would not be difficult to maintain a perpetual med-
from “viror” [freshness], and just as a thing is described
itation on incorruption.
as fresh and retaining its freshness, so long as it is not
Reply to Objection 2. It is true that purity, as to its
parched by excessive heat, so too, virginity denotes that
essence, is in the soul; but as to its matter, it is in the
∗ The quotation is from De Sancta Virgin. xiii
1862
body: and it is the same with virginity. Wherefore Augus-tion of semen may arise in two ways. If this be the result
tine says (De Virgin. viii) that “although virginity resides
of the mind’s purpose, it destroys virginity, whether cop-
in the flesh,” and for this reason is a bodily quality, “yet
ulation takes place or not. Augustine, however, mentions
it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency fosters and
copulation, because such like resolution is the ordinary
preserves.”
and natural result thereof. In another way this may hap-
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, the integrity
pen beside the purpose of the mind, either during sleep,
of a bodily organ is accidental to virginity, in so far as a
or through violence and without the mind’s consent, al-
person, through purposely abstaining from venereal plea-
though the flesh derives pleasure from it, or again through
sure, retains the integrity of a bodily organ. Hence if the
weakness of nature, as in the case of those who are subject
organ lose its integrity by chance in some other way, this
to a flow of semen. In such cases virginity is not forfeit,
is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of
because such like pollution is not the result of impurity
a hand or foot.
which excludes virginity.
Reply to Objection 4. Pleasure resulting from resolu-
Whether virginity is unlawful?
IIa IIae q. 152 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that virginity is unlawful.
portionate to that end. Again, man’s good is threefold as
For whatever is contrary to a precept of the natural law is
stated in Ethic. i, 8; one consisting in external things, for
unlawful. Now just as the words of Gn. 2:16, “Of every
instance riches; another, consisting in bodily goods; the
tree” that is in “paradise, thou shalt eat,” indicate a pre-
third, consisting in the goods of the soul among which
cept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation of
the goods of the contemplative life take precedence of the
the individual, so also the words of Gn. 1:28, “Increase
goods of the active life, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic.
and multiply, and fill the earth,” express a precept of the
x, 7), and as our Lord declared (Lk. 10:42), “Mary hath
natural law, in reference to the preservation of the species.
chosen the better part.” Of these goods those that are ex-
Therefore just as it would be a sin to abstain from all food,
ternal are directed to those which belong to the body, and
as this would be to act counter to the good of the individ-
those which belong to the body are directed to those which
ual, so too it is a sin to abstain altogether from the act
belong to the soul; and furthermore those which belong to
of procreation, for this is to act against the good of the
the active life are directed to those which belong to the life
species.
of contemplation. Accordingly, right reason dictates that
Objection 2.
Further, whatever declines from the
one use external goods in a measure proportionate to the
mean of virtue is apparently sinful. Now virginity de-
body, and in like manner as regards the rest. Wherefore if
clines from the mean of virtue, since it abstains from all
a man refrain from possessing certain things (which oth-
venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2),
erwise it were good for him to possess), for the sake of
that “he who revels in every pleasure, and abstains from
his body’s good, or of the contemplation of truth, this is
not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from
not sinful, but in accord /with right reason. In like man-
all is loutish and insensible.” Therefore virginity is some-
ner if a man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more
thing sinful.
freely to give himself to the contemplation of truth, this
Objection 3. Further, punishment is not due save for
is in accordance with the rectitude of reason. Now holy
a vice. Now in olden times those were punished who led
virginity refrains from all venereal pleasure in order more
a celibate life, as Valerius Maximus asserts∗. Hence ac-
freely to have leisure for Divine contemplation: for the
cording to Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) Plato “is said to
Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:34): “The unmarried woman and
have sacrificed to nature, in order that he might atone for
the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may
his perpetual continency as though it were a sin.” There-
be holy in both body and in spirit. But she that is married
fore virginity is a sin.
thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please
On the contrary, No sin is a matter of direct counsel.
her husband.” Therefore it follows that virginity instead
But virginity is a matter of direct counsel: for it is written
of being sinful is worthy of praise.
(1 Cor. 7:25): “Concerning virgins I have no command-
Reply to Objection 1. A precept implies a duty, as
ment of the Lord: but I give counsel.” Therefore virginity
stated above (q. 122, a. 1). Now there are two kinds of
is not an unlawful thing.
duty. There is the duty that has to be fulfilled by one per-
I answer that, In human acts, those are sinful which
son; and a duty of this kind cannot be set aside without
are against right reason. Now right reason requires that
sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude,
things directed to an end should be used in a measure pro-
and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding on
∗ Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9
1863
each one of the multitude. For the multitude has many dictate of right reason, abstains from all pleasures through
obligations which cannot be discharged by the individ-
aversion, as it were, for pleasure as such, is insensible as
ual; but are fulfilled by one person doing this, and an-
a country lout. But a virgin does not refrain from ev-
other doing that. Accordingly the precept of natural law
ery pleasure, but only from that which is venereal: and
which binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each
abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated
individual, otherwise the individual cannot be sustained.
above. Now the mean of virtue is fixed with reference,
On the other hand, the precept of procreation regards the
not to quantity but to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: whole multitude of men, which needs not only to multi-wherefore it is said of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that
ply in body, but also to advance spiritually. Wherefore
“in point of quantity he goes to the extreme, but in point
sufficient provision is made for the human multitude, if
of becomingness he follows the mean.”
some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while oth-
Reply to Objection 3. Laws are framed according to
ers abstaining from this betake themselves to the contem-
what occurs more frequently. Now it seldom happened in
plation of Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the
olden times that anyone refrained from all venereal plea-
whole human race. Thus too in an army, some take sentry
sure through love of the contemplation of truth: as Plato
duty, others are standard-bearers, and others fight with the
alone is related to have done. Hence it was not through
sword: yet all these things are necessary for the multitude,
thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice, but “because
although they cannot be done by one person.
he yielded to the false opinion of his fellow countrymen,”
Reply to Objection 2. The person who, beside the
as Augustine remarks (De Vera Relig. iii).
Whether virginity is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 152 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that virginity is not a
in order to have leisure for Divine things: while the ma-
virtue. For “no virtue is in us by nature,” as the Philoso-
terial element in virginity is integrity of the flesh free of
pher says (Ethic. ii, 1). Now virginity is in us by nature,
all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest
since all are virgins when born. Therefore virginity is not
that where a good action has a special matter through hav-
a virtue.
ing a special excellence, there is a special kind of virtue:
Objection 2. Further, whoever has one virtue has all
for example, magnificence which is about great expendi-
virtues, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1). Yet some
ture is for this reason a special virtue distinct from liber-
have other virtues without having virginity: else, since
ality, which is about all uses of money in general. Now to
none can go to the heavenly kingdom without virtue, no
keep oneself free from the experience of venereal pleasure
one could go there without virginity, which would involve
has an excellence of its own deserving of greater praise
the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not
than keeping oneself free from inordinate venereal plea-
a virtue.
sure. Wherefore virginity is a special virtue being related
Objection 3. Further, every virtue is recovered by
to chastity as magnificence to liberality.
penance.
But virginity is not recovered by penance:
Reply to Objection 1. Men have from their birth that
wherefore Jerome says∗: “Other things God can do, but
which is material in virginity, namely integrity of the flesh
He cannot restore the virgin after her downfall.” There-
and freedom from venereal experience. But they have not
fore seemingly virginity is not a virtue.
that which is formal in virginity, namely the purpose of
Objection 4. Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet safeguarding this integrity for God’s sake, which purpose
virginity is lost without sin, namely by marriage. There-
gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence Augustine
fore virginity is not a virtue.
says (De Virgin. xi): “Nor do we praise virgins for being
Objection 5. Further, virginity is condivided with
virgins, but, because their virginity is consecrated to God
widowhood and conjugal purity. But neither of these is
by holy continency.”
a virtue. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.
Reply to Objection 2. Virtues are connected together
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3):
by reason of that which is formal in them, namely charity,
“Love of virginity moves us to say something about vir-
or by reason of prudence, as stated above (q. 129, a. 3, ad
ginity, lest by passing it over we should seem to cast a
2), but not by reason of that which is material in them. For
slight on what is a virtue of high degree.”
nothing hinders a virtuous man from providing the matter
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the formal and
of one virtue, and not the matter of another virtue: thus
completive element in virginity is the purpose of abstain-
a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of
ing from venereal pleasure, which purpose is rendered
magnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other
praiseworthy by its end, in so far, to wit, as this is done
virtues lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid
∗ Ep. xxii ad Eustoch.
1864
integrity of the flesh: nevertheless he can have that which even by miracle, to wit, that one who has experienced
is formal in virginity, his mind being so prepared that he
venereal lust should cease to have had that experience.
has the purpose of safeguarding this same integrity of the
For God cannot make that which is done not to have been
flesh, should it be fitting for him to do so: even as a poor
done, as stated in the Ia, q. 25 , a. 4.
man may be so prepared in mind as to have the purpose
Reply to Objection 4. Virginity as a virtue denotes
of being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a posi-
the purpose, confirmed by vow, of observing perpetual
tion to do so: or again as a prosperous man is so prepared
integrity. For Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that “by
in mind as to purpose bearing misfortune with equanim-
virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and
ity: without which preparedness of the mind no man can
observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh.”
be virtuous.
Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin.
Reply to Objection 3. Virtue can be recovered by
Reply to Objection 5. Conjugal chastity is deserv-
penance as regards that which is formal in virtue, but not
ing of praise merely because it abstains from unlawful
as to that which is material therein. For if a magnificent
pleasures: hence no excellence attaches to it above that
man has squandered all his wealth he does not recover his
of chastity in general. Widowhood, however, adds some-
riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a person
thing to chastity in general; but it does not attain to that
who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not
which is perfect in this matter, namely to entire free-
the matter of virginity but the purpose of virginity.
dom from venereal pleasure; virginity alone achieves this.
As regards the matter of virginity there is that which
Wherefore virginity alone is accounted a virtue above
can be miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity
chastity, even as magnificence is reckoned above liberal-
of the organ, which we hold to be accidental to virginity:
ity.
while there is something else which cannot be restored
Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage?
IIa IIae q. 152 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that virginity is not more
be preferable to marriage. This error is refuted above all
excellent than marriage. For Augustine says (De Bono
by the example of Christ Who both chose a virgin for His
Conjug. xxi): “Continence was equally meritorious in
mother, and remained Himself a virgin, and by the teach-
John who remained unmarried and Abraham who begot
ing of the Apostle who (1 Cor. 7) counsels virginity as the
children.” Now a greater virtue has greater merit. There-
greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both because a
fore virginity is not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity.
Divine good takes precedence of a human good, and be-
Objection 2. Further, the praise accorded a virtu-
cause the good of the soul is preferable to the good of the
ous man depends on his virtue. If, then, virginity were
body, and again because the good of the contemplative
preferable to conjugal continence, it would seem to fol-
life is better than that of the active life. Now virginity is
low that every virgin is to be praised more than any mar-
directed to the good of the soul in respect of the contem-
ried woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity is not
plative life, which consists in thinking “on the things of
preferable to marriage.
God” [Vulg.: ‘the Lord’], whereas marriage is directed to
Objection 3. Further, the common good takes prece-
the good of the body, namely the bodily increase of the
dence of the private good, according to the Philosopher
human race, and belongs to the active life, since the man
(Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is directed to the common
and woman who embrace the married life have to think
good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): “What
“on the things of the world,” as the Apostle says (1 Cor.
food is to a man’s wellbeing, such is sexual intercourse to
7:34). Without doubt therefore virginity is preferable to
the welfare of the human race.” On the other hand, virgin-
conjugal continence.
ity is ordered to the individual good, namely in order to
Reply to Objection 1. Merit is measured not only
avoid what the Apostle calls the “tribulation of the flesh,”
by the kind of action, but still more by the mind of the
to which married people are subject (1 Cor. 7:28). There-
agent. Now Abraham had a mind so disposed, that he was
fore virginity is not greater than conjugal continence.
prepared to observe virginity, if it were in keeping with
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xix):
the times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal
“Both solid reason and the authority of Holy Writ show
continence was equally meritorious with the virginal con-
that neither is marriage sinful, nor is it to be equaled to
tinence of John, as regards the essential reward, but not as
the good of virginal continence or even to that of widow-
regards the accidental reward. Hence Augustine says (De
hood.”
Bono Conjug. xxi) that both “the celibacy of John and
I answer that, According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i)
the marriage of Abraham fought Christ’s battle in keep-
the error of Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to
ing with the difference of the times: but John was conti-
1865
nent even in deed, whereas Abraham was continent only (De Virgin. xliv): “Whence does a virgin know the things
in habit.”
that belong to the Lord, however solicitous she be about
Reply to Objection 2. Though virginity is better than
them, if perchance on account of some mental fault she be
conjugal continence, a married person may be better than
not yet ripe for martyrdom, whereas this woman to whom
a virgin for two reasons. First, on the part of chastity it-
she delighted in preferring herself is already able to drink
self; if to wit, the married person is more prepared in mind
the chalice of the Lord?”
to observe virginity, if it should be expedient, than the one
Reply to Objection 3. The common good takes prece-
who is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De Bono Con-
dence of the private good, if it be of the same genus: but it
jug. xxii) charges the virgin to say: “I am no better than
may be that the private good is better generically. It is thus
Abraham, although the chastity of celibacy is better than
that the virginity that is consecrated to God is preferable
the chastity of marriage.” Further on he gives the reason
to carnal fruitfulness. Hence Augustine says (De Virgin.
for this: “For what I do now, he would have done better,
ix): “It must be confessed that the fruitfulness of the flesh,
if it were fitting for him to do it then; and what they did I
even of those women who in these times seek naught else
would even do now if it behooved me now to do it.” Sec-
from marriage but children in order to make them servants
ondly, because perhaps the person who is not a virgin has
of Christ, cannot compensate for lost virginity.”
some more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says
Whether virginity is the greatest of virtues?
IIa IIae q. 152 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that virginity is the great-
i, 7): “Can anyone esteem any beauty greater than a vir-
est of virtues. For Cyprian says (De Virgin.∗): “We ad-
gin’s, since she is beloved of her King, approved by her
dress ourselves now to the virgins. Sublime is their glory,
Judge, dedicated to her Lord, consecrated to her God?”
but no less exalted is their vocation. They are a flower of
Secondly, a thing may be most excellent simply, and in
the Church’s sowing, the pride and ornament of spiritual
this way virginity is not the most excellent of the virtues.
grace, the most honored portion of Christ’s flock.”
Because the end always excels that which is directed to
Objection 2. Further, a greater reward is due to the
the end; and the more effectively a thing is directed to
greater virtue. Now the greatest reward is due to virginity,
the end, the better it is. Now the end which renders vir-
namely the hundredfold fruit, according to a gloss on Mat.
ginity praiseworthy is that one may have leisure for Di-
13:23. Therefore virginity is the greatest of the virtues.
vine things, as stated above (a. 4). Wherefore the theo-
Objection 3. Further, the more a virtue conforms us to
logical virtues as well as the virtue of religion, the acts
Christ, the greater it is. Now virginity above all conforms
of which consist in being occupied about Divine things,
us to Christ; for it is declared in the Apocalypse 14:4 that
are preferable to virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more
virgins “follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth,” and
mightily in order to cleave to God—since for this end they
(Apoc. 14:3) that they sing “a new canticle,” which “no”
hold their own life in contempt; and those who dwell in
other “man” could say. Therefore virginity is the greatest
monasteries—since for this end they give up their own
of the virtues.
will and all that they may possess—than virgins who re-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi):
nounce venereal pleasure for that same purpose. There-
“No one, methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyr-
fore virginity is not simply the greatest of virtues.
dom,” and (De Virgin. xlv): “The authority of the Church
Reply to Objection 1. Virgins are “the more honored
informs the faithful in no uncertain manner, so that they
portion of Christ’s flock,” and “their glory more sublime”
know in what place the martyrs and the holy virgins who
in comparison with widows and married women.
have departed this life are commemorated in the Sacra-
Reply to Objection 2. The hundredfold fruit is as-
ment of the Altar.” By this we are given to understand that
cribed to virginity, according to Jerome†, on account of
martyrdom, and also the monastic state, are preferable to
its superiority to widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit
virginity.
is ascribed, and to marriage, to which is ascribed the thir-
I answer that, A thing may excel all others in two
tyfold fruit. But according to Augustine (De QQ. Evang.
ways. First, in some particular genus: and thus virginity
i, 9), “the hundredfold fruit is given to martyrs, the six-
is most excellent, namely in the genus of chastity, since
tyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold to married persons.”
it surpasses the chastity both of widowhood and of mar-
Wherefore it does not follow that virginity is simply the
riage. And because comeliness is ascribed to chastity
greatest of virtues, but only in comparison with other de-
antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is as-
grees of chastity.
cribed to chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Virgin.
Reply to Objection 3.
Virgins “follow the Lamb
∗ De Habitu Virg.
† Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.
1866
whithersoever He goeth,” because they imitate Christ, by follow more closely, because other virtues make us cleave
integrity not only of the mind but also of the flesh, as Au-
to God more closely by imitation of the mind. The “new
gustine says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore they follow
hymn” which virgins alone sing, is their joy at having pre-
the Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that they
served integrity of the flesh.
1867
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 153
Of Lust
(In Five Articles)
We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity: (1) Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) What is the matter of lust?
(2) Whether all copulation is unlawful?
(3) Whether lust is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether lust is a capital vice?
(5) Concerning its daughters.
Whether the matter of lust is only venereal desires and pleasures?
IIa IIae q. 153 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the matter of lust is
real pleasures above all debauch a man’s mind. Therefore
not only venereal desires and pleasures. For Augustine
lust is especially concerned with such like pleasures.
says (Confess. ii, 6) that “lust affects to be called surfeit
Reply to Objection 1. Even as temperance chiefly
and abundance.” But surfeit regards meat and drink, while
and properly applies to pleasures of touch, yet conse-
abundance refers to riches. Therefore lust is not properly
quently and by a kind of likeness is referred to other
about venereal desires and pleasures.
matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal pleasures,
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 20:1): “Wine
which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in
is a lustful [Douay: ‘luxurious’] thing.” Now wine is con-
a man’s mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other mat-
nected with pleasure of meat and drink. Therefore these
ters pertaining to excess. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5:19 says
would seem to be the matter of lust.
“lust is any kind of surfeit.”
Objection 3. Further, lust is defined “as the desire of
Reply to Objection 2. Wine is said to be a lustful
wanton pleasure”∗. But wanton pleasure regards not only
thing, either in the sense in which surfeit in any matter
venereal matters but also many others. Therefore lust is
is ascribed to lust, or because the use of too much wine
not only about venereal desires and pleasures.
affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.
On the contrary, To the lustful it is said (De Vera Re-
Reply to Objection 3. Although wanton pleasure ap-
lig. iii†): “He that soweth in the flesh, of the flesh shall
plies to other matters, the name of lust has a special appli-
reap corruption.” Now the sowing of the flesh refers to
cation to venereal pleasures, to which also wantonness is
venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust.
specially applicable, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. xiv,
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), “a lustful
15,16).
man is one who is debauched with pleasures.” Now vene-
Whether no venereal act can be without sin?
IIa IIae q. 153 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that no venereal act can
ble with the act of understanding,” as the Philosopher ob-
be without sin. For nothing but sin would seem to hin-
serves (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome‡ states, rendered
der virtue. Now every venereal act is a great hindrance to
the hearts of the prophets, for the moment, insensible to
virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): “I consider
the spirit of prophecy. Therefore no venereal act can be
that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height
without sin.
as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts.”
Objection 3. Further, the cause is more powerful than
Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without sin.
its effect. Now original sin is transmitted to children by
Objection 2. Further, any excess that makes one for-
concupiscence, without which no venereal act is possible,
sake the good of reason is sinful, because virtue is cor-
as Augustine declares (De Nup. et Concup. i, 24). There-
rupted by “excess” and “deficiency” as stated in Ethic.
fore no venereal act can be without sin.
ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is excess of plea-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug.
sure, since it so absorbs the mind, that “it is incompati-
xxv): “This is a sufficient answer to heretics, if only they
∗ Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli
† Written by St.
Augustine
‡ Origen, Hom. vi in Num.; Cf. Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad
Ageruch.
1868
will understand that no sin is committed in that which is Bono Conjug. viii): “Just as that was good which Martha
against neither nature, nor morals, nor a commandment”:
did when busy about serving holy men, yet better still that
and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse between the
which Mary did in hearing the word of God: so, too, we
patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not
praise the good of Susanna’s conjugal chastity, yet we pre-
every venereal act is a sin.
fer the good of the widow Anna, and much more that of
I answer that, A sin, in human acts, is that which is
the Virgin Mary.”
against the order of reason. Now the order of reason con-
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 152, a. 2,
sists in its ordering everything to its end in a fitting man-
ad 2; Ia IIae, q. 64, a. 2), the mean of virtue depends not
ner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the dictate of reason,
on quantity but on conformity with right reason: and con-
makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and order
sequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal
for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end
act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the
be something truly good. Now just as the preservation of
mean of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the
the bodily nature of one individual is a true good, so, too,
amount of pleasure experienced by the external sense, as
is the preservation of the nature of the human species a
this depends on the disposition of the body; what matters
very great good. And just as the use of food is directed
is how much the interior appetite is affected by that plea-
to the preservation of life in the individual, so is the use
sure. Nor does it follow that the act in question is contrary
of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole
to virtue, from the fact that the free act of reason in con-
human race. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug.
sidering spiritual things is incompatible with the aforesaid
xvi): “What food is to a man’s well being, such is sex-
pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act of rea-
ual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human race.”
son be sometimes interrupted for something that is done
Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if
in accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue
it be taken in due manner and order, as required for the
for a person to set himself to sleep. That venereal concu-
welfare of the body, so also the use of venereal acts can
piscence and pleasure are not subject to the command and
be without sin, provided they be performed in due manner
moderation of reason, is due to the punishment of the first
and order, in keeping with the end of human procreation.
sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling against God, de-
Reply to Objection 1. A thing may be a hindrance to
served that its body should rebel against it, as Augustine
virtue in two ways. First, as regards the ordinary degree
says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).
of virtue, and as to this nothing but sin is an obstacle to
Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Civ.
virtue. Secondly, as regards the perfect degree of virtue,
Dei xiii, 13), “the child, shackled with original sin, is born
and as to this virtue may be hindered by that which is not
of fleshly concupiscence (which is not imputed as sin to
a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual intercourse
the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin.” Hence it does not
casts down the mind not from virtue, but from the height,
follow that the act in question is a sin, but that it contains
i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De
something penal resulting from the first sin.
Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin?
IIa IIae q. 153 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that lust about venereal
with wine wherein is lust [Douay: ‘luxury’].” Therefore
acts cannot be a sin. For the venereal act consists in the
lust is forbidden.
emission of semen which is the surplus from food, accord-
Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh:
ing to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. i, 18). But there
Gal. 5:19 [Douay: ‘luxury’].
is no sin attaching to the emission of other superfluities.
I answer that, The more necessary a thing is, the
Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts.
more it behooves one to observe the order of reason in
Objection 2. Further, everyone can lawfully make
its regard; wherefore the more sinful it becomes if the or-
what use he pleases of what is his. But in the venereal
der of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal acts,
act a man uses only what is his own, except perhaps in
as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary for
adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in venereal
the common good, namely the preservation of the human
acts, and consequently lust is no sin.
race. Wherefore there is the greatest necessity for observ-
Objection 3. Further, every sin has an opposite vice.
ing the order of reason in this matter: so that if anything
But, seemingly, no vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust
be done in this connection against the dictate of reason’s
is not a sin.
ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust consists essentially in
On the contrary, The cause is more powerful than its
exceeding the order and mode of reason in the matter of
effect. Now wine is forbidden on account of lust, accord-
venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.
ing to the saying of the Apostle (Eph. 5:18), “Be not drunk
Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says in
1869
the same book (De Gener. Anim. i, 18), “the semen is great price: glorify and bear God in your body.” Wherea surplus that is needed.” For it is said to be superflu-
fore by inordinately using the body through lust a man
ous, because it is the residue from the action of the nu-
wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence
tritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the gen-
Augustine says (De Decem. Chord. 10∗): “God Who thus
erative power. But the other superfluities of the human
governs His servants for their good, not for His, made this
body are such as not to be needed, so that it matters not
order and commandment, lest unlawful pleasures should
how they are emitted, provided one observe the decencies
destroy His temple which thou hast begun to be.”
of social life. It is different with the emission of semen,
Reply to Objection 3. The opposite of lust is not
which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the
found in many, since men are more inclined to pleasure.
end for which it is needed.
Yet the contrary vice is comprised under insensibility, and
Reply to Objection 2. As the Apostle says (1 Cor.
occurs in one who has such a dislike for sexual intercourse
6:20) in speaking against lust, “You are bought with a
as not to pay the marriage debt.
Whether lust is a capital vice?
IIa IIae q. 153 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that lust is not a capital vice.
of lust is venereal pleasure, which is very great. Where-
For lust is apparently the same as “uncleanness,” accord-
fore this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive
ing to a gloss on Eph. 5:3 (Cf. 2 Cor. 12:21). But un-
appetite, both on account of the intensity of the pleasure,
cleanness is a daughter of gluttony, according to Gregory
and because such like concupiscence is connatural to man.
(Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a capital vice.
Therefore it is evident that lust is a capital vice.
Objection 2. Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 148, a. 6),
ii, 39) that “as pride of mind leads to the depravity of
according to some, the uncleanness which is reckoned a
lust, so does humility of mind safeguard the chastity of
daughter of gluttony is a certain uncleanness of the body,
the flesh.” Now it is seemingly contrary to the nature of
and thus the objection is not to the point. If, however, it
a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore lust is
denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply that it is
not a capital vice.
caused by gluttony materially—in so far as gluttony pro-
Objection 3. Further, lust is caused by despair, ac-
vides the bodily matter of lust—and not under the aspect
cording to Eph. 4:19, “Who despairing, have given them-
of final cause, in which respect chiefly the capital vices
selves up to lasciviousness.” But despair is not a capital
are said to be the cause of others.
vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of sloth, as stated
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 132, a. 4,
above (q. 35, a. 4, ad 2). Much less, therefore, is lust a
ad 1), when we were treating of vainglory, pride is ac-
capital vice.
counted the common mother of all sins, so that even the
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places
capital vices originate therefrom.
lust among the capital vices.
Reply to Objection 3. Certain persons refrain from
I answer that, As stated above (q. 148, a. 5; Ia IIae,
lustful pleasures chiefly through hope of the glory to
q. 84, Aa. 3,4), a capital vice is one that has a very de-
come, which hope is removed by despair, so that the latter
sirable end, so that through desire for that end, a man
is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle thereto, not as
proceeds to commit many sins, all of which are said to
its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary for a
arise from that vice as from a principal vice. Now the end
capital vice.
Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described?
IIa IIae q. 153 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the daughters of
Objection 2. Further, constancy is reckoned a part of
lust are unfittingly reckoned to be “blindness of mind,
fortitude, as stated above (q. 128, ad 6; q. 137, a. 3). But
thoughtlessness, inconstancy, rashness, self-love, hatred
lust is contrary, not to fortitude but to temperance. There-
of God, love of this world and abhorrence or despair of a
fore inconstancy is not a daughter of lust.
future world.” For mental blindness, thoughtlessness and
Objection 3. Further, “Self-love extending to the con-
rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in
tempt of God” is the origin of every sin, as Augustine
every sin, even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore
says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it should not be
they should not be reckoned especially as daughters of
accounted a daughter of lust.
lust.
Objection 4. Further, Isidore† mentions four, namely,
∗ Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp.)
† QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi
1870
“obscene,” “scurrilous,” “wanton” and “foolish talking.”
hand there is “despair of a future world,” because through
There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be super-
being held back by carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain
fluous.
spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to him.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory
Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher
(Moral. xxxi, 45).
(Ethic. vi, 5), intemperance is the chief corruptive of
I answer that, When the lower powers are strongly
prudence: wherefore the vices opposed to prudence arise
moved towards their objects, the result is that the higher
chiefly from lust, which is the principal species of intem-
powers are hindered and disordered in their acts. Now the
perance.
effect of the vice of lust is that the lower appetite, namely
Reply to Objection 2. The constancy which is a part
the concupiscible, is most vehemently intent on its object,
of fortitude regards hardships and objects of fear; but con-
to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence
stancy in refraining from pleasures pertains to continence
of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely
which is a part of temperance, as stated above (q. 143).
the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by
Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto is to be
lust.
reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first
Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First
named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter
there is simple understanding, which apprehends some
enfeebles a man’s heart and renders it effeminate, accord-
end as good, and this act is hindered by lust, according
ing to Osee 4:11, “Fornication and wine and drunkenness
to Dan. 13:56, “Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath
take away the heart [Douay: ‘understanding’].” Vegetius,
perverted thy heart.” In this respect we have “blindness
too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that “the less a man knows of
of mind.” The second act is counsel about what is to be
the pleasures of life, the less he fears death.” Nor is there
done for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by
any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the daughters
the concupiscence of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch.,
of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf. q. 35, a. 4,
act 1, sc. 1), speaking of lecherous love: “This thing ad-
ad 2; q. 118, a. 8, ad 1; q. 148, a. 6).
mits of neither counsel nor moderation, thou canst not
Reply to Objection 3. Self-love in respect of any
control it by counseling.” In this respect there is “rash-
goods that a man desires for himself is the common ori-
ness,” which denotes absence of counsel, as stated above
gin of all sins; but in the special point of desiring carnal
(q. 53, a. 3). The third act is judgment about the things
pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a daughter of lust.
to be done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it
Reply to Objection 4. The sins mentioned by Isidore
is said of the lustful old men (Dan. 13:9): “They per-
are inordinate external acts, pertaining in the main to
verted their own mind. . . that they might not. . . remember
speech; wherein there is a fourfold inordinateness. First,
just judgments.” In this respect there is “thoughtlessness.”
on account of the matter, and to this we refer “obscene
The fourth act is the reason’s command about the thing
words”: for since “out of the abundance of the heart the
to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so far as
mouth speaketh” (Mat. 12:34), the lustful man, whose
through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is
heart is full of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out
hindered from doing what his reason ordered to be done.
into lewd words. Secondly, on account of the cause: for,
[To this “inconstancy” must be referred.]∗ Hence Terence
since lust causes thoughtlessness and rashness, the result
says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man who declared that he
is that it makes a man speak without weighing or giving a
would leave his mistress: “One little false tear will undo
thought to his words. which are described as “scurrilous.”
those words.”
Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man
On the part of the will there results a twofold inordi-
seeks pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives
nate act. One is the desire for the end, to which we re-
utterance to “wanton words.” Fourthly, on account of the
fer “self-love,” which regards the pleasure which a man
sentiments expressed by his words, for through causing
desires inordinately, while on the other hand there is “ha-
blindness of mind, lust perverts a man’s sentiments, and
tred of God,” by reason of His forbidding the desired plea-
so he gives way “to foolish talking,” for instance, by ex-
sure. The other act is the desire for the things directed to
pressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to any-
the end. With regard to this there is “love of this world,”
thing else.
whose pleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other
∗ The sentence in brackets is omitted in the Leonine edition.
1871
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 154
Of the Parts of Lust
(In Twelve Articles)
We must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Into what parts is lust divided?
(2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like seduction?
(5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?
(6) Of seduction;
(7) Of rape;
(8) Of adultery;
(9) Of incest;
(10) Of sacrilege;
(11) Of the sin against nature;
(12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins.
Whether six species are fittingly assigned to lust?
IIa IIae q. 154 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that six species are unfit-
lasciviousness that they have committed.” Therefore it
tingly assigned to lust, namely, “simple fornication, adul-
seems that also uncleanness and lasciviousness should be
tery, incest, seduction, rape, and the unnatural vice.” For
reckoned species of lust, as well as fornication.
diversity of matter does not diversify the species. Now the
Objection 6. Further, the thing divided is not to be
aforesaid division is made with regard to diversity of mat-
reckoned among its parts. But lust is reckoned together
ter, according as the woman with whom a man has inter-
with the aforesaid: for it is written (Gal. 5:19): “The
course is married or a virgin, or of some other condition.
works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, un-
Therefore it seems that the species of lust are diversified
cleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: ‘luxury’].” Therefore
in this way.
it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species
Objection 2. Further, seemingly the species of one
of lust.
vice are not differentiated by things that belong to another
On the contrary, The aforesaid division is given in
vice. Now adultery does not differ from simple fornica-
the Decretals 36, qu. i∗.
tion, save in the point of a man having intercourse with
I answer that As stated above (q. 153, a. 3), the sin
one who is another’s, so that he commits an injustice.
of lust consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accor-
Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned
dance with right reason. This may happen in two ways.
a species of lust.
First, in respect of the matter wherein this pleasure is
Objection 3. Further, just as a man may happen to
sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due matter, other
have intercourse with a woman who is bound to another
due circumstances are not observed. And since a cir-
man by marriage, so may it happen that a man has in-
cumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose
tercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow.
species is derived from its object which is also its matter,
Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust,
it follows that the species of lust must be assigned with
even as adultery is.
respect to its matter or object.
Objection 4. Further, a married man sins not only
Now this same matter may be discordant with right
if he be with another woman, but also if he use his own
reason in two ways. First, because it is inconsistent with
wife inordinately. But the latter sin is comprised under
the end of the venereal act. In this way, as hindering the
lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among the species
begetting of children, there is the “vice against nature,”
thereof.
which attaches to every venereal act from which genera-
Objection 5. Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21):
tion cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing
“Lest again, when I come, God humble me among you,
and advancement of the child when born, there is “sim-
and I mourn many of them /that sinned before, and have
ple fornication,” which is the union of an unmarried man
not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication and
with an unmarried woman. Secondly, the matter wherein
∗ Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa
1872
the venereal act is consummated may be discordant with is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is this defor-right reason in relation to other persons; and this in two
mity of injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the
ways. First, with regard to the woman, with whom a man
lust that obeys concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice,
has connection, by reason of due honor not being paid
is thereby shown to be more grievous.
to her; and thus there is “incest,” which consists in the
Reply to Objection 3.
Since a woman, by vow-
misuse of a woman who is related by consanguinity or
ing continence, contracts a spiritual marriage with God,
affinity. Secondly, with regard to the person under whose
the sacrilege that is committed in the violation of such a
authority the woman is placed: and if she be under the au-
woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner, the other
thority of a husband, it is “adultery,” if under the authority
kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced
of her father, it is “seduction,” in the absence of violence,
to other species of lust.
and “rape” if violence be employed.
Reply to Objection 4. The sin of a husband with his
These species are differentiated on the part of the
wife is not connected with undue matter, but with other
woman rather than of the man, because in the venereal
circumstances, which do not constitute the species of a
act the woman is passive and is by way of matter, whereas
moral act, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 2).
the man is by way of agent; and it has been stated above
Reply to Objection 5. As a gloss says on this pas-
(obj. 1) that the aforesaid species are assigned with regard
sage, “uncleanness” stands for lust against nature, while
to a difference of matter.
“lasciviousness” is a man’s abuse of boys, wherefore it
Reply to Objection 1. The aforesaid diversity of mat-
would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also reply
ter is connected with a formal difference of object, which
that “lasciviousness” relates to certain acts circumstantial
difference results from different modes of opposition to
to the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so
right reason, as stated above.
forth.
Reply to Objection 2.
As stated above ( Ia IIae,
Reply to Objection 6. According to a gloss on this
q. 18, a. 7), nothing hinders the deformities of different
passage “lust” there signifies any kind of excess.
vices concurring in the one act, and in this way adultery
Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 154 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that simple fornication is
ity, neither as regards the love of God, since it is not a
not a mortal sin. For things that come under the same head
sin directly against. God, nor as regards the love of our
would seem to be on a par with one another. Now forni-
neighbor, since thereby no one is injured. Therefore sim-
cation comes under the same head as things that are not
ple fornication is not a mortal sin.
mortal sins: for it is written (Acts 15:29): “That you ab-
Objection 5. Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal
stain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and
perdition. But simple fornication has not this result: be-
from things strangled, and from fornication.” But there is
cause a gloss of Ambrose∗ on 1 Tim. 4:8, “Godliness
not mortal sin in these observances, according to 1 Tim.
is profitable to all things,” says: “The whole of Chris-
4:4, “Nothing is rejected that is received with thanksgiv-
tian teaching is summed up in mercy and godliness: if a
ing.” Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.
man conforms to this, even though he gives way to the in-
Objection 2. Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a
constancy of the flesh, doubtless he will be punished, but
Divine precept. But the Lord commanded (Osee 1:2): “Go
he will not perish.” Therefore simple fornication is not a
take thee a wife of fornications, and have of her children
mortal sin.
of fornications.” Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.
Objection 6. Further, Augustine says (De Bono Con-
Objection 3. Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in
jug. xvi) that “what food is to the well-being of the body,
Holy Writ without disapprobation. Yet simple fornication
such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the human
is mentioned without disapprobation by Holy Writ in con-
race.” But inordinate use of food is not always a mortal
nection with the patriarchs. Thus we read (Gn. 16:4) that
sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual intercourse;
Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and further on
and this would seem to apply especially to simple fornica-
(Gn. 30:5,9) that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the
tion, which is the least grievous of the aforesaid species.
handmaids of his wives; and again (Gn. 38:18) that Juda
On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:13): “Take heed
was with Thamar whom he thought to be a harlot. There-
to keep thyself. . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife
fore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.
never endure to know a crime.” Now crime denotes a
Objection 4. Further, every mortal sin is contrary to
mortal sin. Therefore fornication and all intercourse with
charity. But simple fornication is not contrary to char-
other than one’s wife is a mortal sin.
∗ The quotation is from the Gloss of Peter Lombard, who refers it to St.
Ambrose: whereas it is from Hilary the deacon
1873
Further, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from and consequently it is a mortal sin.
God’s kingdom. But fornication debars him, as shown
Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a
by the words of the Apostle (Gal. 5:21), who after men-
woman by fornication, make sufficient provision for the
tioning fornication and certain other vices, adds: “They
upbringing of the child: because a matter that comes un-
who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.”
der the determination of the law is judged according to
Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.
what happens in general, and not according to what may
Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i,
happen in a particular case.
can. Praedicandum): “They should know that the same
Reply to Objection 1. Fornication is reckoned in con-
penance is to be enjoined for perjury as for adultery, for-
junction with these things, not as being on a par with
nication, and wilful murder and other criminal offenses.”
them in sinfulness, but because the matters mentioned
Therefore simple fornication is a criminal or mortal sin.
there were equally liable to cause dispute between Jews
I answer that, Without any doubt we must hold sim-
and Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing unan-
ple fornication to be a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a
imously. For among the Gentiles, fornication was not
gloss∗ on Dt. 23:17, says: “This is a prohibition against
deemed unlawful, on account of the corruption of natu-
going with whores, whose vileness is venial.” For instead
ral reason: whereas the Jews, taught by the Divine law,
of “venial” it should be “venal,” since such is the wan-
considered it to be unlawful. The other things mentioned
ton’s trade. In order to make this evident, we must take
were loathsome to the Jews through custom introduced by
note that every sin committed directly against human life
the law into their daily life. Hence the Apostles forbade
is a mortal sin. Now simple fornication implies an inordi-
these things to the Gentiles, not as though they were un-
nateness that tends to injure the life of the offspring to be
lawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to
born of this union. For we find in all animals where the
the Jews, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 103, a. 4, ad 3).
upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and
Reply to Objection 2. Fornication is said to be a sin,
female, that these come together not indeterminately, but
because it is contrary to right reason. Now man’s reason is
the male with a certain female, whether one or several;
right, in so far as it is ruled by the Divine Will, the first and such is the case with all birds: while, on the other hand,
supreme rule. Wherefore that which a man does by God’s
among those animals, where the female alone suffices for
will and in obedience to His command, is not contrary to
the offspring’s upbringing, the union is indeterminate, as
right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general
in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident
order of reason: even so, that which is done miraculously
that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the
by the Divine power is not contrary to nature, though it
mother’s care for his nourishment, but much more the care
be contrary to the usual course of nature. Therefore just
of his father as guide and guardian, and under whom he
as Abraham did not sin in being willing to slay his inno-
progresses in goods both internal and external. Hence hu-
cent son, because he obeyed God, although considered in
man nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the
itself it was contrary to right human reason in general, so,
sexes and demands that a man should be united to a deter-
too, Osee sinned not in committing fornication by God’s
minate woman and should abide with her a long time or
command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly called
even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in the human
fornication, though it be so called in reference to the gen-
race the male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of
eral course of things. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii,
offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of the
8): “When God commands a thing to be done against the
child: and this certainly would cease if the union of sexes
customs or agreement of any people, though it were never
were indeterminate.
done by them heretofore, it is to be done”; and afterwards
This union with a certain definite woman is called mat-
he adds: “For as among the powers of human society, the
rimony; which for the above reason is said to belong to
greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser, so
the natural law. Since, however, the union of the sexes is
must God in preference to all.”
directed to the common good of the whole human race,
Reply to Objection 3. Abraham and Jacob went in
and common goods depend on the law for their determi-
to their handmaidens with no purpose of fornication, as
nation, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 90, a. 2), it follows that we shall show further on when we treat of matrimony (
this union of man and woman, which is called matrimony,
Suppl., q. 65, a. 5, ad 2). As to Juda there is no need to
is determined by some law. What this determination is for
excuse him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold.
us will be stated in the Third Part of this work ( Suppl.,
Reply to Objection 4. Simple fornication is contrary
q. 50, seqq.), where we shall treat of the sacrament of mat-
to the love of our neighbor, because it is opposed to the
rimony. Wherefore, since fornication is an indeterminate
good of the child to be born, as we have shown, since it is
union of the sexes, as something incompatible with matri-
an act of generation accomplished in a manner disadvan-
mony, it is opposed to the good of the child’s upbringing,
tageous to the future child.
∗ St. Augustine, QQ. in Deut., qu. 37
1874
Reply to Objection 5. A person, who, while given to as to the very genus of the act, and not only as to the inor-works of piety, yields to the inconstancy of the flesh, is
dinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand, one meal
freed from eternal loss, in so far as these works dispose
does not hinder the good of a man’s whole life, where-
him to receive the grace to repent, and because by such
fore the act of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason of
works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy; but
its genus. It would, however, be a mortal sin, if a man
not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal
were knowingly to partake of a food which would alter the
inconstancy impenitent until death.
whole condition of his life, as was the case with Adam.
Reply to Objection 6. One copulation may result in
Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins
the begetting of a man, wherefore inordinate copulation,
comprised under lust, for the marriage act that is done out
which hinders the good of the future child, is a mortal sin
of sensuous pleasure is a lesser sin.
Whether fornication is the most grievous of sins?
IIa IIae q. 154 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that fornication is the
gravates a sin is that which is in the inclination of the will.
most grievous of sins. For seemingly a sin is the more
But the sensual pleasure that is in the sensitive appetite,
grievous according as it proceeds from a greater sensuous
lessens sin, because a sin is the less grievous according as
pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous pleasure is in for-
it is committed under the impulse of a greater passion. It
nication, for a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:9 says that the “flame
is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure is in for-
of sensuous pleasure is most fierce in lust.” Therefore it
nication. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christiano∗)
seems that fornication is the gravest of sins.
that of all a Christian’s conflicts, the most difficult com-
Objection 2. Further, a sin is the more grievous that
bats are those of chastity; wherein the fight is a daily one,
is committed against a person more closely united to the
but victory rare: and Isidore declares (De Summo Bono
sinner: thus he sins more grievously who strikes his fa-
ii, 39) that “mankind is subjected to the devil by carnal
ther than one who strikes a stranger. Now according to 1
lust more than by anything else,” because, to wit, the ve-
Cor. 6:18, “He that committeth fornication sinneth against
hemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome.
his own body,” which is most intimately connected with
Reply to Objection 2. The fornicator is said to sin
a man. Therefore it seems that fornication is the most
against his own body, not merely because the pleasure of
grievous of sins.
fornication is consummated in the flesh, which is also the
Objection 3. Further, the greater a good is, the graver
case in gluttony, but also because he acts against the good
would seem to be the sin committed against it. Now the
of his own body by an undue resolution and defilement
sin of fornication is seemingly opposed to the good of the
thereof, and an undue association with another. Nor does
whole human race, as appears from what was said in the
it follow from this that fornication is the most grievous sin,
foregoing Article. It is also against Christ, according to
because in man reason is of greater value than the body,
1 Cor. 6:15, “Shall I. . . take the members of Christ, and
wherefore if there be a sin more opposed to reason, it will
make them the members of a harlot?” Therefore fornica-
be more grievous.
tion is the most grievous of sins.
Reply to Objection 3. The sin of fornication is con-
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 12)
trary to the good of the human race, in so far as it is preju-
that the sins of the flesh are less grievous than spiritual
dicial to the individual begetting of the one man that may
sins.
be born. Now one who is already an actual member of
I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured
the human species attains to the perfection of the species
in two ways, first with regard to the sin in itself, secondly
more than one who is a man potentially, and from this
with regard to some accident. The gravity of a sin is mea-
point of view murder is a more grievous sin than fornica-
sured with regard to the sin itself, by reason of its species,
tion and every kind of lust, through being more opposed
which is determined according to the good to which that
to the good of the human species. Again, a Divine good
sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to the good
is greater than the good of the human race: and therefore
of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin, as to
those sins also that are against God are more grievous.
its species, than those sins which are contrary to external
Moreover, fornication is a sin against God, not directly as
goods, such as theft and the like; while it is less grievous
though the fornicator intended to offend God, but conse-
than those which are directly against God, and sins that
quently, in the same way as all mortal sins. And just as
are injurious to the life of one already born, such as mur-
the members of our body are Christ’s members, so too,
der.
our spirit is one with Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:17,
Reply to Objection 1. The sensual pleasure that ag-
“He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit.” Wherefore
∗ Serm. ccxciii; ccl de Temp.; see Appendix to St. Augustine’s works 1875
also spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is.
Whether there can be mortal sin in touches and kisses?
IIa IIae q. 154 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no mortal
their disgrace and crime.” Therefore by doing these things
sin in touches and kisses. For the Apostle says (Eph.
a man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin.
5:3): “Fornication and all uncleanness, or covetousness,
I answer that, A thing is said to be a mortal works.
let it not so much as be named among you, as becometh
/sin in two ways. First, by reason of its species, and in this
saints,” then he adds: “Or obscenity” (which a gloss refers
way a kiss, caress, or touch does not, of its very nature,
to “kissing and fondling”), “or foolish talking” (as “soft
imply a mortal sin, for it is possible to do such things with-
speeches”), “or scurrility” (which “fools call geniality—
out lustful pleasure, either as being the custom of one’s
i.e. jocularity”), and afterwards he continues (Eph. 5:5):
country, or on account of some obligation or reasonable
“For know ye this and understand that no fornicator, or un-
cause. Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by rea-
clean, or covetous person (which is the serving of idols),
son of its cause: thus he who gives an alms, in order to
hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God,”
lead someone into heresy, sins mortally on account of his
thus making no further mention of obscenity, as neither of
corrupt intention. Now it has been stated above ( Ia IIae,
foolish talking or scurrility. Therefore these are not mortal
q. 74, a. 8), that it is a mortal sin not only to consent to
sins.
the act, but also to the delectation of a mortal sin. Where-
Objection 2. Further, fornication is stated to be a mor-
fore since fornication is a mortal sin, and much more so
tal sin as being prejudicial to the good of the future child’s
the other kinds of lust, it follows that in such like sins not
begetting and upbringing. But these are not affected by
only consent to the act but also consent to the pleasure
kisses and touches or blandishments. Therefore there is
is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and ca-
no mortal sin in these.
resses are done for this delectation, it follows that they are
Objection 3. Further, things that are mortal sins in
mortal sins, and only in this way are they said to be lust-
themselves can never be good actions. Yet kisses, touches,
ful. Therefore in so far as they are lustful, they are mortal
and the like can be done sometimes without sin. Therefore
sins.
they are not mortal sins in themselves.
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle makes no further
On the contrary, A lustful look is less than a touch, a
mention of these three because they are not sinful except
caress or a kiss. But according to Mat. 5:28, “Whosoever
as directed to those that he had mentioned before.
shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already com-
Reply to Objection 2. Although kisses and touches
mitted adultery with her in his heart.” Much more there-
do not by their very nature hinder the good of the human
fore are lustful kisses and other like things mortal sins.
offspring, they proceed from lust, which is the source of
Further, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep.
this hindrance: and on this account they are mortally sin-
lxii), “By their very intercourse, their blandishments, their
ful.
converse, their embraces, those who are associated in a
Reply to Objection 3. This argument proves that such
sleep that knows neither honor nor shame, acknowledge
things are not mortal sins in their species.
Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 154 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that nocturnal pollution is
ing to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep, so that
a sin. For the same things are the matter of merit and de-
nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a
merit. Now a man may merit while he sleeps, as was the
sin, seeing that it is a sin according to its genus.
case with Solomon, who while asleep obtained the gift of
Objection 3. Further, it is useless to reprove and in-
wisdom from the Lord (3 Kings 3:2, Par. 1). Therefore a
struct one who cannot act according to or against rea-
man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal pollu-
son. Now man, while asleep, is instructed and reproved
tion would seem to be a sin.
by God, according to Job 33:15,16, “By a dream in a
Objection 2. Further, whoever has the use of reason
vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of
can sin. Now a man has the use of reason while asleep,
men∗. . . Then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching
since in our sleep we frequently discuss matters, choose
instructeth them in what they are to learn.” Therefore a
this rather than that, consenting to one thing, or dissent-
man, while asleep, can act according to or against his rea-
∗ Vulg.: ‘When deep sleep falleth upon men.’ St. Thomas is apparently quoting from memory, as the passage is given correctly above, q. 95, a. 6, obj. 1
1876
son, and this is to do good or sinful actions, and thus it acts productive of pollution. In this sense the Philosopher
seems that nocturnal pollution is a sin.
says (Ethic. i, 13) that “in so far as certain movements in
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
some degree pass” from the waking state to the state of
15): “When the same image that comes into the mind of
sleep, “the dreams of good men are better than those of
a speaker presents itself to the mind of the sleeper, so that
any other people”: and Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
the latter is unable to distinguish the imaginary from the
15) that “even during sleep, the soul may have conspicu-
real union of bodies, the flesh is at once moved, with the
ous merit on account of its good disposition.” Thus it is
result that usually follows such motions; and yet there is
evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful on the part
as little sin in this as there is in speaking and therefore
of its cause. on the other hand, it may happen that noc-
thinking about such things while one is awake.”
turnal pollution ensues after thoughts about carnal acts,
I answer that, Nocturnal pollution may be considered
though they were speculative, or accompanied by abhor-
in two ways. First, in itself; and thus it has not the char-
rence, and then it is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its
acter of a sin. For every sin depends on the judgment of
cause.
reason, since even the first movement of the sensuality has
The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance
nothing sinful in it, except in so far as it can be suppressed
when by the work of a devil the sleeper’s phantasms are
by reason; wherefore in the absence of reason’s judgment,
disturbed so as to induce the aforesaid result. Sometimes
there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has not a free
this is associated with a previous sin, namely the neglect
judgment. For there is no one who while sleeping does not
to guard against the wiles of the devil. Hence the words of
regard some of the images formed by his imagination as
the hymn at even: “Our enemy repress, that so our bodies
though they were real, as stated above in the Ia, q. 84, a. 8,
no uncleanness know”∗.
ad 2. Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and is
On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on
deprived of reason’s judgment, is not imputed to him as a
man’s part, and through the wickedness of the devil alone.
sin, as neither are the actions of a maniac or an imbecile.
Thus we read in the Collationes Patrum (Coll. xxii, 6) of a
Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with
man who was ever wont to suffer from nocturnal pollution
reference to its cause. This may be threefold. One is a
on festivals, and that the devil brought this about in order
bodily cause. For when there is excess of seminal hu-
to prevent him from receiving Holy Communion. Hence
mor in the body, or when the humor is disintegrated ei-
it is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a sin, but is
ther through overheating of the body or some other distur-
sometimes the result of a previous sin.
bance, the sleeper dreams things that are connected with
Reply to Objection 1. Solomon did not merit to re-
the discharge of this excessive or disintegrated humor: the
ceive wisdom from God while he was asleep. He received
same thing happens when nature is cumbered with other
it in token of his previous desire. It is for this reason that
superfluities, so that phantasms relating to the discharge of
his petition is stated to have been pleasing to God (3 Kings
those superfluities are formed in the imagination. Accord-
3:10), as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15).
ingly if this excess of humor be due to a sinful cause (for
Reply to Objection 2. The use of reason is more or
instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal pollution
less hindered in sleep, according as the inner sensitive
has the character of sin from its cause: whereas if the ex-
powers are more or less overcome by sleep, on account of
cess or disintegration of these superfluities be not due to
the violence or attenuation of the evaporations. Neverthe-
a sinful cause, nocturnal pollution is not sinful, neither in
less it is always hindered somewhat, so as to be unable to
itself nor in its cause.
elicit a judgment altogether free, as stated in the Ia, q. 84,
A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of
a. 8, ad 2. Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it
the soul and the inner man: for instance when it happens
as a sin.
to the sleeper on account of some previous thought. For
Reply to Objection 3. Reason’s apprehension is not
the thought which preceded while he was awake, is some-
hindered during sleep to the same extent as its judgment,
times purely speculative, for instance when one thinks
for this is accomplished by reason turning to sensible ob-
about the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion;
jects, which are the first principles of human thought.
while sometimes it is accompanied by a certain emotion
Hence nothing hinders man’s reason during sleep from ap-
either of concupiscence or of abhorrence. Now noctur-
prehending anew something arising out of the traces left
nal pollution is more apt to arise from thinking about car-
by his previous thoughts and phantasms presented to him,
nal sins with concupiscence for such pleasures, because
or again through Divine revelation, or the interference of
this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul, so that the
a good or bad angel.
sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent to
∗ Translation W. K. Blount
1877
Whether seduction should be reckoned a species of lust?
IIa IIae q. 154 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that seduction should not
power. Moreover, the seal of virginity is a special ob-
be reckoned a species of lust. For seduction denotes the
stacle to the intercourse of fornication, in that it should be
unlawful violation of a virgin, according to the Decretals
removed by marriage only. Hence seduction is not sim-
(XXXVI, qu. 1)∗. But this may occur between an un-
ple fornication, since the latter is intercourse with harlots,
married man and an unmarried woman, which pertains to
women, namely, who are no longer virgins, as a gloss ob-
fornication. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned
serves on 2 Cor. 12:, “And have not done penance for the
a species of lust, distinct from fornication.
uncleanness and fornication,” etc.
Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Patriarch.†):
Reply to Objection 2. Ambrose here takes seduction
“Let no man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is
in another sense, as applicable in a general way to any
adultery.” Now a species is not contained under another
sin of lust. Wherefore seduction, in the words quoted,
that is differentiated in opposition to it. Therefore since
signifies the intercourse between a married man and any
adultery is a species of lust, it seems that seduction should
woman other than his wife. This is clear from his adding:
not be reckoned a species of lust.
“Nor is it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may
Objection 3. Further, to do a person an injury would
not.” In this sense, too, we are to understand the words
seem to pertain to injustice rather than to lust. Now the
of Num. 5:13: “If [Vulg.: ‘But’] the adultery is secret,
seducer does an injury to another, namely the violated
and cannot be provided by witnesses, because she was not
maiden’s father, who “can take the injury as personal to
found in adultery [stupro].”
himself”‡, and sue the seducer for damages. Therefore
Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents a sin from
seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.
having a greater deformity through being united to an-
On the contrary, Seduction consists properly in the
other sin. Now the sin of lust obtains a greater defor-
venereal act whereby a virgin is violated. Therefore, since
mity from the sin of injustice, because the concupiscence
lust is properly about venereal actions, it would seem that
would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it refrains
seduction is a species of lust.
not from the pleasurable object so that it may avoid an in-
I answer that, When the matter of a vice has a special
justice. In fact a twofold injustice attaches to it. One is on
deformity, we must reckon it to be a determinate species
the part of the virgin, who, though not violated by force,
of that vice. Now lust is a sin concerned with venereal
is nevertheless seduced, and thus the seducer is bound to
matter, as stated above (q. 153, a. 1). And a special de-
compensation. Hence it is written (Ex. 22:16,17): “If a
formity attaches to the violation of a virgin who is un-
man seduce a virgin not yet espoused, and lie with her, he
der her father’s care: both on the part of the maid, who
shall endow her and have her to wife. If the maid’s father
through being violated without any previous compact of
will not give her to him, he shall give money according to
marriage is both hindered from contracting a lawful mar-
the dowry, which virgins are wont to receive.” The other
riage and is put on the road to a wanton life from which
injury is done to the maid’s father: wherefore the seducer
she was withheld lest she should lose the seal of virginity:
is bound by the Law to a penalty in his regard. For it is
and on the part of the father, who is her guardian, accord-
written (Dt. 22:28,29): “If a man find a damsel that is a
ing to Ecclus. 42:11, “Keep a sure watch over a shame-
virgin, who is not espoused, and taking her, lie with her,
less daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a
and the matter come to judgment: he that lay with her
laughing-stock to thy enemies.” Therefore it is evident
shall give to the father of the maid fifty sicles of silver,
that seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a
and shall have her to wife, and because he hath humbled
virgin, while still under the guardianship of her parents, is
her, he may not put her away all the days of his life”: and
a determinate species of lust.
this, lest he should prove to have married her in mockery,
Reply to Objection 1. Although a virgin is free from
as Augustine observes.§
the bond of marriage, she is not free from her father’s
Whether rape is a species of lust, distinct from seduction?
IIa IIae q. 154 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that rape is not a species
causing corruption: wherefore he that is guilty of rape is a
of lust, distinct from seduction. For Isidore says (Etym.
seducer.” Therefore it seems that rape should not be reck-
v, 26) that “seduction [stuprum], or rape, properly speak-
oned a species of lust distinct from seduction.
ing, is unlawful intercourse, and takes its name from its
Objection 2. Further, rape, apparently, implies vio-
∗ Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa
† De Abraham i, 4
‡ Gratian, ad
can. Lex illa
§ QQ. in Dt., qu. xxxiv. ¶ Append. Grat. ad can. Lex
illa
1878
lence. For it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1¶)
“We abhor abductors whether of widows or of virgins on
that “rape is committed when a maid is taken away by
account of the heinousness of their crime.”
force from her father’s house that after being violated she
There is seduction without rape when a man, without
may be taken to wife.” But the employment of force is
employing force, violates a virgin unlawfully.
accidental to lust, for this essentially regards the pleasure
Reply to Objection 1. Since rape frequently coin-
of intercourse. Therefore it seems that rape should not be
cides with seduction, the one is sometimes used to signify
reckoned a determinate species of lust.
the other.
Objection 3. Further, the sin of lust is curbed by mar-
Reply to Objection 2.
The employment of force
riage: for it is written (1 Cor. 7:2): “For fear of fornica-
would seem to arise from the greatness of concupiscence,
tion, let every man have his own wife.” Now rape is an
the result being that a man does not fear to endanger him-
obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it was enacted in the
self by offering violence.
council of Meaux: “We decree that those who are guilty
Reply to Objection 3. The rape of a maiden who is
of rape, or of abducting or seducing women, should not
promised in marriage is to be judged differently from that
have those women in marriage, although they should have
of one who is not so promised. For one who is promised
subsequently married them with the consent of their par-
in marriage must be restored to her betrothed, who has a
ents.” Therefore rape is not a determinate species of lust
right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas one that is
distinct from seduction.
not promised to another must first of all be restored to her
Objection 4. Further, a man may have knowledge of
father’s care, and then the abductor may lawfully marry
his newly married wife without committing a sin of lust.
her with her parents’ consent. Otherwise the marriage is
Yet he may commit rape if he take her away by force
unlawful, since whosoever steals a thing he is bound to re-
from her parents’ house, and have carnal knowledge of
store it. Nevertheless rape does not dissolve a marriage al-
her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate
ready contracted, although it is an impediment to its being
species of lust.
contracted. As to the decree of the council in question, it
On the contrary, Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse,
was made in abhorrence of this crime, and has been abro-
as Isidore states (Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin
gated. Wherefore Jerome† declares the contrary: “Three
of lust. Therefore rape is a species of lust.
kinds of lawful marriage,” says he, “are mentioned in
I answer that, Rape, in the sense in which we speak
Holy Writ. The first is that of a chaste maiden given away
of it now, is a species of lust: and sometimes it coincides
lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The second is when
with seduction; sometimes there is rape without seduc-
a man finds a maiden in the city, and by force has carnal
tion, and sometimes seduction without rape.
knowledge of her. If the father be willing, the man shall
They coincide when a man employs force in order un-
endow her according to the father’s estimate, and shall pay
lawfully to violate a virgin. This force is employed some-
the price of her purity‡. The third is, when the maiden is
times both towards the virgin and towards her father; and
taken away from such a man, and is given to another at
sometimes towards the father and not to the virgin, for in-
the father’s will.”
stance if she allows herself to be taken away by force from
We may also take this decree to refer to those who are
her father’s house. Again, the force employed in rape dif-
promised to others in marriage, especially if the betrothal
fers in another way, because sometimes a maid is taken
be expressed by words in the present tense.
away by force from her parents’ house, and is forcibly vi-
Reply to Objection 4. The man who is just married
olated: while sometimes, though taken away by force, she
has, in virtue of the betrothal, a certain right in her: where-
is not forcibly violated, but of her own consent, whether
fore, although he sins by using violence, he is not guilty
by act of fornication or by the act of marriage: for the con-
of the crime of rape. Hence Pope Gelasius says§: “This
ditions of rape remain no matter how force is employed.
law of bygone rulers stated that rape was committed when
There is rape without seduction if a man abduct a widow
a maiden, with regard to whose marriage nothing had so
or one who is not a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus says∗,
far been decided, was taken away by force.”
Whether adultery is determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species?
IIa IIae q. 154 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that adultery is not a de-
ing to a gloss¶ on Ex. 20:14. Now a woman who is not
terminate species of lust, distinct from the other species.
one’s own may be of various conditions, namely either a
For adultery takes its name from a man having intercourse
virgin, or under her father’s care, or a harlot, or of any
“with a woman who is not his own [ad alteram],” accord-
other description. Therefore it seems that adultery is not
∗ Ep. v ad Caesarium; Cf. can. Raptores xxxvi, qu. 2
† The quo-
tation is from Can. Tria. xxxvi, qu. 2
‡ Cf. Dt. 22:23-29
§ Can.
Lex illa, xxvii, qu. 2; xxxvi, qu. 1
¶ St. Augustine: Serm. li, 13 de
Divers. lxiii
1879
a species of lust distinct from the others.
hath fornicated in adultery, and hath gotten children of an-
Objection 2. Further, Jerome says∗: “It matters not
other man,” which is contrary to the good of her offspring.
for what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence
The first of these, however, is common to all mortal sins,
Sixtus the Pythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is in-
while the two others belong especially to the deformity of
satiable of his wife is an adulterer,” and in like manner
adultery. Hence it is manifest that adultery is a determi-
one who is over enamored of any woman. Now every
nate species of lust, through having a special deformity in
kind of lust includes a too ardent love. Therefore adultery
venereal acts.
is in every kind of lust: and consequently it should not be
Reply to Objection 1. If a married man has inter-
reckoned a species of lust.
course with another woman, his sin may be denominated
Objection 3. Further, where there is the same kind
either with regard to him, and thus it is always adultery,
of deformity, there would seem to be the same species of
since his action is contrary to the fidelity of marriage, or
sin. Now, apparently, there is the same kind of deformity
with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse;
in seduction and adultery: since in either case a woman is
and thus sometimes it is adultery, as when a married man
violated who is under another person’s authority. There-
has intercourse with another’s wife; and sometimes it has
fore adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct
the character of seduction, or of some other sin, according
from the others.
to various conditions affecting the woman with whom he
On the contrary, Pope Leo† says that “adultery is
has intercourse: and it has been stated above (a. 1) that
sexual intercourse with another man or woman in con-
the species of lust correspond to the various conditions of
travention of the marriage compact, whether through the
women.
impulse of one’s own lust, or with the consent of the
Reply to Objection 2. Matrimony is specially or-
other party.” Now this implies a special deformity of lust.
dained for the good of human offspring, as stated above
Therefore adultery is a determinate species of lust.
(a. 2). But adultery is specially opposed to matrimony,
I answer that, Adultery, as its name implies, “is ac-
in the point of breaking the marriage faith which is due
cess to another’s marriage-bed [ad alienum torum]”‡. By
between husband and wife. And since the man who is
so doing a man is guilty of a twofold offense against
too ardent a lover of his wife acts counter to the good
chastity and the good of human procreation. First, by
of marriage if he use her indecently, although he be not
accession to a woman who is not joined to him in mar-
unfaithful, he may in a sense be called an adulterer; and
riage, which is contrary to the good of the upbringing of
even more so than he that is too ardent a lover of another
his own children. Secondly, by accession to a woman who
woman.
is united to another in marriage, and thus he hinders the
Reply to Objection 3. The wife is under her hus-
good of another’s children. The same applies to the mar-
band’s authority, as united to him in marriage: whereas
ried woman who is corrupted by adultery. Wherefore it is
the maid is under her father’s authority, as one who is to
written (Ecclus. 23:32,33): “Every woman. . . that leaveth
be married by that authority. Hence the sin of adultery
her husband. . . shall be guilty of sin. For first she hath
is contrary to the good of marriage in one way, and the
been unfaithful to the law of the Most High” (since there it
sin of seduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned
is commanded: “Thou shalt not commit adultery”); “and
to differ specifically. Of other matters concerning adul-
secondly, she hath offended against her husband,” by mak-
tery we shall speak in the Third Part§, when we treat of
ing it uncertain that the children are his: “thirdly, she
matrimony.
Whether incest is a determinate species of lust?
IIa IIae q. 154 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that incest is not a deter-
not one but several species of lust.
minate species of lust. For incest¶ takes its name from
Objection 3.
Further, that which does not, of it-
being a privation of chastity. But all kinds of lust are op-
self, imply a deformity, does not constitute a determinate
posed to chastity. Therefore it seems that incest is not a
species of vice. But intercourse between those who are re-
species of lust, but is lust itself in general.
lated by consanguinity or affinity does not, of itself, con-
Objection 2.
Further, it is stated in the Decretals
tain any deformity, else it would never have been lawful.
(XXXVI, qu. 1k) that “incest is intercourse between a
Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust.
man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity.”
On the contrary, The species of lust are distinguished
Now affinity differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is
according to the various conditions of women with whom
∗ Contra Jovin. i
† St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf. Append.
Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5
‡ Cf. Append. Gratian, ad
can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 1
§ Suppl., q. 59, a. 3; Suppl., Qq. 60,62
¶ ‘Incestus’ is equivalent to ‘in-castus = ‘unchaste’
k Cf. Append.
Grat. ad can. Lex illa
1880
a man has unlawful intercourse. Now incest implies a spe-together in a useful and becoming amity; nor should one
cial condition on the part of the woman, because it is un-
man have many relationships in one, but each should have
lawful intercourse with a woman related by consanguinity
one.”
or affinity as stated (obj. 2). Therefore incest is a determi-
Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it
nate species of lust.
is natural that a man should have a liking for a woman of
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,6) wherever we
his kindred, if to this be added the love that has its origin
find something incompatible with the right use of vene-
in venereal intercourse, his love would be too ardent and
real actions, there must needs be a determinate species of
would become a very great incentive to lust: and this is
lust. Now sexual intercourse with women related by con-
contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that incest is a
sanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to venereal union on
determinate species of lust.
three counts. First, because man naturally owes a certain
Reply to Objection 1. Unlawful intercourse between
respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood re-
persons related to one another would be most prejudicial
lations, who are descended in near degree from the same
to chastity, both on account of the opportunities it affords,
parents: so much so indeed that among the ancients, as
and because of the excessive ardor of love, as stated in the
Valerius Maximus relates∗, it was not deemed right for a
Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse between such
son to bathe with his father, lest they should see one an-
persons is called “incest” antonomastically.
other naked. Now from what has been said (q. 142, a. 4:
Reply to Objection 2. Persons are related by affinity
q. 151, a. 4), it is evident that in venereal acts there is
through one who is related by consanguinity: and there-
a certain shamefulness inconsistent with respect, where-
fore since the one depends on the other, consanguinity and
fore men are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is unseemly
affinity entail the same kind of unbecomingness.
that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse.
Reply to Objection 3. There is something essentially
This reason seems to be indicated (Lev.
18:7) where
unbecoming and contrary to natural reason in sexual in-
we read: “She is thy mother, thou shalt not uncover her
tercourse between persons related by blood, for instance
nakedness,” and the same is expressed further on with re-
between parents and children who are directly and imme-
gard to others.
diately related to one another, since children naturally owe
The second reason is because blood relations must
their parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a
needs live in close touch with one another. Wherefore
horse (De Animal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother
if they were not debarred from venereal union, opportu-
by mistake and threw itself over a precipice as though
nities of venereal intercourse would be very frequent and
horrified at what it had done, because some animals even
thus men’s minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in
have a natural respect for those that have begotten them.
the Old Law† the prohibition was apparently directed spe-
There is not the same essential unbecomingness attach-
cially to those persons who must needs live together.
ing to other persons who are related to one another not
The third reason is, because this would hinder a man
directly but through their parents: and, as to this, becom-
from having many friends: since through a man taking a
ingness or unbecomingness varies according to custom,
stranger to wife, all his wife’s relations are united to him
and human or Divine law: because, as stated above (a. 2),
by a special kind of friendship, as though they were of the
sexual intercourse, being directed to the common good,
same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine says (De
is subject to law. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Civ. Dei xv, 16): “The demands of charity are most per-
Dei xv, 16), whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes
fectly satisfied by men uniting together in the bonds that
back to olden times, it became all the more worthy of con-
the various ties of friendship require, so that they may live
demnation when religion forbade it.
Whether sacrilege can be a species of lust?
IIa IIae q. 154 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that sacrilege cannot be
species of lust.
a species of lust. For the same species is not contained
Objection 3. Further, something derogatory to a sa-
under different genera that are not subalternated to one
cred thing may be done by the other kinds of vice, as
another. Now sacrilege is a species of irreligion, as stated
well as by lust. But sacrilege is not reckoned a species
above (q. 99, a. 2). Therefore sacrilege cannot be reck-
of gluttony, or of any other similar vice. Therefore neither
oned a species of lust.
should it be reckoned a species of lust.
Objection 2. Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1‡),
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv,
do not place sacrilege among other sins which are reck-
16) that “if it is wicked, through covetousness, to go be-
oned species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a
yond one’s earthly bounds, how much more wicked is it
∗ Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1
† Lev. 18
‡ Append. Grat. ad can. Lex
illa
1881
through venereal lust to transgress the bounds of morals!”
it is directed to another vice as its end, and may coin-
Now to go beyond one’s earthly bounds in sacred matters
cide with the various species of lust. For unlawful inter-
is a sin of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacri-
course between persons mutually united by spiritual rela-
lege to overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal
tionship, is a sacrilege after the manner of incest. Inter-
desire in sacred matters. But venereal desire pertains to
course with a virgin consecrated to God, inasmuch as she
lust. Therefore sacrilege is a species of lust.
is the spouse of Christ, is sacrilege resembling adultery. If
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18,
the maiden be under her father’s authority, it will be spiri-
Aa. 6,7), the act of a virtue or vice, that is directed to the
tual seduction; and if force be employed it will be spiritual
end of another virtue or vice, assumes the latter’s species:
rape, which kind of rape even the civil law punishes more
thus, theft committed for the sake of adultery, passes into
severely than others. Thus the Emperor Justinian says∗:
the species of adultery. Now it is evident that as Augustine
“If any man dare, I will not say to rape, but even to tempt
states (De Virgin. 8), the observance of chastity, by being
a consecrated virgin with a view to marriage, he shall be
directed to the worship of God, becomes an act of religion,
liable to capital punishment.”
as in the case of those who vow and keep chastity. Where-
Reply to Objection 3. Sacrilege is committed on a
fore it is manifest that lust also, by violating something
consecrated thing. Now a consecrated thing is either a
pertaining to the worship of God, belongs to the species
consecrated person, who is desired for sexual intercourse,
of sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may be accounted
and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired for possession, a species of lust.
and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege may also come
Reply to Objection 1. Lust, by being directed to an-
under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an
other vice as its end, becomes a species of that vice: and
injury be done to a consecrated person. Again, one may
so a species of lust may be also a species of irreligion, as
commit a sacrilege by partaking gluttonously of sacred
of a higher genus.
food. Nevertheless, sacrilege is ascribed more specially
Reply to Objection 2. The enumeration referred to,
to lust which is opposed to chastity for the observance of
includes those sins which are species of lust by their very
which certain persons are specially consecrated.
nature: whereas sacrilege is a species of lust in so far as
Whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust?
IIa IIae q. 154 a. 11
Objection 1. It would seem that the unnatural vice is
mon to all lustful vices; secondly, because, in addition,
not a species of lust. For no mention of the vice against
it is contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as
nature is made in the enumeration given above (a. 1,
becoming to the human race: and this is called “the un-
obj. 1). Therefore it is not a species of lust.
natural vice.” This may happen in several ways. First, by
Objection 2. Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and
procuring pollution, without any copulation, for the sake
so it is comprised under vice. But the unnatural vice is
of venereal pleasure: this pertains to the sin of “unclean-
comprised not under vice, but under bestiality, according
ness” which some call “effeminacy.” Secondly, by copula-
to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore the unnatural
tion with a thing of undue species, and this is called “bes-
vice is not a species of lust.
tiality.” Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male
Objection 3. Further, lust regards acts directed to hu-
with male, or female with female, as the Apostle states
man generation, as stated above (q. 153, a. 2): Whereas
(Rom. 1:27): and this is called the “vice of sodomy.”
the unnatural vice concerns acts from which generation
Fourthly, by not observing the natural manner of copu-
cannot follow.
Therefore the unnatural vice is not a
lation, either as to undue means, or as to other monstrous
species of lust.
and bestial manners of copulation.
On the contrary, It is reckoned together with the
Reply to Objection 1.
There we enumerated the
other species of lust (2 Cor. 12:21) where we read: “And
species of lust that are not contrary to human nature:
have not done penance for the uncleanness, and fornica-
wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted.
tion, and lasciviousness,” where a gloss says: “Lascivi-
Reply to Objection 2. Bestiality differs from vice, for
ousness, i.e., unnatural lust.”
the latter is opposed to human virtue by a certain excess
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 6,9) wherever
in the same matter as the virtue, and therefore is reducible
there occurs a special kind of deformity whereby the vene-
to the same genus.
real act is rendered unbecoming, there is a determinate
Reply to Objection 3. The lustful man intends not
species of lust.
This may occur in two ways: First,
human generation but venereal pleasures. It is possible
through being contrary to right reason, and this is com-
to have this without those acts from which human genera-
∗ Cod. i, iii de Episc. et Cler. 5
1882
tion follows: and it is that which is sought in the unnatural vice.
Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust?
IIa IIae q. 154 a. 12
Objection 1. It would seem that the unnatural vice is
stated above (a. 9), is contrary to the natural respect which
not the greatest sin among the species of lust. For the more
we owe persons related to us.
a sin is contrary to charity the graver it is. Now adultery,
With regard to the other species of lust they imply a
seduction and rape which are injurious to our neighbor
transgression merely of that which is determined by right
are seemingly more contrary to the love of our neighbor,
reason, on the presupposition, however, of natural prin-
than unnatural sins, by which no other person is injured.
ciples. Now it is more against reason to make use of
Therefore the unnatural sin is not the greatest among the
the venereal act not only with prejudice to the future off-
species of lust.
spring, but also so as to injure another person besides.
Objection 2. Further, sins committed against God
Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed with-
would seem to be the most grievous. Now sacrilege is
out injustice to another person, is the least grave among
committed directly against God, since it is injurious to the
the species of lust. Then, it is a greater injustice to have
Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver sin than
intercourse with a woman who is subject to another’s au-
the unnatural vice.
thority as regards the act of generation, than as regards
Objection 3. Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more
merely her guardianship.
Wherefore adultery is more
grievous according as we owe a greater love to the per-
grievous than seduction. And both of these are aggra-
son against whom that sin is committed. Now the order of
vated by the use of violence. Hence rape of a virgin is
charity requires that a man love more those persons who
graver than seduction, and rape of a wife than adultery.
are united to him—and such are those whom he defiles
And all these are aggravated by coming under the head of
by incest—than persons who are not connected with him,
sacrilege, as stated above (a. 10, ad 2).
and whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural vice.
Reply to Objection 1. Just as the ordering of right
Therefore incest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.
reason proceeds from man, so the order of nature is
Objection 4. Further, if the unnatural vice is most
from God Himself: wherefore in sins contrary to nature,
grievous, the more it is against nature the graver it would
whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is
seem to be. Now the sin of uncleanness or effeminacy
done to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says
would seem to be most contrary to nature, since it would
(Confess. iii, 8): “Those foul offenses that are against na-
seem especially in accord with nature that agent and pa-
ture should be everywhere and at all times detested and
tient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would
punished, such as were those of the people of Sodom,
follow that uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices.
which should all nations commit, they should all stand
But this is not true. Therefore unnatural vices are not the
guilty of the same crime, by the law of God which hath
most grievous among sins of lust.
not so made men that they should so abuse one another.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De adult. conjug.∗)
For even that very intercourse which should be between
that “of all these,” namely the sins belonging to lust, “that
God and us is violated, when that same nature, of which
which is against nature is the worst.”
He is the Author, is polluted by the perversity of lust.”
I answer that, In every genus, worst of all is the cor-
Reply to Objection 2. Vices against nature are also
ruption of the principle on which the rest depend. Now the
against God, as stated above (ad 1), and are so much more
principles of reason are those things that are according to
grievous than the depravity of sacrilege, as the order im-
nature, because reason presupposes things as determined
pressed on human nature is prior to and more firm than
by nature, before disposing of other things according as it
any subsequently established order.
is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative and
Reply to Objection 3. The nature of the species is
in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative mat-
more intimately united to each individual, than any other
ters the most grievous and shameful error is that which
individual is. Wherefore sins against the specific nature
is about things the knowledge of which is naturally be-
are more grievous.
stowed on man, so in matters of action it is most grave and
Reply to Objection 4. Gravity of a sin depends more
shameful to act against things as determined by nature.
on the abuse of a thing than on the omission of the right
Therefore, since by the unnatural vices man transgresses
use. Wherefore among sins against nature, the lowest
that which has been determined by nature with regard to
place belongs to the sin of uncleanness, which consists in
the use of venereal actions, it follows that in this matter
the mere omission of copulation with another. While the
this sin is gravest of all. After it comes incest, which, as
most grievous is the sin of bestiality, because use of the
∗ The quotation is from Cap. Adulterii xxxii, qu. 7. Cf. Augustine, De Bono Conjugali, viii.
1883
due species is not observed. Hence a gloss on Gn. 37:2, Lastly comes the sin of not observing the right manner of
“He accused his brethren of a most wicked crime,” says
copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards
that “they copulated with cattle.” After this comes the sin
the “vas” than if it affects the manner of copulation in re-
of sodomy, because use of the right sex is not observed.
spect of other circumstances.
1884
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 155
Of Continence
(In Four Articles)
We must next consider the potential parts of temperance: (1) continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the first head we must consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether continence is a virtue?
(2) What is its matter?
(3) What is its subject?
(4) Of its comparison with temperance.
Whether continence is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 155 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that continence is not a
firm in opposition to the passions, lest it be led astray by
virtue. For species and genus are not co-ordinate mem-
them: yet it does not attain to the perfect nature of a moral
bers of the same division. But continence is co-ordinated
virtue, by which even the sensitive appetite is subject to
with virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1,9).
reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do
Therefore continence is not a virtue.
not arise in the sensitive appetite. Hence the Philosopher
Objection 2. Further, no one sins by using a virtue,
says (Ethic. iv, 9) that “continence is not a virtue but
since, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19),
a mixture,” inasmuch as it has something of virtue, and
“a virtue is a thing that no one makes ill use of.” Yet one
somewhat falls short of virtue.
may sin by containing oneself: for instance, if one desire
If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any
to do a good, and contain oneself from doing it. Therefore
principle of commendable actions, we may say that conti-
continence is not a virtue.
nence is a virtue.
Objection 3. Further, no virtue withdraws man from
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher includes con-
that which is lawful, but only from unlawful things: for
tinence in the same division with virtue in so far as the
a gloss on Gal. 5:23, “Faith, modesty,” etc., says that by
former falls short of virtue.
continence a man refrains even from things that are law-
Reply to Objection 2. Properly speaking, man is that
ful. Therefore continence is not a virtue.
which is according to reason. Wherefore from the very
On the contrary, Every praiseworthy habit would
fact that a man holds [tenet se] to that which is in accord
seem to be a virtue. Now such is continence, for An-
with reason, he is said to contain himself. Now whatever
dronicus says∗ that “continence is a habit unconquered by
pertains to perversion of reason is not according to reason.
pleasure.” Therefore continence is a virtue.
Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to
I answer that, The word “continence” is taken by var-
that which is in accord with right reason, and not to that
ious people in two ways. For some understand continence
which is in accord with perverse reason. Now evil desires
to denote abstention from all venereal pleasure: thus the
are opposed to right reason, even as good desires are op-
Apostle joins continence to chastity (Gal. 5:23). In this
posed to perverse reason. Wherefore he is properly and
sense perfect continence is virginity in the first place, and
truly continent who holds to right reason, by abstaining
widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies to
from evil desires, and not he who holds to perverse rea-
continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have
son, by abstaining from good desires: indeed, the latter
stated above (q. 152, a. 3 ) to be a virtue. Others, however,
should rather be said to be obstinate in evil.
understand continence as signifying that whereby a man
Reply to Objection 3. The gloss quoted takes conti-
resists evil desires, which in him are vehement. In this
nence in the first sense, as denoting a perfect virtue, which
sense the Philosopher takes continence (Ethic. vii, 7), and
refrains not merely from unlawful goods, but also from
thus also it is used in the Conferences of the Fathers (Col-
certain lawful things that are lesser goods, in order to give
lat. xii, 10,11). In this way continence has something of
its whole attention to the more perfect goods.
the nature of a virtue, in so far, to wit, as the reason stands
∗ De Affectibus
1885
Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence?
IIa IIae q. 155 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that desires for pleasures
is to be observed that natural inclinations are the princi-
of touch are not the matter of continence. For Ambrose
ples of all supervening inclinations, as stated above ( Ia,
says (De Offic. i, 46): “General decorum by its consistent
q. 60, a. 2). Wherefore the more they follow the inclina-
form and the perfection of what is virtuous is restrained∗
tion of nature, the more strongly do the passions urge to
in its every action.” .
the pursuance of an object. Now nature inclines chiefly to
Objection 2. Further, continence takes its name from
those things that are necessary to it, whether for the main-
a man standing for the good of right reason, as stated
tenance of the individual, such as food, or for the main-
above (a. 1, ad 2). Now other passions lead men astray
tenance of the species, such as venereal acts, the plea-
from right reason with greater vehemence than the desire
sures of which pertain to the touch. Therefore continence
for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of mortal dan-
and incontinence refer properly to desires for pleasures of
gers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him
touch.
behave like a madman, as Seneca remarks†. Therefore
Reply to Objection 1. Just as temperance may be
continence does not properly regard the desires for plea-
used in a general sense in connection with any matter;
sures of touch.
but is properly applied to that matter wherein it is best
Objection 3. Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet.
for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly speak-
ii, 54): “It is continence that restrains cupidity with the
ing regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult
guiding hand of counsel.” Now cupidity is generally used
to contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch,
to denote the desire for riches rather than the desire for
and yet in a general sense and relatively may be applied
pleasures of touch, according to 1 Tim. 6:10, “Cupidity
to any other matter: and in this sense Ambrose speaks of
[Douay: ‘The desire of money’] ( philargyria), is the root continence.
of all evils.” Therefore continence is not properly about
Reply to Objection 2. Properly speaking we do not
the desires for pleasures of touch
speak of continence in relation to fear, but rather of firm-
Objection 4. Further, there are pleasures of touch not
ness of mind which fortitude implies. As to anger, it is
only in venereal matters but also in eating. But continence
true that it begets an impulse to the pursuit of something,
is wont to be applied only to the use of venereal matters.
but this impulse follows an apprehension of the soul—
Therefore the desire for pleasures of touch is not its proper
in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured
matter.
him—rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a
Objection 5. Further, among pleasures of touch some
man may be said to be continent of anger, relatively but
are not human but bestial, both as regards food—for in-
not simply.
stance, the pleasure of eating human flesh; and as regards
Reply to Objection 3. External goods, such as hon-
venereal matters—for instance the abuse of animals or
ors, riches and the like, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
boys. But continence is not about such like things, as
vii, 4), seem to be objects of choice in themselves in-
stated in Ethic. vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures
deed, but not as being necessary for the maintenance of
of touch are not the proper matter of continence.
nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,
of a person as being continent or incontinent, not simply,
4) that “continence and incontinence are about the same
but relatively, by adding that they are continent or incon-
things as temperance and intemperance.” Now temper-
tinent in regard to wealth, or honor and so forth. Hence
ance and intemperance are about the desires for pleasures
Tully either understood continence in a general sense, as
of touch, as stated above (q. 141, a. 4). Therefore conti-
including relative continence, or understood cupidity in a
nence and incontinence are also about that same matter.
restricted sense as denoting desire for pleasures of touch.
I answer that, Continence denotes, by its very name,
Reply to Objection 4. Venereal pleasures are more
a certain curbing, in so far as a man contains himself from
vehement than pleasures of the palate: wherefore we are
following his passions. Hence continence is properly said
wont to speak of continence and incontinence in reference
in reference to those passions which urge a man towards
to venereal matters rather than in reference to food; al-
the pursuit of something, wherein it is praiseworthy that
though according to the Philosopher they are applicable
reason should withhold man from pursuing: whereas it is
to both.
not properly about those passions, such as fear and the
Reply to Objection 5. Continence is a good of the
like, which denote some kind of withdrawal: since in
human reason: wherefore it regards those passions which
these it is praiseworthy to remain firm in pursuing what
can be connatural to man. Hence the Philosopher says
reason dictates, as stated above (q. 123, Aa. 3,4). Now it
(Ethic. vii, 5) that “if a man were to lay hold of a child
∗ “Continentem” according to St. Thomas’ reading; St. Ambrose wrote
“concinentem = harmonious”
† De Ira i, 1
1886
with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural pas-be continent‡, not absolutely, but relatively.”
sion whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to
Whether the subject of continence is the concupiscible power?
IIa IIae q. 155 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the subject of con-
who is continent and in one who is incontinent, since
tinence is the concupiscible power. For the subject of a
in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires.
virtue should be proportionate to the virtue’s matter. Now
Wherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the con-
the matter of continence, as stated (a. 2), is desires for
cupiscible as its subject. Again the reason has the same
the pleasures of touch, which pertain to the concupisci-
disposition in both, since both the continent and the incon-
ble power. Therefore continence is in the concupiscible
tinent have right reason, and each of them, while undis-
power.
turbed by passion, purposes not to follow his unlawful
Objection 2. Further, “Opposites are referred to one
desires.
Now the primary difference between them is
same thing”∗. But incontinence is in the concupiscible,
to be found in their choice: since the continent man,
whose passions overcome reason, for Andronicus says†
though subject to vehement desires, chooses not to fol-
that “incontinence is the evil inclination of the concupis-
low them, because of his reason; whereas the incontinent
cible, by following which it chooses wicked pleasures in
man chooses to follow them, although his reason forbids.
disobedience to reason.” Therefore continence is likewise
Hence continence must needs reside in that power of the
in the concupiscible.
soul, whose act it is to choose; and that is the will, as
Objection 3. Further, the subject of a human virtue
stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 1).
is either the reason, or the appetitive power, which is di-
Reply to Objection 1. Continence has for its matter
vided into the will, the concupiscible and the irascible.
the desires for pleasures of touch, not as moderating them
Now continence is not in the reason, for then it would
(this belongs to temperance which is in the concupisci-
be an intellectual virtue; nor is it in the will, since conti-
ble), but its business with them is to resist them. For this
nence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor
reason it must be in another power, since resistance is of
again is it in the irascible, because it is not properly about
one thing against another.
the passions of the irascible, as stated above (a. 2, ad 2).
Reply to Objection 2. The will stands between reason
Therefore it follows that it is in the concupiscible.
and the concupiscible, and may be moved by either. In the
On the contrary, Every virtue residing in a certain
continent man it is moved by the reason, in the incontinent
power removes the evil act of that power.
But conti-
man it is moved by the concupiscible. Hence continence
nence does not remove the evil act of the concupiscible:
may be ascribed to the reason as to its first mover, and
since “the continent man has evil desires,” according to
incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both be-
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore continence is
long immediately to the will as their proper subject.
not in the concupiscible power.
Reply to Objection 3. Although the passions are not
I answer that, Every virtue while residing in a sub-
in the will as their subject, yet it is in the power of the will ject, makes that subject have a different disposition from
to resist them: thus it is that the will of the continent man
that which it has while subjected to the opposite vice.
resists desires.
Now the concupiscible has the same disposition in one
Whether continence is better than temperance?
IIa IIae q. 155 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that continence is better
things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater
than temperance. For it is written (Ecclus. 26:20): “No
virtue than temperance.
price is worthy of a continent soul.” Therefore no virtue
Objection 3. Further, the will is a more excellent
can be equalled to continence.
power than the concupiscible. But continence is in the
Objection 2. Further, the greater the reward a virtue
will, whereas temperance is in the concupiscible, as stated
merits, the greater the virtue. Now continence apparently
above (a. 3). Therefore continence is a greater virtue than
merits the greater reward; for it is written (2 Tim. 2:5):
temperance.
“He. . . is not crowned, except he strive lawfully,” and the
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and
continent man, since he is subject to vehement evil de-
Andronicus‡ reckon continence to be annexed to temper-
sires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom these
ance, as to a principal virtue.
‡ See a. 4
∗ Categ. viii
† De Affectibus
‡ De Affectibus
1887
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), continence has abstinence from things unlawful: and thus it means that
a twofold signification. In one way it denotes cessation
“no price is worthy of a continent soul,” because its value
from all venereal pleasures; and if continence be taken in
is not measured with gold or silver, which are appreciable
this sense, it is greater than temperance considered ab-
according to weight.
solutely, as may be gathered from what we said above
Reply to Objection 2. The strength or weakness of
(q. 152, a. 5) concerning the preeminence of virginity over
concupiscence may proceed from two causes. For some-
chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence
times it is owing to a bodily cause: because some peo-
may be taken as denoting the resistance of the reason to
ple by their natural temperament are more prone to con-
evil desires when they are vehement in a man: and in this
cupiscence than others; and again opportunities for plea-
sense temperance is far greater than continence, because
sure which inflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand
the good of a virtue derives its praise from that which is
for some people than for others. Such like weakness of
in accord with reason. Now the good of reason flourishes
concupiscence diminishes merit, whereas strength of con-
more in the temperate man than in the continent man, be-
cupiscence increases it. on the other hand, weakness or
cause in the former even the sensitive appetite is obedient
strength of concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spir-
to reason, being tamed by reason so to speak, whereas in
itual cause, for instance the vehemence of charity, or the
the continent man the sensitive appetite strongly resists
strength of reason, as in the case of a temperate man.
reason by its evil desires. Hence continence is compared
In this way weakness of concupiscence, by reason of its
to temperance, as the imperfect to the perfect.
cause, increases merit, whereas strength of concupiscence
Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted may be
diminishes it.
understood in two ways. First in reference to the sense
Reply to Objection 3. The will is more akin to the
in which continence denotes abstinence from all things
reason than the concupiscible power is. Wherefore the
venereal: and thus it means that “no price is worthy of a
good of reason—on account of which virtue is praised by
continent soul,” in the genus of chastity the fruitfulness
the very fact that it reaches not only to the will but also
of the flesh is the purpose of marriage is equalled to the
to the concupiscible power, as happens in the temperate
continence of virginity or of widowhood, as stated above
man—is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the
(q. 152, Aa. 4,5). Secondly it may be understood in refer-
will, as in the case of one who is continent.
ence to the general sense in which continence denotes any
1888
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 156
Of Incontinence
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?
(2) Whether incontinence is a sin?
(3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance;
(4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in desire?
Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?
IIa IIae q. 156 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that incontinence pertains
such people do not retain the judgment of reason, which
not to the soul but to the body. For sexual diversity comes
the continent man follows and the incontinent forsakes.
not from the soul but from the body. Now sexual diversity
From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence
causes diversity of incontinence: for the Philosopher says
is on the part of the soul, which fails to resist a passion
(Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described either as con-
by the reason. This happens in two ways, according to the
tinent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence pertains
Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7): first, when the soul yields to
not to the soul but to the body.
the passions, before the reason has given its counsel; and
Objection 2. Further, that which pertains to the soul
this is called “unbridled incontinence” or “impetuosity”:
does not result from the temperament of the body. But in-
secondly, when a man does not stand to what has been
continence results from the bodily temperament: for the
counselled, through holding weakly to reason’s judgment;
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “it is especially peo-
wherefore this kind of incontinence is called “weakness.”
ple of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper whose
Hence it is manifest that incontinence pertains chiefly to
incontinence is one of unbridled desire.” Therefore in-
the soul.
continence regards the body.
Reply to Objection 1. The human soul is the form
Objection 3.
Further, victory concerns the victor
of the body, and has certain powers which make use of
rather than the vanquished. Now a man is said to be incon-
bodily organs. The operations of these organs conduce
tinent, because “the flesh lusteth against the spirit,” and
somewhat to those operations of the soul which are ac-
overcomes it. Therefore incontinence pertains to the flesh
complished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts
rather than to the soul.
of the intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect
On the contrary, Man differs from beast chiefly as
receives from the senses, and the will is urged by pas-
regards the soul. Now they differ in respect of conti-
sions of the sensitive appetite. Accordingly, since woman,
nence and incontinence, for we ascribe neither continence
as regards the body, has a weak temperament, the re-
nor incontinence to the beasts, as the Philosopher states
sult is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she
(Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly on the
holds to it weakly; although in /rare cases the opposite oc-
part of the soul.
curs, according to Prov. 31:10, “Who shall find a valiant
I answer that, Things are ascribed to their direct
woman?”
And since small and weak things “are ac-
causes rather than to those which merely occasion them.
counted as though they were not”∗ the Philosopher speaks
Now that which is on the part of the body is merely an
of women as though they had not the firm judgment of
occasional cause of incontinence; since it is owing to a
reason, although the contrary happens in some women.
bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the
Hence he states that “we do not describe women as being
sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body.
continent, because they are vacillating” through being un-
Yet these passions, however vehement they be, are not the
stable of reason, and “are easily led” so that they follow
sufficient cause of incontinence, but are merely the occa-
their passions readily.
sion thereof, since, so long as the use of reason remains,
Reply to Objection 2. It is owing to the impulse of
man is always able to resist his passions. If, however, the
passion that a man at once follows his passion before his
passions gain such strength as to take away the use of rea-
reason counsels him. Now the impulse of passion may
son altogether—as in the case of those who become insane
arise either from its quickness, as in bilious persons†, or
through the vehemence of their passions—the essential
from its vehemence, as in the melancholic, who on ac-
conditions of continence or incontinence cease, because
count of their earthy temperament are most vehemently
∗ Aristotle, Phys. ii, 5
† Cf. Ia IIae, q. 46, a. 5
1889
aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand to the bodily temperament is an occasional but not a suffi-that which is counselled, because he holds to it in weakly
cient cause of incontinence, as stated above.
fashion by reason of the softness of his temperament, as
Reply to Objection 3. In the incontinent man concu-
we have stated with regard to woman (ad 1). This is also
piscence of the flesh overcomes the spirit, not necessarily,
the case with phlegmatic temperaments, for the same rea-
but through a certain negligence of the spirit in not resist-
son as in women. And these results are due to the fact that
ing strongly.
Whether incontinence is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 156 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that incontinence is not
reason—but not simply; for instance when a man does
a sin. For as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): “No
not observe the mode of reason in his desire for honor,
man sins in what he cannot avoid.” Now no man can by
riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in themselves.
himself avoid incontinence, according to Wis. 8:21, “I
About such things there is incontinence, not simply but
know [Vulg.: ‘knew’] that I could not. . . be continent, ex-
relatively, even as we have said above in reference to con-
cept God gave it.” Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
tinence (q. 155, a. 2, ad 3). In this way incontinence is a
Objection 2. Further, apparently every sin originates
sin, not from the fact that one gives way to wicked desires,
in the reason. But the judgment of reason is overcome in
but because one fails to observe the mode of reason even
the incontinent man. Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
in the desire for things that are of themselves desirable.
Objection 3. Further, no one sins in loving God ve-
Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not
hemently. Now a man becomes incontinent through the
properly, but metaphorically. for instance about the de-
vehemence of divine love: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
sires for things of which one cannot make an evil use,
iv) that “Paul, through incontinence of divine love, ex-
such as the desire for virtue. A man may be said to be
claimed: I live, now not I” (Gal. 2:20). Therefore incon-
incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because just
tinence is not a sin.
as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire,
On the contrary, It is numbered together with other
even so is a man entirely led by his good desire which is
sins (2 Tim. 3:3) where it is written: “Slanderers, inconti-
in accord with reason. Such like incontinence is no sin,
nent, unmerciful,” etc. Therefore incontinence is a sin.
but pertains to the perfection of virtue.
I answer that, Incontinence about a matter may be
Reply to Objection 1. Man can avoid sin and do
considered in two ways. First it may be considered prop-
good, yet not without God’s help, according to Jn. 15:5:
erly and simply: and thus incontinence is about concu-
“Without Me you can do nothing.” Wherefore the fact that
piscences of pleasures of touch, even as intemperance
man needs God’s help in order to be continent, does not
is, as we have said in reference to continence (q. 155,
show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in Ethic. iii,
a. 2 ). In this way incontinence is a sin for two rea-
3, “what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a way,
sons: first, because the incontinent man goes astray from
ourselves.”
that which is in accord with reason; secondly, because
Reply to Objection 2. The judgment of reason is
he plunges into shameful pleasures. Hence the Philoso-
overcome in the incontinent man, not necessarily, for then
pher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that “incontinence is censurable
he would commit no sin, but through a certain negligence
not only because it is wrong”—that is, by straying from
on account of his not standing firm in resisting the passion
reason—“but also because it is wicked”—that is, by fol-
by holding to the judgment formed by his reason.
lowing evil desires. Secondly, incontinence about a matter
Reply to Objection 3. This argument takes inconti-
is considered, properly—inasmuch as it is a straying from
nence metaphorically and not properly.
Whether the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate?
IIa IIae q. 156 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the incontinent man
tinent man, though knowing how wicked are the things he
sins more gravely than the intemperate. For, seemingly,
desires, nevertheless acts through passion, whereas the in-
the more a man acts against his conscience, the more
temperate man judges what he desires to be good. There-
gravely he sins, according to Lk. 12:47, “That servant
fore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the in-
who knew the will of his lord. . . and did not. . . shall be
temperate.
beaten with many stripes.”
Now the incontinent man
Objection 2. Further, apparently, the graver a sin is,
would seem to act against his conscience more than the
the more incurable it is: wherefore the sins against the
intemperate because, according to Ethic. vii, 3, the incon-
Holy Ghost, being most grave, are declared to be unpar-
1890
donable. Now the sin of incontinence would appear to be inclined to something, either by passion, as in the incon-more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a per-
tinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless
son’s sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which
greater ignorance results thus in the intemperate than in
seemingly are no good to the incontinent man, since he
the incontinent. In one respect as regards duration, since
knows he is doing wrong, and does wrong notwithstand-
in the incontinent man this ignorance lasts only while the
ing: whereas it seems to the intemperate man that he is
passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever lasts
doing well, so that it were good for him to be admon-
as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the ignorance
ished. Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man
of the intemperate man endures without ceasing, on ac-
sins more gravely than the intemperate.
count of the endurance of the habit, wherefore it is likened
Objection 3. Further, the more eagerly man sins, the
to phthisis or any chronic disease, as the Philosopher says
more grievous his sin. Now the incontinent sins more
(Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect the ignorance of the in-
eagerly than the intemperate, since the incontinent man
temperate man is greater as regards the thing ignored. For
has vehement passions and desires, which the intemper-
the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some partic-
ate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent
ular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must
man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
choose this particular thing now): whereas the intemper-
On the contrary, Impenitence aggravates every sin:
ate man’s ignorance is about the end itself, inasmuch as
wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi,
he judges this thing good, in order that he may follow his
12,13) that “impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost.”
desires without being curbed. Hence the Philosopher says
Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) “the in-
(Ethic. vii, 7,8) that “the incontinent man is better than
temperate man is not inclined to be penitent, for he holds
the intemperate, because he retains the best principle‡,” to
on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined
wit, the right estimate of the end.
to repentance.” Therefore the intemperate man sins more
Reply to Objection 2. Mere knowledge does not suf-
gravely than the incontinent.
fice to cure the incontinent man, for he needs the inward
I answer that, According to Augustine∗ sin is chiefly
assistance of grace which quenches concupiscence, be-
an act of the will, because “by the will we sin and live
sides the application of the external remedy of admonish-
arightӠ. Consequently where there is a greater inclina-
ment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist
tion of the will to sin, there is a graver sin.
Now in
his desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated
the intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue
above (q. 142, a. 2 ). By these same means the intem-
of its own choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired
perate man can be cured. But his curing is more difficult,
through custom: whereas in the incontinent man, the will
for two reasons. The first is on the part of reason, which is
is inclined to sin through a passion. And since passion
corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end, which holds
soon passes, whereas a habit is “a disposition difficult to
the same position as the principle in demonstrations. Now
remove,” the result is that the incontinent man repents at
it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs
once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so the
as to the principle; and it is the same in practical matters
intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned, be-
with one who errs in regard to the end. The other rea-
cause the sinful act has become connatural to him by rea-
son is on the part of the inclination of the appetite: for in
son of his habit. Wherefore in reference to such persons it
the intemperate man this proceeds from a habit, which is
is written (Prov. 2:14) that “they are glad when they have
difficult to remove, whereas the inclination of the incon-
done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things.” Hence it
tinent man proceeds from a passion, which is more easily
follows that “the intemperate man is much worse than the
suppressed.
incontinent,” as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii,
Reply to Objection 3. The eagerness of the will,
7).
which increases a sin, is greater in the intemperate man
Reply to Objection 1.
Ignorance in the intellect
than in the incontinent, as explained above. But the ea-
sometimes precedes the inclination of the appetite and
gerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite is some-
causes it, and then the greater the ignorance, the more
times greater in the incontinent man, because he does not
does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in so far as it
sin except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the
renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in the
intemperate man sins even through slight concupiscence
reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite,
and sometimes forestalls it. Hence the Philosopher says
and then such like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver
(Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the intemperate man,
the sin, because the inclination of the appetite is shown
“because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with
thereby to be greater. Now in both the incontinent and the
calm,” i.e. slight desire. “For what would he have done if
intemperate man, ignorance arises from the appetite being
he had desired it with passion?”
∗ De Duab. Anim. x, xi
† Retract. i, 9
‡ To beltiston, e arche, ‘the best thing, i.e. the principle’
1891
Whether the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire?
IIa IIae q. 156 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the incontinent in
reason dictates this in a certain degree. Yet he does not
anger is worse than the incontinent in desire. For the more
tend thereto perfectly, because he does not intend the due
difficult it is to resist the passion, the less grievous, ap-
mode of vengeance. on the other hand, the movement of
parently is incontinence: wherefore the Philosopher says
desire is altogether in accord with sense and nowise in
(Ethic. vii, 7): “It is not wonderful, indeed it is pardon-
accord with reason. Secondly, because the movement of
able if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming
anger results more from the bodily temperament owing to
pleasures or pains.” Now, “as Heraclitus says, it is more
the quickness of the movement of the bile which tends to
difficult to resist desire than anger”∗. Therefore inconti-
anger. Hence one who by bodily temperament is disposed
nence of desire is less grievous than incontinence of anger.
to anger is more readily angry than one who is disposed
Objection 2. Further, one is altogether excused from
to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent: wherefore
sin if the passion be so vehement as to deprive one of the
also it happens more often that the children of those who
judgment of reason, as in the case of one who becomes
are disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger,
demented through passion. Now he that is incontinent in
than that the children of those who are disposed to con-
anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one
cupiscence are also disposed to concupiscence. Now that
who is incontinent in desire: since “anger listens to reason
which results from the natural disposition of the body is
somewhat, but desire does not” as the Philosopher states
deemed more deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because anger
(Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse
seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain to
than the incontinent in desire.
disguise itself and creeps in by stealth. Fourthly, because
Objection 3. Further, the more dangerous a sin the
he who is subject to concupiscence works with pleasure,
more grievous it is. Now incontinence of anger would
whereas the angry man works as though forced by a cer-
seem to be more dangerous, since it leads a man to a
tain previous displeasure.
greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more grievous
Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered
sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads.
with regard to the evil into which one falls through for-
Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than inconti-
saking reason; and thus incontinence of anger is, for the
nence of desire.
most part, more grievous, because it leads to things that
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6)
are harmful to one’s neighbor.
that “incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incon-
Reply to Objection 1. It is more difficult to resist
tinence of desire.”
pleasure perseveringly than anger, because concupiscence
I answer that, The sin of incontinence may be consid-
is enduring. But for the moment it is more difficult to re-
ered in two ways. First, on the part of the passion which
sist anger, on account of its impetuousness.
occasions the downfall of reason. In this way incontinence
Reply to Objection 2. Concupiscence is stated to be
of desire is worse than incontinence of anger, because the
without reason, not as though it destroyed altogether the
movement of desire is more inordinate than the movement
judgment of reason, but because nowise does it follow the
of anger. There are four reasons for this, and the Philoso-
judgment of reason: and for this reason it is more dis-
pher indicates them, Ethic.
vii, 6: First, because the
graceful.
movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason, since
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers in-
the angry man tends to avenge the injury done to him, and
continence with regard to its result.
∗ Ethic. ii. 3
1892
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 157
Of Clemency and Meekness
(In Four Articles)
We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices. Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical?
(2) Whether each of them is a virtue?
(3) Whether each is a part of temperance?
(4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.
Whether clemency and meekness are absolutely the same?
IIa IIae q. 157 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that clemency and meek-
because through the passion of anger a man is provoked to
ness are absolutely the same. For meekness moderates
inflict a too severe punishment, while it belongs directly to
anger, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5). Now
clemency to mitigate punishment, and this might be pre-
anger is “desire of vengeance”∗. Since, then, clemency “is
vented by excessive anger.
leniency of a superior in inflicting punishment on an infe-
Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the
rior,” as Seneca states (De Clementia ii, 3), and vengeance
onslaught of anger, concurs with clemency towards the
is taken by means of punishment, it would seem that
same effect; yet they differ from one another, inasmuch
clemency and meekness are the same.
as clemency moderates external punishment, while meek-
Objection 2. Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet.
ness properly mitigates the passion of anger.
ii, 54) that “clemency is a virtue whereby the mind is re-
Reply to Objection 1. Meekness regards properly the
strained by kindness when unreasonably provoked to ha-
desire itself of vengeance; whereas clemency regards the
tred of a person,” so that apparently clemency moderates
punishment itself which is applied externally for the pur-
hatred. Now, according to Augustine†, hatred is caused by
pose of vengeance.
anger; and this is the matter of meekness and clemency.
Reply to Objection 2. Man’s affections incline to the
Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are abso-
moderation of things that are unpleasant to him in them-
lutely the same.
selves. Now it results from one man loving another that he
Objection 3. Further, the same vice is not opposed to
takes no pleasure in the latter’s punishment in itself, but
different virtues. But the same vice, namely cruelty, is op-
only as directed to something else, for instance justice, or
posed to meekness and clemency. Therefore it seems that
the correction of the person punished. Hence love makes
meekness and clemency are absolutely the same.
one quick to mitigate punishment —and this pertains to
On the contrary, According to the aforesaid defini-
clemency—while hatred is an obstacle to such mitiga-
tion of Seneca (obj. 1 ) “clemency is leniency of a supe-
tion. For this reason Tully says that “the mind provoked
rior towards an inferior”: whereas meekness is not merely
to hatred” that is to punish too severely, “is restrained by
of superior to inferior, but of each to everyone. Therefore
clemency,” from inflicting too severe a punishment, so
meekness and clemency are not absolutely the same.
that clemency directly moderates not hatred but punish-
I answer that, As stated in Ethic. ii, 3, a moral virtue ment.
is “about passions and actions.” Now internal passions are
Reply to Objection 3. The vice of anger, which de-
principles of external actions, and are likewise obstacles
notes excess in the passion of anger, is properly opposed
thereto. Wherefore virtues that moderate passions, to a
to meekness, which is directly concerned with the pas-
certain extent, concur towards the same effect as virtues
sion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in punishing.
that moderate actions, although they differ specifically.
Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that “those
Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain man from
are called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack
theft, whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or de-
moderation in punishing.” Those who delight in a man’s
sire of money, which is restrained by liberality; so that
punishment for its own sake may be called savage or bru-
liberality concurs with justice towards the effect, which
tal, as though lacking the human feeling that leads one
is abstention from theft. This applies to the case in point;
man to love another.
∗ Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2
† Ep. ccxi
1893
Whether both clemency and meekness are virtues?
IIa IIae q. 157 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that neither clemency nor
ing, as stated above (a. 1). Yet they are not really opposed
meekness is a virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another
to one another, since they are both according to right rea-
virtue. Yet both of these are apparently opposed to sever-
son. For severity is inflexible in the infliction of punish-
ity, which is a virtue. Therefore neither clemency nor
ment when right reason requires it; while clemency miti-
meekness is a virtue.
gates punishment also according to right reason, when and
Objection 2.
Further, “Virtue is destroyed by ex-
where this is requisite. Wherefore they are not opposed to
cess and defect”∗. But both clemency and meekness con-
one another as they are not about the same thing.
sist in a certain decrease; for clemency decreases punish-
Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher
ment, and meekness decreases anger. Therefore neither
(Ethic. iv, 5), “the habit that observes the mean in anger
clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
is unnamed; so that the virtue is denominated from the
Objection 3. Further, meekness or mildness is in-
diminution of anger, and is designated by the name of
cluded (Mat. 5:4) among the beatitudes, and (Gal. 5:23)
meekness.” For the virtue is more akin to diminution
among the fruits. Now the virtues differ from the beati-
than to excess, because it is more natural to man to desire
tudes and fruits. Therefore they are not comprised under
vengeance for injuries done to him, than to be lacking in
virtue.
that desire, since “scarcely anyone belittles an injury done
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5):
to himself,” as Sallust observes†. As to clemency, it miti-
“Every good man is conspicuous for his clemency and
gates punishment, not in respect of that which is according
meekness.” Now it is virtue properly that belongs to a
to right reason, but as regards that which is according to
good man, since “virtue it is that makes its possessor
common law, which is the object of legal justice: yet on
good, and renders his works good also” (Ethic. ii, 6).
account of some particular consideration, it mitigates the
Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues.
punishment, deciding, as it were, that a man is not to be
I answer that, The nature of moral virtue consists in
punished any further. Hence Seneca says (De Clementia
the subjection of appetite to reason, as the Philosopher de-
ii, 1): “Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those
clares (Ethic. i, 13). Now this is verified both in clemency
whom she sets free are declared immune from all further
and in meekness. For clemency, in mitigating punishment,
punishment; and remission of punishment due amounts to
“is guided by reason,” according to Seneca (De Clementia
a pardon.” Wherefore it is clear that clemency is related to
ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates anger according
severity as equity [the Greek ‘epieikeia’‡] to legal justice,
to right reason, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Wherefore it is
whereof severity is a part, as regards the infliction of pun-
manifest that both clemency and meekness are virtues.
ishment in accordance with the law. Yet clemency differs
Reply to Objection 1. Meekness is not directly op-
from equity, as we shall state further on (a. 3, ad 1).
posed to severity; for meekness is about anger. On the
Reply to Objection 3. The beatitudes are acts of
other hand, severity regards the external infliction of pun-
virtue: while the fruits are delights in virtuous acts.
ishment, so that accordingly it would seem rather to be
Wherefore nothing hinders meekness being reckoned both
opposed to clemency, which also regards external punish-
virtue, and beatitude and fruit.
Whether the aforesaid virtues are parts of temperance?
IIa IIae q. 157 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the aforesaid virtues
clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is
are not parts of temperance. For clemency mitigates pun-
opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meek-
ishment, as stated above (a. 2).
But the Philosopher
ness are parts of prudence rather than of temperance.
(Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to equity, which pertains to jus-
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3)
tice, as stated above (q. 120, a. 2). Therefore seemingly
that “clemency is temperance of the soul in exercising the
clemency is not a part of temperance.
power of taking revenge.” Tully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii,
Objection 2. Further, temperance is concerned with
54) reckons clemency a part of temperance.
concupiscences; whereas meekness and clemency regard,
I answer that, Parts are assigned to the principal
not concupiscences, but anger and vengeance. Therefore
virtues, in so far as they imitate them in some sec-
they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.
ondary matter as to the mode whence the virtue derives
Objection 3. Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii,
its praise and likewise its name.
Thus the mode and
4): “A man may be said to be of unsound mind when
name of justice consist in a certain “equality,” those of
he takes pleasure in cruelty.” Now this is opposed to
fortitude in a certain “strength of mind,” those of tem-
∗ Ethic. ii, 2
† Cf. q. 120
‡ Cf. q. 120
1894
perance in a certain “restraint,” inasmuch as it restrains ness of soul in one who fears not to pain others.
the most vehement concupiscences of the pleasures of
Reply to Objection 2. The annexation of secondary
touch. Now clemency and meekness likewise consist in
to principal virtues depends on the mode of virtue, which
a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates punishment,
is, so to speak, a kind of form of the virtue, rather than
while meekness represses anger, as stated above (Aa. 1,2).
on the matter. Now meekness and clemency agree with
Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to
temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree
temperance as principal virtue, and accordingly are reck-
not in matter.
oned to be parts thereof.
Reply to Objection 3. “Unsoundness” is corruption
Reply to Objection 1. Two points must be considered
of “soundness.” Now just as soundness of body is cor-
in the mitigation of punishment. one is that punishment
rupted by the body lapsing from the condition due to the
should be mitigated in accordance with the lawgiver’s in-
human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind
tention, although not according to the letter of the law; and
lapsing from the disposition due to the human species.
in this respect it pertains to equity. The other point is a cerThis occurs both in respect of the reason, as when a man
tain moderation of a man’s inward disposition, so that he
loses the use of reason, and in respect of the appetitive
does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This
power, as when a man loses that humane feeling whereby
belongs properly to clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De
“every man is naturally friendly towards all other men”
Clementia ii, 3) that “it is temperance of the soul in ex-
(Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes
ercising the power of taking revenge.” This moderation
the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man
of soul comes from a certain sweetness of disposition,
who takes pleasure in the punishment of others is said to
whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful
be of unsound mind, is because he seems on this account
to another. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3)
to be devoid of the humane feeling which gives rise to
that “clemency is a certain smoothness of the soul”; for,
clemency.
on the other hand, there would seem to be a certain rough-
Whether clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues?
IIa IIae q. 157 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that clemency and meek-
Objection 3.
Further, Augustine says (De Serm.
ness are the greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of
Dom. in Monte i, 2) that “the meek are they who yield
praise chiefly because it directs man to happiness that
to reproaches, and resist not evil, but overcome evil by
consists in the knowledge of God. Now meekness above
good.” Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety which
all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is writ-
would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss
ten (James 1:21): “With meekness receive the ingrafted
of Ambrose† on 1 Tim. 4:8, “Piety [Douay: ‘Godliness’]
word,” and (Ecclus. 5:13): “Be meek to hear the word”
is profitable to all things,” observes that “piety is the sum
of God. Again, Dionysius says (Ep. viii ad Demophil.)
total of the Christian religion.” Therefore meekness and
that “Moses was deemed worthy of the Divine apparition
clemency are the greatest virtues.
on account of his great meekness.” Therefore meekness is
On the contrary, They are not reckoned as princi-
the greatest of virtues.
pal virtues, but are annexed to another, as to a principal,
Objection 2. Further, seemingly a virtue is all the
virtue.
greater according as it is more acceptable to God and men.
I answer that, Nothing prevents certain virtues from
Now meekness would appear to be most acceptable to
being greatest, not indeed simply, nor in every respect,
God. For it is written (Ecclus. 1:34,35): “That which
but in a particular genus. It is impossible for clemency or
is agreeable” to God is “faith and meekness”; wherefore
meekness to be absolutely the greatest virtues, since they
Christ expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself
owe their praise to the fact that they withdraw a man from
(Mat. 11:29), where He says: “Learn of Me, because I
evil, by mitigating anger or punishment. Now it is more
am meek and humble of heart”; and Hilary declares∗ that
perfect to obtain good than to lack evil. Wherefore those
“Christ dwells in us by our meekness of soul.” Again, it
virtues like faith, hope, charity, and likewise prudence and
is most acceptable to men; wherefore it is written (Ecclus.
justice, which direct one to good simply, are absolutely
3:19): “My son, do thy works in meekness, and thou shalt
greater virtues than clemency and meekness.
be beloved above the glory of men”: for which reason
Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from
it is also declared (Prov. 20:28) that the King’s “throne
having a certain restricted excellence among the virtues
is strengthened by clemency.” Therefore meekness and
which resist evil inclinations. For anger, which is mit-
clemency are the greatest of virtues.
igated by meekness, is, on account of its impetuous-
∗ Comment. in Matth. iv, 3
† Hilary the deacon
1895
ness, a very great obstacle to man’s free judgment of it not, as though we might know better and have a clearer
truth: wherefore meekness above all makes a man self-
insight of the truth.”
possessed. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 10:31): “My son,
Reply to Objection 2. Meekness and clemency make
keep thy soul in meekness.” Yet the concupiscences of the
us acceptable to God and men, in so far as they concur
pleasures of touch are more shameful, and harass more
with charity, the greatest of the virtues, towards the same
incessantly, for which reason temperance is more rightly
effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor’s evils.
reckoned as a principal virtue. as stated above (q. 141,
Reply to Objection 3. Mercy and piety agree indeed
a. 7, ad 2). As to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates pun-
with meekness and clemency by concurring towards the
ishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity, the
same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor’s evils.
greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good towards
Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For piety relieves a
our neighbor, and hinder his evil.
neighbor’s evil through reverence for a superior, for in-
Reply to Objection 1. Meekness disposes man to the
stance God or one’s parents: mercy relieves a neighbor’s
knowledge of God, by removing an obstacle; and this in
evil, because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as
two ways. First, because it makes man self-possessed by
one looks upon it as affecting oneself, as stated above
mitigating his anger, as stated above; secondly, because
(q. 30, a. 2): and this results from friendship which makes
it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict the
friends rejoice and grieve for the same things: meekness
words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by
does this, by removing anger that urges to vengeance, and
anger. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7):
clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far as
“To be meek is not to contradict Holy Writ, whether we
it judges equitable that a person be no further punished.
understand it, if it condemn our evil ways, or understand
1896
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 158
Of Anger
(In Eight Articles)
We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed to meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency. Concerning anger there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful to be angry?
(2) Whether anger is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
(5) Of its species;
(6) Whether anger is a capital vice?
(7) Of its daughters;
(8) Whether it has a contrary vice?
Whether it is lawful to be angry?
IIa IIae q. 158 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that it cannot be lawful
the sensitive appetite, and gives its name to the irascible
to be angry. For Jerome in his exposition on Mat. 5:22,
power, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 46, a. 1) when we were
“Whosoever is angry with his brother,” etc. says: “Some
treating of the passions. Now with regard to the passions
codices add ‘without cause.’ However, in the genuine
of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may be found in
codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is forbid-
them in two ways. First by reason of the passion’s very
den altogether.” Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.
species, which is derived from the passion’s object. Thus
Objection 2. Further, according to Dionysius (Div.
envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil, since it is
Nom. iv) “The soul’s evil is to be without reason.” Now
displeasure at another’s good, and such displeasure is in
anger is always without reason: for the Philosopher says
itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher
(Ethic. vii, 6) that “anger does not listen perfectly to rea-
remarks (Ethic. ii, 6), “the very mention of envy denotes
son”; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that “when anger
something evil.” Now this does not apply to anger, which
sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and
is the desire for revenge, since revenge may be desired
rends it by its riot”; and Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob.
both well and ill. Secondly, evil is found in a passion in
viii, 6): “From whatever cause it arises, the angry passion
respect of the passion’s quantity, that is in respect of its
boils over and blinds the eye of the mind.” Therefore it is
excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in anger,
always evil to be angry.
when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right rea-
Objection 3.
Further,
anger is “desire for
son demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right
vengeance”∗ according to a gloss on Lev. 19:17, “Thou
reason, one’s anger is deserving of praise.
shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart.” Now it would
Reply to Objection 1. The Stoics designated anger
seem unlawful to desire vengeance, since this should be
and all the other passions as emotions opposed to the or-
left to God, according to Dt. 32:35, “Revenge is Mine.”
der of reason; and accordingly they deemed anger and
Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always an evil.
all other passions to be evil, as stated above ( Ia IIae,
Objection 4. Further, all that makes us depart from
q. 24, a. 2 ) when we were treating of the passions. It
likeness to God is evil. Now anger always makes us depart
is in this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks
from likeness to God, since God judges with tranquillity
of the anger whereby one is angry with one’s neighbor,
according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be angry is always
with the intent of doing him a wrong.—But, according to
an evil.
the Peripatetics, to whose opinion Augustine inclines (De
On the contrary, Chrysostom† says: “He that is angry
Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions of the soul
without cause, shall be in danger; but he that is angry with
are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be
cause, shall not be in danger: for without anger, teaching
moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense
will be useless, judgments unstable, crimes unchecked.”
anger is not always evil.
Therefore to be angry is not always an evil.
Reply to Objection 2. Anger may stand in a twofold
I answer that, Properly speaking anger is a passion of
relation to reason. First, antecedently; in this way it with-
∗ Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2
† Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely
ascribed to St. John Chrysostom
1897
draws reason from its rectitude, and has therefore the char-Reply to Objection 3.
It is unlawful to desire
acter of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch as the
vengeance considered as evil to the man who is to be pun-
movement of the sensitive appetite is directed against vice
ished, but it is praiseworthy to desire vengeance as a cor-
and in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is
rective of vice and for the good of justice; and to this the
called “zealous anger.” Wherefore Gregory says (Moral.
sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved thereto
v, 45): “We must beware lest, when we use anger as an
by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance
instrument of virtue, it overrule the mind, and go before
with the order of judgment, it is God’s work, since he who
it as its mistress, instead of following in reason’s train,
has power to punish “is God’s minister,” as stated in Rom.
ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey.” This latter anger,
13:4.
although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason in
Reply to Objection 4. We can and ought to be like
the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of
to God in the desire for good; but we cannot be alto-
reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that “zeal-
gether likened to Him in the mode of our desire, since
ous anger troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger
in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the move-
blinds it.” Nor is it incompatible with virtue that the delib-
ment of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory
eration of reason be interrupted in the execution of what
says (Moral. v, 45) that “anger is more firmly erect in
reason has deliberated: since art also would be hindered in
withstanding vice, when it bows to the command of rea-
its act, if it were to deliberate about what has to be done,
son.”
while having to act.
Whether anger is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 158 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that anger is not a sin.
der of reason, in regard to anger, may be considered in
For we demerit by sinning. But “we do not demerit by the
relation to two things. First, in relation to the appetible
passions, even as neither do we incur blame thereby,” as
object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Where-
stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Consequently no passion is a sin.
fore if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with
Now anger is a passion as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 46,
the order of reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy,
a. 1) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not
and is called “zealous anger”¶. On the other hand, if one
a sin.
desire the taking of vengeance in any way whatever con-
Objection 2. Further, in every sin there is conversion
trary to the order of reason, for instance if he desire the
to some mutable good. But in anger there is conversion
punishment of one who has not deserved it, or beyond his
not to a mutable good, but to a person’s evil. Therefore
deserts, or again contrary to the order prescribed by law,
anger is not a sin.
or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of justice
Objection 3. Further, “No man sins in what he can-
and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will
not avoid,” as Augustine asserts∗. But man cannot avoid
be sinful, and this is called sinful anger.
anger, for a gloss on Ps.
4:5, “Be ye angry and sin
Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may
not,” says: “The movement of anger is not in our power.”
be considered in relation to the mode of being angry,
Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. vii, 6) that “the an-
namely that the movement of anger should not be im-
gry man acts with displeasure.” Now displeasure is con-
moderately fierce, neither internally nor externally; and
trary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin.
if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack sin,
Objection 4. Further, sin is contrary to nature, accord-
even though just vengeance be desired.
ing to Damascene†. But it is not contrary to man’s nature
Reply to Objection 1. Since passion may be either
to be angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely
regulated or not regulated by reason, it follows that a pas-
the irascible; wherefore Jerome says in a letter‡ that “to
sion considered absolutely does not include the notion of
be angry is the property of man.” Therefore it is not a sin
merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as regulated by
to be angry.
reason, it may be something meritorious and deserving of
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:31): “Let
praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by reason,
all indignation and anger§. . . be put away from you.”
it may be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the
I answer that, Anger, as stated above (a. 1), is prop-
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that “it is he who is angry
erly the name of a passion. A passion of the sensitive ap-
in a certain way, that is praised or blamed.”
petite is good in so far as it is regulated by reason, whereas
Reply to Objection 2. The angry man desires the evil
it is evil if it set the order of reason aside. Now the or-
of another, not for its own sake but for the sake of revenge,
∗ De Lib. Arb. iii, 18
† De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30
‡ Ep. xii ad Anton.
Monach.
§ Vulg.: ‘Anger and indignation’
¶ Cf. Greg., Moral. v,
45
1898
towards which his appetite turns as to a mutable good.
The statement of the Philosopher that “the angry man acts
Reply to Objection 3. Man is master of his actions
with displeasure,” means that he is displeased, not with
through the judgment of his reason, wherefore as to the
his being angry, but with the injury which he deems done
movements that forestall that judgment, it is not in man’s
to himself: and through this displeasure he is moved to
power to prevent them as a whole, i.e. so that none of them
seek vengeance.
arise, although his reason is able to check each one, if it
Reply to Objection 4. The irascible power in man is
arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger
naturally subject to his reason, wherefore its act is natural
is not in man’s power, to the extent namely that no such
to man, in so far as it is in accord with reason, and in so
movement arise. Yet since this movement is somewhat
far as it is against reason, it is contrary to man’s nature.
in his power, it is not entirely sinless if it be inordinate.
Whether all anger is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 158 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that all anger is a mortal
of vengeance, as when the movement of anger forestalls
sin. For it is written (Job 5:2): “Anger killeth the fool-
the judgment of his reason; or in relation to the desired ob-
ish man∗,” and he speaks of the spiritual killing, whence
ject, as when one desires to be avenged in a trifling matter,
mortal sin takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal
which should be deemed of no account, so that even if one
sin.
proceeded to action, it would not be a mortal sin, for in-
Objection 2. Further, nothing save mortal sin is de-
stance by pulling a child slightly by the hair, or by some
serving of eternal condemnation. Now anger deserves
other like action. Secondly, the movement of anger may
eternal condemnation; for our Lord said (Mat.
5:22):
be inordinate in the mode of being angry, for instance, if
“Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in danger of
one be too fiercely angry inwardly, or if one exceed in the
the judgment”: and a gloss on this passage says that “the
outward signs of anger. In this way anger is not a mortal
three things mentioned there, namely judgment, council,
sin in the point of its genus; yet it may happen to be a mor-
and hell-fire, signify in a pointed manner different abodes
tal sin, for instance if through the fierceness of his anger a
in the state of eternal damnation corresponding to various
man fall away from the love of God and his neighbor.
sins.” Therefore anger is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1. It does not follow from the
Objection 3. Further, whatsoever is contrary to char-
passage quoted that all anger is a mortal sin, but that the
ity is a mortal sin. Now anger is of itself contrary to char-
foolish are killed spiritually by anger, because, through
ity, as Jerome declares in his commentary on Mat. 5:22,
not checking the movement of anger by their reason, they
“Whosoever is angry with his brother,” etc. where he says
fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming God or
that this is contrary to the love of your neighbor. There-
by doing injury to their neighbor.
fore anger is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2. Our Lord said this of anger,
On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 4:5, “Be ye angry
by way of addition to the words of the Law: “Whosoever
and sin not,” says: “Anger is venial if it does not proceed
shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment” (Mat. 5:21).
to action.”
Consequently our Lord is speaking here of the movement
I answer that, The movement of anger may be inor-
of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave
dinate and sinful in two ways, as stated above (a. 2). First,
injury of his neighbor: and should the consent of reason
on the part of the appetible object, as when one desires
be given to this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal
unjust revenge; and thus anger is a mortal sin in the point
sin.
of its genus, because it is contrary to charity and justice.
Reply to Objection 3. In the case where anger is con-
Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a venial sin
trary to charity, it is a mortal sin, but it is not always so,
by reason of the imperfection of the act. This imperfec-
as appears from what we have said.
tion is considered either in relation to the subject desirous
Whether anger is the most grievous sin?
IIa IIae q. 158 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that anger is the most
uglier than a ruthless‡ face, and most of all than a cruel
grievous sin. For Chrysostom says† that “nothing is more
soul.” . Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.
repulsive than the look of an angry man, and nothing
Objection 2. Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the
∗ Vulg.: ‘Anger indeed killeth the foolish’
† Hom. xlviii in Joan.
‡ ‘Severo’. The correct text is ‘Si vero.’ The translation would then run thus. . . ‘and nothing uglier.’ And if his ‘face is ugly, how much uglier is his soul!’
1899
worse it would seem to be; since, according to Augus-of justice. On the part of the good, under the aspect of
tine (Enchiridion xii), “a thing is said to be evil because
which the angry man desires an evil, anger concurs with
it hurts.” Now anger is most hurtful, because it deprives
the sin of concupiscence that tends to a good. In this re-
man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself; for
spect again, absolutely speaking. the sin of anger is appar-
Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan.) that “anger dif-
ently less grievous than that of concupiscence, according
fers in no way from madness; it is a demon while it lasts,
as the good of justice, which the angry man desires, is bet-
indeed more troublesome than one harassed by a demon.”
ter than the pleasurable or useful good which is desired by
Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.
the subject of concupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher
Objection 3. Further, inward movements are judged
says (Ethic. vii, 4) that “the incontinent in desire is more
according to their outward effects. Now the effect of anger
disgraceful than the incontinent in anger.”
is murder, which is a most grievous sin. Therefore anger
On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which
is a most grievous sin.
regards the mode of being angry, anger would seem to
On the contrary, Anger is compared to hatred as the
have a certain pre-eminence on account of the strength
mote to the beam; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep.
and quickness of its movement, according to Prov. 27:4,
ccxi): “Lest anger grow into hatred and a mote become a
“Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth:
beam.” Therefore anger is not the most grievous sin.
and who can bear the violence of one provoked?” Hence
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2), the inor-
Gregory says (Moral.
v, 45): “The heart goaded by
dinateness of anger is considered in a twofold respect,
the pricks of anger is convulsed, the body trembles, the
namely with regard to an undue object, and with regard to
tongue entangles itself, the face is inflamed, the eyes
an undue mode of being angry. As to the appetible object
are enraged and fail utterly to recognize those whom we
which it desires, anger would seem to be the least of sins,
know: the tongue makes sounds indeed, but there is no
for anger desires the evil of punishment for some person,
sense in its utterance.”
under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on
Reply to Objection 1. Chrysostom is alluding to the
the part of the evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees
repulsiveness of the outward gestures which result from
with those sins which desire the evil of our neighbor, such
the impetuousness of anger.
as envy and hatred; but while hatred desires absolutely an-
Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the
other’s evil as such, and the envious man desires another’s
inordinate movement of anger, that results from its im-
evil through desire of his own glory, the angry man desires
petuousness, as stated above.
another’s evil under the aspect of just revenge. Wherefore
Reply to Objection 3. Murder results from hatred and
it is evident that hatred is more grievous than envy, and
envy no less than from anger: yet anger is less grievous,
envy than anger: since it is worse to desire evil as an evil,
inasmuch as it considers the aspect of justice, as stated
than as a good; and to desire evil as an external good such
above.
as honor or glory, than under the aspect of the rectitude
Whether the Philosopher suitably assigns the species of anger?
IIa IIae q. 158 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that the species of anger
grees of anger, when He says (Mat. 5:22): “Whosoever
are unsuitably assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5)
is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judg-
where he says that some angry persons are “choleric,”
ment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall
some “sullen,” and some “ill-tempered” or “stern.” Ac-
be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say” to
cording to him, a person is said to be “sullen” whose anger
his brother, “Thou fool.” But these degrees are not refer-
“is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time.”
able to the aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the
But this apparently pertains to the circumstance of time.
above division of anger is not fitting.
Therefore it seems that anger can be differentiated specif-
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ says “there are
ically in respect also of the other circumstances.
three species of irascibility,” namely, “the anger which is
Objection 2. Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that “ill-
called wrath†,” and “ill-will” which is a disease of the
tempered” or “stern” persons “are those whose anger is
mind, and “rancour.” Now these three seem to coincide
not appeased without revenge, or punishment.” Now this
with the three aforesaid.
For “wrath” he describes as
also pertains to the unquenchableness of anger. Therefore
“having beginning and movement,” and the Philosopher
seemingly the ill-tempered is the same as bitterness.
(Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to “choleric” persons: “ill-will”
Objection 3. Further, our Lord mentions three de-
he describes as “an anger that endures and grows old,” and
∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi † ‘Fellea,’ i.e. like gall. But in Ia IIae, q. 46, a. 8, St. Thomas quoting the same authority has Cholos which we render ‘wrath’
1900
this the Philosopher ascribes to “sullenness”; while he de-account of an abiding displeasure, which he holds locked
scribes “rancour” as “reckoning the time for vengeance,”
in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the out-
which tallies with the Philosopher’s description of the “ill-
ward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it,
tempered.” The same division is given by Damascene (De
nor does he of his own accord lay aside his anger, except
Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the aforesaid division as-
his displeasure wear away with time and thus his anger
signed by the Philosopher is not unfitting.
cease. On the other hand, the anger of “ill-tempered” per-
I answer that, The aforesaid distinction may be re-
sons is long-lasting on account of their intense desire for
ferred either to the passion, or to the sin itself of anger.
revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can be
We have already stated when treating of the passions ( Ia
quelled only by revenge.
IIae, q. 46, a. 8) how it is to be applied to the passion of
Reply to Objection 3. The degrees of anger men-
anger. And it would seem that this is chiefly what Gre-
tioned by our Lord do not refer to the different species
gory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here, how-
of anger, but correspond to the course of the human act∗.
ever, we have to take the distinction of these species in
For the first degree is an inward conception, and in ref-
its application to the sin of anger, and as set down by the
erence to this He says: “Whosoever is angry with his
Philosopher.
brother.” The second degree is when the anger is man-
For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in
ifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into
relation to two things. First, in relation to the origin of
effect; and in reference to this He says: “Whosoever shall
anger, and this regards “choleric” persons, who are angry
say to his brother, Raca!” which is an angry exclama-
too quickly and for any slight cause. Secondly, in relation
tion. The third degree is when the sin conceived inwardly
to the duration of anger, for that anger endures too long;
breaks out into effect. Now the effect of anger is another’s
and this may happen in two ways. In one way, because
hurt under the aspect of revenge; and the least of hurts is
the cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too
that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in refer-
long in a man’s memory, the result being that it gives rise
ence to this He says: “Whosoever shall say to his brother
to a lasting displeasure, wherefore he is “grievous” and
Thou fool!” Consequently it is clear that the second adds
“sullen” to himself. In another way, it happens on the part
to the first, and the third to both the others; so that, if the of vengeance, which a man seeks with a stubborn desire:
first is a mortal sin, in the case referred to by our Lord,
this applies to “ill-tempered” or “stern” people, who do
as stated above (a. 3, ad 2), much more so are the oth-
not put aside their anger until they have inflicted punish-
ers. Wherefore some kind of condemnation is assigned
ment.
as corresponding to each one of them. In the first case
Reply to Objection 1. It is not time, but a man’s
“judgment” is assigned, and this is the least severe, for
propensity to anger, or his pertinacity in anger, that is the
as Augustine says†, “where judgment is to be delivered,
chief point of consideration in the aforesaid species.
there is an opportunity for defense”: in the second case
Reply to Objection 2.
Both “sullen” and “ill-
“council” is assigned, “whereby the judges deliberate to-
tempered” people have a long-lasting anger, but for differ-
gether on the punishment to be inflicted”: to the third case
ent reasons. For a “sullen” person has an abiding anger on
is assigned “hell-fire,” i.e. “decisive condemnation.”
Whether anger should be reckoned among the capital vices?
IIa IIae q. 158 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that anger should not be
anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices.
reckoned among the capital sins. For anger is born of sor-
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places
row which is a capital vice known by the name of sloth.
anger among the capital vices.
Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital vice.
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 84, a. 3,4), Objection 2. Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger.
a capital vice is defined as one from which many vices
Therefore it should be reckoned a capital vice rather than
arise. Now there are two reasons for which many vices
anger.
can arise from anger. The first is on the part of its ob-
Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Prov. 29:22, “An an-
ject which has much of the aspect of desirability, in so far
gry [Douay: ‘passionate’] man provoketh quarrels,” says:
as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest‡,
“Anger is the door to all vices: if it be closed, peace is
which is attractive by its excellence, as stated above (a. 4).
ensured within to all the virtues; if it be opened, the soul
. The second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it
is armed for every crime.” Now no capital vice is the ori-
precipitates the mind into all kinds of inordinate action.
gin of all sins, but only of certain definite ones. Therefore
Therefore it is evident that anger is a capital vice.
∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 46, a. 8, obj. 3 † Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 9 ‡ Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. q. 145, a. 1
1901
Reply to Objection 1.
The sorrow whence anger
has a more desirable end than hatred has, since the latter
arises is not, for the most part, the vice of sloth, but the
desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger is
passion of sorrow, which results from an injury inflicted.
more a capital vice than hatred is.
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 118, a. 7;
Reply to Objection 3. Anger is stated to be the door
q. 148, a. 5; q. 153, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 84, a. 4), it belongs to to the vices accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to
the notion of a capital vice to have a most desirable end, so
wit by hindering the judgment of reason, whereby man is
that many sins are committed through the desire thereof.
withdrawn from evil. It is, however, directly the cause of
Now anger, which desires evil under the aspect of good,
certain special sins, which are called its daughters.
Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to anger?
IIa IIae q. 158 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that six daughters are un-
speech, as stated above (a. 5, ad 3) of the man who says
fittingly assigned to anger, namely “quarreling, swelling
to his brother, “Raca”: and this refers to “clamor,” which
of the mind, contumely, clamor, indignation and blas-
denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disor-
phemy.” For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore∗ to be a
der is when a man breaks out into injurious words, and if
daughter of pride. Therefore it should not be accounted a
these be against God, it is “blasphemy,” if against one’s
daughter of anger.
neighbor, it is “contumely.”
Objection 2. Further, hatred is born of anger, as Au-
Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to
gustine says in his rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be
deeds; and thus anger gives rise to “quarrels,” by which
placed among the daughters of anger.
we are to understand all manner of injuries inflicted on
Objection 3. Further, “a swollen mind” would seem
one’s neighbor through anger.
to be the same as pride. Now pride is not the daughter
Reply to Objection 1. The blasphemy into which a
of a vice, but “the mother of all vices,” as Gregory states
man breaks out deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby
(Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of the mind should
a man lifts himself up against God: since, according to Ec-
not be reckoned among the daughters of anger.
clus. 10:14, “the beginning of the pride of man is to fall
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns
off from God,” i.e. to fall away from reverence for Him
these daughters to anger.
is the first part of pride†; and this gives rise to blasphemy.
I answer that, Anger may be considered in three
But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out through a
ways. First, as consisting in thought, and thus two vices
disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger.
arise from anger. one is on the part of the person with
Reply to Objection 2. Although hatred sometimes
whom a man is angry, and whom he deems unworthy [in-
arises from anger, it has a previous cause, from which it
dignum] of acting thus towards him, and this is called “in-
arises more directly, namely displeasure, even as, on the
dignation.” The other vice is on the part of the man him-
other hand, love is born of pleasure. Now through dis-
self, in so far as he devises various means of vengeance,
pleasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes
and with such like thoughts fills his mind, according to
to hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred
Job 15:2, “Will a wise man. . . fill his stomach with burn-
arises from sloth rather than from anger.
ing heat?” And thus we have “swelling of the mind.”
Reply to Objection 3. Swelling of the mind is not
Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in
taken here as identical with pride, but for a certain effort
words: and thus a twofold disorder arises from anger.
or daring attempt to take vengeance; and daring is a vice
One is when a man manifests his anger in his manner of
opposed to fortitude.
Whether there is a vice opposed to anger resulting from lack of anger?
IIa IIae q. 158 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that there. is not a vice
for no purpose, as Seneca proves in the book he wrote on
opposed to anger, resulting from lack of anger. For no
anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq.). Therefore it seems that lack of
vice makes us like to God. Now by being entirely with-
anger is not a vice.
out anger, a man becomes like to God, Who judges “with
Objection 3. Further, according to Dionysius (Div.
tranquillity” (Wis. 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is not a
Nom. iv), “man’s evil is to be without reason.” Now
vice to be altogether without anger.
the judgment of reason remains unimpaired, if all move-
Objection 2. Further, it is not a vice to lack what is
ment of anger be done away. Therefore no lack of anger
altogether useless. But the movement of anger is useful
amounts to a vice.
∗ QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi
† Cf. q. 162, a. 7, ad 2
1902
On the contrary, Chrysostom‡ says: “He who is not there be an obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in the
angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable
sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether, unless the
patience is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence,
movement of the will be altogether lacking or weak. Con-
and incites not only the wicked but even the good to do
sequently lack of the passion of anger is also a vice, even
wrong.”
as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment
I answer that, Anger may be understood in two ways.
by the judgment of reason.
In one way, as a simple movement of the will, whereby
Reply to Objection 1. He that is entirely without
one inflicts punishment, not through passion, but in virtue
anger when he ought to be angry, imitates God as to lack
of a judgment of the reason: and thus without doubt lack
of passion, but not as to God’s punishing by judgment.
of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger is taken
Reply to Objection 2. The passion of anger, like all
in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in
other movements of the sensitive appetite, is useful, as be-
Matth., in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St.
ing conducive to the more prompt execution∗ of reason’s
John Chrysostom): “Anger, when it has a cause, is not
dictate: else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to
anger but judgment. For anger, properly speaking, de-
no purpose, whereas “nature does nothing without pur-
notes a movement of passion”: and when a man is angry
poseӠ.
with reason, his anger is no longer from passion: where-
Reply to Objection 3. When a man acts inordinately,
fore he is said to judge, not to be angry. In another way
the judgment of his reason is cause not only of the sim-
anger is taken for a movement of the sensitive appetite,
ple movement of the will but also of the passion in the
which is with passion resulting from a bodily transmuta-
sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore just as the
tion. This movement is a necessary sequel, in man, to the
removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed,
movement of his will, since the lower appetite necessar-
so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason
ily follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless
is lacking.
‡ Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom
∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 3
† Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4
1903
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 159
Of Cruelty
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?
(2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.
Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?
IIa IIae q. 159 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that cruelty is not op-
that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness
posed to clemency. For Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4)
of soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment.
that “those are said to be cruel who exceed in punishing,”
Hence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency.
which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is reckoned
Reply to Objection 1. Just as it belongs to equity
a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore appar-
to mitigate punishment according to reason, while the
ently cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
sweetness of soul which inclines one to this belongs to
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Jer. 6:23): “They
clemency: so too, excess in punishing, as regards the ex-
are cruel, and will have no mercy”; so that cruelty would
ternal action, belongs to injustice; but as regards the hard-
seem opposed to mercy. Now mercy is not the same as
ness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punish-
clemency, as stated above (q. 157, a. 4, ad 3). Therefore
ment, belongs to cruelty.
cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
Reply to Objection 2. Mercy and clemency concur
Objection 3. Further, clemency is concerned with the
in this, that both shun and recoil from another’s unhappi-
infliction of punishment, as stated above (q. 157, a. 1):
ness, but in different ways. For it belongs to mercy∗ to re-
whereas cruelty applies to the withdrawal of beneficence,
lieve another’s unhappiness by a beneficent action, while
according to Prov. 11:17, “But he that is cruel casteth off
it belongs to clemency to mitigate another’s unhappiness
even his own kindred.” Therefore cruelty is not opposed
by the cessation of punishment. And since cruelty denotes
to clemency.
excess in exacting punishment, it is more directly opposed
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4)
to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the mutual
that “the opposite of clemency is cruelty, which is nothing
likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for
else but hardness of heart in exacting punishment.”
mercilessness.
I answer that, Cruelty apparently takes its name from
Reply to Objection 3. Cruelty is there taken for mer-
“cruditas” [rawness]. Now just as things when cooked
cilessness, which is lack of beneficence. We may also
and prepared are wont to have an agreeable and sweet sa-
reply that withdrawal of beneficence is in itself a punish-
vor, so when raw they have a disagreeable and bitter taste.
ment.
Now it has been stated above (q. 157, a. 3, ad 1; a. 4, ad 3)
Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality?
IIa IIae q. 159 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that cruelty differs not
Objection 3. Further, just as there is a vice opposed
from savagery or brutality. For seemingly one vice is op-
to a virtue by way of excess, so is there a vice opposed
posed in one way to one virtue. Now both savagery and
to it by way of deficiency, which latter is opposed both
cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess. There-
to the virtue which is the mean, and to the vice which is
fore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the same.
in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to deficiency is
Objection 2. Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that
opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission
“severity is as it were savagery with verity, because it
or laxity. For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): “Let there be
holds to justice without attending to piety”: so that sav-
love, but not that which enervates, let there be severity,
agery would seem to exclude that mitigation of punish-
but without fury, let there be zeal without unseemly sav-
ment in delivering judgment which is demanded by piety.
agery, let there be piety without undue clemency.” There-
Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty (a. 1, ad 1).
fore savagery is the same as cruelty.
Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4)
∗ Cf. q. 30, a. 1
1904
that “a man who is angry without being hurt, or with one Reply to Objection 1. Clemency is a human virtue;
who has not offended him, is not said to be cruel, but to
wherefore directly opposed to it is cruelty which is a form
be brutal or savage.”
of human wickedness. But savagery or brutality is com-
I answer that, “Savagery” and “brutality” take their
prised under bestiality, wherefore it is directly opposed
names from a likeness to wild beasts which are also de-
not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which the
scribed as savage. For animals of this kind attack man that
Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls “heroic” or “god-like,”
they may feed on his body, and not for some motive of jus-
which according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts
tice the consideration of which belongs to reason alone.
of the Holy Ghost. Consequently we may say that sav-
Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery ap-
agery is directly opposed to the gift of piety.
plies to those who in inflicting punishment have not in
Reply to Objection 2. A severe man is not said to be
view a default of the person punished, but merely the plea-
simply savage, because this implies a vice; but he is said
sure they derive from a man’s torture. Consequently it is
to be “savage as regards the truth,” on account of some
evident that it is comprised under bestiality: for such like
likeness to savagery which is not inclined to mitigate pun-
pleasure is not human but bestial, and resulting as it does
ishment.
either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature, as do
Reply to Objection 3. Remission of punishment is
other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not
not a vice, except it disregard the order of justice, which
only regards the default of the person punished, but ex-
requires a man to be punished on account of his offense,
ceeds in the mode of punishing: wherefore cruelty differs
and which cruelty exceeds. On the other hand, cruelty
from savagery or brutality, as human wickedness differs
disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission of
from bestiality, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5.
punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.
1905
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 160
Of Modesty
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of its species. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance?
(2) What is the matter of modesty?
Whether modesty is a part of temperance?
IIa IIae q. 160 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that modesty is not a
there is a special virtue about some matter of very great
part of temperance. For modesty is denominated from
moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters
mode. Now mode is requisite in every virtue: since virtue
of lesser import: because the life of man requires to be
is directed to good; and “good,” according to Augustine
regulated by the virtues with regard to everything: thus it
(De Nat. Boni 3), “consists in mode, species, and order.”
was stated above (q. 134, a. 3, ad 1), that while magnifi-
Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently
cence is about great expenditure, there is need in addition
should not be reckoned a part of temperance.
for liberality, which is concerned with ordinary expendi-
Objection 2. Further, temperance would seem to be
ture. Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate other
deserving of praise chiefly on account of its moderation.
lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult. This
Now this gives modesty its name. Therefore modesty is
virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as
the same as temperance, and not one of its parts.
its principal.
Objection 3. Further, modesty would seem to re-
Reply to Objection 1. When a name is common to
gard the correction of our neighbor, according to 2 Tim.
many it is sometimes appropriated to those of the low-
2:24,25, “The servant of the Lord must not wrangle, but be
est rank; thus the common name of angel is appropriated
mild towards all men. . . with modesty admonishing them
to the lowest order of angels. In the same way, mode
that resist the truth.” Now admonishing wrong-doers is an
which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially
act of justice or of charity, as stated above (q. 33, a. 1).
appropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in
Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather
the slightest things.
than of temperance.
Reply to Objection 2. Some things need tempering
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reck-
on account of their strength, thus we temper strong wine.
ons modesty as a part of temperance.
But moderation is necessary in all things: wherefore tem-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 141, a. 4; q. 157,
perance is more concerned with strong passions, and mod-
a. 3), temperance brings moderation into those things
esty about weaker passions.
wherein it is most difficult to be moderate, namely the
Reply to Objection 3. Modesty is to be taken there for
concupiscences of pleasures of touch.
Now whenever
the general moderation which is necessary in all virtues.
Whether modesty is only about outward actions?
IIa IIae q. 160 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that modesty is only about
to the moral virtues—and about things pertaining to
outward actions. For the inward movements of the pas-
knowledge—which is proper to the intellectual virtues—
sions cannot be known to other persons. Yet the Apostle
and again about things pertaining to the irascible and con-
enjoins (Phil. 4:5): “Let your modesty be known to all
cupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue,
men.” Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.
it cannot be about all these things.
Objection 2. Further, the virtues that are about the
On the contrary, In all these things it is necessary
passions are distinguished from justice which is about op-
to observe the “mode” whence modesty takes its name.
erations. Now modesty is seemingly one virtue. There-
Therefore modesty is about all of them.
fore, if it be about outward works, it will not be concerned
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), modesty dif-
with inward passions.
fers from temperance, in that temperance moderates those
Objection 3.
Further, no one same virtue is both
matters where restraint is most difficult, while modesty
about things pertaining to the appetite—which is proper
moderates those that present less difficulty. Authorities
1906
seem to have had various opinions about modesty. For tions “meekness, simplicity, humility,” and other kindred
wherever they found a special kind of good or a spe-
virtues, of which we have spoken above (q. 143); while
cial difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the
Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) assigned eutrapelia to pleasures in province of modesty, which they confined to lesser mat-games, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 60, a. 5). All these
ters. Now it is clear to all that the restraint of pleasures
are comprised under modesty as understood by Tully; and
of touch presents a special difficulty: wherefore all distin-
in this way modesty regards not only outward but also in-
guished temperance from modesty.
ward actions.
In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet.
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle speaks of mod-
ii, 54) considered that there was a special kind of good
esty as regarding externals. Nevertheless the moderation
in the moderation of punishment; wherefore he severed
of the inner man may be shown by certain outward signs.
clemency also from modesty, and held modesty to be
Reply to Objection 2. Various virtues assigned by
about the remaining ordinary matters that require mod-
various authorities are comprised under modesty. Where-
eration. These seemingly are of four kinds. one is the
fore nothing prevents modesty from regarding matters
movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this
which require different virtues. Yet there is not so great a
is moderated by “humility.” The second is the desire of
difference between the various parts of modesty, as there
things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by
is between justice, which is about operations, and tem-
“studiousness” which is opposed to curiosity. The third
perance, which is about passions, because in actions and
regards bodily movements and actions, which require to
passions that present no great difficulty on the part of the
be done becomingly and honestly∗, whether we act seri-
matter, but only on the part of moderation, there is but one
ously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for
virtue, one namely for each kind of moderation.
instance in dress and the like.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is
To some of these matters, however, other authorities
clear.
appointed certain special virtues: thus Andronicus† men-
∗ Cf. q. 145, a. 1
† De Affectibus
1907
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 161
Of Humility
(In Six Articles)
We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite, Curiosity; (3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds; (4) Modesty as affecting outward attire.
Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether humility is a virtue?
(2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the judgment of reason?
(3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men?
(4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance?
(5) Of its comparison with the other virtues;
(6) Of the degrees of humility.
Whether humility is a virtue?
IIa IIae q. 161 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that humility is not a
of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been
virtue. For virtue conveys the notion of a penal evil, ac-
stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 61, a. 2) that for those appetitive
cording to Ps. 104:18, “They humbled his feet in fetters.”
movements which are a kind of impulse towards an object,
Therefore humility is not a virtue.
there is need of a moderating and restraining moral virtue,
Objection 2. Further, virtue and vice are mutually op-
while for those which are a kind of recoil, there is need,
posed. Now humility seemingly denotes a vice, for it is
on the part of the appetite, of a moral virtue to strengthen
written (Ecclus. 19:23): “There is one that humbleth him-
it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold virtue is necessary
self wickedly.” Therefore humility is not a virtue.
with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper and re-
Objection 3. Further, no virtue is opposed to another
strain the mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately;
virtue. But humility is apparently opposed to the virtue of
and this belongs to the virtue of humility: and another to
magnanimity, which aims at great things, whereas humil-
strengthen the mind against despair, and urge it on to the
ity shuns them. Therefore it would seem that humility is
pursuit of great things according to right reason; and this
not a virtue.
is magnanimity. Therefore it is evident that humility is a
Objection 4. Further, virtue is “the disposition of that virtue.
which is perfect” (Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seem-
Reply to Objection 1. As Isidore observes (Etym.
ingly belongs to the imperfect: wherefore it becomes not
x), “a humble man is so called because he is, as it were,
God to be humble, since He can be subject to none. There-
‘humo acclinis’ ”∗, i.e. inclined to the lowest place. This
fore it seems that humility is not a virtue.
may happen in two ways. First, through an extrinsic prin-
Objection 5. Further, every moral virtue is about ac-
ciple, for instance when one is cast down by another, and
tions and passions, according to Ethic. ii, 3. But humil-
thus humility is a punishment. Secondly, through an in-
ity is not reckoned by the Philosopher among the virtues
trinsic principle: and this may be done sometimes well,
that are about passions, nor is it comprised under justice
for instance when a man, considering his own failings, as-
which is about actions. Therefore it would seem not to be
sumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus Abra-
a virtue.
ham said to the Lord (Gn. 18:27), “I will speak to my
On the contrary, Origen commenting on Lk. 1:48,
Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes.” In this way humility
“He hath regarded the humility of His handmaid,” says
is a virtue. Sometimes, however, this may be ill-done, for
(Hom. viii in Luc.): “One of the virtues, humility, is par-
instance when man, “not understanding his honor, com-
ticularly commended in Holy Writ; for our Saviour said:
pares himself to senseless beasts, and becomes like to
‘Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.’ ”
them” (Ps. 48:13).
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 2)
Reply to Objection 2. As stated (ad 1), humility, in so
when we were treating of the passions, the difficult good
far as it is a virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy
has something attractive to the appetite, namely the aspect
self-abasement to the lowest place. Now this is sometimes
of good, and likewise something repulsive to the appetite,
done merely as to outward signs and pretense: wherefore
namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In respect of the for-
this is “false humility,” of which Augustine says in a letter
mer there arises the movement of hope, and in respect
(Ep. cxlix) that it is “grievous pride,” since to wit, it would
∗ Literally, ‘bent to the ground’
1908
seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however, ting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only as regards
this is done by an inward movement of the soul, and in
His assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be
this way, properly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue,
perfect in a restricted sense, for instance in respect of its
because virtue does not consist externals, but chiefly in
nature or state or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect:
the inward choice of the mind, as the Philosopher states
although in comparison with God his perfection is found
(Ethic. ii, 5).
wanting, according to the word of Is. 40:17, “All nations
Reply to Objection 3. Humility restrains the appetite
are before Him as if they had no being at all.” In this way
from aiming at great things against right reason: while
humility may be competent to every man.
magnanimity urges the mind to great things in accord with
Reply to Objection 5. The Philosopher intended to
right reason. Hence it is clear that magnanimity is not op-
treat of virtues as directed to civic life, wherein the sub-
posed to humility: indeed they concur in this, that each is
jection of one man to another is defined according to the
according to right reason.
ordinance of the law, and consequently is a matter of le-
Reply to Objection 4. A thing is said to be perfect in
gal justice. But humility, considered as a special virtue,
two ways. First absolutely; such a thing contains no de-
regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose
fect, neither in its nature nor in respect of anything else,
sake he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others.
and thus God alone is perfect. To Him humility is fit-
Whether humility has to do with the appetite?
IIa IIae q. 161 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that humility concerns,
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Poenit.†) that
not the appetite but the judgment of reason. Because hu-
“the humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in
mility is opposed to pride. Now pride concerns things
the house of the Lord, rather than to dwell in the tents
pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv,
of sinners.” But choice concerns the appetite. Therefore
22) that “pride, when it extends outwardly to the body, is
humility has to do with the appetite rather than with the
first of all shown in the eyes”: wherefore it is written (Ps.
estimative power.
130:1), “Lord, my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), it belongs prop-
lofty.” Now eyes are the chief aids to knowledge. There-
erly to humility, that a man restrain himself from being
fore it would seem that humility is chiefly concerned with
borne towards that which is above him. For this purpose
knowledge, whereby one thinks little of oneself.
he must know his disproportion to that which surpasses
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Virginit.
his capacity. Hence knowledge of one’s own deficiency
xxxi) that “almost the whole of Christian teaching is
belongs to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite. Nev-
humility.” Consequently nothing contained in Christian
ertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself; and
teaching is incompatible with humility. Now Christian
consequently it must be said that humility, properly speak-
teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, accord-
ing, moderates the movement of the appetite.
ing to 1 Cor. 12:31, “Be zealous for the better gifts.”
Reply to Objection 1. Lofty eyes are a sign of pride,
Therefore it belongs to humility to restrain not the desire
inasmuch as it excludes respect and fear: for fearing and
of difficult things but the estimate thereof.
respectful persons are especially wont to lower the eyes,
Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the same virtue
as though not daring to compare themselves with others.
both to restrain excessive movement, and to strengthen
But it does not follow from this that humility is essentially
the soul against excessive withdrawal: thus fortitude both
concerned with knowledge.
curbs daring and fortifies the soul against fear. Now it
Reply to Objection 2. It is contrary to humility to aim
is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against the dif-
at greater things through confiding in one’s own powers:
ficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. There-
but to aim at greater things through confidence in God’s
fore if humility were to curb the desire of great things,
help, is not contrary to humility; especially since the more
it would follow that humility is not a distinct virtue from
one subjects oneself to God, the more is one exalted in
magnanimity, which is evidently false. Therefore humil-
God’s sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi):
ity is concerned, not with the desire but with the estimate
“It is one thing to raise oneself to God, and another to
of great things.
raise oneself up against God. He that abases himself be-
Objection 4. Further, Andronicus∗ assigns humility
fore Him, him He raiseth up; he that raises himself up
to outward show; for he says that humility is “the habit of
against Him, him He casteth down.”
avoiding excessive expenditure and parade.” Therefore it
Reply to Objection 3. In fortitude there is the same
is not concerned with the movement of the appetite.
reason for restraining daring and for strengthening the
∗ De Affectibus
† Serm. cccli
1909
soul against fear: since the reason in both cases is that humility, which he understands by poverty of spirit, to the
man should set the good of reason before dangers of death.
gift of fear whereby man reveres God. Hence it follows
But the reason for restraining presumptuous hope which
that the relation of fortitude to daring differs from that of
pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for
humility to hope. Because fortitude uses daring more than
strengthening the soul against despair. Because the rea-
it suppresses it: so that excess of daring is more like for-
son for strengthening the soul against despair is the ac-
titude than lack of daring is. On the other hand, humility
quisition of one’s proper good lest man, by despair, ren-
suppresses hope or confidence in self more than it uses it;
der himself unworthy of a good which was competent to
wherefore excessive self-confidence is more opposed to
him; while the chief reason for suppressing presumptu-
humility than lack of confidence is.
ous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that
Reply to Objection 4. Excess in outward expenditure
man ought not to ascribe to himself more than is compe-
and parade is wont to be done with a view of boasting,
tent to him according to the position in which God has
which is suppressed by humility. Accordingly humility
placed him. Wherefore humility would seem to denote in
has to do, in a secondary way, with externals, as signs of
the first place man’s subjection to God; and for this rea-
the inward movement of the appetite.
son Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) ascribes
Whether one ought, by humility, to subject oneself to all men?
IIa IIae q. 161 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not, by hu-
the latter has of God’s: but humility does not require a
mility, to subject oneself to all men. For, as stated above
man to subject what he has of God’s to that which may
(a. 2, ad 3), humility consists chiefly in man’s subjection
seem to be God’s in another. For those who have a share
to God. Now one ought not to offer to a man that which
of God’s gifts know that they have them, according to 1
is due to God, as is the case with all acts of religious wor-
Cor. 2:12: “That we may know the things that are given
ship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not to subject one-
us from God.” Wherefore without prejudice to humility
self to man.
they may set the gifts they have received from God above
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gra-
those that others appear to have received from Him; thus
tia xxxiv): “Humility should take the part of truth, not of
the Apostle says (Eph. 3:5): ”(The mystery of Christ)
falsehood.” Now some men are of the highest rank, who
was not known to the sons of men as it is now revealed
cannot, without falsehood, subject themselves to their in-
to His holy apostles.” In like manner. humility does not
feriors. Therefore one ought not, by humility, to subject
require a man to subject that which he has of his own to
oneself to all men.
that which his neighbor has of man’s: otherwise each one
Objection 3. Further no one ought to do that which
would have to esteem himself a greater sinner than any-
conduces to the detriment of another’s spiritual welfare.
one else: whereas the Apostle says without prejudice to
But if a man subject himself to another by humility, this
humility (Gal. 2:15): “We by nature are Jews, and not
is detrimental to the person to whom he subjects himself;
of the Gentiles, sinners.” Nevertheless a man may esteem
for the latter might wax proud, or despise the other. Hence
his neighbor to have some good which he lacks himself,
Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): “Lest through ex-
or himself to have some evil which another has not: by
cessive humility the superior lose his authority.” There-
reason of which, he may subject himself to him with hu-
fore a man ought not, by humility, to subject himself to
mility.
all.
Reply to Objection 1. We must not only revere God
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:3): “In humil-
in Himself, but also that which is His in each one, al-
ity, let each esteem others better than themselves.”
though not with the same measure of reverence as we re-
I answer that, We may consider two things in man,
vere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with
namely that which is God’s, and that which is man’s.
humility to all our neighbors for God’s sake, according to
Whatever pertains to defect is man’s: but whatever per-
1 Pet. 2:13, “Be ye subject. . . to every human creature for
tains to man’s welfare and perfection is God’s, according
God’s sake”; but to God alone do we owe the worship of
to the saying of Osee 13:9, “Destruction is thy own, O
latria.
Israel; thy help is only in Me.” Now humility, as stated
Reply to Objection 2. If we set what our neighbor
above (a. 1, ad 5; a. 2, ad 3), properly regards the rev-
has of God’s above that which we have of our own, we
erence whereby man is subject to God. Wherefore every
cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a gloss∗ on Phil. 2:3,
man, in respect of that which is his own, ought to sub-
“Esteem others better than themselves,” says: “We must
ject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that which
not esteem by pretending to esteem; but we should in truth
∗ St. Augustine, QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 71
1910
think it possible for another person to have something that Rule (Ep. ccxi): “With fear, the superior should prostrate
is hidden to us and whereby he is better than we are, al-
himself at your feet in the sight of God.” On the other
though our own good whereby we are apparently better
hand, due moderation must be observed in the outward
than he, be not hidden.”
acts of humility even as of other virtues, lest they conduce
Reply to Objection 3. Humility, like other virtues, re-
to the detriment of others. If, however, a man does as he
sides chiefly inwardly in the soul. Consequently a man, by
ought, and others take therefrom an occasion of sin, this
an inward act of the soul, may subject himself to another,
is not imputed to the man who acts with humility; since
without giving the other man an occasion of detriment to
he does not give scandal, although others take it.
his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine means in his
Whether humility is a part of modesty or temperance?
IIa IIae q. 161 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that humility is not a part
of the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now
of modesty or temperance. For humility regards chiefly
just as meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so
the reverence whereby one is subject to God, as stated
does humility suppress the movement of hope, which is
above (a. 3). Now it belongs to a theological virtue to have
the movement of a spirit aiming at great things. Where-
God for its object. Therefore humility should be reckoned
fore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part of tem-
a theological virtue rather than a part of temperance or
perance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3)
modesty.
says that a man who aims at small things in proportion to
Objection 2. Further, temperance is in the concupis-
his mode is not magnanimous but “temperate,” and such a
cible, whereas humility would seem to be in the irascible,
man we may call humble. Moreover, for the reason given
just as pride which is opposed to it, and whose object is
above (q. 160, a. 2), among the various parts of temper-
something difficult. Therefore apparently humility is not
ance, the one under which humility is comprised is mod-
a part of temperance or modesty.
esty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54),
Objection 3. Further, humility and magnanimity are
inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of
about the same object, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). But
spirit: wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 3:4): “In the incor-
magnanimity is reckoned a part, not of temperance but of
ruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit.”
fortitude, as stated above (q. 129, a. 5). Therefore it would
Reply to Objection 1. The theological virtues, whose
seem that humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.
object is our last end, which is the first principle in matters On the contrary, Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.):
of appetite, are the causes of all the other virtues. Hence
“If thou wilt hear the name of this virtue, and what it was
the fact that humility is caused by reverence for God does
called by the philosophers, know that humility which God
not prevent it from being a part of modesty or temperance.
regards is the same as what they called metriotes, i.e. mea-Reply to Objection 2. Parts are assigned to a prin-
sure or moderation.” Now this evidently pertains to mod-
cipal virtue by reason of a sameness, not of subject or
esty or temperance. Therefore humility is a part of mod-
matter, but of formal mode, as stated above (q. 137, a. 2,
esty or temperance.
ad 1; q. 157, a. 3, ad 2). Consequently, although humility
I answer that, As stated above (q. 137, a. 2, ad 1;
is in the irascible as its subject, it is assigned as a part of q. 157, a. 3, ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we con-modesty or temperance by reason of its mode.
sider chiefly the likeness that results from the mode of the
Reply to Objection 3. Although humility and magna-
virtue. Now the mode of temperance, whence it chiefly
nimity agree as to matter, they differ as to mode, by reason
derives its praise, is the restraint or suppression of the im-
of which magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, and
petuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues restrain or
humility a part of temperance.
suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity
Whether humility is the greatest of the virtues?
IIa IIae q. 161 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that humility is the great-
will stand among the angels by the judgment seat of God.”
est of the virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story
Hence it is clear that humility is set above justice. Now
of the Pharisee and the publican (Lk. 18), says∗ that “if
justice is either the most exalted of all the virtues, or in-
humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin
cludes all virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v,
that it overtakes the justice that is the companion of pride,
1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues.
whither will it not reach if you couple it with justice? It
Objection 2.
Further, Augustine says (De Verb.
∗ Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi.
1911
Dom., Serm.†): “Are you thinking of raising the great fab-Reply to Objection 2. Just as the orderly assembly
ric of spirituality? Attend first of all to the foundation of
of virtues is, by reason of a certain likeness, compared to
humility.” Now this would seem to imply that humility
a building, so again that which is the first step in the ac-
is the foundation of all virtue. Therefore apparently it is
quisition of virtue is likened to the foundation, which is
greater than the other virtues.
first laid before the rest of the building. Now the virtues
Objection 3. Further, the greater virtue deserves the
are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in
greater reward. Now the greatest reward is due to humil-
the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways.
ity, since “he that humbleth himself shall be exalted” (Lk.
First by way of removing obstacles: and thus humility
14:11). Therefore humility is the greatest of virtues.
holds the first place, inasmuch as it expels pride, which
Objection 4. Further, according to Augustine (De
“God resisteth,” and makes man submissive and ever open
Vera Relig. 16), “Christ’s whole life on earth was a les-
to receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence it is written
son in moral conduct through the human nature which He
(James 4:6): “God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to
assumed.” Now He especially proposed His humility for
the humble.” In this sense humility is said to be the foun-
our example, saying (Mat. 11:29): “Learn of Me, because
dation of the spiritual edifice. Secondly, a thing is first
I am meek and humble of heart.” Moreover, Gregory says
among virtues directly, because it is the first step towards
(Pastor. iii, 1) that the “lesson proposed to us in the mys-
God. Now the first step towards God is by faith, according
tery of our redemption is the humility of God.” Therefore
to Heb. 11:6, “He that cometh to God must believe.” In
humility would seem to be the greatest of virtues.
this sense faith is the foundation in a more excellent way
On the contrary, Charity is set above all the virtues,
than humility.
according to Col. 3:14, “Above all. . . things have charity.”
Reply to Objection 3. To him that despises earthly
Therefore humility is not the greatest of virtues.
things, heavenly things are promised: thus heavenly trea-
I answer that, The good of human virtue pertains to
sures are promised to those who despise earthly riches,
the order of reason: which order is considered chiefly in
according to Mat. 6:19,20, “Lay not up to yourselves
reference to the end: wherefore the theological virtues are
treasures on earth. . . but lay up to yourselves treasures in
the greatest because they have the last end for their object.
heaven.” Likewise heavenly consolations are promised to
Secondarily, however, it is considered in reference to the
those who despise worldly joys, according to Mat. 4:5,
ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance, as to
“Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be com-
its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but
forted.” In the same way spiritual uplifting is promised to
by participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason;
humility, not that humility alone merits it, but because it
and this ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of le-
is proper to it to despise earthly uplifting. Wherefore Au-
gal justice. Now humility makes a man a good subject to
gustine says (De Poenit.†): “Think not that he who hum-
ordinance of all kinds and in all matters; while every other
bles himself remains for ever abased, for it is written: ‘He
virtue has this effect in some special matter. Therefore
shall be exalted.’ And do not imagine that his exaltation
after the theological virtues, after the intellectual virtues
in men’s eyes is effected by bodily uplifting.”
which regard the reason itself, and after justice, especially
Reply to Objection 4. The reason why Christ chiefly
legal justice, humility stands before all others.
proposed humility to us, was because it especially re-
Reply to Objection 1. Humility is not set before jus-
moves the obstacle to man’s spiritual welfare consisting in
tice, but before that justice which is coupled with pride,
man’s aiming at heavenly and spiritual things, in which he
and is no longer a virtue; even so, on the other hand, sin
is hindered by striving to become great in earthly things.
is pardoned through humility: for it is said of the publi-
Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our spir-
can (Lk. 18:14) that through the merit of his humility “he
itual welfare, showed by giving an example of humility,
went down into his house justified.” Hence Chrysostom
that outward exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility
says∗: “Bring me a pair of two-horse chariots: in the one
is, as it were, a disposition to man’s untrammeled access
harness pride with justice, in the other sin with humility:
to spiritual and divine goods. Accordingly as perfection
and you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not by its
is greater than disposition, so charity, and other virtues
own strength, but by that of humility: while you will see
whereby man approaches God directly, are greater than
the other pair beaten, not by the weakness of justice, but
humility.
by the weight and size of pride.”
† S. 10, C[1]
∗ De incompr. Nat. Dei, Hom. v
† Serm. cccli
1912
Whether twelve degrees of humility are fittingly distinguished in the Rule of the IIa IIae q. 161 a. 6
Blessed Benedict?
Objection 1. It would seem that the twelve degrees
Objection 5. Further, Augustine says (De Virginit.
of humility that are set down in the Rule of the Blessed
xxxi): “The measure of humility is apportioned to each
Benedict∗ are unfittingly distinguished. The first is to be
one according to his rank. It is imperiled by pride, for the
“humble not only in heart, but also to show it in one’s
greater a man is the more liable is he to be entrapped.”
very person, one’s eyes fixed on the ground”; the second
Now the measure of a man’s greatness cannot be fixed
is “to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud
according to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it
of voice”; the third is “not to be easily moved, and dis-
would seem that it is not possible to assign the aforesaid
posed to laughter”; the fourth is “to maintain silence un-
degrees to humility.
til one is asked”; the fifth is “to do nothing but to what
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2) humility has
one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery”;
essentially to do with the appetite, in so far as a man
the sixth is “to believe and acknowledge oneself viler
restrains the impetuosity of his soul, from tending in-
than all”; the seventh is “to think oneself worthless and
ordinately to great things: yet its rule is in the cogni-
unprofitable for all purposes”; the eighth is “to confess
tive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be
one’s sin”; the ninth is “to embrace patience by obeying
above what we are. Also, the principle and origin of both
under difficult and contrary circumstances”; the tenth is
these things is the reverence we bear to God. Now the
“to subject oneself to a superior”; the eleventh is “not
inward disposition of humility leads to certain outward
to delight in fulfilling one’s own desires”; the twelfth
signs in words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest that
is “to fear God and to be always mindful of everything
which is hidden within, as happens also with the other
that God has commanded.” For among these there are
virtues. For “a man is known by his look, and a wise
some things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obe-
man, when thou meetest him, by his countenance” (Ec-
dience and patience. Again there are some that seem to
clus. 19:26). Wherefore the aforesaid degrees of humility
involve a false opinion—and this is inconsistent with any
include something regarding the root of humility, namely
virtue—namely to declare oneself more despicable than
the twelfth degree, “that a man fear God and bear all His
all men, and to confess and believe oneself to be in all
commandments in mind.”
ways worthless and unprofitable. Therefore these are un-
Again, they include certain things with regard to the
fittingly placed among the degrees of humility.
appetite, lest one aim inordinately at one’s own excel-
Objection 2. Further, humility proceeds from within
lence. This is done in three ways. First, by not follow-
to externals, as do other virtues. Therefore in the afore-
ing one’s own will, and this pertains to the eleventh de-
said degrees, those which concern outward actions are un-
gree; secondly, by regulating it according to one’s supe-
fittingly placed before those which pertain to inward ac-
rior judgment, and this applies to the tenth degree; thirdly,
tions.
by not being deterred from this on account of the difficul-
Objection 3. Further, Anselm (De Simil. ci, seqq.)
ties and hardships that come in our way, and this belongs
gives seven degrees of humility, the first of which is
to the ninth degree.
“to acknowledge oneself contemptible”; the second, “to
Certain things also are included referring to the esti-
grieve for this”; the third, “to confess it”; the fourth, “to
mate a man forms in acknowledging his own deficiency,
convince others of this, that is to wish them to believe it”;
and this in three ways. First by acknowledging and avow-
the fifth, “to bear patiently that this be said of us”; the
ing his own shortcomings; this belongs to the eighth de-
sixth, “to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt”; the
gree: secondly, by deeming oneself incapable of great
seventh, “to love being thus treated.” Therefore the afore-
things, and this pertains to the seventh degree: thirdly,
said degrees would seem to be too numerous.
that in this respect one should put others before oneself,
Objection 4. Further, a gloss on Mat. 3:15 says: “Per-
and this belongs to the sixth degree.
fect humility has three degrees. The first is to subject our-
Again, some things are included that refer to outward
selves to those who are above us, and not to set ourselves
signs. One of these regards deeds, namely that in one’s
above our equals: this is sufficient. The second is to sub-
work one should not depart from the ordinary way; this
mit to our equals, and not to set ourselves before our infe-
applies to the fifth degree. Two others have reference to
riors; this is called abundant humility. The third degree is
words, namely that one should not be in a hurry to speak,
to subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is perfect righ-
which pertains to the fourth degree, and that one be not
teousness.” Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem
immoderate in speech, which refers to the second. The
to be too numerous.
others have to do with outward gestures, for instance in
∗ St. Thomas gives these degrees in the reverse order to that followed by St. Benedict
1913
restraining haughty looks, which regards the first, and in Anselm are reducible to knowledge, avowal, and desire
outwardly checking laughter and other signs of senseless
of one’s own abasement. For the first degree belongs to
mirth, and this belongs to the third degree.
the knowledge of one’s own deficiency; but since it would
Reply to Objection 1. It is possible, without false-
be wrong for one to love one’s own failings, this is ex-
hood, to deem and avow oneself the most despicable of
cluded by the second degree. The third and fourth de-
men, as regards the hidden faults which we acknowledge
grees regard the avowal of one’s own deficiency; namely
in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of God which others
that not merely one simply assert one’s failing, but that
have. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. lii): “Bethink
one convince another of it. The other three degrees have
you that some persons are in some hidden way better than
to do with the appetite, which seeks, not outward excel-
you, although outwardly you are better than they.” Again,
lence, but outward abasement, or bears it with equanimity,
without falsehood one may avow and believe oneself in
whether it consist of words or deeds. For as Gregory says
all ways unprofitable and useless in respect of one’s own
(Regist. ii, 10, Ep. 36), “there is nothing great in being
capability, so as to refer all one’s sufficiency to God, ac-
humble towards those who treat us with regard, for even
cording to 2 Cor. 3:5, “Not that we are sufficient to think
worldly people do this: but we should especially be hum-
anything of ourselves as of ourselves: but our sufficiency
ble towards those who make us suffer,” and this belongs
is from God.” And there is nothing unbecoming in ascrib-
to the fifth and sixth degrees: or the appetite may even go
ing to humility those things that pertain to other virtues,
so far as lovingly to embrace external abasement, and this
since, just as one vice arises from another, so, by a natural
pertains to the seventh degree; so that all these degrees are
sequence, the act of one virtue proceeds from the act of
comprised under the sixth and seventh mentioned above.
another.
Reply to Objection 4. These degrees refer, not to the
Reply to Objection 2. Man arrives at humility in two
thing itself, namely the nature of humility, but to the de-
ways. First and chiefly by a gift of grace, and in this way
grees among men, who are either of higher or lower or of
the inner man precedes the outward man. The other way is
equal degree.
by human effort, whereby he first of all restrains the out-
Reply to Objection 5. This argument also considers
ward man, and afterwards succeeds in plucking out the
the degrees of humility not according to the nature of the
inward root. It is according to this order that the degrees
thing, in respect of which the aforesaid degrees are as-
of humility are here enumerated.
signed, but according to the various conditions of men.
Reply to Objection 3. All the degrees mentioned by
1914
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 162
Of Pride
(In Eight Articles)
We must next consider pride, and (1) pride in general; (2) the first man’s sin, which we hold to have been pride.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pride is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special vice?
(3) Wherein does it reside as in its subject?
(4) Of its species;
(5) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(6) Whether it is the most grievous of all sins?
(7) Of its relation to other sins;
(8) Whether it should be reckoned a capital vice?
Whether pride is a sin?
IIa IIae q. 162 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that pride is not a sin. For
stood in two ways. First, as overpassing [supergreditur]
no sin is the object of God’s promise. For God’s promises
the rule of reason, and in this sense we say that it is a sin.
refer to what He will do; and He is not the author of sin.
Secondly, it may simply denominate “super-abundance”;
Now pride is numbered among the Divine promises: for
in which sense any super-abundant thing may be called
it is written (Is. 60:15): “I will make thee to be an ever-
pride: and it is thus that God promises pride as signifi-
lasting pride [Douay: ‘glory’], a joy unto generation and
cant of super-abundant good. Hence a gloss of Jerome on
generation.” Therefore pride is not a sin.
the same passage (Is. 61:6) says that “there is a good and
Objection 2. Further, it is not a sin to wish to be
an evil pride”; or “a sinful pride which God resists, and a
like unto God: for every creature has a natural desire for
pride that denotes the glory which He bestows.”
this; and especially does this become the rational creature
It may also be replied that pride there signifies abun-
which is made to God’s image and likeness. Now it is
dance of those things in which men may take pride.
said in Prosper’s Lib. Sent. 294, that “pride is love of
Reply to Objection 2. Reason has the direction of
one’s own excellence, whereby one is likened to God who
those things for which man has a natural appetite; so that
is supremely excellent.” Hence Augustine says (Confess.
if the appetite wander from the rule of reason, whether by
ii, 6): “Pride imitates exaltedness; whereas Thou alone art
excess or by default, it will be sinful, as is the case with
God exalted over all.” Therefore pride is not a sin.
the appetite for food which man desires naturally. Now
Objection 3. Further, a sin is opposed not only to a
pride is the appetite for excellence in excess of right rea-
virtue but also to a contrary vice, as the Philosopher states
son. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13) that
(Ethic. ii, 8). But no vice is found to be opposed to pride.
pride is the “desire for inordinate exaltation”: and hence it
Therefore pride is not a sin.
is that, as he asserts (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13; xix, 12), “pride
On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:14): “Never
imitates God inordinately: for it hath equality of fellow-
suffer pride to reign in thy mind or in thy words.”
ship under Him, and wishes to usurp Hi. dominion over
I answer that, Pride [superbia] is so called because
our fellow-creatures.”
a man thereby aims higher [supra] than he is; wherefore
Reply to Objection 3. Pride is directly opposed to
Isidore says (Etym. x): “A man is said to be proud, be-
the virtue of humility, which, in a way, is concerned about
cause he wishes to appear above (super) what he really
the same matter as magnanimity, as stated above (q. 161,
is”; for he who wishes to overstep beyond what he is, is
a. 1, ad 3). Hence the vice opposed to pride by default
proud. Now right reason requires that every man’s will
is akin to the vice of pusillanimity, which is opposed by
should tend to that which is proportionate to him. There-
default to magnanimity. For just as it belongs to magna-
fore it is evident that pride denotes something opposed to
nimity to urge the mind to great things against despair, so
right reason, and this shows it to have the character of sin,
it belongs to humility to withdraw the mind from the in-
because according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 4), “the
ordinate desire of great things against presumption. Now
soul’s evil is to be opposed to reason.” Therefore it is evi-
pusillanimity, if we take it for a deficiency in pursuing
dent that pride is a sin.
great things, is properly opposed to magnanimity by de-
Reply to Objection 1. Pride [superbia] may be under-
fault; but if we take it for the mind’s attachment to things
1915
beneath what is becoming to a man, it is opposed to hu-to great things inordinately. Since, however, pride implies
mility by default; since each proceeds from a smallness
a certain elation, it is more directly opposed to humility,
of mind. In the same way, on the other hand, pride may
even as pusillanimity, which denotes littleness of soul in
be opposed by excess, both to magnanimity and humility,
tending towards great things, is more directly opposed to
from different points of view: to humility, inasmuch as it
magnanimity.
scorns subjection, to magnanimity, inasmuch as it tends
Whether pride is a special sin?
IIa IIae q. 162 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that pride is not a special
sired. Secondly, indirectly and accidentally as it were,
sin. For Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that “you
that is by removing an obstacle, since pride makes a man
will find no sin that is not labelled pride”; and Prosper
despise the Divine law which hinders him from sinning,
says (De Vita Contempl. iii, 2) that “without pride no sin
according to Jer. 2:20, “Thou hast broken My yoke, thou
is, or was, or ever will be possible.” Therefore pride is a
hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I will not serve.”
general sin.
It must, however, be observed that this generic char-
Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Job 33:17, “That
acter of pride admits of the possibility of all vices arising
He may withdraw man from wickedness∗,” says that “a
from pride sometimes, but it does not imply that all vices
man prides himself when he transgresses His command-
originate from pride always. For though one may break
ments by sin.” Now according to Ambrose†, “every sin
the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin, through
is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience
contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always
of the heavenly commandments.” Therefore every sin is
break the Divine commandments through contempt, but
pride.
sometimes through ignorance. and sometimes through
Objection 3. Further, every special sin is opposed to
weakness: and for this reason Augustine says (De Nat.
a special virtue. But pride is opposed to all the virtues,
et Grat. xxix) that “many things are done amiss which are
for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23): “Pride is by no
not done through pride.”
means content with the destruction of one virtue; it raises
Reply to Objection 1. These words are introduced
itself up against all the powers of the soul, and like an
by Augustine into his book De Nat. et Grat., not as be-
all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole
ing his own, but as those of someone with whom he is
body”; and Isidore says (Etym.‡) that it is “the downfall
arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the assertion,
of all virtues.” Therefore pride is not a special sin.
and shows that not all sins are committed through pride.
Objection 4. Further, every special sin has a special
We might, however, reply that these authorities must be
matter. Now pride has a general matter, for Gregory says
understood as referring to the outward effect of pride,
(Moral. xxxiv, 23) that “one man is proud of his gold, an-
namely the breaking of the commandments, which applies
other of his eloquence: one is elated by mean and earthly
to every sin, and not to the inward act of pride, namely
things, another by sublime and heavenly virtues.” There-
contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed, not
fore pride is not a special but a general sin.
always through contempt, but sometimes through igno-
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat.
rance, sometimes through weakness, as stated above.
xxix): “If he look into the question carefully, he will find
Reply to Objection 2. A man may sometimes com-
that, according to God’s law, pride is a very different sin
mit a sin effectively, but not affectively; thus he who, in
from other vices.” Now the genus is not different from its
ignorance, slays his father, is a parricide effectively, but
species. Therefore pride is not a general but a special sin.
not affectively, since he did not intend it. Accordingly
I answer that, The sin of pride may be considered in
he who breaks God’s commandment is said to pride him-
two ways. First with regard to its proper species, which it
self against God, effectively always, but not always affec-
has under the aspect of its proper object. In this way pride
tively.
is a special sin, because it has a special object: for it is
Reply to Objection 3. A sin may destroy a virtue in
inordinate desire of one’s own excellence, as stated (a. 1,
two ways. In one way by direct contrariety to a virtue, and
ad 2). Secondly, it may be considered as having a certain
thus pride does not corrupt every virtue, but only humil-
influence towards other sins. In this way it has somewhat
ity; even as every special sin destroys the special virtue
of a generic character, inasmuch as all sins may arise from
opposed to it, by acting counter thereto. In another way
pride, in two ways. First directly, through other sins being
a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue:
directed to the end of pride which is one’s own excellence,
and thus pride destroys every virtue, in so far as it finds an
to which may be directed anything that is inordinately de-
occasion of pride in every virtue, just as in everything else
∗ Vulg.: ‘From the things that he is doing, and may deliver him from pride’
† De Parad. viii
‡ De Summo Bono ii, 38
1916
pertaining to excellence. Hence it does not follow that it in its object, which aspect may be found in various matis a general sin.
ters: for it is inordinate love of one’s excellence, and ex-
Reply to Objection 4. Pride regards a special aspect
cellence may be found in various things.
Whether the subject of pride is the irascible faculty?
IIa IIae q. 162 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the subject of pride
Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object
is not the irascible faculty.
For Gregory says (Moral.
of pride, were merely some sensible object, whereto the
xxiii, 17): “A swollen mind is an obstacle to truth, for
sensitive appetite might tend, pride would have to be in the
the swelling shuts out the light.” Now the knowledge of
irascible which is part of the sensitive appetite. But since
truth pertains, not to the irascible but to the rational fac-
the difficult thing which pride has in view is common
ulty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.
both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8)
that the subject of pride is the irascible not only strictly
that “the proud observe other people’s conduct not so as to
so called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in
set themselves beneath them with humility, but so as to set
its wider acceptation, as applicable to the intellective ap-
themselves above them with pride”: wherefore it would
petite. Wherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons.
seem that pride originates in undue observation. Now ob-
Reply to Objection 1. Knowledge of truth is twofold.
servation pertains not to the irascible but to the rational
One is purely speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly
faculty.
by removing its cause. For the proud man subjects not his
Objection 3. Further. pride seeks pre-eminence not
intellect to God, that he may receive the knowledge of
only in sensible things, but also in spiritual and intelligi-
truth from Him, according to Mat. 11:25, “Thou hast hid
ble things: while it consists essentially in the contempt of
these things from the wise and the prudent,” i.e. from the
God, according to Ecclus. 10:14, “The beginning of the
proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, “and
pride of man is to fall off from God.” Now the irascible,
hast revealed them to little ones,” i.e. to the humble.
since it is a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot extend to
Nor does he deign to learn anything from man,
God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot be in
whereas it is written (Ecclus. 6:34): “If thou wilt incline
the irascible.
thy ear, thou shalt receive instruction.” The other knowl-
Objection 4. Further, as stated in Prosper’s Liber Sen-
edge of truth is affective, and this is directly hindered by
tentiarum, sent. 294, “Pride is love of one’s own excel-
pride, because the proud, through delighting in their own
lence.” But love is not in the irascible, but in the concu-
excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory
piscible. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.
says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that “the proud, although certain
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes
hidden truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot
pride to the gift of fear. Now fear belongs to the irasci-
realize their sweetness: and if they know of them they can-
ble. Therefore pride is in the irascible.
not relish them.” Hence it is written (Prov. 11:2): “Where
I answer that, The subject of any virtue or vice is
humility is there also is wisdom.”
to be ascertained from its proper object: for the object
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 161, Aa. 2,
of a habit or act cannot be other than the object of the
6), humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a
power, which is the subject of both. Now the proper object
man has true self-esteem. Now pride does not observe
of pride is something difficult, for pride is the desire of
this rule of right reason, for he esteems himself greater
one’s own excellence, as stated above (Aa. 1,2). Where-
than he is: and this is the outcome of an inordinate desire
fore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible
for his own excellence, since a man is ready to believe
faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First
what he desires very much, the result being that his ap-
in a strict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive ap-
petite is borne towards things higher than what become
petite, even as anger, strictly speaking, is a passion of the
him. Consequently whatsoever things lead a man to in-
sensitive appetite. Secondly, the irascible may be taken
ordinate self-esteem lead him to pride: and one of those
in a broader sense, so as to belong also to the intellective
is the observing of other people’s failings, just as, on the
appetite, to which also anger is sometimes ascribed. It
other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17),
is thus that we attribute anger to God and the angels, not
“holy men, by a like observation of other people’s virtues,
as a passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice pro-
set others above themselves.” Accordingly the conclusion
nouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood
is not that pride is in the rational faculty, but that one of
in this broad sense is not distinct from the concupiscible
its causes is in the reason.
power, as stated above in the Ia, q. 59, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 82,
Reply to Objection 3. Pride is in the irascible, not
a. 5, ad 1 and 2.
only as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also as having
1917
a more general signification, as stated above.
denote any of the other emotions. It is in this sense that
Reply to Objection 4. According to Augustine (De
pride is said to be “love of one’s own excellence,” inas-
Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), “love precedes all other emotions of the
much as love makes a man presume inordinately on his
soul, and is their cause,” wherefore it may be employed to
superiority over others, and this belongs properly to pride.
Whether the four species of pride are fittingly assigned by Gregory?
IIa IIae q. 162 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that the four species of pride are First, in itself. For it is evident that the greater the good
unfittingly assigned by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii,
that one has, the greater the excellence that one derives
6): “There are four marks by which every kind of pride
from it. Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good
of the arrogant betrays itself; either when they think that
greater than what he has, it follows that his appetite tends
their good is from themselves, or if they believe it to be
to his own excellence in a measure exceeding his compe-
from above, yet they think that it is due to their own mer-
tency: and thus we have the third species of pride, namely
its; or when they boast of having what they have not, or
“boasting of having what one has not.”
despise others and wish to appear the exclusive posses-
Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its
sors of what they have.” For pride is a vice distinct from
cause, in so far as to have a thing of oneself is more excel-
unbelief, just as humility is a distinct virtue from faith.
lent than to have it of another. Hence when a man esteems
Now it pertains to unbelief, if a man deem that he has not
the good he has received of another as though he had it of
received his good from God, or that he has the good of
himself, the result is that his appetite is borne towards his
grace through his own merits. Therefore this should not
own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of one’s
be reckoned a species of pride.
own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and
Objection 2. Further, the same thing should not be
thus we have the first two species of pride, namely “when
reckoned a species of different genera. Now boasting is
a man thinks he has from himself that which he has from
reckoned a species of lying, as stated above (q. 110, a. 2;
God,” or “when he believes that which he has received
q. 112). Therefore it should not be accounted a species of
from above to be due to his own merits.”
pride.
Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the man-
Objection 3. Further, some other things apparently
ner of having it, in so far as a man obtains greater ex-
pertain to pride, which are not mentioned here.
For
cellence through possessing some good more excellently
Jerome∗ says that “nothing is so indicative of pride as to
than other men; the result again being that his appetite is
show oneself ungrateful”: and Augustine says (De Civ.
borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus
Dei xiv, 14) that “it belongs to pride to excuse oneself of a
we have the fourth species of pride, which is “when a man
sin one has committed.” Again, presumption whereby one
despises others and wishes to be singularly conspicuous.”
aims at having what is above one, would seem to have
Reply to Objection 1. A true judgment may be de-
much to do with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division
stroyed in two ways. First, universally: and thus in mat-
does not sufficiently account for the different species of
ters of faith, a true judgment is destroyed by unbelief.
pride.
Secondly, in some particular matter of choice, and unbe-
Objection 4. Further, we find other divisions of pride.
lief does not do this. Thus a man who commits forni-
For Anselm† divides the uplifting of pride, saying that
cation, judges that for the time being it is good for him
there is “pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of deed.”
to commit fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he
Bernard‡ also reckons twelve degrees of pride, namely
would be, were he to say that universally fornication is
“curiosity, frivolity of mind, senseless mirth, boasting,
good. It is thus in the question in point: for it pertains to
singularity, arrogance, presumption, defense of one’s sins,
unbelief to assert universally that there is a good which is
deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license, sinful habit.”
not from God, or that grace is given to men for their mer-
Now these apparently are not comprised under the species
its, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and not
mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to
to unbelief, through inordinate desire of one’s own excel-
be assigned unfittingly.
lence, to boast of one’s goods as though one had them of
On the contrary, The authority of Gregory suffices.
oneself, or of one’s own merits.
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2,3), pride de-
Reply to Objection 2. Boasting is reckoned a species
notes immoderate desire of one’s own excellence, a de-
of lying, as regards the outward act whereby a man falsely
sire, to wit, that is not in accord with right reason. Now it
ascribes to himself what he has not: but as regards the in-
must be observed that all excellence results from a good
ward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned by Gregory to
possessed. Such a good may be considered in three ways.
be a species of pride.
∗ Reference unknown † Eadmer, De Similit. xxii, seqq. ‡ De Grad.
Humil. et Superb. x, seqq.
1918
Reply to Objection 3. The ungrateful man ascribes to opposed “boasting”. The fifth degree of humility is “to
himself what he has from another: wherefore the first two
do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common
species of pride pertain to ingratitude. To excuse oneself
rule of the monastery,” to which is opposed “singularity,”
of a sin one has committed, belongs to the third species,
whereby a man wishes to seem more holy than others.
since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the good of
The sixth degree of humility is “to believe and acknowl-
innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at
edge oneself viler than all,” to which is opposed “arro-
what is above one, would seem to belong chiefly to the
gance,” whereby a man sets himself above others. The
fourth species, which consists in wishing to be preferred
seventh degree of humility is “to think oneself worthless
to others.
and unprofitable for all purposes,” to which is opposed
Reply to Objection 4.
The three mentioned by
“presumption,” whereby a man thinks himself capable of
Anselm correspond to the progress of any particular sin:
things that are above him. The eighth degree of humility
for it begins by being conceived in thought, then is uttered
is “to confess one’s sins,” to which is opposed “defense
in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.
of one’s sins.” The ninth degree is “to embrace patience
The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reck-
by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances,” to
oned by way of opposition to the twelve degrees of hu-
which is opposed “deceitful confession,” whereby a man
mility, of which we have spoken above (q. 161, a. 6). For
being unwilling to be punished for his sins confesses them
the first degree of humility is to “be humble in heart, and
deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility is “obedience,”
to show it in one’s very person, one’s eyes fixed on the
to which is opposed “rebelliousness.” The eleventh de-
ground”: and to this is opposed “curiosity,” which con-
gree of humility is “not to delight in fulfilling one’s own
sists in looking around in all directions curiously and in-
desires”; to this is opposed “license,” whereby a man de-
ordinately. The second degree of humility is “to speak
lights in doing freely whatever he will. The last degree of
few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice”:
humility is “fear of God”: to this is opposed “the habit of
to this is opposed “frivolity of mind,” by which a man
sinning,” which implies contempt of God.
is proud of speech. The third degree of humility is “not
In these twelve degrees not only are the species of
to be easily moved and disposed to laughter,” to which is
pride indicated, but also certain things that precede and
opposed “senseless mirth.” The fourth degree of humil-
follow them, as we have stated above with regard to hu-
ity is “to maintain silence until one is asked,” to which is
mility (q. 161, a. 6).
Whether pride is a mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 162 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that pride is not a mortal
mility properly regards the subjection of man to God, as
sin. For a gloss on Ps. 7:4, “O Lord my God, if I have
stated above (q. 161, a. 1, ad 5). Hence pride properly
done this thing,” says: “Namely, the universal sin which
regards lack of this subjection, in so far as a man raises
is pride.” Therefore if pride were a mortal sin, so would
himself above that which is appointed to him according
every sin be.
to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the
Objection 2. Further, every mortal sin is contrary to
Apostle (2 Cor. 10:13), “But we will not glory beyond our
charity. But pride is apparently not contrary to charity,
measure; but according to the measure of the rule which
neither as to the love of God, nor as to the love of one’s
God hath measured to us.” Wherefore it is written (Ec-
neighbor, because the excellence which, by pride, one de-
clus. 10:14): “The beginning of the pride of man is to fall
sires inordinately, is not always opposed to God’s honor,
off from God” because, to wit, the root of pride is found to
or our neighbor’s good. Therefore pride is not a mortal
consist in man not being, in some way, subject to God and
sin.
His rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God is
Objection 3. Further, every mortal sin is opposed to
of its very nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning
virtue. But pride is not opposed to virtue; on the contrary,
away from God: and consequently pride is, of its genus,
it arises therefrom, for as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv,
a mortal sin. Nevertheless just as in other sins which are
23), “sometimes a man is elated by sublime and heavenly
mortal by their genus (for instance fornication and adul-
virtues.” Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.
tery) there are certain motions that are venial by reason of
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23)
their imperfection (through forestalling the judgment of
that “pride is a most evident sign of the reprobate, and
reason, and being without its consent), so too in the mat-
contrariwise, humility of the elect.” But men do not be-
ter of pride it happens that certain motions of pride are
come reprobate on account of venial sins. Therefore pride
venial sins, when reason does not consent to them.
is not a venial but a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 2) pride is
I answer that, Pride is opposed to humility. Now hu-
a general sin, not by its essence but by a kind of influence,
1919
in so far as all sins may have their origin in pride. Hence this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has
it does not follow that all sins are mortal, but only such
established order among men, so that one ought to be sub-
as arise from perfect pride, which we have stated to be a
ject to another.
mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3. Pride arises from virtue, not as
Reply to Objection 2. Pride is always contrary to the
from its direct cause, but as from an accidental cause, in
love of God, inasmuch as the proud man does not subject
so far as a man makes a virtue an occasion for pride. And
himself to the Divine rule as he ought. Sometimes it is
nothing prevents one contrary from being the accidental
also contrary to the love of our neighbor; when, namely,
cause of another, as stated in Phys. viii, 1. Hence some
a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor: and
are even proud of their humility.
Whether pride is the most grievous of sins?
IIa IIae q. 162 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that pride is not the most
a consequence as it were in other sins, belongs to pride
grievous of sins. For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the by its very nature, for its act is the contempt of God. And
less grievous it would seem to be. Now pride is most dif-
since that which belongs to a thing by its nature is always
ficult to avoid; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi),
of greater weight than that which belongs to it through
“Other sins find their vent in the accomplishment of evil
something else, it follows that pride is the most grievous
deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy
of sins by its genus, because it exceeds in aversion which
them.” Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.
is the formal complement of sin.
Objection 2. Further, “The greater evil is opposed to
Reply to Objection 1. A sin is difficult to avoid in
the greater good,” as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii,
two ways. First, on account of the violence of its on-
10). Now humility to which pride is opposed is not the
slaught; thus anger is violent in its onslaught on account
greatest of virtues, as stated above (q. 61, a. 5). There-
of its impetuosity; and “still more difficult is it to resist
fore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues, such as
concupiscence, on account of its connaturality,” as stated
unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are
in Ethic. ii, 3,9. A difficulty of this kind in avoiding
more grievous sins than pride.
sin diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man sins
Objection 3. Further, the greater evil is not punished
the more grievously, according as he yields to a less im-
by a lesser evil. But pride is sometimes punished by other
petuous temptation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
sins according to Rom. 1:28, where it is stated that on
12,15).
account of their pride of heart, men of science were de-
Secondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of
livered “to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are
its being hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride,
not convenient.” Therefore pride is not the most grievous
since it takes occasion even from good deeds, as stated
of sins.
(a. 5, ad 3). Hence Augustine says pointedly that it “lies
On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 118:51, “The proud
in wait for good deeds”; and it is written (Ps. 141:4):
did iniquitously,” says: “The greatest sin in man is pride.”
“In the way wherein I walked, the proud† [Vulg.: ‘they’]
I answer that, Two things are to be observed in sin,
have hidden a snare for me.” Hence no very great gravity
conversion to a mutable good, and this is the material
attaches to the movement of pride while creeping in se-
part of sin; and aversion from the immutable good, and
cretly, and before it is discovered by the judgment of rea-
this gives sin its formal aspect and complement. Now on
son: but once discovered by reason, it is easily avoided,
the part of the conversion, there is no reason for pride
both by considering one’s own infirmity, according to Ec-
being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride
clus. 10:9, “Why is earth and ashes proud?” and by con-
covets inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible
sidering God’s greatness, according to Job 15:13, “Why
with the good of virtue. But on the part of the aver-
doth thy spirit swell against God?” as well as by consid-
sion, pride has extreme gravity, because in other sins man
ering the imperfection of the goods on which man prides
turns away from God, either through ignorance or through
himself, according to Is. 40:6, “All flesh is grass, and all
weakness, or through desire for any other good whatever;
the glory thereof as the flower of the field”; and farther on
whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply through
(Is. 64:6), “all our justices” are become “like the rag of a
being unwilling to be subject to God and His rule. Hence
menstruous woman.”
Boethius∗ says that “while all vices flee from God, pride
Reply to Objection 2. Opposition between a vice and
alone withstands God”; for which reason it is specially
a virtue is inferred from the object, which is considered
stated (James 4:6) that “God resisteth the proud.” Where-
on the part of conversion. In this way pride has no claim
fore aversion from God and His commandments, which is
to be the greatest of sins, as neither has humility to be
∗ Cf. Cassian, de Caenob. Inst. xii, 7
† Cf. Ps. 139:6, ‘The proud
have hidden a net for me.’
1920
the greatest of virtues. But it is the greatest on the part those who are of highest and foremost rank, or because it
of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other sins. For
originates from just and virtuous deeds, so that its guilt is
unbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud con-
less perceptible. on the other hand, carnal lust is apparent
tempt, is rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome
to all, because from the outset it is of a shameful nature:
of ignorance or weakness. The same applies to despair
and yet, under God’s dispensation, it is less grievous than
and the like.
pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels it
Reply to Objection 3. Just as in syllogisms that lead
not, falls into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus hum-
to an impossible conclusion one is sometimes convinced
bled he may rise from his abasement.”
by being faced with a more evident absurdity, so too, in or-
From this indeed the gravity of pride is made mani-
der to overcome their pride, God punishes certain men by
fest. For just as a wise physician, in order to cure a worse
allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh, which though
disease, allows the patient to contract one that is less dan-
they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence
gerous, so the sin of pride is shown to be more grievous
Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that “pride is the
by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows men to fall
worst of all vices; whether because it is appropriate to
into other sins.
Whether pride is the first sin of all?
IIa IIae q. 162 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that pride is not the first
pride, but because any kind of sin is naturally liable to
sin of all. For the first is maintained in all that follows.
arise from pride.
Now pride does not accompany all sins, nor is it the origin
Reply to Objection 2. To fall off from God is said
of all: for Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xx) that many
to be the beginning of pride, not as though it were a dis-
things are done “amiss which are not done with pride.”
tinct sin from pride, but as being the first part of pride.
Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.
For it has been said above (a. 5) that pride regards chiefly
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14) that subjection to God which it scorns, and in consequence it
the “beginning of. . . pride is to fall off from God.” There-
scorns to be subject to a creature for God’s sake.
fore falling away from God precedes pride.
Reply to Objection 3. There is no need for the or-
Objection 3. Further, the order of sins would seem to
der of virtues to be the same as that of vices. For vice is
be according to the order of virtues. Now, not humility
corruptive of virtue. Now that which is first to be gen-
but faith is the first of all virtues. Therefore pride is not
erated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore as faith is
the first sin of all.
the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to which Objection 4. Further, it is written (2 Tim. 3:13):
sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on Ps.
“Evil men and seducers shall grow worse and worse”; so
136:7, “Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof,”
that apparently man’s beginning of wickedness is not the
says that “by heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into
greatest of sins. But pride is the greatest of sins as stated
unbelief,” and the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:19) that “some
in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is not the first
rejecting a good conscience have made shipwreck con-
sin.
cerning the faith.”
Objection 5. Further, resemblance and pretense come
Reply to Objection 4. Pride is said to be the most
after the reality. Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7)
grievous of sins because that which gives sin its gravity
that “pride apes fortitude and daring.” Therefore the vice
is essential to pride. Hence pride is the cause of gravity
of daring precedes the vice of pride.
in other sins. Accordingly previous to pride there may be
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): “Pride
certain less grievous sins that are committed through igno-
is the beginning of all sin.”
rance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is
I answer that, The first thing in every genus is that
pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more
which is essential. Now it has been stated above (a. 6)
grievous. And as that which is the first in causing sins is
that aversion from God, which is the formal complement
the last in the withdrawal from sin, a gloss on Ps. 18:13,
of sin, belongs to pride essentially, and to other sins, con-
“I shall be cleansed from the greatest sin,” says: “Namely
sequently. Hence it is that pride fulfils the conditions of
from the sin of pride, which is the last in those who return
a first thing, and is “the beginning of all sins,” as stated
to God, and the first in those who withdraw from God.”
above ( Ia IIae, q. 84, a. 2), when we were treating of the
Reply to Objection 5. The Philosopher associates
causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief
pride with feigned fortitude, not that it consists precisely
part of sin.
in this, but because man thinks he is more likely to be
Reply to Objection 1. Pride is said to be “the begin-
uplifted before men, if he seem to be daring or brave.
ning of all sin,” not as though every sin originated from
1921
Whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice?
IIa IIae q. 162 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that pride should be reck-
fore some, considering pride in the light of a special sin,
oned a capital vice, since Isidore∗ and Cassian† number
numbered it together with the other capital vices. But
pride among the capital vices.
Gregory, taking into consideration its general influence
Objection 2. Further, pride is apparently the same as
towards all vices, as explained above (a. 2, obj. 3), did
vainglory, since both covet excellence. Now vainglory is
not place it among the capital vices, but held it to be
reckoned a capital vice. Therefore pride also should be
the “queen and mother of all the vices.” Hence he says
reckoned a capital vice.
(Moral. xxxi, 45): “Pride, the queen of vices, when it has
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Virginit.
vanquished and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it
xxxi) that “pride begets envy, nor is it ever without this
into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices,
companion.” Now envy is reckoned a capital vice, as
that they may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds.”
stated above (q. 36, a. 4). Much more therefore is pride a
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
capital vice.
Reply to Objection 2. Pride is not the same as vain-
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not
glory, but is the cause thereof: for pride covets excellence
include pride among the capital vices.
inordinately: while vainglory covets the outward show of
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 2,5, ad 1) pride
excellence.
may be considered in two ways; first in itself, as being
Reply to Objection 3. The fact that envy, which is a
a special sin; secondly, as having a general influence to-
capital vice, arises from pride, does not prove that pride
wards all sins. Now the capital vices are said to be certain
is a capital vice, but that it is still more principal than the special sins from which many kinds of sin arise. Where-capital vices themselves.
∗ Comment. in Deut. xvi
† De Inst. Caenob. v, 1: Collat. v, 2
1922
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 163
Of the First Man’s Sin
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the first man’s sin which was pride: and (1) his sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby he was led to sin.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pride was the first man’s first sin?
(2) What the first man coveted by sinning?
(3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins?
(4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman?
Whether pride was the first man’s first sin?
IIa IIae q. 163 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that pride was not the first
which inordinateness is first found. And it is evident that
man’s first sin. For the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that “by
inordinateness is in the inward movement of the soul be-
the disobedience of one man many were made sinners.”
fore being in the outward act of the body; since, as Augus-
Now the first man’s first sin is the one by which all men
tine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the body is not
were made sinners in the point of original sin. Therefore
forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains. Also,
disobedience, and not pride, was the first man’s first sin.
among the inward movements, the appetite is moved to-
Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says, commenting on
wards the end before being moved towards that which is
Lk. 4:3, “And the devil said to Him,” that the devil in
desired for the sake of the end; and consequently man’s
tempting Christ observed the same order as in overcoming
first sin was where it was possible for his appetite to be
the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to gluttony, as
directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so appointed
appears from Mat. 4:3, where it was said to Him: “If thou
in the state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of
be the Son of God, command that these stones be made
the flesh against the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible
bread.” Therefore the first man’s first sin was not pride
for the first inordinateness in the human appetite to result
but gluttony.
from his coveting a sensible good, to which the concu-
Objection 3. Further, man sinned at the devil’s sug-
piscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason. It
gestion. Now the devil in tempting man promised him
remains therefore that the first inordinateness of the hu-
knowledge (Gn. 3:5). Therefore inordinateness in man
man appetite resulted from his coveting inordinately some
was through the desire of knowledge, which pertains to
spiritual good. Now he would not have coveted it inordi-
curiosity. Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the first
nately, by desiring it according to his measure as estab-
sin.
lished by the Divine rule. Hence it follows that man’s first
Objection 4. Further, a gloss∗ on 1 Tim. 2:14, “The
sin consisted in his coveting some spiritual good above his
woman being seduced was in the transgression,” says:
measure: and this pertains to pride. Therefore it is evident
“The Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were
that man’s first sin was pride.
persuaded to accept a falsehood as being true; namely
Reply to Objection 1. Man’s disobedience to the Di-
that God had forbidden them to touch that tree, because
vine command was not willed by man for his own sake,
He knew that if they touched it, they would be like gods,
for this could not happen unless one presuppose inordi-
as though He who made them men, begrudged them the
nateness in his will. It remains therefore that he willed
godhead. . . ” Now it pertains to unbelief to believe such
it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he
a thing. Therefore man’s first sin was unbelief and not
coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and conse-
pride.
quently his disobedience was the result of his pride. This
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): “Pride
agrees with the statement of Augustine, who says (Ad
is the beginning of all sin.” Now man’s first sin is the be-
Oros†) that “man puffed up with pride obeyed the ser-
ginning of all sin, according to Rom. 5:12, “By one man
pent’s prompting, and scorned God’s commands.”
sin entered into this world.” Therefore man’s first sin was
Reply to Objection 2. Gluttony also had a place in
pride.
the sin of our first parents. For it is written (Gn. 3:6):
I answer that, Many movements may concur towards
“The woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to
one sin, and the character of sin attaches to that one in
the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she took of the fruit
∗ St. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xi
† Dial. QQ. lxv, qu. 4
1923
thereof, and did eat.” Yet the very goodness and beauty of Reply to Objection 4. According to Augustine (Gen.
the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but the per-
ad lit. xi, 30), “the woman had not believed the serpent’s
suasive words of the serpent, who said (Gn. 3:5): “Your
statement that they were debarred by God from a good and
eyes shall be opened and you shall be as Gods”: and it was
useful thing, were her mind not already filled with the love
by coveting this that the woman fell into pride. Hence the
of her own power, and a certain proud self-presumption.”
sin of gluttony resulted from the sin of pride.
This does not mean that pride preceded the promptings of
Reply to Objection 3. The desire for knowledge re-
the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had spoken his
sulted in our first parents from their inordinate desire for
words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result
excellence. Hence the serpent began by saying: “You
being that she believed the demon to have spoken truly.
shall be as Gods,” and added: “Knowing good and evil.”
Whether the first man’s pride consisted in his coveting God’s likeness?
IIa IIae q. 163 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the first man’s pride
ing as an effect falls short of its cause.” Now every good
did not consist in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no
existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first
one sins by coveting that which is competent to him ac-
good.
cording to his nature. Now God’s likeness is competent to
Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spir-
man according to his nature: for it is written (Gn. 1:26):
itual good above his measure, as stated in the foregoing
“Let us make man to our image and likeness.” Therefore
Article, it follows that he coveted God’s likeness inordi-
he did not sin by coveting God’s likeness.
nately.
Objection 2. Further, it would seem that man coveted
It must, however, be observed that the proper object of
God’s likeness in order that he might obtain knowledge of
the appetite is a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good,
good and evil: for this was the serpent’s suggestion: “You
in so far as the rational creature participates in the Divine
shall be as Gods knowing good and evil.” Now the desire
likeness, may be considered in reference to three things.
of knowledge is natural to man, according to the saying of
First, as to natural being: and this likeness was imprinted
the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1:
from the very outset of their creation, both on man—of
“All men naturally desire knowledge.” Therefore he did
whom it is written (Gn. 1:26) that God made man “to
not sin by coveting God’s likeness.
His image and likeness”—and on the angel, of whom it
Objection 3. Further, no wise man chooses the im-
is written (Ezech. 28:12): “Thou wast the seal of resem-
possible. Now the first man was endowed with wisdom,
blance.” Secondly, as to knowledge: and this likeness was
according to Ecclus. 17:5, “He filled them with the knowl-
bestowed on the angel at his creation, wherefore immedi-
edge of understanding.” Since then every sin consists in
ately after the words just quoted, “Thou wast the seal of
a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would
resemblance,” we read: “Full of wisdom.” But the first
seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something
man, at his creation, had not yet received this likeness ac-
impossible. But it is impossible for man to be like God,
tually but only in potentiality. Thirdly, as to the power of
according to the saying of Ex. 15:11, “Who is like to Thee
operation: and neither angel nor man received this like-
among the strong, O Lord?” Therefore the first man did
ness actually at the very outset of his creation, because
not sin by coveting God’s likeness.
to each there remained something to be done whereby to
On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps.
obtain happiness.
68:5∗, “Then did I restore [Douay: ‘pay’] that which I
Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the
took not away,” says: “Adam and Eve wished to rob the
first man) coveted God’s likeness inordinately, neither of
Godhead and they lost happiness.”
them sinned by coveting a likeness of nature. But the
I answer that, likeness is twofold. One is a likeness
first man sinned chiefly by coveting God’s likeness as re-
of absolute equality†: and such a likeness to God our first
gards “knowledge of good and evil,” according to the ser-
parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not
pent’s instigation, namely that by his own natural power
conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.
he might decide what was good, and what was evil for
The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible
him to do; or again that he should of himself foreknow
for a creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature
what good and what evil would befall him. Secondarily
participates somewhat of God’s likeness according to its
he sinned by coveting God’s likeness as regards his own
measure. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): “The same
power of operation, namely that by his own natural power
things are like and unlike to God; like, according as they
he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine
imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike, accord-
says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that “the woman’s mind was
∗ Enarr. in Ps. 68
† Cf. Ia, q. 93, a. 1
1924
filled with love of her own power.” On the other hand, the likeness as to knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this
devil sinned by coveting God’s likeness, as regards power.
likeness inordinately, that is, above one’s measure, this
Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 13) that “he
is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:18, “O
wished to enjoy his own power rather than God’s.” Nev-
God, who is like Thee?” says: “He who desires to be of
ertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to God, in so
himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be
far as each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the
like God. Thus did the devil, who was unwilling to be
order of the Divine rule.
subject to Him, and man who refused to be, as a servant,
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the
bound by His command.”
likeness of nature: and man did not sin by coveting this,
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the
as stated.
likeness of equality.
Reply to Objection 2. It is not a sin to covet God’s
Whether the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins?
IIa IIae q. 163 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of our first
is more essential to sin and is of greater moment: hence
parents was more grievous than other sins. For Augustine
a sin is said to be grave in respect of this gravity rather
says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15): “Great was the wickedness in
than of the other. Accordingly we must say that the first
sinning, when it was so easy to avoid sin.” Now it was
man’s sin was not graver than all other sins of men, as re-
very easy for our first parents to avoid sin, because they
gards the species of the sin. For though pride, of its genus,
had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore the
has a certain pre-eminence over other sins, yet the pride
sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins.
whereby one denies or blasphemes God is greater than
Objection 2. Further, punishment is proportionate to
the pride whereby one covets God’s likeness inordinately,
guilt. Now the sin of our first parents was most severely
such as the pride of our first parents, as stated (a. 2).
punished, since by it “death entered into this world,” as
But if we consider the circumstances of the persons
the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12). Therefore that sin was
who sinned, that sin was most grave on account of the
more grievous than other sins.
perfection of their state. We must accordingly conclude
Objection 3. Further, the first in every genus is seem-
that this sin was most grievous relatively but not simply.
ingly the greatest (Metaph. ii, 4∗). Now the sin of our first
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the
parents was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was
gravity of sin as resulting from the person of the sinner.
the greatest.
Reply to Objection 2. The severity of the punishment
On the contrary, Origen says†: “I think that a man
awarded to that first sin corresponds to the magnitude of
who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or
the sin, not as regards its species but as regards its being
fall suddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little
the first sin: because it destroyed the innocence of our
by little.” Now our first parents were established on the
original state, and by robbing it of innocence brought dis-
highest and perfect grade. Therefore their first sin was not
order upon the whole human nature.
the greatest of all sins.
Reply to Objection 3. Where things are directly sub-
I answer that, There is a twofold gravity to be ob-
ordinate, the first must needs be the greatest. Such is not
served in sin. one results from the very species of the sin:
the order among sins, for one follows from another acci-
thus we say that adultery is a graver sin than simple for-
dentally. And thus it does not follow that the first sin is
nication. The other gravity of sin results from some cir-
the greatest.
cumstance of place, person, or time. The former gravity
Whether Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s?
IIa IIae q. 163 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that Adam’s sin was more
of his lord. . . and did not according to his will, shall be
grievous than Eve’s. For it is written (1 Tim. 2:14):
beaten with many stripes: but he that knew not, and did
“Adam was not seduced, but the woman being seduced
things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes.”
was in the transgression”: and so it would seem that the
Therefore Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s.
woman sinned through ignorance, but the man through
Objection 2.
Further, Augustine says (De Decem
assured knowledge. Now the latter is the graver sin, ac-
Chordis 3‡): “If the man is the head, he should live bet-
cording to Lk. 12:47,48, “That servant who knew the will
ter, and give an example of good deeds to his wife, that
∗ Ed. Diel. i, 1
† Peri Archon i, 3
‡ Serm. ix; xcvi de Temp.
1925
she may imitate him.” Now he who ought to do better, of desiring to obtain something against God’s will. On the
sins more grievously, if he commit a sin. Therefore Adam
other hand, the man did not believe this to be true; where-
sinned more grievously than Eve.
fore he did not wish to attain to God’s likeness against
Objection 3. Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost
God’s will: but his pride consisted in wishing to attain
would seem to be the most grievous. Now Adam, appar-
thereto by his own power. Secondly, the woman not only
ently, sinned against the Holy Ghost, because while sin-
herself sinned, but suggested sin to the man; wherefore
ning he relied on God’s mercy∗, and this pertains to the
she sinned against both God and her neighbor. Thirdly,
sin of presumption. Therefore it seems that Adam sinned
the man’s sin was diminished by the fact that, as Augus-
more grievously than Eve.
tine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 42), “he consented to the sin out
On the contrary, Punishment corresponds to guilt.
of a certain friendly good-will, on account of which a man
Now the woman was more grievously punished than the
sometimes will offend God rather than make an enemy of
man, as appears from Gn. 3. Therefore she sinned more
his friend. That he ought not to have done so is shown by
grievously than the man.
the just issue of the Divine sentence.”
I answer that, As stated (a. 3), the gravity of a sin
It is therefore evident that the woman’s sin was more
depends on the species rather than on a circumstance of
grievous than the man’s.
that sin. Accordingly we must assert that, if we consider
Reply to Objection 1. The woman was deceived be-
the condition attaching to these persons, the man’s sin is
cause she was first of all puffed up with pride. Wherefore
the more grievous, because he was more perfect than the
her ignorance did not excuse, but aggravated her sin, in
woman.
so far as it was the cause of her being puffed up with still
As regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each
greater pride.
is considered to be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence
Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 35): “Eve in excusing
circumstance of personal condition, on account of which
herself betrays disparity of sex, though parity of pride.”
the man’s sin was more grievous than the woman’s.
But as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned
Reply to Objection 3. The man’s reliance on God’s
more grievously, for three reasons. First, because she was
mercy did not reach to contempt of God’s justice, wherein
more puffed up than the man. For the woman believed in
consists the sin against the Holy Ghost, but as Augustine
the serpent’s persuasive words, namely that God had for-
says (Gen. ad lit. xi†), it was due to the fact that, “having
bidden them to eat of the tree, lest they should become like
had no experience of God’s severity, he thought the sin to
to Him; so that in wishing to attain to God’s likeness by
be venial,” i.e. easily forgiven‡.
eating of the forbidden fruit, her pride rose to the height
∗ Cf. q. 21, a. 2, obj. 3. St. Thomas is evidently alluding to the words of Peter Lombard quoted there
† De Civ. Dei xiv, 11
‡ Cf. Ia IIae,
q. 89, a. 3, ad 1
1926
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 164
Of the Punishments of the First Man’s Sin
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the punishments of the first sin; and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Death, which is the common punishment; (2) the other particular punishments mentioned in Genesis.
Whether death is the punishment of our first parents’ sin?
IIa IIae q. 164 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that death is not the pun-
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): “By
ishment of our first parents’ sin. For that which is natural
one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.”
to man cannot be called a punishment of sin, because sin
I answer that, If any one, on account of his fault,
does not perfect nature but vitiates it. Now death is natu-
be deprived of a favor bestowed on him the privation of
ral to man: and this is evident both from the fact that his
that favor is a punishment of that fault. Now as we stated
body is composed of contraries, and because “mortal” is
in the Ia, q. 95, a. 1; Ia, q. 97, a. 1, God bestowed this
included in the definition of man. Therefore death is not a
favor on man, in his primitive state, that as long as his
punishment of our first parents’ sin.
mind was subject to God, the lower powers of his soul
Objection 2. Further, death and other bodily defects
would be subject to his rational mind, and his body to his
are similarly found in man as well as in other animals, ac-
soul. But inasmuch as through sin man’s mind withdrew
cording to Eccles. 3:19, “The death of man and of beasts
from subjection to God, the result was that neither were
is one, and the condition of them both equal.” But in dumb
his lower powers wholly subject to his reason, whence
animals death is not a punishment of sin. Therefore nei-
there followed so great a rebellion of the carnal appetite
ther is it so in men.
against the reason: nor was the body wholly subject to the
Objection 3. Further, the sin of our first parents was
soul; whence arose death and other bodily defects. For life
the sin of particular individuals: whereas death affects the
and soundness of body depend on the body being subject
entire human nature. Therefore it would seem that it is not
to the soul, as the perfectible is subject to its perfection.
a punishment of our first parents’ sin.
Consequently, on the other hand, death, sickness, and all
Objection 4. Further, all are equally descended from
defects of the body are due to the lack of the body’s sub-
our first parents. Therefore if death were the punishment
jection to the soul.
of our first parents’ sin, it would follow that all men would
It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the car-
suffer death in equal measure. But this is clearly untrue,
nal appetite against the spirit is a punishment of our first
since some die sooner, and some more painfully, than oth-
parents’ sin, so also are death and all defects of the body.
ers. Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.
Reply to Objection 1. A thing is said to be natural if
Objection 5. Further, the evil of punishment is from
it proceeds from the principles of nature. Now the essen-
God, as stated above ( Ia, q. 48, a. 6; Ia, q. 49, a. 2). But
tial principles of nature are form and matter. The form
death, apparently, is not from God: for it is written (Wis.
of man is his rational soul, which is, of itself, immor-
1:13): “God made not death.” Therefore death is not the
tal: wherefore death is not natural to man on the part of
punishment of the first sin.
his form. The matter of man is a body such as is com-
Objection 6. Further, seemingly, punishments are not
posed of contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary
meritorious, since merit is comprised under good, and
consequence, and in this respect death is natural to man.
punishment under evil. Now death is sometimes meritori-
Now this condition attached to the nature of the human
ous, as in the case of a martyr’s death. Therefore it would
body results from a natural necessity, since it was nec-
seem that death is not a punishment.
essary for the human body to be the organ of touch, and
Objection 7. Further, punishment would seem to be
consequently a mean between objects of touch: and this
painful. But death apparently cannot be painful, since
was impossible, were it not composed of contraries, as the
man does not feel it when he is dead, and he cannot feel it
Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 11). On the other hand,
when he is not dying. Therefore death is not a punishment
this condition is not attached to the adaptability of mat-
of sin.
ter to form because, if it were possible, since the form is
Objection 8. Further, if death were a punishment of
incorruptible, its matter should rather be incorruptible. In
sin, it would have followed sin immediately. But this is
the same way a saw needs to be of iron, this being suitable
not true, for our first parents lived a long time after their
to its form and action, so that its hardness may make it fit
sin (Gn. 5:5). Therefore, seemingly, death is not a pun-
for cutting. But that it be liable to rust is a necessary result ishment of sin.
of such a matter and is not according to the agent’s choice;
1927
for, if the craftsman were able, of the iron he would make the Ia, q. 90, a. 4; Ia, q. 118, a. 3, namely that the soul
a saw that would not rust. Now God Who is the author of
is not created before the body: but either in punishment
man is all-powerful, wherefore when He first made man,
of their parents’ sins, inasmuch as the child is something
He conferred on him the favor of being exempt from the
belonging to the father, wherefore parents are often pun-
necessity resulting from such a matter: which favor, how-
ished in their children; or again it is for a remedy intended
ever, was withdrawn through the sin of our first parents.
for the spiritual welfare of the person who suffers these
Accordingly death is both natural on account of a condi-
penalties, to wit that he may thus be turned away from his
tion attaching to matter, and penal on account of the loss
sins, or lest he take pride in his virtues, and that he may
of the Divine favor preserving man from death∗.
be crowned for his patience.
Reply to Objection 2. This likeness of man to other
Reply to Objection 5. Death may be considered in
animals regards a condition attaching to matter, namely
two ways. First, as an evil of human nature, and thus it is
the body being composed of contraries. But it does not
not of God, but is a defect befalling man through his fault.
regard the form, for man’s soul is immortal, whereas the
Secondly, as having an aspect of good, namely as being a
souls of dumb animals are mortal.
just punishment, and thus it is from God. Wherefore Au-
Reply to Objection 3. Our first parents were made by
gustine says (Retract. i, 21) that God is not the author of
God not only as particular individuals, but also as princi-
death, except in so far as it is a punishment.
ples of the whole human nature to be transmitted by them
Reply to Objection 6. As Augustine says (De Civ.
to their posterity, together with the Divine favor preserv-
Dei xiii, 5), “just as the wicked abuse not only evil but
ing them from death. Hence through their sin the entire
also good things, so do the righteous make good use not
human nature, being deprived of that favor in their poster-
only of good but also of evil things. Hence it is that
ity, incurred death.
both evil men make evil use of the law, though the law
Reply to Objection 4. A twofold defect arises from
is good, while good men die well, although death is an
sin. One is by way of a punishment appointed by a judge:
evil.” Wherefore inasmuch as holy men make good use of
and such a defect should be equal in those to whom the
death, their death is to them meritorious.
sin pertains equally. The other defect is that which re-
Reply to Objection 7. Death may be considered in
sults accidentally from this punishment; for instance, that
two ways. First, as the privation of life, and thus death
one who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has
cannot be felt, since it is the privation of sense and life.
committed, should fall down in the road. Such a defect
In this way it involves not pain of sense but pain of loss.
is not proportionate to the sin, nor does a human judge
Secondly, it may be considered as denoting the corruption
take it into account, since he cannot foresee chance hap-
which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may speak
penings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for the
of corruption even as of generation in two ways: in one
first sin and proportionately corresponding thereto, was
way as being the term of alteration, and thus in the first
the withdrawal of the Divine favor whereby the rectitude
instant in which life departs, death is said to be present.
and integrity of human nature was maintained. But the
In this way also death has no pain of sense. In another
defects resulting from this withdrawal are death and other
way corruption may be taken as including the previous al-
penalties of the present life. Wherefore these punishments
teration: thus a person is said to die, when he is in motion
need not be equal in those to whom the first sin equally
towards death; just as a thing is said to be engendered,
appertains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all fu-
while in motion towards the state of having been engen-
ture events, Divine providence has so disposed that these
dered: and thus death may be painful.
penalties are apportioned in different ways to various peo-
Reply to Objection 8. According to Augustine (Gen.
ple. This is not on account of any merits or demerits pre-
ad lit.†), “although our first parents lived thereafter many
vious to this life, as Origen held∗: for this is contrary to
years, they began to die on the day when they heard the
the words of Rom. 9:11, “When they. . . had not done any
death-decree, condemning them to decline to old age.”
good or evil”; and also contrary to statements made in
Whether the particular punishments of our first parents are suitably appointed in IIa IIae q. 164 a. 2
Scripture?
Objection 1. It would seem that the particular pun-
Now seemingly there would have been “pain in child-
ishments of our first parents are unsuitably appointed in
bearing,” even had there been no sin: for the disposition
Scripture. For that which would have occurred even with-
of the female sex is such that offspring cannot be born
out sin should not be described as a punishment for sin.
without pain to the bearer. Likewise the “subjection of
∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 6
∗ Peri Archon ii, 9
† De Pecc. Mer. et
Rem. i, 16. Cf. Gen. ad lit. ii. 32
1928
woman to man” results from the perfection of the male, outweighs in good all the penal evils which are stated to
and the imperfection of the female sex. Again it belongs
have resulted from sin. Therefore the punishments result-
to the nature of the earth “to bring forth thorns and this-
ing from our first parents’ sin are unsuitably described.
tles,” and this would have occurred even had there been
On the contrary, These punishments were appointed
no sin. Therefore these are unsuitable punishments of the
by God, Who does all things, “in number, weight, and
first sin.
measure∗” (Wis. 11:21).
Objection 2. Further, that which pertains to a per-
I answer that, As stated in the foregoing Article, on
son’s dignity does not, seemingly, pertain to his punish-
account of their sin, our first parents were deprived of the
ment. But the “multiplying of conceptions” pertains to a
Divine favor, whereby the integrity of human nature was
woman’s dignity. Therefore it should not be described as
maintained in them, and by the withdrawal of this favor
the woman’s punishment.
human nature incurred penal defects. Hence they were
Objection 3. Further, the punishment of our first par-
punished in two ways. In the first place by being deprived
ents’ sin is transmitted to all, as we have stated with regard
of that which was befitting the state of integrity, namely
to death (a. 1). But all “women’s conceptions” are not
the place of the earthly paradise: and this is indicated (Gn.
“multiplied,” nor does “every man eat bread in the sweat
3:23) where it is stated that “God sent him out of the par-
of his face.” Therefore these are not suitable punishments
adise of pleasure.” And since he was unable, of himself,
of the first sin.
to return to that state of original innocence, it was fit-
Objection 4. Further, the place of paradise was made
ting that obstacles should be placed against his recovering
for man. Now nothing in the order of things should be
those things that were befitting his original state, namely
without purpose. Therefore it would seem that the exclu-
food (lest he should take of the tree of life) and place; for
sion of man from paradise was not a suitable punishment
“God placed before. . . paradise. . . Cherubim, and a flam-
of man.
ing sword.”
Secondly, they were punished by having
Objection 5. Further, this place of the earthly par-
appointed to them things befitting a nature bereft of the
adise is said to be naturally inaccessible. Therefore it was
aforesaid favor: and this as regards both the body and
useless to put other obstacles in the way lest man should
the soul. With regard to the body, to which pertains the
return thither, to wit the cherubim, and the “flaming sword
distinction of sex, one punishment was appointed to the
turning every way.”
woman and another to the man. To the woman punish-
Objection 6. Further, immediately after his sin man
ment was appointed in respect of two things on account
was subject to the necessity of dying, so that he could not
of which she is united to the man; and these are the beget-
be restored to immortality by the beneficial tree of life.
ting of children, and community of works pertaining to
Therefore it was useless to forbid him to eat of the tree
family life. As regards the begetting of children, she was
of life, as instanced by the words of Gn. 3:22: “See, lest
punished in two ways: first in the weariness to which she
perhaps he. . . take. . . of the tree of life. . . and live for ever.”
is subject while carrying the child after conception, and
Objection 7. Further, to mock the unhappy seems in-
this is indicated in the words (Gn. 3:16), “I will multiply
consistent with mercy and clemency, which are most of
thy sorrows, and thy conceptions”; secondly, in the pain
all ascribed to God in Scripture, according to Ps. 144:9,
which she suffers in giving birth, and this is indicated by
“His tender mercies are over all His works.” Therefore
the words (Gn. 3:16), “In sorrow shalt thou bring forth.”
God is unbecomingly described as mocking our first par-
As regards family life she was punished by being sub-
ents, already reduced through sin to unhappy straits, in
jected to her husband’s authority, and this is conveyed in
the words of Gn. 3:22, “Behold Adam is become as one
the words (Gn. 3:16), “Thou shalt be under thy husband’s
of Us, knowing good and evil.”
power.”
Objection 8. Further, clothes are necessary to man,
Now, just as it belongs to the woman to be subject to
like food, according to 1 Tim. 6:8, “Having food, and
her husband in matters relating to the family life, so it
wherewith to be covered, with these we are content.”
belongs to the husband to provide the necessaries of that
Therefore just as food was appointed to our first parents
life. In this respect he was punished in three ways. First,
before their sin, so also should clothing have been as-
by the barrenness of the earth, in the words (Gn. 3:17),
cribed to them. Therefore after their sin it was unsuitable
“Cursed is the earth in thy work.” Secondly, by the cares
to say that God made for them garments of skin.
of his toil, without which he does not win the fruits of the
Objection 9. Further, the punishment inflicted for a
earth; hence the words (Gn. 3:17), “With labor and toil
sin should outweigh in evil the gain realized through the
shalt thou eat thereof all the days of thy life.” Thirdly, by
sin: else the punishment would not deter one from sin-
the obstacles encountered by the tillers of the soil, where-
ning. Now through sin our first parents gained in this, that
fore it is written (Gn. 3:18), “Thorns and thistles shall it
their eyes were opened, according to Gn. 3:7. But this
bring forth to thee.”
∗ Vulg.: ‘Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.’
1929
Likewise a triple punishment is ascribed to them on Reply to Objection 4.
Although the place of the
the part of the soul. First, by reason of the confusion
earthly paradise avails not man for his use, it avails him
they experienced at the rebellion of the flesh against the
for a lesson; because he knows himself deprived of that
spirit; hence it is written (Gn. 3:7): “The eyes of them
place on account of sin, and because by the things that
both were opened; and. . . they perceived themselves to be
have a bodily existence in that paradise, he is instructed
naked.” Secondly, by the reproach for their sin, indicated
in things pertaining to the heavenly paradise, the way to
by the words (Gn. 3:22), “Behold Adam is become as one
which is prepared for man by Christ.
of Us.” Thirdly, by the reminder of their coming death,
Reply to Objection 5. Apart from the mysteries of
when it was said to him (Gn. 3:19): “Dust thou art and
the spiritual interpretation, this place would seem to be
into dust thou shalt return.” To this also pertains that God
inaccessible, chiefly on account of the extreme heat in the
made them garments of skin, as a sign of their mortality.
middle zone by reason of the nighness of the sun. This
Reply to Objection 1. In the state of innocence child-
is denoted by the “flaming sword,” which is described as
bearing would have been painless: for Augustine says (De
“turning every way,” as being appropriate to the circular
Civ. Dei xiv, 26): “Just as, in giving birth, the mother
movement that causes this heat. And since the movements
would then be relieved not by groans of pain, but by the
of corporal creatures are set in order through the ministry
instigations of maturity, so in bearing and conceiving the
of the angels, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4),
union of both sexes would be one not of lustful desire but
it was fitting that, besides the sword turning every way,
of deliberate action”∗.
there should be cherubim “to keep the way of the tree of
The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be
life.” Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 40): “It is to
understood as inflicted in punishment of the woman, not
be believed that even in the visible paradise this was done
as to his headship (since even before sin the man was the
by heavenly powers indeed, so that there was a fiery guard
“head” and governor “of the woman”), but as to her hav-
set there by the ministry of angels.”
ing now to obey her husband’s will even against her own.
Reply to Objection 6. After sin, if man had ate of
If man had not sinned, the earth would have brought
the tree of life, he would not thereby have recovered im-
forth thorns and thistles to be the food of animals, but not
mortality, but by means of that beneficial food he might
to punish man, because their growth would bring no la-
have prolonged his life. Hence in the words “And live for
bor or punishment for the tiller of the soil, as Augustine
ever,” “for ever” signifies “for a long time.” For it was not
says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 18). Alcuin†, however, holds that,
expedient for man to remain longer in the unhappiness of
before sin, the earth brought forth no thorns and thistles,
this life.
whatever: but the former opinion is the better.
Reply to Objection 7. According to Augustine (Gen.
Reply to Objection 2. The multiplying of her con-
ad lit. xi, 39), “these words of God are not so much a
ceptions was appointed as a punishment to the woman,
mockery of our first parents as a deterrent to others, for
not on account of the begetting of children, for this would
whose benefit these things are written, lest they be proud
have been the same even before sin, but on account of
likewise, because Adam not only failed to become that
the numerous sufferings to which the woman is subject,
which he coveted to be, but did not keep that to which he
through carrying her offspring after conception. Hence it
was made.”
is expressly stated: “I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy
Reply to Objection 8. Clothing is necessary to man
conceptions.”
in his present state of unhappiness for two reasons. First,
Reply to Objection 3. These punishments affect all
to supply a deficiency in respect of external harm caused
somewhat. For any woman who conceives must needs
by, for instance, extreme heat or cold. Secondly, to hide
suffer sorrows and bring forth her child with pain: except
his ignominy and to cover the shame of those members
the Blessed Virgin, who “conceived without corruption,
wherein the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is most
and bore without pain”‡, because her conceiving was not
manifest. Now these two motives do not apply to the
according to the law of nature, transmitted from our first
primitive state. because then man’s body could not be
parents. And if a woman neither conceives nor bears, she
hurt by any outward thing, as stated in the Ia, q. 97, a. 2,
suffers from the defect of barrenness, which outweighs
nor was there in man’s body anything shameful that would
the aforesaid punishments. Likewise whoever tills the soil
bring confusion on him. Hence it is written (Gn. 2:23):
must needs eat his bread in the sweat of his brow: while
“And they were both naked, to wit Adam and his wife,
those who do not themselves work on the land, are bus-
and were not ashamed.” The same cannot be said of food,
ied with other labors, for “man is born to labor” (Job 5:7):
which is necessary to entertain the natural heat, and to
and thus they eat the bread for which others have labored
sustain the body.
in the sweat of their brow.
Reply to Objection 9. As Augustine says (Gen. ad
∗ Cf. Ia, q. 98, a. 2
† Interrog. et Resp. in Gen. lxxix
‡ St.
Bernard, Serm. in Dom. inf. oct. Assum. B. V. M.
1930
lit. xi, 31), “We must not imagine that our first parents they saw and thought on things which had not occurred to
were created with their eyes closed, especially since it is
their minds before, this was a mutual concupiscence such
stated that the woman saw that the tree was fair, and good
as they had not hitherto.”
to eat. Accordingly the eyes of both were opened so that
1931
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 165
Of Our First Parents’ Temptation
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider our first parents’ temptation, concerning which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?
(2) Of the manner and order of that temptation.
Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?
IIa IIae q. 165 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting for
of grace, it was granted him that no creature outside him-
man to be tempted by the devil. For the same final punish-
self could harm him against his own will, whereby he was
ment is appointed to the angels’ sin and to man’s, accord-
able even to resist the temptation of the demon.
ing to Mat. 25:41, “Go [Vulg.: ‘Depart from Me’] you
Reply to Objection 1. Above the human nature there
cursed into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the
is another that admits of the possibility of the evil of fault: devil and his angels.” Now the angels’ first sin did not fol-but there is not above the angelic nature. Now only one
low a temptation from without. Therefore neither should
that is already become evil through sin can tempt by lead-
man’s first sin have resulted from an outward temptation.
ing another into evil. Hence it was fitting that by an evil
Objection 2. Further, God, Who foreknows the fu-
angel man should be tempted to sin, even as according
ture, knew that through the demon’s temptation man
to the order of nature he is moved forward to perfection
would fall into sin, and thus He knew full well that it was
by means of a good angel. An angel could be perfected
not expedient for man to be tempted. Therefore it would
in good by something above him, namely by God, but he
seem unfitting for God to allow him to be tempted.
could not thus be led into sin, because according to James
Objection 3. Further, it seems to savor of punishment
1:13, “God is not a tempter of evils.”
that anyone should have an assailant, just as on the other
Reply to Objection 2. Just as God knew that man,
hand the cessation of an assault is akin to a reward. Now
through being tempted, would fall into sin, so too He
punishment should not precede fault. Therefore it was un-
knew that man was able, by his free will, to resist the
fitting for man to be tempted before he sinned.
tempter. Now the condition attaching to man’s nature re-
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 34:11): “He
quired that he should be left to his own will, according to
that hath not been tempted [Douay: ‘tried’], what manner
Ecclus. 15:14, “God left” man “in the hand of his own
of things doth he know?”
counsel.” Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 4): “It
I answer that, God’s wisdom “orders all things
seems to me that man would have had no prospect of any
sweetly” (Wis. 8:1), inasmuch as His providence appoints
special praise, if he were able to lead a good life simply
to each one that which is befitting it according to its na-
because there was none to persuade him to lead an evil
ture. For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), “it belongs to
life; since both by nature he had the power, and in his
providence not to destroy, but to maintain, nature.” Now
power he had the will, not to consent to the persuader.”
it is a condition attaching to human nature that one crea-
Reply to Objection 3. An assault is penal if it be dif-
ture can be helped or impeded by another. Wherefore it
ficult to resist it: but, in the state of innocence, man was
was fitting that God should both allow man in the state of
able, without any difficulty, to resist temptation. Con-
innocence to be tempted by evil angels, and should cause
sequently the tempter’s assault was not a punishment to
him to be helped by good angels. And by a special favor
man.
Whether the manner and order of the first temptation was fitting?
IIa IIae q. 165 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the manner and order
way about.
of the first temptation was not fitting. For just as in the
Objection 2. Further, the temptation of our first par-
order of nature the angel was above man, so was the man
ents was by suggestion. Now the devil is able to make
above the woman. Now sin came upon man through an
suggestions to man without making use of an outward sen-
angel: therefore in like manner it should have come upon
sible creature. Since then our first parents were endowed
the woman through the man; in other words the woman
with a spiritual mind, and adhered less to sensible than
should have been tempted by the man, and not the other
to intelligible things, it would have been more fitting for
1932
man to be tempted with a merely spiritual, instead of an ward suggestion, a change is wrought merely on an out-outward, temptation.
ward creature. Now the devil had a minimum of power
Objection 3. Further, one cannot fittingly suggest an
against man before sin, wherefore he was unable to tempt
evil except through some apparent good. But many other
him by inward suggestion, but only by outward sugges-
animals have a greater appearance of good than the ser-
tion.
pent has. Therefore man was unfittingly tempted by the
Reply to Objection 3. According to Augustine (Gen.
devil through a serpent.
ad lit. xi, 3), “we are not to suppose that the devil chose
Objection 4. Further, the serpent is an irrational an-
the serpent as his means of temptation; but as he was pos-
imal. Now wisdom, speech, and punishment are not be-
sessed of the lust of deceit, he could only do so by the
fitting an irrational animal. Therefore the serpent is unfit-
animal he was allowed to use for that purpose.”
tingly described (Gn. 3:1) as “more subtle than any of the
Reply to Objection 4. According to Augustine (Gen.
beasts of the earth,” or as “the most prudent of all beasts”
ad lit. xi, 29), “the serpent is described as most prudent
according to another version∗: and likewise is unfittingly
or subtle, on account of the cunning of the devil, who
stated to have spoken to the woman, and to have been pun-
wrought his wiles in it: thus, we speak of a prudent or
ished by God.
cunning tongue, because it is the instrument of a prudent
On the contrary, That which is first in any genus
or cunning man in advising something prudently or cun-
should be proportionate to all that follow it in that genus.
ningly. Nor indeed (Gen. ad lit. xi, 28) did the serpent
Now in every kind of sin we find the same order as in the
understand the sounds which were conveyed through it to
first temptation. For, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii,
the woman; nor again are we to believe that its soul was
12), it begins with the concupiscence of sin in the sensu-
changed into a rational nature, since not even men, who
ality, signified by the serpent; extends to the lower reason,
are rational by nature, know what they say when a demon
by pleasure, signified by the woman; and reaches to the
speaks in them. Accordingly (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29) the ser-
higher reason by consent in the sin, signified by the man.
pent spoke to man, even as the ass on which Balaam sat
Therefore the order of the first temptation was fitting.
spoke to him, except that the former was the work of a
I answer that, Man is composed of a twofold na-
devil, whereas the latter was the work of an angel. Hence
ture, intellective and sensitive. Hence the devil, in tempt-
(Gen. ad lit. xi, 36) the serpent was not asked why it had
ing man, made use of a twofold incentive to sin: one on
done this, because it had not done this in its own nature,
the part of the intellect, by promising the Divine likeness
but the devil in it, who was already condemned to ever-
through the acquisition of knowledge which man naturally
lasting fire on account of his sin: and the words addressed
desires to have; the other on the part of sense. This he
to the serpent were directed to him who wrought through
did by having recourse to those sensible things, which are
the serpent.”
most akin to man, partly by tempting the man through the
Moreover, as again Augustine says (Super Gen. con-
woman who was akin to him in the same species; partly
tra Manich. ii, 17,18), “his, that is, the devil’s, punish-
by tempting the woman through the serpent, who was akin
ment mentioned here is that for which we must be on our
to them in the same genus; partly by suggesting to them
guard against him, not that which is reserved till the last
to eat of the forbidden fruit, which was akin to them in the
judgment. For when it was said to him: ‘Thou art cursed
proximate genus.
among all cattle and beasts of the earth,’ the cattle are
Reply to Objection 1. In the act of tempting the
set above him, not in power, but in the preservation of
devil was by way of principal agent; whereas the woman
their nature, since the cattle lost no heavenly bliss, seeing
was employed as an instrument of temptation in bringing
that they never had it, but they continue to live in the na-
about the downfall of the man, both because the woman
ture which they received.” It is also said to him: “ ‘Upon
was weaker than the man, and consequently more liable
thy breast and belly shalt thou creep,’ ” according to an-
to be deceived, and because, on account of her union with
other version‡ “Here the breast signifies pride, because it
man, the devil was able to deceive the man especially
is there that the impulse of the soul dominates, while the
through her. Now there is no parity between principal
belly denotes carnal desire, because this part of the body
agent and instrument, because the principal agent must
is softest to the touch: and on these he creeps to those
exceed in power, which is not requisite in the instrumen-
whom he wishes to deceive.” The words, “ ‘Earth shalt
tal agent.
thou eat all the days of thy life’ may be understood in two
Reply to Objection 2. A suggestion whereby the
ways. Either ‘Those shall belong to thee, whom thou shalt
devil suggests something to man spiritually, shows the
deceive by earthly lust,’ namely sinners who are signified
devil to have more power against man than outward sug-
under the name of earth, or a third kind of temptation,
gestion has, since by an inward suggestion, at least, man’s
namely curiosity, is signified by these words: for to eat
imagination is changed by the devil†; whereas by an out-
earth is to look into things deep and dark.” The putting
∗ The Septuagint
† Cf. Ia, q. 91, a. 3
‡ The Septuagint
1933
of enmities between him and the woman “means that we tation to evil is resisted. Wherefore the serpent lies in wait
cannot be tempted by the devil, except through that part of
for the woman’s heel, that if at any time she fall away to-
the soul which bears or reflects the likeness of a woman.
wards what is unlawful, pleasure may seize hold of her:
The seed of the devil is the temptation to evil, the seed of
and she watches his head that she may shut him out at the
the woman is the fruit of good works, whereby the temp-
very outset of the evil temptation.”
1934
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 166
Of Studiousness
(In Two Articles)
We must next consider studiousness and its opposite, curiosity. Concerning studiousness there are two points of inquiry:
(1) What is the matter of studiousness?
(2) Whether it is a part of temperance?
Whether the proper matter of studiousness is knowledge?
IIa IIae q. 166 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that knowledge is not the
fore the mind’s application to knowledge precedes its ap-
proper matter of studiousness. For a person is said to be
plication to those things to which man is directed by his
studious because he applies study to certain things. Now
knowledge. Hence study regards knowledge in the first
a man ought to apply study to every matter, in order to do
place, and as a result it regards any other things the work-
aright what has to be done. Therefore seemingly knowl-
ing of which requires to be directed by knowledge. Now
edge is not the special matter of studiousness.
the virtues lay claim to that matter about which they are
Objection 2. Further, studiousness is opposed to cu-
first and foremost; thus fortitude is concerned about dan-
riosity.
Now curiosity, which is derived from “cura”
gers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch.
[care], may also refer to elegance of apparel and other
Therefore studiousness is properly ascribed to knowledge.
such things, which regard the body; wherefore the Apos-
Reply to Objection 1. Nothing can be done aright
tle says (Rom. 13:14): “Make not provision [curam] for
as regards other matters, except in so far as is previ-
the flesh in its concupiscences.”
ously directed by the knowing reason. Hence studious-
Objection 3. Further it is written (Jer. 6:13): “From
ness, to whatever matter it be applied, has a prior regard
the least of them even to the greatest, all study [Douay:
for knowledge.
‘are given to’] covetousness.” Now covetousness is not
Reply to Objection 2. Man’s mind is drawn, on ac-
properly about knowledge, but rather about the posses-
count of his affections, towards the things for which he
sion of wealth, as stated above (q. 118, a. 2). Therefore
has an affection, according to Mat. 6:21, “Where thy trea-
studiousness, which is derived from “study,” is not prop-
sure is, there is thy heart also.” And since man has special
erly about knowledge.
affection for those things which foster the flesh, it follows
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 27:11): “Study
that man’s thoughts are concerned about things that fos-
wisdom, my son, and make my heart joyful, that thou
ter his flesh, so that man seeks to know how he may best
mayest give an answer to him that reproacheth.” Now
sustain his body. Accordingly curiosity is accounted to
study, which is commended as a virtue, is the same as
be about things pertaining to the body by reason of things
that to which the Law urges. Therefore studiousness is
pertaining to knowledge.
properly about “knowledge.”
Reply to Objection 3. Covetousness craves the acqui-
I answer that, Properly speaking, study denotes keen
sition of gain, and for this it is very necessary to be skilled application of the mind to something. Now the mind is not
in earthly things. Accordingly studiousness is ascribed to
applied to a thing except by knowing that thing. Where-
things pertaining to covetousness.
Whether studiousness is a part of temperance?
IIa IIae q. 166 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that studiousness is not
ance.
a part of temperance. For a man is said to be studious
Objection 2. Further, studiousness, as stated (a. 1),
by reason of his studiousness. Now all virtuous persons
pertains to knowledge. But knowledge has no connec-
without exception are called studious according to the
tion with the moral virtues which are in the appetitive part
Philosopher, who frequently employs the term “studious”
of the soul, and pertains rather to the intellectual virtues
( spoudaios) in this sense (Ethic. ix, 4,8,9).∗ Therefore which are in the cognitive part: wherefore solicitude is an
studiousness is a general virtue, and not a part of temper-
act of prudence as stated above (q. 47, a. 9). Therefore
∗ In the same sense Aristotle says in Ethic. iii, 2, that “every vicious person is ignorant of what he ought to do.”
1935
studiousness is not a part of temperance.
regards knowledge, is applied to all the virtues.
Objection 3. Further, a virtue that is ascribed as part
Reply to Objection 2. The act of a cognitive power
of a principal virtue resembles the latter as to mode. Now
is commanded by the appetitive power, which moves all
studiousness does not resemble temperance as to mode,
the powers, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 1). Where-
because temperance takes its name from being a kind of
fore knowledge regards a twofold good. One is connected
restraint, wherefore it is more opposed to the vice that is
with the act of knowledge itself; and this good pertains to
in excess: whereas studiousness is denominated from be-
the intellectual virtues, and consists in man having a true
ing the application of the mind to something, so that it
estimate about each thing. The other good pertains to the
would seem to be opposed to the vice that is in default,
act of the appetitive power, and consists in man’s appetite
namely, neglect of study, rather than to the vice which is
being directed aright in applying the cognitive power in
in excess, namely curiosity. wherefore, on account of its
this or that way to this or that thing. And this belongs to
resemblance to the latter, Isidore says (Etym. x) that “a
the virtue of seriousness. Wherefore it is reckoned among
studious man is one who is curious to study.” Therefore
the moral virtues.
studiousness is not a part of temperance.
Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl.
ii, 93) in order to be virtuous we must avoid those things
21): “We are forbidden to be curious: and this is a great
to which we are most naturally inclined. Hence it is that,
gift that temperance bestows.” Now curiosity is prevented
since nature inclines us. chiefly to fear dangers of death,
by moderate studiousness. Therefore studiousness is a
and to seek pleasures of the flesh, fortitude is chiefly com-
part of temperance.
mended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such
I answer that, As stated above (q. 141, Aa. 3,4,5), it
dangers, and temperance for a certain restraint from plea-
belongs to temperance to moderate the movement of the
sures of the flesh. But as regards knowledge, man has
appetite, lest it tend excessively to that which is desired
contrary inclinations. For on the part of the soul, he is in-
naturally. Now just as in respect of his corporeal nature
clined to desire knowledge of things; and so it behooves
man naturally desires the pleasures of food and sex, so,
him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint on this desire, lest
in respect of his soul, he naturally desires to know some-
he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the part of
thing; thus the Philosopher observes at the beginning of
his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of
his Metaphysics i, 1: “All men have a natural desire for
seeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first in-
knowledge.”
clination studiousness is a kind of restraint, and it is in
The moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of
this sense that it is reckoned a part of temperance. But
studiousness; wherefore it follows that studiousness is a
as to the second inclination, this virtue derives its praise
potential part of temperance, as a subordinate virtue an-
from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge
nexed to a principal virtue. Moreover, it is comprised un-
of things; and from this it takes its name. The former
der modesty for the reason given above (q. 160, a. 2).
is more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the
Reply to Objection 1. Prudence is the complement
desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which stu-
of all the moral virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Conse-
diousness is directed, whereas the trouble of learning is
quently, in so far as the knowledge of prudence pertains
an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this
to all the virtues, the term “studiousness,” which properly
virtue indirectly, as by that which removes an obstacle.
1936
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 167
Of Curiosity
(In Two Articles)
We must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective knowledge?
(2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge?
Whether curiosity can be about intellective knowledge?
IIa IIae q. 167 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that curiosity cannot be
art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the
about intellective knowledge. Because, according to the
heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), there can be no mean and ex-
of mind?” Now vanity of understanding and darkness of
tremes in things which are essentially good. Now intellec-
mind are sinful. Therefore curiosity about intellective sci-
tive knowledge is essentially good: because man’s perfec-
ences may be sinful.
tion would seem to consist in his intellect being reduced
I answer that, As stated above (q. 166, a. 2, ad 2) stu-
from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowl-
diousness is directly, not about knowledge itself, but about
edge of truth. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
the desire and study in the pursuit of knowledge. Now
“the good of the human soul is to be in accordance with
we must judge differently of the knowledge itself of truth,
reason,” whose perfection consists in knowing the truth.
and of the desire and study in the pursuit of the knowledge
Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about intellec-
of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly speaking, is
tive knowledge.
good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some
Objection 2. Further, that which makes man like to
result, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth,
God, and which he receives from God, cannot be an evil.
according to 1 Cor. 8:1, “Knowledge puffeth up,” or be-
Now all abundance of knowledge is from God, accord-
cause one uses the knowledge of truth in order to sin.
ing to Ecclus. 1:1, “All wisdom is from the Lord God,”
On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the
and Wis. 7:17, “He hath given me the true knowledge
knowledge of truth may be right or wrong. First, when
of things that are, to know the disposition of the whole
one tends by his study to the knowledge of truth as hav-
world, and the virtues of the elements,” etc. Again, by
ing evil accidentally annexed to it, for instance those who
knowing the truth man is likened to God, since “all things
study to know the truth that they may take pride in their
are naked and open to His eyes” (Heb. 4:13), and “the
knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21):
Lord is a God of all knowledge” (1 Kings 2:3). There-
“Some there are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of
fore however abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is
what God is, and of the majesty of that nature which
not evil but good. Now the desire of good is not sinful.
ever remains the same, imagine they are doing something
Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about the intel-
great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness they ex-
lective knowledge of truth.
plore the whole mass of this body which we call the world.
Objection 3. Further, if the vice of curiosity can be
So great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they
about any kind of intellective knowledge, it would be
dwelt in the very heavens about which they argue.” In like
chiefly about the philosophical sciences. But, seemingly,
manner, those who study to learn something in order to
there is no sin in being intent on them: for Jerome says
sin are engaged in a sinful study, according to the saying
(Super Daniel 1:8): “Those who refused to partake of the
of Jer. 9:5, “They have taught their tongue to speak lies,
king’s meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they
they have labored to commit iniquity.”
had considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylo-
Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite
nians to be sinful, would never have consented to learn
or study directed to the learning of truth being itself inor-
that which was unlawful”: and Augustine says (De Doctr.
dinate; and this in four ways. First, when a man is with-
Christ. ii, 40) that “if the philosophers made any true
drawn by a less profitable study from a study that is an
statements, we must claim them for our own use, as from
obligation incumbent on him; hence Jerome says†: “We
unjust possessors.” Therefore curiosity about intellective
see priests forsaking the gospels and the prophets, reading
knowledge cannot be sinful.
stage-plays, and singing the love songs of pastoral idylls.”
On the contrary, Jerome∗ says: “Is it not evident
Secondly, when a man studies to learn of one, by whom it
that a man who day and night wrestles with the dialectic
is unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who seek
∗ Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17
† Epist. xxi ad Damas
1937
to know the future through the demons. This is super-
(Ethic. x, 7,8). Hence there may be sin in the knowledge
stitious curiosity, of which Augustine says (De Vera Re-
of certain truths, in so far as the desire of such knowl-
lig. 4): “Maybe, the philosophers were debarred from the
edge is not directed in due manner to the knowledge of
faith by their sinful curiosity in seeking knowledge from
the sovereign truth, wherein supreme happiness consists.
the demons.”
Reply to Objection 2. Although this argument shows
Thirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about
that the knowledge of truth is good in itself, this does not
creatures, without referring his knowledge to its due end,
prevent a man from misusing the knowledge of truth for
namely, the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says
an evil purpose, or from desiring the knowledge of truth
(De Vera Relig. 29) that “in studying creatures, we must
inordinately, since even the desire for good should be reg-
not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity; but we
ulated in due manner.
should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things.”
Reply to Objection 3. The study of philosophy is in
Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above
itself lawful and commendable, on account of the truth
the capacity of his own intelligence, since by so doing
which the philosophers acquired through God revealing it
men easily fall into error: wherefore it is written (Ec-
to them, as stated in Rom. 1:19. Since, however, certain
clus. 3:22): “Seek not the things that are too high for
philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the faith,
thee, and search not into things above thy ability. . . and in
the Apostle says (Col. 2:8): “Beware lest any man cheat
many of His works be not curious,” and further on (Ec-
you by philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tra-
clus. 3:26), “For. . . the suspicion of them hath deceived
dition of men. . . and not according to Christ”: and Diony-
many, and hath detained their minds in vanity.”
sius says (Ep. vii ad Polycarp.) of certain philosophers
Reply to Objection 1. Man’s good consists in the
that “they make an unholy use of divine things against
knowledge of truth; yet man’s sovereign good consists,
that which is divine, and by divine wisdom strive to de-
not in the knowledge of any truth, but in the perfect knowl-
stroy the worship of God.”
edge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher states
Whether the vice of curiosity is about sensitive knowledge?
IIa IIae q. 167 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the vice of curiosity
that “concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious.” Now
is not about sensitive knowledge. For just as some things
according to Bede (Comment. in 1 Jn. 2:16) “concupis-
are known by the sense of sight, so too are some things
cence of the eyes refers not only to the learning of magic
known by the senses of touch and taste. Now the vice
arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the discovery and dis-
concerned about objects of touch and taste is not curios-
praise of our neighbor’s faults,” and all these are partic-
ity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the
ular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of
vice of curiosity about things known by the sight.
the eves is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and
Objection 2. Further, curiosity would seem to refer to
pride of life, which are members of the same division (1
watching games; wherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi,
Jn. 2:16), it seems that the vice of curiosity is about the
8) that when “a fall occurred in the fight, a mighty cry of
knowledge of sensible things.
the whole people struck him strongly, and overcome by
I answer that, The knowledge of sensible things is
curiosity Alypius opened his eyes.” But it does not seem
directed to two things. For in the first place, both in man
to be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on
and in other animals, it is directed to the upkeep of the
account of the representation, wherein man takes a natural
body, because by knowledge of this kind, man and other
delight, as the Philosopher states (Poet. vi). Therefore the
animals avoid what is harmful to them, and seek those
vice of curiosity is not about the knowledge of sensible
things that are necessary for the body’s sustenance. In the
objects.
second place, it is directed in a manner special to man, to
Objection 3. Further, it would seem to pertain to cu-
intellective knowledge, whether speculative or practical.
riosity to inquire into our neighbor’s actions, as Bede ob-
Accordingly to employ study for the purpose of knowing
serves∗. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into
sensible things may be sinful in two ways. First, when
the actions of others, because according to Ecclus. 17:12,
the sensitive knowledge is not directed to something use-
God “gave to every one of them commandment concern-
ful, but turns man away from some useful consideration.
ing his neighbor.” Therefore the vice of curiosity does
Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 35), “I go no more to
not regard the knowledge of such like particular sensible
see a dog coursing a hare in the circus; but in the open
objects.
country, if I happen to be passing, that coursing haply
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38)
will distract me from some weighty thought, and draw
∗ Comment. in 1 Jn. 2:16
1938
me after it. . . and unless Thou, having made me see my trial’s sake, seeketh even the contraries of these, not for
weakness, didst speedily admonish me, I become fool-
the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust of ex-
ishly dull.” Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible
periment and knowledge.”
things is directed to something harmful, as looking on a
Reply to Objection 2. Sight-seeing becomes sinful,
woman is directed to lust: even so the busy inquiry into
when it renders a man prone to the vices of lust and cru-
other people’s actions is directed to detraction. on the
elty on account of things he sees represented.
Hence
other hand, if one be ordinately intent on the knowledge
Chrysostom says∗ that such sights make men adulterers
of sensible things by reason of the necessity of sustaining
and shameless.
nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible truth,
Reply to Objection 3. One may watch other people’s
this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things
actions or inquire into them, with a good intent, either for
is virtuous.
one’s own good—that is in order to be encouraged to bet-
Reply to Objection 1. Lust and gluttony are about
ter deeds by the deeds of our neighbor—or for our neigh-
pleasures arising from the use of objects of touch, whereas
bor’s good—that is in order to correct him, if he do any-
curiosity is about pleasures arising from the knowledge
thing wrong, according to the rule of charity and the duty
acquired through all the senses. According to Augustine
of one’s position. This is praiseworthy, according to Heb.
(Confess. x, 35) “it is called concupiscence of the eyes”
10:24, “Consider one another to provoke unto charity and
because “the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining
to good works.” But to observe our neighbor’s faults with
knowledge, so that all sensible things are said to be seen,”
the intention of looking down upon them, or of detracting
and as he says further on: “By this it may more evidently
them, or even with no further purpose than that of disturb-
be discerned wherein pleasure and wherein curiosity is the
ing them, is sinful: hence it is written (Prov. 24:15), “Lie
object of the senses; for pleasure seeketh objects beau-
not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the
tiful, melodious, fragrant, savory, soft; but curiosity, for
just, nor spoil his rest.”
∗ Hom. vi in Matth.
1939
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 168
Of Modesty As Consisting in the Outward Movements of the Body (In Four Articles)
We must next consider modesty as consisting in the outward movements of the body, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in the outward movements of the body that are done seriously?
(2) Whether there can be a virtue about playful actions?
(3) Of the sin consisting in excess of play;
(4) Of the sin consisting in lack of play.
Whether any virtue regards the outward movements of the body?
IIa IIae q. 168 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that no virtue regards the
ward movement.
outward movements of the body. For every virtue pertains
I answer that, Moral virtue consists in the things per-
to the spiritual beauty of the soul, according to Ps. 44:14,
taining to man being directed by his reason. Now it is
“All the glory of the king’s daughter is within,” and a gloss
manifest that the outward movements of man are dirigible
adds, “namely, in the conscience.” Now the movements of
by reason, since the outward members are set in motion at
the body are not within, but without. Therefore there can
the command of reason. Hence it is evident that there is a
be no virtue about them.
moral virtue concerned with the direction of these move-
Objection 2. Further, “Virtues are not in us by na-
ments.
ture,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward
Now the direction of these movements may be con-
bodily movements are in man by nature, since it is by na-
sidered from a twofold standpoint. First, in respect of fit-
ture that some are quick, and some slow of movement, and
tingness to the person; secondly, in respect of fittingness
the same applies to other differences of outward move-
to externals, whether persons, business, or place. Hence
ments. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): “Beauty of conduct con-
this kind.
sists in becoming behavior towards others, according to
Objection 3. Further, every moral virtue is either
their sex and person,” and this regards the first. As to the
about actions directed to another person, as justice, or
second, he adds: “This is the best way to order our behav-
about passions, as temperance and fortitude. Now out-
ior, this is the polish becoming to every action.”
ward bodily movements are not directed to another per-
Hence Andronicus† ascribes two things to these out-
son, nor are they passions. Therefore no virtue is con-
ward movements: namely “taste” [ornatus] which regards
nected with them.
what is becoming to the person, wherefore he says that it
Objection 4. Further, study should be applied to all
is the knowledge of what is becoming in movement and
works of virtue, as stated above (q. 166, a. 1, obj. 1; a. 2,
behavior; and “methodicalness” [bona ordinatio] which
ad 1). Now it is censurable to apply study to the order-
regards what is becoming to the business in hand, and
ing of one’s outward movements: for Ambrose says (De
to one’s surroundings, wherefore he calls it “the practical
Offic. i, 18): “A becoming gait is one that reflects the car-
knowledge of separation,” i.e. of the distinction of “acts.”
riage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the foot-
Reply to Objection 1. Outward movements are signs
print of tranquillity: yet so that there be neither study nor
of the inward disposition, according to Ecclus. 19:27,
affectation, but natural and artless movement.” Therefore
“The attire of the body, and the laughter of the teeth, and
seemingly there is no virtue about the style of outward
the gait of the man, show what he is”; and Ambrose says
movements.
(De Offic. i, 18) that “the habit of mind is seen in the
On the contrary, The beauty of honesty∗ pertains to
gesture of the body,” and that “the body’s movement is an
virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to
index of the soul.”
the beauty of honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18):
Reply to Objection 2. Although it is from natural
“The sound of the voice and the gesture of the body are
disposition that a man is inclined to this or that style of
distasteful to me, whether they be unduly soft and nerve-
outward movement, nevertheless what is lacking to nature
less, or coarse and boorish. Let nature be our model; her
can be supplied by the efforts of reason. Hence Ambrose
reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of hon-
says (De Offic. i, 18): “Let nature guide the movement:
esty.” Therefore there is a virtue about the style of out-
and if nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply
∗ Cf. q. 145, a. 1
† De Affectibus
1940
the defect.”
ward movements may be reduced to two virtues, which
Reply to Objection 3. As stated (ad 1) outward move-
the Philosopher mentions in Ethic. iv, 6,7. For, in so far
ments are indications of the inward disposition, and this
as by outward movements we are directed to other per-
regards chiefly the passions of the soul. Wherefore Am-
sons, the moderation of our outward movements belongs
brose says (De Offic. i, 18) that “from these things,” i.e.
to “friendliness or affability”∗. This regards pleasure or
the outward movements, “the man that lies hidden in our
pain which may arise from words or deeds in reference
hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful, or
to others with whom a man comes in contact. And, in so
impure, or on the other hand sedate, steady, pure, and free
far as outward movements are signs of our inward dispo-
from blemish.” It is moreover from our outward move-
sition, their moderation belongs to the virtue of truthful-
ments that other men form their judgment about us, ac-
ness†, whereby a man, by word and deed, shows himself
cording to Ecclus. 19:26, “A man is known by his look,
to be such as he is inwardly.
and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by
Reply to Objection 4. It is censurable to study the
his countenance.” Hence moderation of outward move-
style of one’s outward movements, by having recourse to
ments is directed somewhat to other persons, according
pretense in them, so that they do not agree with one’s in-
to the saying of Augustine in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), “In all
ward disposition. Nevertheless it behooves one to study
your movements, let nothing be done to offend the eye
them, so that if they be in any way inordinate, this may
of another, but only that which is becoming to the ho-
be corrected. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): “Let
liness of your state.” Wherefore the moderation of out-
them be without artifice, but not without correction.”
Whether there can be a virtue about games?
IIa IIae q. 168 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be a
amount of labor, so too is it with his soul, whose power
virtue about games. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23):
is also finite and equal to a fixed amount of work. Con-
“Our Lord said: ‘Woe to you who laugh, for you shall
sequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain
weep.’ Wherefore I consider that all, and not only exces-
work, he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all the
sive, games should be avoided.” Now that which can be
more since when the soul works, the body is at work like-
done virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore
wise, in so far as the intellective soul employs forces that
there cannot be a virtue about games.
operate through bodily organs. Now sensible goods are
Objection 2. Further, “Virtue is that which God forms
connatural to man, and therefore, when the soul arises
in us, without us,” as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 4).
above sensibles, through being intent on the operations of
Now Chrysostom says‡: “It is not God, but the devil, that
reason, there results in consequence a certain weariness of
is the author of fun. Listen to what happened to those who
soul, whether the operations with which it is occupied be
played: ‘The people sat down to eat and drink, and they
those of the practical or of the speculative reason. Yet this
rose up to play.’ ” Therefore there can be no virtue about
weariness is greater if the soul be occupied with the work
games.
of contemplation, since thereby it is raised higher above
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic.
sensible things; although perhaps certain outward works
x, 6) that “playful actions are not directed to something
of the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor. In
else.” But it is a requisite of virtue that the agent in choos-
either case, however, one man is more soul-wearied than
ing should “direct his action to something else,” as the
another, according as he is more intensely occupied with
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4). Therefore there can be
works of reason. Now just as weariness of the body is dis-
no virtue about games.
pelled by resting the body, so weariness of the soul must
On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): “I
needs be remedied by resting the soul: and the soul’s rest
pray thee, spare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise
is pleasure, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 25, a. 2; Ia IIae,
man sometimes to relax the high pressure of his attention
q. 31, a. 1, ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness
to work.” Now this relaxation of the mind from work con-
of soul must needs consist in the application of some plea-
sists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it becomes a
sure, by slackening the tension of the reason’s study. Thus
wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at
in the Conferences of the Fathers xxiv, 21, it is related of
times. Moreover the Philosopher§ assigns to games the
Blessed John the Evangelist, that when some people were
virtue of eutrapelia, which we may call “pleasantness.”
scandalized on finding him playing together with his dis-
I answer that, Just as man needs bodily rest for
ciples, he is said to have told one of them who carried a
the body’s refreshment, because he cannot always be at
bow to shoot an arrow. And when the latter had done this
work, since his power is finite and equal to a certain fixed
several times, he asked him whether he could do it indef-
∗ Cf. q. 114, a. 1
† Cf. q. 9
‡ Hom. vi in Matth.
§ Ethic. ii, 7;
iv, 8
1941
initely, and the man answered that if he continued doing and a man is said to be pleasant through having a happy
it, the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew
turn∗ of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a
the inference that in like manner man’s mind would break
cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man
if its tension were never relaxed.
from immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty. .
Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing fur-
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, fun should
ther is sought than the soul’s delight, are called playful or
fit with business and persons; wherefore Tully says (De
humorous. Hence it is necessary at times to make use of
Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that “when the audience is weary, it
them, in order to give rest, as it were, to the soul. This is
will be useful for the speaker to try something novel or
in agreement with the statement of the Philosopher (Ethic.
amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with
iv, 8) that “in the intercourse of this life there is a kind of the gravity of the subject.” Now the sacred doctrine is
rest that is associated with games”: and consequently it is
concerned with things of the greatest moment, accord-
sometimes necessary to make use of such things.
ing to Prov. 8:6, “Hear, for I will speak of great things.”
Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there
Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether exclude fun from
are three points which require especial caution. The first
human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he be-
and chief is that the pleasure in question should not be
gins by saying: “Although jokes are at times fitting and
sought in indecent or injurious deeds or words. Where-
pleasant, nevertheless they are incompatible with the ec-
fore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that “one kind of joke
clesiastical rule; since how can we have recourse to things
is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene.” Another
which are not to be found in Holy Writ?”
thing to be observed is that one lose not the balance of
Reply to Objection 2. This saying of Chrysostom
one’s mind altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i,
refers to the inordinate use of fun, especially by those who
20): “We should beware lest, when we seek relaxation of
make the pleasure of games their end; of whom it is writ-
mind, we destroy all that harmony which is the concord
ten (Wis. 15:12): “They have accounted our life a pas-
of good works”: and Tully says (De Offic. i, 29), that,
time.” Against these Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): “We are
“just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute free-
so begotten by nature that we appear to be made not for
dom in their games, but only that which is consistent with
play and fun, but rather for hardships, and for occupations
good behavior, so our very fun should reflect something
of greater gravity and moment.”
of an upright mind.” Thirdly, we must be careful, as in
Reply to Objection 3. Playful actions themselves
all other human actions, to conform ourselves to persons,
considered in their species are not directed to an end: but
time, and place, and take due account of other circum-
the pleasure derived from such actions is directed to the
stances, so that our fun “befit the hour and the man,” as
recreation and rest of the soul, and accordingly if this be
Tully says (De Offic. i, 29).
done with moderation, it is lawful to make use of fun.
Now these things are directed according to the rule of
Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): “It is indeed lawful to
reason: and a habit that operates according to reason is
make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we have
virtue. Therefore there can be a virtue about games. The
recourse to sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when
Philosopher gives it the name of wittiness ( eutrapelia), we have done our duty by grave and serious matters.”
Whether there can be sin in the excess of play?
IIa IIae q. 168 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be sin
would be in a state of sin; moreover all those who em-
in the excess of play. For that which is an excuse for sin
ploy them, as well as those who make them any payment,
is not held to be sinful. Now play is sometimes an excuse
would sin as accomplices of their sin. But this would seem
for sin, for many things would be grave sins if they were
untrue; for it is related in the Lives of the Fathers (ii. 16;
done seriously, whereas if they be done in fun, are either
viii. 63) that is was revealed to the Blessed Paphnutius
no sin or but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems that there
that a certain jester would be with him in the life to come.
is no sin in excessive play.
On the contrary, A gloss on Prov. 14:13, “Laughter
Objection 2. Further, all other vices are reducible to
shall be mingled with sorrow and mourning taketh hold
the seven capital vices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi,
of the end of joy,” remarks: “A mourning that will last for
17). But excess of play does not seem reducible to any of
ever.” Now there is inordinate laughter and inordinate joy
the capital vices. Therefore it would seem not to be a sin.
in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin therein,
Objection 3. Further, comedians especially would
since mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourn-
seem to exceed in play, since they direct their whole life to
ing.
playing. Therefore if excess of play were a sin, all actors
I answer that, In all things dirigible according to rea-
∗ Eutrapelia is derived from trepein = ‘to turn’
1942
son, the excessive is that which goes beyond, and the de-scandalous and obscene.
ficient is that which falls short of the rule of reason. Now
Reply to Objection 2.
Excessive play pertains to
it has been stated (a. 2) that playful or jesting words or
senseless mirth, which Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) calls
deeds are dirigible according to reason. Wherefore exces-
a daughter of gluttony. Wherefore it is written (Ex. 32:6):
sive play is that which goes beyond the rule of reason: and
“The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up
this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very
to play.”
species of the acts employed for the purpose of fun, and
Reply to Objection 3. As stated (a. 2), play is neces-
this kind of jesting, according to Tully (De Offic. i, 29), is
sary for the intercourse of human life. Now whatever is
stated to be “discourteous, insolent, scandalous, and ob-
useful to human intercourse may have a lawful employ-
scene,” when to wit a man, for the purpose of jesting, em-
ment ascribed to it. Wherefore the occupation of play-
ploys indecent words or deeds, or such as are injurious to
actors, the object of which is to cheer the heart of man,
his neighbor, these being of themselves mortal sins. And
is not unlawful in itself; nor are they in a state of sin pro-
thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin.
vided that their playing be moderated, namely that they
Secondly, there may be excess in play, through lack
use no unlawful words or deeds in order to amuse, and that
of due circumstances: for instance when people make use
they do not introduce play into undue matters and seasons.
of fun at undue times or places, or out of keeping with
And although in human affairs, they have no other occu-
the matter in hand, or persons. This may be sometimes
pation in reference to other men, nevertheless in reference
a mortal sin on account of the strong attachment to play,
to themselves, and to God, they perform other actions both
when a man prefers the pleasure he derives therefrom to
serious and virtuous, such as prayer and the moderation
the love of God, so as to be willing to disobey a command-
of their own passions and operations, while sometimes
ment of God or of the Church rather than forego, such like
they give alms to the poor. Wherefore those who maintain
amusements. Sometimes, however, it is a venial sin, for
them in moderation do not sin but act justly, by rewarding
instance where a man is not so attached to amusement as
them for their services. on the other hand, if a man spends
to be willing for its sake to do anything in disobedience to
too much on such persons, or maintains those comedians
God.
who practice unlawful mirth, he sins as encouraging them
Reply to Objection 1. Certain things are sinful on
in their sin. Hence Augustine says (Tract. c. in Joan.) that
account of the intention alone, because they are done in
“to give one’s property to comedians is a great sin, not a
order to injure someone. Such an intention is excluded
virtue”; unless by chance some play-actor were in extreme
by their being done in fun, the intention of which is to
need, in which case one would have to assist him, for Am-
please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from sin,
brose says (De Offic.∗): “Feed him that dies of hunger; for
or diminishes it. Other things, however, are sins accord-
whenever thou canst save a man by feeding him, if thou
ing to their species, such as murder, fornication, and the
hast not fed him, thou hast slain him.”
like: and fun is no excuse for these; in fact they make fun
Whether there is a sin in lack of mirth?
IIa IIae q. 168 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no sin in
of conversation. Now this pertains to the lack of mirth.
lack of mirth. For no sin is prescribed to a penitent. But
Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than sinful.
Augustine speaking of a penitent says (De Vera et Falsa
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8)
Poenit. 15)†: “Let him refrain from games and the sights
reckons the lack of mirth to be a vice.
of the world, if he wishes to obtain the grace of a full par-
I answer that, In human affairs whatever is against
don.” Therefore there is no sin in lack of mirth.
reason is a sin. Now it is against reason for a man to be
Objection 2. Further, no sin is included in the praise
burdensome to others, by offering no pleasure to others,
given to holy men. But some persons are praised for hav-
and by hindering their enjoyment. Wherefore Seneca‡
ing refrained from mirth; for it is written (Jer. 15:17):
says (De Quat. Virt., cap. De Continentia): “Let your
“I sat not in the assembly of jesters,” and (Tobias 3:17):
conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think
“Never have I joined myself with them that play; neither
you rude, or despise you as a cad.” Now a man who is
have I made myself partaker with them that walk in light-
without mirth, not only is lacking in playful speech, but
ness.” Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth.
is also burdensome to others, since he is deaf to the mod-
Objection 3. Further, Andronicus counts austerity
erate mirth of others. Consequently they are vicious, and
to be one of the virtues, and he describes it as a habit
are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher states
whereby a man neither gives nor receives the pleasures
(Ethic. iv, 8).
∗ Quoted in Canon Pasce, dist. 86
† Spurious
‡ Martin of Braga,
Formula Vitae Honestae: cap. De Continentia
1943
Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest dance with the times, the state of which required that man
and pleasures it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure
should mourn; wherefore he adds: “I sat alone, because
and rest are not in quest for their own sake, but for the
Thou hast filled me with threats.” The words of Tobias
sake of operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 6, it follows that
3 refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident from his
“lack of mirth is less sinful than excess thereof.” Hence
adding: “Neither have I made myself partaker with them
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 10): “We should make
that walk in lightness.”
few friends for the sake of pleasure, since but little sweet-
Reply to Objection 3. Austerity, as a virtue, does not
ness suffices to season life, just as little salt suffices for
exclude all pleasures, but only such as are excessive and
our meat.”
inordinate; wherefore it would seem to pertain to affabil-
Reply to Objection 1. Mirth is forbidden the penitent
ity, which the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6) calls “friendli-
because he is called upon to mourn for his sins. Nor does
ness,” or eutrapelia, otherwise wittiness. Nevertheless he this imply a vice in default, because this very diminish-names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement with
ment of mirth in them is in accordance with reason.
temperance, to which it belongs to restrain pleasure.
Reply to Objection 2. Jeremias speaks there in accor-
1944
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 169
Of Modesty in the Outward Apparel
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider modesty as connected with the outward apparel, and under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel?
(2) Whether women sin mortally by excessive adornment?
Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel?
IIa IIae q. 169 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be virtue
selves which man uses, that there is vice, but on the part of
and vice in connection with outward apparel. For outward
man who uses them immoderately. This lack of modera-
adornment does not belong to us by nature, wherefore it
tion occurs in two ways. First, in comparison with the cus-
varies according to different times and places. Hence Au-
toms of those among whom one lives; wherefore Augus-
gustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12) that “among the
tine says (Confess. iii, 8): “Those offenses which are con-
ancient Romans it was scandalous for one to wear a cloak
trary to the customs of men, are to be avoided according
with sleeves and reaching to the ankles, whereas now it is
to the customs generally prevailing, so that a thing agreed
scandalous for anyone hailing from a reputable place to be
upon and confirmed by custom or law of any city or na-
without them.” Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
tion may not be violated at the lawless pleasure of any,
ii, 1) there is in us a natural aptitude for the virtues. There-whether citizen or foreigner. For any part, which harmo-
fore there is no virtue or vice about such things.
nizeth not with its whole, is offensive.” Secondly, the lack
Objection 2. Further, if there were virtue and vice
of moderation in the use of these things may arise from the
in connection with outward attire, excess in this matter
inordinate attachment of the user, the result being that a
would be sinful. Now excess in outward attire is not ap-
man sometimes takes too much pleasure in using them, ei-
parently sinful, since even the ministers of the altar use
ther in accordance with the custom of those among whom
most precious vestments in the sacred ministry. Likewise
he dwells or contrary to such custom. Hence Augustine
it would seem not to be sinful to be lacking in this, for it is says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): “We must avoid excessive
said in praise of certain people (Heb. 11:37): “They wan-
pleasure in the use of things, for it leads not only wickedly
dered about in sheepskins and in goatskins.” Therefore it
to abuse the customs of those among whom we dwell, but
seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in this matter.
frequently to exceed their bounds, so that, whereas it lay
Objection 3. Further, every virtue is either theologi-
hidden, while under the restraint of established morality,
cal, or moral, or intellectual. Now an intellectual virtue is
it displays its deformity in a most lawless outbreak.”
not conversant with matter of this kind, since it is a perfec-
In point of excess, this inordinate attachment occurs in
tion regarding the knowledge of truth. Nor is there a theo-
three ways. First when a man seeks glory from excessive
logical virtue connected therewith, since that has God for
attention to dress; in so far as dress and such like things
its object; nor are any of the moral virtues enumerated by
are a kind of ornament. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xl in
the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), connected with it. Therefore
Ev.): “There are some who think that attention to finery
it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection
and costly dress is no sin. Surely, if this were no fault,
with this kind of attire.
the word of God would not say so expressly that the rich
On the contrary, Honesty∗ pertains to virtue. Now
man who was tortured in hell had been clothed in purple
a certain honesty is observed in the outward apparel; for
and fine linen. No one, forsooth, seeks costly apparel”
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 19): “The body should be
(such, namely, as exceeds his estate) “save for vainglory.”
bedecked naturally and without affectation, with simplic-
Secondly, when a man seeks sensuous pleasure from ex-
ity, with negligence rather than nicety, not with costly
cessive attention to dress, in so far as dress is directed to
and dazzling apparel, but with ordinary clothes, so that
the body’s comfort. Thirdly, when a man is too solicitous†
nothing be lacking to honesty and necessity, yet nothing
in his attention to outward apparel.
be added to increase its beauty.” Therefore there can be
Accordingly Andronicus‡ reckons three virtues in
virtue and vice in the outward attire.
connection with outward attire; namely “humility,” which
I answer that, It is not in the outward things them-
excludes the seeking of glory, wherefore he says that hu-
∗ Cf. q. 145
† Cf. q. 55, a. 6
‡ De Affectibus
§ Cf. q. 143,
obj. 4
1945
mility is “the habit of avoiding excessive expenditure and attired in more costly apparel than others, not for the sake
parade”; “contentment”§, which excludes the seeking of
of their own glory, but to indicate the excellence of their
sensuous pleasure, wherefore he says that “contentedness
office or of the Divine worship: wherefore this is not sin-
is the habit that makes a man satisfied with what is suit-
ful in them. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii,
able, and enables him to determine what is becoming in
12): “Whoever uses outward things in such a way as to
his manner of life” (according to the saying of the Apostle,
exceed the bounds observed by the good people among
1 Tim. 6:8): “Having food and wherewith to be covered,
whom he dwells, either signifies something by so doing,
with these let us be content;”—and “simplicity,” which
or is guilty of sin, inasmuch as he uses these things for
excludes excessive solicitude about such things, where-
sensual pleasure or ostentation.”
fore he says that “simplicity is a habit that makes a man
Likewise there may be sin on the part of deficiency:
contented with what he has.”
although it is not always a sin to wear coarser clothes than
In the point of deficiency there may be inordinate at-
other people. For, if this be done through ostentation or
tachment in two ways. First, through a man’s neglect to
pride, in order to set oneself above others, it is a sin of su-
give the requisite study or trouble to the use of outward
perstition; whereas, if this be done to tame the flesh, or to
apparel. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7)
humble the spirit, it belongs to the virtue of temperance.
that “it is a mark of effeminacy to let one’s cloak trail
Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): “Who-
on the ground to avoid the trouble of lifting it up.” Sec-
ever uses transitory things with greater restraint than is
ondly, by seeking glory from the very lack of attention to
customary with those among whom he dwells, is either
outward attire. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
temperate or superstitious.” Especially, however, is the
Monte ii, 12) that “not only the glare and pomp of outward
use of coarse raiment befitting to those who by word and
things, but even dirt and the weeds of mourning may be a
example urge others to repentance, as did the prophets
subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a
of whom the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted.
decoy under the guise of God’s service”; and the Philoso-
Wherefore a gloss on Mat. 3:4, says: “He who preaches
pher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that “both excess and inordinate
penance, wears the garb of penance.”
defect are a subject of ostentation.”
Reply to Objection 3. This outward apparel is an
Reply to Objection 1. Although outward attire does
indication of man’s estate; wherefore excess, deficiency,
not come from nature, it belongs to natural reason to mod-
and mean therein, are referable to the virtue of truthful-
erate it; so that we are naturally inclined to be the recipi-
ness, which the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) assigns to deeds
ents of the virtue that moderates outward raiment.
and words, which are indications of something connected
Reply to Objection 2. Those who are placed in a po-
with man’s estate.
sition of dignity, or again the ministers of the altar, are
Whether the adornment of women is devoid of mortal sin?
IIa IIae q. 169 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the adornment of
that alters the natural features.” And afterwards he adds:
women is not devoid of mortal sin. For whatever is con-
“They lay hands on God, when they strive to reform what
trary to a precept of the Divine law is a mortal sin. Now
He has formed. This is an assault on the Divine handi-
the adornment of women is contrary to a precept of the Di-
work, a distortion of the truth. Thou shalt not be able to
vine law; for it is written (1 Pet. 3:3): “Whose,” namely
see God, having no longer the eyes that God made, but
women’s, “adorning, let it not be the outward plaiting of
those the devil has unmade; with him shalt thou burn on
the hair, or the wearing of gold, or the putting on of ap-
whose account thou art bedecked.” But this is not due ex-
parel.” Wherefore a gloss of Cyprian says: “Those who
cept to mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women is
are clothed in silk and purple cannot sincerely put on
not devoid of mortal sin.
Christ: those who are bedecked with gold and pearls and
Objection 3. Further, just as it is unbecoming for a
trinkets have forfeited the adornments of mind and body.”
woman to wear man’s clothes, so is it unbecoming for her
Now this is not done without a mortal sin. Therefore the
to adorn herself inordinately. Now the former is a sin, for
adornment of women cannot be devoid of mortal sin.
it is written (Dt. 22:5): “A woman shall not be clothed
Objection 2. Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.):
with man’s apparel, neither shall a man use woman’s ap-
“I hold that not only virgins and widows, but also wives
parel.” Therefore it seems that also the excessive adorn-
and all women without exception, should be admonished
ment of women is a mortal sin.
that nowise should they deface God’s work and fabric, the
Objection 4. On the contrary, If this were true it
clay that He has fashioned, with the aid of yellow pig-
would seem that the makers of these means of adornment
ments, black powders or rouge, or by applying any dye
sin mortally.
1946
I answer that, As regards the adornment of women, I doubt whether even their husbands are willing to be de-we must bear in mind the general statements made above
ceived by it, by whom alone” (i.e. the husbands) “are they
(a. 1) concerning outward apparel, and also something
to be permitted, but not ordered, to adorn themselves.”
special, namely that a woman’s apparel may incite men to
However, such painting does not always involve a mor-
lust, according to Prov. 7:10, “Behold a woman meeteth
tal sin, but only when it is done for the sake of sensuous
him in harlot’s attire, prepared to deceive souls.”
pleasure or in contempt of God, and it is to like cases that
Nevertheless a woman may use means to please her
Cyprian refers.
husband, lest through despising her he fall into adultery.
It must, however, be observed that it is one thing to
Hence it is written (1 Cor. 7:34) that the woman “that
counterfeit a beauty one has not, and another to hide a
is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she
disfigurement arising from some cause such as sickness or
may please her husband.” Wherefore if a married woman
the like. For this is lawful, since according to the Apostle
adorn herself in order to please her husband she can do
(1 Cor. 12:23), “such as we think to be the less honorable
this without sin.
members of the body, about these we put more abundant
But those women who have no husband nor wish to
honor.”
have one, or who are in a state of life inconsistent with
Reply to Objection 3. As stated in the foregoing Ar-
marriage, cannot without sin desire to give lustful plea-
ticle, outward apparel should be consistent with the estate
sure to those men who see them, because this is to incite
of the person, according to the general custom. Hence it
them to sin. And if indeed they adorn themselves with this
is in itself sinful for a woman to wear man’s clothes, or
intention of provoking others to lust, they sin mortally;
vice versa; especially since this may be a cause of sensu-
whereas if they do so from frivolity, or from vanity for
ous pleasure; and it is expressly forbidden in the Law (Dt.
the sake of ostentation, it is not always mortal, but some-
22) because the Gentiles used to practice this change of
times venial. And the same applies to men in this respect.
attire for the purpose of idolatrous superstition. Neverthe-
Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): “I do not
less this may be done sometimes without sin on account of
wish you to be hasty in forbidding the wearing of gold or
some necessity, either in order to hide oneself from ene-
costly attire except in the case of those who being neither
mies, or through lack of other clothes, or for some similar
married nor wishful to marry, should think how they may
motive.
please God: whereas the others think on the things of the
Reply to Objection 4. In the case of an art directed
world, either husbands how they may please their wives,
to the production of goods which men cannot use without
or wives how they may please their husbands, except that
sin, it follows that the workmen sin in making such things,
it is unbecoming for women though married to uncover
as directly affording others an occasion of sin; for in-
their hair, since the Apostle commands them to cover the
stance, if a man were to make idols or anything pertaining
head.” Yet in this case some might be excused from sin,
to idolatrous worship. But in the case of an art the prod-
when they do this not through vanity but on account of
ucts of which may be employed by man either for a good
some contrary custom: although such a custom is not to
or for an evil use, such as swords, arrows, and the like, the
be commended.
practice of such an art is not sinful. These alone should
Reply to Objection 1. As a gloss says on this pas-
be called arts; wherefore Chrysostom says∗: “The name
sage, “The wives of those who were in distress despised
of art should be applied to those only which contribute to-
their husbands, and decked themselves that they might
wards and produce necessaries and mainstays of life.” In
please other men”: and the Apostle forbids this. Cyprian
the case of an art that produces things which for the most
is speaking in the same sense; yet he does not forbid mar-
part some people put to an evil use, although such arts
ried women to adorn themselves in order to please their
are not unlawful in themselves, nevertheless, according
husbands, lest the latter be afforded an occasion of sin
to the teaching of Plato, they should be extirpated from
with other women. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:9):
the State by the governing authority. Accordingly, since
“Women. . . in ornate [Douay: ‘decent’] apparel, adorning
women may lawfully adorn themselves, whether to main-
themselves with modesty and sobriety, not with plaited
tain the fitness of their estate, or even by adding some-
hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly attire”: whence we are
thing thereto, in order to please their husbands, it follows
given to understand that women are not forbidden to adorn
that those who make such means of adornment do not sin
themselves soberly and moderately but to do so exces-
in the practice of their art, except perhaps by inventing
sively, shamelessly, and immodestly.
means that are superfluous and fantastic. Hence Chrysos-
Reply to Objection 2. Cyprian is speaking of women
tom says (Super Matth.) that “even the shoemakers’ and
painting themselves: this is a kind of falsification, which
clothiers’ arts stand in need of restraint, for they have lent
cannot be devoid of sin. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep.
their art to lust, by abusing its needs, and debasing art by
ccxlv ad Possid.): “To dye oneself with paints in order to
art.”
have a rosier or a paler complexion is a lying counterfeit.
∗ Hom. xlix super Matth.
1947
1948
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 170
Of the Precepts of Temperance
(In Two Articles)
We must next consider the precepts of temperance:
(1) The precepts of temperance itself;
(2) The precepts of its parts.
Whether the precepts of temperance are suitably given in the Divine law?
IIa IIae q. 170 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of tem-
those precepts which tend more directly to the love of God
perance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. Because
and of our neighbor. Now among the vices opposed to
fortitude is a greater virtue than temperance, as stated
temperance, adultery would seem most of all opposed to
above (q. 123, a. 12; q. 141, a. 8; Ia IIae, q. 66, a. 4 ).
the love of our neighbor, since thereby a man lays hold of
Now there is no precept of fortitude among the precepts
another’s property for his own use, by abusing his neigh-
of the decalogue, which are the most important among the
bor’s wife. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue in-
precepts of the Law. Therefore it was unfitting to include
clude a special prohibition of adultery, not only as com-
among the precepts of the decalogue the prohibition of
mitted in deed, but also as desired in thought.
adultery, which is contrary to temperance, as stated above
Reply to Objection 1. Among the species of vices
(q. 154, Aa. 1,8).
opposed to fortitude there is not one that is so directly op-
Objection 2. Further, temperance is not only about
posed to the love of our neighbor as adultery, which is a
venereal matters, but also about pleasures of meat and
species of lust that is opposed to temperance. And yet the
drink.
Now the precepts of the decalogue include no
vice of daring, which is opposed to fortitude, is wont to be
prohibition of a vice pertaining to pleasures of meat and
sometimes the cause of murder, which is forbidden by one
drink, or to any other species of lust. Neither, therefore,
of the precepts of the decalogue: for it is written (Ecclus.
should they include a precept prohibiting adultery, which
8:18): “Go not on the way with a bold man lest he burden
pertains to venereal pleasure.
thee with his evils.”
Objection 3. Further, in the lawgiver’s intention in-
Reply to Objection 2. Gluttony is not directly op-
ducement to virtue precedes the prohibition of vice, since
posed to the love of our neighbor, as adultery is. Nor
vices are forbidden in order that obstacles to virtue may
indeed is any other species of lust, for a father is not so
be removed. Now the precepts of the decalogue are the
wronged by the seduction of the virgin over whom he has
most important in the Divine law. Therefore the precepts
no connubial right, as is the husband by the adultery of
of the decalogue should have included an affirmative pre-
his wife, for he, not the wife herself, has power over her
cept directly prescribing the virtue of temperance, rather
body∗.
than a negative precept forbidding adultery which is di-
Reply to Objection 3.
As stated above (q. 122,
rectly opposed thereto.
Aa. 1,4) the precepts of the decalogue are universal prin-
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture in
ciples of the Divine law; hence they need to be common
the decalogue (Ex. 20:14,17).
precepts. Now it was not possible to give any common
I answer that, As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), “the
affirmative precepts of temperance, because the practice
end of the commandment is charity,” which is enjoined
of temperance varies according to different times, as Au-
upon us in the two precepts concerning the love of God
gustine remarks (De Bono Conjug. xv, 7), and according
and of our neighbor. Wherefore the decalogue contains
to different human laws and customs.
Whether the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are suitably given in the IIa IIae q. 170 a. 2
Divine law?
Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of the
whole Divine law. Now “pride is the beginning of all sin,”
virtues annexed to temperance are unsuitably given in the
according to Ecclus. 10:15. Therefore among the precepts
Divine law. For the precepts of the Decalogue, as stated
of the Decalogue there should have been one forbidding
above (a. 1, ad 3), are certain universal principles of the
pride.
∗ 1 Cor. 7:4
1949
Objection 2. Further, a place before all should have bor; rather do they regard a certain moderation of things
been given in the decalogue to those precepts by which
pertaining to man himself. But considered in their effects,
men are especially induced to fulfil the Law, because these
they may regard the love of God or of our neighbor: and in
would seem to be the most important. Now since humil-
this respect the decalogue contains precepts that relate to
ity subjects man to God, it would seem most of all to dis-
the prohibition of the effects of the vices opposed to the
pose man to the fulfilment of the Divine law; wherefore
parts of temperance. Thus the effect of anger, which is
obedience is accounted one of the degrees of humility,
opposed to meekness, is sometimes that a man goes on to
as stated above (q. 161, a. 6); and the same apparently
commit murder (and this is forbidden in the Decalogue),
applies to meekness, the effect of which is that a man
and sometimes that he refuses due honor to his parents,
does not contradict the Divine Scriptures, as Augustine
which may also be the result of pride, which leads many
observes (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7). Therefore it seems that
to transgress the precepts of the first table.
the Decalogue should have contained precepts of humility
Reply to Objection 1. Pride is the beginning of sin,
and meekness.
but it lies hidden in the heart; and its inordinateness is not
Objection 3. Further, it was stated in the foregoing
perceived by all in common. Hence there was no place
Article that adultery is forbidden in the decalogue, be-
for its prohibition among the precepts of the Decalogue,
cause it is contrary to the love of our neighbor. But in-
which are like first self-evident principles.
ordinateness of outward movements, which is contrary to
Reply to Objection 2. Those precepts which are es-
modesty, is opposed to neighborly love: wherefore Au-
sentially an inducement to the observance of the Law pre-
gustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxii): “In all your move-
suppose the Law to be already given, wherefore they can-
ments let nothing be done to offend the eye of any person
not be first precepts of the Law so as to have a place in the
whatever.” Therefore it seems that this kind of inordinate-
Decalogue.
ness should also have been forbidden by a precept of the
Reply to Objection 3.
Inordinate outward move-
Decalogue.
ment is not injurious to one’s neighbor, if we consider the
On the contrary, suffices the authority of Scripture.
species of the act, as are murder, adultery, and theft, which
I answer that, The virtues annexed to temperance
are forbidden in the decalogue; but only as being signs of
may be considered in two ways: first, in themselves; sec-
an inward inordinateness, as stated above (q. 168, a. 1, ad
ondly, in their effects. Considered in themselves they have
1,3).
no direct connection with the love of God or of our neigh-
1950
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 171
Of Prophecy
(In Six Articles)
After treating individually of all the virtues and vices that pertain to men of all conditions and estates, we must now consider those things which pertain especially to certain men. Now there is a triple difference between men as regards things connected with the soul’s habits and acts. First, in reference to the various gratuitous graces, according to 1 Cor.
12:4,7: “There are diversities of graces. . . and to one. . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge,” etc. Another difference arises from the diversities of life, namely the active and the contemplative life, which correspond to diverse purposes of operation, wherefore it is stated (1 Cor. 12:4,7) that “there are diversities of operations.” For the purpose of operation in Martha, who “was busy about much serving,” which pertains to the active life, differed from the purpose of operation in Mary, “who sitting. . . at the Lord’s feet, heard His word” (Lk.
10:39,40), which pertains to the contemplative life. A third difference corresponds to the various duties and states of life, as expressed in Eph. 4:11, “And He gave some apostles; and some prophets; and other some evangelists; and other some pastors and doctors”: and this pertains to diversity of ministries, of which it is written (1 Cor. 12:5): “There are diversities of ministries.”
With regard to gratuitous graces, which are the first object to be considered, it must be observed that some of them pertain to knowledge, some to speech, and some to operation. Now all things pertaining to knowledge may be comprised under “prophecy,” since prophetic revelation extends not only to future events relating to man, but also to things relating to God, both as to those which are to be believed by all and are matters of “faith,” and as to yet higher mysteries, which concern the perfect and belong to “wisdom.” Again, prophetic revelation is about things pertaining to spiritual substances, by whom we are urged to good or evil; this pertains to the “discernment of spirits.” Moreover it extends to the direction of human acts, and this pertains to “knowledge,” as we shall explain further on (q. 177).
Accordingly we must first of all consider prophecy, and rapture which is a degree of prophecy.
Prophecy admits of four heads of consideration: (1) its essence; (2) its cause; (3) the mode of prophetic knowledge; (4) the division of prophecy.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?
(2) Whether it is a habit?
(3) Whether it is only about future contingencies?
(4) Whether a prophet knows all possible matters of prophecy?
(5) Whether a prophet distinguishes that which he perceives by the gift of God, from that which he perceives by his own spirit?
(6) Whether anything false can be the matter of prophecy?
Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?
IIa IIae q. 171 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that prophecy does not
Israel, that the prophet was foolish and mad∗.” Therefore
pertain to knowledge. For it is written (Ecclus. 48:14)
prophecy is not a cognitive perfection.
that after death the body of Eliseus prophesied, and fur-
Objection 4. Further, just as revelation regards the in-
ther on (Ecclus. 49:18) it is said of Joseph that “his bones
tellect, so inspiration regards, apparently, the affections,
were visited, and after death they prophesied.” Now no
since it denotes a kind of motion. Now prophecy is de-
knowledge remains in the body or in the bones after death.
scribed as “inspiration” or “revelation,” according to Cas-
Therefore prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.
siodorus†. Therefore it would seem that prophecy does
Objection 2. Further, it is written (1 Cor. 14:3): “He
not pertain to the intellect more than to the affections.
that prophesieth, speaketh to men unto edification.” Now
On the contrary, It is written (1 Kings 9:9): “For
speech is not knowledge itself, but its effect. Therefore it
he that is now called a prophet, in time past was called
would seem that prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.
a seer.” Now sight pertains to knowledge. Therefore
Objection 3. Further, every cognitive perfection ex-
prophecy pertains to knowledge.
cludes folly and madness. Yet both of these are consistent
I answer that, Prophecy first and chiefly consists in
with prophecy; for it is written (Osee 9:7): “Know ye, O
knowledge, because, to wit, prophets know things that are
∗ Vulg.: ‘the spiritual man was mad’
† Prolog. super Psalt. i
1951
far [procul] removed from man’s knowledge. Wherefore unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face, in all the
they may be said to take their name from phanos, “appari-signs and wonders.”
tion,” because things appear to them from afar. Where-
Reply to Objection 1.
These passages speak of
fore, as Isidore states (Etym. vii, 8), “in the Old Tes-
prophecy in reference to the third point just mentioned,
tament, they were called Seers, because they saw what
which regards the proof of prophecy.
others saw not, and surveyed things hidden in mystery.”
Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle is speaking there
Hence among heathen nations they were known as “vates,
of the prophetic utterances.
on account of their power of mind [vi mentis],”‡ (Etym.
Reply to Objection 3. Those prophets who are de-
viii, 7).
scribed as foolish and mad are not true but false prophets,
Since, however, it is written (1 Cor. 12:7): “The man-
of whom it is said (Jer. 3:16): “Hearken not to the words
ifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit,”
of the prophets that prophesy to you, and deceive you;
and further on (1 Cor. 14:12): “Seek to abound unto the
they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the
edification of the Church,” it follows that prophecy con-
mouth of the Lord,” and (Ezech. 13:3): “Woe to the fool-
sists secondarily in speech, in so far as the prophets de-
ish prophets, that follow their own spirit, and see nothing.”
clare for the instruction of others, the things they know
Reply to Objection 4. It is requisite to prophecy that
through being taught of God, according to the saying of
the intention of the mind be raised to the perception of
Is. 21:10, “That which I have heard of the Lord of hosts,
Divine things: wherefore it is written (Ezech. 2:1): “Son
the God of Israel, I have declared unto you.” Accord-
of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will speak to thee.”
ingly, as Isidore says (Etym. viii, 7), “prophets” may be
This raising of the intention is brought about by the mo-
described as “proefatores [foretellers], because they tell
tion of the Holy Ghost, wherefore the text goes on to say:
from afar [porro fantur],” that is, speak from a distance,
“And the Spirit entered into me. . . and He set me upon my
“and foretell the truth about things to come.”
feet.” After the mind’s intention has been raised to heav-
Now those things above human ken which are revealed
enly things, it perceives the things of God; hence the text
by God cannot be confirmed by human reason, which they
continues: “And I heard Him speaking to me.” Accord-
surpass as regards the operation of the Divine power, ac-
ingly inspiration is requisite for prophecy, as regards the
cording to Mk. 16:20, “They. . . preached everywhere, the
raising of the mind, according to Job 32:8, “The inspira-
Lord working withal and confirming the word with signs
tion of the Almighty giveth understanding”: while revela-
that followed.” Hence, thirdly, prophecy is concerned
tion is necessary, as regards the very perception of Divine
with the working of miracles, as a kind of confirmation
things, whereby prophecy is completed; by its means the
of the prophetic utterances. Wherefore it is written (Dt.
veil of darkness and ignorance is removed, according to
34:10,11): “There arose no more a prophet in Israel like
Job 12:22, “He discovereth great things out of darkness.”
Whether prophecy is a habit?
IIa IIae q. 171 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that prophecy is a habit.
a. 2). Therefore prophecy is a habit.
For according to Ethic. ii, 5, “there are three things in the
On the contrary, A habit is something “whereby we
soul, power, passion, and habit.” Now prophecy is not a
act when we will,” as the Commentator∗ says (De An-
power, for then it would be in all men, since the powers
ima iii). But a man cannot make use of prophecy when
of the soul are common to them. Again it is not a pas-
he will, as appears in the case of Eliseus (4 Kings 3:15),
sion, since the passions belong to the appetitive faculty, as
“who on Josaphat inquiring of him concerning the future,
stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 22 , a. 2); whereas prophecy per-
and the spirit of prophecy failing him, caused a minstrel
tains principally to knowledge, as stated in the foregoing
to be brought to him, that the spirit of prophecy might
Article. Therefore prophecy is a habit.
come down upon him through the praise of psalmody, and
Objection 2. Further, every perfection of the soul,
fill his mind with things to come,” as Gregory observes
which is not always in act, is a habit. Now prophecy is
(Hom. i super Ezech.). Therefore prophecy is not a habit.
a perfection of the soul; and it is not always in act, else a
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13), “all
prophet could not be described as asleep. Therefore seem-
that is made manifest is light,” because, to wit, just as
ingly prophecy is a habit.
the manifestation of the material sight takes place through
Objection 3. Further, prophecy is reckoned among the
material light, so too the manifestation of intellectual sight
gratuitous graces. Now grace is something in the soul, af-
takes place through intellectual light. Accordingly mani-
ter the manner of a habit, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 110,
festation must be proportionate to the light by means of
‡ The Latin ‘vates’ is from the Greek phates, and may be rendered
‘soothsayer’
∗ Averroes or Ibn Roshd, 1120-1198
1952
which it takes place, even as an effect is proportionate such a prophet,” or that “the word of the Lord,” or “the
to its cause. Since then prophecy pertains to a knowl-
hand of the Lord was made upon him.”
edge that surpasses natural reason, as stated above (a. 1),
But a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident
it follows that prophecy requires an intellectual light sur-
that, properly speaking, prophecy is not a habit.
passing the light of natural reason.
Hence the saying
Reply to Objection 1. This division of the Philoso-
of Micah 7:8: “When I sit in darkness, the Lord is my
pher’s does not comprise absolutely all that is in the soul,
light.” Now light may be in a subject in two ways: first,
but only such as can be principles of moral actions, which
by way of an abiding form, as material light is in the
are done sometimes from passion, sometimes from habit,
sun, and in fire; secondly, by way of a passion, or pass-
sometimes from mere power, as in the case of those who
ing impression, as light is in the air. Now the prophetic
perform an action from the judgment of their reason be-
light is not in the prophet’s intellect by way of an abiding
fore having the habit of that action.
form, else a prophet would always be able to prophesy,
However, prophecy may be reduced to a passion, pro-
which is clearly false. For Gregory says (Hom. i super
vided we understand passion to denote any kind of receiv-
Ezech.): “Sometimes the spirit of prophecy is lacking to
ing, in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4)
the prophet, nor is it always within the call of his mind,
that “to understand is, in a way, to be passive.” For just as,
yet so that in its absence he knows that its presence is due
in natural knowledge, the possible intellect is passive to
to a gift.” Hence Eliseus said of the Sunamite woman (4
the light of the active intellect, so too in prophetic knowl-
Kings 4:27): “Her soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath
edge the human intellect is passive to the enlightening of
hid it from me, and hath not told me.” The reason for this
the Divine light.
is that the intellectual light that is in a subject by way of an Reply to Objection 2. Just as in corporeal things,
abiding and complete form, perfects the intellect chiefly
when a passion ceases, there remains a certain aptitude
to the effect of knowing the principle of the things man-
to a repetition of the passion—thus wood once ignited is
ifested by that light; thus by the light of the active intel-
more easily ignited again, so too in the prophet’s intellect,
lect the intellect knows chiefly the first principles of all
after the actual enlightenment has ceased, there remains
things known naturally. Now the principle of things per-
an aptitude to be enlightened anew—thus when the mind
taining to supernatural knowledge, which are manifested
has once been aroused to devotion, it is more easily re-
by prophecy, is God Himself, Whom the prophets do not
called to its former devotion. Hence Augustine says (De
see in His essence, although He is seen by the blessed in
orando Deum. Ep. cxxx, 9) that our prayers need to be
heaven, in whom this light is by way of an abiding and
frequent, “lest devotion be extinguished as soon as it is
complete form, according to Ps. 35:10, “In Thy light we
kindled.”
shall see light.”
We might, however, reply that a person is called a
It follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the
prophet, even while his prophetic enlightenment ceases
prophet’s soul by way of a passion or transitory impres-
to be actual, on account of his being deputed by God, ac-
sion. This is indicated Ex. 33:22: “When my glory shall
cording to Jer. 1:5, “And I made thee a prophet unto the
pass, I will set thee in a hole of the rock,” etc., and 3 Kings nations.”
19:11: “Go forth and stand upon the mount before the
Reply to Objection 3. Every gift of grace raises man
Lord; and behold the Lord passeth,” etc. Hence it is that
to something above human nature, and this may happen
even as the air is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so
in two ways. First, as to the substance of the act—for in-
too the prophet’s mind is always in need of a fresh revela-
stance, the working of miracles, and the knowledge of the
tion; thus a disciple who has not yet acquired the princi-
uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom—and for
ples of an art needs to have every detail explained to him.
such acts man is not granted a habitual gift of grace. Sec-
Wherefore it is written (Is. 1:4): “In the morning He wak-
ondly, a thing is above human nature as to the mode but
eneth my ear, so that I may hear Him as a master.” This is
not the substance of the act—for instance to love God and
also indicated by the very manner in which prophecies are
to know Him in the mirror of His creatures—and for this
uttered: thus it is stated that “the Lord spake to such and
a habitual gift of grace is bestowed.
Whether prophecy is only about future contingencies?
IIa IIae q. 171 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that prophecy is only
issues pertain to future contingencies.
Therefore the
about future contingencies. For Cassiodorus says∗ that
prophetic revelation is about future contingencies alone.
“prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announc-
Objection 2. Further, according to 1 Cor. 12, the
ing the issue of things with unchangeable truth.” Now
grace of prophecy is differentiated from wisdom and faith,
∗ Prol. super Psalt. i
1953
which are about Divine things; and from the discernment ther sensitive or intellective, of some particular man, but
of spirits, which is about created spirits; and from knowl-
not from the knowledge of all men; thus a particular man
edge, which is about human things. Now habits and acts
knows by sense things present to him locally, which an-
are differentiated by their objects, as stated above ( Ia IIae, other man does not know by human sense, since they are
q. 54, a. 2). Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy
removed from him. Thus Eliseus knew prophetically what
is not connected with any of the above. Therefore it fol-
his disciple Giezi had done in his absence (4 Kings 5:26),
lows that it is about future contingencies alone.
and in like manner the secret thoughts of one man are
Objection 3. Further, difference of object causes dif-
manifested prophetically to another, according to 1 Cor.
ference of species, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2).
14:25; and again in this way what one man knows by
Therefore, if one prophecy is about future contingencies,
demonstration may be revealed to another prophetically.
and another about other things, it would seem to follow
The second degree comprises those things which sur-
that these are different species of prophecy.
pass the knowledge of all men without exception, not
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.)
that they are in themselves unknowable, but on account
that some prophecies are “about the future, for instance
of a defect in human knowledge; such as the mystery of
(Is. 7:14), ‘Behold a virgin shall conceive, and bear a
the Trinity, which was revealed by the Seraphim saying:
son’ ”; some are “about the past, as (Gn. 1:1), ‘In the be-
“Holy, Holy, Holy,” etc. (Is. 6:3).
ginning God created heaven and earth’ ”; some are “about
The last degree comprises things remote from the
the present,” as (1 Cor. 14:24,25), “If all prophesy, and
knowledge of all men, through being in themselves un-
there come in one that believeth not. . . the secrets of his
knowable; such are future contingencies, the truth of
heart are made manifest.” Therefore prophecy is not about
which is indeterminate. And since that which is pred-
future contingencies alone.
icated universally and by its very nature, takes prece-
I answer that, A manifestation made by means of a
dence of that which is predicated in a limited and relative
certain light can extend to all those things that are subject
sense, it follows that revelation of future events belongs
to that light: thus the body’s sight extends to all colors,
most properly to prophecy, and from this prophecy appar-
and the soul’s natural knowledge extends to whatever is
ently takes its name. Hence Gregory says (Hom. i su-
subject to the light of the active intellect. Now prophetic
per Ezech.): “And since a prophet is so called because he
knowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is
foretells the future, his name loses its significance when
possible to know all things both Divine and human, both
he speaks of the past or present.”
spiritual and corporeal; and consequently the prophetic
Reply to Objection 1. Prophecy is there defined ac-
revelation extends to them all. Thus by the ministry of
cording to its proper signification; and it is in this sense
spirits a prophetic revelation concerning the perfections
that it is differentiated from the other gratuitous graces.
of God and the angels was made to Is. 6:1, where it is
Reply to Objection 2. This is evident from what
written, “I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and
has just been said. We might also reply that all those
elevated.” Moreover his prophecy contains matters re-
things that are the matter of prophecy have the common
ferring to natural bodies, according to the words of Is.
aspect of being unknowable to man except by Divine rev-
40:12, “Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of
elation; whereas those that are the matter of “wisdom,”
His hand,” etc. It also contains matters relating to human
“knowledge,” and the “interpretation of speeches,” can be
conduct, according to Is. 58:1, “Deal thy bread to the
known by man through natural reason, but are manifested
hungry,” etc.; and besides this it contains things pertain-
in a higher way through the enlightening of the Divine
ing to future events, according to Is. 47:9, “Two things
light. As to “faith,” although it is about things invisible to
shall come upon thee suddenly in one day, barrenness and
man, it is not concerned with the knowledge of the things
widowhood.”
believed, but with a man’s certitude of assent to things
Since, however, prophecy is about things remote from
known by others.
our knowledge, it must be observed that the more remote
Reply to Objection 3.
The formal element in
things are from our knowledge the more pertinent they are
prophetic knowledge is the Divine light, which being one,
to prophecy. Of such things there are three degrees. One
gives unity of species to prophecy, although the things
degree comprises things remote from the knowledge, ei-
prophetically manifested by the Divine light are diverse.
1954
Whether by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known propheti-IIa IIae q. 171 a. 4
cally?
Objection 1. It would seem that by the Divine revela-
ciple perfectly, as regards all to which its virtue extends,
tion a prophet knows all that can be known prophetically.
knows at the same time all that can be known through that
For it is written (Amos 3:7): “The Lord God doth nothing
principle; whereas if the common principle is unknown,
without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets.”
or known only in a general way, it does not follow that
Now whatever is revealed prophetically is something done
one knows all those things at the same time, but each of
by God. Therefore there is not one of them but what is re-
them has to be manifested by itself, so that consequently
vealed to the prophet.
some of them may be known, and some not.
Objection 2. Further, “God’s works are perfect” (Dt.
Now the principle of those things that are prophet-
32:4). Now prophecy is a “Divine revelation,” as stated
ically manifested by the Divine light is the first truth,
above (a. 3). Therefore it is perfect; and this would not
which the prophets do not see in itself. Wherefore there
be so unless all possible matters of prophecy were re-
is no need for their knowing all possible matters of
vealed prophetically, since “the perfect is that which lacks
prophecy; but each one knows some of them according
nothing” (Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible matters of
to the special revelation of this or that matter.
prophecy are revealed to the prophet.
Reply to Objection 1.
The Lord reveals to the
Objection 3. Further, the Divine light which causes
prophets all things that are necessary for the instruction
prophecy is more powerful than the right of natural reason
of the faithful; yet not all to every one, but some to one,
which is the cause of human science. Now a man who has
and some to another.
acquired a science knows whatever pertains to that sci-
Reply to Objection 2. Prophecy is by way of being
ence; thus a grammarian knows all matters of grammar.
something imperfect in the genus of Divine revelation:
Therefore it would seem that a prophet knows all matters
hence it is written (1 Cor. 13:8) that “prophecies shall
of prophecy.
be made void,” and that “we prophesy in part,” i.e. im-
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom.
i super
perfectly. The Divine revelation will be brought to its per-
Ezech.) that “sometimes the spirit of prophecy indicates
fection in heaven; wherefore the same text continues (1
the present to the prophet’s mind and nowise the future;
Cor. 113:10): “When that which is perfect is come, that
and sometimes it points not to the present but to the fu-
which is in part shall be done away.” Consequently it does
ture.” Therefore the prophet does not know all matters of
not follow that nothing is lacking to prophetic revelation,
prophecy.
but that it lacks none of those things to which prophecy is
I answer that, Things which differ from one another
directed.
need not exist simultaneously, save by reason of some one
Reply to Objection 3. He who has a science knows
thing in which they are connected and on which they de-
the principles of that science, whence whatever is perti-
pend: thus it has been stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65, Aa. 1,2)
nent to that science depends; wherefore to have the habit
that all the virtues must needs exist simultaneously on ac-
of a science perfectly, is to know whatever is pertinent to
count of prudence and charity. Now all the things that are
that science. But God Who is the principle of prophetic
known through some principle are connected in that prin-
knowledge is not known in Himself through prophecy;
ciple and depend thereon. Hence he who knows a prin-
wherefore the comparison fails.
Whether the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what IIa IIae q. 171 a. 5
he says by the prophetic spirit?
Objection 1. It would seem that the prophet always
Objection 2. Further, God commands nothing im-
distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he
possible, as Jerome∗ says. Now the prophets were com-
says by the prophetic spirit. For Augustine states (Con-
manded (Jer. 23:28): “The prophet that hath a dream,
fess. vi, 13) that his mother said “she could, through
let him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him
a certain feeling, which in words she could not express,
speak My word with truth.” Therefore the prophet can dis-
discern betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her
tinguish what he has through the spirit of prophecy from
own soul.” Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as stated
what he sees otherwise.
above (a. 3). Therefore the prophet always distinguishes
Objection 3. Further, the certitude resulting from a
what he says by the spirit of prophecy, from what he says
Divine light is greater than that which results from the
by his own spirit.
light of natural reason. Now he that has science, by the
∗ Pelagius. Ep. xvi, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome 1955
light of natural reason knows for certain that he has it.
titude may be gathered from the fact that Abraham being
Therefore he that has prophecy by a Divine light is much
admonished in a prophetic vision, prepared to sacrifice his
more certain that he has it.
only-begotten son, which he nowise would have done had
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom.
i super
he not been most certain of the Divine revelation.
Ezech.): “It must be observed that sometimes the holy
On the other hand, his position with regard to the
prophets, when consulted, utter certain things by their
things he knows by instinct is sometimes such that he is
own spirit, through being much accustomed to prophesy-
unable to distinguish fully whether his thoughts are con-
ing, and think they are speaking by the prophetic spirit.”
ceived of Divine instinct or of his own spirit. And those
I answer that, The prophet’s mind is instructed by
things which we know by Divine instinct are not all man-
God in two ways: in one way by an express revelation, in
ifested with prophetic certitude, for this instinct is some-
another way by a most mysterious instinct to “which the
thing imperfect in the genus of prophecy. It is thus that we
human mind is subjected without knowing it,” as Augus-
are to understand the saying of Gregory. Lest, however,
tine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17). Accordingly the prophet has
this should lead to error, “they are very soon set aright by
the greatest certitude about those things which he knows
the Holy Ghost∗, and from Him they hear the truth, so
by an express revelation, and he has it for certain that they
that they reproach themselves for having said what was
are revealed to him by God; wherefore it is written (Jer.
untrue,” as Gregory adds (Hom. i super Ezech.).
26:15): “In truth the Lord sent me to you, to speak all
The arguments set down in the first place consider the
these words in your hearing.” Else, were he not certain
revelation that is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore
about this, the faith which relies on the utterances of the
the answer to all the objections is clear.
prophet would not be certain. A sign of the prophet’s cer-
Whether things known or declared prophetically can be false?
IIa IIae q. 171 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that things known or de-
tecedent of this conditional proposition is absolutely nec-
clared prophetically can be false. For prophecy is about
essary, since it is about the past. Therefore the consequent
future contingencies, as stated above (a. 3 ). Now future
is also necessary absolutely; yet this is unfitting, for then
contingencies may possibly not happen; else they would
prophecy would not be about contingencies. Therefore it
happen of necessity. Therefore the matter of prophecy can
is untrue that the matter of prophecy cannot be false.
be false.
On the contrary, Cassiodorus says† that “prophecy is
Objection 2. Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias
a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of
saying (Is. 38:1): “Take order with thy house, for thou
things with invariable truth.” Now the truth of prophecy
shalt surely die, and shalt not live,” and yet fifteen years
would not be invariable, if its matter could be false. There-
were added to his life (4 Kings 20:6). Again the Lord
fore nothing false can come under prophecy.
said (Jer. 18:7,8): “I will suddenly speak against a nation
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has
and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and
been said (Aa. 1,3,5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge
to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken
impressed under the form of teaching on the prophet’s in-
shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that tellect, by Divine revelation. Now the truth of knowledge
I have thought to do them.” This is instanced in the ex-
is the same in disciple and teacher since the knowledge of
ample of the Ninevites, according to Jn. 3:10: “The Lord
the disciple is a likeness of the knowledge of the teacher,
[Vulg.: ‘God’] had mercy with regard to the evil which
even as in natural things the form of the thing generated
He had said that He would do to them, and He did it not.”
is a likeness of the form of the generator. Jerome speaks
Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false.
in this sense when he says‡ that “prophecy is the seal of
Objection 3. Further, in a conditional proposition,
the Divine foreknowledge.” Consequently the same truth
whenever the antecedent is absolutely necessary, the con-
must needs be in prophetic knowledge and utterances, as
sequent is absolutely necessary, because the consequent
in the Divine knowledge, under which nothing false can
of a conditional proposition stands in the same relation to
possibly come, as stated in the Ia, q. 16, a. 8. Therefore
the antecedent, as the conclusion to the premises in a syl-
nothing false can come under prophecy.
logism, and a syllogism whose premises are necessary al-
Reply to Objection 1. As stated in the Ia, q. 14, a. 13
ways leads to a necessary conclusion, as we find proved in
the certitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not ex-
I Poster. 6. But if the matter of a prophecy cannot be false,
clude the contingency of future singular events, because
the following conditional proposition must needs be true:
that knowledge regards the future as present and already
“If a thing has been prophesied, it will be.” Now the an-
determinate to one thing. Wherefore prophecy also, which
∗ For instance, cf. 2 Kings 7:3 seqq. † Prol. in Psalt. i ‡ Comment.
in Daniel ii, 10
1956
is an “impressed likeness” or “seal of the Divine fore-the event is otherwise than foretold. Yet the prophecy does
knowledge,” does not by its unchangeable truth exclude
not cover a falsehood, for the meaning of the prophecy
the contingency of future things.
is that inferior causes, whether they be natural causes or
Reply to Objection 2. The Divine foreknowledge re-
human acts, are so disposed as to lead to such a result.
gards future things in two ways. First, as they are in them-
In this way we are to understand the saying of Is. 38:1:
selves, in so far, to wit, as it sees them in their presential-
“Thou shalt die, and not live”; in other words, “The dis-
ity: secondly, as in their causes, inasmuch as it sees the
position of thy body has a tendency to death”: and the
order of causes in relation to their effects. And though
saying of Jonah 3:4, “Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall
future contingencies, considered as in themselves, are de-
be destroyed,” that is to say, “Its merits demand that it
terminate to one thing, yet, considered as in their causes,
should be destroyed.” God is said “to repent,” metaphor-
they are not so determined but that they can happen oth-
ically, inasmuch as He bears Himself after the manner of
erwise. Again, though this twofold knowledge is always
one who repents, by “changing His sentence, although He
united in the Divine intellect, it is not always united in the
changes not His counsel”∗.
prophetic revelation, because an imprint made by an ac-
Reply to Objection 3.
Since the same truth of
tive cause is not always on a par with the virtue of that
prophecy is the same as the truth of Divine foreknowl-
cause. Hence sometimes the prophetic revelation is an
edge, as stated above, the conditional proposition: “If this
imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in so far
was prophesied, it will be,” is true in the same way as
as the latter regards future contingencies in themselves:
the proposition: “If this was foreknown, it will be”: for
and such things happen in the same way as foretold, for
in both cases it is impossible for the antecedent not to
example this saying of Is. 7:14: “Behold a virgin shall
be. Hence the consequent is necessary, considered, not
conceive.” Sometimes, however, the prophetic revelation
as something future in our regard, but as being present to
is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge as
the Divine foreknowledge, as stated in the Ia, q. 14, a. 13,
knowing the order of causes to effects; and then at times
ad 2.
∗ Cf. Ia, q. 19, a. 7, ad 2
1957
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 172
Of the Cause of Prophecy
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the cause of prophecy. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether prophecy is natural?
(2) Whether it is from God by means of the angels?
(3) Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?
(4) Whether a good life is requisite?
(5) Whether any prophecy is from the demons?
(6) Whether prophets of the demons ever tell what is true?
Whether prophecy can be natural?
IIa IIae q. 172 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that prophecy can be nat-
prophetic foreknowledge may regard future things in two
ural. For Gregory says (Dial. iv, 26) that “sometimes the
ways: in one way, as they are in themselves; in another
mere strength of the soul is sufficiently cunning to fore-
way, as they are in their causes. Now, to foreknow future
see certain things”: and Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
things, as they are in themselves, is proper to the Divine
13) that the human soul, according as it is withdrawn from
intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as stated
the sense of the body, is able to foresee the future∗. Now
in the Ia, q. 14, a. 13. Wherefore such like foreknowledge
this pertains to prophecy. Therefore the soul can acquire
of the future cannot come from nature, but from Divine
prophecy naturally.
revelation alone. On the other hand, future things can be
Objection 2. Further, the human soul’s knowledge is
foreknown in their causes with a natural knowledge even
more alert while one wakes than while one sleeps. Now
by man: thus a physician foreknows future health or death
some, during sleep, naturally foresee the future, as the
in certain causes, through previous experimental knowl-
Philosopher asserts (De Somn. et Vigil.†). Much more
edge of the order of those causes to such effects. Such
therefore can a man naturally foreknow the future.
like knowledge of the future may be understood to be in a
Objection 3. Further, man, by his nature, is more per-
man by nature in two ways. In one way that the soul, from
fect than dumb animals. Yet some dumb animals have
that which it holds, is able to foreknow the future, and thus
foreknowledge of future things that concern them. Thus
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): “Some have deemed
ants foreknow the coming rains, which is evident from
the human soul to contain a certain power of divination.”
their gathering grain into their nest before the rain com-
This seems to be in accord with the opinion of Plato§, who
mences; and in like manner fish foreknow a coming storm,
held that our souls have knowledge of all things by partic-
as may be gathered from their movements in avoiding
ipating in the ideas; but that this knowledge is obscured in
places exposed to storm. Much more therefore can men
them by union with the body; yet in some more, in others
foreknow the future that concerns themselves, and of such
less, according to a difference in bodily purity. Accord-
things is prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes from na-
ing to this it might be said that men, whose souls are not
ture.
much obscured through union with the body, are able to
Objection 4. Further, it is written (Prov. 29:18):
foreknow such like future things by their own knowledge.
“When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered
Against this opinion Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13):
abroad”; wherefore it is evident that prophecy is neces-
“How is it that the soul cannot always have this power of
sary for the stability of the human race. Now “nature does
divination, since it always wishes to have it?”
not fail in necessaries”‡. Therefore it seems that prophecy
Since, however, it seems truer, according to the opin-
is from nature.
ion of Aristotle, that the soul acquires knowledge from
On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 1:21): “For
sensibles, as stated in the Ia, q. 84, a. 6, it is better to have prophecy came not by the will of man at any time, but
recourse to another explanation, and to hold that men have
the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost.”
no such foreknowledge of the future, but that they can ac-
Therefore prophecy comes not from nature, but through
quire it by means of experience, wherein they are helped
the gift of the Holy Ghost.
by their natural disposition, which depends on the perfec-
I answer that, As stated above (q. 171, a. 6, ad 2)
tion of a man’s imaginative power, and the clarity of his
∗ Cf. Ia, q. 86, a. 4, ad 2
† De Divinat. per Somn. ii, which is
annexed to the work quoted
‡ Aristotle, de Anima iii, 9
§ Phaed.
xxvii; Civit. vi
1958
understanding.
be able to foreknow the future whenever it willed,” which
Nevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future
is clearly false.
differs in two ways from the former, which comes through
Objection 2. Knowledge of the future by means of
Divine revelation. First, because the former can be about
dreams, comes either from the revelation of spiritual sub-
any events whatever, and this infallibly; whereas the lat-
stances, or from a corporeal cause, as stated above (q. 95,
ter foreknowledge, which can be had naturally, is about
a. 6), when we were treating of divination. Now both these
certain effects, to which human experience may extend.
causes are more applicable to a person while asleep than
Secondly, because the former prophecy is “according to
while awake, because, while awake, the soul is occupied
the unchangeable truthӦ, while the latter is not, and can
with external sensibles, so that it is less receptive of the
cover a falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and
subtle impressions either of spiritual substances, or even
not the latter, properly belongs to prophecy, because, as
of natural causes; although as regards the perfection of
stated above (q. 171, a. 3), prophetic knowledge is of
judgment, the reason is more alert in waking than in sleep-
things which naturally surpass human knowledge. Conse-
ing.
quently we must say that prophecy strictly so called can-
Reply to Objection 3.
Even dumb animals have
not be from nature, but only from Divine revelation.
no foreknowledge of future events, except as these are
Reply to Objection 1. When the soul is withdrawn
foreknown in their causes, whereby their imagination is
from corporeal things, it becomes more adapted to receive
moved more than man’s, because man’s imagination, es-
the influence of spiritual substances∗, and also is more in-
pecially in waking, is more disposed according to reason
clined to receive the subtle motions which take place in
than according to the impression of natural causes. Yet
the human imagination through the impression of natural
reason effects much more amply in man, that which the
causes, whereas it is hindered from receiving them while
impression of natural causes effects in dumb animals; and
occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says (Dial.
Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy assists man still
iv, 26) that “the soul, at the approach of death, foresees
more.
certain future things, by reason of the subtlety of its na-
Reply to Objection 4. The prophetic light extends
ture,” inasmuch as it is receptive even of slight impres-
even to the direction of human acts; and in this way
sions. Or again, it knows future things by a revelation of
prophecy is requisite for the government of a people, es-
the angels; but not by its own power, because according to
pecially in relation to Divine worship; since for this nature
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13), “if this were so, it would
is not sufficient, and grace is necessary.
Whether prophetic revelation comes through the angels?
IIa IIae q. 172 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that prophetic revela-
prophetic visions. Therefore prophetic revelation is con-
tion does not come through the angels. For it is writ-
veyed by means of the angels.
ten (Wis. 7:27) that Divine wisdom “conveyeth herself
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1),
into holy souls,” and “maketh the friends of God, and the
“Things that are of God are well ordered‡.” Now the Di-
prophets.” Now wisdom makes the friends of God imme-
vine ordering, according to Dionysius§, is such that the
diately. Therefore it also makes the prophets immediately,
lowest things are directed by middle things. Now the an-
and not through the medium of the angels.
gels hold a middle position between God and men, in that
Objection 2. Further, prophecy is reckoned among
they have a greater share in the perfection of the Divine
the gratuitous graces. But the gratuitous graces are from
goodness than men have. Wherefore the Divine enlight-
the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, “There are di-
enments and revelations are conveyed from God to men
versities of graces, but the same Spirit.” Therefore the
by the angels. Now prophetic knowledge is bestowed by
prophetic revelation is not made by means of an angel.
Divine enlightenment and revelation. Therefore it is evi-
Objection 3.
Further, Cassiodorus† says that
dent that it is conveyed by the angels.
prophecy is a “Divine revelation”: whereas if it were con-
Reply to Objection 1. Charity which makes man a
veyed by the angels, it would be called an angelic revela-
friend of God, is a perfection of the will, in which God
tion. Therefore prophecy is not bestowed by means of the
alone can form an impression; whereas prophecy is a per-
angels.
fection of the intellect, in which an angel also can form an
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv):
impression, as stated in the Ia, q. 111, a. 1, wherefore the
“Our glorious fathers received Divine visions by means
comparison fails between the two.
of the heavenly powers”; and he is speaking there of
Reply to Objection 2. The gratuitous graces are as-
¶ q. 171, a. 3, obj. 1
∗ Cf. Ia, q. 88, a. 4, ad 2
† Prol. in Psalt. i
‡ Vulg.: ‘Those that are, are ordained of God.’ § Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl.
Hier. v
1959
cribed to the Holy Ghost as their first principle: yet He strument acts. And since a minister is like an instrument,
works grace of this kind in men by means of the angels.
prophetic revelation, which is conveyed by the ministry of
Reply to Objection 3. The work of the instrument
the angels, is said to be Divine.
is ascribed to the principal agent by whose power the in-
Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?
IIa IIae q. 172 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that a natural disposi-
it is written (1 Cor. 12:2): “All these things, one and the
tion is requisite for prophecy. For prophecy is received
same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as
by the prophet according to the disposition of the recipi-
He will.”
ent, since a gloss of Jerome on Amos 1:2, “The Lord will
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), prophecy in
roar from Sion,” says: “Anyone who wishes to make a
its true and exact sense comes from Divine inspiration;
comparison naturally turns to those things of which he
while that which comes from a natural cause is not called
has experience, and among which his life is spent. For
prophecy except in a relative sense. Now we must observe
example, sailors compare their enemies to the winds, and
that as God Who is the universal efficient cause requires
their losses to a shipwreck. In like manner Amos, who
neither previous matter nor previous disposition of matter
was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to that which is in-
in His corporeal effects, for He is able at the same instant
spired by the lion’s roar.” Now that which is received by
to bring into being matter and disposition and form, so
a thing according to the mode of the recipient requires a
neither does He require a previous disposition in His spir-
natural disposition. Therefore prophecy requires a natural
itual effects, but is able to produce both the spiritual effect disposition.
and at the same time the fitting disposition as requisite ac-
Objection 2. Further, the considerations of prophecy
cording to the order of nature. More than this, He is able
are more lofty than those of acquired science. Now nat-
at the same time, by creation, to produce the subject, so
ural indisposition hinders the considerations of acquired
as to dispose a soul for prophecy and give it the prophetic
science, since many are prevented by natural indisposi-
grace, at the very instant of its creation.
tion from succeeding to grasp the speculations of science.
Reply to Objection 1. It matters not to prophecy by
Much more therefore is a natural disposition requisite for
what comparisons the thing prophesied is expressed; and
the contemplation of prophecy.
so the Divine operation makes no change in a prophet in
Objection 3. Further, natural indisposition is a much
this respect. Yet if there be anything in him incompatible
greater obstacle than an accidental impediment.
Now
with prophecy, it is removed by the Divine power.
the considerations of prophecy are hindered by an acci-
Reply to Objection 2. The considerations of science
dental occurrence. For Jerome says in his commentary
proceed from a natural cause, and nature cannot work
on Matthew∗ that “at the time of the marriage act, the
without a previous disposition in matter. This cannot be
presence of the Holy Ghost will not be vouchsafed, even
said of God Who is the cause of prophecy.
though it be a prophet that fulfils the duty of procreation.”
Reply to Objection 3. A natural indisposition, if not
Much more therefore does a natural indisposition hinder
removed, might be an obstacle to prophetic revelation, for
prophecy; and thus it would seem that a good natural dis-
instance if a man were altogether deprived of the natu-
position is requisite for prophecy.
ral senses. In the same way a man might be hindered
On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily for Pen-
from the act of prophesying by some very strong passion,
tecost (xxx in Ev.): “He,” namely the Holy Ghost, “fills
whether of anger, or of concupiscence as in coition, or by
the boy harpist and makes him a Psalmist; He fills the
any other passion. But such a natural indisposition as this
herdsman plucking wild figs, and makes him a prophet.”
is removed by the Divine power, which is the cause of
Therefore prophecy requires no previous disposition, but
prophecy.
depends on the will alone of the Holy Ghost, of Whom
Whether a good life is requisite for prophecy?
IIa IIae q. 172 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that a good life is requi-
Now there can be no holiness without a good life and
site for prophecy. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that the wis-
sanctifying grace. Therefore prophecy cannot be without
dom of God “through nations conveyeth herself into holy
a good life and sanctifying grace.
souls,” and “maketh the friends of God, and prophets.”
Objection 2. Further, secrets are not revealed save
∗ The quotation is from Origen, Hom. vi in Num.
1960
to a friend, according to Jn. 15:15, “But I have called man’s affections to God, which is the purpose of charity.
you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard
Therefore prophecy can be without a good life, as regards
of My Father, I have made known to you.” Now God re-
the first root of this goodness.
veals His secrets to the prophets (Amos 3:7). Therefore
If, however, we consider a good life, with regard to
it would seem that the prophets are the friends of God;
the passions of the soul, and external actions, from this
which is impossible without charity. Therefore seemingly
point of view an evil life is an obstacle to prophecy. For
prophecy cannot be without charity; and charity is impos-
prophecy requires the mind to be raised very high in or-
sible without sanctifying grace.
der to contemplate spiritual things, and this is hindered
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Mat. 7:15): “Be-
by strong passions, and the inordinate pursuit of external
ware of false prophets, who come to you in the clothing
things. Hence we read of the sons of the prophets (4 Kings
of sheep, but inwardly they are ravening wolves.” Now all
4:38) that they “dwelt together with [Vulg.: ‘before’]”
who are without grace are likened inwardly to a ravening
Eliseus, leading a solitary life, as it were, lest worldly em-
wolf, and consequently all such are false prophets. There-
ployment should be a hindrance to the gift of prophecy.
fore no man is a true prophet except he be good by grace.
Reply to Objection 1. Sometimes the gift of prophecy
Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (De Somn.
is given to a man both for the good of others, and in order
et Vigil.∗) that “if interpretation of dreams is from God,
to enlighten his own mind; and such are those whom Di-
it is unfitting for it to be bestowed on any but the best.”
vine wisdom, “conveying itself” by sanctifying grace to
Now it is evident that the gift of prophecy is from God.
their minds, “maketh the friends of God, and prophets.”
Therefore the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed only to the
Others, however, receive the gift of prophecy merely for
best men.
the good of others. Hence Jerome commenting on Mat.
On the contrary, To those who had said, “Lord, have
7:22, says: “Sometimes prophesying, the working of mir-
we not prophesied in Thy name?” this reply is made: “I
acles, and the casting out of demons are accorded not to
never knew you” (Mat. 7:22,23). Now “the Lord knoweth
the merit of those who do these things, but either to the
who are His” (2 Tim. 2:19). Therefore prophecy can be
invoking the name of Christ, or to the condemnation of
in those who are not God’s by grace.
those who invoke, and for the good of those who see and
I answer that, A good life may be considered from
hear.”
two points of view. First, with regard to its inward root,
Reply to Objection 2. Gregory† expounding this pas-
which is sanctifying grace. Secondly, with regard to the
sage‡ says: “Since we love the lofty things of heaven as
inward passions of the soul and the outward actions. Now
soon as we hear them, we know them as soon as we love
sanctifying grace is given chiefly in order that man’s soul
them, for to love is to know. Accordingly He had made all
may be united to God by charity. Wherefore Augustine
things known to them, because having renounced earthly
says (De Trin. xv, 18): “A man is not transferred from
desires they were kindled by the torches of perfect love.”
the left side to the right, unless he receive the Holy Ghost,
In this way the Divine secrets are not always revealed to
by Whom he is made a lover of God and of his neigh-
prophets.
bor.” Hence whatever can be without charity can be with-
Reply to Objection 3. Not all wicked men are raven-
out sanctifying grace, and consequently without goodness
ing wolves, but only those whose purpose is to injure oth-
of life. Now prophecy can be without charity; and this
ers. For Chrysostom says§ that “Catholic teachers, though
is clear on two counts. First, on account of their respec-
they be sinners, are called slaves of the flesh, but never
tive acts: for prophecy pertains to the intellect, whose act
ravening wolves, because they do not purpose the destruc-
precedes the act of the will, which power is perfected by
tion of Christians.” And since prophecy is directed to the
charity. For this reason the Apostle (1 Cor. 13) reck-
good of others, it is manifest that such are false prophets,
ons prophecy with other things pertinent to the intellect,
because they are not sent for this purpose by God.
that can be had without charity. Secondly, on account of
Reply to Objection 4. God’s gifts are not always be-
their respective ends. For prophecy like other gratuitous
stowed on those who are simply the best, but sometimes
graces is given for the good of the Church, according to 1
are vouchsafed to those who are best as regards the receiv-
Cor. 12:7, “The manifestation of the Spirit is given to ev-
ing of this or that gift. Accordingly God grants the gift of
ery man unto profit”; and is not directly intended to unite
prophecy to those whom He judges best to give it to.
∗ Cf. De Divinat. per Somn. i, which is annexed to the work quoted
† Hom. xxvii in Ev.
‡ Jn. 15:15
§ Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix,
among the works of St. John Chrysostom, and falsely ascribed to him 1961
Whether any prophecy comes from the demons?
IIa IIae q. 172 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that no prophecy comes
ural knowledge, know certain things remote from men’s
from the demons. For prophecy is “a Divine revelation,”
knowledge, which they can reveal to men: although those
according to Cassiodorus∗. But that which is done by a
things which God alone knows are remote simply and
demon is not Divine. Therefore no prophecy can be from
most of all.
a demon.
Accordingly prophecy, properly and simply, is con-
Objection 2. Further, some kind of enlightenment is
veyed by Divine revelations alone; yet the revelation
requisite for prophetic knowledge, as stated above (q. 171,
which is made by the demons may be called prophecy in
Aa. 2,3). Now the demons do not enlighten the human in-
a restricted sense. Wherefore those men to whom some-
tellect, as stated above in the Ia, q. 119, a. 3. Therefore no
thing is revealed by the demons are styled in the Scriptures
prophecy can come from the demons.
as prophets, not simply, but with an addition, for instance
Objection 3. Further, a sign is worthless if it beto-
as “false prophets,” or “prophets of idols.” Hence Au-
kens contraries. Now prophecy is a sign in confirma-
gustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19): “When the evil spirit
tion of faith; wherefore a gloss on Rom. 12:6, “Either
lays hold of a man for such purposes as these,” namely
prophecy to be used according to the rule of faith,” says:
visions, “he makes him either devilish, or possessed, or a
“Observe that in reckoning the graces, he begins with
false prophet.”
prophecy, which is the first proof of the reasonableness of
Reply to Objection 1. Cassiodorus is here defining
our faith; since believers, after receiving the Spirit, proph-
prophecy in its proper and simple acceptation.
esied.” Therefore prophecy cannot be bestowed by the
Reply to Objection 2. The demons reveal what they
demons.
know to men, not by enlightening the intellect, but by an
On the contrary, It is written (3 Kings 18:19):
imaginary vision, or even by audible speech; and in this
“Gather unto me all Israel unto mount Carmel, and the
way this prophecy differs from true prophecy.
prophets of Baal four hundred and fifty, and the prophets
Reply to Objection 3. The prophecy of the demons
of the grove four hundred, who eat at Jezebel’s table.”
can be distinguished from Divine prophecy by certain, and
Now these were worshippers of demons. Therefore it
even outward, signs. Hence Chrysostom says† that “some
would seem that there is also a prophecy from the demons.
prophesy by the spirit of the devil, such as diviners, but
I answer that, As stated above (q. 171, a. 1), prophecy
they may be discerned by the fact that the devil sometimes
denotes knowledge far removed from human knowledge.
utters what is false, the Holy Ghost never.” Wherefore it is
Now it is evident that an intellect of a higher order can
written (Dt. 18:21,22): “If in silent thought thou answer:
know some things that are far removed from the knowl-
How shall I know the word that the Lord hath spoken?
edge of an inferior intellect. Again, above the human
Thou shalt have this sign: Whatsoever that same prophet
intellect there is not only the Divine intellect, but also
foretelleth in the name of the Lord, and it come not to
the intellects of good and bad angels according to the
pass, that thing the Lord hath not spoken.”
order of nature. Hence the demons, even by their nat-
Whether the prophets of the demons ever foretell the truth?
IIa IIae q. 172 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the prophets of the
never speak false, as stated above (q. 111, a. 6). Therefore
demons never foretell the truth. For Ambrose‡ says that
the prophets of the demons never speak truth.
“Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from the Holy
Objection 3. Further, it is said of the devil (Jn. 8:44) Ghost.” Now the prophets of the demons do not speak
that “when he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own, for
from the Holy Ghost, because “there is no concord be-
the devil is a liar, and the father thereof,” i.e. of lying.
tween Christ and Belial§” (2 Cor. 6:15). Therefore it
Now by inspiring his prophets, the devil speaks only of
would seem that they never foretell the truth.
his own, for he is not appointed God’s minister to declare
Objection 2. Further, just as true prophets are inspired the truth, since “light hath no fellowship with darkness¶”
by the Spirit of truth, so the prophets of the demons are in-
(2 Cor. 6:14). Therefore the prophets of the demons never
spired by the spirit of untruth, according to 3 Kings 22:22,
foretell the truth.
“I will go forth, and be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his On the contrary, A gloss on Num. 22:14, says that
prophets.” Now the prophets inspired by the Holy Ghost
“Balaam was a diviner, for he sometimes foreknew the
∗ Prol. in Psalt. i
† Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely as-
cribed to St. John Chrysostom
‡ Hilary the Deacon (Ambrosiaster)
on 1 Cor. 12:3
§ ‘What concord hath Christ with Belial?’
¶ Vulg.:
‘What fellowship hath light with darkness?’
1962
future by help of the demons and the magic art.” Now he more credible, since even its foes bear witness to it, and
foretold many true things, for instance that which is to be
also in order that men, by believing such men, may be
found in Num. 24:17: “A star shall rise out of Jacob, and
more easily led on to truth. Wherefore also the Sibyls
a scepter shall spring up from Israel.” Therefore even the
foretold many true things about Christ.
prophets of the demons foretell the truth.
Yet even when the demons’ prophets are instructed by
I answer that, As the good is in relation to things, so
the demons, they foretell the truth, sometimes by virtue of
is the true in relation to knowledge. Now in things it is im-
their own nature, the author of which is the Holy Ghost,
possible to find one that is wholly devoid of good. Where-
and sometimes by revelation of the good spirits, as Augus-
fore it is also impossible for any knowledge to be wholly
tine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19): so that even then this
false, without some mixture of truth. Hence Bede says∗
truth which the demons proclaim is from the Holy Ghost.
that “no teaching is so false that it never mingles truth with
Reply to Objection 2. A true prophet is always in-
falsehood.” Hence the teaching of the demons, with which
spired by the Spirit of truth, in Whom there is no false-
they instruct their prophets, contains some truths whereby
hood, wherefore He never says what is not true; whereas
it is rendered acceptable. For the intellect is led astray to
a false prophet is not always instructed by the spirit of
falsehood by the semblance of truth, even as the will is
untruth, but sometimes even by the Spirit of truth. Even
seduced to evil by the semblance of goodness. Wherefore
the very spirit of untruth sometimes declares true things,
Chrysostom says†: “The devil is allowed sometimes to
sometimes false, as stated above.
speak true things, in order that his unwonted truthfulness
Reply to Objection 3. Those things are called the
may gain credit for his lie.”
demons’ own, which they have of themselves, namely lies
Reply to Objection 1. The prophets of the demons do
and sins; while they have, not of themselves but of God,
not always speak from the demons’ revelation, but some-
those things which belong to them by nature: and it is
times by Divine inspiration. This was evidently the case
by virtue of their own nature that they sometimes foretell
with Balaam, of whom we read that the Lord spoke to him
the truth, as stated above (ad 1). Moreover God makes
(Num. 22:12), though he was a prophet of the demons,
use of them to make known the truth which is to be ac-
because God makes use even of the wicked for the profit
complished through them, by revealing Divine mysteries
of the good. Hence He foretells certain truths even by
to them through the angels, as already stated (Gen. ad lit.
the demons’ prophets, both that the truth may be rendered
xii, 19; Ia, q. 109, a. 4, ad 1).
∗ Comment. in Luc. xvii, 12; Cf. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, 40
† Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 1963
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 173
Of the Manner in Which Prophetic Knowledge Is Conveyed
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the manner in which prophetic knowledge is conveyed, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the prophets see God’s very essence?
(2) Whether the prophetic revelation is effected by the infusion of certain species, or by the infusion of Divine light alone?
(3) Whether prophetic revelation is always accompanied by abstraction from the sense?
(4) Whether prophecy is always accompanied by knowledge of the things prophesied?
Whether the prophets see the very essence of God?
IIa IIae q. 173 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the prophets see the
God (which they call the “mirror of eternity”)∗, not, how-
very essence of God, for a gloss on Is. 38:1, “Take or-
ever, in the way in which it is the object of the blessed,
der with thy house, for thou shalt die and not live,” says:
but as containing the types† of future events. But this is
“Prophets can read in the book of God’s foreknowledge in
altogether impossible. For God is the object of bliss in
which all things are written.” Now God’s foreknowledge
His very essence, according to the saying of Augustine
is His very essence. Therefore prophets see God’s very
(Confess. v, 4): “Happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he
essence.
know not these,” i.e. creatures. Now it is not possible
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 7)
to see the types of creatures in the very essence of God
that “in that eternal truth from which all temporal things
without seeing It, both because the Divine essence is It-
are made, we see with the mind’s eye the type both of our
self the type of all things that are made—the ideal type
being and of our actions.” Now, of all men, prophets have
adding nothing to the Divine essence save only a relation-
the highest knowledge of Divine things. Therefore they,
ship to the creature—and because knowledge of a thing
especially, see the Divine essence.
in itself—and such is the knowledge of God as the object
Objection 3. Further, future contingencies are fore-
of heavenly bliss—precedes knowledge of that thing in its
known by the prophets “with unchangeable truth.” Now
relation to something else—and such is the knowledge of
future contingencies exist thus in God alone. Therefore
God as containing the types of things. Consequently it is
the prophets see God Himself.
impossible for prophets to see God as containing the types
On the contrary, The vision of the Divine essence
of creatures, and yet not as the object of bliss. Therefore
is not made void in heaven; whereas “prophecy is made
we must conclude that the prophetic vision is not the vi-
void” (1 Cor. 13:8). Therefore prophecy is not conveyed
sion of the very essence of God, and that the prophets do
by a vision of the Divine essence.
not see in the Divine essence Itself the things they do see,
I answer that, Prophecy denotes Divine knowledge
but that they see them in certain images, according as they
as existing afar off. Wherefore it is said of the prophets
are enlightened by the Divine light.
(Heb. 11:13) that “they were beholding. . . afar off.” But
Wherefore Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), in speaking
those who are in heaven and in the state of bliss see, not as
of prophetic visions, says that “the wise theologian calls
from afar off, but rather, as it were, from near at hand, ac-
that vision divine which is effected by images of things
cording to Ps. 139:14, “The upright shall dwell with Thy
lacking a bodily form through the seer being rapt in di-
countenance.” Hence it is evident that prophetic knowl-
vine things.” And these images illumined by the Divine
edge differs from the perfect knowledge, which we shall
light have more of the nature of a mirror than the Divine
have in heaven, so that it is distinguished therefrom as the
essence: since in a mirror images are formed from other
imperfect from the perfect, and when the latter comes the
things, and this cannot be said of God. Yet the prophet’s
former is made void, as appears from the words of the
mind thus enlightened may be called a mirror, in so far
Apostle (1 Cor. 13:10).
as a likeness of the truth of the Divine foreknowledge is
Some, however, wishing to discriminate between
formed therein, for which reason it is called the “mirror of
prophetic knowledge and the knowledge of the blessed,
eternity,” as representing God’s foreknowledge, for God
have maintained that the prophets see the very essence of
in His eternity sees all things as present before Him, as
∗ Cf. De Veritate, xii, 6; Sent. II, D, XI, part 2, art. 2, ad 4
† Cf. Ia,
q. 15
1964
stated above (q. 172, a. 1).
the First Truth shines forth on man’s mind, so that he is
Reply to Objection 1. The prophets are said to read
able to know himself.
the book of God’s foreknowledge, inasmuch as the truth
Reply to Objection 3. From the very fact that future
is reflected from God’s foreknowledge on the prophet’s
contingencies are in God according to unalterable truth,
mind.
it follows that God can impress a like knowledge on the
Reply to Objection 2. Man is said to see in the First
prophet’s mind without the prophet seeing God in His
Truth the type of his existence, in so far as the image of
essence.
Whether, in prophetic revelation, new species of things are impressed on the prophet’s IIa IIae q. 173 a. 2
mind, or merely a new light?
Objection 1. It would seem that in prophetic rev-
the passive intellect, and these are changed by the species
elation no new species of things are impressed on the
derived from the phantasms, which change results from
prophet’s mind, but only a new light.
For a gloss of
the enlightening action of the active intellect. Now in the
Jerome on Amos 1:2 says that “prophets draw compar-
imagination there are the forms of sensible things not only
isons from things with which they are conversant.” But if
as received from the senses, but also transformed in var-
prophetic vision were effected by means of species newly
ious ways, either on account of some bodily transforma-
impressed, the prophet’s previous experience of things
tion (as in the case of people who are asleep or out of their
would be inoperative. Therefore no new species are im-
senses), or through the coordination of the phantasms, at
pressed on the prophet’s soul, but only the prophetic light.
the command of reason, for the purpose of understanding
Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (Gen.
something. For just as the various arrangements of the
ad lit. xii, 9), “it is not imaginative but intellective vision letters of the alphabet convey various ideas to the under-that makes the prophet”; wherefore it is declared (Dan.
standing, so the various coordinations of the phantasms
10:1) that “there is need of understanding in a vision.”
produce various intelligible species of the intellect.
Now intellective vision, as stated in the same book (Gen.
As to the judgment formed by the human mind, it de-
ad lit. xii, 6) is not effected by means of images, but by
pends on the power of the intellectual light.
the very truth of things. Therefore it would seem that
Now the gift of prophecy confers on the human mind
prophetic revelation is not effected by impressing species
something which surpasses the natural faculty in both
on the soul.
these respects, namely as to the judgment which depends
Objection 3. Further, by the gift of prophecy the Holy
on the inflow of intellectual light, and as to the acceptance
Ghost endows man with something that surpasses the fac-
or representation of things, which is effected by means
ulty of nature. Now man can by his natural faculties form
of certain species. Human teaching may be likened to
all kinds of species of things. Therefore it would seem
prophetic revelation in the second of these respects, but
that in prophetic revelation no new species of things are
not in the first. For a man represents certain things to his
impressed, but merely an intellectual light.
disciple by signs of speech, but he cannot enlighten him
On the contrary, It is written (Osee 12:10): “I have
inwardly as God does.
multiplied” their “visions, and I have used similitudes, by
But it is the first of these two that holds the chief place
the ministry of the prophets.” Now multiplicity of visions
in prophecy, since judgment is the complement of knowl-
results, not from a diversity of intellectual light, which is
edge. Wherefore if certain things are divinely represented
common to every prophetic vision, but from a diversity
to any man by means of imaginary likenesses, as hap-
of species, whence similitudes also result. Therefore it
pened to Pharaoh (Gn. 41:1-7) and to Nabuchodonosor
seems that in prophetic revelation new species of things
(Dan. 4:1-2), or even by bodily likenesses, as happened to
are impressed, and not merely an intellectual light.
Balthasar (Dan. 5:5), such a man is not to be considered a
I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
prophet, unless his mind be enlightened for the purpose of
9), “prophetic knowledge pertains most of all to the intel-
judgment; and such an apparition is something imperfect
lect.” Now two things have to be considered in connec-
in the genus of prophecy. Wherefore some∗ have called
tion with the knowledge possessed by the human mind,
this “prophetic ecstasy,” and such is divination by dreams.
namely the acceptance or representation of things, and the
And yet a man will be a prophet, if his intellect be enlight-
judgment of the things represented. Now things are repre-
ened merely for the purpose of judging of things seen in
sented to the human mind under the form of species: and
imagination by others, as in the case of Joseph who inter-
according to the order of nature, they must be represented
preted Pharaoh’s dream. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
first to the senses, secondly to the imagination, thirdly to
lit. xii, 9), “especially is he a prophet who excels in both
∗ Rabbi Moyses, Doct. Perplex. II, xxxvi
1965
respects, so,” to wit, “as to see in spirit likenesses sig-was their leader.”
nificant of things corporeal, and understand them by the
Hence it is evident that prophetic revelation is con-
quickness of his intellect.”
veyed sometimes by the mere infusion of light, sometimes
Now sensible forms are divinely presented to the
by imprinting species anew, or by a new coordination of
prophet’s mind, sometimes externally by means of the
species.
senses—thus Daniel saw the writing on the wall (Dan.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, sometimes in
5:25)—sometimes by means of imaginary forms, either
prophetic revelation imaginary species previously derived
of exclusively Divine origin and not received through the
from the senses are divinely coordinated so as to accord
senses (for instance, if images of colors were imprinted
with the truth to be revealed, and then previous experience
on the imagination of one blind from birth), or divinely
is operative in the production of the images, but not when
coordinated from those derived from the senses—thus
they are impressed on the mind wholly from without.
Jeremiah saw the “boiling caldron. . . from the face of the
Reply to Objection 2. Intellectual vision is not ef-
north” (Jer. 1:13)—or by the direct impression of intel-
fected by means of bodily and individual images, but by
ligible species on the mind, as in the case of those who
an intelligible image. Hence Augustine says (De Trin.
receive infused scientific knowledge or wisdom, such as
ix, 11) that “the soul possesses a certain likeness of the
Solomon or the apostles.
species known to it.” Sometimes this intelligible image is,
But intellectual light is divinely imprinted on the hu-
in prophetic revelation, imprinted immediately by God,
man mind—sometimes for the purpose of judging of
sometimes it results from pictures in the imagination, by
things seen by others, as in the case of Joseph, quoted
the aid of the prophetic light, since a deeper truth is gath-
above, and of the apostles whose understanding our
ered from these pictures in the imagination by means of
Lord opened “that they might understand the scriptures”
the enlightenment of the higher light.
(Lk. 24:45); and to this pertains the “interpretation of
Reply to Objection 3. It is true that man is able by his speeches”—sometimes for the purpose of judging accord-natural powers to form all kinds of pictures in the imag-
ing to Divine truth, of the things which a man apprehends
ination, by simply considering these pictures, but not so
in the ordinary course of nature—sometimes for the pur-
that they be directed to the representation of intelligible
pose of discerning truthfully and efficaciously what is to
truths that surpass his intellect, since for this purpose he
be done, according to Is. 63:14, “The Spirit of the Lord
needs the assistance of a supernatural light.
Whether the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses?
IIa IIae q. 173 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the prophetic vision
sary for prophetic revelation to be always accompanied by
is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses.
abstraction from the senses.
For it is written (Num. 12:6): “If there be among you
Objection 4. On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor.
a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision,
14:32): “The spirits of the prophets are subject to the
or I will speak to him in a dream.” Now a gloss says at
prophets.” Now this were impossible if the prophet were
the beginning of the Psalter, “a vision that takes place by
not in possession of his faculties, but abstracted from his
dreams and apparitions consists of things which seem to
senses. Therefore it would seem that prophetic vision is
be said or done.” But when things seem to be said or done,
not accompanied by abstraction from the senses.
which are neither said nor done, there is abstraction from
I answer that, As stated in the foregoing Article, the
the senses. Therefore prophecy is always accompanied by
prophetic revelation takes place in four ways: namely, by
abstraction from the senses.
the infusion of an intelligible light, by the infusion of in-
Objection 2. Further, when one power is very intent
telligible species, by impression or coordination of pic-
on its own operation, other powers are drawn away from
tures in the imagination, and by the outward presentation
theirs; thus men who are very intent on hearing some-
of sensible images. Now it is evident that there is no ab-
thing fail to see what takes place before them. Now in the
straction from the senses, when something is presented
prophetic vision the intellect is very much uplifted, and in-
to the prophet’s mind by means of sensible species—
tent on its act. Therefore it seems that the prophetic vision
whether these be divinely formed for this special purpose,
is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses.
as the bush shown to Moses (Ex. 3:2), and the writing
Objection 3. Further, the same thing cannot, at the
shown to Daniel (Dan. 5:)—or whether they be produced
same time, tend in opposite directions.
Now in the
by other causes; yet so that they are ordained by Divine
prophetic vision the mind tends to the acceptance of things
providence to be prophetically significant of something,
from above, and consequently it cannot at the same time
as, for instance, the Church was signified by the ark of
tend to sensible objects. Therefore it would seem neces-
Noah.
1966
Again, abstraction from the external senses is not ren-Ezechiel 1:3: “The hand of the Lord was upon him.”
dered necessary when the prophet’s mind is enlightened
Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted refers to
by an intellectual light, or impressed with intelligible
prophets in whom imaginary pictures were formed or co-
species, since in us the perfect judgment of the intellect
ordinated, either while asleep, which is denoted by the
is effected by its turning to sensible objects, which are the
word “dream,” or while awake, which is signified by the
first principles of our knowledge, as stated in the Ia, q. 84,
word “vision.”
a. 6.
Reply to Objection 2. When the mind is intent, in its
When, however, prophetic revelation is conveyed by
act, upon distant things which are far removed from the
images in the imagination, abstraction from the senses is
senses, the intensity of its application leads to abstraction
necessary lest the things thus seen in imagination be taken
from the senses; but when it is intent, in its act, upon the
for objects of external sensation. Yet this abstraction from
coordination of or judgment concerning objects of sense,
the senses is sometimes complete, so that a man perceives
there is no need for abstraction from the senses.
nothing with his senses; and sometimes it is incomplete,
Reply to Objection 3. The movement of the prophetic
so that he perceives something with his senses, yet does
mind results not from its own power, but from a power act-
not fully discern the things he perceives outwardly from
ing on it from above. Hence there is no abstraction from
those he sees in imagination. Hence Augustine says (Gen.
the senses when the prophet’s mind is led to judge or coor-
ad lit. xii, 12): “Those images of bodies which are formed
dinate matters relating to objects of sense, but only when
in the soul are seen just as bodily things themselves are
the mind is raised to the contemplation of certain more
seen by the body, so that we see with our eyes one who
lofty things.
is present, and at the same time we see with the soul one
Reply to Objection 4.
The spirit of the prophets
who is absent, as though we saw him with our eyes.”
is said to be subject to the prophets as regards the
Yet this abstraction from the senses takes place in the
prophetic utterances to which the Apostle refers in the
prophets without subverting the order of nature, as is the
words quoted; because, to wit, the prophets in declar-
case with those who are possessed or out of their senses;
ing what they have seen speak their own mind, and are
but is due to some well-ordered cause. This cause may be
not thrown off their mental balance, like persons who are
natural—for instance, sleep—or spiritual—for instance,
possessed, as Priscilla and Montanus maintained. But as
the intenseness of the prophets’ contemplation; thus we
regards the prophetic revelation itself, it would be more
read of Peter (Acts 10:9) that while he was praying in the
correct to say that the prophets are subject to the. spirit of
supper-room∗ “he fell into an ecstasy”—or he may be car-
prophecy, i.e. to the prophetic gift.
ried away by the Divine power, according to the saying of
Whether prophets always know the things which they prophesy?
IIa IIae q. 173 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the prophets always
in itself. Therefore it would seem that the prophet is first
know the things which they prophesy. For, as Augus-
enlightened so as to know what he declares to others.
tine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), “those to whom signs
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 11:51): “And this
were shown in spirit by means of the likenesses of bod-
he” (Caiphas) “spoke, not of himself, but being the High
ily things, had not the gift of prophecy, unless the mind
Priest of that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for
was brought into action, so that those signs were also un-
the nation,” etc. Now Caiphas knew this not. Therefore
derstood by them.” Now what is understood cannot be
not every prophet knows what he prophesies.
unknown. Therefore the prophet is not ignorant of what
I answer that, In prophetic revelation the prophet’s
he prophesies.
mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, as an instrument that
Objection 2. Further, the light of prophecy surpasses
is deficient in regard to the principal agent. Now the
the light of natural reason. Now one who possesses a
prophet’s mind is moved not only to apprehend some-
science by his natural light, is not ignorant of his scien-
thing, but also to speak or to do something; sometimes
tific acquirements. Therefore he who utters things by the
indeed to all these three together, sometimes to two, some-
prophetic light cannot ignore them.
times to one only, and in each case there may be a defect
Objection 3. Further, prophecy is directed for man’s
in the prophet’s knowledge. For when the prophet’s mind
enlightenment; wherefore it is written (2 Pet. 1:19): “We
is moved to think or apprehend a thing, sometimes he is
have the more firm prophetical word, whereunto you do
led merely to apprehend that thing, and sometimes he is
well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place.”
further led to know that it is divinely revealed to him.
Now nothing can enlighten others unless it be lightsome
Again, sometimes the prophet’s mind is moved to
∗ Vulg.: ‘the house-top’ or ‘upper-chamber’
1967
speak something, so that he understands what the Holy Accordingly, when a man knows that he is being
Ghost means by the words he utters; like David who said
moved by the Holy Ghost to think something, or sig-
(2 Kings 23:2): “The Spirit of the Lord hath spoken by
nify something by word or deed, this belongs properly to
me”; while, on the other hand, sometimes the person
prophecy; whereas when he is moved, without his know-
whose mind is moved to utter certain words knows not
ing it, this is not perfect prophecy, but a prophetic instinct.
what the Holy Ghost means by them, as was the case with
Nevertheless it must be observed that since the prophet’s
Caiphas (Jn. 11:51).
mind is a defective instrument, as stated above, even true
Again, when the Holy Ghost moves a man’s mind to
prophets know not all that the Holy Ghost means by the
do something, sometimes the latter understands the mean-
things they see, or speak, or even do.
ing of it, like Jeremias who hid his loin-cloth in the Eu-
And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections,
phrates (Jer. 13:1-11); while sometimes he does not un-
since the arguments given at the beginning refer to true
derstand it—thus the soldiers, who divided Christ’s gar-
prophets whose minds are perfectly enlightened from
ments, understood not the meaning of what they did.
above.
1968
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 174
Of the Division of Prophecy
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the division of prophecy, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) The division of prophecy into its species;
(2) Whether the more excellent prophecy is that which is without imaginative vision?
(3) The various degrees of prophecy;
(4) Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets?
(5) Whether a comprehensor can be a prophet?
(6) Whether prophecy advanced in perfection as time went on?
Whether prophecy is fittingly divided into the prophecy of divine predestination, of IIa IIae q. 174 a. 1
foreknowledge, and of denunciation?
Objection 1. It would seem that prophecy is unfit-
The fourth kind is from the midst of a cloud: thus God
tingly divided according to a gloss on Mat. 1:23, “Be-
spake to Moses. The fifth kind is a voice from heaven, as
hold a virgin shall be with child,” where it is stated that
that which called to Abraham saying (Gn. 22:11): ‘Lay
“one kind of prophecy proceeds from the Divine predes-
not thy hand upon the boy.’ The sixth kind is taking up a
tination, and must in all respects be accomplished so that
parable, as in the example of Balaam (Num. 23:7; 24:15).
its fulfillment is independent of our will, for instance the
The seventh kind is the fullness of the Holy Ghost, as in
one in question. Another prophecy proceeds from God’s
the case of nearly all the prophets.” Further, he mentions
foreknowledge: and into this our will enters. And another
three kinds of vision; “one by the eyes of the body, an-
prophecy is called denunciation, which is significative of
other by the soul’s imagination, a third by the eyes of the
God’s disapproval.” For that which results from every
mind.” Now these are not included in the aforesaid divi-
prophecy should not be reckoned a part of prophecy. Now
sion. Therefore it is insufficient.
all prophecy is according to the Divine foreknowledge,
On the contrary, stands the authority of Jerome to
since the prophets “read in the book of foreknowledge,”
whom the gloss above quoted is ascribed.
as a gloss says on Is. 38:1. Therefore it would seem that
I answer that, The species of moral habits and acts
prophecy according to foreknowledge should not be reck-
are distinguished according to their objects. Now the ob-
oned a species of prophecy.
ject of prophecy is something known by God and surpass-
Objection 2. Further, just as something is foretold
ing the faculty of man. Wherefore, according to the dif-
in denunciation, so is something foretold in promise, and
ference of such things, prophecy is divided into various
both of these are subject to alteration. For it is written
species, as assigned above. Now it has been stated above
(Jer. 18:7,8): “I will suddenly speak against a nation and
(q. 71, a. 6, ad 2) that the future is contained in the Divine
against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to
knowledge in two ways. First, as in its cause: and thus we
destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall
have the prophecy of “denunciation,” which is not always
repent of their evil, I also will repent”—and this pertains
fulfilled. but it foretells the relation of cause to effect,
to the prophecy of denunciation, and afterwards the text
which is sometimes hindered by some other occurrence
continues in reference to the prophecy of promise (Jer.
supervening. Secondly, God foreknows certain things in
18:9,10): “I will suddenly speak of a nation and of a king-
themselves—either as to be accomplished by Himself,
dom, to build up and plant it. If it shall do evil in My
and of such things is the prophecy of “predestination,”
sight. . . I will repent of the good that I have spoken to do
since, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30),
unto it.” Therefore as there is reckoned to be a prophecy
“God predestines things which are not in our power”—
of denunciation, so should there be a prophecy of promise.
or as to be accomplished through man’s free-will, and of
Objection 3. Further, Isidore says (Etym. vii, 8):
such is the prophecy of “foreknowledge.” This may regard
“There are seven kinds of prophecy. The first is an ec-
either good or evil, which does not apply to the prophecy
stasy, which is the transport of the mind: thus Peter saw a
of predestination, since the latter regards good alone. And
vessel descending from heaven with all manner of beasts
since predestination is comprised under foreknowledge,
therein. The second kind is a vision, as we read in Isa-
the gloss in the beginning of the Psalter assigns only two
ias, who says (Is. 6:1): ‘I saw the Lord sitting,’ etc. The
species to prophecy, namely of “foreknowledge,” and of
third kind is a dream: thus Jacob in a dream, saw a ladder.
“denunciation.”
1969
Reply to Objection 1.
Foreknowledge, properly
prophetic current is received. Thus as regards the enlight-
speaking, denotes precognition of future events in them-
ening of the intellect there is the “fullness of the Holy
selves, and in this sense it is reckoned a species of
Ghost” which he mentions in the seventh place. As to
prophecy. But in so far as it is used in connection with fu-
the imprinting of pictures on the imagination he mentions
ture events, whether as in themselves, or as in their causes,
three, namely “dreams,” to which he gives the third place;
it is common to every species of prophecy.
“vision,” which occurs to the prophet while awake and re-
Reply to Objection 2. The prophecy of promise is
gards any kind of ordinary object, and this he puts in the
included in the prophecy of denunciation, because the as-
second place; and “ecstasy,” which results from the mind
pect of truth is the same in both. But it is denominated
being uplifted to certain lofty things, and to this he as-
in preference from denunciation, because God is more
signs the first place. As regards sensible signs he reckons
inclined to remit punishment than to withdraw promised
three kinds of prophecy, because a sensible sign is—either
blessings.
a corporeal thing offered externally to the sight, such as
Reply to Objection 3. Isidore divides prophecy ac-
“a cloud,” which he mentions in the fourth place—or a
cording to the manner of prophesying. Now we may dis-
“voice” sounding from without and conveyed to man’s
tinguish the manner of prophesying—either according to
hearing—this he puts in the fifth place—or a voice pro-
man’s cognitive powers, which are sense, imagination,
ceeding from a man, conveying something under a simili-
and intellect, and then we have the three kinds of vision
tude, and this pertains to the “parable” to which he assigns
mentioned both by him and by Augustine (Gen. ad lit.
the sixth place.
xii, 6,7)—or according to the different ways in which the
Whether the prophecy which is accompanied by intellective and imaginative vision is IIa IIae q. 174 a. 2
more excellent than that which is accompanied by intellective vision alone?
Objection 1. It would seem that the prophecy which
cred veils.” Now the prophetic revelation is conveyed by
has intellective and imaginative vision is more excellent
the infusion of the divine ray. Therefore it seems that it
than that which is accompanied by intellective vision
cannot be without the veils of phantasms.
alone. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9): “He is
On the contrary, A gloss says at the beginning of
less a prophet, who sees in spirit nothing but the signs
the Psalter that “the most excellent manner of prophecy
representative of things, by means of the images of things
is when a man prophesies by the mere inspiration of the
corporeal: he is more a prophet, who is merely endowed
Holy Ghost, apart from any outward assistance of deed,
with the understanding of these signs; but most of all is
word, vision, or dream.”
he a prophet, who excels in both ways,” and this refers to
I answer that, The excellence of the means is mea-
the prophet who has intellective together with imaginative
sured chiefly by the end. Now the end of prophecy is
vision. Therefore this kind of prophecy is more excellent.
the manifestation of a truth that surpasses the faculty of
Objection 2.
Further, the greater a thing’s power
man. Wherefore the more effective this manifestation is,
is, the greater the distance to which it extends.
Now
the more excellent the prophecy. But it is evident that the
the prophetic light pertains chiefly to the mind, as stated
manifestation of divine truth by means of the bare contem-
above (q. 173, a. 2). Therefore apparently the prophecy
plation of the truth itself, is more effective than that which
that extends to the imagination is greater than that which
is conveyed under the similitude of corporeal things, for
is confined to the intellect.
it approaches nearer to the heavenly vision whereby the
Objection 3. Further, Jerome (Prol. in Lib. Reg.) dis-
truth is seen in God’s essence. Hence it follows that the
tinguishes the “prophets” from the “sacred writers.” Now
prophecy whereby a supernatural truth is seen by intellec-
all those whom he calls prophets (such as Isaias, Jeremias,
tual vision, is more excellent than that in which a super-
and the like) had intellective together with imaginative vi-
natural truth is manifested by means of the similitudes of
sion: but not those whom he calls sacred writers, as writ-
corporeal things in the vision of the imagination.
ing by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost (such as Job,
Moreover the prophet’s mind is shown thereby to be
David, Solomon, and the like). Therefore it would seem
more lofty: even as in human teaching the hearer, who
more proper to call prophets those who had intellective
is able to grasp the bare intelligible truth the master pro-
together with imaginative vision, than those who had in-
pounds, is shown to have a better understanding than one
tellective vision alone.
who needs to be taken by the hand and helped by means of
Objection 4. Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i)
examples taken from objects of sense. Hence it is said in
that “it is impossible for the Divine ray to shine on us,
commendation of David’s prophecy (2 Kings 23:3): “The
except as screened round about by the many-colored sa-
strong one of Israel spoke to me,” and further on (2 Kings
1970
23:4): “As the light of the morning, when the sun riseth, excellent than the knowledge of the wayfarer, although
shineth in the morning without clouds.”
faith is more properly predicated of the latter knowledge,
Reply to Objection 1. When a particular supernatural
because faith implies an imperfection of knowledge. In
truth has to be revealed by means of corporeal images, he
like manner prophecy implies a certain obscurity, and re-
that has both, namely the intellectual light and the imag-
moteness from the intelligible truth; wherefore the name
inary vision, is more a prophet than he that has only one,
of prophet is more properly applied to those who see by
because his prophecy is more perfect; and it is in this sense
imaginary vision. And yet the more excellent prophecy is
that Augustine speaks as quoted above. Nevertheless the
that which is conveyed by intellectual vision, provided the
prophecy in which the bare intelligible truth is revealed is
same truth be revealed in either case. If, however, the in-
greater than all.
tellectual light be divinely infused in a person, not that he
Reply to Objection 2. The same judgment does not
may know some supernatural things, but that he may be
apply to things that are sought for their own sake, as to
able to judge, with the certitude of divine truth, of things
things sought for the sake of something else. For in things
that can be known by human reason, such intellectual
sought for their own sake, the agent’s power is the more
prophecy is beneath that which is conveyed by an imag-
effective according as it extends to more numerous and
inary vision leading to a supernatural truth. It was this
more remote objects; even so a physician is thought more
kind of prophecy that all those had who are included in the
of, if he is able to heal more people, and those who are
ranks of the prophets, who moreover were called prophets
further removed from health. on the other hand, in things
for the special reason that they exercised the prophetic
sought only for the sake of something else, that agent
calling officially. Hence they spoke as God’s representa-
would seem to have greater power, who is able to achieve
tives, saying to the people: “Thus saith the Lord”: but not
his purpose with fewer means and those nearest to hand:
so the authors of the “sacred writings,” several of whom
thus more praise is awarded the physician who is able to
treated more frequently of things that can be known by
heal a sick person by means of fewer and more gentle
human reason, not in God’s name, but in their own, yet
remedies. Now, in the prophetic knowledge, imaginary
with the assistance of the Divine light withal.
vision is required, not for its own sake, but on account
Reply to Objection 4. In the present life the enlight-
of the manifestation of the intelligible truth. Wherefore
enment by the divine ray is not altogether without any veil
prophecy is all the more excellent according as it needs it
of phantasms, because according to his present state of life
less.
it is unnatural to man not to understand without a phan-
Reply to Objection 3. The fact that a particular predi-
tasm. Sometimes, however, it is sufficient to have phan-
cate is applicable to one thing and less properly to another,
tasms abstracted in the usual way from the senses with-
does not prevent this latter from being simply better than
out any imaginary vision divinely vouchsafed, and thus
the former: thus the knowledge of the blessed is more
prophetic vision is said to be without imaginary vision.
Whether the degrees of prophecy can be distinguished according to the imaginary IIa IIae q. 174 a. 3
vision?
Objection 1.
It would seem that the degrees of
consists of words, deeds, dreams, and visions. Therefore
prophecy cannot be distinguished according to the imag-
the degrees of prophecy should not be distinguished ac-
inary vision. For the degrees of a thing bear relation to
cording to imaginary vision, to which vision and dreams
something that is on its own account, not on account of
pertain, rather than according to words and deeds.
something else. Now, in prophecy, intellectual vision is
On the contrary, The medium differentiates the de-
sought on its own account, and imaginary vision on ac-
grees of knowledge: thus science based on direct† proofs
count of something else, as stated above (a. 2, ad 2).
is more excellent than science based on indirect‡ premises
Therefore it would seem that the degrees of prophecy are
or than opinion, because it comes through a more ex-
distinguished not according to imaginary, but only accord-
cellent medium.
Now imaginary vision is a kind of
ing to intellectual, vision.
medium in prophetic knowledge. Therefore the degrees
Objection 2. Further, seemingly for one prophet there
of prophecy should be distinguished according to imagi-
is one degree of prophecy. Now one prophet receives rev-
nary vision.
elation through various imaginary visions. Therefore a
I answer that, As stated above (q. 173, a. 2), the
difference of imaginary visions does not entail a differ-
prophecy wherein, by the intelligible light, a supernatural
ence of prophecy.
truth is revealed through an imaginary vision, holds the
Objection 3. Further, according to a gloss∗, prophecy
mean between the prophecy wherein a supernatural truth
∗ Cassiodorus, super Prolog. Hieron. in Psalt.
† “Propter quid”
‡ “Quia”
1971
is revealed without imaginary vision, and that wherein excellent, according as the signs are more expressive, for
through the intelligible light and without an imaginary
instance when Jeremias saw the burning of the city un-
vision, man is directed to know or do things pertaining
der the figure of a boiling cauldron (Jer. 1:13). Thirdly,
to human conduct. Now knowledge is more proper to
it is evidently a still higher degree of prophecy when a
prophecy than is action; wherefore the lowest degree of
prophet not only sees signs of words or deeds, but also,
prophecy is when a man, by an inward instinct, is moved
either awake or asleep, sees someone speaking or show-
to perform some outward action. Thus it is related of
ing something to him, since this proves the prophet’s mind
Samson (Judges 15:14) that “the Spirit of the Lord came
to have approached nearer to the cause of the revelation.
strongly upon him, and as the flax§ is wont to be con-
Fourthly, the height of a degree of prophecy may be mea-
sumed at the approach of fire, so the bands with which
sured according to the appearance of the person seen: for
he was bound were broken and loosed.” The second de-
it is a higher degree of prophecy, if he who speaks or
gree of prophecy is when a man is enlightened by an
shows something to the waking or sleeping prophet be
inward light so as to know certain things, which, how-
seen by him under the form of an angel, than if he be seen
ever, do not go beyond the bounds of natural knowledge:
by him under the form of man: and higher still is it, if he
thus it is related of Solomon (3 Kings 4:32,33) that “he
be seen by the prophet whether asleep or awake, under the
spoke. . . parables. . . and he treated about trees from the
appearance of God, according to Is. 6:1, “I saw the Lord
cedar that is in Libanus unto the hyssop that cometh out of
sitting.”
the wall, and he discoursed of beasts and of fowls, and of
But above all these degrees there is a third kind of
creeping things and of fishes”: and all of this came from
prophecy, wherein an intelligible and supernatural truth
divine inspiration, for it was stated previously (3 Kings
is shown without any imaginary vision. However, this
4:29): “God gave to Solomon wisdom and understanding
goes beyond the bounds of prophecy properly so called,
exceeding much.”
as stated above (a. 2, ad 3); and consequently the degrees
Nevertheless these two degrees are beneath prophecy
of prophecy are properly distinguished according to imag-
properly so called, because they do not attain to super-
inary vision.
natural truth. The prophecy wherein supernatural truth is
Reply to Objection 1. We are unable to know how to
manifested through imaginary vision is differentiated first
distinguish the intellectual light, except by means of imag-
according to the difference between dreams which occur
inary or sensible signs. Hence the difference in the intel-
during sleep, and vision which occurs while one is awake.
lectual light is gathered from the difference in the things
The latter belongs to a higher degree of prophecy, since
presented to the imagination.
the prophetic light that draws the soul away to supernat-
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 171, a. 2),
ural things while it is awake and occupied with sensible
prophecy is by way, not of an abiding habit, but of a tran-
things would seem to be stronger than that which finds a
sitory passion; wherefore there is nothing inconsistent if
man’s soul asleep and withdrawn from objects of sense.
one and the same prophet, at different times, receive vari-
Secondly the degrees of this prophecy are differentiated
ous degrees of prophetic revelation.
according to the expressiveness of the imaginary signs
Reply to Objection 3. The words and deeds men-
whereby the intelligible truth is conveyed.
And since
tioned there do not pertain to the prophetic revelation,
words are the most expressive signs of intelligible truth,
but to the announcement, which is made according to the
it would seem to be a higher degree of prophecy when
disposition of those to whom that which is revealed to
the prophet, whether awake or asleep, hears words ex-
the prophet is announced; and this is done sometimes by
pressive of an intelligible truth, than when he sees things
words, sometimes by deeds. Now this announcement, and
significative of truth, for instance “the seven full ears of
the working of miracles, are something consequent upon
corn” signified “seven years of plenty” (Gn. 41:22,26).
prophecy, as stated above (q. 171, a. 1).
In such like signs prophecy would seem to be the more
Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets?
IIa IIae q. 174 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that Moses was not the
by Josue, who made the sun and moon to stand still (Josh.
greatest of the prophets. For a gloss at the beginning of
10:12-14), and by Isaias, who made the sun to turn back
the Psalter says that “David is called the prophet by way
(Is. 38:8), than by Moses, who divided the Red Sea (Ex.
of excellence.” Therefore Moses was not the greatest of
14:21). In like manner greater miracles were wrought
all.
by Elias, of whom it is written (Ecclus. 48:4,5): “Who
Objection 2. Further, greater miracles were wrought
can glory like to thee?
Who raisedst up a dead man
§ ‘Lina.’ St. Thomas apparently read ‘ligna’ (‘wood’)
1972
from below.” Therefore Moses was not the greatest of the to his friend.” Thirdly, as regards the working of mira-prophets.
cles which he wrought on a whole nation of unbelievers.
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Mat. 11:11) that
Wherefore it is written (Dt. 34:10,11): “There arose no
“there hath not risen, among them that are born of women,
more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord
a greater than John the Baptist.” Therefore Moses was not
knew face to face: in all the signs and wonders, which He
greater than all the prophets.
sent by him, to do in the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, and to
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 34:10): “There
all his servants, and to his whole land.”
arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses.”
Reply to Objection 1. The prophecy of David ap-
I answer that, Although in some respect one or other
proaches near to the vision of Moses, as regards the in-
of the prophets was greater than Moses, yet Moses was
tellectual vision, because both received a revelation of in-
simply the greatest of all. For, as stated above (a. 3;
telligible and supernatural truth, without any imaginary
q. 171, a. 1), in prophecy we may consider not only the
vision. Yet the vision of Moses was more excellent as re-
knowledge, whether by intellectual or by imaginary vi-
gards the knowledge of the Godhead; while David more
sion, but also the announcement and the confirmation by
fully knew and expressed the mysteries of Christ’s incar-
miracles. Accordingly Moses was greater than the other
nation.
prophets. First, as regards the intellectual vision, since he
Reply to Objection 2. These signs of the prophets
saw God’s very essence, even as Paul in his rapture did,
mentioned were greater as to the substance of the thing
according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27). Hence it
done; yet the miracles of Moses were greater as regards
is written (Num. 12:8) that he saw God “plainly and not
the way in which they were done, since they were wrought
by riddles.” Secondly, as regards the imaginary vision,
on a whole people.
which he had at his call, as it were, for not only did he hear
Reply to Objection 3. John belongs to the New Tes-
words, but also saw one speaking to him under the form
tament, whose ministers take precedence even of Moses,
of God, and this not only while asleep, but even when he
since they are spectators of a fuller revelation, as stated in
was awake. Hence it is written (Ex. 33:11) that “the Lord
2 Cor. 3.
spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak
Whether there is a degree of prophecy in the blessed?
IIa IIae q. 174 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that there is a degree
in two ways. First, on the part of the knowledge itself,
of prophecy in the blessed. For, as stated above (a. 4),
because, to wit, the supernatural truth is not known in it-
Moses saw the Divine essence, and yet he is called a
self, but in some of its effects; and this truth will be more
prophet. Therefore in like manner the blessed can be
remote if it be known by means of images of corporeal
called prophets.
things, than if it be known in its intelligible effects; and
Objection 2. Further, prophecy is a “divine revela-
such most of all is the prophetic vision, which is conveyed
tion.” Now divine revelations are made even to the blessed
by images and likenesses of corporeal things. Secondly,
angels. Therefore even blessed angels can be prophets.
vision is remote on the part of the seer, because, to wit, he
Objection 3.
Further, Christ was a comprehensor
has not yet attained completely to his ultimate perfection,
from the moment of His conception; and yet He calls
according to 2 Cor. 5:6, “While we are in the body, we
Himself a prophet (Mat.
13:57), when He says: “A
are absent from the Lord.”
prophet is not without honor, save in his own country.”
Now in neither of these ways are the blessed remote;
Therefore even comprehensors and the blessed can be
wherefore they cannot be called prophets.
called prophets.
Reply to Objection 1. This vision of Moses was in-
Objection 4. Further, it is written of Samuel (Ecclus.
terrupted after the manner of a passion, and was not per-
46:23): “He lifted up his voice from the earth in prophecy
manent like the beatific vision, wherefore he was as yet a
to blot out the wickedness of the nation.” Therefore other
seer from afar. For this reason his vision did not entirely
saints can likewise be called prophets after they have died.
lose the character of prophecy.
On the contrary, The prophetic word is compared (2
Reply to Objection 2. The divine revelation is made
Pet. 1:19) to a “light that shineth in a dark place.” Now
to the angels, not as being far distant, but as already
there is no darkness in the blessed. Therefore they cannot
wholly united to God; wherefore their revelation has not
be called prophets.
the character of prophecy.
I answer that, Prophecy denotes vision of some su-
Reply to Objection 3. Christ was at the same time
pernatural truth as being far remote from us. This happens
comprehensor and wayfarer∗. Consequently the notion of
∗ Cf. IIIa, Qq. 9, seqq.
1973
prophecy is not applicable to Him as a comprehensor, but be done by the power of God, so that when the demon is
only as a wayfarer.
consulted, God Himself declares the truth by His messen-
Reply to Objection 4. Samuel had not yet attained
ger: even as He gave a true answer by Elias to the King’s
to the state of blessedness. Wherefore although by God’s
messengers who were sent to consult the god of Accaron
will the soul itself of Samuel foretold to Saul the issue of
(4 Kings 1).
the war as revealed to him by God, this pertains to the na-
It might also be replied∗ that it was not the soul of
ture of prophecy. It is not the same with the saints who are
Samuel, but a demon impersonating him; and that the
now in heaven. Nor does it make any difference that this
wise man calls him Samuel, and describes his prediction
is stated to have been brought about by the demons’ art,
as prophetic, in accordance with the thoughts of Saul and
because although the demons are unable to evoke the soul
the bystanders who were of this opinion.
of a saint, or to force it to do any particular thing, this can Whether the degrees of prophecy change as time goes on?
IIa IIae q. 174 a. 6
Objection 1.
It would seem that the degrees of
true knowledge of God, according to Heb. 11:6, “He that
prophecy change as time goes on. For prophecy is di-
cometh to God must believe that He is”; secondly, in the
rected to the knowledge of Divine things, as stated above
mystery of Christ’s incarnation, according to Jn. 14:1,
(a. 2). Now according to Gregory (Hom. in Ezech.),
“You believe in God, believe also in Me.” Accordingly,
“knowledge of God went on increasing as time went on.”
if we speak of prophecy as directed to the Godhead as
Therefore degrees of prophecy should be distinguished
its end, it progressed according to three divisions of time,
according to the process of time.
namely before the law, under the law, and under grace.
Objection 2.
Further, prophetic revelation is con-
For before the law, Abraham and the other patriarchs were
veyed by God speaking to man; while the prophets de-
prophetically taught things pertinent to faith in the God-
clared both in words and in writing the things revealed to
head. Hence they are called prophets, according to Ps.
them. Now it is written (1 Kings 3:1) that before the time
104:15, “Do no evil to My prophets,” which words are
of Samuel “the word of the Lord was precious,” i.e. rare;
said especially on behalf of Abraham and Isaac. Under
and yet afterwards it was delivered to many. In like man-
the Law prophetic revelation of things pertinent to faith in
ner the books of the prophets do not appear to have been
the Godhead was made in a yet more excellent way than
written before the time of Isaias, to whom it was said (Is.
hitherto, because then not only certain special persons or
8:1): “Take thee a great book and write in it with a man’s
families but the whole people had to be instructed in these
pen,” after which many prophets wrote their prophecies.
matters. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2,3): “I am
Therefore it would seem that in course of time the degree
the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Ja-
of prophecy made progress.
cob, by the name of God almighty, and My name Adonai
Objection 3. Further, our Lord said (Mat. 11:13):
I did not show to them”; because previously the patriarchs
“The prophets and the law prophesied until John”; and af-
had been taught to believe in a general way in God, one
terwards the gift of prophecy was in Christ’s disciples in a
and Almighty, while Moses was more fully instructed in
much more excellent manner than in the prophets of old,
the simplicity of the Divine essence, when it was said to
according to Eph. 3:5, “In other generations” the mystery
him (Ex. 3:14): “I am Who am”; and this name is sig-
of Christ “was not known to the sons of men, as it is now
nified by Jews in the word “Adonai” on account of their
revealed to His holy apostles and prophets in the Spirit.”
veneration for that unspeakable name. Afterwards in the
Therefore it would seem that in course of time the degree
time of grace the mystery of the Trinity was revealed by
of prophecy advanced.
the Son of God Himself, according to Mat. 28:19: “Go-
On the contrary, As stated above (a. 4), Moses was
ing. . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of
the greatest of the prophets, and yet he preceded the other
the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.”
prophets. Therefore prophecy did not advance in degree
In each state, however, the most excellent revelation
as time went on.
was that which was given first. Now the first revelation,
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), prophecy is di-
before the Law, was given to Abraham, for it was at that
rected to the knowledge of Divine truth, by the contem-
time that men began to stray from faith in one God by
plation of which we are not only instructed in faith, but
turning aside to idolatry, whereas hitherto no such rev-
also guided in our actions, according to Ps. 42:3, “Send
elation was necessary while all persevered in the wor-
forth Thy light and Thy truth: they have conducted me.”
ship of one God. A less excellent revelation was made
Now our faith consists chiefly in two things: first, in the
to Isaac, being founded on that which was made to Abra-
∗ The Book of Ecclesiasticus was not as yet declared by the Church to be Canonical Scripture; Cf. Ia, q. 89, a. 8, ad 2
1974
ham. Wherefore it was said to him (Gn. 26:24): “I am the Whom were to be fulfilled the promises made through the
God of Abraham thy father,” and in like manner to Jacob
prophetic oracles testifying in word and writing to that
(Gn. 28:13): “I am the God of Abraham thy father, and the
great event to come,” the promises, namely, which were
God of Isaac.” Again in the state of the Law the first reve-
made to Abraham. “For while prophets were scarcely ever
lation which was given to Moses was more excellent, and
lacking to the people of Israel from the time that they be-
on this revelation all the other revelations to the prophets
gan to have kings, it was exclusively for their benefit, not
were founded. And so, too, in the time of grace the entire
for that of the nations. But when those prophetic writings
faith of the Church is founded on the revelation vouch-
were being set up with greater publicity, which at some
safed to the apostles, concerning the faith in one God and
future time were to benefit the nations, it was fitting to be-
three Persons, according to Mat. 16:18, “On this rock,”
gin when this city,” Rome to wit, “was being built, which
i.e. of thy confession, “I will build My Church.”
was to govern the nations.”
As to the faith in Christ’s incarnation, it is evident
The reason why it behooved that nation to have a num-
that the nearer men were to Christ, whether before or af-
ber of prophets especially at the time of the kings, was that
ter Him, the more fully, for the most part, were they in-
then it was not over-ridden by other nations, but had its
structed on this point, and after Him more fully than be-
own king; wherefore it behooved the people, as enjoying
fore, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 3:5).
liberty, to have prophets to teach them what to do.
As regards the guidance of human acts, the prophetic
Reply to Objection 3. The prophets who foretold the
revelation varied not according to the course of time, but
coming of Christ could not continue further than John,
according as circumstances required, because as it is writ-
who with his finger pointed to Christ actually present.
ten (Prov. 29:18), “When prophecy shall fail, the people
Nevertheless as Jerome says on this passage, “This does
shall be scattered abroad.” Wherefore at all times men
not mean that there were no more prophets after John. For
were divinely instructed about what they were to do, ac-
we read in the Acts of the apostles that Agabus and the
cording as it was expedient for the spiritual welfare of the
four maidens, daughters of Philip, prophesied.” John, too,
elect.
wrote a prophetic book about the end of the Church; and at
Reply to Objection 1. The saying of Gregory is to be
all times there have not been lacking persons having the
referred to the time before Christ’s incarnation, as regards
spirit of prophecy, not indeed for the declaration of any
the knowledge of this mystery.
new doctrine of faith, but for the direction of human acts.
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Civ.
Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 26) that “the em-
Dei xviii, 27), “just as in the early days of the Assyrian
peror Theodosius sent to John who dwelt in the Egyptian
kingdom promises were made most explicitly to Abra-
desert, and whom he knew by his ever-increasing fame to
ham, so at the outset of the western Babylon,” which
be endowed with the prophetic spirit: and from him he
is Rome, “and under its sway Christ was to come, in
received a message assuring him of victory.”
1975
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 175
Of Rapture
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider rapture. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine?
(2) Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive or to the appetitive power?
(3) Whether Paul when in rapture saw the essence of God?
(4) Whether he was withdrawn from his senses?
(5) Whether, when in that state, his soul was wholly separated from his body?
(6) What did he know, and what did he not know about this matter?
Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine?
IIa IIae q. 175 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of man is
Accordingly man’s soul also is said to be carried away,
not carried away to things divine. For some define rap-
in a twofold manner, to that which is contrary to its nature:
ture as “an uplifting by the power of a higher nature, from
in one way, as regards the term of transport—as when it
that which is according to nature to that which is above
is carried away to punishment, according to Ps. 49:22,
nature”∗. Now it is in accordance with man’s nature that
“Lest He snatch you away, and there be none to deliver
he be uplifted to things divine; for Augustine says at the
you”; in another way, as regards the manner connatural to
beginning of his Confessions: “Thou madest us, Lord,
man, which is that he should understand the truth through
for Thyself, and our heart is restless, till it rest in Thee.”
sensible things. Hence when he is withdrawn from the
Therefore man’s soul is not carried away to things divine.
apprehension of sensibles, he is said to be carried away,
Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii)
even though he be uplifted to things whereunto he is di-
that “God’s justice is seen in this that He treats all things
rected naturally: provided this be not done intentionally,
according to their mode and dignity.” But it is not in ac-
as when a man betakes himself to sleep which is in ac-
cordance with man’s mode and worth that he be raised
cordance with nature, wherefore sleep cannot be called
above what he is according to nature. Therefore it would
rapture, properly speaking.
seem that man’s soul is not carried away to things divine.
This withdrawal, whatever its term may be, may arise
Objection 3.
Further, rapture denotes violence of
from a threefold cause. First, from a bodily cause, as
some kind. But God rules us not by violence or force,
happens to those who suffer abstraction from the senses
as Damascene says†. Therefore man’s soul is not carried
through weakness: secondly, by the power of the demons,
away to things divine.
as in those who are possessed: thirdly, by the power of
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:2): “I
God. In this last sense we are now speaking of rapture,
know a man in Christ. . . rapt even to the third heaven.” On
whereby a man is uplifted by the spirit of God to things
which words a gloss says: “Rapt, that is to say, uplifted
supernatural, and withdrawn from his senses, according
contrary to nature.”
to Ezech. 8:3, “The spirit lifted me up between the earth
I answer that, Rapture denotes violence of a kind as
and the heaven, and brought me in the vision of God into
stated above (obj. 3); and “the violent is that which has
Jerusalem.”
its principle without, and in which he that suffers violence
It must be observed, however, that sometimes a person
concurs not at all” (Ethic. iii, 1). Now everything concurs
is said to be carried away, not only through being with-
in that to which it tends in accordance with its proper incli-
drawn from his senses, but also through being withdrawn
nation, whether voluntary or natural. Wherefore he who
from the things to which he was attending, as when a per-
is carried away by some external agent, must be carried
son’s mind wanders contrary to his purpose. But this is to
to something different from that to which his inclination
use the expression in a less proper signification.
tends. This difference arises in two ways: in one way from
Reply to Objection 1. It is natural to man to tend
the end of the inclination—for instance a stone, which is
to divine things through the apprehension of things sen-
naturally inclined to be borne downwards, may be thrown
sible, according to Rom. 1:20, “The invisible things of
upwards; in another way from the manner of tending—for
God. . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things
instance a stone may be thrown downwards with greater
that are made.” But the mode, whereby a man is uplifted
velocity than consistent with its natural movement.
to divine things and withdrawn from his senses, is not nat-
∗ Reference unknown; Cf. De Veritate xiii, 1
† De Fide Orth. ii, 30
1976
ural to man.
Reply to Objection 3.
The saying of Damascene
Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to man’s mode and
refers to those things which a man does by himself. But
dignity that he be uplifted to divine things, from the very
as to those things which are beyond the scope of the free-
fact that he is made to God’s image. And since a divine
will, man needs to be uplifted by a stronger operation,
good infinitely surpasses the faculty of man in order to at-
which in a certain respect may be called force if we con-
tain that good, he needs the divine assistance which is be-
sider the mode of operation, but not if we consider its term
stowed on him in every gift of grace. Hence it is not con-
to which man is directed both by nature and by his inten-
trary to nature, but above the faculty of nature that man’s
tion.
mind be thus uplifted in rapture by God.
Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive rather than to the appetitive power?
IIa IIae q. 175 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that rapture pertains to the
petitive power. For from the very fact that the appetite is
appetitive rather than to the cognitive power. For Diony-
strongly affected towards something, it may happen, ow-
sius says (Div. Nom. iv): “The Divine love causes ec-
ing to the violence of his affection, that a man is carried
stasy.” Now love pertains to the appetitive power. There-
away from everything else. Moreover, it has an effect on
fore so does ecstasy or rapture.
the appetitive power, when for instance a man delights in
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3) that
the things to which he is rapt. Hence the Apostle said that
“he who fed the swine debased himself by a dissipated
he was rapt, not only “to the third heaven”—which per-
mind and an unclean life; whereas Peter, when the angel
tains to the contemplation of the intellect—but also into
delivered him and carried him into ecstasy, was not beside
“paradise,” which pertains to the appetite.
himself, but above himself.” Now the prodigal son sank
Reply to Objection 1. Rapture adds something to ec-
into the depths by his appetite. Therefore in those also
stasy. For ecstasy means simply a going out of oneself
who are carried up into the heights it is the appetite that is
by being placed outside one’s proper order†; while rap-
affected.
ture denotes a certain violence in addition. Accordingly
Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Ps. 30:1, “In Thee, O
ecstasy may pertain to the appetitive power, as when a
Lord, have I hoped, let me never be confounded,” says in
man’s appetite tends to something outside him, and in
explaining the title∗: ” Ekstasis in Greek signifies in Latin this sense Dionysius says that “the Divine love causes ec-
‘excessus mentis,’ an aberration of the mind. This hap-
stasy,” inasmuch as it makes man’s appetite tend to the
pens in two ways, either through dread of earthly things
object loved. Hence he says afterwards that “even God
or through the mind being rapt in heavenly things and for-
Himself, the cause of all things, through the overflow of
getful of this lower world.” Now dread of earthly things
His loving goodness, goes outside Himself in His provi-
pertains to the appetite. Therefore rapture of the mind in
dence for all beings.” But even if this were said expressly
heavenly things, being placed in opposition to this dread,
of rapture, it would merely signify that love is the cause
also pertains to the appetite.
of rapture.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 115:2, “I said in my
Reply to Objection 2. There is a twofold appetite in
excess: Every man is a liar,” says: “We speak of ecstasy,
man; to wit, the intellective appetite which is called the
not when the mind wanders through fear, but when it is
will, and the sensitive appetite known as the sensuality.
carried aloft on the wings of revelation.” Now revelation
Now it is proper to man that his lower appetite be subject
pertains to the intellective power. Therefore ecstasy or
to the higher appetite, and that the higher move the lower.
rapture does also.
Hence man may become outside himself as regards the
I answer that, We can speak of rapture in two ways.
appetite, in two ways. In one way, when a man’s intellec-
First, with regard to the term of rapture, and thus, prop-
tive appetite tends wholly to divine things, and takes no
erly speaking, rapture cannot pertain to the appetitive, but
account of those things whereto the sensitive appetite in-
only to the cognitive power. For it was stated (a. 1) that
clines him; thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “Paul
rapture is outside the inclination of the person who is rapt;
being in ecstasy through the vehemence of Divine love”
whereas the movement of the appetitive power is an incli-
exclaimed: “I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me.”
nation to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly speak-
In another way, when a man tends wholly to things
ing, in desiring something, a man is not rapt, but is moved
pertaining to the lower appetite, and takes no account of
by himself.
his higher appetite. It is thus that “he who fed the swine
Secondly, rapture may be considered with regard to its
debased himself”; and this latter kind of going out of one-
cause, and thus it may have a cause on the part of the ap-
self, or being beside oneself, is more akin than the former
∗ Unto the end, a psalm for David, in an ecstasy
† Cf. Ia IIae, q. 28,
a. 3
1977
to the nature of rapture because the higher appetite is more affecting the appetite may cause an excess in the cognitive
proper to man. Hence when through the violence of his
power, either because the mind is carried away to certain
lower appetite a man is withdrawn from the movement of
intelligible objects, through being drawn away from ob-
his higher appetite, it is more a case of being withdrawn
jects of sense, or because it is caught up into some imagi-
from that which is proper to him. Yet, because there is no
nary vision or fanciful apparition.
violence therein, since the will is able to resist the passion, Reply to Objection 3. Just as love is a movement of
it falls short of the true nature of rapture, unless perchance
the appetite with regard to good, so fear is a movement
the passion be so strong that it takes away entirely the use
of the appetite with regard to evil. Wherefore either of
of reason, as happens to those who are mad with anger or
them may equally cause an aberration of mind; and all the
love.
more since fear arises from love, as Augustine says (De
It must be observed. however, that both these excesses
Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9).
Whether Paul, when in rapture, saw the essence of God?
IIa IIae q. 175 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that Paul, when in rap-
which it is not granted unto man to utter”: and such would
ture, did not see the essence of God. For just as we read
seem to be words pertaining to the vision of the blessed,
of Paul that he was rapt to the third heaven, so we read
which transcends the state of the wayfarer, according to
of Peter (Acts 10:10) that “there came upon him an ec-
Is. 64:4, “Eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what
stasy of mind.” Now Peter, in his ecstasy, saw not God’s
things Thou hast prepared for them that love [Vulg.: ‘wait
essence but an imaginary vision. Therefore it would seem
for’] Thee”∗. Therefore it is more becoming to hold that
that neither did Paul see the essence of God.
he saw God in His essence.
Objection 2. Further, the vision of God is beatific.
Reply to Objection 1. Man’s mind is rapt by God to
But Paul, in his rapture, was not beatified; else he would
the contemplation of divine truth in three ways. First, so
never have returned to the unhappiness of this life, but his
that he contemplates it through certain imaginary pictures,
body would have been glorified by the overflow from his
and such was the ecstasy that came upon Peter. Secondly,
soul, as will happen to the saints after the resurrection,
so that he contemplates the divine truth through its intel-
and this clearly was not the case. Therefore Paul when in
ligible effects; such was the ecstasy of David, who said
rapture saw not the essence of God.
(Ps. 115:11): “I said in my excess: Every man is a liar.”
Objection 3. Further, according to 1 Cor. 13:10-12,
Thirdly, so that he contemplates it in its essence. Such
faith and hope are incompatible with the vision of the Di-
was the rapture of Paul, as also of Moses†; and not with-
vine essence. But Paul when in this state had faith and
out reason, since as Moses was the first Teacher of the
hope. Therefore he saw not the essence of God.
Jews, so was Paul the first “Teacher of the gentiles”‡.
Objection 4. Further, as Augustine states (Gen. ad
Reply to Objection 2. The Divine essence cannot be
lit. xii, 6,7), “pictures of bodies are seen in the imaginary
seen by a created intellect save through the light of glory,
vision.” Now Paul is stated (2 Cor. 12:2,4) to have seen
of which it is written (Ps. 35:10): “In Thy light we shall
certain pictures in his rapture, for instance of the “third
see light.” But this light can be shared in two ways. First
heaven” and of “paradise.” Therefore he would seem to
by way of an abiding form, and thus it beatifies the saints
have been rapt to an imaginary vision rather than to the
in heaven. Secondly, by way of a transitory passion, as
vision of the Divine essence.
stated above (q. 171 , a. 2) of the light of prophecy; and
On the contrary, Augustine (Ep.
CXLVII, 13;
in this way that light was in Paul when he was in rap-
ad Paulin., de videndo Deum) concludes that “possibly
ture. Hence this vision did not beatify him simply, so as
God’s very substance was seen by some while yet in this
to overflow into his body, but only in a restricted sense.
life: for instance by Moses, and by Paul who in rapture
Consequently this rapture pertains somewhat to prophecy.
heard unspeakable words, which it is not granted unto
Reply to Objection 3. Since, in his rapture, Paul was
man to utter.”
beatified not as to the habit, but only as to the act of the
I answer that, Some have said that Paul, when in rap-
blessed, it follows that he had not the act of faith at the
ture, saw “not the very essence of God, but a certain re-
same time, although he had the habit.
flection of His clarity.” But Augustine clearly comes to
Reply to Objection 4. In one way by the third heaven
an opposite decision, not only in his book (De videndo
we may understand something corporeal, and thus the
Deum), but also in Gen. ad lit. xii, 28 (quoted in a gloss
third heaven denotes the empyrean§, which is described
on 2 Cor. 12:2). Indeed the words themselves of the Apos-
as the “third,” in relation to the aerial and starry heav-
tle indicate this. For he says that “he heard secret words,
ens, or better still, in relation to the aqueous and crys-
∗ 1 Cor. 2:9
† Cf. q. 174, a. 4
‡ Cf. Ia, q. 68, a. 4
§ 1 Tim. 2:7;
Cf. Ia, q. 12, a. 11, ad 2
1978
talline heavens. Moreover Paul is stated to be rapt to the and the third heaven would denote an intellectual vision
“third heaven,” not as though his rapture consisted in the
according to Augustine’s explanation (Gen. ad lit. xii,
vision of something corporeal, but because this place is
26,28,34). Secondly, the third heaven may be taken ac-
appointed for the contemplation of the blessed. Hence the
cording to the order of things knowable, the first heaven
gloss on 2 Cor. 12 says that the “third heaven is a spiri-
being “the knowledge of heavenly bodies, the second the
tual heaven, where the angels and the holy souls enjoy the
knowledge of heavenly spirits, the third the knowledge of
contemplation of God: and when Paul says that he was
God Himself.” Thirdly, the third heaven may denote the
rapt to this heaven he means that God showed him the life
contemplation of God according to the degrees of knowl-
wherein He is to be seen forevermore.”
edge whereby God is seen. The first of these degrees be-
In another way the third heaven may signify a supra-
longs to the angels of the lowest hierarchy∗, the second to
mundane vision. Such a vision may be called the third
the angels of the middle hierarchy, the third to the angels
heaven in three ways. First, according to the order of the
of the highest hierarchy, according to the gloss on 2 Cor.
cognitive powers. In this way the first heaven would indi-
12.
cate a supramundane bodily vision, conveyed through the
And since the vision of God cannot be without delight,
senses; thus was seen the hand of one writing on the wall
he says that he was not only “rapt to the third heaven” by
(Dan. 5:5); the second heaven would be an imaginary
reason of his contemplation, but also into “Paradise” by
vision such as Isaias saw, and John in the Apocalypse;
reason of the consequent delight.
Whether Paul, when in rapture, was withdrawn from his senses?
IIa IIae q. 175 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that Paul, when in rap-
vision.†”
ture, was not withdrawn from his senses. For Augustine
I answer that, The Divine essence cannot be seen by
says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28): “Why should we not believe
man through any cognitive power other than the intellect.
that when so great an apostle, the teacher of the gentiles,
Now the human intellect does not turn to intelligible ob-
was rapt to this most sublime vision, God was willing to
jects except by means of the phantasms‡ which it takes
vouchsafe him a glimpse of that eternal life which is to
from the senses through the intelligible species; and it is
take the place of the present life?” Now in that future
in considering these phantasms that the intellect judges of
life after the resurrection the saints will see the Divine
and coordinates sensible objects. Hence in any operation
essence without being withdrawn from the senses of the
that requires abstraction of the intellect from phantasms,
body. Therefore neither did such a withdrawal take place
there must be also withdrawal of the intellect from the
in Paul.
senses. Now in the state of the wayfarer it is necessary for
Objection 2. Further, Christ was truly a wayfarer,
man’s intellect, if it see God’s essence, to be withdrawn
and also enjoyed an uninterrupted vision of the Divine
from phantasms. For God’s essence cannot be seen by
essence, without, however, being withdrawn from His
means of a phantasm, nor indeed by any created intelli-
senses. Therefore there was no need for Paul to be with-
gible species§, since God’s essence infinitely transcends
drawn from his senses in order for him to see the essence
not only all bodies, which are represented by phantasms,
of God.
but also all intelligible creatures. Now when man’s in-
Objection 3. Further, after seeing God in His essence,
tellect is uplifted to the sublime vision of God’s essence,
Paul remembered what he had seen in that vision; hence
it is necessary that his mind’s whole attention should be
he said (2 Cor. 12:4): “He heard secret words, which it
summoned to that purpose in such a way that he under-
is not granted to man to utter.” Now the memory belongs
stand naught else by phantasms, and be absorbed entirely
to the sensitive faculty according to the Philosopher (De
in God. Therefore it is impossible for man while a way-
Mem. et Remin. i). Therefore it seems that Paul, while
farer to see God in His essence without being withdrawn
seeing the essence of God, was not withdrawn from his
from his senses.
senses.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 3, obj. 2),
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
after the resurrection, in the blessed who see God in His
27): “Unless a man in some way depart this life, whether
essence, there will be an overflow from the intellect to the
by going altogether out of his body or by turning away
lower powers and even to the body. Hence it is in keeping
and withdrawing from his carnal senses, so that he truly
with the rule itself of the divine vision that the soul will
knows not as the Apostle said, whether he be in the body
turn towards phantasms and sensible objects. But there is
or out of the body, he is not rapt and caught up into that
no such overflow in those who are raptured, as stated (a. 3,
∗ Cf. Ia, q. 108, a. 1
† The text of St. Augustine reads: “when he is
rapt,” etc.
‡ Cf. Ia, q. 84, a. 7
§ Cf. Ia, q. 12, a. 2
1979
obj. 2, ad 2), and consequently the comparison fails.
other wayfarers.
Reply to Objection 2. The intellect of Christ’s soul
Reply to Objection 3. Paul, after seeing God in His
was glorified by the habit of the light of glory, whereby
essence, remembered what he had known in that vision,
He saw the Divine essence much more fully than an angel
by means of certain intelligible species that remained in
or a man. He was, however, a wayfarer on account of the
his intellect by way of habit; even as in the absence of
passibility of His body, in respect of which He was “made
the sensible object, certain impressions remain in the soul
a little lower than the angels” (Heb. 2:9), by dispensation,
which it recollects when it turns to the phantasms. And so
and not on account of any defect on the part of His in-
this was the knowledge that he was unable wholly to think
tellect. Hence there is no comparison between Him and
over or express in words.
Whether, while in this state, Paul’s soul was wholly separated from his body?
IIa IIae q. 175 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that, while in this state,
that which is above nature.” Wherefore two things have to
Paul’s soul was wholly separated from his body. For the
be considered: first, what pertains to man according to na-
Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6,7): “While we are in the body
ture; secondly, what has to be done by God in man above
we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by faith, and
his nature. Now, since the soul is united to the body as its
not by sight”∗. Now, while in that state, Paul was not ab-
natural form, it belongs to the soul to have a natural dis-
sent from the Lord, for he saw Him by a species, as stated
position to understand by turning to phantasms; and this
above (a. 3). Therefore he was not in the body.
is not withdrawn by the divine power from the soul in rap-
Objection 2.
Further, a power of the soul cannot
ture, since its state undergoes no change, as stated above
be uplifted above the soul’s essence wherein it is rooted.
(a. 3, ad 2,3). Yet, this state remaining, actual conversion
Now in this rapture the intellect, which is a power of the
to phantasms and sensible objects is withdrawn from the
soul, was withdrawn from its bodily surroundings through
soul, lest it be hindered from being uplifted to that which
being uplifted to divine contemplation. Much more there-
transcends all phantasms, as stated above (a. 4). Therefore
fore was the essence of the soul separated from the body.
it was not necessary that his soul in rapture should be so
Objection 3. Further, the forces of the vegetative soul
separated from the body as to cease to be united thereto
are more material than those of the sensitive soul. Now in
as its form; and yet it was necessary for his intellect to be
order for him to be rapt to the vision of God, it was neces-
withdrawn from phantasms and the perception of sensible
sary for him to be withdrawn from the forces of the sen-
objects.
sitive soul, as stated above (a. 4). Much more, therefore,
Reply to Objection 1. In this rapture Paul was absent
was it necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces
from the Lord as regards his state, since he was still in the
of the vegetative soul. Now when these forces cease to op-
state of a wayfarer, but not as regards the act by which he
erate, the soul is no longer in any way united to the body.
saw God by a species, as stated above (a. 3, ad 2,3).
Therefore it would seem that in Paul’s rapture it was nec-
Reply to Objection 2. A faculty of the soul is not
essary for the soul to be wholly separated from the body.
uplifted by the natural power above the mode becoming
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. CXLVII, 13, ad
the essence of the soul; but it can be uplifted by the divine
Paulin.; de videndo Deum): “It is not incredible that this
power to something higher, even as a body by the violence
sublime revelation” (namely, that they should see God in
of a stronger power is lifted up above the place befitting it
His essence) “was vouchsafed certain saints, without their
according to its specific nature.
departing this life so completely as to leave nothing but
Reply to Objection 3. The forces of the vegetative
a corpse for burial.” Therefore it was not necessary for
soul do not operate through the soul being intent thereon,
Paul’s soul, when in rapture, to be wholly separated from
as do the sensitive forces, but by way of nature. Hence
his body.
in the case of rapture there is no need for withdrawal
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, obj. 1), in the
from them, as from the sensitive powers, whose opera-
rapture of which we are speaking now, man is uplifted by
tions would lessen the intentness of the soul on intellective
God’s power, “from that which is according to nature to
knowledge.
∗ ‘Per speciem,’ i.e. by an intelligible species
1980
Did Paul know whether his soul were separated from his body?
IIa IIae q. 175 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that Paul was not igno-
Now if he knew it to be really the third heaven, it follows
rant whether his soul were separated from his body. For
that either he knew it to be something spiritual and incor-
he says (2 Cor. 12:2): “I know a man in Christ rapt even
poreal, and then his body could not be rapt thither; or he
to the third heaven.” Now man denotes something com-
knew it to be something corporeal, and then his soul could
posed of soul and body; and rapture differs from death.
not be rapt thither without his body, unless it were sepa-
Seemingly therefore he knew that his soul was not sepa-
rated from his body. Consequently we must explain the
rated from his body by death, which is the more probable
matter otherwise, by saying that the Apostle knew him-
seeing that this is the common opinion of the Doctors.
self to be rapt both in soul and body, but that he ignored
Objection 2. Further, it appears from the same words
how his soul stood in relation to his body, to wit, whether
of the Apostle that he knew whither he was rapt, since it
it were accompanied by his body or not.
was “to the third heaven.” Now this shows that he knew
Here we find a diversity of opinions. For some say
whether he was in the body or not, for if he knew the third
that the Apostle knew his soul to be united to his body
heaven to be something corporeal, he must have known
as its form, but ignored whether it were abstracted from
that his soul was not separated from his body, since a cor-
its senses, or again whether it were abstracted from the
poreal thing cannot be an object of sight save through the
operations of the vegetative soul. But he could not but
body. Therefore it would seem that he was not ignorant
know that it was abstracted from the senses, seeing that
whether his soul were separated from his body.
he knew himself to be rapt; and as to his being abstracted
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
from the operation of the vegetative soul, this was not
28) that “when in rapture, he saw God with the same vi-
of such importance as to require him to be so careful in
sion as the saints see Him in heaven.” Now from the very
mentioning it. It follows, then, that the Apostle ignored
fact that the saints see God, they know whether their soul
whether his soul were united to his body as its form, or
is separated from their body. Therefore Paul too knew
separated from it by death. Some, however, granting this
this.
say that the Apostle did not consider the matter while he
On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 12:3): “Whether
was in rapture, because he was wholly intent upon God,
in the body, or out of the body, I know not, God knoweth.”
but that afterwards he questioned the point, when taking
I answer that, The true answer to this question must
cognizance of what he had seen. But this also is contrary
be gathered from the Apostle’s very words, whereby he
to the Apostle’s words, for he there distinguishes between
says he knew something, namely that he was “rapt even to
the past and what happened subsequently, since he states
the third heaven,” and that something he knew not, namely
that at the present time he knows that he was rapt “four-
“whether” he were “in the body or out of the body.” This
teen years ago,” and that at the present time he knows not
may be understood in two ways. First, the words “whether
“whether he was in the body or out of the body.”
in the body or out of the body” may refer not to the very
Consequently we must assert that both before and af-
being of the man who was rapt (as though he knew not
ter he ignored whether his soul were separated from his
whether his soul were in his body or not), but to the mode
body. Wherefore Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 5), after dis-
of rapture, so that he ignored whether his body besides his
cussing the question at length, concludes: “Perhaps then
soul, or, on the other hand, his soul alone, were rapt to the
we must infer that he ignored whether, when he was rapt
third heaven. Thus Ezechiel is stated (Ezech. 8:3) to have
to the third heaven, his soul was in his body (in the same
been “brought in the vision of God into Jerusalem.” This
way as the soul is in the body, when we speak of a living
was the explanation of a certain Jew according to Jerome
body either of a waking or of a sleeping man, or of one
(Prolog. super Daniel.), where he says that “lastly our
that is withdrawn from his bodily senses during ecstasy),
Apostle” (thus said the Jew) “durst not assert that he was
or whether his soul went out of his body altogether, so that
rapt in his body, but said: ‘Whether in the body or out of
his body lay dead.”
the body, I know not.’ ”
Reply to Objection 1. Sometimes by the figure of
Augustine, however, disapproves of this explanation
synecdoche a part of man, especially the soul which is the
(Gen.
ad lit.
xii, 3 seqq.)
for this reason that the
principal part, denotes a man. or again we might take this
Apostle states that he knew he was rapt even to the third
to mean that he whom he states to have been rapt was a
heaven. Wherefore he knew it to be really the third heaven
man not at the time of his rapture, but fourteen years af-
to which he was rapt, and not an imaginary likeness of
terwards: for he says “I know a man,” not “I know a rapt
the third heaven: otherwise if he gave the name of third
man.” Again nothing hinders death brought about by God
heaven to an imaginary third heaven, in the same way he
being called rapture; and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
might state that he was rapt in the body, meaning, by body,
xii, 3): “If the Apostle doubted the matter, who of us will
an image of his body, such as appears in one’s dreams.
dare to be certain about it?” Wherefore those who have
1981
something to say on this subject speak with more conjec-spect, namely as to the mode of seeing, because he saw
ture than certainty.
not so perfectly as do the saints in heaven. Hence Augus-
Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle knew that ei-
tine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 36): “Although, when the Apos-
ther the heaven in question was something incorporeal,
tle was rapt from his carnal senses to the third heaven, he
or that he saw something incorporeal in that heaven; yet
lacked that full and perfect knowledge of things which is
this could be done by his intellect, even without his soul
in the angels, in that he knew not whether he was in the
being separated from his body.
body, or out of the body, this will surely not be lacking af-
Reply to Objection 3. Paul’s vision, while he was in
ter reunion with the body in the resurrection of the dead,
rapture, was like the vision of the blessed in one respect,
when this corruptible will put on incorruption.”
namely as to the thing seen; and, unlike, in another re-
1982
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 176
Of the Grace of Tongues
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider those gratuitous graces that pertain to speech, and (1) the grace of tongues; (2) the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether by the grace of tongues a man acquires the knowledge of all languages?
(2) Of the comparison between this gift and the grace of prophecy.
Whether those who received the gift of tongues spoke in every language?
IIa IIae q. 176 a. 1
Objection 1. It seems that those who received the
I answer that, Christ’s first disciples were chosen
gift of tongues did not speak in every language. For that
by Him in order that they might disperse throughout the
which is granted to certain persons by the divine power is
whole world, and preach His faith everywhere, according
the best of its kind: thus our Lord turned the water into
to Mat. 28:19, “Going. . . teach ye all nations.” Now it
good wine, as stated in Jn. 2:10. Now those who had the
was not fitting that they who were being sent to teach oth-
gift of tongues spoke better in their own language; since
ers should need to be taught by others, either as to how
a gloss on Heb. 1, says that “it is not surprising that the
they should speak to other people, or as to how they were
epistle to the Hebrews is more graceful in style than the
to understand those who spoke to them; and all the more
other epistles, since it is natural for a man to have more
seeing that those who were being sent were of one nation,
command over his own than over a strange language. For
that of Judea, according to Is. 27:6, “When they shall rush
the Apostle wrote the other epistles in a foreign, namely
out from Jacob†. . . they shall fill the face of the world with the Greek, idiom; whereas he wrote this in the Hebrew
seed.” Moreover those who were being sent were poor and
tongue.” Therefore the apostles did not receive the knowl-
powerless; nor at the outset could they have easily found
edge of all languages by a gratuitous grace.
someone to interpret their words faithfully to others, or
Objection 2. Further, nature does not employ many
to explain what others said to them, especially as they
means where one is sufficient; and much less does God
were sent to unbelievers. Consequently it was necessary,
Whose work is more orderly than nature’s. Now God
in this respect, that God should provide them with the gift
could make His disciples to be understood by all, while
of tongues; in order that, as the diversity of tongues was
speaking one tongue: hence a gloss on Acts 2:6, “Ev-
brought upon the nations when they fell away to idolatry,
ery man heard them speak in his own tongue,” says that
according to Gn. 11, so when the nations were to be re-
“they spoke in every tongue, or speaking in their own,
called to the worship of one God a remedy to this diversity
namely the Hebrew language, were understood by all, as
might be applied by the gift of tongues.
though they spoke the language proper to each.” There-
Reply to Objection 1. As it is written (1 Cor. 12:7),
fore it would seem that they had not the knowledge to
“the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto
speak in all languages.
profit”; and consequently both Paul and the other apos-
Objection 3. Further, all graces flow from Christ to
tles were divinely instructed in the languages of all na-
His body, which is the Church, according to Jn. 1:16, “Of
tions sufficiently for the requirements of the teaching of
His fullness we all have received.” Now we do not read
the faith. But as regards the grace and elegance of style
that Christ spoke more than one language, nor does each
which human art adds to a language, the Apostle was in-
one of the faithful now speak save in one tongue. There-
structed in his own, but not in a foreign tongue. Even so
fore it would seem that Christ’s disciples did not receive
they were sufficiently instructed in wisdom and scientific
the grace to the extent of speaking in all languages.
knowledge, as required for teaching the faith, but not as
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 2:4) that “they
to all things known by acquired science, for instance the
were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and they began to
conclusions of arithmetic and geometry.
speak with divers tongues, according as the Holy Ghost
Reply to Objection 2. Although either was possible,
gave them to speak”; on which passage a gloss of Gre-
namely that, while speaking in one tongue they should be
gory∗ says that “the Holy Ghost appeared over the disci-
understood by all, or that they should speak in all tongues,
ples under the form of fiery tongues, and gave them the
it was more fitting that they should speak in all tongues,
knowledge of all tongues.”
because this pertained to the perfection of their knowl-
∗ Hom. xxx in Ev. † Vulg.: ‘When they shall rush in unto Jacob,’ etc.
1983
edge, whereby they were able not only to speak, but also Reply to Objection 3. Christ in His own person pur-to understand what was said by others. Whereas if their
posed preaching to only one nation, namely the Jews.
one language were intelligible to all, this would either
Consequently, although without any doubt He possessed
have been due to the knowledge of those who understood
most perfectly the knowledge of all languages, there was
their speech, or it would have amounted to an illusion,
no need for Him to speak in every tongue. And therefore,
since a man’s words would have had a different sound in
as Augustine says (Tract. xxxii in Joan.), “whereas even
another’s ears, from that with which they were uttered.
now the Holy Ghost is received, yet no one speaks in the
Hence a gloss says on Acts 2:6 that “it was a greater mira-
tongues of all nations, because the Church herself already
cle that they should speak all kinds of tongues”; and Paul
speaks the languages of all nations: since whoever is not
says (1 Cor. 14:18): “I thank my God I speak with all your
in the Church, receives not the Holy Ghost.”
tongues.”
Whether the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy?
IIa IIae q. 176 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of tongues
“Greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh with
is more excellent than the grace of prophecy. For, seem-
tongues.”
ingly, better things are proper to better persons, accord-
I answer that, The gift of prophecy surpasses the
ing to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 1). Now the gift of
gift of tongues, in three ways. First, because the gift of
tongues is proper to the New Testament, hence we sing
tongues regards the utterance of certain words, which sig-
in the sequence of Pentecost∗: “On this day Thou gavest
nify an intelligible truth, and this again is signified by the
Christ’s apostles an unwonted gift, a marvel to all time”:
phantasms which appear in an imaginary vision; where-
whereas prophecy is more pertinent to the Old Testament,
fore Augustine compares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 8) the gift of
according to Heb. 1:1, “God Who at sundry times and
tongues to an imaginary vision. On the other hand, it has
in divers manners spoke in times past to the fathers by the
been stated above (q. 173, a. 2) that the gift of prophecy
prophets.” Therefore it would seem that the gift of tongues
consists in the mind itself being enlightened so as to know
is more excellent than the gift of prophecy.
an intelligible truth. Wherefore, as the prophetic enlight-
Objection 2. Further, that whereby we are directed
enment is more excellent than the imaginary vision, as
to God is seemingly more excellent than that whereby we
stated above (q. 174, a. 2), so also is prophecy more ex-
are directed to men. Now, by the gift of tongues, man is
cellent than the gift of tongues considered in itself. Sec-
directed to God, whereas by prophecy he is directed to
ondly, because the gift of prophecy regards the knowledge
man; for it is written (1 Cor. 14:2,3): “He that speaketh
of things, which is more excellent than the knowledge of
in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God. . . but
words, to which the gift of tongues pertains.
he that prophesieth, speaketh unto men unto edification.”
Thirdly, because the gift of prophecy is more prof-
Therefore it would seem that the gift of tongues is more
itable. The Apostle proves this in three ways (1 Cor. 14);
excellent than the gift of prophecy.
first, because prophecy is more profitable to the edifica-
Objection 3. Further, the gift of tongues abides like a
tion of the Church, for which purpose he that speaketh in
habit in the person who has it, and “he can use it when he
tongues profiteth nothing, unless interpretation follow (1
will”; wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 14:18): “I thank my
Cor. 14:4,5). Secondly, as regards the speaker himself,
God I speak with all your tongues.” But it is not so with
for if he be enabled to speak in divers tongues without un-
the gift of prophecy, as stated above (q. 171, a. 2). There-
derstanding them, which pertains to the gift of prophecy,
fore the gift of tongues would seem to be more excellent
his own mind would not be edified (1 Cor. 14:7-14).
than the gift of prophecy.
Thirdly, as to unbelievers for whose especial benefit the
Objection 4. Further, the “interpretation of speeches”
gift of tongues seems to have been given; since perchance
would seem to be contained under prophecy, because the
they might think those who speak in tongues to be mad
Scriptures are expounded by the same Spirit from Whom
(1 Cor. 14:23), for instance the Jews deemed the apos-
they originated. Now the interpretation of speeches is
tles drunk when the latter spoke in various tongues (Acts
placed after “divers kinds of tongues” (1 Cor. 12:10).
2:13): whereas by prophecies the unbeliever is convinced,
Therefore it seems that the gift of tongues is more excel-
because the secrets of his heart are made manifest (Acts
lent than the gift of prophecy, particularly as regards a part
2:25).
of the latter.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 174, a. 3,
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:5):
ad 1), it belongs to the excellence of prophecy that a man
∗ The sequence: ‘Sancti Spiritus adsit nobis gratia’ ascribed to King Robert of France, the reputed author of the ‘Veni Sancte Spiritus.’ Cf.
Migne, Patr. Lat. tom. CXLI
1984
is not only enlightened by an intelligible light, but also life it cannot be had perfectly by way of habit, but only
that he should perceive an imaginary vision: and so again
imperfectly by way of passion. on the other hand, the gift
it belongs to the perfection of the Holy Ghost’s operation,
of tongues is confined to a certain particular knowledge,
not only to fill the mind with the prophetic light, and the
namely of human words; wherefore it is not inconsistent
imagination with the imaginary vision, as happened in the
with the imperfection of this life, that it should be had
Old Testament, but also to endow the tongue with exter-
perfectly and by way of habit.
nal erudition, in the utterance of various signs of speech.
Reply to Objection 4. The interpretation of speeches
All this is done in the New Testament, according to 1 Cor.
is reducible to the gift of prophecy, inasmuch as the mind
14:26, “Every one of you hath a psalm, hath a doctrine,
is enlightened so as to understand and explain any obscu-
hath a tongue, hath a revelation,” i.e. a prophetic revela-
rities of speech arising either from a difficulty in the things tion.
signified, or from the words uttered being unknown, or
Reply to Objection 2. By the gift of prophecy man is
from the figures of speech employed, according to Dan.
directed to God in his mind, which is more excellent than
5:16, “I have heard of thee, that thou canst interpret ob-
being directed to Him in his tongue. “He that speaketh
scure things, and resolve difficult things.” Hence the in-
in a tongue “is said to speak “not unto men,” i.e. to men’s
terpretation of speeches is more excellent than the gift of
understanding or profit, but unto God’s understanding and
tongues, as appears from the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor.
praise. On the other hand, by prophecy a man is directed
14:5), “Greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh
both to God and to man; wherefore it is the more perfect
with tongues; unless perhaps he interpret.” Yet the inter-
gift.
pretation of speeches is placed after the gift of tongues,
Reply to Objection 3. Prophetic revelation extends to
because the interpretation of speeches extends even to the
the knowledge of all things supernatural; wherefore from
interpretation of divers kinds of tongues.
its very perfection it results that in this imperfect state of
1985
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 177
Of the Gratuitous Grace Consisting in Words
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider the gratuitous grace that attaches to words; of which the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): “To one. . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge.” Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?
(2) To whom is the grace becoming?
Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?
IIa IIae q. 177 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that a gratuitous grace
effect, and this pertains to the grace “of the word.”
does not attach to words. For grace is given for that which
This happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct
surpasses the faculty of nature. But natural reason has de-
the intellect, and this is the case when a man speaks so as
vised the art of rhetoric whereby a man is able to speak so
“to teach.” Secondly, in order to move the affections, so
as to teach, please, and persuade, as Augustine says (De
that a man willingly hearkens to the word of God. This is
Doctr. Christ. iv, 12). Now this belongs to the grace of
the case when a man speaks so as “to please” his hearers,
words. Therefore it would seem that the grace of words is
not indeed with a view to his own favor, but in order to
not a gratuitous grace.
draw them to listen to God’s word. Thirdly, in order that
Objection 2. Further, all grace pertains to the king-
men may love that which is signified by the word, and de-
dom of God. But the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): “The
sire to fulfill it, and this is the case when a man so speaks
kingdom of God is not in speech, but in power.” There-
as “to sway” his hearers. In order to effect this the Holy
fore there is no gratuitous grace connected with words.
Ghost makes use of the human tongue as of an instrument;
Objection 3. Further, no grace is given through merit,
but He it is Who perfects the work within. Hence Gregory
since “if by grace, it is not now of works” (Rom. 11:6).
says in a homily for Pentecost (Hom. xxx in Ev.): “Unless
But the word is sometimes given to a man on his merits.
the Holy Ghost fill the hearts of the hearers, in vain does
For Gregory says (Moral. xi, 15) in explanation of Ps.
the voice of the teacher resound in the ears of the body.”
118:43, “Take not Thou the word of truth utterly out of
Reply to Objection 1. Even as by a miracle God
my mouth” that “the word of truth is that which Almighty
sometimes works in a more excellent way those things
God gives to them that do it, and takes away from them
which nature also can work, so too the Holy Ghost effects
that do it not.” Therefore it would seem that the gift of the
more excellently by the grace of words that which art can
word is not a gratuitous grace.
effect in a less efficient manner.
Objection 4. Further, it behooves man to declare in
Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle is speaking there
words things pertaining to the virtue of faith, no less than
of the word that relies on human eloquence without the
those pertaining to the gift of wisdom or of knowledge.
power of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore he says just before
Therefore if the word of wisdom and the word of knowl-
(1 Cor. 4:19): “I. . . will know, not the speech of them that
edge are reckoned gratuitous graces, the word of faith
are puffed up, but the power”: and of himself he had al-
should likewise be placed among the gratuitous graces.
ready said (1 Cor. 2:4): “My speech and my preaching
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 6:5): “A gra-
was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in
cious tongue in a good man shall abound [Vulg.: ‘abound-
the showing of the spirit and power.”
eth’].” Now man’s goodness is by grace. Therefore gra-
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, the grace of
ciousness in words is also by grace.
the word is given to a man for the profit of others. Hence
I answer that, The gratuitous graces are given for the
it is withdrawn sometimes through the fault of the hearer,
profit of others, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 111, Aa. 1,4).
and sometimes through the fault of the speaker. The good
Now the knowledge a man receives from God cannot be
works of either of them do not merit this grace directly, but
turned to another’s profit, except by means of speech. And
only remove the obstacles thereto. For sanctifying grace
since the Holy Ghost does not fail in anything that pertains
also is withdrawn on account of a person’s fault, and yet
to the profit of the Church, He provides also the members
he does not merit it by his good works, which, however,
of the Church with speech; to the effect that a man not
remove the obstacles to grace.
only speaks so as to be understood by different people,
Reply to Objection 4. As stated above, the grace of
which pertains to the gift of tongues, but also speaks with
the word is directed to the profit of others. Now if a man
1986
communicates his faith to others this is by the word of Apostle means by knowledge.” Hence it was not neces-knowledge or of wisdom. Hence Augustine says (De Trin.
sary for him to mention the word of faith, but it was suf-
xiv, 1) that “to know how faith may profit the godly and
ficient for him to mention the word of knowledge and of
be defended against the ungodly, is apparently what the
wisdom.
Whether the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming to women?
IIa IIae q. 177 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the grace of the word
ing oneself to the whole church, and this is not permitted
of wisdom and knowledge is becoming even to women.
to women. First and chiefly, on account of the condition
For teaching is pertinent to this grace, as stated in the fore-
attaching to the female sex, whereby woman should be
going Article. Now it is becoming to a woman to teach;
subject to man, as appears from Gn. 3:16. Now teaching
for it is written (Prov. 4:3,4): “I was an only son in the
and persuading publicly in the church belong not to sub-
sight of my mother, and she taught me∗.” Therefore this
jects but to the prelates (although men who are subjects
grace is becoming to women.
may do these things if they be so commissioned, because
Objection 2. Further, the grace of prophecy is greater
their subjection is not a result of their natural sex, as it
than the grace of the word, even as the contemplation of
is with women, but of some thing supervening by acci-
truth is greater than its utterance. But prophecy is granted
dent). Secondly, lest men’s minds be enticed to lust, for
to women, as we read of Deborah (Judges 4:4), and of
it is written (Ecclus. 9:11): “Her conversation burneth as
Holda the prophetess, the wife of Sellum (4 Kings 22:14),
fire.” Thirdly, because as a rule women are not perfected
and of the four daughters of Philip (Acts 21:9). Moreover
in wisdom, so as to be fit to be intrusted with public teach-
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:5): “Every woman praying
ing.
or prophesying,” etc. Much more therefore would it seem
Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted speaks of
that the grace of the word is becoming to a woman.
private teaching whereby a father instructs his son.
Objection 3. Further, it is written (1 Pet. 4:10): “As
Reply to Objection 2. The grace of prophecy con-
every man hath received grace ministering the same one
sists in God enlightening the mind, on the part of which
to another.” Now some women receive the grace of wis-
there is no difference of sex among men, according to Col.
dom and knowledge, which they cannot minister to others
3:10,11, “Putting on the new” man, “him who is renewed
except by the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of
unto knowledge, according to the image of Him that cre-
the word is becoming to women.
ated him, where there is neither male nor female†.” Now
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:34):
the grace of the word pertains to the instruction of men
“Let women keep silence in the churches,” and (1 Tim.
among whom the difference of sex is found. Hence the
2:12): “I suffer not a woman to teach.” Now this pertains
comparison fails.
especially to the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of
Reply to Objection 3. The recipients of a divinely
the word is not becoming to women.
conferred grace administer it in different ways according
I answer that, Speech may be employed in two ways:
to their various conditions. Hence women, if they have
in one way privately, to one or a few, in familiar conver-
the grace of wisdom or of knowledge, can administer it
sation, and in this respect the grace of the word may be
by teaching privately but not publicly.
becoming to women; in another way, publicly, address-
∗ Vulg.: ‘I was my father’s son, tender, and as an only son in the sight of my mother. And he taught me.’
† Vulg.: ‘Neither Gentile nor Jew,
circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian nor Scythian, bond nor free.’ Cf. Ia, q. 93, a. 6, ad 2 footnote 1987
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 178
Of the Grace of Miracles
(In Two Articles)
We must next consider the grace of miracles, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?
(2) To whom is it becoming?
Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?
IIa IIae q. 178 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that no gratuitous grace
“the grace of healing. . . to another, the working of mira-
is directed to the working of miracles. For every grace
cles.”
puts something in the one to whom it is given (Cf. Ia
I answer that, As stated above (q. 177, a. 1), the
IIae, q. 90, a. 1). Now the working of miracles puts noth-
Holy Ghost provides sufficiently for the Church in mat-
ing in the soul of the man who receives it since miracles
ters profitable unto salvation, to which purpose the gra-
are wrought at the touch even of a dead body. Thus we
tuitous graces are directed. Now just as the knowledge
read (4 Kings 13:21) that “some. . . cast the body into the
which a man receives from God needs to be brought to
sepulchre of Eliseus. And when it had touched the bones
the knowledge of others through the gift of tongues and
of Eliseus, the man came to life, and stood upon his feet.”
the grace of the word, so too the word uttered needs to
Therefore the working of miracles does not belong to a
be confirmed in order that it be rendered credible. This is
gratuitous grace.
done by the working of miracles, according to Mk. 16:20,
Objection 2. Further, the gratuitous graces are from
“And confirming the word with signs that followed”: and
the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, “There are di-
reasonably so. For it is natural to man to arrive at the in-
versities of graces, but the same Spirit.” Now the working
telligible truth through its sensible effects. Wherefore just
of miracles is effected even by the unclean spirit, accord-
as man led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some
ing to Mat. 24:24, “There shall arise false Christs and
knowledge of God through His natural effects, so is he
false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders.”
brought to a certain degree of supernatural knowledge of
Therefore it would seem that the working of miracles does
the objects of faith by certain supernatural effects which
not belong to a gratuitous grace.
are called miracles. Therefore the working of miracles
Objection 3.
Further, miracles are divided into
belongs to a gratuitous grace.
“signs,” “wonders” or “portents,” and “virtues.”∗. There-
Reply to Objection 1. Just as prophecy extends to
fore it is unreasonable to reckon the “working of miracles”
whatever can be known supernaturally, so the working of
a gratuitous grace, any more than the “working of signs”
miracles extends to all things that can be done supernatu-
and “wonders.”
rally; the cause whereof is the divine omnipotence which
Objection 4.
Further, the miraculous restoring to
cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence it is im-
health is done by the power of God. Therefore the grace
possible for the principle of working miracles to be a qual-
of healing should not be distinguished from the working
ity abiding as a habit in the soul. On the other hand, just as
of miracles.
the prophet’s mind is moved by divine inspiration to know
Objection 5. Further, the working of miracles results
something supernaturally, so too is it possible for the mind
from faith—either of the worker, according to 1 Cor. 13:2,
of the miracle worker to be moved to do something re-
“If I should have all faith, so that I could remove moun-
sulting in the miraculous effect which God causes by His
tains,” or of other persons for whose sake miracles are
power. Sometimes this takes place after prayer, as when
wrought, according to Mat. 13:58, “And He wrought not
Peter raised to life the dead Tabitha (Acts 9:40): some-
many miracles there, because of their unbelief.” There-
times without any previous prayer being expressed, as
fore, if faith be reckoned a gratuitous grace, it is superflu-
when Peter by upbraiding the lying Ananias and Saphira
ous to reckon in addition the working of signs as another
delivered them to death (Acts 5:4,9). Hence Gregory says
gratuitous grace.
(Dial. ii, 30) that “the saints work miracles, sometimes by
On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:9,10) says
authority, sometimes by prayer.” In either case, however,
that among other gratuitous graces, “to another” is given
God is the principal worker, for He uses instrumentally
∗ Cf. 2 Thess. 2:9, where the Douay version renders ‘virtus’ by ‘power.’
The use of the word ‘virtue’ in the sense of a miracle is now obsolete, and the generic term ‘miracle’ is elsewhere used in its stead: Cf. 1 Cor.
12:10,28; Heb. 2:4; Acts 2:22
1988
either man’s inward movement, or his speech, or some man’s profit.
outward action, or again the bodily contact of even a dead
Reply to Objection 3. Two things may be considered
body. Thus when Josue had said as though authoritatively
in miracles. One is that which is done: this is something
(Josh. 10:12): “Move not, O sun, toward Gabaon,” it is
surpassing the faculty of nature, and in this respect mira-
said afterwards (Josh. 10:14): “There was not before or
cles are called “virtues.” The other thing is the purpose for
after so long a day, the Lord obeying the voice of a man.”
which miracles are wrought, namely the manifestation of
Reply to Objection 2. Our Lord is speaking there of
something supernatural, and in this respect they are com-
the miracles to be wrought at the time of Antichrist, of
monly called “signs”: but on account of some excellence
which the Apostle says (2 Thess. 2:9) that the coming of
they receive the name of “wonder” or “prodigy,” as show-
Antichrist will be “according to the working of Satan, in
ing something from afar [procul].
all power, and signs, and lying wonders.” To quote the
Reply to Objection 4. The “grace of healing” is men-
words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 19), “it is a matter
tioned separately, because by its means a benefit, namely
of debate whether they are called signs and lying wonders,
bodily health, is conferred on man in addition to the com-
because he will deceive the senses of mortals by imag-
mon benefit bestowed in all miracles, namely the bringing
inary visions, in that he will seem to do what he does
of men to the knowledge of God.
not, or because, though they be real wonders, they will
Reply to Objection 5. The working of miracles is
seduce into falsehood them that believe.” They are said
ascribed to faith for two reasons. First, because it is di-
to be real, because the things themselves will be real, just
rected to the confirmation of faith, secondly, because it
as Pharaoh’s magicians made real frogs and real serpents;
proceeds from God’s omnipotence on which faith relies.
but they will not be real miracles, because they will be
Nevertheless, just as besides the grace of faith, the grace
done by the power of natural causes, as stated in the Ia,
of the word is necessary that people may be instructed in
q. 114, a. 4; whereas the working of miracles which is as-
the faith, so too is the grace of miracles necessary that
cribed to a gratuitous grace, is done by God’s power for
people may be confirmed in their faith.
Whether the wicked can work miracles?
IIa IIae q. 178 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the wicked cannot
I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains,
work miracles. For miracles are wrought through prayer,
and have not charity, I am nothing.” Now whosoever has
as stated above (a. 1, ad 1). Now the prayer of a sinner
not charity is wicked, because “this gift alone of the Holy
is not granted, according to Jn. 9:31, “We know that God
Ghost distinguishes the children of the kingdom from the
doth not hear sinners,” and Prov. 28:9, “He that turneth
children of perdition,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xv,
away his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an
18). Therefore it would seem that even the wicked can
abomination.” Therefore it would seem that the wicked
work miracles.
cannot work miracles.
I answer that, Some miracles are not true but imag-
Objection 2. Further, miracles are ascribed to faith,
inary deeds, because they delude man by the appearance
according to Mat. 17:19, “If you have faith as a grain
of that which is not; while others are true deeds, yet they
of mustard seed you shall say to this mountain: Remove
have not the character of a true miracle, because they are
from hence hither, and it shall remove.” Now “faith with-
done by the power of some natural cause. Both of these
out works is dead,” according to James 2:20, so that,
can be done by the demons, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2).
seemingly, it is devoid of its proper operation. Therefore
True miracles cannot be wrought save by the power
it would seem that the wicked, since they do not good
of God, because God works them for man’s benefit, and
works, cannot work miracles.
this in two ways: in one way for the confirmation of truth
Objection 3. Further, miracles are divine attestations,
declared, in another way in proof of a person’s holiness,
according to Heb. 2:4, “God also bearing them witness
which God desires to propose as an example of virtue. In
by signs and wonders and divers miracles”: wherefore in
the first way miracles can be wrought by any one who
the Church the canonization of certain persons is based on
preaches the true faith and calls upon Christ’s name, as
the attestation of miracles. Now God cannot bear witness
even the wicked do sometimes.
In this way even the
to a falsehood. Therefore it would seem that wicked men
wicked can work miracles. Hence Jerome commenting on
cannot work miracles.
Mat. 7:22, “Have not we prophesied in Thy name?” says:
Objection 4.
Further, the good are more closely
“Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and
united to God than the wicked. But the good do not all
the casting out of demons are accorded not to the merit of
work miracles. Much less therefore do the wicked.
those who do these things, but to the invoking of Christ’s
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:2): “If
name, that men may honor God, by invoking Whom such
1989
great miracles are wrought.”
Reply to Objection 2. Faith without works is said
In the second way miracles are not wrought except by
to be dead, as regards the believer, who lives not, by
the saints, since it is in proof of their holiness that mira-
faith, with the life of grace. But nothing hinders a living
cles are wrought during their lifetime or after death, either
thing from working through a dead instrument, as a man
by themselves or by others. For we read (Acts 19:11,12)
through a stick. It is thus that God works while employing
that “God wrought by the hand of Paul. . . miracles” and
instrumentally the faith of a sinner.
“even there were brought from his body to the sick, hand-
Reply to Objection 3. Miracles are always true wit-
kerchiefs. . . and the diseases departed from them.” In this
nesses to the purpose for which they are wrought. Hence
way indeed there is nothing to prevent a sinner from work-
wicked men who teach a false doctrine never work true
ing miracles by invoking a saint; but the miracle is as-
miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although some-
cribed not to him, but to the one in proof of whose holi-
times they may do so in praise of Christ’s name which
ness such things are done.
they invoke, and by the power of the sacraments which
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 83, a. 16)
they administer.
If they teach a true doctrine, some-
when we were treating of prayer, the prayer of impetra-
times they work true miracles as confirming their teach-
tion relies not on merit but on God’s mercy, which ex-
ing, but not as an attestation of holiness. Hence Augus-
tends even to the wicked, wherefore the prayers even of
tine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79): “Magicians work miracles
sinners are sometimes granted by God. Hence Augustine
in one way, good Christians in another, wicked Chris-
says (Tract. xliv in Joan.) that “the blind man spoke these
tians in another. Magicians by private compact with the
words before he was anointed,” that is, before he was per-
demons, good Christians by their manifest righteousness,
fectly enlightened; “since God does hear sinners.” When
evil Christians by the outward signs of righteousness.”
it is said that the prayer of one who hears not the law is an
Reply to Objection 4.
As Augustine says (QQ.
abomination, this must be understood so far as the sinner’s
lxxxiii, qu. 79), “the reason why these are not granted
merit is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for
to all holy men is lest by a most baneful error the weak be
the spiritual welfare of the one who prays—as the publi-
deceived into thinking such deeds to imply greater gifts
can was heard (Lk. 18:14)—or for the good of others and
than the deeds of righteousness whereby eternal life is ob-
for God’s glory.
tained.”
1990
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 179
Of the Division of Life Into Active and Contemplative
(In Two Articles)
We must next consider active and contemplative life. This consideration will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into active and contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the active life; (4) Of the comparison between the active and the contemplative life.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?
(2) Whether this is an adequate division?
Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?
IIa IIae q. 179 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that life is not fittingly
which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to
divided into active and contemplative. For the soul is the
consist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals
principle of life by its essence: since the Philosopher says
in sensation and movement; and the life of men in their
(De Anima ii, 4) that “in living things to live is to be.”
understanding and acting according to reason. Wherefore
Now the soul is the principle of action and contemplation
also in men the life of every man would seem to be that
by its powers. Therefore it would seem that life is not
wherein he delights most, and on which he is most in-
fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
tent; thus especially does he wish “to associate with his
Objection 2. Further, the division of that which comes
friends” (Ethic. ix, 12).
afterwards is unfittingly applied to that which comes
Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on
first. Now active and contemplative, or “speculative” and
the contemplation of truth, while others are especially in-
“practical,” are differences of the intellect (De Anima iii,
tent on external actions, it follows that man’s life is fit-
10); while “to live” comes before “to understand,” since
tingly divided into active and contemplative.
“to live” comes first to living things through the vegetative
Reply to Objection 1. Each thing’s proper form that
soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore
makes it actually “to be” is properly that thing’s principle
life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
of operation. Hence “to live” is, in living things, “to be,”
Objection 3. Further, the word “life” implies move-
because living things through having “being” from their
ment, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas
form, act in such and such a way.
contemplation consists rather in rest, according to Wis.
Reply to Objection 2. Life in general is not divided
8:16: “When I enter into my house, I shall repose myself
into active and contemplative, but the life of man, who de-
with her.” Therefore it would seem that life is unfittingly
rives his species from having an intellect, wherefore the
divided into active and contemplative.
same division applies to intellect and human life.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom.
xiv super
Reply to Objection 3. It is true that contemplation en-
Ezech.): “There is a twofold life wherein Almighty God
joys rest from external movements. Nevertheless to con-
instructs us by His holy word, the active life and the con-
template is itself a movement of the intellect, in so far
templative.”
as every operation is described as a movement; in which
I answer that, Properly speaking, those things are
sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensa-
said to live whose movement or operation is from within
tion and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far
themselves. Now that which is proper to a thing and to
as movement is defined “the act of a perfect thing.” In this
which it is most inclined is that which is most becoming to
way Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) ascribes three movements
it from itself; wherefore every living thing gives proof of
to the soul in contemplation, namely, “straight,” “circu-
its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to
lar,” and “oblique”∗.
∗ Cf. q. 180, a. 6
1991
Whether life is adequately divided into active and contemplative?
IIa IIae q. 179 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that life is not adequately
tive, since the end of intellective knowledge is either the
divided into active and contemplative. For the Philoso-
knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to the contem-
pher says (Ethic. i, 5) that there are three most promi-
plative intellect, or some external action, which pertains
nent kinds of life, the life of “pleasure,” the “civil” which
to the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is
would seem to be the same as the active, and the “contem-
adequately divided into active and contemplative.
plative” life. Therefore the division of life into active and
Reply to Objection 1. The life of pleasure places its
contemplative would seem to be inadequate.
end in pleasures of the body, which are common to us and
Objection 2. Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix,
dumb animals; wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
1,2,3,19) mentions three kinds of life, namely the life of
Ethic. i, 5), it is the life “of a beast.” Hence it is not in-
“leisure” which pertains to the contemplative, the “busy”
cluded in this division of the life of a man into active and
life which pertains to the active, and a third “composed of
contemplative.
both.” Therefore it would seem that life is inadequately
Reply to Objection 2. A mean is a combination of
divided into active and contemplative.
extremes, wherefore it is virtually contained in them, as
Objection 3. Further, man’s life is diversified accord-
tepid in hot and cold, and pale in white and black. In like
ing to the divers actions in which men are occupied. Now
manner active and contemplative comprise that which is
there are more than two occupations of human actions.
composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one
Therefore it would seem that life should be divided into
of the simples predominates, so too in the mean state of
more kinds than the active and the contemplative.
life sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active
On the contrary, These two lives are signified by the
element, abounds.
two wives of Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contempla-
Reply to Objection 3. All the occupations of human
tive by Rachel: and by the two hostesses of our Lord; the
actions, if directed to the requirements of the present life
contemplative life by Mary, and the active life by Martha,
in accord with right reason, belong to the active life which
as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37∗). Now this signifi-
provides for the necessities of the present life by means of
cation would not be fitting if there were more than two
well-ordered activity. If, on the other hand, they minis-
lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active and
ter to any concupiscence whatever, they belong to the life
contemplative.
of pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 2), this divi-
Those human occupations that are directed to the consid-
sion applies to the human life as derived from the intellect.
eration of truth belong to the contemplative life.
Now the intellect is divided into active and contempla-
∗ Hom. xiv in Ezech.
1992
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 180
Of the Contemplative Life
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or also to the affections?
(2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?
(3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in several?
(4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the contemplative life?
(5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to the vision of God?
(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv); (7) Of the pleasure of contemplation;
(8) Of the duration of contemplation.
Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections, and pertains IIa IIae q. 180 a. 1
wholly to the intellect?
Objection 1. It would seem that the contemplative life
the contemplative life, as regards the essence of the ac-
has nothing to do with the affections and pertains wholly
tion, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive
to the intellect. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text.
cause of the exercise of that action it belongs to the will,
3∗) that “the end of contemplation is truth.” Now truth
which moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to
pertains wholly to the intellect. Therefore it would seem
their actions, as stated above ( Ia, q. 82, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 9, that the contemplative life wholly regards the intellect.
a. 1).
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37;
Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things
Hom. xix in Ezech.) that “Rachel, which is interpreted
either with the senses or with the intellect, sometimes for
‘vision of the principle’†, signifies the contemplative life.”
love of the thing seen because, as it is written (Mat. 6:21),
Now the vision of a principle belongs properly to the in-
“where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also,” sometimes
tellect. Therefore the contemplative life belongs properly
for love of the very knowledge that one acquires by ob-
to the intellect.
servation. Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative
Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
life to consist in the “love of God,” inasmuch as through
Ezech.) that it belongs to the contemplative life, “to rest
loving God we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And
from external action.” Now the affective or appetitive
since everyone delights when he obtains what he loves,
power inclines to external actions. Therefore it would
it follows that the contemplative life terminates in delight,
seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with
which is seated in the affective power, the result being that
the appetitive power.
love also becomes more intense.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.)
Reply to Objection 1. From the very fact that truth is
that “the contemplative life is to cling with our whole
the end of contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible
mind to the love of God and our neighbor, and to desire
good, both lovable and delightful, and in this respect it
nothing beside our Creator.” Now desire and love pertain
pertains to the appetitive power.
to the affective or appetitive power, as stated above ( Ia
Reply to Objection 2. We are urged to the vision
IIae, q. 25, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 26, a. 2). Therefore the con-
of the first principle, namely God, by the love thereof;
templative life has also something to do with the affective
wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “the
or appetitive power.
contemplative life tramples on all cares and longs to see
I answer that, As stated above (q. 179, a. 1) theirs is
the face of its Creator.”
said to be the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the
Reply to Objection 3. The appetitive power moves
contemplation of truth. Now intention is an act of the will,
not only the bodily members to perform external actions,
as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 12, a. 1), because intention is
but also the intellect to practice the act of contemplation,
of the end which is the object of the will. Consequently
as stated above.
∗ Ed Did. ia, 1
† Or rather, ‘One seeing the principle,’ if derived from rah and irzn; Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.
1993
Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?
IIa IIae q. 180 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the moral virtues per-
On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the con-
tain to the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv
templative life dispositively. For the act of contempla-
in Ezech.) that “the contemplative life is to cling to the
tion, wherein the contemplative life essentially consists,
love of God and our neighbor with the whole mind.” Now
is hindered both by the impetuosity of the passions which
all the moral virtues, since their acts are prescribed by the
withdraw the soul’s intention from intelligible to sensi-
precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of God and
ble things, and by outward disturbances. Now the moral
of our neighbor, for “love. . . is the fulfilling of the Law”
virtues curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the
(Rom. 13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral
disturbance of outward occupations. Hence moral virtues
virtues belong to the contemplative life.
belong dispositively to the contemplative life.
Objection 2. Further, the contemplative life is chiefly
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 1), the con-
directed to the contemplation of God; for Gregory says
templative life has its motive cause on the part of the affec-
(Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “the mind tramples on all cares
tions, and in this respect the love of God and our neighbor
and longs to gaze on the face of its Creator.” Now no one
is requisite to the contemplative life. Now motive causes
can accomplish this without cleanness of heart, which is
do not enter into the essence of a thing, but dispose and
a result of moral virtue∗. For it is written (Mat. 5:8):
perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that the moral
“Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God”:
virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life.
and (Heb. 12:14): “Follow peace with all men, and holi-
Reply to Objection 2. Holiness or cleanness of heart
ness, without which no man shall see God.” Therefore it
is caused by the virtues that are concerned with the pas-
would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the contem-
sions which hinder the purity of the reason; and peace is
plative life.
caused by justice which is about operations, according to
Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
Is. 32:17, “The work of justice shall be peace”: since he
Ezech.) that “the contemplative life gives beauty to the
who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions
soul,” wherefore it is signified by Rachel, of whom it
of quarrels and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dis-
is said (Gn. 29:17) that she was “of a beautiful coun-
pose one to the contemplative life by causing peace and
tenance.”
Now the beauty of the soul consists in the
cleanness of heart.
moral virtues, especially temperance, as Ambrose says
Reply to Objection 3. Beauty, as stated above (q. 145,
(De Offic. i, 43,45,46). Therefore it seems that the moral
a. 2), consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now
virtues pertain to the contemplative life.
each of these is found radically in the reason; because
On the contrary, The moral virtues are directed to
both the light that makes beauty seen, and the establishing
external actions. Now Gregory says (Moral. vi†) that it
of due proportion among things belong to reason. Hence
belongs to the contemplative life “to rest from external
since the contemplative life consists in an act of the rea-
action.” Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the
son, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence;
contemplative life.
wherefore it is written (Wis. 8:2) of the contemplation of
I answer that, A thing may belong to the contem-
wisdom: “I became a lover of her beauty.”
plative life in two ways, essentially or dispositively. The
On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by
moral virtues do not belong to the contemplative life es-
participation, in so far as they participate in the order of
sentially, because the end of the contemplative life is
reason; and especially is it in temperance, which restrains
the consideration of truth: and as the Philosopher states
the concupiscences which especially darken the light of
(Ethic. ii, 4), “knowledge,” which pertains to the consid-
reason. Hence it is that the virtue of chastity most of
eration of truth, “has little influence on the moral virtues”:
all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal plea-
wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues
sures most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects,
pertain to active but not to contemplative happiness.
as Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10).
Whether there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life?
IIa IIae q. 180 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that there are various ac-
to contemplation. Therefore it would seem that there are
tions pertaining to the contemplative life. For Richard of
various actions pertaining to the contemplative life.
St. Victor‡ distinguishes between “contemplation,” “med-
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:18):
itation,” and “cogitation.” Yet all these apparently pertain
“But we. . . beholding [speculantes] the glory of the Lord
∗ Cf. q. 8, a. 7
† Hom. xiv in Ezech.; Cf. a. 1, obj. 3
‡ De Grat.
Contempl. i, 3,4
§ Vulg.: ‘into the same image from glory to glory.’
1994
with open face, are transformed into the same clarity§.”
not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance
Now this belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore in
of certain effects, but also the imaginations. and again the
addition to the three aforesaid, vision [speculatio] belongs
reason’s discussion of the various signs or of anything that
to the contemplative life.
conduces to the truth in view: although, according to Au-
Objection 3. Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v,
gustine (De Trin. xiv, 7), cogitation may signify any ac-
14) that “the first and greatest contemplation is admira-
tual operation of the intellect. “Meditation” would seem
tion of the Majesty.” Now according to Damascene (De
to be the process of reason from certain principles that
Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear. Therefore it
lead to the contemplation of some truth: and “consider-
would seem that several acts are requisite for the contem-
ation” has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De
plative life.
Consid. ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De
Objection 4. Further, “Prayer,” “reading,” and “med-
Anima ii, 1), every operation of the intellect may be called
itation”∗ are said to belong to the contemplative life.
“consideration.” But “contemplation” regards the simple
Again, “hearing” belongs to the contemplative life: since
act of gazing on the truth; wherefore Richard says again
it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is
(De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that “contemplation is the soul’s
signified) “sitting. . . at the Lord’s feet, heard His word”
clear and free dwelling upon the object of its gaze; medita-
(Lk. 10:39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are
tion is the survey of the mind while occupied in searching
requisite for the contemplative life.
for the truth: and cogitation is the mind’s glance which is
On the contrary, Life signifies here the operation on
prone to wander.”
which a man is chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are sev-
Reply to Objection 2. According to a gloss† of Au-
eral operations of the contemplative life, there will be, not
gustine on this passage, “beholding” [speculatio] denotes
one, but several contemplative lives.
“seeing in a mirror [speculo], not from a watch-tower
I answer that, We are now speaking of the contempla-
[specula].” Now to see a thing in a mirror is to see a cause
tive life as applicable to man. Now according to Diony-
in its effect wherein its likeness is reflected. Hence “be-
sius (Div. Nom. vii) between man and angel there is this
holding” would seem to be reducible to meditation.
difference, that an angel perceives the truth by simple ap-
Reply to Objection 3. Admiration is a kind of fear
prehension, whereas man arrives at the perception of a
resulting from the apprehension of a thing that surpasses
simple truth by a process from several premises. Accord-
our faculties: hence it results from the contemplation of
ingly, then, the contemplative life has one act wherein it
the sublime truth. For it was stated above (a. 1) that con-
is finally completed, namely the contemplation of truth,
templation terminates in the affections.
and from this act it derives its unity. Yet it has many acts
Reply to Objection 4. Man reaches the knowledge
whereby it arrives at this final act. Some of these pertain
of truth in two ways. First, by means of things received
to the reception of principles, from which it proceeds to
from another. In this way, as regards the things he receives
the contemplation of truth; others are concerned with de-
from God, he needs “prayer,” according to Wis. 7:7, “I
ducing from the principles, the truth, the knowledge of
called upon” God, “and the spirit of wisdom came upon
which is sought; and the last and crowning act is the con-
me”: while as regards the things he receives from man, he
templation itself of the truth.
needs “hearing,” in so far as he receives from the spoken
Reply to Objection 1. According to Richard of St.
word, and “reading,” in so far as he receives from the tra-
Victor “cogitation” would seem to regard the considera-
dition of Holy Writ. Secondly, he needs to apply himself
tion of the many things from which a person intends to
by his personal study, and thus he requires “meditation.”
gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may comprise
Whether the contemplative life consists in the mere contemplation of God, or also in IIa IIae q. 180 a. 4
the consideration of any truth whatever?
Objection 1. It would seem that the contemplative
Objection 2. Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14)
life consists not only in the contemplation of God, but
that “contemplation consists in admiration first of God’s
also in the consideration of any truth. For it is written
majesty, secondly of His judgments, thirdly of His bene-
(Ps. 138:14): “Wonderful are Thy works, and my soul
fits, fourthly of His promises.” Now of these four the first
knoweth right well.” Now the knowledge of God’s works
alone regards the divine truth, and the other three pertain
is effected by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore
to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life consists
it would seem that it pertains to the contemplative life to
not only in the contemplation of the divine truth, but also
contemplate not only the divine truth, but also any other.
in the consideration of truth regarding the divine effects.
∗ Hugh of St. Victor, Alleg. in N.T. iii, 4 † Cf. De Trin. xv, 8 ‡ De Grat. Contempl. i, 6
1995
Objection 3. Further, Richard of St. Victor‡ distin-contemplation of God Himself, according to Rom. 1:20,
guishes six species of contemplation. The first belongs to
“The invisible things of God. . . are clearly seen, being un-
“the imagination alone,” and consists in thinking of cor-
derstood by the things that are made,” it follows that the
poreal things. The second is in “the imagination guided
contemplation of the divine effects also belongs to the
by reason,” and consists in considering the order and dis-
contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided thereby to
position of sensible objects. The third is in “the reason
the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera
based on the imagination”; when, to wit, from the consid-
Relig. xxix) that “in the study of creatures we must not
eration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The fourth
exercise an empty and futile curiosity, but should make
is in “the reason and conducted by the reason,” when the
them the stepping-stone to things unperishable and ever-
mind is intent on things invisible of which the imagina-
lasting.”
tion has no cognizance. The fifth is “above the reason,”
Accordingly it is clear from what has been said
but not contrary to reason, when by divine revelation we
(Aa. 1,2,3) that four things pertain, in a certain order, to
become cognizant of things that cannot be comprehended
the contemplative life; first, the moral virtues; secondly,
by the human reason. The sixth is “above reason and con-
other acts exclusive of contemplation; thirdly, contempla-
trary to reason”; when, to wit, by the divine enlightening
tion of the divine effects; fourthly, the complement of all
we know things that seem contrary to human reason, such
which is the contemplation of the divine truth itself.
as the doctrine of the mystery of the Trinity. Now only
Reply to Objection 1. David sought the knowledge
the last of these would seem to pertain to the divine truth.
of God’s works, so that he might be led by them to God;
Therefore the contemplation of truth regards not only the
wherefore he says elsewhere (Ps. 142:5,6): “I meditated
divine truth, but also that which is considered in creatures.
on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of Thy
Objection 4. Further, in the contemplative life the
hands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee.”
contemplation of truth is sought as being the perfection
Reply to Objection 2.
By considering the divine
of man. Now any truth is a perfection of the human in-
judgments man is guided to the consideration of the di-
tellect. Therefore the contemplative life consists in the
vine justice; and by considering the divine benefits and
contemplation of any truth.
promises, man is led to the knowledge of God’s mercy or
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that
goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to be
“in contemplation we seek the principle which is God.”
vouchsafed.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), a thing may be-
Reply to Objection 3. These six denote the steps
long to the contemplative life in two ways: principally,
whereby we ascend by means of creatures to the con-
and secondarily, or dispositively.
That which belongs
templation of God. For the first step consists in the mere
principally to the contemplative life is the contemplation
consideration of sensible objects; the second step consists
of the divine truth, because this contemplation is the end
in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the
of the whole human life. Hence Augustine says (De Trin.
third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intel-
i, 8) that “the contemplation of God is promised us as be-
ligible things; the fourth is the absolute consideration of
ing the goal of all our actions and the everlasting perfec-
the intelligible objects to which one has attained by means
tion of our joys.” This contemplation will be perfect in the
of sensibles; the fifth is the contemplation of those intelli-
life to come, when we shall see God face to face, where-
gible objects that are unattainable by means of sensibles,
fore it will make us perfectly happy: whereas now the
but which the reason is able to grasp; the sixth step is the
contemplation of the divine truth is competent to us im-
consideration of such intelligible things as the reason can
perfectly, namely “through a glass” and “in a dark man-
neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime
ner” (1 Cor. 13:12). Hence it bestows on us a certain in-
contemplation of divine truth, wherein contemplation is
choate beatitude, which begins now and will be continued
ultimately perfected.
in the life to come; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. x,
Reply to Objection 4. The ultimate perfection of the
7) places man’s ultimate happiness in the contemplation
human intellect is the divine truth: and other truths perfect
of the supreme intelligible good.
the intellect in relation to the divine truth.
Since, however, God’s effects show us the way to the
Whether in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of the IIa IIae q. 180 a. 5
Divine essence?
Objection 1. It would seem that in the present state
Now the vision of God’s face is the vision of the Divine
of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of the
essence. Therefore it would seem that in the present life
Divine essence. For, as stated in Gn. 32:30, Jacob said: “I
one may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in
have seen God face to face, and my soul has been saved.”
His essence.
1996
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) contemplation of the present life can attain to the vision
that “contemplative men withdraw within themselves in
of the Divine essence. Consequently the highest degree
order to explore spiritual things, nor do they ever carry
of contemplation in the present life is that which Paul had
with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if these
in rapture, whereby he was in a middle state between the
follow them they prudently drive them away: but being
present life and the life to come.
desirous of seeing the incomprehensible light, they sup-
Reply to Objection 1. As Dionysius says (Ep. i ad
press all the images of their limited comprehension, and
Caium. Monach.), “if anyone seeing God, understood
through longing to reach what is above them, they over-
what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but something be-
come that which they are.” Now man is not hindered from
longing to God.” And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.):
seeing the Divine essence, which is the incomprehensible
“By no means is God seen now in His glory; but the soul
light, save by the necessity of turning to corporeal phan-
sees something of lower degree, and is thereby refreshed
tasms. Therefore it would seem that the contemplation of
so that afterwards it may attain to the glory of vision.” Ac-
the present life can extend to the vision of the incompre-
cordingly the words of Jacob, “I saw God face to face” do
hensible light in its essence.
not imply that he saw God’s essence, but that he saw some
Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 35): “All
shape∗, imaginary of course, wherein God spoke to him.
creatures are small to the soul that sees its Creator: where-
Or, “since we know a man by his face, by the face of God
fore when the man of God,” the blessed Benedict, to wit,
he signified his knowledge of Him,” according to a gloss
“saw a fiery globe in the tower and angels returning to
of Gregory on the same passage.
heaven, without doubt he could only see such things by
Reply to Objection 2. In the present state of life hu-
the light of God.” Now the blessed Benedict was still in
man contemplation is impossible without phantasms, be-
this life. Therefore the contemplation of the present life
cause it is connatural to man to see the intelligible species
can extend to the vision of the essence of God.
in the phantasms, as the Philosopher states (De Anima
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.):
iii, 7). Yet intellectual knowledge does not consist in the
“As long as we live in this mortal flesh, no one reaches
phantasms themselves, but in our contemplating in them
such a height of contemplation as to fix the eyes of his
the purity of the intelligible truth: and this not only in nat-
mind on the ray itself of incomprehensible light.”
ural knowledge, but also in that which we obtain by reve-
I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
lation. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that “the Divine
27), “no one seeing God lives this mortal life wherein the
glory shows us the angelic hierarchies under certain sym-
bodily senses have their play: and unless in some way
bolic figures, and by its power we are brought back to the
he depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his
single ray of light,” i.e. to the simple knowledge of the
body, or by withdrawing from his carnal senses, he is not
intelligible truth. It is in this sense that we must under-
caught up into that vision.” This has been carefully dis-
stand the statement of Gregory that “contemplatives do
cussed above (q. 175, Aa. 4,5), where we spoke of rapture,
not carry along with them the shadows of things corpo-
and in the Ia, q. 12, a. 2, where we treated of the vision of
real,” since their contemplation is not fixed on them, but
God.
on the consideration of the intelligible truth.
Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life
Reply to Objection 3. By these words Gregory does
in two ways. First, with regard to act, that is to say by
not imply that the blessed Benedict, in that vision, saw
actually making use of the bodily senses, and thus con-
God in His essence, but he wishes to show that because
templation in the present life can nowise attain to the vi-
“all creatures are small to him that sees God,” it follows
sion of God’s essence. Secondly, one may be in this life
that all things can easily be seen through the enlighten-
potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say, when
ment of the Divine light. Wherefore he adds: “For how-
the soul is united to the mortal body as its form, yet so as
ever little he may see of the Creator’s light, all created
to make use neither of the bodily senses, nor even of the
things become petty to him.”
imagination, as happens in rapture; and in this way the
Whether the operation of contemplation is fittingly divided into a threefold movement, IIa IIae q. 180 a. 6
circular, straight and oblique?
Objection 1. It would seem that the operation of con-
cording to Wis. 8:16, “When I go into my house, I shall
templation is unfittingly divided into a threefold move-
repose myself with her.” Now movement is opposed to
ment, “circular,” “straight,” and “oblique” (Div. Nom.
rest. Therefore the operations of the contemplative life
iv). For contemplation pertains exclusively to rest, ac-
should not be described as movements.
∗ Cf. Ia, q. 12, a. 11, ad 1
1997
Objection 2. Further, the action of the contemplative for there is the “circular” movement, by which a thing
life pertains to the intellect, whereby man is like the an-
moves uniformly round one point as center, another is
gels. Now Dionysius describes these movements as being
the “straight” movement, by which a thing goes from one
different in the angels from what they are in the soul. For
point to another; the third is “oblique,” being composed
he says (Div. Nom. iv) that the “circular” movement in
as it were of both the others. Consequently, in intelligi-
the angel is “according to his enlightenment by the beau-
ble operations, that which is simply uniform is compared
tiful and the good.” On the other hand, he assigns the cir-
to circular movement; the intelligible operation by which
cular movement of the soul to several things: the first of
one proceeds from one point to another is compared to the
which is the “withdrawal of the soul into itself from exter-
straight movement; while the intelligible operation which
nals”; the second is “a certain concentration of its powers,
unites something of uniformity with progress to various
whereby it is rendered free of error and of outward occu-
points is compared to the oblique movement.
pation”; and the third is “union with those things that are
Reply to Objection 1. External bodily movements are
above it.” Again, he describes differently their respective
opposed to the quiet of contemplation, which consists in
straight movements. For he says that the straight move-
rest from outward occupations: but the movements of in-
ment of the angel is that by which he proceeds to the care
tellectual operations belong to the quiet of contemplation.
of those things that are beneath him. On the other hand,
Reply to Objection 2. Man is like the angels in intel-
he describes the straight movement of the soul as being
lect generically, but the intellective power is much higher
twofold: first, “its progress towards things that are near
in the angel than in man. Consequently these movements
it”; secondly, “its uplifting from external things to simple
must be ascribed to souls and angels in different ways, ac-
contemplation.” Further, he assigns a different oblique
cording as they are differently related to uniformity. For
movement to each. For he assigns the oblique movement
the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two re-
of the angels to the fact that “while providing for those
spects. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth
who have less they remain unchanged in relation to God”:
from the variety of composite objects; secondly, because
whereas he assigns the oblique movement of the soul to
it understands the truth of intelligible objects not discur-
the fact that “the soul is enlightened in Divine knowl-
sively, but by simple intuition. On the other hand, the
edge by reasoning and discoursing.” Therefore it would
intellect of the soul acquires intelligible truth from sensi-
seem that the operations of contemplation are unfittingly
ble objects, and understands it by a certain discoursing of
assigned according to the ways mentioned above.
the reason.
Objection 3. Further, Richard of St. Victor (De Con-
Wherefore Dionysius assigns the “circular” movement
templ. i, 5) mentions many other different movements in
of the angels to the fact that their intuition of God is uni-
likeness to the birds of the air. “For some of these rise
form and unceasing, having neither beginning nor end:
at one time to a great height, at another swoop down to
even as a circular movement having neither beginning nor
earth, and they do so repeatedly; others fly now to the
end is uniformly around the one same center. But on the
right, now to the left again and again; others go forwards
part of the soul, ere it arrive at this uniformity, its twofold or lag behind many times; others fly in a circle now more
lack of uniformity needs to be removed. First, that which
now less extended; and others remain suspended almost
arises from the variety of external things: this is removed
immovably in one place.” Therefore it would seem that
by the soul withdrawing from externals, and so the first
there are only three movements of contemplation.
thing he mentions regarding the circular movement of the
On the contrary, stands the authority of Dionysius
soul is “the soul’s withdrawal into itself from external ob-
(Div. Nom. iv).
jects.” Secondly, another lack of uniformity requires to be
I answer that, As stated above (q. 119, a. 1, ad 3),
removed from the soul, and this is owing to the discours-
the operation of the intellect, wherein contemplation es-
ing of reason. This is done by directing all the soul’s oper-
sentially consists, is called a movement, in so far as move-
ations to the simple contemplation of the intelligible truth,
ment is the act of a perfect thing, according to the Philoso-
and this is indicated by his saying in the second place that
pher (De Anima iii, 1). Since, however, it is through
“the soul’s intellectual powers must be uniformly concen-
sensible objects that we come to the knowledge of intel-
trated,” in other words that discoursing must be laid aside
ligible things, and since sensible operations do not take
and the soul’s gaze fixed on the contemplation of the one
place without movement, the result is that even intelligi-
simple truth. In this operation of the soul there is no error,
ble operations are described as movements, and are differ-
even as there is clearly no error in the understanding of
entiated in likeness to various movements. Now of bod-
first principles which we know by simple intuition. Af-
ily movements, local movements are the most perfect and
terwards these two things being done, he mentions thirdly
come first, as proved in Phys. viii, 7; wherefore the fore-
the uniformity which is like that of the angels, for then all
most among intelligible operations are described by being
things being laid aside, the soul continues in the contem-
likened to them. These movements are of three kinds;
plation of God alone. This he expresses by saying: “Then
1998
being thus made uniform unitedly,” i.e. conformably, “by Reply to Objection 3. These varieties of movement
the union of its powers, it is conducted to the good and
that are taken from the distinction between above and be-
the beautiful.” The “straight” movement of the angel can-
low, right and left, forwards and backwards, and from
not apply to his proceeding from one thing to another
varying circles, are all comprised under either straight and
by considering them, but only to the order of his provi-
oblique movement, because they all denote discursions
dence, namely to the fact that the higher angel enlightens
of reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the
the lower angels through the angels that are intermediate.
species, or from the part to the whole, it will be, as he
He indicates this when he says: “The angel’s movement
explains, from above to below: if from one opposite to
takes a straight line when he proceeds to the care of things
another, it will be from right to left; if from the cause to
subject to him, taking in his course whatever things are
the effect, it will be backwards and forwards; if it be about
direct,” i.e. in keeping with the dispositions of the direct
accidents that surround a thing near at hand or far remote,
order. Whereas he ascribes the “straight” movement in
the movement will be circular. The discoursing of reason
the soul to the soul’s proceeding from exterior sensibles
from sensible to intelligible objects, if it be according to
to the knowledge of intelligible objects. The “oblique”
the order of natural reason, belongs to the straight move-
movement in the angels he describes as being composed
ment; but if it be according to the Divine enlightenment, it
of the straight and circular movements, inasmuch as their
will belong to the oblique movement as explained above
care for those beneath them is in accordance with their
(ad 2). That alone which he describes as immobility be-
contemplation of God: while the “oblique” movement in
longs to the circular movement.
the soul he also declares to be partly straight and partly
Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the
circular, in so far as in reasoning it makes use of the light
movement of contemplation with much greater fulness
received from God.
and depth.
Whether there is delight in contemplation?
IIa IIae q. 180 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no delight
ness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and glad-
in contemplation. For delight belongs to the appetitive
ness”: and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “the
power; whereas contemplation resides chiefly in the intel-
contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable.”
lect. Therefore it would seem that there is no delight in
I answer that, There may be delight in any partic-
contemplation.
ular contemplation in two ways. First by reason of the
Objection 2. Further, all strife and struggle is a hin-
operation itself∗, because each individual delights in the
drance to delight. Now there is strife and struggle in con-
operation which befits him according to his own nature or
templation. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that
habit. Now contemplation of the truth befits a man ac-
“when the soul strives to contemplate God, it is in a state
cording to his nature as a rational animal: the result be-
of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes, because by
ing that “all men naturally desire to know,” so that conse-
understanding and feeling it tastes something of the in-
quently they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more
comprehensible light, and at another time it almost suc-
delightful still does this become to one who has the habit
cumbs, because even while tasting, it fails.” Therefore
of wisdom and knowledge, the result of which is that he
there is no delight in contemplation.
contemplates without difficulty. Secondly, contemplation
Objection 3. Further, delight is the result of a perfect may be delightful on the part of its object, in so far as
operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4. Now the contempla-
one contemplates that which one loves; even as bodily vi-
tion of wayfarers is imperfect, according to 1 Cor. 13:12,
sion gives pleasure, not only because to see is pleasurable
“We see now through a glass in a dark manner.” Therefore
in itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves.
seemingly there is no delight in the contemplative life.
Since, then, the contemplative life consists chiefly in the
Objection 4. Further, a lesion of the body is an obsta-
contemplation of God, of which charity is the motive, as
cle to delight. Now contemplation causes a lesion of the
stated above (Aa. 1,2, ad 1), it follows that there is delight
body; wherefore it is stated (Gn. 32) that after Jacob had
in the contemplative life, not only by reason of the con-
said (Gn. 32:30), “ ‘I have seen God face to face’. . . he
templation itself, but also by reason of the Divine love.
halted on his foot (Gn. 32:31). . . because he touched the
In both respects the delight thereof surpasses all hu-
sinew of his thigh and it shrank” (Gn. 32:32). Therefore
man delight, both because spiritual delight is greater than
seemingly there is no delight in contemplation.
carnal pleasure, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 31, a. 5), when
On the contrary, It is written of the contemplation of
we were treating of the passions, and because the love
wisdom (Wis. 8:16): “Her conversation hath no bitter-
whereby God is loved out of charity surpasses all love.
∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 3, a. 5
1999
Hence it is written (Ps. 33:9): “O taste and see that the the Apostle (Rom. 7:24): “Unhappy man that I am, who
Lord is sweet.”
shall deliver me from the body of this death?” Wherefore
Reply to Objection 1. Although the contemplative
Gregory say (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): “When God is once
life consists chiefly in an act of the intellect, it has its beknown by desire and understanding, He withers all carnal
ginning in the appetite, since it is through charity that one
pleasure in us.”
is urged to the contemplation of God. And since the end
Reply to Objection 3. The contemplation of God in
corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the term also
this life is imperfect in comparison with the contempla-
and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the
tion in heaven; and in like manner the delight of the way-
appetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and
farer’s contemplation is imperfect as compared with the
the very delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater
delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is written
love. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that
(Ps. 35:9): “Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent
“when we see one whom we love, we are so aflame as
of Thy pleasure.” Yet, though the contemplation of Di-
to love him more.” And this is the ultimate perfection of
vine things which is to be had by wayfarers is imperfect,
the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be not
it is more delightful than all other contemplation however
only seen but also loved.
perfect, on account of the excellence of that which is con-
Reply to Objection 2. Strife or struggle arising from
templated. Hence the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal.
the opposition of an external thing, hinders delight in that
i, 5): “We may happen to have our own little theories
thing. For a man delights not in a thing against which he
about those sublime beings and godlike substances, and
strives: but in that for which he strives; when he has ob-
though we grasp them but feebly, nevertheless so elevat-
tained it, other things being equal, he delights yet more:
ing is the knowledge that they give us more delight than
wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3) that “the more
any of those things that are round about us”: and Gre-
peril there was in the battle, the greater the joy in the tri-
gory says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): “The
umph.” But there is no strife or struggle in contempla-
contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable; for
tion on the part of the truth which we contemplate, though
it carries the soul away above itself, it opens heaven and
there is on the part of our defective understanding and our
discovers the spiritual world to the eyes of the mind.”
corruptible body which drags us down to lower things,
Reply to Objection 4. After contemplation Jacob
according to Wis. 9:15, “The corruptible body ss a load
halted with one foot, “because we need to grow weak in
upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down
the love of the world ere we wax strong in the love of
the mind that museth upon many things.” Hence it is that
God,” as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.). “Thus when
when man attains to the contemplation of truth, he loves
we have known the sweetness of God, we have one foot
it yet more, while he hates the more his own deficiency
sound while the other halts; since every one who halts on
and the weight of his corruptible body, so as to say with
one foot leans only on that foot which is sound.”
Whether the contemplative life is continuous?
IIa IIae q. 180 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that the contemplative
tinuous.
life is not continuous. For the contemplative life consists
Objection 3. Further, that which is not connatural to
essentially in things pertaining to the intellect. Now all
man cannot be continuous. Now the contemplative life,
the intellectual perfections of this life will be made void,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7), “is better than
according to 1 Cor. 13:8, “Whether prophecies shall be
the life which is according to man.” Therefore seemingly
made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be
the contemplative life is not continuous.
destroyed.” Therefore the contemplative life is made void.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 10:42): “Mary
Objection 2.
Further, a man tastes the sweetness
hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away
of contemplation by snatches and for a short time only:
from her,” since as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.),
wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x, 40), “Thou ad-
“the contemplative life begins here so that it may be per-
mittest me to a most unwonted affection in my inmost
fected in our heavenly home.”
soul, to a strange sweetness. . . yet through my grievous
I answer that, A thing may be described as continu-
weight I sink down again.” Again, Gregory commenting
ous in two ways: first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in
on the words of Job 4:15, “When a spirit passed before
regard to us. It is evident that in regard to itself contem-
me,” says (Moral. v, 33): “The mind does not remain long
plative life is continuous for two reasons: first, because it
at rest in the sweetness of inward contemplation, for it is
is about incorruptible and unchangeable things; secondly,
recalled to itself and beaten back by the very immensity
because it has no contrary, for there is nothing contrary to
of the light.” Therefore the contemplative life is not con-
the pleasure of contemplation, as stated in Topic. i, 13.
2000
But even in our regard contemplative life is continuous—
with a yet greater love when we see Him Whom we love.”
both because it is competent to us in respect of the incor-
Reply to Objection 2. No action can last long at its
ruptible part of the soul, namely the intellect, wherefore it
highest pitch. Now the highest point of contemplation is
can endure after this life—and because in the works of the
to reach the uniformity of Divine contemplation, accord-
contemplative life we work not with our bodies, so that we
ing to Dionysius∗, and as we have stated above (a. 6, ad
are the more able to persevere in the works thereof, as the
2). Hence although contemplation cannot last long in this
Philosopher observes (Ethic. x, 7).
respect, it can be of long duration as regards the other con-
Reply to Objection 1. The manner of contemplation
templative acts.
is not the same here as in heaven: yet the contemplative
Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher declares the
life is said to remain by reason of charity, wherein it has
contemplative life to be above man, because it befits us
both its beginning and its end. Gregory speaks in this
“so far as there is in us something divine” (Ethic. x, 7),
sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): “The contemplative life be-
namely the intellect, which is incorruptible and impassi-
gins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, be-
ble in itself, wherefore its act can endure longer.
cause the fire of love which begins to burn here is aflame
∗ Cf. Coel. Hier. iii
2001
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 181
Of the Active Life
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the active life, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether all the works of the moral virtues pertain to the active life?
(2) Whether prudence pertains to the active life?
(3) Whether teaching pertains to the active life?
(4) Of the duration of the active life.
Whether all the actions of the moral virtues pertain to the active life?
IIa IIae q. 181 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the acts of the moral
I answer that, As stated above (q. 179, a. 1) the active virtues do not all pertain to the active life. For seemingly
and the contemplative life differ according to the different
the active life regards only our relations with other per-
occupations of men intent on different ends: one of which
sons: hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “the
occupations is the consideration of the truth; and this is
active life is to give bread to the hungry,” and after men-
the end of the contemplative life, while the other is exter-
tioning many things that regard our relations with other
nal work to which the active life is directed.
people he adds finally, “and to give to each and every one
Now it is evident that the moral virtues are directed
whatever he needs.” Now we are directed in our relations
chiefly, not to the contemplation of truth but to operation.
to others, not by all the acts of moral virtues, but only
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that “for
by those of justice and its parts, as stated above (q. 58,
virtue knowledge is of little or no avail.” Hence it is clear
Aa. 2,8; Ia IIae, q. 60, Aa. 2,3). Therefore the acts of the
that the moral virtues belong essentially to the active life;
moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life.
for which reason the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 8) subordi-
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
nates the moral virtues to active happiness.
Ezech.) that Lia who was blear-eyed but fruitful signi-
Reply to Objection 1. The chief of the moral virtues
fies the active life: which “being occupied with work,
is justice by which one man is directed in his relations
sees less, and yet since it urges one’s neighbor both by
towards another, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 1).
word and example to its imitation it begets a numerous
Hence the active life is described with reference to our
offspring of good deeds.” Now this would seem to belong
relations with other people, because it consists in these
to charity, whereby we love our neighbor, rather than to
things, not exclusively, but principally.
the moral virtues. Therefore seemingly the acts of moral
Reply to Objection 2. It is possible, by the acts of all virtue do not pertain to the active life.
the moral virtues, for one to direct one’s neighbor to good
Objection 3. Further, as stated above (q. 180, a. 2),
by example: and this is what Gregory here ascribes to the
the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life.
active life.
Now disposition and perfection belong to the same thing.
Reply to Objection 3. Even as the virtue that is di-
Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues do not per-
rected to the end of another virtue passes, as it were, into
tain to the active life.
the species of the latter virtue, so again when a man makes
On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii,
use of things pertaining to the active life, merely as dispo-
15): “In the active life all vices must first of all be extir-
sitions to contemplation, such things are comprised un-
pated by the practice of good works, in order that in the
der the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we
contemplative life the mind’s eye being purified one may
practice the works of the moral virtues, as being good in
advance to the contemplation of the Divine light.” Now all
themselves, and not as dispositions to the contemplative
vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral virtues.
life, the moral virtues belong to the active life.
Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the active
It may also be replied, however, that the active life is
life.
a disposition to the contemplative life.
2002
Whether prudence pertains to the active life?
IIa IIae q. 181 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that prudence does not
contemplative life, so the knowledge of prudence, which
pertain to the active life. For just as the contemplative life
is of itself directed to the works of the moral virtues, be-
belongs to the cognitive power, so the active life belongs
longs directly to the active life, provided we take prudence
to the appetitive power. Now prudence belongs not to the
in its proper sense as the Philosopher speaks of it.
appetitive but to the cognitive power. Therefore prudence
If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as com-
does not belong to the active life.
prising any kind of human knowledge, then prudence, as
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
regards a certain part thereof, belongs to the contempla-
Ezech.) that the “active life being occupied with work,
tive life. In this sense Tully (De Offic. i, 5) says that “the
sees less,” wherefore it is signified by Lia who was blear-
man who is able most clearly and quickly to grasp the
eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes, so that one may
truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be considered
judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore it seems
most prudent and wise.”
that prudence does not pertain to the active life.
Reply to Objection 1. Moral works take their species
Objection 3. Further, prudence stands between the
from their end, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, Aa. 4,6),
moral and the intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral
wherefore the knowledge pertaining to the contemplative
virtues belong to the active life, as stated above (a. 1), so
life is that which has its end in the very knowledge of
do the intellectual virtues pertain to the contemplative life.
truth; whereas the knowledge of prudence, through hav-
Therefore it would seem that prudence pertains neither to
ing its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the
the active nor to the contemplative life, but to an interme-
active life.
diate kind of life, of which Augustine makes mention (De
Reply to Objection 2. External occupation makes a
Civ. Dei xix, 2,3,19).
man see less in intelligible things, which are separated
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8)
from sensible objects with which the works of the active
that prudence pertains to active happiness, to which the
life are concerned. Nevertheless the external occupation
moral virtues belong.
of the active life enables a man to see more clearly in judg-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 3; Ia IIae,
ing of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence, both
q. 18, a. 6), if one thing be directed to another as its end, it on account of experience, and on account of the mind’s at-is drawn, especially in moral matters, to the species of the
tention, since “brains avail when the mind is attentive” as
thing to which it is directed: for instance “he who commits
Sallust observes∗.
adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adul-
Reply to Objection 3. Prudence is said to be inter-
terer,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2). Now it
mediate between the intellectual and the moral virtues
is evident that the knowledge of prudence is directed to
because it resides in the same subject as the intellectual
the works of the moral virtues as its end, since it is “right
virtues, and has absolutely the same matter as the moral
reason applied to action” (Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends
virtues. But this third kind of life is intermediate between
of the moral virtues are the principles of prudence, as the
the active and the contemplative life as regards the things
Philosopher says in the same book. Accordingly, as it was
about which it is occupied, because it is occupied some-
stated above (a. 1, ad 3) that the moral virtues in one who
times with the contemplation of the truth, sometimes with
directs them to the quiet of contemplation belong to the
eternal things.
Whether teaching is a work of the active or of the contemplative life?
IIa IIae q. 181 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that teaching is a work
that “to be able to teach is an indication of knowledge.”
not of the active but of the contemplative life. For Gre-
Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain to the con-
gory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that “the perfect who have
templative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs
been able to contemplate heavenly goods, at least through
to the contemplative life.
a glass, proclaim them to their brethren, whose minds they
Objection 3. Further, prayer, no less than contempla-
inflame with love for their hidden beauty.” But this per-
tion, is an act of the contemplative life. Now prayer, even
tains to teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of the con-
when one prays for another, belongs to the contemplative
templative life.
life. Therefore it would seem that it belongs also to the
Objection 2. Further, act and habit would seem to
contemplative life to acquaint another, by teaching him,
be referable to the same kind of life. Now teaching is an
of the truth we have meditated.
act of wisdom: for the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1)
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.):
∗ Bell. Catilin., LI
2003
“The active life is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the The other object of teaching is on the part of the
ignorant the words of wisdom.”
speech heard, and thus the object of teaching is the hearer.
I answer that, The act of teaching has a twofold ob-
As to this object all doctrine belongs to the active life to
ject. For teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the
which external actions pertain.
audible sign of the interior concept. Accordingly one ob-
Reply to Objection 1. The authority quoted speaks
ject of teaching is the matter or object of the interior con-
expressly of doctrine as to its matter, in so far as it is con-
cept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes to
cerned with the consideration and love of truth.
the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It belongs
Reply to Objection 2. Habit and act have a common
to the active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly,
object. Hence this argument clearly considers the matter
so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it
of the interior concept. For it pertains to the man having
belongs to the contemplative life when a man conceives
wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in so far as he
an intelligible truth, in the consideration and love whereof
is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to
he delights. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm.
bring another man to understand the truth.
civ, 1): “Let them choose for themselves the better part,”
Reply to Objection 3. He who prays for another does
namely the contemplative life, “let them be busy with the
nothing towards the man for whom he prays, but only to-
word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy them-
wards God Who is the intelligible truth; whereas he who
selves with salutary knowledge,” thus stating clearly that
teaches another does something in his regard by external
teaching belongs to the contemplative life.
action. Hence the comparison fails.
Whether the active life remains after this life?
IIa IIae q. 181 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the active life remains
to contemplation as their end. For, as Augustine says at
after this life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to
the end of De Civitate Dei xxii, 30, “there we shall rest
the active life, as stated above (a. 1). But the moral virtues
and we shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and
endure after this life according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv,
praise.” And he had said before (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30)
9). Therefore the active life remains after this life.
that “there God will be seen without end, loved without
Objection 2. Further, teaching others belongs to the
wearying, praised without tiring: such will be the occupa-
active life, as stated above (a. 3).
But in the life to
tion of all, the common love, the universal activity.”
come when “we shall be like the angels,” teaching will
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 136, a. 1,
be possible: even as apparently it is in the angels of
ad 1), the moral virtues will remain not as to those actions
whom one “enlightens, cleanses, and perfects”∗ another,
which are about the means, but as to the actions which
which refers to the “receiving of knowledge,” according
are about the end. Such acts are those that conduce to the
to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it would seem
quiet of contemplation, which in the words quoted above
that the active life remains after this life.
Augustine denotes by “rest,” and this rest excludes not
Objection 3. Further, the more lasting a thing is in
only outward disturbances but also the inward disturbance
itself, the more is it able to endure after this life. But the
of the passions.
active life is seemingly more lasting in itself: for Gregory
Reply to Objection 2.
The contemplative life, as
says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that “we can remain fixed in
stated above (q. 180, a. 4), consists chiefly in the contem-
the active life, whereas we are nowise able to maintain an
plation of God, and as to this, one angel does not teach
attentive mind in the contemplative life.” Therefore the
another, since according to Mat. 18:10, “the little ones’
active life is much more able than the contemplative to
angels,” who belong to the lower order, “always see the
endure after this life.
face of the Father”; and so, in the life to come, no man
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.):
will teach another of God, but “we shall” all “see Him as
“The active life ends with this world, but the contem-
He is” (1 Jn. 3:2). This is in keeping with the saying of
plative life begins here, to be perfected in our heavenly
Jeremiah 31:34: “They shall teach no more every man his
home.”
neighbor. . . saying: Know the Lord: for all shall know me,
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the active life
from the least of them even to the greatest.”
has its end in external actions: and if these be referred to
But as regards things pertaining to the “dispensation
the quiet of contemplation, for that very reason they be-
of the mysteries of God,” one angel teaches another by
long to the contemplative life. But in the future life of the
cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting him: and thus they
blessed the occupation of external actions will cease, and
have something of the active life so long as the world lasts,
if there be any external actions at all, these will be referred from the fact that they are occupied in administering to the
∗ Coel. Hier. iii, viii
2004
creatures below them. This is signified by the fact that Ja-petent to us not by reason of our natural order, as it is to
cob saw angels “ascending” the ladder—which refers to
the angels, but by reason of our seeing God.
contemplation—and “descending” —which refers to ac-
Reply to Objection 3. That the durability of the active
tion. Nevertheless, as Gregory remarks (Moral. ii, 3),
life in the present state surpasses the durability of the con-
“they do not wander abroad from the Divine vision, so
templative life arises not from any property of either life
as to be deprived of the joys of inward contemplation.”
considered in itself, but from our own deficiency, since
Hence in them the active life does not differ from the con-
we are withheld from the heights of contemplation by the
templative life as it does in us for whom the works of the
weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds (Moral. ii, 3)
active life are a hindrance to contemplation.
that “the mind through its very weakness being repelled
Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as re-
from that immense height recoils on itself.”
gards the administering to lower creatures, for this is com-
2005
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 182
Of the Active Life in Comparison with the Contemplative Life (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the active life in comparison with the contemplative life, under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Which of them is of greater import or excellence?
(2) Which of them has the greater merit?
(3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?
(4) Of their order.
Whether the active life is more excellent than the contemplative?
IIa IIae q. 182 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the active life is more
sons (Ethic. x, 7,8). The first is, because the contempla-
excellent than the contemplative. For “that which belongs
tive life becomes man according to that which is best in
to better men would seem to be worthier and better,” as
him, namely the intellect, and according to its proper ob-
the Philosopher says (Top. iii, 1). Now the active life be-
jects, namely things intelligible; whereas the active life
longs to persons of higher rank, namely prelates, who are
is occupied with externals. Hence Rachael, by whom the
placed in a position of honor and power; wherefore Au-
contemplative life is signified, is interpreted “the vision
gustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that “in our actions we
of the principle,Ӡ whereas as Gregory says (Moral. vi,
must not love honor or power in this life.” Therefore it
37) the active life is signified by Lia who was blear-eyed.
would seem that the active life is more excellent than the
The second reason is because the contemplative life can
contemplative.
be more continuous, although not as regards the highest
Objection 2. Further, in all habits and acts, direction
degree of contemplation, as stated above (q. 180, a. 8, ad
belongs to the more important; thus the military art, being
2; q. 181, a. 4, ad 3), wherefore Mary, by whom the con-
the more important, directs the art of the bridle-maker∗.
templative life is signified, is described as “sitting” all the Now it belongs to the active life to direct and command
time “at the Lord’s feet.” Thirdly, because the contempla-
the contemplative, as appears from the words addressed
tive life is more delightful than the active; wherefore Au-
to Moses (Ex. 19:21), “Go down and charge the people,
gustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) that “Martha was
lest they should have a mind to pass the” fixed “limits to
troubled, but Mary feasted.” Fourthly, because in the con-
see the Lord.” Therefore the active life is more excellent
templative life man is more self-sufficient, since he needs
than the contemplative.
fewer things for that purpose; wherefore it was said (Lk.
Objection 3. Further, no man should be taken away
10:41): “Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled
from a greater thing in order to be occupied with lesser
about many things.” Fifthly, because the contemplative
things: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:31): “Be zealous
life is loved more for its own sake, while the active life is
for the better gifts.” Now some are taken away from the
directed to something else. Hence it is written (Ps. 36:4):
state of the contemplative life to the occupations of the ac-
“One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after,
tive life, as in the case of those who are transferred to the
that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of
state of prelacy. Therefore it would seem that the active
my life, that I may see the delight of the Lord.” Sixthly,
life is more excellent than the contemplative.
because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest,
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Lk. 10:42): “Mary
according to Ps. 45:11, “Be still and see that I am God.”
hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away
Seventhly, because the contemplative life is according to
from her.”
Now Mary figures the contemplative life.
Divine things, whereas active life is according to human
Therefore the contemplative life is more excellent than the
things; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm.
active.
civ): “ ‘In the beginning was the Word’: to Him was Mary
I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being
hearkening: ‘The Word was made flesh’: Him was Martha
more excellent in themselves, whereas they are surpassed
serving.” Eighthly, because the contemplative life is ac-
by another in some respect. Accordingly we must reply
cording to that which is most proper to man, namely his
that the contemplative life is simply more excellent than
intellect; whereas in the works of the active life the lower
the active: and the Philosopher proves this by eight rea-
powers also, which are common to us and brutes, have
∗ Ethic. i, 1
† Or rather, ‘One seeing the principle,’ if derived from
rah and irzn; Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.
2006
their part; wherefore (Ps. 35:7) after the words, “Men and nal things.” And Boethius says (De Consol. v, 2): “The
beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord,” that which is special
soul of man must needs be more free while it continues
to man is added (Ps. 35:10): “In Thy light we shall see
to gaze on the Divine mind, and less so when it stoops
light.”
to bodily things.” Wherefore it is evident that the ac-
Our Lord adds a ninth reason (Lk. 10:42) when He
tive life does not directly command the contemplative life,
says: “Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not
but prescribes certain works of the active life as disposi-
be taken away from her,” which words Augustine (De
tions to the contemplative life; which it accordingly serves
Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) expounds thus: “Not—Thou hast
rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he
chosen badly but—She has chosen better. Why better?
says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that “the active life is bondage,
Listen—because it shall not be taken away from her. But
whereas the contemplative life is freedom.”
the burden of necessity shall at length be taken from thee:
Reply to Objection 3. Sometimes a man is called
whereas the sweetness of truth is eternal.”
away from the contemplative life to the works of the active
Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one
life, on account of some necessity of the present life, yet
should prefer the active life on account of the needs of the
not so as to be compelled to forsake contemplation alto-
present life. Thus too the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2):
gether. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): “The
“It is better to be wise than to be rich, yet for one who is
love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity
in need, it is better to be rich. . . ”
undertake an honest toil,” the work namely of the active
Reply to Objection 1. Not only the active life con-
life. “If no one imposes this burden upon us we must de-
cerns prelates, they should also excel in the contemplative
vote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth,
life; hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1): “A prelate should
but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity
be foremost in action, more uplifted than others in con-
demands it of us. Yet even then we must not altogether
templation.”
forsake the delights of truth, lest we deprive ourselves of
Reply to Objection 2. The contemplative life consists
its sweetness, and this burden overwhelm us.” Hence it is
in a certain liberty of mind. For Gregory says (Hom. iii
clear that when a person is called from the contemplative
in Ezech.) that “the contemplative life obtains a certain
life to the active life, this is done by way not of subtraction freedom of mind, for it thinks not of temporal but of eter-but of addition.
Whether the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative?
IIa IIae q. 182 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the active life is of
active, but more of the character of reward.
greater merit than the contemplative. For merit implies
Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in
relation to meed; and meed is due to labor, according to
Ezech.) that “no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than
1 Cor. 3:8, “Every man shall receive his own reward ac-
zeal for souls.” Now by the zeal for souls a man turns to
cording to his own labor.” Now labor is ascribed to the
the occupations of the active life. Therefore it would seem
active life, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory
that the contemplative life is not of greater merit than the
says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): “Whosoever is converted to
active.
God must first of all sweat from labor, i.e. he must take
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral.
vi, 37):
Lia, that afterwards he may rest in the embraces of Rachel
“Great are the merits of the active life, but greater still
so as to see the principle.” Therefore the active life is of
those of the contemplative.”
greater merit than the contemplative.
I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 4), Objection 2. Further, the contemplative life is a be-the root of merit is charity; and, while, as stated above
ginning of the happiness to come; wherefore Augustine
(q. 25, a. 1), charity consists in the love of God and our
commenting on Jn. 21:22, “So I will have him to re-
neighbor, the love of God is by itself more meritorious
main till I come,” says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan.): “This
than the love of our neighbor, as stated above (q. 27, a. 8).
may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect works fol-
Wherefore that which pertains more directly to the love of
low Me conformed to the example of My passion, and
God is generically more meritorious than that which per-
let contemplation begun here remain until I come, that it
tains directly to the love of our neighbor for God’s sake.
may be perfected when I shall come.” And Gregory says
Now the contemplative life pertains directly and imme-
(Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “contemplation begins here, so
diately to the love of God; for Augustine says (De Civ.
as to be perfected in our heavenly home.” Now the life
Dei xix, 19) that “the love of” the Divine “truth seeks a
to come will be a state not of meriting but of receiving
holy leisure,” namely of the contemplative life, for it is
the reward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative life
that truth above all which the contemplative life seeks, as
would seem to have less of the character of merit than the
stated above (q. 181, a. 4, ad 2). On the other hand, the
2007
active life is more directly concerned with the love of our plation.
neighbor, because it is “busy about much serving” (Lk.
Reply to Objection 2. In the state of future happiness
10:40). Wherefore the contemplative life is generically
man has arrived at perfection, wherefore there is no room
of greater merit than the active life. This is moreover as-
for advancement by merit; and if there were, the merit
serted by Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech.): “The contempla-
would be more efficacious by reason of the greater char-
tive life surpasses in merit the active life, because the lat-
ity. But in the present life contemplation is not without
ter labors under the stress of present work,” by reason of
some imperfection, and can always become more perfect;
the necessity of assisting our neighbor, “while the former
wherefore it does not remove the idea of merit, but causes
with heartfelt relish has a foretaste of the coming rest,” i.e.
a yet greater merit on account of the practice of greater
the contemplation of God.
Divine charity.
Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more
Reply to Objection 3. A sacrifice is rendered to God
by the works of the active life than another by the works of
spiritually when something is offered to Him; and of all
the contemplative life. For instance through excess of Di-
man’s goods, God specially accepts that of the human soul
vine love a man may now and then suffer separation from
when it is offered to Him in sacrifice. Now a man ought to
the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the time be-
offer to God, in the first place, his soul, according to Ec-
ing, that God’s will may be done and for His glory’s sake.
clus. 30:24, “Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God”; in
Thus the Apostle says (Rom. 9:3): “I wished myself to be
the second place, the souls of others, according to Apoc.
an anathema from Christ, for my brethren”; which words
22:17, “He that heareth, let him say: Come.” And the
Chrysostom expounds as follows (De Compunct. i, 7∗):
more closely a man unites his own or another’s soul to
“His mind was so steeped in the love of Christ that, al-
God, the more acceptable is his sacrifice to God; where-
though he desired above all to be with Christ, he despised
fore it is more acceptable to God that one apply one’s own
even this, because thus he pleased Christ.”
soul and the souls of others to contemplation than to ac-
Reply to Objection 1. External labor conduces to the
tion. Consequently the statement that “no sacrifice is more
increase of the accidental reward; but the increase of merit
acceptable to God than zeal for souls,” does not mean that
with regard to the essential reward consists chiefly in char-
the merit of the active life is preferable to the merit of the
ity, whereof external labor borne for Christ’s sake is a
contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer
sign. Yet a much more expressive sign thereof is shown
to God one’s own soul and the souls of others, than any
when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this life,
other external gifts.
delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contem-
Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?
IIa IIae q. 182 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the contemplative life
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral.
vi, 37):
is hindered by the active life. For the contemplative life re-
“Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation,
quires a certain stillness of mind, according to Ps. 45:11,
must first of all train in the camp of action.”
“Be still, and see that I am God”; whereas the active life
I answer that, The active life may be considered from
involves restlessness, according to Lk. 10:41, “Martha,
two points of view. First, as regards the attention to and
Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things.”
practice of external works: and thus it is evident that the
Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.
active life hinders the contemplative, in so far as it is im-
Objection 2. Further, clearness of vision is a requisite possible for one to be busy with external action, and at
for the contemplative life. Now active life is a hindrance
the same time give oneself to Divine contemplation. Sec-
to clear vision; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that
ondly, active life may be considered as quieting and di-
it “is blear-eyed and fruitful, because the active life, being
recting the internal passions of the soul; and from this
occupied with work, sees less.” Therefore the active life
point of view the active life is a help to the contempla-
hinders the contemplative.
tive, since the latter is hindered by the inordinateness of
Objection 3. Further, one contrary hinders the other.
the internal passions. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi,
Now the active and the contemplative life are apparently
37): “Those who wish to hold the fortress of contempla-
contrary to one another, since the active life is busy about
tion must first of all train in the camp of action. Thus
many things, while the contemplative life attends to the
after careful study they will learn whether they no longer
contemplation of one; wherefore they differ in opposition
wrong their neighbor, whether they bear with equanim-
to one another. Therefore it would seem that the contem-
ity the wrongs their neighbors do to them, whether their
plative life is hindered by the active.
soul is neither overcome with joy in the presence of tem-
∗ Ad Demetr. de Compunct. Cordis.
2008
poral goods, nor cast down with too great a sorrow when plative, by quelling the interior passions which give rise
those goods are withdrawn. In this way they will known
to the phantasms whereby contemplation is hindered.
when they withdraw within themselves, in order to ex-
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for
plore spiritual things, whether they no longer carry with
these arguments consider the occupation itself of exter-
them the shadows of the things corporeal, or, if these
nal actions, and not the effect which is the quelling of the
follow them, whether they prudently drive them away.”
passions.
Hence the work of the active life conduces to the contem-
Whether the active life precedes the contemplative?
IIa IIae q. 182 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the active life does
rected to the love of God, not of any degree, but to that
not precede the contemplative. For the contemplative life
which is perfect; whereas the active life is necessary for
pertains directly to the love of God; while the active life
any degree of the love of our neighbor. Hence Gregory
pertains to the love of our neighbor. Now the love of
says (Hom. iii in Ezech.): “Without the contemplative
God precedes the love of our neighbor, since we love our
life it is possible to enter the heavenly kingdom, provided
neighbor for God’s sake. Seemingly therefore the con-
one omit not the good actions we are able to do; but we
templative life also precedes the active life.
cannot enter therein without the active life, if we neglect
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
to do the good we can do.”
Ezech.): “It should be observed that while a well-ordered
From this it is also evident that the active precedes the
life proceeds from action to contemplation, sometimes it
contemplative life, as that which is common to all pre-
is useful for the soul to turn from the contemplative to the
cedes, in the order of generation, that which is proper to
active life.” Therefore the active is not simply prior to the
the perfect.
contemplative.
Reply to Objection 2. Progress from the active to
Objection 3. Further, it would seem that there is not
the contemplative life is according to the order of genera-
necessarily any order between things that are suitable to
tion; whereas the return from the contemplative life to the
different subjects. Now the active and the contemplative
active is according to the order of direction, in so far as
life are suitable to different subjects; for Gregory says
the active life is directed by the contemplative. Even thus
(Moral. vi, 37): “Often those who were able to contem-
habit is acquired by acts, and by the acquired habit one
plate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen
acts yet more perfectly, as stated in Ethic. ii, 7.
when pressed with occupation; and frequently they who
Reply to Objection 3. He that is prone to yield to
might live advantageously occupied with the service of
his passions on account of his impulse to action is simply
their fellow-creatures are killed by the sword of their in-
more apt for the active life by reason of his restless spirit.
action.”
Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that “there be some
I answer that, A thing is said to precede in two ways.
so restless that when they are free from labor they labor all
First, with regard to its nature; and in this way the con-
the more, because the more leisure they have for thought,
templative life precedes the active, inasmuch as it applies
the worse interior turmoil they have to bear.” Others, on
itself to things which precede and are better than others,
the contrary, have the mind naturally pure and restful, so
wherefore it moves and directs the active life. For the
that they are apt for contemplation, and if they were to
higher reason which is assigned to contemplation is com-
apply themselves wholly to action, this would be detri-
pared to the lower reason which is assigned to action, and
mental to them. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37)
the husband is compared to his wife, who should be ruled
that “some are so slothful of mind that if they chance to
by her husband, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3,7,12).
have any hard work to do they give way at the very out-
Secondly, a thing precedes with regard to us, because
set.” Yet, as he adds further on, “often. . . love stimulates
it comes first in the order of generation. In this way the
slothful souls to work, and fear restrains souls that are dis-
active precedes the contemplative life, because it disposes
turbed in contemplation.” Consequently those who are
one to it, as stated above (a. 1; q. 181, a. 1, ad 3); and,
more adapted to the active life can prepare themselves for
in the order of generation, disposition precedes form, al-
the contemplative by the practice of the active life; while
though the latter precedes simply and according to its na-
none the less, those who are more adapted to the contem-
ture.
plative life can take upon themselves the works of the ac-
Reply to Objection 1. The contemplative life is di-
tive life, so as to become yet more apt for contemplation.
2009
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 183
Of Man’s Various Duties and States in General
(In Four Articles)
We must next consider man’s various states and duties. We shall consider (1) man’s duties and states in general; (2) the state of the perfect in particular.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What constitutes a state among men?
(2) Whether among men there should be various states and duties?
(3) Of the diversity of duties;
(4) Of the diversity of states.
Whether the notion of a state denotes a condition of freedom or servitude?
IIa IIae q. 183 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the notion of a state
it is natural to man that his head should be directed up-
does not denote a condition of freedom or servitude. For
wards, his feet set firmly on the ground, and his other
“state” takes its name from “standing.” Now a person is
intermediate members disposed in becoming order; and
said to stand on account of his being upright; and Gre-
this is not the case if he lie down, sit, or recline, but only
gory says (Moral. vii, 17): “To fall by speaking harm-
when he stands upright: nor again is he said to stand, if
ful words is to forfeit entirely the state of righteousness.”
he move, but only when he is still. Hence it is again that
But a man acquires spiritual uprightness by submitting his
even in human acts, a matter is said to have stability [sta-
will to God; wherefore a gloss on Ps. 32:1, “Praise be-
tum] in reference to its own disposition in the point of
cometh the upright,” says: “The upright are those who
a certain immobility or restfulness. Consequently mat-
direct their heart according to God’s will.” Therefore it
ters which easily change and are extrinsic to them do not
would seem that obedience to the Divine commandments
constitute a state among men, for instance that a man be
suffices alone for the notion of a state.
rich or poor, of high or low rank, and so forth. Where-
Objection 2. Further, the word “state” seems to de-
fore in the civil law∗ (Lib. Cassius ff. De Senatoribus)
note immobility according to 1 Cor. 15:48, “Be ye stead-
it is said that if a man be removed from the senate, he is
fast [stabiles] and immovable”; wherefore Gregory says
deprived of his dignity rather than of his state. But that
(Hom. xxi in Ezech.): “The stone is foursquare, and is
alone seemingly pertains to a man’s state, which regards
stable on all sides, if no disturbance will make it fall.”
an obligation binding his person, in so far, to wit, as a man
Now it is virtue that enables us “to act with immobility,”
is his own master or subject to another, not indeed from
according to Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore it would seem that a
any slight or unstable cause, but from one that is firmly
state is acquired by every virtuous action.
established; and this is something pertaining to the nature
Objection 3. Further, the word “state” seems to in-
of freedom or servitude. Therefore state properly regards
dicate height of a kind; because to stand is to be raised
freedom or servitude whether in spiritual or in civil mat-
upwards. Now one man is made higher than another by
ters.
various duties; and in like manner men are raised upwards
Reply to Objection 1. Uprightness as such does not
in various ways by various grades and orders. Therefore
pertain to the notion of state, except in so far as it is con-
the mere difference of grades, orders, or duties suffices for
natural to man with the addition of a certain restfulness.
a difference of states.
Hence other animals are said to stand without its being re-
On the contrary, It is thus laid down in the Decretals
quired that they should be upright; nor again are men said
(II, qu. vi, can. Si Quando): “Whenever anyone intervene
to stand, however upright their position be, unless they be
in a cause where life or state is at stake he must do so,
still.
not by a proxy, but in his own person”; and “state” here
Reply to Objection 2. Immobility does not suffice for
has reference to freedom or servitude. Therefore it would
the notion of state; since even one who sits or lies down is
seem that nothing differentiates a man’s state, except that
still, and yet he is not said to stand.
which refers to freedom or servitude.
Reply to Objection 3. Duty implies relation to act;
I answer that, “State,” properly speaking, denotes a
while grades denote an order of superiority and inferior-
kind of position, whereby a thing is disposed with a cer-
ity. But state requires immobility in that which regards a
tain immobility in a manner according with its nature. For
condition of the person himself.
∗ Dig. I, IX, De Senatoribus
2010
Whether there should be different duties or states in the Church?
IIa IIae q. 183 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that there should not be
12:4,5), “As in one body we have many members, but all
different duties or states in the Church. For distinction is
the members have not the same office, so we being many
opposed to unity. Now the faithful of Christ are called to
are one body in Christ.” Thirdly, this belongs to the dig-
unity according to Jn. 17:21,22: “That they. . . may be one
nity and beauty of the Church, which consist in a certain
in Us. . . as We also are one.” Therefore there should not
order; wherefore it is written (3 Kings 10:4,5) that “when
be a distinction of duties and states in the Church.
the queen of Saba saw all the wisdom of Solomon. . . and
Objection 2. Further, nature does not employ many
the apartments of his servants, and the order of his min-
means where one suffices. But the working of grace is
isters. . . she had no longer any spirit in her.” Hence the
much more orderly than the working of nature. Therefore
Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:20) that “in a great house there are
it were more fitting for things pertaining to the operations
not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and
of grace to be administered by the same persons, so that
of earth.”
there would not be a distinction of duties and states in the
Reply to Objection 1. The distinction of states and
Church.
duties is not an obstacle to the unity of the Church, for
Objection 3. Further, the good of the Church seem-
this results from the unity of faith, charity, and mutual ser-
ingly consists chiefly in peace, according to Ps. 147:3,
vice, according to the saying of the Apostle (Eph. 4:16):
“Who hath placed peace in thy borders,” and 2 Cor. 13:11,
“From whom the whole body being compacted,” namely
“Have peace, and the God of peace. . . shall be with you.”
by faith, “and fitly joined together,” namely by charity,
Now distinction is a hindrance to peace, for peace would
“by what every joint supplieth,” namely by one man serv-
seem to result from likeness, according to Ecclus. 13:19,
ing another.
“Every beast loveth its like,” while the Philosopher says
Reply to Objection 2. Just as nature does not employ
(Polit. vii, 5) that “a little difference causes dissension in
many means where one suffices, so neither does it con-
a state.” Therefore it would seem that there ought not to
fine itself to one where many are required, according to
be a distinction of states and duties in the Church.
the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), “If the whole
On the contrary, It is written in praise of the Church
body were the eye, where would be the hearing?” Hence
(Ps. 44:10) that she is “surrounded with variety”: and a
there was need in the Church, which is Christ’s body, for
gloss on these words says that “the Queen,” namely the
the members to be differentiated by various duties, states,
Church, “is bedecked with the teaching of the apostles,
and grades.
the confession of martyrs, the purity of virgins, the sor-
Reply to Objection 3. Just as in the natural body the
rowings of penitents.”
various members are held together in unity by the power
I answer that, The difference of states and duties in
of the quickening spirit, and are dissociated from one an-
the Church regards three things. In the first place it re-
other as soon as that spirit departs, so too in the Church’s
gards the perfection of the Church. For even as in the
body the peace of the various members is preserved by
order of natural things, perfection, which in God is sim-
the power of the Holy Spirit, Who quickens the body of
ple and uniform, is not to be found in the created uni-
the Church, as stated in Jn. 6:64. Hence the Apostle says
verse except in a multiform and manifold manner, so too,
(Eph. 4:3): “Careful to keep the unity of the Spirit in the
the fulness of grace, which is centered in Christ as head,
bond of peace.” Now a man departs from this unity of
flows forth to His members in various ways, for the per-
spirit when he seeks his own; just as in an earthly king-
fecting of the body of the Church. This is the meaning
dom peace ceases when the citizens seek each man his
of the Apostle’s words (Eph. 4:11,12): “He gave some
own. Besides, the peace both of mind and of an earthly
apostles, and some prophets, and other some evangelists,
commonwealth is the better preserved by a distinction of
and other some pastors and doctors for the perfecting of
duties and states, since thereby the greater number have
the saints.” Secondly, it regards the need of those actions
a share in public actions. Wherefore the Apostle says (1
which are necessary in the Church. For a diversity of ac-
Cor. 12:24,25) that “God hath tempered [the body] to-
tions requires a diversity of men appointed to them, in
gether that there might be no schism in the body, but the
order that all things may be accomplished without delay
members might be mutually careful one for another.”
or confusion; and this is indicated by the Apostle (Rom.
2011
Whether duties differ according to their actions?
IIa IIae q. 183 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that duties do not differ
appointed to various actions. A third distinction regards
according to their actions. For there are infinite varieties
the order of ecclesiastical beauty: and thus we distinguish
of human acts both in spirituals and in temporals. Now
various grades according as in the same state or duty one
there can be no certain distinction among things that are
person is above another. Hence according to a variant
infinite in number. Therefore human duties cannot be dif-
text∗ it is written (Ps. 47:4): “In her grades shall God
ferentiated according to a difference of acts.
be known.”
Objection 2. Further, the active and the contemplative
Reply to Objection 1. The material diversity of hu-
life differ according to their acts, as stated above (q. 179,
man acts is infinite. It is not thus that duties differ, but by a. 1). But the distinction of duties seems to be other than
their formal diversity which results from diverse species
the distinction of lives. Therefore duties do not differ ac-
of acts, and in this way human acts are not infinite.
cording to their acts.
Reply to Objection 2. Life is predicated of a thing
Objection 3.
Further, even ecclesiastical orders,
absolutely: wherefore diversity of acts which are becom-
states, and grades seemingly differ according to their acts.
ing to man considered in himself. But efficiency, whence
If, then, duties differ according to their acts it would seem
we have the word “office” (as stated above), denotes ac-
that duties, grades, and states differ in the same way. Yet
tion tending to something else according to Metaph. ix,
this is not true, since they are divided into their respec-
text. 16†. Hence offices differ properly in respect of acts
tive parts in different ways. Therefore duties do not differ
that are referred to other persons; thus a teacher is said to
according to their acts.
have an office, and so is a judge, and so forth. Wherefore
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that “of-
Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that “to have an office is to be
ficium [duty] takes its name from ‘efficere’ [to effect], as
officious,” i.e. harmful “to no one, but to be useful to all.”
though it were instead of ‘efficium,’ by the change of one
Reply to Objection 3. Differences of state, offices
letter for the sake of the sound.” But effecting pertains to
and grades are taken from different things, as stated above
action. Therefore duties differ according to their acts.
(a. 1, ad 3). Yet these three things may concur in the same
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), difference
subject: thus when a person is appointed to a higher ac-
among the members of the Church is directed to three
tion, he attains thereby both office and grade, and some-
things: perfection, action, and beauty; and according to
times, besides this, a state of perfection, on account of
these three we may distinguish a threefold distinction
the sublimity of the act, as in the case of a bishop. The
among the faithful. One, with regard to perfection, and
ecclesiastical orders are particularly distinct according to
thus we have the difference of states, in reference to which
divine offices. For Isidore says (Etym. vi): “There are
some persons are more perfect than others. Another dis-
various kinds of offices; but the foremost is that which
tinction regards action and this is the distinction of duties:
relates to sacred and Divine things.”
for persons are said to have various duties when they are
Whether the difference of states applies to those who are beginning, progressing, or IIa IIae q. 183 a. 4
perfect?
Objection 1. It would seem that the difference of
progress, and perfection seems to refer to “more” and
states does not apply to those who are beginning, pro-
“less,” and this seemingly implies the notion of grades.
gressing, or perfect. For “diverse genera have diverse
But the distinction of grades differs from that of states,
species and differences”‡. Now this difference of begin-
as we have said above (Aa. 2,3). Therefore state is unfit-
ning, progress, and perfection is applied to the degrees
tingly divided according to beginning, progress, and per-
of charity, as stated above (q. 24, a. 9), where we were
fection.
treating of charity. Therefore it would seem that the dif-
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 11):
ferences of states should not be assigned in this manner.
“There are three states of the converted, the beginning,
Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a. 1), state re-
the middle, and the perfection”; and (Hom. xv in Ezech.):
gards a condition of servitude or freedom, which appar-
“Other is the beginning of virtue, other its progress, and
ently has no connection with the aforesaid difference of
other still its perfection.”
beginning, progress, and perfection. Therefore it is unfit-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) state regards
ting to divide state in this way.
freedom or servitude. Now in spiritual things there is
Objection 3. Further, the distinction of beginning,
a twofold servitude and a twofold freedom: for there is
∗ The Septuagint
† Ed. Did. viii, 8
‡ Aristotle, Categ. ii
2012
the servitude of sin and the servitude of justice; and there unto justice.” Now in every human effort we can distinis likewise a twofold freedom, from sin, and from jus-
guish a beginning, a middle, and a term; and consequently
tice, as appears from the words of the Apostle (Rom.
the state of spiritual servitude and freedom is differenti-
6:20,22), “When you were the servants of sin, you were
ated according to these things, namely, the beginning—
free men to justice. . . but now being made free from sin,”
to which pertains the state of beginners—the middle, to
you are. . . “become servants to God.”
which pertains the state of the proficient—and the term,
Now the servitude of sin or justice consists in being
to which belongs the state of the perfect.
inclined to evil by a habit of sin, or inclined to good by
Reply to Objection 1. Freedom from sin results from
a habit of justice: and in like manner freedom from sin is
charity which “is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy
not to be overcome by the inclination to sin, and freedom
Ghost, Who is given to us” (Rom. 5:5). Hence it is writ-
from justice is not to be held back from evil for the love of
ten (2 Cor. 3:17): “Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there
justice. Nevertheless, since man, by his natural reason, is
is liberty.” Wherefore the same division applies to charity
inclined to justice, while sin is contrary to natural reason,
as to the state of those who enjoy spiritual freedom.
it follows that freedom from sin is true freedom which is
Reply to Objection 2. Men are said to be beginners,
united to the servitude of justice, since they both incline
proficient, and perfect (so far as these terms indicate dif-
man to that which is becoming to him. In like manner true
ferent states), not in relation to any occupation whatever,
servitude is the servitude of sin, which is connected with
but in relation to such occupations as pertain to spiritual
freedom from justice, because man is thereby hindered
freedom or servitude, as stated above (a. 1).
from attaining that which is proper to him. That a man be-
Reply to Objection 3. As already observed (a. 3, ad
come the servant of justice or sin results from his efforts,
3), nothing hinders grade and state from concurring in the
as the Apostle declares (Rom. 6:16): “To whom you yield
same subject. For even in earthly affairs those who are
yourselves servants to obey, his servants you are whom
free, not only belong to a different state from those who
you obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or of obedience
are in service, but are also of a different grade.
2013
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 184
Of the State of Perfection in General
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider those things that pertain to the state of perfection whereto the other states are directed. For the consideration of offices in relation to other acts belongs to the legislator; and in relation to the sacred ministry it comes under the consideration of orders of which we shall treat in the Third Part∗.
Concerning the state of the perfect, a three-fold consideration presents itself: (1) The state of perfection in general; (2) Things relating to the perfection of bishops; (3) Things relating to the perfection of religious.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether perfection bears any relation to charity?
(2) Whether one can be perfect in this life?
(3) Whether the perfection of this life consists chiefly in observing the counsels or the commandments?
(4) Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection?
(5) Whether especially prelates and religious are in the state of perfection?
(6) Whether all prelates are in the state of perfection?
(7) Which is the more perfect, the episcopal or the religious state?
(8) The comparison between religious and parish priests and archdeacons.
Whether the perfection of the Christian life consists chiefly in charity?
IIa IIae q. 184 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the perfection of the
senses would seem to consist chiefly in their concurring
Christian life does not consist chiefly in charity. For the
together in the unity of truth, according to 1 Cor. 1:10,
Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:20): “In malice be children, but
“That you be perfect in the same mind [sensu], and in the
in sense be perfect.” But charity regards not the senses but
same judgment.” Now this is effected by charity which
the affections. Therefore it would seem that the perfection
operates consent in us men. Wherefore even the perfec-
of the Christian life does not chiefly consist in charity.
tion of the senses consists radically in the perfection of
Objection 2. Further,‘it is written (Eph. 6:13): “Take
charity.
unto you the armor of God, that you may be able to resist
Reply to Objection 2. A man may be said to be per-
in the evil day, and to stand in all things perfect”; and the
fect in two ways. First, simply: and this perfection regards
text continues (Eph. 6:14,16), speaking of the armor of
that which belongs to a thing’s nature, for instance an ani-
God: “Stand therefore having your loins girt about with
mal may be said to be perfect when it lacks nothing in the
truth, and having on the breast-plate of justice. . . in all
disposition of its members and in such things as are nec-
things taking the shield of faith.” Therefore the perfec-
essary for an animal’s life. Secondly, a thing is said to be
tion of the Christian life consists not only in charity, but
perfect relatively: and this perfection regards something
also in other virtues.
connected with the thing externally, such as whiteness or
Objection 3. Further, virtues like other habits, are
blackness or something of the kind. Now the Christian life
specified by their acts. Now it is written (James 1:4) that
consists chiefly in charity whereby the soul is united to
“patience hath a perfect work.” Therefore seemingly the
God; wherefore it is written (1 Jn. 3:14): “He that loveth
state of perfection consists more specially in patience.
not abideth in death.” Hence the perfection of the Chris-
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 3:14): “Above all
tian life consists simply in charity, but in the other virtues
things have charity, which is the bond of perfection,” be-
relatively. And since that which is simply, is paramount
cause it binds, as it were, all the other virtues together in
and greatest in comparison with other things, it follows
perfect unity.
that the perfection of charity is paramount in relation to
I answer that, A thing is said to be perfect in so far
the perfection that regards the other virtues.
as it attains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfec-
Reply to Objection 3. Patience is stated to have a per-
tion thereof. Now it is charity that unites us to God, Who
fect work in relation to charity, in so far as it is an effect
is the last end of the human mind, since “he that abideth
of the abundance of charity that a man bears hardships pa-
in charity abideth in God, and God in him” (1 Jn. 4:16).
tiently, according to Rom. 8:35, “Who. . . shall separate us
Therefore the perfection of the Christian life consists rad-
from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation? Or distress?”
ically in charity.
etc.
Reply to Objection 1. The perfection of the human
∗ Suppl., q. 34
2014
Whether any one can be perfect in this life?
IIa IIae q. 184 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that none can be perfect
tine says (QQ. LXXXIII, qu. 36) that “carnal desire is the
in this life. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): “When
bane of charity; to have no carnal desires is the perfec-
that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall
tion of charity.” Such perfection as this can be had in this
be done away.” Now in this life that which is in part is
life, and in two ways. First, by the removal from man’s
not done away; for in this life faith and hope, which are in
affections of all that is contrary to charity, such as mortal
part, remain. Therefore none can be perfect in this life.
sin; and there can be no charity apart from this perfec-
Objection 2. Further, “The perfect is that which lacks
tion, wherefore it is necessary for salvation. Secondly,
nothing” (Phys. iii, 6). Now there is no one in this life
by the removal from man’s affections not only of what-
who lacks nothing; for it is written (James 3:2): “In many
ever is contrary to charity, but also of whatever hinders
things we all offend”; and (Ps. 138:16): “Thy eyes did
the mind’s affections from tending wholly to God. Char-
see my imperfect being.” Therefore none is perfect in this
ity is possible apart from this perfection, for instance in
life.
those who are beginners and in those who are proficient.
Objection 3. Further, the perfection of the Christian
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking there
life, as stated (a. 1), relates to charity, which comprises
of heavenly perfection which is not possible to those who
the love of God and of our neighbor. Now, neither as to
are on the way.
the love of God can one have perfect charity in this life,
Reply to Objection 2. Those who are perfect in this
since according to Gregory (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) “the
life are said to “offend in many things” with regard to ve-
furnace of love which begins to burn here, will burn more
nial sins, which result from the weakness of the present
fiercely when we see Him Whom we love”; nor as to the
life: and in this respect they have an “imperfect being” in
love of our neighbor, since in this life we cannot love all
comparison with the perfection of heaven.
our neighbors actually, even though we love them habit-
Reply to Objection 3.
As the conditions of the
ually; and habitual love is imperfect. Therefore it seems
present life do not allow of a man always tending actu-
that no one can be perfect in this life.
ally to God, so neither does it allow of his tending actu-
On the contrary, The Divine law does not prescribe
ally to each individual neighbor; but it suffices for him to
the impossible. Yet it prescribes perfection according to
tend to all in common and collectively, and to each indi-
Mat. 5:48, “Be you. . . perfect, as also your heavenly Fa-
vidual habitually and according to the preparedness of his
ther is perfect.” Therefore seemingly one can be perfect
mind. Now in the love of our neighbor, as in the love of
in this life.
God we may observe a twofold perfection: one without
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the perfection
which charity is impossible, and consisting in one’s hav-
of the Christian life consists in charity. Now perfection
ing in one’s affections nothing that is contrary to the love
implies a certain universality because according to Phys.
of one’s neighbor; and another without which it is possi-
iii, 6, “the perfect is that which lacks nothing.” Hence we
ble to have charity. The latter perfection may be consid-
may consider a threefold perfection. One is absolute, and
ered in three ways. First, as to the extent of love, through
answers to a totality not only on the part of the lover, but
a man loving not only his friends and acquaintances but
also on the part of the object loved, so that God be loved
also strangers and even his enemies, for as Augustine says
as much as He is lovable. Such perfection as this is not
(Enchiridion lxxiii) this is a mark of the perfect children
possible to any creature, but is competent to God alone, in
of God. Secondly, as to the intensity of love, which is
Whom good is wholly and essentially.
shown by the things which man despises for his neigh-
Another perfection answers to an absolute totality on
bor’s sake, through his despising not only external goods
the part of the lover, so that the affective faculty always
for the sake of his neighbor, but also bodily hardships and
actually tends to God as much as it possibly can; and such
even death, according to Jn. 15:13, “Greater love than this
perfection as this is not possible so long as we are on the
no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.”
way, but we shall have it in heaven.
Thirdly, as to the effect of love, so that a man will sur-
The third perfection answers to a totality neither on
render not only temporal but also spiritual goods and even
the part of the object served, nor on the part of the lover
himself, for his neighbor’s sake, according to the words of
as regards his always actually tending to God, but on the
the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:15), “But I most gladly will spend
part of the lover as regards the removal of obstacles to the
and be spent myself for your souls.”
movement of love towards God, in which sense Augus-
2015
Whether, in this life, perfection consists in the observance of the commandments or of IIa IIae q. 184 a. 3
the counsels?
Objection 1. It would seem that, in this life, perfec-
self most. The reason of this is that “the end of the com-
tion consists in the observance not of the commandments
mandment is charity,” according to the Apostle (1 Tim.
but of the counsels. For our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): “If
1:5); and the end is not subject to a measure, but only such
thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast,
things as are directed to the end, as the Philosopher ob-
and give to the poor. . . and come, follow Me.” Now this is
serves (Polit. i, 3); thus a physician does not measure the
a counsel. Therefore perfection regards the counsels and
amount of his healing, but how much medicine or diet he
not the precepts.
shall employ for the purpose of healing. Consequently it
Objection 2. Further, all are bound to the observance
is evident that perfection consists essentially in the obser-
of the commandments, since this is necessary for salva-
vance of the commandments; wherefore Augustine says
tion. Therefore, if the perfection of the Christian life con-
(De Perf. Justit. viii): “Why then should not this perfec-
sists in observing the commandments, it follows that per-
tion be prescribed to man, although no man has it in this
fection is necessary for salvation, and that all are bound
life?”
thereto; and this is evidently false.
Secondarily and instrumentally, however, perfection
Objection 3. Further, the perfection of the Christian
consists in the observance of the counsels, all of which,
life is gauged according to charity, as stated above (a. 1).
like the commandments, are directed to charity; yet not
Now the perfection of charity, seemingly, does not consist
in the same way. For the commandments, other than the
in the observance of the commandments, since the per-
precepts of charity, are directed to the removal of things
fection of charity is preceded both by its increase and by
contrary to charity, with which, namely, charity is incom-
its beginning, as Augustine says (Super Canonic. Joan.
patible, whereas the counsels are directed to the removal
Tract. ix). But the beginning of charity cannot precede
of things that hinder the act of charity, and yet are not
the observance of the commandments, since according to
contrary to charity, such as marriage, the occupation of
Jn. 14:23, “If any one love Me, he will keep My word.”
worldly business, and so forth. Hence Augustine says
Therefore the perfection of life regards not the command-
(Enchiridion cxxi): “Whatever things God commands, for
ments but the counsels.
instance, ‘Thou shalt not commit adultery,’ and whatever
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): “Thou shalt
are not commanded, yet suggested by a special counsel,
love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart,” and (Lev.
for instance, ‘It is good for a man not to touch a woman,’
19:18): “Thou shalt love thy neighbor [Vulg.: ‘friend’] as
are then done aright when they are referred to the love
thyself”; and these are the commandments of which our
of God, and of our neighbor for God’s sake, both in this
Lord said (Mat. 22:40): “On these two commandments
world and in the world to come.” Hence it is that in the
dependeth the whole law and the prophets.” Now the per-
Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, cap. vii) the ab-
fection of charity, in respect of which the Christian life
bot Moses says: “Fastings, watchings, meditating on the
is said to be perfect, consists in our loving God with our
Scriptures, penury and loss of all one’s wealth, these are
whole heart, and our neighbor as ourselves. Therefore it
not perfection but means to perfection, since not in them
would seem that perfection consists in the observance of
does the school of perfection find its end, but through
the precepts.
them it achieves its end,” and he had already said that
I answer that, Perfection is said to consist in a thing
“we endeavor to ascend by these steps to the perfection
in two ways: in one way, primarily and essentially; in
of charity.”
another, secondarily and accidentally. Primarily and es-
Reply to Objection 1. In this saying of our Lord
sentially the perfection of the Christian life consists in
something is indicated as being the way to perfection by
charity, principally as to the love of God, secondarily as
the words, “Go, sell all thou hast, and give to the poor”;
to the love of our neighbor, both of which are the matter
and something else is added wherein perfection consists,
of the chief commandments of the Divine law, as stated
when He said, “And follow Me.” Hence Jerome in his
above. Now the love of God and of our neighbor is not
commentary on Mat. 19:27, says that “since it is not
commanded according to a measure, so that what is in
enough merely to leave, Peter added that which is perfect:
excess of the measure be a matter of counsel. This is ev-
‘And have followed Thee’ ”; and Ambrose, commenting
ident from the very form of the commandment, pointing,
on Lk. 5:27, “Follow Me,” says: “He commands him to
as it does, to perfection—for instance in the words, “Thou
follow, not with steps of the body, but with devotion of the
shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart”: since
soul, which is the effect of charity.” Wherefore it is evi-
“the whole” is the same as “the perfect,” according to the
dent from the very way of speaking that the counsels are
Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6), and in the words, “Thou shalt
means of attaining to perfection, since it is thus expressed:
love thy neighbor as thyself,” since every one loves him-
“If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell,” etc., as though He said:
2016
“By so doing thou shalt accomplish this end.”
the Divine love, which cannot be fulfilled so long as we
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Perf.
are on the way, as stated above (a. 2), and it is evident that
Justit. viii) “the perfection of charity is prescribed to man
to fail from this is not to be a transgressor of the precept;
in this life, because one runs not right unless one knows
and in like manner one does not transgress the precept, if
whither to run. And how shall we know this if no com-
one does not attain to the intermediate degrees of perfec-
mandment declares it to us?” And since that which is a
tion, provided one attain to the lowest.
matter of precept can be fulfilled variously, one does not
Reply to Objection 3. Just as man has a certain per-
break a commandment through not fulfilling it in the best
fection of his nature as soon as he is born, which per-
way, but it is enough to fulfil it in any way whatever. Now
fection belongs to the very essence of his species, while
the perfection of Divine love is a matter of precept for all
there is another perfection which he acquires by growth,
without exception, so that even the perfection of heaven
so again there is a perfection of charity which belongs to
is not excepted from this precept, as Augustine says (De
the very essence of charity, namely that man love God
Perf. Justit. viii∗), and one escapes transgressing the pre-
above all things, and love nothing contrary to God, while
cept, in whatever measure one attains to the perfection of
there is another perfection of charity even in this life,
Divine love. The lowest degree of Divine love is to love
whereto a man attains by a kind of spiritual growth, for
nothing more than God, or contrary to God, or equally
instance when a man refrains even from lawful things, in
with God, and whoever fails from this degree of perfec-
order more freely to give himself to the service of God.
tion nowise fulfils the precept. There is another degree of
Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection?
IIa IIae q. 184 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that whoever is perfect is
in two ways: first, with respect to his internal actions; sec-
in the state of perfection. For, as stated above (a. 3, ad 3),
ondly, with respect to his external actions. And since ac-
just as bodily perfection is reached by bodily growth, so
cording to 1 Kings 16:7, “man seeth those things that ap-
spiritual perfection is acquired by spiritual growth. Now
pear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart,” it follows that with
after bodily growth one is said to have reached the state
regard to man’s internal disposition we consider his spir-
of perfect age. Therefore seemingly also after spiritual
itual state in relation to the Divine judgment, while with
growth, when one has already reached spiritual perfec-
regard to his external actions we consider man’s spiritual
tion, one is in the state of perfection.
state in relation to the Church. It is in this latter sense
Objection 2. Further, according to Phys. v, 2, move-
that we are now speaking of states, namely in so far as
ment “from one contrary to another” has the same aspect
the Church derives a certain beauty from the variety of
as “movement from less to more.” Now when a man is
states†.
changed from sin to grace, he is said to change his state,
Now it must be observed, that so far as men are con-
in so far as the state of sin differs from the state of grace.
cerned, in order that any one attain to a state of freedom
Therefore it would seem that in the same manner, when
or servitude there is required first of all an obligation or
one progresses from a lesser to a greater grace, so as to
a release. For the mere fact of serving someone does not
reach the perfect degree, one is in the state of perfection.
make a man a slave, since even the free serve, according
Objection 3. Further, a man acquires a state by being
to Gal. 5:13, “By charity of the spirit serve one another”:
freed from servitude. But one is freed from the servitude
nor again does the mere fact of ceasing to serve make a
of sin by charity, because “charity covereth all sins” (Prov.
man free, as in the case of a runaway slave; but properly
10:12). Now one is said to be perfect on account of char-
speaking a man is a slave if he be bound to serve, and a
ity, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore, seemingly, whoever
man is free if he be released from service. Secondly, it is
has perfection, for this very reason has the state of perfec-
required that the aforesaid obligation be imposed with a
tion.
certain solemnity; even as a certain solemnity is observed
On the contrary, Some are in the state of perfection,
in other matters which among men obtain a settlement in
who are wholly lacking in charity and grace, for instance
perpetuity.
wicked bishops or religious. Therefore it would seem that
Accordingly, properly speaking, one is said to be in
on the other hand some have the perfection of life, who
the state of perfection, not through having the act of per-
nevertheless have not the state of perfection.
fect love, but through binding himself in perpetuity and
I answer that, As stated above (q. 183, a. 1), state
with a certain solemnity to those things that pertain to
properly regards a condition of freedom or servitude. Now
perfection. Moreover it happens that some persons bind
spiritual freedom or servitude may be considered in man
themselves to that which they do not keep, and some ful-
∗ Cf. De Spir. et Lit. XXXVI
† Cf. q. 183, a. 2
2017
fil that to which they have not bound themselves, as in relation to the Divine judgment. But as regards the dis-the case of the two sons (Mat. 21:28,30), one of whom
tinctions of ecclesiastical states, a man does not reach the
when his father said: “Work in my vineyard,” answered:
state of perfection except by growth in respect of external
“I will not,” and “afterwards. . . he went,” while the other
actions.
“answering said: I go. . . and he went not.” Wherefore
Reply to Objection 2. This argument also regards the
nothing hinders some from being perfect without being in
interior state. Yet when a man passes from sin to grace, he
the state of perfection, and some in the state of perfection
passes from servitude to freedom; and this does not result
without being perfect.
from a mere progress in grace, except when a man binds
Reply to Objection 1. By bodily growth a man pro-
himself to things pertaining to grace.
gresses in things pertaining to nature, wherefore he attains
Reply to Objection 3. Again this argument considers
to the state of nature; especially since “what is according
the interior state. Nevertheless, although charity causes
to nature is,” in a way, “unchangeable”∗, inasmuch as na-
the change of condition from spiritual servitude to spiri-
ture is determinate to one thing. In like manner by inward
tual freedom, an increase of charity has not the same ef-
spiritual growth a man reaches the state of perfection in
fect.
Whether religious and prelates are in the state of perfection?
IIa IIae q. 184 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that prelates and religious
religious and bishops. For religious bind themselves by
are not in the state of perfection. For the state of perfection vow to refrain from worldly affairs, which they might law-differs from the state of the beginners and the proficient.
fully use, in order more freely to give themselves to God,
Now no class of men is specially assigned to the state of
wherein consists the perfection of the present life. Hence
the proficient or of the beginners. Therefore it would seem
Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi), speaking of religious:
that neither should any class of men be assigned to the
“Some call them therapeutai,” i.e. servants, “on account state of perfection.
of their rendering pure service and homage to God; oth-
Objection 2. Further, the outward state should answer
ers call them monachoi”†, “on account of the indivisible to the inward, else one is guilty of lying, “which consists
and single-minded life which by their being wrapped in,”
not only in false words, but also in deceitful deeds,” ac-
i.e. contemplating, “indivisible things, unites them in a
cording to Ambrose in one of his sermons (xxx de Tem-
Godlike union and a perfection beloved of God”‡. More-
pore). Now there are many prelates and religious who
over, the obligation in both cases is undertaken with a cer-
have not the inward perfection of charity. Therefore, if
tain solemnity of profession and consecration; wherefore
all religious and prelates are in the state of perfection, it
Dionysius adds (Eccl. Hier. vi): “Hence the holy legis-
would follow that all of them that are not perfect are in
lation in bestowing perfect grace on them accords them a
mortal sin, as deceivers and liars.
hallowing invocation.”
Objection 3. Further, as stated above (a. 1), perfec-
In like manner bishops bind themselves to things per-
tion is measured according to charity. Now the most per-
taining to perfection when they take up the pastoral duty,
fect charity would seem to be in the martyrs, according
to which it belongs that a shepherd “lay down his life for
to Jn. 15:13, “Greater love than this no man hath, that
his sheep,” according to Jn. 10:15. Wherefore the Apos-
a man lay down his life for his friends”: and a gloss on
tle says (1 Tim. 6:12): “Thou. . . hast confessed a good
Heb. 12:4, “For you have not yet resisted unto blood,”
confession before many witnesses,” that is to say, “when
says: “In this life no love is more perfect than that to
he was ordained,” as a gloss says on this passage. Again,
which the holy martyrs attained, who strove against sin
a certain solemnity of consecration is employed together
even unto blood.” Therefore it would seem that the state
with the aforesaid profession, according to 2 Tim. 1:6:
of perfection should be ascribed to the martyrs rather than
“Stir up the grace of God which is in thee by the imposi-
to religious and bishops.
tion of my hands,” which the gloss ascribes to the grace
On the contrary, Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) ascribes
of the episcopate. And Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v)
perfection to bishops as being perfecters, and (Eccl. Hier.
that “when the high priest,” i.e. the bishop, “is ordained,
vi) to religious (whom he calls monks or therapeutai, i.e.
he receives on his head the most holy imposition of the
servants of God) as being perfected.
sacred oracles, whereby it is signified that he is a partici-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 4), there is re-
pator in the whole and entire hierarchical power, and that
quired for the state of perfection a perpetual obligation
not only is he the enlightener in all things pertaining to his
to things pertaining to perfection, together with a certain
holy discourses and actions, but that he also confers this
solemnity. Now both these conditions are competent to
on others.”
∗ Ethic. v, 7
† i.e. solitaries; whence the English word ‘monk’
‡ Cf. q. 180, a. 6
2018
Reply to Objection 1. Beginning and increase are terwards (Phil. 3:15): “Let us therefore as many as are
sought not for their own sake, but for the sake of perfec-
perfect, be thus minded.” Hence a man who takes up the
tion; hence it is only to the state of perfection that some
state of perfection is not guilty of lying or deceit through
are admitted under certain obligations and with solemnity.
not being perfect, but through withdrawing his mind from
Reply to Objection 2. Those who enter the state of
the intention of reaching perfection.
perfection do not profess to be perfect, but to tend to per-
Reply to Objection 3. Martyrdom is the most perfect
fection. Hence the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): “Not as
act of charity. But an act of perfection does not suffice to
though I had already attained, or were already perfect; but
make the state of perfection, as stated above (a. 4).
I follow after, if I may by any means apprehend”: and af-
Whether all ecclesiastical prelates are in the state of perfection?
IIa IIae q. 184 a. 6
Objection 1.
It would seem that all ecclesiastical
pertaining to perfection, except in so far as in the Western
prelates are in a state of perfection. For Jerome com-
Church the receiving of a sacred order includes the taking
menting on Titus 1:5, “Ordain. . . in every city,” etc. says:
of a vow of continence, which is one of the things pertain-
“Formerly priest was the same as bishop,” and afterwards
ing to perfection, as we shall state further on (q. 186, a. 4).
he adds: “Just as priests know that by the custom of the
Therefore it is clear that from the fact that a man receives
Church they are subject to the one who is placed over
a sacred order a man is not placed simply in the state of
them, so too, bishops should recognize that, by custom
perfection, although inward perfection is required in order
rather than by the very ordinance of our Lord, they are
that one exercise such acts worthily.
above the priests, and are together the rightful governors
In like manner, neither are they placed in the state of
of the Church.” Now bishops are in the state of perfec-
perfection on the part of the cure which they take upon
tion. Therefore those priests also are who have the cure of
themselves. For they are not bound by this very fact un-
souls.
der the obligation of a perpetual vow to retain the cure of
Objection 2. Further, just as bishops together with
souls; but they can surrender it—either by entering reli-
their consecration receive the cure of souls, so also do
gion, even without their bishop’s permission (cf. Decret.
parish priests and archdeacons, of whom a gloss on Acts
xix, qu. 2, can. Duae sunt)—or again an archdeacon may
6:3, “Brethren, look ye out. . . seven men of good rep-
with his bishop’s permission resign his arch-deaconry or
utation,” says: “The apostles decided here to appoint
parish, and accept a simple prebend without cure, which
throughout the Church seven deacons, who were to be of
would be nowise lawful, if he were in the state of perfec-
a higher degree, and as it were the supports of that which
tion; for “no man putting his hand to the plough and look-
is nearest to the altar.” Therefore it would seem that these
ing back is fit for the kingdom of God” (Lk. 9:62). On
also are in the state of perfection.
the other hand bishops, since they are in the state of per-
Objection 3. Further, just as bishops are bound to “lay
fection, cannot abandon the episcopal cure, save by the
down their life for their sheep,” so too are parish priests
authority of the Sovereign Pontiff (to whom alone it be-
and archdeacons. But this belongs to the perfection of
longs also to dispense from perpetual vows), and this for
charity, as stated above (a. 2, ad 3). Therefore it would
certain causes, as we shall state further on (q. 185, a. 4).
seem that parish priests and archdeacons also are in the
Wherefore it is manifest that not all prelates are in the
state of perfection.
state of perfection, but only bishops.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v):
Reply to Objection 1. We may speak of priest and
“The order of pontiffs is consummative and perfecting,
bishop in two ways. First, with regard to the name: and
that of the priests is illuminative and light-giving, that of
thus formerly bishops and priests were not distinct. For
the ministers is cleansing and discretive.” Hence it is evi-
bishops are so called “because they watch over others,”
dent that perfection is ascribed to bishops only.
as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei xix, 19); while the
I answer that, In priests and deacons having cure of
priests according to the Greek are “elders.”∗ Hence the
souls two things may be considered, namely their order
Apostle employs the term “priests” in reference to both,
and their cure. Their order is directed to some act in the
when he says (1 Tim. 5:17): “Let the priests that rule
Divine offices. Wherefore it has been stated above (q. 183,
well be esteemed worthy of double honor”; and again
a. 3, ad 3) that the distinction of orders is comprised un-
he uses the term “bishops” in the same way, wherefore
der the distinction of offices. Hence by receiving a certain
addressing the priests of the Church of Ephesus he says
order a man receives the power of exercising certain sa-
(Acts 20:28): “Take heed to yourselves” and “to the whole
cred acts, but he is not bound on this account to things
flock, wherein the Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops, to
∗ Referring to the Greek episkopos and presbyteros from which the English ‘bishop’ and ‘priest’ are derived.
2019
rule the church of God.”
instruct the people”: and Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v)
But as regards the thing signified by these terms, there
that “just as we see the whole hierarchy culminating in
was always a difference between them, even at the time
Jesus, so each office culminates in its respective godlike
of the apostles. This is clear on the authority of Diony-
hierarch or bishop.” Also it is said (XVI, qu. i, can. Cunc-
sius (Eccl. Hier. v), and of a gloss on Lk. 10:1, “After
tis): “Priests and deacons must all take care not to do any-
these things the Lord appointed,” etc. which says: “Just
thing without their bishop’s permission.” Wherefore it is
as the apostles were made bishops, so the seventy-two
evident that they stand in relation to their bishop as war-
disciples were made priests of the second order.” Subse-
dens or mayors to the king; and for this reason, just as
quently, however, in order to avoid schism, it became nec-
in earthly governments the king alone receives a solemn
essary to distinguish even the terms, by calling the higher
blessing, while others are appointed by simple commis-
ones bishops and the lower ones priests. But to assert that
sion, so too in the Church the episcopal cure is conferred
priests nowise differ from bishops is reckoned by Augus-
with the solemnity of consecration, while the archdeacon
tine among heretical doctrines (De Heres. liii), where he
or parish priest receives his cure by simple appointment;
says that the Arians maintained that “no distinction ex-
although they are consecrated by receiving orders before
isted between a priest and a bishop.”
having a cure.
Reply to Objection 2. Bishops have the chief cure
Reply to Objection 3. As parish priests and archdea-
of the sheep of their diocese, while parish priests and
cons have not the chief cure, but a certain ministry as com-
archdeacons exercise an inferior ministry under the bish-
mitted to them by the bishop, so the pastoral office does
ops. Hence a gloss on 1 Cor. 12:28, “to one, helps, to
not belong to them in chief, nor are they bound to lay
another, governments∗,” says: “Helps, namely assistants
down their life for the sheep, except in so far as they have
to those who are in authority,” as Titus was to the Apostle,
a share in their cure. Hence we should say that they have
or as archdeacons to the bishop; “governments, namely
an office pertaining to perfection rather than that they at-
persons of lesser authority, such as priests who have to
tain the state of perfection.
Whether the religious state is more perfect than that of prelates?
IIa IIae q. 184 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the religious state
the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias, who was fain
is more perfect than that of prelates. For our Lord said
to hold fast to the love of his Creator, exclaimed against
(Mat. 19:21): “If thou wilt be perfect, go” and “sell” all
being sent to preach.” Therefore it would seem that the
[Vulg.: ‘what’] “thou hast, and give to the poor”; and re-
religious state is more perfect than the episcopal state.
ligious do this. But bishops are not bound to do so; for
On the contrary, It is not lawful for anyone to pass
it is said (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus): “Bishops,
from a more excellent to a less excellent state; for this
if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or
would be to look back‡. Yet a man may pass from the re-
acquired property, and whatever belongs to them person-
ligious to the episcopal state, for it is said (XVIII, qu. i,
ally.” Therefore religious are in a more perfect state than
can. Statutum) that “the holy ordination makes a monk to
bishops.
be a bishop.” Therefore the episcopal state is more perfect
Objection 2. Further, perfection consists more espe-
than the religious.
cially in the love of God than in the love of our neigh-
I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
bor. Now the religious state is directly ordered to the
16), “the agent is ever more excellent than the patient.”
love of God, wherefore it takes its name from “service
Now in the genus of perfection according to Dionysius
and homage to God,” as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi);†
(Eccl. Hier. v, vi), bishops are in the position of “per-
whereas the bishop’s state would seem to be ordered to the
fecters,” whereas religious are in the position of being
love of our neighbor, of whose cure he is the “warden,”
“perfected”; the former of which pertains to action, and
and from this he takes his name, as Augustine observes
the latter to passion. Whence it is evident that the state of
(De Civ. Dei. xix, 19). Therefore it would seem that the
perfection is more excellent in bishops than in religious.
religious state is more perfect than that of bishops.
Reply to Objection 1. Renunciation of one’s pos-
Objection 3. Further, the religious state is directed to sessions may be considered in two ways. First, as be-the contemplative life, which is more excellent than the
ing actual: and thus it is not essential, but a means, to
active life to which the episcopal state is directed. For
perfection, as stated above (a. 3). Hence nothing hinders
Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7) that “Isaias wishing to be of
the state of perfection from being without renunciation of
profit to his neighbor by means of the active life desired
one’s possessions, and the same applies to other outward
∗ Vulg.: ‘God hath set some in the church. . . helps, governments,’ etc.
† Quoted above a. 5
‡ Cf. Lk. 9:62
2020
practices. Secondly, it may be considered in relation to asked Peter first of all whether he loved Him, and after-one’s preparedness, in the sense of being prepared to re-
wards committed the care of His flock to him. And Gre-
nounce or give away all: and this belongs directly to per-
gory says (Pastor. i, 5): “If the pastoral care is a proof of
fection. Hence Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii, qu.
love, he who refuses to feed God’s flock, though having
11): “Our Lord shows that the children of wisdom un-
the means to do so, is convicted of not loving the supreme
derstand righteousness to consist neither in eating nor in
Pastor.” And it is a sign of greater love if a man devotes
abstaining, but in bearing want patiently.” Wherefore the
himself to others for his friend’s sake, than if he be willing
Apostle says (Phil. 4:12): “I know. . . both to abound and
only to serve his friend.
to suffer need.” Now bishops especially are bound to de-
Reply to Objection 3. As Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1),
spise all things for the honor of God and the spiritual wel-
“a prelate should be foremost in action, and more uplifted
fare of their flock, when it is necessary for them to do so,
than others in contemplation,” because it is incumbent on
either by giving to the poor of their flock, or by suffering
him to contemplate, not only for his own sake, but also for
“with joy the being stripped of” their “own goods”§.
the purpose of instructing others. Hence Gregory applies
Reply to Objection 2. That bishops are busy about
(Hom. v in Ezech.) the words of Ps. 144:7, “They shall
things pertaining to the love of their neighbor, arises out
publish the memory. . . of Thy sweetness,” to perfect men
of the abundance of their love of God. Hence our Lord
returning after their contemplation.
Whether parish priests and archdeacons are more perfect than religious?
IIa IIae q. 184 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that also parish priests
become worse thereby,” namely by leaving the monastic
and archdeacons are more perfect than religious.
For
state. Therefore it would seem that those who are in the
Chrysostom says in his Dialogue (De Sacerdot. vi): “Take
clerical state are more perfect than religious.
for example a monk, such as Elias, if I may exaggerate
Objection 4. Further, it is not lawful to pass from a
somewhat, he is not to be compared with one who, cast
more perfect to a less perfect state. Yet it is lawful to pass
among the people and compelled to carry the sins of many,
from the monastic state to a priestly office with a cure at-
remains firm and strong.” A little further on he says: “If
tached, as appears (XVI, qu. i, can. Si quis monachus)
I were given the choice, where would I prefer to please,
from a decree of Pope Gelasius, who says: “If there be
in the priestly office, or in the monastic solitude, without
a monk, who by the merit of his exemplary life is wor-
hesitation I should choose the former.” Again in the same
thy of the priesthood, and the abbot under whose author-
book (ch. 5) he says: “If you compare the toils of this
ity he fights for Christ his King, ask that he be made a
project, namely of the monastic life, with a well-employed
priest, the bishop shall take him and ordain him in such
priesthood, you will find them as far distant from one an-
place as he shall choose fitting.” And Jerome says (Ad
other as a common citizen is from a king.” Therefore it
Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): “In the monastery so live
would seem that priests who have the cure of souls are
as to deserve to be a clerk.” Therefore parish priests and
more perfect than religious.
archdeacons are more perfect than religious.
Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (ad Valerium,
Objection 5. Further, bishops are in a more perfect
Ep. xxi): “Let thy religious prudence observe that in
state than religious, as shown above (a. 7). But parish
this life, and especially at these times, there is nothing
priests and archdeacons. through having cure of souls, are
so difficult, so onerous, so perilous as the office of bishop,
more like bishops than religious are. Therefore they are
priest, or deacon; while in God’s sight there is no greater
more perfect.
blessing, if one engage in the fight as ordered by our
Objection 6. Further, virtue “is concerned with the
Commander-in-chief.” Therefore religious are not more
difficult and the good” (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is more dif-
perfect than priests or deacons.
ficult to lead a good life in the office of parish priest or
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Ep. lx, ad
archdeacon than in the religious state. Therefore parish
Aurel.): “It would be most regrettable, were we to exalt
priests and archdeacons have more perfect virtue than re-
monks to such a disastrous degree of pride, and deem the
ligious.
clergy deserving of such a grievous insult,” as to assert
On the contrary, It is stated (XIX, qu. ii, cap. Duce):
that ‘a bad monk is a good clerk,’ “since sometimes even
“If a man while governing the people in his church un-
a good monk makes a bad clerk.” And a little before this
der the bishop and leading a secular life is inspired by
he says that “God’s servants,” i.e. monks, “must not be
the Holy Ghost to desire to work out his salvation in a
allowed to think that they may easily be chosen for some-
monastery or under some canonical rule, since he is led
thing better,” namely the clerical state, “if they should
by a private law, there is no reason why he should be con-
§ Heb. 10:34
2021
strained by a public law.” Now a man is not led by the law of the strictness of religious observance. If, however, the
of the Holy Ghost, which is here called a “private law,” ex-
religious is also without orders, as in the case of religious
cept to something more perfect. Therefore it would seem
lay brethren, then it is evident that the pre-eminence of
that religious are more perfect than archdeacons or parish
order excels in the point of dignity, since by holy orders
priests.
a man is appointed to the most august ministry of serv-
I answer that, When we compare things in the point
ing Christ Himself in the sacrament of the altar. For this
of super-eminence, we look not at that in which they
requires a greater inward holiness than that which is req-
agree, but at that wherein they differ. Now in parish priests
uisite for the religious state, since as Dionysius says (Eccl.
and archdeacons three things may be considered, their
Hier. vi) the monastic order must follow the priestly or-
state, their order, and their office. It belongs to their state ders, and ascend to Divine things in imitation of them.
that they are seculars, to their order that they are priests
Hence, other things being equal, a cleric who is in holy
or deacons, to their office that they have the cure of souls
orders, sins more grievously if he do something contrary
committed to them.
to holiness than a religious who is not in holy orders: al-
Accordingly, if we compare these with one who is a
though a religious who is not in orders is bound to regular
religious by state, a deacon or priest by order, having the
observance to which persons in holy orders are not bound.
cure of souls by office, as many monks and canons regu-
Reply to Objection 1. We might answer briefly these
lar have, this one will excel in the first point, and in the
quotations from Chrysostom by saying that he speaks not
other points he will be equal. But if the latter differ from
of a priest of lesser order who has the cure of souls, but
the former in state and office, but agree in order, such as
of a bishop, who is called a high-priest; and this agrees
religious priests and deacons not having the cure of souls,
with the purpose of that book wherein he consoles him-
it is evident that the latter will be more excellent than the
self and Basil in that they were chosen to be bishops. We
former in state, less excellent in office, and equal in order.
may, however, pass this over and reply that he speaks in
We must therefore consider which is the greater, pre-
view of the difficulty. For he had already said: “When
eminence of state or of office; and here, seemingly, we
the pilot is surrounded by the stormy sea and is able to
should take note of two things, goodness and difficulty.
bring the ship safely out of the tempest, then he deserves
Accordingly, if we make the comparison with a view
to be acknowledged by all as a perfect pilot”; and after-
to goodness, the religious state surpasses the office of
wards he concludes, as quoted, with regard to the monk,
parish priest or archdeacon, because a religious pledges
“who is not to be compared with one who, cast among the
his whole life to the quest of perfection, whereas the
people. . . remains firm”; and he gives the reason why, be-
parish priest or archdeacon does not pledge his whole
cause “both in the calm end in the storm he piloted himself
life to the cure of souls, as a bishop does, nor is it com-
to safety.” This proves nothing more than that the state of
petent to him, as it is to a bishop, to exercise the cure
one who has the cure of souls is fraught with more dan-
of souls in chief, but only in certain particulars regard-
ger than the monastic state; and to keep oneself innocent
ing the cure of souls committed to his charge, as stated
in face of a greater peril is proof of greater virtue. on the
above (a. 6, ad 2). Wherefore the comparison of their re-
other hand, it also indicates greatness of virtue if a man
ligious state with their office is like the comparisons of
avoid dangers by entering religion; hence he does not say
the universal with the particular, and of a holocaust with a
that “he would prefer the priestly office to the monastic
sacrifice which is less than a holocaust according to Gre-
solitude,” but that “he would rather please” in the former
gory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence it is said (XIX, qu. i,
than in the latter, since this is a proof of greater virtue.
can. Clerici qui monachorum.): “Clerics who wish to take
Reply to Objection 2. This passage quoted from Au-
the monastic vows through being desirous of a better life
gustine also clearly refers to the question of difficulty
must be allowed by their bishops the free entrance into the
which proves the greatness of virtue in those who lead
monastery.”
a good life, as stated above (ad 1).
This comparison, however, must be considered as re-
Reply to Objection 3.
Augustine there compares
garding the genus of the deed; for as regards the charity of
monks with clerics as regards the pre-eminence of order,
the doer it happens sometimes that a deed which is of less
not as regards the distinction between religious and secu-
account in its genus is of greater merit if it be done out of
lar life.
greater charity.
Reply to Objection 4. Those who are taken from the
On the other hand, if we consider the difficulty of lead-
religious state to receive the cure of souls, being already
ing a good life in religion, and in the office of one having
in sacred orders, attain to something they had not hith-
the cure of souls, in this way it is more difficult to lead a
erto, namely the office of the cure, yet they do not put
good life together with the exercise of the cure of souls, on
aside what they had already. For it is said in the Decretals
account of outward dangers: although the religious life is
(XVI, qu. i, can. De Monachis): “With regard to those
more difficult as regards the genus of the deed, by reason
monks who after long residence in a monastery attain to
2022
the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay aside their for-Reply to Objection 6. The difficulty that arises from
mer purpose.”
the arduousness of the deed adds to the perfection of
On the other hand, parish priests and archdeacons,
virtue; but the difficulty that results from outward obsta-
when they enter religion, resign their cure, in order to en-
cles sometimes lessens the perfection of virtue—for in-
ter the state of perfection. This very fact shows the excel-
stance, when a man loves not virtue so much as to wish to
lence of the religious life. When religious who are not in
avoid the obstacles to virtue, according to the saying of the
orders are admitted to the clerical state and to the sacred
Apostle (1 Cor. 9:25), “Everyone that striveth for the mas-
orders, they are clearly promoted to something better, as
tery refraineth himself from all things”: and sometimes it
stated: this is indicated by the very way in which Jerome
is a sign of perfect virtue—for instance, when a man for-
expresses himself: “So live in the monastery as to deserve
sakes not virtue, although he is hindered in the practice
to be a clerk.”
of virtue unawares or by some unavoidable cause. In the
Reply to Objection 5. Parish priests and archdeacons
religious state there is greater difficulty arising from the
are more like bishops than religious are, in a certain re-
arduousness of deeds; whereas for those who in any way
spect, namely as regards the cure of souls which they have
at all live in the world, there is greater difficulty resulting subordinately; but as regards the obligation in perpetuity,
from obstacles to virtue, which obstacles the religious has
religious are more like a bishop, as appears from what we
had the foresight to avoid.
have said above (Aa. 5,6).
2023
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 185
Of Things Pertaining to the Episcopal State
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider things pertaining to the episcopal state. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop?
(2) Whether it is lawful to refuse the office of bishop definitively?
(3) Whether the better man should be chosen for the episcopal office?
(4) Whether a bishop may pass over to the religious state?
(5) Whether he may lawfully abandon his subjects in a bodily manner?
(6) Whether he can have anything of his own?
(7) Whether he sins mortally by not distributing ecclesiastical goods to the poor?
(8) Whether religious who are appointed to the episcopal office are bound to religious observances?
Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop?
IIa IIae q. 185 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that it is lawful to desire
above others, according to Mat. 24:45, “A faithful and a
the office of a bishop. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:1):
wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his fam-
“He that desires [Vulg.: ‘If a man desire’] the office of a
ily.” The third is something resulting from these, namely
bishop, he desireth a good work.” Now it is lawful and
reverence, honor, and a sufficiency of temporalities, ac-
praiseworthy to desire a good work. Therefore it is even
cording to 1 Tim. 5:17, “Let the priests that rule well be
praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop.
esteemed worthy of double honor.” Accordingly, to desire
Objection 2. Further, the episcopal state is more per-
the episcopal office on account of these incidental goods
fect than the religious, as we have said above (q. 184, a. 7).
is manifestly unlawful, and pertains to covetousness or
But it is praiseworthy to desire to enter the religious state.
ambition. Wherefore our Lord said against the Pharisees
Therefore it is also praiseworthy to desire promotion to
(Mat. 23:6,7): “They love the first places at feasts, and
the episcopal state.
the first chairs in the synagogues, and salutations in the
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Prov. 11:26): “He
market-place, and to be called by men, Rabbi.” As re-
that hideth up corn shall be cursed among the people; but
gards the second, namely the height of degree, it is pre-
a blessing upon the head of them that sell.” Now a man
sumptuous to desire the episcopal office. Hence our Lord
who is apt, both in manner of life and by knowledge, for
reproved His disciples for seeking precedence, by saying
the episcopal office, would seem to hide up the spiritual
to them (Mat. 20:25): “You know that the princes of the
corn, if he shun the episcopal state, whereas by accepting
gentiles lord it over them.” Here Chrysostom says (Hom.
the episcopal office he enters the state of a dispenser of
lxv in Matth.) that in these words “He points out that it
spiritual corn. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to
is heathenish to seek precedence; and thus by comparing
desire the office of a bishop, and blameworthy to refuse it.
them to the gentiles He converted their impetuous soul.”
Objection 4. Further, the deeds of the saints related
On the other hand, to desire to do good to one’s neigh-
in Holy Writ are set before us as an example, according to
bor is in itself praiseworthy, and virtuous. Nevertheless,
Rom. 15:4, “What things soever were written, were writ-
since considered as an episcopal act it has the height of
ten for our learning.” Now we read (Is. 6:8) that Isaias
degree attached to it, it would seem that, unless there be
offered himself for the office of preacher, which belongs
manifest and urgent reason for it, it would be presumptu-
chiefly to bishops. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy
ous for any man to desire to be set over others in order
to desire the office of a bishop.
to do them good. Thus Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8) that
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
“it was praiseworthy to seek the office of a bishop when
19): “The higher place, without which the people cannot
it was certain to bring one into graver dangers.” Where-
be ruled, though it be filled becomingly, is unbecomingly
fore it was not easy to find a person to accept this bur-
desired.”
den, especially seeing that it is through the zeal of charity
I answer that, Three things may be considered in the
that one divinely instigated to do so, according to Gre-
episcopal office. One is principal and final, namely the
gory, who says (Pastor. i, 7) that “Isaias being desirous of
bishop’s work, whereby the good of our neighbor is in-
profiting his neighbor, commendably desired the office of
tended, according to Jn. 21:17, “Feed My sheep.” An-
preacher.”
other thing is the height of degree, for a bishop is placed
Nevertheless, anyone may, without presumption, de-
2024
sire to do such like works if he should happen to be in that tend to perfection. Secondly, because he who enters the
office, or to be worthy of doing them; so that the object
religious state subjects himself to others for the sake of a
of his desire is the good work and not the precedence in
spiritual profit, and anyone may lawfully do this. Where-
dignity. Hence Chrysostom∗ says: “It is indeed good to
fore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): “No man is
desire a good work, but to desire the primacy of honor is
debarred from striving for the knowledge of truth, since
vanity. For primacy seeks one that shuns it, and abhors
this pertains to a praiseworthy ease.” On the other hand,
one that desires it.”
he who enters the episcopal state is raised up in order to
Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory says (Pastor. i,
watch over others, and no man should seek to be raised
8), “when the Apostle said this he who was set over the
thus, according to Heb. 5:4, “Neither doth any man take
people was the first to be dragged to the torments of mar-
the honor to himself, but he that is called by God”: and
tyrdom,” so that there was nothing to be desired in the
Chrysostom says: “To desire supremacy in the Church is
episcopal office, save the good work. Wherefore Augus-
neither just nor useful. For what wise man seeks of his
tine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that when the Apostle
own accord to submit to such servitude and peril, as to
said, “ ‘Whoever desireth the office of bishop, desireth a
have to render an account of the whole Church? None
good work,’ he wished to explain what the episcopacy
save him who fears not God’s judgment, and makes a sec-
is: for it denotes work and not honor: since skopos sig-ular abuse of his ecclesiastical authority, by turning it to
nifies ‘watching.’ Wherefore if we like we may render
secular uses.”
episkopein by the Latin ‘superintendere’ [to watch over]: Reply to Objection 3. The dispensing of spiritual
thus a man may know himself to be no bishop if he loves
corn is not to be carried on in an arbitrary fashion, but
to precede rather than to profit others.” For, as he observed
chiefly according to the appointment and disposition of
shortly before, “in our actions we should seek, not honor
God, and in the second place according to the appoint-
nor power in this life, since all things beneath the sun are
ment of the higher prelates, in whose person it is said (1
vanity, but the work itself which that honor or power en-
Cor. 4:1): “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers
ables us to do.” Nevertheless, as Gregory says (Pastor. i,
of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God.”
8), “while praising the desire” (namely of the good work)
Wherefore a man is not deemed to hide spiritual corn if
“he forthwith turns this object of praise into one of fear,
he avoids governing or correcting others, and is not com-
when he adds: It behooveth. . . a bishop to be blameless,”
petent to do so, neither in virtue of his office nor of his
as though to say: “I praise what you seek, but learn first
superior’s command; thus alone is he deemed to hide it,
what it is you seek.”
when he neglects to dispense it while under obligation to
Reply to Objection 2. There is no parity between the
do so in virtue of his office, or obstinately refuses to ac-
religious and the episcopal state, for two reasons. First,
cept the office when it is imposed on him. Hence Augus-
because perfection of life is a prerequisite of the episco-
tine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): “The love of truth seeks a
pal state, as appears from our Lord asking Peter if he loved
holy leisure, the demands of charity undertake an honest
Him more than the others, before committing the pastoral
labor. If no one imposes this burden upon us, we must de-
office to him, whereas perfection is not a prerequisite of
vote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth,
the religious state, since the latter is the way to perfection.
but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity
Hence our Lord did not say (Mat. 19:21): “If thou art per-
demands it of us.”
fect, go, sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast,” but “If thou
Reply to Objection 4. As Gregory says (Pastor. i,
wilt be perfect.” The reason for this difference is because,
7), “Isaias, who wishing to be sent, knew himself to be al-
according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vi), perfection per-
ready cleansed by the live coal taken from the altar, shows
tains actively to the bishop, as the “perfecter,” but to the
us that no one should dare uncleansed to approach the sa-
monk passively as one who is “perfected”: and one needs
cred ministry. Since, then, it is very difficult for anyone to
to be perfect in order to bring others to perfection, but not
be able to know that he is cleansed, it is safer to decline
in order to be brought to perfection. Now it is presumptu-
the office of preacher.”
ous to think oneself perfect, but it is not presumptuous to
Whether it is lawful for a man to refuse absolutely an appointment to the episcopate?
IIa IIae q. 185 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that it is lawful to refuse
fice of preaching, whereas Jeremias who was fain to hold
absolutely an appointment to the episcopate. For as Gre-
fast to the love of his Creator by contemplation exclaimed
gory says (Pastor. i, 7), “Isaias wishing to be of profit to
against being sent to preach.” Now no man sins by be-
his neighbor by means of the active life, desired the of-
ing unwilling to forgo better things in order to adhere to
∗ The quotation is from the Opus Imperfectum in Matth. (Hom. xxxv), falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom.
2025
things that are not so good. Since then the love of God of our neighbor, yet, on the other hand, the good of the
surpasses the love of our neighbor, and the contemplative
many should be preferred to the good of the individual.
life is preferable to the active, as shown above (q. 25, a. 1;
Wherefore Augustine says in the passage quoted above:
q. 26, a. 2; q. 182, a. 1) it would seem that a man sins not
“Nor prefer your own ease to the needs of the Church,”
if he refuse absolutely the episcopal office.
and all the more since it belongs to the love of God that a
Objection 2. Further, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7),
man undertake the pastoral care of Christ’s sheep. Hence
“it is very difficult for anyone to be able to know that he
Augustine, commenting on Jn. 21:17, “Feed My sheep,”
is cleansed: nor should anyone uncleansed approach the
says (Tract. cxxiii in Joan.): “Be it the task of love to feed
sacred ministry.” Therefore if a man perceives that he is
the Lord’s flock, even as it was the mark of fear to deny
not cleansed, however urgently the episcopal office be en-
the Shepherd.”
joined him, he ought not to accept it.
Moreover prelates are not transferred to the active life,
Objection 3. Further, Jerome (Prologue, super Marc.)
so as to forsake the contemplative; wherefore Augustine
says that “it is related of the Blessed Mark∗ that after re-
says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that “if the burden of the pas-
ceiving the faith he cut off his thumb that he might be
toral office be imposed, we must not abandon the delights
excluded from the priesthood.” Likewise some take a vow
of truth,” which are derived from contemplation.
never to accept a bishopric. Now to place an obstacle to a
Reply to Objection 2. No one is bound to obey his
thing amounts to the same as refusing it altogether. There-
superior by doing what is unlawful, as appears from what
fore it would seem that one may, without sin, refuse the
was said above concerning obedience (q. 104, a. 5). Ac-
episcopal office absolutely.
cordingly it may happen that he who is appointed to the
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. xlviii ad Eu-
office of prelate perceive something in himself on account
dox.): “If Mother Church requires your service, neither
of which it is unlawful for him to accept a prelacy. But
accept with greedy conceit, nor refuse with fawning indo-
this obstacle may sometimes be removed by the very per-
lence”; and afterwards he adds: “Nor prefer your ease to
son who is appointed to the pastoral cure—for instance, if
the needs of the Church: for if no good men were willing
he have a purpose to sin, he may abandon it—and for this
to assist her in her labor, you would seek in vain how we
reason he is not excused from being bound to obey def-
could be born of her.”
initely the superior who has appointed him. Sometimes,
I answer that, Two things have to be considered in the
however, he is unable himself to remove the impediment
acceptance of the episcopal office: first, what a man may
that makes the pastoral office unlawful to him, yet the
fittingly desire according to his own will; secondly, what
prelate who appoints him can do so—for instance, if he
it behooves a man to do according to the will of another.
be irregular or excommunicate. In such a case he ought to
As regards his own will it becomes a man to look chiefly
make known his defect to the prelate who has appointed
to his own spiritual welfare, whereas that he look to the
him; and if the latter be willing to remove the impediment,
spiritual welfare of others becomes a man according to the
he is bound humbly to obey. Hence when Moses had said
appointment of another having authority, as stated above
(Ex. 4:10): “I beseech thee, Lord, I am not eloquent from
(a. 1, ad 3). Hence just as it is a mark of an inordinate
yesterday, and the day before,” the Lord answered (Ex.
will that a man of his own choice incline to be appointed
4:12): “I will be in thy mouth, and I will teach thee what
to the government of others, so too it indicates an inordi-
thou shalt speak.” At other times the impediment cannot
nate will if a man definitively refuse the aforesaid office
be removed, neither by the person appointing nor by the
of government in direct opposition to the appointment of
one appointed—for instance, if an archbishop be unable
his superior: and this for two reasons.
to dispense from an irregularity; wherefore a subject, if
First, because this is contrary to the love of our neigh-
irregular, would not be bound to obey him by accepting
bor, for whose good a man should offer himself accord-
the episcopate or even sacred orders.
ing as place and time demand: hence Augustine says (De
Reply to Objection 3. It is not in itself necessary for
Civ. Dei xix, 19) that “the demands of charity undertake
salvation to accept the episcopal office, but it becomes
an honest labor.” Secondly, because this is contrary to
necessary by reason of the superior’s command. Now one
humility, whereby a man submits to his superior’s com-
may lawfully place an obstacle to things thus necessary
mands: hence Gregory says (Pastor. i, 6): “In God’s sight
for salvation, before the command is given; else it would
humility is genuine when it does not obstinately refuse to
not be lawful to marry a second time, lest one should thus
submit to what is usefully prescribed.”
incur an impediment to the episcopate or holy orders. But
Reply to Objection 1. Although simply and abso-
this would not be lawful in things necessary for salvation.
lutely speaking the contemplative life is more excellent
Hence the Blessed Mark did not act against a precept by
than the active, and the love of God better than the love
cutting off his finger, although it is credible that he did
∗ This prologue was falsely ascribed to St. Jerome, and the passage quoted refers, not to St. Mark the Evangelist, but to a hermit of that name. (Cf. Baronius, Anno Christi, 45, num. XLIV)
2026
this by the instigation of the Holy Ghost, without which he intend to bind himself, so far as it lies with him, not
it would be unlawful for anyone to lay hands on himself.
to seek the episcopal office, nor to accept it except under
If a man take a vow not to accept the bishop’s office, and
urgent necessity, his vow is lawful, because he vows to do
by this intend to bind himself not even to accept it in obe-
what it becomes a man to do.
dience to his superior prelate, his vow is unlawful; but if
Whether he that is appointed to the episcopate ought to be better than others?
IIa IIae q. 185 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that one who is appointed
not to say worse than this, have succeeded by means of
to the episcopate ought to be better than others. For our
gifts in being made clerics.”
Lord, when about to commit the pastoral office to Peter,
Now this pertains to the respect of persons, which in
asked him if he loved Him more than the others. Now a
such matters is a grave sin. Wherefore a gloss of Augus-
man is the better through loving God the more. Therefore
tine† on James 2:1, “Brethren, have not. . . with respect of
it would seem that one ought not to be appointed to the
persons,” says: “If this distinction of sitting and standing
episcopal office except he be better than others.
be referred to ecclesiastical honors, we must not deem it
Objection 2. Further, Pope Symmachus says (can.
a slight sin to ‘have the faith of the Lord of glory with re-
Vilissimus I, qu. 1): “A man is of very little worth who
spect of persons.’ For who would suffer a rich man to be
though excelling in dignity, excels not in knowledge and
chosen for the Church’s seat of honor, in despite of a poor
holiness.” Now he who excels in knowledge and holiness
man who is better instructed and holier?”
is better. Therefore a man ought not to be appointed to the
On the part of the person appointed, it is not required
episcopate unless he be better than others.
that he esteem himself better than others, for this would
Objection 3. Further, in every genus the lesser are
be proud and presumptuous; but it suffices that he per-
governed by the greater, as corporeal things are governed
ceive nothing in himself which would make it unlawful
by things spiritual, and the lower bodies by the higher,
for him to take up the office of prelate. Hence although
as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 3). Now a bishop is ap-
Peter was asked by our Lord if he loved Him more than
pointed to govern others. Therefore he should be better
the others, he did not, in his reply, set himself before the
than others.
others, but answered simply that he loved Christ.
On the contrary, The Decretal∗ says that “it suffices
Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord knew that, by His
to choose a good man, nor is it necessary to choose the
own bestowal, Peter was in other respects fitted to gov-
better man.”
ern the Church: wherefore He questioned him about his
I answer that, In designating a man for the episco-
greater love, to show that when we find a man otherwise
pal office, something has to be considered on the part of
fitted for the government of the Church, we must look
the person designate, and something on the part of the
chiefly to his pre-eminence in the love of God.
designator. For on the part of the designator, whether by
Reply to Objection 2. This statement refers to the
election or by appointment, it is required that he choose
pursuits of the man who is placed in authority. For he
such a one as will dispense the divine mysteries faithfully.
should aim at showing himself to be more excellent than
These should be dispensed for the good of the Church,
others in both knowledge and holiness. Wherefore Gre-
according to 1 Cor. 14:12, “Seek to abound unto the ed-
gory says (Pastor. ii, 1) “the occupations of a prelate ought
ifying of the Church”; and the divine mysteries are not
to excel those of the people, as much as the shepherd’s life
committed to men for their own meed, which they should
excels that of his flock.” But he is not to be blamed and
await in the life to come. Consequently he who has to
looked upon as worthless if he excelled not before being
choose or appoint one for a bishop is not bound to take
raised to the prelacy.
one who is best simply, i.e. according to charity, but one
Reply to Objection 3. According to 1 Cor. 12:4
who is best for governing the Church, one namely who is
seqq., “there are diversities of graces. . . and. . . of min-
able to instruct, defend, and govern the Church peacefully.
istries. . . and. . . of operations.” Hence nothing hinders one Hence Jerome, commenting on Titus 1:5, says against
from being more fitted for the office of governing, who
certain persons that “some seek to erect as pillars of the
does not excel in the grace of holiness. It is otherwise
Church, not those whom they know to be more useful to
in the government of the natural order, where that which
the Church, but those whom they love more, or those by
is higher in the natural order is for that very reason more
whose obsequiousness they have been cajoled or undone,
fitted to dispose of those that are lower.
or for whom some person in authority has spoken, and,
∗ Can. Cum dilectus, de Electione
† Ep. clxvii ad Hieron.
2027
Whether a bishop may lawfully forsake the episcopal cure, in order to enter religion?
IIa IIae q. 185 a. 4
Objection 1. It seems that a bishop cannot lawfully
ther of conscience (for instance if he be guilty of murder
forsake his episcopal cure in order to enter religion. For
or simony), or of body (for example if he be old or in-
no one can lawfully pass from a more perfect to a less
firm), or of irregularity arising, for instance, from bigamy.
perfect state; since this is “to look back,” which is con-
Sometimes he is hindered through some defect in his sub-
demned by the words of our Lord (Lk. 9:62), “No man
jects, whom he is unable to profit. Hence Gregory says
putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for
(Dial. ii, 3): “The wicked must be borne patiently, when
the kingdom of God.” Now the episcopal state is more
there are some good who can be succored, but when there
perfect than the religious, as shown above (q. 184, a. 7).
is no profit at all for the good, it is sometimes useless to la-Therefore just as it is unlawful to return to the world from
bor for the wicked. Wherefore the perfect when they find
the religious state, so is it unlawful to pass from the epis-
that they labor in vain are often minded to go elsewhere in
copal to the religious state.
order to labor with fruit.” Sometimes again this hindrance
Objection 2. Further, the order of grace is more con-
arises on the part of others, as when scandal results from
gruous than the order of nature. Now according to nature
a certain person being in authority: for the Apostle says
a thing is not moved in contrary directions; thus if a stone
(1 Cor. 8:13): “If meat scandalize my brother, I will never
be naturally moved downwards, it cannot naturally return
eat flesh”: provided, however, the scandal is not caused
upwards from below. But according to the order of grace it
by the wickedness of persons desirous of subverting the
is lawful to pass from the religious to the episcopal state.
faith or the righteousness of the Church; because the pas-
Therefore it is not lawful to pass contrariwise from the
toral cure is not to be laid aside on account of scandal
episcopal to the religious state.
of this kind, according to Mat. 15:14, “Let them alone,”
Objection 3. Further, in the works of grace nothing
those namely who were scandalized at the truth of Christ’s
should be inoperative. Now when once a man is conse-
teaching, “they are blind, and leaders of the blind.”
crated bishop he retains in perpetuity the spiritual power
Nevertheless just as a man takes upon himself the
of giving orders and doing like things that pertain to the
charge of authority at the appointment of a higher supe-
episcopal office: and this power would seemingly remain
rior, so too it behooves him to be subject to the latter’s au-
inoperative in one who gives up the episcopal cure. There-
thority in laying aside the accepted charge for the reasons
fore it would seem that a bishop may not forsake the epis-
given above. Hence Innocent III says (Extra, de Renunt.,
copal cure and enter religion.
cap. Nisi cum pridem): “Though thou hast wings where-
On the contrary, No man is compelled to do what
with thou art anxious to fly away into solitude, they are so
is in itself unlawful. Now those who seek to resign their
tied by the bonds of authority, that thou art not free to fly
episcopal cure are compelled to resign (Extra, de Renunt.
without our permission.” For the Pope alone can dispense
cap. Quidam). Therefore apparently it is not unlawful to
from the perpetual vow, by which a man binds himself to
give up the episcopal cure.
the care of his subjects, when he took upon himself the
I answer that, The perfection of the episcopal state
episcopal office.
consists in this that for love of God a man binds himself
Reply to Objection 1. The perfection of religious and
to work for the salvation of his neighbor, wherefore he
that of bishops are regarded from different standpoints.
is bound to retain the pastoral cure so long as he is able
For it belongs to the perfection of a religious to occupy
to procure the spiritual welfare of the subjects entrusted
oneself in working out one’s own salvation, whereas it
to his care: a matter which he must not neglect—neither
belongs to the perfection of a bishop to occupy oneself
for the sake of the quiet of divine contemplation, since
in working for the salvation of others. Hence so long as
the Apostle, on account of the needs of his subjects, suf-
a man can be useful to the salvation of his neighbor, he
fered patiently to be delayed even from the contemplation
would be going back, if he wished to pass to the religious
of the life to come, according to Phil. 1:22-25, “What I
state, to busy himself only with his own salvation, since
shall choose I know not, but I am straitened between two,
he has bound himself to work not only for his own but also
having a desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ, a
for others’ salvation. Wherefore Innocent III says in the
thing by far better. But to abide still in the flesh is needful Decretal quoted above that “it is more easily allowable for
for you. And having this confidence, I know that I shall
a monk to ascend to the episcopacy, than for a bishop to
abide”; nor for the sake of avoiding any hardships or of ac-
descend to the monastic life. If, however, he be unable to
quiring any gain whatsoever, because as it is written (Jn.
procure the salvation of others it is meet he should seek
10:11), “the good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep.”
his own.”
At times, however, it happens in several ways that a
Reply to Objection 2. On account of no obstacle
bishop is hindered from procuring the spiritual welfare of
should a man forego the work of his own salvation, which
his subjects. Sometimes on account of his own defect, ei-
pertains to the religious state. But there may be an ob-
2028
stacle to the procuring of another’s salvation; wherefore fined in a monastery that he may do penance, he cannot
a monk may be raised to the episcopal state wherein he
be reappointed to a bishopric. Hence it is stated (VII, qu.
is able also to work out his own salvation. And a bishop,
i, can. Hoc nequaquam): “The holy synod orders that any
if he be hindered from procuring the salvation of others,
man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity to
may enter the religious life, and may return to his bish-
the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no
opric should the obstacle cease, for instance by the cor-
means rise again to the episcopate.”
rection of his subjects, cessation of the scandal, healing
Reply to Objection 3. Even in natural things power
of his infirmity, removal of his ignorance by sufficient
remains inactive on account of a supervening obstacle, for
instruction. Again, if he owed his promotion to simony
instance the act of sight ceases through an affliction of the
of which he was in ignorance, and resigning his episco-
eye. So neither is it unreasonable if, through the occur-
pate entered the religious life, he can be reappointed to
rence of some obstacle from without, the episcopal power
another bishopric∗. On the other hand, if a man be de-
remain without the exercise of its act.
posed from the episcopal office for some sin, and con-
Whether it is lawful for a bishop on account of bodily persecution to abandon the IIa IIae q. 185 a. 5
flock committed to his care?
Objection 1. It would seem that it is unlawful for a
I answer that, In any obligation the chief thing to be
bishop, on account of some temporal persecution, to with-
considered is the end of the obligation. Now bishops bind
draw his bodily presence from the flock committed to his
themselves to fulfil the pastoral office for the sake of the
care. For our Lord said (Jn. 10:12) that he is a hireling
salvation of their subjects. Consequently when the salva-
and no true shepherd, who “seeth the wolf coming, and
tion of his subjects demands the personal presence of the
leaveth the sheep and flieth”: and Gregory says (Hom.
pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his personal pres-
xiv in Ev.) that “the wolf comes upon the sheep when any
ence from his flock, neither for the sake of some temporal
man by his injustice and robbery oppresses the faithful
advantage, nor even on account of some impending dan-
and the humble.” Therefore if, on account of the perse-
ger to his person, since the good shepherd is bound to lay
cution of a tyrant, a bishop withdraws his bodily presence
down his life for his sheep.
from the flock entrusted to his care, it would seem that he
On the other hand, if the salvation of his subjects can
is a hireling and not a shepherd.
be sufficiently provided for by another person in the ab-
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 6:1): “My
sence of the pastor, it is lawful for the pastor to withdraw
son, if thou be surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged
his bodily presence from his flock, either for the sake of
fast thy hand to a stranger,” and afterwards (Prov. 6:3):
some advantage to the Church, or on account of some dan-
“Run about, make haste, stir up thy friend.” Gregory ex-
ger to his person. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxxviii ad
pounds these words and says (Pastor. iii, 4): “To be surety
Honorat.): “Christ’s servants may flee from one city to
for a friend, is to vouch for his good conduct by engaging
another, when one of them is specially sought out by per-
oneself to a stranger. And whoever is put forward as an
secutors: in order that the Church be not abandoned by
example to the lives of others, is warned not only to watch
others who are not so sought for. When, however, the
but even to rouse his friend.” Now he cannot do this if
same danger threatens all, those who stand in need of oth-
he withdraw his bodily presence from his flock. There-
ers must not be abandoned by those whom they need.” For
fore it would seem that a bishop should not on account of
“if it is dangerous for the helmsman to leave the ship when
persecution withdraw his bodily presence from his flock.
the sea is calm, how much more so when it is stormy,” as
Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the perfection of
Pope Nicholas I says (cf. VII, qu. i, can. Sciscitaris).
the bishop’s state that he devote himself to the care of his
Reply to Objection 1. To flee as a hireling is to prefer neighbor. Now it is unlawful for one who has professed
temporal advantage or one’s bodily welfare to the spiritual
the state of perfection to forsake altogether the things that
welfare of one’s neighbor. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv
pertain to perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful
in Ev.): “A man cannot endanger himself for the sake of
for a bishop to withdraw his bodily presence from the ex-
his sheep, if he uses his authority over them not through
ecution of his office, except perhaps for the purpose of
love of them but for the sake of earthly gain: wherefore
devoting himself to works of perfection in a monastery.
he fears to stand in the way of danger lest he lose what
On the contrary, our Lord commanded the apostles,
he loves.” But he who, in order to avoid danger, leaves
whose successors bishops are (Mat. 10:23): “When they
the flock without endangering the flock, does not flee as a
shall persecute you in this city, flee into another.”
hireling.
∗ Cap. Post translat., de Renunt.
2029
Reply to Objection 2. If he who is surety for another one kind of perfection; and if he be hindered from the
be unable to fulfil his engagement, it suffices that he fulfil
practice thereof, he is not bound to another kind of per-
it through another. Hence if a superior is hindered from
fection, so as to be obliged to enter the religious state.
attending personally to the care of his subjects, he fulfils
Yet he is under the obligation of retaining the intention
his obligation if he do so through another.
of devoting himself to his neighbor’s salvation, should an
Reply to Objection 3. When a man is appointed to a
opportunity offer, and necessity require it of him.
bishopric, he embraces the state of perfection as regards
Whether it is lawful for a bishop to have property of his own?
IIa IIae q. 185 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful for
wilt be perfect go sell” all “that thou hast, and give to the
a bishop to have property of his own. For our Lord said
poor” (Mat. 19:17,21). Bishops, however, do not bind
(Mat. 19:21): “If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.:
themselves at their ordination to live without possessions
‘what] thou hast, and give to the poor. . . and come, fol-
of their own; nor indeed does the pastoral office, to which
low Me”; whence it would seem to follow that voluntary
they bind themselves, make it necessary for them to live
poverty is requisite for perfection. Now bishops are in the
without anything of their own. Therefore bishops are not
state of perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for
bound to live without possessions of their own.
them to possess anything as their own.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 184, a. 3,
Objection 2. Further, bishops take the place of the
ad 1) the perfection of the Christian life does not essen-
apostles in the Church, according to a gloss on Lk. 10:1.
tially consist in voluntary poverty, but voluntary poverty
Now our Lord commanded the apostles to possess noth-
conduces instrumentally to the perfection of life. Hence it
ing of their own, according to Mat. 10:9, “Do not possess
does not follow that where there is greater poverty there is
gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses”; wherefore Pe-
greater perfection; indeed the highest perfection is com-
ter said for himself and the other apostles (Mat. 19:27):
patible with great wealth, since Abraham, to whom it was
“Behold we have left all things and have followed Thee.”
said (Gn. 17:1): “Walk before Me and be perfect,” is
Therefore it would seem that bishops are bound to keep
stated to have been rich (Gn. 13:2).
this command, and to possess nothing of their own.
Reply to Objection 2. This saying of our Lord can
Objection 3. Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepo-
be understood in three ways. First, mystically, that we
tian.): “The Greek kleros denotes the Latin ‘sors.’ Hence should possess neither gold nor silver means that the
clerics are so called either because they are of the Lord’s
preacher should not rely chiefly on temporal wisdom and
estate, or because the Lord Himself is the estate, i.e. por-
eloquence; thus Jerome expounds the passage.
tion of clerics. Now he that possesses the Lord, can have
Secondly, according to Augustine’s explanation (De
nothing besides God; and if he have gold and silver, pos-
Consens. Ev. ii, 30), we are to understand that our Lord
sessions, and chattels of all kinds, with such a portion the
said this not in command but in permission. For he per-
Lord does not vouchsafe to be his portion also.” There-
mitted them to go preaching without gold or silver or other
fore it would seem that not only bishops but even clerics
means, since they were to receive the means of livelihood
should have nothing of their own.
from those to whom they preached; wherefore He added:
On the contrary, It is stated (XII, qu. i, can. Epis-
“For the workman is worthy of his meat.” And yet if any-
copi de rebus): “Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to
one were to use his own means in preaching the Gospel,
their heirs their personal or acquired property, and what-
this would be a work of supererogation, as Paul says in
ever belongs to them personally.”
reference to himself (1 Cor. 9:12,15).
I answer that, No one is bound to works of su-
Thirdly, according to the exposition of Chrysostom∗,
pererogation, unless he binds himself specially thereto by
we are to understand that our Lord laid these commands
vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Paulin. et Ar-
on His disciples in reference to the mission on which they
ment.): “Since you have taken the vow, you have already
were sent to preach to the Jews, so that they might be en-
bound yourself, you can no longer do otherwise. Before
couraged to trust in His power, seeing that He provided for
you were bound by the vow, you were free to submit.”
their wants without their having means of their own. But
Now it is evident that to live without possessing anything
it does not follow from this that they, or their successors,
is a work of supererogation, for it is a matter not of pre-
were obliged to preach the Gospel without having means
cept but of counsel. Wherefore our Lord after saying to
of their own: since we read of Paul (2 Cor. 11:8) that he
the young man: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the com-
“received wages” of other churches for preaching to the
mandments,” said afterwards by way of addition: “If thou
Corinthians, wherefore it is clear that he possessed some-
∗ Hom. ii in Rom. xvi, 3
2030
thing sent to him by others. And it seems foolish to say with God, if he becomes less intent on things pertaining to
that so many holy bishops as Athanasius, Ambrose, and
God by occupying himself with things of the world. Now
Augustine would have disobeyed these commandments if
neither bishops nor clerics ought thus to possess means
they believed themselves bound to observe them.
of their own, that while busy with their own they neglect
Reply to Objection 3. Every part is less than the
those that concern the worship of God.
whole. Accordingly a man has other portions together
Whether bishops sin mortally if they distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods IIa IIae q. 185 a. 7
which accrue to them?
Objection 1. It would seem that bishops sin mor-
goods; wherefore from the very nature of the case they
tally if they distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical
are not bound to give these things to others, and may ei-
goods which they acquire. For Ambrose∗ expounding Lk.
ther keep them for themselves or bestow them on others
12:16, “The land of a certain. . . man brought forth plenty
at will. Nevertheless they may sin in this disposal by in-
of fruits,” says: “Let no man claim as his own that which
ordinate affection, which leads them either to accumulate
he has taken and obtained by violence from the common
more than they should, or not to assist others, in accor-
property in excess of his requirements”; and afterwards
dance with the demands of charity; yet they are not bound
he adds: “It is not less criminal to take from him who has,
to restitution, because such things are entrusted to their
than, when you are able and have plenty to refuse him who
ownership.
has not.” Now it is a mortal sin to take another’s property
On the other hand, they hold ecclesiastical goods as
by violence. Therefore bishops sin mortally if they give
dispensers or trustees. For Augustine says (Ep. clxxxv
not to the poor that which they have in excess.
ad Bonif.): “If we possess privately what is enough for
Objection 2. Further, a gloss of Jerome on Is. 3:14,
us, other things belong not to us but to the poor, and we
“The spoil of the poor is in your house,” says that “eccle-
have the dispensing of them; but we can claim ownership
siastical goods belong to the poor.” Now whoever keeps
of them only by wicked theft.” Now dispensing requires
for himself or gives to others that which belongs to an-
good faith, according to 1 Cor. 4:2, “Here now it is re-
other, sins mortally and is bound to restitution. Therefore
quired among the dispensers that a man be found faithful.”
if bishops keep for themselves, or give to their relations
Moreover ecclesiastical goods are to be applied not only
or friends, their surplus of ecclesiastical goods, it would
to the good of the poor, but also to the divine worship and
seem that they are bound to restitution.
the needs of its ministers. Hence it is said (XII, qu. ii, can.
Objection 3. Further, much more may one take what
de reditibus): “Of the Church’s revenues or the offerings
is necessary for oneself from the goods of the Church,
of the faithful only one part is to be assigned to the bishop,
than accumulate a surplus therefrom. Yet Jerome says in a
two parts are to be used by the priest, under pain of sus-
letter to Pope Damasus†: “It is right that those clerics who
pension, for the ecclesiastical fabric, and for the benefit
receive no goods from their parents and relations should
of the poor; the remaining part is to be divided among
be supported from the funds of the Church. But those
the clergy according to their respective merits.” Accord-
who have sufficient income from their parents and their
ingly if the goods which are assigned to the use of the
own possessions, if they take what belongs to the poor,
bishop are distinct from those which are appointed for the
they commit and incur the guilt of sacrilege.” Wherefore
use of the poor, or the ministers, or for the ecclesiastical
the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:16): “If any of the faithful
worship, and if the bishop keeps back for himself part of
have widows, let him minister to them, and let not the
that which should be given to the poor, or to the ministers
Church be charged, that there may be sufficient for them
for their use, or expended on the divine worship, without
that are widows indeed.” Much more therefore do bishops
doubt he is an unfaithful dispenser, sins mortally, and is
sin mortally if they give not to the poor the surplus of their
bound to restitution.
ecclesiastical goods.
But as regards those goods which are deputed to his
On the contrary, Many bishops do not give their sur-
private use, the same apparently applies as to his own
plus to the poor, but would seem commendably to lay it
property, namely that he sins through immoderate attach-
out so as to increase the revenue of the Church.
ment thereto or use thereof, if he exceeds moderation in
I answer that, The same is not to be said of their
what he keeps for himself, and fails to assist others ac-
own goods which bishops may possess, and of ecclesi-
cording to the demands of charity.
astical goods. For they have real dominion over their own
On the other hand, if no distinction is made in the
∗ Basil, Serm. lxiv, de Temp., among the supposititious works of St.
Jerome
† Cf. Can. Clericos, cause. i, qu. 2; Can. Quoniam; cause.
xvi, qu. 1; Regul. Monach. iv, among the supposititious works of St.
Jerome
2031
aforesaid goods, their distribution is entrusted to his good cleric wish to deprive himself of that which is assigned to
faith; and if he fail or exceed in a slight degree, this may
his own use, and give it to his relations or others, he sins
happen without prejudice to his good faith, because in
not so long as he observes moderation, so, to wit, that they
such matters a man cannot possibly decide precisely what
cease to be in want without becoming the richer thereby.
ought to be done. On the other hand, if the excess be
Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): “It is a commend-
very great he cannot be ignorant of the fact; consequently
able liberality if you overlook not your kindred when you
he would seem to be lacking in good faith, and is guilty
know them to be in want; yet not so as to wish to make
of mortal sin. For it is written (Mat. 24:48-51) that “if
them rich with what you can give to the poor.”
that evil servant shall say in his heart: My lord is long a-
Reply to Objection 3. The goods of churches should
coming,” which shows contempt of God’s judgment, “and
not all be given to the poor, except in a case of necessity:
shall begin to strike his fellow-servants,” which is a sign
for then, as Ambrose says (De Offic. ii, 28), even the ves-
of pride, “and shall eat and drink with drunkards,” which
sels consecrated to the divine worship are to be sold for
proceeds from lust, “the lord of that servant shall come in
the ransom of prisoners, and other needs of the poor. In
a day that he hopeth not. . . and shall separate him,” namely
such a case of necessity a cleric would sin if he chose to
from the fellowship of good men, “and appoint his portion
maintain himself on the goods of the Church, always sup-
with hypocrites,” namely in hell.
posing him to have a patrimony of his own on which to
Reply to Objection 1. This saying of Ambrose refers
support himself.
to the administration not only of ecclesiastical things but
Reply to Objection 4. The goods of the churches
also of any goods whatever from which a man is bound,
should be employed for the good of the poor. Conse-
as a duty of charity, to provide for those who are in need.
quently a man is to be commended if, there being no
But it is not possible to state definitely when this need is
present necessity for helping the poor, he spends the sur-
such as to impose an obligation under pain of mortal sin,
plus from the Church revenue, in buying property, or lays
as is the case in other points of detail that have to be con-
it by for some future use connected with the Church or
sidered in human acts: for the decision in such matters is
the needs of the poor. But if there be a pressing need for
left to human prudence.
helping the poor, to lay by for the future is a superfluous
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above the goods of
and inordinate saving, and is forbidden by our Lord Who
the Church have to be employed not only for the use of
said (Mat. 6:34): “Be. . . not solicitous for the morrow.”
the poor, but also for other purposes. Hence if a bishop or
Whether religious who are raised to the episcopate are bound to religious obser-IIa IIae q. 185 a. 8
vances?
Objection 1. It would seem that religious who are
are above them; nor apparently are they bound to poverty,
raised to the episcopate are not bound to religious obser-
since according to the decree quoted above (obj. 1) “when
vances. For it is said (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that
the holy ordination has made of a monk a bishop he enjoys
a “canonical election loosens a monk from the yoke im-
the right, as the lawful heir, of claiming his paternal inher-
posed by the rule of the monastic profession, and the holy
itance.” Moreover they are sometimes allowed to make a
ordination makes of a monk a bishop.” Now the regu-
will. Much less therefore are they bound to other regular
lar observances pertain to the yoke of the rule. Therefore
observances.
religious who are appointed bishops are not bound to reli-
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu.
gious observances.
i, can. De Monachis): “With regard to those who after
Objection 2. Further, he who ascends from a lower
long residence in a monastery attain to the order of cler-
to a higher degree is seemingly not bound to those things
ics, we bid them not to lay aside their former purpose.”
which pertain to the lower degree: thus it was stated above
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 2) the re-
(q. 88, a. 12, ad 1) that a religious is not bound to keep the
ligious state pertains to perfection, as a way of tending
vows he made in the world. But a religious who is ap-
to perfection, while the episcopal state pertains to perfec-
pointed to the episcopate ascends to something greater, as
tion, as a professorship of perfection. Hence the religious
stated above (q. 84, a. 7). Therefore it would seem that a
state is compared to the episcopal state, as the school to
bishop is not bound to those things whereto he was bound
the professorial chair, and as disposition to perfection.
in the state of religion.
Now the disposition is not voided at the advent of per-
Objection 3.
Further, religious would seem to be
fection, except as regards what perchance is incompatible
bound above all to obedience, and to live without property
with perfection, whereas as to that wherein it is in accord
of their own. But religious who are appointed bishops, are
with perfection, it is confirmed the more. Thus when the
not bound to obey the superiors of their order, since they
scholar has become a professor it no longer becomes him
2032
to be a listener, but it becomes him to read and meditate whereas the disposition is still necessary when perfection
even more than before. Accordingly we must assert that
has been attained.
if there be among religious observances any that instead
Reply to Objection 3. It is accidental that religious
of being an obstacle to the episcopal office, are a safe-
who are bishops are not bound to obey the superiors of
guard of perfection, such as continence, poverty, and so
their order, because, to wit, they have ceased to be their
forth, a religious, even after he has been made a bishop,
subjects; even as those same religious superiors. Never-
remains bound to observe these, and consequently to wear
theless the obligation of the vow remains virtually, so that
the habit of his order, which is a sign of this obligation.
if any person be lawfully set above them, they would be
On the other hand, a man is not bound to keep such
bound to obey them, inasmuch as they are bound to obey
religious observances as may be incompatible with the
both the statutes of their rule in the way mentioned above,
episcopal office, for instance solitude, silence, and cer-
and their superiors if they have any.
tain severe abstinences or watchings and such as would
As to property they can nowise have it. For they claim
render him bodily unable to exercise the episcopal office.
their paternal inheritance not as their own, but as due to
For the rest he may dispense himself from them, accord-
the Church. Hence it is added (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statu-
ing to the needs of his person or office, and the manner of
tum) that after he has been ordained bishop at the altar to
life of those among whom he dwells, in the same way as
which he is consecrated and appointed according to the
religious superiors dispense themselves in such matters.
holy canons, he must restore whatever he may acquire.
Reply to Objection 1. He who from being a monk be-
Nor can he make any testament at all, because he is
comes a bishop is loosened from the yoke of the monastic
entrusted with the sole administration of things ecclesias-
profession, not in everything, but in those that are incom-
tical, and this ends with his death, after which a testament
patible with the episcopal office, as stated above.
comes into force according to the Apostle (Heb. 9:17). If,
Reply to Objection 2. The vows of those who are
however, by the Pope’s permission he make a will, he is
living in the world are compared to the vows of religion
not to be understood to bequeath property of his own, but
as the particular to the universal, as stated above (q. 88,
we are to understand that by apostolic authority the power
a. 12, ad 1). But the vows of religion are compared to
of his administration has been prolonged so as to remain
the episcopal dignity as disposition to perfection. Now
in force after his death.
the particular is superfluous when one has the universal,
2033
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 186
Of Those Things in Which the Religious State Properly Consists (In Ten Articles)
We must now consider things pertaining to the religious state: which consideration will be fourfold. In the first place we shall consider those things in which the religious state consists chiefly; secondly, those things which are lawfully befitting to religious; thirdly, the different kinds of religious orders; fourthly, the entrance into the religious state.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the religious state is perfect?
(2) Whether religious are bound to all the counsels?
(3) Whether voluntary poverty is required for the religious state?
(4) Whether continency is necessary?
(5) Whether obedience is necessary?
(6) Whether it is necessary that these should be the matter of a vow?
(7) Of the sufficiency of these vows;
(8) Of their comparison one with another;
(9) Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses a statute of his rule?
(10) Whether, other things being equal, a religious sins more grievously by the same kind of sin than a secular person?
Whether religion implies a state of perfection?
IIa IIae q. 186 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that religion does not
tance is opposed to the state of perfection; hence Diony-
imply a state of perfection. For that which is necessary
sius (Eccl. Hier. vi) places penitents in the lowest place,
for salvation does not seemingly pertain to perfection.
namely among those who are to be cleansed. Therefore it
But religion is necessary for salvation, whether because
would seem that religion is not the state of perfection.
“thereby we are bound [religamur] to the one almighty
On the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers
God,” as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55), or because
(Collat. i, 7) abbot Moses speaking of religious says:
it takes its name from “our returning [religimus] to God
“We must recognize that we have to undertake the hunger
Whom we had lost by neglecting Him”∗, according to Au-
of fasting, watchings, bodily toil, privation, reading, and
gustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3). Therefore it would seem that
other acts of virtue, in order by these degrees to mount
religion does not denote the state of perfection.
to the perfection of charity.” Now things pertaining to hu-
Objection 2. Further, religion according to Tully (De
man acts are specified and denominated from the intention
Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) is that “which offers worship and cer-
of the end. Therefore religious belong to the state of per-
emony to the Divine nature.” Now the offering of worship
fection.
and ceremony to God would seem to pertain to the min-
Moreover Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that those
istry of holy orders rather than to the diversity of states, as who are called servants of God, by reason of their renderstated above (q. 40, a. 2; q. 183, a. 3). Therefore it would
ing pure service and subjection to God, are united to the
seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.
perfection beloved of Him.
Objection 3. Further, the state of perfection is distinct I answer that, As stated above (q. 141, a. 2) that
from the state of beginners and that of the proficient. But
which is applicable to many things in common is ascribed
in religion also some are beginners, and some are profi-
antonomastically to that to which it is applicable by way
cient. Therefore religion does not denote the state of per-
of excellence. Thus the name of “fortitude” is claimed
fection.
by the virtue which preserves the firmness of the mind in
Objection 4. Further, religion would seem a place
regard to most difficult things, and the name of “temper-
of repentance; for it is said in the Decrees (VII, qu. i,
ance,” by that virtue which tempers the greatest pleasures.
can. Hoc nequaquam): “The holy synod orders that any
Now religion as stated above (q. 81 , a. 2; a. 3, ad 2) is
man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity to
a virtue whereby a man offers something to the service
the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no
and worship of God. Wherefore those are called religious
means rise again to the episcopate.” Now a place of repen-
antonomastically, who give themselves up entirely to the
∗ Cf. q. 81, a. 1
2034
divine service, as offering a holocaust to God. Hence Gre-Aa. 4,6) religion denotes the state of perfection by rea-
gory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): “Some there are who keep
son of the end intended. Hence it does not follow that
nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their
whoever is in the state of perfection is already perfect, but
tongue, their senses, their life, and the property they pos-
that he tends to perfection. Hence Origen commenting on
sess.” Now the perfection of man consists in adhering
Mat. 19:21, “If thou wilt be perfect,” etc., says (Tract. viii
wholly to God, as stated above (q. 184, a. 2), and in this
in Matth.) that “he who has exchanged riches for poverty
sense religion denotes the state of perfection.
in order to become perfect does not become perfect at the
Reply to Objection 1. To offer something to the wor-
very moment of giving his goods to the poor; but from
ship of God is necessary for salvation, but to offer oneself
that day the contemplation of God will begin to lead him
wholly, and one’s possessions to the worship of God be-
to all the virtues.” Thus all are not perfect in religion, but
longs to perfection.
some are beginners, some proficient.
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 81, a. 1, ad
Reply to Objection 4. The religious state was insti-
1; a. 4, ad 1,2; q. 85, a. 3) when we were treating of the
tuted chiefly that we might obtain perfection by means of
virtue of religion, religion has reference not only to the
certain exercises, whereby the obstacles to perfect charity
offering of sacrifices and other like things that are proper
are removed. By the removal of the obstacles of perfect
to religion, but also to the acts of all the virtues which in
charity, much more are the occasions of sin cut off, for sin
so far as these are referred to God’s service and honor be-
destroys charity altogether. Wherefore since it belongs to
come acts of religion. Accordingly if a man devotes his
penance to cut out the causes of sin, it follows that the
whole life to the divine service, his whole life belongs to
religious state is a most fitting place for penance. Hence
religion, and thus by reason of the religious life that they
(XXXIII, qu. ii, cap. Admonere) a man who had killed his
lead, those who are in the state of perfection are called
wife is counseled to enter a monastery which is described
religious.
as “better and lighter,” rather than to do public penance
Reply to Objection 3.
As stated above (q. 184,
while remaining in the world.
Whether every religious is bound to keep all the counsels?
IIa IIae q. 186 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that every religious is
I answer that, A thing pertains to perfection in three
bound to keep all the counsels. For whoever professes a
ways. First, essentially, and thus, as stated above (q. 184,
certain state of life is bound to observe whatever belongs
a. 3) the perfect observance of the precepts of charity be-
to that state. Now each religious professes the state of per-
longs to perfection. Secondly, a thing belongs to perfec-
fection. Therefore every religious is bound to keep all the
tion consequently: such are those things that result from
counsels that pertain to the state of perfection.
the perfection of charity, for instance to bless them that
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xx in
curse you (Lk. 6:27), and to keep counsels of a like kind,
Ezech.) that “he who renounces this world, and does all
which though they be binding as regards the preparedness
the good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt
of the mind, so that one has to fulfil them when neces-
and offers sacrifice in the wilderness.” Now it belongs
sity requires; yet are sometimes fulfilled, without there
specially to religious to renounce the world. Therefore it
being any necessity, through superabundance of charity.
belongs to them also to do all the good they can. and so
Thirdly, a thing belongs to perfection instrumentally and
it would seem that each of them is bound to fulfil all the
dispositively, as poverty, continence, abstinence, and the
counsels.
like.
Objection 3. Further, if it is not requisite for the
Now it has been stated (a. 1) that the perfection of
state of perfection to fulfil all the counsels, it would seem
charity is the end of the religious state. And the religious
enough to fulfil some of them. But this is false, since some
state is a school or exercise for the attainment of perfec-
who lead a secular life fulfil some of the counsels, for in-
tion, which men strive to reach by various practices, just
stance those who observe continence. Therefore it would
as a physician may use various remedies in order to heal.
seem that every religious who is in the state of perfection
But it is evident that for him who works for an end it is not
is bound to fulfil whatever pertains to perfection: and such
necessary that he should already have attained the end, but
are the counsels.
it is requisite that he should by some means tend thereto.
On the contrary, one is not bound, unless one bind
Hence he who enters the religious state is not bound to
oneself, to do works of supererogation. But every reli-
have perfect charity, but he is bound to tend to this, and
gious does not bind himself to keep all the counsels, but
use his endeavors to have perfect charity.
to certain definite ones, some to some, others to others.
For the same reason he is not bound to fulfil those
Therefore all are not bound to keep all of them.
things that result from the perfection of charity, although
2035
he is bound to intend to fulfil them: against which inten-out sin (q. 184, a. 2, ad 3), provided there be no con-
tion he acts if he contemns them, wherefore he sins not by
tempt, as stated above (ad 1), so too, all, both religious
omitting them but by contempt of them.
and seculars, are bound, in a certain measure, to do what-
In like manner he is not bound to observe all the prac-
ever good they can, for to all without exception it is said
tices whereby perfection may be attained, but only those
(Eccles. 9:10): “Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it
which are definitely prescribed to him by the rule which
earnestly.” Yet there is a way of fulfilling this precept, so
he has professed.
as to avoid sin, namely if one do what one can as required
Reply to Objection 1. He who enters religion does
by the conditions of one’s state of life: provided there be
not make profession to be perfect, but he professes to
no contempt of doing better things, which contempt sets
endeavor to attain perfection; even as he who enters the
the mind against spiritual progress.
schools does not profess to have knowledge, but to study
Reply to Objection 3. There are some counsels such
in order to acquire knowledge. Wherefore as Augustine
that if they be omitted, man’s whole life would be taken
says (De Civ. Dei viii, 2), Pythagoras was unwilling to
up with secular business; for instance if he have property
profess to be a wise man, but acknowledged himself, “a
of his own, or enter the married state, or do something of
lover of wisdom.” Hence a religious does not violate his
the kind that regards the essential vows of religion them-
profession if he be not perfect, but only if he despises to
selves; wherefore religious are bound to keep all such like
tend to perfection.
counsels. Other counsels there are, however, about cer-
Reply to Objection 2. Just as, though all are bound
tain particular better actions, which can be omitted with-
to love God with their whole heart, yet there is a certain
out one’s life being taken up with secular actions; where-
wholeness of perfection which cannot be omitted without
fore there is no need for religious to be bound to fulfil all
sin, and another wholeness which can be omitted with-
of them.
Whether poverty is required for religious perfection?
IIa IIae q. 186 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that poverty is not re-
Objection 3. Further, “Virtue observes the mean,” as
quired for religious perfection. For that which it is un-
stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But he who renounces all by vol-
lawful to do does not apparently belong to the state of
untary poverty seems to go to the extreme rather than to
perfection. But it would seem to be unlawful for a man to
observe the mean. Therefore he does not act virtuously:
give up all he possesses; since the Apostle (2 Cor. 8:12)
and so this does not pertain to the perfection of life.
lays down the way in which the faithful are to give alms
Objection 4. Further, the ultimate perfection of man
saying: “If the will be forward, it is accepted according to
consists in happiness. Now riches conduce to happiness;
that which a man hath,” i.e. “you should keep back what
for it is written (Ecclus. 31:8): “Blessed is the rich man
you need,” and afterwards he adds (2 Cor. 8:13): “For I
that is found without blemish,” and the Philosopher says
mean not that others should be eased, and you burthened,”
(Ethic. i, 8) that “riches contribute instrumentally to hap-
i.e. “with poverty,” according to a gloss. Moreover a gloss
piness.” Therefore voluntary poverty is not requisite for
on 1 Tim. 6:8, “Having food, and wherewith to be cov-
religious perfection.
ered,” says: “Though we brought nothing, and will carry
Objection 5. Further, the episcopal state is more per-
nothing away, we must not give up these temporal things
fect than the religious state. But bishops may have prop-
altogether.” Therefore it seems that voluntary poverty is
erty, as stated above (q. 185, a. 6). Therefore religious
not requisite for religious perfection.
may also.
Objection 2.
Further, whosoever exposes himself
Objection 6. Further, almsgiving is a work most ac-
to danger sins. But he who renounces all he has and
ceptable to God, and as Chrysostom says (Hom. ix in Ep.
embraces voluntary poverty exposes himself to danger—
ad Hebr.) “is a most effective remedy in repentance.” Now
not only spiritual, according to Prov. 30:9, “Lest per-
poverty excludes almsgiving. Therefore it would seem
haps. . . being compelled by poverty, I should steal and for-
that poverty does not pertain to religious perfection.
swear the name of my God,” and Ecclus. 27:1, “Through
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral.
viii, 26):
poverty many have sinned”—but also corporal, for it is
“There are some of the righteous who bracing themselves
written (Eccles. 7:13): “As wisdom is a defense, so money
up to lay hold of the very height of perfection, while they
is a defense,” and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that
aim at higher objects within, abandon all things without.”
“the waste of property appears to be a sort of ruining of
Now, as stated above, (Aa. 1,2), it belongs properly to re-
one’s self, since thereby man lives.” Therefore it would
ligious to brace themselves up in order to lay hold of the
seem that voluntary poverty is not requisite for the perfec-
very height of perfection. Therefore it belongs to them to
tion of religious life.
abandon all outward things by voluntary poverty.
2036
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the religious by anxiety lest they lack what is necessary.”
state is an exercise and a school for attaining to the perfec-
Reply to Objection 3. According to the Philosopher
tion of charity. For this it is necessary that a man wholly
(Ethic. ii, 6), the mean of virtue is taken according to
withdraw his affections from worldly things; since Au-
right reason, not according to the quantity of a thing.
gustine says (Confess. x, 29), speaking to God: “Too
Consequently whatever may be done in accordance with
little doth he love Thee, who loves anything with Thee,
right reason is not rendered sinful by the greatness of the
which he loveth not for Thee.” Wherefore he says (QQ.
quantity, but all the more virtuous. It would, however,
lxxxiii, qu. 36) that “greater charity means less cupidity,
be against right reason to throw away all one’s posses-
perfect charity means no cupidity.” Now the possession
sions through intemperance, or without any useful pur-
of worldly things draws a man’s mind to the love of them:
pose; whereas it is in accordance with right reason to re-
hence Augustine says (Ep. xxxi ad Paulin. et Theras.)
nounce wealth in order to devote oneself to the contem-
that “we are more firmly attached to earthly things when
plation of wisdom. Even certain philosophers are said to
we have them than when we desire them: since why did
have done this; for Jerome says (Ep. xlviii ad Paulin.):
that young man go away sad, save because he had great
“The famous Theban, Crates, once a very wealthy man,
wealth? For it is one thing not to wish to lay hold of what
when he was going to Athens to study philosophy, cast
one has not, and another to renounce what one already
away a large amount of gold; for he considered that he
has; the former are rejected as foreign to us, the latter are
could not possess both gold and virtue at the same time.”
cut off as a limb.” And Chrysostom says (Hom. lxiii in
Much more therefore is it according to right reason for
Matth.) that “the possession of wealth kindles a greater
a man to renounce all he has, in order perfectly to fol-
flame and the desire for it becomes stronger.”
low Christ. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rust.
Hence it is that in the attainment of the perfection of
Monach.): “Poor thyself, follow Christ poor.”
charity the first foundation is voluntary poverty, whereby
Reply to Objection 4.
Happiness or felicity is
a man lives without property of his own, according to the
twofold. One is perfect, to which we look forward in the
saying of our Lord (Mat. 19:21), “If thou wilt be per-
life to come; the other is imperfect, in respect of which
fect, go, sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast, and give to the
some are said to be happy in this life. The happiness of
poor. . . and come, follow Me.”
this life is twofold, one is according to the active life, the
Reply to Objection 1. As the gloss adds, “when the
other according to the contemplative life, as the Philoso-
Apostle said this (namely “not that you should be bur-
pher asserts (Ethic. x, 7,8). Now wealth conduces in-
thened,” i.e. with poverty),” he did not mean that “it were
strumentally to the happiness of the active life which con-
better not to give: but he feared for the weak, whom he
sists in external actions, because as the Philosopher says
admonished so to give as not to suffer privation.” Hence
(Ethic. i, 8) “we do many things by friends, by riches,
in like manner the other gloss means not that it is unlaw-
by political influence, as it were by instruments.” On the
ful to renounce all one’s temporal goods, but that this is
other hand, it does not conduce to the happiness of the
not required of necessity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De
contemplative life, rather is it an obstacle thereto, inas-
Offic. i, 30): “Our Lord does not wish,” namely does not
much as the anxiety it involves disturbs the quiet of the
command us “to pour out our wealth all at once, but to
soul, which is most necessary to one who contemplates.
dispense it; or perhaps to do as did Eliseus who slew his
Hence it is that the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. x, 8) that
oxen, and fed the poor with that which was his own so that
“for actions many things are needed, but the contempla-
no household care might hold him back.”
tive man needs no such things,” namely external goods,
Reply to Objection 2. He who renounces all his pos-
“for his operation; in fact they are obstacles to his con-
sessions for Christ’s sake exposes himself to no danger,
templation.”
neither spiritual nor corporal. For spiritual danger en-
Man is directed to future happiness by charity; and
sues from poverty when the latter is not voluntary; be-
since voluntary poverty is an efficient exercise for the at-
cause those who are unwillingly poor, through the desire
taining of perfect charity, it follows that it is of great avail of money-getting, fall into many sins, according to 1 Tim.
in acquiring the happiness of heaven. Wherefore our Lord
6:9, “They that will become rich, fall into temptation and
said (Mat. 19:21): “Go, sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou
into the snare of the devil.” This attachment is put away
hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure
by those who embrace voluntary poverty, but it gathers
in heaven.” Now riches once they are possessed are in
strength in those who have wealth, as stated above. Again
themselves of a nature to hinder the perfection of charity,
bodily danger does not threaten those who, intent on fol-
especially by enticing and distracting the mind. Hence it
lowing Christ, renounce all their possessions and entrust
is written (Mat. 13:22) that “the care of this world and the
themselves to divine providence. Hence Augustine says
deceitfulness of riches choketh up the word” of God, for
(De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17): “Those who seek first
as Gregory says (Hom. xv in Ev.) by “preventing the good
the kingdom of God and His justice are not weighed down
desire from entering into the heart, they destroy life at its
2037
very outset.” Consequently it is difficult to safeguard char-governing Christ’s flock, that they have nothing of their
ity amidst riches: wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 19:23)
own, whereas it is required of religious who make profes-
that “a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of
sion of learning to obtain perfection.
heaven,” which we must understand as referring to one
Reply to Objection 6. The renouncement of one’s
who actually has wealth, since He says that this is impos-
own wealth is compared to almsgiving as the universal to
sible for him who places his affection in riches, according
the particular, and as the holocaust to the sacrifice. Hence
to the explanation of Chrysostom (Hom. lxiii in Matth.),
Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that those who as-
for He adds (Mat. 19:24): “It is easier for a camel to pass
sist “the needy with the things they possess, by their good
through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter
deeds offer sacrifice, since they offer up something to God
into the kingdom of heaven.” Hence it is not said simply
and keep back something for themselves; whereas those
that the “rich man” is blessed, but “the rich man that is
who keep nothing for themselves offer a holocaust which
found without blemish, and that hath not gone after gold,”
is greater than a sacrifice.” Wherefore Jerome also says
and this because he has done a difficult thing, wherefore
(Contra Vigilant.): “When you declare that those do bet-
the text continues (Mat. 19:9): “Who is he? and we will
ter who retain the use of their possessions, and dole out
praise him; for he hath done wonderful things in his life,”
the fruits of their possessions to the poor, it is not I but
namely by not loving riches though placed in the midst of
the Lord Who answers you; If thou wilt be perfect,” etc.,
them.
and afterwards he goes on to say: “This man whom you
Reply to Objection 5. The episcopal state is not di-
praise belongs to the second and third degree, and we too
rected to the attainment of perfection, but rather to the
commend him: provided we acknowledge the first as to be
effect that, in virtue of the perfection which he already
preferred to the second and third.” For this reason in or-
has, a man may govern others, by administering not only
der to exclude the error of Vigilantius it is said (De Eccl.
spiritual but also temporal things. This belongs to the ac-
Dogm. xxxviii): “It is a good thing to give away one’s
tive life, wherein many things occur that may be done by
goods by dispensing them to the poor: it is better to give
means of wealth as an instrument, as stated (ad 4). Where-
them away once for all with the intention of following the
fore it is not required of bishops, who make profession of
Lord, and, free of solicitude, to be poor with Christ.”
Whether perpetual continence is required for religious perfection?
IIa IIae q. 186 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that perpetual continence
body and in spirit’].” Therefore religious perfection re-
is not required for religious perfection. For all perfection
quires continence.
of the Christian life began with Christ’s apostles. Now the
I answer that, The religious state requires the removal
apostles do not appear to have observed continence, as
of whatever hinders man from devoting himself entirely
evidenced by Peter, of whose mother-in-law we read Mat.
to God’s service. Now the use of sexual union hinders
8:14. Therefore it would seem that perpetual continence
the mind from giving itself wholly to the service of God,
is not requisite for religious perfection.
and this for two reasons. First, on account of its vehement
Objection 2. Further, the first example of perfection
delectation, which by frequent repetition increases concu-
is shown to us in the person of Abraham, to whom the
piscence, as also the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 12):
Lord said (Gn. 17:1): “Walk before Me, and be perfect.”
and hence it is that the use of venery withdraws the mind
Now the copy should not surpass the example. Therefore
from that perfect intentness on tending to God. Augustine
perpetual continence is not requisite for religious perfec-
expresses this when he says (Solil. i, 10): “I consider that
tion.
nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as
Objection 3. Further, that which is required for reli-
the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which
gious perfection is to be found in every religious order.
belong to the married state.” Secondly, because it involves
Now there are some religious who lead a married life.
man in solicitude for the control of his wife, his children,
Therefore religious perfection does not require perpetual
and his temporalities which serve for their upkeep. Hence
continence.
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:32,33): “He that is without a
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): “Let
wife is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord,
us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and
how he may please God: but he that is with a wife is so-
of the spirit, perfecting sanctification in the fear of God.”
licitous for the things of the world, how he may please his
Now cleanness of flesh and spirit is safeguarded by conti-
wife.”
nence, for it is said (1 Cor. 7:34): “The unmarried woman
Therefore perpetual continence, as well as voluntary
and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord that she
poverty, is requisite for religious perfection. Wherefore
may be holy both in spirit and in body [Vulg.: ‘both in
just as Vigilantius was condemned for equaling riches to
2038
poverty, so was Jovinian condemned for equaling mar-both of them in habit. For he lived chastely, and he might
riage to virginity.
have been chaste without marrying, but it was not requi-
Reply to Objection 1. The perfection not only of
site then.” Nevertheless if the patriarchs of old had per-
poverty but also of continence was introduced by Christ
fection of mind together with wealth and marriage, which
Who said (Mat. 19:12): “There are eunuchs who have
is a mark of the greatness of their virtue, this is no rea-
made themselves eunuchs, for the kingdom of heaven,”
son why any weaker person should presume to have such
and then added: “He that can take, let him take it.”
great virtue that he can attain to perfection though rich and
And lest anyone should be deprived of the hope of at-
married; as neither does a man unarmed presume to attack
taining perfection, he admitted to the state of perfection
his enemy, because Samson slew many foes with the jaw-
those even who were married. Now the husbands could
bone of an ass. For those fathers, had it been seasonable
not without committing an injustice forsake their wives,
to observe continence and poverty, would have been most
whereas men could without injustice renounce riches.
careful to observe them.
Wherefore Peter whom He found married, He severed not
Reply to Objection 3. Such ways of living as admit
from his wife, while “He withheld from marriage John
of the use of marriage are not the religious life simply and
who wished to marry”∗.
absolutely speaking, but in a restricted sense, in so far as
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Bono
they have a certain share in those things that belong to the
Conjug. xxii), “the chastity of celibacy is better than the
religious state.
chastity of marriage, one of which Abraham had in use,
Whether obedience belongs to religious perfection?
IIa IIae q. 186 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that obedience does not
Objection 5. Further, those services are most accept-
belong to religious perfection. For those things seem-
able to God which are done freely and not of necessity,
ingly belong to religious perfection, which are works of
according to 2 Cor. 9:7, “Not with sadness or of neces-
supererogation and are not binding upon all. But all are
sity.” Now that which is done out of obedience is done
bound to obey their superiors, according to the saying of
of necessity of precept. Therefore those good works are
the Apostle (Heb. 13:17), “Obey your prelates, and be
more deserving of praise which are done of one’s own ac-
subject to them.” Therefore it would seem that obedience
cord. Therefore the vow of obedience is unbecoming to
does not belong to religious perfection.
religion whereby men seek to attain to that which is bet-
Objection 2. Further, obedience would seem to be-
ter.
long properly to those who have to be guided by the sense
On the contrary, Religious perfection consists chiefly
of others, and such persons are lacking in discernment.
in the imitation of Christ, according to Mat. 19:21, “If
Now the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that “strong meat is for
thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast,
the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses ex-
and give to the poor, and follow Me.” Now in Christ obe-
ercised to the discerning of good and evil.” Therefore it
dience is commended above all according to Phil. 2:8,
would seem that obedience does not belong to the state of
“He became [Vulg.: ‘becoming’] obedient unto death.”
the perfect.
Therefore seemingly obedience belongs to religious per-
Objection 3. Further, if obedience were requisite for
fection.
religious perfection, it would follow that it is befitting to
I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 2,3) the religious
all religious. But it is not becoming to all; since some reli-
state is a school and exercise for tending to perfection.
gious lead a solitary life, and have no superior whom they
Now those who are being instructed or exercised in order
obey. Again religious superiors apparently are not bound
to attain a certain end must needs follow the direction of
to obedience. Therefore obedience would seem not to per-
someone under whose control they are instructed or exer-
tain to religious perfection.
cised so as to attain that end as disciples under a master.
Objection 4. Further, if the vow of obedience were
Hence religious need to be placed under the instruction
requisite for religion, it would follow that religious are
and command of someone as regards things pertaining to
bound to obey their superiors in all things, just as they are
the religious life; wherefore it is said (VII, qu. i, can.
bound to abstain from all venery by their vow of conti-
Hoc nequaquam): “The monastic life denotes subjection
nence. But they are not bound to obey them in all things,
and discipleship.” Now one man is subjected to another’s
as stated above (q. 104, a. 5), when we were treating of
command and instruction by obedience: and consequently
the virtue of obedience. Therefore the vow of obedience
obedience is requisite for religious perfection.
is not requisite for religion.
Reply to Objection 1. To obey one’s superiors in mat-
∗ Prolog. in Joan. among the supposititious works of St. Jerome 2039
ters that are essential to virtue is not a work of supereroga-pertain specially to religious discipline.
tion, but is common to all: whereas to obey in matters
Reply to Objection 4. The vow of obedience taken by
pertaining to the practice of perfection belongs properly
religious, extends to the disposition of a man’s whole life,
to religious. This latter obedience is compared to the for-
and in this way it has a certain universality, although it
mer as the universal to the particular. For those who live
does not extend to all individual acts. For some of these do
in the world, keep something for themselves, and offer
not belong to religion, through not being of those things
something to God; and in the latter respect they are under
that concern the love of God and of our neighbor, such as
obedience to their superiors: whereas those who live in
rubbing one’s beard, lifting a stick from the ground and
religion give themselves wholly and their possessions to
so forth, which do not come under a vow nor under obedi-
God, as stated above (Aa. 1,3). Hence their obedience is
ence; and some are contrary to religion. Nor is there any
universal.
comparison with continence whereby acts are excluded
Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
which are altogether contrary to religion.
ii, 1,2), by performing actions we contract certain habits,
Reply to Objection 5.
The necessity of coercion
and when we have acquired the habit we are best able
makes an act involuntary and consequently deprives it of
to perform the actions.
Accordingly those who have
the character of praise or merit; whereas the necessity
not attained to perfection, acquire perfection by obey-
which is consequent upon obedience is a necessity not of
ing, while those who have already acquired perfection are
coercion but of a free will, inasmuch as a man is willing to
most ready to obey, not as though they need to be directed
obey, although perhaps he would not be willing to do the
to the acquisition of perfection, but as maintaining them-
thing commanded considered in itself. Wherefore since
selves by this means in that which belongs to perfection.
by the vow of obedience a man lays himself under the ne-
Reply to Objection 3. The subjection of religious
cessity of doing for God’s sake certain things that are not
is chiefly in reference to bishops, who are compared to
pleasing in themselves, for this very reason that which he
them as perfecters to perfected, as Dionysius states (Eccl.
does is the more acceptable to God, though it be of less ac-
Hier. vi), where he also says that the “monastic order is
count, because man can give nothing greater to God, than
subjected to the perfecting virtues of the bishops, and is
by subjecting his will to another man’s for God’s sake.
taught by their godlike enlightenment.” Hence neither
Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xviii, 7) it
hermits nor religious superiors are exempt from obedi-
is stated that “the Sarabaitae are the worst class of monks,
ence to bishops; and if they be wholly or partly exempt
because through providing for their own needs without be-
from obedience to the bishop of the diocese, they are nev-
ing subject to superiors, they are free to do as they will;
ertheless bound to obey the Sovereign Pontiff, not only in
and yet day and night they are more busily occupied in
matters affecting all in common, but also in those which
work than those who live in monasteries.”
Whether it is requisite for religious perfection that poverty, continence, and obedience IIa IIae q. 186 a. 6
should come under a vow?
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not requisite
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Ad Pollent., de
for religious perfection that the three aforesaid, namely
Adult. Conjug. i, 14): “The services we render are more
poverty, continence, and obedience, should come under a
pleasing when we might lawfully not render them, yet do
vow. For the school of perfection is founded on the princi-
so out of love.” Now it is lawful not to render a service
ples laid down by our Lord. Now our Lord in formulating
which we have not vowed, whereas it is unlawful if we
perfection (Mat. 19:21) said: “If thou wilt be perfect, go,
have vowed to render it. Therefore seemingly it is more
sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast, and give to the poor,”
pleasing to God to keep poverty, continence, and obedi-
without any mention of a vow. Therefore it would seem
ence without a vow. Therefore a vow is not requisite for
that a vow is not necessary for the school of religion.
religious perfection.
Objection 2. Further, a vow is a promise made to
On the contrary, In the Old Law the Nazareans were
God, wherefore (Eccles. 5:3) the wise man after saying:
consecrated by vow according to Num. 6:2, “When a man
“If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it,”
or woman shall make a vow to be sanctified and will con-
adds at once, “for an unfaithful and foolish promise dis-
secrate themselves to the Lord,” etc. Now these were a
pleaseth Him.” But when a thing is being actually given
figure of those “who attain the summit of perfection,” as a
there is no need for a promise. Therefore it suffices for re-
gloss∗ of Gregory states. Therefore a vow is requisite for
ligious perfection that one keep poverty, continence, and
religious perfection.
obedience without. vowing them.
I answer that, It belongs to religious to be in the state
∗ Cf. Moral. ii
2040
of perfection, as shown above (q. 174, a. 5). Now the lowed Him after drawing their boats on to the beach, not
state of perfection requires an obligation to whatever be-
as though they purposed to return, but as following Him at
longs to perfection: and this obligation consists in binding
His command.” Now this unwavering following of Christ
oneself to God by means of a vow. But it is evident from
is made fast by a vow: wherefore a vow is requisite for
what has been said (Aa. 3,4,5) that poverty, continence,
religious perfection.
and obedience belong to the perfection of the Christian
Reply to Objection 2. As Gregory says (Moral. ii) re-
life. Consequently the religious state requires that one be
ligious perfection requires that a man give “his whole life”
bound to these three by vow. Hence Gregory says (Hom.
to God. But a man cannot actually give God his whole
xx in Ezech.): “When a man vows to God all his posses-
life, because that life taken as a whole is not simultaneous
sions, all his life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust”; and but successive. Hence a man cannot give his whole life to
afterwards he says that this refers to those who renounce
God otherwise than by the obligation of a vow.
the present world.
Reply to Objection 3. Among other services that we
Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord declared that it be-
can lawfully give, is our liberty, which is dearer to man
longs to the perfection of life that a man follow Him, not
than aught else. Consequently when a man of his own
anyhow, but in such a way as not to turn back. Wherefore
accord deprives himself by vow of the liberty of abstain-
He says again (Lk. 9:62): “No man putting his hand to the
ing from things pertaining to God’s service, this is most
plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God.”
acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii
And though some of His disciples went back, yet when
ad Paulin. et Arment.): “Repent not of thy vow; rejoice
our Lord asked (Jn. 6:68,69), “Will you also go away?”
rather that thou canst no longer do lawfully, what thou
Peter answered for the others: “Lord, to whom shall we
mightest have done lawfully but to thy own cost. Happy
go?” Hence Augustine says (De Consensu Ev. ii, 17)
the obligation that compels to better things.”
that “as Matthew and Mark relate, Peter and Andrew fol-
Whether it is right to say that religious perfection consists in these three vows?
IIa IIae q. 186 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not right to say
and the renouncing of property are affixed to the monastic
that religious perfection consists in these three vows. For
rule.”
the perfection of life consists of inward rather than of
I answer that, The religious state may be considered
outward acts, according to Rom. 14:17, “The Kingdom
in three ways. First, as being a practice of tending to
of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace and
the perfection of charity: secondly, as quieting the human
joy in the Holy Ghost.” Now the religious vow binds a
mind from outward solicitude, according to 1 Cor. 7:32:
man to things belonging to perfection. Therefore vows
“I would have you to be without solicitude”: thirdly, as
of inward actions, such as contemplation, love of God
a holocaust whereby a man offers himself and his pos-
and our neighbor, and so forth, should pertain to the re-
sessions wholly to God; and in corresponding manner the
ligious state, rather than the vows of poverty, continence,
religious state is constituted by these three vows.
and obedience which refer to outward actions.
First, as regards the practice of perfection a man is re-
Objection 2. Further, the three aforesaid come under
quired to remove from himself whatever may hinder his
the religious vow, in so far as they belong to the practice
affections from tending wholly to God, for it is in this
of tending to perfection. But there are many other things
that the perfection of charity consists. Such hindrances
that religious practice, such as abstinence, watchings, and
are of three kinds. First, the attachment to external goods,
the like. Therefore it would seem that these three vows
which is removed by the vow of poverty; secondly, the
are incorrectly described as pertaining to the state of per-
concupiscence of sensible pleasures, chief among which
fection.
are venereal pleasures, and these are removed by the vow
Objection 3. Further, by the vow of obedience a man
of continence; thirdly, the inordinateness of the human
is bound to do according to his superior’s command what-
will, and this is removed by the vow of obedience. In
ever pertains to the practice of perfection. Therefore the
like manner the disquiet of worldly solicitude is aroused
vow of obedience suffices without the two other vows.
in man in reference especially to three things. First, as re-
Objection 4. Further, external goods comprise not
gards the dispensing of external things, and this solicitude
only riches but also honors. Therefore, if religious, by the
is removed from man by the vow of poverty; secondly,
vow of poverty, renounce earthly riches, there should be
as regards the control of wife and children, which is cut
another vow whereby they may despise worldly honors.
away by the vow of continence; thirdly, as regards the dis-
On the contrary, It is stated (Extra, de Statu Monach.,
posal of one’s own actions, which is eliminated by the
cap. Cum ad monasterium) that “the keeping of chastity
vow of obedience, whereby a man commits himself to the
2041
disposal of another.
rected to the end of religion, namely the love of God and
Again, “a holocaust is the offering to God of all that
his neighbor (such as reading, prayer, visiting the sick,
one has,” according to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Now
and the like), are comprised under the vow of obedience
man has a threefold good, according to the Philosopher
that applies to the will, which directs its actions to the end
(Ethic. i, 8). First, the good of external things, which
according to the ordering of another person. The distinc-
he wholly offers to God by the vow of voluntary poverty:
tion of habit belongs to all three vows, as a sign of being
secondly, the good of his own body, and this good he of-
bound by them: wherefore the religious habit is given or
fers to God especially by the vow of continence, whereby
blessed at the time of profession.
he renounces the greatest bodily pleasures. the third is the
Reply to Objection 3. By obedience a man offers to
good of the soul, which man wholly offers to God by the
God his will, to which though all human affairs are sub-
vow of obedience, whereby he offers God his own will by
ject, yet some are subject to it alone in a special manner,
which he makes use of all the powers and habits of the
namely human actions, since passions belong also to the
soul. Therefore the religious state is fittingly constituted
sensitive appetite. Wherefore in order to restrain the pas-
by the three vows.
sions of carnal pleasures and of external objects of ap-
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 1), the
petite, which hinder the perfection of life, there was need
end whereunto the religious vow is directed is the perfec-
for the vows of continence and poverty; but for the order-
tion of charity, since all the interior acts of virtue belong
ing of one’s own actions accordingly as the state of per-
to charity as to their mother, according to 1 Cor. 13:4,
fection requires, there was need for the vow of obedience.
“Charity is patient, is kind,” etc. Hence the interior acts of
Reply to Objection 4. As the Philosopher says (Ethic.
virtue, for instance humility, patience, and so forth, do not
iv, 3), strictly and truly speaking honor is not due save to
come under the religious vow, but this is directed to them
virtue. Since, however, external goods serve instrumen-
as its end.
tally for certain acts of virtue, the consequence is that a
Reply to Objection 2. All other religious observances
certain honor is given to their excellence especially by the
are directed to the three aforesaid principal vows; for if
common people who acknowledge none but outward ex-
any of them are ordained for the purpose of procuring a
cellence. Therefore since religious tend to the perfection
livelihood, such as labor, questing, and so on, they are
of virtue it becomes them not to renounce the honor which
to be referred to poverty; for the safeguarding of which
God and all holy men accord to virtue, according to Ps.
religious seek a livelihood by these means. Other obser-
138:17, “But to me Thy friends, O God, are made exceed-
vances whereby the body is chastised, such as watching,
ingly honorable.” On the other hand, they renounce the
fasting, and the like, are directly ordained for the obser-
honor that is given to outward excellence, by the very fact
vance of the vow of continence. And such religious ob-
that they withdraw from a worldly life: hence no special
servances as regard human actions whereby a man is di-
vow is needed for this.
Whether the vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious vows?
IIa IIae q. 186 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that the vow of obedience
from obeying his superior. Therefore it would seem that
is not the chief of the three religious vows. For the perfec-
the vow of obedience is less than the vow of poverty and
tion of the religious life was inaugurated by Christ. Now
continence.
Christ gave a special counsel of poverty; whereas He is
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv, 14):
not stated to have given a special counsel of obedience.
“Obedience is rightly placed before victims, since by vic-
Therefore the vow of poverty is greater than the vow of
tims another’s flesh, but by obedience one’s own will, is
obedience.
sacrificed.” Now the religious vows are holocausts, as
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 26:20) that stated above (Aa. 1,3, ad 6). Therefore the vow of obe-
“no price is worthy of a continent soul.” Now the vow of
dience is the chief of all religious vows.
that which is more worthy is itself more excellent. There-
I answer that, The vow of obedience is the chief of
fore the vow of continence is more excellent than the vow
the three religious vows, and this for three reasons.
of obedience.
First, because by the vow of obedience man offers God
Objection 3. Further, the greater a vow the more in-
something greater, namely his own will; for this is of more
dispensable it would seem to be. Now the vows of poverty
account than his own body, which he offers God by con-
and continence “are so inseparable from the monastic rule,
tinence, and than external things, which he offers God by
that not even the Sovereign Pontiff can allow them to be
the vow of poverty. Wherefore that which is done out of
broken,” according to a Decretal (De Statu Monach., cap.
obedience is more acceptable to God than that which is
Cum ad monasterium): yet he can dispense a religious
done of one’s own will, according to the saying of Jerome
2042
(Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.): “My words are intended to
“No one, methinks, would prefer virginity to the monastic
teach you not to rely on your own judgment”: and a little
life.”∗.
further on he says: “You may not do what you will; you
Reply to Objection 1. The counsel of obedience was
must eat what you are bidden to eat, you may possess as
included in the very following of Christ, since to obey
much as you receive, clothe yourself with what is given to
is to follow another’s will. Consequently it is more per-
you.” Hence fasting is not acceptable to God if it is done
tinent to perfection than the vow of poverty, because as
of one’s own will, according to Is. 58:3, “Behold in the
Jerome, commenting on Mat. 19:27, “Behold we have
day of your fast your own will is found.”
left all things,” observes, “Peter added that which is per-
Secondly, because the vow of obedience includes the
fect when he said: And have followed Thee.”
other vows, but not vice versa: for a religious, though
Reply to Objection 2. The words quoted mean that
bound by vow to observe continence and poverty, yet
continence is to be preferred, not to all other acts of virtue, these also come under obedience, as well as many other
but to conjugal chastity, or to external riches of gold and
things besides the keeping of continence and poverty.
silver which are measured by weight†. Or again conti-
Thirdly, because the vow of obedience extends prop-
nence is taken in a general sense for abstinence from ali
erly to those acts that are closely connected with the end
evil, as stated above (q. 155, a. 4, ad 1).
of religion; and the more closely a thing is connected with
Reply to Objection 3. The Pope cannot dispense a
the end, the better it is.
religious from his vow of obedience so as to release him
It follows from this that the vow of obedience is more
from obedience to every superior in matters relating to the
essential to the religious life. For if a man without taking a
perfection of life, for he cannot exempt him from obedi-
vow of obedience were to observe, even by vow, voluntary
ence to himself. He can, however, exempt him from sub-
poverty and continence, he would not therefore belong to
jection to a lower superior, but this is not to dispense him
the religious state, which is to be preferred to virginity ob-
from his vow of obedience.
served even by vow; for Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi):
Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses the things contained in IIa IIae q. 186 a. 9
his rule?
Objection 1. It would seem that a religious sins mor-
religious in mortal sin, the religious life would be fraught
tally whenever he transgresses the things contained in his
with danger of account of its multitude of observances.
rule. For to break a vow is a sin worthy of condemna-
Therefore not every transgression of the things contained
tion, as appears from 1 Tim. 5:11,12, where the Apostle
in the rule is a mortal sin.
says that widows who “will marry have [Vulg.: ‘having’]
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 1,2), a thing
damnation, because they have made void their first faith.”
is contained in the rule in two ways. First, as the end of
But religious are bound to a rule by the vows of their pro-
the rule, for instance things that pertain to the acts of the
fession. Therefore they sin mortally by transgressing the
virtues; and the transgression of these, as regards those
things contained in their rule.
which come under a common precept, involves a mortal
Objection 2. Further, the rule is enjoined upon a reli-
sin; but as regards those which are not included in the
gious in the same way as a law. Now he who transgresses
common obligation of a precept, the transgression thereof
a precept of law sins mortally. Therefore it would seem
does not involve a mortal sin, except by reason of con-
that a monk sins mortally if he transgresses the things con-
tempt, because, as stated above (a. 2), a religious is not
tained in his rule.
bound to be perfect, but to tend to perfection, to which the
Objection 3. Further, contempt involves a mortal sin.
contempt of perfection is opposed.
Now whoever repeatedly does what he ought not to do
Secondly, a thing is contained in the rule through per-
seems to sin from contempt. Therefore it would seem that
taining to the outward practice, such as all external ob-
a religious sins mortally by frequently transgressing the
servances, to some of which a religious is bound by the
things contained in his rule.
vow of his profession. Now the vow of profession re-
On the contrary, The religious state is safer than the
gards chiefly the three things aforesaid, namely poverty,
secular state; wherefore Gregory at the beginning of his
continence, and obedience, while all others are directed to
Morals‡ compares the secular life to the stormy sea, and
these. Consequently the transgression of these three in-
the religious life to the calm port. But if every transgres-
volves a mortal sin, while the transgression of the others
sion of the things contained in his rule were to involve a
does not involve a mortal sin, except either by reason of
∗ St. Augustine wrote not ‘monasterio’ but ‘martyrio’—to ‘martyrdom’; and St. Thomas quotes the passage correctly above, q. 124, a. 3
and q. 152, a. 5
† ‘Pondere,’ referring to the Latin ‘ponderatio’ in the
Vulgate, which the Douay version renders ‘price.’
‡ Epist. Missoria,
ad Leand. Episc. i
2043
contempt of the rule (since this is directly contrary to the nial; but they bind one to suffer the punishment affixed
profession whereby a man vows to live according to the
thereto, because it is in this way that they are bound to
rule), or by reason of a precept, whether given orally by
observe such things. Nevertheless they may sin venially
a superior, or expressed in the rule, since this would be to
or mortally through neglect, concupiscence, or contempt.
act contrary to the vow of obedience.
Reply to Objection 2. Not all the contents of the law
Reply to Objection 1. He who professes a rule does
are set forth by way of precept; for some are expressed un-
not vow to observe all the things contained in the rule, but
der the form of ordinance or statute binding under pain of
he vows the regular life which consists essentially in the
a fixed punishment. Accordingly, just as in the civil law
three aforesaid things. Hence in certain religious orders
the transgression of a legal statute does not always ren-
precaution is taken to profess, not the rule, but to live ac-
der a man deserving of bodily death, so neither in the law
cording to the rule, i.e. to tend to form one’s conduct in
of the Church does every ordinance or statute bind under
accordance with the rule as a kind of model; and this is
mortal sin; and the same applies to the statutes of the rule.
set aside by contempt. Yet greater precaution is observed
Reply to Objection 3. An action or transgression pro-
in some religious orders by professing obedience accord-
ceeds from contempt when a man’s will refuses to submit
ing to the rule, so that only that which is contrary to a
to the ordinance of the law or rule, and from this he pro-
precept of the rule is contrary to the profession, while the
ceeds to act against the law or rule. on the other hand, he
transgression or omission of other things binds only un-
does not sin from contempt, but from some other cause,
der pain of venial sin, because, as stated above (a. 7, ad
when he is led to do something against the ordinance of
2), such things are dispositions to the chief vows. And ve-
the law or rule through some particular cause such as con-
nial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated above ( Ia IIae, cupiscence or anger, even though he often repeat the same
q. 88, a. 3), inasmuch as it hinders those things whereby a
kind of sin through the same or some other cause. Thus
man is disposed to keep the chief precepts of Christ’s law,
Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that “not all sins
namely the precepts of charity.
are committed through proud contempt.” Nevertheless
There is also a religious order, that of the Friars
the frequent repetition of a sin leads dispositively to con-
Preachers, where such like transgressions or omissions do
tempt, according to the words of Prov. 18:3, “The wicked
not, by their very nature, involve sin, either mortal or ve-
man, when he is come into the depth of sins, contemneth.”
Whether a religious sins more grievously than a secular by the same kind of sin?
IIa IIae q. 186 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that a religious does not
low that religious are worse off than seculars: and con-
sin more grievously than a secular by the same kind of sin.
sequently it would not be a wholesome counsel to enter
For it is written (2 Paralip 30:18,19): “The Lord Who is
religion.
good will show mercy to all them who with their whole
On the contrary, The greater the evil the more it
heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers, and will not
would seem to be deplored. But seemingly the sins of
impute it to them that they are not sanctified.” Now reli-
those who are in the state of holiness and perfection are
gious apparently follow the Lord the God of their fathers
the most deplorable, for it is written (Jer. 23:9): “My heart
with their whole heart rather than seculars, who partly
is broken within me,” and afterwards (Jer. 23:11): “For
give themselves and their possessions to God and reserve
the prophet and the priest are defiled; and in My house
part for themselves, as Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.).
I have found their wickedness.” Therefore religious and
Therefore it would seem that it is less imputed to them if
others who are in the state of perfection, other things be-
they fall short somewhat of their sanctification.
ing equal, sin more grievously.
Objection 2. Further, God is less angered at a man’s
I answer that, A sin committed by a religious may
sins if he does some good deeds, according to 2 Paralip
be in three ways more grievous than a like sin committed
19:2,3, “Thou helpest the ungodly, and thou art joined
by a secular. First, if it be against his religious vow; for
in friendship with them that hate the Lord, and therefore
instance if he be guilty of fornication or theft, because by
thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord: but good
fornication he acts against the vow of continence, and by
works are found in thee.” Now religious do more good
theft against the vow of poverty; and not merely against
works than seculars. Therefore if they commit any sins,
a precept of the divine law. Secondly, if he sin out of
God is less angry with them.
contempt, because thereby he would seem to be the more
Objection 3. Further, this present life is not carried
ungrateful for the divine favors which have raised him
through without sin, according to James 3:2, “In many
to the state of perfection. Thus the Apostle says (Heb.
things we all offend.” Therefore if the sins of religious
10:29) that the believer “deserveth worse punishments”
were more grievous than those of seculars it would fol-
who through contempt tramples under foot the Son of
2044
God. Hence the Lord complains (Jer. 11:15): “What is woman and desired her knew to say: ‘I have sinned and
the meaning that My beloved hath wrought much wicked-
done evil before Thee.’ ” Secondly, he is assisted by his
ness in My house?” Thirdly, the sin of a religious may be
fellow-religious to rise again, according to Eccles. 4:10,
greater on account of scandal, because many take note of
“If one fall he shall be supported by the other: woe to him
his manner of life: wherefore it is written (Jer. 23:14): “I
that is alone, for when he falleth he hath none to lift him
have seen the likeness of adulterers, and the way of lying
up.”
in the Prophets of Jerusalem; and they strengthened the
Reply to Objection 1. The words quoted refer to
hands of the wicked, that no man should return from his
things done through weakness or ignorance, but not to
evil doings.”
those that are done out of contempt.
On the other hand, if a religious, not out of contempt,
Reply to Objection 2. Josaphat also, to whom these
but out of weakness or ignorance, commit a sin that is not
words were addressed, sinned not out of contempt, but out
against the vow of his profession, without giving scan-
of a certain weakness of human affection.
dal (for instance if he commit it in secret) he sins less
Reply to Objection 3. The just sin not easily out of
grievously in the same kind of sin than a secular, because
contempt; but sometimes they fall into a sin through igno-
his sin if slight is absorbed as it were by his many good
rance or weakness from which they easily arise. If, how-
works, and if it be mortal, he more easily recovers from
ever, they go so far as to sin out of contempt, they become
it. First, because he has a right intention towards God,
most wicked and incorrigible, according to the word of
and though it be intercepted for the moment, it is easily
Jer. 2:20: “Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst
restored to its former object. Hence Origen commenting
My bands, and thou hast said: ‘I will not serve.’ For on
on Ps. 36:24, “When he shall fall he shall not be bruised,”
every high hill and under every green tree thou didst pros-
says (Hom. iv in Ps. 36): “The wicked man, if he sin,
titute thyself.” Hence Augustine says (Ep. lxxviii ad Pleb.
repents not, and fails to make amends for his sin. But the
Hippon.): “From the time I began to serve God, even as I
just man knows how to make amends and recover himself;
scarcely found better men than those who made progress
even as he who had said: ‘I know not the man,’ shortly af-
in monasteries, so have I not found worse than those who
terwards when the Lord had looked on him, knew to shed
in the monastery have fallen.”
most bitter tears, and he who from the roof had seen a
2045
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 187
Of Those Things That Are Competent to Religious
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the things that are competent to religious; and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful for them to teach, preach, and do like things?
(2) Whether it is lawful for them to meddle in secular business?
(3) Whether they are bound to manual labor?
(4) Whether it is lawful for them to live on alms?
(5) Whether it is lawful for them to quest?
(6) Whether it is lawful for them to wear coarser clothes than other persons?
Whether it is lawful for religious to teach, preach, and the like?
IIa IIae q. 187 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for religious
our office, be it lawful to monk priests who are configured
to teach, preach, and the like. For it is said (VII, qu. i,
to the apostles, to preach, baptize, give communion, pray
can. Hoc nequaquam) in an ordinance of a synod of Con-
for sinners, impose penance, and absolve from sin.”
stantinople∗: “The monastic life is one of subjection and
I answer that, A thing is declared to be unlawful to
discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or pastoral care.”
a person in two ways. First, because there is something
And Jerome says (ad Ripar. et Desider.†): “A monk’s duty
in him contrary to that which is declared unlawful to him:
is not to teach but to lament.” Again Pope Leo‡: says
thus to no man is it lawful to sin, because each man has in
“Let none dare to preach save the priests of the Lord, be
himself reason and an obligation to God’s law, to which
he monk or layman, and no matter what knowledge he
things sin is contrary. And in this way it is said to be
may boast of having.” Now it is not lawful to exceed the
unlawful for a person to preach, teach, or do like things,
bounds of one’s office or transgress the ordinance of the
because there is in him something incompatible with these
Church. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for religious
things, either by reason of a precept—thus those who are
to teach, preach, and the like.
irregular by ordinance of the Church may not be raised to
Objection 2. Further, in an ordinance of the Council
the sacred orders—or by reason of sin, according to Ps.
of Nicea (cf. XVI, qu. i, can. Placuit) it is laid down
49:16, “But to the sinner God hath said: Why dost thou
as follows: “It is our absolute and peremptory command
declare My justice?”
addressed to all that monks shall not hear confessions ex-
In this way it is not unlawful for religious to preach,
cept of one another, as is right, that they shall not bury the
teach, and do like things, both because they are bound
dead except those dwelling with them in the monastery, or
neither by vow nor by precept of their rule to abstain from
if by chance a brother happen to die while on a visit.” But
these things, and because they are not rendered less apt
just as the above belong to the duty of clerics, so also do
for these things by any sin committed, but on the contrary
preaching and teaching. Therefore since “the business of
they are the more apt through having taken upon them-
a monk differs from that of a cleric,” as Jerome says (Ep.
selves the practice of holiness. For it is foolish to say that
xiv ad Heliod.), it would seem unlawful for religious to
a man is rendered less fit for spiritual duties through ad-
preach, teach, and the like.
vancing himself in holiness; and consequently it is foolish
Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Regist. v, Ep. 1):
to declare that the religious state is an obstacle to the ful-
“No man can fulfil ecclesiastical duties, and keep consis-
filment of such like duties. This error is rejected by Pope
tently to the monastic rule”: and this is quoted XVI, qu. i,
Boniface§ for the reasons given above. His words which
can. Nemo potest. Now monks are bound to keep consis-
are quoted (XVI, qu. i, can. Sunt. nonnulli) are these:
tently to the monastic rule. Therefore it would seem that
“There are some who without any dogmatic proof, and
they cannot fulfil ecclesiastical duties, whereof teaching
with extreme daring, inspired with a zeal rather of bitter-
and preaching are a part. Therefore seemingly it is unlaw-
ness than of love, assert that monks though they be dead
ful for them to preach, teach, and do similar things.
to the world and live to God, are unworthy of the power
On the contrary, Gregory is quoted (XVI, qu. i, can.
of the priestly office, and that they cannot confer penance,
Ex auctoritate) as saying: “By authority of this decree
nor christen, nor absolve in virtue of the power divinely
framed in virtue of our apostolic power and the duty of
bestowed on them in the priestly office. But they are alto-
∗ Pseudosynod held by Photius in the year 879
† Contra Vigilant.
xvi
‡ Leo I, Ep. cxx ad Theodoret., 6, cf. XVI, qu. i, can. Adjicimus
§ Boniface IV
2046
gether wrong.” He proves this first because it is not con-power to do these things. They can, however, do them if
trary to the rule; thus he continues: “For neither did the
they receive orders, or ordinary jurisdiction, or if matters
Blessed Benedict the saintly teacher of monks forbid this
of jurisdiction be delegated to them.
in any way,” nor is it forbidden in other rules. Secondly, he
Reply to Objection 1.
It results from the words
refutes the above error from the usefulness of the monks,
quoted that the fact of their being monks does not give
when he adds at the end of the same chapter: “The more
monks the power to do these things, yet it does not in-
perfect a man is, the more effective is he in these, namely
volve in them anything contrary to the performance of
in spiritual works.”
these acts.
Secondly, a thing is said to be unlawful for a man,
Reply to Objection 2. Again, this ordinance of the
not on account of there being in him something contrary
Council of Nicea forbids monks to claim the power of ex-
thereto, but because he lacks that which enables him to do
ercising those acts on the ground of their being monks,
it: thus it is unlawful for a deacon to say mass, because he
but it does not forbid those acts being delegated to them.
is not in priestly orders; and it is unlawful for a priest to
Reply to Objection 3. These two things are incompat-
deliver judgment because he lacks the episcopal authority.
ible, namely, the ordinary cure of ecclesiastical duties, and
Here, however, a distinction must be made. Because those
the observance of the monastic rule in a monastery. But
things which are a matter of an order, cannot be deputed to
this does not prevent monks and other religious from be-
one who has not the order, whereas matters of jurisdiction
ing sometimes occupied with ecclesiastical duties through
can be deputed to those who have not ordinary jurisdic-
being deputed thereto by superiors having ordinary cure;
tion: thus the delivery of a judgment is deputed by the
especially members of religious orders that are especially
bishop to a simple priest. In this sense it is said to be un-
instituted for that purpose, as we shall say further on
lawful for monks and other religious to preach, teach, and
(q. 188, a. 4).
so forth, because the religious state does not give them the
Whether it is lawful for religious to occupy themselves with secular business?
IIa IIae q. 187 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for religious to
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 16:1): “I
occupy themselves with secular business. For in the de-
commend to you Phoebe our Sister,” and further on (Rom.
cree quoted above (a. 1) of Pope Boniface it is said that the
16:2), “that you assist her in whatsoever business she shall
“Blessed Benedict bade them to be altogether free from
have need of you.”
secular business; and this is most explicitly prescribed by
I answer that, As stated above (q. 186, Aa. 1,7, ad
the apostolic doctrine and the teaching of all the Fathers,
1), the religious state is directed to the attainment of the
not only to religious, but also to all the canonical clergy,”
perfection of charity, consisting principally in the love of
according to 2 Tim. 2:4, “No man being a soldier to God,
God and secondarily in the love of our neighbor. Conse-
entangleth himself with secular business.” Now it is the
quently that which religious intend chiefly and for its own
duty of all religious to be soldiers of God. Therefore it
sake is to give themselves to God. Yet if their neighbor be
is unlawful for them to occupy themselves with secular
in need, they should attend to his affairs out of charity, ac-
business.
cording to Gal. 6:2, “Bear ye one another’s burthens: and
Objection 2.
Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess.
so you shall fulfil the law of Christ,” since through serv-
4:11): “That you use your endeavor to be quiet, and that
ing their neighbor for God’s sake, they are obedient to the
you do your own business,” which a gloss explains thus—
divine love. Hence it is written (James 1:27): “Religion
“by refraining from other people’s affairs, so as to be the
clean and undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to
better able to attend to the amendment of your own life.”
visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation,” which
Now religious devote themselves in a special way to the
means, according to a gloss, to assist the helpless in their
amendment of their life. Therefore they should not oc-
time of need.
cupy themselves with secular business.
We must conclude therefore that it is unlawful for ei-
Objection 3. Further, Jerome, commenting on Mat.
ther monks or clerics to carry on secular business from
11:8, “Behold they that are clothed in soft garments are in
motives of avarice; but from motives of charity, and with
the houses of kings,” says: “Hence we gather that an aus-
their superior’s permission, they may occupy themselves
tere life and severe preaching should avoid the palaces of
with due moderation in the administration and direction
kings and the mansions of the voluptuous.” But the needs
of secular business. Wherefore it is said in the Decre-
of secular business induce men to frequent the palaces of
tals (Dist. xxxviii, can. Decrevit): “The holy synod de-
kings. Therefore it is unlawful for religious to occupy
crees that henceforth no cleric shall buy property or oc-
themselves with secular business.
cupy himself with secular business, save with a view to
2047
the care of the fatherless, orphans, or widows, or when but charity.
the bishop of the city commands him to take charge of
Reply to Objection 3. To haunt the palaces of kings
the business connected with the Church.” And the same
from motives of pleasure, glory, or avarice is not becom-
applies to religious as to clerics, because they are both
ing to religious, but there is nothing unseemly in their vis-
debarred from secular business on the same grounds, as
iting them from motives of piety. Hence it is written (4
stated above.
Kings 4:13): “Hast thou any business, and wilt thou that
Reply to Objection 1. Monks are forbidden to occupy
I speak to the king or to the general of the army?” Like-
themselves with secular business from motives of avarice,
wise it becomes religious to go to the palaces of kings to
but not from motives of charity.
rebuke and guide them, even as John the Baptist rebuked
Reply to Objection 2. To occupy oneself with secular
Herod, as related in Mat. 14:4.
business on account of another’s need is not officiousness
Whether religious are bound to manual labor?
IIa IIae q. 187 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that religious are bound
say: “Those who say they are occupied in reading, do they
to manual labor. For religious are not exempt from the
not find there what the Apostle commanded? What sort of
observance of precepts. Now manual labor is a matter of
perverseness is this, to wish to read but not to obey what
precept according to 1 Thess. 4:11, “Work with your own
one reads?” Fourthly, he adds in reference to preaching†:
hands as we commanded you”; wherefore Augustine says
“If one has to speak, and is so busy that he cannot spare
(De oper. Monach. xxx): “But who can allow these in-
time for manual work, can all in the monastery do this?
solent men,” namely religious that do no work, of whom
And since all cannot do this, why should all make this a
he is speaking there, “who disregard the most salutary ad-
pretext for being exempt? And even if all were able, they
monishment of the Apostle, not merely to be borne with
should do so by turns, not only so that the others may be
as being weaker than others, but even to preach as though
occupied in other works, but also because it suffices that
they were holier than others.” Therefore it would seem
one speak while many listen.” Therefore it would seem
that religious are bound to manual labor.
that religious should not desist from manual labor on ac-
Objection 2. Further, a gloss∗ on 2 Thess. 3:10, “If
count of such like spiritual works to which they devote
any man will not work, neither let him eat,” says: “Some
themselves.
say that this command of the Apostle refers to spiritual
Objection 4. Further, a gloss on Lk. 12:33, “Sell what
works, and not to the bodily labor of the farmer or crafts-
you possess,” says: “Not only give your clothes to the
man”; and further on: “But it is useless for them to try to
poor, but sell what you possess, that having once for all
hide from themselves and from others the fact that they
renounced all your possessions for the Lord’s sake, you
are unwilling not only to fulfil, but even to understand the
may henceforth work with the labor of your hands, so as
useful admonishments of charity”; and again: “He wishes
to have wherewith to live or to give alms.” Now it belongs
God’s servants to make a living by working with their
properly to religious to renounce all they have. Therefore
bodies.” Now religious especially are called servants of
it would seem likewise to belong to them to live and give
God, because they give themselves entirely to the service
alms through the labor of their hands.
of God, as Dionysius asserts (Eccl. Hier. vi). Therefore it
Objection 5. Further, religious especially would seem
would seem that they are bound to manual labor.
to be bound to imitate the life of the apostles, since they
Objection 3.
Further, Augustine says (De oper.
profess the state of perfection. Now the apostles worked
Monach. xvii): “I would fain know how they would oc-
with their own hands, according to 1 Cor. 4:12: “We la-
cupy themselves, who are unwilling to work with their
bor, working with our own hands.” Therefore it would
body. We occupy our time, say they, with prayers, psalms,
seem that religious are bound to manual labor.
reading, and the word of God.” Yet these things are no ex-
On the contrary, Those precepts that are commonly
cuse, and he proves this, as regards each in particular. For
enjoined upon all are equally binding on religious and sec-
in the first place, as to prayer, he says: “One prayer of the
ulars. But the precept of manual labor is enjoined upon
obedient man is sooner granted than ten thousand prayers
all in common, as appears from 2 Thess. 3:6, “Withdraw
of the contemptuous”: meaning that those are contemp-
yourselves from every brother walking disorderly,” etc.
tuous and unworthy to be heard who work not with their
(for by brother he signifies every Christian, according to 1
hands. Secondly, as to the divine praises he adds: “Even
Cor. 7:12, “If any brother have a wife that believeth not”).
while working with their hands they can easily sing hymns
Now it is written in the same passage (2 Thess. 3:10): “If
to God.” Thirdly, with regard to reading, he goes on to
any man will not work, neither let him eat.” Therefore
∗ St. Augustine, (De oper. Monach. xxi)
† Cap. xviii
2048
religious are not bound to manual labor any more than
“not so much in his capacity of teacher as on account of
seculars are.
the faults of the people.”
I answer that, Manual labor is directed to four things.
It must, however, be observed that under manual la-
First and principally to obtain food; wherefore it was said
bor are comprised all those human occupations whereby
to the first man (Gn. 3:19): “In the sweat of thy face shalt
man can lawfully gain a livelihood, whether by using his
thou eat bread,” and it is written (Ps. 127:2): “For thou
hands, his feet, or his tongue. For watchmen, couriers,
shalt eat the labors of thy hands.” Secondly, it is directed
and such like who live by their labor, are understood to
to the removal of idleness whence arise many evils; hence
live by their handiwork: because, since the hand is “the
it is written (Ecclus. 33:28,29): “Send” thy slave “to
organ of organsӠ, handiwork denotes all kinds of work,
work, that he be not idle, for idleness hath taught much
whereby a man may lawfully gain a livelihood.
evil.” Thirdly, it is directed to the curbing of concupis-
In so far as manual labor is directed to the removal of
cence, inasmuch as it is a means of afflicting the body;
idleness, or the affliction of the body, it does not come un-
hence it is written (2 Cor. 6:5,6): “In labors, in watch-
der a necessity of precept if we consider it in itself, since
ings, in fastings, in chastity.” Fourthly, it is directed to
there are many other means besides manual labor of af-
almsgiving, wherefore it is written (Eph. 4:28): “He that
flicting the body or of removing idleness: for the flesh
stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let him labor,
is afflicted by fastings and watchings, and idleness is re-
working with his hands the thing which is good, that he
moved by meditation on the Holy Scriptures and by the
may have something to give to him that suffereth need.”
divine praises. Hence a gloss on Ps. 118:82, “My eyes
Accordingly, in so far as manual labor is directed to ob-
have failed for Thy word,” says: “He is not idle who med-
taining food, it comes under a necessity of precept in so
itates only on God’s word; nor is he who works abroad
far as it is necessary for that end: since that which is di-
any better than he who devotes himself to the study of
rected to an end derives its necessity from that end, being,
knowing the truth.” Consequently for these reasons reli-
in effect, so far necessary as the end cannot be obtained
gious are not bound to manual labor, as neither are secu-
without it. Consequently he who has no other means of
lars, except when they are so bound by the statutes of their
livelihood is bound to work with his hands, whatever his
order. Thus Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.):
condition may be. This is signified by the words of the
“The Egyptian monasteries are wont to admit none un-
Apostle: “If any man will not work, neither let him eat,”
less they work or labor, not so much for the necessities
as though to say: “The necessity of manual labor is the ne-
of life, as for the welfare of the soul, lest it be led astray
cessity of meat.” So that if one could live without eating,
by wicked thoughts.” But in so far as manual labor is di-
one would not be bound to work with one’s hands. The
rected to almsgiving, it does not come under the necessity
same applies to those who have no other lawful means
of precept, save perchance in some particular case, when a
of livelihood: since a man is understood to be unable to
man is under an obligation to give alms, and has no other
do what he cannot do lawfully. Wherefore we find that
means of having the wherewithal to assist the poor: for in
the Apostle prescribed manual labor merely as a remedy
such a case religious would be bound as well as seculars
for the sin of those who gained their livelihood by un-
to do manual labor.
lawful means. For the Apostle ordered manual labor first
Reply to Objection 1. This command of the Apostle
of all in order to avoid theft, as appears from Eph. 4:28,
is of natural law: wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:6, “That
“He that stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let
you withdraw yourselves from every brother walking dis-
him labor, working with his hands.” Secondly, to avoid
orderly,” says, “otherwise than the natural order requires,”
the coveting of others’ property, wherefore it is written (1
and he is speaking of those who abstained from manual
Thess. 4:11): “Work with your own hands, as we com-
labor. Hence nature has provided man with hands instead
manded you, and that you walk honestly towards them
of arms and clothes, with which she has provided other
that are without.” Thirdly, to avoid the discreditable pur-
animals, in order that with his hands he may obtain these
suits whereby some seek a livelihood. Hence he says (2
and all other necessaries. Hence it is clear that this pre-
Thess. 3:10-12): “When we were with you, this we de-
cept, even as all the precepts of the natural law, is binding
clared to you: that if any man will not work, neither let
on both religious and seculars alike. Yet not everyone sins
him eat. For we have heard that there are some among
that works not with his hands, because those precepts of
you who walk disorderly, working not at all, but curiously
the natural law which regard the good of the many are not
meddling” (namely, as a gloss explains it, “who make a
binding on each individual, but it suffices that one person
living by meddling in unlawful things). Now we charge
apply himself to this business and another to that; for in-
them that are such, and beseech them. . . that working with
stance, that some be craftsmen, others husbandmen, oth-
silence, they would eat their own bread.” Hence Jerome
ers judges, and others teachers, and so forth, according to
states (Super epist. ad Galat.∗) that the Apostle said this
the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), “If the whole
∗ Preface to Bk. ii of Commentary
† De Anima iii, 8
2049
body were the eye, where would be the hearing? If the what he says of reading and prayer is to be referred to the
whole were the hearing, where would be the smelling?”
private prayer and reading which even lay people do at
Reply to Objection 2. This gloss is taken from Au-
times, and not to those who perform public prayers in the
gustine’s De operibus Monachorum, cap. 21, where he
church, or give public lectures in the schools. Hence he
speaks against certain monks who declared it to be un-
does not say: “Those who say they are occupied in teach-
lawful for the servants of God to work with their hands,
ing and instructing,” but: “Those who say they are occu-
on account of our Lord’s saying (Mat. 6:25): “Be not
pied in reading.” Again he speaks of that preaching which
solicitous for your life, what you shall eat.” Neverthe-
is addressed, not publicly to the people, but to one or a
less his words do not imply that religious are bound to
few in particular by way of private admonishment. Hence
work with their hands, if they have other means of liveli-
he says expressly: “If one has to speak.” For according
hood. This is clear from his adding: “He wishes the ser-
to a gloss on 1 Cor. 2:4, “Speech is addressed privately,
vants of God to make a living by working with their bod-
preaching to many.”
ies.” Now this does not apply to religious any more than
Reply to Objection 4. Those who despise all for
to seculars, which is evident for two reasons. First, on
God’s sake are bound to work with their hands, when
account of the way in which the Apostle expresses him-
they have no other means of livelihood, or of almsgiving
self, by saying: “That you withdraw yourselves from ev-
(should the case occur where almsgiving were a matter of
ery brother walking disorderly.” For he calls all Christians
precept), but not otherwise, as stated in the Article. It is
brothers, since at that time religious orders were not as yet
in this sense that the gloss quoted is to be understood.
founded. Secondly, because religious have no other obli-
Reply to Objection 5. That the apostles worked with
gations than what seculars have, except as required by the
their hands was sometimes a matter of necessity, some-
rule they profess: wherefore if their rule contain nothing
times a work of supererogation. It was of necessity when
about manual labor, religious are not otherwise bound to
they failed to receive a livelihood from others. Hence a
manual labor than seculars are.
gloss on 1 Cor. 4:12, “We labor, working with our own
Reply to Objection 3. A man may devote himself in
hands,” adds, “because no man giveth to us.” It was su-
two ways to all the spiritual works mentioned by Augus-
pererogation, as appears from 1 Cor. 9:12, where the
tine in the passage quoted: in one way with a view to the
Apostle says that he did not use the power he had of liv-
common good, in another with a view to his private advan-
ing by the Gospel. The Apostle had recourse to this su-
tage. Accordingly those who devote themselves publicly
pererogation for three motives. First, in order to deprive
to the aforesaid spiritual works are thereby exempt from
the false apostles of the pretext for preaching, for they
manual labor for two reasons: first, because it behooves
preached merely for a temporal advantage; hence he says
them to be occupied exclusively with such like works;
(2 Cor. 11:12): “But what I do, that I will do that I may
secondly, because those who devote themselves to such
cut off the occasion from them,” etc. Secondly, in order
works have a claim to be supported by those for whose
to avoid burdening those to whom he preached; hence he
advantage they work.
says (2 Cor. 12:13): “What is there that you have had less
On the other hand, those who devote themselves to
than the other churches, but that I myself was not bur-
such works not publicly but privately as it were, ought
thensome to you?” Thirdly, in order to give an example
not on that account to be exempt from manual labor, nor
of work to the idle; hence he says (2 Thess. 3:8,9): “We
have they a claim to be supported by the offerings of the
worked night and day. . . that we might give ourselves a
faithful, and it is of these that Augustine is speaking. For
pattern unto you, to imitate us.” However, the Apostle
when he says: “They can sing hymns to God even while
did not do this in places like Athens where he had facili-
working with their hands; like the craftsmen who give
ties for preaching daily, as Augustine observes (De oper.
tongue to fable telling without withdrawing their hands
Monach. xviii). Yet religious are not for this reason bound
from their work,” it is clear that he cannot refer to those
to imitate the Apostle in this matter, since they are not
who sing the canonical hours in the church, but to those
bound to all works of supererogation: wherefore neither
who tell psalms or hymns as private prayers. Likewise
did the other apostles work with their hands.
Whether it is lawful for religious to live on alms?
IIa IIae q. 187 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for religious to
alms of the Church, so that the Church may have “suffi-
live on alms. For the Apostle (1 Tim. 5:16) forbids those
cient for them that are widows indeed.” And Jerome says
widows who have other means of livelihood to live on the
to Pope Damasus∗ that “those who have sufficient income
∗ Cf. Cf. Can. Clericos, cause. i, qu. 2; Can. Quoniam, cause xvi, qu.
1; Regul. Monach. iv among the supposititious works of St. Jerome 2050
from their parents and their own possessions, if they take though he was able-bodied, we do not read that he sought
what belongs to the poor they commit and incur the guilt
to live by the labor of his hands. Therefore religious may
of sacrilege, and by the abuse of such things they eat and
lawfully live on alms.
drink judgment to themselves.” Now religious if they be
I answer that, A man may lawfully live on what is
able-bodied can support themselves by the work of their
his or due to him. Now that which is given out of lib-
hands. Therefore it would seem that they sin if they con-
erality becomes the property of the person to whom it is
sume the alms belonging to the poor.
given. Wherefore religious and clerics whose monasteries
Objection 2. Further, to live at the expense of the
or churches have received from the munificence of princes
faithful is the stipend appointed to those who preach the
or of any of the faithful any endowment whatsoever for
Gospel in payment of their labor or work, according to
their support, can lawfully live on such endowment with-
Mat. 10:10: “The workman is worthy of his meat.” Now
out working with their hands, and yet without doubt they
it belongs not to religious to preach the Gospel, but chiefly
live on alms. Wherefore in like manner if religious receive
to prelates who are pastors and teachers. Therefore reli-
movable goods from the faithful they can lawfully live on
gious cannot lawfully live on the alms of the faithful.
them. For it is absurd to say that a person may accept an
Objection 3. Further, religious are in the state of per-
alms of some great property but not bread or some small
fection. But it is more perfect to give than to receive alms;
sum of money. Nevertheless since these gifts would seem
for it is written (Acts 20:35): “It is a more blessed thing
to be bestowed on religious in order that they may have
to give, rather than to receive.” Therefore they should
more leisure for religious works, in which the donors of
not live on alms, but rather should they give alms of their
temporal goods wish to have a share, the use of such gifts
handiwork.
would become unlawful for them if they abstained from
Objection 4. Further, it belongs to religious to avoid
religious works, because in that case, so far as they are
obstacles to virtue and occasions of sin. Now the receiv-
concerned, they would be thwarting the intention of those
ing of alms offers an occasion of sin, and hinders an act
who bestowed those gifts.
of virtue; hence a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:9, “That we might
A thing is due to a person in two ways. First, on ac-
give ourselves a pattern unto you,” says: “He who through
count of necessity, which makes all things common, as
idleness eats often at another’s table, must needs flatter the
Ambrose∗ asserts. Consequently if religious be in need
one who feeds him.” It is also written (Ex. 23:8): “Neither
they can lawfully live on alms. Such necessity may occur
shalt thou take bribes which . . . blind the wise, and pervert
in three ways. First, through weakness of body, the re-
the words of the just,” and (Prov. 22:7): “The borrower is
sult being that they are unable to make a living by work-
servant to him that lendeth.” This is contrary to religion,
ing with their hands. Secondly, because that which they
wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:9, “That we might give
gain by their handiwork is insufficient for their livelihood:
ourselves a pattern,” etc., says, “our religion calls men to
wherefore Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii) that
liberty.” Therefore it would seem that religious should not
“the good works of the faithful should not leave God’s
live on alms.
servants who work with their hands without a supply of
Objection 5. Further, religious especially are bound
necessaries, that when the hour comes for them to nourish
to imitate the perfection of the apostles; wherefore the
their souls, so as to make it impossible for them to do these
Apostle says (Phil. 3:15): “Let us. . . as many as are per-
corporal works, they be not oppressed by want.” Thirdly,
fect, be thus minded.” But the Apostle was unwilling to
because of the former mode of life of those who were un-
live at the expense of the faithful, either in order to cut off wont to work with their hands: wherefore Augustine says
the occasion from the false apostles as he himself says (2
(De oper. Monach. xxi) that “if they had in the world
Cor. 11:12), or to avoid giving scandal to the weak, as
the wherewithal easily to support this life without work-
appears from 1 Cor. 9:12. It would seem therefore that
ing, and gave it to the needy when they were converted to
religious ought for the same reasons to refrain from living
God, we must credit their weakness and bear with it.” For
on alms. Hence Augustine says (De oper. Monach. 28):
those who have thus been delicately brought up are wont
“Cut off the occasion of disgraceful marketing whereby
to be unable to bear the toil of bodily labor.
you lower yourselves in the esteem of others, and give
In another way a thing becomes due to a person
scandal to the weak: and show men that you seek not an
through his affording others something whether tempo-
easy livelihood in idleness, but the kingdom of God by the
ral or spiritual, according to 1 Cor. 9:11, “If we have
narrow and strait way.”
sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we
On the contrary, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): The
reap your carnal things?” And in this sense religious may
Blessed Benedict after leaving his home and parents dwelt
live on alms as being due to them in four ways. First, if
for three years in a cave, and while there lived on the food
they preach by the authority of the prelates. Secondly, if
brought to him by a monk from Rome. Nevertheless, al-
they be ministers of the altar, according to 1 Cor. 9:13,14,
∗ Basil, Serm. de Temp. lxiv, among the supposititious works of St.
Ambrose
2051
“They that serve the altar partake with the altar. So also that in a life wherein senators become laborers, laborers
the lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should
should become idle, and that where the lords of the manor
live by the Gospel.” Hence Augustine says (De oper.
have come after renouncing their ease, the serfs should
Monach. xxi): “If they be gospelers, I allow, they have”
live in comfort.”
(a claim to live at the charge of the faithful): “if they be
Reply to Objection 1. These authorities must be un-
ministers of the altar and dispensers of the sacraments,
derstood as referring to cases of necessity, that is to say,
they need not insist on it, but it is theirs by perfect right.”
when there is no other means of succoring the poor: for
The reason for this is because the sacrament of the al-
then they would be bound not only to refrain from accept-
tar wherever it be offered is common to all the faithful.
ing alms, but also to give what they have for the support
Thirdly, if they devote themselves to the study of Holy
of the needy.
Writ to the common profit of the whole Church. Where-
Reply to Objection 2.
Prelates are competent to
fore Jerome says (Contra Vigil. xiii): “It is still the custom
preach in virtue of their office, but religious may be com-
in Judea, not only among us but also among the Hebrews,
petent to do so in virtue of delegation; and thus when they
for those who meditate on the law of the Lord day and
work in the field of the Lord, they may make their living
night, end have no other share on earth but God alone, to
thereby, according to 2 Tim. 2:6, “The husbandman that
be supported by the subscriptions of the synagogues and
laboreth must first partake of the fruits,” which a gloss ex-
of the whole world.” Fourthly, if they have endowed the
plains thus, “that is to say, the preacher, who in the field of monastery with the goods they possessed, they may live
the Church tills the hearts of his hearers with the plough
on the alms given to the monastery. Hence Augustine says
of God’s word.” Those also who minister to the preach-
(De oper. Monach. xxv) that “those who renouncing or
ers may live on alms. Hence a gloss on Rom. 15:27,
distributing their means, whether ample or of any amount
“If the Gentiles have been made partakers of their spiri-
whatever, have desired with pious and salutary humility
tual things, they ought also in carnal things to minister to
to be numbered among the poor of Christ, have a claim on
them,” says, “namely, to the Jews who sent preachers from
the community and on brotherly love to receive a liveli-
Jerusalem.” There are moreover other reasons for which a
hood in return. They are to be commended indeed if they
person has a claim to live at the charge of the faithful, as
work with their hands, but if they be unwilling, who will
stated above.
dare to force them? Nor does it matter, as he goes on to
Reply to Objection 3. Other things being equal, it is
say, to which monasteries, or in what place any one of
more perfect to give than to receive. Nevertheless to give
them has bestowed his goods on his needy brethren; for
or to give up all one’s possessions for Christ’s sake, and
all Christians belong to one commonwealth.”
to receive a little for one’s livelihood is better than to give On the other hand, in the default of any necessity, or
to the poor part by part, as stated above (q. 186, a. 3, ad
of their affording any profit to others, it is unlawful for
6).
religious to wish to live in idleness on the alms given to
Reply to Objection 4. To receive gifts so as to in-
the poor. Hence Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxii):
crease one’s wealth, or to accept a livelihood from another
“Sometimes those who enter the profession of God’s ser-
without having a claim to it, and without profit to others
vice come from a servile condition of life, from tilling the
or being in need oneself, affords an occasion of sin. But
soil or working at some trade or lowly occupation. In their
this does not apply to religious, as stated above.
case it is not so clear whether they came with the purpose
Reply to Objection 5.
Whenever there is evident
of serving God, or of evading a life of want and toil with
necessity for religious living on alms without doing any
a view to being fed and clothed in idleness, and further-
manual work, as well as an evident profit to be derived by
more to being honored by those by whom they were wont
others, it is not the weak who are scandalized, but those
to be despised and downtrodden. Such persons surely can-
who are full of malice like the Pharisees, whose scan-
not excuse themselves from work on the score of bodily
dal our Lord teaches us to despise (Mat. 15:12-14). If,
weakness, for their former mode of life is evidence against
however, these motives of necessity and profit be lacking,
them.” And he adds further on (De oper. Monach. xxv):
the weak might possibly be scandalized thereby; and this
“If they be unwilling to work, neither let them eat. For if
should be avoided. Yet the same scandal might be occa-
the rich humble themselves to piety, it is not that the poor
sioned through those who live in idleness on the common
may be exalted to pride; since it is altogether unseemly
revenues.
2052
Whether it is lawful for religious to beg?
IIa IIae q. 187 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for religious to
a servant,’ ” and further on: “A beggar is one who entreats
beg. For Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxviii): “The
another, and a poor man is one who has not enough for
most cunning foe has scattered on all sides a great number
himself.” Again it is written (Ps. 69:6): “I am needy and
of hypocrites wearing the monastic habit, who go wander-
poor”; where a gloss says: “ ‘Needy,’ that is a suppliant;
ing about the country,” and afterwards he adds: “They all
‘and poor,’ that is, not having enough for myself, because
ask, they all demand to be supported in their profitable
I have no worldly wealth.” And Jerome says in a letter†:
penury, or to be paid for a pretended holiness.” Therefore
“Beware lest whereas thy Lord,” i.e. Christ, “begged, thou
it would seem that the life of mendicant religious is to be
amass other people’s wealth.” Therefore it becomes reli-
condemned.
gious to beg.
Objection 2. Further, it is written (1 Thess. 4:11):
I answer that, Two things may be considered in ref-
“That you. . . work with your own hands as we com-
erence to mendicancy. The first is on the part of the act
manded you, and that you walk honestly towards them
itself of begging, which has a certain abasement attach-
that are without: and that you want nothing of any man’s”:
ing to it; since of all men those would seem most abased
and a gloss on this passage says: “You must work and not
who are not only poor, but are so needy that they have
be idle, because work is both honorable and a light to the
to receive their meat from others. In this way some de-
unbeliever: and you must not covet that which belongs
serve praise for begging out of humility, just as they abase
to another and much less beg or take anything.” Again a
themselves in other ways, as being the most efficacious
gloss∗ on 2 Thess. 3:10, “If any man will not work,” etc.
remedy against pride which they desire to quench either
says: “He wishes the servants of God to work with the
in themselves or in others by their example. For just as
body, so as to gain a livelihood, and not be compelled by
a disease that arises from excessive heat is most effica-
want to ask for necessaries.” Now this is to beg. There-
ciously healed by things that excel in cold, so proneness
fore it would seem unlawful to beg while omitting to work
to pride is most efficaciously healed by those things which
with one’s hands.
savor most of abasement. Hence it is said in the Decretals
Objection 3. Further, that which is forbidden by law
(II, cap. Si quis semel, de Paenitentia): “To condescend to
and contrary to justice, is unbecoming to religious. Now
the humblest duties, and to devote oneself to the lowliest
begging is forbidden in the divine law; for it is written (Dt.
service is an exercise of humility; for thus one is able to
15:4): “There shall be no poor nor beggar among you,”
heal the disease of pride and human glory.” Hence Jerome
and (Ps. 36:25): “I have not seen the just forsaken, nor his
praises Fabiola (Ep. lxxvii ad ocean.) for that she de-
seed seeking bread.” Moreover an able-bodied mendicant
sired “to receive alms, having poured forth all her wealth
is punished by civil law, according to the law (XI, xxvi, de
for Christ’s sake.” The Blessed Alexis acted in like man-
Valid. Mendicant.). Therefore it is unfitting for religious
ner, for, having renounced all his possessions for Christ’s
to beg.
sake he rejoiced in receiving alms even from his own ser-
Objection 4. Further, “Shame is about that which is
vants. It is also related of the Blessed Arsenius in the
disgraceful,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15).
Lives of the Fathers (v, 6) that he gave thanks because
Now Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30) that “to be ashamed
he was forced by necessity to ask for alms. Hence it is
to beg is a sign of good birth.” Therefore it is disgraceful
enjoined to some people as a penance for grievous sins
to beg: and consequently this is unbecoming to religious.
to go on a pilgrimage begging. Since, however, humil-
Objection 5. Further, according to our Lord’s com-
ity like the other virtues should not be without discretion,
mand it is especially becoming to preachers of the Gospel
it behooves one to be discreet in becoming a mendicant
to live on alms, as stated above (a. 4). Yet it is not be-
for the purpose of humiliation, lest a man thereby incur
coming that they should beg, since a gloss on 2 Tim. 2:6,
the mark of covetousness or of anything else unbecom-
“The husbandman, that laboreth,” etc. says: “The Apostle
ing. Secondly, mendicancy may be considered on the part
wishes the gospeler to understand that to accept neces-
of that which one gets by begging: and thus a man may
saries from those among whom he labors is not mendi-
be led to beg by a twofold motive. First, by the desire to
cancy but a right.” Therefore it would seem unbecoming
have wealth or meat without working for it, and such like
for religious to beg.
mendicancy is unlawful; secondly, by a motive of neces-
On the contrary, It becomes religious to live in imi-
sity or usefulness. The motive is one of necessity if a man
tation of Christ. Now Christ was a mendicant, according
has no other means of livelihood save begging; and it is
to Ps. 39:18, “But I am a beggar and poor”; where a gloss
a motive of usefulness if he wishes to accomplish some-
says: “Christ said this of Himself as bearing the ‘form of
thing useful, and is unable to do so without the alms of
∗ St. Augustine, (De oper. Monach. iii)
† Reference unknown
2053
the faithful. Thus alms are besought for the building of a does not forbid anyone to beg, but it forbids the rich to
bridge, or church, or for any other work whatever that is
be so stingy that some are compelled by necessity to beg.
conducive to the common good: thus scholars may seek
The civil law imposes a penalty on able-bodied mendi-
alms that they may devote themselves to the study of wis-
cants who beg from motives neither of utility nor of ne-
dom. In this way mendicancy is lawful to religious no less
cessity.
than to seculars.
Reply to Objection 4. Disgrace is twofold; one arises
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking there
from lack of honesty∗, the other from an external defect,
explicitly of those who beg from motives of covetousness.
thus it is disgraceful for a man to be sick or poor. Such
Reply to Objection 2. The first gloss speaks of beg-
like uncomeliness of mendicancy does not pertain to sin,
ging from motives of covetousness, as appears from the
but it may pertain to humility, as stated above.
words of the Apostle; while the second gloss speaks of
Reply to Objection 5. Preachers have the right to be
those who without effecting any useful purpose, beg their
fed by those to whom they preach: yet if they wish to seek
livelihood in order to live in idleness. on the other hand,
this by begging so as to receive it as a free gift and not as
he lives not idly who in any way lives usefully.
a right this will be a mark of greater humility.
Reply to Objection 3. This precept of the divine law
Whether it is lawful for religious to wear coarser clothes than others?
IIa IIae q. 187 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for religious to
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:37):
wear coarser clothes than others. For according to the
“They wandered about in sheep-skins in goat-skins,” and
Apostle (1 Thess. 5:22) we ought to “refrain from all
a gloss adds—“as Elias and others.” Moreover it is said
appearance of evil.” Now coarseness of clothes has an
in the Decretal XXI, qu. iv, can. Omnis jactantia: “If any
appearance of evil; for our Lord said (Mat. 7:15): “Be-
persons be found to deride those who wear coarse and re-
ware of false prophets who come to you in the clothing of
ligious apparel they must be reproved. For in the early
sheep”: and a gloss on Apoc. 6:8, “Behold a pale horse,”
times all those who were consecrated to God went about
says: “The devil finding that he cannot succeed, neither
in common and coarse apparel.”
by outward afflictions nor by manifest heresies, sends in
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
advance false brethren, who under the guise of religion
iii, 12), “in all external things, it is not the use but the
assume the characteristics of the black and red horses by
intention of the user that is at fault.” In order to judge
corrupting the faith.” Therefore it would seem that reli-
of this it is necessary to observe that coarse and homely
gious should not wear coarse clothes.
apparel may be considered in two ways. First, as being
Objection 2. Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepo-
a sign of a man’s disposition or condition, because ac-
tian.): “Avoid somber,” i.e. black, “equally with glitter-
cording to Ecclus. 19:27, “the attire. . . of the man” shows
ing apparel. Fine and coarse clothes are equally to be
“what he is.” In this way coarseness of attire is sometimes
shunned, for the one exhales pleasure, the other vain-
a sign of sorrow: wherefore those who are beset with sor-
glory.” Therefore, since vainglory is a graver sin than the
row are wont to wear coarser clothes, just as on the other
use of pleasure, it would seem that religious who should
hand in times of festivity and joy they wear finer clothes.
aim at what is more perfect ought to avoid coarse rather
Hence penitents make use of coarse apparel, for example,
than fine clothes.
the king (Jonah 3:6) who “was clothed with sack-cloth,”
Objection 3. Further, religious should aim especially
and Achab (3 Kings 21:27) who “put hair-cloth upon his
at doing works of penance. Now in works of penance
flesh.” Sometimes, however, it is a sign of the contempt
we should use, not outward signs of sorrow, but rather
of riches and worldly ostentation. Wherefore Jerome says
signs of joy; for our Lord said (Mat. 6:16): “When you
(Ep. cxxv ad Rustico Monach.): “Let your somber attire
fast, be not, as the hypocrites, sad,” and afterwards He
indicate your purity of mind, your coarse robe prove your
added: “But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thy head and
contempt of the world, yet so that your mind be not in-
wash thy face.” Augustine commenting on these words
flated withal, lest your speech belie your habit.” In both
(De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12): “In this chapter we
these ways it is becoming for religious to wear coarse at-
must observe that not only the glare and pomp of outward
tire, since religion is a state of penance and of contempt
things, but even the weeds of mourning may be a subject
of worldly glory.
of ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a decoy
But that a person wish to signify this to others arises
under the guise of God’s service.” Therefore seemingly
from three motives. First, in order to humble himself:
religious ought not to wear coarse clothes.
for just as a man’s mind is uplifted by fine clothes, so
∗ Cf. q. 145, a. 1
2054
is it humbled by lowly apparel. Hence speaking of Achab Reply to Objection 2. Jerome is speaking there of the
who “put hair-cloth on his flesh,” the Lord said to Elias:
coarse attire that is worn on account of human glory.
“Hast thou not seen Achab humbled before Me?”
(3
Reply to Objection 3. According to our Lord’s teach-
Kings 21:29). Secondly, in order to set an example to oth-
ing men should do no deeds of holiness for the sake of
ers; wherefore a gloss on Mat. 3:4, ”(John) had his gar-
show: and this is especially the case when one does some-
ments of camel’s hair,” says: “He who preaches penance
thing strange. Hence Chrysostom∗ says: “While pray-
is clothed in the habit of penance.” Thirdly, on account of
ing a man should do nothing strange, so as to draw the
vainglory; thus Augustine says (cf. obj. 3) that “even the
gaze of others, either by shouting or striking his breast, or
weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation.”
casting up his hands,” because the very strangeness draws
Accordingly in the first two ways it is praiseworthy to
people’s attention to him. Yet blame does not attach to
wear humble apparel, but in the third way it is sinful.
all strange behavior that draws people’s attention, for it
Secondly, coarse and homely attire may be considered
may be done well or ill. Hence Augustine says (De Serm.
as the result of covetousness or negligence, and thus also
Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that “in the practice of the Chris-
it is sinful.
tian religion when a man draws attention to himself by
Reply to Objection 1. Coarseness of attire has not
unwonted squalor and shabbiness, since he acts thus vol-
of itself the appearance of evil, indeed it has more the
untarily and not of necessity, we can gather from his other
appearance of good, namely of the contempt of worldly
deeds whether his behavior is motivated by contempt of
glory. Hence it is that wicked persons hide their wicked-
excessive dress or by affectation.” Religious, however,
ness under coarse clothing. Hence Augustine says (De
would especially seem not to act thus from affectation,
Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24) that “the sheep should not
since they wear a coarse habit as a sign of their profession
dislike their clothing for the reason that the wolves some-
whereby they profess contempt of the world.
times hide themselves under it.”
∗ Hom. xiii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 2055
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 188
Of the Different Kinds of Religious Life
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the different kinds of religious life, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are different kinds of religious life or only one?
(2) Whether a religious order can be established for the works of the active life?
(3) Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering?
(4) Whether a religious order can be established for preaching and the exercise of like works?
(5) Whether a religious order can be established for the study of science?
(6) Whether a religious order that is directed to the contemplative life is more excellent than one that is directed to the active life?
(7) Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in common?
(8) Whether the religious life of solitaries is to be preferred to the religious life of those who live in community?
Whether there is only one religious order?
IIa IIae q. 188 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that there is but one reli-
aims by practice at the perfection of charity. Now there are
gious order. For there can be no diversity in that which
various works of charity to which a man may devote him-
is possessed wholly and perfectly; wherefore there can
self; and there are also various kinds of exercise. Where-
be only one sovereign good, as stated in the Ia, q. 6 ,
fore religious orders may be differentiated in two ways.
Aa. 2,3,4. Now as Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.),
First, according to the different things to which they may
“when a man vows to Almighty God all that he has, all his
be directed: thus one may be directed to the lodging of
life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust,” without which
pilgrims, another to visiting or ransoming captives. Sec-
there is no religious life. Therefore it would seem that
ondly, there may be various religious orders according to
there are not many religious orders but only one.
the diversity of practices; thus in one religious order the
Objection 2. Further, things which agree in essen-
body is chastised by abstinence in food, in another by the
tials differ only accidentally. Now there is no religious or-
practice of manual labor, scantiness of clothes, or the like.
der without the three essential vows of religion, as stated
Since, however, the end imports most in every matter,†
above (q. 186, Aa. 6,7). Therefore it would seem that reli-
religious orders differ more especially according to their
gious orders differ not specifically, but only accidentally.
various ends than according to their various practices.
Objection 3. Further, the state of perfection is com-
Reply to Objection 1. The obligation to devote one-
petent both to religious and to bishops, as stated above
self wholly to God’s service is common to every reli-
(q. 185, Aa. 5,7). Now the episcopate is not diversified
gious order; hence religious do not differ in this respect,
specifically, but is one wherever it may be; wherefore
as though in one religious order a person retained some
Jerome says (Ep. cxlvi ad Evan.): “Wherever a bishop
one thing of his own, and in another order some other
is, whether at Rome, or Gubbio, or Constantinople, or
thing. But the difference is in respect of the different
Reggio, he has the same excellence, the same priesthood.”
things wherein one may serve God, and whereby a man
Therefore in like manner there is but one religious order.
may dispose himself to the service of God.
Objection 4. Further, anything that may lead to con-
Reply to Objection 2. The three essential vows of
fusion should be removed from the Church. Now it would
religion pertain to the practice of religion as principles
seem that a diversity of religious orders might confuse
to which all other matters are reduced, as stated above
the Christian people, as stated in the Decretal de Statu
(q. 186, a. 7). But there are various ways of disposing
Monach. et Canon. Reg.∗. Therefore seemingly there
oneself to the observance of each of them. For instance
ought not to be different religious orders.
one disposes oneself to observe the vow of continence,
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 44:10) that it per-
by solitude of place, by abstinence, by mutual fellowship,
tains to the adornment of the queen that she is “surrounded
and by many like means. Accordingly it is evident that
with variety.”
the community of the essential vows is compatible with
I answer that, As stated above (q. 186, A, 7; q. 187,
diversity of religious life, both on account of the differ-
a. 2), the religious state is a training school wherein one
ent dispositions and on account of the different ends, as
∗ Cap. Ne Nimia, de Relig. Dom.
† Arist., Topic. vi 8
2056
explained above.
Reply to Objection 4. Confusion is opposed to dis-
Reply to Objection 3. In matters relating to perfec-
tinction and order. Accordingly the multitude of religious
tion, the bishop stands in the position of agent, and the
orders would lead to confusion, if different religious or-
religious as passive, as stated above (q. 184, a. 7). Now
ders were directed to the same end and in the same way,
the agent, even in natural things, the higher it is, is so
without necessity or utility. Wherefore to prevent this hap-
much the more one, whereas the things that are passive
pening it has been wholesomely forbidden to establish a
are various. Hence with reason the episcopal state is one,
new religious order without the authority of the Sovereign
while religious orders are many.
Pontiff.
Whether a religious order should be established for the works of the active life?
IIa IIae q. 188 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that no religious order
templative life which seeks to devote itself to God alone
should be established for the works of the active life. For
belongs directly to the love of God, while the active life,
every religious order belongs to the state of perfection, as
which ministers to our neighbor’s needs, belongs directly
stated above (q. 184, a. 5; q. 186, a. 1). Now the perfection
to the love of one’s neighbor. And just as out of charity
of the religious state consists in the contemplation of di-
we love our neighbor for God’s sake, so the services we
vine things. For Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that they
render our neighbor redound to God, according to Mat.
are “called servants of God by reason of their rendering
25:40, “What you have done [Vulg.: ‘As long as you did
pure service and subjection to God, and on account of the
it’] to one of these My least brethren, you did it to Me.”
indivisible and singular life which unites them by holy re-
Consequently those services which we render our neigh-
flections,” i.e. contemplations, “on invisible things, to the
bor, in so far as we refer them to God, are described as
Godlike unity and the perfection beloved of God.” There-
sacrifices, according to Heb. 13:16, “Do not forget to do
fore seemingly no religious order should be established
good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God’s favor is
for the works of the active life.
obtained.” And since it belongs properly to religion to
Objection 2. Further, seemingly the same judgment
offer sacrifice to God, as stated above (q. 81, a. 1, ad 1;
applies to canons regular as to monks, according to Extra,
a. 4, ad 1), it follows that certain religious orders are fit-
De Postul., cap. Ex parte; and De Statu Monach., cap.
tingly directed to the works of the active life. Wherefore
Quod Dei timorem: for it is stated that “they are not con-
in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4) the Abbot
sidered to be separated from the fellowship of monks”:
Nesteros in distinguishing the various aims of religious
and the same would seem to apply to all other religious.
orders says: “Some direct their intention exclusively to
Now the monastic rule was established for the purpose of
the hidden life of the desert and purity of heart; some are
the contemplative life; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. lviii
occupied with the instruction of the brethren and the care
ad Paulin.): “If you wish to be what you are called, a
of the monasteries; while others delight in the service of
monk,” i.e. a solitary, “what business have you in a city?”
the guesthouse,” i.e. in hospitality.
The same is found stated in Extra, De Renuntiatione, cap.
Reply to Objection 1. Service and subjection ren-
Nisi cum pridem; and De Regular., cap. Licet quibusdam.
dered to God are not precluded by the works of the active
Therefore it would seem that every religious order is di-
life, whereby a man serves his neighbor for God’s sake, as
rected to the contemplative life, and none to the active life.
stated in the Article. Nor do these works preclude singu-
Objection 3. Further, the active life is concerned with
larity of life; not that they involve man’s living apart from
the present world. Now all religious are said to renounce
his fellow-men, but in the sense that each man individ-
the world; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.):
ually devotes himself to things pertaining to the service
“He who renounces this world, and does all the good he
of God; and since religious occupy themselves with the
can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and offers sac-
works of the active life for God’s sake, it follows that their
rifice in the wilderness.” Therefore it would seem that no
action results from their contemplation of divine things.
religious order can be directed to the active life.
Hence they are not entirely deprived of the fruit of the
On the contrary, It is written (James 1:27): “Religion
contemplative life.
clean and undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to
Reply to Objection 2. The same judgment applies to
visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation.” Now
monks and to all other religious, as regards things com-
this belongs to the active life. Therefore religious life can
mon to all religious orders: for instance as regards their
be fittingly directed to the active life.
devoting themselves wholly to the divine service, their
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the religious
observance of the essential vows of religion, and their re-
state is directed to the perfection of charity, which extends
fraining from worldly business. But it does not follow
to the love of God and of our neighbor. Now the con-
that this likeness extends to other things that are proper
2057
to the monastic profession, and are directed especially to the world,” and yet speaking of them to His Father He
the contemplative life. Hence in the aforesaid Decretal,
said (Jn. 17:11): “These are in the world, and I come to
De Postulando, it is not simply stated that “the same judg-
Thee.” Although, then, religious who are occupied with
ment applies to canons regular” as “to monks,” but that it
the works of the active life are in the world as to the pres-
applies “in matters already mentioned,” namely that “they
ence of the body, they are not in the world as regards
are not to act as advocates in lawsuits.” Again the Dec-
their bent of mind, because they are occupied with ex-
retal quoted, De Statu Monach., after the statement that
ternal things, not as seeking anything of the world, but
“canons regular are not considered to be separated from
merely for the sake of serving God: for “they. . . use this
the fellowship of monks,” goes on to say: “Nevertheless
world, as if they used it not,” to quote 1 Cor. 7:31. Hence
they obey an easier rule.” Hence it is evident that they are
(James 1:27) after it is stated that “religion clean and un-
not bound to all that monks are bound.
defiled. . . is. . . to visit the fatherless and widows in their Reply to Objection 3. A man may be in the world
tribulation,” it is added, “and to keep one’s self unspot-
in two ways: in one way by his bodily presence, in an-
ted from this world,” namely to avoid being attached to
other way by the bent of his mind. Hence our Lord said
worldly things.
to His disciples (Jn. 15:19): “I have chosen you out of
Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering?
IIa IIae q. 188 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that no religious order can
please God. Therefore nothing hinders the establishing
be directed to soldiering. For all religious orders belong
of a religious order for the purpose of soldiering.
to the state of perfection. Now our Lord said with refer-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), a religious order ence to the perfection of Christian life (Mat. 5:39): “I say
may be established not only for the works of the contem-
to you not to resist evil; but if one strike thee on the right
plative life, but also for the works of the active life, in so
cheek, turn to him also the other,” which is inconsistent
far as they are concerned in helping our neighbor and in
with the duties of a soldier. Therefore no religious order
the service of God, but not in so far as they are directed to
can be established for soldiering.
a worldly object. Now the occupation of soldiering may
Objection 2. Further, the bodily encounter of the bat-
be directed to the assistance of our neighbor, not only as
tlefield is more grievous than the encounter in words that
regards private individuals, but also as regards the defense
takes place between counsel at law. Yet religious are for-
of the whole commonwealth. Hence it is said of Judas
bidden to plead at law, as appears from the Decretal De
Machabeus (1 Macc. 3:2,3) that “he [Vulg.: ‘they’] fought
Postulando quoted above (a. 2, obj. 2). Therefore it is
with cheerfulness the battle of Israel, and he got his peo-
much less seemly for a religious order to be established
ple great honor.” It can also be directed to the upkeep of
for soldiering.
divine worship, wherefore (1 Macc. 3:21) Judas is stated
Objection 3. Further, the religious state is a state of
to have said: “We will fight for our lives and our laws,”
penance, as we have said above (q. 187, a. 6). Now ac-
and further on (1 Macc. 13:3) Simon said: “You know
cording to the code of laws soldiering is forbidden to pen-
what great battles I and my brethren, and the house of my
itents. for it is said in the Decretal De Poenit., Dist. v, cap.
father, have fought for the laws and the sanctuary.”
3: “It is altogether opposed to the rules of the Church, to
Hence a religious order may be fittingly established
return to worldly soldiering after doing penance.” There-
for soldiering, not indeed for any worldly purpose, but for
fore it is unfitting for any religious order to be established
the defense of divine worship and public safety, or also
for soldiering.
of the poor and oppressed, according to Ps. 81:4: “Res-
Objection 4. Further, no religious order may be es-
cue the poor, and deliver the needy out of the hand of the
tablished for an unjust object. But as Isidore says (Etym.
sinner.”
xviii, 1), “A just war is one that is waged by order of the
Reply to Objection 1. Not to resist evil may be un-
emperor.” Since then religious are private individuals, it
derstood in two ways. First, in the sense of forgiving the
would seem unlawful for them to wage war; and conse-
wrong done to oneself, and thus it may pertain to per-
quently no religious order may be established for this pur-
fection, when it is expedient to act thus for the spiritual
pose.
welfare of others. Secondly, in the sense of tolerating
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. clxxxix; ad
patiently the wrongs done to others: and this pertains to
Bonifac.), “Beware of thinking that none of those can
imperfection, or even to vice, if one be able to resist the
please God who handle war-like weapons. Of such was
wrongdoer in a becoming manner. Hence Ambrose says
holy David to whom the Lord gave great testimony.” Now
(De Offic. i, 27): “The courage whereby a man in bat-
religious orders are established in order that men may
tle defends his country against barbarians, or protects the
2058
weak at home, or his friends against robbers is full of is to buy property or occupy himself with secular busi-justice”: even so our Lord says in the passage quoted∗,
ness, save with a view to the care of the fatherless. . . and
”. . . thy goods, ask them not again.” If, however, a man
widows.” Likewise to be a soldier for the sake of some
were not to demand the return of that which belongs to
worldly object is contrary to all religious life, but this does another, he would sin if it were his business to do so: for it
not apply to those who are soldiers for the sake of God’s
is praiseworthy to give away one’s own, but not another’s
service.
property. And much less should the things of God be ne-
Reply to Objection 3. Worldly soldiering is forbid-
glected, for as Chrysostom† says, “it is most wicked to
den to penitents, but the soldiering which is directed to
overlook the wrongs done to God.”
the service of God is imposed as a penance on some peo-
Reply to Objection 2. It is inconsistent with any reli-
ple, as in the case of those upon whom it is enjoined to
gious order to act as counsel at law for a worldly object,
take arms in defense of the Holy Land.
but it is not inconsistent to do so at the orders of one’s
Reply to Objection 4. The establishment of a reli-
superior and in favor of one’s monastery, as stated in the
gious order for the purpose of soldiering does not imply
same Decretal, or for the defense of the poor and widows.
that the religious can wage war on their own authority; but
Wherefore it is said in the Decretals (Dist. lxxxviii, cap.
they can do so only on the authority of the sovereign or of
1): “The holy synod has decreed that henceforth no cleric
the Church.
Whether a religious order can be established for preaching or hearing confessions?
IIa IIae q. 188 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that no religious order
as stated in Luke 10. Moreover, according to the gloss of
may be established for preaching, or hearing confessions.
Bede on “And after these things” (Lk. 10:1), “the apostles
For it is said (VII, qu. i∗): “The monastic life is one of
are represented by the bishops, the seventy-two disciples
subjection and discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or
by the lesser priests,” i.e. the parish priests. Therefore
pastoral care,” and the same apparently applies to reli-
in addition to bishops and parish priests, no religious or-
gious. Now preaching and hearing confessions are the
der should be established for the purpose of preaching and
actions of a pastor and teacher. Therefore a religious or-
hearing confessions.
der should not be established for this purpose.
On the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers
Objection 2. Further, the purpose for which a reli-
(Coll. xiv, 4), Abbot Nesteros, speaking of the various
gious order is established would seem to be something
kinds of religious orders, says: “Some choosing the care
most proper to the religious life, as stated above (a. 1).
of the sick, others devoting themselves to the relief of the
Now the aforesaid actions are not proper to religious but
afflicted and oppressed, or applying themselves to teach-
to bishops. Therefore a religious order should not be es-
ing, or giving alms to the poor, have been most highly es-
tablished for the purpose of such actions.
teemed on account of their devotion and piety.” Therefore
Objection 3. Further, it seems unfitting that the au-
just as a religious order may be established for the care of
thority to preach and hear confessions should be commit-
the sick, so also may one be established for teaching the
ted to an unlimited number of men; and there is no fixed
people by preaching and like works.
number of those who are received into a religious order.
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), it is fitting for a Therefore it is unfitting for a religious order to be estab-religious order to be established for the works of the active
lished for the purpose of the aforesaid actions.
life, in so far as they are directed to the good of our neigh-
Objection 4. Further, preachers have a right to receive
bor, the service of God, and the upkeep of divine worship.
their livelihood from the faithful of Christ, according to 1
Now the good of our neighbor is advanced by things per-
Cor. 9. If then the office of preaching be committed to
taining to the spiritual welfare of the soul rather than by
a religious order established for that purpose, it follows
things pertaining to the supplying of bodily needs, in pro-
that the faithful of Christ are bound to support an unlim-
portion to the excellence of spiritual over corporal things.
ited number of persons, which would be a heavy burden
Hence it was stated above (q. 32, a. 3) that spiritual works
on them. Therefore a religious order should not be estab-
of mercy surpass corporal works of mercy. Moreover this
lished for the exercise of these actions.
is more pertinent to the service of God, to Whom no sacri-
Objection 5. Further, the organization of the Church
fice is more acceptable than zeal for souls, as Gregory says
should be in accordance with Christ’s institution. Now
(Hom. xii in Ezech.). Furthermore, it is a greater thing to
Christ sent first the twelve apostles to preach, as related in
employ spiritual arms in defending the faithful against the
Luke 9, and afterwards He sent the seventy-two disciples,
errors of heretics and the temptations of the devil, than to
∗ Lk. 6:30 “Of him that taketh away thy goods, ask them not again”; Cf. Mat. 5:40
† Hom. v in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely
ascribed to St. John Chrysostom
∗ Cap. Hoc nequaquam; Cf. q. 187,
a. 1, obj. 1
2059
protect the faithful by means of bodily weapons. There-nary prelates, who receive the tithes and offerings of the
fore it is most fitting for a religious order to be established faithful for that purpose, as well as other ecclesiastical
for preaching and similar works pertaining to the salvation
revenues. But if some men are willing to minister to the
of souls.
faithful by exercising the aforesaid acts gratuitously, and
Reply to Objection 1. He who works by virtue of
without demanding payment as of right, the faithful are
another, acts as an instrument. And a minister is like an
not burdened thereby because their temporal contributions
“animated instrument,” as the Philosopher says (Polit. i,
can be liberally repaid by those men, nor are they bound
2∗). Hence if a man preach or do something similar by the
by law to contribute, but by charity, and yet not so that
authority of his superiors, he does not rise above the de-
they be burdened thereby and others eased, as stated in 2
gree of “discipleship” or “subjection,” which is competent
Cor. 8:13. If, however, none be found to devote them-
to religious.
selves gratuitously to services of this kind, the ordinary
Reply to Objection 2.
Some religious orders are
prelate is bound, if he cannot suffice by himself, to seek
established for soldiering, to wage war, not indeed on
other suitable persons and support them himself.
their own authority, but on that of the sovereign or of the
Reply to Objection 5. The seventy-two disciples are
Church who are competent to wage war by virtue of their
represented not only by the parish priests, but by all those
office, as stated above (a. 3, ad 4). In the same way certain
of lower order who in any way assist the bishops in their
religious orders are established for preaching and hearing
office. For we do not read that our Lord appointed the
confessions, not indeed by their own authority, but by the
seventy-two disciples to certain fixed parishes, but that
authority of the higher and lower superiors, to whom these
“He sent them two and two before His face into every
things belong by virtue of their office. Consequently to
city and place whither He Himself was to come.” It was
assist one’s superiors in such a ministry is proper to a re-
fitting, however, that in addition to the ordinary prelates
ligious order of this kind.
others should be chosen for these duties on account of the
Reply to Objection 3. Bishops do not allow these
multitude of the faithful, and the difficulty of finding a suf-
religious severally and indiscriminately to preach or hear
ficient number of persons to be appointed to each locality,
confessions, but according to the discretion of the reli-
just as it was necessary to establish religious orders for
gious superiors, or according to their own appointment.
military service, on account of the secular princes being
Reply to Objection 4. The faithful are not bound by
unable to cope with unbelievers in certain countries.
law to contribute to the support of other than their ordi-
Whether a religious order should be established for the purpose of study?
IIa IIae q. 188 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that a religious order
known as professors of certain sciences. Therefore the
should not be established for the purpose of study. For it
study of letters does not become religious.
is written (Ps. 70:15,16): “Because I have not known let-
On the contrary, Jerome (Ep. liii ad Paulin.) urges
ters [Douay: ‘learning’], I will enter into the powers of the
him to acquire learning in the monastic state, saying: “Let
Lord,” i.e. “Christian virtue,” according to a gloss. Now
us learn on earth those things the knowledge of which will
the perfection of Christian virtue, seemingly, pertains es-
remain in heaven,” and further on: “Whatever you seek to
pecially to religious. Therefore it is not for them to apply
know, I will endeavor to know with you.”
themselves to the study of letters.
I answer that As stated above (a. 2), religion may be
Objection 2. Further, that which is a source of dissent
ordained to the active and to the contemplative life. Now
is unbecoming to religious, who are gathered together in
chief among the works of the active life are those which
the unity of peace. Now study leads to dissent: where-
are directly ordained to the salvation of souls, such as
fore different schools of thought arose among the philoso-
preaching and the like. Accordingly the study of letters
phers. Hence Jerome (Super Epist. ad Tit. 1:5) says: “Be-
is becoming to the religious life in three ways. First, as
fore a diabolical instinct brought study into religion, and
regards that which is proper to the contemplative life, to
people said: I am of Paul, I of Apollo, I of Cephas,” etc.
which the study of letters helps in a twofold manner. In
Therefore it would seem that no religious order should be
one way by helping directly to contemplate, namely by
established for the purpose of study.
enlightening the intellect. For the contemplative life of
Objection 3. Further, those who profess the Chris-
which we are now speaking is directed chiefly to the con-
tian religion should profess nothing in common with the
sideration of divine things, as stated above (q. 180, a. 4), to Gentiles. Now among the Gentiles were some who pro-which consideration man is directed by study; for which
fessed philosophy, and even now some secular persons are
reason it is said in praise of the righteous (Ps. 1:2) that “he
∗ Cf. Ethic. viii, 11
2060
shall meditate day and night” on the law of the Lord, and nothing in comparison with her,” and (1 Macc. 12:9):
(Ecclus. 39:1): “The wise man will seek out the wisdom
“We needed none of these things,” namely assistance from
of all the ancients, and will be occupied in the prophets.”
without, “having for our comfort the holy books that are
In another way the study of letters is a help to the contem-
in our hands.” It also helps to teach obedience, wherefore
plative life indirectly, by removing the obstacles to con-
Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii): “What sort of
templation, namely the errors which in the contemplation
perverseness is this, to wish to read, but not to obey what
of divine things frequently beset those who are ignorant
one reads?” Hence it is clearly fitting that a religious order
of the scriptures. Thus we read in the Conferences of the
be established for the study of letters.
Fathers (Coll. x, 3) that the Abbot Serapion through sim-
Reply to Objection 1. This commentary of the gloss
plicity fell into the error of the Anthropomorphites, who
is an exposition of the Old Law of which the Apostle says
thought that God had a human shape. Hence Gregory
(2 Cor. 3:6): “The letter killeth.” Hence not to know let-
says (Moral. vi) that “some through seeking in contem-
ters is to disapprove of the circumcision of the “letter” and
plation more than they are able to grasp, fall away into
other carnal observances.
perverse doctrines, and by failing to be the humble dis-
Reply to Objection 2. Study is directed to knowledge
ciples of truth become the masters of error.” Hence it is
which, without charity, “puffeth up,” and consequently
written (Eccles. 2:3): “I thought in my heart to withdraw
leads to dissent, according to Prov. 13:10, “Among the
my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom
proud there are always dissensions”: whereas, with char-
and might avoid folly.”
ity, it “edifieth and begets concord.” Hence the Apostle
Secondly, the study of letters is necessary in those re-
after saying (1 Cor. 1:5): “You are made rich. . . in all ut-
ligious orders that are founded for preaching and other
terance and in all knowledge,” adds (1 Cor. 1:10): “That
like works; wherefore the Apostle (Titus 1:9), speaking of
you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms
bishops to whose office these acts belong, says: “Embrac-
among you.” But Jerome is not speaking here of the study
ing that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that
of letters, but of the study of dissensions which heretics
he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince
and schismatics have brought into the Christian religion.
the gainsayers.” Nor does it matter that the apostles were
Reply to Objection 3. The philosophers professed the
sent to preach without having studied letters, because, as
study of letters in the matter of secular learning: whereas
Jerome says (Ep. liii ad Paulin.), “whatever others acquire
it becomes religious to devote themselves chiefly to the
by exercise and daily meditation in God’s law, was taught
study of letters in reference to the doctrine that is “accord-
them by the Holy Ghost.”
ing to godliness” (Titus 1:1). It becomes not religious,
Thirdly, the study of letters is becoming to religious as
whose whole life is devoted to the service of God, to seek
regards that which is common to all religious orders. For
for other learning, save in so far as it is referred to the
it helps us to avoid the lusts of the flesh; wherefore Jerome
sacred doctrine. Hence Augustine says at the end of De
says (Ep. cxxv ad Rust. Monach.): “Love the science of
Musica vi, 17: “Whilst we think that we should not over-
the Scriptures and thou shalt have no love for carnal vice.”
look those whom heretics delude by the deceitful assur-
For it turns the mind away from lustful thoughts, and
ance of reason and knowledge, we are slow to advance in
tames the flesh on account of the toil that study entails ac-
the consideration of their methods. Yet we should not be
cording to Ecclus. 31:1, “Watching for riches∗ consumeth
praised for doing this, were it not that many holy sons of
the flesh.” . It also helps to remove the desire of riches,
their most loving mother the Catholic Church had done
wherefore it is written (Wis. 7:8): “I. . . esteemed riches
the same under the necessity of confounding heretics.”
Whether a religious order that is devoted to the contemplative life is more excellent IIa IIae q. 188 a. 6
than on that is given to the active life?
Objection 1. It would seem that a religious order
is directed to the greater good is better. Therefore it would
which is devoted to the contemplative life is not more
seem that those religious orders that are directed to the ac-
excellent than one which is given to the active life. For
tive life are more excellent than those which are directed
it is said (Extra, de Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig.,
to the contemplative life.
cap. Licet), quoting the words of Innocent III: “Even as a
Objection 2. Further, every religious order is directed
greater good is preferred to a lesser, so the common profit
to the perfection of charity, as stated above (Aa. 1,2). Now
takes precedence of private profit: and in this case teach-
a gloss on Heb. 12:4, “For you have not yet resisted unto
ing is rightly preferred to silence, responsibility to con-
blood,” says: “In this life there is no more perfect love
templation, work to rest.” Now the religious order which
than that to which the holy martyrs attained, who fought
∗ Vigilia honestatis St. Thomas would seem to have taken ‘honestas’ in the sense of virtue
2061
against sin unto blood.” Now to fight unto blood is beare less excellent than the works of contemplation, ex-
coming those religious who are directed to military ser-
cept in cases of necessity, as stated above (q. 182, a. 1).
vice, and yet this pertains to the active life. Therefore it
Accordingly the highest place in religious orders is held
would seem that religious orders of this kind are the most
by those which are directed to teaching and preaching,
excellent.
which, moreover, are nearest to the episcopal perfection,
Objection 3. Further, seemingly the stricter a reli-
even as in other things “the end of that which is first is in
gious order is, the more excellent it is. But there is no rea-
conjunction with the beginning of that which is second,”
son why certain religious orders directed to the active life
as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. vii). The second place
should not be of stricter observance than those directed to
belongs to those which are directed to contemplation, and
the contemplative life. Therefore they are more excellent.
the third to those which are occupied with external ac-
On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 10:42) that the
tions.
“best part” was Mary’s, by whom the contemplative life
Moreover, in each of these degrees it may be noted
is signified.
that one religious order excels another through being di-
I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the difference
rected to higher action in the same genus; thus among the
between one religious order and another depends chiefly
works of the active life it is better to ransom captives than
on the end, and secondarily on the exercise. And since
to receive guests, and among the works of the contempla-
one thing cannot be said to be more excellent than an-
tive life prayer is better than study. Again one will excel
other save in respect of that in which it differs therefrom,
another if it be directed to more of these actions than an-
it follows that the excellence of one religious order over
other, or if it have statutes more adapted to the attainment
another depends chiefly on their ends, and secondarily
of the end in view.
on their respective exercises. Nevertheless each of these
Reply to Objection 1. This Decretal refers to the ac-
comparisons is considered in a different way. For the
tive life as directed to the salvation of souls.
comparison with respect to the end is absolute, since the
Reply to Objection 2. Those religious orders that are
end is sought for its own sake; whereas the comparison
established for the purpose of military service aim more
with respect to exercise is relative, since exercise is sought
directly at shedding the enemy’s blood than at the shed-
not for its own sake, but for the sake of the end. Hence a
ding of their own, which latter is more properly compe-
religious order is preferable to another, if it be directed to
tent to martyrs. Yet there is no reason why religious of
an end that is absolutely more excellent either because it
this description should not acquire the merit of martyr-
is a greater good or because it is directed to more goods.
dom in certain cases, and in this respect stand higher than
If, however, the end be the same, the excellence of one re-
other religious; even as in some cases the works of the
ligious order over another depends secondarily, not on the
active life take precedence of contemplation.
amount of exercise, but on the proportion of the exercise
Reply to Objection 3. Strictness of observances, as
to the end in view. Wherefore in the Conferences of the
the Blessed Antony remarks (Conferences of the Fathers;
Fathers (Coll. ii, 2) Blessed Antony is quoted, as prefer-
Coll. ii, 2), is not the chief object of commendation in a
ring discretion whereby a man moderates all his actions,
religious order; and it is written (Is. 58:5): “Is this such
to fastings, watchings, and all such observances.
a fast as I have chosen, for a man to afflict his soul for a
Accordingly we must say that the work of the active
day?” Nevertheless it is adopted in religious life as be-
life is twofold. one proceeds from the fulness of contem-
ing necessary for taming the flesh, “which if done with-
plation, such as teaching and preaching. Wherefore Gre-
out discretion, is liable to make us fail altogether,” as the
gory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that the words of Ps. 144:7,
Blessed Antony observes. Wherefore a religious order is
“They shall publish the memory of. . . Thy sweetness,” re-
not more excellent through having stricter observances,
fer “to perfect men returning from their contemplation.”
but because its observances are directed by greater discre-
And this work is more excellent than simple contempla-
tion to the end of religion. Thus the taming of the flesh
tion. For even as it is better to enlighten than merely to
is more efficaciously directed to continence by means of
shine, so is it better to give to others the fruits of one’s con-abstinence in meat and drink, which pertain to hunger and
templation than merely to contemplate. The other work of
thirst, than by the privation of clothing, which pertains to
the active life consists entirely in outward occupation, for
cold and nakedness, or by bodily labor.
instance almsgiving, receiving guests, and the like, which
2062
Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in common?
IIa IIae q. 188 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that religious perfection
thing whether for oneself or for the common use.
is diminished by possessing something in common. For
On the contrary, Prosper† says (De Vita Contempl.
our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): “If thou wilt be perfect, go
ix) and his words are quoted (XII, qu. 1, can. Expedit):
sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast and give to the poor.”
“It is sufficiently clear both that for the sake of perfec-
Hence it is clear that to lack worldly wealth belongs to the
tion one should renounce having anything of one’s own,
perfection of Christian life. Now those who possess some-
and that the possession of revenues, which are of course
thing in common do not lack worldly wealth. Therefore it
common property, is no hindrance to the perfection of the
would seem that they do not quite reach to the perfection
Church.”
of Christian life.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 184, a. 3, ad 1;
Objection 2. Further, the perfection of the counsels
q. 185, a. 6, ad 1), perfection consists, essentially, not in
requires that one should be without worldly solicitude;
poverty, but in following Christ, according to the saying
wherefore the Apostle in giving the counsel of virginity
of Jerome (Super Matth. xix, 27): “Since it is not enough
said (1 Cor. 7:32): “I would have you to be without so-
to leave all, Peter adds that which is perfect, namely, ‘We
licitude.” Now it belongs to the solicitude of the present
have followed Thee,’ ” while poverty is like an instrument
life that certain people keep something to themselves for
or exercise for the attainment of perfection. Hence in the
the morrow; and this solicitude was forbidden His disci-
Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the abbot Moses
ples by our Lord (Mat. 6:34) saying: “Be not . . . solicitous
says: “Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures,
for tomorrow.” Therefore it would seem that the perfec-
poverty, and privation of all one’s possessions are not per-
tion of Christian life is diminished by having something
fection, but means of perfection.”
in common.
Now the privation of one’s possessions, or poverty,
Objection 3. Further, possessions held in common
is a means of perfection, inasmuch as by doing away
belong in some way to each member of the community;
with riches we remove certain obstacles to charity; and
wherefore Jerome (Ep. lx ad Heliod. Episc.) says in refer-
these are chiefly three. The first is the cares which riches
ence to certain people: “They are richer in the monastery
bring with them; wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 13:22):
than they had been in the world; though serving the poor
“That which was sown [Vulg.: ‘He that received the seed’]
Christ they have wealth which they had not while serving
among thorns, is he that heareth the word, and the care
the rich devil; the Church rejects them now that they are
of this world, and the deceitfulness of riches, choketh up
rich, who in the world were beggars.” But it is deroga-
the word.” The second is the love of riches, which in-
tory to religious perfection that one should possess wealth
creases with the possession of wealth; wherefore Jerome
of one’s own. Therefore it is also derogatory to religious
says (Super Matth. xix, 23) that “since it is difficult to
perfection to possess anything in common.
despise riches when we have them, our Lord did not say:
Objection 4. Further, Gregory (Dial. iii, 14) relates
‘It is impossible for a rich man to enter the kingdom of
of a very holy man named Isaac, that “when his disciples
heaven,’ but: ‘It is difficult.’ ” The third is vainglory or
humbly signified that he should accept the possessions of-
elation which results from riches, according to Ps. 48:7,
fered to him for the use of the monastery, he being solici-
“They that trust in their own strength, and glory in the
tous for the safeguarding of his poverty, held firmly to his
multitude of their riches.”
opinion, saying: A monk who seeks earthly possessions
Accordingly the first of these three cannot be alto-
is no monk at all”: and this refers to possessions held in
gether separated from riches whether great or small. For
common, and which were offered him for the common
man must needs take a certain amount of care in acquiring
use of the monastery. Therefore it would seem destructive
or keeping external things. But so long as external things
of religious perfection to possess anything in common.
are sought or possessed only in a small quantity, and as
Objection 5. Further, our Lord in prescribing reli-
much as is required for a mere livelihood, such like care
gious perfection to His disciples, said (Mat. 10:9,10): “Do
does not hinder one much; and consequently is not incon-
not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses,
sistent with the perfection of Christian life. For our Lord
nor script for your journey.” By these words, as Jerome
did not forbid all care, but only such as is excessive and
says in his commentary, “He reproves those philosophers
hurtful; wherefore Augustine, commenting on Mat. 6:25,
who are commonly called Bactroperatae∗, who as despis-
“Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat,” says
ing the world and valuing all things at naught carried their
(De Serm. in Monte‡): “In saying this He does not forbid
pantry about with them.” Therefore it would seem deroga-
them to procure these things in so far as they needed them,
tory to religious perfection that one should keep some-
but to be intent on them, and for their sake to do whatever
∗ i.e. staff and scrip bearers
† Julianus Pomerius, among the works
of Prosper
‡ The words quoted are from De Operibus Monach. xxvi
2063
they are bidden to do in preaching the Gospel.” Yet the for the purpose of contemplating and of giving to others
possession of much wealth increases the weight of care,
the fruits of one’s contemplation by teaching and preach-
which is a great distraction to man’s mind and hinders
ing, requires greater care of spiritual things than one that
him from giving himself wholly to God’s service. The
is established for contemplation only. Wherefore it be-
other two, however, namely the love of riches and taking
comes a religious order of this kind to embrace a poverty
pride or glorying in riches, result only from an abundance
that burdens one with the least amount of care. Again it is
of wealth.
clear that to keep what one has acquired at a fitting time
Nevertheless it makes a difference in this matter if
for one’s necessary use involves the least burden of care.
riches, whether abundant or moderate, be possessed in pri-
Wherefore a threefold degree of poverty corresponds to
vate or in common. For the care that one takes of one’s
the three aforesaid degrees of religious life. For it is fit-
own wealth, pertains to love of self, whereby a man loves
ting that a religious order which is directed to the bod-
himself in temporal matters; whereas the care that is given
ily actions of the active life should have an abundance of
to things held in common pertains to the love of charity
riches in common; that the common possession of a re-
which “seeketh not her own,” but looks to the common
ligious order directed to contemplation should be more
good. And since religion is directed to the perfection of
moderate, unless the said religious be bound, either them-
charity, and charity is perfected in “the love of God ex-
selves or through others, to give hospitality or to assist
tending to contempt of self”∗, it is contrary to religious
the poor; and that those who aim at giving the fruits of
perfection to possess anything in private. But the care that
their contemplation to others should have their life most
is given to common goods may pertain to charity, although
exempt from external cares; this being accomplished by
it may prove an obstacle to some higher act of charity,
their laying up the necessaries of life procured at a fitting
such as divine contemplation or the instructing of one’s
time. This, our Lord, the Founder of poverty, taught by
neighbor. Hence it is evident that to have excessive riches
His example. For He had a purse which He entrusted to
in common, whether in movable or in immovable prop-
Judas, and in which were kept the things that were offered
erty, is an obstacle to perfection, though not absolutely in-
to Him, as related in Jn. 12:6.
compatible with it; while it is not an obstacle to religious
Nor should it be argued that Jerome (Super Matth.
perfection to have enough external things, whether mov-
xvii, 26) says: “If anyone object that Judas carried money
ables or immovables, as suffice for a livelihood, if we con-
in the purse, we answer that He deemed it unlawful to
sider poverty in relation to the common end of religious
spend the property of the poor on His own uses,” namely
orders, which is to devote oneself to the service of God.
by paying the tax—because among those poor His dis-
But if we consider poverty in relation to the special end
ciples held a foremost place, and the money in Christ’s
of any religious order, then this end being presupposed, a
purse was spent chiefly on their needs. For it is stated
greater or lesser degree of poverty is adapted to that re-
(Jn. 4:8) that “His disciples were gone into the city to buy
ligious order; and each religious order will be the more
meats,” and (Jn. 13:29) that the disciples “thought, be-
perfect in respect of poverty, according as it professes a
cause Judas had the purse, that Jesus had said to him: But
poverty more adapted to its end. For it is evident that for
those things which we have need of for the festival day,
the purpose of the outward and bodily works of the active
or that he should give something to the poor.” From this
life a man needs the assistance of outward things, whereas
it is evident that to keep money by, or any other common
few are required for contemplation. Hence the Philoso-
property for the support of religious of the same order,
pher says (Ethic. x, 8) that “many things are needed for
or of any other poor, is in accordance with the perfection
action, and the more so, the greater and nobler the actions
which Christ taught by His example. Moreover, after the
are. But the contemplative man requires no such things
resurrection, the disciples from whom all religious orders
for the exercise of his act: he needs only the necessaries;
took their origin kept the price of the lands, and distributed
other things are an obstacle to his contemplation.” Ac-
it according as each one had need (Acts 4:34,35).
cordingly it is clear that a religious order directed to the
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 184, a. 3,
bodily actions of the active life, such as soldiering or the
ad 1), this saying of our Lord does not mean that poverty
lodging of guests, would be imperfect if it lacked common
itself is perfection, but that it is the means of perfection.
riches; whereas those religious orders which are directed
Indeed, as shown above (q. 186, a. 8), it is the least of the
to the contemplative life are the more perfect, according
three chief means of perfection; since the vow of conti-
as the poverty they profess burdens them with less care
nence excels the vow of poverty, and the vow of obedience
for temporal things. And the care of temporal things is so
excels them both. Since, however, the means are sought
much a greater obstacle to religious life as the religious
not for their own sake, but for the sake of the end, a thing
life requires a greater care of spiritual things.
is better, not for being a greater instrument, but for being
Now it is manifest that a religious order established
more adapted to the end. Thus a physician does not heal
∗ Augustine, De Civ. Dei xiv, 28
2064
the more the more medicine he gives, but the more the future being uncertain, let us leave it to God”: according
medicine is adapted to the disease. Accordingly it does
to Chrysostom∗, “It is enough to endure the toil for nec-
not follow that a religious order is the more perfect, ac-
essary things, labor not in excess for unnecessary things”:
cording as the poverty it professes is more perfect, but
according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17):
according as its poverty is more adapted to the end both
“When we do any good action, we should bear in mind
common and special. Granted even that the religious or-
not temporal things which are denoted by the morrow, but
der which exceeds others in poverty be more perfect in so
eternal things.”
far as it is poorer, this would not make it more perfect sim-
Reply to Objection 3. The saying of Jerome applies
ply. For possibly some other religious order might surpass
where there are excessive riches, possessed in private as it
it in matters relating to continence, or obedience, and thus
were, or by the abuse of which even the individual mem-
be more perfect simply, since to excel in better things is
bers of a community wax proud and wanton. But they do
to be better simply.
not apply to moderate wealth, set by for the common use,
Reply to Objection 2. Our Lord’s words (Mat. 6:34),
merely as a means of livelihood of which each one stands
“Be not solicitous for tomorrow,” do not mean that we are
in need. For it amounts to the same that each one makes
to keep nothing for the morrow; for the Blessed Antony
use of things pertaining to the necessaries of life, and that
shows the danger of so doing, in the Conferences of the
these things be set by for the common use.
Fathers (Coll. ii, 2), where he says: “It has been our expe-
Reply to Objection 4. Isaac refused to accept the of-
rience that those who have attempted to practice the pri-
fer of possessions, because he feared lest this should lead
vation of all means of livelihood, so as not to have the
him to have excessive wealth, the abuse of which would be
wherewithal to procure themselves food for one day, have
an obstacle to religious perfection. Hence Gregory adds
been deceived so unawares that they were unable to finish
(Dial. iii, 14): “He was as afraid of forfeiting the security
properly the work they had undertaken.” And, as Augus-
of his poverty, as the rich miser is careful of his perish-
tine says (De oper. Monach. xxiii), “if this saying of our
able wealth.” It is not, however, related that he refused
Lord, ‘Be not solicitous for tomorrow,’ means that we are
to accept such things as are commonly necessary for the
to lay nothing by for the morrow, those who shut them-
upkeep of life.
selves up for many days from the sight of men, and apply
Reply to Objection 5. The Philosopher says (Polit.
their whole mind to a life of prayer, will be unable to pro-
i, 5,6) that bread, wine, and the like are natural riches,
vide themselves with these things.” Again he adds after-
while money is artificial riches. Hence it is that certain
wards: “Are we to suppose that the more holy they are, the
philosophers declined to make use of money, and em-
less do they resemble the birds?” And further on (De oper.
ployed other things, living according to nature. Wherefore
Monach. xxiv): “For if it be argued from the Gospel that
Jerome shows by the words of our Lord, Who equally for-
they should lay nothing by, they answer rightly: Why then
bade both, that it comes to the same to have money and
did our Lord have a purse, wherein He kept the money that
to possess other things necessary for life. And though our
was collected? Why, in days long gone by, when famine
Lord commanded those who were sent to preach not to
was imminent, was grain sent to the holy fathers? Why
carry these things on the way, He did not forbid them to
did the apostles thus provide for the needs of the saints?”
be possessed in common. How these words of our Lord
Accordingly the saying: “Be not solicitous for tomor-
should be understood has been shown above (q. 185, a. 6
row,” according to Jerome (Super Matth.) is to be ren-
, ad 2; Ia IIae, q. 108, a. 2, ad 3).
dered thus: “It is enough that we think of the present; the
Whether the religious life of those who live in community is more perfect than that of IIa IIae q. 188 a. 8
those who lead a solitary life?
Objection 1. It would seem that the religious life of
name, there am I in the midst of them.” But nothing can
those who live in community is more perfect than that of
be better than the fellowship of Christ. Therefore it would
those who lead a solitary life. For it is written (Eccles.
seem better to live in community than in solitude.
4:9): “It is better. . . that two should be together, than one; Objection 3. Further, the vow of obedience is more
for they have the advantage of their society.” Therefore
excellent than the other religious vows; and humility is
the religious life of those who live in community would
most acceptable to God. Now obedience and humility are
seem to be more perfect.
better observed in company than in solitude; for Jerome
Objection 2.
Further, it is written (Mat.
18:20):
says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic. Monach.): “In solitude pride
“Where there are two or three gathered together in My
quickly takes man unawares, he sleeps as much as he will,
∗ Hom. xvi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom
2065
he does what he likes”; whereas when instructing one who evil.”
lives in community, he says: “You may not do what you
Now man is assisted in this practice by the fellowship
will, you must eat what you are bidden to eat, you may
of others in two ways. First, as regards his intellect, to
possess so much as you receive, you must obey one you
the effect of his being instructed in that which he has to
prefer not to obey, you must be a servant to your brethren,
contemplate; wherefore Jerome says (ad Rustic. Monach.,
you must fear the superior of the monastery as God, love
Ep. cxxv): “It pleases me that you have the fellowship of
him as a father.” Therefore it would seem that the reli-
holy men, and teach not yourself. Secondly, as regards
gious life of those who live in community is more perfect
the affections, seeing that man’s noisome affections are
than that of those who lead a solitary life.
restrained by the example and reproof which he receives
Objection 4. Further, our Lord said (Lk. 11:33): “No
from others; for as Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 23), com-
man lighteth a candle and putteth it in a hidden place, nor
menting on the words, “To whom I have given a house in
under a bushel.” Now those who lead a solitary life are
the wilderness” (Job 39:6), “What profits solitude of the
seemingly in a hidden place, and to be doing no good to
body, if solitude of the heart be lacking?” Hence a so-
any man. Therefore it would seem that their religious life
cial life is necessary for the practice of perfection. Now
is not more perfect.
solitude befits those who are already perfect; wherefore
Objection 5. Further, that which is in accord with
Jerome says (ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): “Far from
man’s nature is apparently more pertinent to the perfec-
condemning the solitary life, we have often commended
tion of virtue. But man is naturally a social animal, as the
it. But we wish the soldiers who pass from the monastic
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1). Therefore it would seem
school to be such as not to be deterred by the hard novi-
that to lead a solitary life is not more perfect than to lead
ciate of the desert, and such as have given proof of their
a community life.
conduct for a considerable time.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De oper. Monach.
Accordingly, just as that which is already perfect sur-
xxiii) that “those are holier who keep themselves aloof
passes that which is being schooled in perfection, so the
from the approach of all, and give their whole mind to a
life of the solitaries, if duly practiced, surpasses the com-
life of prayer.”
munity life. But if it be undertaken without the aforesaid
I answer that, Solitude, like poverty, is not the
practice, it is fraught with very great danger, unless the
essence of perfection, but a means thereto. Hence in the
grace of God supply that which others acquire by prac-
Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the Abbot Moses
tice, as in the case of the Blessed Antony and the Blessed
says that “solitude,” even as fasting and other like things,
Benedict.
is “a sure means of acquiring purity of heart.” Now it
Reply to Objection 1. Solomon shows that two are
is evident that solitude is a means adapted not to action
better than one, on account of the help which one affords
but to contemplation, according to Osee 2:14, “I. . . will
the other either by “lifting him” up, or by “warming him,”
lead her into solitude [Douay: ‘the wilderness’]; and I will
i.e. giving him spiritual heat (Eccles. 4:10,11). But those
speak to her heart.” Wherefore it is not suitable to those
who have already attained to perfection do not require this
religious orders that are directed to the works whether cor-
help.
poral or spiritual of the active life; except perhaps for a
Reply to Objection 2. According to 1 Jn. 4:16, “He
time, after the example of Christ, Who as Luke relates
that abideth in charity abideth in God and God in him.”
(6:12), “went out into a mountain to pray; and He passed
Wherefore just as Christ is in the midst of those who are
the whole night in the prayer of God.” On the other hand,
united together in the fellowship of brotherly love, so does
it is suitable to those religious orders that are directed to
He dwell in the heart of the man who devotes himself to
contemplation.
divine contemplation through love of God.
It must, however, be observed that what is solitary
Reply to Objection 3. Actual obedience is required of
should be self-sufficing by itself. Now such a thing is one
those who need to be schooled according to the direction
“that lacks nothing,” and this belongs to the idea of a per-
of others in the attainment of perfection; but those who are
fect thing∗. Wherefore solitude befits the contemplative
already perfect are sufficiently “led by the spirit of God”
who has already attained to perfection. This happens in
so that they need not to obey others actually. Nevertheless
two ways: in one way by the gift only of God, as in the
they have obedience in the preparedness of the mind.
case of John the Baptist, who was “filled with the Holy
Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine says (De Civ.
Ghost even from his mother’s womb” (Lk. 1:11), so that
Dei xix, 19), “no one is forbidden to seek the knowl-
he was in the desert even as a boy; in another way by
edge of truth, for this pertains to a praiseworthy leisure.”
the practice of virtuous action, according to Heb. 5:14:
That a man be placed “on a candlestick,” does not con-
“Strong meat is for the perfect; for them who by custom
cern him but his superiors, and “if this burden is not
have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and
placed on us,” as Augustine goes on to say (De Civ. Dei
∗ Aristotle, Phys. iii, 6
2066
xix, 19), “we must devote ourselves to the contempla-example to us is the life of those whom we are forbidden
tion of truth,” for which purpose solitude is most help-
to see in the body.”
ful. Nevertheless, those who lead a solitary life are most
Reply to Objection 5. A man may lead a solitary life
useful to mankind. Hence, referring to them, Augustine
for two motives. one is because he is unable, as it were,
says (De Morib. Eccl. xxxi): “They dwell in the most
to bear with human fellowship on account of his uncouth-
lonely places, content to live on water and the bread that
ness of mind; and this is beast-like. The other is with a
is brought to them from time to time, enjoying colloquy
view to adhering wholly to divine things; and this is su-
with God to whom they have adhered with a pure mind.
perhuman. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that
To some they seem to have renounced human intercourse
“he who associates not with others is either a beast or a
more than is right: but these understand not how much
god,” i.e. a godly man.
such men profit us by the spirit of their prayers, what an
2067
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 189
Of the Entrance Into Religious Life
(In Ten Articles)
We must now consider the entrance into religious life. Under this head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether those who are not practiced in the observance of the commandments should enter religion?
(2) Whether it is lawful for a person to be bound by vow to enter religion?
(3) Whether those who are bound by vow to enter religion are bound to fulfil their vow?
(4) Whether those who vow to enter religion are bound to remain there in perpetuity?
(5) Whether children should be received into religion?
(6) Whether one should be withheld from entering religion through deference to one’s parents?
(7) Whether parish priests or archdeacons may enter religion?
(8) Whether one may pass from one religious order to another?
(9) Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion?
(10) Whether serious deliberation with one’s relations and friends is requisite for entrance into religion?
Whether those who are not practiced in keeping the commandments should enter IIa IIae q. 189 a. 1
religion?
Objection 1. It would seem that none should enter
that is weaned is towards his mother,” says: “First we are
religion but those who are practiced in the observance of
conceived in the womb of Mother Church, by being taught
the commandments. For our Lord gave the counsel of per-
the rudiments of faith. Then we are nourished as it were
fection to the young man who said that he had kept the
in her womb, by progressing in those same elements. Af-
commandments “from his youth.” Now all religious or-
terwards we are brought forth to the light by being regen-
ders originate from Christ. Therefore it would seem that
erated in baptism. Then the Church bears us as it were in
none should be allowed to enter religion but those who are
her hands and feeds us with milk, when after baptism we
practiced in the observance of the commandments.
are instructed in good works and are nourished with the
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xv in
milk of simple doctrine while we progress; until having
Ezech., and Moral. xxii): “No one comes suddenly to the
grown out of infancy we leave our mother’s milk for a fa-
summit; but he must make a beginning of a good life in the
ther’s control, that is to say, we pass from simple doctrine,
smallest matters, so as to accomplish great things.” Now
by which we are taught the Word made flesh, to the Word
the great things are the counsels which pertain to the per-
that was in the beginning with God.” Afterwards it goes
fection of life, while the lesser things are the command-
on to say: “For those who are just baptized on Holy Sat-
ments which belong to common righteousness. Therefore
urday are borne in the hands of the Church as it were and
it would seem that one ought not to enter religion for the
fed with milk until Pentecost, during which time nothing
purpose of keeping the counsels, unless one be already
arduous is prescribed, no fasts, no rising at midnight. Af-
practiced in the observance of the precepts.
terwards they are confirmed by the Paraclete Spirit, and
Objection 3. Further, the religious state, like the holy being weaned so to speak, begin to fast and keep other
orders, has a place of eminence in the Church. Now,
difficult observances. Many, like the heretics and schis-
as Gregory writes to the bishop Siagrius∗, “order should
matics, have perverted this order by being weaned before
be observed in ascending to orders. For he seeks a fall
the time. Hence they have come to naught.” Now this or-
who aspires to mount to the summit by overpassing the
der is apparently perverted by those who enter religion, or
steps.”†. “For we are well aware that walls when built re-
induce others to enter religion, before they are practiced
ceive not the weight of the beams until the new fabric is rid
in the easier observance of the commandments. Therefore
of its moisture, lest if they should be burdened with weight
they would seem to be heretics or schismatics.
before they are seasoned they bring down the whole build-
Objection 5. Further, one should proceed from that
ing” (Dist. xlviii, can. Sicut neophytus). Therefore it
which precedes to that which follows after. Now the com-
would seem that one should not enter religion unless one
mandments precede the counsels, because they are more
be practiced in the observance of the precepts.
universal, for “the implication of the one by the other is
Objection 4. Further, a gloss on Ps. 130:2, “As a child
not convertible”‡, since whoever keeps the counsels keeps
∗ Regist. ix, Ep. 106
† The rest of the quotation is from Regist. v,
Ep. 53, ad Virgil. Episc.
‡ Categor. ix
2068
the commandments, but the converse does not hold. See-it is impossible to fulfil the commandment which says,
ing then that the right order requires one to pass from that
Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, and to be rich, es-
which comes first to that which comes after, it follows that
pecially to have such great wealth.” This also refers to the
one ought not to pass to the observance of the counsels in
perfect fulfilment of this precept. on the other hand, it is
religion, without being first of all practiced in the obser-
true that he kept the commandments imperfectly and in a
vance of the commandments.
general way. For perfection consists chiefly in the obser-
On the contrary, Matthew the publican who was
vance of the precepts of charity, as stated above (q. 184,
not practiced in the observance of the commandments
a. 3). Wherefore in order to show that the perfection of the
was called by our Lord to the observance of the coun-
counsels is useful both to the innocent and to sinners, our
sels. For it is stated (Lk. 5:28) that “leaving all things
Lord called not only the innocent youth but also the sin-
he. . . followed Him.” Therefore it is not necessary for a
ner Matthew. Yet Matthew obeyed His call, and the youth
person to be practiced in the observance of the command-
obeyed not, because sinners are converted to the religious
ments before passing to the perfection of the counsels.
life more easily than those who presume on their inno-
I answer that, As shown above (q. 188, a. 1), the re-
cency. It is to the former that our Lord says (Mat. 21:31):
ligious state is a spiritual schooling for the attainment of
“The publicans and the harlots shall go into the kingdom
the perfection of charity. This is accomplished through
of God before you.”
the removal of the obstacles to perfect charity by religious
Reply to Objection 2. The highest and the lowest
observances; and these obstacles are those things which
place can be taken in three ways. First, in reference to the
attach man’s affections to earthly things. Now the attach-
same state and the same man; and thus it is evident that
ment of man’s affections to earthly things is not only an
no one comes to the summit suddenly, since every man
obstacle to the perfection of charity, but sometimes leads
that lives aright, progresses during the whole course of his
to the loss of charity, when through turning inordinately
life, so as to arrive at the summit. Secondly, in compari-
to temporal goods man turns away from the immutable
son with various states; and thus he who desires to reach
good by sinning mortally. Hence it is evident that the ob-
to a higher state need not begin from a lower state: for in-
servances of the religious state, while removing the obsta-
stance, if a man wish to be a cleric he need not first of all
cles to perfect charity, remove also the occasions of sin:
be practiced in the life of a layman. Thirdly, in compari-
for instance, it is clear that fasting, watching, obedience,
son with different persons; and in this way it is clear that
and the like withdraw man from sins of gluttony and lust
one man begins straightway not only from a higher state,
and all other manner of sins.
but even from a higher degree of holiness, than the highest
Consequently it is right that not only those who are
degree to which another man attains throughout his whole
practiced in the observance of the commandments should
life. Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): “All are agreed
enter religion in order to attain to yet greater perfection,
that the boy Benedict began at a high degree of grace and
but also those who are not practiced, in order the more
perfection in his daily life.”
easily to avoid sin and attain to perfection.
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 184, a. 6)
Reply to Objection 1. Jerome (Super Matth. xix, 20)
the holy orders prerequire holiness, whereas the religious
says: “The young man lies when he says: ‘All these have
state is a school for the attainment of holiness. Hence the
I kept from my youth.’ For if he had fulfilled this com-
burden of orders should be laid on the walls when these
mandment, ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,’ why
are already seasoned with holiness, whereas the burden of
did he go away sad when he heard: Go, sell all thou hast
religion seasons the walls, i.e. men, by drawing out the
and give to the poor?” But this means that he lied as to the
damp of vice.
perfect observance of this commandment. Hence Origen
Reply to Objection 4. It is manifest from the words
says (Tract. viii super Matth.) that “it is written in the
of this gloss that it is chiefly a question of the order of
Gospel according to the Hebrews that when our Lord had
doctrine, in so far as one has to pass from easy matter
said to him: ‘Go, sell all thou hast,’ the rich man began
to that which is more difficult. Hence it is clear from
to scratch his head; and that our Lord said to him: How
what follows that the statement that certain “heretics” and
sayest thou: I have fulfilled the law and the prophets, see-
“schismatics have perverted this order” refers to the order
ing that it is written in the law: Thou shalt love thy neigh-
of doctrine. For it continues thus: “But he says that he
bor as thyself? Behold many of thy brethren, children of
has kept these things, namely the aforesaid order, bind-
Abraham, are clothed in filth, and die of hunger, whilst
ing himself by an oath∗. Thus I was humble not only
thy house is full of all manner of good things, and nothing
in other things but also in knowledge, for ‘I was humbly
whatever hath passed thence to them. And thus our Lord
minded’; because I was first of all fed with milk, which
reproves him saying: If thou wilt be perfect, go, etc. For
is the Word made flesh, so that I grew up to partake of
∗ Referring to the last words of the verse, and taking ‘retributio,’ which Douay renders ‘reward,’ as meaning ‘punishment’
2069
the bread of angels, namely the Word that is in the be-less one observe them it is altogether impossible to keep
ginning with God.” The example which is given in proof,
the precepts of charity. Accordingly in the intention the
of the newly baptized not being commanded to fast until
perfect observance of the precepts of charity precedes the
Pentecost, shows that no difficult things are to be laid on
counsels, and yet sometimes it follows them in point of
them as an obligation before the Holy Ghost inspires them
time. For such is the order of the end in relation to things
inwardly to take upon themselves difficult things of their
directed to the end. But the observance in a general way
own choice. Hence after Pentecost and the receiving of
of the precepts of charity together with the other precepts,
the Holy Ghost the Church observes a fast. Now the Holy
is compared to the counsels as the common to the proper,
Ghost, according to Ambrose (Super Luc. 1:15), “is not
because one can observe the precepts without observing
confined to any particular age; He ceases not when men
the counsels, but not vice versa. Hence the common ob-
die, He is not excluded from the maternal womb.” Gre-
servance of the precepts precedes the counsels in the order
gory also in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in Ev.) says: “He
of nature; but it does not follow that it precedes them in
fills the boy harpist and makes him a psalmist: He fills the
point of time, for a thing is not in the genus before being
boy abstainer and makes him a wise judge†,” and after-
in one of the species. But the observance of the precepts
wards he adds: “No time is needed to learn whatsoever He
apart from the counsels is directed to the observance of
will, for He teaches the mind by the merest touch.” Again
the precepts together with the counsels; as an imperfect to
it is written (Eccles. 8:8), “It is not in man’s power to
a perfect species, even as the irrational to the rational an-
stop the Spirit,” and the Apostle admonishes us (1 Thess.
imal. Now the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect,
5:19): “Extinguish not the Spirit,” and (Acts 7:51) it is
since “nature,” as Boethius says (De Consol. iii, 10), “be-
said against certain persons: “You always resist the Holy
gins with perfect things.” And yet it is not necessary for
Ghost.”
the precepts first of all to be observed without the coun-
Reply to Objection 5. There are certain chief pre-
sels, and afterwards with the counsels, just as it is not nec-
cepts which are the ends, so to say, of the commandments
essary for one to be an ass before being a man, or married
and counsels. These are the precepts of charity, and the
before being a virgin. In like manner it is not necessary
counsels are directed to them, not that these precepts can-
for a person first of all to keep the commandments in the
not be observed without keeping the counsels, but that the
world before entering religion; especially as the worldly
keeping of the counsels conduces to the better observance
life does not dispose one to religious perfection, but is
of the precepts. The other precepts are secondary and are
more an obstacle thereto.
directed to the precepts of charity; in such a way that un-
Whether one ought to be bound by vow to enter religion?
IIa IIae q. 189 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not to be
through being bound by vow to enter religion it often hap-
bound by vow to enter religion. For in making his pro-
pens that people fall into despair and various sins. There-
fession a man is bound by the religious vow. Now before
fore it would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow
profession a year of probation is allowed, according to the
to enter religion.
rule of the Blessed Benedict (lviii) and according to the
On the contrary, It is written, (Ps. 75:12): “Vow ye,
decree of Innocent IV∗ who moreover forbade anyone to
and pay to the Lord your God”; and a gloss of Augus-
be bound to the religious life by profession before com-
tine says that “some vows concern the individual, such as
pleting the year of probation. Therefore it would seem
vows of chastity, virginity, and the like.” Consequently
that much less ought anyone while yet in the world to be
Holy Scripture invites us to vow these things. But Holy
bound by vow to enter religion.
Scripture invites us only to that which is better. Therefore
Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep.
it is better to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.
15): Jews “should be persuaded to be converted, not by
I answer that, As stated above (q. 88, a. 6), when we
compulsion but of their own free will” (Dist. xlv, can.
were treating of vows, one and the same work done in ful-
De Judaeis). Now one is compelled to fulfil what one has
filment of a vow is more praiseworthy than if it be done
vowed. Therefore no one should be bound by vow to enter
apart from a vow, both because to vow is an act of religion,
religion.
which has a certain pre-eminence among the virtues, and
Objection 3. Further, no one should give another an
because a vow strengthens a man’s will to do good; and
occasion of falling; wherefore it is written (Ex. 21:33,34):
just as a sin is more grievous through proceeding from a
“If a man open a pit. . . and an ox or an ass fall into it, the will obstinate in evil, so a good work is the more praise-owner of the pit shall pay the price of the beasts.” Now
worthy through proceeding from a will confirmed in good
† Dan. 1:8-17
∗ Sext. Decret., cap. Non solum., de Regular. et
Transeunt, ad Relig.
2070
by means of a vow. Therefore it is in itself praiseworthy after such a vow one cannot attain to the end of salvation
to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.
unless one fulfil that vow. Such a necessity is not to be
Reply to Objection 1. The religious vow is twofold.
avoided; indeed, as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Ar-
One is the solemn vow which makes a man a monk or
mentar. et Paulin.), “happy is the necessity that compels
a brother in some other religious order. This is called the
us to better things.”
profession, and such a vow should be preceded by a year’s
Reply to Objection 3. The vow to enter religion is
probation, as the objection proves. The other is the simple
a strengthening of the will for better things, and conse-
vow which does not make a man a monk or a religious,
quently, considered in itself, instead of giving a man an
but only binds him to enter religion, and such a vow need
occasion of falling, withdraws him from it. But if one
not be preceded by a year’s probation.
who breaks a vow falls more grievously, this does not
Reply to Objection 2. The words quoted from Gre-
derogate from the goodness of the vow, as neither does
gory must be understood as referring to absolute violence.
it derogate from the goodness of Baptism that some sin
But the compulsion arising from the obligation of a vow
more grievously after being baptized.
is not absolute necessity, but a necessity of end, because
Whether one who is bound by a vow to enter religion is under an obligation of entering IIa IIae q. 189 a. 3
religion?
Objection 1. It would seem that one who is bound by
says: “To vow depends on the will: but after the vow has
the vow to enter religion is not under an obligation of en-
been taken the fulfilment is of obligation.”
tering religion. For it is said in the Decretals (XVII, qu.
I answer that, As stated above (q. 88, a. 1), when we
ii, can. Consaldus): “Consaldus, a priest under pressure
were treating of vows, a vow is a promise made to God in
of sickness and emotional fervour, promised to become a
matters concerning God. Now, as Gregory says in a letter
monk. He did not, however, bind himself to a monastery
to Boniface∗: “If among men of good faith contracts are
or abbot; nor did he commit his promise to writing, but
wont to be absolutely irrevocable, how much more shall
he renounced his benefice in the hands of a notary; and
the breaking of this promise given to God be deserving
when he was restored to health he refused to become a
of punishment!” Therefore a man is under an obligation
monk.” And afterwards it is added: “We adjudge and by
to fulfil what he has vowed, provided this be something
apostolic authority we command that the aforesaid priest
pertaining to God.
be admitted to his benefice and sacred duties, and that he
Now it is evident that entrance into religion pertains
be allowed to retain them in peace.” Now this would not
very much to God, since thereby man devotes himself en-
be if he were bound to enter religion. Therefore it would
tirely to the divine service, as stated above (q. 186, a. 1).
seem that one is not bound to keep one’s vow of entering
Hence it follows that he who binds himself to enter reli-
religion.
gion is under an obligation to enter religion according as
Objection 2. Further, no one is bound to do what is
he intends to bind himself by his vow: so that if he in-
not in his power. Now it is not in a person’s power to enter
tend to bind himself absolutely, he is obliged to enter as
religion, since this depends on the consent of those whom
soon as he can, through the cessation of a lawful imped-
he wishes to join. Therefore it would seem that a man is
iment; whereas if he intend to bind himself to a certain
not obliged to fulfil the vow by which he bound himself
fixed time, or under a certain fixed condition, he is bound
to enter religion.
to enter religion when the time comes or the condition is
Objection 3. Further, a less useful vow cannot remit a
fulfilled.
more useful one. Now the fulfilment of a vow to enter re-
Reply to Objection 1. This priest had made, not a
ligion might hinder the fulfilment of a vow to take up the
solemn, but a simple vow. Hence he was not a monk in ef-
cross in defense of the Holy Land; and the latter appar-
fect, so as to be bound by law to dwell in a monastery and
ently is the more useful vow, since thereby a man obtains
renounce his cure. However, in the court of conscience
the forgiveness of his sins. Therefore it would seem that
one ought to advise him to renounce all and enter reli-
the vow by which a man has bound himself to enter reli-
gion. Hence (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap.
gion is not necessarily to be fulfilled.
Per tuas) the Bishop of Grenoble, who had accepted the
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3): “If thou
episcopate after vowing to enter religion, without having
hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an un-
fulfilled his vow, is counseled that if “he wish to heal his
faithful and foolish promise displeaseth him”; and a gloss
conscience he should renounce the government of his see
on Ps. 75:12, “Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God,”
and pay his vows to the Most High.”
∗ Innoc. I, Epist. ii, Victricio Epo. Rotomag., cap. 14; Cf. can. Viduas: cause. xxvii, qu. 1
2071
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 88, a. 3, Moreover it may be reasonably stated that also by en-ad 2), when we were treating of vows, he who has bound
trance into religion a man obtains remission of all his sins.
himself by vow to enter a certain religious order is bound
For if by giving alms a man may forthwith satisfy for his
to do what is in his power in order to be received in that
sins, according to Dan. 4:24, “Redeem thou thy sins with
order; and if he intend to bind himself simply to enter the
alms,” much more does it suffice to satisfy for all his sins
religious life, if he be not admitted to one, he is bound to
that a man devote himself wholly to the divine service by
go to another; whereas if he intend to bind himself only
entering religion, for this surpasses all manner of satisfac-
to one particular order, he is bound only according to the
tion, even that of public penance, according to the Dec-
measure of the obligation to which he has engaged him-
retals (XXXIII, qu. i, cap. Admonere) just as a holo-
self.
caust exceeds a sacrifice, as Gregory declares (Hom. xx
Reply to Objection 3. The vow to enter religion being
in Ezech.). Hence we read in the Lives of the Fathers (vi,
perpetual is greater than the vow of pilgrimage to the Holy
1) that by entering religion one receives the same grace as
Land, which is a temporal vow; and as Alexander III says
by being baptized. And yet even if one were not thereby
(Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. Scripturae),
absolved from all debt of punishment, nevertheless the en-
“he who exchanges a temporary service for the perpet-
trance into religion is more profitable than a pilgrimage to
ual service of religion is in no way guilty of breaking his
the Holy Land, as regards the advancement in good, which
vow.”
is preferable to absolution from punishment.
Whether he who has vowed to enter religion is bound to remain in religion in perpe-IIa IIae q. 189 a. 4
tuity?
Objection 1. It would seem that he who has vowed
it seems that he who vows to enter religion is not for that
to enter religion, is bound in perpetuity to remain in re-
reason bound to remain there in perpetuity.
ligion. For it is better not to enter religion than to leave
I answer that, The obligation of a vow proceeds from
after entering, according to 2 Pet. 2:21, “It had been bet-
the will: because “to vow is an act of the will” accord-
ter for them not to have known the way of justice, than
ing to Augustine∗. Consequently the obligation of a vow
after they have known it to turn back,” and Lk. 9:62, “No
extends as far as the will and intention of the person who
man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is
takes the vow. Accordingly if in vowing he intend to bind
fit for the kingdom of God.” But he who bound himself
himself not only to enter religion, but also to remain there
by the vow to enter religion, is under the obligation to en-
evermore, he is bound to remain in perpetuity. If, on the
ter, as stated above (a. 3). Therefore he is also bound to
other hand, he intend to bind himself to enter religion for
remain for always.
the purpose of trial, while retaining the freedom to remain
Objection 2. Further, everyone is bound to avoid that
or not remain, it is clear that he is not bound to remain.
which gives rise to scandal, and is a bad example to oth-
If, however, in vowing he thought merely of entering re-
ers. Now by leaving after entering religion a man gives a
ligion, without thinking of being free to leave, or of re-
bad example and is an occasion of scandal to others, who
maining in perpetuity, it would seem that he is bound to
are thereby withdrawn from entering or incited to leave.
enter religion according to the form prescribed by com-
Therefore it seems that he who enters religion in order to
mon law, which is that those who enter should be given a
fulfil a vow which he had previously taken, is bound to
year’s probation. Wherefore he is not bound to remain for
remain evermore.
ever.
Objection 3. Further, the vow to enter religion is ac-
Reply to Objection 1. It is better to enter religion
counted a perpetual vow: wherefore it is preferred to tem-
with the purpose of making a trial than not to enter at all,
poral vows, as stated above (a. 3, ad 3; q. 88, a. 12, ad
because by so doing one disposes oneself to remain al-
1). But this would not be so if a person after vowing to
ways. Nor is a person accounted to turn or to look back,
enter religion were to enter with the intention of leaving.
save when he omits to do that which he engaged to do:
It seems, therefore, that he who vows to enter religion is
else whoever does a good work for a time, would be unfit
bound also to remain in perpetuity.
for the kingdom of God, unless he did it always, which is
On the contrary, The vow of religious profession,
evidently false.
for the reason that it binds a man to remain in religion
Reply to Objection 2. A man who has entered re-
for evermore, has to be preceded by a year of proba-
ligion gives neither scandal nor bad example by leaving,
tion; whereas this is not required before the simple vow
especially if he do so for a reasonable motive; and if oth-
whereby a man binds himself to enter religion. Therefore
ers are scandalized, it will be passive scandal on their part,
∗ Gloss of Peter Lombard on Ps. 75:12
2072
and not active scandal on the part of the person leaving, pose of leaving forthwith, does not seem to fulfil his vow,
since in doing so, he has done what was lawful, and ex-
since this was not his intention in vowing. Hence he must
pedient on account of some reasonable motive, such as
change that purpose, at least so as to wish to try whether it
sickness, weakness, and the like.
is good for him to remain in religion, but he is not bound
Reply to Objection 3. He who enters with the pur-
to remain for evermore.
Whether children should be received in religion?
IIa IIae q. 189 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that children ought not
ficacy from the divine law. Nevertheless it may encounter
to be received in religion. Because it is said (Extra, De
a twofold obstacle. First, through lack of deliberation, as
Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Nullus): “No one
in the case of the insane, whose vows are not binding§.
should be tonsured unless he be of legal age and willing.”
The same applies to children who have not reached the
But children, seemingly, are not of legal age; nor have
required use of reason, so as to be capable of guile, which
they a will of their own, not having perfect use of reason.
use boys attain, as a rule, at about the age of fourteen, and
Therefore it seems that they ought not to be received in
girls at the age of twelve, this being what is called “the age
religion.
of puberty,” although in some it comes earlier and in oth-
Objection 2. Further, the state of religion would seem
ers it is delayed, according to the various dispositions of
to be a state of repentance; wherefore religion is derived∗
nature. Secondly, the efficacy of a simple vow encounters
from “religare” [to bind] or from “re-eligere” [to choose
an obstacle, if the person who makes a vow to God is not
again], as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 3†). But repen-
his own master; for instance, if a slave, though having the
tance does not become children. Therefore it seems that
use of reason, vows to enter religion, or even is ordained,
they should not enter religion.
without the knowledge of his master: for his master can
Objection 3. Further, the obligation of a vow is like
annul this, as stated in the Decretals (Dist. LIV, cap. Si
that of an oath. But children under the age of fourteen
servus). And since boys and girls under the age of pu-
ought not to be bound by oath (Decret. XXII, qu. v, cap.
berty are naturally in their father’s power as regards the
Pueri and cap. Honestum.). Therefore it would seem that
disposal of their manner of life, their father may either
neither should they be bound by vow.
cancel or approve their vow, if it please him to do so, as it
Objection 4. Further, it is seemingly unlawful to bind
is expressly said with regard to a woman (Num. 30:4).
a person to an obligation that can be justly canceled. Now
Accordingly if before reaching the age of puberty a
if any persons of unripe age bind themselves to religion,
child makes a simple vow, not yet having full use of rea-
they can be withdrawn by their parents or guardians. For
son, he is not bound in virtue of the vow; but if he has
it is written in the Decretals (XX, qu. ii, can. Puella) that
the use of reason before reaching the age of puberty, he
“if a maid under twelve years of age shall take the sacred
is bound, so far as he is concerned, by his vow; yet this
veil of her own accord, her parents or guardians, if they
obligation may be removed by his father’s authority, un-
choose, can at once declare the deed null and void.” It is
der whose control he still remains, because the ordinance
therefore unlawful for children, especially of unripe age,
of the law whereby one man is subject to another consid-
to be admitted or bound to religion.
ers what happens in the majority of cases. If, however,
On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 19:14): “Suf-
the
fer the little children, and forbid them not to come to Me.”
child has passed the age of puberty, his vow cannot be
Expounding these words Origen says (Tract. vii in Matth.)
annulled by the authority of his parents; though if he has
that “the disciples of Jesus before they have been taught
not the full use of reason, he would not be bound in the
the conditions of righteousness‡, rebuke those who offer
sight of God.
children and babes to Christ: but our Lord urges His dis-
The other is the solemn vow which makes a man a
ciples to stoop to the service of children. We must there-
monk or a religious. Such a vow is subject to the ordi-
fore take note of this, lest deeming ourselves to excel in
nance of the Church, on account of the solemnity attached
wisdom we despise the Church’s little ones, as though we
to it. And since the Church considers what happens in the
were great, and forbid the children to come to Jesus.”
majority of cases, a profession made before the age of
I answer that, As stated above (a. 2, ad 1), the reli-
puberty, however much the person who makes profession
gious vow is twofold. One is the simple vow consisting in
may have the use of reason, or be capable of guile, does
a mere promise made to God, and proceeding from the in-
not take effect so as to make him a religious (Extra, De
terior deliberation of the mind. Such a vow derives its ef-
Regular., etc. cap. Significatum est.).
∗ Cf. q. 81, a. 1
† Cf. De Vera Relig. lv
‡ Cf. Mat. 19:16-30
§ Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Sicut tenor
2073
Nevertheless, although they cannot be professed be-directed to the attachment of perfection, as stated above
fore the age of puberty, they can, with the consent of their
(q. 186, a. 1, ad 4); and accordingly it is becoming to chil-
parents, be received into religion to be educated there:
dren, who are easily drawn to it. But as a consequence it
thus it is related of John the Baptist (Lk. 1:80) that “the
is called a state of repentance, inasmuch as occasions of
child grew and was strengthened in spirit, and was in the
sin are removed by religious observances, as stated above
deserts.” Hence, as Gregory states (Dial. ii, 3), “the Ro-
(q. 186, a. 1, ad 4).
man nobles began to give their sons to the blessed Bene-
Reply to Objection 3. Even as children are not bound
dict to be nurtured for Almighty God”; and this is most fit-
to take oaths (as the canon states), so are they not bound
ting, according to Lam. 3:27, “It is good for a man when
to take vows. If, however, they bind themselves by vow
he has borne the yoke from his youth.” It is for this reason
or oath to do something, they are bound in God’s sight, if
that by common custom children are made to apply them-
they have the use of reason, but they are not bound in the
selves to those duties or arts with which they are to pass
sight of the Church before reaching the age of fourteen.
their lives.
Reply to Objection 4. A woman who has not reached
Reply to Objection 1. The legal age for receiving the
the age of puberty is not rebuked (Num. 30:4) for tak-
tonsure and taking the solemn vow of religion is the age of
ing a vow without her parents’ consent: but the vow can
puberty, when a man is able to make use of his own will;
be made void by her parents. Hence it is evident that she
but before the age of puberty it is possible to have reached
does not sin in vowing. But we are given to understand
the lawful age to receive the tonsure and be educated in a
that she binds herself by vow, so far as she may, without
religious house.
prejudice to her parents’ authority.
Reply to Objection 2. The religious state is chiefly
Whether one ought to be withdrawn from entering religion through deference to one’s IIa IIae q. 189 a. 6
parents?
Objection 1. It would seem that one ought to be with-
enter religion in despite of their duty to their parents.
drawn from entering religion through deference to one’s
On the contrary, It is related (Mat. 4:22) that James
parents. For it is not lawful to omit that which is of obliga-
and John “left their nets and father, and followed our
tion in order to do that which is optional. Now deference
Lord.” By this, says Hilary (Can. iii in Matth.), “we learn
to one’s parents comes under an obligation of the pre-
that we who intend to follow Christ are not bound by the
cept concerning the honoring of our parents (Ex. 20:12);
cares of the secular life, and by the ties of home.”
wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:4): “If any widow
I answer that, As stated above (q. 101, a. 2, ad 2)
have children or grandchildren, let her learn first to gov-
when we were treating of piety, parents as such have the
ern her own house, and to make a return of duty to her
character of a principle, wherefore it is competent to them
parents.” But the entrance to religion is optional. There-
as such to have the care of their children. Hence it is un-
fore it would seem that one ought not to omit deference to
lawful for a person having children to enter religion so as
one’s parents for the sake of entering religion.
altogether to set aside the care for their children, namely
Objection 2. Further, seemingly the subjection of a
without providing for their education. For it is written (1
son to his father is greater than that of a slave to his mas-
Tim. 5:8) that “if any man have not care of his own. . . he
ter, since sonship is natural, while slavery results from the
hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.”
curse of sin, as appears from Gn. 9:25. Now a slave can-
Nevertheless it is accidentally competent to parents to
not set aside the service of his master in order to enter re-
be assisted by their children, in so far, to wit, as they are
ligion or take holy orders, as stated in the Decretals (Dist.
placed in a condition of necessity. Consequently we must
LIV, cap. Si servus). Much less therefore can a son set
say that when their parents are in such need that they can-
aside the deference due to his father in order to enter reli-
not fittingly be supported otherwise than by the help of
gion.
their children, these latter may not lawfully enter religion
Objection 3. Further, a man is more indebted to his
in despite of their duty to their parents. If, however, the
parents than to those to whom he owes money. Now per-
parents’ necessity be not such as to stand in great need
sons who owe money to anyone cannot enter religion.
of their children’s assistance, the latter may, in despite of
For Gregory says (Regist. viii, Ep. 5) that “those who
the duty they owe their parents, enter religion even against
are engaged in trade must by no means be admitted into
their parents’ command, because after the age of puberty
a monastery, when they seek admittance, unless first of
every freeman enjoys freedom in things concerning the or-
all they withdraw from public business” (Dist. liii, can.
dering of his state of life, especially in such as belong to
Legem.). Therefore seemingly much less may children
the service of God, and “we should more obey the Father
2074
of spirits that we may live∗,” as says the Apostle (Heb.
from freely disposing of his person by transferring him-
12:9), than obey our parents. Hence as we read (Mat.
self to the service of God; which is most conducive to
8:22; Lk. 9:62) our Lord rebuked the disciple who was
man’s good.
unwilling to follow him forthwith on account of his fa-
Reply to Objection 3. He who is under a certain fixed
ther’s burial: for there were others who could see to this,
obligation cannot lawfully set it aside so long as he is able
as Chrysostom remarks†.
to fulfil it. Wherefore if a person is under an obligation
Reply to Objection 1. The commandment of honor-
to give an account to someone or to pay a certain fixed
ing our parents extends not only to bodily but also to spir-
debt, he cannot lawfully evade this obligation in order to
itual service, and to the paying of deference. Hence even
enter religion. If, however, he owes a sum of money, and
those who are in religion can fulfil the commandment of
has not wherewithal to pay the debt, he must do what he
honoring their parents, by praying for them and by rever-
can, namely by surrendering his goods to his creditor. Ac-
ing and assisting them, as becomes religious, since even
cording to civil law† money lays an obligation not on the
those who live in the world honor their parents in different
person of a freeman, but on his property, because the per-
ways as befits their condition.
son of a freeman “is above all pecuniary consideration”‡.
Reply to Objection 2. Since slavery was imposed
Hence, after surrendering his property, he may lawfully
in punishment of sin, it follows that by slavery man for-
enter religion, nor is he bound to remain in the world in
feits something which otherwise he would be competent
order to earn the means of paying the debt.
to have, namely the free disposal of his person, for “a slave
On the other hand, he does not owe his father a special
belongs wholly to his master”∗. On the other hand, the
debt, except as may arise in a case of necessity, as stated
son, through being subject to his father, is not hindered
above.
Whether parish priests may lawfully enter religion?
IIa IIae q. 189 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that parish priests can-
ular life, is inspired by the Holy Ghost to desire to work
not lawfully enter religion. For Gregory says (Past. iii,
out his salvation in a monastery or under some canonical
4) that “he who undertakes the cure of souls, receives an
rule, even though his bishop withstand him, we authorize
awful warning in the words: ‘My son, if thou be surety for
him to go freely.”
thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a stranger’ ”
I answer that, As stated above (a. 3, ad 3; q. 88, a. 12, (Prov. 6:1); and he goes on to say, “because to be surety
ad 1), the obligation of a perpetual vow stands before ev-
for a friend is to take charge of the soul of another on the
ery other obligation. Now it belongs properly to bish-
surety of one’s own behavior.” Now he who is under an
ops and religious to be bound by perpetual vow to devote
obligation to a man for a debt, cannot enter religion, un-
themselves to the divine service§, while parish priests and
less he pay what he owes, if he can. Since then a priest is
archdeacons are not, as bishops are, bound by a perpet-
able to fulfil the cure of souls, to which obligation he has
ual and solemn vow to retain the cure of souls. Where-
pledged his soul, it would seem unlawful for him to lay
fore bishops “cannot lay aside their bishopric for any pre-
aside the cure of souls in order to enter religion.
text whatever, without the authority of the Roman Pon-
Objection 2. Further, what is lawful to one is likewise
tiff” (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap.
lawful to all. But if all priests having cure of souls were to
Licet.): whereas archdeacons and parish priests are free
enter religion, the people would be left without a pastor’s
to renounce in the hands of the bishop the cure entrusted
care, which would be unfitting. Therefore it seems that
to them, without the Pope’s special permission, who alone
parish priests cannot lawfully enter religion.
can dispense from perpetual vows. Therefore it is evident
Objection 3. Further, chief among the acts to which
that archdeacons and parish priests may lawfully enter re-
religious orders are directed are those whereby a man
ligion.
gives to others the fruit of his contemplation. Now such
Reply to Objection 1. Parish priests and archdeacons
acts are competent to parish priests and archdeacons,
have bound themselves to the care of their subjects, as
whom it becomes by virtue of their office to preach and
long as they retain their archdeaconry or parish, but they
hear confessions. Therefore it would seem unlawful for a
did not bind themselves to retain their archdeaconry or
parish priest or archdeacon to pass over to religion.
parish for ever.
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XIX, qu.
Reply to Objection 2.
As Jerome says (Contra
ii, cap. Duce sunt leges.): “If a man, while governing the
Vigil.): “Although they,” namely religious, “are sorely
people in his church under the bishop and leading a sec-
smitten by thy poisonous tongue, about whom you argue,
∗ ‘Shall we not much more obey the Father of Spirits, and live?’
† Hom. xxvii in Matth.
∗ Aristotle, Polit. i, 2
† Cod. IV, x,
de Oblig. et Action, 12
‡ Dig. L, xvii, de div. reg. Jur. ant. 106,176
§ Cf. q. 184, a. 5
2075
saying; ‘If all shut themselves up and live in solitude, who the human race will perish. Virtue is rare, and is not de-will go to church? who will convert worldlings? who will
sired by many.” It is therefore evident that this is a foolish
be able to urge sinners to virtue?’ If this holds true, if all
alarm; thus might a man fear to draw water lest the river
are fools with thee, who can be wise? Nor will virgin-
run dry.¶
ity be commendable, for if all be virgins, and none marry,
Whether it is lawful to pass from one religious order to another?
IIa IIae q. 189 a. 8
Objection 1. It seems unlawful to pass from one reli-
ligious order to which one is accustomed than in one to
gious order to another, even a stricter one. For the Apostle
which one is not habituated. Hence in the Conferences of
says (Heb. 10:25): “Not forsaking our assembly, as some
the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 5) Abbot Nesteros says: “It is best
are accustomed”; and a gloss observes: “Those namely
for each one that he should, according to the resolve he
who yield through fear of persecution, or who presuming
has made, hasten with the greatest zeal and care to reach
on themselves withdraw from the company of sinners or
the perfection of the work he has undertaken, and nowise
of the imperfect, that they may appear to be righteous.”
forsake the profession he has chosen.” And further on he
Now those who pass from one religious order to another
adds (cap. 6) by way of reason: “For it is impossible that
more perfect one would seem to do this. Therefore this is
one and the same man should excel in all the virtues at
seemingly unlawful.
once, since if he endeavor to practice them equally, he will
Objection 2.
Further, the profession of monks is
of necessity, while trying to attain them all, end in acquir-
stricter than that of canons regular (Extra, De Statu
ing none of them perfectly”: because the various religious
Monach. et Canonic. Reg., cap. Quod Dei timorem). But
orders excel in respect of various works of virtue.
it is unlawful for anyone to pass from the state of canon
Nevertheless one may commendably pass from one re-
regular to the monastic state. For it is said in the Dec-
ligious order to another for three reasons. First, through
retals (XIX, qu. iii, can. Mandamus): “We ordain and
zeal for a more perfect religious life, which excellence de-
without any exception forbid any professed canon regu-
pends, as stated above (q. 188, a. 6), not merely on sever-
lar to become a monk, unless (which God forbid) he have
ity, but chiefly on the end to which a religious order is
fallen into public sin.” Therefore it would seem unlawful
directed, and secondarily on the discretion whereby the
for anyone to pass from one religious order to another of
observances are proportionate to the due end. Secondly,
higher rank.
on account of a religious order falling away from the per-
Objection 3. Further, a person is bound to fulfil what
fection it ought to have: for instance, if in a more severe
he has vowed, as long as he is able lawfully to do so; thus
religious order, the religious begin to live less strictly, it
if a man has vowed to observe continence, he is bound,
is commendable for one to pass even to a less severe re-
even after contracting marriage by words in the present
ligious order if the observance is better. Hence in the
tense, to fulfil his vow so long as the marriage is not con-
Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xix, 3,5,6) Abbot John
summated, because he can fulfil the vow by entering re-
says of himself that he had passed from the solitary life,
ligion. Therefore if a person may lawfully pass from one
in which he was professed, to a less severe life, namely
religious order to another, he will be bound to do so if he
of those who lived in community, because the hermetical
vowed it previously while in the world. But this would
life had fallen into decline and laxity. Thirdly, on account
seem objectionable, since in many cases it might give rise
of sickness or weakness, the result of which sometimes
to scandal. Therefore a religious may not pass from one
is that one is unable to keep the ordinances of a more se-
religious order to another stricter one.
vere religious order, though able to observe those of a less
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XX, qu.
strict religion.
iv, can. Virgines): “If sacred virgins design for the good
There is, however, a difference in these three cases.
of their soul to pass to another monastery on account of
For in the first case one ought, on account of humility, to
a stricter life, and decide to remain there, the holy synod
seek permission: yet this cannot be denied, provided it
allows them to do so”: and the same would seem to apply
be certain that this other religion is more severe. “And if
to any religious. Therefore one may lawfully pass from
there be a probable doubt about this, one should ask one’s
one religious order to another.
superior to decide” (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad
I answer that, It is not commendable to pass from one
Relig., cap. Licet.). In like manner the superior’s decision
religious order to another: both because this frequently
should be sought in the second case. In the third case it is
gives scandal to those who remain; and because, other
also necessary to have a dispensation.
things being equal, it is easier to make progress in a re-
Reply to Objection 1. Those who pass to a stricter re-
¶ St. Thomas gives no reply to the third objection, which is sufficiently solved in the body of the article.
2076
ligious order, do so not out of presumption that they may come a cleric”; but not conversely, as expressed in the
appear righteous, but out of devotion, that they may be-
Decretal quoted (XIX, qu. iii). If, however, the monks
come more righteous.
be clerics devoting themselves to the sacred ministry, they
Reply to Objection 2. Religious orders whether of
have this in common with canons regular coupled with
monks or of canons regular are destined to the works of
greater severity, and consequently it will be lawful to pass
the contemplative life. Chief among these are those which
from an order of canons regular to a monastic order, pro-
are performed in the divine mysteries, and these are the di-
vided withal that one seek the superior’s permission (XIX,
rect object of the orders of canons regular, the members of
qu. iii; cap. Statuimus).
which are essentially religious clerics. On the other hand,
Reply to Objection 3. The solemn vow whereby a
monastic religious are not essentially clerics, according
person is bound to a less strict order, is more binding than
to the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, cap. Alia causa). Hence
the simple vow whereby a person is bound to a stricter or-
although monastic orders are more severe, it would be
der. For if after taking a simple vow a person were to be
lawful, supposing the members to be lay monks, to pass
married, his marriage would not be invalid, as it would be
from the monastic order to an order of canons regular, ac-
after his taking a solemn vow. Consequently a person who
cording to the statement of Jerome (Ep. cxxv, ad Rustic.
is professed in a less severe order is not bound to fulfil a
Monach.): “So live in the monastery as to deserve to be-
simple vow he has taken on entering a more severe order.
Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion?
IIa IIae q. 189 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that no one ought to in-
person persuade another simoniacally to enter religion, by
duce others to enter religion. For the blessed Benedict
giving him presents: and this is forbidden in the Decretal
prescribes in his Rule (lviii) that “those who seek to enter
(I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio). But this does not apply to the
religion must not easily be admitted, but spirits must be
case where one provides a poor person with necessaries by
tested whether they be of God”; and Cassian has the same
educating him in the world for the religious life; or when
instruction (De Inst. Caenob. iv, 3). Much less therefore
without any compact one gives a person little presents for
is it lawful to induce anyone to enter religion.
the sake of good fellowship. Thirdly, if one person entices
Objection 2. Further, our Lord said (Mat. 23:15):
another by lies: for it is to be feared that the person thus
“Woe to you. . . because you go round about the sea and
enticed may turn back on finding himself deceived, and
the land to make one proselyte, and when he is made you
thus “the last state of that man” may become “worse than
make him the child of hell twofold more than yourselves.”
the first” (Lk. 11:26).
Now thus would seem to do those who induce persons to
Reply to Objection 1. Those who are induced to enter
enter religion. Therefore this would seem blameworthy.
religion have still a time of probation wherein they make a
Objection 3. Further, no one should induce another to
trial of the hardships of religion, so that they are not easily do what is to his prejudice. But those who are induced to
admitted to the religious life.
enter religion, sometimes take harm therefrom, for some-
Reply to Objection 2. According to Hilary (Can.
times they are under obligation to enter a stricter religion.
xxiv in Matth.) this saying of our Lord was a forecast
Therefore it would not seem praiseworthy to induce others
of the wicked endeavors of the Jews, after the preaching
to enter religion.
of Christ, to draw Gentiles or even Christians to observe
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 26:3, seqq.∗): “Let
the Jewish ritual, thereby making them doubly children of
one curtain draw the other.” Therefore one man should
hell, because, to wit, they were not forgiven the former
draw another to God’s service.
sins which they committed while adherents of Judaism,
I answer that, Those who induce others to enter re-
and furthermore they incurred the guilt of Jewish perfidy;
ligion not only do not sin, but merit a great reward. For
and thus interpreted these words have nothing to do with
it is written (James 5:20): “He who causeth a sinner to
the case in point.
be converted from the error of his way, shall save his soul
According to Jerome, however, in his commentary on
from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins”; and (Dan.
this passage of Matthew, the reference is to the Jews even
12:3): “They that instruct many to justice shall be as stars
at the time when it was yet lawful to keep the legal obser-
for all eternity.”
vances, in so far as he whom they converted to Judaism
Nevertheless such inducement may be affected by a
“from paganism, was merely misled; but when he saw the
threefold inordinateness. First, if one person force another
wickedness of his teachers, he returned to his vomit, and
by violence to enter religion: and this is forbidden in the
becoming a pagan deserved greater punishment for his
Decretals (XX, qu. iii, cap. Praesens). Secondly, if one
treachery.” Hence it is manifest that it is not blamewor-
∗ St. Thomas quotes the sense, not the words
2077
thy to draw others to the service of God or to the religious a greater one. unless there be some special obstacle, such
life, but only when one gives a bad example to the person
as ill-health, or the hope of making greater progress in the
converted, whence he becomes worse.
lesser order. On the other hand, one who is bound by vow
Reply to Objection 3. The lesser is included in the
or oath to enter a greater order, cannot be lawfully induced
greater. Wherefore a person who is bound by vow or oath
to enter a lesser order, except for some special and evident
to enter a lesser order, may be lawfully induced to enter
motive, and then with the superior’s dispensation.
Whether it is praiseworthy to enter religion without taking counsel of many, and pre-IIa IIae q. 189 a. 10
viously deliberating for a long time?
Objection 1. It would not seem praiseworthy to en-
good, and to doubt about this is to disparage Christ Who
ter religion without taking counsel of many, and previ-
gave this counsel. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.,
ously deliberating for a long time. For it is written (1 Jn.
Serm. c, 2): “The East,” that is Christ, “calleth thee, and
4:1): “Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits if they
thou turnest to the West,” namely mortal and fallible man.
be of God.” Now sometimes a man’s purpose of enter-
Secondly, the entrance into religion may be considered in
ing religion is not of God, since it often comes to naught
relation to the strength of the person who intends to en-
through his leaving the religious life; for it is written (Acts ter. And here again there is no room for doubt about the
5:38,39): “If this counsel or this work be of God, you can-
entrance to religion, since those who enter religion trust
not overthrow it.” Therefore it would seem that one ought
not to be able to stay by their own power, but by the assis-
to make a searching inquiry before entering religion.
tance of the divine power, according to Is. 40:31, “They
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 25:9): “Treat that hope in the Lord shall renew their strength, they shall
thy cause with thy friend.” Now a man’s cause would
take wings as eagles, they shall run and not be weary, they
seem to be especially one that concerns a change in his
shall walk and not faint.” Yet if there be some special ob-
state of life. Therefore seemingly one ought not to enter
stacle (such as bodily weakness, a burden of debts, or the
religion without discussing the matter with one’s friends.
like) in such cases a man must deliberate and take coun-
Objection 3. Further, our Lord (Lk. 14:28) in making
sel with such as are likely to help and not hinder him.
a comparison with a man who has a mind to build a tower,
Hence it is written (Ecclus. 37:12): “Treat with a man
says that he doth “first sit down and reckon the charges
without religion concerning holiness∗, with an unjust man
that are necessary, whether he have wherewithal to finish
concerning justice,” meaning that one should not do so,
it,” lest he become an object of mockery, for that “this
wherefore the text goes on (Ecclus. 37:14,15), “Give no
man began to build and was not able to finish.” Now the
heed to these in any matter of counsel, but be continually
wherewithal to build the tower, as Augustine says (Ep. ad
with a holy man.” In these matters, however, one should
Laetum ccxliii), is nothing less than that “each one should
not take long deliberation. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep.
renounce all his possessions.” Yet it happens sometimes
and Paulin. liii): “Hasten, I pray thee, cut off rather than
that many cannot do this, nor keep other religious obser-
loosen the rope that holds the boat to the shore.” Thirdly,
vances; and in signification of this it is stated (1 Kings
we may consider the way of entering religion, and which
17:39) that David could not walk in Saul’s armor, for he
order one ought to enter, and about such matters also one
was not used to it. Therefore it would seem that one ought
may take counsel of those who will not stand in one’s way.
not to enter religion without long deliberation beforehand
Reply to Objection 1. The saying: “Try the spir-
and taking counsel of many.
its, if they be of God,” applies to matters admitting of
On the contrary, It is stated (Mat. 4:20) that upon
doubt whether the spirits be of God; thus those who are
our Lord’s calling them, Peter and Andrew “immediately
already in religion may doubt whether he who offers him-
leaving their nets, followed Him.” Here Chrysostom says
self to religion be led by the spirit of God, or be moved by
(Hom. xiv in Matth.): “Such obedience as this does Christ
hypocrisy. Wherefore they must try the postulant whether
require of us, that we delay not even for a moment.”
he be moved by the divine spirit. But for him who seeks to
I answer that, Long deliberation and the advice of
enter religion there can be no doubt but that the purpose
many are required in great matters of doubt, as the
of entering religion to which his heart has given birth is
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3); while advice is unnec-
from the spirit of God, for it is His spirit “that leads” man
essary in matters that are certain and fixed. Now with re-
“into the land of uprightness” (Ps. 142:10).
gard to entering religion three points may be considered.
Nor does this prove that it is not of God that some turn
First, the entrance itself into religion, considered by itself; back; since not all that is of God is incorruptible: else cor-and thus it is certain that entrance into religion is a greater ruptible creatures would not be of God, as the Manicheans
∗ The Douay version supplies the negative: ‘Treat not. . . nor with. . . ’
2078
hold, nor could some who have grace from God lose it, the text goes on to state, be Christ’s disciple, and this is to which is also heretical. But God’s “counsel” whereby He
build the tower.
makes even things corruptible and changeable, is imper-
The misgiving of those who hesitate as to whether they
ishable according to Is. 46:10, “My counsel shall stand
may be able to attain to perfection by entering religion is
and all My will shall be done.” Hence the purpose of en-
shown by many examples to be unreasonable. Hence Au-
tering religion needs not to be tried whether it be of God,
gustine says (Confess. viii, 11): “On that side whither I
because “it requires no further demonstration,” as a gloss
had set my face, and whither I trembled to go, there ap-
says on 1 Thess. 5:21, “Prove all things.”
peared to me the chaste dignity of continency. . . honestly
Reply to Objection 2.
Even as “the flesh lusteth
alluring me to come and doubt not, and stretching forth to
against the spirit” (Gal. 5:17), so too carnal friends often
receive and embrace me, her holy hands full of multitudes
thwart our spiritual progress, according to Mic. 7:6, “A
of good examples. There were so many young men and
man’s enemies are they of his own household.” Wherefore
maidens here, a multitude of youth and every age, grave
Cyril expounding Lk. 9:61, “Let me first take my leave of
widows and aged virgins. . . And she smiled at me with a
them that are at my house,” says∗: “By asking first to take
persuasive mockery as though to say: Canst not thou what
his leave of them that were at his house, he shows he was
these youths and these maidens can? Or can they either in
somewhat of two minds. For to communicate with his
themselves, and not rather in the Lord their God?. . . Why
neighbors, and consult those who are unwilling to relish
standest thou in thyself, and so standest not? Cast thyself
righteousness, is an indication of weakness and turning
upon Him; fear not, He will not withdraw Himself that
back. Hence he hears our Lord say: ‘No man putting his
thou shouldst fall. Cast thyself fearlessly upon Him: He
hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the king-
will receive and will heal thee.”
dom of God,’ because he looks back who seeks delay in
The example quoted of David is not to the point, be-
order to go home and confer with his kinsfolk.”
cause “the arms of Saul,” as a gloss on the passage ob-
Reply to Objection 3. The building of the tower sig-
serves, “are the sacraments of the Law, as being burden-
nifies the perfection of Christian life; and the renunciation
some”: whereas religion is the sweet yoke of Christ, for
of one’s possessions is the wherewithal to build this tower.
as Gregory says (Moral. iv, 33), “what burden does He lay
Now no one doubts or deliberates about wishing to have
on the shoulders of the mind, Who commands us to shun
the wherewithal, or whether he is able to build the tower
all troublesome desires, Who warns us to turn aside from
if he have the wherewithal, but what does come under de-
the rough paths of this world?”
liberation is whether one has the wherewithal. Again it
To those indeed who take this sweet yoke upon them-
need not be a matter of deliberation whether one ought
selves He promises the refreshment of the divine fruition
to renounce all that one has, or whether by so doing one
and the eternal rest of their souls.
may be able to attain to perfection; whereas it is a matter
To which may He Who made this promise bring us, Je-
of deliberation whether that which one is doing amounts
sus Christ our Lord, “Who is over all things God blessed
to the renunciation of all that he has, since unless he does
for ever. Amen.”
renounce (which is to have the wherewithal) he cannot, as
∗ Cf. St. Thomas’s Catena Aurea
2079
THIRD PART
PROLOGUE
Forasmuch as our Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to “save His people from their sins” (Mat. 1:21), as the angel announced, showed unto us in His own Person the way of truth, whereby we may attain to the bliss of eternal life by rising again, it is necessary, in order to complete the work of theology, that after considering the last end of human life, and the virtues and vices, there should follow the consideration of the Saviour of all, and of the benefits bestowed by Him on the human race.
Concerning this we must consider (1) the Saviour Himself; (2) the sacraments by which we attain to our salvation; (3) the end of immortal life to which we attain by the resurrection.
Concerning the first, a double consideration occurs: the first, about the mystery of the Incarnation itself, whereby God was made man for our salvation; the second, about such things as were done and suffered by our Saviour—i.e.
God incarnate.
THIRD PART, QUESTION 1
Of the Fitness of the Incarnation
(In Six Articles)
Concerning the first, three things occur to be considered: first, the fitness of the Incarnation; secondly, the mode of union of the Word Incarnate; thirdly, what follows this union.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is fitting for God to become incarnate?
(2) Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race?
(3) Whether if there had been no sin God would have become incarnate?
(4) Whether He became incarnate to take away original sin rather than actual?
(5) Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate from the beginning of the world?
(6) Whether His Incarnation ought to have been deferred to the end of the world?
Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate?
IIIa q. 1 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting for
highest uncreated spirit should assume a body.
God to become incarnate. Since God from all eternity is
Objection 4.
Further, it is not becoming that He
the very essence of goodness, it was best for Him to be
Who surpassed the greatest things should be contained
as He had been from all eternity. But from all eternity He
in the least, and He upon Whom rests the care of great
had been without flesh. Therefore it was most fitting for
things should leave them for lesser things. But God—
Him not to be united to flesh. Therefore it was not fitting
Who takes care of the whole world—the whole universe
for God to become incarnate.
of things cannot contain. Therefore it would seem unfit-
Objection 2. Further, it is not fitting to unite things
ting that “He should be hid under the frail body of a babe
that are infinitely apart, even as it would not be a fitting
in swathing bands, in comparison with Whom the whole
union if one were “to paint a figure in which the neck of
universe is accounted as little; and that this Prince should
a horse was joined to the head of a man”∗. But God and
quit His throne for so long, and transfer the government of
flesh are infinitely apart; since God is most simple, and
the whole world to so frail a body,” as Volusianus writes
flesh is most composite—especially human flesh. There-
to Augustine (Ep. cxxxv).
fore it was not fitting that God should be united to human
On the contrary, It would seem most fitting that by
flesh.
visible things the invisible things of God should be made
Objection 3. Further, a body is as distant from the
known; for to this end was the whole world made, as is
highest spirit as evil is from the highest good. But it
clear from the word of the Apostle (Rom. 1:20): “For the
was wholly unfitting that God, Who is the highest good,
invisible things of God. . . are clearly seen, being under-
should assume evil. Therefore it was not fitting that the
stood by the things that are made.” But, as Damascene
∗ Horace, Ars. Poet., line 1
2080
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 1), by the mystery of the Incar-the creature began to be, although it had not been before,
nation are made known at once the goodness, the wis-
so likewise, not having been previously united to God in
dom, the justice, and the power or might of God—“His
Person, it was afterwards united to Him.
goodness, for He did not despise the weakness of His own
Reply to Objection 2. To be united to God in unity
handiwork; His justice, since, on man’s defeat, He caused
of person was not fitting to human flesh, according to its
the tyrant to be overcome by none other than man, and yet
natural endowments, since it was above its dignity; nev-
He did not snatch men forcibly from death; His wisdom,
ertheless, it was fitting that God, by reason of His infinite
for He found a suitable discharge for a most heavy debt;
goodness, should unite it to Himself for man’s salvation.
His power, or infinite might, for there is nothing greater
Reply to Objection 3. Every mode of being wherein
than for God to become incarnate. . . ”
any creature whatsoever differs from the Creator has been
I answer that, To each things, that is befitting which
established by God’s wisdom, and is ordained to God’s
belongs to it by reason of its very nature; thus, to reason
goodness. For God, Who is uncreated, immutable, and in-
befits man, since this belongs to him because he is of a
corporeal, produced mutable and corporeal creatures for
rational nature. But the very nature of God is goodness,
His own goodness. And so also the evil of punishment
as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Hence, what
was established by God’s justice for God’s glory. But evil
belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. But it be-
of fault is committed by withdrawing from the art of the
longs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to
Divine wisdom and from the order of the Divine good-
others, as is plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Hence
ness. And therefore it could be fitting to God to assume a
it belongs to the essence of the highest good to communi-
nature created, mutable, corporeal, and subject to penalty,
cate itself in the highest manner to the creature, and this
but it did not become Him to assume the evil of fault.
is brought about chiefly by “His so joining created nature
Reply to Objection 4.
As Augustine replies (Ep.
to Himself that one Person is made up of these three—the
ad Volusian. cxxxvii): “The Christian doctrine nowhere
Word, a soul and flesh,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii).
holds that God was so joined to human flesh as either to
Hence it is manifest that it was fitting that God should be-
desert or lose, or to transfer and as it were, contract within
come incarnate.
this frail body, the care of governing the universe. This is
Reply to Objection 1. The mystery of the Incarna-
the thought of men unable to see anything but corporeal
tion was not completed through God being changed in any
things. . . God is great not in mass, but in might. Hence the
way from the state in which He had been from eternity,
greatness of His might feels no straits in narrow surround-
but through His having united Himself to the creature in
ings. Nor, if the passing word of a man is heard at once
a new way, or rather through having united it to Himself.
by many, and wholly by each, is it incredible that the abid-
But it is fitting that a creature which by nature is muta-
ing Word of God should be everywhere at once?” Hence
ble, should not always be in one way. And therefore, as
nothing unfitting arises from God becoming incarnate.
Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race that the Word of God IIIa q. 1 a. 2
should become incarnate?
Objection 1. It would seem that it was not necessary
Objection 3. Further, to revere God pertains espe-
for the reparation of the human race that the Word of God
cially to man’s salvation; hence it is written (Mal. 1:6):
should become incarnate. For since the Word of God is
“If, then, I be a father, where is my honor? and if I be a
perfect God, as has been said ( Ia, q. 4, Aa. 1,2), no power
master, where is my fear?” But men revere God the more
was added to Him by the assumption of flesh. Therefore,
by considering Him as elevated above all, and far beyond
if the incarnate Word of God restored human nature. He
man’s senses, hence (Ps. 112:4) it is written: “The Lord is
could also have restored it without assuming flesh.
high above all nations, and His glory above the heavens”;
Objection 2. Further, for the restoration of human
and farther on: “Who is as the Lord our God?” which per-
nature, which had fallen through sin, nothing more is re-
tains to reverence. Therefore it would seem unfitting to
quired than that man should satisfy for sin. Now man can
man’s salvation that God should be made like unto us by
satisfy, as it would seem, for sin; for God cannot require
assuming flesh.
from man more than man can do, and since He is more
On the contrary, What frees the human race from
inclined to be merciful than to punish, as He lays the act
perdition is necessary for the salvation of man. But the
of sin to man’s charge, so He ought to credit him with
mystery of the Incarnation is such; according to Jn. 3:16:
the contrary act. Therefore it was not necessary for the
“God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten
restoration of human nature that the Word of God should
Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but
become incarnate.
may have life everlasting.” Therefore it was necessary for
2081
man’s salvation that God should become incarnate.
xvi): “God has proved to us how high a place human na-
I answer that, A thing is said to be necessary for a
ture holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared
certain end in two ways. First, when the end cannot be
to men as a true man.” And Pope Leo says in a sermon
without it; as food is necessary for the preservation of hu-
on the Nativity (xxi): “Learn, O Christian, thy worth; and
man life. Secondly, when the end is attained better and
being made a partner of the Divine nature, refuse to re-
more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for a journey.
turn by evil deeds to your former worthlessness.” Thirdly,
In the first way it was not necessary that God should be-
because, “in order to do away with man’s presumption,
come incarnate for the restoration of human nature. For
the grace of God is commended in Jesus Christ, though
God with His omnipotent power could have restored hu-
no merits of ours went before,” as Augustine says (De
man nature in many other ways. But in the second way it
Trin. xiii, 17). Fourthly, because “man’s pride, which is
was necessary that God should become incarnate for the
the greatest stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can
restoration of human nature. Hence Augustine says (De
be convinced and cured by humility so great,” as Augus-
Trin. xii, 10): “We shall also show that other ways were
tine says in the same place. Fifthly, in order to free man
not wanting to God, to Whose power all things are equally
from the thraldom of sin, which, as Augustine says (De
subject; but that there was not a more fitting way of heal-
Trin. xiii, 13), “ought to be done in such a way that the
ing our misery.”
devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Je-
Now this may be viewed with respect to our “fur-
sus Christ,” and this was done by Christ satisfying for us.
therance in good.”
First, with regard to faith, which
Now a mere man could not have satisfied for the whole
is made more certain by believing God Himself Who
human race, and God was not bound to satisfy; hence it
speaks; hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 2): “In
behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and man. Hence
order that man might journey more trustfully toward the
Pope Leo says in the same sermon: “Weakness is assumed
truth, the Truth itself, the Son of God, having assumed
by strength, lowliness by majesty, mortality by eternity, in
human nature, established and founded faith.” Secondly,
order that one and the same Mediator of God and men
with regard to hope, which is thereby greatly strength-
might die in one and rise in the other—for this was our
ened; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): “Nothing was
fitting remedy. Unless He was God, He would not have
so necessary for raising our hope as to show us how deeply
brought a remedy; and unless He was man, He would not
God loved us. And what could afford us a stronger proof
have set an example.”
of this than that the Son of God should become a partner
And there are very many other advantages which ac-
with us of human nature?” Thirdly, with regard to charity,
crued, above man’s apprehension.
which is greatly enkindled by this; hence Augustine says
Reply to Objection 1. This reason has to do with the
(De Catech. Rudib. iv): “What greater cause is there of
first kind of necessity, without which we cannot attain to
the Lord’s coming than to show God’s love for us?” And
the end.
he afterwards adds: “If we have been slow to love, at least
Reply to Objection 2. Satisfaction may be said to be
let us hasten to love in return.” Fourthly, with regard to
sufficient in two ways—first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is
well-doing, in which He set us an example; hence Augus-
condign, being adequate to make good the fault commit-
tine says in a sermon (xxii de Temp.): “Man who might be
ted, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man cannot
seen was not to be followed; but God was to be followed,
be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human na-
Who could not be seen. And therefore God was made
ture has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of
man, that He Who might be seen by man, and Whom man
any person or persons could not be made up adequately
might follow, might be shown to man.” Fifthly, with re-
for the harm done to the whole of the nature; and also
gard to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the
because a sin committed against God has a kind of infin-
true bliss of man and end of human life; and this is be-
ity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the
stowed upon us by Christ’s humanity; for Augustine says
greater the person we offend, the more grievous the of-
in a sermon (xiii de Temp.): “Go was made man, that man
fense. Hence for condign satisfaction it was necessary
might be made God.”
that the act of the one satisfying should have an infinite ef-
So also was this useful for our “withdrawal from evil.”
ficiency, as being of God and man. Secondly, man’s satis-
First, because man is taught by it not to prefer the devil
faction may be termed sufficient, imperfectly—i.e. in the
to himself, nor to honor him who is the author of sin;
acceptation of him who is content with it, even though it is
hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): “Since human
not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man
nature is so united to God as to become one person, let
is sufficient. And forasmuch as every imperfect presup-
not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man,
poses some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence
because they have no bodies.” Secondly, because we are
it is that satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency
thereby taught how great is man’s dignity, lest we should
from the satisfaction of Christ.
sully it with sin; hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig.
Reply to Objection 3. By taking flesh, God did not
2082
lessen His majesty; and in consequence did not lessen the much as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He
reason for reverencing Him, which is increased by the in-
greatly drew us to know Him.
crease of knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary, inas-
Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?
IIIa q. 1 a. 3
Objection 1.
It would seem that if man had not
would not have come.” And on 1 Tim. 1:15, “Christ Jesus
sinned, God would still have become incarnate. For the
came into this world to save sinners,” a gloss says, “There
cause remaining, the effect also remains. But as Augus-
was no cause of Christ’s coming into the world, except to
tine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): “Many other things are to
save sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and
be considered in the Incarnation of Christ besides abso-
there is no need of medicine.”
lution from sin”; and these were discussed above (a. 2).
I answer that, There are different opinions about this
Therefore if man had not sinned, God would have become
question. For some say that even if man had not sinned,
incarnate.
the Son of Man would have become incarnate. Others as-
Objection 2. Further, it belongs to the omnipotence
sert the contrary, and seemingly our assent ought rather to
of the Divine power to perfect His works, and to mani-
be given to this opinion.
fest Himself by some infinite effect. But no mere crea-
For such things as spring from God’s will, and beyond
ture can be called an infinite effect, since it is finite of
the creature’s due, can be made known to us only through
its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of the In-
being revealed in the Sacred Scripture, in which the Di-
carnation alone is an infinite effect of the Divine power
vine Will is made known to us. Hence, since everywhere
manifested in a special manner by which power things in-
in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned
finitely distant are united, inasmuch as it has been brought
as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance
about that man is God. And in this work especially the
with this to say that the work of the Incarnation was or-
universe would seem to be perfected, inasmuch as the last
dained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not
creature—viz. man—is united to the first principle—viz.
existed, the Incarnation would not have been. And yet
God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would
the power of God is not limited to this; even had sin not
have become incarnate.
existed, God could have become incarnate.
Objection 3.
Further, human nature has not been
Reply to Objection 1. All the other causes which are
made more capable of grace by sin. But after sin it is
assigned in the preceding article have to do with a remedy
capable of the grace of union, which is the greatest grace.
for sin. For if man had not sinned, he would have been en-
Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature would
dowed with the light of Divine wisdom, and would have
have been capable of this grace; nor would God have
been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice
withheld from human nature any good it was capable of.
in order to know and carry out everything needful. But
Therefore, if man had not sinned, God would have be-
because man, on deserting God, had stooped to corporeal
come incarnate.
things, it was necessary that God should take flesh, and
Objection 4. Further, God’s predestination is eternal.
by corporeal things should afford him the remedy of sal-
But it is said of Christ (Rom. 1:4): “Who was predes-
vation. Hence, on Jn. 1:14, “And the Word was made
tined the Son of God in power.” Therefore, even before
flesh,” St. Augustine says (Tract. ii): “Flesh had blinded
sin, it was necessary that the Son of God should become
thee, flesh heals thee; for Christ came and overthrew the
incarnate, in order to fulfil God’s predestination.
vices of the flesh.”
Objection 5. Further, the mystery of the Incarnation
Reply to Objection 2. The infinity of Divine power is
was revealed to the first man, as is plain from Gn. 2:23.
shown in the mode of production of things from nothing.
“This now is bone of my bones,” etc. which the Apostle
Again, it suffices for the perfection of the universe that the
says is “a great sacrament. . . in Christ and in the Church,”
creature be ordained in a natural manner to God as to an
as is plain from Eph. 5:32. But man could not be fore-
end. But that a creature should be united to God in person
conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the angels
exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature.
could not, as Augustine proves (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18).
Reply to Objection 3. A double capability may be
Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have
remarked in human nature: one, in respect of the order of
become incarnate.
natural power, and this is always fulfilled by God, Who
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost.
apportions to each according to its natural capability; the
viii, 2), expounding what is set down in Lk. 19:10, “For
other in respect to the order of the Divine power, which
the Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was
all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak
lost”; “Therefore, if man had not sinned, the Son of Man
of pertains to this. But God does not fulfil all such capa-
2083
bilities, otherwise God could do only what He has done foreknowledge of future things; and hence, as God pre-in creatures, and this is false, as stated above ( Ia, q. 105,
destines the salvation of anyone to be brought about by
a. 6). But there is no reason why human nature should not
the prayers of others, so also He predestined the work of
have been raised to something greater after sin. For God
the Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin.
allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good
Reply to Objection 5. Nothing prevents an effect
therefrom; hence it is written (Rom. 5:20): “Where sin
from being revealed to one to whom the cause is not re-
abounded, grace did more abound.” Hence, too, in the
vealed. Hence, the mystery of the Incarnation could be
blessing of the Paschal candle, we say: “O happy fault,
revealed to the first man without his being fore-conscious
that merited such and so great a Redeemer!”
of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows
Reply to Objection 4. Predestination presupposes the
the cause.
Whether God became incarnate in order to take away actual sin, rather than to take IIIa q. 1 a. 4
away original sin?
Objection 1. It would seem that God became incar-
Moreover, the more grievous the sin, the more partic-
nate as a remedy for actual sins rather than for original
ularly did Christ come to blot it out. But “greater” is said
sin. For the more grievous the sin, the more it runs counter
in two ways: in one way “intensively,” as a more intense
to man’s salvation, for which God became incarnate. But
whiteness is said to be greater, and in this way actual sin
actual sin is more grievous than original sin; for the light-
is greater than original sin; for it has more of the nature
est punishment is due to original sin, as Augustine says
of voluntary, as has been shown ( Ia IIae, q. 81, a. 1). In
(Contra Julian. v, 11). Therefore the Incarnation of Christ
another way a thing is said to be greater “extensively,” as
is chiefly directed to taking away actual sins.
whiteness on a greater superficies is said to be greater; and
Objection 2. Further, pain of sense is not due to orig-
in this way original sin, whereby the whole human race is
inal sin, but merely pain of loss, as has been shown ( Ia
infected, is greater than any actual sin, which is proper to
IIae, q. 87, a. 5). But Christ came to suffer the pain of
one person. And in this respect Christ came principally to
sense on the Cross in satisfaction for sins—and not the
take away original sin, inasmuch as “the good of the race
pain of loss, for He had no defect of either the beatific vi-
is a more Divine thing than the good of an individual,” as
sion or fruition. Therefore He came in order to take away
is said Ethic. i, 2.
actual sin rather than original sin.
Reply to Objection 1. This reason looks to the inten-
Objection 3. Further, as Chrysostom says (De Com-
sive greatness of sin.
punctione Cordis ii, 3): “This must be the mind of the
Reply to Objection 2. In the future award the pain of
faithful servant, to account the benefits of his Lord, which
sense will not be meted out to original sin. Yet the penal-
have been bestowed on all alike, as though they were be-
ties, such as hunger, thirst, death, and the like, which we
stowed on himself alone. For as if speaking of himself
suffer sensibly in this life flow from original sin. And
alone, Paul writes to the Galatians 2:20: ‘Christ. . . loved
hence Christ, in order to satisfy fully for original sin,
me and delivered Himself for me.’ ” But our individual
wished to suffer sensible pain, that He might consume
sins are actual sins; for original sin is the common sin.
death and the like in Himself.
Therefore we ought to have this conviction, so as to be-
Reply to Objection 3. Chrysostom says (De Com-
lieve that He has come chiefly for actual sins.
punctione Cordis ii, 6): “The Apostle used these words,
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): “Behold
not as if wishing to diminish Christ’s gifts, ample as they
the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sins
are, and spreading throughout the whole world, but that
[Vulg.: ‘sin’] of the world.”
he might account himself alone the occasion of them. For
I answer that, It is certain that Christ came into this
what does it matter that they are given to others, if what
world not only to take away that sin which is handed on
are given to you are as complete and perfect as if none of
originally to posterity, but also in order to take away all
them were given to another than yourself?” And hence,
sins subsequently added to it; not that all are taken away
although a man ought to account Christ’s gifts as given to
(and this is from men’s fault, inasmuch as they do not ad-
himself, yet he ought not to consider them not to be given
here to Christ, according to Jn. 3:19: “The light is come
to others. And thus we do not exclude that He came to
into the world, and men loved darkness rather than the
wipe away the sin of the whole nature rather than the sin of
light”), but because He offered what was sufficient for
one person. But the sin of the nature is as perfectly healed
blotting out all sins. Hence it is written (Rom. 5:15-16):
in each one as if it were healed in him alone. Hence, on
“But not as the offense, so also the gift. . . For judgment in-
account of the union of charity, what is vouchsafed to all
deed was by one unto condemnation, but grace is of many
ought to be accounted his own by each one.
offenses unto justification.”
2084
Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of the hu-IIIa q. 1 a. 5
man race?
Objection 1. It would seem that it was fitting that
words in Gal. 3:19, “Being ordained by angels in the hand
God should become incarnate in the beginning of the hu-
of a mediator,” a gloss says: “With great wisdom was it
man race. For the work of the Incarnation sprang from
so ordered that the Son of Man should not be sent imme-
the immensity of Divine charity, according to Eph. 2:4,5:
diately after man’s fall. For first of all God left man under
“But God (Who is rich in mercy), for His exceeding char-
the natural law, with the freedom of his will, in order that
ity wherewith He loved us. . . even when we were dead in
he might know his natural strength; and when he failed
sins, hath quickened us together in Christ.” But charity
in it, he received the law; whereupon, by the fault, not of
does not tarry in bringing assistance to a friend who is
the law, but of his nature, the disease gained strength; so
suffering need, according to Prov. 3:28: “Say not to thy
that having recognized his infirmity he might cry out for a
friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow I will give to
physician, and beseech the aid of grace.”
thee, when thou canst give at present.” Therefore God
Secondly, on account of the order of furtherance in
ought not to have put off the work of the Incarnation, but
good, whereby we proceed from imperfection to perfec-
ought thereby to have brought relief to the human race
tion. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46,47): “Yet that
from the beginning.
was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural;
Objection 2. Further, it is written (1 Tim. 1:15):
afterwards that which is spiritual. . . The first man was of
“Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners.” But
the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly.”
more would have been saved had God become incarnate
Thirdly, on account of the dignity of the incarnate
at the beginning of the human race; for in the various cen-
Word, for on the words (Gal. 4:4), “But when the ful-
turies very many, through not knowing God, perished in
ness of the time was come,” a gloss says: “The greater the
their sin. Therefore it was fitting that God should become
judge who was coming, the more numerous was the band
incarnate at the beginning of the human race.
of heralds who ought to have preceded him.”
Objection 3. Further, the work of grace is not less
Fourthly, lest the fervor of faith should cool by the
orderly than the work of nature. But nature takes its rise
length of time, for the charity of many will grow cold at
with the more perfect, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii).
the end of the world. Hence (Lk. 18:8) it is written: “But
Therefore the work of Christ ought to have been perfect
yet the Son of Man, when He cometh, shall He find think
from the beginning. But in the work of the Incarnation we
you, faith on earth?”
see the perfection of grace, according to Jn. 1:14: “The
Reply to Objection 1. Charity does not put off bring-
Word was made flesh”; and afterwards it is added: “Full of
ing assistance to a friend: always bearing in mind the cir-
grace and truth.” Therefore Christ ought to have become
cumstances as well as the state of the persons. For if the
incarnate at the beginning of the human race.
physician were to give the medicine at the very outset of
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:4): “But when
the ailment, it would do less good, and would hurt rather
the fulness of the time was come, God sent His Son, made
than benefit. And hence the Lord did not bestow upon the
of a woman, made under the law”: upon which a gloss
human race the remedy of the Incarnation in the begin-
says that “the fulness of the time is when it was decreed by
ning, lest they should despise it through pride, if they did
God the Father to send His Son.” But God decreed every-
not already recognize their disease.
thing by His wisdom. Therefore God became incarnate at
Reply to Objection 2.
Augustine replies to this
the most fitting time; and it was not fitting that God should
(De Sex Quest.
Pagan., Ep.
cii), saying (q. 2) that
become incarnate at the beginning of the human race.
“Christ wished to appear to man and to have His doctrine
I answer that, Since the work of the Incarnation is
preached to them when and where He knew those were
principally ordained to the restoration of the human race
who would believe in Him. But in such times and places
by blotting out sin, it is manifest that it was not fitting
as His Gospel was not preached He foresaw that not all,
for God to become incarnate at the beginning of the hu-
indeed, but many would so bear themselves towards His
man race before sin. For medicine is given only to the
preaching as not to believe in His corporeal presence, even
sick. Hence our Lord Himself says (Mat. 9:12,13): “They
were He to raise the dead.” But the same Augustine, tak-
that are in health need not a physician, but they that are
ing exception to this reply in his book (De Perseverantia
ill. . . For I am not come to call the just, but sinners.”
ix), says: “How can we say the inhabitants of Tyre and
Nor was it fitting that God should become incarnate
Sidon would not believe when such great wonders were
immediately after sin. First, on account of the manner of
wrought in their midst, or would not have believed had
man’s sin, which had come of pride; hence man was to
they been wrought, when God Himself bears witness that
be liberated in such a manner that he might be humbled,
they would have done penance with great humility if these
and see how he stood in need of a deliverer. Hence on the
signs of Divine power had been wrought in their midst?”
2085
And he adds in answer (De Perseverantia xi): “Hence, as Reply to Objection 3. Perfection is prior to imperfec-the Apostle says (Rom. 9:16), ‘it is not of him that willeth
tion, both in time and nature, in things that are different
nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy’;
(for what brings others to perfection must itself be per-
Who (succors whom He will of) those who, as He fore-
fect); but in one and the same, imperfection is prior in
saw, would believe in His miracles if wrought amongst
time though posterior in nature. And thus the eternal per-
them, (while others) He succors not, having judged them
fection of God precedes in duration the imperfection of
in His predestination secretly yet justly. Therefore let us
human nature; but the latter’s ultimate perfection in union
unshrinkingly believe His mercy to be with those who are
with God follows.
set free, and His truth with those who are condemned.”∗.
Whether the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world?
IIIa q. 1 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the work of the In-
carnation human nature is raised to its highest perfection;
carnation ought to have been put off till the end of the
and in this way it was not becoming that the Incarnation
world. For it is written (Ps. 91:11): “My old age in plen-
should take place at the beginning of the human race. And
tiful mercy”—i.e. “in the last days,” as a gloss says. But
the Word incarnate is the efficient cause of the perfection
the time of the Incarnation is especially the time of mercy,
of human nature, according to Jn. 1:16: “Of His fulness
according to Ps. 101:14: “For it is time to have mercy on
we have all received”; and hence the work of the Incar-
it.” Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off
nation ought not to have been put off till the end of the
till the end of the world.
world. But the perfection of glory to which human nature
Objection 2. Further, as has been said (a. 5, ad 3), in
is to be finally raised by the Word Incarnate will be at the
the same subject, perfection is subsequent in time to im-
end of the world.
perfection. Therefore, what is most perfect ought to be
Secondly, from the effect of man’s salvation; for, as
the very last in time. But the highest perfection of human
is said Qq. Vet et Nov. Test., qu. 83, “it is in the power
nature is in the union with the Word, because “in Christ it
of the Giver to have pity when, or as much as, He wills.
hath pleased the Father that all the fulness of the Godhead
Hence He came when He knew it was fitting to succor,
should dwell,” as the Apostle says (Col. 1:19, and 2:9).
and when His boons would be welcome. For when by the
Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till
feebleness of the human race men’s knowledge of God be-
the end of the world.
gan to grow dim and their morals lax, He was pleased to
Objection 3. Further, what can be done by one ought
choose Abraham as a standard of the restored knowledge
not to be done by two. But the one coming of Christ at the
of God and of holy living; and later on when reverence
end of the world was sufficient for the salvation of human
grew weaker, He gave the law to Moses in writing; and be-
nature. Therefore it was not necessary for Him to come
cause the gentiles despised it and would not take it upon
beforehand in His Incarnation; and hence the Incarnation
themselves, and they who received it would not keep it,
ought to have been put off till the end of the world.
being touched with pity, God sent His Son, to grant to all
On the contrary, It is written (Hab. 3:2): “In the
remission of their sin and to offer them, justified, to God
midst of the years Thou shalt make it known.” Therefore
the Father.” But if this remedy had been put off till the end
the mystery of the Incarnation which was made known to
of the world, all knowledge and reverence of God and all
the world ought not to have been put off till the end of the
uprightness of morals would have been swept away from
world.
the earth.
I answer that, As it was not fitting that God should
Thirdly, this appears fitting to the manifestation of the
become incarnate at the beginning of the world, so also it
Divine power, which has saved men in several ways—not
was not fitting that the Incarnation should be put off till
only by faith in some future thing, but also by faith in
the end of the world. And this is shown first from the
something present and past.
union of the Divine and human nature. For, as it has been
Reply to Objection 1. This gloss has in view the
said (a. 5, ad 3), perfection precedes imperfection in time
mercy of God, which leads us to glory. Nevertheless, if
in one way, and contrariwise in another way imperfection
it is referred to the mercy shown the human race by the
precedes perfection. For in that which is made perfect
Incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as Augustine
from being imperfect, imperfection precedes perfection in
says (Retract. i), the time of the Incarnation may be com-
time, whereas in that which is the efficient cause of per-
pared to the youth of the human race, “on account of the
fection, perfection precedes imperfection in time. Now in
strength and fervor of faith, which works by charity”; and
the work of the Incarnation both concur; for by the In-
to old age—i.e. the sixth age—on account of the num-
∗ The words in brackets are not in the text of St. Augustine
2086
ber of centuries, for Christ came in the sixth age. And to be viewed not as merely the terminus of a movement
although youth and old age cannot be together in a body,
from imperfection to perfection, but also as a principle of
yet they can be together in a soul, the former on account
perfection to human nature, as has been said.
of quickness, the latter on account of gravity. And hence
Reply to Objection 3. As Chrysostom says on Jn.
Augustine says elsewhere (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 44) that “it
3:11, “For God sent not His Son into the world to judge
was not becoming that the Master by Whose imitation the
the world” (Hom. xxviii): “There are two comings of
human race was to be formed to the highest virtue should
Christ: the first, for the remission of sins; the second, to
come from heaven, save in the time of youth.” But in an-
judge the world. For if He had not done so, all would have
other work (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 23) he says: that
perished together, since all have sinned and need the glory
Christ came in the sixth age—i.e. in the old age—of the
of God.” Hence it is plain that He ought not to have put
human race.
off the coming in mercy till the end of the world.
Reply to Objection 2. The work of the Incarnation is
2087
THIRD PART, QUESTION 2
Of the Mode of Union of the Word Incarnate
(In Twelve Articles)
Now we must consider the mode of union of the Incarnate Word; and, first, the union itself; secondly, the Person assuming; thirdly, the nature assumed.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature?
(2) Whether it took place in the Person?
(3) Whether it took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?
(4) Whether the Person or hypostasis of Christ is composite after the Incarnation?
(5) Whether any union of body and soul took place in Christ?
(6) Whether the human nature was united to the Word accidentally?
(7) Whether the union itself is something created?
(8) Whether it is the same as assumption?
(9) Whether the union of the two natures is the greatest union?
(10) Whether the union of the two natures in Christ was brought about by grace?
(11) Whether any merits preceded it?
(12) Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?
Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature?
IIIa q. 2 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that the Union of the
the word “nature” comes from nativity. Hence this word
Word Incarnate took place in the nature. For Cyril says
was used first of all to signify the begetting of living be-
(he is quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part
ings, which is called “birth” or “sprouting forth,” the word
ii, act. 1): “We must understand not two natures, but one
“natura” meaning, as it were, “nascitura.” Afterwards this
incarnate nature of the Word of God”; and this could not
word “nature” was taken to signify the principle of this
be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the
begetting; and because in living things the principle of
union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature.
generation is an intrinsic principle, this word “nature” was
Objection 2. Further, Athanasius says that, as the ra-
further employed to signify any intrinsic principle of mo-
tional soul and the flesh together form the human nature,
tion: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that “nature is
so God and man together form a certain one nature; there-
the principle of motion in that in which it is essentially
fore the union took place in the nature.
and not accidentally.” Now this principle is either form or
Objection 3. Further, of two natures one is not de-
matter. Hence sometimes form is called nature, and some-
nominated by the other unless they are to some extent
times matter. And because the end of natural generation,
mutually transmuted. But the Divine and human natures
in that which is generated, is the essence of the species,
in Christ are denominated one by the other; for Cyril says
which the definition signifies, this essence of the species
(quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii,
is called the “nature.” And thus Boethius defines nature
act. 1) that the Divine nature “is incarnate”; and Gregory
(De Duab. Nat.): “Nature is what informs a thing with
Nazianzen says (Ep. i ad Cledon.) that the human nature
its specific difference,”—i.e. which perfects the specific
is “deified,” as appears from Damascene (De Fide Orth.
definition. But we are now speaking of nature as it signi-
iii, 6,11). Therefore from two natures one seems to have
fies the essence, or the “what-it-is,” or the quiddity of the
resulted.
species.
On the contrary, It is said in the declaration of the
Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that
Council of Chalcedon: “We confess that in these latter
the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature.
times the only-begotten Son of God appeared in two na-
For one thing is made of two or more in three ways. First,
tures, without confusion, without change, without divi-
from two complete things which remain in their perfec-
sion, without separation—the distinction of natures not
tion. This can only happen to those whose form is com-
having been taken away by the union.” Therefore the
position, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many
union did not take place in the nature.
stones brought together without any order, but solely with
I answer that, To make this question clear we must
juxtaposition; and a house is made of stones and beams ar-
consider what is “nature.” Now it is to be observed that
ranged in order, and fashioned to a figure. And in this way
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some said the union was by manner of confusion (which of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot be the
is without order) or by manner of commensuration (which
form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since
is with order). But this cannot be. First, because neither
it would follow that the species resulting therefrom would
composition nor order nor figure is a substantial form, but
be communicable to several, and thus there would be sev-
accidental; and hence it would follow that the union of the
eral Christs. Thirdly, because Christ would exist neither
Incarnation was not essential, but accidental, which will
in human nature nor in the Divine Nature: since any dif-
be disproved later on (a. 6). Secondly, because thereby
ference varies the species, as unity varies number, as is
we should not have an absolute unity, but relative only,
said (Metaph. viii, text. 10).
for there remain several things actually. Thirdly, because
Reply to Objection 1. This authority of Cyril is ex-
the form of such is not a nature, but an art, as the form of
pounded in the Fifth Synod (i.e. Constantinople II, coll.
a house; and thus one nature would not be constituted in
viii, can. 8) thus: “If anyone proclaiming one nature of
Christ, as they wish.
the Word of God to be incarnate does not receive it as
Secondly, one thing is made up of several things, per-
the Fathers taught, viz. that from the Divine and human
fect but changed, as a mixture is made up of its elements;
natures (a union in subsistence having taken place) one
and in this way some have said that the union of the In-
Christ results, but endeavors from these words to intro-
carnation was brought about by manner of combination.
duce one nature or substance of the Divinity and flesh of
But this cannot be. First, because the Divine Nature is al-
Christ, let such a one be anathema.” Hence the sense is
together immutable, as has been said ( Ia, q. 9, Aa. 1,2),
not that from two natures one results; but that the Nature
hence neither can it be changed into something else, since
of the Word of God united flesh to Itself in Person.
it is incorruptible; nor can anything else be changed into
Reply to Objection 2. From the soul and body a
it, for it cannot be generated. Secondly, because what is
double unity, viz. of nature and person—results in each
mixed is of the same species with none of the elements;
individual—of nature inasmuch as the soul is united to the
for flesh differs in species from any of its elements. And
body, and formally perfects it, so that one nature springs
thus Christ would be of the same nature neither with His
from the two as from act and potentiality or from matter
Father nor with His Mother. Thirdly, because there can
and form. But the comparison is not in this sense, for the
be no mingling of things widely apart; for the species of
Divine Nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proved
one of them is absorbed, e.g. if we were to put a drop of
( Ia, q. 3, a. 8). Unity of person results from them, how-
water in a flagon of wine. And hence, since the Divine
ever, inasmuch as there is an individual subsisting in flesh
Nature infinitely exceeds the human nature, there could
and soul; and herein lies the likeness, for the one Christ
be no mixture, but the Divine Nature alone would remain.
subsists in the Divine and human natures.
Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor
Reply to Objection 3. As Damascene says (De Fide
changed, but imperfect; as man is made up of soul and
Orth. iii, 6,11), the Divine Nature is said to be incarnate
body, and likewise of divers members. But this cannot
because It is united to flesh personally, and not that It is
be said of the mystery of the Incarnation. First, because
changed into flesh. So likewise the flesh is said to be dei-
each nature, i.e. the Divine and the human, has its spe-
fied, as he also says (De Fide Orth. 15,17), not by change,
cific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and hu-
but by union with the Word, its natural properties still re-
man natures cannot constitute anything after the manner
maining, and hence it may be considered as deified, inas-
of quantitative parts, as the members make up the body;
much as it becomes the flesh of the Word of God, but not
for the Divine Nature is incorporeal; nor after the manner
that it becomes God.
Whether the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the Person?
IIIa q. 2 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the In-
sonality.
carnate Word did not take place in the person. For the
Objection 3. Further, as Boethius says (De Duab.
Person of God is not distinct from His Nature, as we said
Nat.), a person is an individual substance of rational na-
( Ia, q. 39, a. 1). If, therefore, the union did not take place ture. But the Word of God assumed an individual human
in the nature, it follows that it did not take place in the
nature, for “universal human nature does not exist of it-
person.
self, but is the object of pure thought,” as Damascene says
Objection 2. Further, Christ’s human nature has no
(De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the human nature of
less dignity than ours. But personality belongs to dignity,
Christ has its personality. Hence it does not seem that the
as was stated above ( Ia, q. 29, a. 3, ad 2). Hence, since
union took place in the person.
our human nature has its proper personality, much more
On the contrary, We read in the Synod of Chalcedon
reason was there that Christ’s should have its proper per-
(Part ii, act. 5): “We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is
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not parted or divided into two persons, but is one and the Person are not really distinct, yet they have distinct mean-same only-Begotten Son and Word of God.” Therefore
ings, as was said above, inasmuch as person signifies after
the union took place in the person.
the manner of something subsisting. And because human
I answer that, Person has a different meaning from
nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists in
“nature.” For nature, as has been said (a. 1), designates
it, and not so that His Nature receives therefrom any addi-
the specific essence which is signified by the definition.
tion or change, it follows that the union of human nature
And if nothing was found to be added to what belongs
to the Word of God took place in the person, and not in
to the notion of the species, there would be no need to
the nature.
distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature
Reply to Objection 2. Personality pertains of neces-
(which is the individual subsisting in this nature), because
sity to the dignity of a thing, and to its perfection so far
every individual subsisting in a nature would be altogether
as it pertains to the dignity and perfection of that thing
one with its nature. Now in certain subsisting things we
to exist by itself (which is understood by the word “per-
happen to find what does not belong to the notion of the
son”). Now it is a greater dignity to exist in something
species, viz. accidents and individuating principles, which
nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself. Hence the
appears chiefly in such as are composed of matter and
human nature of Christ has a greater dignity than ours,
form. Hence in such as these the nature and the sup-
from this very fact that in us, being existent by itself, it
positum really differ; not indeed as if they were wholly
has its own personality, but in Christ it exists in the Per-
separate, but because the suppositum includes the nature,
son of the Word. Thus to perfect the species belongs to
and in addition certain other things outside the notion of
the dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in man, on ac-
the species. Hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole
count of its union with the nobler form which perfects the
which has the nature as its formal part to perfect it; and
species, is more noble than in brutes, where it is itself the
consequently in such as are composed of matter and form
form which perfects.
the nature is not predicated of the suppositum, for we do
Reply to Objection 3. The Word of God “did not as-
not say that this man is his manhood. But if there is a thing
sume human nature in general, but ‘in atomo’ ”—that is,
in which there is nothing outside the species or its nature
in an individual—as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
(as in God), the suppositum and the nature are not really
11) otherwise every man would be the Word of God, even
distinct in it, but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch
as Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every
it is called “nature” as it is an essence, and a “supposi-
individual in the genus of substance, even in rational na-
tum” as it is subsisting. And what is said of a supposi-
ture, is a person, but that alone which exists by itself, and
tum is to be applied to a person in rational or intellectual
not that which exists in some more perfect thing. Hence
creatures; for a person is nothing else than “an individ-
the hand of Socrates, although it is a kind of individual,
ual substance of rational nature,” according to Boethius.
is not a person, because it does not exist by itself, but in
Therefore, whatever adheres to a person is united to it in
something more perfect, viz. in the whole. And hence,
person, whether it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if
too, this is signified by a “person” being defined as “an
the human nature is not united to God the Word in person,
individual substance,” for the hand is not a complete sub-
it is nowise united to Him; and thus belief in the Incar-
stance, but part of a substance. Therefore, although this
nation is altogether done away with, and Christian faith
human nature is a kind of individual in the genus of sub-
wholly overturned. Therefore, inasmuch as the Word has
stance, it has not its own personality, because it does not
a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to
exist separately, but in something more perfect, viz. in the
His Divine Nature, it follows that the union took place in
Person of the Word. Therefore the union took place in the
the Person of the Word, and not in the nature.
person.
Reply to Objection 1. Although in God Nature and
Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?
IIIa q. 2 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the
injuries.” But “one” [aliud] and “the other” [aliud] differ
Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum or hy-
in suppositum. Therefore the union of the Word Incarnate
postasis. For Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxv, xxxviii):
did not take place in the suppositum.
“Both the Divine and human substance are one Son of
Objection 2.
Further, hypostasis is nothing more
God, but they are one thing [aliud] by reason of the Word
than a “particular substance,” as Boethius says (De Duab.
and another thing [aliud] by reason of the man.” And Pope
Nat.). But it is plain that in Christ there is another par-
Leo says in his letter to Flavian (Ep. xxviii): “One of
ticular substance beyond the hypostasis of the Word, viz.
these is glorious with miracles, the other succumbs under
the body and the soul and the resultant of these. Therefore
2090
there is another hypostasis in Him besides the hypostasis lies [supponitur] whatever belongs to man and receives its
of the Word.
predication. Therefore, if there is any hypostasis in Christ
Objection 3. Further, the hypostasis of the Word is
besides the hypostasis of the Word, it follows that what-
not included in any genus or species, as is plain from Ia,
ever pertains to man is verified of some other than the
q. 3, a. 5. But Christ, inasmuch as He is made man, is
Word, e.g. that He was born of a Virgin, suffered, was
contained under the species of man; for Dionysius says
crucified, was buried. And this, too, was condemned with
(Div. Nom. 1): “Within the limits of our nature He came,
the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 4) in
Who far surpasses the whole order of nature supersubstan-
these words: “If anyone ascribes to two persons or subsis-
tially.” Now nothing is contained under the human species
tences such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic
unless it be a hypostasis of the human species. Therefore
Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the saints, or
in Christ there is another hypostasis besides the hyposta-
by Himself of Himself, and, moreover, applies some of
sis of the Word of God; and hence the same conclusion
them to the man, taken as distinct from the Word of God,
follows as above.
and some of them (as if they could be used of God alone)
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
only to the Word of God the Father, let him be anathema.”
3,4,5): “In our Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two na-
Therefore it is plainly a heresy condemned long since by
tures and one hypostasis.”
the Church to say that in Christ there are two hypostases,
I answer that, Some who did not know the relation
or two supposita, or that the union did not take place in
of hypostasis to person, although granting that there is but
the hypostasis or suppositum. Hence in the same Synod
one person in Christ, held, nevertheless, that there is one
(can. 2) it is said: “If anyone does not confess that the
hypostasis of God and another of man, and hence that the
Word was united to flesh in subsistence, and that Christ
union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis.
with His flesh is both—to wit, God and man—let him be
Now this, for three reasons, is clearly erroneous. First,
anathema.”
because person only adds to hypostasis a determinate na-
Reply to Objection 1. As accidental difference makes
ture, viz. rational, according to what Boethius says (De
a thing “other” [alterum], so essential difference makes
Duab. Nat.), “a person is an individual substance of ratio-
“another thing” [aliud]. Now it is plain that the “oth-
nal nature”; and hence it is the same to attribute to the hu-
erness” which springs from accidental difference may
man nature in Christ a proper hypostasis and a proper per-
pertain to the same hypostasis or suppositum in created
son. And the holy Fathers, seeing this, condemned both
things, since the same thing numerically can underlie dif-
in the Fifth Council held at Constantinople, saying: “If
ferent accidents. But it does not happen in created things
anyone seeks to introduce into the mystery of the Incar-
that the same numerically can subsist in divers essences
nation two subsistences or two persons, let him be anath-
or natures. Hence just as when we speak of “otherness” in
ema. For by the incarnation of one of the Holy Trinity,
regard to creatures we do not signify diversity of supposi-
God the Word, the Holy Trinity received no augment of
tum, but only diversity of accidental forms, so likewise
person or subsistence.” Now “subsistence” is the same as
when Christ is said to be one thing or another thing, we
the subsisting thing, which is proper to hypostasis, as is
do not imply diversity of suppositum or hypostasis, but
plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Secondly, because
diversity of nature. Hence Gregory Nazianzen says in a
if it is granted that person adds to hypostasis something
letter to Chelidonius (Ep. ci): “In the Saviour we may
in which the union can take place, this something is noth-
find one thing and another, yet He is not one person and
ing else than a property pertaining to dignity; according
another. And I say ‘one thing and another’; whereas, on
as it is said by some that a person is a “hypostasis distin-
the contrary, in the Trinity we say one Person and another
guished by a property pertaining to dignity.” If, therefore,
(so as not to confuse the subsistences), but not one thing
the union took place in the person and not in the hyposta-
and another.”
sis, it follows that the union only took place in regard to
Reply to Objection 2. Hypostasis signifies a particu-
some dignity. And this is what Cyril, with the approval
lar substance, not in every way, but as it is in its comple-
of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 3), condemned in
ment. Yet as it is in union with something more complete,
these terms: “If anyone after the uniting divides the sub-
it is not said to be a hypostasis, as a hand or a foot. So like-sistences in the one Christ, only joining them in a union
wise the human nature in Christ, although it is a particular
of dignity or authority or power, and not rather in a con-
substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or
course of natural union, let him be anathema.” Thirdly,
suppositum, seeing that it is in union with a completed
because to the hypostasis alone are attributed the opera-
thing, viz. the whole Christ, as He is God and man. But
tions and the natural properties, and whatever belongs to
the complete being with which it concurs is said to be a
the nature in the concrete; for we say that this man rea-
hypostasis or suppositum.
sons, and is risible, and is a rational animal. So likewise
Reply to Objection 3. In created things a singular
this man is said to be a suppositum, because he under-
thing is placed in a genus or species, not on account of
2091
what belongs to its individuation, but on account of its na-that Christ is in the human species by reason of the nature
ture, which springs from its form, and in composite things
assumed, and not by reason of the hypostasis.
individuation is taken more from matter. Hence we say
Whether after the Incarnation the Person or Hypostasis of Christ is composite?
IIIa q. 2 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that the Person of Christ
tures, but one hypostasis composed from both.”
is not composite. For the Person of Christ is naught else
I answer that, The Person or hypostasis of Christ may
than the Person or hypostasis of the Word, as appears from
be viewed in two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus
what has been said (a. 2). But in the Word, Person and Na-
it is altogether simple, even as the Nature of the Word.
ture do not differ, as appears from Ia, q. 39, a. 1. There-
Secondly, in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which
fore since the Nature of the Word is simple, as was shown
it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the Person of
above ( Ia, q. 3, a. 7), it is impossible that the Person of
Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one
Christ be composite.
subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of
Objection 2. Further, all composition requires parts.
subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite per-
But the Divine Nature is incompatible with the notion of
son, insomuch as one being subsists in two.
a part, for every part implicates the notion of imperfec-
And thereby the solution to the first is clear.
tion. Therefore it is impossible that the Person of Christ
Reply to Objection 2. This composition of a person
be composed of two natures.
from natures is not so called on account of parts, but by
Objection 3. Further, what is composed of others
reason of number, even as that in which two things concur
would seem to be homogeneous with them, as from bod-
may be said to be composed of them.
ies only a body can be composed. Therefore if there is
Reply to Objection 3. It is not verified in every com-
anything in Christ composed of the two natures, it follows
position, that the thing composed is homogeneous with
that this will not be a person but a nature; and hence the
its component parts, but only in the parts of a continuous
union in Christ will take place in the nature, which is con-
thing; for the continuous is composed solely of continu-
trary to a. 2.
ous [parts]. But an animal is composed of soul and body,
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
and neither of these is an animal.
3,4,5), “In the Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two na-
Whether in Christ there is any union of soul and body?
IIIa q. 2 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was
save from its union with the soul. Now the body of Christ
no union of soul and body. For from the union of soul
is said to be animated, as the Church chants: “Taking an
and body in us a person or a human hypostasis is caused.
animate body, He deigned to be born of a Virgin”∗. There-
Hence if the soul and body were united in Christ, it fol-
fore in Christ there was a union of soul and body.
lows that a hypostasis resulted from their union. But this
I answer that, Christ is called a man univocally with
was not the hypostasis of God the Word, for It is eternal.
other men, as being of the same species, according to the
Therefore in Christ there would be a person or hypostasis
Apostle (Phil. 2:7), “being made in the likeness of a man.”
besides the hypostasis of the Word, which is contrary to
Now it belongs essentially to the human species that the
Aa. 2,3.
soul be united to the body, for the form does not constitute
Objection 2. Further, from the union of soul and body
the species, except inasmuch as it becomes the act of mat-
results the nature of the human species. But Damascene
ter, and this is the terminus of generation through which
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3), that “we must not conceive
nature intends the species. Hence it must be said that in
a common species in the Lord Jesus Christ.” Therefore
Christ the soul was united to the body; and the contrary is
there was no union of soul and body in Him.
heretical, since it destroys the truth of Christ’s humanity.
Objection 3. Further, the soul is united to the body for Reply to Objection 1. This would seem to be the reathe sole purpose of quickening it. But the body of Christ
son which was of weight with such as denied the union of
could be quickened by the Word of God Himself, seeing
the soul and body in Christ, viz. lest they should thereby
He is the fount and principle of life. Therefore in Christ
be forced to admit a second person or hypostasis in Christ,
there was no union of soul and body.
since they saw that the union of soul and body in mere
On the contrary, The body is not said to be animated
men resulted in a person. But this happens in mere men
∗ Feast of the Circumcision, Ant. ii, Lauds
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because the soul and body are so united in them as to ex-written (Lk. 24:39), “A spirit hath not flesh and bones as
ist by themselves. But in Christ they are united together,
you see Me to have.” Neither can it be said that the Son of
so as to be united to something higher, which subsists in
God assumed human nature as it is in all the individuals
the nature composed of them. And hence from the union
of the same species, otherwise He would have assumed all
of the soul and body in Christ a new hypostasis or person
men. Therefore it remains, as Damascene says further on
does not result, but what is composed of them is united
(De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that He assumed human nature “in
to the already existing hypostasis or Person. Nor does it
atomo,” i.e. in an individual; not, indeed, in another in-
therefore follow that the union of the soul and body in
dividual which is a suppositum or a person of that nature,
Christ is of less effect than in us, for its union with some-
but in the Person of the Son of God.
thing nobler does not lessen but increases its virtue and
Secondly, this saying of Damascene may be taken not
worth; just as the sensitive soul in animals constitutes the
as referring to human nature, as if from the union of soul
species, as being considered the ultimate form, yet it does
and body one common nature (viz. human) did not result,
not do so in man, although it is of greater effect and dig-
but as referring to the union of the two natures Divine and
nity, and this because of its union with a further and nobler
human: which do not combine so as to form a third some-
perfection, viz. the rational soul, as has been said above
thing that becomes a common nature, for in this way it
(a. 2, ad 2).
would become predicable of many, and this is what he is
Reply to Objection 2. This saying of Damascene may
aiming at, since he adds: “For there was not generated,
be taken in two ways: First, as referring to human nature,
neither will there ever be generated, another Christ, Who
which, as it is in one individual alone, has not the nature
from the Godhead and manhood, and in the Godhead and
of a common species, but only inasmuch as either it is ab-
manhood, is perfect God and perfect man.”
stracted from every individual, and considered in itself by
Reply to Objection 3. There are two principles of
the mind, or according as it is in all individuals. Now the
corporeal life: one the effective principle, and in this way
Son of God did not assume human nature as it exists in the
the Word of God is the principle of all life; the other, the
pure thought of the intellect, since in this way He would
formal principle of life, for since “in living things to be is
not have assumed human nature in reality, unless it be said
to live,” as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), just as
that human nature is a separate idea, just as the Platonists
everything is formally by its form, so likewise the body
conceived of man without matter. But in this way the Son
lives by the soul: in this way a body could not live by the
of God would not have assumed flesh, contrary to what is
Word, Which cannot be the form of a body.
Whether the human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally?
IIIa q. 2 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the human nature was
Godhead in Christ, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
united to the Word of God accidentally. For the Apostle
iii, 15), that “the flesh of Christ is the instrument of the
says (Phil. 2:7) of the Son of God, that He was “in habit
Godhead.” Therefore it seems that the human nature was
found as a man.” But habit is accidentally associated with
united to the Son of God accidentally.
that to which it pertains, whether habit be taken for one of
On the contrary, Whatever is predicated accidentally,
the ten predicaments or as a species of quality. Therefore
predicates, not substance, but quantity, or quality, or some
human nature is accidentally united to the Son of God.
other mode of being. If therefore the human nature ac-
Objection 2. Further, whatever comes to a thing that
crues accidentally, when we say Christ is man, we do not
is complete in being comes to it accidentally, for an acci-
predicate substance, but quality or quantity, or some other
dent is said to be what can come or go without the subject
mode of being, which is contrary to the Decretal of Pope
being corrupted. But human nature came to Christ in time,
Alexander III, who says (Conc. Later. iii): “Since Christ
Who had perfect being from eternity. Therefore it came
is perfect God and perfect man, what foolhardiness have
to Him accidentally.
some to dare to affirm that Christ as man is not a sub-
Objection 3. Further, whatever does not pertain to the
stance?”
nature or the essence of a thing is its accident, for what-
I answer that, In evidence of this question we must
ever is, is either a substance or an accident. But human
know that two heresies have arisen with regard to the
nature does not pertain to the Divine Essence or Nature
mystery of the union of the two natures in Christ. The
of the Son of God, for the union did not take place in the
first confused the natures, as Eutyches and Dioscorus,
nature, as was said above (a. 1). Hence the human nature
who held that from the two natures one nature resulted,
must have accrued accidentally to the Son of God.
so that they confessed Christ to be “from” two natures
Objection 4. Further, an instrument accrues acciden-
(which were distinct before the union), but not “in” two
tally. But the human nature was the instrument of the
natures (the distinction of nature coming to an end after
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the union). The second was the heresy of Nestorius and what came together” (i.e. destroying both natures), “con-Theodore of Mopsuestia, who separated the persons. For
fess a union by mingling; but the followers of Theodore
they held the Person of the Son of God to be distinct from
and Nestorius, maintaining division, introduce a union of
the Person of the Son of man, and said these were mutu-
purpose. But the Holy Church of God, rejecting the impi-
ally united: first, “by indwelling,” inasmuch as the Word
ety of both these treasons, confesses a union of the Word
of God dwelt in the man, as in a temple; secondly, “by
of God with flesh, by composition, which is in subsis-
unity of intention,” inasmuch as the will of the man was
tence.” Therefore it is plain that the second of the three
always in agreement with the will of the Word of God;
opinions, mentioned by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6), which
thirdly, “by operation,” inasmuch as they said the man was
holds one hypostasis of God and man, is not to be called
the instrument of the Word of God; fourthly, “by greatness
an opinion, but an article of Catholic faith. So likewise
of honor,” inasmuch as all honor shown to the Son of God
the first opinion which holds two hypostases, and the third
was equally shown to the Son of man, on account of His
which holds an accidental union, are not to be styled opin-
union with the Son of God; fifthly, “by equivocation,” i.e.
ions, but heresies condemned by the Church in Councils.
communication of names, inasmuch as we say that this
Reply to Objection 1. As Damascene says (De Fide
man is God and the Son of God. Now it is plain that these
Orth. iii, 26): “Examples need not be wholly and at all
modes imply an accidental union.
points similar, for what is wholly similar is the same, and
But some more recent masters, thinking to avoid these
not an example, and especially in Divine things, for it is
heresies, through ignorance fell into them.
For some
impossible to find a wholly similar example in the The-
conceded one person in Christ, but maintained two hy-
ology,” i.e. in the Godhead of Persons, “and in the Dis-
postases, or two supposita, saying that a man, composed
pensation,” i.e. the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence the
of body and soul, was from the beginning of his concep-
human nature in Christ is likened to a habit, i.e. a garment,
tion assumed by the Word of God. And this is the first
not indeed in regard to accidental union, but inasmuch as
opinion set down by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6). But oth-
the Word is seen by the human nature, as a man by his
ers desirous of keeping the unity of person, held that the
garment, and also inasmuch as the garment is changed,
soul of Christ was not united to the body, but that these
for it is shaped according to the figure of him who puts it
two were mutually separate, and were united to the Word
on, and yet he is not changed from his form on account
accidentally, so that the number of persons might not be
of the garment. So likewise the human nature assumed by
increased. And this is the third opinion which the Master
the Word of God is ennobled, but the Word of God is not
sets down (Sent. iii, D, 6).
changed, as Augustine says (Qq. 83, qu. 73).
But both of these opinions fall into the heresy of
Reply to Objection 2. Whatever accrues after the
Nestorius; the first, indeed, because to maintain two hy-
completion of the being comes accidentally, unless it be
postases or supposita in Christ is the same as to maintain
taken into communion with the complete being, just as in
two persons, as was shown above (a. 3). And if stress
the resurrection the body comes to the soul which pre-
is laid on the word “person,” we must have in mind that
exists, yet not accidentally, because it is assumed unto
even Nestorius spoke of unity of person on account of
the same being, so that the body has vital being through
the unity of dignity and honor. Hence the fifth Council
the soul; but it is not so with whiteness, for the being of
(Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) directs an anath-
whiteness is other than the being of man to which white-
ema against such a one as holds “one person in dignity,
ness comes. But the Word of God from all eternity had
honor and adoration, as Theodore and Nestorius foolishly
complete being in hypostasis or person; while in time the
wrote.” But the other opinion falls into the error of Nesto-
human nature accrued to it, not as if it were assumed unto
rius by maintaining an accidental union. For there is no
one being inasmuch as this is of the nature (even as the
difference in saying that the Word of God is united to the
body is assumed to the being of the soul), but to one being
Man Christ by indwelling, as in His temple (as Nesto-
inasmuch as this is of the hypostasis or person. Hence the
rius said), or by putting on man, as a garment, which
human nature is not accidentally united to the Son of God.
is the third opinion; rather it says something worse than
Reply to Objection 3. Accident is divided against
Nestorius—to wit, that the soul and body are not united.
substance. Now substance, as is plain from Metaph. v,
Now the Catholic faith, holding the mean between the
25, is taken in two ways: first, for essence or nature;
aforesaid positions, does not affirm that the union of God
secondly, for suppositum or hypostasis—hence the union
and man took place in the essence or nature, nor yet in
having taken place in the hypostasis, is enough to show
something accidental, but midway, in a subsistence or hy-
that it is not an accidental union, although the union did
postasis. Hence in the fifth Council (Constantinople II,
not take place in the nature.
coll. viii, can. 5) we read: “Since the unity may be un-
Reply to Objection 4. Not everything that is assumed
derstood in many ways, those who follow the impiety of
as an instrument pertains to the hypostasis of the one who
Apollinaris and Eutyches, professing the destruction of
assumes, as is plain in the case of a saw or a sword; yet
2094
nothing prevents what is assumed into the unity of the hy-Son of God, but His instrument. Hence Cyril says (Epist.
postasis from being as an instrument, even as the body
ad Monach. Aegyptii): “The Scripture does not affirm that
of man or his members. Hence Nestorius held that the
this Emmanuel,” i.e. Christ, “was assumed for the office
human nature was assumed by the Word merely as an in-
of an instrument, but as God truly humanized,” i.e. made
strument, and not into the unity of the hypostasis. And
man. But Damascene held that the human nature in Christ
therefore he did not concede that the man was really the
is an instrument belonging to the unity of the hypostasis.
Whether the union of the Divine nature and the human is anything created?
IIIa q. 2 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the Di-
son of the Son of God. Now, as was said above ( Ia, q. 13,
vine and human natures is not anything created. For there
a. 7), every relation which we consider between God and
can be nothing created in God, because whatever is in God
the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the
is God. But the union is in God, for God Himself is united
relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in
to human nature. Therefore it seems that the union is not
God, but only in our way of thinking, since it does not
anything created.
arise from any change in God. And hence we must say
Objection 2. Further, the end holds first place in ev-
that the union of which we are speaking is not really in
erything. But the end of the union is the Divine hypostasis
God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the human
or Person in which the union is terminated. Therefore it
nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must
seems that this union ought chiefly to be judged with ref-
say it is something created.
erence to the dignity of the Divine hypostasis, which is not
Reply to Objection 1. This union is not really in
anything created. Therefore the union is nothing created.
God, but only in our way of thinking, for God is said to
Objection 3. Further, “That which is the cause of a
be united to a creature inasmuch as the creature is really
thing being such is still more so” (Poster. i). But man
united to God without any change in Him.
is said to be the Creator on account of the union. There-
Reply to Objection 2. The specific nature of a rela-
fore much more is the union itself nothing created, but the
tion, as of motion, depends on the subject. And since this
Creator.
union has its being nowhere save in a created nature, as
On the contrary, Whatever has a beginning in time is
was said above, it follows that it has a created being.
created. Now this union was not from eternity, but began
Reply to Objection 3. A man is called Creator and is
in time. Therefore the union is something created.
God because of the union, inasmuch as it is terminated in
I answer that, The union of which we are speaking is
the Divine hypostasis; yet it does not follow that the union
a relation which we consider between the Divine and the
itself is the Creator or God, because that a thing is said to
human nature, inasmuch as they come together in one Per-
be created regards its being rather than its relation.
Whether union is the same as assumption?
IIIa q. 2 a. 8
Objection 1. It would seem that union is the same
does not determine the end of copulation. Therefore it
as assumption. For relations, as motions, are specified by
seems that union is the same as assumption.
their termini. Now the term of assumption and union is
On the contrary, The Divine Nature is said to be
one and the same, viz. the Divine hypostasis. Therefore it
united, not assumed.
seems that union and assumption are not different.
I answer that, As was stated above (a. 7), union
Objection 2. Further, in the mystery of the Incarna-
implies a certain relation of the Divine Nature and the
tion the same thing seems to be what unites and what as-
human, according as they come together in one Person.
sumes, and what is united and what is assumed. But union
Now all relations which begin in time are brought about
and assumption seem to follow the action and passion of
by some change; and change consists in action and pas-
the thing uniting and the united, of the thing assuming and
sion. Hence the “first” and principal difference between
the assumed. Therefore union seems to be the same as as-
assumption and union must be said to be that union im-
sumption.
plies the relation: whereas assumption implies the ac-
Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
tion, whereby someone is said to assume, or the passion,
iii, 11): “Union is one thing, incarnation is another; for
whereby something is said to be assumed. Now from this
union demands mere copulation, and leaves unsaid the
difference another “second” difference arises, for assump-
end of the copulation; but incarnation and humanation de-
tion implies “becoming,” whereas union implies “having
termine the end of copulation.” But likewise assumption
become,” and therefore the thing uniting is said to be
2095
united, but the thing assuming is not said to be assumed.
the Divine Person subsists in human nature.
For the human nature is taken to be in the terminus of as-
Reply to Objection 1. Union and assumption have
sumption unto the Divine hypostasis when man is spoken
not the same relation to the term, but a different relation,
of; and hence we can truly say that the Son of God, Who
as was said above.
assumes human nature unto Himself, is man. But human
Reply to Objection 2. What unites and what assumes
nature, considered in itself, i.e. in the abstract, is viewed
are not the same. For whatsoever Person assumes unites,
as assumed; and we do not say the Son of God is hu-
and not conversely. For the Person of the Father united the
man nature. From this same follows a “third” difference,
human nature to the Son, but not to Himself; and hence He
which is that a relation, especially one of equiparance, is
is said to unite and not to assume. So likewise the united
no more to one extreme than to the other, whereas action
and the assumed are not identical, for the Divine Nature
and passion bear themselves differently to the agent and
is said to be united, but not assumed.
the patient, and to different termini. And hence assump-
Reply to Objection 3. Assumption determines with
tion determines the term whence and the term whither; for
whom the union is made on the part of the one assum-
assumption means a taking to oneself from another. But
ing, inasmuch as assumption means taking unto oneself
union determines none of these things. hence it may be
[ad se sumere], whereas incarnation and humanation (de-
said indifferently that the human nature is united with the
termine with whom the union is made) on the part of the
Divine, or conversely. But the Divine Nature is not said
thing assumed, which is flesh or human nature. And thus
to be assumed by the human, but conversely, because the
assumption differs logically both from union and from in-
human nature is joined to the Divine personality, so that
carnation or humanation.
Whether the union of the two natures in Christ is the greatest of all unions?
IIIa q. 2 a. 9
Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the two
tion may be taken in two ways: first, in regard to the
natures in Christ is not the greatest of all unions. For what
things united; secondly, in regard to that in which they are
is united falls short of the unity of what is one, since what
united. And in this regard this union has a pre-eminence
is united is by participation, but one is by essence. Now
over other unions; for the unity of the Divine Person, in
in created things there are some that are simply one, as is
which the two natures are united, is the greatest. But it
shown especially in unity itself, which is the principle of
has no pre-eminence in regard to the things united.
number. Therefore the union of which we are speaking
Reply to Objection 1. The unity of the Divine Per-
does not imply the greatest of all unions.
son is greater than numerical unity, which is the principle
Objection 2. Further, the greater the distance between
of number. For the unity of a Divine Person is an uncre-
things united, the less the union. Now, the things united by
ated and self-subsisting unity, not received into another by
this union are most distant—namely, the Divine and hu-
participation. Also, it is complete in itself, having in itself man natures; for they are infinitely apart. Therefore their
whatever pertains to the nature of unity; and therefore it is
union is the least of all.
not compatible with the nature of a part, as in numerical
Objection 3. Further, from union there results one.
unity, which is a part of number, and which is shared in by
But from the union of soul and body in us there arises
the things numbered. And hence in this respect the union
what is one in person and nature; whereas from the union
of the Incarnation is higher than numerical unity by rea-
of the Divine and human nature there results what is one
son of the unity of the Divine Person, and not by reason
in person only. Therefore the union of soul and body is
of the human nature, which is not the unity of the Divine
greater than that of the Divine and human natures; and
Person, but is united to it.
hence the union of which we speak does not imply the
Reply to Objection 2. This reason regards the things
greatest unity.
united, and not the Person in Whom the union takes place.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 10) that
Reply to Objection 3. The unity of the Divine Per-
“man is in the Son of God, more than the Son in the Fa-
son is greater than the unity of person and nature in us;
ther.” But the Son is in the Father by unity of essence, and
and hence the union of the Incarnation is greater than the
man is in the Son by the union of the Incarnation. There-
union of soul and body in us.
fore the union of the Incarnation is greater than the unity
And because what is urged in the argument “on the
of the Divine Essence, which nevertheless is the greatest
contrary” rests upon what is untrue—namely, that the
union; and thus the union of the Incarnation implies the
union of the Incarnation is greater than the unity of the
greatest unity.
Divine Persons in Essence—we must say to the authority
I answer that, Union implies the joining of several
of Augustine that the human nature is not more in the Son
in some one thing. Therefore the union of the Incarna-
of God than the Son of God in the Father, but much less.
2096
But the man in some respects is more in the Son than the and when I say “Son of God”; whereas it is not the same
Son in the Father—namely, inasmuch as the same sup-
suppositum of Father and Son.
positum is signified when I say “man,” meaning Christ,
Whether the union of the Incarnation took place by grace?
IIIa q. 2 a. 10
Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the In-
as the will of God gratuitously doing something or reput-
carnation did not take place by grace. For grace is an ac-
ing anything as well-pleasing or acceptable to Him, the
cident, as was shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 110, a. 2). But
union of the Incarnation took place by grace, even as the
the union of the human nature to the Divine did not take
union of the saints with God by knowledge and love. But
place accidentally, as was shown above (a. 6). Therefore it
if grace be taken as the free gift of God, then the fact that
seems that the union of the Incarnation did not take place
the human nature is united to the Divine Person may be
by grace.
called a grace, inasmuch as it took place without being
Objection 2.
Further, the subject of grace is the
preceded by any merits—but not as though there were an
soul. But it is written (Col. 2:9): “In Christ [Vulg.:
habitual grace, by means of which the union took place.
‘Him’] dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corpore-
Reply to Objection 1. The grace which is an accident
ally.” Therefore it seems that this union did not take place
is a certain likeness of the Divinity participated by man.
by grace.
But by the Incarnation human nature is not said to have
Objection 3. Further, every saint is united to God by
participated a likeness of the Divine nature, but is said to
grace. If, therefore, the union of the Incarnation was by
be united to the Divine Nature itself in the Person of the
grace, it would seem that Christ is said to be God no more
Son. Now the thing itself is greater than a participated
than other holy men.
likeness of it.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.
Reply to Objection 2. Habitual grace is only in the
xv): “By the same grace every man is made a Christian,
soul; but the grace, i.e. the free gift of God, of being
from the beginning of his faith, as this man from His be-
united to the Divine Person belongs to the whole human
ginning was made Christ.” But this man became Christ
nature, which is composed of soul and body. And hence it
by union with the Divine Nature. Therefore this union
is said that the fulness of the Godhead dwelt corporeally
was by grace.
in Christ because the Divine Nature is united not merely
I answer that, As was said above ( Ia IIae, q. 110,
to the soul, but to the body also. Although it may also
a. 1), grace is taken in two ways:–first, as the will of God
be said that it dwelt in Christ corporeally, i.e. not as in
gratuitously bestowing something; secondly, as the free
a shadow, as it dwelt in the sacraments of the old law, of
gift of God. Now human nature stands in need of the gra-
which it is said in the same place (Col. 2:17) that they
tuitous will of God in order to be lifted up to God, since
are the “shadow of things to come but the body is Christ”
this is above its natural capability. Moreover, human na-
[Vulg.: ‘Christ’s’], inasmuch as the body is opposed to
ture is lifted up to God in two ways: first, by operation, as
the shadow. And some say that the Godhead is said to
the saints know and love God; secondly, by personal be-
have dwelt in Christ corporeally, i.e. in three ways, just as
ing, and this mode belongs exclusively to Christ, in Whom
a body has three dimensions: first, by essence, presence,
human nature is assumed so as to be in the Person of the
and power, as in other creatures; secondly, by sanctifying
Son of God. But it is plain that for the perfection of oper-
grace, as in the saints; thirdly, by personal union, which is
ation the power needs to be perfected by a habit, whereas
proper to Christ.
that a nature has being in its own suppositum does not take
Hence the reply to the third is manifest, viz. because
place by means of a habit.
the union of the Incarnation did not take place by habitual
And hence we must say that if grace be understood
grace alone, but in subsistence or person.
Whether any merits preceded the union of the Incarnation?
IIIa q. 2 a. 11
Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the In-
Objection 2. Further, whoever merits anything merits
carnation followed upon certain merits, because upon Ps.
that without which it cannot be. But the ancient Fathers
32:22, “Let Thy mercy, o Lord, be upon us, as,” etc. a
merited eternal life, to which they were able to attain only
gloss says: “Here the prophet’s desire for the Incarnation
by the Incarnation; for Gregory says (Moral. xiii): “Those
and its merited fulfilment are hinted at.” Therefore the
who came into this world before Christ’s coming, whatso-
Incarnation falls under merit.
ever eminency of righteousness they may have had, could
2097
not, on being divested of the body, at once be admitted which is the reward of virtue, and consists in the full en-into the bosom of the heavenly country, seeing that He
joyment of God. Whereas the union of the Incarnation,
had not as yet come Who, by His own descending, should
inasmuch as it is in the personal being, transcends the
place the souls of the righteous in their everlasting seat.”
union of the beatified mind with God, which is by the
Therefore it would seem that they merited the Incarnation.
act of the soul in fruition; and therefore it cannot fall
Objection 3. Further, of the Blessed Virgin it is sung
under merit. Secondly, because grace cannot fall under
that “she merited to bear the Lord of all”∗, and this took
merit, for the principle of merit does not fall under merit;
place through the Incarnation. Therefore the Incarnation
and therefore neither does grace, for it is the principle of
falls under merit.
merit. Hence, still less does the Incarnation fall under
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.
merit, since it is the principle of grace, according to Jn.
xv): “Whoever can find merits preceding the singular gen-
1:17: “Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.” Thirdly,
eration of our Head, may also find merits preceding the
because the Incarnation is for the reformation of the en-
repeated regeneration of us His members.” But no merits
tire human nature, and therefore it does not fall under the
preceded our regeneration, according to Titus 3:5: “Not
merit of any individual man, since the goodness of a mere
by the works of justice which we have done, but according
man cannot be the cause of the good of the entire nature.
to His mercy He saved us, by the laver of regeneration.”
Yet the holy Fathers merited the Incarnation congruously
Therefore no merits preceded the generation of Christ.
by desiring and beseeching; for it was becoming that God
I answer that, With regard to Christ Himself, it is
should harken to those who obeyed Him.
clear from the above (a. 10) that no merits of His could
And thereby the reply to the First Objection is mani-
have preceded the union. For we do not hold that He was
fest.
first of all a mere man, and that afterwards by the merits of
Reply to Objection 2. It is false that under merit falls a good life it was granted Him to become the Son of God,
everything without which there can be no reward. For
as Photinus held; but we hold that from the beginning of
there is something pre-required not merely for reward, but
His conception this man was truly the Son of God, see-
also for merit, as the Divine goodness and grace and the
ing that He had no other hypostasis but that of the Son of
very nature of man. And again, the mystery of the Incar-
God, according to Luke 1:35: “The Holy which shall be
nation is the principle of merit, because “of His fulness
born of thee shall be called the Son of God.” And hence
we all have received” (Jn. 1:16).
every operation of this man followed the union. There-
Reply to Objection 3. The Blessed Virgin is said to
fore no operation of His could have been meritorious of
have merited to bear the Lord of all; not that she merited
the union.
His Incarnation, but because by the grace bestowed upon
Neither could the needs of any other man whatsoever
her she merited that grade of purity and holiness, which
have merited this union condignly: first, because the mer-
fitted her to be the Mother of God.
itorious works of man are properly ordained to beatitude,
Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?
IIIa q. 2 a. 12
Objection 1. It would seem that the grace of union
cording to the human nature, otherwise it would belong to
was not natural to the man Christ. For the union of the
all men, since they are of the same nature as He. Therefore
Incarnation did not take place in the nature, but in the Per-
it would seem that the grace of union is nowise natural to
son, as was said above (a. 2). Now a thing is denominated
Christ.
from its terminus. Therefore this grace ought rather to be
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xl):
called personal than natural.
“In the assumption of human nature, grace itself became
Objection 2. Further, grace is divided against nature,
somewhat natural to that man, so as to leave no room for
even as gratuitous things, which are from God, are distin-
sin in Him.”
guished from natural things, which are from an intrinsic
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph.
principle. But if things are divided in opposition to one
v, 5), nature designates, in one way, nativity; in another,
another, one is not denominated by the other. Therefore
the essence of a thing. Hence natural may be taken in
the grace of Christ was not natural to Him.
two ways: first, for what is only from the essential princi-
Objection 3. Further, natural is that which is accord-
ples of a thing, as it is natural to fire to mount; secondly,
ing to nature. But the grace of union is not natural to
we call natural to man what he has had from his birth,
Christ in regard to the Divine Nature, otherwise it would
according to Eph. 2:3: “We were by nature children of
belong to the other Persons; nor is it natural to Him ac-
wrath”; and Wis. 12:10: “They were a wicked generation,
∗ Little Office of B. V. M., Dominican Rite, Ant. at Benedictus 2098
and their malice natural.” Therefore the grace of Christ, grace and natural in the same respect; for it is called grace
whether of union or habitual, cannot be called natural as
inasmuch as it is not from merit; and it is said to be natural
if caused by the principles of the human nature of Christ,
inasmuch as by the power of the Divine Nature it was in
although it may be called natural, as if coming to the hu-
the humanity of Christ from His nativity.
man nature of Christ by the causality of His Divine Na-
Reply to Objection 3. The grace of union is not nat-
ture. But these two kinds of grace are said to be natural to
ural to Christ according to His human nature, as if it were
Christ, inasmuch as He had them from His nativity, since
caused by the principles of the human nature, and hence
from the beginning of His conception the human nature
it need not belong to all men. Nevertheless, it is natural
was united to the Divine Person, and His soul was filled
to Him in regard to the human nature on account of the
with the gift of grace.
“property” of His birth, seeing that He was conceived by
Reply to Objection 1. Although the union did not
the Holy Ghost, so that He might be the natural Son of
take place in the nature, yet it was caused by the power of
God and of man. But it is natural to Him in regard to the
the Divine Nature, which is truly the nature of Christ, and
Divine Nature, inasmuch as the Divine Nature is the ac-
it, moreover, belonged to Christ from the beginning of His
tive principle of this grace; and this belongs to the whole
nativity.
Trinity—to wit, to be the active principle of this grace.
Reply to Objection 2. The union is not said to be
2099
THIRD PART, QUESTION 3
Of the Mode of Union On the Part of the Person Assuming
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the union on the part of the Person assuming, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether to assume is befitting to a Divine Person?
(2) Whether it is befitting to the Divine Nature?
(3) Whether the Nature abstracted from the Personality can assume?
(4) Whether one Person can assume without another?
(5) Whether each Person can assume?
(6) Whether several Persons can assume one individual nature?
(7) Whether one Person can assume two individual natures?
(8) Whether it was more fitting for the Person of the Son of God to assume human nature than for another Divine Person?
Whether it is befitting for a Divine Person to assume?
IIIa q. 3 a. 1
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not befitting to
as was said above (q. 2, Aa. 1 ,2), the union took place in
a Divine Person to assume a created nature. For a Divine
the Person, and not in the nature. Hence it is plain that to
Person signifies something most perfect. Now no addition
assume a nature is most properly befitting to a Person.
can be made to what is perfect. Therefore, since to assume
Reply to Objection 1. Since the Divine Person is in-
is to take to oneself, and consequently what is assumed is
finite, no addition can be made to it: Hence Cyril says†:
added to the one who assumes, it does not seem to be be-
“We do not conceive the mode of conjunction to be ac-
fitting to a Divine Person to assume a created nature.
cording to addition”; just as in the union of man with
Objection 2. Further, that to which anything is as-
God, nothing is added to God by the grace of adoption,
sumed is communicated in some degree to what is as-
but what is Divine is united to man; hence, not God but
sumed to it, just as dignity is communicated to whosoever
man is perfected.
is assumed to a dignity. But it is of the nature of a person
Reply to Objection 2. A Divine Person is said to be
to be incommunicable, as was said above ( Ia, q. 29, a. 1).
incommunicable inasmuch as It cannot be predicated of
Therefore it is not befitting to a Divine Person to assume,
several supposita, but nothing prevents several things be-
i.e. to take to Himself.
ing predicated of the Person. Hence it is not contrary to
Objection 3. Further, person is constituted by nature.
the nature of person to be communicated so as to sub-
But it is repugnant that the thing constituted should as-
sist in several natures, for even in a created person several
sume the constituent, since the effect does not act on its
natures may concur accidentally, as in the person of one
cause. Hence it is not befitting to a Person to assume a
man we find quantity and quality. But this is proper to a
nature.
Divine Person, on account of its infinity, that there should
On the contrary, Augustine∗ says (De Fide ad Petrum
be a concourse of natures in it, not accidentally, but in
ii): “This God, i.e. the only-Begotten one, took the form,”
subsistence.
i.e. the nature, “of a servant to His own Person.” But the
Reply to Objection 3. As was said above (q. 2, a. 1),
only-Begotten God is a Person. Therefore it is befitting to
the human nature constitutes a Divine Person, not simply,
a Person to take, i.e. to assume a nature.
but forasmuch as the Person is denominated from such a
I answer that, In the word “assumption” are implied
nature. For human nature does not make the Son of Man
two things, viz. the principle and the term of the act, for
to be simply, since He was from eternity, but only to be
to assume is to take something to oneself. Now of this as-
man. It is by the Divine Nature that a Divine Person is
sumption a Person is both the principle and the term. The
constituted simply. Hence the Divine Person is not said
principle—because it properly belongs to a person to act,
to assume the Divine Nature, but to assume the human
and this assuming of flesh took place by the Divine action.
nature.
Likewise a Person is the term of this assumption, because,
∗ Fulgentius
† Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26
2100
Whether it is befitting to the Divine Nature to assume?
IIIa q. 3 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not befitting to
ered to be. Hence a Person is primarily and more properly
the Divine Nature to assume. Because, as was said above
said to assume, but it may be said secondarily that the Na-
(a. 1), to assume is to take to oneself. But the Divine
ture assumed a nature to Its Person. And after the same
Nature did not take to Itself human nature, for the union
manner the Nature is also said to be incarnate, not that it
did not take place in the nature, as was said above (q. 2,
is changed to flesh, but that it assumed the nature of flesh.
Aa. 1,3). Hence it is not befitting to the Divine Nature to
Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6): “Following
assume human nature.
the blessed Athanasius and Cyril we say that the Nature
Objection 2. Further, the Divine Nature is common to
of God is incarnate.”
the three Persons. If, therefore, it is befitting to the Divine Reply to Objection 1. “Oneself” is reciprocal, and
Nature to assume, it consequently is befitting to the three
points to the same suppositum. But the Divine Nature is
Persons; and thus the Father assumed human nature even
not a distinct suppositum from the Person of the Word.
as the Son, which is erroneous.
Hence, inasmuch as the Divine Nature took human nature
Objection 3. Further, to assume is to act. But to act
to the Person of the Word, It is said to take it to Itself.
befits a person, not a nature, which is rather taken to be the
But although the Father takes human nature to the Person
principle by which the agent acts. Therefore to assume is
of the Word, He did not thereby take it to Himself, for
not befitting to the nature.
the suppositum of the Father and the Son is not one. and
On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius) says (De
hence it cannot properly be said that the Father assumes
Fide ad Petrum ii): “That nature which remains eternally
human nature.
begotten of the Father” (i.e. which is received from the
Reply to Objection 2. What is befitting to the Divine
Father by eternal generation) “took our nature free of sin
Nature in Itself is befitting to the three Persons, as good-
from His Mother.”
ness, wisdom, and the like. But to assume belongs to It by
I answer that, As was said above (a. 1), in the word
reason of the Person of the Word, as was said above, and
assumption two things are signified—to wit, the principle
hence it is befitting to that Person alone.
and the term of the action. Now to be the principle of the
Reply to Objection 3.
As in God “what is” and
assumption belongs to the Divine Nature in itself, because
“whereby it is” are the same, so likewise in Him “what
the assumption took place by Its power; but to be the term
acts” and “whereby it acts” are the same, since everything
of the assumption does not belong to the Divine Nature in
acts, inasmuch as it is a being. Hence the Divine Nature is
itself, but by reason of the Person in Whom It is consid-
both that whereby God acts, and the very God Who acts.
Whether the Nature abstracted from the Personality can assume?
IIIa q. 3 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that if we abstract the
Filiation and Procession, as was said above ( Ia, q. 30,
Personality by our mind, the Nature cannot assume. For
a. 2). Now if we mentally abstract these, there still re-
it was said above (a. 1) that it belongs to the Nature to as-
mains the omnipotence of God, by which the Incarnation
sume by reason of the Person. But what belongs to one
was wrought, as the angel says (Lk. 1:37): “No word
by reason of another cannot belong to it if the other is
shall be impossible with God.” Therefore it seems that
removed; as a body, which is visible by reason of color,
if the Personality be removed, the Divine Nature can still
without color cannot be seen. Hence if the Personality be
assume.
mentally abstracted, the Nature cannot assume.
I answer that, The intellect stands in two ways to-
Objection 2. Further, assumption implies the term of
wards God. First, to know God as He is, and in this
union, as was said above (a. 1). But the union cannot take
manner it is impossible for the intellect to circumscribe
place in the nature, but only in the Person. Therefore, if
something in God and leave the rest, for all that is in God
the Personality be abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot
is one, except the distinction of Persons; and as regards
assume.
these, if one is removed the other is taken away, since
Objection 3. Further, it has been said above ( Ia, q. 40, they are distinguished by relations only which must be
a. 3) that in the Godhead if the Personality is abstracted,
together at the same time. Secondly, the intellect stands
nothing remains. But the one who assumes is something.
towards God, not indeed as knowing God as He is, but in
Therefore, if the Personality is abstracted, the Divine Na-
its own way, i.e. understanding manifoldly and separately
ture cannot assume.
what in God is one: and in this way our intellect can un-
On the contrary, In the Godhead Personality signifies
derstand the Divine goodness and wisdom, and the like,
a personal property; and this is threefold, viz. Paternity,
which are called essential attributes, without understand-
2101
ing Paternity or Filiation, which are called Personalities.
Reply to Objection 2. Even if the personal properties
And hence if we abstract Personality by our intellect, we
of the three Persons are abstracted by our mind, neverthe-
may still understand the Nature assuming.
less there will remain in our thoughts the one Personality
Reply to Objection 1. Because in God “what is,” and
of God, as the Jews consider. And the assumption can
“whereby it is,” are one, if any one of the things which
be terminated in It, as we now say it is terminated in the
are attributed to God in the abstract is considered in itself,
Person of the Word.
abstracted from all else, it will still be something subsist-
Reply to Objection 3. If we mentally abstract the Per-
ing, and consequently a Person, since it is an intellectual
sonality, it is said that nothing remains by way of resolu-
nature. Hence just as we now say three Persons, on ac-
tion, i.e. as if the subject of the relation and the relation
count of holding three personal properties, so likewise if
itself were distinct because all we can think of in God is
we mentally exclude the personal properties there will still
considered as a subsisting suppositum. However, some
remain in our thought the Divine Nature as subsisting and
of the things predicated of God can be understood with-
as a Person. And in this way It may be understood to
out others, not by way of resolution, but by the way men-
assume human nature by reason of Its subsistence or Per-
tioned above.
sonality.
Whether one Person without another can assume a created nature?
IIIa q. 3 a. 4
Objection 1. It would seem that one Person cannot
but the term of the assumption is a Person, as stated above
assume a created nature without another assuming it. For
(a. 2). Hence what has to do with action in the assumption
“the works of the Trinity are inseparable,” as Augustine
is common to the three Persons; but what pertains to the
says (Enchiridion xxxviii). But as the three Persons have
nature of term belongs to one Person in such a manner as
one essence, so likewise They have one operation. Now
not to belong to another; for the three Persons caused the
to assume is an operation. Therefore it cannot belong to
human nature to be united to the one Person of the Son.
one without belonging to another.
Reply to Objection 1. This reason regards the oper-
Objection 2. Further, as we say the Person of the Son
ation, and the conclusion would follow if it implied this
became incarnate, so also did the Nature; for “the whole
operation only, without the term, which is a Person.
Divine Nature became incarnate in one of Its hypostases,”
Reply to Objection 2. The Nature is said to be incar-
as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6). But the Nature
nate, and to assume by reason of the Person in Whom the
is common to the three Persons. Therefore the assumption
union is terminated, as stated above (Aa. 1,2), and not as
is.
it is common to the three Persons. Now “the whole Divine
Objection 3. Further, as the human nature in Christ
Nature is” said to be “incarnate”; not that It is incarnate in
is assumed by God, so likewise are men assumed by Him
all the Persons, but inasmuch as nothing is wanting to the
through grace, according to Rom. 14:3: “God hath taken
perfection of the Divine Nature of the Person incarnate, as
him to Him.” But this assumption pertains to all the Per-
Damascene explains there.
sons; therefore the first also.
Reply to Objection 3. The assumption which takes
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that
place by the grace of adoption is terminated in a certain
the mystery of the Incarnation pertains to “discrete theol-
participation of the Divine Nature, by an assimilation to
ogy,” i.e. according to which something “distinct” is said
Its goodness, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: “That you may be
of the Divine Persons.
made partakers of the Divine Nature”; and hence this as-
I answer that, As was said above (a. 1), assumption
sumption is common to the three Persons, in regard to the
implies two things, viz. the act of assuming and the term
principle and the term. But the assumption which is by
of assumption. Now the act of assumption proceeds from
the grace of union is common on the part of the principle,
the Divine power, which is common to the three Persons,
but not on the part of the term, as was said above.
Whether each of the Divine Persons could have assumed human nature?
IIIa q. 3 a. 5
Objection 1. It would seem that no other Divine Per-
to be a Son; for this would tend to the confusion of the Di-
son could have assumed human nature except the Person
vine Persons. Therefore the Father and Holy Ghost could
of the Son. For by this assumption it has been brought
not have assumed flesh.
about that God is the Son of Man. But it was not becom-
Objection 2. Further, by the Divine Incarnation men
ing that either the Father or the Holy Ghost should be said
have come into possession of the adoption of sons, ac-
2102
cording to Rom. 8:15: “For you have not received the vine power could have united human nature to the Person
spirit of bondage again in fear, but the spirit of adoption
of the Father or of the Holy Ghost, as It united it to the
of sons.” But sonship by adoption is a participated like-
Person of the Son. And hence we must say that the Father
ness of natural sonship which does not belong to the Fa-
or the Holy Ghost could have assumed flesh even as the
ther nor the Holy Ghost; hence it is said (Rom. 8:29):
Son.
“For whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made
Reply to Objection 1.
The temporal sonship,
conformable to the image of His Son.” Therefore it seems
whereby Christ is said to be the Son of Man, does not
that no other Person except the Person of the Son could
constitute His Person, as does the eternal Sonship; but is
have become incarnate.
something following upon the temporal nativity. Hence, if
Objection 3. Further, the Son is said to be sent and
the name of son were transferred to the Father or the Holy
to be begotten by the temporal nativity, inasmuch as He
Ghost in this manner, there would be no confusion of the
became incarnate. But it does not belong to the Father to
Divine Persons.
be sent, for He is innascible, as was said above ( Ia, q. 32,
Reply to Objection 2. Adoptive sonship is a certain
a. 3; Ia, q. 43, a. 4). Therefore at least the Person of the
participation of natural sonship; but it takes place in us,
Father cannot become incarnate.
by appropriation, by the Father, Who is the principle of
On the contrary, Whatever the Son can do, so can
natural sonship, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost, Who
the Father and the Holy Ghost, otherwise the power of the
is the love of the Father and Son, according to Gal. 4:6:
three Persons would not be one. But the Son was able
“God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts cry-
to become incarnate. Therefore the Father and the Holy
ing, Abba, Father.” And therefore, even as by the Incar-
Ghost were able to become incarnate.
nation of the Son we receive adoptive sonship in the like-
I answer that, As was said above (Aa. 1,2,4), assump-
ness of His natural sonship, so likewise, had the Father
tion implies two things, viz. the act of the one assuming
become incarnate, we should have received adoptive son-
and the term of the assumption. Now the principle of the
ship from Him, as from the principle of the natural son-
act is the Divine power, and the term is a Person. But
ship, and from the Holy Ghost as from the common bond
the Divine power is indifferently and commonly in all the
of Father and Son.
Persons. Moreover, the nature of Personality is common
Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to the Father to be
to all the Persons, although the personal properties are dif-
innascible as to eternal birth, and the temporal birth would
ferent. Now whenever a power regards several things in-
not destroy this. But the Son of God is said to be sent in
differently, it can terminate its action in any of them in-
regard to the Incarnation, inasmuch as He is from another,
differently, as is plain in rational powers, which regard
without which the Incarnation would not suffice for the
opposites, and can do either of them. Therefore the Di-
nature of mission.
Whether several Divine Persons can assume one and the same individual nature?
IIIa q. 3 a. 6
Objection 1. It would seem that two Divine Persons
versely. Hence, if three Persons were to assume one hu-
cannot assume one and the same individual nature. For,
man nature, it would follow that whatever is said of each
this being granted, there would either be several men or
of the three Persons would be said of the man; and con-
one. But not several, for just as one Divine Nature in sev-
versely, what was said of the man could be said of each of
eral Persons does not make several gods, so one human
the three Persons. Therefore what is proper to the Father,
nature in several persons does not make several men. Nor
viz. to beget the Son, would be said of the man, and con-
would there be only one man, for one man is “this man,”
sequently would be said of the Son of God; and this could
which signifies one person; and hence the distinction of
not be. Therefore it is impossible that the three Persons
three Divine Persons would be destroyed, which cannot
should assume one human nature.
be allowed. Therefore neither two nor three Persons can
On the contrary, The Incarnate Person subsists in two
take one human nature.
natures. But the three Persons can subsist in one Divine
Objection 2. Further, the assumption is terminated in
Nature. Therefore they can also subsist in one human na-
the unity of Person, as has been said above (a. 2). But the
ture in such a way that the human nature be assumed by
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not one Person. There-
the three Persons.
fore the three Persons cannot assume one human nature.
I answer that, As was said above (q. 2, a. 5, ad 1),
Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
by the union of the soul and body in Christ neither a new
iii, 3,4), and Augustine (De Trin. i, 11,12,13), that from
person is made nor a new hypostasis, but one human na-
the Incarnation of God the Son it follows that whatever is
ture is assumed to the Divine Person or hypostasis, which,
said of the Son of God is said of the Son of Man, and con-
indeed, does not take place by the power of the human na-
2103
ture, but by the power of the Divine Person. Now such is by inherence one spirit results,” according to 1 Cor. 6:17:
the characteristic of the Divine Persons that one does not
“He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit.”
exclude another from communicating in the same nature,
Reply to Objection 2. In this supposition the human
but only in the same Person. Hence, since in the mystery
nature would be assumed to the unity, not indeed of one
of the Incarnation “the whole reason of the deed is the
Person, but to the unity of each Person, so that even as
power of the doer,” as Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum
the Divine Nature has a natural unity with each Person,
cxxxvii), we must judge of it in regard to the quality of the
so also the human nature would have a unity with each
Divine Person assuming, and not according to the quality
Person by assumption.
of the human nature assumed. Therefore it is not impos-
Reply to Objection 3. In the mystery of the Incar-
sible that two or three Divine Persons should assume one
nation, there results a communication of the properties
human nature, but it would be impossible for them to as-
belonging to the nature, because whatever belongs to the
sume one human hypostasis or person; thus Anselm says
nature can be predicated of the Person subsisting in that
in the book De Concep. Virg. (Cur Deus Homo ii, 9), that
nature, no matter to which of the natures it may apply.
“several Persons cannot assume one and the same man to
Hence in this hypothesis, of the Person of the Father may
unity of Person.”
be predicated what belongs to the human nature and what
Reply to Objection 1. In the hypothesis that three
belongs to the Divine; and likewise of the Person of the
Persons assume one human nature, it would be true to say
Son and of the Holy Ghost. But what belongs to the Per-
that the three Persons were one man, because of the one
son of the Father by reason of His own Person could not
human nature. For just as it is now true to say the three
be attributed to the Person of the Son or Holy Ghost on
Persons are one God on account of the one Divine Nature,
account of the distinction of Persons which would still re-
so it would be true to say they are one man on account
main. Therefore it might be said that as the Father was un-
of the one human nature. Nor would “one” imply unity
begotten, so the man was unbegotten, inasmuch as “man”
of person, but unity in human nature; for it could not be
stood for the Person of the Father. But if one were to go on
argued that because the three Persons were one man they
to say, “The man is unbegotten; the Son is man; therefore
were one simply. For nothing hinders our saying that men,
the Son is unbegotten,” it would be the fallacy of figure
who are many simply, are in some respect one, e.g. one
of speech or of accident; even as we now say God is un-
people, and as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 3): “The Spirit
begotten, because the Father is unbegotten, yet we cannot
of God and the spirit of man are by nature different, but
conclude that the Son is unbegotten, although He is God.
Whether one Divine Person can assume two human natures?
IIIa q. 3 a. 7
Objection 1. It would seem that one Divine Person
natures cannot be wholly united together, inasmuch as the
cannot assume two human natures. For the nature as-
soul of one would be united to the body of the other; and,
sumed in the mystery of the Incarnation has no other sup-
again, two bodies would be together, which would give
positum than the suppositum of the Divine Person, as is
rise to confusion of natures. Therefore it is not possibly
plain from what has been stated above (q. 2, Aa. 3,6).
for one Divine Person to assume two human natures.
Therefore, if we suppose one Person to assume two hu-
On the contrary, Whatever the Father can do, that
man natures, there would be one suppositum of two na-
also can the Son do. But after the Incarnation the Father
tures of the same species; which would seem to imply a
can still assume a human nature distinct from that which
contradiction, for the nature of one species is only multi-
the Son has assumed; for in nothing is the power of the
plied by distinct supposita.
Father or the Son lessened by the Incarnation of the Son.
Objection 2. Further, in this hypothesis it could not be Therefore it seems that after the Incarnation the Son can
said that the Divine Person incarnate was one man, seeing
assume another human nature distinct from the one He has
that He would not have one human nature; neither could it
assumed.
be said that there were several, for several men have dis-
I answer that, What has power for one thing, and no
tinct supposita, whereas in this case there would be only
more, has a power limited to one. Now the power of a
one suppositum. Therefore the aforesaid hypothesis is im-
Divine Person is infinite, nor can it be limited by any cre-
possible.
ated thing. Hence it may not be said that a Divine Person
Objection 3. Further, in the mystery of the Incarna-
so assumed one human nature as to be unable to assume
tion the whole Divine Nature is united to the whole nature
another. For it would seem to follow from this that the
assumed, i.e. to every part of it, for Christ is “perfect God
Personality of the Divine Nature was so comprehended by
and perfect man, complete God and complete man,” as
one human nature as to be unable to assume another to its
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 7). But two human
Personality; and this is impossible, for the Uncreated can-
2104
not be comprehended by any creature. Hence it is plain qualities is designated in the singular as “such by reason
that, whether we consider the Divine Person in regard to
of the two qualities.” Now the assumed nature is, as it
His power, which is the principle of the union, or in re-
were, a garment, although this similitude does not fit at all
gard to His Personality, which is the term of the union, it
points, as has been said above (q. 2, a. 6, ad 1). And hence,
has to be said that the Divine Person, over and beyond the
if the Divine Person were to assume two human natures,
human nature which He has assumed, can assume another
He would be called, on account of the unity of supposi-
distinct human nature.
tum, one man having two human natures. Now many men
Reply to Objection 1. A created nature is completed
are said to be one people, inasmuch as they have some
in its essentials by its form, which is multiplied according
one thing in common, and not on account of the unity of
to the division of matter. And hence, if the composition
suppositum. So likewise, if two Divine Persons were to
of matter and form constitutes a new suppositum, the con-
assume one singular human nature, they would be said
sequence is that the nature is multiplied by the multipli-
to be one man, as stated (a. 6, ad 1), not from the unity
cation of supposita. But in the mystery of the Incarnation
of suppositum, but because they have some one thing in
the union of form and matter, i.e. of soul and body, does
common.
not constitute a new suppositum, as was said above (a. 6).
Reply to Objection 3. The Divine and human natures
Hence there can be a numerical multitude on the part of
do not bear the same relation to the one Divine Person,
the nature, on account of the division of matter, without
but the Divine Nature is related first of all thereto, inas-
distinction of supposita.
much as It is one with It from eternity; and afterwards the
Reply to Objection 2. It might seem possible to reply
human nature is related to the Divine Person, inasmuch
that in such a hypothesis it would follow that there were
as it is assumed by the Divine Person in time, not indeed
two men by reason of the two natures, just as, on the con-
that the nature is the Person, but that the Person of God
trary, the three Persons would be called one man, on ac-
subsists in human nature. For the Son of God is His God-
count of the one nature assumed, as was said above (a. 6,
head, but is not His manhood. And hence, in order that the
ad 1). But this does not seem to be true; because we must
human nature may be assumed by the Divine Person, the
use words according to the purpose of their signification,
Divine Nature must be united by a personal union with the
which is in relation to our surroundings. Consequently, in
whole nature assumed, i.e. in all its parts. Now in the two
order to judge of a word’s signification or co-signification,
natures assumed there would be a uniform relation to the
we must consider the things which are around us, in which
Divine Person, nor would one assume the other. Hence it
a word derived from some form is never used in the plural
would not be necessary for one of them to be altogether
unless there are several supposita. For a man who has on
united to the other, i.e. all the parts of one with all the
two garments is not said to be “two persons clothed,” but
parts of the other.
“one clothed with two garments”; and whoever has two
Whether it was more fitting that the Person of the Son rather than any other Divine IIIa q. 3 a. 8
Person should assume human nature?
Objection 1. It would seem that it was not more fit-
would seem to be, as it were, a second creation of human
ting that the Son of God should become incarnate than the
nature, according to Gal. 6:15: “For in Christ Jesus nei-
Father or the Holy Ghost. For by the mystery of the Incar-
ther circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision,
nation men are led to the true knowledge of God, accord-
but a new creature.” But the power of creation is appro-
ing to Jn. 18:37: “For this was I born, and for this came I
priated to the Father. Therefore it would have been more
into the world, to give testimony to the truth.” But by the
becoming to the Father than to the Son to become incar-
Person of the Son of God becoming incarnate many have
nate.
been kept back from the true knowledge of God, since
Objection 3. Further, the Incarnation is ordained to
they referred to the very Person of the Son what was said
the remission of sins, according to Mat. 1:21: “Thou shalt
of the Son in His human nature, as Arius, who held an in-
call His name Jesus. For He shall save His people from
equality of Persons, according to what is said (Jn. 14:28):
their sins.” Now the remission of sins is attributed to the
“The Father is greater than I.” Now this error would not
Holy Ghost according to Jn. 20:22,23: “Receive ye the
have arisen if the Person of the Father had become incar-
Holy Ghost. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are for-
nate, for no one would have taken the Father to be less
given them.” Therefore it became the Person of the Holy
than the Son. Hence it seems fitting that the Person of
Ghost rather than the Person of the Son to become incar-
the Father, rather than the Person of the Son, should have
nate.
become incarnate.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
Objection 2. Further, the effect of the Incarnation
iii, 1): “In the mystery of the Incarnation the wisdom
2105
and power of God are made known: the wisdom, for He inheritance, which is bestowed only on sons, according
found a most suitable discharge for a most heavy debt; the
to Rom. 8:17: “If sons, heirs also.” Hence it was fitting
power, for He made the conquered conquer.” But power
that by Him Who is the natural Son, men should share this
and wisdom are appropriated to the Son, according to 1
likeness of sonship by adoption, as the Apostle says in the
Cor. 1:24: “Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of
same chapter (Rom. 8:29): “For whom He foreknew, He
God.” Therefore it was fitting that the Person of the Son
also predestinated to be made conformable to the image
should become incarnate.
of His Son.”
I answer that, It was most fitting that the Person of
Thirdly, the reason for this fitness may be taken from
the Son should become incarnate. First, on the part of the
the sin of our first parent, for which the Incarnation sup-
union; for such as are similar are fittingly united. Now the
plied the remedy. For the first man sinned by seeking
Person of the Son, Who is the Word of God, has a certain
knowledge, as is plain from the words of the serpent,
common agreement with all creatures, because the word
promising to man the knowledge of good and evil. Hence
of the craftsman, i.e. his concept, is an exemplar likeness
it was fitting that by the Word of true knowledge man
of whatever is made by him. Hence the Word of God,
might be led back to God, having wandered from God
Who is His eternal concept, is the exemplar likeness of
through an inordinate thirst for knowledge.
all creatures. And therefore as creatures are established in
Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing which human
their proper species, though movably, by the participation
malice cannot abuse, since it even abuses God’s goodness,
of this likeness, so by the non-participated and personal
according to Rom. 2:4: “Or despisest thou the riches of
union of the Word with a creature, it was fitting that the
His goodness?” Hence, even if the Person of the Father
creature should be restored in order to its eternal and un-
had become incarnate, men would have been capable of
changeable perfection; for the craftsman by the intelligi-
finding an occasion of error, as though the Son were not
ble form of his art, whereby he fashioned his handiwork,
able to restore human nature.
restores it when it has fallen into ruin. Moreover, He has
Reply to Objection 2. The first creation of things was
a particular agreement with human nature, since the Word
made by the power of God the Father through the Word;
is a concept of the eternal Wisdom, from Whom all man’s
hence the second creation ought to have been brought
wisdom is derived. And hence man is perfected in wis-
about through the Word, by the power of God the Father,
dom (which is his proper perfection, as he is rational) by
in order that restoration should correspond to creation ac-
participating the Word of God, as the disciple is instructed
cording to 2 Cor. 5:19: “For God indeed was in Christ
by receiving the word of his master. Hence it is said (Ec-
reconciling the world to Himself.”
clus. 1:5): “The Word of God on high is the fountain of
Reply to Objection 3. To be the gift of the Father and
wisdom.” And hence for the consummate perfection of
the Son is proper to the Holy Ghost. But the remission of
man it was fitting that the very Word of God should be
sins is caused by the Holy Ghost, as by the gift of God.
personally united to human nature.
And hence it was more fitting to man’s justification that
Secondly, the reason of this fitness may be taken from
the Son should become incarnate, Whose gift the Holy
the end of the union, which is the fulfilling of predesti-
Ghost is.
nation, i.e. of such as are preordained to the heavenly
2106
THIRD PART, QUESTION 4
Of the Mode of Union On the Part of the Human Nature
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the union on the part of what was assumed. About which we must consider first what things were assumed by the Word of God; secondly, what were co-assumed, whether perfections or defects.
Now the Son of God assumed human nature and its parts. Hence a threefold consideration arises. First, with regard to the nature; secondly, with regard to its parts; thirdly, with regard to the order of the assumption.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human nature was more capable of being assumed than any other nature?
(2) Whether He assumed a person?
(3) Whether He assumed a man?
(4) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature abstracted from all individuals?
(5) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in all its individuals?
(6) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in any man begotten of the stock of Adam?
Whether human nature was more assumable by the Son of God than any other na-IIIa q. 4 a. 1
ture?
Objection 1. It would seem that human nature is not
ness in the union of the Son of God with human nature.
more capable of being assumed by the Son of God than
I answer that, A thing is said to be assumable as be-
any other nature. For Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum
ing capable of being assumed by a Divine Person, and this
cxxxvii): “In deeds wrought miraculously the whole rea-
capability cannot be taken with reference to the natural
son of the deed is the power of the doer.” Now the power
passive power, which does not extend to what transcends
of God Who wrought the Incarnation, which is a most
the natural order, as the personal union of a creature with
miraculous work, is not limited to one nature, since the
God transcends it. Hence it follows that a thing is said to
power of God is infinite. Therefore human nature is not
be assumable according to some fitness for such a union.
more capable of being assumed than any other creature.
Now this fitness in human nature may be taken from two
Objection 2. Further, likeness is the foundation of
things, viz. according to its dignity, and according to its
the fittingness of the Incarnation of the Divine Person, as
need. According to its dignity, because human nature, as
above stated (q. 3, a. 8). But as in rational creatures we
being rational and intellectual, was made for attaining to
find the likeness of image, so in irrational creatures we
the Word to some extent by its operation, viz. by know-
find the image of trace. Therefore the irrational creature
ing and loving Him. According to its need—because it
was as capable of assumption as human nature.
stood in need of restoration, having fallen under original
Objection 3. Further, in the angelic nature we find
sin. Now these two things belong to human nature alone.
a more perfect likeness than in human nature, as Gregory
For in the irrational creature the fitness of dignity is want-
says: (Hom. de Cent. Ovib.; xxxiv in Ev.), where he intro-
ing, and in the angelic nature the aforesaid fitness of need
duces Ezech. 28:12: “Thou wast the seal of resemblance.”
is wanting. Hence it follows that only human nature was
And sin is found in angels, even as in man, according
assumable.
to Job 4:18: “And in His angels He found wickedness.”
Reply to Objection 1. Creatures are said to be “such”
Therefore the angelic nature was as capable of assump-
with reference to their proper causes, not with reference to
tion as the nature of man.
what belongs to them from their first and universal causes;
Objection 4. Further, since the highest perfection be-
thus we call a disease incurable, not that it cannot be cured
longs to God, the more like to God a thing is, the more
by God, but that it cannot be cured by the proper princi-
perfect it is. But the whole universe is more perfect than
ples of the subject. Therefore a creature is said to be not
its parts, amongst which is human nature. Therefore the
assumable, not as if we withdrew anything from the power
whole universe is more capable of being assumed than hu-
of God, but in order to show the condition of the creature,
man nature.
which has no capability for this.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 8:31) by the mouth
Reply to Objection 2. The likeness of image is found
of Begotten Wisdom: “My delights were to be with the
in human nature, forasmuch as it is capable of God, viz.
children of men”; and hence there would seem some fit-
by attaining to Him through its own operation of knowl-
2107
edge and love. But the likeness of trace regards only a personality be destroyed, and this does not befit the in-representation by Divine impression, existing in the crea-
corruptibility of their nature nor the goodness of the one
ture, and does not imply that the irrational creature, in
assuming, to Whom it does not belong to corrupt any per-
which such a likeness is, can attain to God by its own op-
fection in the creature assumed. But this would not seem
eration alone. For what does not come up to the less, has
totally to disprove the fitness of the angelic nature for be-
no fitness for the greater; as a body which is not fitted to
ing assumed. For God by producing a new angelic nature
be perfected by a sensitive soul is much less fitted for an
could join it to Himself in unity of Person, and in this way
intellectual soul. Now much greater and more perfect is
nothing pre-existing would be corrupted in it. But as was
the union with God in personal being than the union by
said above, there is wanting the fitness of need, because,
operation. And hence the irrational creature which falls
although the angelic nature in some is the subject of sin,
short of the union with God by operation has no fitness to
their sin is irremediable, as stated above ( Ia, q. 64, a. 2).
be united with Him in personal being.
Reply to Objection 4. The perfection of the universe
Reply to Objection 3. Some say that angels are not
is not the perfection of one person or suppositum, but of
assumable, since they are perfect in their personality from
something which is one by position or order, whereof very
the beginning of their creation, inasmuch as they are not
many parts are not capable of assumption, as was said
subject to generation and corruption; hence they cannot
above. Hence it follows that only human nature is capable
be assumed to the unity of a Divine Person, unless their
of being assumed.
Whether the Son of God assumed a person?
IIIa q. 4 a. 2
Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God as-
which case it was useless; or it remains after the union—
sumed a person. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
and thus there would be two persons, one assuming and
iii, 11) that the Son of God “assumed human nature ‘in
the other assumed, which is false, as was shown above
atomo,’ ” i.e. in an individual. But an individual in ratio-
(q. 2, a. 6). Hence it follows that the Son of God nowise
nal nature is a person, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab.
assumed a human person.
Nat.). Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.
Reply to Objection 1. The Son of God assumed hu-
Objection 2. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
man nature “in atomo,” i.e. in an individual, which is no
iii, 6) that the Son of God “assumed what He had sown in
other than the uncreated suppositum, the Person of the
our nature.” But He sowed our personality there. There-
Son of God. Hence it does not follow that a person was
fore the Son of God assumed a person.
assumed.
Objection 3. Further, nothing is absorbed unless it ex-
Reply to Objection 2. Its proper personality is not
ist. But Innocent III∗ says in a Decretal that “the Person
wanting to the nature assumed through the loss of any-
of God absorbed the person of man.” Therefore it would
thing pertaining to the perfection of the human nature but
seem that the person of man existed previous to its being
through the addition of something which is above human
assumed.
nature, viz. the union with a Divine Person.
On the contrary, Augustine† says (De Fide ad Petrum
Reply to Objection 3. Absorption does not here im-
ii) that “God assumed the nature, not the person, of man.”
ply the destruction of anything pre-existing, but the hin-
I answer that, A thing is said to be assumed inasmuch
dering what might otherwise have been. For if the human
as it is taken into another. Hence, what is assumed must be
nature had not been assumed by a Divine Person, the hu-
presupposed to the assumption, as what is moved locally
man nature would have had its own personality; and in
is presupposed to the motion. Now a person in human
this way is it said, although improperly, that the Person
nature is not presupposed to assumption; rather, it is the
“absorbed the person,” inasmuch as the Divine Person by
term of the assumption, as was said (q. 3, Aa. 1,2). For if it
His union hindered the human nature from having its per-
were presupposed, it must either have been corrupted—in
sonality.
Whether the Divine Person assumed a man?
IIIa q. 4 a. 3
Objection 1. It would seem that the Divine Person
Christ. xi): “The Son of God assumed a man, and in him
assumed a man. For it is written (Ps. 64:5): “Blessed is
bore things human.”
he whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee,” which a
Objection 2. Further, the word “man” signifies a hu-
gloss expounds of Christ; and Augustine says (De Agone
man nature. But the Son of God assumed a human nature.
∗ Paschas. Diac., De Spiritu Sanct. ii
† Fulgentius
2108
Therefore He assumed a man.
said that the Son assumed a man, granted (as it must be,
Objection 3. Further, the Son of God is a man. But
in fact) that in Christ there is but one suppositum and one
He is not one of the men He did not assume, for with equal
hypostasis. But according to such as hold that there are
reason He would be Peter or any other man. Therefore He
two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, it may fittingly
is the man whom He assumed.
and properly be said that the Son of God assumed a man.
On the contrary, Is the authority of Felix, Pope and
Hence the first opinion quoted in Sent. iii, D. 6, grants
Martyr, which is quoted by the Council of Ephesus: “We
that a man was assumed. But this opinion is erroneous, as
believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary,
was said above (q. 2, a. 6).
because He is the Eternal Son and Word of God, and not
Reply to Objection 1. These phrases are not to be
a man assumed by God, in such sort that there is another
taken too literally, but are to be loyally explained, wher-
besides Him. For the Son of God did not assume a man,
ever they are used by holy doctors; so as to say that a man
so that there be another besides Him.”
was assumed, inasmuch as his nature was assumed; and
I answer that, As has been said above (a. 2), what is
because the assumption terminated in this—that the Son
assumed is not the term of the assumption, but is presup-
of God is man.
posed to the assumption. Now it was said (q. 3, Aa. 1,2)
Reply to Objection 2. The word “man” signifies hu-
that the individual to Whom the human nature is assumed
man nature in the concrete, inasmuch as it is in a supposi-
is none other than the Divine Person, Who is the term of
tum; and hence, since we cannot say a suppositum was
the assumption. Now this word “man” signifies human
assumed, so we cannot say a man was assumed.
nature, as it is in a suppositum, because, as Damascene
Reply to Objection 3. The Son of God is not the
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4,11), this word God signifies Him
man whom He assumed, but the man whose nature He
Who has human nature. And hence it cannot properly be
assumed.
Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from all IIIa q. 4 a. 4
individuals?
Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God ought
Therefore the Son of God did not assume human nature,
to have assumed human nature abstracted from all indi-
as it is separated from individuals.
viduals. For the assumption of human nature took place
I answer that, The nature of man or of any other sen-
for the common salvation of all men; hence it is said of
sible thing, beyond the being which it has in individuals,
Christ (1 Tim. 4:10) that He is “the Saviour of all men,
may be taken in two ways: first, as if it had being of itself,
especially of the faithful.” But nature as it is in individ-
away from matter, as the Platonists held; secondly, as ex-
uals withdraws from its universality. Therefore the Son
isting in an intellect either human or Divine. Now it can-
of God ought to have assumed human nature as it is ab-
not subsist of itself, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph.
stracted from all individuals.
vii, 26,27,29,51), because sensible matter belongs to the
Objection 2. Further, what is noblest in all things
specific nature of sensible things, and is placed in its defi-
ought to be attributed to God. But in every genus what
nition, as flesh and bones in the definition of man. Hence
is of itself is best. Therefore the Son of God ought to have
human nature cannot be without sensible matter. Nev-
assumed self-existing [per se] man, which, according to
ertheless, if human nature were subsistent in this way, it
Platonists, is human nature abstracted from its individu-
would not be fitting that it should be assumed by the Word
als. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed this.
of God. First, because this assumption is terminated in a
Objection 3. Further, human nature was not assumed
Person, and it is contrary to the nature of a common form
by the Son of God in the concrete as is signified by the
to be thus individualized in a person. Secondly, because
word “man,” as was said above (a. 3). Now in this way
to a common nature can only be attributed common and
it signifies human nature as it is in individuals, as is plain
universal operations, according to which man neither mer-
from what has been said (a. 3